# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali L 219/2015

| | ISSN 1977-074X |
| --- | --- |
| Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali
  tal-Unjoni Ewropea | L 219 |
| | |
| Edizzjoni bil-Malti | Leġiżlazzjoni | Volum 5820 ta' Awwissu 2015 |

ISSN 1977-074X

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali

tal-Unjoni Ewropea

L 219

Edizzjoni bil-Malti

Leġiżlazzjoni

Volum 5820 ta' Awwissu 2015

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| Werrej | | II   Atti mhux leġiżlattivi | Paġna |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGOLAMENTI |
| | * | Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) 2015/1407 tad-19 ta' Awwissu 2015 li jemenda r-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013 li jistipula miżuri ta' tranżizzjoni fis-settur taz-zokkor minħabba l-adeżjoni tal-Kroazja | 1 |
| | * | Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) 2015/1408 tad-19 ta' Awwissu 2015 li jikkonċerna l-awtorizzazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina bħala addittiv fl-għalf għall-ħut u għall-krustaċji (
  1
  ) | 3 |
| | | Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) 2015/1409 tad-19 ta' Awwissu 2015 li jistabbilixxi l-valuri standard tal-importazzjoni għad-determinazzjoni tal-prezz ta' dħul ta' ċertu frott u ħxejjex | 6 |
| | | DEĊIŻJONIJIET |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2015/1410 of 19 August 2015 giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit | 8 |
| | * | Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 of 19 August 2015 approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme of Greece | 12 |
| | | ATTI ADOTTATI MINN KORPI STABBILITI PERMEZZ TA' FTEHIMIET INTERNAZZJONALI |
| | * | Deċiżjoni Nru 1 tal-Kumitat tal-Kummerċ fil-Prodotti UE-Korea tat-28 ta' Mejju 2015 dwar l-adozzjoni tar-regoli ta' amministrazzjoni u implimentazzjoni tal-kwota tar-rata tariffarja [2015/1412] | 17 |

Werrej

II   Atti mhux leġiżlattivi

Paġna

REGOLAMENTI

*

Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) 2015/1407 tad-19 ta' Awwissu 2015 li jemenda r-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013 li jistipula miżuri ta' tranżizzjoni fis-settur taz-zokkor minħabba l-adeżjoni tal-Kroazja

1

*

Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) 2015/1408 tad-19 ta' Awwissu 2015 li jikkonċerna l-awtorizzazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina bħala addittiv fl-għalf għall-ħut u għall-krustaċji (
  1
  )

1

3

Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) 2015/1409 tad-19 ta' Awwissu 2015 li jistabbilixxi l-valuri standard tal-importazzjoni għad-determinazzjoni tal-prezz ta' dħul ta' ċertu frott u ħxejjex

6

DEĊIŻJONIJIET

*

Council Decision (EU) 2015/1410 of 19 August 2015 giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit

8

*

Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 of 19 August 2015 approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme of Greece

12

ATTI ADOTTATI MINN KORPI STABBILITI PERMEZZ TA' FTEHIMIET INTERNAZZJONALI

*

Deċiżjoni Nru 1 tal-Kumitat tal-Kummerċ fil-Prodotti UE-Korea tat-28 ta' Mejju 2015 dwar l-adozzjoni tar-regoli ta' amministrazzjoni u implimentazzjoni tal-kwota tar-rata tariffarja [2015/1412]

17

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| | (1)   Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE |

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(1)   Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE

1

| MT | L-Atti li t-titoli tagħhom huma stampati b'tipa ċara huma dawk li għandhom x'jaqsmu mal-maniġment ta' kuljum ta' materji agrikoli, u li ġeneralment huma validi għal perijodu limitat.
  It-titoli ta'l-atti l-oħra kollha huma stampati b'tipa skura u mmarkati b'asterisk quddiemhom. |
| --- | --- |

MT

L-Atti li t-titoli tagħhom huma stampati b'tipa ċara huma dawk li għandhom x'jaqsmu mal-maniġment ta' kuljum ta' materji agrikoli, u li ġeneralment huma validi għal perijodu limitat.

It-titoli ta'l-atti l-oħra kollha huma stampati b'tipa skura u mmarkati b'asterisk quddiemhom.

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II Atti mhux leġiżlattivi

REGOLAMENTI

| 20.8.2015 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | L 219/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.8.2015

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

L 219/1

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REGOLAMENT TA' IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-KUMMISSJONI (UE) 2015/1407

tad-19 ta' Awwissu 2015

li jemenda r-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013 li jistipula miżuri ta' tranżizzjoni fis-settur taz-zokkor minħabba l-adeżjoni tal-Kroazja

IL-KUMMISSJONI EWROPEA,

Wara li kkunsidrat it-Trattat tal-Adeżjoni tal-Kroazja,

Wara li kkunsidrat l-Att tal-Adeżjoni tal-Kroazja (1), u b'mod partikolari l-Artikoli 41 u 16 tiegħu b'mod konġunt mal-punt 4 tat-Taqsima 3(a) tal-Anness IV tiegħu,

Billi:

| (1) | Ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013 (2) jistipula miżuri ta' tranżizzjoni fis-settur taz-zokkor minħabba l-adeżjoni tal-Kroazja mal-Unjoni. It-Taqsima 2 tal-Kapitolu II ta' dak ir-Regolament tittratta d-determinazzjoni u l-eliminazzjoni ta' kwantitajiet żejda ta' zokkor preżenti fil-Kroazja fid-data tal-adeżjoni tagħha. B'mod partikolari tistabbilixxi skadenzi għad-determinazzjoni tal-kwantitajiet żejda ta' zokkor, għall-eliminazzjoni tagħhom u għall-provi tal-eliminazzjoni li għandhom jingħataw mill-operaturi identifikati fil-Kroazja. Tiffissa wkoll perjodi ta' referenza li għandhom jintużaw għall-kalkolu tal-imposti għall-Kroazja jekk il-kwantitajiet żejda ta' zokkor ma jiġux eliminati. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013 (2) jistipula miżuri ta' tranżizzjoni fis-settur taz-zokkor minħabba l-adeżjoni tal-Kroazja mal-Unjoni. It-Taqsima 2 tal-Kapitolu II ta' dak ir-Regolament tittratta d-determinazzjoni u l-eliminazzjoni ta' kwantitajiet żejda ta' zokkor preżenti fil-Kroazja fid-data tal-adeżjoni tagħha. B'mod partikolari tistabbilixxi skadenzi għad-determinazzjoni tal-kwantitajiet żejda ta' zokkor, għall-eliminazzjoni tagħhom u għall-provi tal-eliminazzjoni li għandhom jingħataw mill-operaturi identifikati fil-Kroazja. Tiffissa wkoll perjodi ta' referenza li għandhom jintużaw għall-kalkolu tal-imposti għall-Kroazja jekk il-kwantitajiet żejda ta' zokkor ma jiġux eliminati.

| (2) | Fir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 1345/2014 (3) ġew determinati l-kwantitajiet żejda ta' zokkor fil-Kroazja maħżuna qabel l-adeżjoni tagħha u li għandhom jiġu eliminati mis-suq tal-Unjoni a skapitu tal-Kroazja f'konformità mal-iskadenzi stabbiliti fir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013, kif emendat bir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 968/2014 (4). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Fir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 1345/2014 (3) ġew determinati l-kwantitajiet żejda ta' zokkor fil-Kroazja maħżuna qabel l-adeżjoni tagħha u li għandhom jiġu eliminati mis-suq tal-Unjoni a skapitu tal-Kroazja f'konformità mal-iskadenzi stabbiliti fir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013, kif emendat bir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 968/2014 (4).

| (3) | Fl-ittra tagħha tad-19 ta' Mejju 2015, il-Kroazja infurmat lill-Kummissjoni li, filwaqt li tirrispetta l-obbligu li sat-30 ta' Settembru 2015, tiżgura l-eliminazzjoni mis-suq tal-kwantitajiet żejda taz-zokkor, kif determinati mill-Kummissjoni, hija esperjenzat diffikultajiet proċedurali mhux previsti fl-implimentazzjoni tal-obbligu biex iġġiegħel l-operaturi kkonċernati jeliminaw dawk il-kwantitajiet żejda u li tiħtieġ żmien addizzjonali biex tegħleb dawn id-diffikultajiet. Għalhekk jixraq li l-iskadenzi previsti mir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013 jiġu estiżi b'sitt xhur. |
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(3)

Fl-ittra tagħha tad-19 ta' Mejju 2015, il-Kroazja infurmat lill-Kummissjoni li, filwaqt li tirrispetta l-obbligu li sat-30 ta' Settembru 2015, tiżgura l-eliminazzjoni mis-suq tal-kwantitajiet żejda taz-zokkor, kif determinati mill-Kummissjoni, hija esperjenzat diffikultajiet proċedurali mhux previsti fl-implimentazzjoni tal-obbligu biex iġġiegħel l-operaturi kkonċernati jeliminaw dawk il-kwantitajiet żejda u li tiħtieġ żmien addizzjonali biex tegħleb dawn id-diffikultajiet. Għalhekk jixraq li l-iskadenzi previsti mir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013 jiġu estiżi b'sitt xhur.

| (4) | Għaldaqstant, ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013 għandu jiġi emendat skont dan. |
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(4)

Għaldaqstant, ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013 għandu jiġi emendat skont dan.

| (5) | Il-miżuri previsti f'dan ir-Regolament huma skont l-opinjoni tal-Kumitat għall-Organizzazzjoni Komuni tas-Swieq Agrikoli. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Il-miżuri previsti f'dan ir-Regolament huma skont l-opinjoni tal-Kumitat għall-Organizzazzjoni Komuni tas-Swieq Agrikoli.

