After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

F I LED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

December 19, 2006

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

RAYMOND G. CHAPMAN,

individually, and on behalf of all

persons similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA; W.A.

DREW EDMONDSON, Attorney

General; BRAD HENRY, Governor;

JOSEPH M. WATT, Chief Justice,

Oklahoma Supreme Court,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-5064

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(D.C. No. 04-CV-722-CVE-PJC)

Submitted on the briefs:*

Raymond G. Chapman, Pro Se.

Gregory Thomas Metcalfe, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma Attorney

General’s Office, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees.
See 1 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

(1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 

See 2 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 

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Before TYMKOVICH, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Raymond G. Chapman appeals from the dismissal of his amended

complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1

We conclude that even though federal jurisdiction is not barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, jurisdiction is barred by the Younger abstention

doctrine. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal but remand for the 2

limited purpose of having that dismissal corrected to be without prejudice.

Mr. Chapman filed suit in federal court attempting to challenge, on behalf

of himself and others adjudicated by an Oklahoma state court to be a noncustodial

parent, alleged constitutional violations in the family court system of the State of

Oklahoma. He sought damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against the

State of Oklahoma and the Governor, the Attorney General, and the Chief Justice

of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, all in their official capacities only. The district

court dismissed the amended complaint, holding that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine barred federal jurisdiction over Mr. Chapman’s claims. On
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Mr. Chapman’s “Motion to Correct Errors,” the district court reconsidered

Mr. Chapman’s claims in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), and again reached the

same conclusion–that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred federal jurisdiction.

On appeal, Mr. Chapman argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is

defunct in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lance v. Dennis,

126 S. Ct. 1198 (2006) (per curiam), and that the district court had subject matter

jurisdiction over his amended complaint. In their response, defendants concede

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been limited and that its application to this

case is questionable, but argue that federal jurisdiction is otherwise barred by

(1) the Younger abstention doctrine; (2) the domestic relations exception to

federal jurisdiction; and (3) the State of Oklahoma’s Eleventh Amendment

immunity.

We review the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction de novo. Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006). 

We conclude that the district court erred by dismissing under Rooker-Feldman. 

In Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court made clear that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

has a narrow scope, and that federal jurisdiction is not barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine if suit “was filed before the end of the state courts’

appeal process.” Guttman, 446 F.3d at 1029, 1031-32 (discussing Exxon Mobil,

544 U.S. at 290-91). In Lance, the Supreme Court reemphasized the narrow
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contours of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (but, contrary to Mr. Chapman’s

contention, did not hold that the doctrine is defunct). See Lance, 126 S. Ct.

at 1200-01. Mr. Chapman’s state court proceedings have not reached the end of

the state courts’ appeal process, and the district court therefore erred by

dismissing his complaint under Rooker-Feldman. 

Defendants argue that the Younger abstention doctrine nevertheless obliges

the district court to abstain from hearing Mr. Chapman’s claims. Although

defendants did not make this argument to the district court, we can consider

Younger abstention for the first time on appeal. Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d

1386, 1390-92 (10th Cir. 1996). 

The Supreme Court has established three factors to be relevant to our

decision as to whether abstention is required under Younger. Seneca-Cayuga

Tribe of Okla. v. Okla. ex rel. Thompson, 874 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989)

(citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,

432 (1982)). These factors ask us to determine whether: 

(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative

proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the

claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings

involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to

state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state

policies.

Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215

(10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). “Once these three conditions are met,
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Younger abstention is non-discretionary and, absent extraordinary circumstances,

a district court is required to abstain.” Id. 

The three Younger conditions are met in this case. First, Mr. Chapman is

involved in a state civil proceeding that is ongoing. Second, he has not shown

that the state court is not an adequate forum to hear his constitutional challenges

to the state family court system. Cf. Crown Point I, LLC, 319 F.3d at 1215

(holding that state court was inadequate forum where state court held that plaintiff

was collaterally estopped from raising constitutional challenges); Joseph A.

ex. rel Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1274 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that

Younger abstention cannot be avoided by purported class action as long as

individual relief can be provided by state court). Finally, the Supreme Court has

long held that “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,

parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the

United States.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). We

conclude that the district court must abstain under Younger from hearing

Mr. Chapman’s claims. 

It is unnecessary to discuss defendants’ other arguments.

We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal and REMAND only for the

district court to amend its Opinion and Order to reflect that the dismissal is

without prejudice and to enter a Rule 58 judgment dismissing the suit without

prejudice.