J-A16012-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

FREDERICK W. KARASH,

Appellant No. 1318 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 5, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-SA-0000074-2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2016

Appellant, Frederick W. Karash, appeals pro se from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County. We affirm.

We summarize the history of this case as follows. On March 29, 2015, 

Appellant was traveling on Route 8 in Erie County when he drove by 

Pennsylvania State Trooper Joshua Deitle and was clocked with a radar gun 

as traveling 73 miles per hour (“mph”) in a 55 mph zone. The trooper cited 

Appellant for traveling 60 mph in a 55 mph zone. Prior to the hearing before 

the district magistrate, the Commonwealth amended the citation to reflect 

that Appellant was traveling 73 mph. The magistrate convicted Appellant 

and sentenced him to pay fines. Appellant then appealed to the court of 

____________________________________________

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A16012-16

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common pleas. On August 5, 2015, the trial court convicted Appellant and 

imposed a $61.00 fine, plus fees and costs. This timely pro se appeal 

followed. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review, which we 

reproduce verbatim:

1 Q- Did the Judge err in allowing the “amended” citation to be 

presented as evidence?

2 Q- Did the Judge Show discriminatory bias and incompetent 

arrogance by failing to review the motions brought by the 

defendant while wasting not a moments time in granting the 

Commonwealths motions?

3 Q- Did the judge err by failing to adhere strictly to ruling in 

regard to the Constitution of the United States (specifically 5th

and 14th Amendment)?

4 Q- Did the Commonwealth fail to strictly adhere to the rules 

of Criminal Procedure by failing to properly issue the Citation?

5 Q- Did the Commonwealth meet the burden set forth for 

amending a citation pursuant to The Rules of Criminal Procedure 

as delineated in Commonwealth v Palmer?

6 Q- Did the Issuing authority fail to comply with the Rules of 

Criminal Procedure thus biasing me for future hearings/ thus 

violating my rights?

7 Q- Did the Judge Completely disregard the Rules of Criminal 

Procedure at the time of reaching a verdict thus expounding on 

the argument that she is discriminatively biased and arrogantly 

incompetent?

8 Q- Did the Judge allow contradicting stories from the 

prosecution to be submitted as evidence yet fail to address the 

issue of credibility of Commonwealth witnesses, Thus Showing 

reckless disregard for the interest of justice?
J-A16012-16

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9 Q- Did the Judge Show Bias by granting the continuance 

request of the Commonwealth (without considering the 

responsive pleading) while denying the continuance request of 

the defendant?

10 Q-Did the Judge have a responsibility to recuse herself? Did 

her failure to do so create a prejudice? Did She act outside of 

her Judicial Function/athority?

11 Q-Does the Judge understand the concept of a de novo 

hearing? Does her disinterest in the violative manner in which 

the initial hearing transpired elude to the fact that she has 

interests in revenue generation and not neutral fact finding and 

justice?

12 Q-Did the Commonwealth meet the Burden of Proof?

Appellant’s Brief at ii-iii.

As a prefatory matter, we observe that appellate briefs must materially 

conform to the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. Chapter 21. When a party’s brief fails to 

conform to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and the defects are substantial, 

an appellate court may, in its discretion, quash or dismiss the appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

It is well settled that the argument portion of an appellate brief must 

be developed with pertinent discussion of the issue, which includes citations 

to relevant authority. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). See Commonwealth v. 

Genovese, 675 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. Super. 1996) (stating that “[t]he 

argument portion of an appellate brief must be developed with a pertinent 

discussion of the point which includes citations to the relevant authority”).
J-A16012-16

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In Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super. 2008), a 

panel of this Court offered the following relevant observation regarding the 

proper formation of the argument portion of an appellate brief:

In an appellate brief, parties must provide an argument as to 

each question, which should include a discussion and citation of 

pertinent authorities. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). This Court is neither 

obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument 

for a party. Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 577, 

782 A.2d 517, 532 (2001) (Castille, J., concurring). To do so 

places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral 

arbiter. Id. When an appellant fails to develop his issue in an 

argument and fails to cite any legal authority, the issue is 

waived. Commonwealth v. Luktisch, 680 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 

Super. 1996).

Id. at 371-372. Thus, failure to cite case law or other legal authority in 

support of an argument results in waiver of the claim. Commonwealth v. 

Owens, 750 A.2d 872, 877 (Pa. Super. 2000). 

As we have often stated, “Although this Court is willing to liberally 

construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special 

benefit upon the appellant.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 

498 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 

252 (Pa. Super. 2003)). “To the contrary, any person choosing to represent 

himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his 

lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Adams, 882 A.2d 

at 498 (citing Commonwealth v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 

1996)).
J-A16012-16

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Here, the argument portion of Appellant’s pro se brief contains 

rambling discussions of purported error lacking any pertinent analysis. 

