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WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., TRUSTEE v. ROBERT

TREGLIA ET AL.

(AC 36474)

DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Flynn, Js.

Argued November 13, 2014—officially released March 17, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
Stamford-Norwalk, Genuario, J. [summary judgment;

motion to open]; Hon. Kevin Tierney, judge trial referee

[motion to cite in a party defendant; strict foreclosure]).

Ridgely W. Brown, with whom, on the brief, was

Benjamin Gershberg, forthe appellants (defendant Patrick Treglia et al.).

Zachary Grendi, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

FLYNN, J. The defendant Patrick A. Treglia and proposed intervenor Richard Treglia appeal from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court

in favor of the plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as

trustee.1 On appeal, Patrick Treglia claims that the trial

court improperly denied his motion to set aside the

default entered against him.2 Additionally, both Patrick

Treglia and Richard Treglia claim that the court improperly denied their motion to cite in Richard Treglia as a

party defendant. We reverse the judgment of the trial

court denying Patrick Treglia’s motion to set aside the

default and affirm the judgment denying the motion to

cite in Richard Treglia as a party defendant.3

This appeal arises out of the plaintiff’s attempt to

foreclose on certain real property located at 181 Fillow

Street in Norwalk. On April 25, 2011, the plaintiff instituted an action for foreclosure on the Norwalk property

in the Superior Court for the Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk.4 The plaintiff’s complaint alleged the following facts. The Norwalk property had previously been

owned by Edna N. Treglia. On August 29, 2002, Edna

Treglia and Robert C. Treglia executed a note in the

principal amount of $175,000 in favor of Option One

Mortgage Corporation. The note was secured by a mortgage on the Norwalk property. On August 30, 2002, a

quitclaim deed was recorded in the Norwalk land

records, by which Edna Treglia transferred the entire

interest in the Norwalk property to Robert Treglia.

Option One subsequently assigned the note and the

mortgage to the plaintiff. Edna Treglia died on July

5, 2003, and Robert B. Keyes was appointed as the

administrator of her estate.

The plaintiff further alleged in its complaint that the

note was in default and that it intended to accelerate the

balance due on the note and foreclose on the Norwalk

property. The plaintiff named Keyes, as the administrator of Edna Treglia’s estate, and Robert Treglia as defendants in the foreclosure action. By virtue of notices of

lis pendens recorded on July 17, 2003, September 16,

2003, and October 7, 2004, in the Norwalk land records,

the plaintiff also named Michael Treglia and Patrick

Treglia as party defendants who also claimed an interest

in the property.

Judgment for the plaintiff was ultimately rendered

against Keyes,Robert Treglia, and Michael Treglia. They

have not appealed from the judgment. Accordingly, the

remainder of this opinion will discuss only the relevant

facts and claims related to Patrick Treglia and Richard

Treglia, who did appeal.

After the plaintiff instituted its foreclosure action,

default was entered against Patrick Treglia for failure

to plead. On August 10, 2012, the plaintiff moved for

summary judgment. On November 5, 2012, Patrick Treg-
lia filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and an accompanying memorandum of

law. On that day, he also filed an answerto the plaintiff’s

complaint and a motion to set aside the default entered

against him forfailure to plead. Although Patrick Treglia

had filed an answer to the plaintiff’s complaint, the

clerk did not set aside the default. The court denied

Patrick Treglia’s motion to set aside the default and

granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

On January 11, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for

a judgment of strict foreclosure. The court rendered

judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff.

This appeal followed.

I

Patrick Treglia first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to set aside the default. He argues

that the court improperly conflated the plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment with a motion for judgment when it denied his motion to set aside the default

entered against him. He asserts that, pursuant to Practice Book § 17-32 (b), the court did not have discretion

over his motion and the clerk was required to set aside

the default when he filed his answer. We agree.

