[Cite as State v. Griffith, 2011-Ohio-6410.]

STATE OF OHIO, MONROE COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, ) 

 ) CASE NO. 11 MO 3 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, ) 

 ) 

 - VS - ) O P I N I O N 

 ) 

DANNELLE GRIFFITH, ) 

 ) 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from County Court, Case 

 No. 2010CRB329. 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: Attorney L. Kent Riethmiller 

 Prosecuting Attorney 

 Attorney Thomas Hampton 

 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

 101 North Main Street, Room 15 

 Woodsfield, Ohio 43793 

For Defendant-Appellant: Attorney Joseph Vavra

 132 West Main Street 

 P.O. Box 430 

 St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

 Dated: December 12, 2011 
VUKOVICH, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Dannelle Griffith appeals the decision of the Monroe 

County Court denying her motion to suppress. Griffith asserts that the officer’s 

observation of her driving and hitting the curb twice, stumbling out of the car, unusual 

staring, constricted pupils and the information from her employer about her allegedly 

being “high” did not establish probable cause for stopping and arresting her. For the 

reasons expressed below, we disagree with Griffith’s position and affirm the judgment 

of the trial court. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

{¶ 2} In the evening hours of July 7, 2010, Griffith was terminated from her 

position with Monroe County Care Center for failing to take a drug screening test. 

Following her discharge, someone from Monroe County Care Center called the Village 

of Woodsfield Police Department and indicated that they believed Griffith was “high” 

on drugs. They were told that she left the premises in her silver Cavalier. 

{¶ 3} Officers Young and Neuhardt responded to the call; they drove to 

Griffith’s residence to see if she made it home. When she was not there, they began 

patrolling and after a few minutes they got behind her on East Church Street. The 

officers did not stop Griffith, but rather followed her to her home. During this drive, 

they observed her hit the curb twice. The officers initiated a stop at Griffith’s home. 

{¶ 4} Officer Young spoke with Griffith and asked her to exit her vehicle, which 

she did. Officer Young then decided to take her to the police department. She was 

not informed that she was under arrest, but the officer stated that he considered her in 

custody at that point. Griffith was not Mirandized. 

{¶ 5} At some point prior to taking her to the police department, the officers 

observed a piece of plastic with white residue on it on the passenger seat. They also 

searched her glove box and found drug paraphernalia. 

{¶ 6} At the police department a urine sample was taken, which tested positive 

with “Hydrocodone 5,335 ng/ml.” She also gave the officers permission to search her 
purse. In the purse, the officer found two pills of Hydrocodone that were not in a script 

bottle. Tr. 22. 

{¶ 7} As a result of the above, Griffith was charged with drug possession, a 

first degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2925.11; drug paraphernalia, a fourthdegree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 2925.14(C)(1); and operating a motor vehicle 

while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation 

of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d) (third offense within six years). 

{¶ 8} Griffith pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress. The motion sought 

to suppress any opinion and observation of Officer Young regarding Griffith’s sobriety 

level, any statements she made to the Officers while in route to the police department 

and while at the police department. She also asserted that suppression should be 

granted because the officers did not have probable cause to stop, detain or arrest her. 

The state opposed the motion. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in 

part. The court found that the search of the car was without a warrant, was not 

consented to, and was not incidental to the arrest. Thus, the drug paraphernalia 

collected during the search of the car and glove box., i.e. the snort straw found in the 

glove box, was excluded. Also, the court suppressed a statement made by Griffith 

concerning her hitting something with her vehicle because she was under arrest at the 

time but had not been Mirandized. However, the trial court found that the officers did 

have probable cause to stop, detain and test Griffith. Therefore, the officers’ 

observations of her driving and opinions on her impairment were not suppressed. 

Likewise, the drugs found in her purse were also not suppressed. 

{¶ 9} Following that ruling, Griffith pled no contest to the possession of drugs 

and driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol charges; the state dismissed 

the drug paraphernalia charge. The trial court accepted the plea, found Griffith guilty, 

and sentenced her. She received 120 days in jail with 90 days suspended. The court 

stated she could either serve the 30 days in jail or complete a 90 day residential drug 

and alcohol treatment program. She was fined $1,050, but the court suspended $200 

of that fine. The court ordered two years of supervised probation, but indicated it 

would be terminated after one year if she fully complied. Additionally, her driver’s 

license was suspended for one year. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 10} “THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE MOTION OF THE 

APPELLANT TO SUPPRESS AS THE OFFICERS LACK PROBABLE CAUSE TO 

STOP OR MAKE THE ARREST OF APPELLANT.” 

{¶ 11} Griffith pled no contest to the charges; therefore, the trial court’s 

suppression ruling is reviewable on appeal. Crim.R. 12(I); State v. Ulis (1992), 65 

Ohio St.3d 83. The standard of review for a suppression ruling is two-fold. State v. 

Dabney, 7th Dist. No. 02BE31, 2003-Ohio-5141, at ¶9, citing State v. Lloyd (1998), 

126 Ohio App.3d 95, 100-101. Since the trial court is in the best position to evaluate 

witness credibility, an appellate court must uphold the trial court's findings of fact if 

they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Id., citing State v. Winand

(1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 286, 288, citing Tallmadge v. McCoy (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 

604, 608. However, once an appellate court has accepted those facts as true, the 

court must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the 

applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. Clayton (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 627. 

This determination is a question of law of which an appellate court cannot give 

deference to the trial court's conclusion. Id., citing Lloyd, supra.

{¶ 12} The argument in this appeal concerns not only the legality of the stop, 

but the legality of the arrest. We take this opportunity to emphasize that a stop and an 

arrest are wholly distinct concepts which are supported by wholly distinct standards. 

An officer needs only reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop, not probable cause. 

Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 2, 11-12. To justify an investigatory stop of a 

vehicle, the officer must demonstrate specific and articulable facts which, when 

considered with the rational inferences that can be drawn, justify a reasonable 

suspicion that the individual to be stopped may be involved in criminal activity, 

including minor traffic violations. Id. See, also, Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21-

22. 

{¶ 13} In order to make an arrest, the officer needs probable cause. State v. 

Homan (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 427 (Superseded by statute on other grounds as 
stated in R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b).). “Probable cause exists where there is a reasonable 

ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to 

warrant a cautious person in the belief that an individual is guilty of the offense with 

which he or she is charged.” State v. Downen (Jan. 12, 2000), 7th Dist. No. 97BA53. 

Or in other words, the standard for determining whether there was probable cause to 

arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs is whether, at the 

moment of arrest, the police had sufficient information, derived from a reasonably 

trustworthy source of facts and circumstances, sufficient to cause a prudent person to 

believe that the suspect was driving under the influence. Homan, supra at 427. That 

determination is based on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 

arrest. Id. 

{¶ 14} Our analysis will begin with whether the trial court’s determination that 

there was a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the stop was correct. In 

formulating an answer to that question, we note the following facts. The police 

department received a call that Griffith was terminated from her position with Monroe 

County Care Center for refusing to take a drug test. The employer believed Griffith to 

be “high” and reported to the police department that she left in her vehicle. Officers 

Young and Neuhardt responded to the call and began patrolling in the vicinity of 

Griffith’s residence. They got behind her on East Church Street; she was traveling 

east towards her house and was approximately 300 yards from her house. They 

began following her and observed that in a 200 yard distance she hit the curb twice on 

the driver’s side. East Church Street is not a one way street, but since parking is 

allowed on one side of the street it is necessary to travel in the wrong lane when 

traveling east on East Church Street. Officer Young described the nature of her driving 

as a “slow veer.” The officers followed her to her house, when she stopped, the 

officers activated the lights and initiated the stop. 

{¶ 15} Considering both the officers’ observations of Griffith’s driving and the 

report made by Monroe County Care Center, there was reasonable articulable 

suspicion for the stop. State v. Stanley, 9th Dist. No. 23832, 2008-Ohio-4840, ¶9-11 

citing State v. Mittiga (July 3, 1996), 9th Dist. No. 17616. While a tip from an informant 

alone may not be sufficient to justify a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity, when there is independent police corroboration through observation of the 

driver repeatedly weaving within her own lane within in a short distance, it does 

amount to a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Stanley, supra. Thus, 

there is no merit with Griffith’s assertion that there was no reasonable suspicion to 

justify the stop. 

{¶ 16} The analysis now turns to whether there was probable cause for the 

arrest. As stated above, the officers observed her hit the curb twice within a 200 yard 

distance. When Officer Young approached the car, the first thing he asked Griffith was 

about hitting the curb. Her response was “What curb?” He indicated that during their 

conversation, Griffith would just sit there, staring straight ahead. He indicated it was 

“[a]lmost like I was just talking to nobody.” He asked Griffith to exit the car. She 

complied, however, she stumbled getting out of the car and leaned against it. Officer 

Young also noted her pupils; they were small and like pencil lead. However, he also 

indicated that her speech was not slurred and there was no odor of alcohol emanating 

from her. No field sobriety tests were performed. 

{¶ 17} The lack of field sobriety tests alone does not indicate that there was no 

probable cause for the arrest. “The totality of the facts and circumstances can support 

a finding of probable cause to arrest even where no field sobriety tests were 

administered or where * * * the test results must be excluded[.]” Homan, 89 Ohio 

St.3d at 427. Observations made during the stop may contribute to the totality of the 

circumstances analysis bearing upon probable cause. State v. Vonalt, (9th Dist. No. 

10CA0103-M, 2011-Ohio-3883, ¶12. 

{¶ 18} Furthermore, the lack of an odor of alcohol does not indicate that there 

was no probable cause for the arrest. Driving under the influence means either being 

impaired by alcohol or by drugs. If a driver is impaired by use of drugs, which was 

suspected in this case, there will be no odor of alcohol. Thus, merely because there 

was no odor of alcohol does not mean that Griffith was not under the influence. 

{¶ 19} In addition to the report made to the police department and Officer 

Young’s observations of Griffith’s driving, there were other indications of impairment. 

First, there was Griffith’s behavior. She was staring straight ahead and Officer Young 

indicated that he felt that he was talking to himself. Also, when he asked her about the 
curb, her answer of “what curb” is an indication that she was unaware that she hit the 

curb and/or that the street had a curb. Either indication is odd considering the officers 

witnessed her hit the curb twice. Second, Officer Young noted that her pupils were 

small and like lead. This is also odd considering that this stop occurred around 

midnight. At that time of night normal human pupils would not be constricted in that 

manner. Lastly, Officer Young observed Griffith stumble out of the car and lean on the 

car while he was talking to her. 

{¶ 20} Considering all of these facts, there was sufficient information to cause a 

prudent person to believe that Griffith was driving under the influence. Thus, Griffith’s 

assertion that there was no probable cause for the arrest is also meritless. Therefore, 

as there was a reasonable articulable suspicion to warrant the stop and there was 

probable cause to support the arrest, the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress 

was correct. 

{¶ 21} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is hereby 

affirmed. 

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, J., concurs.