J-A30042-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

NAHEEM ADAMS,

Appellant No. 1016 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 22, 2013

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-48-CR-0000287-2013

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MARCH 04, 2015

Appellant, Naheem Adams, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his jury conviction of third-degree murder.1 We affirm. 

This case arises from the shooting death of George Jeter. The relevant 

facts and procedural history are as follows. On July 27, 2012, at 

approximately 7:00 p.m., Harry Booker and Quincy Wilson went to Michael 

Comito’s apartment to purchase crack cocaine. Comito called Appellant to 

arrange the purchase, but Appellant did not have any crack cocaine. Comito 

then called Jeter, and arranged to buy two bags of crack. Appellant arrived 

at Comito’s apartment at approximately 8:00 p.m. He entered the 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c). 
J-A30042-14

- 2 -

apartment, indicated that he did not have any drugs, and walked out the 

back door and sat on the back step. Jeter arrived at the apartment at 

approximately 9:00 p.m., and he and Comito completed the drug 

transaction. Jeter left through the side door and Comito and the other 

individuals inside the house heard what sounded like people pushing and 

shoving each other outside. Comito opened the door to see what was taking 

place and Appellant told him to go back in the house and shut the door. 

Comito shut the door and heard multiple gunshots. Comito opened the 

door, saw Jeter lying on the ground, unsuccessfully attempted to revive him, 

and called 911. Another individual in the apartment, Karen Culver, looked 

out of a window and saw a person running away. 

Appellant and his girlfriend moved out of their apartment 

approximately two days after the murder. In October 2012, police arrested 

him in New York. Appellant informed detectives that he left the Easton area 

on July 27, 2012, and that he never returned. Videotape surveillance 

footage obtained by police shows Appellant walking in the vicinity of 

Comito’s apartment at 8:22 p.m. on the night of Jeter’s murder. 

On July 30, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine

requesting that the court permit it to introduce evidence of Appellant’s prior 

bad act of drug dealing pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b). 

Specifically, the Commonwealth sought to present evidence that Appellant 

was a drug dealer who had regularly provided drugs to the residents of 

Comito’s house. The trial court granted the motion on August 1, 2013. The 
J-A30042-14

- 3 -

case proceeded to a four-day jury trial, and the testimony established that 

Jeter died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds to the chest and torso. On 

August 8, 2013, the jury found Appellant guilty of third-degree murder.2

On November 22, 2013, after considering a pre-sentence investigation 

(PSI) report, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of not less than 

twenty nor more than forty years’ incarceration. On December 2, 2013, 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied 

following argument. This timely appeal followed.3

Appellant raises five issues for our review: 

1. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient, as a matter 

of law, to sustain a conviction for the offense of third degree 

murder such that the trial court erred when it did not enter a 

judgment of acquittal?

2. Was the jury’s verdict of third degree murder against the 

weight of the evidence such that Appellant is entitled to a new trial?

3. Did the trial court err in allowing Appellant’s prior bad acts to 

be admissible under 404(b)(1)?

4. Was the Commonwealth erroneously permitted to introduce 

into evidence pictures of the victim’s face and body?

5. Did the trial court err in the discretionary aspects of its 

sentence?

____________________________________________

2 The jury found Appellant not guilty of first-degree murder. 

3

Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Appellant filed a timely concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal on April 21, 2014. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on May 16, 2014. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 
J-A30042-14

- 4 -

(Appellant’s Brief, at 6).

In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support his third-degree murder conviction. (See id. at 30-38). He 

maintains that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was involved in 

the homicide, and that it did not establish the element of malice. (See id.

at 33, 37). He contends that the testimony of the Commonwealth’s 

witnesses, whom he characterizes as “incoherent drug users,” was 

inconsistent and inconclusive. (Id. at 37; see id. at 36). He points to the 

testimony of “[t]he Commonwealth’s most inconsistent witness, Mike 

Comito,” to support his argument that the Commonwealth’s evidence was 

insufficient as a matter of law. (Id. at 34; see id. at 36). This issue lacks 

merit. 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.
J-A30042-14

- 5 -

Commonwealth v. Cahill, 95 A.3d 298, 300 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations 

omitted).

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines murder of the third degree as 

“[a]ll other kinds of murder” other than first or second-degree murder. 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c). “Murder in the third degree is an unlawful killing with 

malice but without the specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 

20 A.3d 1215, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted). 

To convict an accused of third degree murder, the 

Commonwealth must prove that the accused killed another 

person with malice.

The elements of third degree murder, as 

developed by case law, are a killing done with legal 

malice but without specific intent to kill required in 

first degree murder. Malice is the essential element 

of third degree murder, and is the distinguishing 

factor between murder and manslaughter.

Malice under the law comprehends not only a particular illwill, but every case where there is wickedness of disposition, 

hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a 

mind regardless of social duty, although a particular person may 

not be intending to be injured. Malice may be inferred from the 

attending circumstances of the act resulting in death. Otherwise 

stated, malice may be found where the defendant has 

consciously disregarded an unjustified and extremely high risk 

that h[is] conduct might cause death or serious injury to 

another.

Commonwealth v. Geiger, 944 A.2d 85, 90 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal 

denied, 964 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Our Supreme Court has stated that “[m]alice . . . may be inferred from 

the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s body.” 
J-A30042-14

- 6 -

Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 33 A.3d 602, 607 (Pa. 2011) (citation 

omitted).

Here, the record reflects that Comito had asked both Appellant and 

Jeter to supply him with crack cocaine in the past, and that, on the night of 

Jeter’s murder, he called Appellant to arrange a drug purchase. (See N.T. 

Trial, 8/06/13, at 79-80, 82-83). Appellant told Comito that he was “out of 

stuff,” and Comito called Jeter instead to buy the crack. (Id. at 82; see id.

at 80, 83, 86). Although Appellant did not have any crack to sell, he arrived 

at Comito’s apartment anyway and sat on the back porch. (See id. at 86-

87, 90, 94). Jeter then arrived at Comito’s apartment, completed the drug 

transaction, and left the house. (See id. 92, 95). Immediately after Jeter 

walked out the door, Comito and the other individuals in the apartment 

heard what sounded like people fighting on the porch. (See id. at 95-96). 

Comito opened the door and Appellant told him to “get back in the house, 

shut the door.” (Id at 99).4 Comito shut the door and then heard multiple 

gunshots. (See id. at 100). Karen Culver looked out of the window into the 

backyard and saw a person running away. (See id. 154-57). After the 

____________________________________________

4 At trial, Comito consistently testified that Appellant told him to shut the 

door. (See N.T. Trial, 8/06/13, at 99, 125). However, at the preliminary 

hearing, he testified that he could not be sure that the voice he heard telling 

him to shut the door was Appellant’s. (See id. at 124-25; see also N.T. 

Preliminary Hearing, 1/18/13, at 31). 
J-A30042-14

- 7 -

murder, Appellant and his girlfriend left the Easton area abruptly and went 

to New York. (See N.T. Trial, 8/07/13 at 12-13, 89-90).

Upon review of the record, and viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, see Cahill, supra at 300, we conclude 

that the trial court properly found the evidence was sufficient to sustain 

Appellant’s conviction. Although Comito’s testimony at trial was inconsistent 

with his testimony at the preliminary hearing, it was for the jury as 

factfinder to resolve credibility issues. See id. Comito consistently testified 

at trial that Appellant directed him to shut the door, and it was for the jury 

to believe “all, part, or none of the evidence.” Id. Further, although 

Appellant specifically challenges the element of malice, the evidence 

established that Jeter’s death was caused by multiple gunshot wounds to the 

chest and torso, and the jury could infer “[m]alice . . . from the use of a 

deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s body.” Ramtahal, supra at 

607. The record supports the trial court’s determination that, although there 

were some inconsistencies in the Commonwealth witnesses’ testimony, the 

jury carefully deliberated and considered the offenses charged, and returned 

a verdict for the lesser offense of third-degree murder. (See Trial Court 

Opinion, 5/16/14, at 12-14). Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue does not 

merit relief. 
J-A30042-14

- 8 -

In his second issue, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence to 

support his conviction. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 38-41).5 He claims that 

the jury ignored or failed to give adequate weight to certain evidence that 

was favorable to him, and he again argues that the Commonwealth’s 

witnesses were not credible. (See id.). This issue lacks merit. 

Our standard of review is as follows:

The finder of fact is the exclusive judge of the weight of 

the evidence as the fact finder is free to believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence presented and determines the credibility of the 

witnesses. 

As an appellate court, we cannot substitute our judgment 

for that of the finder of fact. Therefore, we will reverse a jury’s 

verdict and grant a new trial only where the verdict is so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. A 

verdict is said to be contrary to the evidence such that it shocks 

one’s sense of justice when the figure of Justice totters on her 

pedestal, or when the jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition, 

causes the trial judge to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes 

him to almost fall from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the 

judicial conscience.

Furthermore, where the trial court has ruled on the weight 

claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether 

the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the 

weight claim.

____________________________________________

5 Appellant preserved this issue by raising it in his post-sentence motion. 

(See Post-Sentence Motion, 12/02/13, at 3); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 

607(A)(3). 
J-A30042-14

- 9 -

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 73 A.3d 1269, 1274-75 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a weight of 

the evidence claim, this Court carefully considers the findings and reasons 

advanced by the trial court, because the trial judge had the opportunity to 

hear and see the evidence presented. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 

A.3d 426, 432 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 63 A.3d 1243 (Pa. 2013). 

Here, the trial court determined:

Based on the evidence presented at trial, this court was not 

inclined to upset the jury’s verdict after they were presented 

with sufficient evidence and thoughtfully deliberated. . . .

. . . The jury made credibility determinations when 

presented with conflicting and inconsistent testimony. The 

verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s 

sense of justice. . . . 

(Trial Ct. Op., at 14) (most capitalization omitted). 

After review of the record, we cannot conclude that the court’s 

decision constituted a palpable abuse of discretion. See Boyd, supra at 

1275. The jury, as finder of fact, while passing upon the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, was free to believe all, 

part, or none of the evidence. See id. at 1274. Accordingly, Appellant’s 

weight claim does not merit relief. 

In his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by 

permitting the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of his prior bad act of 

drug dealing. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 41-43). He claims that this 

evidence was inadmissible under the general rule set forth in Pennsylvania 
J-A30042-14

- 10 -

Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), and that the Commonwealth failed to 

demonstrate the applicability of any exception set forth in Rule 404(b)(2). 

(See id. at 41-42). Appellant maintains that the court’s admission of 

evidence indicating he may have been a drug dealer in the past “misguided 

the jury to believe that [he] has the criminal propensity to commit the 

current crime.” (Id. at 43). We disagree. 

“Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of 

the trial judge, and such rulings form no basis for a grant of appellate relief 

absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Powell, 956 A.2d 406,

419 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1131 (2009) (citation omitted). 

. . . [E]vidence of crimes [, wrongs, or acts] other than the one 

in question is not admissible solely to show the defendant’s bad 

character or propensity to commit crime. [S]ee Pa.R.E. 

404(b)(1). (providing that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or 

other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order 

to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 

accordance with the character”). Nevertheless, “[t]his evidence 

may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). In 

order for evidence of prior bad acts to be admissible as evidence 

of motive, the prior bad acts must give sufficient ground to 

believe that the crime currently being considered grew out of or 

was in any way caused by the prior set of facts and 

circumstances. Additionally, evidence of other crimes may be 

admitted where such evidence is part of the history of the case 

and forms part of the natural development of the facts.

Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 2015 WL 49438, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 

5, 2015) (case citations and some quotation marks omitted). “In weighing 

whether evidence of prior bad acts will be admissible, however, the trial 
J-A30042-14

- 11 -

court must still weigh the relevance and probative value of the evidence 

against the prejudicial impact of that evidence.” Commonwealth v. 

Dowling, 883 A.2d 570, 578 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 838 (2006) 

(citation omitted); see also Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).

Here, upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting evidence of Appellant’s prior drug dealing. See 

Powell, supra at 419. The evidence was offered not to show Appellant’s 

propensity to commit crime, but in the context of establishing his motive for 

shooting Jeter, a rival drug dealer who supplied crack to the same 

individuals Appellant supplied. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2); see also 

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 769 A.2d 1116, 1128 (Pa. 2001), cert. denied, 

535 U.S. 906 (2002) (concluding that court properly allowed testimony 

regarding appellant’s prior drug-dealing activities offered to establish his 

motive for killing). Evidence showing that Appellant routinely provided 

drugs to Comito also formed part of the natural development of the facts 

and history of this case, see Ferguson, supra at *3; Appellant’s 

involvement in drug dealing was the reason Comito contacted him on the 

night of Jeter’s murder. 

Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury immediately following 

the testimony, and at the conclusion of trial, regarding the proper 

consideration to give the prior bad acts evidence so that jurors would not 

regard it as evidence of Appellant’s general bad character. (See N.T. Trial, 
J-A30042-14

- 12 -

8/06/13, at 105-06; N.T. Trial, 8/08/13, at 110-11). These instructions, 

which the jury is presumed to have followed, eliminated any risk of unfair 

prejudice. See Commonwealth v. Burno, 94 A.3d 956, 977 (Pa. 2014) 

(stating juries are presumed to follow trial court’s instructions); see also 

Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 497 (Pa. 2009), cert. 

denied, 559 U.S. 1111 (2010) (concluding cautionary instructions 

ameliorated any undue prejudice caused by introduction of prior bad acts 

evidence). Accordingly, Appellant’s third issue does not merit relief. 

In his fourth issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erroneously 

permitted the Commonwealth to introduce photographs depicting Jeter’s 

face and body into evidence. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 43-45). Specifically, 

Appellant challenges the admission of three photographs showing the 

victim’s body at the crime scene, and four photographs depicting his body at 

the autopsy (Commonwealth Exhibits 4, 6, 13, and 17-20). (See id. at 44). 

Appellant argues that the pictures are gruesome and inflammatory and the 

court should have excluded them because they lacked essential evidentiary 

value. (See id.). He asserts that any evidentiary value the photographs 

may have had was outweighed by the likelihood that they would inflame the 

passions of the jury. (See id.). This issue is waived and would not merit 

relief.
J-A30042-14

- 13 -

“A defendant must make a timely and specific objection at trial or face 

waiver of h[is] issue on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Olsen, 82 A.3d 1041, 

1050 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant does not direct us to where in the substantial record 

the Commonwealth presented the photographs of the victim, but the 

Commonwealth does. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 43-45; Commonwealth’s 

Brief, at 19). Our review of the relevant part of the trial transcripts reflects 

that the defense offered no objection to the admission of the photographs. 

(See N.T. Trial 8/05/13, at 8-11, 50-51, 55-56; N.T. Trial 8/06/13, at 43-

46). “Such failure to offer a timely and specific objection results in waiver of 

this claim.” Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 671 (Pa. Super. 

2007), appeal denied, 932 A.2d 74 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted) (concluding 

that appellant waived challenge to admission of photographs where defense 

offered no objection to their admission at trial). 

Moreover, even if Appellant had properly preserved this issue, it would 

not merit relief. 

We will affirm a trial court’s admission of photographs 

absent an abuse of discretion. Further,

When considering the admissibility of 

photographs of a homicide victim, which by their 

very nature can be unpleasant, disturbing, and even 

brutal, the trial court must engage in a two-step 

analysis:

First a [trial] court must determine whether 

the photograph is inflammatory. If not, it may be 

admitted if it has relevance and can assist the jury’s 
J-A30042-14

- 14 -

understanding of the facts. If the photograph is 

inflammatory, the trial court must decide whether or 

not the photographs are of such essential evidentiary 

value that their need clearly outweighs the likelihood 

of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors.

Commonwealth v. Spell, 28 A.3d 1274, 1279 (Pa. 2011) (citations 

omitted). 

Here, the trial court determined that the photographs did not depict 

gruesome damage to the victim’s body and were not inflammatory. (See 

Trial Ct. Op., at 17). It stated that the “photographs were admissible as 

relevant evidence . . . [and] were necessary to assist the jury in 

understanding the facts of this case[.]” (Id.). Further, the court “reduced 

any potential for prejudice caused by the photographs by . . . instructing the 

jury it should not allow the photographs to inflame it.” Spell, supra at 

1280 (citation omitted); see also Burno, supra at 977; (N.T. Trial, 

8/08/13, at 112). After review of the photographs, we discern no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s decision to admit them. See Spell, supra at 

1279. Accordingly, Appellant’s fourth issue would not merit relief, even if it 

we did not deem it waived. 

In Appellant’s fifth and final issue, he challenges the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 45-47). Specifically, he 

claims that the trial court impermissibly relied on his lack of remorse in 

sentencing him to the statutory maximum sentence, under circumstances 

where he continues to maintain his innocence. (See id. at 29, 46-47). He 
J-A30042-14

- 15 -

also claims that the sentence constitutes too severe a punishment because 

the court failed to consider mitigating factors such as his age and capacity 

for rehabilitation. (See id. at 46). This issue does not merit relief. 

Our standard of review in sentencing matters is well settled:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of 

the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of 

discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on appeal, 

the trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion 

unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 85 A.3d 481 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). 

However, “[t]he right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1220 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (citation omitted). 

Before we reach the merits of this [issue], we must engage 

in a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appeal is 

timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether 

Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the reasons 

relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the 

discretionary aspects of sentence [See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)]; and 

(4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question 

that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code. . . . 

[I]f the appeal satisfies each of these four requirements, we will 

then proceed to decide the substantive merits of the case.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329-30 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). 
J-A30042-14

- 16 -

In the instant case, Appellant has complied with the first three 

requirements because he filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved his claim 

in a timely post-sentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in 

his brief. See id.

With respect to the fourth requirement:

The determination of what constitutes a substantial 

question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A 

substantial question exits only when the appellant advances a 

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were 

either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the 

Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms 

which underlie the sentencing process.

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 77 A.3d 1258 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“[T]his Court has held on numerous occasions that a claim of 

inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial 

question for our review.” Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 

(Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we conclude Appellant’s 

argument that the trial court failed to give adequate consideration to 

mitigating factors such as his age and ability to rehabilitate does not present 

a substantial question appropriate for our review. See id. However, “[t]his 

Court has recognized that a claim that a sentence is excessive because the 

trial court relied on an impermissible factor raises a substantial question.” 

Commonwealth v. Crork, 966 A.2d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal 

denied, 981 A.2d 217 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted). Therefore, we turn to 
J-A30042-14

- 17 -

the merits of Appellant’s claim that his sentence is excessive because the 

court impermissibly relied on his lack of remorse. 

“[I]t is undoubtedly appropriate for a trial court to consider a 

defendant’s lack of remorse as a factor at sentencing, provided that it is 

specifically considered in relation to protection of the public, the gravity of 

the offense, and the defendant’s rehabilitative needs.” Commonwealth v. 

Bowen, 975 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). 

Here, at the sentencing hearing, the court heard a victim impact 

statement and argument from both parties, and it acknowledged the content 

of the PSI report. (See N.T. Sentencing, 11/22/13, at 3-10). It explained 

its rationale for the sentence as follows:

. . . I have given this considerable thought since the day of 

your trial. While it wasn’t a long trial[,] it was very involved [] 

and I was taken by the fact I was never involved in a homicide 

trial where the defendant had as much support throughout the 

trial as you did. . . . [E]very day you had 5 to 6 to 7 people 

come here on your behalf. That speaks volumes for you. I don’t 

think that you are without value. I think you can be 

rehabilitated but in the absence of your admission to this crime 

I’m going to be forced, anything less than 20 to 40 years would 

not be warranted. You are convicted of a drug killing in the City 

of Easton. The evidence was clear that you knew of a 

transaction by another individual in your turf and you killed that 

person. I don’t see any possible way for me to impose anything 

but the maximum sentence given those facts . . . . Had there 

been any other redeeming factors here other than I don’t take 

that lightly with his family support, I watched him through this 

trial and his respectful demeanor and the way he comported 

himself, but without—he has not taken blame for this yet. He 

professes his innocence and I understand that. But based on the 

evidence before me I have a drug killing that occurred, it was 

deliberate, in the City of Easton, Northampton County, 
J-A30042-14

- 18 -

Pennsylvania. The taxpayers of this county will be outraged if I 

don’t impose the maximum sentence. And I believe the

maximum sentence is warranted here based on these facts. 

(Id. at 11-12). 

Thus, the record reflects that the trial court did not justify its statutory 

maximum sentence based solely on Appellant’s lack of remorse. Rather, the 

court considered this factor as one of numerous sentencing factors, and it 

specifically acknowledged Appellant’s right to maintain his innocence. The 

court’s comments at sentencing indicate that, after observing Appellant 

throughout the trial, it considered his lack of remorse “in relation to 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and [his] rehabilitative 

needs.” Bowen, supra at 1125. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Appellant’s sentence. See

Clarke, supra at 1287. Appellant’s final issue on appeal does not merit 

relief.6 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

____________________________________________

6 We note that a review of the record belies Appellant’s claim that the trial 

court failed to consider mitigating circumstances such as his age and ability 

for rehabilitation. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 46). The court specifically took 

note of Appellant’s young age and his capacity for rehabilitation. (See N.T. 

Sentencing, 11/22/13, at 9, 11). Further, because the court reviewed a PSI 

report, “we can assume [it] was aware of relevant information regarding 

[Appellant’s] character and weighed those considerations along with 

mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Rhoades 8 A.3d 912, 

919 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied, 

132 S. Ct. 1746 (2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Therefore, even if we were to determine that Appellant’s claim did raise a 

substantial question, we would find no merit to it. 
J-A30042-14

- 19 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/4/2015