RDC Melanie Drive, LLC v. Mark R. Eppard, et al., No. 48, September Term 2020. 

Opinion by Hotten, J. 

CIVIL PROCEDURE – RES JUDICATA – COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

The Court of Appeals held that the issue of whether restrictive covenants prohibited a 

commercial golf driving range on any lot within a residential subdivision was neither 

barred by res judicata nor collateral estoppel. Res judicata did not apply because the issues 

litigated in a previous matter and the current matter were distinct. The former concerned

a zoning variance and the latter concerned the application of a restrictive covenant. 

Collateral estoppel did not apply because a zoning board in the first matter expressly 

declined to consider the issue of restrictive covenants, which prevented the issue from 

being “actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment[.]” Cosby v. Dep’t 

of Hum. Res., 425 Md. 629, 639, 42 A.3d 596, 602 (2012).

PROPERTY LAW – RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS – CONSTRUCTION AND 

OPERATION

The Court of Appeals held that a restrictive covenant unambiguously intended to preserve 

the residential character of a small, single-family home community by applying a

“reasonable construction” of a restrictive covenant as first articulated by the Court in 

Belleview Construction Co. v. Rugby Hall Community Ass’n, 321 Md. 152, 158, 582 A.2d 

493, 496 (1990) (citation and internal quotation omitted). The Court also concluded that a 

majority of homeowners within the residential community validly amended the restrictive

covenant by prohibiting a commercial golf driving range on any of the lots within the 

community. The amendment clarified a preexisting and uniform restriction on all of the 

lots that prevented offensive or noxious trades or activities and any activity that may 

become an annoyance or nuisance.

PROPERTY LAW – RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS – CONSTRUCTION AND 

OPERATION

The Court of Appeals held that a restrictive covenant unambiguously permitted the 

realignment of a lot boundary line. A restrictive covenant prohibited the creation of new 

lots through subdivision but expressly permitted the “adjustment or realignment of 

boundary lines[.]” A property owner permissibly realigned the boundary of their property 

pursuant to the plain language of the restrictive covenant.
Circuit Court for Talbot County

Case No. C-20-CV-18-000079

Argued: May 6, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 48

September Term, 2020

__________________________________

RDC MELANIE DRIVE, LLC

v.

MARK EPPARD, ET AL.

__________________________________

Barbera, C.J.,

McDonald,

Watts,

Hotten,

Getty,

Booth,

Biran,

JJ.

__________________________________

Opinion by Hotten, J.

__________________________________

Filed: July 15, 2021
The parties in this appeal own property in the Swan Point Subdivision (“Swan 

Point”), located in Talbot County, Maryland.1 Swan Point consists of six lots, reflected in 

the tax record as Lots A, B, C, D, 5, and 6. Petitioner, RDC Melanie Drive, LLC (“RDC”)

owns a nearby golf course, now known as the Links, and purchased Lot 6 in 2015. The 

present dispute arises from an effort by RDC to convert Lot 6 into a commercial golf 

driving range (“a driving range” or “the driving range”). Respondent, Mark Eppard, et al. 

(“Homeowners”), represent four of the other five property owners in Swan Point who 

oppose RDC’s proposed plan to construct a driving range on Lot 6.

2

 

On August 21, 2017, RDC applied for zoning variances and exceptions from the 

Talbot County Board of Appeals (“the Board”) to modify the boundaries of Lot 6 and to 

construct the driving range. The Homeowners opposed the variance, contending that a 

restrictive covenant, applicable to all lots within Swan Point, prevented the construction of 

the driving range. The Board did not address the issue of the restrictive covenant, but 

granted the zoning variance for RDC. In response, the Homeowners amended the 

restrictive covenant to specifically prohibit a driving range on any lot within Swan Point.

The Homeowners sought judicial review of the Board’s determination in the Circuit 

Court for Talbot County. Following a hearing on May 16, 2018, the circuit court found 

1

“Swan Point [] is part of a larger subdivision that was created by a subdivision 

plat, . . . prepared by William W. Ludlow Jr., dated November 28, 1987 . . . and recorded 

among the Plat Records of Talbot County[,] Maryland in Plat Book 79[,] Folio 76.” 

Eppard v. RDC Melanie Drive, LLC, C-20-CV-18-000079, slip. op. at 2 (Md. Cir. Ct. July 

12, 2019) (memorandum opinion and declaratory judgment).

2 The sixth property owner, Old Martingham LLC, declined to participate in any of 

the proceedings.
2

that most of the decisions of the Board were supported by substantial evidence and

following a remand to the Board for additional findings, affirmed the decisions of the Board 

on November 19, 2018.

The Homeowners sought a declaratory judgment in the circuit court for a 

determination that the original Swan Point restrictive covenant, the Homeowners’ 

amendment to the original Swan Point restrictive covenant, and a restrictive covenant 

specifically applicable to Lot 6—recorded in 2008 by former owners Vladimir D. Zajic 

and Etta K. Zajic (“Zajic Declaration”)—prohibited the driving range. RDC filed a counter 

complaint, contending that the development of a driving range and a realignment of the 

property boundaries of Lot 6 was not prohibited by the restrictive covenants. The circuit 

court entered a declaratory judgment, concluding that the Homeowners’ amended 

restrictive covenant validly prohibited the construction of a driving range on Lot 6, and the 

original Swan Point restrictive covenant permitted the realignment of Lot 6 property 

boundaries. The circuit court also declared that the controversy surrounding the Zajic 

Declaration was moot by virtue of the other declarations.

The parties cross-appealed the decision of the circuit court to the Court of Special 

Appeals, which affirmed. The Court of Special Appeals consolidated the questions 

presented and held that the determination of whether the original Swan Point restrictive 

covenant prohibited a driving range was not precluded by collateral estoppel and that the 

Homeowners’ amended restrictive covenant validly prohibited a driving range on Lot 6. 

The Court of Special Appeals further held that the circuit court did not err when it declared 

the Zajic Declaration moot and that the circuit court correctly determined that it was 
3

permissible under the original Swan Point restrictive covenant for RDC to realign the 

boundaries of Lot 6. 

RDC timely appealed to this Court and the Homeowners filed a cross-petition. We 

granted the petition for certiorari and the cross-petition on January 6, 2021, RDC Melanie 

Drive, LLC v. Eppard, 472 Md. 4, 243 A.3d 1198 (2021), which resolve into the following 

five questions:

1. Whether the factual issue of whether a driving range constitutes a 

“noxious or offensive trade or activity” or causes any “annoyance or 

nuisance” is precluded by res judicata or collateral estoppel.

2. Whether the Original Declaration unambiguously restricts various 

activities to preserve the residential character of a small community of 

single-family homes? 

3. Whether the Amended Declaration validly clarified the terms of the 

Original Declaration by prohibiting a commercial driving range on any 

lot within Swan Point? 

4. Whether Article III, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (k) of the Original 

Declaration permits the revision of existing lot lines?

5. Whether the controversy regarding the Zajic Declaration is moot?3

3 We rephrased and reordered the questions presented for analytical consistency and

clarity. RDC’s petition for certiorari presented the following seven questions for review:

I. Whether, as a matter of first impression under Maryland law, the 

Amended Declaration is enforceable against RDC where the Amended 

Declaration adds new restrictions prohibiting golf course uses and 

driving ranges, and the language of the amendment clause of the Original 

Declaration does not expressly permit changes which add new 

restrictions? 

