NO. 12-19-00053-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

RICARDO LATRELLE TAYLOR, 

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

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§

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APPEAL FROM THE 7TH 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ricardo Latrelle Taylor appeals his conviction for engaging in organized criminal activity. 

In two issues, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment 

and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to submit a self-defense instruction to the jury. 

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Following the exchange of gunfire at Fun Forrest Park in Tyler, Texas, Appellant was 

charged by indictment with engaging in organized criminal activity and pleaded “not guilty.” The 

matter proceeded to a jury trial. After the presentation of evidence and argument of counsel, the 

jury found Appellant “guilty” as charged. At the conclusion of the trial on punishment, the jury 

assessed Appellant’s punishment at imprisonment for forty years. The trial court sentenced 

Appellant accordingly, and this appeal followed.

EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial 

court’s judgment. Specifically, Appellant argues that there is no evidence to support that he 

committed the underlying offense of aggravated assault.
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Standard of Review

The Jackson v. Virginia1 legal sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing 

court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a 

criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v. State,

323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum 

required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. 

See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315–16, 99 S. Ct. at 2786–87; see also Escobedo v. State, 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 

(Tex. App.–San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d). The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency 

challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; see also Johnson v. 

State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence is examined in the light most 

favorable to the verdict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Johnson, 871 S.W.2d 

at 186. A jury is free to believe all or any part of a witness’s testimony or disbelieve all or any 

part of that testimony. See Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 

2004), aff’d, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A successful legal sufficiency challenge 

will result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing court. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 

41–42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217–18, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982).

Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and 

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Rodriguez v. State, 521 S.W.3d 

822, 827 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Sorrells v. State, 343 S.W.3d 152, 

155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of 

the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient 

to support the conviction. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Juries 

are permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each inference is supported by the 

evidence presented at trial. Id. at 15. Juries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on 

mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions. Id. An inference is a 

conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them, 

while speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence 

presented. Id. at 16. 

 1 443 U.S. 307, 315–16, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786–87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). 
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The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a 

hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997). Such a charge would include one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the 

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict 

the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the 

defendant is tried.” Id.

Discussion

To satisfy its burden of proof that Appellant committed the offense of engaging in 

organized activity as charged in the indictment, the State was required to prove that Appellant 

committed the offense of aggravated assault in that he (1) intentionally and knowingly (2) 

threatened Datreon Jackson with imminent bodily injury (3) by shooting at him with a firearm and 

(4) did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, during the commission of 

the assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(17)(A), 22.01(a)(2) (West Supp. 2019), 

22.02(a)(2) (West 2019).

In the instant case, Datreon Jackson testified that Appellant sent him multiple Facebook 

messages, in which he challenged him to a fight. The State introduced an exhibit into evidence 

demonstrating that Appellant also sent a message in which he threatened to kill Jackson five days 

before the incident. Specifically, in this message to Jackson, Appellant stated, “I’m telling you 

now, you play wit my mama crib, imma kill you. I’m done talking.” 

Jackson further testified that he drove to Fun Forest Park in Tyler, Texas in a white van 

with Davonta Hill for the purpose of engaging in a fight there with JaQarious Barron. According 

to Jackson, when they arrived at the park, Appellant, Barron, and Lakeria Hamlett already were 

there, waiting in a black Honda. Jackson testified that Appellant jumped out of the Honda and 

yelled at him to “catch fade with his homeboy,” which Jackson understood to mean Appellant was 

encouraging him to fight with Barron. Jackson described the events in greater detail as follows:

Q. And you’re still sitting in the car?

A. I’m just getting out the car when he told me that.

Q. Okay. So you’re just getting out of the car. 

They’re hollering at you. What do you remember happening next with the defendant --

with Ricardo?
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A. I was about to fight Jayy Barron. I seen him reach back in the car and grab a pistol 

and told Jayy Barron, “Move, groove.” 

And he shot at me.

Q. So you’re saying, as you sit here under oath, that it was Ricardo Taylor shot at you?

A. Yes, sir.

. . . . 

Q. Okay. So what you’re saying is that the defendant shot at you while you were out 

there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You said he grabbed a handgun?

A. Yeah.

Q. It wasn’t a rifle or anything?

A. Huh-uh.

Q. Okay. And he shoots at you. When he shoots at you, does he hit you?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any idea if that bullet hit anything?

A. Just hit the driver door.

Q. The driver door of your car?

A. Yes, sir.

The State also introduced photographic evidence showing a bullet hole in the driver’s side, 

passenger door of Jackson’s van, which was consistent with Jackson’s testimony. The State further 

introduced evidence of twenty fired shell casings at the scene, which were ejected by three different 

firearms. According to Jackson, after Appellant shot at him, Hill exited the van and returned fire. 

Jackson stated that as Appellant ran away from them, he continued firing his gun at them as they 

got back into the van and drove away. Jackson admitted that once Hill started shooting, he also 

fired a handgun in Appellant’s direction.

Hill also testified on the State’s behalf. His testimony differed from Jackson’s in several 

respects. However, he similarly stated that Appellant was armed and firing a handgun at him and 

Jackson. He also stated that he was aware that Appellant previously told Jackson that he was going 

to kill him.
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As Appellant argues in his brief, other witnesses testified to the effect that they never saw 

Appellant in possession of a handgun and/or he was unarmed at the park on the day in question. 

