1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 94-10345.

Issam HASSAN, as next friend of Ameen Hassan, a minor child,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LUBBOCK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants,

Lubbock Independent School District, Joe Williams, Vincent

Thomas, and Ricky Atkins, Defendants-Appellants.

June 27, 1995.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Texas.

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GARWOOD and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Chief Judge:

Issam Hassan, on behalf of his son Ameen Hassan, sued the

Lubbock Independent School District; the principal of Whiteside

Elementary School, Joe Williams; a teacher at Whiteside

Element ary, Vincent Thomas; and a juvenile probation officer at

the Lubbock County Youth Center, Ricky Atki ns; asserting fourth

and fourteenth amendment claims. LISD, Williams, Thomas, and

Atkins appeal the district court's denial o f their motion for

summary judgment based on their claim of qualified immunity. We

dismiss the appeal of the LISD for lack of appellate jurisdiction

and reverse the denial of summary judgment for the remaining

defendants and render judgment in their favor.

Background

On Februa ry 27, 1992, approximately 103 sixth graders from

James A. Whiteside Elementary School in Lubbock, Texas, visited the1 The defendants describe the facility as a series of locked

sections which must be keyed to enter or exit any section.

Atkins apparently escorted Hassan back through several sections

to a holding room, also described as an "intake" room.

2 Lubbock County Youth Center, a facility housing both the Lubbock

County Probation Office and a detention center for minors between

the ages of 10 and 17 who are either in custody a waiting

adjudication on criminal offenses or being detained thereafter.

Williams and Thomas accompanied the children.

At the outset of the tour, Center employees explained to the

children that the Center expected all visitors to comply with

Center rules concerning deportment and respect, and that they

should listen carefully and not talk inside the facility. Center

personnel then divided the schoolchildren into groups, one of which

consisted of 15 boys, Williams, Thomas, and a Center employee,

Ricky Atkins. As this group made its way through the facility

Ameen Hassan was cautioned repeatedly for being inattentive and

disrespectful. When he persisted, Williams and Thomas asked Atkins

to place him in a holding room so that the other students could

continue the tour without distraction. 1

Atkins took Hassan to a room used to hold juveniles brought to

the facility pending retrieval by their parents or admission into

the Center. The room, located at the front of the facility outside

the detention area, contained a bed and a toilet, but was otherwise

bare. Its metal door had a glass partition. Hassan was locked in

this room for approximately 50 minutes, monitored continuously by

Center employees and Thomas who returned to the area to check on2 The amended original complaint also alleges false

imprisonment, but Hassan maintains that all of his claims are

based on federal law and we accordingly treat the false

imprisonment claim as part of the fourth amendment seizure claim.

3 him.

When the other students finished their tour, school officials

led them by the room in which Hassan was waiting and allegedly told

them to look at Hassan. Thomas then escorted Hassan to the bus

where he joined the other students for the return trip to Whiteside

Elementary. Once back at the school, Thomas had Hassan tell the

class about his b ehavior and the resulting punishment, informing

them what, if anything, he had learned from the experience.

The next day Williams met with Hassan's parents to explain the

incident. He apologized for placing Hassan in a situation of which

they did not approve, but insisted that the trip had been a

positive experience for Hassan. Manifesting disagreement, Hassan's

parents removed him from Whiteside Elementary and enrolled him in

another school.

The instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 followed, claiming

that LISD, Williams, Thomas, and Atkins violated Ameen Hassan's

fourth amendment right against unreasonable seizures, fourteenth

amendment due process rights, and eighth amendment right to be free

from cruel and unusual punishment. 2 The complaint also claims that

Thomas violated Hassan's first amendment right to free association

by ordering Hassan to leave the school grounds when he went there

to play with his friends after transferring schools. The district

c ourt dismissed the eighth and first amendment claims under3 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)

(allowing interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity

under the collateral order doctrine).

4 See Loya v. Texas Dep't of Corrections, 878 F.2d 860 (5th

Cir.1989) (allowing entity to appeal denial of absolute

immunity).

4 Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Hassan did not appeal those dismissals.

The LISD, Williams, Thomas, and Atkins moved for summary

judgment on the fourth and fourteenth am endment claims on two

grounds: (1) the LISD could not be held liable because its

employees did not act pursuant to an official policy or custom, and

(2) the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

The district court denied the motions for summary judgment and the

defendants timely appealed.

Analysis

At the outset, we note t hat we have jurisdiction over the

appeal by Williams, Thomas, and Atkins of the district court's

denial of qualified immunity under Mitchell v. Forsyth, 3 which held

that such denials, to the extent that the y turn on a question of

law, wer e final judgments for the purposes of appellate

jurisdiction. The LISD appeals the district court's denial of its

defense of absolute immunity to Hassan's apparent state law false

imprisonment claim. 4 Hassan, however, maintains in brief that all

of his claims arise under federal law. Because of this

c larification, the LISD no longer advances its claim of absolute

immunity. LISD offers no other jurisdictional basis for its

appeal. We therefore dismiss same for lack of appellate

jurisdiction.5 Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co., 990 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir.)

(citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 467,

126 L.Ed.2d 419 (1993).

6 Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793,

114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991) (outlining two step process for evaluating

qualified immunity claims).

7 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97

L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Hassan insists his rights under the fourth

and fourteenth amendments were clearly established at the time of

the incident and that the first inquiry is therefore satisfied.

The determination whether a right is "clearly established" is a

more particularized inquiry than Hassan suggests; otherwise,

plaintiffs could "convert the rule of qualified immunity ... into

a rule of virtually unqualified liability." Id. at 639, 107

S.Ct. at 3039. The proper inquiry is whether a reasonable

official would know that the act in question was unlawful. Id.

at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. It necessarily follows that a right

is not clearly established if there is no actual constitutional

violation alleged. Siegert.

5 We review a district court's denial of summary judgment de

novo, applying the same standard as the district court. "Summary

j udgment is proper when no issue of material fact exists and the

moving party is entitled to judgm ent as a matter of law. In

determining whether summary judgment was proper, all fact questions

are viewed in the light most favorable to the non- movant.

Questions of law are reviewed ... de novo. " 5

In examining the claims of qualified immunity on summary

judgment, we first inquire whether Hassan has alleged "the

violation of a clearly established con stitutional right." 6 For a

right to be clearly established, there does not have to be a prior

case directly on point, but the unlawfulness of the precipitating

acts must be apparent in light of the existing law. 7 We then

inquire whether the defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable

" "in light of the legal rules clearly established at the time' of8 Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir.1993) (citing

Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir.1992)).

9 Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298 (5th Cir.1994).

10 Siegert; Blackwell.

11 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83

L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (finding search of student by principal

constitutional).

12 Id. at 339, 105 S.Ct. at 741.

6 the incident in issue." 8 Thus, even if we find a violation of

Hassan's constitutional rights, the individual defendants are

immune from liability if reasonable public officials could differ

on the lawfulness of their actions. 9 The court need not reach this

second in quiry, however, if Hassan fails to tender the requisite

summary judgment evidence that the individual defendants violated

a clearly established constitutional right. 10

In his first claim, Hassan alleges that the acts of Williams,

Thomas, and Atkins violated his fourth amendment right to be free

from an unreasonable seizure. This constitutional right extends to

seizures by or at the direction of school officials, but whether

such a seizure is unreasonable depends on all relevant contextual

circumstances. 11 The Supreme Court has recognized the unique

backdrop that schools present for the oper ation of the fourth

amendment, specifically noting that "the preservation of order and

a proper educational envi ronment requires close supervision of

schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct

that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an ad ult." 1 2

Thus, while school officials are subject to the limitations of the13 Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882 (10th Cir.1989) (applying

reasonableness test announced in T.L.O. for school searches to a

school seizure case); Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist., 377, 669

F.Supp. 1519 (D.Kan.1987) (applying T.L.O. framework to seizure

claim of student), rev'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 809 (10th

Cir.1989).

14 Hassan concedes in his affidavit that he was uncooperative

and was reprimanded by Thomas.

7 fourth amendment, the reasonableness of seizures must be determined

in light of all of the circumstances, wi th particular attention

being paid to whether the seizure was justified at its inception

and reasonable in scope. 13

At the time of the instant seizure, Hassan was touring a

juvenile detention center as part of a school-sponsored educational

field trip. The two school officials supervising the trip,

Williams and Thomas, were charged with the care and control of all

of the students. The detention center contained both older and

younger youths awaiting adjudication for crim inal offenses, or

residing at the center following adjudication for criminal

offen ses; these surroundings understandably heightened the need

for a disciplined attitude by the visiting students to ensure their

safety and to maintain order among the residents of the facility.

In this setting Ha ssan misbehaved. 1 4 We are fully cognizant that

teachers routinely find it necessary to punish such behavior.

Williams and Thomas, aware of their responsibilities, responded to

Hassan's behavior by separating and isolating him until the other

students had finished their tour. We entertain no doubt that these

actions properly furthered the mandated maintenance of discipline

within the touring group, thus making it possible for the other15 We reject the suggestion that the location of this seizure

heightens the otherwise relaxed fourth amendment standards

applicable to school searches and seizures. School field trips

often present greater, not lesser, challenges to school officials

trying to maintain order and discipline than do the relatively

orderly confines of a school. See Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d

1151 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that the greater challenges

presented by field trips justify in loco parentis authority as

well as official authority).

16 While the duration of a seizure is normally irrelevant to

the determination of its constitutionality, see United States v.

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607

(1975), the Supreme Court's command in T.L.O. to examine all of

the circumstances in the context of school searches and seizures

leads us to conclude that the duration of a seizure is relevant

to its constitutionality in the school setting. See Edwards

(noting seizure of student lasted for 20 minutes).

8 students to continue their valuable educational experience. 15 We

conclude that Hassan's seizure was reasonably justi fied at its

inception.

The placement of Hassan in the holding room at the detention

center was also reasonably related in scope to the relevant

circumstances, thus justifying the action. The presence of other

potentially dangerous juveniles militated against Hassan being left

alone in an easily accessible area. The room into which Hassan was

placed both protected him and allowed for his e asy supervision.

Further, this restriction of his freedom of movement lasted no

longer than absolutely necessary. 16 He was released from the room

as soon as the other students completed their visit. Under these

circumstances, we find no violation of any of Hassan's clearly

established constitutional rights by either Williams or Thomas.

Nor do we percei ve anything in Atkins' role as a Center

employee, or his actions in this incident, that warrants the17 See Martens v. Dist. No. 220, Bd. of Educ., 620 F.Supp.

29, 32 (N.D.Ill.1985) (noting that there was "no basis for

thinking that school official action was a subterfuge to avoid

warrant and probable cause requirements").

18 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 736, 42

L.Ed.2d 725 (1975) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community

Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 736, 21 L.Ed.2d 731

(1969)).

19 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1003,

43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) ("Public high school students do have

substantive and procedural rights while at school."); Goss

(recognizing that discipline can implicate procedural due process

rights); Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303

(5th Cir.1987) (finding allegations of teacher tying a student to

a chair during school to allege a substantive due process

violation).

9 application of a different standard to his conduct. He acted at

the behest of school official s and at all times his control over

H assan remained subject to the direction of Thomas and Williams.

There is no summary judgment evidence that Atkins used the school

trip as a subterfuge for incarcerating Hassan; 17 rather, the

evidence supports the conclusion that Atkins acted reasonably. We

therefore conclude that Hassan has not shown that Atkins violated

a clearly established fourth amendment right.

H assan also claims that Williams, Thomas, and Atkins

"incarcerated" him in a "jail cell" in violation of the due process

clause of the fourteenth amendment. It is well established that

children do not " "shed their constitutional rights' at the

schoolhouse door" 18 and that deprivations of liberty in the school

context may implicate both procedural and substantive due process

liberty interests. 19 These rights, however, are circumscribed by

the need for effective and often immediate action by school20 Goss; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51

L.Ed.2d 711 (1977); T.L.O.

