In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-1239 

STEVEN KAILIN, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

VILLAGE OF GURNEE and DELANTE GREER, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:19-cv-05188 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 6, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 8, 2023 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Steven and Kim Kailin called the 

Village of Gurnee Police Department to report that their 

daughter, Taylor, had been the victim of possible criminal 

conduct. Officer Delante Greer arrived at their house around 

8 p.m. on July 26, 2019, to follow up on the report. Six seconds 

after Kim opened the door, Officer Greer shot the Kailins’ 

dog, Timber, on their neighbor’s lawn. The Kailins sued Officer Greer and the Village of Gurnee, Illinois, naming 
2 No. 22-1239 

multiple theories of liability, but the only surviving claims in 

this court are the one for illegal seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against Officer Greer,1 a claim of municipal liability under 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and a claim 

for indemnification by the Village.2 The district court granted 

the defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment. 

Ordinarily we would begin our de novo review of a grant 

of a motion for summary judgment with a recitation of the 

facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Smith 

v. Crounse Corp., 72 F. 4th 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2023). In this case, 

however, the lens through which the district court viewed the 

facts was influenced both by procedural processes and by 

summary judgment case law. Consequently, we will articulate the facts in more detail as we move through the procedural and summary judgment terrain. 

1 The killing of a pet constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the 

Fourth Amendment, and the use of deadly force against the pet is reasonable only if the pet poses an immediate danger and the use of force is unavoidable. Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2008). 

2 The plaintiffs-appellants’ only discussion regarding indemnification 

is one sentence at the end of their brief which states, “Likewise, summary 

judgment on Plaintiffs’ indemnification count must also be reversed 

where the unreasonable seizure and Monell claims are reversed.” Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief at 22. This argument likely has been waived, but in 

any event, it is not necessary to resolve the issue given our conclusions 

here. Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 898 (7th Cir. 

2018) (“Arguments that consist of conclusory allegations that are not 

properly developed are waived.”). 
No. 22-1239 3

A. The statement of undisputed material facts 

The district court judge in this case, Judge Ellis, has procedural requirements regarding the submission of facts for summary judgment motions. She requires parties to confer and 

then “file a joint statement of undisputed material facts that 

the parties agree are not in dispute” separately from the memoranda of law. Defendants-Appellees’ Short Appendix at 28 

(emphasis omitted). Kailin argues that those procedures are 

inconsistent with Local Rule 56.1 of the Northern District of 

Illinois, and thus invalid. This court has previously reviewed 

Judge Ellis’ requirement to file a joint motion of undisputed 

facts and found her required procedures to be consistent with 

both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) and the Northern 

District of Illinois’ Local Rule 56.1. Chicago Studio Rental, Inc. 

v. Ill. Dep’t of Com., 940 F.3d 971, 982 (7th Cir. 2019); Sweatt v. 

Union Pac. RR. Co., 796 F.3d 701, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015). Like 

the previous panels to consider the issue, we find no fault in 

those required processes. See Sweatt, 796 F.3d at 711–12. 

Our conclusion still leaves us with a factual knot to disentangle. The district court’s procedural requirement states that 

“the parties may not file—and the court will not consider—

separate documents of undisputed facts.” Defendants-Appellees’ Short Appendix at 28–29. The other relevant portions of 

the court’s procedural requirements are as follows: 

If the parties cannot agree whether proposed 

statements of fact are not in dispute, they may 

file a joint motion prior to filing the motion for 

summary judgment so the Court can determine 

whether there is a basis for the alleged disputes. 

... Parties should provide the Court with sufficient time to rule on factual disputes before 
4 No. 22-1239 

summary judgment motions are due. Failure to 

stipulate to an undisputed fact without a reasonable basis for doing so may result in the 

statement being admitted and/or the imposition 

of sanctions. ... 

If the non-moving party wholly refuses to join 

in the joint statement of undisputed material 

facts, the moving party will nevertheless be permitted to file the motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a separate declaration of 

counsel explaining why a joint statement of the 

undisputed facts was not filed. 

The Local Rules and the Court’s procedures 

are not mere technicalities. Failure to abide by 

any of them, especially the joint statement requirement, will result in the Court striking 

briefs, disregarding statements of fact, deeming statements of facts admitted, denying summary judgment, and/or imposing sanctions. 

Id. (emphasis in original).

