J-S56003-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CAINE SHEPPARD PELZER, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

DEMETRIUS W. FANNICK,

Appellee No. 2165 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered November 16, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County

Civil Division at No(s): 12727-2009

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2016

Appellant, Caine Sheppard Pelzer, appeals pro se from the trial court’s 

order, entered on November 16, 2015, denying his request for the 

appointment of counsel in his underlying civil case. After careful review, we 

conclude that the order from which Pelzer appeals is interlocutory and not 

otherwise appealable. Accordingly, we quash this appeal.

It is unnecessary to provide extensive details about the procedural 

history underlying this appeal. We need only note that this case was 

initiated when Pelzer filed a civil complaint against his former, privatelyretained attorney, Demetrius W. Fannick, Esq, who had represented Pelzer 

in a prior, unrelated criminal case. In Pelzer’s complaint, he primarily raised 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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claims sounding in legal malpractice. According to the trial court, Pelzer 

mainly alleged “that he paid Fannick $5,000.00 to pursue an appeal of his 

criminal conviction based on the theory of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel and Fannick failed to file a [p]etition for [relief under the] Post 

Conviction Relief [Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546,] despite assurances that he 

would do so.” Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 3/16/16, at 2-3. During the 

course of the underlying litigation, Pelzer filed numerous requests for the 

appointment of counsel, all of which were denied. See id. at 1-2. On 

November 16, 2015, the court again denied a request by Pelzer for the 

appointment of counsel, and Pelzer filed the instant appeal. 

On January 14, 2016, this Court issued a rule to show cause why 

Pelzer’s appeal should not be quashed as having been taken from an order 

that is interlocutory and not yet appealable. See Per Curiam Order, 

1/14/16. On February 3, 2016, Pelzer filed a pro se response, and on March 

1, 2016, this Court discharged our rule to show cause, directing that “[t]he 

merits panel may revisit the issue and may find that the appeal is defective.” 

Per Curiam Order, 3/1/16. We also stated that Pelzer “should be prepared 

to address the issue in his brief[,]” which Pelzer has done. Id. Thus, we 

begin by assessing whether the court’s November 16, 2015 order is 

appealable, as that question “goes directly to the jurisdiction of the Court 

asked to review the order.” In re N.B., 817 A.2d 530, 533 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (citing Pace v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 717 A.2d 539, 540 

(Pa. Super. 1998)).
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“It is well-settled that, generally, appeals may be taken only from final 

orders....” Commonwealth v. Blystone, 119 A.3d 306, 312 (Pa. 2015). “A 

final order is any order that disposes of all claims and all parties, is expressly 

defined as a final order by statute, or is entered as a final order pursuant to 

the trial court's determination.” In re N.B., 817 A.2d at 533 (citing 

Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1)-(3)). Here, Appellant concedes that the November 16, 

2015 order denying his request for the appointment of counsel is a non-final, 

interlocutory order. See Pelzer’s Brief at 8 (“Initially, [Pelzer] notes that the 

[o]rder denying his request for appointment of counsel is technically 

interlocutory.”). He argues, however, that the order is immediately 

appealable under the ‘collateral order doctrine.’ For the following reasons, 

we disagree.

Our Supreme Court has explained that:

[T]he collateral order doctrine permits an appeal as of right from 

a non-final order which meets the criteria established in 

Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Pa.R.A.P. 313 is jurisdictional in nature and 

provides that “[a] collateral order is an order [1] separable from 

and collateral to the main cause of action where [2] the right 

involved is too important to be denied review and [3] the 

question presented is such that if review is postponed until final 

judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).

Thus, if a non-final order satisfies each of the requirements 

articulated in Pa.R.A.P. 313(b), it is immediately appealable. 

However, we construe the collateral order doctrine narrowly so 

as to avoid ‘piecemeal determinations and protracted litigation. 

Blystone, 119 A.3d at 312 (some internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). We also note that this Court and our Supreme Court have 
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previously held, in both civil and criminal cases, that orders involving the 

denial or disqualification of counsel are interlocutory and do not meet the 

criteria for appealability as a collateral order. See Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 705 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1998) (holding than an order disqualifying a 

criminal defendant’s choice of counsel is interlocutory and not immediately 

appealable); In re N.B., 817 A.2d at 535 (holding that an order denying a 

mother’s right to counsel in a dependency proceeding failed to satisfy the 

collateral order doctrine and, thus, was not appealable); Duttry v. Talkish, 

576 A.2d 53 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding that an order denying an indigent 

petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel in an ongoing 

custody/visitation case was interlocutory and not a collateral order). 

Here, Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us that his case presents 

a unique instance where an order denying a request for counsel in a civil 

case must be considered as an appealable order. Specifically, Appellant has 

not demonstrated that “the right involved is too important to be denied 

review[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Regarding this prong of the collateral order 

doctrine, our Supreme Court has explained:

[F]or purposes of Rule 313(b), a right is important if the 

interests that would go unprotected without immediate appeal 

are significant relative to the efficiency interests served by the 

final order rule. Additionally, the order [must] involve [ ] rights 

deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular 

litigation at hand, and [i]t is not sufficient that the issue is 

important to the particular parties involved.

Blystone, 119 A.3d at 312 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Here, Appellant cannot demonstrate that the court’s order denying his 

request for counsel impacts any right, let alone one that is “deeply rooted in 

public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand....” Id. “The law 

is well settled that there is no right to counsel in civil cases.” Rich v. 

Acrivos, 815 A.2d 1106, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2003). Appellant confusingly 

suggests that he has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in this civil case 

because it is a “case within [a] case” that also involves a prior criminal 

action. Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant does not develop any meaningful or 

coherent argument to support this claim; instead, he simply makes bald 

references to “the seriousness of [his] related criminal matter,” and claims 

that he has a right to counsel because he “is being forced into proving that 

he did not commit a crime....” Id. Appellant’s undeveloped and legally 

unsupported arguments fail to prove that the court’s order denying him 

counsel implicates a right that is too important for us to deny his request for 

review at this juncture. Therefore, he cannot satisfy the second prong of the 

collateral order doctrine.1

____________________________________________

1 We also point out that Appellant offers no coherent argument pertaining to 

why his ability to challenge the court’s refusal to appoint him counsel will be 

irreparably lost if we decline to review this issue now. We can ascertain no 

reason why Appellant would not be able to assert such an argument on 

appeal after final judgment is entered in this case. Accordingly, we also 

conclude that Appellant failed to meet the third prong of the collateral order 

doctrine.
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Because the court’s November 16, 2015 order denying Appellant 

court-appointed counsel is an interlocutory order, and Appellant has failed to 

prove that the collateral order doctrine applies, we quash this appeal. 

Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/16/2016