21 See Goss (recognizing that de minimis deprivations do not

implicate due process concerns); Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674, 97

S.Ct. at 1414 ("There is, of course, a de minimis level of

imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned."); Dunn

v. Tyler Indep. Sch. Dist., 460 F.2d 137, 144 (5th Cir.1972)

("Obviously school officials have available to them in day-to-day

operation of schools a scope of summary punishment without even

the limited type of hearing required in more serious

circumstance[s]."). See also Dickens v. Johnson County Bd. of

Educ., 661 F.Supp. 155 (E.D.Tenn.1987) (finding that segregation

of child to "timeout" box (refrigerator box) without notice or

hearing did not implicate either procedural or substantive due

process); Fenton v. Stear, 423 F.Supp. 767 (W.D.Pa.1976)

(holding that assignment to a particular room and prohibition of

participation with school trip to be de minimis interference with

rights).

22 Ysleta, 817 F.2d at 305-06 (citing Woodard v. Los Fresnos

Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.1984)); Wise v. Pea

Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560 (8th Cir.1988) (holding in-school

confinement to small room did not violate substantive due process

rights); Edwards, 883 F.2d at 885 (rejecting a "cryptic"

complaint of "right to be free from the restraints of the

criminal justice system"); Mitchell v. Bd. of Trustees of Oxford

Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 625 F.2d 660, 665 (5th Cir.1980)

("Because the rule and the punishment for violating the rule

clearly are rationally related to the goal of providing a safe

environment in which children can learn, it comports with

substantive due process.").

10 officials to maintain order and discipline. 20 D e minimis or trivial

deprivations of liberty in the course of the disciplining of a

student do not implicate procedural due process requirements. 21

Likewise, punishment does not implicate substantive due process

concerns unless the actio n is "arbitrary, capricious, or wholly

unrelated to the legitimate state goal of maintaining an atmosphere

conducive to learning." 22

We perceive no constitutional violation inherent in the

detenti on of Hassan in the Center's intake room. The room was23 Cf. Ysleta (finding physical restraint of child by tying

him to chair to be unconstitutional).

24 The school officials clearly retained ultimate authority

over Hassan at all times, even though they delegated that

authority to Atkins to detain and watch Hassan while the other

children completed the tour.

11 relatively large with 80 square feet of space and was furnished

with a toilet and a bed and had a glass partition in the door.

Although Hassan could not leave the room, he was not otherwise

physically restrained. 23 He remained under adult supervision and

protection.

Nor do we equate the request of Williams and Thomas that

Atkins physically remove Hassan so that the other students could

proceed with their educational field trip with the t urning of

Has san over to the state authorities for incarceration. 2 4 Hassan

was not placed with the residents of the facility and the intake

room was not located within the detention area. Putting Hassan in

that room was done in response to his behavior and was a measure of

punishment in a safe and supervised manne r. This action made it

possible for the other children to finish the planned visit to the

facility. As noted above, Hassan's restraint was terminated

immediately upon cessation of its need. Under these circumstances,

we are persuaded beyond peradventure that the actions of Thomas,

Williams, and Atkins amount to a de minimis deprivation of Hassan's

l iberty that does not implicate either procedural or substantive

due process guarantees. We also conclude that Hassan's punishment

was withi n the range of discretion accorded school officials and

that the punishment bore a rational relationship to the goal of25 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507, 89 S.Ct. at 737.

12 providing a valuable and safe educational experience for the other

102 children.

Hassan insists, and we do not disagree, that more appropriate

means of punishment were available to the school officials. This

argument, however, lacks persuasive force. That a better

punishment may have been available does not establish that the

punishment administered was unconstitutional. To so hold would run

counter to the Supreme Court's affirmance of "the comprehensive

authority of the States a nd of school officials, consistent with

fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control

conduct in the schools." 25 Perceiving no summary judgment evidence

of a constitutional violation, we conclude, as we must, that there

is no violation of a clearly established constitutional right. We

therefore need inquire no further. The trial court erred in

denying qualified immunity to Thomas, Williams, and Atkins.

Accordingly, we REVERSE the denial of summary judgment for

Williams, Thomas, and Atkins and render judgment in their favor.

The trial court is to enter the appropriate decree. We DISMISS the

appeal of LISD for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

DISMISSED IN PART, REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.