II. Whether the [c]ircuit [c]ourt and the Court of Special Appeals erred in 

(continued . . .)
4

(. . . continued)

ruling that the Amended Declaration does not add additional restrictions 

to Lot 6, where the Amended Declaration plainly adds new restrictions 

prohibiting golf course uses and driving ranges? 

III. Whether the enforcement of the restrictions prohibiting any “noxious or 

offensive trade or activity” or any use that “may become an annoyance 

or nuisance,” or any amendment thereto, is subject to review on an 

objective standard? 

IV. Whether Respondents’ claims that the use of Lot 6 as driving range will 

be “noxious or offensive” or cause “annoyance or nuisance” have been 

fully litigated before the Board of Appeals and those issues and claims 

are precluded by the doctrines of [collateral estoppel] and res judicata? 

And if not, whether RDC is entitled to trial on those issues and claims? 

V. Whether the restrictions prohibiting any “noxious or offensive trade or 

activity” or any use that “may become an annoyance or nuisance to the 

neighborhood or other owners” are too vague to be enforced? 

VI. Whether the Original Declaration prohibits golf course uses, driving 

ranges, or other commercial activity under uniform plan of 

development?

VII. Whether RDC is entitled to summary judgment on the Respondents’ 

Claims arising from Article III, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (m) of the 

Original Declaration and from the Zajic Declaration?

The Homeowner’s conditional cross-petition presented the following five questions 

for review:

I. In this declaratory judgment action, were the lower courts obliged as a 

matter of law to review each provision of the applicable covenants 

addressed by the parties in the pleadings, and to declare the rights and 

obligations of parties based upon the language of the instruments, read 

together in accordance with their express terms and the intent thereof as 

stated in the instruments? 

II. Did the lower courts err as a matter of law, by failing to render an 

analysis whether the Original Covenants, by their terms, intended only 

a residential and agricultural use subdivision? 

(continued . . .)
5

We answer the first question in the negative, the second, third, and fourth questions 

in the affirmative and accordingly shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special 

Appeals. We need not reach the fifth question presented.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Underlying Incident

The Links, formerly known as the Harbourtowne Golf Course, is a golf course 

located in St. Michaels, Maryland. The Links was originally developed in the 1970s and 

(. . . continued)

III. Did the lower courts err in failing to address the express provision of 

the Original Declaration, in Article III, ¶ 1 (m), [] prohibiting any 

excavations on any Lot within the subdivision except in connection 

with permitted buildings; and did they erroneously fail to integrate that 

provision with the Zajic [Declaration], approved and accepted by all the 

parties or their predecessors, that specifically prohibits the construction 

of any buildings on the agricultural portion of Lot 6? Alternatively 

stated, were the trial court and the Court of Special Appeals clearly in 

error by declaring that the issues arising under the Zajic [Declaration]

were moot under the circumstances of this case? 

IV. Did the lower courts err as a matter of law in their interpretation that 

the Original Declaration, Article III, ¶ (k), permits a boundary line 

adjustment with a non-subdivision lot for the purpose of permitting 

resort and golf course uses on land intended for only residential and 

agricultural use? 

V. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by failing to address CrossPetitioners’ request for injunctive relief, and in the case of the Court of 

Special Appeals, did it likewise err in failing to remand this case to the 

trial court (as requested in the Homeowners’ briefs in the Court of 

Special Appeals) to address the question of ancillary injunctive relief in 

light of both courts’ conclusions that the Amended Declaration is a 

valid prohibition of driving range development?
6

is now part of the Perry Cabin resort. Swan Point was developed in 1988 and is adjacent 

to and contiguous with the Links. Swan Point contains six lots: A, B, C, D, 5, and 6.4 

Each lot at Swan Point is subject to the covenants and restrictions described in the 

“DECLARATION OF RESTRICTIONS, COVENANTS AND CONDITIONS SWAN 

POINT” (“the Original Declaration”). In pertinent part, the Original Declaration provided:

WHEREAS, the Declarants desire to provide for the preservation of 

the values and amenities in the community comprised of their collective 

properties; and to this end, desire to impose upon the Property [i.e., Swan 

Point] the covenants, restrictions, easements and equitable servitudes, 

hereinafter set forth, each and all of which are for the benefit of the Property 

and the owners thereof. . . . [A]ll of which are declared and agreed to be in 

aid of a plan for the improvement of the Property . . . and shall inure to the 

benefit of and be enforceable by the Declarants, their successors and assigns, 

and any person acquiring or owning an interest in the Property, including, 

without limitation, any person, group of persons, . . . or other legal entity. . . .

ARTICLE I

***

(a) “Declarant” shall mean and refer to the Declarants hereinabove 

identified in the preamble to this Declaration, and their successors and 

assigns. . . .

(b) “Dwelling” shall mean and refer to any building or portion of a 

building situated upon the Property and designed and intended for use and 

occupancy as a residence by a single person or family.

***

ARTICLE III

1. Prohibited Uses and Nuisances. Except for the activities of the 

Declarant during the construction or development of the community:

(a) No noxious or offensive trade or activity shall be carried on upon 

any Lot or within any dwelling, nor shall anything be done therein or 

4 At the time of the present dispute, Albert G. Boyce and Kim T. Boyce own Lot B; 

Mark R. Eppard and Patricia A. Eppard own Lot C; Norman S. Hastings and Lily S. 

Hastings own Lot D; and Madeline C. Holmes owns Lot 5. Old Martingham, LLC owns 

Lot A, but has not participated in proceedings. RDC owns Lot 6. See infra page 9.
7

thereon, which may be or become an annoyance or nuisance to the 

neighborhood or other Owners. Without limiting the generality of the 

foregoing, no speaker, horn, whistle, siren, bell, amplifier or other sound 

device, except such devices as may be used exclusively for security purposes, 

shall be located, installed or maintained upon the exterior of any dwelling or 

upon the exterior of any other improvements constructed upon any Lot. No 

snowmobiles, go-carts, motor bikes, trail bikes or other loud engine 

recreational vehicles shall be run or operated upon any Lot or upon the roads 

serving the Property.

***

(b) The maintenance, keeping, boarding or raising of animals, 

livestock, or poultry of any kind, regardless of number, shall be and is hereby 

prohibited on any Lot or within any dwelling, except that this provision shall 

not prohibit the keeping of horses, dogs, cats or customary household 

animals, provided that such animals are not a source of annoyance or 

nuisance to the neighborhood or other Owners and do not roam at-large.

***

(f) No structure of a temporary character shall be erected, used or 

maintained on any Lot at any time.

(g) Except for entrance signs, directional signs, signs for traffic 

control or safety and such promotional sign or signs as may be maintained 

by the Declarant, no signs or advertising devices of any character shall be 

erected, posted or displayed upon, in or about any Lot or dwelling; provided, 

however, that one temporary real estate sign not exceeding four (4) square 

feet in area, may be erected upon any Lot placed upon the market for sale or 

rent. . . .

***

(k) No Lot shall be subdivided; provided, however, that this 

restriction shall not be construed to prohibit the adjustment or realignment 

of boundary lines between Lots as long as such adjustment or realignment 

shall not create an additional Lot.