ADOTTAT DAN IR-REGOLAMENT:

Artikolu 1

Ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013 huwa emendat kif ġej:

| (1) | Fl-Artikolu 9(1), “30 ta' Settembru 2015” tinbidel u ssir “31 ta' Marzu 2016”; |
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(1)

Fl-Artikolu 9(1), “30 ta' Settembru 2015” tinbidel u ssir “31 ta' Marzu 2016”;

| (2) | L-Artikolu 10 huwa emendat kif ġej:






  (a) | “30 ta' Settembru 2015” tinbidel u ssir “31 ta' Marzu 2016”; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(2)

L-Artikolu 10 huwa emendat kif ġej:

(a)

“30 ta' Settembru 2015” tinbidel u ssir “31 ta' Marzu 2016”;

| (b) | “31 ta' Mejju 2016” tinbidel u ssir “30 ta' Novembru 2016”; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

“31 ta' Mejju 2016” tinbidel u ssir “30 ta' Novembru 2016”;

| (3) | L-Artikolu 11 huwa emendat kif ġej:






  (a) | Fil-paragrafu 1, “31 ta' Diċembru 2015” tinbidel u ssir “30 ta' Ġunju 2016”; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(3)

L-Artikolu 11 huwa emendat kif ġej:

(a)

Fil-paragrafu 1, “31 ta' Diċembru 2015” tinbidel u ssir “30 ta' Ġunju 2016”;

| (b) | Fir-raba' subparagrafu tal-paragrafu 2, “30 ta' Settembru 2015” tinbidel u ssir “31 ta' Marzu 2016”; |
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(b)

Fir-raba' subparagrafu tal-paragrafu 2, “30 ta' Settembru 2015” tinbidel u ssir “31 ta' Marzu 2016”;

| (4) | L-Artikolu 12 huwa emendat kif ġej:






  (a) | Fil-paragrafu 1, “Il-Ħadd, 31 ta' Jannar 2016” tinbidel u ssir “Il-Ħadd, 31 ta' Lulju 2016”; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

L-Artikolu 12 huwa emendat kif ġej:

(a)

Fil-paragrafu 1, “Il-Ħadd, 31 ta' Jannar 2016” tinbidel u ssir “Il-Ħadd, 31 ta' Lulju 2016”;

| (b) | Il-paragrafu 2 huwa emendat kif ġej:






  (i) | fl-ewwel subparagrafu “30 ta' Settembru 2015” tinbidel u ssir “31 ta' Marzu 2016”; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

Il-paragrafu 2 huwa emendat kif ġej:

(i)

fl-ewwel subparagrafu “30 ta' Settembru 2015” tinbidel u ssir “31 ta' Marzu 2016”;

| (ii) | fit-tieni subparagrafu “31 ta' Mejju 2016” tinbidel u ssir “30 ta' Novembru 2016”; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

fit-tieni subparagrafu “31 ta' Mejju 2016” tinbidel u ssir “30 ta' Novembru 2016”;

| (iii) | fit-tielet subparagrafu, “31 ta' Marzu 2016” tinbidel u ssir “30 ta' Settembru 2016”. |
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(iii)

fit-tielet subparagrafu, “31 ta' Marzu 2016” tinbidel u ssir “30 ta' Settembru 2016”.

Artikolu 2

Dan ir-Regolament jidħol fis-seħħ fit-tielet jum wara l-pubblikazzjoni tiegħu f'Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

Dan ir-Regolament jorbot fl-intier tiegħu u japplika direttament fl-Istati Membri kollha.

Magħmul fi Brussell, id-19 ta' Awwissu 2015.

Għall-Kummissjoni

Il-President

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

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(1)  ĠU L 112, 24.4.2012, p. 10.

1

(2)  Ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013 tal-25 ta' Frar 2013 li jistipula miżuri ta' tranżizzjoni fis-settur taz-zokkor minħabba l-adeżjoni tal-Kroazja (ĠU L 55, 27.2.2013, p. 1).

2

(3)  Ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 1345/2014 tas-17 ta' Diċembru 2014 dwar id-determinazzjoni tal-kwantitajiet żejda ta' zokkor, isoglukożju u fruttożju fil-Kroazja (ĠU L 363, 18.12.2014, p. 80).

3

(4)  Ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 968/2014 tat-12 ta' Settembru 2014 li jemenda r-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 170/2013 li jistipula miżuri ta' tranżizzjoni fis-settur taz-zokkor minħabba l-adeżjoni tal-Kroazja (ĠU L 272, 13.9.2014, p. 6).

4

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| 20.8.2015 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | L 219/3 |
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20.8.2015

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

L 219/3

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REGOLAMENT TA' IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-KUMMISSJONI (UE) 2015/1408

tad-19 ta' Awwissu 2015

li jikkonċerna l-awtorizzazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina bħala addittiv fl-għalf għall-ħut u għall-krustaċji

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

IL-KUMMISSJONI EWROPEA,

Wara li kkunsidrat it-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea,

Wara li kkunsidrat ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1831/2003 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-22 ta' Settembru 2003 dwar l-addittivi għall-użu fl-għalf tal-annimali (1), u b'mod partikolari l-Artikolu 9(2) tiegħu,

Billi:

| (1) | Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1831/2003 jistipula l-awtorizzazzjoni tal-użu ta' addittivi fin-nutrizzjoni tal-annimali u jistipula wkoll ir-raġunijiet u l-proċeduri għall-għoti ta' din l-awtorizzazzjoni. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1831/2003 jistipula l-awtorizzazzjoni tal-użu ta' addittivi fin-nutrizzjoni tal-annimali u jistipula wkoll ir-raġunijiet u l-proċeduri għall-għoti ta' din l-awtorizzazzjoni.

| (2) | Skont l-Artikolu 7 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1831/2003, tressqet applikazzjoni għall-awtorizzazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina bħala addittiv tal-għalf. Ma' din l-applikazzjoni ntbagħtu wkoll id-dettalji u d-dokumenti meħtieġa skont l-Artikolu 7(3) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1831/2003. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Skont l-Artikolu 7 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1831/2003, tressqet applikazzjoni għall-awtorizzazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina bħala addittiv tal-għalf. Ma' din l-applikazzjoni ntbagħtu wkoll id-dettalji u d-dokumenti meħtieġa skont l-Artikolu 7(3) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1831/2003.

| (3) | Dik l-applikazzjoni tikkonċerna l-awtorizzazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina bħala addittiv fl-għalf għall-ispeċijiet kollha tal-annimali akkwatiċi, biex tiġi kklassifikata fil-kategorija tal-addittivi “addittivi nutrittivi”. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Dik l-applikazzjoni tikkonċerna l-awtorizzazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina bħala addittiv fl-għalf għall-ispeċijiet kollha tal-annimali akkwatiċi, biex tiġi kklassifikata fil-kategorija tal-addittivi “addittivi nutrittivi”.

| (4) | Fl-opinjoni tagħha tas-27 ta' Jannar 2015 (2) l-Awtorità Ewropea dwar is-Sigurtà fl-Ikel (“l-Awtorità”) ikkonkludiet li, skont il-kundizzjonijiet tal-użu proposti, id-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina ma għandhiex effett ħażin fuq is-saħħa tal-annimali, is-saħħa tal-bniedem jew l-ambjent u tista' titqies bħala sors effikaċi tal-aċidu amminiku L-metjonina għall-ispeċijiet tal-ħut u tal-krustaċji. L-Awtorità tqis li ma hemmx bżonn ta' rekwiżiti speċifiċi għall-monitoraġġ wara l-kummerċjalizzazzjoni. Hija vverifikat ukoll ir-rapport dwar il-metodu ta' analiżi tal-addittiv tal-għalf fl-għalf, mibgħut mil-Laboratorju ta' Referenza mwaqqaf bir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1831/2003. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Fl-opinjoni tagħha tas-27 ta' Jannar 2015 (2) l-Awtorità Ewropea dwar is-Sigurtà fl-Ikel (“l-Awtorità”) ikkonkludiet li, skont il-kundizzjonijiet tal-użu proposti, id-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina ma għandhiex effett ħażin fuq is-saħħa tal-annimali, is-saħħa tal-bniedem jew l-ambjent u tista' titqies bħala sors effikaċi tal-aċidu amminiku L-metjonina għall-ispeċijiet tal-ħut u tal-krustaċji. L-Awtorità tqis li ma hemmx bżonn ta' rekwiżiti speċifiċi għall-monitoraġġ wara l-kummerċjalizzazzjoni. Hija vverifikat ukoll ir-rapport dwar il-metodu ta' analiżi tal-addittiv tal-għalf fl-għalf, mibgħut mil-Laboratorju ta' Referenza mwaqqaf bir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1831/2003.

| (5) | Il-valutazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina turi li l-kundizzjonijiet għall-awtorizzazzjoni, kif stipulat fl-Artikolu 5 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1831/2003, huma ssodisfati. Għaldaqstant, l-użu ta' din is-sustanza għandu jiġi awtorizzat kif speċifikat fl-Anness ta' dan ir-Regolament. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Il-valutazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina turi li l-kundizzjonijiet għall-awtorizzazzjoni, kif stipulat fl-Artikolu 5 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1831/2003, huma ssodisfati. Għaldaqstant, l-użu ta' din is-sustanza għandu jiġi awtorizzat kif speċifikat fl-Anness ta' dan ir-Regolament.

| (6) | Il-miżuri stipulati f'dan ir-Regolament huma skont l-opinjoni tal-Kumitat Permanenti dwar il-Pjanti, l-Annimali, l-Ikel u l-Għalf, |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Il-miżuri stipulati f'dan ir-Regolament huma skont l-opinjoni tal-Kumitat Permanenti dwar il-Pjanti, l-Annimali, l-Ikel u l-Għalf,

ADOTTAT DAN IR-REGOLAMENT:

Artikolu 1

Is-sustanza speċifikata fl-Anness, li tifforma parti mill-kategorija tal-addittivi “addittivi nutrittivi” u mill-grupp funzjonali “aċidi amminiċi, l-imluħ u l-analogi tagħhom”, hija awtorizzata bħala addittiv fin-nutriment tal-annimali suġġetta għall-kundizzjonijiet stipulati f'dak l-Anness.

Artikolu 2

Dan ir-Regolament jidħol fis-seħħ fl-għoxrin jum wara l-pubblikazzjoni tiegħu f'Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

Dan ir-Regolament jorbot fl-intier tiegħu u japplika direttament fl-Istati Membri kollha.

Magħmul fi Brussell, id-19 ta' Awwissu 2015.

Għall-Kummissjoni

Il-President

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

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(1)  ĠU L 268, 18.10.2003, p. 29.

1

(2)  EFSA Journal 2015;13(2):4012.

2

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ANNESS

| Numru tal-identifikazzjoni tal-addittiv | Isem id-detentur tal-awtorizzazzjoni | Addittiv | Kompożizzjoni, formola kimika, deskrizzjoni, metodu analitiku. | Speċi jew kategorija tal-annimal | Età massima | Kontenut minimu | Kontenut massimu | Dispożizzjonijiet oħra | Tmiem il-perjodu tal-awtorizzazzjoni |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| mg/kg tal-għalf komplet b'kontenut ta' ilma ta' 12 % |
| Kategorija tal-addittivi nutrizzjonali. Grupp funzjonali: aċidi amminiċi, l-imluħ u l-analogi tagħhom. |
| 3c306 | — | DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina | Kompożizzjoni tal-addittiv

  Trab kristallin minn sinteżi kimika b'minimu ta' 93 % DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina, massimu ta' 3 % DL-metjonina u massimu ta' 3 % sulfat tas-sodju (abbażi ta' materja niexfa)

  Karatterizzazzjoni tas-sustanza attiva

  DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina (2-[(2-amino-4-metisulfanilbutanojl) amino]-aċidu 4-metilsulfanilbutanojku)
  Formula kimika: C10H20N2O3S2

  Numru CAS: 52715-93-2

  Metodu analitiku
   (1)

  Għall-kwantifikazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina fl-addittiv tal-għalf: kromatografija likwida ta' rendiment għoli f'fażi inversa flimkien ma' detezzjoni fotometrika f'205 nm (RP-HPLC-UV).
  Għall-kwantifikazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina fit-taħlitiet lesti minn qabel, fl-għalf kompost u fil-materjali tal-għalf: kromatografija bi skambju tal-joni flimkien ma' derivatizzazzjoni postkolonna u detezzjoni fotometrika f'570 nm (IEC-UV). | Ħut u krustaċji | — | | | Il-kontenut ta' ilma għandu jkun indikat fuq it-tikketta. | Id-9 ta' Settembru 2025 |

Numru tal-identifikazzjoni tal-addittiv

Isem id-detentur tal-awtorizzazzjoni

Addittiv

Kompożizzjoni, formola kimika, deskrizzjoni, metodu analitiku.

Speċi jew kategorija tal-annimal

Età massima

Kontenut minimu

Kontenut massimu

Dispożizzjonijiet oħra

Tmiem il-perjodu tal-awtorizzazzjoni

mg/kg tal-għalf komplet b'kontenut ta' ilma ta' 12 %

Kategorija tal-addittivi nutrizzjonali. Grupp funzjonali: aċidi amminiċi, l-imluħ u l-analogi tagħhom.

3c306

—

DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina

Kompożizzjoni tal-addittiv

Trab kristallin minn sinteżi kimika b'minimu ta' 93 % DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina, massimu ta' 3 % DL-metjonina u massimu ta' 3 % sulfat tas-sodju (abbażi ta' materja niexfa)

Karatterizzazzjoni tas-sustanza attiva

DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina (2-[(2-amino-4-metisulfanilbutanojl) amino]-aċidu 4-metilsulfanilbutanojku)

Formula kimika: C10H20N2O3S2

Numru CAS: 52715-93-2

Metodu analitiku
   (1)

Għall-kwantifikazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina fl-addittiv tal-għalf: kromatografija likwida ta' rendiment għoli f'fażi inversa flimkien ma' detezzjoni fotometrika f'205 nm (RP-HPLC-UV).

Għall-kwantifikazzjoni tad-DL-metjonil-DL-metjonina fit-taħlitiet lesti minn qabel, fl-għalf kompost u fil-materjali tal-għalf: kromatografija bi skambju tal-joni flimkien ma' derivatizzazzjoni postkolonna u detezzjoni fotometrika f'570 nm (IEC-UV).

Ħut u krustaċji

—

Il-kontenut ta' ilma għandu jkun indikat fuq it-tikketta.

Id-9 ta' Settembru 2025

---

(1)  Id-dettalji dwar il-metodi analitiċi jistgħu jinstabu fl-indirizz tal-Laboratorju ta' Referenza li ġej: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/eurl/feed-additives/evaluation-reports

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| 20.8.2015 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | L 219/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.8.2015

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

L 219/6

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REGOLAMENT TA' IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-KUMMISSJONI (UE) 2015/1409

tad-19 ta' Awwissu 2015

li jistabbilixxi l-valuri standard tal-importazzjoni għad-determinazzjoni tal-prezz ta' dħul ta' ċertu frott u ħxejjex

IL-KUMMISSJONI EWROPEA,

Wara li kkunsidrat it-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea,

Wara li kkunsidrat ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1308/2013 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas- 17 ta' Diċembru 2013 li jistabbilixxi organizzazzjoni komuni tas-swieq fi prodotti agrikoli u li jħassar ir-Regolamenti tal-Kunsill (KEE) Nru 922/72, (KEE) Nru 234/79, (KE) Nru 1037/2001 u (KE) Nru 1234/2007 (1),

Wara li kkunsidrat ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 543/2011 tas-7 ta' Ġunju 2011 li jippreskrivi regoli dettaljati dwar l-applikazzjoni tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1234/2007 fir-rigward tas-setturi tal-frott u l-ħxejjex u tal-frott u l-ħxejjex ipproċessati (2) u b'mod partikolari l-Artikolu 136(1) tiegħu,

Billi:

| (1) | Ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 543/2011 jistipula, skont ir-riżultat tan-negozjati kummerċjali multilaterali taċ-Ċiklu tal-Urugwaj, il-kriterji li bihom il-Kummissjoni tiffissal-valuri standard għall-importazzjonijiet minn pajjiżi terzi, għall-prodotti u għall-perjodi stipulati fl-Anness XVI, il-Parti A tiegħu. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 543/2011 jistipula, skont ir-riżultat tan-negozjati kummerċjali multilaterali taċ-Ċiklu tal-Urugwaj, il-kriterji li bihom il-Kummissjoni tiffissal-valuri standard għall-importazzjonijiet minn pajjiżi terzi, għall-prodotti u għall-perjodi stipulati fl-Anness XVI, il-Parti A tiegħu.

| (2) | Il-valur standard tal-importazzjoni huwa kkalkulat kull ġurnata tax-xogħol skont l-Artikolu 136(1) tar-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 543/2011, billi jqis id-dejta varjabbli ta' kuljum. Għalhekk dan ir-Regolament għandu jidħol fis-seħħ fil-jum tal-pubblikazzjoni tiegħu f'Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Il-valur standard tal-importazzjoni huwa kkalkulat kull ġurnata tax-xogħol skont l-Artikolu 136(1) tar-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 543/2011, billi jqis id-dejta varjabbli ta' kuljum. Għalhekk dan ir-Regolament għandu jidħol fis-seħħ fil-jum tal-pubblikazzjoni tiegħu f'Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

ADOTTAT DAN IR-REGOLAMENT:

Artikolu 1

Il-valuri standard tal-importazzjoni msemmija fl-Artikolu 136 tar-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 543/2011 huma stipulati fl-Anness għal dan ir-Regolament.

Artikolu 2

Dan ir-Regolament għandu jidħol fis-seħħ fil-jum tal-pubblikazzjoni tiegħu f'Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

Dan ir-Regolament għandu jorbot fl-intier tiegħu u japplika direttament fl-Istati Membri kollha.

Magħmul fi Brussell, id-19 ta' Awwissu 2015.

Għall-Kummissjoni,

F'isem il-President,

Jerzy PLEWA

Direttur Ġenerali għall-Agrikoltura u l-Iżvilupp Rurali

---

(1)  ĠU L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671.

1

(2)  ĠU L 157, 15.6.2011, p. 1.

2

---

ANNESS

Il-valuri standard tal-importazzjoni għad-determinazzjoni tal-prezz ta' dħul ta' ċertu frott u ħxejjex

| (EUR/100 kg) |
| --- |
| Kodiċi tan-NM | Kodiċi tal-pajjiż terz (1) | Valur standard tal-importazzjoni |
| 0702 00 00 | MA | 164,5 |
| MK | 51,2 |
| ZZ | 107,9 |
| 0709 93 10 | TR | 131,0 |
| ZZ | 131,0 |
| 0805 50 10 | AR | 143,0 |
| BO | 154,5 |
| CL | 163,3 |
| UY | 153,9 |
| ZA | 153,7 |
| ZZ | 153,7 |
| 0806 10 10 | EG | 253,2 |
| IL | 390,7 |
| TR | 166,5 |
| US | 339,9 |
| ZZ | 283,1 |
| 0808 10 80 | AR | 122,9 |
| BR | 92,7 |
| CL | 124,5 |
| NZ | 146,7 |
| US | 109,0 |
| UY | 141,9 |
| ZA | 120,2 |
| ZZ | 122,6 |
| 0808 30 90 | AR | 136,4 |
| CL | 152,7 |
| CN | 85,3 |
| NZ | 108,4 |
| TR | 136,3 |
| ZA | 111,8 |
| ZZ | 121,8 |
| 0809 30 10 , 0809 30 90 | MK | 69,5 |
| TR | 131,7 |
| ZZ | 100,6 |
| 0809 40 05 | BA | 44,3 |
| IL | 99,6 |
| MK | 36,8 |
| XS | 57,7 |
| ZZ | 59,6 |

(EUR/100 kg)

Kodiċi tan-NM

Kodiċi tal-pajjiż terz (1)

Valur standard tal-importazzjoni

0702 00 00

MA

164,5

MK

51,2

ZZ

107,9

0709 93 10

TR

131,0

ZZ

131,0

0805 50 10

AR

143,0

BO

154,5

CL

163,3

UY

153,9

ZA

153,7

ZZ

153,7

0806 10 10

EG

253,2

IL

390,7

TR

166,5

US

339,9

ZZ

283,1

0808 10 80

AR

122,9

BR

92,7

CL

124,5

NZ

146,7

US

109,0

UY

141,9

ZA

120,2

ZZ

122,6

0808 30 90

AR

136,4

CL

152,7

CN

85,3

NZ

108,4

TR

136,3

ZA

111,8

ZZ

121,8

0809 30 10 , 0809 30 90

MK

69,5

TR

131,7

ZZ

100,6

0809 40 05

BA

44,3

IL

99,6

MK

36,8

XS

57,7

ZZ

59,6

---

(1)  In-nomenklatura tal-pajjiżi stabbilita bir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 1106/2012 tas-27 ta' Novembru 2012 li jimplimenta r-Regolament (KE) Nru 471/2009 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar statistika Komunitarja relatata mal-kummerċ estern ma' pajjiżi li mhumiex membri, fir-rigward tal-aġġornament tan-nomenklatura tal-pajjiżi u t-territorji (ĠU L 328, 28.11.2012, p. 7). Il-kodiċi “ZZ” jirrappreżenta “ta' oriġini oħra”.

