required to overcome the rebuttable presumption of prejudice. NRS 

34.800(2). 

First, appellant argues that he has good cause because of 

ineffective assistance of his trial and previous post-conviction appellate 

counsel. A procedurally barred claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel cannot constitute cause for additional claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 

503, 506 (2003). In addition, appellant had no statutory right to postconviction counsel, and thus the ineffective assistance of post-conviction 

counsel does not provide good cause for a successive and untimely petition. 

See McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 164-65 & n.5, 912 P.2d 255, 258 & 

n.5 (1996); Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303 & n.5, 934 P.2d 247, 253 

& n.5 (1997). 3 

Moreover, appellant fails to demonstrate actual prejudice. 

Appellant claims that his trial counsel failed to inform him that he would 

be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, that counsel coerced 

his plea due to the Mexican government's opposition to the death penalty, 

3Appellant also argues that Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. , 132 S. 

Ct. 1309 (2012), provides good cause to raise his claims of ineffective 

assistance of post-conviction appellate counsel. A claim under the 

Martinez decision was not raised in the district court, and therefore, we 

decline to consider this claim in the first instance on appeal. See Davis v. 

State, 107 Nev. 600, 606, 817 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1991), overruled on other 

grounds by Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012-13, 103 P.2d 25, 33 (2004). 

As a separate and independent ground for denying this argument, 

Martinez does not apply to "appeals from initial-review collateral 

proceedings," and therefore, does not apply to appellant's claims of 

ineffective assistance of post-conviction appellate counsel. Martinez, 566 

U.S. at , 132 S. Ct. at 1320. 

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that counsel coerced his guilty plea by threatening to have his family 

deported, and that post-conviction counsel failed to properly raise those 

claims in the post-conviction appeal. Appellant cannot demonstrate actual 

prejudice for these claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because 

he acknowledged in the guilty plea agreement that he understood his 

sentence would be for a term of life without the possibility of parole and 

that he made the agreement voluntarily, and not under duress or coercion. 

At the plea canvass, appellant also acknowledged that he had stipulated to 

a sentence of life without the possibility of parole and informed the court 

that no one had threatened or coerced him into entering his plea. Further, 

as appellant was not entitled to post-conviction counsel, he cannot show 

prejudice stemming from his appellate post-conviction counsel's 

performance. Moreover, appellant fails to demonstrate that any of these 

claims would have had a reasonable likelihood of success had postconviction counsel raised them on appeal, and therefore, fails to 

demonstrate any prejudice for the failure to raise them on appeal. 

Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that these claims 

were procedurally barred. 

Second, appellant argues he had good cause because he lacks 

access to the prison law library and to prison law clerks, he is uneducated, 

he does not speak English, and has no access to Spanish-language legal 

material. Appellant fails to demonstrate that inadequate law libraries or 

inadequate assistance from legally trained persons deprived him of 

meaningful access to the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 

(1977), limited by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-56 (1996). Further, 

appellant's alleged language barrier does not provide good cause in this 

case as appellant has already litigated a post-conviction petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 

2006) (holding that equitable tolling requires a non-English speaking 

petitioner demonstrate that during the time period, the petitioner was 

unable to procure either legal materials in his own language or translation 

assistance despite diligent efforts). Moreover, appellant's lack of 

education fails to demonstrate that an impediment external to the defense 

prevented appellant from complying with the procedural bars. See 

generally Phelps v. Dir., Nev. Dep't of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 660, 764 P.2d 

1303, 1306 (1988) (holding that petitioner's claim of organic brain damage, 

borderline mental retardation and reliance on assistance of inmate law 

clerk unschooled in the law did not constitute good cause for the filing of a 

successive post-conviction petition). 

Fourth, appellant appears to assert that he has good cause to 

overcome the procedural bars because the district court erred in the 

proceedings for his first post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

by declining to appoint post-conviction counsel, by declining to conduct an 

evidentiary hearing regarding the claims in his first petition, and by orally 

denying the petition at a status conference without appellant's presence. 

These issues have already been considered and rejected by this court. 

Felix v. State, Docket No. 49613 (Order of Affirmance, February 3, 2009). 

The doctrine of law of the case prevents further litigation of these issues 

and "cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused 

argument." Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975). 

Appellant also fails to overcome the presumption of prejudice 

to the State because he fails to demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice. See NRS 34.800(1)(b). Therefore, the district court did not err in 

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denying the petition as procedurally barred and barred by laches. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Hardesty 

Parraguirre 

Cherry 

cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge 

Federal Public Defender/Las Vegas 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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