The following additional facts are necessary for our

review of this claim. On October 5, 2011, the plaintiff

filed a demand for disclosure of defense, pursuant to

Practice Book § 13-19, and a simultaneous motion for

default against Patrick Treglia for failure to plead. Practice Book § 13-19 states in relevant part: ‘‘In any action

to foreclose . . . in which there is an appearance by

an attorney for any defendant, the plaintiff may at any

time file and serve . . . a written demand that such

attorney present to the court . . . a writing signed by

the attorney stating whether he or she has reason to

believe and does believe that there exists a bona fide

defense to the plaintiff’s action and whether such

defense will be made, together with a general statement

of the nature or substance of such defense. If the defendant fails to disclose a defense within ten days of the

filing of such demand . . . the plaintiff may file a written motion that a default be entered against the defendant by reason of the failure of the defendant to disclose

a defense. . . .’’ Patrick Treglia did purport to disclose

a defense to the plaintiff’s foreclosure action pursuant

to § 13-19, but the clerk granted the plaintiff’s motion

to enter default against him.5

Particularly relevant to the issue before us, Practice

Book § 13-19 further states in relevant part: ‘‘If no disclosure of defense has been filed, the judicial authority

may order judgment upon default to be entered for the

plaintiff at the time the motion is heard or thereafter,

provided that in any event a separate motion for such

judgment has been filed.’’ Similarly, Practice Book § 17-

33 (b) states in relevant part: ‘‘Since the effect of a

default is to preclude the defendant from making any
further defense in the case so far as liability is concerned, the judicial authority, at or after the time it

renders the default . . . may also render judgment in

foreclosure cases . . . provided the plaintiff has also

made a motion for judgment . . . .’’

Practice Book § 17-32 (b), on the other hand, permits

a defaulted party to set aside the default under certain

circumstances. Practice Book § 17-32 (b) states in relevant part: ‘‘If a party who has been defaulted [for failure

to plead] . . . files an answer before a judgment after

default has been rendered by the judicial authority, the

clerk shall set aside the default. If a claim for a hearing

in damages or a motion for judgment has been filed,

the default may be set aside only by the judicial authority. . . .’’

On August 10, 2012, the plaintiff moved for summary

judgment. On November 5, 2012, using a ‘‘belt and suspenders’’ approach, Patrick Treglia filed an answer to

the plaintiff’s complaint and a motion to set aside the

default entered against him. In a memorandum of decision dated December 19, 2012, the court denied Patrick

Treglia’s motion to set aside the default and granted

the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

In its memorandum of decision, the court provided

the following explanation for its decision to deny Patrick Treglia’s motion to set aside the default: ‘‘The

defendant Patrick Treglia argues first that the default

must be opened as a matter of right because Connecticut Practice Book section 17-32 requires the clerk to

set aside a default entered for failure to plead if the

defaulted party files an answer before a judgment after

default has been rendered. However, the court finds

that it is the second sentence of section 17-32 (b) that

controls. ‘If a claim for [a] hearing [in] damages or a

motion for judgment has been filed, the default may be

set aside only by the judicial authority.’ In the case at

bar the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment

on August 11, 2012, almost three months before [Patrick

Treglia] filed his motion to open the default. . . .

Accordingly, the decision of whether or not to open

the default is one that is within the court’s discretion.

In determining whether or not to exercise that discretion the court is guided by Practice Book section 17-

42 which states ‘a motion to set aside a default when

no judgment has been rendered may be granted by the

judicial authority for good cause shown.’ . . . In the

instant case [Patrick Treglia] has offered no credible

justification for the failure to plead within the time

allowed by law, orforfailure to move to open the default

within a reasonable time thereafter.’’(Citation omitted.)

On January 9, 2013, Patrick Treglia filed a motion to

reargue the court’s decision on the plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment and his motion to set aside the

default. The court granted the motion to reargue. Patrick Treglia argued that, in denying his motion to set
aside the default, the court had improperly conflated a

motion for summary judgment with a motion for judgment and that, pursuant to Practice Book § 17-32 (b),

the clerk was required to set aside the default. In a

memorandum of decision dated February 13, 2013, the

court reaffirmed its decision granting the plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment and denying Patrick

Treglia’s motion to set aside the default. In its memorandum, the court stated: ‘‘In the case at bar the motion

for summary judgment would have the same effect

against the defaulted defendant as the motion for judgment. It was an appropriate procedure for the plaintiff

to follow in order to obtain a judgment against [Patrick

Treglia]. There does not seem to be any substantive

reasons as to why the filing of such a motion by the

plaintiff in an effort to bring the litigation to a conclusion should have any lesser impact than the motion for

judgment accompanied by an affidavit of debt.’’

(Emphasis added.) The court also cited Practice Book

§ 17-44, which states in relevant part: ‘‘In any action

. . . any party may move for a summary judgment at

any time . . . .’’

On appeal, Patrick Treglia argues that the court

improperly conflated a motion for summary judgment

with a motion for judgment for the purposes of Practice

Book § 17-32 (b). Essentially, he claims that the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, filed on August 10,

2012, was not a motion for judgment upon default as

required by Practice Book §§ 13-19, 17-32 (b), and 17-

33 (b) and therefore, pursuant to § 17-32 (b), the clerk

was required to set aside the default against him after

he filed his answer to the plaintiff’s complaint on

November 5, 2012. We agree.

We now turn to the applicable standard of review.

Ordinarily, ‘‘[a] motion to open and vacate a judgment

. . . is addressed to the [trial] court’s discretion, and

the action of the trial court will not be disturbed on

appeal unless it acted unreasonably and in clear abuse

of its discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Gillis v. Gillis, 214 Conn. 336, 340, 572 A.2d 323 (1990).

However, in the present case, Patrick Treglia does not

claim that the court abused its discretion. Rather, he

claims that the court did not have the authority to exercise its discretion at all over his motion. ‘‘Whether a

court has the power to exercise discretion at all is

governed by the statutes and the rules of practice.

Because we are concerned with the interpretation of

the rules of practice, which interpretation is controlled

by the same rules of construction as statutes . . . we

are dealing with a question of law rather than a question

of the discretion of the court.’’ (Citation omitted.) CAS

Construction Co. v. Dainty Rubbish Service, Inc., 60

Conn. App. 294, 299, 759 A.2d 555 (2000), cert. denied,

255 Conn. 928, 767 A.2d 101 (2001). Accordingly, our

review is plenary. See Friezo v. Friezo, 281 Conn. 166,

180, 914 A.2d 533 (2007) (‘‘statutory interpretation
involves a question of law over which we exercise plenary review’’).

The following principles of statutory interpretation

also apply to our review of rules of practice. CAS Construction Co. v. Dainty Rubbish Service, Inc., supra, 60

Conn. App. 299. ‘‘The process of statutory interpretation

involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case . . . .

When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective

is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of

the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case . . . .

In seeking to determine that meaning . . . [General

Statutes] § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of

the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.

If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,

extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall

not be considered. . . . We recognize that terms in a

statute are to be assigned their ordinary meaning, unless

context dictates otherwise . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 99–100, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010).

Furthermore, ‘‘ourrules of practice should be construed

harmoniously and not in a way that would render one

provision superfluous as a result of the existence of

another.’’ State v. Strickland, 243 Conn. 339, 347–48,

703 A.2d 109 (1997).

In accordance with § 1-2z, we first turn to the relevant

language of the rule of practice at issue, Practice Book

§ 17-32 (b), which states in relevant part: ‘‘If a party

who has been defaulted [for failure to plead] . . . files

an answer before a judgment after default has been

rendered by the judicial authority, the clerk shall set

aside the default. If a claim for a hearing in damages

or a motion for judgment has been filed, the default may

be set aside only by the judicial authority.’’ (Emphasis

added.) Looking to the text of Practice Book § 17-32

(b) and its relationship to the other rules of practice,

we must determine whether the term ‘‘motion for judgment,’’ as used in Practice Book § 17-32 (b) and applied

to the facts of this case, encompasses a motion for

summary judgment. We conclude that it does not.

In the present case, default was entered against Patrick Treglia for failure to plead—specifically for failure

to disclose a defense after the plaintiff filed a demand

for such disclosure pursuant to Practice Book § 13-19

on October 5, 2011. Section 13-19 sets forth the appropriate procedure by which a plaintiff may obtain judgment in foreclosure actions in which a defendant has

failed to disclose a defense. Pursuant to § 13-19, when

a defendant fails to disclose a defense, the plaintiff

may file a motion for default to be entered against
the defendant and ‘‘the judicial authority may order

judgment upon default to be entered for the plaintiff

at the time the motion is heard or thereafter, provided

that in either event a separate motion for such judgment

has been filed. The motions for default and judgment

upon default may be served and filed simultaneously

but shall be separate motions.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Practice Book § 13-19 specifically requires a motion

for judgment upon default when a defendant has been

defaulted for failure to disclose a defense in a foreclosure action. The plaintiff in the present case, however,

filed a motion for summary judgment. A motion for

judgment upon default and a motion for summary judgment are different motions. ‘‘A judgment upon default

. . . is the final judgment in the case which is entered

after [a] default and after a hearing in damages.’’ Automotive Twins, Inc. v. Klein, 138 Conn. 28, 33, 82 A.2d

146 (1951). Thus, a judgment upon default is necessarily

predicated on a default by one of the parties to the

action for failure to appear or for failure to plead. Summary judgment, on the other hand, is typically sought

when all the parties have appeared and filed pleadings

and, pursuant to Practice Book § 17-49, is properly rendered when ‘‘the pleadings, affidavits and any other

proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.’’

The limited case law on this issue indicates that summary judgment is not appropriate when the nonmoving

party is in default. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.

v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 295 n.12, 596 A.2d 414 (1991)

(declining to address claim that summary judgment

should have been granted against one defendant

because ‘‘a valid default judgment had already been

rendered against him at the time that the plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment was denied’’); Deutsche

Bank National Trust Co. v. Ayers, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-08-5009166-

S, 2011 WL 2611806, *5 (June 7, 2011) (holding that, ‘‘to

obtain judgment on the basis of default, a party must

file a motion for judgment upon default . . . rather

than a motion for summary judgment’’); Merrill Lynch

Equity Access v. Cooper, Superior Court, Docket No.

228981, 1996 WL 88088, *4 (February 5, 1996) (noting

that ‘‘[a] motion for summary judgment cannot be

treated as a motion for judgment upon the default’’);

Ciccarello v. Cahill, Superior Court, judicial district of

Middlesex, Docket No. 65497 (August 26, 1992)(7 Conn.

L. Rptr. 263) (denying motion for summary judgment

because, when defendant is in default, ‘‘the proper

course of action forthe plaintiff is to move forjudgment

upon default . . . rather than to move for summary

judgment’’); see also W. Horton & K. Knox, 1 Connecticut Practice Series: Superior Court Civil Rules (2014-

2015 Ed.) § 13-19, author’s comment, p. 723 (‘‘[a] motion

for summary judgment after default is not appro-
priate’’).

We recognize that Practice Book § 17-44 permits a

party ‘‘to move for a summary judgment at any time’’

in any action. However, we are required to construe

our rules of practice in a way that does not ‘‘render

one provision superfluous as a result of the existence

of another.’’ State v. Strickland, supra, 243 Conn. 347–

48. To permit a motion for summary judgment in place

of a motion for judgment upon default for the purposes

of Practice Book §§ 13-19, 17-32 (b), and 17-33 (b) would

render § 13-19 meaningless. It would not be necessary to

have § 13-19 establish a specific procedure for obtaining

judgment through a motion for judgment upon default

in a foreclosure action when the defendant is in default

if a motion for summary judgment would suffice.

The plaintiff argues that ‘‘there is no reason courts

should distinguish between motions for judgment and

motions for summary judgment in this context.’’ We

disagree. Practice Book § 17-32 (b) states that, until

a ‘‘motion for judgment’’ is filed by the plaintiff, the

defendant has the right to file an answer and have his

default automatically set aside. If we were to dispose

of the distinction between a motion for judgment and

a motion for summary judgment, we would restrict the

defendant’s ability to open a default and have the case

heard on the merits. It is ‘‘our expressed policy preference to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute

whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day

in court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola

v. Coppola, 243 Conn. 657, 665, 707 A.2d 281 (1998).

Section 17-32 (b) unequivocally states, and provides

notice to litigants, that a motion forjudgment is required

in order to cut off the defendant’s right to automatically

open a default. The plaintiff in the present case chose

to file a motion for summary judgment and, therefore,

Patrick Treglia retained his right to file an answer to

the plaintiff’s complaint and have his default automatically set aside by the clerk.

We conclude that, under the facts of the present case,

a ‘‘motion for judgment’’ for the purposes of § 17-32 (b)

does not encompass a motion for summary judgment.

We further conclude that, because Patrick Treglia filed

an answer to the plaintiff’s complaint and the plaintiff

never filed a motion for judgment upon default, the

clerk, pursuant to § 17-32 (b), was required to set aside

the default entered against Patrick Treglia, and there

was no need for judicial discretion to be employed.

Once the default was opened, the court did not have

discretion over Patrick Treglia’s motion to set aside the

default and improperly denied it. The judgment of strict

foreclosure against Patrick Treglia must be reversed

and the clerk must set aside the default against him.

II

Patrick Treglia and Richard Treglia claim that the
trial court improperly denied their motion to cite in

Richard Treglia as a party defendant. We disagree. The

following additional facts are necessary for our resolution of this claim. On February 13, 2013, Richard Treglia

filed a motion to intervene in the plaintiff’s foreclosure

action. In his motion, Richard Treglia alleged that he

had an interest in the Norwalk property that would be

affected by the outcome of the foreclosure action. The

plaintiff objected to the motion to intervene and the

court sustained the objection. Thereafter, Patrick Treglia and Richard Treglia filed a motion to cite in Richard

Treglia as a party defendant.6

In their motion, they

argued that ‘‘[t]he court must exercise its discretionary

authority under [General Statutes] § 52-107 to add Richard Treglia as a party Defendant because a ‘complete

determination (of the case) cannot be had’ . . . without his inclusion because he is a part owner of the real

property that is at issue in this foreclosure action.’’ The

court denied the motion to cite in Richard Treglia as a

party defendant. The court articulated several reasons

for denying the motion, the first of which was that it

had not been properly certified to all parties of record.

On appeal, Patrick Treglia and Richard Treglia argue

that, pursuant to § 52-107, the court is required to allow

a party to intervene if that party has a direct and immediate interest in the subject matter of the action. They

further argue that Richard Treglia has a direct and

immediate interest in the foreclosure action because

he owns an interest in the Norwalk property.

The court denied the motion to cite in Richard Treglia

because it had not been properly certified to all parties

of record. The court did not err when it denied the

motion on this ground. See Leftridge v. Wiggins, 136

Conn. App. 238, 245, 44 A.3d 217 (2012) (holding that

trial court improperly acted on state’s motion to modify

when defendant had not been served with copy of

motion). On appeal, Patrick Treglia and Richard Treglia

argue that, despite their failure to properly certify the

motion, the court should have acted sua sponte to

include Richard Treglia as a party to the foreclosure

action because he owns an interest in the Norwalk

property. We are not persuaded.

General Statutes § 9-18 states in relevant part: ‘‘The

judicial authority may determine the controversy as

between the parties before it, if it can do so without

prejudice to the rights of others . . . . If a person not

a party has an interest or title which the judgment will

affect, the judicial authority, on its motion, shall direct

that person to be made a party.’’ This section permits

the court, on its own motion, to make a person a party

to an action, as Patrick Treglia and Richard Treglia

argue the court should have done in the present case.

However, the court is only required to direct that a

person be made a party if an interest or title of such

person will be affected by the judgment.
‘‘It is well settled that those having an interest in

real property who are not joined as parties in litigation

affecting that property will not be bound by the court’s

judgment.’’ Loricco Towers Condominium Assn. v.

Pantani, 90 Conn. App. 43, 49, 876 A.2d 1211, cert.

denied, 276 Conn. 925, 888 A.2d 93 (2005); see also Gill

v. Shimelman, 180 Conn. 568, 571, 430 A.2d 1292 (1980)

(noting that tenants of buildings served by sewage disposal system would not be bound by judgment in action

against development company to correct system

because tenants were not joined as parties). Accordingly, if a party owning an interest in foreclosed real

estate was not a party to the foreclosure action, he

is not bound by the judgment of foreclosure and the

foreclosing party cannot enforce it against him. In the

present case, the court was not required to direct that

Richard Treglia be made a party to the foreclosure

action because Richard Treglia, as an omitted party,

would not be affected by any judgment of foreclosure

the plaintiff might obtain.

Joinder of Richard Treglia was not mandatory in this

case.7 General Statutes § 49-30 expressly states that a

judgment of foreclosure against parties owning an interest in the foreclosed property will not be affected if

some other parties having an interest in the property

are omitted from the foreclosure action. General Statutes § 49-30 states in relevant part: ‘‘When a mortgage

. . . on real estate has been foreclosed and one or more

parties owning any interest in . . . such real estate

. . . has been omitted . . . all other parties foreclosed

by the foreclosure judgment shall be bound thereby as

fully as if no such omission . . . had occurred . . . .

Such omission or failure to properly foreclose such

party . . . may be completely cured and cleared by

deed or foreclosure or other proper legal proceedings

to which the only necessary parties shall be the party

acquiring such foreclosure title . . . and the party . . .

not foreclosed . . . .’’ Accordingly, we conclude that

the court properly denied the motion to cite in Richard

Treglia as a party defendant and that it was not required

to make him a party on its own motion.

The judgment of strict foreclosure against Patrick

Treglia is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to set aside the default entered against him and

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff is the trustee for the Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-

6 Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2002-6.

2 Patrick Treglia titled his motion as a motion to open default. Because

a default, and not a judgment after default, was entered against Patrick

Treglia in this case, we refer to his motion as a motion to set aside the

default. Practice Book § 17-32 (b) states, in relevant part: ‘‘If a party who

has been defaulted [for failure to plead] . . . files an answer before a judgment after default has been rendered by the judicial authority, the clerk

shall set aside the default.’’

3 Patrick Treglia also claims that the court improperly rendered judgment
of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff. Because we conclude that the

court improperly denied Patrick Treglia’s motion to set aside the default,

and reverse the judgment in part on that ground, we do not reach this claim.

4

It is not disputed that the plaintiff commenced a prior foreclosure action

on the same property in 2006 and then withdrew it in 2011 after the court

denied its third motion for a continuance.

5 Patrick Treglia does not challenge this entry of default by the clerk.

6 Robert Treglia joined this motion.

7

Joinder of a necessary party is mandatory when that party’s due process

rights are implicated in the action. See 98 Lords Highway, LLC v. One

Hundred Lords Highway, LLC, 138 Conn. App. 776, 786, 54 A.3d 232 (2012).

Even if we assume, without deciding, that Richard Treglia is a necessary

party to the plaintiff’s foreclosure action, he has not shown that the plaintiff’s

or the court’s failure to join him as a party will infringe on his due process

rights. Furthermore, the omission of Richard Treglia as a defendant in the

plaintiff’s action does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

Lack of a necessary party implicates subject matter jurisdiction only when

a statute mandates the naming and serving of that party. See Fong v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 212 Conn. 628, 637–38, 563 A.2d 293 (1989);

Yellow Cab Co. of New London & Groton,Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 127

Conn. App. 170, 176–77, 13 A.3d 690, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 908, 19 A.3d

178 (2011). There is no such statute in the present case.