### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Se pte m be r 20, 200 5 S es sio n WALT ER BAI LEY, ET AL 

### . v. COUNTY OF SH ELB Y, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-04-0550- 3 D.J. Alissand ratos, Chancellor

No. W2005-01508-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Novem ber 22, 2005

Thi s ap p ea l fr o ma d ec l ar at o ryj u d gm en tac t i o n re q u i re s u s t o d et er m i n e w h et h ert er ml i m its imposed on She lby Cou nty Com mis sio ne rs by the 19 94 a me nd me nts to the She lby Cou nty Cha rt e r, Artic le I I , section 2.03(G) , are permissible under T ennesse e Code Annotated § 5-1-210 and, if so, whether § 5-1-210 is unconstitutional under the Tenne ssee Const itution, Article VI I , Section 1. We hold that te r m l im it s ar e p e r mi tt e d a s “ q u a li f ic a ti o n s ” u n d e r

Tenn e s s e e Co d e A n n o tate d § 5

- 1

- 2 1 0 ( 4 )

. We fu rthe r h oldthat T e nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d § 5- 1- 21 0( 4) , in so far as it pe rm its c ou nty c ha rt e rs to prescri be the qua lifications of member s of the county leg islative body , is void as unconstituti onal under A rticle VII , Section 1, of the Tenne ssee Constitution. W e ac cording ly vacate the judg ment of the trial c ourt, awa

rd summary

judgme nt to Pl aintiffs/ Appellants, and e njoin enforc ement of section 2.03(G) of the Shelby CountyCharter

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t V ac at e d; and Rem anded
D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., jo in e d

. W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., filed a dissenting opinion.
Allan J . Wade, L ori Hac kleman Patterson and Br andy S. Parrish, Memphis, Tennessee , for the appellants, Walter B ailey , J ulian Bolton and Cleo Kir k.
L eo Be arma n, J r., J ason A. Strain, Memphis, T ennesse e, for the appe llees, County of Shelby , Shelby Cou nty El e c tio n Co mm is sio n, Gr e g ory M. Du c ke tt, Ric ha

rdL . H old e n, Nanc y e E. Hi ne s, O. C. Pleasant, Jr., and Maura

Bla ck Sullivan.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter , Michae l E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral, a nd Ann L ouise Vix , Senior Counsel, for the Interve nor, State of Te nnessee
.T en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated § 2

- 1 0

- 1 0 2 (3 ) p ro vid es: 1

“C a n d id a te ” m e a n s a n ind ivid u a l wh o ha s m a d e a fo rm a l an n o u n c e m e n t o f ca n d id a c y o r w h o is qual i f i ed un der t he l aw of t hi s s t at e t o s eek nomi nat i on for el ect i on or el ect i ons t o publ i c of f i ce, or has recei ved co nt ri b ut i o ns o r mad e exp end i t ures excep t fo r i nci d ent al exp end i t ures t o de t erm i ne i f one shal l be a cand i d at e, or has gi ven co nsent for a cam p ai gn c o m m i t t ee t o recei ve co nt ri b ut i o ns o r make
e x p e n d iture s w ith a v ie w to b rin g ing a b o u t t h e ind ivid u a l' s n o m ina tio n fo r e le c tio n o r e le c tio n to sta te p u b lic o ff

ic e [.]

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 2

- 1 0

- 1 0 2 (3)(20 0 3 & Sup p 20 0 4 ).

-2- OP IN ION
T h e f a c t s i n th i s c a s e ar e u n d i s p u t e d a n d t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d ar e i s s u e s o f l a w
. W a l t e r B a i l e y, Julia n Bo lto n, a nd Cle o Kir k (c oll e c tiv e ly , “A pp e llants ” ) ar e e le c te d membe rs of theShe lby

Cou nty Boa rd of Commissioners (“the B oard of Commi ssioners”)

. They also are candidates, as def ined by Tenne ssee Code Annotated 2-10-102( 3), for the Boa rd of Commi ssioners in the elec tion scheduled 1 to be held in A ug ust 2006. Under Article I I , section 2.03(G) of the Shelby CountyC h ar t er (“the Cha rt e r” ), the y

wi ll b e ine lig ibl e to b e e le c te d to or to hol d the of fi c e of Com mis sio ne r w he n th e ir curr ent terms expire.
On Marc h 22, 2004, Appellants filed a d ec l ar at o ry judgme nt action ag ainst the County of S h e l b y, th e S h e l b y C o u n t y E l e c t i o n C o m m i s s i o n , G r e g o r y M

. D u c k e t t , R i c h ar d L

. H o l d e n , N a n c ye E. H in e s , O

. C. Pl e a s a n t, Jr

. , a n d M au r a B la c k Su ll iv a n ( c o ll e c ti v e ly , “ th e Co u n ty ” ) inth e Shelby County Chance ry Court. I n their complaint, Appe llants sought a de clar ation that Article II , section 2.03(G) of

the Charter , which imp o s es a l i m i t of two consec utive four- y ear terms on the Shelby Count y M ay o r a n d Bo ar d o f C o m m i s s i o n er s , i s u n l aw fu l u n d erT en n es s ee C o d e A n n o t at ed § 5 -1-21- 201, et. seq. , and void as unc ons t i t u t i o n al under Article V I I , Section 1, of the Te nnessee Constit ution. They

further soug ht an injunction enjoining the County from enf orcing the Charter provision. The parties stipulated t o t he fa cts, filed cr oss-motions for summary judgme nt, and sti pu late d th a t th e su mma ry jud g me nt h e ari ng c ou ld b e tr e a te d a s a no n- jury tria l ontheme ri ts.
Th e tria l c ou rt

de te rm ine d th a t, b e c aus e ha vin g se rv e d tw o c on se c uti ve fo ur-y e ar t e rm s rende rs a pr ospective c andidate i n el i gi ble for of fice , term limits relate to the qualifications for holding of

fice . It held, there fore , that the Charter ’s impositi on of term limits is permissi ble under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 5-1-210( 4). It also determined that Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 5-1- 210(4) is not invalid under Article VI I , Section 1, of t he Tennessee Constit ution. Acc ording ly , the trial court de nied injunctive re lief and a war ded summary judgme nt to the C ounty on J une 23, 2005. Appellants filed a

timely notice of a

ppeal to this Court on J une 23, 2005. On June 28, 2005, Appellants filed a motion in the Tennessee Supreme C ourt pursuant to Tennessee Code A nnotatedT en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated § 1 6

- 3

- 2 0 1 (d ) p ro vid es: 2
( d)( 1) T he s upr eme cour t may , upon t he mo t i on of an y par t y , as s ume j ur i s di ct i on over an un deci ded cas e i n w hi ch a n ot i ce of appeal o r an ap pl i cat i on f or i nt er l ocut ory o r ex t r aordi nar y appeal i s f i l ed bef or e an y i n t er medi at e s t at e appe l l at e cou r t a f t er J u n e 22, 1992. (2 ) T h e p ro v isio n s o f sub d ivisio n (d )( 1 ) a p p ly o n ly t o c a se s o f un u su a l p u b lic im p o rta n c e in whi ch t her e i s a s peci al ne ed for e xpedi t ed deci s i on an d whi ch i nv ol ve:

(A ) S t ate taxe s; ( B ) T h e r i g h t t o h ol d or r et ai n pu bl i c of f i ce ; or © I s s ues of

cons t i t ut i onal l aw.
T enn. C o d e A nn. § 1 6

- 3

- 2 0 1 (d)(Sup p
. 20 0 4 ). -3- § 16-3-201( d), reque sting that the supreme court assume jurisdiction of the a ppeal on the g rounds 2 that it is a case of unusual public importance involving constitutional issues. They further moved the court to g rant an expedited a ppeal in or der to a ssure that the issues would be dec ided in advanc e of the Fe bruary 16, 2006, filing and qualifying de adlines for the next election. The supre me court denied Appe llants’ motion on J uly 13, 2005. On J uly