Appellant’s Brief at 3-11. Essentially, we are perplexed by Appellant’s 

incomprehensible analyses and discussions. This unclear discourse has 

hampered meaningful appellate review. We recognize that Appellant is 

acting pro se. As we previously mentioned, Appellant’s status as a pro se

litigant does not relieve him of his responsibility to conform to the applicable 

rules of appellate procedure. While this particular defect in Appellant’s brief 

warrants dismissal of the appeal, we decline to do so at this juncture.

Instantly, we have thoroughly reviewed the briefs of the parties, the 

relevant law, and the certified record before us, including the sixteen-page 

opinion of the trial court dated October 26, 2015, which addresses the issues 

raised by Appellant in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. We conclude that 

the issues presented by Appellant lack merit, and the trial court’s opinion 

adequately addresses Appellant’s various claims raised on appeal. 

Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion and adopt its 

reasoning as our own. The parties are directed to attach a copy of that 

opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
J-A16012-16

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/12/2016
E 

I 

\- 

"Genesis" model with a serial number of GHDI 7653. Id., pg. 16, line 17 -pg. 17, line 1. 

1 

Trooper Deitle was also using a hand-held speed timing device, identified as a Decatur Electronics 

traffic speeds on Route 8 in Union Township, Erie County, Pennsylvania. Notes of Testimony, 

Summary Conviction Appeal hearing, August 51h, 2015, pg. 16, lines 5-8. Trooper Deitle was in a 

marked police cruiser and was in full Pennsylvania State Police uniform. Id., pg. 16, lines 10-13. 

On March 29th, 2015, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Joshua David Deitle was monitoring 

I. Factual and Procedural History 

period by a station approved by the Department of Transportation. 

Transportation, as well as appropriately calibrated and tested for accuracy within the prescribed time 

using a speed timing device properly approved by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of 

Computer and all court costs. Appellant's speed was detected by a Pennsylvania State Police trooper 

Maximum Speed Limits, at TR 317-2015, in violation of 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2) at 73 m.p.h. in a 55 

m.p.h. zone, an:d imposed a sentence of a $61.00 fine, $10.00 EMS, $45.00 Surcharge, $10.00 Judicial 

whereby this Trial Court found, at the de novo trial, Appellant guilty of the summary charge of 

(hereafter referred to as "Appellant") appeal from this Trial Court's Order dated August 5th, 2015, 

The instant matter is before the Pennsylvania Superior Court on Frederick W. Karash's 

Domitrovich, J., October 26th, 2015 

OPINION 

Frederick W. Karash, Prose (Appellant) 

Nathaniel E. Strasser, Assistant District Attorney, on behalf of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Appellee) 

APPEARANCES: 

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FREDERJCK W. KARASH, 

Appellant 

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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

OF ERJE COUNTY, PENNSYL,V ANIN. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

Appellee 

Circulated 08/30/2016 02:54 PM
2 

On that date, a Mitsubishi Outlander, black in color and traveling northbound on Route 8, came 

into the speed timing device's field of influence traveling at initially 73 miles per hour. Id, pg. 18, line 

24 - pg. 19, line 2. Once the vehicle passed the police cruiser, Trooper Deitle pulled out and initiated a 

traffic stop of the Mitsubishi Outlander. Id., pg. 19, lines 2-3. Trooper Deitle discovered the vehicle 

was being operated by Appellant Frederick W. Karash, whose identity was confirmed by his 

Pennsylvania Driver's License. Id, pg. 19, lines 4-7. Prior to the traffic stop on March 29th, 2015, 

Trooper Deitle had no other interaction with Appellant. Id., pg. 20, lines 2-7. Trooper Deitle advised 

Appellant he was exceeding the maximum speed limit, but cited Appellant for a lower speed in order 

to "cut him [Appellant] a little bit of a break" and due to Appellant recording the traffic stop. Id., pg. 

20, line 17-pg. 21, line 21. Trooper Deitle cited Appellant for traveling 60 miles per hour in a 55 mile 

per hour zone. Id., pg. 21, lines 11-12. 

On April 21st, -2015, Assistant District Attorney and Trooper Deitle amended the traffic citation 

at Appellant's hearing in front of Magisterial District Judge Carol L. Southwick. Id., pg. 23, lines 2-4. 

The traffic citation was amended before a hearing had commenced, with Appellant present, and was 

amended to reflect 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, the speed Appellant was actually 

traveling when Trooper Deitle timed his vehicle. Id, pg. 23, lines 5-15. Appellant was found guilty by 

Magisterial District Judge Carol L. Southwick of violating 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2) at 73 m.p.h. in a 55 

m.p.h. zone, and sentence was properly imposed. 

Appellant filed both a Notice of Summary Appeal and a Motion to Quash Citation "Exceeding 

Maximum Speed Limits" on May 11th, 2015. A Summary Conviction Appeal hearing was scheduled 

before this Trial Court for July ih, 2015. Assistant District Attorney Nathaniel E. Strasser filed a 

Motion to Reschedule Summary Appeal Hearing on June 9th, 2015, which was granted by this Trial 

Court on June 11th, 2015. Appellant's Summary Conviction Appeal hearing was rescheduled for 

August 5th, 2015 before this Trial Court, at which testimony was taken and evidence was received. 

Following the Summary Conviction Appeal de novo hearing, this Trial Court found Appellant guilty of 
3 

the crimes specified in the amended complaint, citation, summons, or warrant. See Palmer at 1320 

summons, or warrant involve the same basic elements and evolved out of the same factual situation as 

Pennsylvania courts employ the test of whether the crimes specified in the original complaint, citation, 

Pa. R. Crim. P. 109; see Commonwealth v. Palmer, 482 A.2d 1318, 1319 (Pa. Super. 1984). 

A defendant shall not be discharged nor shall a case be dismissed because of a defect in 

the form or content of a complaint, citation, summons, or warrant, or a defect in the 

procedures of these rules, unless the defendant raises the defect before the conclusion of 

the trial in a summary case or before the conclusion of the preliminary hearing in a 

court case, and the defect is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. 

Rule 109 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 

separate issues on appeal, which this Trial Court will summarize into ten (10) issues as follows: 

1. As to Appellant's first, fourth and eighth issues, the traffic citation, issued by 

Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Joshua David Deitle to Appellant on March 29th, 

2015, was properly amended to reflect 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, 

the actual speed Appellant was traveling when Trooper Deitle timed Appellant's 

vehicle. 

In his "Precise Statement of Matters to be Raised on Appeal," Appellant- raises twelve (12) 

Super. 1992). 

appeal except for a manifest abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Kittelberger, 616 A.2d I, 2 (Pa. 

correct conclusions of law erroneously made; and the action of a trial court will not be disturbed on 

novo is to determine whether or not the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and to 

II. Legal Argument 

The Pennsylvania Superior Court's scope of review where a trial court has heard the case de 

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court on August zs", 2015. 

This Trial Court filed its 1925(b) Order on August zs", 2015. Appellant filed his "Precise Statement of 

Matters to be Raised on Appeal" on September 1 5\ 2015. 

imposed. 

violating 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2) at 73 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone, and sentence was properly 
4 

(citing Commonwealth v. Stanley, 401 A.2d 1166 (Pa. Super. 1979)). If so, then a defendant is deemed 

to have been placed on notice regarding his alleged criminal conduct. See id. 

Appellant argues the traffic citation itself states Appellant was traveling at a speed of 60 miles 

per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone and, pursuant to 75 Pa. C. S. §3368, said speed "is not a 

convictable offense." At the time of the de nova hearing, Trooper Deitle clearly stated that, on March 

29th, 2015, Appellant's vehicle was traveling 73 miles per hour northbound on Route 8 in Union City, 

Pennsylvania. NT., pgs. 16-19. Trooper Deitle, using an approved Decatur Electronics model handheld speed timing device, rather than citing Appellant for the initial speed of 73 miles per hour, gave 

Appellant "a break" on his original citation at 60 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. Id, pgs. 

20-21. Prior to the hearing commencing before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick, the 

Commonwealth amended Appellant's traffic citation to reflect 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour 

zone - the original speed Appellant as timed by Trooper Deitle. The amended traffic citation formed 

the basis of Appellant's conviction before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick on April 215\ 

2015 and before this Trial Court on August 5t\ 2015. Furthermore, the amendment to the traffic 

citation was proper as the same basic elements were involved and the traffic citation arose from the 

same factual situation - Appellant traveling in excess of the maximum speed limit, which was timed 

by a Pennsylvania State Police trooper using an approved speed timing device. See Palmer, 482 A.2d 

at 1320. 

Therefore, Appellant's argument that traveling 60 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone "is 

not a convictable offense" is not relevant because Appellant's traffic citation was properly amended to 

the original speed timed by Trooper Deitle - 73 miles per hour. As the amended traffic citation for 

traveling 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone formed the basis of Appellant's conviction, 

Appellant's first issue is without merit. 

2. The Trial Court properly denied Appellant's Motion to Quash Citation. 
5 

'amending the citation' secondary to my [Appellant's] refusal to plead guilty." Appellant also argues 

Appellant argues this Trial Court allowed "the Prosecuting Attorney's narrative regarding 

3. Appellant's assertion of "intimidating, threatening or coercive" behavior of the 

Commonwealth's attorney during initial plea negotiations is not relevant to 

Appellant's conviction for violation 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2). 

is without merit. 

properly denied Appellant's Motion prior to the beginning of testimony, and Appellant's second issue 

Therefore, this Trial Court did acknowledge Appellant's Motion to Quash Citation and 

1320. 

Pennsylvania State Police trooper using an approved speed timing device. See Palmer, 482 A.2d at 

factual situation - Appellant traveling in excess of the maximum speed limit, which was timed by a 

was proper as the same basic elements were involved and the amended citation arose from the same 

Citation. As stated above, the amendment to Appellant's traffic citation to cure a defect in the citation 

Furthermore, this Trial Court had a proper basis for denying Appellant's Motion to Quash 

Id, pg. 13, lines 8-11. 

Ultimately, this Trial Court denied Appellant's Motion to Quash Citation, stating: 

THE COURT: Okay. And the Court has heard from both sides. I think we 

thoroughly had you discuss your arguments and the Court will rule that the Motion to 

Quash is denied. 

Commonwealth's attorney time to respond to Appellant's Motion to Quash Citation. NT, pgs. 6-13. 

Court provided Appellant ample time to argue his Motion to Quash Citation and then provided the 

during the Summary Conviction Appeal hearing on August 5t\ 2015. Prior to any testimony, this Trial 

Procedure. 

First and foremost, this Trial Court did acknowledge Appellant's Motion to Quash Citation 

doing so, ignored the provisions of Rules 109 and 403 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 

Appellant argues the Trial Court refused to acknowledge his Motion to Quash Citation and, by 
required by Rule 403." 

contemporaneously shall give the defendant a paper copy of the citation containing all the information 

in a summary case is instituted by issuing a citation to the defendant. .. the law enforcement officer 

Rule 405 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states "when a criminal proceeding 

an issuing authority, rather than an officer, can amend a citation." 

6 

405 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellant also argues he "rejects the theory that 

Appellant argues the amended traffic citation was never "issued" to him in violation of Rule 

issue is without merit. 

negotiations and did not plead guilty before this Trial Court due to said negotiations. Appellant's third 

4. Appellant was issued the original traffic citation and had notice of the amended traffic 

citation. 

Appellant did not plead guilty before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick due to said 

lines 1-3. In addition, any "intimidating, threatening, or coercive" negotiations are not relevant as 

were not relevant to the charge Appellant had allegedly violated. Id, pg. 30, lines 11-13, 20-22; pg. 31, 

indicated the Summary Conviction Appeal hearing was de novo; therefore, any prior plea negotiations 

before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick. NT., pgs. 28-31. Ultimately, this Trial Court 

negotiations occurring between the Commonwealth's attorney and Appellant prior to the hearing 

R. Crim. P. 462(a). 

During cross-examination of Trooper Deitle, Appellant elicited testimony regarding plea 

case shall be heard de novo by the judge of the court of common pleas sitting without a jury." See Pa. 

after the entry of a guilty plea or a conviction by an issuing authority in any summary proceeding ... the 

Rule 462 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states ''when a defendant appeals 

negotiations. 

the Commonwealth's attorney was intimidating and threatening m his behavior during pleas 
7 

(4) the charge against the defendant as set forth in the prosecutor's complaint; (5) the date of issuance 

prosecutor, defendant and witnesses; (3) the names and office addresses of counsel in the proceeding; 

Authority must contain (1) the date and place of hearings; (2) the names and addresses of the 

transcripts and other required papers from the lower court. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 462(a). Furthermore, 

Rule 13 5 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure states a "transcript" before the Issuing 

after the entry of a guilty plea or a conviction by an issuing authority, said issuing authority must file 

Rule 462 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states, when a defendant appeals 

were not noted, as required by Rule 462 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

from the Magistrate District Judge hearing were not forwarded and his objections from said hearing 

Appellant argues that, upon the filing of his Notice of Summary Conviction Appeal, transcripts 

5. Upon Appellant's Notice of Appeal, transcripts from the Magistrate District Judge 

hearing were filed pursuant to Pa. R. Crim. P. 462; however, Rule 462 does not 

require the Magistrate District Judge to note Appellant's objections. 

Carol L. Southwick, Appellant's fourth issue is without merit. 

the amendment to the traffic citation prior to the hearing commencing before Magistrate District Judge 

required by Rule 405 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Appellant had notice of 

Therefore, as the original citation was provided to Appellant at the time of the violation, as 

citation, which indicated 73 miles per hour, was both made part of the record. 

Furthermore, both the original citation, which indicated 60 miles per hour, and the orally amended 

hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, the speed originally timed by Trooper Deitle. Id., pg. 23, lines 2-15. 

Commonwealth orally amended the traffic citation to indicate Appellant was traveling 73 miles per 

before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick and in the presence of Appellant, the 

was traveling 60 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. NT, pg. 20, lines 19. Prior to the hearing 

Appellant containing all the information required by Pa. R. Crim. P. 403, which indicated Appellant 

Following the traffic stop on March 291\ 2015, Trooper Deitle issued a traffic citation to 
the trial judge shall. .. issue a written order imposing sentence, signed by the trial judge and including 

Rule 462(g) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states "at the time of sentencing, 

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure in that regard. 

8 

6. This Trial Court did issue both an oral and written Order at the time of sentencing 

following Appellant's Summary Conviction Appeal hearing. 

Appellant argues this Trial Court failed to provide Appellant with a written Order or follow the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure was satisfied. Appellant's fifth issue is without merit. 

after Appellant filed bis Notice of Summary Conviction Appeal. Therefore, Rule 462(a) of the 

Therefore, as the Transcripts from the lower court, pursuant to Rule 462(a), were properly filed 

of proceedings in a trial or hearing." See Black's Law Dictionary, 1636 (lh Ed 2009). 

from the Issuing Authority does not mean "a typed copy of testimony given orally or an official record 

addition, Rule 462(a) does not require objections from the lower court be noted. Finally, "transcripts" 

be forwarded to Appellant or anyone else; rather, the filing of said transcripts satisfies Rule 462(a). In 

2015 satisfies the requirements of Rule 462( a). There is no requirement that the lower court transcripts 

Lower Court Filed" were filed on May 181h, 2015. Filing of the lower court transcripts on May 181\ 

required by the Rules to be in the Issuing Authority's transcript. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 135. 

thereof, and the judgment of sentence and place of confinement, if any; and (13) any other information 

the defendant's plea of guilty or not guilty, the decision that was rendered in the case and the date 

Contrary to Appellant's assertion, a review of the docket clearly reveals "Transcripts from 

(11) a notation that the defendant was advised of the right to apply for the assignment of counsel; (12) 

fingerprinted; (10) a specific descripting of any defect properly raised in accordance with Rule 109; 

corporate surety or individual surety; (9) a notation that the defendant has or has. not been 

held for court, the amount of bail set; (8) the nature of the bail posted and the name and address of the 

the parties and witnesses were sworn and which of these persons testified; (7) when the defendant was 

of any citation, summons or warrant of arrest and the return of service thereon; ( 6) a statement whether 
1 As a sentence of imprisonment was not imposed by this Trial Court for Appellant's violation of75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2), 

the information specified in Rule 462(g)(3) was not required in this Trial Court's Order dated August s", 2015. 

. 9 

denying the continuance." See Pa. R. Crim. P. 106(c). 

judge shall on the record identify the moving party and state of record the reasons for granting or 

either party." See Pa. R. Crim. P. 106(a). "When the matter is in the court of common pleas, the trial 

authority may, in the interests of justice, grant a continuance, on its own motion, or on the motion of 

Rule 106 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states "a trial court or issuing 

7. This Trial Court properly granted the Commonwealth's Motion for Continuance of 

Summary Hearing, filed prior to the scheduled Summary Conviction Appeal hearing 

with· good cause shown, and properly denied Appellant's Motion to Continue, made 

during the rescheduled Summary Conviction Appeal hearing. 

Procedure were satisfied. Appellant's sixth issue is without merit. 

was supplied to Appellant, the requirements of Rule 462(g) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 

which included the information specified in Rule 462(g)(l) through (g)(3), and a copy of said Order 

Therefore, as this Trial Court did issue both an oral and written Order at the time of sentencing, 

a copy of this Trial Court's Order was supplied to Appellant via mail. 

imposition of sentence, and that, if an appeal is filed, the execution of sentence will be stayed.1 Finally, 

fines, costs and fees were due and (2) the right to appeal to the Superior Court within 30 days of the 

specified in Rule 462(g)(l) through (g)(3), as it stated (1) the date on which payment of Appellant's 

Order was prepared and was signed by the undersigned judge. Said Order included the information 

C. S .. §3363(a)(2). The Trial Court imposed the appropriate sentence. Following said hearing, a written 

Trial Court announced its decision orally from the bench an found Appellant guilty of violation 75 Pa. 

Appellant's Summary Conviction Appeal hearing was held before this Trial Court on August 

st\ 2015. After hearing testimony and receiving evidence from Appellant and the Commonwealth, this 

the defendant." See Pa. R. Crim. P. 462(g)(4). 

I 

I 

l 

I 

the information specified in paragraphs (g)(l) through (g)(3), and a copy of the order shall be given to 
was provided the citation and all of the paperwork provided to Magistrate District Judge Carol L. 

was present during the hearing before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick; and Appellant 

10 

circumstance" for continuing the hearing other than not having all of his evidence ready; Appellant 

Commonwealth's attorney responded by noting Appellant had not stated any "extraordinary 

defense" and he "hadn't been apprised of any crime until now." Id, pg. 38, lines 15-19. The 

continuance he had "a lot more evidence to bring into the nature of this case in order to prepare his 

proceedings, Appellant requested a continuance. See NT, pg. 38, lines 1-2. Appellant requested a 

At the rescheduled Summary Conviction Appeal hearing, after a pause in the middle of the 

hearing for August 5t\ 2015, and a copy of said Order was provided to Appellant via mail. 

Trial Court granted the Commonwealth's Motion and rescheduled the Summary Conviction Appeal 

was necessary in the interest of justice. Pa. R. Crim. P. 106(a). By Order dated June n", 2015, this 

testify, pursuant to Pa. R. Crim. P. 462(c); no prior continuances had been granted; and a continuance 

good cause for granting the Commonwealth's Motion as Trooper Deitle was required to appear and 

date; and (3) there were no prior continuances in this· matter. This Trial Court concluded there was 

scheduled for July ih, 2015; (2) the affiant, Trooper Joshua David Deitle, would be unavailable on this 

Hearing. In said Motion, Attorney Strasser averred (1) a Summary Conviction Appeal hearing was 

Assistant District Attorney Nathaniel E. Strasser filed a Motion to Reschedule Summary Appeal 

Prior to the originally scheduled Summary Conviction Appeal hearing on July ih, 2015, 

See Pa. R. Crim. P. 462(c)(3). 

(3) The trial judge determines that good cause exists for the law enforcement officer's 

unavailability and grants a continuance. 

In appeals from summary proceedings arising under the Vehicle Code or local traffic 

ordinances, other than parking offenses, the law enforcement officer who observed the 

alleged offense must appear and testify. The failure of a law enforcement officer to 

appear and testify shall result in the dismissal of the charges unless: 

Furthermore, Rule 462 states: 
2 According to Rule 2.ll(a), a judge must recuse himself or herself where said judge: (I) has a personal bias or prejudice 

concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge offacts that are in dispute in the proceeding; (2) knows they 

are a party in the proceeding; (3) knows they have an economic interest in the proceedings; (4) knows a party has made 

contributions to the judge's campaign; (5) made a public statement committing the judge to rule a particular way in the 

proceeding; or (6) served as an attorney, governmental employee or material witness in the proceeding. 

11 

filed, of which the undersigned judge had no notice of. Id, pg. 13, lines 17-22. After hearing 

judge's recusal was an investigation by the Judicial Conduct Board because of a Complaint Appellant 

instant case. See NT, pg. 13, lines 13-15. The reason behind Appellant's request for the undersigned 

testimony, Appellant indicated the undersigned judge had a responsibility to recuse herself from the 

be questioned. See Pa. Code Judicial Conduct 2.11 (a)(l)-(6).2 

shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably 

Rule 2.11 of Chapter 33 "Code of Judicial Conduct" provides several circumstances where a judge 

After the Summary Conviction Appeal had commenced, but prior to the commencement of 

disqualification is required by Rule 2.11 or other law." Pa. Code Judicial Conduct 2. 7. Furthermore, 

matters assigned to the judge, except where the judge has recused himself or herself or when 

Rule 2. 7 of Chapter 33 "Code of Judicial Conduct" states "a judge shall hear and decide 

8. This Trial Court was not required to recuse herself from Appellant's Summary 

Conviction Appeal hearing as there was no evidence of impartiality, bias or the 

appearance of impropriety. 

seventh issue is without merit. 

Commonwealth's continuance and properly denied Appellant's request for a continuance. Appellant's 

hearing, failed to show good cause for a continuance. This Trial Court properly granted the 

show good cause for a continuance. Appellant, during the rescheduled Summary Conviction Appeal 

cause was not shown by Appellant. Id, pg. 39, line 13. 

for a continuance since this Summary Conviction Appeal hearing had already commenced and good 

Southwick. Id., pg. 38, line 23 - pg. 39, line 12. This Trial Court ultimately denied Appellant's request 

Therefore, the Commonwealth, prior to the initial Summary Conviction Appeal hearing, did 
12 

amended citation at Appellant's de novo proceeding. 

citation, were both made part of the record, and it was proper for this Trial Court to consider the 

P. 109; see also Palmer, 482 A.2d at 1320. In addition, the amended citation, along with the original 

timed by a Pennsylvania State Police trooper using an approved speed timing device. See Pa. R. Crim. 

same factual situation - Appellant traveling in excess of the maximum speed limit, which was properly 

Southwick was proper as the same basic elements were involved and the traffic citation arose from the 

above numerous times, the amendment of the traffic citation before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. 

First, Appellant argues the amended citation was not only illegal, but also moot. As stated 

9. This Trial Court conducted a proper de novo Summary Conviction Appeal hearing on 

August s", 2015. 

issue is without merit. 

against her, the undersigned judge properly denied Appellant's request for recusal. Appellant's eighth 

the undersigned judge to recuse herself from the instant case, other than Appellant's Complaint filed 

Therefore, as Appellant has failed to raise any specific requirement which would have required 

Complaint against said judge. 

Rule 2.11 ( a) requiring a judge to recuse simply because a litigant has filed a Judicial Conduct Board 

not raise any argument to further support his request for recusal. There are no requirements within 

recuse herself because of a Complaint Appellant filed against the undersigned judge, and Appellant did 

Statement of Matters to be Raised on Appeal." In fact, Appellant only requested the undersigned judge 

Summary Conviction Appeal hearing, and does not raise any of the provisions in his "Precise 

undersigned judge to disqualify or recuse herself from the instant case, at the August 5th, 2015 

lines 11-21. 

Appellant did not raise any of the provisions of Rule 2.1 l(a), which would require the 

Appellant's argument, the undersigned judge did not recuse herself from the instant case. Id, pg. 14, 
Conviction Appeal hearing before this Trial Court. 

Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof following the Summary 

10. The Commonwealth has met its burden of proof regarding Appellant's violation of 75 

Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2). 

issue is without merit. 

to Appellant's de novo hearing regarding his violation of 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2). Appellant's ninth 

negotiations, ex parte communications and alleged mathematical errors on the citations are not relevant 

Therefore, the citation was properly amended and received by this Trial Court, and any plea 

Summary Conviction Appeal hearing and when the fines, costs and fees are to be paid. 

13 

was served upon Appellant, clearly indicates the fines, costs and fees imposed after Appellant's 

but it does not add up." A review of this Trial Court's Order dated August 51\ 2015, a copy of which 

Appellant's de novo hearing regarding this amended citation at 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2). 

communications, this Trial Court concludes any alleged ex parte communications are not relevant to 

testimony on direct or cross-examination to refute Trooper Deitle's testimony regarding no ex parte 

Finally, Appellant argues his original written citation has an area "where fines are delineated, 

Judge Carol L. Southwick, see NT., pg. 22, line 8 - pg. 23, line I, and Appellant did not offer any 

witnessed the Commonwealth's attorney engage in ex parte communications with Magistrate District 

the Issuing Authority undertaking ex parte communications. Although Trooper Deitle stated he never 

not plead guilty before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick or before this Trial Court. 

the plea negotiations were "intimidating, threatening and coercive" are not relevant as Appellant did 

plea negotiations had no bearing on Appellant's violation of 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2). Also, whether 

stated above, said negotiations were not relevant to the de nova hearing before this Trial Court as the 

coercive" plea negotiations at the Magistrate District Judge level shows deprivation of due process. As 

Third, Appellant argues this Trial Court ignored evidence of the Commonwealth's attorney and 

Second, Appellant argues the Commonwealth's attorney's "intimidating, threatening and 
14 

To sustain a conviction for speeding, the Commonwealth must show beyond a reasonable doubt 

that: (1) an accused was driving in excess of the speed limit; (2) the speed timing device was approved 

by the Department of Transportation; and (3) the device was calibrated and tested for accuracy within 

the prescribed time period by a station which has been approved by the Department of Transportation. 

Commonwealth v. Kittelberger, 616 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 1992); see also Commonwealth v. Hamaker, 

541 A.2d 1141, 1142 (Pa. Super. 1988). 

Trooper Deitle stated, on March 291\ 2015, he was monitoring traffic speeds along Route 8 in 

Union City, Pennsylvania. NT, pg. 16, lines 5-8. Trooper Deitle was using a hand-held speed timing 

device, identified as a Decatur Electronics "Gensis" model with a serial number of GHDl 7653, to time 

traffic speeds. Id, pg. 16, line 17 - pg. 17, line 1. A Mitsubishi Outlander, black in color and traveling 

northbound on Route 8, came into the speed timing device's field of influence traveling at initially 73 

miles per hour. Id, pg. 18, line 24 - pg. 19, line 2. Trooper Deitle discovered the vehicle was being 

operated by Appellant, whose identity was confirmed by his Pennsylvania Driver's License. Id., pg. 

19, lines 4-7. Therefore, as Trooper Deitle indicated Appellant was driving in excess of the maximum 

speed limit, i.e. 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, the first element has been sustained. 

In sustaining its burden of proof, the Commonwealth need not produce a certificate from 

PennDOT which expressly indicates approval of a particular speed timing device; rather, the 

Pennsylvania Legislature has considerably lessened the Commonwealth's evidentiary burden by 

enabling a trial court to take judicial notice of the fact that the device has been approved by PennDOT, 

provided that the approval has been published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. Kittelberger, 616 A.2d at 

3. According to 44 Pa. Bulletin 8064, dated December 2ih, 2014, the Genesis GHD model hand-held 

speed timing device, manufactured by Decatur Electronics, has been approved for use by the 

Pennsylvania State Police. See. 44 Pa.B. 8064. Therefore, as this Trial Court may take judicial notice 
3 44 Pa. Bulletin 8064 also states that Wisco Calibration Services, Inc., 820 Washington Boulevard, Pittsburgh, Allegheny 

County, PA 15206, was appointed as an official Electronic Device Testing Stations for radar devices used by members of 

the Pennsylvania State Police on July 141\ 1999 as Station RIO. See 44 Pa.B. 8064. 

15 

accuracy within the prescribed time period by a station which has been approved by the Department of 

was approved by the Department of Transportation; and (3) said device was calibrated and tested for 

excess of the speed limit; (2) the speed timing device used by Trooper Deitle to time Appellant's speed 

James Bonaparte, the third element has been sustained. 

a hill. Id, pg. 50, lines 2-20. Therefore, based upon the Certificate of Accuracy and the testimony of 

hand-held speed timing device Trooper Deitle was using on March 29th, 2015, either at a distance or on 

The Commonwealth has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Appellant was driving in 

Appellant's own questioning, Mr. Bonaparte stated there was no possibility of operator error with the 

electrical engineering degree, which Mr. Bonaparte has attained. NT, pg. 49, lines 3-15. Based upon 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requires for calibrating speed timing devices in the acquisition of an 

devices. Id, pg. 47, line 16 - pg. 49, line 2. Mr. Bonaparte stated the only qualification the 

the State," stated he signed the Certificate of Accuracy as an individual qualified to calibrate said 

Bonaparte of WISCO Calibration Services3 who signs all of the calibration certificates for ''this side of 

completed the testing. Id, pg. 18, lines 6-13. Finally, Appellant's own subpoenaed witness, James 

was last calibrated for accuracy on October 22nd, 2014 and was signed by the individuals who 

Said Certificate stated the Genesis GHD model hand-held speed timing device used by Trooper Deitle 

'used by Trooper Deitle on March z9t\ 2015 as Commonwealth's Exhibit A. NT, pg. 18, lines 3-5. 

Commonwealth offered a copy of the Certificate of Accuracy for the particular speed timing device 

facts in every proceeding in which a violation of this title is charged. 75 Pa. C. S. 3368(d). The 

required period and that the device was accurate shall be competent and prima facie evidence of those 

A certificate from the station showing that the calibration and test were made within the 

element has been satisfied. 

of the notice of approved speed timing devices, published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, the second 
cc: Frederick W. Karash, 21 Center Street, Apt. #1, North East, PA 16428 

Nathaniel E. Strasser, Assistant District Attorney 

16 

and respectfully requests the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirm its Order dated August 51\ 2015. 

BY THE COURT: 

L ,-····--······· .. -:· .. -· - ··············· . . r··; /~-------., ,.,\ 

~"Jjli:;/;;'l~Z/Jll-~f;/:/t7)·1/i;\._IL___---,.-' 

1steplfanie Domitrovich, Judge 

r 

HI. Conclusion 

C. S. §3362(a)(2). Appellant's tenth issue is without merit. 

Transportation. The Commonwealth met its burden of proof regarding Appellant's violation of 75 Pa. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Trial Court concludes the instant appeal is without merit