UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ROGER D. PFEIL, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. ROBERT LAMPERT, in his official capacity as WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR and in his individual capacity; MICHAEL PACHECO, in his official capacity as WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS HONOR FARM WARDEN and in his individual capacity, Defendants - Appellees. No. 14-8035 (D.C. No. 2:12-CV-00184-SWS) (D. Wyo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before HARTZ , McKAY , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Roger D. Pfeil, at all re levant times a Wyoming state prisoner, brought this action against Wyoming Depa rtment of Corrections (WDOC) Director

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 20, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - Robert Lampert and Wyoming Honor Farm (WHF) Warden Michael Pacheco, in their individual and official capacit ies, alleging the denial of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLU IPA), actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, and the Free Ex ercise Clause of the First Amendment, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 198 3. He later added claims for the denial of his rights under the Americans with Di sabilities Act (ADA) and uncon stitutional retaliation for protected activities related to this action. In a published deci sion on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district cour t ruled for defendants on all claims. See Pfeil v. Lampert , 11 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (D. Wyo. 2014). As explained below, we dismiss the appeal for mootness insofar as it invol ves RLUIPA claims and otherwise affirm the district court for subs tantially the reasons stated in its decision. PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Mr. Pfeil has, until very recently, b een incarcerated by the State of Wyoming since pleading guilty to second- degree murder in 1997. When he filed this action in August 2012, he was confined at the WHF, where he had been placed in May 2009. His complaint alleged that defendants had im peded the free exercise of his religious rights as a practicing Catholic in two primary respects: (1) enforcing a new policy prohibiting inmates from possessing hardbound books, thereby depriving him of his two bibles and a religious commentary, 1 which were printed in a font size that he

1 He also complained of the loss of a standard secu lar dictionary, which would not appear to raise any free-ex ercise implications. Even if it did, its inclusion in the (continued)- 3 - could read despite vision problems; and (2 ) not allowing a Eucharistic Minister to enter the prison under a policy conditioning admission on possession of a current approved application, which the minister di d not have. The complaint also included a chronicle of alleged religious deprivati ons dating back to the late 1990s when Mr. Pfeil was confined in ot her facilities, many out of state (per c ontracts with WDOC). We agree with th e district court that any redress for these ancillary allegations was barred by statute of li mitations and/or e xhaustion principles . See id. at 1105 n.1, 1107. Events prior to Au gust 2008 are barred by the four year limitations period applicable to claims under both § 1983, see Gee v. Pacheco , 627 F.3d 1178, 1189-90 (10t h Cir. 2010), and RLUIPA, see Pouncil v. Tilton , 704 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied , 134 S. Ct. 76 (2013). As for exhaustion, Mr. Pfeil specifica lly identified the grievances through which he insisted he had exhausted his relig ious exercise claims, see R. Vol. 1, at 25-26 (complaint), 283 (summary judgment memorandum), an d these properly exhausted only the two claims noted above (and in particular did not exhaust any additional events within the limitations window after August 2008). 2

analysis to follow would not alter our conclu sions reached with respect to the other, clearly religious books.
2 In this vein, Mr. Pfeil objects that WDOC did not extend its own grievance procedures to Wyoming prisoners housed in out-of-state facilities, which he contends is required by the Western Interstate Corre ctions Compact (WICC), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-3-401. But the only stat e he was confined in duri ng the limitations period was Virginia, which is not covered by the WICC, see id. § 7-3-401 (Art. VII). Similarly, on the merits, Mr. Pfeil’s reliance on WI CC for holding WDOC Director Lampert (continued)- 4 - Both parties moved for summary judgmen t. In his briefing on the motions, Mr. Pfeil voiced additional complaints a bout defendants’ failure to accommodate his vision problems and alleged acts of retalia tion (including a transfer from WHF to the Wyoming Honor Conservation Camp in Oct ober 2012) for filing this case. After defendants objected to the interjection of these new claims, Mr. Pfeil asked to supplement his pleadings to add them. The district court granted his request, deemed the pleadings amended accordingly, and ga ve defendants a shor t time to submit a brief and affidavits addressi ng the new claims, which they did. Nine months later, the district court granted summary j udgment for defendants on all claims. ANALYSIS Because Mr. Pfeil appeals from the grant of summary judgment, our review is de novo. See Ward v. Utah , 398 F.3d 1239, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005). But we limit our review to the issues he has raised on appeal. See id. In addition, a significant portion of this appeal, involving Mr. Pfeil’s RLUIPA claims, has become moot. RLUIPA is limited to official ca pacity claims for equitable relief. See Sossamon v. Texas , 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1655 (2011) (holding Eleventh Amendment immunity bars RLUIPA claims for money damages); Stewart v. Beach , 701 F.3d 1322, 1335 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting RLUIPA does not pe rmit individual capacity cl aims). Consequently, RLUIPA claims regarding prison conditions become moot if the inmate plaintiff is