28, 2 005, Appellants filed a motion for an expedited appea l in this Court. The County consente d to the moti o n , and this Court gr anted Appellants’ motion on Aug ust 3, 2005.
This Court heard or al arg ument of t he matter on September 20, 2005. We vacate the aw ard of su mma ry jud g me nt to the Cou nty

a nda wa rdsu mma ry jud g me nt t o A pp e llants . We a dd iti on a lly enjoin the County

from enf orcing section 2.03(G) of the Charter.
ISSU ES P RE SEN TED
Th e iss ue raise d f

or ou r r e vie w, a s p re se nte d b y Ap pe llants is: Whether Shelby

CountyCharter , Article II , § 2.03(G), w hich provides that no Cou nty May or or Cou nty Com mis sio ne r is eli g ibl e to b e e le c te d to or to h oldthe ir of fi c e s fo r mor e than tw o c on se c uti ve fo ur -y e ar te rm s, is i lle g a l a ndvo id b e c aus e it contra venes Te nnessee Constit ution, Article VII , Section 1.
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW This issue presente d for our revie w is an issue of law . Our re view of a trial court’ s c on c lus ion s o n matte rs of la w i s de novo , with no presumption of correc tness. Tay lor v . F e ze ll , 158 S.W .3d 352, 357 (Tenn. 2005) . We likewise revie w the trial c ourt’s applica t i o n o f t h e l aw to the fa c ts de novo , w ithno pr e su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss
. State v. Thacke r , 164 S.W .3d 208, 248 (Tenn. 2005).Br annon v . Count y of She l by , 900 S. W

. 2d 30, 33 n. 6 (T en n
. C t

. A pp. 1994) ( t ak i n g ju di ci al not i ce of t h e Sh el by 3 C o u n ty C h a r te r) ; See Ci t y of M emphi s v . Int ’ l Bhd. of El ec . Wor ke r s U ni on, Loc al 1288 , 54 5 S.W

. 2 d 98 , 10 1 (T enn. 1976) ( t ak i n g j u di ci al n ot i ce of pr i v at e ac t s of

t h e G en er al As s embl y a u t h or i zi n g j oi n t c i t y - cou n t y a g en ci es i n Sh el by C o unt y ). -4- AN AL YSI S
Th e iss ue raise d fo r ou r re vie w, a s we pe rc e ive it, re qu ir e s a tw o- pa rt a na ly sis . F ir st, wemus t determine whether

Article II , section 2.03(G) (“se ction 2.03(G)” ) of the C harte r is permissible under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 5-1- 210. T h i s d et er m ination turns on whether term limits are a constitutionallyimpermissible restric tion of the four -y ear terms to which constitutional office rs ar e e le c te d, or

are a n e le me nt of qu a lif

ic a tio ns wh ic h ma y be pr e sc ri be d by thele g isl a tur e . Se c on d, if term limits relate to the qualification of a candidate, sec tion 2.03(G) does not doe s not contrave ne the express provisions of § 5-1-210( 4) of the Code, and we must de termine whet h er § 5-1-210( 4) violates Article V I I , Section 1, of the Te nnessee Constit ution. We beg in our an al y s is by noting that, a lthough Appe llants rely on various portions of the Cha rt e r i n s uppo rt of the ir

arg ume nt, there c or d d oe s n ot c on ta in a c op y of theShe lby

Cou nty Charter . We further

note, however, that the parties do not dispute that Shelby Countyhas a c harte r form of g overnme nt, or that in 1994 the Shelby CountyCharter

was a mended by

ref ere ndum of the voters of Shelby

Countyto include sec tion 2.03(G). The p arties a lso do not disput e that sec tion 2. 03 (G ) p ro vid e s: No County

May or nor any

member of the Board of County Commi ssioners s hall be elig ible to be elec ted to or hold the office of County May or or County

Commi ssioner for more than t wo consecutive four-y ear terms. Provided, howe ver, if an individual is a pp oin te d to fi ll a n un fi lle d te rm e ith e r f or May or or Cou nty Com mis sio ne r, thi s te rm sh a ll n ot b e c ou nte d a s p art of thetw o c on se c uti ve e le c te d te rm s.
Acc ording ly , w e ta

k e ju d ic ia l n o ti c e th a t S h e lb y Co u n ty u ti li ze s a c h arte r f o r m o f g o v e r n me n t a s authorized by

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 5-1- 201, et. seq. , pursuant to the Te nnessee Co n s ti tution, Article V I I , Section 1 (“A rticle VII ”); that it s Charter became effec tive on September 1, 1986; a nd that the Charter

was a mended in 1994 to include, inte r a lia , s ect ion 2. 03 (G ). B e c aus e it i s a g overnme ntal document whose exis tence is neither in doubt nor di sputed and whose contents may be re adily known by

all, we a dditionallycan and do take judicial notice of the Shelby CountyCharter i n i t s e n t i r e t y. 3
Va lidi ty of se c ti on 2 .0 3( G ) u nde rth e Te nne sse e Co de
Artic le VII , Se c tio n 1 , o f the Te nn e sse e Con sti tutiona s a me nd e d in19 78 pr ov ide s: The qua lified voter s o f ea ch county shall elec t for terms of four y ear s a leg islative body , a county

executive, a Sheriff, a T rustee, a R egi s t er , a County Clerk and an-5-

Ass e s s o r o f Pr o p e rty

. T h e ir q u a li f ic a ti o n s a n d d u ti e s s h a ll b e p r e s c r ib e d bythe Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y . A ny

of fi c e r s ha ll b e re mov e d f

or ma lf e a sa nc e or ne g le c t of

du ty a s p r e s c r i b e d b y t h e G e n e r a l A s s e mb l y. The leg islative body

shall be composed of

repr esentatives from distri c ts in the county as dra wn by t h e countyleg islative body pursuant to statutes ena cted by the Gene r a l A s s e mb ly

. D is tric ts s h a ll b e r e ap p o rti o n e d a t l e a s t e v e r y te n y e ar s b a sed upon the m ost rece nt fede ral c ensus. The le g islative body shall not ex cee d twenty -five me mbers, and no mor e than thre e re prese ntatives shall be ele cted f rom a district. Any

county org anized under the consolidated g ov ernment provisions of Artic le XI , Se c tio n 9, of this Co ns tituti on sh a ll b e e xemp t f ro m ha vin g a

c ou nty executive and a

county leg islative body

as desc ribed in this para g raph. The Ge nera l Assembly

may provide a lternat e forms of county g overnme nt including the rig ht to charter and the manner by which a ref ere ndum may

be ca lled. T h e n e w f

o r mo f g o v e r n m e n ts h a l l r e p l a c e t h e e x i s t i n g f o r m i f a p p r o v e d b y a ma jority of thevo te rs in the re fe re nd um. No of fi c e ho lde r' s c ur

re nt te rm sh a ll be dim ini sh e d b y theratif ic a tio n o f this article

. Tenn. Const. art. VII , § 1.
Under the Tenne ssee Const itution, the establishm ent of a county charter form of g overnme nt i s p e r m i s s i b l e o n l y i n s o f

ar a s p r o v i d e d b y t h e G e n e r a l A s s e mb l y. County of Shelby v. M cW herter , 936 S.W .2d 923, 934 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) perm. app. de nied (Tenn. O ct. 28, 1996). The Ge nera l As se mbl y ha s p ro vid e d for the ri g ht of c ou nti e s to c ha rt e r a s a n a lte rn a tiv e fo rm of g ov e rn me nt i n Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 5-1- 201, et. seq. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 5-1-210 pr escribes the c on te nts of

a c ou nty c ha rt e r andpr ov ide s: The propose d county

charter shall provide : (1 ) F or thec re a tio n o f an a lte rn a tiv e fo rm of c ou nty g ov e rn me nt v e ste d w ith any and all powe rs which c ounties are , or may here af t er be, authorized or require d to exercise under the Constit ution and g ener al laws of the state of Te nnessee , and any a nd a ll pow e rs a nd du tie s of suc h co un ty wh ic h a rere qu ir e d o r a

uth orize d b y

private acts e ffe ctive on the date of ratification of such c harte r, as f ully and co m pletely

as though the power s werespecific ally enumer ated ther ein; (2 ) T hat su c h c ha

rt e re d c ou nty

g ov e rnme nt s ha ll b e a

pu bli c c or

po ratio n, wi th p erp et u al s u cc es s i o n , ca p ab l e o f s u i n g an d b ei n g s u ed , an d ca p ab l e o f p u rc h as i n g, rec eiving and holdi ng property , rea l and personal, and of selling , leasing or disposing of thesa me to the e xten t a s o the r c ou nti e s; (3) F or a c ounty