***

(m) No excavation shall be made on any Lot except for the purpose 

of building thereon at the same time when the building operations are 

commenced, and no earth or sand shall be removed from any Lot except as a 

part of such operations; provided, however, that this restriction shall not be 

construed to prohibit the construction of swimming pools or ponds.

***

(q) Not more than one (1) dwelling shall be erected on any one (1) 

Lot within the Property, said dwelling being restricted to a single family 

dwelling. . . .

***
8

ARTICLE VI

1. Amendment. This Declaration may be amended by an instrument 

executed and acknowledged by two-thirds (2/3) of the Owners of the Lots 

within the community, which instrument shall be recorded among the Land 

Records of Talbot County, Maryland. Unless a later date is specified in any 

such instrument, any amendment to this Declaration shall become effective 

on the date of recording. Except as required by the appropriate zoning 

authorities of Talbot County, while Declarant owns any Lot, no substantial 

change shall be made in this Declaration without the written consent 

appended to the amending instrument of all Owners, including Declarant.

2. Duration. Unless amended in accordance with the provisions of 

Paragraph 1 of this Article and the other requirements of this Declaration, 

and except where permanent easements or other permanent rights or interests 

are herein created, the covenants and restrictions of this Declaration shall run 

with and bind the land, and shall inure to the benefit of and be enforceable 

by the Owner of any Lot subject to this Declaration, their respective legal 

representatives, heirs, successors and assigns, for a term of thirty (30) years 

from the date of the recordation of this Declaration, after which the said 

covenants shall be automatically be extended until terminated by a vote of 

two-thirds (2/3) of the Owners of the Lots.

3. Construction and Enforcement. The provisions hereof shall be 

liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of creating a uniform plan for 

the development and operation of the Property. . . .

***

(Emphasis added).

In 2008, the former owners of Lot 6, Vladimir D. Zajic and Etta K. Zajic executed 

the Zajic Declaration, recorded among the land records of Talbot County at MAS Liber 

1649, folio 503.5 The Zajic Declaration provided in pertinent part:

5 The Zajic Declaration was not recorded solely for the benefit of the Zajic family. 

The preamble to the Zajic Declaration also names Paul D. Haines and Ann N. Haines, 

Marsha E. Jewett, Mark R. Eppard and Patricia A. Eppard, and Norman S. Hastings and 

Lilly S. Hastings as “Benefited Owners[.]” At the time that the Zajic Declaration was 

recorded, these individuals owned Lots 5, B, C, and D, respectively. Only Lot A, now 

owned by Old Martingham LLC, was not named as a Benefited Owner. 
9

1. Prohibited Structures. Commencing upon the Effective Date as 

hereinafter defined, no structure, habitation or other building may be 

constructed on the Property. This Declaration shall not prohibit, limit, 

restrict or otherwise impair the Declarants’ rights, in their sole discretion, to 

use, maintain, repair, replace or improve the driveway located on the 

Property.

***

4. Construction and Enforcement. The provisions hereof shall be 

liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of the preservation of the natural 

values and amenities of the Property. . . .

(Emphasis added).

In 2015, RDC purchased the Links. As part of its redevelopment and operation of 

the Links, RDC sought to relocate the driving range to a waterfront property at 9599 

Melanie Drive, St. Michaels. This property is designated as Lot 6 of Swan Point.6 RDC 

also intended to expand its existing golf course onto a portion of Lot 6. On July 21, 2016, 

David W. Rattner, on behalf of RDC, sent a letter to all the Swan Point property owners,

communicating RDC’s intention to convert the southern portion of Lot 6 into a driving 

range. The letter provided in pertinent part:

This plan enables us to lengthen the driving range and expand the 1st and 

18th holes; moreover, relocating the driving range will allow us to 

significantly reduce the number of golf balls flying on to Martingham Drive. 

We hope Harbourtowne members agree that this will provide a muchimproved golfing experience, and that residents will feel safer traveling along 

Martingham Drive.

To this end, we recently proposed a zoning change to Talbot County, which 

would allow us to incorporate this piece of the lot [into] the golf course.

6 Lot 6 was 29.711 acres before its conveyance and subsequent boundary 

modification by RDC. The proposed driving range would occupy approximately thirteen 

acres of the northern portion of the property. Lot 6 had been used as a spray field for the 

treated effluent from the nearby Martingham subdivision until the subdivision gained 

public sewer access. Lot 6 is partially located in a Critical Area on lands designated as a 

Resource Conservation Area. See RDC Melanie Drive, 2020 WL 5989518, at *3.
10

On July 29, 2016, the Zajic’s conveyed their interest in Lot 6 to RDC.

On or about May 12, 2017, RDC submitted a Critical Area Variance and Special 

Exception Application for the driving range to the Board, which held evidentiary hearings

concerning RDC’s Application on August 7 and 21, 2017. Mark R. Eppard, Patricia A. 

Eppard, and Madeline C. Holmes appeared at the hearings, and through counsel, submitted 

a memorandum of law in opposition to RDC’s Application. On November 17, 2017, the 

Board voted to approve RDC’s requested variances, which included an expansion of the 

existing golf course onto a portion of Lot 6 to accommodate the relocated driving range 

and an associated access path and drainage. The Board determined that it lacked the 

authority “to consider the effects of or to enforce any private restrictive covenants that may 

impact the subject property.”

On September 11, 2017, the Homeowners recorded an “AMENDED 

DECLARATION AND REAFFIRMATION OF RESTRICTIONS, COVENANTS, AND 

CONDITIONS FOR SWAN POINT SUBDIVISION” (“Amended Declaration”). The

Amended Declaration provided in pertinent part:

(u) No Lot within the Property, nor any portion thereof, shall be converted 

from residential or agricultural use into a commercial or private golf course 

use, nor shall any Lot be utilized as or in connection with a driving range or 

similar commercial use in connection with a golf course, it being the intent 

of the subscribers hereto that the Swan Point subdivision retain its character 

as a residential, single family dwelling community, and not be converted into 

a commercial resort property for use by members of the public, golf course 

members, or resort hotel guests.

(Emphasis added).
11

In January 2018, RDC recorded a plat entitled “MINOR REVISION PLAT ON 

THE LANDS OF RDC HARBOURTOWNE LLC AND MELANIE DRIVE, LLC[,]” 

among the Plat Records of Talbot County in Plat Book MAS 86/04, pages 4 and 5 (“Minor 

Revision Plat”), that adjusted the boundary line between Lot 6 and the neighboring golf 

course.7 The boundary revision incorporated 12.811 acres of Lot 6 within the boundaries 

of the adjacent and contiguous golf course.

Legal Proceedings

A. The Circuit Court

The Homeowners petitioned the Circuit Court for Talbot County to review the 

Board’s decision.8 On May 16, 2018, the circuit court found that there was substantial 

evidence to support most of the findings, but remanded the case to the Board for additional 

factual determinations.

9

 Following additional findings by the Board on remand, the 

Homeowners sought judicial review of the Board’s decision a second time, which was 

affirmed again by the circuit court on May 6, 2019.

7 The record indicates several contradictory titles for the Minor Revision Plat. We 

provide the title of the Minor Revision Plat as originally recorded in the county plat records.

