alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
P. 1 

# OAR Box 1865 Prepped by Charmelle Mathews

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# 21 ) IV-E- 9 Docket Number: 

# A-83-2 7

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ACTIO N C O 

# i Distribution :
Opinion issued September 12, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-13-00648-CV

———————————

IN RE HON. CHRISTOPHER DUPUY, Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Accelerated Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

By petition for writ of mandamus, relator Hon. Christopher Dupuy, 

challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.

1

 

 

1

The underlying case is State of Texas ex rel. Hughes v. Dupuy, No. 13-CV-0701,

in the 10th District Court of Galveston County, Texas, the Honorable Robert J. 

Kern presiding. 
2

We deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. All outstanding motions 

are dismissed as moot and the stay granted by this court on July 29, 2013 is 

hereby lifted.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Sharp, and Brown.
#### ANGUS et al. v. STATE.

No. 20635.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 18, 1939.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 15, 1939.

No attorney for appellants.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty„ of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellants were both convicted of robbery by assault and violence, and were by the jury each assessed a penalty of twenty-five years in the penitentiary.

It appears from the record that the appellant Berthrong acted as an attorney for both appellants at the trial, and has filed a very comprehensive brief in this court. Many complaints are made in such brief of the action of the trial court in the trial of the casé, but such complained of actions are not found in the record. There are ho bills of exception in the record, and, in the absence of such, we are unable to review the complaints fo'und in such brief.

The facts seem to clearly establish the proposition that by means of an assault and by violence the appellants possessed themselves of the complaining witness’ automobile and drove the same into New Mexico, where it was later recovered. They are deemed sufficient to establish the allegations contained in the indictment, and, in the absence of any errors shown, the judgment is affirmed as to both appellants.

On Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

In their motion for rehearing appellants contend that they were deprived of their bills of exception. No affidavits are presented in support of this contention. The averments in the unsworn motion cannot be held sufficient to present the question for review.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not t o be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2010-474

MAY TERM, 2011

Clinton Bedell } APPEALED FROM: }

v. } Superior Court, Washington Unit, } Civil Division } State of Vermont } DOCKET NO. 388-5-09 Wncv

Trial Judge: Geoffrey W. Crawford

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Petitioner Clinton Bedell appeals pro se from a sup erior court order dismissing his complaint.

We affirm.

This is the latest in a series of pleadings and app eals filed by petitioner following his conviction of sexual assault against his daughter. We affirme d his conviction on appeal in State v. Bedell, No. 1999- 115 (Vt. Nov. 24, 1999) (unpub. mem.). Thereafter, he filed successive unsuccessful motions for sentence reconsideration, and we affirmed on appeal in two separate decisions. See State v. Bedell, N os. 2002-244 & 2003-047 (Vt. April 4, 2003 (unpub. mem. ); In re Bedell, No. 2006-519, 2007 WL 5313337 (Vt. May 1, 2007) (unpub. mem.). Most recently, we affirmed the dismissal of a Rule 75 complaint. Se e Bedell v. Washington Cnty. State’s Attorney, No. 2 009-341, 2010 WL 716111 (Vt. Feb. 25, 2010) (unpub. mem.). In our last decision, we noted that the trial court had dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it was “unintelligible” and stated no “discernible legal claim,” and we upheld the court’ s decision on the basis that petitioner had offered “ no coherent argument” relevant to the appeal and, t o the extent that his arguments could be discerned, they all related to issues previously decided. Id. at * 1.

Here, similarly, the trial court ruled that all of the assertions in petitioner’s rambling complaint, which he labeled a “motion for P.C.R. expunged,” we re either legally incoherent, had been previously addressed, or were foreclosed by his guilty plea. Petitioner’s brief on appeal largely repeats the cl aims raised below, and to that extent fails again to pro vide any coherent or cognizable argument. See John son v. Johnson, 158 Vt. 160, 164 n.* (1992) (mem.) (th is Court will not consider arguments inadequately briefed); V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4) (appellant’s brief must identify and explain the issues and how they were preserved, and set forth the contentions and the re asons therefore, with appropriate citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record reli ed on). Even under the relaxed standards applicabl e to pro se litigants, petitioner must set forth comprehensi ble arguments demonstrating error. He has not met this standard. Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the judgment.

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________________ Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

_______________________________________ Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

_______________________________________ Brian L. Burgess, Associate Justice
<PAGE>
                           CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
                                      OF
               AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
                                      OF
                                 BIGMAR, INC.


     Bigmar, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of
the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware,

DOES HEREBY CERTIFY:

     1.  That the name of the corporation (hereinafter called the "Corporation")
     is Bigmar, Inc.

     2.  That the Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the
     Corporation is hereby amended by striking out Article Fourth thereof 
     and by substituting in lieu of said Article the following new Article:

     FOURTH: The total number of shares of all classes of stock to which the
     Corporation shall have authority to issue is twenty-five million
     (25,000,000) consisting of the following classes:  (i) twenty million
     (20,000,000) shares of common stock, par value $.001; (ii) five million
     (5,000,000) shares of preferred stock, par value $.001.

     3.  That the amendment herein certified was duly adopted in accordance with
     the provisions of section 242 of the General Corporation Law of the State
     of Delaware.

     4.  That the effective time of the amendment herein certified shall be upon
     the filing date of this Certificate of Amendment.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has caused this Certificate to be
     executed by John G. Tramontana, its President and Chief Executive Officer,
     this 5th day of June, 1998.

                                   BIGMAR, INC.


                                   By: /s/ John G. Tramontana
                                       --------------------------
                                   John G. Tramontana
                                   President and CEO

     ATTEST:


     /s/ Michael K. Medors
     ----------------------
     Michael K. Medors
     Secretary
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Consolidated Balance Sheets and Statements of Operations of United Payors &
United Providers, Inc. as of and for the six months ended June 30, 1997 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                      11,219,418
<SECURITIES>                                11,695,919
<RECEIVABLES>                                9,679,016
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            33,151,941
<PP&E>                                       4,172,967
<DEPRECIATION>                                 911,150
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              59,817,388
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,172,661
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    35,399,376
<OTHER-SE>                                  16,746,070
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                59,817,388
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            27,278,415
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               16,591,224
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              16,350
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             11,430,485
<INCOME-TAX>                                 4,619,573
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          6,810,912
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 6,810,912
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.58
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### WOODS v. STATE.

No. 17076.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 19, 1934.

J. S. Kendall, of Munday, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

Conviction is for burglary, the punishment assessed being two years’ confinement in the penitentiary.

No bills of exception appear in the record, the sole contention of appellant being that the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction. Some time during the month of May, 1933, the barn of Mr. Edsall was broken into and a saddle was taken therefrom. An examination made by the sheriff at the premises of Mr. Edsall the next morning after the burglary revealed that there were three sets of tracks leading from a point in the road about one hundred yards from the barn toward the barn, and that also three sets of tracks were found returning to this point in the road where a car appeared to have been parked.

These facts would indicate that three parties were implicated in the -burglary and theft of the saddle. The saddle was recovered by the sheriff on the 7th day of November from one Doc Roberts. This saddle was delivered to Mr. Edsall, who positively identified it as the one which had been stolen from him at the time of the burglary. The testimony of Joe Barker, who was the brother-in-law of Oran and Floyd Woods, was to the effect that the two parties named, and another by the name of Wayne Womack, were staying at Barker’s house, and that the three parties left his place in the afternoon and came back some time that night bringing a saddle with them. The saddle stayed at Barker’s place for some time, when this appellant took it away and kept and used it for something like two and a half months, and then returned it to Barker’s place. Later Doc Roberts came with Oran and Floyd .Woods and their father to Barker’s place and the saddle was delivered to Doc Roberts, who took it away with him. Barker said he did not know who brought the saddle to his place, but that Oran said it was his saddle.

We have purposely stated the testimony of the nonaccomplice witnesses first. To our minds it clearly tends to connect this appellant with the commission of the burglary at the time the saddle was stolen. Doc Roberts, *235who was charged to he an accomplice witness, testified that in November, 1933, he bought the saddle for $15 from Oran Woods, who told him at the time not to use the saddle at a certain place as there would he parties who might know the saddle. He testified that Oran did not tell him where he got the saddle, nor who it belonged to, but that he had reason to believe at the time he bought it that the saddle had been stolen, and kept it hid out until the officers came and got it.

We think it unnecessary ,to restate the rules necessary to be complied with in corroborating the testimony of an accomplice witness before a conviction may be sustained. In the present case there seems no doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence.

The judgment is affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.8

               TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WITH LARRY DALESANDRO
                              EFFECTIVE MAY 3, 2002

      Should Lannett terminate your employment other than "for cause" (as
defined below), you will be eligible for severance compensation in an amount to
be determined by Lannett, but not less than six (6) months of your base salary
at the time of termination. You will also be eligible to continue your
participation in the Company's medical benefit plans for six (6) months, at no
cost to you. For purposes hereof, "for cause" is defined to include engaging in
unethical business practices or conduct which creates a conflict of interest,
fraud, malfeasance, criminal behavior, and willful conduct in violation of
Lannett's Non-Harassment Policy or Corporate Handbook. If the Company is sold or
a majority of the Company's ANDAs (Abbreviated New Drug Applications) are sold
during your employment, and the Company or new organization terminates your
employment, you will be eligible for severance compensation in an amount equal
to one year of your current base salary at the time of termination. In this
scenario, you will also be eligible to continue your participation in the
Company's medical benefit plans, at no cost to you, for up to one year.
Additionally, all option grants issued to you, whether they are vested or
unvested, will become immediately vested for your benefit. If the Company is
sold during your employment, and the organization that takes control of the
Board of Directors desires to continue your employment with the same assignment
and place of business, regardless of whether you remain with the buying
organization or not, you will be paid an amount equal to six months of your then
current base salary at the time of the sale transaction for the Company.

      It is understood that these benefit terms are not being offered for a
definite period of time and that either you or the Company may terminate the
employment relationship at any time and for any reason without prior notice.
Nothing in this letter to you of compensation, stock options or benefits should
be interpreted as creating anything other than an at-will employment
relationship. In addition, the Company reserves the right to periodically review
the salary, bonus and benefits it offers to you and to adjust them from time to
time in its sole discretion but in no case will the salary be adjusted below
your current base salary.

                                       64
CARDEL SALMON-MAIR,

Appellant,

v.

REEMPLOYMENT 

ASSISTANCE APPEALS 

COMMISSION AND IOWA 

COLLEGE ACQUISITION 

CORP.,

Appellees.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-4159

_____________________________/

Opinion filed October 21, 2014.

An appeal from an order of the State of Florida, Reemployment Assistance 

Appeals Commission. 

Frank E. Brown, Chairman.

Cardel Salmon-Mair, pro se, Appellant.

Norman A. Blessing, General Counsel, and Louis A. Gutierrez, Assistant Court 

Chief, Tallahassee, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant has sought review of an order vacating a decision of the appeals 

referee based on the referee’s failure to afford the employer due process of law and 

remanding the matter to the referee for further proceedings and rendition of a new 
decision. Because the order on appeal does not bring the administrative 

adjudicative process to a close, it is not a final administrative order. See Hill v. 

Division of Retirement, 687 So. 2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). 

Consequently, this appeal is premature. Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss, filed on 

September 15, 2014, is granted and the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

WOLF, BENTON, and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR.

2
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2384 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2384

 To amend the National Agricultural Research, Extension, and Teaching 
   Policy Act of 1977 to make funding available to 1890 institutions 
                    without fiscal year limitation.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            February 6, 2018

 Mr. Van Hollen (for himself, Mr. Perdue, Mr. Tillis, Mr. Graham, Mr. 
 Brown, Mr. Coons, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Kaine, and Mr. Manchin) introduced 
the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee 
                on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the National Agricultural Research, Extension, and Teaching 
   Policy Act of 1977 to make funding available to 1890 institutions 
                    without fiscal year limitation.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Carryover Equity Act of 2018''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION PROGRAM CARRYOVER AT 1890 LAND-GRANT COLLEGES, 
              INCLUDING TUSKEGEE UNIVERSITY.

    Section 1444(a) of the National Agricultural Research, Extension, 
and Teaching Policy Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. 3221(a)) is amended by 
striking paragraph (4).
                                 <all>
```
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2285 

To require mailing addresses to correspond with the physical address at 

which the mail will be delivered. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 10, 2018 

Mrs. MCCASKILL introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

A BILL 

To require mailing addresses to correspond with the physical 

address at which the mail will be delivered. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. MAILING ADDRESS REQUIREMENTS. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter VI of chapter 36 of 

5 title 39, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 

6 end the following: 

7 ‘‘§ 3687. Mailing address requirements 

8 ‘‘(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 

9 ‘‘(1) the term ‘municipality’ means a city, town, 

10 borough, county, parish, district, association, or 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2285 IS

1 other public entity established by, or pursuant to, 

2 applicable State law; and 

3 ‘‘(2) the term ‘State’ means each of the several 

4 States, territories, and possessions of the United 

5 States, the District of Columbia, and the Common6 wealth of Puerto Rico. 

7 ‘‘(b) PHYSICAL AND MAILING ADDRESS SHALL COR8 RESPOND.—The State and municipality used by the Post9 al Service for the delivery address for purposes of mail 

10 matter shall correspond with the State and municipality 

11 of the physical address of the location for the delivery of 

12 such mail matter.’’. 

13 (b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.— 

14 The table of sections for chapter 36 of title 39, United 

15 States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relat16 ing to section 3686 the following: 

‘‘3687. Mailing address requirements.’’. 

Æ 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the transition report of Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. (the Partnership) on Form
10-Q for the four months ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Brian J. Jennings, Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: February 11, 2008



/s/ Brian J. JenningsBrian J. JenningsChief Financial Officer




|* | A signed original of this written statement required by 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 has been provided to and will be retained by Energy Transfer Partners, L.P.
|- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------