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DEĊIŻJONIJIET

| 20.8.2015 | EN | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | L 219/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.8.2015

EN

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

L 219/8

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COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2015/1410

of 19 August 2015

giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 126(9) thereof,

Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) establishes that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits and sets out the excessive deficit procedure to that effect. The Stability and Growth Pact, which in its corrective arm implements the excessive deficit procedure, provides the framework supporting government policies for a prompt return to sound budgetary positions taking account of the economic situation. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) establishes that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits and sets out the excessive deficit procedure to that effect. The Stability and Growth Pact, which in its corrective arm implements the excessive deficit procedure, provides the framework supporting government policies for a prompt return to sound budgetary positions taking account of the economic situation.

| (2) | On 27 April 2009, the Council decided, in accordance with Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community that an excessive deficit existed in Greece. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 27 April 2009, the Council decided, in accordance with Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community that an excessive deficit existed in Greece.

| (3) | On 10 May 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/320/EU (1) addressed to Greece under Article 126(9) and Article 136 TFEU with a view to reinforcing and deepening the fiscal surveillance and giving notice to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit at the latest by the deadline of 2014. The Council established 2014 as the deadline for correcting the situation of excessive deficit, and annual targets for the government deficit. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 10 May 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/320/EU (1) addressed to Greece under Article 126(9) and Article 136 TFEU with a view to reinforcing and deepening the fiscal surveillance and giving notice to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit at the latest by the deadline of 2014. The Council established 2014 as the deadline for correcting the situation of excessive deficit, and annual targets for the government deficit.

| (4) | Council Decision No 2010/320/EU was substantially amended several times. Since further amendments were to be made, it was recast, on 12 July 2011, by Council Decision 2011/734/EU of 12 July 2011 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit (2) in the interest of clarity. Subsequently, that Decision was significantly amended several times between 8 July 2011 and December 2012 (3). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Council Decision No 2010/320/EU was substantially amended several times. Since further amendments were to be made, it was recast, on 12 July 2011, by Council Decision 2011/734/EU of 12 July 2011 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit (2) in the interest of clarity. Subsequently, that Decision was significantly amended several times between 8 July 2011 and December 2012 (3).

| (5) | The very severe deterioration of the financial situation of Greece has led euro area Member States to decide to provide it stability support, with a view to safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, in conjunction with multilateral assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund. From May 2010 to June 2015, support provided by the euro area Member States took the form of both a bilateral Greek Loan Facility and a loan from the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’). The lenders' support was accompanied by extensive policy conditionality, including the respect by Greece of Council Decision 2011/734/EU and subsequent amendments thereto. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The very severe deterioration of the financial situation of Greece has led euro area Member States to decide to provide it stability support, with a view to safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, in conjunction with multilateral assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund. From May 2010 to June 2015, support provided by the euro area Member States took the form of both a bilateral Greek Loan Facility and a loan from the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’). The lenders' support was accompanied by extensive policy conditionality, including the respect by Greece of Council Decision 2011/734/EU and subsequent amendments thereto.

| (6) | On 8 July 2015, Greece requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in the form of a three-year loan, and on 12 July 2015 an agreement in principle was reached on the provision of a loan of the amount of up to EUR 86 000 million to Greece. On 17 July, the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank, and with the International Monetary Fund, with the task of negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) detailing the policy conditionality for a financial assistance facility covering the period 2015-2018 in accordance with Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 8 July 2015, Greece requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in the form of a three-year loan, and on 12 July 2015 an agreement in principle was reached on the provision of a loan of the amount of up to EUR 86 000 million to Greece. On 17 July, the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank, and with the International Monetary Fund, with the task of negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) detailing the policy conditionality for a financial assistance facility covering the period 2015-2018 in accordance with Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty.

| (7) | In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (4), and in particular Article 7 thereof, a Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM must prepare a macroeconomic adjustment programme (‘the Programme’) for approval by the Council. Such a programme should ensure the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances and the regulatory environment. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (4), and in particular Article 7 thereof, a Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM must prepare a macroeconomic adjustment programme (‘the Programme’) for approval by the Council. Such a programme should ensure the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances and the regulatory environment.

| (8) | The Programme prepared by Greece was approved by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 (5). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The Programme prepared by Greece was approved by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 (5).

| (9) | Article 10(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 also establishes that, in case a Member State subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme under Article 7 of that Regulation is also subject to a decision under 126(9) TFEU for the correction of its excessive deficit, the annual budgetary targets in its macroeconomic adjustment programme shall be integrated into the decision to give notice under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (6); in addition, the measures conducive to those targets in the macroeconomic adjustment programme shall also be integrated into the decision to give notice in accordance with Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Article 10(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 further establishes that the Member State shall be exempt from submitting reports under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Finally, Article 10(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 establishes that the monitoring shall be undertaken as provided for by Article 7(4) of that Regulation and the Member State shall be exempt from monitoring under Article 10(1) and Article 10a of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 and from monitoring underlying any decision under Article 6(2) of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Article 10(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 also establishes that, in case a Member State subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme under Article 7 of that Regulation is also subject to a decision under 126(9) TFEU for the correction of its excessive deficit, the annual budgetary targets in its macroeconomic adjustment programme shall be integrated into the decision to give notice under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (6); in addition, the measures conducive to those targets in the macroeconomic adjustment programme shall also be integrated into the decision to give notice in accordance with Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Article 10(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 further establishes that the Member State shall be exempt from submitting reports under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Finally, Article 10(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 establishes that the monitoring shall be undertaken as provided for by Article 7(4) of that Regulation and the Member State shall be exempt from monitoring under Article 10(1) and Article 10a of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 and from monitoring underlying any decision under Article 6(2) of that Regulation.

| (10) | Economic activity in Greece is currently projected to be much weaker than was expected when the latest amendment to Council Decision 2011/734/EU was adopted in December 2012. Both real and nominal GDP are expected to be at much lower levels in 2015 and 2016 than was expected in the 2015 Spring Forecast of the Commission, due to policy uncertainty, lack of implementation of reforms, a shortfall in government revenues, bank holidays, and the imposition of capital controls. The Commission updated its forecast for GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the MoU required for an ESM programme. According to this forecast, real GDP in 2015-2016 is projected to contract by 2,3 % and 1,3 % respectively, (against a positive growth of 0,5 % and 2,9 % in the 2015 Spring Forecast for the corresponding years), before growing by 2,7 % in 2017 and 3,1 % in 2018. This marked worsening of the economic scenario in 2015-2016 implies a corresponding deterioration of the outlook for public finances given unchanged policies. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Economic activity in Greece is currently projected to be much weaker than was expected when the latest amendment to Council Decision 2011/734/EU was adopted in December 2012. Both real and nominal GDP are expected to be at much lower levels in 2015 and 2016 than was expected in the 2015 Spring Forecast of the Commission, due to policy uncertainty, lack of implementation of reforms, a shortfall in government revenues, bank holidays, and the imposition of capital controls. The Commission updated its forecast for GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the MoU required for an ESM programme. According to this forecast, real GDP in 2015-2016 is projected to contract by 2,3 % and 1,3 % respectively, (against a positive growth of 0,5 % and 2,9 % in the 2015 Spring Forecast for the corresponding years), before growing by 2,7 % in 2017 and 3,1 % in 2018. This marked worsening of the economic scenario in 2015-2016 implies a corresponding deterioration of the outlook for public finances given unchanged policies.

| (11) | Greece is estimated to have improved its structural deficit by 16 percentage points of GDP from a 15,2 % deficit in 2009 to an estimated 1 % surplus in 2014, thus ensuring an improvement in the structural balance in 2009-2014, which is significantly larger than the requirement of at least 10 percentage points of GDP over the period recommended by the Council. In 2014, the general government deficit reached 3,5 % of GDP, clearly within the 4,5 % of GDP government deficit (ESA2010 basis) ceiling for 2014 established by the Council Decision. However, the primary balance outturn of 0,4 % of GDP was substantially weaker than expected and undershot the target set at 1,5 % of GDP due to a combination of factors including the reversal in the economic cycle and the related negative impact on budget revenues, the relaxation of fiscal policy and increased economic uncertainty. The weakening macroeconomic environment accompanied with expiring temporary fiscal measures in 2015 have, however, made it impossible to achieve the primary balance target of 3 % of GDP in 2015 envisaged in the latest amendment to Decision 2011/734/EU adopted in December 2012. The fiscal targets have, therefore, been revised down substantially, taking into account the macroeconomic circumstances and the current fiscal situation, to avoid overtightening fiscal policy in the short term. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Greece is estimated to have improved its structural deficit by 16 percentage points of GDP from a 15,2 % deficit in 2009 to an estimated 1 % surplus in 2014, thus ensuring an improvement in the structural balance in 2009-2014, which is significantly larger than the requirement of at least 10 percentage points of GDP over the period recommended by the Council. In 2014, the general government deficit reached 3,5 % of GDP, clearly within the 4,5 % of GDP government deficit (ESA2010 basis) ceiling for 2014 established by the Council Decision. However, the primary balance outturn of 0,4 % of GDP was substantially weaker than expected and undershot the target set at 1,5 % of GDP due to a combination of factors including the reversal in the economic cycle and the related negative impact on budget revenues, the relaxation of fiscal policy and increased economic uncertainty. The weakening macroeconomic environment accompanied with expiring temporary fiscal measures in 2015 have, however, made it impossible to achieve the primary balance target of 3 % of GDP in 2015 envisaged in the latest amendment to Decision 2011/734/EU adopted in December 2012. The fiscal targets have, therefore, been revised down substantially, taking into account the macroeconomic circumstances and the current fiscal situation, to avoid overtightening fiscal policy in the short term.

| (12) | Greece will accordingly pursue a new fiscal path, premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with the expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. The revised path means that the general government budget deficit will fall below 3 % of GDP in 2017. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Greece will accordingly pursue a new fiscal path, premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with the expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. The revised path means that the general government budget deficit will fall below 3 % of GDP in 2017.

| (13) | Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018.

| (14) | The budget for 2016 to be adopted by the Greek parliament forms part of the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) 2016-2019, with the aim to deliver a sizeable and front-loaded fiscal consolidation bringing savings of more than EUR 6 900 million, close to 4 % of GDP. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The budget for 2016 to be adopted by the Greek parliament forms part of the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) 2016-2019, with the aim to deliver a sizeable and front-loaded fiscal consolidation bringing savings of more than EUR 6 900 million, close to 4 % of GDP.

| (15) | The failure to complete the final EFSF programme review, the missed debt service payments, the expiration of the EFSF programme and the introduction of capital controls have created new circumstances that have led to a further strong deterioration in debt sustainability. This is due to lower growth estimates, a downward revision of the primary surplus targets, a downward revision of privatisation receipts, a strong deterioration in the financing needs of the banking sector following the imposition of capital controls, the need for a higher clearance of arrears following the liquidity shortage experienced by the sovereign and valuation effects due to the depreciation of the euro with respect to the SDR. As a result of these developments debt-to-GDP is expected to reach 198,3 % in 2016, before decreasing to 169,3 % in 2020, 154,5 % in 2022 and 115,9 % in 2030 in the baseline scenario. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The failure to complete the final EFSF programme review, the missed debt service payments, the expiration of the EFSF programme and the introduction of capital controls have created new circumstances that have led to a further strong deterioration in debt sustainability. This is due to lower growth estimates, a downward revision of the primary surplus targets, a downward revision of privatisation receipts, a strong deterioration in the financing needs of the banking sector following the imposition of capital controls, the need for a higher clearance of arrears following the liquidity shortage experienced by the sovereign and valuation effects due to the depreciation of the euro with respect to the SDR. As a result of these developments debt-to-GDP is expected to reach 198,3 % in 2016, before decreasing to 169,3 % in 2020, 154,5 % in 2022 and 115,9 % in 2030 in the baseline scenario.

| (16) | Taking into account those developments, the adjustment path towards the correction of the excessive deficit needs to be updated. The commitment undertaken by Greece concerns not only the fiscal consolidation measures, but also those measures needed to enhance the growth-friendly nature and to minimise any negative social impact. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Taking into account those developments, the adjustment path towards the correction of the excessive deficit needs to be updated. The commitment undertaken by Greece concerns not only the fiscal consolidation measures, but also those measures needed to enhance the growth-friendly nature and to minimise any negative social impact.

| (17) | Each measure required by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 is instrumental in achieving the required budgetary adjustment. Some measures have a direct impact on the budgetary situation of Greece while the others are structural measures that will result in improved fiscal governance and a sounder budgetary situation in the medium term. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Each measure required by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 is instrumental in achieving the required budgetary adjustment. Some measures have a direct impact on the budgetary situation of Greece while the others are structural measures that will result in improved fiscal governance and a sounder budgetary situation in the medium term.

| (18) | In light of the above considerations, it appears necessary to revise the previous annual budgetary targets and the measures conducive to those targets. The new annual budgetary targets and measures conducive to those targets are those contained in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411, |
| --- | --- |

(18)

In light of the above considerations, it appears necessary to revise the previous annual budgetary targets and the measures conducive to those targets. The new annual budgetary targets and measures conducive to those targets are those contained in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1.   Greece shall put an end to the present excessive deficit situation as rapidly as possible, and at the latest, by 2017.

2.   The adjustment path towards the correction of the excessive deficit shall aim to meet the annual general-government-deficit targets, as laid down in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 and will be based on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. The revised path means that the general government budget deficit will fall below 3 % of GDP in 2017.

3.   Greece shall adopt and fully implement all fiscal, economic and structural adjustment measures incorporated in the economic and financial adjustment programme as approved by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411.

4.   Greece shall stand ready to adopt further measures if risks to the budgetary plans materialise. Budgetary consolidation measures shall secure a lasting improvement in the general government structural balance in a growth-friendly manner.

Article 2

This Decision shall take effect on the day of its notification.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Hellenic Republic.

Done at Brussels, 19 August 2015.

For the Council

The President

J. ASSELBORN

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(1)  OJ L 145, 11.6.2010, p. 6.

1

(2)  OJ L 296, 15.11.2011, p. 38.

2

(3)  Council Decision 2011/791/EU of 8 November 2011 (OJ L 320, 3.12.2011, p. 28), Council Decision 2012/211/EU of 13 March 2012 (OJ L 113, 25.4.2012, p. 8), Council Decision 2013/6/EU of 4 December 2012 (OJ L 4, 9.1.2013, p. 40).

3

(4)  OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1.

4

(5)  See page 12 of this Official Journal.

5

(6)  OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.

6

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| 20.8.2015 | EN | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | L 219/12 |
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20.8.2015

EN

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

L 219/12

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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2015/1411

of 19 August 2015

approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme of Greece

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (1), and in particular Article 7(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | Article 136(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) foresees the possibility of adopting measures specific to Member States whose currency is the euro in order to ensure the proper functioning of economic and monetary union. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 136(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) foresees the possibility of adopting measures specific to Member States whose currency is the euro in order to ensure the proper functioning of economic and monetary union.

| (2) | Since 2010, Greece has been granted financial assistance by the Member States and the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’). A first Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was been agreed on 2 May 2010: the euro area Member States agreed to provide bilateral loans, pooled by the European Commission, for a total amount of EUR 80 000 million to be disbursed over the period May 2010 through June 2013 and the IMF committing additional EUR 30 000 million under a stand-by arrangement. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was approved on 14 March 2012. The euro area Member States and the IMF committed the undisbursed amounts of the first programme plus an additional EUR 130 000 million for the years 2012-2014. Whereas the financing of the first programme was based on bilateral loans, it was agreed that — on the side of euro area Member States — the second programme would be financed by the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’), which had been fully operational since August 2010. In total, the second programme foresaw financial assistance of EUR 164 500 million until the end of 2014 (the period was later extended until the end of June 2015). Of that sum, the euro area commitment amounts to EUR 144 700 million to be provided via the EFSF, while the IMF contributed EUR 19 800 million, as part of a four-year EUR 28 000 million arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Greece that the IMF approved in March 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Since 2010, Greece has been granted financial assistance by the Member States and the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’). A first Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was been agreed on 2 May 2010: the euro area Member States agreed to provide bilateral loans, pooled by the European Commission, for a total amount of EUR 80 000 million to be disbursed over the period May 2010 through June 2013 and the IMF committing additional EUR 30 000 million under a stand-by arrangement. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was approved on 14 March 2012. The euro area Member States and the IMF committed the undisbursed amounts of the first programme plus an additional EUR 130 000 million for the years 2012-2014. Whereas the financing of the first programme was based on bilateral loans, it was agreed that — on the side of euro area Member States — the second programme would be financed by the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’), which had been fully operational since August 2010. In total, the second programme foresaw financial assistance of EUR 164 500 million until the end of 2014 (the period was later extended until the end of June 2015). Of that sum, the euro area commitment amounts to EUR 144 700 million to be provided via the EFSF, while the IMF contributed EUR 19 800 million, as part of a four-year EUR 28 000 million arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Greece that the IMF approved in March 2012.

| (3) | On 8 July 2015, in view of the ongoing severe economic and financial disturbance, the Greek authorities requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in order to ensure a properly-functioning Greek banking system, to meet Greece's debt obligations, to support the return of Greece's economy to sustainable growth and safeguard financial stability of the euro area and of its Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 8 July 2015, in view of the ongoing severe economic and financial disturbance, the Greek authorities requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in order to ensure a properly-functioning Greek banking system, to meet Greece's debt obligations, to support the return of Greece's economy to sustainable growth and safeguard financial stability of the euro area and of its Member States.

| (4) | Pursuant to Article 13(1) of the ESM Treaty, and to form the basis for a decision of the ESM Board of Governors, in line with Article 13(2) thereof, whether to grant, in principle, stability support to Greece in the form of a loan, on 8 July 2015 the Chairperson of the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank (‘ECB’), with assessing the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole or its Member States; assessing, together with the IMF, whether public debt is sustainable; and estimating the actual or potential financing needs of Greece. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Pursuant to Article 13(1) of the ESM Treaty, and to form the basis for a decision of the ESM Board of Governors, in line with Article 13(2) thereof, whether to grant, in principle, stability support to Greece in the form of a loan, on 8 July 2015 the Chairperson of the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank (‘ECB’), with assessing the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole or its Member States; assessing, together with the IMF, whether public debt is sustainable; and estimating the actual or potential financing needs of Greece.

| (5) | In compliance with Article 13 of the ESM Treaty, the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and with input from IMF staff, completed those assessments on 10 July 2015, concluding that conditions for the financial support for Greece, to be provided in the form of an ESM loan, are in place. The financing needs were estimated to be up to EUR 86 000 million. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

In compliance with Article 13 of the ESM Treaty, the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and with input from IMF staff, completed those assessments on 10 July 2015, concluding that conditions for the financial support for Greece, to be provided in the form of an ESM loan, are in place. The financing needs were estimated to be up to EUR 86 000 million.

| (6) | On 17 July 2015, Greece was granted EUR 7 160 million short-term financial assistance under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (‘EFSM’), by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1181 (2), for facing July 2015 repayment obligations and settling its arrears to the IMF. The assistance was disbursed in one instalment on 20 July 2015, and was linked to economic policy conditionality. The ESM assistance will be used, inter alia, to repay that short-term EFSM bridge loan. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 17 July 2015, Greece was granted EUR 7 160 million short-term financial assistance under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (‘EFSM’), by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1181 (2), for facing July 2015 repayment obligations and settling its arrears to the IMF. The assistance was disbursed in one instalment on 20 July 2015, and was linked to economic policy conditionality. The ESM assistance will be used, inter alia, to repay that short-term EFSM bridge loan.

| (7) | On 16 July 2015, the ESM Board of Governors invited the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, the ESM, the Greek authorities, and, where appropriate, the IMF, to agree on a macroeconomic adjustment programme for Greece. The programme was prepared in accordance with the procedure provided for under Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013. On 11 August 2015, those institutions reached an agreement at technical level on a macroeconomic adjustment programme (the ‘Programme’) with the Greek Government. The Programme submitted by Greece to the Commission and the Council aims at ensuring the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances, as well as to ensure financial stability and to promote growth, employment, and social fairness. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

