F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

J A S B I R S I

N G H T O O R , P etitioner
,

v

.

L O R E T T A E. L Y

N C H , Attorney General, Respondent

. N o. 10-73212

Ag ency No. A056-361-534

OPI NI ON

O n Petition for Review of an Order of the B oard of I

mmig ration Appeals

Arg ued and Submitted March 4, 2015—Pasadena, California

F iled J une 17, 2015

B efore: Stephen Reinhardt, N. Randy Smith, and Andrew D. Hurwitz
, Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by

J udg e ReinhardtT O O R V

. L Y N C H 2

SUMMARY *

Im m igration

The panel g ranted J asbir Sing h Toor’s petition for r eview of the B o ard of I mmig ration Appeals’ decision dismissing his appeal of a

n I mmig ration J u d g e’s order deny ing his motion
to reopen or reconsider on the g rou n d t h a t the I J and B I A lack e d jurisdiction under the reg ulatory departure bars because he voluntarily d e parted the United States during removal proceeding s.

The p anel held that two p re-I I RI RA reg ulations concerning motions to reopen or reconsider made before an I J ( 8 C.F .R. § 1003.23(b)(1)) a n d before the B I A ( 8 C

. F .R. § 10 0 3

. 2 ( d)), referred to a s the departure bars, are invalid irrespective of the manner in which the noncitiz en departed. The p anel analy

z ed the unpublished decision in Toor’s case under Chevron because it was directly control l ed b y Matter of Armendarez-Mendez
, 24 I

. & N

. D ec. 646 (B I A 2008), which held that the departure bars apply af t e r I I RI RA even thoug h the reg ulations p redated I I RI RA. The panel held that the tex t of I I RI RA made clear that the statutory rig ht to file a motion to reopen or reconsider is not limited by whether the individual had departed, a n d that the bar i s invalid irrespective o f how the noncitiz en departed the United States.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.T O O R V

. L Y N C H 3

COUNSEL

Marie L

. Kay al (arg

ued), The L aw Office of Marie L

. Kay a l, B urling a me, California, for Petitioner.

Ann C. Varnon (arg

ued), Trial Attorney ; To ny W est, Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S. Fe r r ier, Assistant Director; and Sunah L ee , T r ial Attorney
, Office o f I mmig r a tion L itig a tion, United States Department of J ustice, W a shing ton, D.C., for Respondent.

OP INION

REI NHARDT, Circuit J udg e:

I n 1996, Cong ress p assed the I lleg a l I mmig r ation Reform and I mmig rant Responsibility Act (I I RI RA), which inter alia provides a ll noncitiz ens a statutory g uarantee that th e y may file “one motion to reconsider a decision that the alien is

r e m o v a b l e f

r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , ” 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), and “one motion to reopen proc e e d i n g s,” 8 U.S.C. § 1 229a(c)(7)(A). S ee Dada v. Mukasey
, 554 U.S. 1, 14 (2008) (“[ T] he statutory tex t is pl a i n i n s ofar a s it
g uarantees to each alien the rig ht to file ‘ one mot ion to reopen p roce e d i n g s u nder this section.’” (citation o mitted)). Th a t guarantee was limited in some w ay s — with number, content, and time restrictions — b ut not in any respect b y whether the nonciti z en had departed the United States prior to filing such motions.

Two re gu lations that predate the passag e of I I RI RA

— he re inafter referred to as the reg ulatory departure bar

— prov i de that a noncitiz en w ho is the subject of immig r ationT O O R V

. L Y N C H 4

proceeding s may not make a motion to reopen or reconsider “subsequent to his or her departure f rom the United States.” See 8 C.F .R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (concerning motions to r eopen

or reconsider made befo re an I mmig ration J udg e); 8 C.F .R. § 1003.2(d) (concerning motion to reopen or reconsider made before the B oard of I mmig ration Appeals (B I A)). I n Matter of Armendarez-Mendez
, 2 4 I & N D ec. 6 46, 660 (B I A 2008), the B I A held tha t t he reg ulatory departure bar survives the
passag e of I I RI RA. Here, we consider whether the B I A was correct, or w hether the reg ulatory departure bar conflicts with I I RI RA’s statutory g uarantee that n o ncitiz ens m a y f i le o ne motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider irrespective o f whether they

previously departed the United States.

This is not the first time we have ex a mined the reg ulatory de p a r t u re b ar. As a matter of reg ulatory interpretation, we have held that the departure bar does not apply to noncitiz ens

w h o departed the U nited States e ither before removal proceeding s have commenced, see S ingh v. G onzales
, 412 F .3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2005), or after removal proceeding s

were c ompleted, see Lin v. Gonzales , 473 F .3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007). I n considering the r elationship between the reg ulatory departure bar a

nd I I RI RA, we have h e l d that the reg ulatory departure bar is invalid as a pplie d t o a noncitiz e n who is involuntarily removed from the United States

. See ReyesTorr e s v. Holder
, 645 F .3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2011); Coyt v

. Holder , 593 F

. 3d 902 (9th Cir. 2010).

W e have n ot, however, a ddressed whether the reg ulatory departure bar ma y be validly applied to a noncitiz en w ho voluntarily departs the United States during removal proceeding s. Althoug h we have never u p held the invocation of the reg ulatory departure bar in a precedential decision, we have reserved that q

uestion. S

ee Coyt
, 593 F .3d at 907 n .3T O O R V

. L Y N C H 5

(“Other c ircuits have considered whether 8 C.F .R. § 1003.2(d) a

nd 8 C.F .R. § 1003.23(b)(1) . . . can be a pplied
to a ny removal — voluntary or involuntary — a question we need not, and d o not, reach in this case.”); Cardoso-Tlaseca

v. Gonzales
, 460 F .3d 1102, 1 106 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006). N ow,

w e address the question, and consistent with every other circuit that h as addressed it, we hold the reg ulatory departure bar invalid irre s p e c t i ve o f how the noncitiz en departed the United States. 1

1 T h e o th er circu it co u rts th at h av e ad d ressed th is issu e h av e ap p ro ach ed it i n t w o w a y s. T h e First, T h ird
, Fo u rth
, Fif th
, T en th
, an d Elev en th Circu its h av e h eld th at th e reg u lato ry d ep artu re bar clearly co n f licts w i th IIRIR A
, an d th eref

o re f ails at step o n e o f C

h evro n

. S

ee S a nta n a v. Ho ld er , 7 3 1 F.3 d 5 0 (1 s t Cir. 2 01 3 ) ; Presto l Esp in a l v. Atty. Gen

. , 6 5 3 F.3 d 2 1 3 (3 d Cir. 20 1 1 ); W i llia m v. Go n za les
, 4 9 9 F.3 d 32 9 (4 th Cir. 2 0 0 7 ) ; Ga rcia -Ca ria s v. Ho ld er , 6 9 7 F.3 d 2 5 7 (5 th Cir. 20 1 2 ); Co n t rera s-Bo ca n eg ra v. Ho ld

er , 6 7 8 F.3 d 8 1 1 (1 0 th Cir. 2 01 2 ) (en b an c); Lin v. U.S

. Atty. G en

. , 6 8 1 F.3 d 1 23 6 (1 1 th Cir. 2 01 2 ). T h e Seco n d
, S ix th
, an d Sev en th C ircu its h av e h eld t h at th e B IA ’ s ap p licatio n o f th e reg u lato ry d ep artu re bar as a j u risd ictio n al ru le is an im p erm issib l e co n tractio n o f its

o w n j u risd i ctio n

. S

ee Lu n a v. H

o ld er , 6 3 7 F.3 d 8 5 (2 d Cir. 2 0 11 ); Pru i dze

v

. Ho ld er , 6 3 2 F.3 d 2 3 4 (6 t

h C ir. 2 0 1 1 ); M

a rin -Ro d rig u ez v. H

o l d e r , 6 1 2 F.3 d 5 9 1 (7 th Cir. 2 01 0 ). A lth o u g h th e tw o ratio n ales “ m ay n o t b e alto g eth er sep arate,” Co n trera s-Bo ca n eg r a , 6 7 8 F.3 d at 8 1 6
, w e n eed n o t

an d d o n o t o p i n e o n th e ratio n ale ad o pted b y th e Seco n d, Six th
, an d Sev en th C ircu i ts b ecau se w e reso lv e th e case as a m atter o f statu to ry in terp retatio n

. (T h e Eig h th Circu it h as n o t y et d ecid ed th e v alid ity o f th e reg u lato ry d ep artu re b ar. S ee O rteg a -Ma r

ro q u in v. Ho ld

er , 6 4 0 F.3 d 8 1 4
, 8 2 0 (8 t h Cir. 2 0 1 1 ).)

So m e circu it co u r t s ha v e u p h eld th e v alid ity o f th e reg u lato ry d ep artu re b ar w

h en ap p l ied to m otio n s t o reo p en o r to reco n sid er f iled

u n tim ely
, an d th u s o u t o f co m p lian ce w ith IIRIRA

. S

ee Zh a n g v. H

o ld er , 6 1 7 F.3 d 6 5 0, 6 6 0

– 6 5 (2 d Cir. 2 0 10 ); O va lles v. Ho ld er , 5 7 7 F. 3 d 2 8 8
, 2 9 5

– 9 6 (5 th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ); Na va r ro -Mira nd

a v. Ash cro

ft
, 33 0 F.3 d 6 7 2
, 6 7 6 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 3 ). B ecau se P etitio n er’ s m o tio n w as tim ely

an d , it ap p ears,T O O R V

. L Y N C H 6

I.

J asbir Sing h Toor ( P e t i tioner), a native and citiz en o f I n d i a , was a dmitted to the United States a s a lawful permanent r esident on a conditional basis in 2003. I n 2005, the former I mmig ration and Naturaliz ation Service (I NS) approved his petition to remove the conditions on hi s residence. On Aug ust 2 3, 2007, the Department of Homeland Secur ity (DHS) initiated removal proceeding s ag ainst Petitioner, charg ing that he was removable for fraudulently o r willfully misrepresenting a material fact on a visa p etition in viol a tion of I

NA § 2 12(a)(6)(C)(I ), and for lacking a valid entry document a t the time of h is application for admission in violation of I

NA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I

)

. O n November 3, 2008,

an I mmig ration J udg e ( I J ) s u stained both c harg e s o f removability

. Two day s late r , the I J g ranted Petitioner until December 19, 2008, to apply for a l l f o r m s of r e lief from removal. Petitioner d id not do so, and on F ebruary 3
, 2009, the I J c ons i d e r e d all requests for relief waived a nd abandoned, and ordered Petitioner removed to I ndia.

Petitioner f

iled a timely motion to reopen or re c o nsider his removal proceeding s, in which he arg ued that the I J could
not validly order him removed to I ndia because Petitioner h ad already “departed the Un i t e d States and arrived in I ndia on April 3, 2008” before the I J ordered him removed. The I J denied Petitioner’s motion, holding that, pursuant to 8 C.F .R. § 1003.23(b)(1) — the r eg ulatory departure bar applicable to proceeding s before an I mmig ration J ud ge

— t h e I J had no jurisdiction to entertain Pe t i t ioner’s motion to reopen o r reconsider because Petitioner had “ voluntarily left the United

o th erw i se in co m

p lian ce w ith IIRIRA
, w e n eed n o t an d d o n o t ad d ress th at issu e in th is case. S

ee n o te 7
, in

fra

.T O O R V

. L Y N C H 7

States while his removal proceeding s w e r e pending .” 2 The B I A dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. L ike the I J
, the B I A

ex p lained that it had n o jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s motion because the reg u l atory departure bar — located for
t h e BI A at 8 C.F .R. § 1003.2(d) — precludes a n o nciti z e n from moving the B I A to reopen or r econsider his removal proceeding s subsequent to his departu re from the United States, and Petitioner had “self-deported from the United States during the pendency o f administrative proc e e ding s.” The instant petition for review followed.

II.

W e have jurisdiction to review questions of law presented in a petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1 252(a)(2)(D). “W e review the B I A ’s denial of motions to r eopen or to reconsider for abuse of discretion, ‘althoug h [de novo] review applies to the B I A ’s determination of purely leg al questions.’” CanoMerida v. I.N.S. , 311 F .3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mejia v. Ashcroft
, 2 98 F .3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 2002)). The

s u b j ect of this appeal — the validity of the reg ulat o r y departure bar

— presents a purely leg a l question of statutory interpretation to which we apply d e novo review, “gi v i n g appropriate deference to the ag ency if warranted.” ArteagaDe Alvarez v. Holder , 704 F

. 3d 730, 735 (9th Cir. 2012).

2 T h e IJ also h eld th at ev en if i t h ad j u risd i ctio n to co n sid er Petitio n er’ s

m o tio n , th e m o tio n w o u ld f ail o n th e m erits. T h e B IA , h o w ev er, d id n o t reach th e m erits o f P etitio n er’ s m o tio n , an d it is n o t, th eref ore, a su b j ect

o f th is ap peal. In d eed
, th e g o v ern m en t co n ced es th at w e can n o t af f irm th e B IA o n th e m erits alo n e, b u t rath er m u st “ rem an d th e case to th e B oard f or f u rth er p ro ceed in g s o n

th e m erits o f

th e m o t io n ” if

w e rev erse th e B IA ’ s j u risd ictio n al h o ld in g

.T O O R V

. L Y N C H 8

III.

Separate sections in the F ederal Reg ister provide essentially

an identical limitation on motions to reopen or to

r e consider filed before an I J
, o n the one hand, and the BI A
, on the other. T he reg ulation pertaining to motions to r eopen or to reconsider made before an I J states, in relevant part:

A motion to reopen or to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a per s o n w h o is the subject of r emoval, deportation, o r

ex c lusion proceeding s s u

b s equent to his or her departure from the United States.

8 C.F .R. § 1 003.23(b)( 1 )

. The reg ulation pertaining to motions to reopen or to re co n sider made before the B I A
states:

A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by

or on behalf of a person who is the subject of e x clusion, depo r t a tion,

or r e moval proceedi ng s subsequent to his o r her departure from the United States.

8 C.F .R. § 1003.2(d). T h es e reg ulations compose the
reg ulatory departure b ar

. I n this case, the I J and the B I A refused to e x ercise jurisdiction over Petitioner’s motion to reopen and reconsider because he h ad voluntarily departed the United States during his immig ration proceed ing s, a nd therefore was barred b y the r eg ulatory departure b a r from making a motion to reopen or to reconsider.

P etitioner arg ues that the r eg u latory departure bar conflicts w i th the statutory r ig ht to file a motion to r eopenT O O R V

. L Y N C H 9

and a motion to r ec o nsider provided in the I lleg al I mmig r a tion Reform and I mmig rant Res p o n sibility Act o f 1996 (I I RI RA). I n Matter of Armendarez-Mendez
, 24 I & N D e c

. 646, 660 (B I A 2008), the B I A held that the reg u la t o r y departure bar
, w h i ch predated the passag e of I I RI RA, “remains in full effect” after I I RI RA. The B I A ex plained that it saw “nothing i n t h e l ang uag e or leg islative history of

. . . I I RI RA that would lead [ it] t o c onclude that [ I I RI RA] was in t e n d e d to override the ex isting reg ulatory scheme g overning
t h e filing and adjudication of motions in remov al proceeding s.” Id. at 657.

“W e apply Chevron d eference to the Bo ard’s interpretations of ambig uous immig ration statutes, if the B oard’s decision is a published d ecision” or an unpubl ished decision “directly controlled b y [ a ] p ublished decision.” Guevara v. Holder
, 649 F .3d 1086, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Uppal v. Holder
, 605 F .3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). I n t his case, the B I A issued an unpublished d ecision, but it w as directly controlled by Matter of Armendarez-Mendez
, a published decision. Therefore, we apply Chevron deference. Under Chevron
, we first ask “ whether Cong ress has d irectly spoken to the precise question at issue. I f the intent o f Cong ress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . . .” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
, 4 67 U.S. 837, 842 ( 1984). I f
, however, “the statute is silent or a mbig uous with respect to the specific issue, the question f

or the court is whether th e a g e ncy ’s

answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.

Here, w e hold that Cong ress ha s directly spoken to the precise question at issue; the tex t o f I I RI RA makes clear that the statutory

rig ht to file a motion to reopen and a motion toT O O R V

. L Y N C H 10

reconsi d e r is not limited b y w hether the individual has departed the United States. 3 The reg ulatory departure bar, therefore, fails at the first step of Chevron

. I n so holding
, we join every c ircuit that has resolved this issue under Chevron

. See Santana v. Holder
, 7 3 1 F. 3 d 5 0
, 61 (1st Cir. 2 013); Prestol Espinal v. Atty. G e n. , 6 53 F

. 3d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 2011); W illiam v. Gonzales
, 499 F .3d 3 29, 334 (4th Cir. 2007); Garcia-Carias v

. Holder
, 697 F .3d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 2012); Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder
, 678 F

. 3d 8 1 1
, 819 (10th Cir. 2012) (en b anc); Lin v. U.S. Atty. Gen.
, 6 81 F .3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2012). W e r ecog niz e that the Second, Six th, and Seventh Circuits h av e h e ld that the reg ulatory departure bar is an impermissible contraction of the B I A ’s jurisdiction. See Luna v. Holder
, 637 F .3d 8 5 (2d Cir. 2 011); Pruidze v. Holder
, 632 F .3d 2 34 (6th Cir. 2 011); Marin-Rodriguez v

. Holder
, 612 F. 3 d 5 91 (7th Cir. 2010). W ithout necessarily disag reeing with those courts, we choose

3 Ou r d ecis i o n i s in n o w ay in co n sisten t w ith S in g h v. Go n za les
, 4 1 2 F.3 d 1 1 17 (9 th Cir. 2 00 5 ), o r Lin v. G o n za les
, 4 7 3 F.3 d 9 7 9 (9 t h Cir. 2 0 0 7 ). In t

h o se cases, w e si m

p ly in terp reted t

h e tex t o f th e reg u lato ry d ep artu re b ar an d h eld th at as w ritten th e b ar ap p lies o n ly to n on citizen s

w h o d e p a r t t h e Un ited States d urin g rem ov al p ro ceed in g s — n o t b ef ore

o r af ter. In bo th cases, w e h eld th at t h e reg u lato ry d ep artu re b ar co u ld no t b e ap plied to th e petitio n ers b ef o re u s b ecau se th ey d id n o t d ep art du rin g

rem o v al p ro ceed i n g s. In n eith er case d id w e u p h o ld th e ap p licatio n o f th e reg u lato ry d ep artu re b ar. W e w ere n o t ask ed to reso lv e n o r d id w e reso lv e th e p recise issu e b ef

o r e u s n o w — w

h eth er th e reg u lato ry dep artu re bar

w as ov erru led b y IIRIRA

. S in g h an d Lin
, t h e r e fo r e, w ere cases

ex clu siv ely co n cern ed w i th reg u lato ry in t erp retatio n

. W e ack n ow led g ed th at f act in C o yt v. Ho ld

er , 5 9 3 F.3 d 9 0 2 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 0 ) — th e f irst case in w h i ch w e ad d ressed th e relatio n sh ip betw een IIRIRA an d th e reg u lato ry d ep artu re b a r

— w h en w e reserv ed th e v ery q u estio n th at w e an sw er in th is case: w

h eth er th e reg u lato ry d e p a r t u re b ar “ can b e ap plied to an y

rem o v al

— v olu n tary o r in v o lu n tary .” C o yt , 5 9 3 F.3 d at 9 0 7 n .3

. W e

co u ld n o t h av e do n e so if th at qu estio n h ad alread y b een reso l v ed b y S in g h

an d Lin

.T O O R V

. L Y N C H 11

to resolve this case under Ch e v r o n because that is the approach taken by six o f the n ine circuits to h ave considered the question, and the one that our c ases in this area of the law have taken. See R eyes-Torres v. H older
, 645 F .3d 1073, 1076 ( 9th Cir. 2 011); Coyt v. H older
, 593 F .3d 902, 905 (9th C i r. 2010).

Our inquiry “beg ins with the statutory tex t, and ends there

as well,” because the tex t is “ clear and u n ambig uous.” Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.
, 569 F .3d 9 4 6, 951 (9th Cir. 2 009) (quoting McDonald v. Sun O il Co.
, 538 F .3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2008 ) ( internal q uotation marks o mitted)). I I RI RA states inter alia that a n “alien may f

ile one motion to reconsider a decision that the alien is remo v a b l e from the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), and that an “alien
may file one motion to reopen p r o c eeding s under this section,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A). The s tatute d oes not limit these rig hts to “aliens who have not departed the United States duri ng their immig ration p roceeding s,” as the
reg ulatory

departure b ar would require. The statutory rig hts
are, instead, g uaranteed to each “alien. ” T h e reg ulatory departure b ar conflicts with this cl ea r statutory command. See Dada
, 554 U.S. at 15 (“The statutory tex t is plain insofar

as it g uarantees to e a c h a l i en the r ig ht to file ‘one motion to reopen p roce e d ing s under this section.’” (citation omitted)); Santana
, 731 F .3d at 5 6 (“[ T] he provision unambig uously confers u pon ‘an alien’ the authority and the rig ht to file a motion to r eopen, in lang uag e that admits of no ex ceptions.”); W illiam
, 499 F .3d at 332 (“B ecause the s t a tute sweeps broadly i n t h i s r e ference to ‘an alien,’ it need be no more specif i c to encompass within its terms those aliens w ho a re abroad.”); Garcia-Cari a s , 697 F .3d at 263 (“B y its clear terms, the statute does not disting ui s h b etween those a liens who are abroad and those who remain in the United States

—T O O R V

. L Y N C H 12

the u nmodified ‘alien’ c aptures both.”); Con t r erasBocanegra
, 6 78 F .3d at 816 ( “The l a ng uag e does not disting uish b etwe en noncitiz e n s abroad and those in the United States.”).

Placing th e s e s tatutory rig hts in their proper c ontex t confirms that I I RI RA inval i dated the reg ulatory departure bar. I I RI RA limits the rig h t to file a motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider by number, time, and content, but not in
any respect by whether the individual has departed the United States. Specifically
, the statute provides that a noncitiz en

m a y f i l e “ o n e ” m o t i o n t o re c o n s i d e r , 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), it “ must be filed within 30 day s of the date of entry of a final a dministrative order of removal,” id. § 1229a (c)(6)(B ), and it “shall specify the e rrors of law o r fact in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority ,” id. § 1229a(c)(6)(C). S i milarly
, unless the statute’s ex c eption for victims of domestic violence applies,

a n oncitiz en is limited to “one” motion to reop e n , id. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), which must “be filed w ithin 90 day s of the d a t e of entry o f a final administrative order,” i d

. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), and “shall state the n ew f acts that w ill be
proven at a hearing to be h e l d if the motion is g r anted, a nd shall be supported b y affidavits or other evid e n t iary material
, ” id. § 1229a(c)(7)(B ). I n contrast, the statute does
not c o n t a in any requirement that the noncitiz en filing a motion to reconsider or a motion to r e o pen remain phy sically present in the United States during the immig r ation proceedin gs

. I ndeed, it contains no departure-related restriction of any

kind.

“W hen Cong ress provides e x cept i o n s i n a statute,

. . . [ t] he proper inference

. . . is that C o ng ress considered the issue of ex ceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to theT O O R V

. L Y N C H 13

ones set forth.” United States v. Johnson
, 529 U.S. 5 3, 58 (2000). As the Tenth Circuit e x plained, “[ t] his pr i nciple is particularly pertinent in the I I RI RA contex t, gi v e n that Cong r ess w as undoubtedly aware of the pre-ex isting
reg ulatory post-departure bar.” Contreras-Bocanegra
, 678 F .3d at 817. Applied here, therefore, the “proper inference” is th a

t Cong r ess considered whether to bar motions
to reopen or to reconsider from noncitiz ens who had departed the U nited States, a

nd chose n ot to d o so. The s t a t u te contains several ex c ep t i o n s to the g eneral g rant of a rig h t to file a motion to reopen a

nd a motion to reconsider, but does
not c ontain any relate d to whether the noncitiz en previously departed the United States. The r e gu l atory departure bar unambig uously conflicts with this decision by Cong ress. See Garcias-Carias
, 697 F .3d at 2 6 4 ( “The fact that Cong ress

cr e ated limitations on the ex ercise of the motion to reopen, y et did not place a g eog raphic restriction, supports a r eading

. . . that d oes not deny departed aliens their rig ht to file a motion to reopen.”); Lin
, 681 F

. 3 d a t 1240 (“Cong ress clearly considered and included some restrictions on the ability to file a motion to reopen but chose not t o make a limitation based on the alien’s phy sical location.”).

Moreover, subsequent enactments by Cong ress f urther demonstrate that it k

new how to include a phy sical-presence requirement on motions to r e o pen, y et did not do so f or all noncitiz ens who make such a motion — contrary t o the
reg ulatory departure bar, which applies to all noncitiz e ns. See Food & Drug A d

min. v. Brown & W

illiamson Tobacco Corp.
, 529 U.S. 1 2 0
, 133 (2000) (“[ T] he meaning of o ne statute may b e a ffected by other Acts, particularl y where Cong r ess h as spoken subsequently a nd more specifically toT O O R V

. L Y N C H 14

t h e t o p ic at hand.”). W ith chang es enacted in 2000 4 a n d 2006, 5 Cong ress provided that the number and time limitations on filing a motion to r eopen do not a p ply to b a t t er e d spouses, c hildren, and parents, 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv), as long a s s u c h individuals a re “phy sically present in the United States at the time of filing the motion,” id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(I V). No other phy sicalpresence requirement ex ists in the statute g overning motions to reopen and motions to reconsider.

The addition of a phy sical-presence requirement confirms that the omission of a departure bar from th e statute g overning motions to r e o pen and m otions to reconsider was deliberate. “W here Cong ress includes particular lang uag e in

one section of a statute but omits it in another sectio n of the

same A ct, it is g enerally presumed that Cong r e ss acts intentionally and purposely in the d i sparate inclusion o r

ex c lusion.” Russello v. United States
, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Cong r ess included a p hy sical-presence requ i rement in the section of the statute concerning tardy or successive motions
to r eopen filed by b attered spouses, children, and parents, but did not include any presence-related requirements elsewhere in the statute. Therefore, we must presume t hat Cong ress intentionally ex cluded a presence -r elated requirement from its g eneral g rant of a statutory rig ht to f ile a motion to r eopen and a m o t i o n t o reconsider. See Santana
, 731 F .3d a t 56

4 See Victim s of T raf

f ick in g an d Vio len ce P ro tectio n A ct o f 20 0 0, P u b

. L . No . 1 0 6- 3 8 6 , § 1 5 0 6 (c), 1 1 4 Stat. 1 46 4 , 1 5 2 8 (2 0 0 0 ).

5 S ee Vio l en ce A g ain st W o m en an d Dep artm en t o f J us t i ce Reau t h o rizatio n A ct o f 20 0 5
, P u b

. L

. No

. 1 0 9

- 1 6 2
, § 8 2 5 (a)(2 )(F), 1 1 9 Stat. 2 9 6 0, 3 0 6 3

– 6 4 (2 0 0 6 ).T O O R V

. L Y N C H 15

(“This provision shows that Cong ress knew how to impose a g eog raphic restriction w hen it w anted to, and further sug g ests that the statute’s g e n eral prov i s i o ns d o not c ontain such a limitation.”); Lin
, 681 F .3d at 1240 (ex plaining that the phy sical-presence r equirement included in the statute leads to

an inference that Cong ress “intentionally chose not to require such presence for a motion to reopen, ex cept in the specified circumstances.”).

Moreover
, C o ng r ess must have understood that I I RI RA invalidated the reg u latory departure b ar. As the Third Circuit

ex p lained, there would have been “no need” for Cong r ess in its enactments subsequent to I I RI RA to provid e a phy sicalpresence requirement for v ictims of domestic violence filing motions to r eopen if I I RI RA had left the reg ulatory departure bar undisturbe d

. Prestol E spinal
, 633 F .3d at 223. I n fact, the arg ument to the contrary — that the reg ulatory departure bar survived I I RI RA, y e t Cong ress nevertheless provided the
p h y sical-presence requirement for victims of domestic violence filing late or successive motions to reopen

— would require us to read the latter provision as me r e surplusag e, in di r ect violation of the “fundamental canon of statutory construction that a statute s h ould not b e construed so as to render any of its provisions mere surplusag e.” United States

v. W enner , 351 F .3d 969, 975 ( 9th C i r

. 2003); see also W illiam
, 499 F

. 3d at 333 (“W e can g o bey o n d s i m p l y drawing an inference reg arding Cong ress’ intent in this c ase, fo r a f inding that phy sical presence in the U nited States is required before any motion to reopen m a y b e filed would render the phy sical presence requirement ex pressly written int o subsection (c)(7)(C)(iv)(I V ) mere surplusag e.”); Garcias-Carias
, 697 F .3d at 264 (“[ A] n interpretation of the
statute that would im p ose a g eneral phy sical presence requirement would effectively r ead the aforementionedT O O R V

. L Y N C H 16

p r o v ision r eg arding d omestic abuse v ictims out of t h e statute.”).

I n sum, our conventional tools of statutory interpretation
y ield one con c lusion, and o n e conclusion alone — the
reg ulatory departure bar has been invalidated by Con gress. However, notwithstanding the complete lack of statutory authority for the reg u latory departure bar and the compelling statutory evidence that Cong ress leg i s l a ted to the contrary , the g overnment a

rg ues that the reg ulatory departure bar may , at leas t i n the case of a v oluntary d e p arture, nevertheless apply for two reasons, both of which we reject.

F irst, the g overnment ar gu es that b ecause the reg ulatory departure bar predated I I RI RA and I I RI RA did not ex plicitly
overturn it, Cong r ess c hose n o t to disturb the pre- e x i sting
reg ulat o r y d e parture bar. T h e basic story , in the
g overnment’s view, is the following : I n 1 990, Cong ress directed the Attorney General to “ issue r e g ulations with respect to

. . . the period of time in which motions to r eopen and to reconsider may b e offered in deportation proceeding s, which reg ulations include a limitation on the number of such motions that may be filed and a max imum time period f or the filing of such motions.” I mmig rat i o n A ct of 1990, Pub. L

. No. 1 01-649, § 545(d), 1 0 4 Stat. 4978, 5066. I n April 1996, the Attorney G eneral promulg ated time and number limitations as instructed, w hile also reaffirming the reg ulatory de p arture bar. See Motions and Appeals in I mmig r ation Proceeding s, 61 F ed. Reg

. 18,900, 18,905 (Apr. 2 9
, 1996). L ater that y ear, Cong ress enacted I I RI RA, which codified the time and number limitations that the Attorney G ene r a l h ad promulg a ted, and

— a ccording to the g overnment — “did not displace or o therwise disturb the pos t

- d e parture bar.” As aT O O R V

. L Y N C H 17

result, the g overnment claims, the reg ulatory departure bar remains valid after I I RI RA.

The g overnment’s arg ument, h owev e r, merely beg s the
q u e stion

— did I I RI RA, in fact, n ot “displace or othe rw i s e disturb” the reg ulatory d eparture b ar? B ased on the conventional tools of stat u tory interpretation a s a pplied above, the answer is “no.” Our precedent c o n f i rms this

answer. I n b oth Coyt v. Holder
, 593 F .3d 902 (9th Cir. 2010), and Reyes-Torres v. H

older
, 645 F .3d 1073 (9th C i r. 2011),

we h e ld that I I RI RA invalidated the reg u latory departure bar

as applied to involuntary depar t u r es

. Therefore, we have already held that I I RI RA “displace[ d] or otherw ise disturb[ ed] ” the reg ulatory d e p a r t ure b ar. I n short, we have already rejected the premise of the g overnment’s arg ument. 6

The g overnment’s contention is not o n l y unpersuasive, but would create troubling precedent. I

n short,

the g overnment would place upon Cong ress , when enacting a new statute ag ainst a backg round reg ulatory scheme, the burden o f addressing each and every regulation that

ex isted before and ex press ly stating whether it surviv e s the c hang e in the statute. That
arg ument is untenable. As the T enth C i rcuit

6 P etitio n er arg u es in p art th at o u r d ecisio n s i n Co yt an d Reyes-To rres th em selv es reso lv e h is case. W e d o n ot ag ree. T h o se d ecisio n s h eld th at IIRIRA w as i n co m

p atib le w ith th e reg u lato ry d ep artu re b ar as ap p lied to in v o lu n tary rem o v als. In t h i s c a se, b y co n trast, P etitio n er d ep arted th e Un i ted States v olu n tarily

. In d eed
, as w e h av e said
, Co yt reserv ed th e v ery q u estio n at i ssu e in t

h is case: w

h eth er th e reg u lato ry d ep artu re b ar “ can b e ap p lied to a n

y re m o v a l

— v o l u n tary o r in v o l u n tary .” Co yt , 5 9 3 F .3 d at 9 0 7 n .3

.T O O R V

. L Y N C H 18

ex p lained, “[ t] o require an ex press repeal o f a discretionary r eg ulation in this contex t would

u p e n d t h e f

u n dament a l p r i n c i p l e t h at reg ulations should interpret statutes and not the other way a

round.”

S a n t a na , 7 31 F .3d at 5 8 ( quoting Contreras-Bocanegra
, 678 F .3d at 818) (footnote omitted).

Moreover, far from demonstrating that Cong ress chose to leave intac t the reg ulatory departure bar, the story presented b y the g overnment more strong ly sug g ests that Cong re s s deliberately invalidated it. T h e g overnment acknowledg e s that I I RI RA codified some reg ulatory limitations in ex istence
at the time, y et did not c odify the r eg ulatory departure bar. Th e correct inference f

r om this fact is that Cong ress made a “considered judg ment” a s to which r e gulatory limitations would b e integ rated into the statutor y scheme g overning motions to r e o p en and motions to r econsider, and the departure bar was not one of them. See Pr e s t ol Espinal
, 653 F .3d a t 222 (“Cong ress d id n ot codify the post-departure bar n otwithstanding its long h istory

. Neither w e n or the
ag ency should be permitted to o verride Cong ress’ considered judg ment.”).

Second, the g overnment arg ues that “ [ t] he decision to bar aliens w ho h ave left the U nited States from having their cases reopened or rec o n sidered represented a categ o rical ex ercise of discretion b y t h e Attorney General.” T o support this
arg ument, the g overnment cites Lopez v. Davis
, 531 U .S. 230, 244 (2001), which upheld the authority of an ag ency to make categ orical rules in place of case-by -case determinations.T O O R V

. L Y N C H 19

This arg ument is unpersuasive as w ell. W e have held that

“ Lopez appli e s only when Cong ress has not spoken to the precise issue and the statute contains a g ap.” Rodriguez v

. Smith
, 541 F .3d 1180, 1188 (9th C i r. 2008) (quoting W edelstedt v. W

iley
, 477 F. 3 d 1160, 1168 (10th Cir. 2 007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A s ex plained above, Cong r ess has spoken to the p recise issue here by providing a statutory g uarantee that all noncitiz e ns may file a motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider a nd by not limi t i n g t h at rig ht to noncitiz ens who have remained in the United States. Moreover, even if Lopez applie d
, t h i s arg ument would fail because we may affirm the B I A base d o n l y on “the

ex p lanations offered by the ag ency , ” Arringto n v. D aniels
, 516 F

. 3d 1106, 1113 ( 9th Cir. 2008); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp.
, 318 U .S. 80, 87 (1943), and the B I A has “consistently characteriz ed the [ departure b ar] reg ulation as jurisdictional”

r a ther than a “categ orical ex e r cise of discretio n , ” Contreras-Bocanegra
, 678 F .3d at 819. 7

IV.

Th at Petitioner departed the United States voluntarily
, rather than involuntarily
, is immaterial. The reg ulatory departure bar is invalid irrespective of the manner in which the movant departed the United States, as it c onflicts with clear and unambig uous s t a t u t o ry tex t. The B I A erred b y

r efusing to ex ercise jurisdiction over Petitioner’s motion t o reopen and to r econsider on the basis of the reg ulatory

7 B ecau s e P etitio n er’ s m o tio n t o reo p en o r to reco n sid er w as tim ely an d
, it ap p ears, o th erw ise co m p lian t w ith

IIRIRA
, w e d o n o t ad dress w h eth er th e B IA m ay v alid ly ap p l y th e reg u lato ry d ep artu re b ar to a m oti o n th at d o es n ot m eet th e n

u m b er, tim e, an d co n ten t req u irem en ts sp ecif ied in IIRIRA

. S

ee n o te 1
, su

p ra

.T O O R V

. L Y N C H 20

departure bars. W e therefore G RANT the petition for r eview and REMAND fo r f

u rther proceeding s consistent with this opinion.