alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Local Rule 47.5 provides: “The publication of opinions that have

no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the

basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on

the public and burdens on the legal profession.” Pursuant to that

Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 95-20305

Summary Calendar

THOMAS G. MOORE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Department 

of Health & Human Services,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(CA-H-94-3118)

(September 25, 1995)

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Thomas Moore appeals the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the Commissioner affirming the denial of

Moore’s application for disability insurance benefits. We affirm.
2

The ALJ rejected Appellant’s claim at the fifth step of the

well-known sequential process (the impairment prevents the claimant

from doing any other substantial gainful work which exists in the

national economy). 42 U.S.C. § 432(d)(2)(A); Selders v. Sullivan,

914 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1990). The ALJ found that Moore

retained the residual functional capacity to perform medium work.

Moore argues that the ALJ’s conclusion is in conflict with the

finding that Moore could not stand or walk more than four hours per

day. Moore relies on Social Security Ruling 83-10, the “Vocational

Expert’s Handbook” published by the Department of Labor, which

states that “a full range of medium work requires standing or

walking, off and on, for a total of approximately six hours in an

eight hour day. . . .” We construe this as a contention that the

record does not contain substantial evidence supporting the

decision. 

The flaw in Appellant’s argument is that the ALJ did not find

that Moore could perform a full range of medium work. He found

that Moore could perform medium work subject to the specific

limitation that he stand or walk no more than four hours per day,

limited to one hour at a time. The vocational expert was presented

with a hypothetical question describing precisely all of Moore’s

limitations and he testified that Moore could perform as a

production line welder, production worker, food preparer, assembler

in any industry, or a marker in any industry, and that these

positions existed “by the many thousands” in the national economy,

but were “limited to the hundreds per job” in the regional economy.
3

Since Moore does not challenge the ALJ’s findings relating to his

limitations, the ALJ was correct in relying on the expert’s

testimony that, subject to those specific limitations, Moore was

capable of performing relevant work available in the workplace. 

AFFIRMED.
|                                     |   | Year Ended December 31, |   |
|------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|                                     |   | 2014                    |   |   | 2013 |   |   | 2012 |   |   | 2011 |   |   | 2010 |   |
| Earnings:                                |   |                    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Net income                               |   | $                       | 1,450  |   |   | $ | 828 |   |   | $ | 830 |   |   | $ | 858 |   |   | $ | 1,113 |   |
| Income tax provision                     |   |                    | 345    |   |   |   | 268 |   |   |   | 237 |   |   |   | 440 |   |   |   | 547 |   |
| Fixed charges                            |   |                    | 1,206  |   |   |   | 1,012 |   |   |   | 931 |   |   |   | 919 |   |   |   | 850 |   |
| Pre-tax earnings required to cover the   |   |                    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| preferred stock dividend of consolidated |   |                    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| subsidiaries                             |   |                    | (15    | ) |   |   | (16 | ) |   |   | (15 | ) |   |   | (17 | ) |   |   | (16 | ) |
| Total earnings                           |   | $                       | 2,986  |   |   | $ | 2,092 |   |   | $ | 1,983 |   |   | $ | 2,200 |   |   | $ | 2,494 |   |
| Fixed charges:                           |   |                    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Interest on short-term borrowings and    |   |                    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| long-term debt, net                      |   | $                       | 1,140  |   |   | $ | 942 |   |   | $ | 859 |   |   | $ | 846 |   |   | $ | 766 |   |
| Interest on capital leases               |   |                    | 6      |   |   |   | 7 |   |   |   | 9 |   |   |   | 16 |   |   |   | 18 |   |
| AFUDC debt                               |   |                    | 45     |   |   |   | 47 |   |   |   | 48 |   |   |   | 40 |   |   |   | 50 |   |
| Pre-tax earnings required to cover the   |   |                    |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| preferred stock dividend of consolidated |   |                    | 15     |   |   |   | 16 |   |   |   | 15 |   |   |   | 17 |   |   |   | 16 |   |
| Total fixed charges                      |   | $                       | 1,206  |   |   | $ | 1,012 |   |   | $ | 931 |   |   | $ | 919 |   |   | $ | 850 |   |
| Ratios of earnings to fixed charges      |   |                    | 2.48   |   |   |   | 2.07 |   |   |   | 2.13 |   |   |   | 2.39 |   |   |   | 2.93 |   |
Exhibit 28.3

Report of Independent Accountants


March 15, 2000

Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., Servicer,
and
Yasuda Bank and Trust Company, Trustee


We have examined management's assertion that, as of December 31, 1999, the Chase
Manhattan Bank USA, N.A. maintained an effective system of internal control over
servicing of securitized credit card receivables, included in the accompanying
Management Report on Internal Control over Servicing of Securitized Credit Card
Receivables.

Our examination was made in accordance with standards established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and, accordingly included
obtaining an understanding of internal control over servicing of securitized
credit card receivables, testing and evaluating the design and operating
effectiveness of internal control, and such other procedures as we considered
necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our examination provides a
reasonable basis for our opinion.

Because of inherent limitations in internal control, errors or irregularities
may occur and not be detected. Also, projections of any evaluation of the system
of internal control over servicing of securitized credit card receivables to
future periods are subject to the risk that internal control may become
inadequate because of changes in conditions, or that the degree of compliance
with the policies or procedures may deteriorate.

In our opinion, management's assertion that, as of December 31, 1999, the Chase
Manhattan Bank USA, N.A. maintained an effective system of internal control over
servicing of securitized credit card receivables, is fairly stated, in all
material respects, based upon the criteria for effective internal control
described in "Internal Control - Integrated Framework" issued by the Committee
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.

/s/ PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

GRIER MATTHEWS, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D17-3048

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed June 26, 2019. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for 

Hillsborough County; Kimberly K. 

Fernandez, Judge.

Grier Matthews, Pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and C. Suzanne Bechard, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for 

Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

NORTHCUTT, KELLY, and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.
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###### Department of Health and Human Services

###### National Institutes of Health

Pursuant to section 1009 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.

The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), title 5 U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

*Name of Committee:*                         National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences Special Emphasis Panel; Review of Limited Competition CTSA R03 Applications.                    

*Date:*                         October 21, 2024.                    

*Time:*                         10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.                    

*Agenda:*                         To review and evaluate grant applications.                    

*Place:*                         National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences, National Institutes of Health, 9609 Medical Center Drive, Rockville, MD 20892.                    

*Contact Person:*                         Victor Henriquez, Ph.D., Scientific Review Officer, Office of Scientific Review, National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences, National Institutes of Health, 9609 Medical Center Drive, Suite 1E504, Bethesda, MD 20892, (301) 435-0813,                         *henriquv@mail.nih.gov.*

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.859, Pharmacology, Physiology, and Biological Chemistry Research; 93.350, B—Cooperative Agreements; 93.859, Biomedical Research and Research Training, National Institutes of Health, HHS)

Dated: September 4, 2024.

David W. Freeman,

Supervisory Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.

[FR Doc. 2024-20369 Filed 9-9-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
#### PARADIS et al. v. STATE.

No. 20094.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 22, 1939.

Rehearing Denied April 12, 1939.

Rogers & Spurlock, of Fort Worth, for appellants.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

On July 3, 1936, an indictment against G. D. Paradis was returned into the Criminal District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, charging him with forgery in one count and with passing a forged instrument in another count. On the 14th day of August, 1936, Paradis entered into an appearance bond in the sum of one thousand dollars with J. A. Petty and J. E. Petty as sureties. On the 11th day of December, 1936, the case against Paradis was called for trial. He failed to appear and judgment nisi was entered against him and his sureties on his bond. Upon proper notice the judgment nisi was made final on' the 29th day of June, 1938, against Paradis and J. A. Petty, from which judgment the said Petty brings this appeal.

The evidence heard to determine whether the judgment nisi should he made final is substantially the same as that set out in cause No. 20109, Henry Darwin Caldwell et al. v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 126 S.W.2d 654, this day decided, and appellants’ contention in this case is the same as that made in the case mentioned; viz: that the forfeiture was not taken in compliance with the statute.

The same reason which led to the judgment of affirmance, in cause No. 20109 is operative here and results in the affirmance of the present case, and it is so ordered.

On Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

After carefully re-examining the record in the light of appellants’ motion for rehearing, we are constrained to adhere to the conclusion expressed in the original opinion.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
#### DE-VELIN v. CARTER.

No. 2174.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

Jan. 4, 1940.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1940.

*748A. Jack Pope, Jr., of Corpus Christi, for appellant.

J. Marvin Ericson, of Corpus Christi, for appellee.

ALEXANDER, Justice.

This suit was brought by Bob Porky De-Velin against Hendrick Carter for the sum of $504.00, alleged to be due the plaintiff as a watchman for guarding a drilling rig belonging to the defendant. The defendant denied employing the plaintiff and claimed that he had been employed by one Coward, who seemed to be interested in the lease where the' drilling rig was situated. The jury found that the defendant had not employed plaintiff to guard the drilling rig, and judgment was entered for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff’s sole complaint is that the defendant was permitted to elicit certain alleged improper evidence from plaintiff on cross-examination. The plaintiff testified, without objection, that prior to the date of the trial he had been employed as a physical educator, training fighters and wrestlers and dancers at a dancing marathon. The defendant then asked the witness: “How long had you been working at that marathon over there?” to which plaintiff objected on the ground that it was irrelevant and immaterial. The question was not answered. In view of the fact that the witness had previously testified without objection to his connection with the marathon, his rights were in nowise prejudiced by permitting the defendant to inquire how long he had been engaged in such business, particularly where the question was never answered.

Plaintiff also complained because the defendant was permitted, on cross-examination, to ask plaintiff if at one time he had had a medical doctor’s license, to which the witness answered that- he had. S.ome further questions were asked as to when he quit practicing medicine, ■ but the witness was unable to remember the date.There is nothing- particularly inflammatory about this testimony such as to require a reversal of the judgment.

The plaintiff voluntarily testified, on direct examination, without- objection from either party, that on the day prior to the trial he had traveled from Bruni, Texas, to Corpus Christi, Texas, where the case was on trial, on a freight train. On cross-examination counsel for defendant asked him if he did not know that it was a violation of the law for him'to ride a freight train. The plaintiff objected on the ground that the witness was not qualified to answer the question. The court overruled the objection, but the question was never answered. Apparently, the plaintiff volunteered the information about his having ridden a freight train for the purpose of calling attention to his poverty and thereby eliciting the sympathy of the jury. Having volunteered the information, he has no right to complain if defendant was permitted to make further inquiry into the same matter.

It is readily apparent that no reversible error is presented by any of the assignments above discussed. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.
#### OLIVARES v. STATE.

No. 17036.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 21, 1934.

Wiseman & Murray, of Eloresville, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

( HAWKINS, Judge.

Conviction is for operating a commercial motor vehicle which was over the gross weight permitted by law. Punishment was assessed at a fine of $25.

The information found in the record recites that it is based upon the affidavit of a named party, which affidavit is “hereto attached and made a part hereof.” There is no complaint attached to the information, or, if so, it is not shown from the record, and no complaint appears anywhere in the record before this court. In such condition no jurisdiction is shown in the county court. See article 415, O. C. P. (1925); Wadgymar v. State, 21 Tex. App. 459, 2 S. W. 768; Diltz v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. R. 127, 119 S. W. 92; Day v. State, 105 Tex. Cr. R. 117, 286 S. W. 1107. Other authorities are annotated in note 5 under said article 415, vol. 1, Vernon’s Ann. Tex. C. O. P. No complaint appearing as a predicate for the information, it will be necessary for this court to reverse and direct the dismissal of the prosecution.

However, if the record could be amended to show a proper complaint, a reversal would be called for on the following grounds: Appellant was operating a truck, the license for which was issued to the Mead Ranch. Two highway officers, Miller and Rohatsch, stopped the truck on a public road. If Ro-hatseh was present at the trial, he wag not used as a witness. Miller testified that he weighed one side of the truck with portable scales; that Rohatsch weighed the other side, and that witness knew nothing about the reading of the scales on Rohatsch’s side of the truck, except what Rohatsch told him it weighed, and that, from his actual knowledge as to what one side weighed and from what Rohatsch told him the other side weighed, the truck weighed 9,500 pounds gross.

Appellant, by bill of exception," objected to the testimony of Miller based, in part, upon what Rohatsch had told Mm, on the ground that the same was hearsay. There seems to be no escape from'the fact that it was hearsay, and that appellant’s objection should have been sustained.

Appellant complained in his motion for new trial of misconduct of the jury-. We do not discuss the matter at length, although.it presents a serious question. It will not likely occur upon another trial, and it is necessary to reverse the case upon other grounds.

The judgment is reversed, and the prosecution ordered dismissed under the present record.
#### GRADY et ux. v. GLEN WALKER, COLLETT & RIGG.

No. 12892.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

Jan. 6, 1934.

Polk & Sansorn, of Fort Worth, and Felix Atwood, of Ennis, for appellants.

Todd & Crowley, of Fort Worth, for ap-pellee.

LATTIMORE, Justice.

Appellee sued appellants, husband and wife, alleging:

> “That plaintiff is an insurance company and a partnership composed of the aforesaid members, with its office and place of business in Fort Worth, Tarrant Comity, Texas; that defendants, and each of them, are residents of Tarrant County, Texas.

> “That heretofore, towit, on the 19th day of September, 1931, and on divers days before that time, plaintiff, at the special instance.and request of the defendant, W. R. Grady, wrote insurance on certain property, both real and personal, the same being either the community property of defendants' or the separate property of the defendant Paralee Grady, and issued and delivered to the defendants policies covering said property, at the several times specified in the account, said account being marked ‘Exhibit A’ and hereto annexed and made a part of 'this petition (such exhibit also setting out various credits allowed defendants on said account).

> “That in consideration of the plaintiff’s issuing such policies, the defendant W. R. Grady then and there promised to pay plaintiff, on demand, certain premiums in amounts set out in' the account marked ‘Exhibit A’ and attached hereto; that plaintiff has often requested defendants to pay said sums of money, and that defendants have not paid such amounts, except such sums as are shown in ‘Exhibit A’ as having been paid and duly credited on defendants’ account; that defendants have refused and still refuse to pay said account, to the plaintiff’s damage in the amount of $594.62.

> “Wherefore plaintiff prays that defendants be cited to answer this petition and that plaintiff have judgment for $594.62, as aforesaid, together with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on each item set out in the account marked ‘Exhibit A’ from the time that each such item became due and payable, and for such other relief, general and special, in law and in equity, as to which plaintiff may be entitled.” t

The exhibit contained a tabulation headed as follows and contained lengthy hieroglyphics ; a sample below quoted:

> Amount "Date Co. No. Location Credit Debit

> 10 — 14 Queen 1614 Hhgs. 2102 2102 Pembroke Dr. 2,600 27.50

> 12 — 31 Annie E. Poster Account 62.60"

Even if the exhibit was sufficient to state definitely what is meant thereby, and we think it was not, the petition is insufficient, attempting as it does to embody fundamental allegations by reference to exhibits. See Durham v. Foust (Tex. Civ. App.) 64 S.W.(2d) 1027, and many cases there cited.

Certainly the allegations of the petition ias to the community or separate character of the property insured would not support a judgment against each the husband and wife for all the premiums.

We do not pass on the serious question of whether a suit by a partnership can be thus pleaded.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JU LY 29, 2014

NO. 03

- 14

- 00168

- CV

G. N. E.

- A., a/k/a G. N. E., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 126TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE JONES, JUSTICES PEMBERTON A ND ROSE

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE JONES

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the tr i a l court on M arch 7, 2014. Having

reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the C ourt holds that there was no reversible error

in the trial court’s judgment . Therefore, the C ourt affirms the trial court’s judgment

. Because

appellant is indigent and unable to p ay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.