The defendants were the first to run up against (and thus 

to be reminded of) the district court’s procedures, when they 

filed their summary judgment motion along with their own 

separate statement of material facts. The district court judge 

struck the filings for failing to comply with the court’s procedures, and ordered the parties to meet and confer on a joint 

statement of facts as required by those procedures. She then 

set the due date for defendants’ motion for summary judgment for Monday, August 9, 2021. Defendants’ counsel sent a 

proposed “Joint Statement of Material Facts” to the Kailins’ 
No. 22-1239 5

counsel on July 15, 2021. Between July 15 and the due date for 

the statement, defendants’ counsel sent many emails imploring the Kailins’ counsel to respond to the proposed statement 

of material facts, all the while extending the requested response date and beseeching opposing counsel to respond 

quickly. On Thursday, August 5, defendants’ counsel emailed 

plaintiffs’ counsel to say that with the Monday deadline looming, and no response to date, “there is not enough time to present any points of disagreement to the Court. As such, I will 

be filing a statement of material facts and providing a separate 

declaration as to why we were unable to file a joint statement 

of material facts to the Court as outlined in Judge Ellis’ standing orders.” R. 79-6 at 3. At noon on Friday—one business day 

before the joint statement of material facts was due—the Kailins’ counsel finally responded, inserting objections to most of 

the defendants’ proposed facts. Defendants’ counsel replied 

that the response had arrived too late for either negotiation or 

to bring the disputes before the judge, and consequently, she 

would be filing the defendants’ statement of material facts 

with a declaration as described in the Thursday e-mail. This 

is, in fact, how the defendants proceeded. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, however, 

mistakenly stated that “[t]o date, Plaintiffs’ counsel has made 

no substantive response to Defendant’s correspondence or its 

Joint Statement of Material Facts.” R. 77 at 2. This was not 

true, as plaintiffs’ counsel had indeed responded, but had 

done so just five hours before the close of business on the last 

business day before the joint statement was due. The simultaneously-filed declaration was more accurate and clear, stating, “I did not receive a substance [sic] response from Plaintiffs’ counsel in time to properly negotiate the proposed Joint 

Statement of Material Facts in this matter and the Kailin v 
6 No. 22-1239 

Metcalf 19-cv-04703 matter.”3 R. 79 at 4. In the summary judgment reply brief, defendants’ counsel stated that the language 

in the opening summary judgment brief had been an oversight as she was simultaneously filing a similar statement for 

the other case referenced in counsel’s declaration. Defendants’ counsel explained that she had intended to say, “To 

date, Plainttifs’ counsel has made no timely substantive response to Defendants’ correspondence or their Joint Statement of Material Facts.” R. 86 at 2 (emphasis in original). 

In the opinion and order granting the defendants’ summary judgment motion, the district court commented on the 

joint statement hullabaloo as follows: 

The Court derives the facts set forth in this section from Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. Steven, 

Kim, and Taylor failed to participate in the 

drafting of a joint statement of undisputed facts, 

as required by the Court’s summary judgment 

procedures. Because the Court’s procedures are 

not advisory and Steven, Kim, and Taylor failed 

to abide by them, the Court finds it appropriate 

to treat Defendants’ facts as established. See

N.D. Ill. LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) (“All material facts set 

forth in the statement required of the moving 

party will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing 

party.”); Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGo, Inc., 

3 The Kailins had two unrelated matters against the Village pending 

before the same district court judge at the same time with the same filing 

deadlines. See Kailin v. Metcalf, 19-cv-04703 (N.D. Ill.). 
No. 22-1239 7

919 F.3d 405, 411 (7th Cir. 2019) (“According to 

well-established Seventh Circuit law, that noncompliance [with the court’s summary judgment procedures] meant that the district court 

could exercise its discretion to accept Kreg’s 

statements of fact as undisputed.”). As for Steven, Kim, and Taylor’s additional facts, the 

Court considers them to the extent they actually 

create a disputed fact and are appropriately presented and supported, disregarding any statements that rely solely on hearsay evidence. The 

Court takes the facts in the light most favorable 

to Steven, Kim, and Taylor, the non-movants. 

R. 88 at 2 n.2; D. Ct. Op. at 2 n.2. 

It is not clear whether the district court missed the details 

in the declaration and the correction in the reply brief, or 

whether the judge considered plaintiffs’ eleventh-hour response to be the equivalent of a failure to participate. After 

all, even if plaintiffs’ counsel had overlooked the court’s rule 

or had any misunderstanding about it at the get-go, on July 

12, after the defendants’ gaffe, the court ordered both parties 

“to meet and confer regarding the motion for summary judgment and file a joint statement of facts.” R. 74. The Kailins had 

not met and conferred with the defendants at all, and certainly not with enough time to submit factual disputes to the 

court before the deadline, as required by the court’s procedures. A district court would be well within reason to construe plaintiffs’ response submitted five hours before the close 

of business the day before the due date as a violation of that 

order and the court’s procedures. We review a trial court’s 

decisions regarding strict compliance with local rules for an 
8 No. 22-1239 

abuse of discretion only. Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 

F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a district court 

has discretion to strictly enforce local rules, including by 

deeming a party’s facts admitted); Johnson v. Edward Orton, Jr. 

Ceramic Found., 71 F.4th 601, 611 n.13 (7th Cir. 2023) (same). 

In the end, the district court judge did, at the least, take 

note of the Kailins’ theory of the case, stating that the plaintiffs “argue that Timber never barked nor growled at Greer 

and cite to their testimony in which they testified that Timber 

was simply playing.” R. 88 at 9; D. Ct. Op. at 9. But, as we 

discuss next, it did not matter which version of the facts the 

district court accepted, because the court concluded that the 

video from the body worn camera controlled and eliminated 

any dispute of fact. 

B. The role of the video evidence 

The district court anchored its conclusion about the video 

evidence to the Supreme Court’s message in Scott v. Harris, 

550 U.S. 372 (2007), that facts need only be taken in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party where there is a “genuine” dispute as to those facts. Id. at 380. “When opposing 

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for 

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

In the case of Scott, the Court found that a video showing the 

plaintiff driving erratically during a high-speed chase provided irrefutable evidence that the plaintiff posed an imminent threat to others. Id. at 380. Applying Scott, we have concluded that “a video record of the events at issue can evaporate any factual dispute that would otherwise exist.” United 

States v. Norville, 43 F.4th 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2022). In light of 
No. 22-1239 9

Scott, the district court determined that the footage the body 

worn camera governed the findings of fact in this case and 

that no reasonable jury could therefore believe the Kailins’ 

version of events. 

Video evidence, however, can eviscerate a factual dispute 

only when the video is so definitive that there could be no 

reasonable disagreement about what the video depicts. Scott, 

550 U.S. at 380. It is a “narrow, pragmatic exception allowing 

appellants to contest the district court’s determination that 

material facts are genuinely disputed,” but only where the 

video “utterly discredit[s]” the non-movant’s version of the 

facts. Gant v. Hartman, 924 F.3d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 2019). Gant

further explained that 

Scott does not hold that courts should reject a 

plaintiff’s account on summary judgment 

whenever documentary evidence, such as a 

video, offers some support for a governmental 

officer’s version of events. Instead, Scott holds 

that where the trial court’s determination that a 

fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly 

and demonstrably false, a court of appeals may 

say so, even on interlocutory review. 

Id. at 450 (internal citations omitted). It should be considered 

a rare case where video evidence leaves no room for interpretation by a fact finder. Id. (refusing to find that there was no 

material dispute of fact where the video did not provide irrefutable evidence of the movant’s version of the facts); see also 

Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 692 n. 56 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting 

that the Scott exception is a narrow and pragmatic one reserved only in cases where there is clear and irrefutable video 

evidence); Ferguson v. McDonough, 13 F.4th 574, 581 (7th Cir. 
10 No. 22-1239 

2021) (declining to apply the Scott exception where the video 

was open to interpretation and did not utterly discredit the 

plaintiff’s version of the facts); Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 

998 (7th Cir. 2021) (reversing a grant of summary judgment 

where reasonable jurors could have many different and opposing conclusions about what they saw in video evidence); 

McCottrell v. White, 933 F.3d 651, 661 n.9 (7th Cir. 2019) (declining to draw independent factual conclusions from a poorquality, black and white video lacking audio).4 

This is certainly not the rare case where the video definitively demonstrates what occurred. As a primary matter, 

there is no audio that could reveal whether Timber was 

growling or barking as Officer Greer alleged.5 See, e.g., McCottrell, 933 F.3d at 661 n.9; Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 

4 Moreover, the use of video evidence to discredit factual disputes at 

summary judgment should be rare because, as research has revealed, 

video images are seldom as unambiguous as they may appear. See, e.g.,

Morgan A. Birck, Do You See What I See? Problems with Juror Bias in Viewing 

Body-Camera Video Evidence, 24 Mich. J. Race & L. 153, 164 (2018); Naomi 

Mezey, The Image Cannot Speak for Itself: Film, Summary Judgment, and Visual 

Literacy, 48 Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 17 (2013); Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: 

The Bias We Overlook, 85 Ind. L.J. 1333, 1334 (2010); David Kessler, Justices 

in the Jury Box: Video Evidence and Summary Judgment in Scott v. Harris, 127 

S. Ct. 1769 (2007), 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 423, 434 (2008). 

For an interesting interactive first-hand display of how body camera 

video can be ambiguous, see Timothy Williams, et. al., Police Body Cameras: 

What Do You See?” N.Y.Times, Updated Apr. 1, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article®ion=Footer 