responsible for any religious inadequacies at that out-of-state facility would be unavailing.- 5 - released from custody. See Alvarez v. Hill , 667 F.3d 1061, 1063-65 (9th Cir. 2012). That has occurred here. Mr. Pfeil was released from WDOC custody on September 9, 2014. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal insofar as it involves his RLUIPA claims, vacate that portion of the district court’s judgme nt resolving those claims on the merits, and remand the claims for dismissal by th e district court. 3 See, e.g. , Watkins v. Mabus , 502 U.S. 954, 954 (1991) (effectuating Munsingwear 4 mootness procedure in appeal mooted only in part by intervening events). We turn now to the claims that rema in in controversy on this appeal. A. Exclusion of Minister for Lack of Application with Cu rrent Information The district court’s opinion sets out th e factual details of this claim. See Pfeil , 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1111. Basically, a volunteer minister was not pe rmitted to enter the prison to provide Catholic services on one occasion because personal information on his application was not current, as require d by prison policy for ad mission of outside volunteers. Mr. Pfeil claime d this policy violated his ri ghts under the Free Exercise Clause. 5 The fact that we are now concerned only with this constitutional claim has a

3 We note that the parties were afforded an opportunity to address the mootness issue through an order to show cause, to which they failed to respond.
4 United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. , 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
5 To the extent Mr. Pfeil complains of the incident it self, as distinct from the policy it implemented, his c onstitutional claim would necessa rily fail because WDOC Director Lampert and Warden Pacheco di d not personally participate in it. See Gallagher v. Shelton , 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 ( 10th Cir. 2009). Of course, even if a participating official had b een sued, adherence to this policy—which we hold to be constitutionally permissible—would not afford a basis fo r liability.- 6 - significant consequen ce for our analysis of Mr. Pfe il’s case. As with a RLUIPA claim, he must show that the policy substantially burde ned his religious beliefs. Kay
v. Bemis , 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007). But even assumi ng such a burden, the policy will survive constitu tional scrutiny if it is reasona bly related to legitimate penological interests. 6 See id. at 1218-19 (following O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz , 482 U.S. 342 (1987), and Turner v. Safley , 482 U.S. 78 (1987)). Once such interests are identified, “[t]he burden th en returns to the prisoner to show that these articulated concerns were irrational.” Id. at 1218 n.2 (internal quot ation marks omitted). The district court concluded that ev en if the policy excluding volunteers lacking up to date information imposed a substantial burden on Mr . Pfeil’s religious practice, it was justified by le gitimate penological interests. In this regard, the court recognized the interests in “maintaining security, safety, and orderly operation” served by a prison policy requiring current information on the background of those permitted to enter and in teract with inmates. Pfeil , 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1115. The court elaborated on this point while discussing the counter part RLUIPA claim: The WDOC, in order to protect inma tes and volunteers, and maintain security of the facility, conducts criminal backgr ound checks and maintains updated contact informat ion for each volunteer. Volunteers are also required to complete orient ation and training re lated to safety and security issues su ch as emergency respons e conditions, facility evacuation, and learning the primar y rules and lines of authority.