Some of these witnesses also testified that Hill was the only person they saw shooting that day. 

Further, a recording of Appellant’s interview with police was played for the jury. In it, Appellant 

denied possessing a firearm at the park that day. 

We have reviewed the record in its entirety. Having done so, we remain mindful that a 

jury is free to believe all or any part of a witness’s testimony or disbelieve all or any part of that 

testimony. See Lee, 176 S.W.3d at 458; see also Thompson v. State, 54 S.W.3d 88, 97 (Tex. 

App.–Tyler 2001, pet. ref’d) (jury entitled to find one witness more credible than another or that 

one witness’s version of story more accurate account than version of story offered by another 

witness). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that there was ample evidence to permit 

the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the underlying offense of 

aggravated assault by intentionally threatening Jackson with imminent bodily injury by shooting 

at him with a firearm, a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(17)(A), 

22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2); see also Jones v. State, 500 S.W.3d 106, 113 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (citing Fagan v. State, 362 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2012, 

pet. ref’d)) (act of pointing loaded gun at someone, by itself, is threatening conduct that supports 

conviction for aggravated assault). Thus, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support 

the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.

REFUSAL OF SELF-DEFENSE INSTRUCTION

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 

submit a self-defense instruction in its charge to the jury.

A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defensive issue raised by the evidence, 

whether that evidence is weak or strong, unimpeached or contradicted, and regardless of the trial 

court’s opinion about the credibility of the defense. Granger v. State, 3 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1999); Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); VanBrackle v. State, 

179 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. App.–Austin 2005, no pet.); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.03(c) 

(West 2011). This rule is designed to insure that the jury, not the trial court, will decide the relative 

credibility of the evidence. Granger, 3 S.W.3d at 38; VanBrackle, 179 S.W.3d at 712. A 

defendant need not testify in order to raise a defense. Boget v. State, 40 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Tex. 
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App.–San Antonio 2001), aff’d, 74 S.W.3d 23, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Defensive issues may 

be raised by the testimony of any witnesses, even those called by the state. Jackson v. State, 110 

S.W.3d 626, 631 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). In deciding whether a 

defensive theory is raised, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the defense. 

Granger, 3 S.W.3d at 38.

Self-defense is a confession-and-avoidance or justification type of defense. See Juarez v. 

State, 308 S.W.3d 398, 401–02 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 

(West 2019). To be entitled to a self-defense instruction in the court’s charge, the defendant’s 

defensive evidence must admit to the underlying conduct and requisite culpable mental state 

underlying the charged offense. Cf. Juarez, 308 S.W.3d at 405–06; see Williams v. State, 314 

S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2010, pet. ref’d); see also Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 659 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Villa v. State, 370 S.W.3d 787, 793 (Tex. App.–Eastland 2012), aff’d, 

417 S.W.3d 455 (“Unlike Section 2.03 defenses that can find support in evidence from any source, 

matters in confession and avoidance must find support in a defendant’s defensive evidence”).2

In the instant case, Appellant’s defensive evidence does not support an admission of the 

conduct or requisite mental state underlying aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Moreover, 

as set forth previously, the State introduced evidence of Appellant’s interview with police, in 

which Appellant denied that he possessed a firearm at the park on the day in question. By denying 

that he possessed a firearm at the park that day Appellant sought to negate the elements of the 

offense. But such evidence, does not entitle Appellant to a self-defense instruction. Indeed, if 

Appellant had no firearm at the park that day, he could not intentionally or knowingly threaten 

Jackson with imminent bodily injury by shooting at him. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§§ 22.01(a)(2) , 22.02(a). Accordingly, we hold that Appellant was not entitled to a self-defense 

instruction in the court’s charge because he did not admit to having committed the essential 

underlying conduct and to having possessed the requisite mental state. Cf. Shaw, 243 S.W.3d at 

660; see Williams, 314 S.W.3d at 51. Appellant’s second issue is overruled.

 2 The confession and avoidance doctrine’s requirement that a defendant admit to the conduct conflicts with 

Section 2.03(c)’s general rule that a defense is supported by the evidence if there is evidence from any source on each 

element of the defense. See Juarez, 308 S.W.3d at 404. In Juarez, the court concluded that the admission requirement 

for Texas Penal Code, Section 9.22 governs the specific defensive issue of necessity and, therefore, trumps the general 

rule set forth in Section 2.03(c). See Juarez, 308 S.W.3d at 405. Applying similar logic, we conclude that the 

admission requirement for Section 9.31 governs the specific defensive issue of self-defense and, likewise, trumps the 

general rule set forth in Section 2.03(c). Cf. id. 
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DISPOSITION

Having overruled Appellant’s first and second issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAMES T. WORTHEN

Chief Justice

Opinion delivered February 28, 2020.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

FEBRUARY 28, 2020

NO. 12-19-00053-CR

RICARDO LATRELLE TAYLOR,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 7th District Court 

of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 007-1078-18)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed 

herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the 

judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment 

of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below 

for observance.

James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.