### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 652 -CV

Jo hn L. Tay lor , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas , Appellee

F ROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. 01-2 5885 5, HO NORAB LE J. DAVID P HI LLIP S , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
The State of T exas sued J ohn L
. T ay l or, appe llant, for over due pay ments on student loans for whic h Taylor serve d as g uara ntor. The State attempted to se rve pr ocess on Ta y lor persona lly

as authorized by

Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 106(a ), and when that failed it obtained
a cour t order permitting substitut ed service as authorized by Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 106(b)
. No tw ith sta

nd ingthe or de r, the State c on tin ue d tr yingto s e rv e Ta

ylor pe rs on a lly

in a c c or da

nc e wi th Rule 10 6 ( a ) , an d

it e v e n tu a ll y

s u c c e e d e d
. T aylo r

d id n o t f il e a r e s p o n s iv e p le a d in g , an d the county court subseque ntly

ent er ed a defa

ult judgment ag ainst him. On restricted a ppeal, Ta y lor argues that per sonal servic e on him was for bidden once substitut ed service was a uthorized; that he is entitled to a new trial beca use there is no recor d of the he aringon his default judg ment; and that the evidenc e supporting the defa ult judg ment is insuff

icient to e stablish liability
. We w ill af firm the de fa ult jud g me nt.2 F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND The State attempted to serve pr ocess on Ta ylor by cer tified mail. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 106(a)( 2). When that failed, the State obtained a court order permitting substituted process. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 106(b). The orde r re quired that substituted proce ss be serve d by (1) de livery of the citation and petition to someone over six teen y ear s of ag e at Ta ylor’s addr ess or (2) attachme nt of the citation and pe tition t o Taylor’s fr ont door. The State ne verthe less continued attempting to serve Taylor by cer tified mail, and it eventua lly succe eded. Taylor did not file an answ er to the State’ s petition, an d t h e S t at e moved f or de fa ult jud g me nt. Af

te r a he ari ng on th e S tate’ s mo tio n, wh ic h T aylor did no t atte nd , th e c ounty court e ntere d defa

ult judgment ag ain s t T ay lor. The c ourt based the amount of the judg ment on (1) the written rec ords attac hed to the S tate’s petition, which included c opies of the pr omissory notes at issue and a

document summarizing the note s’ pay ment history , and (2) an af fidavit by the State’s custodian of r ecor ds summarizi ng the amounts due.

Taylor later f

iled this restric ted appeal t o contest t he judgment. I n five points of er ror, he ar g ues that persona l se rvice on him was forbidde n once substituted servic e wa s authorized; that he is entitled to a newtrial bec ause t h er e i s n o rec ord of the he aringon the State’s motion for defa ul t judg me nt; and

that th e e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g the de fa

ult jud g me nt i s in su ff

ic ie nt t o establish liability
. STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW On re stricted appe al, we w ill reverse a defa ult judg ment if err or appe ars on the f ace of the re cord. See A lexande r v. Lynda's Boutique , 134 S.W .3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004)
. “The fac e ofService by cer tified mail, which is how the State ser ved Ta ylor, qualifies a s 1 persona l service
. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 06 (a )( 2) ; Dev ine v. Dure e , 616 S.W .2d 439, 441 (Tex. Civ. App.—For

t Worth 1981, writ dis m’d by ag r.). 3 the re cord for purposes of a restric ted appea l c onsists of all the paper s on file befor e the judg ment
as we ll as the repor

ter’s r ecor d.” Con se c o F

in. Se rv ic ing

Cor p. v . Kl e in I

nd e p. Sc h. Di st. , 78 S.W .3d 666, 670 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
DI SCU SSIO N Se rv ic eof

Proc ess Taylor argues that o n ce the county court issued a

n order authorizing substituted service of proc e s s , th e St a te c o u ld o n ly s e r v e p r o c e s s o nh im

in th e ma n n e r th e o r d e r s p e c if ie d. Thus , he argue s, se rv ic e in a c c or da nc e wi th Te xas R

ule of Civ il Pr oc e dure 10 6( a )( 2) rathe r t ha n in
acc ordanc e with the orde r wa s improper.

Taylor is corre ct that when substitut ed service occur s, it must strictly comply with the order authorizing it. Se e Be c k

e r v . R us se ll , 765 S.W .2d 899, 900 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no writ). But the br oader rule that Taylor proposes—pe rsonal service is prohibited once substitut ed ser vice is a uth or ize d—

wo uld un de rm ine the po lic ie s b e hin d T e xas’ s se rv ic e -o f- pr oc e ss r ule s. B e c a us e of its g re a te r r e lia

bil ity , “ Te xas law p re fe rs pe rs on a l se rv ic e ov e r s ub sti tut e service .” Vespa v. National Health Ins. Co. , 98 S.W .3d 749, 751 (Tex. A pp.—Fort W o rt h 2 003,
no pe t.) ; accord M

yl o n a s v. Texas Comme rce Bank -W estwood , 678 S.W .2d 519, 522 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1984, no writ) (“substituted service is not the prefe rre d method”). For rea sons of prac ticality , howeve r, Texas allows substituted service, but only afte r per sonal servic e fails. See State F

arm Fire &Cas. Co. v. Cost ley , 868 S.W .2d 298, 298-99 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam). 14 Th e re a so n s ub sti tut e d s e rvice mus t st ri c tly c omp ly wi th t he or de r a uth or izin g it i s that the orde r “is the sole basis of authority authorizing substituted service .” Vespa , 98 S.W .3d at 752. But if service is ma de in c ompliance with Rule of Civil Procedur e 106(a) , as it wa s in this case, then the Rule provides an independe nt ba sis of authority for service
. That, in tur n, obviates the ne ed for strict c ompliance with the or der a uthorizi ng substitut ed ser

vice. Cf. W

ilson v. Dunn , 800 S.W .2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990) (jurisdiction can attach if citation is “ issued and serve d in a manner provided for by law”)
. Put another wa

y , persona l service is expli citly sanctioned by Rule 106(a)
. Use of a n
a dd iti on a l me tho d o f se rv ic e un de r Rul e 10 6( b) do e s no t se rv e to vo id t he e xiste nc e and

ava ila bil ity of per sonal servic e under

Rule 106(a) . Nothing in the lang uag e of the Rule sugg ests as much, a nd we de cline to re ad such a

n illogica l approa ch into the Rule. Thus, we ove rrule T aylor’s first issue.
Re c ord o f D e fa ult J udg ment H e aring Tay lor n e xt ar g u e s th a t h e is e n ti tl e d to a n e w tr ia l b e c a u s e n o r e c o r d w a s ma d e of the hea ring on the State’s motion for def au l t judgment. In support of this argument, Taylor cites Sm ith v . S mi th , 544 S.W .2d 121 (Tex. 1976), i n which the Te x as Supreme Court g rante d a new trial wher e no re cord w as made of a he aringon a motion for def ault judgme nt. The Sm ith hear ing conce rned divorce and child custody
. Se e id
. at 122. The he aring at issue her e, by

contr as t, conce rned the amount owed on pr omissory notes, which is a liquidated claim. See F

irst N at’l Bank v. Shoc kley , 663 S.W .2d 685, 688 (Tex. A pp.—Corpus Christi 1983,
no wr it) (“ A l iqu idate d c la im i s o ne that ‘ c an b e a c c ur a te ly c a lc ulate d b y

the c ourt , or u

nd e r i ts direc tion, from the alleg ati o n s co n t ained in plaintiff’ s petition in t he instrument in writing .’”)5

(q u o t i n g Freem an v. Leasing Assocs., Inc

. , 503 S.W .2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ. App.—H o u s t on [14t h Dist.] 1973, no writ)). When defa ult judgment is enter ed on a liquidated c laim, “the rule s of the proc edure contemplate that the plaintiff be a war ded t h e dama g es without the nec essity of a hear ing or

the pre sentation of evide nce.” Id . at 688-89. S e e also Tex. R. C iv. P. 241 (“When a jud g me nt b y

defaul t is re nd e re d a g a ins t th e de fe nd ant, or a ll o f s e ve ra l de fe nd ants , if the c la im i s l i qu i d a t e d an d p r o v e d b y ani n s t r u m e n ti nw r i t i n g , t h e d a m a g e s s h a l l b e a s s e s s e d b y t h e c o u rt
. ” )
. In such circ umstances, no repor ter’s r ecor d is require d. Se e W hit ak e r v. R os e , 218 S.W .3d 216, 220-21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“ [T] he lac k of a r eporte r’s rec o rd in an appe al fr om a no -a ns we r d e fa

ult jud g me nt d oe s n ot c on sti tut e e rr or on th e fac e of

the re c or d. ” ); Hahn v. W hiting Petroleum Corp. , 171 S.W .3d 307, 322 (Tex. App.—Corp u s C h ri sti 2005, no pet.) (C a sti llo , J., dis se nti ng ) ( wh e re wr itt e n r e c or ds su pp or tin g de faul t ju dg me nt a

re c on ta ine d in
c le rk ’s re c or d, la c k o f r e po rter’s re c or d n ot r e ve rs ibl e e rr or ); Ba rg an ie r v . S

ad dle br oo k Ap ts. , 104 S.W .3d 171, 175 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, no pet.) ( Vanc e, J., concurring ) (same). Thus, we
overr ule Tay lor’s sec ond issue. Sufficiency of

Proof Taylor’s final thre e po ints of error conce rn the wr itten evidence submitt ed by the State . T ay lor

argue s th a t th e e vidence is insuf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the jud g me nt b e c a

us e (1 ) h is signature is not clea

r on one of the promissory notes, (2) the promissory notes do not prove that the loans w e r e e v e r

a c tu a ll y d is b u r s e d , an d

( 3 ) th e St a te ’ s p ay

me n t h is to r

y d o c u me n t s h o w s th at some interest wa s paid on the loans, but the judg ment does not clea rly provide an o ff

set for tho se pa y me nts
.6 We b e lie ve tha

t T ay lor ha s w a ive d th e se argume nts , b e c a us e e a c h o f t

he m is exceeding ly

brief ( betwee n one and three sentenc es l ong ) and cites no authority . Br ief, c onclusory sta te me nt s , u n s u

p p o rt e d b y l e g a l c i t a t i o n s , ar e i n s u f f i c i e n tt o s u s t a i nana

p p e l l an t ’ s c o mp l a i n t. Swe e d v

. Ci ty of

El Pa so , 194 S.W .3d 684, 686 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.). Se e als o Tex. R. App. P. 38.1( i) (appe llant’s brief “must contain a clea r and concise argum en t fo r t he contentions made, with appropr iate citations to authorities and to the re cord” ) (e mphasis added) ; Ha rri s Co un ty Mu n. Ut il. Dist

. No. 48v . M itc he ll , 915 S.W .2d 859, 866 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (“A lthough a ppellate c ourts g ener ally construe the briefingrules lib e ra lly , p oints o f e rr or

un su pp or te d b y the c ita tio n o f aut ho ri ty

pr e se nt n oth ingfo r t

he c ourt to revie w.”) . But e ven if Ta y lor has not waive d these a rguments, they

fail on their mer its. Taylor has not prope rly

denied that he ex ec u t ed t he promissory notes at issue. To deny the execution of a written instrument on which a pleading is founded, a de fenda nt must file a verifie d answe r. SeeTe x. R. C iv. P. 9 3( 7) ; W heele r v. Sec urity State Bank, N.A. , 159 S.W .3d 754, 756-57 (Te x . App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (pr omissory notes came into evidence as fully proved wher e def endant de nied authenticity of sig nature s on them but did not f ile verifie d answe r). Ta

y lor did no t do s o he re . In f

a c t, h e do e s n ot e ve n d e ny that he sig ne d th e pr omi sso ry no te s; h e sim

ply alleg es that the sig nature on one of the m is “blank or illeg ible.” Moreove r, the State’s custodian of
re c o r d s f i l e d a s w o r

n a f f i d av i t s t a t i n g t h a t T a

yl o r s i g n e d t h e n o t e s . T h a t a f f i d a v i t w a s pr op e rl y
rec eived in evide nce. See W hitaker , 218 S.W .3d at 2 2 0 -2 1. The same aff idavit confirms that the State did in f a c t di sb ur se the loan p roc e e ds . A nd fi na lly , th e State ’s pa

y me nt h ist or

y do c ume nt, wh ic h w a s a lso pr op e rl y

re c e ive d in

e vid e nc e , c on fi rm s th a t T aylor re c e ive d cr e dit fo r int e re st p a id on the loans. Thus, we overr ule Tay lor’s third, fourth, a

nd fifth points of err or.7 CO NC LU SION F or the re a so ns state d a

bo ve , w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: August 12, 2009