8 Pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Land Use § 4-401(a), “[a]ny of the following persons 

may file a request for judicial review of a decision of a board of appeals or a zoning action 

of a legislative body by the circuit court of the county: (1) a person aggrieved by the 

decision or action[.] . . .”

9 The additional factual determinations included whether the lot’s proposed use 

would affect marine, pedestrian, and vehicle traffic, existing agricultural uses, other 

permitted or nonconforming property uses, or exceed “the minimum adjustment necessary 

to relieve the unwarranted hardship.” 
12

The Homeowners sought declaratory judgment10 in the circuit court that the 

applicable covenants prohibited the conversion of Lot 6 into a driving range. The 

Homeowners filed a motion for summary judgment and RDC filed a motion to dismiss or 

in the alternative a motion for summary judgment.

The circuit court granted the Homeowners’ motion for summary judgment, agreeing

with the Board that the interpretation and enforcement of covenants “lay beyond the 

capacity of the Talbot County Board of Appeals[.]” (Citation omitted). Therefore, 

according to the circuit court, the Homeowners did not have an opportunity to be heard on 

the issue.11 As a preliminary issue, the circuit court granted RDC’s motion for summary 

judgment regarding the Minor Revision Plat. According to the circuit court, the plain 

language of Article III, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (k) of the Original Declaration 

restricted the creation of new lots, but permitted the adjustment or realignment of boundary 

lines. RDC’s Minor Revision Plat only provided for a lot line revision, and therefore was

not prohibited by the Original Declaration.

10 Md. Code Ann., Courts and Judicial Proceedings (“Cts. & Jud. Proc.”) §§ 3-

401–415 governs declaratory judgments. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-406 states: 

Any person interested under deed, will, trust, land patent, written contract, or 

other writing constituting contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal 

relations are affected by statute, municipal ordinance, administrative rule or 

regulation, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of 

construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, 

administrative rule or regulation, land patent, contract, or franchise and 

obtain declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under it.

11 The circuit court also noted that because RDC successfully argued to the Board 

that the Original Declaration was beyond the jurisdiction of the Board, it negated its 

collateral estoppel argument. 
13

With respect to the interpretation of the Amended Declaration, the circuit court 

concluded that “the Amended Declaration is consistent with the terms and purpose of the 

Original Declaration, and the [c]ourt will enter a declaratory judgment to that effect[.]” 

Article VI of the Original Declaration authorized the Homeowners to make amendments, 

and the circuit court declared that the Amended Declaration, which prohibited the 

construction of a driving range, “is a valid restriction on all of the lots in [] Swan Point [] 

and that it is appropriately applied to Lot 6. . . .” The circuit court also concluded that its 

findings rendered moot the issue of whether the proposed driving range would violate the 

Zajic Declaration.

B. The Court of Special Appeals

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court in an unreported opinion. 

RDC Melanie Drive, LLC v. Eppard, No. 1146, Sept. Term, 2019, 2020 WL 5989518 (Md. 

Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 9, 2020). The Court began its analysis by noting that the purpose of 

the Original Declaration was to “provide for the preservation of the values and amenities 

in the community comprised of their collective properties.” Id. at *6. According to the 

Court, “the Swan Point lots were purely residential, unlike the bordering Martingham 

subdivision.” Id. at *7. 

The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the circuit court that the Amended 

Declaration was consistent with the Original Declaration, and the Amended Declaration 

supported a uniform plan for the development of Swan Point as a residential community. 

Id. at *7. The Court found no persuasive authority in Maryland for RDC’s contention that 

a new restriction to Lot 6 would invalidate the Amended Declaration. Id. According to 
14

the Court, the out-of-state cases cited by RDC were misplaced because the facts “differ 

vastly” from the case at bar. Id. The Amended Declaration, unlike any of the cases cited 

by RDC, did not create new restrictions, burdens, or covenants. Id. at *8. The Amended 

Declaration “simply clarified the terms of the Original Declaration by giving a definition 

to residential or agricultural land use that may become an annoyance or nuisance to the

neighborhood or other Owners.” Id. (internal quotation and footnote omitted).

The Court of Special Appeals also rejected RDC’s argument that the restriction in 

Article III, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (a) of the Original Declaration is void for vagueness,

because the out-of-state cases cited by RDC were “readily distinguishable” on the facts. 

Id. The Court held that the Amended Declaration was legally enforceable against Lot 6. 

Id. at *6.

The Court of Special Appeals next dismissed RDC’s contention that collateral 

estoppel bars the Homeowners from relitigating the issue of whether the driving range 

constitutes a “noxious or offensive trade or activity” or causes any “annoyance or nuisance 

to the neighborhood or other owners[.]” Id. at *9. According to the Court, the substance 

of the Original Declaration had yet to be litigated, which meant the Homeowners were not 

precluded from being heard on the issue. Id.

The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the circuit court that because the 

Amended Declaration had been determined valid and enforceable against Lot 6, the 

controversy regarding the Zajic Declaration became moot. Id. The Court also agreed with 

the circuit court that the Original Declaration permitted the realignment of Lot 6 boundary 
15

lines under the Minor Revision Plat because the plain meaning of the Original Declaration 

prohibited the creation of additional lots, not a line revision. Id. at *10. 

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

The standard of review for a grant of summary judgment is “whether the [circuit 

court] was legally correct.” Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 533, 

836 A.2d 655, 669 (2003) (citation omitted). Upon review, this Court must consider the 

facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving parties, and “if those facts are susceptible 

to inferences supporting the position of the party opposing summary judgment, then a grant 

of summary judgment is improper.” Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 79, 660 A.2d 447, 452 

(1995) (citation omitted). We review a circuit court’s decision whether to grant or deny 

declaratory relief under an abuse of discretion standard. Converge Servs. Grp., LLC v. 

Curran, 383 Md. 462, 477, 860 A.2d 871, 879–80 (2004); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. 

Proc. § 3-409(a) (“Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, a court may grant a 

declaratory judgment or decree in a civil case, if it will serve to terminate the uncertainty 

or controversy giving rise to the proceeding[.]”).

We have stated that “the interpretation of a restrictive covenant, including a 

determination of its continuing vitality, is subject to [a] de novo [standard of] review as a 

legal question.” Dumbarton Imp. Ass’n v. Druid Ridge Cemetery Co., 434 Md. 37, 55–56, 

73 A.3d 224, 235 (2013) (quoting City of Bowie v. MIE Props., Inc., 398 Md. 657, 677, 

922 A.2d 509, 521 (2007)). Principles of contract interpretation govern our review of a 

restrictive covenant. City of Bowie, 398 Md. at 677, 922 A.2d at 521. We look to the 
16

objective intent of the original parties as it “appears or is implied from the [restrictive 

covenant] itself.” Dumbarton, 434 Md. at 52, 73 A.3d at 233 (quoting Balt. Butchers 

Abattoir & Live Stock Co. v. Union Rendering Co., 179 Md, 117, 122, 17 A.2d 130, 133 

(1941)).

Contentions of the Parties

RDC contends that the Amended Declaration is not enforceable because it imposes 

a new restriction—the prohibition of a driving range—that was not included in the Original 

Declaration. According to RDC, the circuit court and Court of Special Appeals erred by 

ruling that the Amended Declaration was merely a clarification of the Original Declaration. 

