alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Darryl Rochester, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Egitto, J.), rendered November 25, 1987, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the People did prove his guilt of manslaughter in the first degree *(see,*Penal Law § 125.20 [1]) beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of manslaughter in *520the first degree. The People established that during the course of a "gypsy” cab ride, the defendant became embroiled in a heated dispute with the decedent cab driver. When the cab reached its destination the defendant asked the decedent to wait for him. When the decedent informed the defendant that he expected to be compensated for his time spent waiting, the defendant produced a loaded, unlicensed hand gun which he fired, approximately two feet from the decedent’s head, inflicting a mortal head wound. This evidence, coupled with the defendant’s expletive exclamation prior to firing the gun, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to cause the decedent to suffer serious physical injury *(see, People v Esteves,*152 AD2d 406; *People v White,*143 AD2d 1066).

Furthermore, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]). While the defendant contends that the shooting was reckless and not the result of any injurious intent, the jury was not obligated to believe his testimony. Indeed, it is axiomatic that resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses *(see, People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94; *see also, People v Atilio,*155 AD2d 604; *People v Hawkins,*155 AD2d 617). Its determination is entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the evidence *(see, People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86; *see also, People v Kelly,*155 AD2d 692). In the instant case, the jury’s verdict was supported by objective evidence in the record, notwithstanding the defendant’s testimony, and will not be disturbed.

We have reviewed the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Lawrence, J. P., Sullivan, Rosenblatt and Miller, JJ., concur.
\ ;-.;: * Hp;: ,'j ^

•'.''•" »"i 11' .* r* ; >

2015 NOV -9 AH 9:Ul:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

GEBREMESKEL TIKUE GEBRETENSAE,

Appellant.

DIVISION ONE

No. 72408-8-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: November 9, 2015

Dwyer, J. —Gebremeskel Gebretensae appeals his conviction for felony

harassment, arguing that the court's reasonable doubt instruction is

unconstitutional "because it requires the jury to articulate a reason to establish a

reasonable doubt." We affirm.

When a defendant proposes an instruction identical to an instruction he

later challenges on appeal, the invited error doctrine bars review. State v. Studd,

137Wn.2d 533, 546-47, 973 P.2d 1049 (1999). Thisrule applies even if the

defendant's requested instruction was a Washington Pattern Jury Instruction

previously approved by the courts. Studd, 137 Wn.2d at 546-48; State v.

Henderson. 114 Wn.2d 867, 870, 792 P.2d 514 (1990). Here, Gebretensae

proposed the very instruction he challenges on appeal. Review is therefore

barred by the invited error doctrine.
No. 72408-8-1/2

In any case, Gebretensae's argument is meritless. The challenged

instruction, which is taken from 11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern

Jury Instructions: Criminal 4.01, at 85 (3d ed. 2008) (WPIC), states in pertinent

part:

A reasonable doubt is one for which a reason exists and may arise

from the evidence or lack of evidence. It is such a doubt as would

exist in the mind of a reasonable person after fully, fairly, and

carefully considering all of the evidence or lack of evidence.

(Emphasis added.) Nothing in this language requires jurors to articulate a

reason. Read in context, the phrase "'a doubt for which a reason exists'"

does not direct the jury to assign a reason for their doubts, but

merely points out that their doubts must be based on reason, and

not something vague or imaginary. A phrase in this context has

been declared satisfactory in this jurisdiction for over 70 years.

State v. Thompson, 13 Wn. App. 1, 5, 533 P.2d 395 (1975).1 Our State Supreme

Court recently reached a similar conclusion in State v. Kalebauoh, 183Wn.2d

578, 355 P.3d 253 (2015). The Kalebaugh court held that a trial court misstated

the law when it orally instructed the jury that a reasonable doubt "is a doubt for

which a reason can be given," and that it should have read them "the correctjury

instruction that a 'reasonable doubt' is a doubt for which a reason exists."

Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d at 584 (emphasis added). The court's opinion makes

clear that while the trial court's oral remarks verged on an articulation

requirement, the language in WPIC 4.01 does not. See Kalebauqh, 183 Wn.2d at

584-86. Kalebaugh controls Gebretensae's arguments on appeal.

1See also State v. Emery. 174 Wn.2d 741, 759-60, 278 P.3d 653 (2012) (prosecutor's

argument properly described "reasonable doubt as a 'doubt for which a reason exists'"); State v.

Bennett. 161 Wn.2d 303, 307, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007); State v. Tanzvmore. 54 Wn.2d 290, 291

n.2, 340 P.2d 178 (1959).
No. 72408-8-1/3

Affirmed.

We concur:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE
REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10-Q.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0001012270
<NAME>                        CollaGenex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                                    1,000
<CURRENCY>                               US Dollars
       
<S>                                            <C>  
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   3-Mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                              MAR-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                     1
<CASH>                                         13,213
<SECURITIES>                                    2,972
<RECEIVABLES>                                   2,492
<ALLOWANCES>                                      303
<INVENTORY>                                       528
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               19,527
<PP&E>                                            411
<DEPRECIATION>                                    149
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 19,828
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          15,603
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                           86
<OTHER-SE>                                      4,139
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   19,828
<SALES>                                         2,410
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                2,418
<CGS>                                             543
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   7,577
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 44
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (5,089)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (5,089)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (5,089)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.59)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.59)
        

</TABLE>
Amended Schedule to the Forms of Indemnification Agreement



 Exhibit 10.3 
 Amended Schedule to the Forms of 
 Indemnification Agreement 
 Sunoco, Inc. has entered into Indemnification Agreements with the directors, executive officers, trustees, fiduciaries, employees or agents named below: 
  

			
	 Employee
	 	 Date of Agreement

	Michael J. Colavita	 	September 2, 2004
	John F. Carroll	 	March 4, 2004
	Terence P. Delaney	 	March 4, 2004
	Lynn L. Elsenhans	 	August 8, 2008
	Bruce G. Fischer	 	March 4, 2004
	Michael J. Hennigan	 	February 2, 2006
	Thomas W. Hofmann	 	March 4, 2004
	Vincent J. Kelley	 	February 2, 2006
	Joseph P. Krott	 	March 4, 2004
	Michael S. Kuritzkes	 	March 4, 2004
	Michael J. McGoldrick	 	March 4, 2004
	Ann C. Mulé	 	March 4, 2004
	Paul A. Mulholland	 	March 4, 2004
	Rolf D. Naku	 	March 4, 2004
	Marie A. Natoli	 	March 3, 2006
	Robert W. Owens	 	March 4, 2004
	Alan J. Rothman	 	March 4, 2004
	Michael J. Thomson	 	May 30, 2008

  
  
  

			
	Robert M. Aiken, Jr.*	 	February 1, 1996
	Robert H. Campbell*	 	February 1, 1996
	Michael H. R. Dingus*	 	March 4, 2004
	John G. Drosdick*	 	March 4, 2004
	Jack L. Foltz*	 	February 1, 1996
	David E. Knoll*	 	February 1, 1996
	Deborah M. Fretz*	 	September 6, 2001
	Joel H. Maness*	 	March 4, 2004
	Malcolm I. Ruddock, Jr.*	 	February 1, 1996
	David C. Shanks*	 	February 17, 1997
	Sheldon L. Thompson *	 	February 1, 1996
	Ross S. Tippin, Jr.*	 	March 4, 2004
	Charles K. Valutas*	 	March 4, 2004

  

	*	In a different position or no longer with the Company. 









			
	 Director
	 	 Date of Agreement

	 Robert J. Darnall
	 	March 4, 2004
	 John G. Drosdick
	 	March 4, 2004
	 Gary W. Edwards
	 	May 1, 2008
	 Ursula O. Fairbairn
	 	March 4, 2004
	 Thomas P. Gerrity
	 	March 4, 2004
	 Rosemarie B. Greco
	 	March 4, 2004
	 John P. Jones, III
	 	September 8, 2006
	 James G. Kaiser
	 	March 4, 2004
	 R. Anderson Pew
	 	March 4, 2004
	 G. Jackson Ratcliffe
	 	March 4, 2004
	 John W. Rowe
	 	March 4, 2004
	 John K. Wulff
	 	March 8, 2004

  
  
  

			
	 Raymond E. Cartledge**
	 	September 6, 2001
	 Robert E. Cawthorn**
	 	February 1, 1996
	 Mary J. Evans**
	 	September 6, 2001
	 Robert D. Kennedy**
	 	September 6, 2001
	 Richard H. Lenny**
	 	February 8, 2002
	 Norman S. Matthews **
	 	September 6, 2001
	 William B. Pounds**
	 	February 1, 1996

  

	**	No longer serving on the Board. 

  

 2
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk May 27, 2009

p0527 

# Order

May 27, 2009

138689 & (21)

DEBORAH L. ARNOLD and FREDERICK E. ARNOLD, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v SC: 138689 COA: 288456 Oakland CC: 2006-075278-CK FARM BUREAU GENE RAL INSURANCE COMPANY and FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-Appellants.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. Trial court proceedings are stay ed pending the completion of th is appeal. The application for leave to appeal the March 20, 2009 orde r of the Court of Appeals remains pending.
#### NORTHWESTERN NAT. LIFE INS. CO. v. WHITTINGTON et al.

No. 8018.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

Nov. 28, 1934.

Rehearing Denied March 27, 1935.

McBride, Hamilton, Lipscomb & Wood, of Dallas, for appellant.

B. P. Matocha and E. A. Wallace, both of Cameron, for appellees.

' McCLENDON, Chief Justice.

The controlling question in this case is whether, under a proper construction of the wording of two real estate mortgages given to secure a $5,000 loan, the transaction is usurious.

The first mortgage secured a bond for $5,000, with interest coupons attached at 7 per cent, per annum; the second mortgage, executed simultaneously,, secured five $100 *174interest notes, maturing annually thereafter, with interest thereon from maturity at 10 per cent, per annum. The first mortgage does not in any way refer to the second mortgage, or the second mortgage notes. It provided, in case of default: “Then or in any event, the said principal sum hereby secured, and all interest thereon to the date of payment thereof, shall, at the option of the holder of said bond, be and become immediately due and payable, anything in this mortgage or said bond contained to the contrary notwithstanding.”

The contention that the transaction is usurious arises from the following acceleration provision of the second mortgage: “But if default should be made in the payment of any of the notes above described, or of the bonds, or any of them, secured by the first mortgage aforesaid or if default should be made in the compliance with any of the terms or conditions of said first mortgage, which are hereby adopted and made a part of this instrument, then the whole sum of money hereby secured shall become due and payable at the election of the holder thereof, without notice of such election to the mortgagor.”

Applying the rule announced in Hughes v. Bryson (Tex. Civ. App.) 29 S.W.(2d) 898; Walker v. Temple Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 60 S.W.(2d) 826; and Burnette v. Realty Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 74 S.W.(2d) 536, we have reached the conclusion that the transaction is not tainted with usury.

There is no provision in either mortgage that upon acceleration of payment any unearned interest shall be payable; and the first mortgage specifically provides in case of default for the maturity of “all interest thereon to the date of payment thereof.” This clearly has reference to all interest on the principal debt, which includes the interest notes, as they were given solely for interest on the principal debt.

The principle of construction here involved is very fully discussed in the Walker Case, and it is not necessary to do more here than to refer to that discussion.

The trial court’s judgment is reversed, and judgment is here rendered for the amount of the principal debt and interest shown to be due appellant, with foreclosure of appellant’s mortgage lien. Counsel for appellant will prepare a draft of decree to be entered in accordance with this holding, submit it to counsel for appellees for approval as to form, and file it with the clerk of this court within ten days from this date.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY P ROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2) , SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH C AROLINA In The Supreme Court

In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Ronald MJ Gregg, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022

- 001710

Appeal f rom Charleston County Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

Memorandum Opinion No. 2024 -MO- 014 Heard May 22, 2024 – Filed June 5, 2024

DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, both of Columbia

, for Petitioner.

Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia

, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM We granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in In re Care & Treatment of Gregg , Op. No. 2022

- UP

- 336 (S.C. Ct. App. filed A ug. 10 , 2022). We now dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.

DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, FEW, JAMES and HILL, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1



Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of MeriStar Hospitality
Corporation (the Registrant) for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned hereby certifies, in the capacity as
indicated below and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       |  |  |  |                                                                          
|---------------------- |  |  |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                       |  | 
|Date: November 9, 2005 |  |  |  | /s/ PAUL W. WHETSELL                                                     
|                       |  |  |  | Paul W. Whetsell Chief Executive Officer MeriStar Hospitality Corporation
Regus


Exhibit 10.11









			
	Regus

	 
	ONEStep Renewal




    Work without boundaries




Date 

August 7, 2008




     Company Name: China Clean & Renewable Energy Ltd.

Location: HONG KONG, Shui On Plaza, Wancha




Dear Allen:




It has been our pleasure to have you as a Regus Customer.  Since your renewal period is quickly approaching, we wanted to be proactive in reaching out to you with several options to extend your agreement.  These options were created based on our understanding of your requirements along with current availability.  It is also important to point out that you can achieve additional savings by extending the term of the agreement.




					
	Office Number

	12 Months

Option A

	6 Months

Option B

	3 Months

Option C

	 

	86

	14,550.00

	14,800.00

	15,078.00

	until 11/30/08


	 
	 
	 
	 
	 

	Total Monthly    HKD

	14,550.00

	14,800.00

	15,078.00

	 






Comments:

Monthly service fee = Internet Connection/line = HK $890.  Telecom Package/line = HK $750.  Beverage Services/person = HK 250.  One Time fee = Exit VO & Clean up Fee = 3 months x Virtual Office = HK $1,700/month = Clean up fee HK $500/workstation.

Note:  Kindly note that since your existing contract had already terminated, office 286 is available for sell from 1 Sep-08 and is served on a FIRST COME FIRST SERVE basis.




Option A:  I agree

________

Your greatest savings are always on the longest term




Option B:  I agree

________




Option C:  I agree

      X____




I do not wish to renew

________




If no response is received by 12-Aug-08, your agreement(s) will terminate at the end of your current term.




Your renewal will comments on 01-Sep-08.  For your convenience, we have attached our complete terms.  Additional services that you may require can be selected at any time and are listed in our services pricing guide and your retainer will be increased to reflect twice your monthly fee.




Thank you for your continued support.  We very much value your business.




Regards,




Eva Lee

General Manager – Regus Shui On Centre

(852) 2824 8622 / eva.lee@regus.com




Authorized Signer




/s/ Allen Tat Yan Huie

China Clean & Renewable Energy, Ltd.

Signature

Customer Name




President

August 8, 2008

Title

Date
Exhibit 10.1


 





1101
E. Arapaho Road


Richardson,
TX  75081


972-234-6400
tel


972-234-1467
fax


 


November 7,
2008


 


Confidential


 


The
Board of Directors


Intrusion
Inc.


 


Re:  Intrusion Inc.


 


Gentlemen:


 


As
you are aware, over the past few years, I have provided financial assistance to
Intrusion through various private placements. 
This letter confirms my intention to make available funds in the amount
of up to $1,500,000 to cover cash flow shortfalls, if any, which may be
experienced by Intrusion during the period, ended March 2010.  I also confirm that I have access to
sufficient financial assets to make these funds available.  In the event of my death, my heirs will be
bound by this commitment.


 


This
letter is in replacement of, and not in addition to, the original commitment
letter dated March 20, 2008 for $1,500,000.  In essence, I am only extending my original
commitment one year.


 


If
you have any questions regarding this letter, please feel free to contact me.


 


Sincerely,


 


	
  /s/
  G. Ward Paxton

  	
   

  
	
   

  
	
  G.
  Ward Paxton

  
	
  President
  and CEO

  
	
  Intrusion
  Inc.
EXHIBIT 31.1
                                                                    ------------
                                  CERTIFICATION
                                  -------------

I, Robert A. Levinson, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Levcor International,
Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this annual report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this annual report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: March 29, 2006

/s/ ROBERT A. LEVINSON
----------------------
Robert A. Levinson,
Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer

================================================================================