(archived at https://perma.cc/XSA4-5E7V) 

5 Officer Greer was disciplined for failing to turn on the audio portion 

of his body camera as required. R. 83-4 at 16 
No. 22-1239 11

F.3d 272, 277 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding that a soundless and 

poor-quality video does not clearly or blatantly contradict 

non-movant’s version of the events). Moreover, the entire 

video of the critical event lasts a mere six seconds and it is 

disputable whether the dog can be seen at any time in the 

video until she has been shot. Kim Kailin begins to open the 

door when the time stamp on the video reads 20:02:13 (from 

this point forward, we will use only the seconds). At 14 seconds the door is open wide and it does not seem as if there is 

a dog visible in the frame. By 15 seconds, it is possible to see 

what might be the blurry image of a dog coming from the 

back part of the house, but it is difficult to tell, and a reasonable juror might see different things in that inkblot of a blur.6

And because there is no audio during the critical portion of 

the video, a jury could not tell if Timber was barking or growling. Immediately, within that same second (at 15 seconds), Officer Greer turns and begins to run, and so, because the camera is mounted on his chest, the viewer can only see what is 

in front of him, which is the garden and the grass. There is no 

video of what the dog is doing, and, in fact, barring the possible blurry image of the dog in the back of the house for one 

second at the 15-second mark, there is no video of the dog at 

all until she has been shot and is on the ground at 19 seconds—6 seconds from when Kim first opened the door. Jurors 

6 The authoring judge of this opinion watched the video numerous 

times both in slow motion and stopping frame by frame, and the Judge’s 

law clerk did the same while projected on a 65” television screen and neither was able to determine if a dog was visible in the frame before Officer 

Greer turned and began running. Of course, such fact finding is not in an 

appellate court judge’s province. Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 

U.S. 709, 713–14 (1986) (it is a mistake for appellate courts to engage in fact 

finding). 
12 No. 22-1239 

could interpret many things from what they see or do not see 

in those six seconds. The video does not show barking or 

growling; it does not show nipping or biting; it does not show 

the dog jumping on Officer Greer; it does not show Officer 

Greer’s alleged attempt to use his taser; it does not even show 

the dog chasing Officer Greer.7

Without unambiguous video evidence, we are left with 

two conflicting versions of the facts. According to Officer 

Greer and the Village, Timber charged out to chase Officer 

Greer, barking and growling, and as she was running after 

Officer Greer she was nipping and attempting to bite him. The 

Kailins assert that their dog, who had no history of violence 

or aggression, merely ran after Officer Greer as any dog might 

do as part of play behavior once Officer Greer, due to his fear 

of dogs, took off running across the lawn.8 According to their 

version of the facts, as soon as Officer Greer saw the dog in 

the house, he threw up his hands and said “oh shit, you have 

a dog” and then suddenly turned and ran through a flower 

bed in the Kailins’ yard into the neighboring yard where he 

shot Timber. The Kailins also assert that had the Village 

7 The district court states, “the body worn camera also shows the actual chase.” R. 88 at 11 (D. Ct. Op. at 11). Although it appears from the 

movement of the camera that Officer Greer is running, we do not see any 

part of the dog chasing the officer. Of course, a jury could interpret the 

video differently. 

8 Officer Greer testified at his deposition that he also shot and killed a 

dog on January 3, 2019, while serving a citation in Round Lake, Illinois. R. 

83-5 at 8–9. Prior to that, while employed as an officer in North Chicago, 

Greer fired a warning shot from his service weapon into the ground to 

scare off a charging dog. Id. at 4–5. 
No. 22-1239 13

offered proper training on interactions with dogs, Timber 

would not have been killed. 

As we noted in Gupta, 

Where the material facts specifically averred by 

one party contradict the facts averred by a party 

moving for summary judgment, the motion 

must be denied. Lujan v. Natʹl Wildlife Fed’n, 497 

U.S. 871, 888 (1990). A court’s job on summary 

judgment is not to resolve swearing contests or 

decide which party’s facts are more likely true. 

Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003). 

These credibility disputes are for fact finders to 

resolve. Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 

972, 982 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Gupta, 19 F.4th at 996. 

We hold therefore that it was error for the district court to 

conclude that the video left no room for interpretation by a 

fact finder. And without conclusive video evidence, we have 

before us a textbook case of disputed facts. In short, the video 

does nothing to blatantly contradict either side’s story. 

Resolution of the question of what Timber was doing and 

how she was behaving is key to determining the reasonableness of Officer Greer’s actions and therefore not only liability 

on the Fourth Amendment claim, but also on the Monell and 

indemnification claims. As a result, these issues also cannot 

be resolved at this stage of the proceedings. 

We therefore REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.