Leigh S. Halstad v. Damian L. Halstad

Case No.: 678 September Term, 2019

Opinion by Meredith, J.

CIVIL PROCEDURE – VENUE – DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE. The general 

venue statute in Maryland provides that a civil action may be filed in the jurisdiction 

where the defendant resides, carries on a regular business, is employed, or habitually 

engages in a vocation. In addition, an action seeking to annul a marriage may be filed in 

the jurisdiction where the marriage ceremony was performed; and an action seeking a 

divorce may be filed in the jurisdiction where the plaintiff resides. A party who contends 

that venue is not proper in the circuit court in which a complaint has been filed must raise 

the objection before filing an answer, and may do so by filing a motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322. 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 24-D-19-000359

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 678

September Term, 2019

LEIGH S. HALSTAD

v.

DAMIAN L. HALSTAD

Meredith,

Kehoe,

Leahy,

JJ.

Opinion by Meredith, J.

Filed: January 29, 2020
Leigh Halstad (“Wife”), appellant, filed a complaint (“the Complaint”) against her 

husband, Damian L. Halstad (“Husband”), appellee, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore 

City, asserting claims for annulment, divorce, and conversion. The court granted 

Husband’s motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of venue, and Wife appealed.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Wife presented six questions in her brief, but the dispositive issue before this 

Court is: Did the Circuit Court for Baltimore City commit reversible error in granting the 

motion to dismiss the Complaint? We answer “no” to that question, and shall affirm the 

judgment of the circuit court.1

 

1 Wife phrased her questions presented in her brief as follows:

1. Did the Circuit Court commit an error of law in denying the 

Appellant a remedy and access to the courts by dismissing the Complaint 

for Annulment and Divorce on grounds of improper venue where proper 

venue was admitted?

2. Did the Circuit Court commit an error of law in failing to enforce the 

provisions of Md. Courts & Judicial Proc. Code Ann. § 6-202 concerning 

venue?

3. Did the Circuit Court violate the separation of powers and the 

prohibition on the suspension of law by failing to enforce the state venue 

statute?

4. Should the pro se Appellant have to subsidize the Appellee’s 

attorney’s fees absent an order of the Circuit Court adjudicating the 

Complaint for Annulment and Divorce under Md. Fam. Law Art., § 7-107?

5. Should this Court condone a party’s use of and a court’s reliance on 

an admittedly incorrect defense of improper venue in order to coerce a 

settlement agreement, maintain a destructive relationship or manipulate the 

plaintiff’s choice of venue?

continued...
2

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties to this case were married on June 8, 1991, in Baltimore. They have 

resided since 1996 in Carroll County. They are the parents of three children. Both Wife 

and Husband are members of the Maryland bar. Husband is an attorney whose office is in 

Carroll County. Wife’s license to practice law is on inactive status.

On January 31, 2019, Wife, acting pro se, filed the Complaint in the Circuit Court 

for Baltimore City. The caption of the Complaint lists the same address in Carroll 

County for both Wife and Husband. The Complaint is spread over 134 pages, and sets 

forth 717 numbered paragraphs divided into three counts that are captioned: “COUNT I 

ANNULMENT”; “COUNT II ABSOLUTE DIVORCE (ALTERNATE COUNT)”; and 

“COUNT III WRONGFUL TAKING AND/OR CONVERSION.”

After Husband was served in Carroll County on February 6, 2019, he filed

(through counsel) a “Motion To Dismiss For Improper Venue Or, In The Alternative, To 

Transfer.” See Maryland Rule 2-322(a)(2), which provides: “The following defenses shall 

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continued...

6. Did the Circuit Court err as a matter of law in failing to grant a 

request for a hearing in Divorce and Annulment case where child custody 

and child support was sought?

In her brief, in the argument section regarding Question 4, Wife states that, while 

“there is no court order in the family court below awarding Appellee the fees and costs 

associated with divorce and annulment pursuant to Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. § 7-107,” 

she would like any future fee award to “make clear that Appellee (who is a practicing 

attorney) is barred from simply taking such funds from Appellant” without her consent 

and “absent obtaining such a ruling in the circuit court where the action was filed.” But it 

appears that there is, at present, no such order ripe for adjudication.
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be made by motion to dismiss filed before the answer, if an answer is required: . . . (2) 

improper venue, . . . .” Husband’s motion asserted that, pursuant to Maryland Code 

(1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), § 6-201(a), the 

general rule on venue provides that “a civil action shall be brought in a county where the 

defendant resides, carries on a regular business, is employed, or habitually engages in a 

vocation.” According to Husband’s motion, venue under CJP § 6-201(a) would not lie in 