6 In contrast, RLUIPA requires the govern ment to justify a substantial burden on religion by demonstrating a compelling intere st served by the least restrictive means available. Kay , 500 F.3d at 1221 (discussin g 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1).- 7 - Plaintiff argues there is no compelli ng safety and security interest in requiring ministers to complete a new application and go through the entire approval process each and every year. However, prison officials need not wait for a problem to aris e before taking steps to minimize security risks. The requirement that each volunteer provide current contact information before being ad mitted to a WDOC facility is an appropriate proactive approach to en suring facility safety and security and is the least restri ctive means for doing so. Id. at 1113 (citations and intern al quotation marks omitted). The district court went on to explain the reasonableness of the volunteer policy under the O’Lone / Turner framework in light of the rational connection between the policy and the interests supporting it, the av ailability of other me ans for inmates to exercise their religion, the adverse impa ct on prison operation and personnel if the policy were not enforced, and the lack of re ady practical alternativ es to safeguard the interests involved. See id. at 1115-17; see also Kay , 500 F.3d at 1219 (identifying such considerations as rele vant in assessing the reas onableness of prison policies affecting religious practice of inmates). On appeal Mr. Pfeil has not raised any cogent objection to this thor ough analysis. We affirm th e district court’s grant of summary judgment to defe ndants on this claim. B. Prohibition on Possess ion of Hardbound Books In 2012, WDOC adopted and WHF impl emented a new property-control policy prohibiting inmates from possessing hardbound books in their liv ing quarters. The primary reasons for the new policy were th at hardbound books can be used for hiding contraband or weapons and that the hard covers themselves can be used as weapons. Pfeil , 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1105-06. In addition, eliminating such books reduces the- 8 - time and resources the prison mu st expend to inspect and s earch property in inmates’ cells. Id. at 1106. Finally, the policy was also adopted to meet requirements for accreditation with the American Correctional Association. Id. As a result of the policy, Mr. Pfeil had to reli nquish two bibles and a biblical reference work, which were sent to his family for safekeeping. He claims that prohibiting his possession of these books, and not providing him with adequate replace ments, violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause. The district court rejected this claim under the O’Lone / Turner framework as well. Again, it noted that important prison interests in security, safety, and orderly operation (as specified above) support th e prohibition on possess ion of hardbound books in inmate living quarters. Id. at 1115. Mr. Pfeil in sists these interests are exaggerated—a criticism that (when warranted) carries we ight under the compelling interest standard fo r RLUIPA claims. See Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone , 600 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir. 2010). But we do not think the criticism has force here; rather, we agree with the district cour t that, viewed with the defe rence owed the professional judgment of prison administrators on such matters, the concer ns noted above are sufficient to justify the challenged policy under the legitimate inte rest standard for Free Exercise claims. See Pfeil , 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1115. As it did with the volunteer policy, the district court went on to discuss the rational connection between the hardbound book policy and the interests it served, the availability of other means for inmates to exer cise their religion (particularly their- 9 - ability to obtain softbound religious books through purchase, rebinding of hardbound books, 7 or from the prison library), the adve rse impact on prison operation if the policy were not enforced, and the lack of ready practical altern atives that would safeguard the interests involved. See id. at 1115-17; see also id. at 1112-14 (discussing at length the mean s available to inmates to re place proscribed hardbound religious books). Mr. Pfeil takes issue in particular with the conclusion that he had alternatives to his hardbound religious books, objecting that (1) he could not afford to purchase replacements for his confiscated bo oks and (2) even if he could afford replacements, they were not available in a font size large enough for him to read due to vision problems. The firs t objection is readily answer ed by precedent rejecting the notion that prisons must subsidize inmates’ access to religious mate rials. Even under the stricter obligations imposed by RLUIPA, the State is “not require[d] . . . to pay for an inmate’s devo tional accessories.” Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U.S. 709, 720 n.8 (2005). And we have specifically invoked this no subsidy principle to hold that a prison does not have to pay for softboun d versions of confiscated hardbound religious texts. See Abdulhaseeb , 600 F.3d at 1320-21. As for font size, Mr. Pfeil does not cite any authority holding that the constitution requires prisons to purchas e religious books to accommodate the

7 The prisons have machines availa ble to convert books from hardbound to softbound. Mr. Pfeil objects th at he was not offered this service for his confiscated religious books, but he has not cited any ev idence showing that he specifically asked for this to be done and was denied.- 10 - physical limitations (or pers onal preferences) of their in mates. Indeed, such an obligation would be inconsistent with the no subsidy principle applied in Abdulhaseeb , which unqualifiedly held that pr isons are not required to provide replacements for confiscated hardbound books at all. This aspect of Mr. Pfeil’s case is more aptly considered in connection with accommodation obligations under the ADA, which is primarily how he presented it to the district court. His ADA claim is addressed in the next section of this order and judgment. Mr. Pfeil has failed to demonstrate any er ror in the district court’s analysis of his Free Exercise claim regarding the proh ibition on possession of hardbound books. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendants on this claim as well. C. ADA Claim Mr. Pfeil claims that the failure to provi de him with large print versions of his confiscated religious books violated his right to reasonable accommodation under the ADA. The district court identified two dist inct dispositive defici encies with respect to this claim: (1) it ha d not been exhausted in Mr. Pfeil’s grievances over confiscation of his books; and (2) on the me rits, he had not s hown the requisite disability to trigger a duty to accommodate under the ADA. Pfeil , 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1119. We agree with the first point and need not reach the second. Absent a controlling statutory or regulat ory directive specifying the requisite content of prison grievances (and none have been cited to us here), an inmate- 11 - properly exhausts a claim if his grievance provides enough information regarding the nature of the alleged wrong to enable pris on officials to inves tigate and address his complaint. Kikumura v. Osagie , 461 F.3d 1269, 1283-85 (10th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as explained in Robbins v. Oklahoma , 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 -47 (10th Cir. 2008) . The relevant materials here are the grievan ces (initial grievance and s ubsequent appeals) Mr. Pfeil submitted complaining of the confiscation of his religious books pursuant to the prohibition on hardbound books. Even judg ed under the fairly lenient standard clarified in Kikumura , Mr. Pfeil’s grievances did not exhaust an ADA claim. The only legal rights invoked in the gr ievances were those under RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause, which Mr. Pfeil alleged were violated by the confiscation of hardbound religious books th at he could not afford to replace. Nowhere is there any mention of an ADA claim. But his om ission went much further than just not invoking the ADA. He simply never as ked for an accommodation of any vision problems, which is the esse nce of his present ADA claim. Indeed, he never even mentioned a disability. His only reference remotely relevant to an ADA claim was on appeal from the denial of his initial gr ievance when he said in passing that a softbound bible given to him by a prison chaplain did not offset the loss of his own because its print happened to be too small for him to read. He said nothing about any disabling limitation arising from a vision impairment (the macular degeneration and cataracts he now claims require accommodati on made their first appearance in the- 12 - affidavit he filed with the co mplaint initiating this lawsuit). In sum, Mr. Pfeil did not provide enough information in his grievances to enable pr ison officials to investigate and address the material elemen ts of the ADA claim he late r brought in this case. D. Retaliation The district court methodically addre ssed Mr. Pfeil’s vari ous allegations of retaliation and explained why he failed to demonstrate a triable claim. See Pfeil , 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1117-18. Th at discussion need not be repeated here. We have reviewed Mr. Pfeil’s arguments on appeal a nd conclude that no error has been shown with respect to the distri ct court’s determination. 8 Mr. Pfeil does, however, raise a related procedural objection that should be specifically addressed. He a sserts that he did not receive the affidavits attached to defendants’ summary judgment memorandum regarding his retaliation claim and contends that the district court’s reliance on them was therefore impermissible. He never raised this issue with the district court, however, so there is no determination regarding the facts of the matt er for us to review, nor can we as an appellate court determine the facts for ourselv es. But even assuming the facts to be as Mr. Pfeil asserts, we reject his objec tion on the ground that it comes far too late in the day to serve as a proper basis for disturbing the district court’s judgment.

8 Indeed, we would add that the allegati ons of retaliation have a further legal deficiency not noted by the district court: the lack of personal participation by the named defendants in the actions Mr. Pf eil claims were retaliatory.- 13 - Mr. Pfeil does not dispute that he received the memorandum to which the affidavits were attached as exhibits. The memorandum was filed on June 28, 2013. The district court did not rule on summ ary judgment until Ma rch 31, 2014. The affidavits were explicitly cited and relied on throu ghout the memorandum, but Mr. Pfeil raised no objection about their al leged absence in the nine months that preceded the ruling on summary judgment. Nor, after the district court relied on the affidavits in its summary j udgment order, did Mr. Pfeil raise any objection by way of post-judgment motion. The only mention of any problem in this regard was in a letter he sent to the court clerk two months after filing th is appeal. His inaction thus deprived the district court of the opportunity to look into the matter and take steps to cure any omission before deciding summary judgment, and then further deprived the district court of an opportunity to addre ss the matter in post-ju dgment proceedings before jurisdiction was lost through his commencement of appeal. It also deprived defendants of a timely opportunity either to dispute their alleged omission or to correct it while the matter wa s still under advisement in the district court. Just such considerations underlie our general rule barring consider ation of arguments that an appellant has not raised in the district court. See, e.g. , Cahill v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co. , 610 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2010); Wall v. Astrue , 561 F.3d 1048, 1067 & n.25 (10th Cir. 2009). Under the circumstan ces, we hold that Mr. Pfeil has forfeited any objection that he was not provided th e affidavits attach ed to defendants’ summary judgment memorandum on the retaliation claim.- 14 - The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Mr. Pfeil’ s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is granted. His motion for declar atory and injunctive relief for spoliation of evidence is denied.

Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge