FOR PUBLICATION



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

M AR I A R O D R

I G UE Z T O R

NE S , AKA Maria Rodriquez-Tornes, Petitioner
,

v

.

M E R R I C K B. G AR

LA ND , Attorney General, Respondent. No. 19-71104

Agency No. A088-669-863

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Imm igration Appeals

Argued and Subm itted February 3, 2021

Seattle, W ashington

Filed April 5, 2021

Before: Susan P. Graber, M. Margaret McKeown, and

Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber; Concurrence by Judge PaezR O GR I G UE Z T O R

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SUMMARY *

Immigration

The panel granted Maria R odriguez Tornes’s p etition for review o f the Board of Imm igrati on Appeals’ decision

re v e rsing an imm igration judge’s grant of asylum and withholding of rem oval
, and rem anded, holding that the

ev id en c e c o m

p elled t h e c o n c lu s io n th at R o d

rigu ez estab l i s h ed

a nexus between her m istreatm ent in Mexico and her fem inist political opinion.

The p anel noted that un der the Attorney General’s recent decision in Matter ofA-B-
, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199 (A.G. 2 021) (“Matter of A-B- II”), in order to establish the requisite n exus for asylum relief, a protected ground (1) m ust be a b u t

- fo r
cause of the wrongdoer’s act; and (2) m ust play m ore than a
m inor role—in oth e r wo rds, it cannot be incidental o r tangential to another reason for the act. The panel explained that this standard was subs t antively indistinguishable from this circuit’s precedent. The panel wrote that the fact that an unprotected ground, s u ch as a p ersonal dispute, also constitutes a central reason f or persecutio n d o es not bar asy l um

. Rather, if a retributory m otive exists alongside a protected m otive, an applicant n ee d show only that a protected ground is “one central reason” for his or her persecution.

Observing that this court has held repeatedly that political opinions encom

pass m o re than electoral politics or form al

* This summ ary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It h as been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.R O GR I G UE Z T O R

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p ol it i c a l ideology or action, the p anel wrote that it had little doubt that fem inism qualifies as a political opinion within the

m e an ing of the relevant statutes. The panel concluded that Rodriguez’s testim ony concerning equality between th e
sexes , her work habits, and her insistence on autonomy
com pelled the conclusion that she has a f em in ist political opinion. The panel also held that th e r ec o rd com p elled the conclusion that Rodriguez’s political opinion was at least o ne central reason for her past p ersecution. The panel explained that som e of the worst a c t s of violence cam e imm ediately after Rodriguez asserted her rights as a wom an, and that the fact th a t s ome incidents of abuse m ay also have reflected a dysfunctional relationship was beside the point, as Rodriguez d id not need to show that her political opinion—rather th an interpersonal dynam ics—played the sole or predom inant role in her abuse. By dem onstrating that h er political opinion was “one central reason” for her persecution, the panel concluded that R odriguez likewise established that her political opinion

was “a reason” f

o r h er p e r se c ution for purposes o f withholding of rem oval.

Because in granting relief under the Convention Against Torture the agency necessarily determ ined tha t Ro driguez carried her burden to p rove the other elem ents of her claim s for asylum and withholding of rem oval, the panel concluded that Rodriguez’s petition presented a recognized exception to the ordinary rem and rule under I.N.S. v. Ventura
, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam ). The panel explained that because the agency concluded that R odriguez m et the higher burden o f establishing that she is likely to b e tortured, she necessarily met the lower burdens for asylum and withholding reli e f of establishing that she has a well-founded fear, o r cl ear probability, of persecution. Sim ilarly, because the Board determ ined that the Mexican governm ent would acquiesce toR O GR I G UE Z T O R

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Rodriguez’s to rture, the panel concluded that the Board h ad necessarily decided that the Me xi can governm ent would be unwilling or unable to protect Ro driguez from future persecution. T h e panel also concluded that because the Board determ ined that it w ould be unreasonable for Ro dr i g u ez to relocate w ithin Mexico to avoid future torture, she likewise could not relocate to avoid future persecution.

The panel h eld that Rodriguez was thus e l i gible for asylum and entitled to w ithholding of rem oval, and it

rem anded for the Attorney General to exercise his discretion whether to gr ant Rodriguez asylum
, and if asylum is not granted, to grant withholding of rem o val.

Concurring, Judge Paez wrote that in addition to ignoring

e v i d ence that Rodriguez w as targeted on account of h e r fem inist political opinion, the Board also ignored extensive

r e cord evidence from a leading authority on dom esti c violence that directl y rejected the B oard’s prem ise that dom estic violence is presume d to be m otivated by nothing

m ore than the private d

ynam ics of a “personal relationship.”

