alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### SPRATLING et al. v. SMITH et ux.

No. 13015.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

Jan. 20, 1934.

Claude Spratling, of Fort Worth, for appellants.

Greines *&*Greines, of Fort Worth, for ap-pellees.

POWER, Justice.

Simon Smith and wife, Ellawee Smith, petitioned the district court of Tarrant county, complaining of J. V. Spratling and Claude Spratling, praying for a writ of injunction enjoining and restraining said defendants, and each of them, from selling, attempting to sell, or offering for sale, certain real estate. A temporary injunction was granted and the defendants enjoined from said sale. The defendants J. V. Spratling and Claude Sprat-ling filed a motion to dissolve said writ of injunction.

This is an appeal from an order refusing to dissolve the injunction, same having been granted under and by virtue of chapter 102 of the Acts of the 43d Legislature (1933), Regular Session (Vernon’s* Ann. Civ. St. art. 2218b), enjoining and restraining the appellants from selling, and attempting to sell, certain real estate under a certain deed of trust for ISO days from and after June 29, 1933. The time for which the injunction was granted was 180 days from June 29, 1933, and expired on December 25, 1933.

The time for which the injunction was granted, that is, 180 days from June 29, 1933, has expired, and the controversy, whether meritorious or not, has ceased to exist. It will avail nothing to adjudge or extend the contentions of the litigants. The question is now moot, and the courts will not proceed with a moot question. McWhorter v. Northcut, 94 Tex. 86, 58 S. W. 720; Watkins v. Huff, 94 Tex. 631, 64 S. W. 682; Wichita Falls Electric Co. v. Huey (Tex. Civ. App.) 246 S. W. 692, 694; Cisco Independent School District v. Dudley (Tex. Civ. App.) 53 S.W. (2d) 639, 641; Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Dallas County Levee Improvement District (Tex. Civ. App.) 263 S. W. 1103.

Where, pending an appeal, events have transpired which would render the decision moot, the appeal will not be considered, but the case itself will be dismissed. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Dallas County Levee Improvement District (Tex. Civ. App.) 263 S. W. 1103; Wichita Falls Electric Co. v. Huey (Tex. Civ. App.) 246 S. W. 692, 694; Cisco *279Independent School District v. Dudley (Tex. Civ. App.) 53 S.W.(2d) 639, 641.

It is the opinion of this court that the case should be dismissed, and it is so ordered. The costs of appeal are adjudged against appellant.
#### WILLIAMS v. STATE.

No. 17013.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 14, 1934.

Del W. Harrington, C. W. Smith, and J. M. Deaver, all of ml Paso, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The appellant was charged in the corporation court of the city of El Paso, Tex., with the offense of violating the traffic laws of said city. Upon the trial he was convicted and his punishment assessed at a fine of $100, from which said judgment of conviction he appealed to the county court of El Paso county, where, upon a trial in said court, he was again convicted and his punishment assessed at a fine of $75, from which said judgment of conviction he sought to appeal to this court.

Article 53, C. C. P., reads as follows: “The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of the State in all criminal cases. This article shall not be so construed as to embrace any case which has been appealed from any inferior court to the county court or county court at law, in which the fine imposed by the county court of county court at law shall not exceed one hundred dollars.” This article of the statute has many times been construed by this court. See Neubauer v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 513, 21 S. W. 363; Lindley v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 55 S.W.(2d) 846; Ragsdale v. State, 120 Tex. Cr. R. 63, 47 S.W.(2d) 278; McCloudy v. State, 119 Tex. Cr. R. 623, 45 S.W. (2d) 207.

It is quite evident from the article of the Code of Criminal Procedure hereinabove quoted and the decisions hereinabove referred to that this court has not jurisdiction of this case, and therefore the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. ■

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21

- 7585

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. DEMITRIUS COLEMAN , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Florence

. Terry L. Wooten , Senior District Judge. ( 4:04

- cr - 00482

- TLW

- 2 )

Submitted : February 24, 2022 Decided: March 1, 2022

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and KING , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Demitrius Coleman, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Demitrius Coleman appeals the district court’s order d enying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release

. We review a district court’s order granting or denying a compassionate release motion for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Kibble , 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir.) (stating standard of review) , cert. denied , 142 S. Ct. 383 (2021). We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion. The court denied Coleman’s motion after assuming he demonstrated extraordinary and compelling circumstances, d iscussing the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors , and sufficiently explain ing the reasons for the denial. See United States v. High , 997 F.3d 181, 188

- 91 (4th Cir. 2021) (discussing amount of explanation required for denial of straightforward compassi onate release motion). We therefore affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
A FFIRMED
From: Wayland, Robertj

To: Higgins, Cortney; Maxwell, Bill

Cc: Thundiyil, Karen; Frey, Nathan J.; Culligan, Kevin

Subject: RE: Interagency Comments on MATS Preamble and RTC

Date: Thursday, March 21, 2013 10:25:01 AM

Attachments: MATS Table of reconsidered vs final - internal_032113.docx

Cortney/Nathan –

Attached below is the table you requested last evening comparing the final rule limits with the

reconsideration final limits. Let me know if you need anything further.

bob

Robert J. Wayland, Ph.D.

Leader, Energy Strategies Group

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards

Sector Policies and Programs Division

Mail Code D243-01

Research Triangle Park, NC 27709

Office: (919) 541-1045

Cell: (919) 306-2290

Fax: (919) 541-5450

Email: wayland.robertj@epa.gov

*************************************

 DRAFT/Deliberative Document - FOIA Exempt

*************************************

From: Higgins, Cortney [mailto:Cortney_Higgins@omb.eop.gov] 

Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2013 6:18 PM

To: Wayland, Robertj; Maxwell, Bill

Cc: Thundiyil, Karen; Frey, Nathan J.

Subject: Interagency Comments on MATS Preamble and RTC

Hi Bob and Bill,

Below are comments received on the latest draft of the MATS preamble and the response to

comments document.

Preamble:

Page 54 of 97 (of the redline version of the draft rule), Section 60.48Da(f), the second sentence

reads “Daily averages are only calculated for boiler operating days that have out-of-control periods

totaling no more than 6 hours of unit operation during which the standard applies.” The following

revision to the sentence is suggested (additional text underlined) for clarify considering that all
boiler operating days including those with 6 hours of out-of-control operating conditions need to

be accounted for in emission calculations: “Daily averages are only must be calculated for boiler

operating days that have out-of-control periods totaling no more than 6 hours of unit operation

during which the standard applies.”

RTC:

page 77, para 3: The sentence duplicates a clause, we think in error. “According to the Commenter

(20253), natural gas combined cycle plants are less expensive than natural gas combined cycle

plants with lower capital and annual operating costs.” Second, should l coal fired plants should be

in there somewhere?

Nathan Frey (copied, phone: 202.395.7345) will be able handling the review from here forward. 

Thanks for your help on this.

Regards,

Cortney
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-6410

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JUSTIN DEONTA STROM, a/k/a Jae Dee, a/k/a Jae, a/k/a J-Dirt,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:12-cr-00159-LMB-1; 1:20-cv-01298-

LMB)

Submitted: July 20, 2021 Decided: July 23, 2021

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Justin Deonta Strom, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Justin Deonta Strom appeals the district court’s order construing his postjudgment 

motion, which Strom styled as an “Indictment Challenge,” as an unauthorized, successive 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, and dismissing it without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.*

 

Although the district court dismissed the motion without prejudice, we conclude that the 

order is final and appealable. See Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 610-12 (4th Cir. 

2020) (discussing factors this court considers in determining whether order is final and 

appealable), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1376 (2021). Our review of the record confirms that 

the district court properly construed Strom’s filing as a successive § 2255 motion over 

which it lacked jurisdiction because Strom failed to obtain prefiling authorization from this 

court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h); McRae, 793 F.3d at 397-400. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. 

Consistent with our decision in United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th 

Cir. 2003), we construe Strom’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to 

file a second or successive § 2255 motion. Upon review, we conclude that Strom’s claims 

do not meet the relevant standard. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). We therefore deny 

authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. 

* A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal the district court’s 

jurisdictional categorization of a postjudgment motion as an unauthorized, successive 

§ 2255 motion. United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2015).
3

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 21

Significant Subsidiaries



|                                 |  |                                  |  |                                         |  |                                                      
|-------------------------------- |  | -------------------------------- |  | --------------------------------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------
|Parent of Significant
Subsidiary |  | Name of Significant
Subsidiary   |  | Jurisdiction of
Formation of
Subsidiary |  | Names under which SignificantSubsidiary does
business
|PG&E Corporation                 |  | Pacific Gas and Electric Company |  | CA                                      |  | Pacific Gas and Electric Company PG&E                
|                                 |  |                                  | 
|Pacific Gas and Electric Company |  | None                             |  |                                         |  |
Transport Canada Richard Topham 3/3/1010 NoObjections 613-952-4418 Bombardier Robel1 Farinas 3/3/10 NoObjections Aerospace 514-855-5001

X50417 Regional Airline Dave Lotterer 3/3/10 NoObjections Association 201-367-1252

lotterer@raa.org



## ---- ------------
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMAMRY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF IMC MORTGAGE FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTRIETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          19,479
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   58,403
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                          16,467
<DEPRECIATION>                                   7,098
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,460,957
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           38,070
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           342
<OTHER-SE>                                     181,017
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,460,957
<SALES>                                         18,111
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                45,083
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                52,775
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              31,238
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (24,456)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,286
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (28,742)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (28,742)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.86)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.86)
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 23.1**

