J-S06004-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STEPHEN A. REMENTER 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2848 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order August 8, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-45-CR-0000028-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 08, 2018

Stephen A. Rementer appeals from the order denying his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

When he was twenty-three years old, Appellant developed an 

obsession with an eight-year-old girl he met at karate class. He became her 

karate instructor, and used his position to begin grooming her. During a 

four-month period at the end of 2011, Appellant had sex with the theneleven-year-old girl at least six times at her home while her parents were at 

work. After her mother came home to find Appellant having intercourse with 

the victim, Appellant was arrested and ultimately pled guilty to raping a child 

less than thirteen years old. 

Appellant was sentenced to twenty to forty years imprisonment on 

November 20, 2012. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence 
J-S06004-18

- 2 -

on September 20, 2013, and Appellant did not seek review by our Supreme 

Court. Commonwealth v. Rementer, 87 A.3d 388 (Pa.Super. 2013) 

(unpublished memorandum). 

On December 29, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel, noted the apparent untimeliness of the 

petition, instructed counsel to file an amended petition, and scheduled a 

hearing to address the timeliness issue. Following the amendment of the 

petition, a response by the Commonwealth, and a hearing, the PCRA court 

denied Appellant’s petition as untimely-filed by order of August 8, 2017. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the trial 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant presents this Court with questions addressing both the 

timeliness and substantive merits of his PCRA petition.1 We begin with the 

former, as the timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. 

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1280-81 (Pa.Super. 2013). 

“Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address 

the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 

(Pa. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s substantive claims allege ineffectiveness of plea counsel and a 

defect in the guilty plea colloquy. Appellant’s brief at 4. 
J-S06004-18

- 3 -

of sentence is final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, 

that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, the petitioner must 

further plead and offer to prove that the claim was raised within sixty days 

of the date on which it first became available. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in 2013 when he did 

not file a petition for allowance of appeal in our Supreme Court. 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(3). Appellant’s PCRA petition filed in 2016, therefore, is facially 

untimely. In his amended petition, Appellant invoked the governmental 

interference exception of subsection (b)(1)(i) with the following allegations:

a. the public defender and assistant district attorney entered 

into a written plea agreement which was binding and 

neither lawyer informed the [c]ourt of the same at 

sentencing or post[-]sentencing;

b. [Appellant] was not provided a copy of the written plea 

agreement at any time by either the public defender or 

any government official;
J-S06004-18

- 4 -

c. government officials including the public defender 

precluded [Appellant’s] access to information necessary for 

a timely appeal by failing to serve [Appellant] with a copy 

of the appellate briefs, the decision of the Superior Court 

of Pennsylvania issued on September 20, 2013; and

d. government officials including the public defender and the 

assistant district attorney further interfered with 

[Appellant’s] ability to present his claims by failing to 

advise the [c]ourt at any time of [Appellant’s] hearing 

deficits which, coupled with the ineffective assistance of 

counsel, precluded [Appellant] from being apprised of his 

appellate rights and responsibilities or of the incomplete 

nature of the issues appealed.

Amended PCRA Petition, 3/6/17, at 2-3. 

As the PCRA court aptly noted, the PCRA expressly excludes defense 

counsel from the definition of “government officials,” and that Appellant 

failed to identify any other government official. PCRA Court Opinion, 

10/24/17, at 4 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(4)). Moreover, Appellant failed 

to explain why these interference claims only became available within sixty 

days of his filing the petition, as is required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

2

Hence, we agree that Appellant has not properly invoked the governmentalinterference exception. 

____________________________________________

2 For example, Appellant obviously has been aware of his hearing difficulties, 

as he wore hearing aids at least as far back as the preliminary hearing in 

this case. Appellant’s brief at 10. Yet, the record reflects that he was able 

to answer questions during the guilty plea colloquy and at his sentencing 

hearing, including answering “yes” to questions such as “did you hear what 

[your counsel] just told me?” and “Did you hear what she said you did?” N.T. 

Guilty Plea, 9/5/12, at 10.
J-S06004-18

- 5 -

The PCRA court opined that what Appellant was “in reality alleging 

[was] that prior counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him that the 

Superior Court had affirmed the judgment of sentence.” PCRA Court 

Opinion, 10/24/17, at 4. Validating the PCRA court’s supposition, Appellant 

on appeal attempts to invoke the subsection (b)(1)(ii) exception, claiming 

that his PCRA claims are based upon newly-discovered facts. Appellant’s 

brief at 4. This Appellant cannot do, as “exceptions to the time bar must be 

pled in the PCRA petition, and may not be raised for the first time on 

appeal.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa.Super. 2007). 

Even if Appellant had properly and timely invoked this exception by 

alleging it in his petition, he fails on appeal to explain how he exercised due 

diligence in discovering any new facts relevant to the claims he wishes to 

raise. “Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to 

protect his own interests.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, --- A.3d ---, 

2018 PA Super 109 *6 (Pa.Super. May 2, 2018) (en banc) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa.Super. 2015)). 

Indeed, in his brief Appellant either fails to indicate when or upon what 

efforts he discovered the facts that underlie his claims,3 or bases them upon

____________________________________________

3 See Appellant’s brief at 11-12 (averring that Appellant “was never 

provided a copy of the written plea agreement,” that he “never received any 

further legal mail” after receiving a packet “several months after” he arrived 

at the SCI indicating his appeal had been filed, and that he filed the instant 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S06004-18

- 6 -

facts of which he clearly has been aware since they happened.4 From the 

record before us, we cannot conclude that the newly-discovered facts 

exception confers jurisdiction upon any court to decide the substance of his 

PCRA claims. Compare Robinson, supra (holding petitioner failed to show 

that he acted with due diligence in discovering fact that his plea counsel was 

subject to federal prosecution for drug use when he “always ‘knew’ that his 

counsel supplied ineffective advice”), with Commonwealth v. Bennett, 

930 A.2d 1264, 1273 (Pa. 2007) (concluding hearing was warranted upon 

petitioner’s allegations that counsel abandoned him and that he filed his 

petition within sixty days of learning that his appeal had been dismissed for 

failure to file a brief, where he detailed the efforts he had taken to learn the 

status of his appeal). 

Finally, Appellant contends that he cannot be denied a remedy under 

the PCRA given his lack of “knowledge of his appellate rights or of the 

disposition of his direct appeal due to his hearing impairment and the failure 

of the court, its administrators or prosecuting attorney to communicate 

accurate notice of those rights, deadlines or dispositions.” Appellant’s brief 

at 5. However, it has long been settled that there are no “ad hoc equitable 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

petition “shortly after being informed by another inmate” of this Court’s 

decision on his direct appeal). 

4 See Appellant’s brief at 10-11 (indicating the courtroom was noisy and 

chaotic and he had trouble hearing because one of his hearing aids was 

damaged). 
J-S06004-18

- 7 -

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly 

delineated in the Act.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 

1161 (Pa. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Appellant’s PCRA petition was filed more than one year after his 

judgment of sentence became final, and he has failed to establish the 

applicability of a statutory timeliness exception. Accordingly, the PCRA court 

properly denied the petition. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/8/18