RDC argues that the Original Declaration never indicated whether a driving range was 

prohibited, so the Amended Declaration did not merely clarify the Original Declaration,

but added a new wholesale restriction. In support of its argument, RDC cites Walton v. 

Jaskiewicz, 317 Md. 264, 563 A.2d 382 (1989), for the proposition that when the original 

declaration “does not expressly authorize the type of change sought to be made . . . the 

purported amendment is not valid.” According to RDC, interpreting the Amended 

Declaration as a mere clarification would give the Homeowners unfettered discretion in 

prohibiting any activity that they deemed an annoyance or a nuisance.

RDC also argues that the circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals erred in its 

application of the “uniform plan of development” doctrine. According to RDC, the 

Original Declaration “does not provide that ‘[] Swan Point [] be used uniformly for 

residential development[,]’” because the plain language of the Original Declaration never 

imposed a requirement of solely residential use. (Citation omitted). According to RDC, 
17

this Court has previously interpreted the specific omission of an activity in a restrictive 

covenant as an indication of the restrictive covenant permitting that activity. 

Even if the Original Declaration imposed a uniform plan of a residential

development, RDC claims there is no factual basis that a driving range would be 

inconsistent with a residential development. A golf course has continuously and 

contiguously operated alongside Swan Point for decades. At a minimum, RDC contends 

that the issue of whether the Original Declaration prohibits the operation of a driving range 

must be determined objectively and that RDC should be entitled to a trial on the issue. 

Alternatively, RDC argues that the issue of whether a driving range violates Swan Point’s 

covenants is procedurally barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. 

The Homeowners counter that the Amended Declaration does not add new 

restrictions or exceed the scope of the original covenants. According to the Homeowners, 

RDC incorrectly applied a rule of strict construction to the Original Declaration when the 

Original Declaration unambiguously intended to create a small residential community of 

single-family homes. The Homeowners also argue that the circuit court and the Court of 

Special Appeals correctly determined that the Amended Declaration is consistent with the 

Original Declaration. The circuit court found that the Original Declaration intended to 

create a uniform plan of development for Swan Point that was restricted to residential and 

agricultural usages. According to the Homeowners, the uniform plan of development was 

an undisputed factual finding by the circuit court, not a legal conclusion. 

The Homeowners contend that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel apply. 

According to the Homeowners, res judicata is inapplicable in this case because the present 
18

litigation and the former matter before the Board involved different causes of action, and 

the pertinent issue of restrictive covenant interpretation was not, nor could it have been 

litigated before the Board. The Homeowners also assert that collateral estoppel is 

inapplicable because its four elements are not satisfied in the case at bar. While the parties 

in the matter before the Board and the circuit court were the same, the issue of restrictive 

covenant interpretation was not actually litigated by the Board, because the Board

expressly declined to consider the issue of restrictive covenants while making its zoning 

and variance decision.

On cross-appeal, the Homeowners argue that the circuit court and Court of Special 

Appeals failed to fully analyze the original covenants. An objective analysis of the original 

covenant, according to the Homeowners, evidences a clear intent for a quiet, residential 

community. The Homeowners contend that RDC mistakenly assumed that the original 

covenant was ambiguous. The Original Declaration expressly used the phrase “uniform 

plan of development” to communicate an intent for the six properties to retain a purely

residential character. The only permitted deviation from the residential character in the 

community comes from a narrow exception for agricultural uses on Lot 6 contained in the 

Original Declaration. 

Analysis

A. Neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel apply.

As a procedural matter, we note that the issue of whether the Original Declaration

prohibited the construction and operation of a driving range on Lot 6 is not barred either 

by res judicata or collateral estoppel. In MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 367 A.2d 486 
19

(1977), this Court explained the pertinent distinction between res judicata and collateral 

estoppel:

If the second suit is between the same parties and is upon the same cause of 

action, a judgment in the earlier case on the merits is an absolute bar, not 

only as to all matters which were litigated in the earlier case, but as to all 

matters which could have been litigated ([res judicata]). If, in a second suit 

between the same parties, even though the cause of action is different, any 

determination of fact, which was actually litigated in the first case, is 

conclusive in the second case (collateral estoppel)[.] 

Id. at 32, 367 A.2d at 489 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Res judicata could not have applied in this case because the issues before the Board 

and the circuit court were different, and the Homeowners never had an opportunity to 

litigate the issue of the scope and meaning of the Original Declaration. The Board 

considered whether to grant a zoning variance and expressly declined to consider “the 

effects of or to enforce any private restrictive covenants that may impact the subject 

property.” The parties presented a distinct legal question before the circuit court 

concerning the meaning and operation of restrictive covenants. See Colandrea v. Wilde 

Lake Cmty. Ass’n, 361 Md. 371, 392, 761 A.2d 899, 910 (2000) (noting one of the 

requirements of the doctrine of res judicata is whether “the claim presented in the current 

action is identical to the one determined in the prior adjudication[]”) (emphasis added).

Collateral estoppel is also not applicable because the scope and meaning of the 

Original Declaration was not decided by the Board. See Cosby v. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 425 

Md. 629, 639, 42 A.3d 596, 602 (2012) (“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated 

and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the 

judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, 
20

whether on the same or a different claim.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Board 

expressly stated that it would not interpret the restrictive covenants. Therefore, the issue 

of whether the restrictive covenants prohibited the operation of a driving range was not 

actually litigated in the first case. We conclude that neither res judicata nor collateral 

estoppel apply.

B. The unambiguous meaning of the Original Declaration was to create a 

residential community of single-family homes in Swan Point. 

In Belleview Constr. Co. v. Rugby Hall Cmty. Ass’n, this Court explained the 

standard for construing restrictive covenants in Maryland: 

In construing covenants, ‘[i]t is a cardinal principle . . . that the court should 

be governed by the intention of the parties as it appears or is implied from 

the instrument itself.’ The language of the instrument is properly ‘considered 

in connection with the object in view of the parties and the circumstances 

and conditions affecting the parties and the property. . . .’ This principle is 

consistent with the general law of contracts. If the meaning of the instrument 

is not clear from its terms, ‘the circumstances surrounding the execution of 

the instrument should be considered in arriving at the intention of the parties, 

and the apparent meaning and object of their stipulations should be gathered 

from all possible sources.’

If an ambiguity is present, and if that ambiguity is not clearly resolved by 

resort to extrinsic evidence, the general rule in favor of the unrestricted use 

of property will prevail and the ambiguity in a restriction will be resolved 

against the party seeking its enforcement. The rule of strict construction 

should not be employed, however, to defeat a restrictive covenant that is 

clear on its face, or is clear when considered in light of the surrounding 

circumstances.

321 Md. 152, 157–58, 592 A.2d 493, 495–96 (1990) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

“In particular, our recent cases have identified Belleview as the seminal case 

addressing the evolution of our covenant jurisprudence from a purely strict construction 

approach to that of a reasonableness approach.” City of Bowie, 398 Md. at 680, 922 A.2d 
21

at 523 (citations omitted). “[R]easonable construction permits the consideration of the 

circumstances surrounding the adoption of the ambiguous covenant to effectuate the 

ascertainable intent of the parties.” Id., 922 A.2d at 523. “An ambiguity arises when the 

language of the [restrictive covenant] is susceptible of more than one meaning to a 

reasonably prudent person.” County Comm’rs of Charles Cty. v. St. Charles Assocs. Ltd.

P’ship, 366 Md. 426, 445, 784 A.2d 545, 556 (2001). “In endeavoring to arrive at the 

intention, the words used should be taken in their ordinary and popular sense, unless it 

plainly appears from the context that the parties intended to use them in a different sense, 

or that they have acquired a peculiar or special meaning in respect to the particular subjectmatter.” Id. at 447–48, 784 A.2d at 558 (quoting Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md. App. 137, 153, 

607 A.2d 82, 90 (1992)).

“An ambiguity does not exist simply because a strained or conjectural construction 

can be given to a word.” Belleview, 321 Md. at 159, 582 A.2d at 496. “[A] covenant need 

not address every conceivable issue or potential outcome to avoid being ambiguous; it need 

only provide a clear answer for the matter in dispute.” Dumbarton, 434 Md. at 57, 73 A.3d 

at 235.

In Belleview, Rugby Hall Estates, a residential community, along with a majority of 

the owners of the lots in Rugby Hall Estates, executed and recorded a restrictive covenant 

stating, “only one single family dwelling for private residence purposes shall be erected on 

each lot.” 321 Md. at 154, 582 A.2d at 494. Lot A contained a single-family home and 

was subdivided to create lots A and C. Id. at 155, 582 A.2d at 494. Belleview Construction 

Company attempted to construct a home on a newly created lot C, but Rugby Hall Estates 
22

challenged the proposed construction as “contrary to the scheme of development of the 

community.” Id. at 156, 582 A.2d at 495. This Court applied its reasonable construction

approach to decide whether “each lot” described in the restrictive covenant referred to lots

as conveyed by the original developer, Rugby Hall Estates, or as they stood following resubdivision. Id. at 154, 582 A.2d at 493. 

This Court held that the restrictive covenant plainly limited the construction of just 

one single-family home per lot, as conveyed by the original developer. Id. at 158, 582 

A.2d at 496. This Court examined the language in the original deed of covenant to infer 

that the “general plan of the development was for an attractive and desirable community 

consisting of lots of substantial but varying sizes, with little or no repetition in shape.” Id. 

at 159, 582 A.2d at 496. This Court also noted that the subdivision maintained this 

common plan of development for over thirty years. Id. at 159–60, 582 A.2d at 496. While 

the restrictive covenant did not expressly state whether “each lot” referred to the original 

subdivision of the community, this Court did not find any ambiguity in the original 

restrictive covenant after construing the instrument in its entirety. See id. at 159, 582 A.2d 

at 496 (“it almost defies common sense to suggest that although ‘lot’ obviously means a 

lot as conveyed by the developer virtually everywhere it is used in the deed of restrictions, 

it should somehow be afforded a different meaning . . . when it is used in this restriction.”). 

In City of Bowie, this Court followed the same analytical approach used in Belleview

to similarly conclude as a matter of law that the language of the restrictive covenant was 

“clear and unambiguous as to the intent of [the] parties.” 398 Md. at 682, 922 A.2d at 524. 

MIE Properties acquired a 466-acre parcel of land from the City of Bowie (“the City”) with 
23

the intent of partnering with the University of Maryland to create a research park on the 

property. Id. at 669, 922 A.2d at 516. University of Maryland withdrew from the project, 

but the original declaration of covenants maintained fourteen restricted usages for the 

property, ranging from “[o]ffice buildings for science, technology, research and related 

issues” to “convenience commercial establishments[.]” Id. at 669–70, 922 A.2d at 517. 

MIE Properties eventually leased a portion of the property to a dance studio. Id. at 672, 

922 A.2d at 518. The City challenged this lease as a violation of the restrictive covenant 

for the property. Id., 922 A.2d at 518.

This Court interpreted the fourteen enumerated uses of the property to conclude that 

the clear intent of the covenant was to “develop a research park, with or without the 

involvement of the University of Maryland.” Id. at 683, 922 A.2d at 525. This Court 

analyzed the fourteen permitted uses of the land and determined that each was consonant 

with that overarching purpose, even though the covenant lacked any express language 

specifying that the particular purpose for the property was to develop a research park. See 

id., 922 A.2d at 525 (“Both the Agreement and the Covenants originally enumerated 

[fourteen] permitted uses, each addressing that purpose.”). “We may not invalidate a 

plainly written covenant to save a party from what may prove to be a poor business 

decision.” Id., 922 A.2d at 525 (footnote omitted). “Even if the instruments were 

ambiguous, the [circuit court] was not clearly erroneous in its factual finding as to the 

purpose of the Covenants.” Id., 922 A.2d at 525 (footnote omitted).

Similar to the covenants found in Belleview and City of Bowie, the Original 

Declaration, in the case at bar, does not state expressly that usage of Swan Point lots are 
24

restricted to residential purposes, but it is plain from the four corners of the Original 

Declaration that the purpose of the instrument was to maintain the residential character of 

a small subdivision comprised of single-family homes.12 The Original Declaration begins 

with a preamble stating the general purpose to impose restrictions that promoted the values 

and character of the community: 

WHEREAS, the Declarants desire to provide for the preservation of the 

values and amenities in the community comprised of their collective 

properties; and to this end, desire to impose upon the Property [i.e., Swan 

Point] the covenants, restrictions, easements and equitable servitudes, 

hereinafter set forth, each and all of which are for the benefit of the Property 

and the owners thereof. . . .

(Emphasis added). The preamble does not expressly state an intent to preserve the 

residential values and amenities of the community, but similar to City of Bowie, we review 

the restrictions following the preamble to ascertain that the overarching purpose of Original 

Declaration was to preserve the residential character of the community. Article III, 

Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (a) of the Original Declaration provides: 

No noxious or offensive trade or activity shall be carried on upon any Lot or 

within any dwelling, nor shall anything be done therein or thereon, which 

may be or become an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood or other 

Owners. . . .

(Emphasis added).

12 We note that Article III, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (t) states: “Notwithstanding 

any provision contained herein to the contrary, the Owner of Lot 6 shall be permitted to 

plant and harvest crops on Lot 6, including the leasing of such property to a farm tenant.” 

This specific carve out recognized the preexisting agricultural activity on Lot 6 and further 

demonstrates that but for this one exception, the remainder of the Original Declaration is 

dedicated to the preservation of a single-family, residential community. See Williar v. Balt. 

Butchers’ Loan & Annuity Ass’n, 45 Md. 546, 552 (1877) (“according to the maxim ‘the 

exception proves the rule,’ all other cases are left within the operation of the enacting 

clause.”) (citation omitted).
25

While “noxious or offensive trade or activity” or the word “anything” may be 

capacious language, it is not ambiguous in context of the entire covenant and this present 

dispute. See supra Dumbarton, 434 Md. at 57, 73 A.3d at 235. It illustrates the intention 

of the Original Declaration in preserving the residential character of the subdivision by 

broadly restricting activities that would disturb the property owners of Swan Point. Article 

III, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (a) continues with a demonstrative, but non-exhaustive list 

of activities that are prohibited: 

Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, no speaker, horn, whistle, 

siren, bell, amplifier or other sound device, except such devices as may be 

used exclusively for security purposes, shall be located, installed or 

maintained upon the exterior of any dwelling or upon the exterior of any 

other improvements constructed upon any Lot. No snowmobiles, go-carts, 

motor bikes, trail bikes or other loud engine recreational vehicles shall be run 

or operated upon any Lot or upon the roads serving the Property.

(Emphasis added).

These enumerated loud noise-making devices are distinctly residential in nature and 

therefore demonstrate a broad prohibition of activities that may be found on one lot that 

may disturb another residence within Swan Point. See Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. 

American Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129, 111 S. Ct. 1156, 1163 (1991) 

(“Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term follows a specific one, the 

general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific 

enumeration.”) (citation omitted). The security systems and recreational vehicles, 

referenced in the restriction, are made in relation to “any dwelling” or “any Lot[,]” which 

was defined elsewhere in the Original Declaration as belonging to “a residence of a single 

person or family.” (Emphasis added). This Court has acknowledged that language 
26

pertaining to “single-family” homes connotes a specific, limited use of property for quiet 

enjoyment, even more so than restrictive covenants merely using the term “residential.” 

See Lowden v. Bosley, 395 Md. 58, 68–69, 909 A.2d 261, 267 (2006) (noting the usage of 

“single family” in a restrictive covenant narrows what can be construed as “residential”). 

The restrictions unambiguously seek to preserve the residential character of Swan Point. 

The list of restricted activities provided in the Original Declaration prohibits any

potentially disturbing commercial activities or trades, namely the hitting of golf balls, the 

operation of golf ball collection machines, or loud congregations of driving range patrons, 

because such activities were plainly not within the contemplated residential character of 

the subdivision. It would be unnecessary for the Original Declaration to have specifically 

prohibited golf activities or a driving range when every other restriction in the Original 

Declaration plainly pertains to the maintenance of a small, residential community of singlefamily homes.13

This interpretation is further supported by a series of other specific prohibitions in 

Article III, seeking to limit what a property owner or subsequent property owner may do 

to a lot and a single-family home located within the subdivision. A lot owner may not keep 

13 RDC argues that because Swan Point was developed next to a golf course, the 

omission of a specific restriction against golf or a driving range demonstrates that the 

activity is not prohibited under the Original Declaration. As a matter of construction, and 

contrary to RDC’s contention, a specific prohibition against golf activities would 

undermine the purpose of the Original Declaration to maintain the subdivision’s residential 

character by suggesting, through negative implication, that other unenumerated

commercial activities were permitted. In re Walker, 473 Md. 68, __ n.9, 248 A.3d 981, 

991 n.9 (2021) (“[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of 

the alternative[.]”) (quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 574 n.6, 911 A.2d 427, 433 

n.6 (2006)). 
27

or raise animal livestock, may not store junk or commercial vehicles, may not erect a 

temporary structure, may not place signage, may not place satellite dishes that are visible 

from the roadway, may not hunt, may not excavate the lots, may not place exterior lighting 

facing beyond the lot, and may not construct more than one single-family dwelling per lot 

except for caretakers homes.

The latter phrase in Article III, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (a), “which may be or 

become an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood or other Owners[,]” provides an 

additional indication of the intent of the developers to preserve the residential character of 

Swan Point. (Emphasis added). Over a century ago, in Lohmuller v. Samuel Kirk & Son 

Co., 133 Md. 78, 104 A. 270 (1918), this Court distinguished between an annoyance and a 

nuisance. Id. at __, 104 A. 270 at 274 (“While it shows that the noise complained of does 

subject the plaintiffs . . . to some annoyance and discomfort, the record does not, in our 

judgment, present such a clear case of an invasion by the defendant of the rights of the 

plaintiffs as entitled them to the relief prayed.”). 

Not everything that causes annoyance constitutes a nuisance, because a nuisance 

requires a substantial and unreasonable interference with a property owner’s use and 

enjoyment of land. Compare Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright, 433 Md. 303, 410, 71 A.3d 

30, 95 (2013) (“although there is no dispute that any interference with Appellees’ 

properties by Exxon was unreasonable, there is little to suggest that Appellees with nondetect results experienced a substantial interference[]”) (emphasis added), with

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (June 2021 Update) 

(“Freedom from discomfort and annoyance while using land is often as important to a 
28

person as freedom from physical interruption with his [or her] use or freedom from 

detrimental change in the physical condition of the land itself.”). The language used in the 

restrictive covenant demonstrates a broad and inclusive continuum of prohibited activities 

ranging from those that are merely an annoyance to those that satisfy the legal definition 

of nuisance.

We do not have to determine whether the construction and operation of a driving 

range would constitute a nuisance.14 Our analysis is limited to what the drafters of the 

Original Declaration intended when using language restricting activities that may become 

an annoyance or nuisance as determined by the Homeowners. Without having to specify 

every possible annoying or nuisance activity, the Original Declaration employed broad 

14 The initial letter sent to Swan Point residents on behalf of RDC acknowledged 

the occurrence of errant golf balls leaving the driving range: “relocating the driving range 

will allow us to significantly reduce the number of golf balls flying on to Martingham 

Drive.” We note several cases from our sister jurisdictions who have determined that errant 

golf balls or noise generated from golf activity may constitute a nuisance. Gellman v. 

Seawane Golf & Country Club, Inc., 24 A.D.3d 415, 805 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2005) (holding 

that the operation of a driving range that allowed golf balls to escape the range and land on 

property across the street was a nuisance); Mish v. Elks Country Club, 35 Pa. D. & C.3d 

435, 436 (1983) (“The continuing possibility (probability) that balls will strike plaintiffs’ 

property is clearly an invasion of their interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”); 

Sierra Screw Products v. Azusa Greens, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 358, 370, 151 Cal. Rptr. 799, 

806 (1979) (recognizing that operation of adjacent golf course may constitute nuisance 

despite enabling zoning ordinance); Fenton v. Quaboag Country Club, Inc., 353 Mass. 534, 

538–39, 233 N.E.2d 216, 219 (1968) (“The pertinent inquiry is whether the noise (the 

invasion of golf balls) materially interferes with the physical comfort of existence . . . 

according to the simple tastes and unaffected notions generally prevailing among plain 

people (nongolfers). The standard is what ordinary people (again those who eschew golf),

acting reasonably, have a right to demand in the way of health and comfort under all the 

circumstances.”); Sans v. Ramsey Golf & Country Club, Inc., 29 N.J. 438, 449, 149 A.2d 

599, 606 (1959) (“the activities of defendant [golf course operator] are manifestly 

incompatible with the ordinary and expected comfortable life in plaintiffs’ home”). 
29

language to ensure property owners at Swan Point could enjoy and maintain the residential 

character of their community. 

The Original Declaration also tied the determination of what constitutes an 

annoyance to the owners of Swan Point: “which may be or become an annoyance or 

nuisance to the neighborhood or other Owners.” (Emphasis added). Both the Court of 

Special Appeals and circuit court correctly noted that what this particular “neighborhood”

deems an annoyance necessarily required a subjective interpretation by the majority of lot 

owners of Swan Point. The Original Declaration also instructs that interpretation of the 

restrictive covenants is to be made liberally and in conformance with its overarching 

purpose to create a uniform, residential community: “The provisions hereof shall be 

liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of creating a uniform plan for the development 

and operation of the Property.” Similar to Belleview, Swan Point maintained this uniform 

plan of development for thirty years. See 321 Md. at 160, 582 A.2d at 496. We find no

indication in the record that the circuit court’s finding as to Swan Point’s uniform plan of 

development as a residential community was clearly erroneous.

We conclude that the Original Declaration unambiguously imposed restrictions on 

certain activities, both residential and commercial, to preserve the residential character and 

uniform plan of development of a small, single-family community.

15

 

15 By implication of its unambiguous language, we also conclude that the Original 

Declaration was not too vague to be enforced.
30

C. The Court of Special Appeals correctly determined that the Amended 

Declaration clarified the Original Declaration by prohibiting commercial 

driving ranges on the six lots of Swan Point.

We need not resolve whether the Original Declaration would have prohibited a 

driving range on Lot 6 because we agree with the Court of Special Appeals and circuit 

court that the Amended Declaration was consistent with the Original Declaration and 

validly prohibited a driving range on any lot within Swan Point.

16

 Pursuant to Article IV 

of the Original Declaration, the Homeowners specified the following amendment:

(u) No Lot within the Property, nor any portion thereof, shall be converted 

from residential or agricultural use into a commercial or private golf course 

use, nor shall any Lot be utilized as or in connection with a driving range or 

similar commercial use in connection with a golf course, it being the intent 

of the subscribers hereto that the Swan Point subdivision retain its character 

as a residential, single family dwelling community, and not be converted into 

a commercial resort property for use by members of the public, golf course 

members, or resort hotel guests.

16 Homeowners contended on cross-petition that the circuit court and the Court of 

Special Appeals erred by failing to render an analysis of whether the Original Declaration 

restricted Lot 6 to residential or agricultural usages. Neither the circuit court nor the Court 

of Special Appeals erred in this regard as each court necessarily analyzed the Original 

Declaration to conclude, respectively, that a driving range would violate the uniform, 

residential character of Swan Point. RDC Melanie Drive, 2020 WL 5989518, at *7–8 

(“Indeed, the Swan Point lots were purely residential, unlike the bordering Martingham 

subdivision. . . . We agree with the circuit court that [the Amended Declaration] is 

consistent with the Original Declaration and supports a uniform plan for the development 

of the property. Notably, a driving range would not support the uniformity of an otherwise 

residential community[]”); Eppard, C-20-CV-18-000079, at *18 (“The scope of the 

Amended Declaration was within the reasonable contemplation of the Original 

Declaration[.] . . . One could reasonably anticipate such an amendment from the plain 

language of the Original Declaration.”). Similarly, the circuit court and Court of Special 

Appeals did not err in failing to address Article III, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (m) of the 

Original Declaration or integrating the Zajic Declaration into their analysis. For reasons 

previously stated, neither of these provisions warranted individual consideration by the 

circuit court and Court of Special Appeals in reaching their respective decisions.
31

RDC cites Walton for the proposition that a majority of landowners cannot enact an 

amendment over the objection of a minority of landowners within a subdivision. RDC’s 

reliance on Walton is misplaced, and supports our conclusion that the Amended 

Declaration clarified the purpose of the Original Declaration to preserve the residential 

character of Swan Point. In Walton, a developer recorded a restrictive covenant stating,

“[t]here shall be no further subdivision of lots in this tract.” 317 Md. at 265, 563 A.2d at 

382. The preamble to the restrictive covenant expressed an intent to assure uniformity of 

development and to “make certain that said restrictions shall apply uniformly to all the lots 

in said subdivision[.] . . .” Id., 563 A.2d at 382. A family owned Lot 26 in the subdivision 

and wished to split its lot into two smaller properties. Id. at 266, 563 A.2d at 383. The 

Walton family obtained the support of a majority of owners and amended the restrictive 

covenant to read: “Except for Lot 26, Plat Two as shown on the Plat of Subdivision, there 

shall be no further subdivision of lots in this tract. Lot 26, Plat Two shall not be 

resubdivided into more than two lots.” Id., 563 A.2d at 383. Edmond Jaskiewicz and a 

minority of other owners opposed the amendment. Id., 563 A.2d at 383.

This Court held that the amendment was not authorized by the original restrictive 

covenant because it violated the original intent of the developers to uniformly apply the 

restriction to the entire subdivision. Id. at 272–73, 563 A.2d at 386. While the original 

restrictive covenant permitted changes through amendment, an amendment must maintain 

the intent of the original restrictive covenant to apply restrictions uniformly to all lots 

within the residential subdivision. Id. at 272, 563 A.2d at 386. 
32

In the case at bar, and consistent with Walton, the majority of property owners 

amended the Original Declaration, while maintaining the intent of the Original Declaration 

to uniformly impose restrictions that maintain the residential character of the subdivision.

Both the Original Declaration and the Amended Declaration seek to preserve the residential 

character of Swan Point by imposing restrictions that apply uniformly to each lot in the 

subdivision. Unlike Walton, the majority of Homeowners at Swan Point did not attempt 

to deviate from the uniform, residential character of the subdivision. The owners clarified

the preexisting, uniform, and broad restriction against offensive, noxious, annoying, or 

nuisance activities that applied to all lots in Swan Point by specifying a driving range as 

one such activity. Had the Homeowners amended the Original Declaration by prohibiting 

golf activities solely on Lot 6, then Walton would control, and the amendment may have 

been invalid. We hold that the Amended Declaration validly clarified a restriction against 

activities contravening the residential character of Swan Point.17

17 We neither need to discuss, nor distinguish, the out-of-state cases cited by RDC 

because, as the Court of Special Appeals correctly noted, “the terms of the Original and 

Amended Declarations in this case differ vastly from the restrictions and covenants in the 

out-of-state cases.” RDC Melanie Drive, 2020 WL 5989518, at *7. We also reject the 

Homeowners’ argument that the circuit court failed in granting injunctive relief and the 

Court of Special Appeals failed to remand the case to address the question of injunctive 

relief. “The issuance of a declaratory judgment does not lead ineluctably to ancillary relief, 

such as an injunction.” Falls Road Cmty. Ass’n, v. Baltimore County, 437 Md. 115, 150, 

85 A.3d 185, 206 (2014). “In some instances, a declaratory judgment may itself eliminate 

the need for injunctive relief[.] . . .” See id. n.44, 85 A.3d at 206 n.44. 
33

D. The Court of Special Appeals correctly concluded that Article III, Paragraph

1, Subparagraph (k) of the Original Declaration permitted RDC to make a lot 

line revision.

The plain text of Article III, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (k) of the Original 

Declaration clearly permitted the revision of existing lot lines:

(k) No Lot shall be subdivided; provided, however, that this restriction shall 

not be construed to prohibit the adjustment or realignment of boundary lines 

between Lots as long as such adjustment or realignment shall not create an 

additional Lot.

(Emphasis added).

In the case at bar, RDC recorded the “Minor Revision Plat” to adjust the boundary 

line between Lot 6 and the Links. There is nothing in the record to suggest that RDC 

created a new lot from the realignment of the boundary lines. We agree with both the 

circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals “that the plain language of the Original 

Declaration is consistent with the Minor Revision Plat.” RDC Melanie Drive, 2020 WL 

5989518, at *10.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons previously explained, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special 

Appeals.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 

SPECIAL APPEALS IS AFFIRMED. 

COSTS TO BE PAID BY 

PETITIONER.