**Consent of Independent Registered Public AccountingFirm**

We consent to theincorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (Form S-3 No. 333-130622,Form S-3 No. 333-117823, Form S-3 No. 333-114048,Form S-3 No. 333-66047, Form S-3 No. 333-52696and Form S-4 No. 333-116881) and in the relatedProspectuses, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-71346)pertaining to the Amended and Restated 1991 Stock Option Plan, in theRegistration Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-71350) pertainingto the 1992 Stock Option Plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8No. 33-80213) pertaining to the 1994 Stock Option Plan, in theRegistration Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-80215) pertainingto the 1995 Stock Option Plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8No. 333-16349) pertaining to the 1996 Stock Option Plan, in theRegistration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-28971)pertaining to the Houston Biotechnology Incorporated Replacement Stock OptionPlan, the Houston Biotechnology Incorporated 1994A Stock Option Plan, and theHouston Biotechnology Incorporated 1992 Subordinated Stock Option Plan, in theRegistration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-86117)pertaining to the 1997 Stock Option Plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8No. 333-86119) pertaining to the 1999 Stock Option Plan, in theRegistration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-39084)pertaining to the 2000 Stock Option Plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8No. 333-55222) pertaining to the 2000 Non-Director/Officer EmployeeStock Option Plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-55224)pertaining to the 2001 Non-Director/Officer Employee Stock Option Plan, in theRegistration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-72154)pertaining to the 2001 Stock Option Plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8No. 333-101698) pertaining to the 2002 New Employee Stock OptionPlan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-91394)pertaining to the 2002 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, in the RegistrationStatement (Form S-8 No. 333-91392) pertaining to the 2001Stock Option Plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-108294)pertaining to the 2001 Stock Option Plan, the Registration Statement (Form S-8No. 333-121387) pertaining to the 2004 New Employee Stock OptionPlan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-121388)pertaining to the 2002 Employee Stock Purchase Plan and in the RegistrationStatement (Form S-8 No. 333-125444) pertaining to the2005 Equity Incentive Plan of our reports dated March 3, 2006 with respectto the consolidated financial statements of Medarex, Inc., Medarex, Inc.management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financialreporting and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting ofMedarex, Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) forthe year ended December 31, 2005.

|                       | /s/    ERNST & YOUNG LLP |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| MetroPark, New Jersey |                                                  |
| March 10, 2006   |                                                  |

 

----
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2241 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2241

 To amend the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act by clarifying 
 that State Exchanges are prohibited from imposing fees or assessments 
 on issuers of excepted benefits and standalone dental plans not sold 
                          through an Exchange.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           December 14, 2017

   Mr. King introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
  referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act by clarifying 
 that State Exchanges are prohibited from imposing fees or assessments 
 on issuers of excepted benefits and standalone dental plans not sold 
                          through an Exchange.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROHIBITING STATE EXCHANGES FROM IMPOSING ASSESSMENTS OR 
              FEES ON EXCEPTED BENEFITS AND STANDALONE DENTAL PLANS NOT 
              SOLD THROUGH AN EXCHANGE.

    (a) In General.--Section 1311(d)(5) of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (42 U.S.C. 18031(d)(5)) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``, subject to 
        subparagraph (C)'' after ``its operations''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(C) Limitation.--A State may not charge a health 
                insurance issuer, solely for purposes of supporting an 
                Exchange in accordance with subparagraph (A), an 
                assessment, user fee, tax, or any other fee--
                            ``(i) on excepted benefits coverage within 
                        the meaning of section 2791(c) of the Public 
                        Health Service Act that is not sold on an 
                        Exchange; or
                            ``(ii) on standalone dental plans described 
                        in paragraph (2)(B)(ii) that are not sold on an 
                        Exchange.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to assessments, user fees, taxes, and other fees imposed, 
assessed, or collected on or after January 1, 2018, except that, with 
respect to the Exchange of the District of Columbia, such amendments 
shall apply to assessments, user fees, taxes, and other fees imposed, 
assessed, or collected on or after January 1, 2020.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2
 SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION *
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
 Dated April 24 , 2008:
    By:
    /s/ James A. McGradyJames A. McGrady, Executive Vice President,Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Secretary  *
    
    This Certification is being furnished as required by Rule 13a-14(b) under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of
Title 18 of the United States Code, and shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section
18 of the Exchange Act or otherwise subject to the liability of that section. This
Certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act, except as otherwise stated in such filing.A signed original of this written statement required by 18 U.S.C. § 1350 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-7027
RAPHAEL TERRY, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RICHARD A. LANHAM, Comm issioner of Corrections; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA96-265-PJM) Submitted: November 6, 1997 Decided: November 25, 1997 Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Raphael Terry, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr., AttorneyGeneral, Ann Norman Bosse, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994) (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997)). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate j udge and find no reversibleerror. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of probable cause to appeal and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Terry v. Lanham , No. CA-96-265-PJM (D. Md. July 17, 1997). See Lindh v. Murphy , 521 U.S. ___, 1997 WL 338568 (U.S. June 23, 1997) (No. 96-6298). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED