COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Bumgardner 

LEE ALEXANDER STEVENSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2285-97-4 PER CURIAM 

 APRIL 28, 1998 

CHERYL ANN STEVENSON 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 

William D. Hamblen, Judge 

 (Roger A. Potter, on brief), for appellant. 

 No brief for appellee. 

 Lee Alexander Stevenson (husband) appeals the decision of 

the circuit court finding him in contempt of an order entered 

April 2, 1993. Pursuant to that order, husband agreed to (a) 

retain a $150,000 life insurance policy naming Cheryl Ann 

Stevenson (wife) the beneficiary, and (b) pay wife $14,200 no 

later than March 1, 1997, as her interest in his pension with the 

Virginia State Retirement System. Husband contends that the 

trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the April 2, 1993 order 

and that, therefore, he could not be found in contempt. Upon 

reviewing the record and husband's opening brief, we conclude 

that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily 

affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Subject Matter Jurisdiction

 Rule 1:1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia 

provides that "[a]ll final judgments, orders, and decrees, 

irrespective of terms of court, shall remain under the control of 

the trial court and subject to be modified, vacated, or suspended 

for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer." 

Husband contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction in 

April 1993 to enter any order modifying the November 1991 final 

decree. Husband mischaracterizes the nature of the April 1993 

order. We find no error. 

 The final decree ratified and incorporated, but did not 

merge, the parties' marital agreement. The agreement remained an 

extant contract, enforceable under either contract law or through 

the court's contempt power. See generally Doherty v. Doherty, 9 

Va. App. 97, 99, 383 S.E.2d 759, 760 (1989). Subsequently, as 

expressly authorized in paragraph four of their agreement, the 

parties exercised their retained power to amend their agreement 

and executed a written modification. See Pendleton v. Pendleton, 

22 Va. App. 503, 471 S.E.2d 783 (1996). This modification was 

ratified and incorporated, but not merged, into a consent decree 

on April 2, 1993. 

 "'Jurisdiction' means the power of a court to hear and 

determine a cause, which power is conferred by a constitution or 

by statute, or both." Erickson-Dickson v. Erickson-Dickson, 12 

Va. App. 381, 388, 404 S.E.2d 388, 392 (1991). Code § 20-109.1 
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expressly provides as follows: 

 Any court may affirm, ratify and incorporate 

by reference in its decree dissolving a 

marriage or decree of divorce . . . or by a 

separate decree prior to or subsequent to 

such decree, . . . any valid agreement 

between the parties, or provisions thereof, 

concerning the conditions of the maintenance 

of the parties, or either of them and the 

care, custody and maintenance of their minor 

children, or establishing or imposing any 

other condition or consideration, monetary or 

nonmonetary. Where the court affirms, 

ratifies and incorporates by reference in its 

decree such agreement or provision thereof, 

it shall be deemed for all purposes to be a 

term of the decree, and enforceable in the 

same manner as any provision of such decree. 

Therefore, by statute, the court had the power "by a separate 

decree prior to or subsequent to" the final decree to incorporate 

"any valid agreement between the parties." "Marital property 

settlements entered into by competent parties upon valid 

consideration for lawful purposes are favored in the law and such 

will be enforced unless their illegality is clear and certain." 

Cooley v. Cooley, 220 Va. 749, 752, 263 S.E.2d 49, 52 (1980). 

The ratification and incorporation of the parties' original 

agreement into the final decree did not alter the agreement's 

modification provision or strip the parties of the power to 

modify the agreement pursuant to its terms. The parties further 

enforced their amendment by bringing the amendment before the 

circuit court for entry as a consent decree. 

 Husband's contentions that the trial court failed to 

expressly reserve jurisdiction over equitable distribution or 
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spousal support in the final decree are irrelevant under the 

facts of this case.1

 The parties' agreement allowed 

modification. The parties exercised that option. The circuit 

court had jurisdiction to enter the 1993 order. Husband's 

argument ignores the provision in the parties' agreement allowing 

them to subsequently modify their own agreement. His position 

would unduly limit divorcing parties' freedom to address 

unexpected circumstances in a manner agreeable to both of them. 

We will not assume such a restriction where the language of the 

agreement expressly provides otherwise. 

Code § 20-109

 Husband contends that the April 1993 order violated Code 

§ 20-109 because it contained different terms than those set out 

in the agreement. That contention ignores the fact that the 

parties retained power to modify their agreement. The court's 

April 1993 order conformed to the parties' agreement, as amended, 

and did not violate Code § 20-109. 

Parties Cannot Give Jurisdiction by Consent

 As noted by husband, "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may be 

 

 1Husband argues that the April 1993 order impermissibly 

modified spousal support. For the reasons previously stated, we 

find that the circuit court had jurisdiction in 1993 to rule on 

the parties' agreed modification in support. Husband did not 

object to or appeal the provisions of the order in 1993, and any 

challenges to the 1993 order are untimely. In this appeal, he 

also failed to indicate by citation to the record where he raised 

this issue before the trial court. The Court of Appeals will not 

consider an argument on appeal which was not presented to the 

trial court. See Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593, 

405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991) (citing Rule 5A:18). 
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fixed only by the constitution or a statute, and it may not be 

conferred upon a court by the consent of the parties." Rogers v. 

Damron, 23 Va. App. 708, 711, 479 S.E.2d 540, 541 (1997). This 

was not an instance where the parties colluded in an attempt to 

give the court subject matter jurisdiction it did not already 

possess by statute. 

Order of Enforcement

 For the reasons previously stated, husband's contention that 

the April 1993 order was not an order of enforcement under Code 

§ 20-107.3(K) is irrelevant. 

No Prayer for Equitable Distribution

 Husband also contends that the court lacked the power to 

grant any equitable distribution relief because neither party 

included a prayer for equitable distribution in their pleadings. 

 Husband failed to either object to or appeal the April 1993 

order. Therefore, he waived this argument. 

 Moreover, husband's contention lacks merit. In her Bill of 

Complaint, wife stated that the parties "executed a marital 

Agreement which disposes of all matters of property and support, 

on June 18, 1991," and prayed that "the Property Settlement 

Agreement executed by the parties be affirmed, ratified, and 

incorporated by reference into any final decree of divorce 

. . . ." Wife's pleadings adequately described the existence of 

the property settlement agreement and her request that the 

agreement resolving all property issues be incorporated into the 
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final decree. Cf. Boyd v. Boyd, 2 Va. App. 16, 19, 340 S.E.2d 

578, 580 (1986). Husband's reliance on Gologanoff v. Gologanoff, 

6 Va. App. 340, 369 S.E.2d 446 (1988), is misplaced, as we ruled 

in that case that the wife's pleadings were adequate, but that 

evidence was insufficient to warrant a monetary award. 

Additional Issues

 We briefly address the additional issues raised by husband. 

 Because the April 1993 order was not void, husband's contention 

that he could not be found in contempt of a void order is moot. 

We find that, to the extent any inconsistency existed between the 

February 11, 1992 qualified domestic relations order and the 

April 1993 order implementing the parties' modified agreement, 

the April 1993 order superseded the previous order. Husband 

filed no objections or timely appeals in connection with the 

April 1993 order, and, therefore, waived any challenges under 

Code § 20-107.3(G) to the specific provisions of the April 1993 

order. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.