Baltimore City, and would be proper only in Carroll County. Husband’s motion further 

asserted that, although CJP § 6-202(1) provides that a divorce action may also be filed in 

the venue “[w]here the plaintiff resides,” that statute would also provide for the action to 

be filed in Carroll County, and not Baltimore City.2

Wife filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on March 8, 2019. She noted 

that Husband’s motion had not addressed CJP § 6-202(2), which provides that an action 

for annulment may be brought “[w]here the plaintiff resides or where the marriage 

ceremony was performed.” Although Wife’s opposition asserted that Husband “has failed 

to meet his burden of proof to establish that venue in this Court is improper,” Wife 

provided no additional information to support venue in Baltimore City. Her opposition 

 

2

In the motion to dismiss, Husband asserted that Carroll County is the proper 

venue, but he also asserted that the case might “be better suited for transfer to Howard 

County” because of Husband’s “professional and personal relationships with the judges 

who sit in the Circuit Court for Carroll County.” But, as Wife pointed out in her 

opposition, Husband did not allege facts that would support a finding that venue was 

proper in Howard County. Cf. Maryland Rule 2-327(b) (granting court authority to 

“transfer the action to any county in which it could have been brought”). Rule 2-327(c), 

permitting a transfer for convenience of the parties and witnesses, similarly limits the 

transfer “to any other circuit court where the action might have been brought.”
4

objected to Husband’s request for transfer of the Complaint. Neither party requested a 

hearing on the motion. See Maryland Rule 2-311(f) (“A party desiring a hearing on a 

motion, other than a motion filed pursuant to Rule 2-532, 2-533, or 2-534, shall request 

the hearing in the motion or response under the heading ‘Request for Hearing.’ The title 

of the motion or response shall state that a hearing is requested.”).

On March 13, 2019, Wife filed a “Request For Order Of Default.” In that

document, Wife asserted that Husband was in default for failing to file an answer to the 

Complaint within 30 days after he was served with process. Wife’s allegation of a default 

was, however, in error because Maryland Rule 2-321(c) provides a party who files a 

preliminary motion pursuant to Rule 2-322—such as Husband’s motion to dismiss—an 

automatic extension of the time for filing an answer to the complaint. Rule 2-321(c) 

states, in pertinent part: “When a motion is filed pursuant to Rule 2-322 . . ., the time for 

filing an answer is extended without special order to 15 days after entry of the court’s 

order on the motion . . . .”

On March 19, 2019, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City docketed an order 

granting Husband’s motion and dismissing the Complaint for lack of venue. The case 

was ordered dismissed (and not transferred).

On March 28, 2019, Wife filed a “Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment,” asking 

the circuit court to “vacate the order of dismissal.” In her motion, Wife asserted—

apparently for the first time in any of the documents filed in the Circuit Court for 

Baltimore City in this case—that the couple’s marriage ceremony had been performed in 

Baltimore City. She stated in her motion: “Plaintiff further alleges in this pleading that 
5

the marriage ceremony, whether effective or ineffective, was performed in Baltimore 

City at the Church of the Redeemer.” Wife further stated in the motion that she “is 

willing to amend the Complaint to include this allegation pursuant to Md. Rule 2-341.” 

Husband filed an opposition on April 15, 2019, admitting Wife’s allegation that 

their marriage ceremony had been performed in Baltimore City at the Church of the 

Redeemer, but nevertheless arguing that the case was correctly dismissed because there 

was no basis for venue in Baltimore City for two of the three counts in the Complaint. 

Husband’s opposition stated, in part: “The marriage ceremony is the only contact this 

Court has with this complaint as both the Plaintiff and Defendant have resided in Carroll 

County for over twenty years.”

On April 17, 2019, Wife filed a reply to the opposition, highlighting that Husband 

had now admitted that their marriage ceremony took place in Baltimore City, and that he 

had directed her to obtain a marriage license from the clerk of the Circuit Court for 

Baltimore City prior to the marriage ceremony. Consequently, she asserted, the court 

should retain the case even if venue was proper for only one of the three counts in the 

Complaint. 

On May 2, 2019, the circuit court summarily denied Wife’s motion to alter or 

amend. The court also denied Wife’s request for an order of default “as moot.” Wife

noted her appeal to this Court on May 29, 2019.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the decision of the circuit court on a motion to dismiss for 

improper venue. See D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health System, Inc., 465 Md. 339, 350 
6

(2019) (“When reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, the appropriate standard of 

review is whether the trial court was legally correct.” (Internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted.)); see also Lampros v. Gelb & Gelb, P.C., 153 Md. App. 447, 456 

(2003) (reviewing de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of venue); Swanson 

v. Wilde, 74 Md. App. 57, 61 (reviewing de novo a dismissal for lack of venue), aff’d, 

314 Md. 80 (1988).

We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to alter or amend. 

Schlotzhauer v. Morton, 224 Md. App. 72, 84 (2015) (“ʻIn general, the denial of a motion 

to alter or amend a judgment is reviewed by appellate courts for abuse of discretion.’

RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Maryland, Inc., 413 Md. 638, 673, 994 A.2d 430 (2010)

(citing Wilson–X v. Dep’t of Human Res., 403 Md. 667, 674–75, 944 A.2d 509 

(2008)).”).

DISCUSSION

The pertinent venue provisions are set forth in CJP §§ 6-201(a) and 6-202(2). CJP 

§ 6-201(a) is Maryland’s general venue statute, and it provides:

(a) Subject to the provisions of §§ 6-202 and 6-203 of this subtitle and 

unless otherwise provided by law, a civil action shall be brought in 

a county where the defendant resides, carries on a regular 

business, is employed, or habitually engages in a vocation. In 

addition, a corporation also may be sued where it maintains its 

principal office in the State.3

 

3 Neither party suggests that CJP § 6-203 is pertinent to the instant case, and we 

agree that it is not pertinent. That section (mentioned in § 6-201(a)) provides that the 

“general rule of § 6-201 of this subtitle does not apply to” enumerated actions concerning 

particular interests in land, certain actions against a railroad company, an action “for 

guardianship under Title 5, Subtitle 3 of the Family Law Article,” and certain adoptions.
7

(Emphasis added.)

Section 6-202 provides: “In addition to the venue provided in § 6-201 or § 6-203, 

the following actions may be brought in the indicated county: (1) Divorce – Where the 

plaintiff resides; (2) Annulment – Where the plaintiff resides or where the marriage 

ceremony was performed.” (Emphasis added.) Section 6-202(8) provides that a tort 

action “based on negligence” may be filed “[w]here the cause of action arose.”

Both parties are longtime residents of Carroll County, and Carroll County is where 

Husband is employed. Accordingly, the general venue provision of CJP § 6-201(a) 

provides that venue for Wife’s Complaint would be proper in Carroll County. The only

applicable provision permitting alternate venue in a location other than Carroll County is 

§ 6-202(2), which permits an action for annulment to be brought “where the marriage 

ceremony was performed,” which, in this case, was Baltimore City. But Baltimore City 

would not be the proper venue for litigation of Count II of Wife’s complaint (seeking 

divorce), or of Count III (claiming wrongful taking/conversion); there is no additional 

venue for those counts other than the Circuit Court for Carroll County. In other words, 

Carroll County is the only jurisdiction in which venue would have been proper for all 

three of the causes of actions alleged in Wife’s complaint.4

 

4 Count III alleges that Husband “wrongfully [took] and/or disposed of” various 

items of personal property belonging to Wife, including her dog, and a vehicle titled in 

Wife’s name that Wife contends Husband has “made . . . disappear without notice,” as 

well as a long list of items of personal property, and “the use of beneficial funds[.]” The 

Complaint does not allege that the tortious conduct occurred in a location other than

Carroll County, where both parties lived. “Conversion is an intentional tort, consisting of 

continued...
8

At the time the circuit court ruled on Husband’s motion to dismiss, the location of 

the marriage ceremony was not alleged in Wife’s 137-page Complaint. Nor was the 

location of the ceremony specified in Wife’s opposition to the motion to dismiss. Based 

upon the allegations that were made in the Complaint, the circuit court did not err in 

concluding that there was no basis for venue in Baltimore City, and therefore, the circuit 

court did not err in entering an order dismissing the Complaint on March 19, 2019.

In Wife’s motion to alter or amend, Wife apprised the circuit court for the first 

time that the parties’ marriage ceremony was performed in Baltimore City, and therefore, 

pursuant to CJP § 6-202(2), Baltimore City was a permitted additional venue for one of 

the three causes of action in the Complaint. But Wife did not offer to sever the two other 

counts for which Baltimore City was not the proper venue. And we conclude that the 

circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to alter or amend the ruling it had 

previously made. “When a party requests that a court reconsider a ruling solely because 

of new arguments that the party could have raised before the court ruled, the court has 

almost limitless discretion not to consider those arguments.” Schlotzhauer, supra, 224 

Md. App. at 85.

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continued...

two elements, a physical act combined with a certain state of mind.” Darcars Motors of 

Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249, 261 (2004). In the absence of an allegation 

that a tort based on negligence occurred outside Carroll County, venue for Count III of 

the Complaint was proper only in Carroll County, where the tort allegedly occurred and 

where the parties reside. Similarly, venue was proper for Count II, in which Wife 

requested a divorce, only in Carroll County. Although divorce is an action which CJP § 

6-202(1) recognizes as eligible for “addition[al] . . . venue” other than that “provided in § 

6-201 or § 6-203,” the only proper venue for this couple would be no place other than 

Carroll County, as that is where Wife and Husband both reside.
9

Moreover, Wife has directed us to no case in which state courts in Maryland have 

adopted the concept of pendent venue. We acknowledge that some federal cases have 

recognized pendent venue as an exception to the normal rule that, “[i]n general, venue 

must be established for each separate cause of action.” High River Ltd. Partnership v. 

Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 353 F.Supp. 2d 487, 493 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Accord Basile v. 

Walt Disney Co., 717 F.Supp. 2d 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“in a case of multiple 

claims, proper venue must be established with respect to each cause of action 

asserted, . . . [a]nd where venue is challenged, it is plaintiff’s burden to show that it is 

proper in the forum district” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). The 

general rule for federal courts is summarized as follows in 14D FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 

PROCEDURE (WRIGHT & MILLER) § 3808 (4th ed. Westlaw):

The starting point under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b), 

is that venue must be proper for each claim joined between the original 

parties to the case. Thus, if the plaintiff asserts multiple claims against the 

defendant, venue must be proper for each claim.

(Footnote omitted.)

But the authors of WRIGHT & MILLER point out that, under some circumstances, 

federal courts may exercise their discretion to hear cases where claims for which venue 

would not have been proper have been joined with one or more claims for which venue is 

proper. Id. at n.38 (“ʻWhether to apply the principle of pendent venue in any given case is 

a discretionary decision, based on applicable policy considerations.’” (quoting United 

States S.E.C. v. e-Smart Technologies, Inc., 926 F.Supp. 2d 231 (D.D.C. 2013)). See 

Basile, supra, 717 F.Supp. 2d at 387-88 (concluding that pendent venue was 
10

“inappropriate” in that case based upon considerations of “judicial economy, convenience 

to the parties and the court system, avoidance of piecemeal litigation and fairness to the 

litigants” who would be seriously inconvenienced if required to defend the action in the 

forum where suit was filed). The federal procedural venue rule is also discussed in 32A 

AM. JUR. 2d Federal Courts § 1086 (Westlaw ed., November 2019 update).

When faced with a request to permit venue analogous to pendent jurisdiction in a 

putative class action alleging trespasses, however, the Maryland Court of Appeals 

declined to permit the plaintiffs to join a claim for which there was no venue with a claim 

for which venue was proper in Piven v. Comcast Corporation, 397 Md. 278 (2007). In 

Piven, the plaintiffs sued various Comcast entities, alleging that the cable television 

utility companies had committed trespasses upon private property by entering upon 

property of the plaintiffs and “stringing [Comcast] wires across the plaintiffs’ property 

without permission.” Id. at 280. The complaint sought compensatory damages and 

injunctive relief, as well as a ruling “to quiet title.” Id. at 281. The complaint was filed in 

Baltimore County, but the real property of only one couple of the named plaintiffs was 

located in Baltimore County; the real property of the other named plaintiffs was located 

in Baltimore City. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted the defendants’ 

motion to dismiss because Baltimore County was not a proper venue for pursuit of a 

claim of trespass to property located in Baltimore City. Id. at 282. After this Court 

affirmed the dismissal for lack of venue, the Court of Appeals granted a writ of

certiorari. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the dismissal, observing that “actions 

for trespass to land are local actions that must be brought where all or a portion of the 
11

land is situated.” Id. at 286. The Court of Appeals did not expressly address the concept 

of pendent venue, but firmly rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the Baltimore City 

plaintiffs’ claims against Comcast could be heard by the Circuit Court for Baltimore 

County. Id. at 290. The Court of Appeals also noted that the Baltimore City plaintiffs had 

rejected the option of transferring their claims to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, 

and therefore, the Court of Appeals found “no abuse of discretion in the [circuit] court 

dismissing the amended complaint.” Id.

We have been directed to no case in which the appellate courts of Maryland have 

adopted the concept of pendent venue in a case in which venue was proper for only one 

of a plaintiff’s multiple causes of action. Indeed, so far as we can discern, the phrase 

“pendent venue” has never appeared in a reported opinion of either this Court or the 

Court of Appeals.

But, even if Maryland did recognize and adopt the federal concept of pendent

venue as a possibility for expanding venue in actions in the courts of this State, because 

the grant of federal pendent venue is subject to judicial discretion, we would not conclude 

that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City abused its discretion in declining to extend 

pendent venue to a case such as this in which venue was lacking for two of the three 

counts, and both the plaintiff and defendant were longtime residents of another county 

where venue was proper for all three counts. Consequently, we are not persuaded that it 

was an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to deny Wife’s motion to alter or amend.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. 

COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.