leg islative body , which shall be the leg islative body of the county and shall be g iven all the authority and func tions of the leg islative body of the county being chartere d, with suc h exceptions and with suc h additional authority as ma y be sp e c if ie d e lse wh e rein this pa

rt ;-6- (4) F or the siz e, method of election, qualification for holding of fice , method of re moval, and proc edure s of t he county leg islative body with such other pr ovisions with respec t to such body as ar e norma lly

related t o the org anization, powers and du tie s o f g ov e rn ing bo die s inc ou nti e s; (5) F or the a ssignment of

administrative and executive func tions to officers of the county g overnme nt, w hich office rs may be g iven, subject to such limitations as may be deemed appropriate or nece ssary , all or any part of the administrative and executive func tions possessed by the county

being ch ar t ere d and such a dditional power s and duties, not inconsistent with ge nera l law or the Const i t u t ion of Tenne ssee; (6) F or the na mes or titles of the administrative and executive office rs of the county g overnme nt, their qualifications, compensation, method of selection, tenur e, remova l, replac em ent and suc h other provisions with respe ct to such off icer s, not inconsist en t wi t h g ener al law, a s may be dee med nec essary

or appr opriate f

or the c ou nty g ov e rn me nt; (7) For such administrative departments, a g encie s, boards and commissions as may be nece ssary

and appr opriate to pe rform the functions of c ounty g overnme nt in an ef ficient a nd coordinated manner an d for this purpose f or the a lteration or abolition of exis ting county office s, departments, boards, commissions, ag encie s and functions, except wher e other wise prov i d ed in this part or prohibited by the Constit ution of Tennesse e; (8) F or the maintenance and ad m inistration of an ef fec tive civil service sy stem and of county employ ees' retire ment and pension sy stems and the reg ulation of such sy stems; provided, that nothing in this part or in a cha rter a dopted pursuant to t h i s part shall impair or diminish the rig hts and privileg es of the e x isting employ ees u n d er civil service or in the exis ting c ounty

employ ees' retire ment and pe ns ionsy ste ms. No thi ng in thi s subd ivi sio n sha ll b e c on str ue d to re qu ir e a ny

c ou nty to establish a civil servicesy stem or to establish and maintain its own re tirement and pe ns ionsy ste m in thea do pti on of a c ha rt e r f orm of c ou nty g ov e rn me nt; (9 ) F or theme tho d a ndpr oc e du re by which su c h c ha rt e r m a y su bs e qu e ntl y be a me nd e d; p ro vid e d, that no su c h ame nd me nt s ha ll b e e ff e c tiv e un til su bmi tte d to the qualified vote rs of the county and appr oved by

a majority

of those voter s voting there on; (10) F or such pr ocedur es, metho d s and steps as a re de termined to be ne c e ssa ry or app ro priate to e ff

e c tuate a tr a ns iti on fr om the ex ist ing c ou nty g ov e rn me nt t o th e c ha

rt e re d f orm of c ou nty g ov e rn me nt; (1 1) Suc h te rm s a ndpr ov isi on s a s a rec on ta ine d ina ny

private a c t w ith respe ct to any

county owned utility s u p p o rt ed by its own revenue s and oper ated, administered and manag ed pursua n t t o such private act; provide d, that such terms and provisions of the charter may subsequently

be ame nded pursuant to subdivi sion (9); and-7- (12) That the dut ies of t he constit utional county office rs as presc ribed by the g e ne ra l a sse mbl y

sh a ll not be dim ini sh e d und e r a co un ty c ha rt e r f orm of g ov e rn me nt; pr ov ide d, that su c h o ff

ic e rs ma y be g ive n a dd iti on a l du tie s u nd e r s uc h c ha rt e rs
. Tenn. Code Ann. § 5- 1-210(1998)

. The Tennessee Code mandates that a county charter must provide for a legislative branch. Te nn . Co de An n. § 5 -1 -2 10 (3 ). Se c tio n 2 .0 3( A) of the Cha rt e r pr ov ide s tha t th e B oa rdof Cou nty Com mis sio ne rs sh a ll b e thele g isl a tiv e br a nc h o f S he lby Cou nty . T he Cod e a lso pr ov ide s th a t a county chart er s h al l p ro vide for the “qualific ation for holding office. . . of the c ounty leg islative body . . . [.] ” Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-210( 4). The trial court de termined that the imposition of term limit s is within the purview of “qualific ation” and that, acc ording ly , section 2.03(G) of the Charter did not violate or expand upon the express authority g rante d by

the Code. Appellants submit that the Code does not authorize the imposition o f t er m l i m i ts. At oral arg ument, Appellants particularly emphasized their position that term limi ts are not a “qualific ation” as anticipated b ythe §5-1-210( 4), but rathe r ar e an inhe rent pa rt of the “ terms” of

constitutional office rs pre scribed by

Article V I I . They

further submit t hat Article VI I expressly reje cts limit ations on thenu mbe r o f t e rm s a con sti tut ion a l off ic e r ma y se rv e
. Ap pe llants c on te nd that, b e c aus e Artic le VI I provides that county

leg islative bodies shall be ele cted f or “te rms of four y ear s,” any limit ation on the number of

consec utive terms is constitutionallyinvalid. We disagr ee. Article V I I

mandates t h at t h e enume rate d constitutional officer s shall be elec ted by the qu a lif ie d v ote rs of

e a c h c ou nty , a ndthat th e y sh a ll b e e le c te d to fo ur -y e ar t e rm s. Con tr ary to Appellants’ a

rg ument, the plural “terms” does not mandate that eac h office r shall be e ntitled to be elec ted to more than one term. R at h er , t h e duration of eac h term to which e ach of fice r is elec ted shall be four y ear s. A l imitation on t he number of terms an office r may

serve consec utively

does not alter the duration of the te rm for w hich s/he is elec ted. A term is “[a] fix ed and de finite peri o d o f t i m e[

. ]” Blac k’s L aw Dic tionary 1470 (6 ed.

th 19 90 ). A t e rm of of

fi c e is “the pe ri od du ri ng wh ic h e le c te d o ff ic e r o r a pp oin te e is e nti tle d to ho ld office , perf

orm its functions, and enjoy its privileg es and emoluments.” Id. at 1471. Onceelec ted, a constitutional office r is en t i t led to serve one term of four y ear s and may be re moved only

“for malfea sance or neg lect of duty as presc ribed by the Gene ral Assembly .” Tenn. Const. art. V I I , § 1.

A q ua lif ic a tio n, on theoth e r h a nd , is [t]he po sse ssion by an indiv idu a l of thequ a lit ie s, pr op e rt ie s, or

c irc ums ta nc e s, natur a l or a dv e nti tio us , w hic h a

reinh e re ntl y

or le g a lly ne c e ssa ry to rende r him e ligible to f

ill an office or to pe rform a public duty or func tion.” Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary 12 41 (6 th e d. 19 90 ). Se c tio n 2 .0 3( G) of theCha rt e r p ro vid e s tha t a per so n s ha ll n ot b e e lig ibl e to stand for e lection or to hold the off ice of CountyMay or or County Commi ssioner for more than two consec utive four- y ear terms. Thus, an individual who has be en ele cted to two conse cutive four -y ear-8-

terms possess an a dventitious qualityor circ umstance w hich rende rs him/her ineligible to sta nd for a third conse cutive term. We ag re e wi th the tria l cou rt that term limits fall squ are ly wi thi n “q ua lif ic a tio n” a s u se d in § 5-1-210( 4) of the Code. Un der se ction 2.03(G), a may or or membe r of the B oard of Commi ssioners who has serve d two consec utive four- y ear terms is ineligible, or

disqualified, from holding of

fice for an additional consec utive term. Whether s/he will be entitled to serve e ven a second c onsecutive f

our-y ear term is determined by

the will of t h e p eople; ther e is no entitlement to additional terms.
Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d § 5- 1- 21 0( 4) ex pres sly sti pu late s th a t th e c ha

rt e r o f a c ou nty op e ratin g un de r a c ha

rt e r fo rm of g ov e rn me nt sh a ll pr e sc ri be thequ a lif ic a tio ns fo r h old ing of

fi c e in the leg islative body . Although § 5- 1-210 does not expressly autho ri z e that charters may alter the qu a lif ic a tio ns pr e sc ri be d b y

theGe ne ra l A sse mbl y fo r tr a dit ion a l Artic le VII fo rm s o f g ov e rn me nt, such authority

is implied by a plain rea ding and liberal c onstruction of the provision. Se e So uth e rn Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ. , 5 8 S

. W

. 3 d 7 0 6 , 7 1 0 -7 1 3 (T en n
. 2 0 0 1 )( h o l d i n g: the Genera l Assembly ’s gra nt to a local authority of comprehensive gove rnmental powe r that neither enumer ates the pow ers nor expressly limit s the s cope of authority , such as the c omprehe nsive g rant of power seen in the charter provisions c ontained in T ennesse e Code Annotated § 5-1-201, et. seq ., will be liberally

construed.) Acc ording ly , section 2.03(G) of the Charter doe s not violate Tennesse e Code Annotated § 5- 1-210.
CONSTIT UTIONALITY OF TENNESS EE CODE ANNOTATE D § 5-1-210( 4)
We next turn to whether

term limits as prescribe d by section 2.03(G) and authorized by the express provisions of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 5-1- 210(4) a re c onstitut ionally

invalid. A p p e l l a n t s c o n t e n d t h a ts e c t i o n 2

. 0 3 ( G ) v i o l a t e s A rt i c l e V II f o r t w o r e a s o n s
. F i r s t , t h e y contend that the me mbers of the Boa rd of Commissioners are constitutional officer s and that b e c au s e t e r ml i m i t s ar e a n e l e m e n to f “ t e r m s ” a s u t i l i z e d i n t h e f i r s ts e n t e n c e o f

A rt i c l e V II, Article V I I

provides a blanket prohibition on term limit s. Acc ording ly , they assert that even the Ge ne ral A sse mbl y

ma y no t impo se te rm

lim its on c on sti tut ion a l of fi c e rs . Se c on d, Ap pe llants contend that, a ssuming term limi ts fall within the purview of “ qualification” and ar e not constitutionallyinvalid pe r se , under the first para g raph of Article V I I , only

the Gene ral Assembly may presc ribe the qua lifications of constitutional office rs. They contend, ther efor e, that § 5-1-210( 4) unconstitutionally deleg ates the authority

to prescribe the qualific ations of c on sti tut ion a lly

ma nd a te d o ff

ic e rs
. Th e Cou nty , o n th e oth e r h a nd , a sse rt s th a t th e Cha rt e r m a y lim it the te rm s o f the Cou nty Commi ssioners bec ause the Commi ssioners ar e not the constitutional office rs enumer ated in the f i r s tp ar a g r ap h o f

A rt i c l e V II. T h e C o u n t y ar g u e s t h a t , b e c au s e t h e t h i r d p ar a g r ap h o f A rt i c l e V II provides for

the cr eation of a lternate forms of c ounty g overnme nt, county

g overnme nts operating under suc h alternate forms a re not bound by

the provisions and limitations of the prece ding portions of Article V I I . The County submits t hat under

the broa d authority

g iven to the Gene ral-9-

Assembly to provide for

alternate forms of c ounty g overnme nt, the Gene ral Asse mbly may de le g a te thepo we r t o p re sc ri be thequ a lif ic a tio ns fo r m e mbe r o f the c ou nty le g isl a tiv e bo dy

to the alternate c ounty

g overnme nts. The County ’s ar g ument, in summation, i s that para g raph thre e of A rticle VIIis a standalone pr ovision. The Countyacc ording ly asserts that the prec eding para g raphs of Article V I I

are inapplicable w here a county g overnme nt operates under an “alternate f orm” of g overnme nt pursuant to a statute of

the Gene ral Asse mbly . The County alternatively

submits t hat, eve n if the me mbe rs of

theShe lby

Cou nty B oa rdof Com mis sio ne rs arec on sti tut ion a l of fi c e rs un de r A rtic le VI I , section 2.03(G) of the Charter is not invalid because it does not reduc e the term of any constitutional officer

. As noted above , we r ejec t Appellants’ asse rtion that term limits are antithetical to the c on sti tut ion a l mand a te that c on sti tut ion a l of fi c e rs mus t bee le c te d to fo ur -y e ar t e rm s, or that th is ma nd a te re qu ir e s e lig ibi lit y to an u nli mit e d n umb e r o f t e rm s. Th e imp os iti on of te rm lim its rende rs some otherw ise qualified c andidates ine ligible, or unqualified. Appellants also devote considera ble attention to the J ournal of the Debates of the Con sti tut ion a l Co nv e nti on of 19 77 a ndto o pin ion s o f the Attorne y Ge ne ra l in su pp ort of

the ir c on te nti on that, u nd e r A rt ic le VII , te rm lim its , h ow e ve r c a te g orize d, areun c on sti tut ion a l per se. Howeve r, whe ther Article VI I provides a blanket prohibition ag ainst term limits , including te rm lim its wh ic h mi g ht b e imp os e d b y theGe ne ra l A sse mbl y

a c tin g wi thi n it s c on sti tution a l auth ority to prescribe the qualific ations of constitutional office rs, is not properly befor e this Court.
It is we ll s e ttl e d th a t “ a

jus tic ia blec on tr ov e rs y

. . . b e tw e e n p e rs on s w itha dv e rs e interests” must existto maintain a dec laratory judgme nt action. Parks v. Ale xander , 608 S.W .2d 881, 891-92 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1980) perm. app. de nied (T e nn . D e c . 1 , 1 98 0) . N o ju sti c ia ble controve rsy

exis ts where only

a theor etical que stion is raised or whe re the exis tence of a controve rsy

depends upon f

uture, hy pothetical fa cts. Id. at 892. The c ourts have no jurisdiction to rende r advisory

opinions based on eve nts which may occur in the future. Id. Thus, whether theGe ne ral A sse mbl y

ma y imp os e te rm

lim its on c on sti tut ion a l of fi c e rs is n ot an is su e pr op e rl y befor e this Court in thi s case
. I n light of our

holding that term limi ts are an element of qualifications, two questions remain. First, whethe r par ag raph thre e of A rticle VII can beconstrued a s a stand-a lone pa ra g ra ph , s uc h th a t th e pr ov isi on s o f the pr e c e din g pa ra g ra ph s a reina pp lic ableto a lte rn a te fo rm s o f c ou nty

g ov e rn me nt. Se c on d, if

pa ra g ra phthr e e is n ot a

stand -alon e pr ov isi on a ndif alternate forms of c ounty

g overnme nt must i nclude the of fice rs enumer ated in the f irst para g raph of Article VI I , whether

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 5-1- 210(4) impermissibl y deleg ates authority to the Charter

to prescribe the qualific ations of the Shelby CountyCommi ssioners.
We acc ording ly

turn to whether

the member s of the Shelby CountyBoa

rd of Commi ssioners ar e constitutional office rs under Article V I I , Section 1, of the Te nnesseeT h e Coun t y a s s er t s t h at t h e Cha r t er c ou l d n ot e l i mi n at e t h e B oar d of Commi s s i on er s bec au s e T en n es s ee Code 4 A nn ot at ed § 5- 1- 21 0(3) expr es s l y mandat es t hat a c ount y ch ar t er s hal l provi de for a coun t y l egi s l at i ve bo dy

. T hi s i s t r ue. H o w e v e r, w e no te tha t § 5 -1 -2 1 0 d o e s n o t l ike w ise p ro v id e fo r th e o the r c o n stitutio n a l o ff ic e rs li ste d in A rtic le V II . If,
a s the C o u n ty a sse rts, p a ra g ra p h thr e e o f A rtic le V II is a sta n d -alo n e p ro v isio n a n d a lter n a te fo rm s o f co u n ty go v e rn m e n ts ar e n ot cons t i t ut i onal l y r equi r ed t o i ncl ude t he off i cer s l i s t ed i n parag r aph o ne, t hen , un der t he C ount y ’ s l ogi c, ch ar t er cou n t y g ov er n men t s c ou l d di s pen s e wi t h , for e x ampl e, t h e of f i ce of She r i f f , wh i ch i s not e x pr es s l y pr ov i ded for i n § 5- 1- 21 0. W e f

i nd s uch a r es ul t un t ena bl e. -10- Constit ution. The County relies on Le e c h v . W

ay ne Cou nty , 588 S.W .2d 270 (Tenn. 1979) , and Tennessee ex re l. Maner v. Lee ch , 588 S.W .2d 534 (Tenn. 1979) , for the pr oposition t hat the members of

leg islative bodies in counties operating unde r an a lternate form of g overnme nt are no t th e c on sti tut ion a l of

fi c e rs dis c us se d inpa

ra g ra phon e of Artic le VII , o ff

ic e rs wh os e qualifications shall be prescribed by the Gene ral Asse mbly . We ag ree with the County ’s arg ume nt that Le e c h v . W ay ne Cou ntyand Maner v . Leech a ff irm th a t va

ri ou s f orms o f c ou nty g overnme nt are constitutionallypermitted under Article V I I . The Supreme Court has noted:
It is evident that, in broad form, our Constit ution now provides for thr ee ty pes of c ou nty g ov e rn me nt:

a . A rt ic le VII

g ov e rn me nt w he re in the ba sic un its of g ov e rn me nt a

rethec ou nty executive and the c ounty

leg islative body

. b. A consolidated f

orm of g overnme nt commonly known as Metr opolitan or "Me tro." See Article XI , Section 9, last para g raph. A ny county having such a g ov e rn me nt i s e xemp t f

ro m A rtic le VII

g ov e rn me nt. c. An a lternate form of g overnme nt either c harte red or unchartere d cre ated by

the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y . U nd e r this pr ov iso thele g isl a tur e is s pe c if ic a lly auth orize d to cre ate diver se forms of county g overnme nt without reg ard to the g ener al type e s t ab l i s h e d i n A rt i c l e V II.
Whe n th e le g isl a tur e auth orize s a ny de viatio n f

ro m A rt ic le VII

g ov e rn me nt i ts action must be ratified by the people in a

ref ere ndum called f

or that purpose

. Tennessee ex re l. Maner v. Lee ch , 588 S.W .2d at 537 (footnote omitted). We disag ree with the County , howeve r, that

Maner v . Leech stands for the pr oposition t he member s of the B oard of Commi ssioners ar e not member s of the leg islative body discussed in Article V I I , para g raph one , and that par ag raph thre e must be re ad as a stand-alone provision. To so conclude w ould be tantamount to concluding the alternate f orms of county

g overnme nt envisioned by para g raph three , forms which a

re ne ither def

ined nor limited in number, may eliminate the constitutional o f f i c e r s m a n d a t e d b y

p ar a g r ap h o n e o f

A rt i c l e V II. 4
Th a t at le a st thr e e fo rm s o f g ov e rn me nt a rec on sti tut ion a lly

pe rm itt e d d oe s n ot n e c e ssi tate a c on c lus ionthat so me of

thefo rm s may

dis pe ns e wi th the c on sti tut ion a l of fi c e rs ma nd a te d in thefi rs t se nte nc e of

Artic le VII . T he thi rdpa ra g ra phof Artic le VII , a s a me nd e d in19 78 , g rants the Gene ral Asse mbly

“very broad pow ers and discretion with re spect to the str uc ture of loca l-11-

g overnme nts[ .]” Le e c h v . W ay ne Cou nty , 5 8 8 S

. W

. 2 d a t2 7 2 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. A c c o r d i n g l y,

“ thec on sti tut iondo e s n ot m a nd a te a un if orm struc ture o f

c o u n t y g o v e r n m e n t s a c r o s s t h e s t a t e
. It sp e c if ic a lly auth orize s le g isl a tio n c re a tin g dif fe re nt f orms o f l oc a l organization .” Id. (e mph a sis added)

. Form, moreover , is the “[a]nt ithesis of ‘substance .’” B lack’ s L aw Dic tionary 651 (6 ed.

th 1990). F orm relates to the “leg al or tec hnical manne r or or der to be observe d.” Id. Although the third para g raph of

Article V I I

g rants the Ge nera l Assembly broad authority

to provide for alternate forms or struc tures of c ounty g overnme nt, it does not eradicate the substantive re qu ir e me nts pr ov ide d inthepr e c e din g po rt ion s o f A rt ic le VII . T he a sse rt ionthat a lte rn a te forms of c ounty

g overnme nt anticipates that these g overnme ntal structure s may not include the co n s t i t u t i o n al o ff

i ce rs n am ed i n t h e f

i rs ts en t en ce o f t h e art i cl e i s n o ts u p p o rt ed b y t h e l an gu age of Article VI I

or the c ase la w. The plain lang uag e of A rticle VII provides for

at least thre e distinct county g overnme ntal structure s. As the supreme court observed in Maner v . Leech and Le e c h v . W ay ne Cou nty , Article V I I

provides for : traditional Article VII county g overnme nts; Article XI , Section 9, consolidated g overnme nts; and Article VII “alternate f

orms” of g overnme nt, including c harte r g ov e rn me nts . A n e xami natio n o f A rt ic le VII ’s tr e a tme nt o f the se c on d f orm of g ov e rn me nt, which is distinctlyand sepa rate ly provided for

in Article XI , Section 9, of the Te nnessee Constit ution, ill ustrates that, unless e x pressly excepted, ea ch of the three forms of g overnme nt must subst antively

include the c onstitut ional office rs desig nated in par ag raph one

. The sec ond para g raph of

Article V I I

expressly exempts counties operating under an Artic le XI , Se c tio n 9 ho me -r ulec on so lid a te d f

orm of g ov e rn me nt f

ro m ha vin g a

c ou nty executive and c ounty

leg islative body , two of the c onstitut ional office rs mandate d in para g raph o n e
. T h i s e x p r e s s e x e m p t i o n n e c e s s ar i l y i m p l i e s th a t , u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d i n A rt i c l e X I, there ma ini ng c on sti tut ion a l of fi c e rs mus t beinc lud e d ina n Art ic le XI , h ome -r ulefo rm of c ou nty g overnme nt. Any

contra ry construction would re nder the express exempti on superf luous. The third para g raph of

Article V I I , howeve r, conta ins no like ex emption for counties ope rating under an alternate or

charter form of g overnme nt. The proposition that county g overnme nts operating under a form of g overnme nt other than th e tr a dit ion a l f

orm may e lim inate thec on sti tution a l of fi c e rs a lso is u ns up po rt e d b y thec a se law. In Metropolitan Governm ent of Nashville and Davidson County v. Poe , 383 S.W .2d 265 (Tenn. 1964) , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court considere d this propositi on in the context of the consolidated g overnme nt of Nashville and D avidson County , which oper ates a s a consolidated home-rule g overnme nt under a metropolitan cha

rter pur suant to Article XI , Section 9 of the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion . In th a t c a se , th e c ou rt up he ld a c ha rt e r p ro vis iontr a ns fe rring so me duties of the county

sheriff to the Nashville chie f of police

. Metro. Gov ’t of Nashville and Davidson County, 383 S.W .2d at 273. I n so holding, the c ourt noted that althoug h the offic e of sheriff is a constitutional one, the duties of the she riff a re pr escribed by

the Gene ral Asse mbly

by statute. Id. The c ourt opined that, in light of the purpose of the consolidated f

orm of g overnme nt-12-

to “ e lim inate du pli c a tio n a ndov e rl app ing of du tie s a nd

se rv ic e s b y

wh ic h e c on omi c sa vin g s to ta xpa y e rs wi ll b e re a lize d, ” therewa s n o “ c on sti tution a l in fi rm ity a g a ins t” tr a ns fe rring a

du ty from the she riff to the c hief of police

. Id. at 276-77. The supre me court expresslyreje cted, howe ver, theproposition that a charter g overnme nt org anized pursuant to Article XI , Section 9, could eliminate the c onstitut ional officeof sheriff. The c ourt stated: Article 7, Sec tion 1 of the Constit ution of Tennesse e provide s that ' Thereshall be elec ted in eac h County , by the qualified vote rs there in, one Sheriff , one Truste e, one Reg ister;' etc. In the Constitut ion of 1796, Article 6, Sec tion 1, it was provided that ' Thereshall be appointed in e ach c ounty , by the county

Court, one sheriff , one cor oner, one trustee' , etc.
I n the Constitut ion of 1834, by Article V I I , Section 1, it was provided that ' There shall be ele cted in ea ch County , by the qualified vote rs there in, one Sheriff , one Trustee , one Reg ister' , etc.
It is obvious t hat express provisions have be en made in all three Constitutions adopted by

the voters of

Tenne ssee f

or the off ice of Sheriff, and any

lang uag e that ma y ha ve be e n e mpl oy e d ina ny prior de c isi on s o f this Cou rt , andpa rt ic ula rl y in Robinson v. Briley , supra, [374 S.W .2d 382 (Tenn. 1963) ] from which it might be remotely conclude d that we he ld the officeof Sheriff or any other c onstitut ional officecould be or

was a bolished by

the Charter

was a mere inadvertence and not me a nt t o b e a

ho ldi ng of

thi s Co urt.
Th e on ly me tho d b y

wh ic h th e Con sti tutionma y be a me nd e d is se t ou t in Artic le 11, Section 3 of the Constituti on itself.
Id. at 268.
Me tro po lit an Go v e rn me nt o

f Na sh v ill e an d D av ids on Cou ntyconce rned the charter of a county operating unde r the sec ond type of c ounty g overnme nt, the type re cog nized in parag raph two of Article VI I , Section 1 and org anized pursuant to Article XI , Section 9. Howeve r, the re a so nin g of

thesu pr e me c ou rt

in that c a se is e qu a lly

app lic ablehe re . A lth ou g h it pe rm its alternate forms of c ounty

g overnme nts other than and in a ddition to t he tra ditional form and that fo rm e d p ur su a nt t o A rt ic le XI , Se c tio n 9 , A rt ic le VII c on tin ue s to e xpre ssl y

pr ov idefo r c e rt a in constitutional officer s. The pertinent part of Article VI I curr ently provides: “The qualified voters of e ach c ounty

shall elec t for terms of four y ear s a leg islative body , a county executive, a She ri ff , a Tr us te e , a Re g ist e r, a

Cou nty Cle rk a nda n A sse sso r o f P ro pe rty .” Te nn . Co ns t. a rt

. VI I , § 1. Thereis nothing in the ca se law to support the c ontention that an alternate struc ture of c ou nty g ov e rn me nt c ou ld e lim inate thec on sti tution a l of fi c e rs su bs ta nti ve ly

re qu ir e d b y

Artic le VI I , Section 1 of the Te nnessee Constit ution.-13-

We also observe that Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 5-1- 210(12) implicitly rec og nizes that para g raph thre e of A rticle VII is not a stand-alone provision, and that the constitutional office rs named in par ag raph one of Article VI I may not be eliminated fr om county g overnme nt. When the lang uag e of a

statute is clear , we must utiliz e the plain, a cce pted meaning of the wor ds used by thele g isl a tur e to a sc e rt a in the statut e ’s pu rp os e a ndapp lic a tio n. I f the wo rd ing is ambi g uo us , we must look to the entire statutory scheme and at the le g islative history to asce rtain the L eg islature’s intent and pur pose. We must construe statutes in their e ntirety , neither c onstricting nor expanding the leg islature’s intent. In so doing, w e assume that the leg islature chose the words of the statute purposely , and that the wor ds chosen “ convey some intent and have a meaning and a pur

pose” w hen conside red w ithin the context of the e ntire statute. Eastman Chemical Co. v. Johnson , 151 S.W .3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004) (citations omitted). Section 5-1-210( 12) of the T ennesse e Code mandates that a c ounty charter must provide

“ [t]hat th e du tie s o f the c on sti tut ion a l c ou nty of fi c e rs a s p re sc ri be d b y

theg e ne ral a sse mbl y

sh a ll not be diminished under a c ounty charter form of g overnme nt; provided, that such off icer s may be g ive n a dd iti on a l du tie s u nd e r s uc h c ha rt e rs .” Te nn . Co de An n. § 5 -1 -2 10 (1 2) (1 99 8) . A plain rea ding of

this subsection compels a conc lusion that county g overnme nts must i nclude the
c on sti tut ion al office rs whose statutorily define d duties may

not be diminished by

the cha rter. T h e s e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o f

f i c e r s ar e t h o s e p r e s c r i b e d b y A rt i c l e V II. Finally , althoug h we a

re ne ither per suaded by

nor re ly on it for our de termination here , we no te that Sh e lby

Cou nty its e lf ha s r e c og nize d th a t it s c ha rt e r f orm of g ov e rn me nt r e pr e se nts a structura l org anization, and that its elected c ounty office rs include c onstitut ional office rs. The I ntr od uc tio n to theCha

rt e r s tate s: The Charter c ontains a strong prohibitionary section which, among othe r things, pre vents its use in any way to . . . dimini sh the duties of the e lected constitutionaloffice rs of Shelby County . (Emphasis adde d.)

. . . . It is appropriate that, afte r over 180 y ear s of exist ence , the County repla ce thepr e se nt structure of

Cou nty Go ve rn me nt, a s it

ha s e vo lve d, wi th a

tot a lly responsive, r esponsible and modern str uc ture . (Emphasis adde d.)
Ad dit ion a lly , s e c tio n 2 .0 2 o f the Cha rt e r p ro vid e s: “ Th e L e g isl a tiv e B ranc h is ve ste d w itha ll other powe rs of the c ounty not specifica lly , or by

nece ssary

implication, vested in some other officia l of the County

by the Constitut ion or by

statute not inconsistent with thi s Charter.” Section 6.04, furthermore, provide s: “The duties of the constitutionalCountyoffice rs as pr e sc ri be d b y

theg e ne ra l a sse mbl y

sh a ll n ot b e dim ini sh e d u nd e r this Cha rt e r[. ] (E mph a sis added.)-14-

Th e reis n oth ing in the la ng ua g e of pa ra g ra phthr e e of

Artic le VII

to i nd ic a te that it should be rea d as a stand- alone pa rag raph suc h that the provisions of the pre ceding para g raphs are inapplicable to a lternate forms of g overnme nt. Article VII contains neither

an express nor i m p l i e d p r o v i s i o n t h a ta l t e r n a t e f o r m s o f c o u n t y g o v e r n m e n t , f

o r m s w h i c h , u n l i k e A rt i c l e X I, Section 9 consolidated home- rule g overnme nts, are e ntirely undefine d, are exempt from having the constitutional county

office rs which ha ve bee n presc ribed by every Tenne ssee Constitution sin c e 17 96 . A lth ou g h th e c ou rt s h a ve no t pr e vio us ly a dd re sse d w he the r the thi rdty pe of c ou nty g ov e rn me nt, Artic le VII

a lte rn a te -f

orm g ov e rn me nt, mus t in c lud e theof fi c e rs c on sti tution a lly ma nd a te d f

or tr a dition a l A rt ic le VII

/ty pe on e a ndArtic le XI

/ty pe tw o f orms o f c ou nty g overnme nt, that it may

not is unsupported by

a plain re ading of Article VI I and the r easoning of the supreme court in Me tro po lit an Go v e rn me nt o

f Na sh v ill e an d D av ids on Cou nty . I n the abs e nc e of

a n e xpre ss e xemp tio n li ke that pr ov ide d inpa ra g ra phtw o o f A rt ic le VII

fo r A rt ic le XI , Section 9 consolidated g overnme nts, this C ourt is loathe to disturb a historical Te nnessee constitutional mandate. Having conclude d that alternate forms of c ounty g overnme nt must i nclude the constitutional officer s named in Article VI I , we ne x t turn to whether T ennesse e Code Annotated § 5-1-210( 4) unconstitutionally deleg ates the authority

to prescribe the qualific ations of constitutional officer s. Appellants assert that it does. The County , on the other hand, relies on Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Board of Education , 58 S.W .3d 706 (Tenn. 2001) , for the pr oposition t hat it does not. The County also asserts that, because par ag raph thre e of Article V I I

is a stand-a lone provision which does not ve st the authority to prescribe the qualifications of electe d officia ls of alternate forms of g overnme nt in any particula r entity , the Ge ne ral A sse mbl y

ma y de le g a te thi s auth ority

to the a lte rn a te g ov e rn me nt.
A s d i s c u s s e d ab o v e , w e r e j e c tt h e C o u n t y ’ s a

r g u m e n tt h a tp ar a g r ap h t h r e e o f A rt i c l e V II is a stand -alon e pa

ra g ra ph . A c c or din g ly , w e re

je c t th e Cou nty ’s arg ume nt that, b e c aus e pa ra g ra phthr e e do e s n ot e xpre ssl y state wh o s ha ll p re sc ri be thequ a lif ic a tio ns of

thec ou nty of fi c e rs in an a lte rn a te fo rm of g ov e rn me nt, theGe ne ra l A sse mbl y ma y de le g a te thi s auth ority

to theCha rt e r. We a lso re

je c t th e Cou nty ’s a sse rt ionthat, a ssu min g a lte rn a te fo rm s o f c ou nty g overnme nt must i nclude the of fice rs named in pa

rag raph one of Article VI I , section 2.03(G) of the Charter

is not unconstitut ional beca use it does not diminis h the duties of any constitutional office r. This assertion is i rre levant to whethe r the Ge nera l Assembly constitutionallymay deleg ate its Article V I I

authority to prescribe the qualific ations of member s of county leg islative bo die s. We beg in our ana ly sis by noting that whe n considering the constitutionalityof a statute, we sta rt wi th the pr e su mpt ionthat a c ts b y theGe ne ral A sse mbl y

arec on sti tut ion a l. Osborn v. Ma rr , 127 S.W .3d 737, 741 (Tenn. 2004) . As the County asserts, and as we have note d above, So uth e rn Con str uc tor

s rec og nized that a g ener al provision g ranting “compr ehensive g ov e rn me nta l po we r t o th e loc a l auth ority wi tho ut e ith e r e nu me ratin g thepo we rs or e xpre ssl y limit ing the scope of

authority . . . [wil l] be lib e ra llyconstrued.” So uth e rn Con str uc tor s , 58 S.W .3d at 713(c itations omi tted; emphasis in the orig inal). As the So uth e rn Con str uc tor s court-15-

further noted, Article VI I , Section 1 and Te nnessee Code Annotated §§ 5- 1-201 to 5-1-214 a re examples of a compr ehensive g rant of pow er. Thus, c ounties operating unde r a c harte r form of g o v e r n m e n tar e n o t“ s tr i c t l y l i m i t e d t o t h o s e p o w e r s o t h e r w i s e g r a n t e d b y t h e G e n e r a l A s s e mb l y, and they possess broad authority

for the r eg ulation of their own loca l affairs.” Id. We do not find this particularly

helpful, howe ver, w here in § 5-1-210(4) the Gene ral Asse mbly has
ex pre ssl y g rante d th e auth ority

to p re sc ri be thequ a lif

ic a tio ns of

theme mbe rs of

thec ou nty leg islative bodies to the local g overnme nt. No liberal c onstruction of the c omprehe nsive g rant contained in § 5- 1-201, et. seq. , is nece ssary
. Additionally , althoug h para g raph thre e of A rticle VII vests broad authority

in the Gene ral As se mbl y to s truc tur e c ou nty

g ov e rn me nts , w e do no t be lie ve thesu pr e me c ou rt ’s re a so nin g in So uth e rn Con str uc tor

s stand s f or thepr op os iti on theGe ne ra l A sse mbl y ma y de le g a te its authority to prescribe the qualific ations of the constitutional county office rs. In So uth e rn Con str uc tor

s , th e su pr e me court a dd re sse d w he the r a c ou nty sc ho ol b oa

rdha d th e auth ority

to arbitrate a dispute with a c ontrac tor. The So uth e rn Con str uc tor s court e ng ag ed in a leng thy a na ly sis of

theDi llo n Ru le , a

jud ic ia lly c re a te d r uleof statut or y c on str uc tio n u nd e r w hic h c ou rt s construe statutes g ranting authority to local g overnme nts strictlyand nar rowly

. Id. at 710. The court “ retain[ ed] Dillon’s Rul e, subjec t to its exceptions, as a rule of construc tion to determine the scope of loca l gove rnmental authority .” Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 714 (Tenn. 2001) . As noted above , the court rec og nized an exception wher e the Ge nera l Assembly g rants compr ehensive power , such as that g rante d by Tenne ssee Code Annotated §§ 5- 1-201 to 5-1-214, to a local authority

. Id. at 713. Finding no “expressed intention by

the Gene ral Asse mbly

to confe r g ener al power s upon county boards of education or to have the e x presse d power s broadly construed,” the cour

t applied the Dillon Rule in So uth e rn Con str uc tor

s
. Id. a t 71 5. Ne ve rthe le ss, thec ou rt c on c lud e d th a t th e po we r o f the sc ho ol b oa rdto arb itr a te its dis pu te wi th S ou the rnCon str uc tor s w a s f

a ir ly imp lie d b y

thee xpre ss p ow e rs to contra ct provided by

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 49-2- 203. Id. at 716.
I n examining the cir cumstance s under whic h Dillon’s Rule may not apply , the So uth e rn Con str uc tor

s c ou rt a dd re sse d th e auth ority

of theGe ne ral A sse mbl y

to d e le g a te its po we rs to other e ntities. The court noted that the Gene ral Asse mbly may deleg ate its authority

under two circ umstances: “w hen the Constitution i tself authorizes the dele g ation and whe n the deleg ation is ‘sanctioned by

immemorial usag e orig inating anterior to the Constitution and continuing unquestioned there under.’ ” Id. at7 1 2 n
. 3 (q u o t i n g Kee v . Parks , 283 S.W . 751, 753 (1 9 2 6 )( q u o t i n g W

right v. Cunningham , 91 S.W . 293, 297-98)) . I n the ca se now be fore us, there c a n b e no arg ume nt that th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y ’s de le g a tio n o f a uth ority to c ha rt e r c ou nty g overnme nts found in Tennesse e Code Annotated 5-1-210( 4) is sanctioned by “immemorial us a g e .” Th us , w e turn to wh e the r the c on sti tut ionits e lf auth orize s th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y to deleg ate its authority

to prescribe the qualific ations of the constitutional office rs to the Charter

. Artic le VII

pr ov ide s, “ [t]he ir

qu a lif ic a tio ns a nddu tie s sh all

be pre scribed by

the Gene ral Assembly .” Te nn. Const. art. VI I , § 1 (empha sis added). TheGene ral Asse mbly has pre scribed the qualifications for the member s of county leg islative bodies in Tennesse e Code Annotated § 5-T en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated § 1

- 3

- 1 1 0 p ro vid es: 5

It i s hereb y de cl ared t hat t he sect i o ns, cl auses , s ent ences a n d p a rts o f t he T enness ee C o d e are severabl e, are not m at t ers of m ut ual ess ent i al i nd ucem ent , and any of t hem s hal l be exsci nd ed i f t he
co de woul d ot her wi s e be u ncons t i t ut i onal or i nef fect i ve. I f

an y one ( 1) or mo r e s ect i ons , cl aus es, s ent en ce s o r p arts s hal l for a ny r eas on be ques t i oned i n a ny cour t , an d s hal l be adj udged
u n con s t i t u t i on al or i n v al i d, s u ch j u dg men t s h al l n ot a f fec t , i mpai r or i n v al i dat e t h e rem ai ni ng p ro v isio n s the re o f, b u t sha ll b e c o n fine d in its o p e ra tio n to the sp e c ifi c p ro v isio n o r p ro v isio n s so he ld
unco nst i t ut i o nal or i nval i d , and t he i nap p l i cab i l i t y o r i nval i d i t y o f a ny sect i o n, c l ause, sent ence o r part in an y o n e (1 ) o r m o re ins ta n c e s sh a ll n o t b e tak e n to a ff e c t o r p reju d ic e in a n y w a y it s a p p lica b ili ty or v al i di t y i n a ny ot her i ns t anc e.
T enn. C o d e A nn. § 1

- 3

- 1 1 0 (20 0 3 ).

-16- 5-102. When used in the constitution, the word “sha ll” g ener ally is construed a s being mandatory

rathe r than dire ctive. W

est Tenn. Motor Exp., I

nc. v. Tenne ssee Pub. Se rv. Comm’n , 514 S.W .2d 742, 746 (Tenn. 1974) . I n order to be valid, leg islation must comply with mandatory provisions of the constitution. State v. Hailey , 505 S.W .2d 712, 714 (Tenn. 1974) . We find nothing in the lang uag e of A rticle VII that would support the proposition that the Gene ral Assembly ’s duty

to prescribe the qualific ations of constitutional office rs is directive or p e r m i s s i v e a n d n o t

m a n d a t o r y, o r

t h a tt h e G e n e r a l A s s e mb l y m a y d e l e g at e t h i s au t h o r i t y.
Th e su pr e me c ou rt ’s a na ly sis of theGe ne ra l A sse mbl y ’s auth ority to d e le g a te its Tenne ssee Constitution Article I I , Section 3 leg islative authority is applicable he re. The supreme c ourt has opined that, a lthough the G ener al Assembly may deleg ate to an a dminist rative a g e nc y thepo we r t o imple me nt the po lic ie s e xpre sse d b y a pa rt ic ula r s tatut e , it

ma y no t de le g a te authority that is “purely

leg islative.” Gallaher v. Elam , 104 S.W .3d 455, 464 (Tenn. 2003)(c itations omi tted). In deleg ating the power to implement law, moreove r, the Ge nera l As se mbl y mus t do so in a

statut e that “ c on ta ins su ff ic ie nt s ta nd ard s o r g uid e lin e s to e na blebo th the ag ency

and the c ourts to determine if the ag ency is carry ing out the le g islature’s intent.” Id. (q u o t i n g Bean v . McW

herter , 9 53 S.W. 2d19 7, 19 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ). Th us , th e Ge ne ral A sse mbl y ma y no t de le g a te its Artic le I I c on sti tution a l auth ority

to m ake la w, bu t on ly

thesu ff ic ie ntl y define d power

to fac ilitate implementation of the law a s intended. The A ttorney Gene ral of Te nn e sse e , mo re ov e r, a lso ha s o pin e d th a t th e Ge ne ral A sse mbl y ma y no t de le g a te its du ty

to presc ribe the qua lifications of constitutional office rs. Tenn. O p. Atty . Gen. No. 02- 037, 2002 WL 531163 (Tenn.A .G.). The re is simply no support in either the Te nnessee Constit ution or the c a se la w f or thepr op os iti on that th e Ge ne ral A sse mbl y ma y de le g a te its Artic le VII

auth ority to p r e s c r i b e t h e q u a l i f

i c a t i o n s o f

m e mb e r s o f

a c o u n t y l e g i s l a t i v e b o d y.
In s o f ar a s i tp e r m i t s t h e q u a l i f

i c a t i o n s o f

th e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o f

f i c e r s t o b e p r e s c r i b e d b y a c ou nty c ha rt e r, Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d § 5- 1- 21 0( 4) is u nc on sti tution a l. In a c c or danc e wi th Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 1-3- 110, we may elide unconstitutional portions of a statute a nd 5 leave the re mainder intac t where we c onclude that the G ener al Assembly would have e nacte d the statute with the unconstitutional provision omi tted. In re Swanson , 2 S.W .3d 180, 189 (Tenn.-17-

1999). Ac cording ly , we e lide the phra se “qua lifications for holding office ” fr om Tennesse e Code Annotated 5- 1-210(4)

. CO NC LU SION The powe r to alter or

amend the Constitution of Tennesseebelong s not to the Gener al Assembly , but to the people. Il lus tra tio n D e sig n G ro up , I nc . v . M c Can le ss , 454 S.W .2d 115, 118 (Tenn. 1970) . The judicial branch of g overnme nt, moreover , has a duty to determine the substantive constitutionalit y of statutes, ordinanc es, and like me asure s. City of Memphis v. S h e lb y Co u n tyE le c ti o n Co m 'n , 146 S.W .3d 531, 536 (Tenn. 2004) . I n so doing, it may not a me ndthec on sti tut ion . T he Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ionma y be a me nd e d o nly

a s p ro vid e d inArtic le XI , Section 3 of the c onstitut ion itself. “A chang e ef fec ted in any

other way

is revolutionary , and lies wholly

outside the domain of law.” De rry be rryv . S tate Bd . o f E le c tio n Co mm iss ion e rs , 266 S.W . 102, 105 (Tenn. 1924) (citations omitted).
Article V I I , Section 1 of the Te nnessee Constit ution sti pulates that “[t] he qualifie d voters of ea ch county

shall elec t for terms of four y ear s a leg islative body , a county executive, a Sheriff, a Tr us te e , a Re g ist e r, a

Cou nty Cle rk a nda n A sse sso r o f P ro pe rty .” Al tho ug h in19 78 thepe op le of Tenne ssee amended the c onstitut ion and authorized the Ge nera l Assembly to provide for alternate forms of c ounty

g overnme nt, the people did not authorize the substantive e limination of t h e tr a d i t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o f f i c e r s f r o mc o u n t y

g o v e r n m e n t

. P ar a g r ap h t h r e e o f A rt i c l e V II, Section 1, as ame nded, ther efor e, cannot be re ad as a stand-alone provision in the absenc e of lang uag e which e x cepts it from the r emainder of the sec tion. I n the abse nce of lang uag e which excerpts it from the re mainder of the Article , to construe pa rag raph thre e of A rticle VII , Section 1 as a stand- alone pr ovision is i nconsistent with the wording of the Article in its entirety . Thus, the members of

Shelby County ’s leg islative body , the Shelby CountyBoa

rd of Commissioners, like theShe ri ff

a ndtheoth e r A rt ic le VII of fi c e rs , a rec on sti tution a l of

fi c e rs
. The dissent asse rts that this conclusion is “somewhat ludicrous” beca use it “say [s] that the County

can ha ve a ne w form of

g overnme nt but it i s controlled by the old form of g overnme nt that the new f orm repla ces.” We respec tfully disag ree with the dissent that our holding c ompels such a r eading of Article VI I , Section 1. As noted above , para g raph thre e pe rm its theGe ne ra l A sse mbl y to p ro vid e fo r an u nli mit e d n umb e r o f “ fo rm s” of c ou nty g overnme nt upon approva l by a majority

of the voter s in a ref

ere ndum, and it permits the Gene ral Assembly to provide for

the manner

by which such a

ref ere ndum may

be ca lled. Thereis noting in the wording of par ag raph thre e, howe ver, that indicates that this new “f orm” may be so distinct a s to e lim inate thec on sti tut ion a l of fi c e rs sp e c if

ic a lly ma nd a te d b y

pa ra g ra phon e , andthe reis nothing in the lang uag e of pa rag raph one to indicate that par ag raph one does not apply to the remainder of Sec tion 1. That the constitution requires the inc lusion of a leg islative body , a county executive, a she riff, a

trustee, a reg ister, a c ounty

cler k, and an a ssessor of pr operty does no t st a ndfo r the pr op os iti on that a n a lte rn a te fo rm of g ov e rn me nt i s “ c on tr oll e d” by theoldfo rm
. It si mpl y re qu ir e s th a t th e ne w f

orm in c lud e a

le g isl a tiv e bo dy

of so me ty pe a ndsix sp e c if

ic office rs. We cannot a g ree with the dissent that this requirement “ controls” the f orm that an-18-

a lte rn a te g ov e rn me nt m ig ht t ake . Ind e e d, thedu tie s a ndqu a lif ic a tio ns of

the se of fi c e rs wi thi n the alternate f

orm, and the r emainder

of the off icer s and employ ees, struc ture, ope ration, and me tho d o f ame nd me nt o f an a lte rn a te fo rm aree nti re ly

un c on tr oll e d b y

theve ry lim ite d mand a te of par ag raph one

. As thedis se nt a g re e s, theimp os iti on of te rm lim its by theShe lby

Cou nty Cha rt e r f a lls within the penumbra of

“qualific ations” as utilized in Article VI I , Section 1 of the Te nnessee Constit ution and Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 5-1- 210(4). Without opini ng on whether the Gene ral Asse mbly

may impose term limits on members of the Shelby

CountyBoa

rd of Commi ssioners, we hold that Te nnessee Code Annotated § 5- 1-210(4) expressly but unconstitutionallydeleg ates the G ener al Assembly ’s Article VI I , Section 1 authority to prescribe the qualifications of members of the county leg islative body

to counties operating unde r a c harte r form of g overnme nt. We accor dingly elide the phr ase “ qualifications for holding of fice ” fr om Tenne ssee Code A nnotated 5-1- 210(4).
HOLDING
I n light of the fore g oing, the judgme nt of the trial court awar ding summary judgme nt to S h e l b y C o u n t y i s v a c a t e d

. W e a w ar d s u m m ar y j u d g m e n tt o P l a i n t i f f s /A p p e l l a n t s
. A c c o r d i n g l y, She lby Cou nty is e njo ine d f

ro m e nf or c ing se c tio n 2 .0 3( G) of theShe lby

Cou nty Cha rt e r. Cos ts of this Appeal a

re ta x ed to the Appe llees, County of Shelby , Shelby

CountyElection Commi ssion, Greg ory

M. Ducke tt, Ri char d L . Holden, Nancy e E. Hine s, O.C. Pleasant, J r., and Maura Bla ck Sullivan.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE