United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-50210

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Armando Sauseda, Sr., 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:09-CR-252-1

Before Dennis, Elrod, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: *

Armando Sauseda, Sr. is serving a life sentence for murder and an 87-

month sentence for drug trafficking. Sauseda suffers from obesity, asthma, 

and severe hypertension—three conditions which significantly increase the 

risk of hospitalization and death from COVID-19. In January 2021, Sauseda 

filed a motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 1, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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This provision allows a court to modify a sentence of imprisonment after

considering the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and finding 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” that warrant modification of the 

sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Sauseda argued that his increased 

risk of contracting a serious case of COVID-19 while confined at USP 

Coleman II was an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting his 

release. The district court denied Sauseda’s motion. In a four-sentence

order, the court stated in relevant part only: “After considering the 

applicable factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the applicable policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, the Court DENIES the 

Defendant’s Motions [sic] on its merits.” The court did not discuss its 

weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, nor indicate whether it found Sauseda’s 

risk of contracting COVID-19 an extraordinary and compelling reason.

Sauseda appealed. This Court reviews a denial of a motion for 

compassionate release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambliss, 948 

F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). However, we cannot say whether a district 

court abused its discretion when an order does not contain reasons explaining 

how it exercised its discretion. Therefore, we VACATE the district court’s 

order denying Sauseda’s motion for compassionate release and REMAND

for reconsideration consistent with this opinion below.

I.

We have previously said that a “district court must provide specific 

factual reasons, including but not limited to due consideration of the 

§ 3553(a) factors, for its decision” on a motion for compassionate release. Id.

As the word “must” indicates, this is a mandatory requirement. The need 

for specific factual reasonsisin part due to the standard of review that a court 

of appeals applies to a district court’s sentencing decisions. Id. The abuse of 

discretion standard is highly deferential, but it “does not preclude an 

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appellate court’s correction of a district court’s legal or factual error.”

Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2 (2014). 

A legal or factual error must be identifiable by the appellate court in order for 

appellate review, even deferential appellate review, to be meaningful. This 

not only delivers litigants their statutory rights to an appeal, but it also allows 

the appellate court to articulate usable standards for the district courts to 

employ in the first instance. Additionally, it allows us to corral stray decisions 

so as “to promote uniformity in sentencing imposed by different federal 

courts for similar criminal conduct.” Hughes v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 

138 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our Court’s standard of review is not the only basis for a district 

court’s obligation to provide reasons. There are also institutional reasons. A 

thorough explanation of the district court’s sentencing decision “promote[s] 

the perception of fair sentencing.” United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 

F.3d 357, 362 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50

(2007)). As the Supreme Court recently reiterated in the context of a 

sentencing modification motion, a judge’s obligation to explain her decision 

“reflects sound judicial practice. Judicial decisions are reasoned decisions. 

Confidence in a judge’s use of reason underlies the public’s trust in the 

judicial institution. A public statement of those reasons helps provide the 

public with the assurance that creates that trust.” Chavez-Meza v. United 

States, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1964 (2018) (quoting Rita v. United 

States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). When a district court renders a decision 

without explanation, it raises questions whether the judge acted arbitrarily,

unconstrained by law and without due consideration of the parties’ 

arguments. 

Of course, the obligation to provide reasons is not an obligation to 

write a full opinion for every decision:

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The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when 

to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances. Sometimes a 

judicial opinion responds to every argument; sometimes it does not; 

sometimes a judge simply writes the word “granted” or “denied” on 

the face of a motion while relying upon context and the parties’ prior 

arguments to make the reasons clear. The law leaves much, in this 

respect, to the judge’s own professional judgment.

Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. So too can the district court record leave much for the 

judgment of the appellate court. When a decision is rendered after a hearing, 

the record of the hearing may be sufficient to show that the district court 

considered the evidence and the parties’ arguments. This may suffice to 

show the district court’s reasoning, and further written elaboration in some 

particular cases may be unnecessary. See Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d at

362–64 (reviewing cases where record of hearing did, and did not, suffice). 

Similarly, in the context of sentencing reconsideration decisions, the judge 

deciding the motion to modify or reduce a sentence may often be the same 

judge who originally sentenced the defendant. See Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at

1967. When this happens, it may be inferable from the original sentencing 

decision how the judge weighed the § 3553(a) factors in a subsequent motion 

for compassionate release. Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 

1113–14 (6th Cir. 2020). However, when the record lacks any basis for 

inference and the district court’s order provides no explanation, there is little 

the appellate court can do to ascertain the judge’s reasons for her decision

but to remand the case for further proceedings.

Thus, “specific factual reasons” for a district court’s decision are 

required, whether written in the order itself or reasonably inferable from the 

record. Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693. 

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II.

Turning to the order in this case, the district court’s order denying 

Sauseda’s motion for compassionate release contains no articulated reasons 

for its decision. It simply declares that, after considering the applicable 

statutory factors and policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, it was 

denying Sauseda’s motion “on its merits.” Sauseda’s motion was decided 

on the papers without a hearing, as is often the case, and the Government did 

not object or otherwise file any response. The judge deciding the motion was 

not the judge who originally sentenced Sauseda. There is thus nothing in the 

record on appeal to illumine how the district court determined that Sauseda’s 

motion should be denied other than the bare conclusions of the order. 

As mentioned above, a motion for compassionate release requires 

both a consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and a determination whether

extraordinary and compelling reasons for release exist.

1 These are two 

independent requirements, and a finding of one without the other does not 

1 We have noted that Congress neither defined, nor provided examples of 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons.” United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 391 (5th 

Cir. 2021). “Instead, it delegated that authority to the Sentencing Commission,” which 

has provided guidelines for compassionate release motions made by the Bureau of Prisons, 

but not those made by federal prisoners themselves. Id.at 391–92. The Sentencing 

Commission itself has noted that the absence of an applicable policy statement has led to 

considerable variability in how courts decide these motions. See U.S. Sentencing 

Comm’n, Compassionate Release: The Impact of the First Step Act 

and COVID-19 Pandemic 4 (Mar. 2022). Yet no guidance appears likely to be 

forthcoming as “the Commission currently lacks a quorum of voting members.” United 

States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020). Instead, we have suggested that a 

district court may look to the non-binding policy statement at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and its 

commentary to “inform[] [the court’s] analysis as to what reasons may be sufficiently 

‘extraordinary and compelling’ to merit compassionate release.” United States v. 

Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 2021). A district court is free, of course, to deviate 

from the examples discussed in this policy statement. United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283, 

288 (5th Cir. 2021).

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entitle the movant to relief. Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693. Here, we cannot tell 

if, in the district court’s eyes, Sauseda failed to meet one, the other, or both 

requirements for compassionate release. In fact, it is not even clear that the 

district court asked itself whether Sauseda’s susceptibility to COVID-19 

constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting release.2

Especially given the unsettled state of the law around whether the COVID19 pandemic uniquely presents extraordinary and compelling reasons for 

compassionate release, see United States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 434 (5th 

Cir. 2021), appellate review of a district court’s decision for legal or clear 

factual errors is critical. But we cannot provide that on an order that fails to 

present the reasons for the district court’s decision.

For these reasons we VACATE the district court’s order denying 

Sauseda’s motion for compassionate release and REMAND for 

reconsideration consistent with this opinion.

2 The district court’s order notes that the court considered “the applicable policy 

statements,” which could refer to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s “extraordinary and compelling” 

provision for release. Perhaps this could mean the court did analyze whether Sauseda’s 

motion presented an extraordinary and compelling reason, as required by 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c). But we hesitate to assume that it does. Strictly speaking, these policy statements 

are not applicable to Sauseda’s motion. See Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 393. It is not clear then 

what the district court’s order means when it refers to “applicable policy statements.” 

More generally, the Sentencing Guidelines contain numerous policy statements ranging 

widely in subject matter. It is not appropriate for an appellate court to guess what law the 

district court applied when it is charged with the duty of reviewing for legal error.

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