C OUNSEL

Elaine J. Goldenberg (argued), Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, W ash i ngton, D.C.; Sara A. McDerm ott, Munger Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Ang e les, California; Richard Caldarone, Julie C arpenter, and Rachel Sheridan, Tahirih Justice Center, Falls Church, Virginia; for Petitioner.

Tim othy Bo Stanton (argued), Trial Attorney; Sabatino F. Leo, Senior Litigation Counsel; O ffice o f Imm igrationR O GR I G UE Z T O R

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Litigation, Civil Division, United States Departm ent o f Justice, W ashington, D.C.; for Respo n dent.

Blaine Bookey, Karen Musalo, Neela Chakravartula, and Anne Peterson, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, U.C. Hastings College of Law, San Francisco, California, for Am icus Curiae Center for Gender & Refugee Studies.

Betsey Boutelle, DLA Piper LLP (US), San D i e g o, California; Anthony Todaro, Jeffrey DeGroot, and Li anna Bash, DLA Piper LLP (US), Seattle, W ashington; for Am icus Curiae National Im m igrant W om en’s Advocacy Project.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Maria Lu i sa Rodriguez Tornes, a native and citizen of Mexico, testified to a lifetim e of severe abuse from her m other, her estranged husb an d
, and her partner for, in th e i r eyes, being insufficiently subservient to m en. An imm igration judge (“IJ”) granted asylum
, and alternatively granted withholding o f rem o val and pro t e c t ion under the Convention Against T orture (“CAT”), in a detailed d ecision. The B oard o f Imm igration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed in part, holding th a t Pe t itioner’s past persecution and fear of future persecution lacked a nexus to a protected ground. Because the record com

pels a contrary co n c l usion, we grant the petition and rem and for further proceedings.R O GR I G UE Z T O R

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Since the age o f five, P etitioner has b e en told that m en will beat her if she does not subm it. Her m o ther d em anded that she learn how to d o housework, how to accept spousal abuse, and how “to obey everything that [her] husband would say.” She b eat Petitioner with v ar ious o bjects alm o st daily, in part to prepare her for future beatings from her husband. Yet Petitioner cam e to b elieve that “there should be equality in opinions[] and in w orth” between m en and wom e n

. She becam e a teacher.

Pe titioner’s husband, Esteban B aron Mata, began a regim e o f grueling abuse m onths after they m arried. Wh en he o n ce wanted f

ood at 1 a.m ., for exam

ple, he awakened Petitioner b y sticking a lit cigarette into her arm and ordered her to cook. She told him to do it h i ms e l f; h e grabbed her h ai r and dragged her into the kitchen. Petitioner “had to d o it because [she] wa s h i s wom an, [she] w as his wife, and it

was [her] responsibilit y t o serve him ,” he said. On another occasion, he burned Petitioner’s face with a cigarette because she refused to leave her teaching job. H e told her that she h ad

no right to work and that, as a m an, it was his duty to provide. “You think that because you studied, you can step on m e,” he said dur i ng one beating. “You’re not going to step on m e. I’m the m an and y ou’re going to d o what I s ay

. ” Petitioner said that she did not report her husband’s abuse to the police because doing so would have been futile. When a friend tried to report her own husband, a police officer told her t o s t o p gossiping, return hom e, and do her “duties.”R O GR I G UE Z T O R

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Baron 1 left Petitioner in 1993 when she was pregnant. Her Catholic fam ily prohibited divorce and required that she live with the m un t i l Baron returned. Petitioner fled to the United States. Years later, in phone calls and m essages through Facebook, B aron sought Petitioner’s locat i on and insisted that they reunite. After Petitioner changed her phone

num ber and deleted her account on Facebook, Baron visited Petitioner’s daug ht er. H e ap p eared aggressive and threatened “revenge.” “His fam ily also says that he is still a violent m an towards wom en and beats” his current girlfriend.

Petitioner m et Jorge He rn andez F ernandez in Phoenix, Arizona. They m o ved in together. He, too, beat, raped, b urned, and strangled her. Petitioner’s assertions of fe m a le independence and equality prom pted his abus e. Wh en Pe titioner declined to give Hernandez m oney so that sh e could save for household expenses, he cut her with a broken beer bottle and raped h er. “I f you’re not going to give m e
m oney, give m e sex,” he said. During another instance when Petitioner declined sex, H ernandez responded that she had no choice in the m atter because she w as h is property. Wh en she spoke up in front of his friends in their h om e, he said that she had to just “com e in and not say anything.” He then punched her so hard that she suffered a vaginal hem orrhage.

The cycle of abuse oc c urr e d alm ost weekly. Hernandez said that Petitioner, as a wom an, wa s n o t allowed to have opinions; Petitioner expressed opinions anyway; Hernandez abused Petitioner. Whe n Pe titioner took a job in which she would have to speak to m en—despite Hernandez’s dem and that she no t take such a job—he left bite m arks and visible signs of strangulation on her neck to show other m en that she

1 The parties refer to Petitioner’s abusers by their first surnam es.R O GR I G UE Z T O R

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“had an o wner.” “Wh at’s wrong with it?

. . . You’re my
wom an, and they need to know it,” he said. When she tr ied to kick him out, he returned and raped her. He also dictated her clothing. “I wasn’t allowed to have an opinion about

. . . anything,” Petitioner wrote in her declaration. “He couldn’t stand that I, a s th e supposedly weaker sex, was the breadwinner . . . .”

Petitioner and Hernandez had three children, all of whom

are citizens of the Uni ted States. After several f oiled attem p ts, Petitioner escaped the relationship.

In 2017, the govern me n t deported Hernandez to Guatem ala and P et itioner to Mexico. Hernandez called Petitioner and her children, dem anding to know where Petitioner now lived. Because he lacks fam ily in Guatem ala, Petition e r believes that Hernandez now lives in Mexico, where he has fam ily an d can obtain residency. Fearing for her safety, Petitio n e r r e turned to the United States. The governm ent initiated rem oval proceedings against Petitioner in Decem ber 2017.

The IJ found Petitioner credible and granted her asylum

. In the alternative, the IJ granted withholding of rem oval and CAT p r o tection. The IJ f ound that Petitioner’s fem inist p ol it ical opinion w as at least o ne central reason for her p as t persecution by Baron and for her well-founded fear of future persecution by Baron and Hernandez. The IJ also found that Petitioner’s m em

be r s hip in a particular social group o f “Mexican fem ales” w as at least one centr a l r e a s on for her past p ersecution b y Baron and for h er well-founded fe ar o fR O GR I G UE Z T O R

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future persecution by B aron and Hernandez. 2 Citing ream s o f docum entary evide nce, the IJ found that if the Mexican governm ent d id not condone violence against fem ales, it at least “dem o nstrated a com plete helplessness ” to protect Petitioner.

The BIA affirm ed the g r ant o f CAT protection but reversed the grants of asylum and withholding of rem o val. It tersely d isposed of the IJ’s p ages of factual findings. Citing the Attorney General’s opinion in Matter of A-B-
, 27 I. & N

. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (“

Matter of A-B- I ”), the BIA held that “the record la cks findings that [Petitioner’s] dom estic partners abused her for ‘reasons unrelated to their relationship[s].’” Nevertheless, the B IA did not distu rb the IJ’s finding that Petitioner is credible. It also acknowledged that Petitioner “suffered severe m ental and physical abuse from her mo th e r, her ex-husband, and h er form er dom estic partner, including, but not lim ited to , rep eated rap es, b e atings, burns, and verbal and m ental abuse.” More broadly, the B IA did “not disturb the [IJ]’s factual f indings regarding the ‘pandem ic’ of violence against f em ales in that country or the im port o f ‘cu lturally constructed’ and entrenched identity

r o les.” The governm ent did not challenge the IJ’s findings that Peti t i o ner (1) suffered past persecution and torture; (2) h a s a p o litical opinion; and (3) is a m em ber of a cognizable social group of Mexican fem ales.

2 The IJ found that Petition e r’s fem inist p olitical opinion was “ a reason” f or persecution by he r m o th er and t hat her m em

bership in a part ic u lar social group of Mexican fem ales was “at least one central

re a s o n ” for her m o ther’s persecution of h er. But the IJ found t hat Petitioner lacks a well-founded fear of future persecution by her mother. Petitioner does not challenge that finding.R O GR I G UE Z T O R

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In affirm ing CAT relief, the B IA h eld th a t th e IJ did not clearly err i n finding that authorities acquiesced in Petitioner’s torture and that it would be “unreasonable for her to r e locate within Mexico.” Petitioner tim ely petitions for review, challenging the denial of asylum and withholding o f

rem oval. 3

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“Where the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and law, rather than adopting the IJ’s decision, our review is lim ited to the BIA’s decision, except to th e e x t ent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Rodriguez v. Holder
, 6 83 F.3d 1164, 1 169 (9th Ci r

. 2012) (internal quotation m arks

om itted). W e review de novo the B IA’s conclusions of law. Bringas-Rodriguez v. S

essions , 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

W e review for substantial ev i d ence the agency’s factual findings, “including whether an applicant was persecuted on account of h[er] political o pinion.” Regalado-Escobar v. Holder
, 717 F.3d 724, 726–27 (9th Cir. 2 0 13). Those findings ar e “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be c o m

pelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

3 Nothing in our opinion disturb s th e agency’s grant of CAT protection, which the governm ent does not challenge.R O GR I G UE Z T O R

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DISCUSSION

A. General Principles

To be eligible for asylum
, P etitioner m ust prove that she is “unable or unwilling” to return to her c o un try of origin “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution

on account of race, religion, nationality
, me m bership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). T hu s, P etitio ner h as the burden of establishing that (1) her treatm ent rises to the level of persecution or that she has a well-found e d fe ar of future persecution; (2) the persecution was o r would be on account of one o r m ore protected grounds; and (3) the persecution was
or would b e comm itted b y the governm ent, or by forces that the governm ent was unable o r unwi l l ing to control. Baghdasaryan v. Ho lder
, 592 F.3d 1018, 1 023 (9th Cir. 2010); Rodriguez-Rivera v. U.S. D ep’t of Immi gr. & Naturalization
, 848 F.2d 998
, 1 00 5 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam ). To obtain withholding of rem oval, Petitioner must show that her “life o r f reedom would b e th r e atened in [Mexico] b ecause of [her] r a ce, religion, nationality,

m em bership in a particular social group, o r political opinio n.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). “Past persecution ‘trigg e r s a rebuttable presum

p tion of a well-founded fear o f future persecution.’” Singh v. Whitaker
, 914 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation om itted). At issue h ere is whether Petitioner “establi sh[ed] a nexus between [ the] m istreatm ent and a protected ground.” Baghdasaryan , 592 F.3d at 1023.

For asylum
, Petitioner m

ust show that a protected ground “was or will be at least one central reason” fo r p e rsecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).R O GR I G UE Z T O R

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A “central” re a s o n is a reason of prim ary im portance to the persecutors, one that is essential to their decision t o act. In other words, a m otive is a “centr a l reason” if the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant i f such m otive did not exist. Likewise, a m otive is a “central reason” if that

m otive, standing alone, would have led the persecutor to h arm the applicant. As noted above, persecution may b e caused by more than one centra l reason, a nd an asylum applicant need not prove whi c h r eason was dominant

. Nevertheless, to d emo nstrate that

a p rotected g round was “at least one ce n tral reason” for persecution, an applicant mu st prove th a t such ground was a cause of the persecutors’ acts.

Parussimova v. Mukasey
, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009) (em phasis added) (in ternal citations om itted). A central

reason cannot be “incidental, tangential, superficial, o r subordinate to another reason for harm .” Id. (quoting In re JB-N- & S-M

, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007)).

That an unprotected ground, such as a p ersonal dispute, also constitutes a central reason f or persecution does not bar asylum

. Bringas-Rodriguez
, 850 F.3d at 1073. “[I]f a
r etributory m otive exists alongside a protected m otive, an applicant n eed show only th a t a protected ground is ‘one central reason’ fo r h i s [or her] persecution.” Madrigal v. Holder
, 7 16 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation om itted).

The Acting Attorn e y G eneral recently agreed that our
nexus standard is the correct one. “To establish the necessaryR O GR I G UE Z T O R

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nexus, the p ro t ected ground: (1) m ust be a but-for cause o f the wrongdoer’s act; and (2) m u s t p l ay m ore than a m inor role—in other words, it cannot be incidental or tangential to another reason for the act.” Matter of A-B-
, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199, 208 (A.G. 2021) (“ Matter of A-B- II

”). T h at test is substantively indistinguishable f rom our own. Under Parussimova
, Petitioner m ust first show that “the persecutor would not have harm ed [her] if such m otiv e d i d not exist,” 555 F.3d at 741, that is, b ut-for cause, see But-for Cause
, Black’s L aw Dictionary (11th ed. 2 019) (“The cause without wh i c h the event could not have occurred.”). As discussed above, Parussimova next requires Petitioner to show that her protected ground was not “incidental, tangential, superficial,

or subordinate to another reason for h arm .” 555 F.3d at 741 (citation om itted). In sum , Matter of A -B- II did not change the standard for establishing nexus, at least in our circui t

. 4 The governm ent’s mo tion to rem and so that the BIA can consider Matter of A -B- II ’s effect on nexus is therefore denied.

B. Political Opinion

Petitioner m

ust establish two facts to show persecution on account of her political opinion. Ahmed v. Keisler
, 504 F.3d 1183, 1192 (9th Cir. 2007). First, she “m ust show that [ s]he held (or that h [er] persecutors believed that [ s]he held) a political opinion.” Id. (citing Navas v. I.N.S. , 217 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2000) )

. Second, she “m ust show that h[er]

4 And as we held recently, the Attorney General’s opinion in Matter of A-B- I d id not “endorse any sort of categorical” bar to asylum for those fle e i ng dom estic violence p redicated on a p rotected ground. Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr , 968 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2020).R O GR I G UE Z T O R

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persecutors persecuted h[er] because of [that] political opinion.” Id.

W e have h eld repeated l y that political o p inions “encom pass[] m ore than electoral politics or form al political ideology or action.” Id. Although “the m ere presence o f

som e political elem ent does not requi r e the conclusion that

som e m altreatm ent was on acc ount of political opinion,” Kozulin v. I.N.S.
, 2 18 F.3d 1112, 1 116 ( 9 th Cir. 2000), applicants n eed n ot “es po us e p olitical theory,” Grava v. I.N.S.
, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2000). L ike th e Third Circuit
, w e h ave “little doubt that f em inism qualifies as a political opinion within the m eaning of the relevant statutes.” Fatin v. I.N.S. , 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993). 5

Di rect and indirect evidence can show that persecut i o n
was on ac c o un t o f a political opinion. Singh v. H older
, 764 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014). “Testim ony regarding

a persecutor’s statem ents serves as d i r ect evidence that the persecution was m o tivated by a political opin i o n

. . . .” Id. So long as the I J finds that a petitioner is credible, that testim ony can com e from the p etitioner herself. Id. A short tem poral gap between a petitioner’s actual or im puted assertion of a political o pinion and h er m istreatm ent p rovides

“ i n d i r e ct evidence o f a nexus.” Khudaverdyan v. H older
, 778 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2015).

Here
, substantial evidence d oes not support the BIA’s conclusion that the record lacks evidence of a nexus between Petitioner’s pers ecution and her political opinion. At the

5 W e have held the sam e in a non-precedential disposition. Moghaddam v. I.N.S.
, 95 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (citing Fatin , 12 F.3d at 1242).R O GR I G UE Z T O R

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outset, it b ears repeating that the B IA d id not disturb the IJ’s factual findings regarding Petitioner’s favorable credibility and the severity of her m istreatm ent. Therefore, the only two pertinent questions are those described above: (1 ) wh ether Petitioner had an actual or im puted political opinion, and ( 2 ) wh ether she was persecuted because of that politica l opinion. Ahmed
, 5 0 4 F. 3 d at 1192. W e are com pelled to answer both questions in the affirm ative.

First, Petitioner has a fe m inist political opinion. The gov ernm ent did not challenge that conclusion before the agen c y

. To the extent that the B IA determ ined otherwise, Petitioner’s testim ony, work habits, and insistence on autonomy com

p el a contrary conclu s i o n

. Under our precedents, it is no answer that Petition e r did n ot engage in feminist “electoral” activities, A hmed
, 504 F.3d at 1192, o r “espouse political theory,” Gr a v a , 205 F.3d at 1181. Petitioner’s testim ony that “there should be equality in opinions[] and in worth” between the sexes suffices.

Second, Petitioner w as per secuted because of that political opinion. The record contains episode after episode of m en stating, quite plainly, that they were beating, burning, raping, and strangling h er because she sought an equal perch in the social hierarchy. 6 Hernandez left bite and strangulation

m arks o n Petitioner after she took a job against his wishes, to show other m en that she “had an owner.” Pe t itioner’s

6 Petitioner’s expert witness, Professor Na n c y Lem on, described dom estic abusers as generally harboring v iews that m en should d om inate

wom en and sque l ch fem ale independence. That testim ony corroborates Petitioner’s experiences; her persecution occurred when she expressed a contrary o pinion, and her abusers expressly m ade the very points noted b y Professor Lem o n.R O GR I G UE Z T O R

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husband, Baron, burned a cigarette into her face because she refused to leave her jo b an d
, according to her husband, acknowledge “that [he] and [Petitioner] wer e n ot equals.” Pet i t io n er was doing som ething wrong, B aron said, by “providing m oney” when, “as a m an, it was his duty t o do [that].” When he said that Petitioner “didn’t have th[e] right to have that job,” Petitioner coun te r ed that she did. Baron responded by hitting her.

Indeed, som e of the worst acts of viol e nce cam e “imm ediately after” P etitio n er asserted her rights as a wom an. Khudave rd

y an , 778 F.3d at 1107. After Petitioner said that she was not obligated to have sex whenever He rn an d ez wi sh ed, he said that “it was [her] obligation as a woman t o
s erve him when he wanted,” and he raped her. Sim ilar l y , after Petitioner bought h e r own trailer with her wages and attem p ted to p r e v e n t Hernandez’s entry onto her property, Hernandez raped and strangled her so that she “woul d understand that he wasn’t going to go anywhere.”

The governm ent’s argum ent that there is no evidence that Baron and Hern an dez w ere “aware” of P etitioner’s political

o p inion thus lacks any rational b asis. Petitioner does not claim that she was persecute d for being a fem inist m erely because she, a wom an, was m ist r e a ted by m en. Rather, she claim s th at she was persecuted when those m en m istreated her b ecause s h e expressly asserted to them her political opinion that she was their equal.

That som e incidents o f abuse m ay also have reflected a dysfunctional relationshi p i s beside the point. See Parussimova
, 5 55 F.3d at 741 (holding that “persecution m ay be caused by m ore than one central reason”). Petitioner need not show that her political opinion—rather than interpersonalR O GR I G UE Z T O R

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dynam ics—played the sole or predom inant role in her abuse. See id. (holding that “an asylum applican t n ee d not prove which reason [is] dom inant”).

Thus, the record com

pels the conclusion that Petitioner’s political opinion is at least one central rea s o n for her past persecution and her presum p tively well-founded fear o f future persecution. See Ahmed
, 5 04 F.3d at 1197 (hol d i n g tha t past p ersecution on account of a political opinion gives rise to a presum

ption o f a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of that opinion). It then follows that Petitioner’s p olitical opinion is “a reason” for h er persecution f o r purposes of withholding of rem oval. See Barajas-Romero

v. Lynch
, 846 F.3d 351, 359 (9th C ir. 2017) (“A person m ay h av e ‘a reason’ to do som ething that is not his [or h e r ] ‘central’ reason or even ‘one central reason.’”).

C. Fear of Future Persecution

Because the BIA determ ined that nexus is la c king, it “f[ound] it [un]necessary to address the [govern ment’s] arg ume nt that [Petitioner]

. . . did not have a w ell-founded fear of future persecution.” Yet it then held that the IJ did not

err in granting CAT protection. T o receive CAT protection, Petitioner had to prove “that it is m ore likely than not that

. . . she will be tortured in the country of re mo val.” Parada v. Sessions
, 902 F.3d 9 01, 914 (9th Cir. 2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).

Thus, this p etition presents a recognized exception to the ordinary rem and rule that we allow the B IA to decide issues in the first instance. S

ingh
, 764 F.3d at 1163 (citing I.N.S. v. Ven t ura , 5 3 7 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam )). Because Petitioner “m et the high burden of dem onstrating that [s]he isR O GR I G UE Z T O R

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likely to be to rtured,

. . . [s]he necessarily m eets the lower burden f or eligibility for asylum that [ s]he has a w ell-founded fe ar o f fu ture persecution.” Id. In o ther words, when the agency g rants CAT p rotection, it necessarily has decided that there is a well-founded f

ear of f uture persecution. Fedunyak

v. Gonzales
, 477 F.3d 1126, 1 130 (9th Cir. 2007). Sim ilarly, Pe titioner “has dem onstrated the existence of a cl e ar probability o f future persecution” for her withholdin g o f

r e m oval claim

. Id. at 1131. “Having established a nex u s between h[er] persecution and

. . . p ol i t ic a l opinion, and having established a well-founded fear of future persecution,

a Ventura rem and is unnecessary.” Singh
, 764 F.3d at 1163.

D. Inability or Unwillingness to Control Persecution

The BIA did not d iscuss whe ther Petitioner fears persecution “by th e g o v e rnm ent, or by forces that the governm ent was unable or unwilling to control .” Baghdasaryan
, 592 F.3d at 1023. It did, however, affirm the IJ’s finding that the Mexican governm ent would acquiesce in Petitioner’s torture. As with Petitioner’s fear of future persecution, our precedents and the BIA’s own opinion show that it necessarily decided that the governm ent was unable o r unwilling to control Pe t i tioner’s p ersecutors. “Public officials acquiesce in torture if, ‘prior to the activity constituting torture,’ the officials: (1) have awareness of the activity (or consciously close their eyes to the fact it is going on); and (2) breach their le ga l responsibility to intervene to prevent the activity because they are unable or unwil l i n g to oppose it.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder
, 75 5 F. 3 d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (em

phasis added) (citation om itted); see also Cole v. Holder
, 659 F .3d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding th a t “[a]cquiescence by governm ent officials ‘requires onl y tha t [th ey] were aware of the torture but rem ained w illfullyR O GR I G UE Z T O R

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blind to it, or sim

ply stood by because of their inabi l it y or unwillingness to oppose it’” (second alteration in o riginal) (em phasis added) (citation om itted)).

Thus, on this record, the agency’s fin d i n g that the governm ent “would acquiesce” in Petitioner’s to rture necessarily includes the d eterm ination that th e governm ent would be un ab l e or unwilling to stop Petitioner’s future persecution, a less severe formof m istreatm ent than torture. See Guo v. S

essions , 89 7 F .3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2 018) (holding that the concept of t orture is m ore severe than persecution). That is especially s o here, because the B IA parroted the Acting Attorney General’s own standard for persecution in c o n cluding that the governm ent showed acquiescence by “routinely breach[ing] the duty to intervene in these m atters.” S

ee Mat t e r o

f A-B- II
, 28 I. & N

. Dec. at 204 (“The word ‘persecution’ therefore should be read to require that the governm ent in the hom e country has f allen so far short of adequate protection as to have breached its basic duty to protect its citizens . . . .” (em phasis added)).

E. Ability to Relocate

If the governm ent proves that Petitioner “can reasonably relocate internally to an area of safety,” then she is ineligible for asylum

. S

ingh
, 9 14 F.3d at 659. In its analysis of asylum and withholding of rem o v al, the BIA stated that it was unnecessary to address Petitioner’s “ ability to relocate” because it found nexus to be lacking. Once again, the BIA’s holding w ith respect to Petitioner’s CAT claim necessar ily resolved that issue.

For p urposes of asylum and w ithholding o f r e m oval, assessing Petitioner’s ability to relocate “consists o f twoR O GR I G UE Z T O R

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steps: (1) ‘whether [she] could relocate safely, ’ and (2) ‘whether it would be reasonable to require [her] t o d o so.’” Id. (em

phases added ) ( c itation om itted). In resolving Petitioner’s CAT claim
, the BIA held that country conditions “render it unreasonable for [Petitioner] to reloc a t e within Mexico.” Ac c ordingly, the BIA necessarily decided that Petitioner also could not relocate f or purposes of asylum and withholding of rem oval. 7

I n su m , we hold that (1) we are com pelled to conclu d e that Petitioner established a nexus between her m istreatm ent and p ol i t i c a l opinion and (2) the BIA necessarily concluded that she carried her burden to prove the other elem ents of her claim s for asylum and withholding of rem oval. 8 Petitioner is thus eligible for asylum and entitled to wi thholding o f

rem oval.

7 As we h ave n o t e d b e fo re, Akosung v. Barr
, 970 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2020), the text of the regulation governing relocation under CAT, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(ii), lacks a requirem ent that the relocat i o n be reasonable, wh e re as the regulations governing relocation under asylum

a n d w i t h h o l d i n g o f r e m o v a l
, i d

. § § 1 2 0 8

. 1 3 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( i ) ( B )
, 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B), expre ssly require that the relocation be reasonable. But, as i n Ak

osung , “nothing turns on the distinction here ” because the BIA affirm atively f

ound t hat relocation would be unreas o n able, and because “[t]he governm ent [has] not suggest[ed] that the standards in the two r egulations are different.” 970 F.3d at 1101 (em phasis added). To the contrary, i n its brief to the BIA, the g o v e rnm ent lum p ed together the rel o c a t i o n analysis for asylum
, withholding of rem oval, and CAT protection as a single issue.

8 Because Petitioner established persecution on account o f her political opinion, we need not decide whether she did so on account of her

m em bership in a particular social group of Mexican fem ales.R O GR I G UE Z T O R

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On rem and, the Attorney General s h a l l exercise his discretion in determ ining whether to grant Petitioner asylum

. If he does not grant asylum
, Pe t i t i o ner shall receive withholding of rem oval.

P E T IT ION GR

A N T E D AN D R

E M AN D E D

. T h e p a

n e l shall retain jurisdiction over any future petitions for review.

PAEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join Judge Graber’s fi n e o pinion in full. I write separately on a point the court’s opinion does not address. In rejecting Ms. Rodriguez Tornes’s political opinion claim
, the BIA suggests th a t the presence of a “personal relationship”

m otivat i o n for intim ate partner violence im plies that there

were no intersectional o r additional bases for the violence Ms. Rodriguez Tornes experienced. T he court’s opinion thoroughly do c um ents the record evidence, which the B IA ignored, dem onstrating how Ms. Rodriguez Tornes was targeted for violence by her dom estic partners on account o f her f em inist political opinion. The BIA, however, also ignored extensive record evidence from expert witness Prof. Nancy Lem on, a leading authority on dom estic violence, that directly rejects the B IA’s prem ise that dom estic viol e n c e is presum e d t o be m otivated by nothing m ore than the private dynam ics of a “personal relationship.”

In co ntrast to the BIA’s “personal relationship” view o f dom estic violence, 1 Prof. Lem on draws on m ore than three

1 The BIA cites Ma t t e r of A-B-
, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 338–39 (A.G. 2018) as the basis for its assum p tion.R O GR I G UE Z T O R

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decades o f re s earch, writing, legal representation, and lawm aking to e xp l ain that “the socially or culturally constructed and defined identities, roles and responsibilities that are assigned to wom en, as distinct from those assigned to

m en, are the root o f dom estic violence.” She an a l y z e s data from the U.S. Departm ent of Justice, Bureau o f Justice Statistics and studies from leading m edical and social science publications t o highlight “com p elling evidence that heterosexual dom estic v iolence is, in s i gnificant part,

m otivated by b ias against wom en and the belief that m en are entitled to b eat and control wo men.” Prof. Lem on
summ arizes cross-cultural studies within the United States and internationally that dem onstrate “a correlation between patriarchal norm s that support m ale dom inance and violence against wom en by intim ate partners.”

In her report, which the IJ referenced in her d ecision, Prof. Lem o n provides a lengthy exam ination of social science research exploring ho w p articular behaviors exhibited by

m ale abusers—including em otional abuse, sexual abuse,

m arital rape, e conom ic abuse, blam ing, guilt and using children—are each tied to social belief system s that “m en are entitled to dom inate and control w om en because the m ale sex is considered superior” and operate to “exploit the traditional socially constructed roles, ident i t i e s, duties and status o f

wom en i n intim ate relationships.” In describing the legal, social, cultural, and political structures that lay th e foun dations f

or intim ate partner violence, Prof. Lem on explains that “ domestic violence is not typically caused by behaviors u nique to the victim o r by inter-personal dynamics uniqu e to the relationship between the abuser and the abused

. . . . Rather, heterosexual m ale batterers have certain

e xp ectations of intim ate relationships with regard to whic h partner will control the relationship and how control will beR O GR I G UE Z T O R

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exercised. These expectat i on s are prem ised on a dogm atic adherence to m ale privi lege and rigid, distinct, and unequal roles for wom en and m en.”

The record evidence of Pr o f

. Lem on’s rigorous expert analysis underm ines the BIA’s unsubstantiated prem ise that, unless o therwise shown, dom estic v iolence is a purely private

m atter. T he BIA m akes no m ention of the record evidence o f Prof. Lem on’s expert analysis, let alo n e the decades o f pub li cly available social science research and public policy that all reject the BIA’s o utdated view of dom estic v i o l ence
as a quirk within a “personal relationship.” 2 Thus, the BIA’s

a s s e rtion that dom estic violence is p resum ptively a private

m atter is not supported by substantial evidence.

2 See e.g., Nina Rabin, A t the Border B etween Public and Private: U.S. Immigration Policy for Victims of Domestic Violence
, 7 Law & Ethics Hum

. Rts. 1 09, 111–12 (2013) (“Fifty years ago, dom estic violence

was wi d e l y understood to be a private m atter, and the extent to which i t

wa s ap p ro p r iate for the state t o intervene was highly contested. N ow, dom estic violence shelters, state laws and policies specific to the prosecution of dom estic violence crim es, and significant state and federal governm ent support for e ffo rts to eradicate d om estic violence are all

comm onplace. Crucial to bringing about this shift in the state’s role vis-àv i s d om estic violence victim s has b een the acknowledgm ent of the structural roots of dom estic violence. W hen c o n c e ived of as a problem tied to gender subordination and pervasive inequality rather th an interpersonal conflict, the violence at issue dem ands a state response.”); Violence Against Women: Victims of the System
, 102d Cong., 63 (1991); Elizabeth M. Schneider, T he Violence of Privacy
, 2 3 C onn. L. Rev. 9 7 3 (1991); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: W ife Beating As Prerogative and Privacy
, 105 Y a l e L .J. 2117 (1996); Leslye E. Orloff & Janice v. Kaguyutan, O

ffering A Helping H

and: Legal Protections for Battered Immigrant Women: A History o f L eg is la t i v e Responses
, 10 Am

. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L

. 95 (2001); see generally Am

. Br. o f t h e National Im m igrant W o m en’s Advocacy Project.