On 16 July 2015, the ESM Board of Governors invited the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, the ESM, the Greek authorities, and, where appropriate, the IMF, to agree on a macroeconomic adjustment programme for Greece. The programme was prepared in accordance with the procedure provided for under Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013. On 11 August 2015, those institutions reached an agreement at technical level on a macroeconomic adjustment programme (the ‘Programme’) with the Greek Government. The Programme submitted by Greece to the Commission and the Council aims at ensuring the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances, as well as to ensure financial stability and to promote growth, employment, and social fairness.

| (8) | Following that agreement, Greece should adopt a comprehensive policy package, to be implemented in a three-year macroeconomic adjustment programme which would span from the third quarter of 2015 to the third quarter of 2018. |
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(8)

Following that agreement, Greece should adopt a comprehensive policy package, to be implemented in a three-year macroeconomic adjustment programme which would span from the third quarter of 2015 to the third quarter of 2018.

| (9) | The comprehensive policy package, to be laid down in an ESM Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’), should aim at restoring financial market confidence, re-establishing sound macroeconomic balances and enabling the economy to return to sustainable growth. It should be structured on four pillars: restoring fiscal sustainability, safeguarding financial stability, enhancing competitiveness and growth, and modernising the state and the public administration. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The comprehensive policy package, to be laid down in an ESM Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’), should aim at restoring financial market confidence, re-establishing sound macroeconomic balances and enabling the economy to return to sustainable growth. It should be structured on four pillars: restoring fiscal sustainability, safeguarding financial stability, enhancing competitiveness and growth, and modernising the state and the public administration.

| (10) | The Commission services updated their forecast for nominal GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the ESM programme. Under this forecast, which centres around a nominal GDP growth rate of – 3,2 % in 2015, – 0,7 % in 2016, 3,4 % in 2017, 4,1 % in 2018 and 4,2 % in 2019, the debt-to-GDP ratio would amount to 196,3 % in 2015, 200,9 % in 2016, 198,6 % in 2017, 190,7 % in 2018 and 182,3 % in 2019. The debt-to-GDP ratio would therefore increase until 2016 and move to a declining path thereafter, reaching an estimated 174,5 % in 2020, with debt dynamics affected by several below-the-line operations. Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The Commission services updated their forecast for nominal GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the ESM programme. Under this forecast, which centres around a nominal GDP growth rate of – 3,2 % in 2015, – 0,7 % in 2016, 3,4 % in 2017, 4,1 % in 2018 and 4,2 % in 2019, the debt-to-GDP ratio would amount to 196,3 % in 2015, 200,9 % in 2016, 198,6 % in 2017, 190,7 % in 2018 and 182,3 % in 2019. The debt-to-GDP ratio would therefore increase until 2016 and move to a declining path thereafter, reaching an estimated 174,5 % in 2020, with debt dynamics affected by several below-the-line operations. Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018.

| (11) | The authorities will pursue a new fiscal path premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The authorities will pursue a new fiscal path premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession.

| (12) | Enhancing the long-term resilience of the Greek banking sector is critical to restoring financial stability in Greece and to preserving financial stability in the euro area as a whole. To preserve the liquidity of the Greek banking sector, temporary administrative measures were imposed, including capital controls. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Enhancing the long-term resilience of the Greek banking sector is critical to restoring financial stability in Greece and to preserving financial stability in the euro area as a whole. To preserve the liquidity of the Greek banking sector, temporary administrative measures were imposed, including capital controls.

| (13) | The implementation of comprehensive and ambitious reforms in financial, fiscal and structural areas should safeguard the medium-term sustainability of the Greek public debt. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The implementation of comprehensive and ambitious reforms in financial, fiscal and structural areas should safeguard the medium-term sustainability of the Greek public debt.

| (14) | The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, should verify at regular intervals the rigorous implementation of Greece's Programme through missions and regular reporting, on a quarterly basis, by the Greek authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, should verify at regular intervals the rigorous implementation of Greece's Programme through missions and regular reporting, on a quarterly basis, by the Greek authorities.

| (15) | Throughout the implementation of Greece's comprehensive policy package, the Commission should provide additional policy advice and technical assistance in specific areas. |
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(15)

Throughout the implementation of Greece's comprehensive policy package, the Commission should provide additional policy advice and technical assistance in specific areas.

| (16) | The Greek authorities should involve, in accordance with current national rules and practices, the social partners and civil society organisations in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Programme. |
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(16)

The Greek authorities should involve, in accordance with current national rules and practices, the social partners and civil society organisations in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Programme.

| (17) | Any form of financial assistance received by Greece to help it implement the policies under its Programme should be in line with the legal requirements and policies of the Union, in particular the Union's economic governance framework. Any intervention in support of financial institutions should be carried out in accordance with the Union's rules on competition. The Commission should ensure that any measures laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding in the context of requested ESM financial assistance are fully consistent with this Decision, |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Any form of financial assistance received by Greece to help it implement the policies under its Programme should be in line with the legal requirements and policies of the Union, in particular the Union's economic governance framework. Any intervention in support of financial institutions should be carried out in accordance with the Union's rules on competition. The Commission should ensure that any measures laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding in the context of requested ESM financial assistance are fully consistent with this Decision,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1.   In order to facilitate the return of the Greek economy to a path of sustainable growth and to fiscal and financial stability, Greece shall rigorously implement the Programme, the main elements of which are laid down in Article 2 of this Decision. The Programme shall address the specific risks emanating from Greece for the financial stability of the euro area and shall aim to rapidly re-establish a sound and sustainable economic and financial situation in Greece and restore its capacity to finance itself fully on the international financial markets. The Programme shall take due account of the Council recommendations addressed to Greece under Articles 121, 126, 136 and 148 TFEU as well as Greece's actions to comply with them, while aiming to broaden, strengthen and deepen the policy measures required.

2.   The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, shall monitor Greece's progress in implementing its Programme. Greece shall give the Commission and the ECB its full cooperation. It shall, in particular, provide them with all the information that they deem necessary for the monitoring of the Programme.

3.   The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, shall examine with the Greek authorities any changes and updates to the Programme that may be needed in order to take proper account of, inter alia, any significant gap between macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts and realised figures, negative spillover effects, as well as macroeconomic and financial shocks.

In order to ensure the smooth implementation of the Programme and to help the correction of imbalances in a sustainable way, the Commission shall provide continued advice and guidance on fiscal, financial market and structural reforms.

The Commission shall at regular intervals assess the economic impact of the Programme and shall recommend necessary corrections with a view to enhancing growth and job creation, securing the necessary fiscal consolidation, and minimising harmful social impacts.

Article 2

1.   The key objectives of the Programme shall be: restoring fiscal sustainability, safeguarding financial stability, enhancing competitiveness and growth, and modernising the state and the public administration.

2.   Greece shall pursue fiscal consolidation by means of high-quality permanent measures while minimising the impact on disadvantaged people. The Greek authorities commit to ensuring sustainable public finances and achieve sizeable and sustainable primary surpluses over the medium-term that will reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio steadily. The authorities shall accordingly pursue a new fiscal path premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 per cent of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. Greece shall target a medium-term primary surplus of 3,5 % of GDP to be achieved through a combination of upfront parametric fiscal reforms, including to its VAT and pension system, supported by an ambitious programme to strengthen tax compliance and public financial management, and fight tax evasion, while ensuring adequate protection of vulnerable groups. In addition to the measures above, the authorities commit to legislate in October 2015 credible structural measures yielding at least 0,75 % of GDP coming into effect in 2017 and 0,25 % of GDP coming into effect in 2018 to support the achievement of the medium-term primary balance target of 3,5 % of GDP. The authorities commit to take further structural measures in October 2016, if needed to secure the 2017 and 2018 targets. Those would include containing defence expenditure, the planned personal income tax reform and freezing statutory spending. Parametric fiscal measures shall be bolstered by a wide range of administrative actions to address shortfalls in tax collection and enforcement. The Greek Government shall monitor fiscal risks, including court rulings, and shall take offsetting measures as needed to meet the fiscal targets. The authorities intend to transfer at least 30 % of any over-performance to the segregated account earmarked for debt reduction. In addition, another 30 % of the over-performance would be used for clearing unpaid government obligations linked to the past.

3.   Greece shall adopt the measures specified below:

| (i) | take measures in the short term to raise revenues and to target and contain expenditure. Among the measures to raise revenue, Greece shall gradually abolish the refund of excise tax on diesel oil for farmers and increase the tonnage tax. The authorities shall take actions to launch the 2015 property tax (ENFIA) exercise in order to issue bills in October 2015 with the final instalment due in February 2016. They shall also correct identified issues with the revenue measures recently implemented. The authorities also committed to target and contain expenditure by reducing the cost of healthcare and launching the comprehensive social welfare review. The package includes further measures with budgetary impact, such as public administration reforms, reforms addressing shortfalls in tax collection enforcement, and other parametric measures; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

take measures in the short term to raise revenues and to target and contain expenditure. Among the measures to raise revenue, Greece shall gradually abolish the refund of excise tax on diesel oil for farmers and increase the tonnage tax. The authorities shall take actions to launch the 2015 property tax (ENFIA) exercise in order to issue bills in October 2015 with the final instalment due in February 2016. They shall also correct identified issues with the revenue measures recently implemented. The authorities also committed to target and contain expenditure by reducing the cost of healthcare and launching the comprehensive social welfare review. The package includes further measures with budgetary impact, such as public administration reforms, reforms addressing shortfalls in tax collection enforcement, and other parametric measures;

| (ii) | to demonstrate its commitment to credible fiscal policies, adopt in October 2015, a supplementary 2015 budget as needed, the draft 2016 budget and a 2016-2019 Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, supported by a sizable and credible package of parametric measures and structural fiscal reforms; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

to demonstrate its commitment to credible fiscal policies, adopt in October 2015, a supplementary 2015 budget as needed, the draft 2016 budget and a 2016-2019 Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, supported by a sizable and credible package of parametric measures and structural fiscal reforms;

| (iii) | enact reforms of both direct and indirect taxation to improve efficiency, collectability and boost labour supply. To break from past practice and improve the tax and social security payment culture, the Government shall take strong action to improve collection, and neither introduce new instalment or other amnesty or settlement schemes nor extend existing schemes; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

enact reforms of both direct and indirect taxation to improve efficiency, collectability and boost labour supply. To break from past practice and improve the tax and social security payment culture, the Government shall take strong action to improve collection, and neither introduce new instalment or other amnesty or settlement schemes nor extend existing schemes;

| (iv) | continue reforms that aim at improving the budget process and expenditure controls, clearing arrears, and strengthening budget reporting and cash management. The Government is committed to making the Fiscal Council operational; |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

continue reforms that aim at improving the budget process and expenditure controls, clearing arrears, and strengthening budget reporting and cash management. The Government is committed to making the Fiscal Council operational;

| (v) | take further action in the area of public procurement to increase efficiency and transparency of the Greek public procurement system, prevent misconduct, and ensure more accountability and control. Policies will be agreed with the European Commission, which shall assist with the implementation of an action plan; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

take further action in the area of public procurement to increase efficiency and transparency of the Greek public procurement system, prevent misconduct, and ensure more accountability and control. Policies will be agreed with the European Commission, which shall assist with the implementation of an action plan;

| (vi) | implement fully the existing reforms and also proceed with further reforms to strengthen long-term sustainability, targeting savings of around 0,25 % of GDP in 2015 and around 1 % of GDP by 2016. The package inter alia aims to create strong disincentives for early retirement through increasing early retirement penalties and by the gradual elimination of the grandfathering of rights to retire before the statutory retirement age; |
| --- | --- |

(vi)

implement fully the existing reforms and also proceed with further reforms to strengthen long-term sustainability, targeting savings of around 0,25 % of GDP in 2015 and around 1 % of GDP by 2016. The package inter alia aims to create strong disincentives for early retirement through increasing early retirement penalties and by the gradual elimination of the grandfathering of rights to retire before the statutory retirement age;

| (vii) | continue reforming the healthcare sector, controlling public expenditure, managing prices of pharmaceuticals, improve hospital management, increase centralised procurement of hospital supplies, manage demand for pharmaceuticals and health care through evidence-based e-prescription protocols, commission private sector healthcare providers in a cost-effective manner, modernise IT systems, developing a new electronic referral system for primary and secondary care that allows the formulation of care pathways for patients; |
| --- | --- |

(vii)

continue reforming the healthcare sector, controlling public expenditure, managing prices of pharmaceuticals, improve hospital management, increase centralised procurement of hospital supplies, manage demand for pharmaceuticals and health care through evidence-based e-prescription protocols, commission private sector healthcare providers in a cost-effective manner, modernise IT systems, developing a new electronic referral system for primary and secondary care that allows the formulation of care pathways for patients;

| (viii) | adopt by March 2016 a further series of guaranteed employment support schemes with individualised active labour market measures for participants, using local partnerships, involving the private and social economy sectors and ensuring the efficient and effective use of the resources available.
  Achieving a fairer society will require that Greece improve the design of its welfare system, so that there is a genuine social safety net which targets scarce resources at those in most need. The authorities plan to benefit from available technical assistance from international organisations for the social welfare review and for the guaranteed minimum income implementation. |
| --- | --- |

(viii)

adopt by March 2016 a further series of guaranteed employment support schemes with individualised active labour market measures for participants, using local partnerships, involving the private and social economy sectors and ensuring the efficient and effective use of the resources available.

Achieving a fairer society will require that Greece improve the design of its welfare system, so that there is a genuine social safety net which targets scarce resources at those in most need. The authorities plan to benefit from available technical assistance from international organisations for the social welfare review and for the guaranteed minimum income implementation.

4.   To safeguard financial stability, Greece shall immediately take steps to tackle Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) and restore liquidity and capital in the banking system. A recapitalisation process of banks should be completed before the end of 2015, which shall be accompanied by concomitant measures to strengthen the governance of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (‘HFSF’) and of banks. Further measures involve the resolution of Non-Performing Loans (‘NPLs’) and the governance of the HFSF and of banks.

5.   To promote growth, competitiveness and investment, Greece shall design and implement a wide range of reforms in labour markets and product markets (including energy) that not only ensure full compliance with European Union requirements, but also aim at achieving European best practices. More open markets are essential to create economic opportunities and improve social fairness, by curtailing rent-seeking and monopolistic behaviour, which has translated into higher prices and lower living standards. In line with their growth strategy, the authorities shall intensify their efforts to bring key initiatives and reform proposals to fruition as well as enrich the agenda with further ambitious reforms that shall support the country's return to sustainable growth, attract investments and create jobs.

6.   The Greek energy markets need wide-ranging reforms to bring them in line with Union legislation and policies, make them more modern and competitive, reduce monopolistic rents and inefficiencies, promote innovation, favour the wider adoption of renewables and gas, and ensure the transfer of benefits of all these changes to consumers. The authorities shall adopt the reform of the gas market and its specific roadmap, leading inter alia to full eligibility to switch supplier for all customers by 2018, and notify the reformed capacity payments system (including a temporary and a permanent mechanism) and New Organisation of Markets in Electricity products to the Commission. In any case, by 2020 no undertaking shall be permitted to produce or import, directly or indirectly, more than 50 % of total electricity produced and imported in Greece.

7.   There shall be an ambitious privatisation programme and policies which support investment. The Government commits to facilitate the privatisation process and complete all needed Government actions to allow tenders to be executed successfully. In this respect the Government shall complete all actions needed as agreed on a quarterly basis between the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (‘HRADF’), the institutions and the Government. The List of Government Pending Actions has been approved by the Board of Directors of the HRADF. In line with the statement of the Euro Summit of 12 July 2015, a new independent fund (the ‘Fund’) shall be established and have in its possession valuable Greek assets. The overarching objective of the Fund is to manage valuable Greek assets; and to protect, create and ultimately maximise their value which it shall monetise through privatisations and other means.

8.   A modern state and public administration shall be a key priority of the Programme. Particular attention shall be paid to increasing the efficiency of the public sector in the delivery of essential public goods and services. Measures shall be taken to enhance the efficiency of the judicial system and to upgrade the fight against corruption. Reforms shall strengthen the institutional and operational independence of key institutions such as the revenue administration and the statistics institute (Elstat).

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Hellenic Republic.

Done at Brussels, 19 August 2015.

For the Council

The President

J. ASSELBORN

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(1)  OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1.

1

(2)  OJ L 192, 18.7.2015, p. 15.

2

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ATTI ADOTTATI MINN KORPI STABBILITI PERMEZZ TA' FTEHIMIET INTERNAZZJONALI

| 20.8.2015 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | L 219/17 |
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20.8.2015

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

L 219/17

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DEĊIŻJONI Nru 1 TAL-KUMITAT TAL-KUMMERĊ FIL-PRODOTTI UE-KOREA

tat-28 ta' Mejju 2015

dwar l-adozzjoni tar-regoli ta' amministrazzjoni u implimentazzjoni tal-kwota tar-rata tariffarja [2015/1412]

IL-KUMITAT TAL-KUMMERĊ FIL-PRODOTTI,

Wara li kkunsidra l-Ftehim ta' Kummerċ Ħieles bejn ir-Repubblika tal-Korea (“il-Korea”), minn naħa waħda, u l-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Istati Membri tagħha, fuq in-naħa l-oħra, (“il-Partijiet” u “il-Ftehim”) u b'mod partikolari l-Artikoli 2.16, 15.2.1 u l-punti 2 u 3 tal-Appendiċi 2-A-1 tiegħu,

Billi:

| (1) | L-Artikolu 15.1 tal-Ftehim jistabbilixxi Kumitat tal-Kummerċ li għandu, fost affarijiet oħra, jiżgura li l-Ftehim jaħdem kif suppost u jissorvelja l-ħidma tal-kumitati speċjalizzati kollha. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

L-Artikolu 15.1 tal-Ftehim jistabbilixxi Kumitat tal-Kummerċ li għandu, fost affarijiet oħra, jiżgura li l-Ftehim jaħdem kif suppost u jissorvelja l-ħidma tal-kumitati speċjalizzati kollha.

| (2) | Skont l-Artikolu 15.2 tal-Ftehim, ġew stabbiliti kumitati speċjalizzati taħt il-patroċinju tal-Kumitat tal-Kummerċ. Il-Kumitat tal-Kummerċ fil-Prodotti, skont l-Artikolu 2.16 tal-Ftehim, huwa wieħed minn dawn il-kumitati speċjalizzati. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Skont l-Artikolu 15.2 tal-Ftehim, ġew stabbiliti kumitati speċjalizzati taħt il-patroċinju tal-Kumitat tal-Kummerċ. Il-Kumitat tal-Kummerċ fil-Prodotti, skont l-Artikolu 2.16 tal-Ftehim, huwa wieħed minn dawn il-kumitati speċjalizzati.

| (3) | Skont il-punt 2 tal-Appendiċi 2-A-1 tal-Ftehim, il-Korea tista' tuża sistema ta' rkant sabiex tamministra u timplimenta l-kwoti tar-rata tariffarja (“TRQs”) applikati mill-Korea għal ċerti prodotti ta' oriġini tal-Unjoni Ewropea abbażi tal-Ftehim. It-termini tas-sistema ta' rkant jridu jiġu stabbiliti bi ftehim reċiproku tal-Partijiet permezz ta' deċiżjoni tal-Kumitat tal-Kummerċ fil-Prodotti. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Skont il-punt 2 tal-Appendiċi 2-A-1 tal-Ftehim, il-Korea tista' tuża sistema ta' rkant sabiex tamministra u timplimenta l-kwoti tar-rata tariffarja (“TRQs”) applikati mill-Korea għal ċerti prodotti ta' oriġini tal-Unjoni Ewropea abbażi tal-Ftehim. It-termini tas-sistema ta' rkant jridu jiġu stabbiliti bi ftehim reċiproku tal-Partijiet permezz ta' deċiżjoni tal-Kumitat tal-Kummerċ fil-Prodotti.

| (4) | Skont il-punt 3 tal-Appendiċi 2-A-1 tal-Ftehim, il-Korea tista' tuża sistema ta' liċenzji sabiex tamministra u timplimenta ċerti TRQs. Il-Partijiet għandhom jiftiehmu fi ħdan il-Kumitat tal-Kummerċ fil-Prodotti rigward il-politiki u l-proċeduri għas-sistema ta' liċenzji, inkluża l-eliġibbiltà sabiex jiġu rċevuti l-kwantitajiet ta' TRQ, u kull bidla jew emenda għal dawn, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Skont il-punt 3 tal-Appendiċi 2-A-1 tal-Ftehim, il-Korea tista' tuża sistema ta' liċenzji sabiex tamministra u timplimenta ċerti TRQs. Il-Partijiet għandhom jiftiehmu fi ħdan il-Kumitat tal-Kummerċ fil-Prodotti rigward il-politiki u l-proċeduri għas-sistema ta' liċenzji, inkluża l-eliġibbiltà sabiex jiġu rċevuti l-kwantitajiet ta' TRQ, u kull bidla jew emenda għal dawn,

IDDEĊIEDA KIF ĠEJ:

| 1. | Il-Korea għandha tamministra u timplimenta l-kwoti tar-rata tariffarja applikati mill-Korea għal ċerti prodotti ta' oriġini tal-Unjoni Ewropea abbażi tal-Ftehim ta' Kummerċ Ħieles bejn ir-Repubblika tal-Korea, min-naħa l-waħda, u l-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Istati Membri tagħha, min-naħa l-oħra, skont ir-regoli stabbiliti fl-Anness għal din id-Deċiżjoni. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Il-Korea għandha tamministra u timplimenta l-kwoti tar-rata tariffarja applikati mill-Korea għal ċerti prodotti ta' oriġini tal-Unjoni Ewropea abbażi tal-Ftehim ta' Kummerċ Ħieles bejn ir-Repubblika tal-Korea, min-naħa l-waħda, u l-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Istati Membri tagħha, min-naħa l-oħra, skont ir-regoli stabbiliti fl-Anness għal din id-Deċiżjoni.

| 2. | Din id-Deċiżjoni tidħol fis-seħħ fil-jum tal-adozzjoni tagħha. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Din id-Deċiżjoni tidħol fis-seħħ fil-jum tal-adozzjoni tagħha.

Magħmul fit-28 ta' Mejju 2015.

Għall-Kumitat tal-Kummerċ fi Prodotti

Helena KÖNIG

Aġent Direttur

Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Kummerċ tal-Kummissjoni Ewropea

Chang K. KIM

Direttur Ġenerali għall-Uffiċċju tal-Politika tal-Kummerċ

Il-Ministeru għall-Kummerċ, l-Industrija u l-Enerġija tar-Repubblika tal-Korea

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ANNESS

IR-REGOLI GĦALL-AMMINISTRAZZJONI U L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-KWOTI TAR-RATA TARIFFARJA

Artikolu 1

L-għażla taż-żmien tal-irkantijiet u l-applikazzjoni tal-liċenzji

(1)   L-irkantijiet għal trab tal-ħalib xkumat, trab tal-ħalib, ħalib kondensat u għasel naturali għandhom jiġu qabel il-perjodu ta' importazzjoni, jiġifieri f'Ġunju għall-kwoti li jinfetħu f'Lulju.

(2)   Il-linji gwida speċifiċi mill-Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation ser jipprevedu li l-avviżi pubbliċi għall-irkantijiet ser isiru tmint ijiem kalendarji qabel id-data tal-iskadenza tal-applikazzjoni għall-parteċipazzjoni fl-irkantijiet.

(3)   Għal oġġetti ta' prodotti li l-iskeda ta' żmien għall-applikazzjoni għal-liċenzja tal-kwota tagħhom mhix iffissata fil-Ftehim ta' Kummerċ Ħieles Korea-UE, il-linji gwida speċifiċi tal-aġenziji magħżula biex jamministraw il-Kwoti tar-Rata Tariffarja (TRQs) (minn hawn 'il quddiem imsejħa “l-Aġenzji Rakkomandanti”) se jipprevedu perjodu, għat-tressiq tal-applikazzjoni għal liċenzja, li jkun ta' mill-inqas sebat ijiem kalendarji mill-ewwel jum ta' xogħol tas-sena ta' eżekuzzjoni msemmija fl-Anness 2-A, il-punt 5 tal-Ftehim ta' Kummerċ Ħieles Korea-UE.

Artikolu 2

Depożitu u miżati

(1)   Mhu ser ikun hemm l-ebda spiża amministrattiva jew ħlasijiet imposti minbarra d-depożitu — l-ammont imħallas minn offerenti li japplikaw għall-irkant — għal servizzi relatati ma' applikazzjoni għal allokazzjoni ta' TRQ permezz ta' bejgħ bl-irkant.

(2)   L-istruzzjonijiet ġenerali għall-offerenti għal kull irkant għandhom jippreskrivu li d-depożitu jiġi rritornat lill-offerenti hekk kif il-proċeduri tal-amministrazzjoni normali ta' wara l-irkant ikunu tlestew.

(3)   L-ebda garanzija jew depożitu mhu se jkun meħtieġ għal applikanti għal liċenzja.

Artikolu 3

Ħruġ u validità ta' rakkomandazzjoni

(1)   L-Aġenziji Rakkomandanti se joħorġu Rakkomandazzjoni għat-TRQs għall-Importazzjoni tal-FTA Korea-UE (minn hawn 'il quddiem imsejħa “Rakkomandazzjoni”) wara rkant jew applikazzjoni għal liċenzja.

(2)   Ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet lill-applikanti għandhom jinħarġu fi żmien jumejn kalendarji sakemm l-applikazzjoni tar-Rakkomandazzjoni tat-TRQs tkun tissodisfa r-rekwiżiti tar-Rakkomandazzjoni.

(3)   Rakkomandazzjoni għat-TRQs għall-importazzjoni tkun valida għal 90 jum. Il-perjodu tal-validità jista' jiġi estiż għal 30 jum ieħor, iżda ma jistax jaqbeż l-aħħar jum tas-sena ta' eżekuzzjoni msemmija fl-Anness 2-A, punt 5 tal-Ftehim ta' Kummerċ Ħieles Korea-UE.

Artikolu 4

Pubblikazzjoni tal-informazzjoni dwar l-amministrazzjoni tat-TRQs

(1)   Il-linji gwida tal-Ministeru tal-Agrikoltura, l-Ikel u l-Affarijiet Rurali tal-Korea (minn hawn 'il quddiem imsejjaħ “MAFRA”) u l-linji gwida speċifiċi tal-Aġenziji Rakkomandanti se jkunu ppubblikati fuq il-websajts rispettivi tagħhom.

(2)   Fuq bażi regolari, fuq il-websajts tagħhom l-Aġenziji Rakkomandanti se jippubblikaw informazzjoni li tinkludi avviżi pubbliċi biex jitressqu applikazzjonijiet għal liċenzji u rkantijiet, allokazzjoni ta' liċenzji u perijodi tal-irkant, kwantitajiet allokati, kwantitajiet li jifdal disponibbli għal kull TRQ u d-data ppjanata tal-irkant/perjodu ta' liċenzjar li jkun imiss.

(3)   Il-kriterji bażiċi għal irkantijiet inklużi l-eliġibbiltà, il-ħlas ta' depożitu u ta' ritorn, id-dati tal-irkant, il-kodiċi u l-informazzjoni tal-irkant se jkunu inklużi fil-linji gwida speċifiċi tal-Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation jew fl-istruzzjonijiet ġenerali lill-offerenti għal kull irkant.

Artikolu 5

Regoli ta' allokazzjoni tat-TRQs

Il-linji gwida tal-MAFRA jippermettu d-distribuzzjoni tal-volum annwali tat-TRQ matul is-sena permezz ta' diviżjoni tal-volum annwali tat-TRQ f'għadd ta' subvolumi, li s-somma tagħhom tkun ekwivalenti għall-volum tat-TRQ annwali. Il-volum totali ta' TRQ għal kull sena ta' eżekuzzjoni kif jistipula l-Ftehim ta' Kummerċ Ħieles Korea-UE ma għandux jitnaqqas.

L-amministrazzjoni tal-kwoti tar-rata tariffarja (TRQs): Glossarju

| Aġenziji rakkomandanti | Aġenziji Koreani maħtura biex jimmaniġġjaw it-TRQs: Il-Korea Dairy Industries Association, il-Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation, il-Korea Feed Ingredients Association u l-Korea Feed Milk Replacer Association
  Websajts: | Il-Korea Dairy Industries Association (verżjoni bil-Korean biss hija disponibbli):
  http://www.koreadia.or.kr/ |
| --- | --- | --- |

Aġenziji rakkomandanti

Aġenziji Koreani maħtura biex jimmaniġġjaw it-TRQs: Il-Korea Dairy Industries Association, il-Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation, il-Korea Feed Ingredients Association u l-Korea Feed Milk Replacer Association

Websajts:

Il-Korea Dairy Industries Association (verżjoni bil-Korean biss hija disponibbli):

http://www.koreadia.or.kr/

| | Il-Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation:
  http://www.at.or.kr/home/apen000000/index.action |
| --- | --- |

Il-Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation:

http://www.at.or.kr/home/apen000000/index.action

| | Il-Korea Feed Ingredients Association (verżjoni bil-Korean biss hija disponibbli):
  http://www.kfeedia.org/main.html |
| --- | --- |

Il-Korea Feed Ingredients Association (verżjoni bil-Korean biss hija disponibbli):

http://www.kfeedia.org/main.html

| | Il-Korea Feed Milk Replacer Association (verżjoni bil-Korean biss hija disponibbli):
  http://milkreplacer.or.kr/ |
| --- | --- |

Il-Korea Feed Milk Replacer Association (verżjoni bil-Korean biss hija disponibbli):

http://milkreplacer.or.kr/

Depożitu

Ammont imħallas mill-offerenti li japplikaw għal irkant. Id-depożitu jiġi rritornat lil kull offerent immedjatament wara r-rakkomandazzjoni tal-kwota.

Rakkomandazzjoni

Ħruġ ta' TRQ għall-importazzjoni wara rkant jew applikazzjoni għal liċenzja.

Perjodu ta' validità

Il-perjodu li matulu tkun valida rakkomandazzjoni għal TRQ għall-importazzjoni.

Sena ta' eżekuzzjoni

Perjodu ta' 12-il xahar bejn anniversarji konsekuttivi tal-FTA (l-1 ta' Lulju) li huwa stabbilit għalihom fl-FTA Korea-UE volum annwali ta' TRQ.

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