216 S.W .3d 827 (Tex. 2007). 1 See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a )(8) (West Supp. 2006). 2 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 009 -CV

City of Roun d Rock and Round Rock F ire Chief Larry Hodge , Appellan ts

v. Mark Whiteaker , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-06- 0035 76 , HO NORAB LE STEP HEN Y ELENOSK Y , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N This appea l is the latest in the r apidly -evolving jurisprudenc e addr essing , in light of C i ty of Houston v. W

illiams , th e e xte n t to w h ic h g o v e r n me n ta l im mu

n it y b ar s s u it s ar is in g from 1 alleg ed violations of local g overnme nt code c hapter 143. Mark W hiteaker , a li eutena nt in the Round R o c k F i r e D e p art m e n t , s u e d

t h e C i t y o f

R o u n d R o c k an d i t s f i r e c h i e f , L ar r y H o d g e ( c o l l e c t i v e l y, the City ), claiming that his r ights under local g overnme nt c ode section 143.036 wer e violated whe n Hodg e promoted a

nother fir e lieutena

nt to a capta in positi on that Whit eake r de s ired. Whiteaker soug ht remedie s that include re troac tive promotion, ba ck pay , and back benef its. The City

filed a ple a to th e jur isd ic tio n, a sse rt ingthat Whi te a ke r l a c ke d s tand ing , th a t he fa ile d to e xha us t administrative re medies, and that his claims were barr ed by the City ’s g overnme ntal immunit y . The district court denie d the plea, a nd the City

appea ls from this order. 22 W illiams and other

rec ent Texas Supreme Court dec isions reg ardingsovere ign or g overnme ntal immunit y require us to conclude that Whi teake r’s c laims are ba rre d by g overnme ntal immunit y to the extent they seek back pay or ot her retrospec tive monetary relief , but not to the ex tent they seek to c ompel the City to compl y wi t h chapte r 143 prospe ctively . The re cord be fore us ind ic a te s th a t W hi te a ke r m ay be a ble to c ur e thi s p art ia l juri sd ic tio na l de fe c t by a me nd inghis pleading s. For these rea sons, a nd beca use we overr

ule the City ’s other issues, we aff irm the order

o f t h e d i s t r i c tc o urti ni t s e n t i r e t y.

STA ND AR

D A ND SCO P E OF RE VI EW Th e su bje c t- ma tte r jur isd ic tio n of a tr ia l c ourt may be c ha lle ng e d thro ug h a

ple a to the jurisdiction. See Tex as Dep’t of Parks & W ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 225-26 (T e x. 20 04 ); Bland Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. Blue , 3 4 S. W.3 d 5 47 , 5 54 (T e x. 20 00 ); He nd e e v . D e whu rst , 228 S.W .3d 354, 366 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied). T he dete rmination of whethe r a tria l court has subject-matter jurisdiction beg ins with the pleading s. See M iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226. The plea der ha s the initial burden of a lleg ing f acts that a ffirmatively

demonstrate the trial court’ s jurisdiction to hear the cause . Id. (c i t i n g Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex as Air Contr ol Bd. , 852 S.W .2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)). Whether the pleade r has met this burden is a question of law that we r eview de novo. Id. We construe the ple ading s liberally and look to the pleade r’s intent. Id. I f the plea dings do not contain sufficie nt fac ts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction but do not a ffirmatively demonstrate incura ble def ects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of plea ding suf

ficienc y and the plaintiffs should be afforde d the opportunity to amend. Id. at 226-27. I f the plea dings a ffirmatively negat e t h e existence of jur isdiction, then a plea to the3

jurisdiction may

be g rante d without allowing the plaintiffs an oppor tunity to amend. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227.

Ho we ve r, “ a c ourt de c idi ng a ple a to the jur isd ic tio n is no t re qu ir e d t o l oo k s ole ly to the pleading s but may consider e vidence and must do so when nece s s ar y to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.” Bland , 34 S.W .3d at 555. When a plea to the jurisdiction challeng es the exist ence of fa cts alleg ed by the pleade r to establish the trial cour t’s subject-matter

jurisdiction, the trial court must consider rele vant evidenc e submitted by the par ties. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227 (c i t i n g Bland , 3 4 S. W.3 d at 55 5) ; Hende e , 228 S.W .3d at 366. To vary ing de g ree s, this jurisdi ctional inquiry may also implicate t he mer its of the pleade r’s c ause of action. Compare Bland , 34 S.W .3d at 554-55 (c iting cha lleng es to associational standing a nd persona l jurisdict i o n as enta iling “a n

e vid e nti ary

inq uir y [that] . . . d oe s n ot i nv olv e a sig nif ic ant i nq uir y int o th e su

bs tanc e of the c la ims ” and holding that challeng e to t axpay er standing did not impli cate merits), with Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227-28 (de scribing overla pping jur isdictional and merits inquiry reg ardingchalleng e to whethe r parks a nd wildlife depa

rtment ac ted with g ross neg lige nce so a s to waive sover eig n immunit y under th e re cre ational use statute) . When the consideration of a trial cour t’s subject-matter

jurisdiction require s the examination of evidence, the trial court e x erc ises its discretion in determining whether the jurisdictional deter

mination should be made at a pre liminary hear ing or

awa it fuller deve lopment of the c ase, mindful that the jurisdictional determination must be made as soon a s prac ticable. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227-28.

“[I ] n a ca s e i n which the jurisdictional cha lleng e implicates the me rits of the plaintiff’s ca

use of a ction and the plea to the jurisdiction includes evidenc e, the tria l court re viewsTh e fo llo wi ngdis c us sio n r e fe re nc e s r e qu ir e ments in c ha pte r 1 43 a

pp lic a ble to 3 municipalities, like the City , with a population of less than 1.5 million. S omewhat diff ering require ments apply

to municipalities with l arg er populations. 4 the re levant evide nce to de termine if a fa ct issue exist s.” Id . at 22 7. Th is s tand ard , w hic h “ g e ne ra lly mirr o r s t h a t o f a s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t u n d e r T e xa s R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e d

u r e 1 6 6 a ( c ) ,” se e ks to

re c on c ile “ the fu

nd a me nta l pr e c e pt t

hat a cou rt mu st n ot p ro c e e d o n th e me ri ts o f a c a se un til leg itimate challeng es to its jurisdiction have been de cided” while “pr otect[ing] the interests of the state and the . . . claimants in ca ses . . . in w hich the deter mination of

the subject matter

jurisdiction of the c ourt implicates t h e m er i t s of the par ties’ ca use of a ction.” Id . at 228. Acc ording ly , when revie wing a plea

to the jurisdiction in which the pleading require ment has bee n m et and evide nce ha s b e e n s ub mit te d to su pp or t th e ple a tha t im pli c a te s th e mer it s o f t

he c a se , w e take a s tr

ue a ll evidenc e fa

vorable to t h e n o n m o v ant and indulg e eve ry infere nce a

nd resolve a

ny doubt in the nonmovant’s favor. Id . Whether the e vidence prese nts a fac t question reg ardinga jurisdictional fa ct is a question of law that we re view de novo. Id

. CHAP TER 143 B e fo re turnin g to t

he pa rt ie s’ ple a din g s and

jur isd ic tio na l e vid e nc e , it is h e lpf ul t o f ir s t s u r v e y th e s tatuto r

y c o n te xt in w h ic h th is p r o c e e d in g ar is e s

— c h a p te r 1 4 3 o f the loca l g overnme nt code. 3

Chapter 143 of

the local g overnme nt code is the c urre nt incarnation of the Fire fig hter and Police Civil S ervic e Ac t. Chapter 143 is intended “ to se cu re eff icient fire and police depar tments composed of c apable personne l who are fre e f ro m p o l i t ical influenc e and w ho have5

perma nent employ

ment tenure as public s er v an t s . ” Tex . L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 143.001(a) (West 1999). To that end, positi ons in the fire a nd police depa

rtments of municipalities g overne d by chapte r 143 ar e cla ssified, rec eive civil service pr otection, and a re f illed from promotion el ig ib il it y li s ts b a s e d o n o b

je c ti v e , me r it

- b a s e d qu a li f ic a ti o n s an d c o mp e ti ti v e te s ting. Id. § 143.021 (West 1999).

Municipalities a

r e n o t a uto ma ti c a lly g overne d by

chapte r 143. Instead, the le g islature has permitted municipalities w ith a population of 10,000 or more that have a paid fire depar

tment and police de partment to opt-into the cha pter 143 re g ime throug h a loca l election. Id. § 143.002 (West Supp. 2006), § 143.004 ( West 1999). The voters of Round Rock have approve d the adoption of cha pter 143 a

nd, at all times releva

nt t o t h i s ca s e, it has g overne d the City ’s fire and police depar tm e nts

. T h e City

has established a

Fire fig hters’ a

nd Police Offic ers’ Civil Service Commi ssion (t h e C o m m ission) to administ er a nd implement chapter

143 in acc ordanc e with its purposes. S ee id. § 143.001, § 143.006 (West Supp. 2006).

I n a municipality like the City that is g overne d by chapte r 143, th e m u n i ci p al g overningbody

est ab l i s hes by

ordinanc e the c lassifications and number of positions in each classification. Id. § 143.021(a)

. I n t h i s m an n er, the g overningbody can c reate new positions or, within cer tain limit ations, abolish them. See City of San Antonio v. W allace , 338 S.W .2d 153, 155- 59 (T e x. 19 60 ); Michna v. Ci t y o f Houston , 521 S.W .2d 331, 334-35 (Te x . Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ).

Promotion eligibility

lists for vaca

ncies in ea ch n o n -e n t ry

level cla ssification are

c r e a te d b y a d mi n is te r in g a c o mp e ti ti v e w r itte n e xa m o p e n to p r o mo ti o n - e li g ib le c an d ida tes. See6

Tex. L oc. Gov’ t C o d e Ann. §§ 143.028, .032 (West Supp. 2006), § 143.030 (West 1999). Candidates who sc ore 70 points or above (the max imum being 100 points) pass t he ex am. See id. § 1 43 .0 33 (c) (Wes t Su

pp . 2 00 6) . B a se d o n th e c and idate s’ e xam s c or e s and a dd iti on a l po int s

awa rded ba sed on seniority , passing candidates are ranke d on a p rom otion eligibility list. Id. § 143.033(b)-(c). Each pr omotion eligibility list remains in effe ct for one y ear afte r the date on wh i ch the exam was g iven, “unless e x hausted” ear lier. Id. § 1 4 3

. 0 3 6 ( h ) ( We s t Su p p . 2 0 06). As

vaca ncies a rise, the c ommissi on shall submit names from the l ist to the depar tment head until eac h

vaca ncy is filled or the list is ex hausted. Id. § 143.036(c)

. I f a va canc y

arises be fore a promotion elig ibilit y list e x p ires or is exhausted, the de pa rtme nt h e a d is re qu ir e d to fi ll the va c anc y by pe rm ane nt a

pp oin tme nt fr om the lis t w ith in s ixty day s afte r the date the vaca ncy occur s. Id. § 1 43 .0 36 (e ). Te xas c ourt s h a ve re pe a te dly he ld t hat a depar tment head’ s duty

to fill a vaca ncy from a pr omotion eligibility list i s mandatory

—he or she has no discre tion not to fil l the vaca ncy . See I

nter n a t i o n a l A ss’n of Firefighters v. Townsend , 62 2 S.W. 2d 56 2, 56 3 (T e x. 19 81 ) (p e r c ur iam) ; Duck ett v. City of Houston , 495 S.W .2d 883, 886-87 (T e x. 19 73 ); se e Klin ge r v . Ci ty of S an An ge lo , 902 S.W .2d 669, 673-74 (Te x . App.—Austin 1995, writ denied) . I f no promotion elig i b i l i t y list ex ists at the time the vaca ncy arises, the depar

tment head must fill the vac ancy by perma nent appointment fr o m a p rom otion eligibility list t hat the commission shall create by conductinga new

promotional exam. Id. The top-r anked c andidate on a promotion eligibility

list at the time a vac ancy

occur s has the “ primary

rig ht” to be appointed to f ill the vacanc y

not later than the last day of the sixt y -day statut or y pe ri od in w hic h th e de pa

rtme nt h e a d is re qu ir e d to fi ll the va c anc y , a nd fa ilure to t ime lyEa rl ie r v e rs ion s o f t

he c ivi l se rv ic e a c t ma

nd a te d a 90 -d ay pe ri od wi thi n w hic h to fi ll 4 vaca ncies rather than the curr ent 60-da y period. Compare Act of July 5, 1949, 51st L eg ., R.S., ch. 572, § 2, sec. 8, 1949 Tex. Ge n. L aws 1114, 1115 (90-da y period) with Ac t of

May 28 , 1 97 9, 66 th L eg ., R.S., ch. 753, § 3, sec. 8, 1979 Te x . Gen. L aws 1856, 1857 (60-da y period). Hence , pre- 1979 case s ref er to the f ormer 90- day

require ment. See D ucke tt v. City of Houston , 495 S.W .2d 883, 887 (T e x. 19 73 ); Michna v . City of Houston , 521 S.W .2d 331, 335 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [ 1st Dist.] 1975, no writ). 7 fill the vaca

ncy results in the top-ranke d candidate’s entitlement to the appointment, as a matter of law, ef fec tive on the six tieth day

. Lee v. D owney , 842 S.W .2d 646, 649 (Tex. 1992) (“Apromotion is c on sid e re d e ff

e c tiv e a s o f the la st day that th e c ity c ou ld l awf

ull y have fi lle d th e va c anc y ; th a t is , sixty da y s f ro m th e date the va c anc y wa s c re ate d. ” ); Du c k

e tt , 4 95 S.W. 2d

a t 88 7; Klinger , 90 2 S. W.2 d at 67 3- 74 ; s ee also Michna , 521 S.W .2d at 334-35 (holdingthat top candidate s on p r o m o t i o nl i s te x i s t i n g w h e nv a c an c i e s ar o s e w e r e e n t i t l e d t o p r o m o t i o n s an d

p a y b e g i n n i n g 9 0 d a ys afte r the va canc ies arose until the posit ions were validly abolished by

ordinanc e). 4 As su min g the de pa

rtme nt he a d a c ts t ime ly , h ow e ve r, he or sh e po sse sse s so me discretio n t o ap point a candidate from the pr omotion eligibility list ot her tha

n the top-ra

nked

c and idate

. Whe n a vac anc y ari se s, the top thr e e ra nk ing c and idate s on the pr omo tio n e lig ibi lity lis t (or, if the re a

re le ss than three candidates on the list, tho s e ca n d i d at es) are submitted to the de pa rtme nt h e a d, wh o is re qu ir e d to a pp oin t the hig he st- ra

nk ing c and idate un le ss h e or sh e “ ha s a

v al i d re as o n for not appointing the per son.” Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 1 4 3

. 0 3 6 ( f )

. I f the de pa rtme nt h e a d e le c ts n ot t o a pp oin t ( “ by

pa ss” ) a to p-rank e d c and idate , th e de pa rtme nt h e a d is require d to “per sonally

discuss the rea son with the person be ing by passed be fore appointing a nother person” and file the rea son in writing with the c ommissi on. Id. The by passed c andidate ha s the rig ht to seek re view with the commission reg ardingthe re ason for the by pass. Id. I f the c andidate doe s

no t a pp ly fo r r e vie w o r t

he c omm iss ion

do e s n ot s e t a sid e the by pas s, th e candidate ’s name is8

returne d to its pl ace on the elig ibilit y list and shall be resubmitted to the depa rtment hea d if a

vaca ncy occur s. Id. § 1 43 .0 36 (g ). Ho we ve r, if a de pa rtme nt h e a d b y

pa sse s a c and idate thr e e tim e s, files the re ason for

eac h by pass in writing , and the c o m m i s s i o n d o es not set aside a ny by pass, the person’ s name shall be r emoved f rom the promotion elig ibilit y list. Id.

P LEADINGS AND JURISDICTIONAL EVIDENCE The Ci t y challeng ed the suff

iciency of Whiteaker’ s pleading s and submitted

e vid e nc e in a

n atte mpt to c on tr ov e rt

so me of Whit e a ke r’ s p le d ju

ri sd ic tio na l f

a c ts. Som e of

the se challeng es, as e x plained below, implicate the merits of Whiteaker ’s claims. Whit eake r re sponded with his own jurisdictional e vidence . Acc ording ly , we be g in our jurisdictional analy sis by revie wing bo th Whit e a ke r’ s ple a din g s and the pa rt ie s’ jur isd ic tio na l e vid e nc e to ide nti fy (1 ) fa cts all eged in Whit eake r’s plea dings that are unchalleng ed; (2) a ny jurisdictional fac ts that the City has cha lleng ed and conclusively neg ated; and (3) any jurisdictional f acts that the City has challenged b u t ab out which a fac t issue remains. See Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226. Unless the City has cha lleng ed and conclusively

neg ated a jurisdictional fac t pled by Whit eake r, we must assume the fac t to be true for purposes of our

jurisdictional an aly sis. Id. The followingsummary ref lects this analy

tical framework, a

nd we e mphasize t h at we are expressing no opinion re g ardingthe ultimate merits of any of the pa rties’ fa ctual conte ntions. I n J uly 2005, the Round R o ck C i t y Council enac ted an or dinance cre ating new po sit ion s in

se ve ra l f ir e de pa rtme nt cl a ssi fi c a tio ns , inc lud ing a tot a l of ele ve n ne w ca pta in p os iti on s.The City ’s fire depar tment civi l service classifications include, in ascendingrank or der, 5 Fire Fig hter, L ieutenant, Capta in, Battalion Chi ef, D eputy Chief, and F ire Chief. On Oc tob e r 1 2, Chi e f H od g e se nt a me morandu m to e a c h o f t he top e le ve n c a

pta in 6 candidates o n t he promotion elig ibilit y list, i ncluding Whit eake r, titled “Conditional Offer of Promotion.” In this doc ument, Hodg e stated that, “I am please d to offer

y ou a promotion to the rank of Captain . . . ef

fec tive at 0700 am on Oc tober 22, 2005.” Hodge fu rt h er stated that, “With y our a c c e pta nc e of thi s o ff e r o f pr omo tio n, y ou a g re e to ac c e pt [an y ] and a ll as sig nme nts fo r Ca pta in i n the Round

Roc k F ir e De pa

rtme nt a s a ssi g ne d by the F ir e Chi e f f or the dura tio n o f s uc h a ssi g nme nts as dete rmined by

the Fir e Chief.” 9 See T ex . L o c. Gov’t Code Ann. § 143.021. The ordina nce a lso prescr ibed the division to which 5

e a c h c a pta in po sit ion wo uld be a ssi g ne d: e ig ht of the ne w c a pta in po sit ion s we re t o b e in suppression, one in fire preve ntion, and two in training

.

Be cause no promotion eligibility list for capta in positi ons exis ted at the time the ne w

c a pta in v a c anc ie s a

ro se , th e Com mis sio n w a s r e qu ir e d to a dmi nis te r a p ro mot ion a l e xam f or e lig ibl e fire lieute nants and c reate a ne w list. See id. §§ 143.028, .030, .032, .033. On Octobe r 5 or 6, 2005, the C ommissi on administered the require d exam and created a promotion eligibility list of twelve candidates. L ieutenant Whiteaker ranke d eleve nth on the list. Chief Hodg e initially

extended written off

ers of capta in p ro m otions, effe ctive Oc tob e r 22 , to e a c h o f t

he top e le ve n c and idate s o n th e pr omo tio n e lig ibi lity lis t. Whit eake r sig ned 6 the document, ve rifying that “I acc ept the promotion to the ra n k o f fi re C aptain pursua nt to the conditions describe d here in,”and r eturne d it. On October 27, howeve r, Hodg e ema il e d th e to p e leven capta in candidate s “to notify y ou that the letters you signe d ac ce p t i n g a p romotion to the rank of

c a pta in e ff e c tiv e [Oc tob e r] 2 2, 20 05 , are nu ll and vo id sin c e no pr omo tio ns we re ma de

. . . d ue to

conce rns for a ssignment to a 40 hour work week.” Whil e som e fire depa rtment assig nments had a sh if t- ba se d sch e du le (e .g ., 24 ho ur s on, 48 ho ur s o ff ), oth e r a ssi g nme nts —in c lud ingthe tw o c a pta in10

positi o n s a s s igne d to the training division—required a Monday -throug h-F riday , 40-hour wor k wee k. This a nd other portions of the rec ord indicate that many firef ighte rs pre fer

a shift-ba sed sche dule for various re asons. I n his email, Hodg e stated that he wou l d contac t eac h candidate in rank or der of elig ibilit y over the following wee k “to ex plain what posi tions are open and your options reg arding the positions to be filled so this proce ss can be completed.”

Af t er contacting the ten hig her- rankingcandidates in rank or der a nd offe ring them their choice fr o m among the ca ptain positions remaining a vailable, Hodg e had r emaining to offer Whit eake r only

one of the two capta in positions assig ned to t raining (which, a g ain, re quired a 40- hour work w eek) . Acc ording to Whi teake r, who testified by aff idavit, he explained to Hodg e that he could not ac cep t this particular c aptain promotion for “ persona l rea sons” re lated to its work schedule —“I

lived in Temp l e, an d b ec ause of my wife’ s work sche dule, had c erta in childcar e obligations that could not be accommodated by a Monday throug h Fr iday , 40-hour wor k schedule .” At the time, Whiteake r had be en wor king a 24-hours on, 48-hour s off shift sche dule in suppression. Hodg e, Whiteaker

testified, re sponded “that if I declined the promotion Iwould be re moved from the promotion elig ibilit y

list and would not have the opportunity to promote t o Captain unless Itook another promotional examination and was place d on a future promotional elig ibilit y list.” “When Ipr ote ste d, ” Whit e a ke r a dd e d, Ho dg e “ e xpla ine d th at he fel t th e Civ il Se rv ic e Ac t r e qu ir e d my

re mov a l fr om the lis t if Ivo lun tari ly de c lin e d a

n o ff e r o f p ro mot ion .” “ Af

te r c on su lti ngwi th [h is] repr esentatives in the Round Rock Firef ighte r’s As s o c ia

ti o n,” Whiteaker

“told Chief Hodg e that [he] did not ag ree that [Hodge ’s] was a cor rec t interpretation of the Civil S ervic e Ac t.”Whit eake r pled a nd produce d jurisdictional evidence conce rning a De cemb e r 2 0 0 5 me e ting 7 involving him, the pre sident of the Round Rock Fire fig hters Association, the Association’s attorne y (also his attorney

in this proceeding ), Chief Hodg e, and the city att orney . Whit eake r and the Association had r equeste d the meeting“conc erningmy status as a c andidate f

or promotion to the rank of Captain.” During this mee ting, Hodg e stated his c oncer n that he would be unable to fill the capta in positi on in tr aining if firef ighte rs on the promotion e ligibility list could volunt arily decline pr omo tio n to that po sit ion . T he As so c ia tio n r e sp on de d b y of fe ri ng to c on du c t a

surv e y of lie ute na nts to determine if a

ny would be willing to a cce pt positi ons in training. Acc ording to Whi teake r, “The meeting ended w ithout any resolution as to whe t h er or not Irema ined on the promotion elig ibilit y list.” F oll ow ingthe me e tin g , th e As so c ia tio n c on ducted the surv e y and , o n D e c e mbe r 3 1, its a tto rn e y e ma ile d th e c ity

a tto rn e y statin g that tw o li e ute na nts we re wi lli ngto a c c e pt p os iti on s in training . Around the sa

me time, in response to a n i n q u i ry from Chief Hodg e, the Assoc iation’s pr e sident res ta te d it s p os iti on that Whi te a ke r’ s d e c isi on to d e c lin e to b e pr omo te d to the c a pta in position i n training did not require his re moval from the pr omotional eligibility list. 11 On Novembe r 15, Whit eake r—who states that he was “ direc ted” to do so by Chief Ho dg e —c ounte rs ig ne d a

me mor and

um f ro m H od g e a c kn ow le dg ingthat H od g e ha d o ff e re d h im a pr omo tio n to Ca

pta in, that he ha d “d e c lin e d the of fe r . . . and

re qu e ste d to re ma in o n th e e lig ibi lity list,” but that Hodge was instead r equire d to remove him fr om t h e l i s t. The docume nt concluded with, “My

signature is ver ification that I have r ece ived and u n d erstand the information containe d within this document, althoug h Imay not ag ree wi t h it[ s] actions pursuant to the conditions descr ibed her ein.” Hodg e then f illed the eleve nth new ca

ptain position by

promoting the twelfthrankingcandidate on the promotion e ligibility list. After some neg otiations invol ving H odg e, other City officia ls, W hiteaker , and re prese ntatives of the Round Rock F irefig hters Association, Hodg e, 7 as the City

acknow ledg ed in its plea to the j urisdiction, “did not remove [W hiteaker ’s] name from the list at that tim e.”

On Janu a ry 14 , 2 00 6, on e of

the c a pta ins a ssi g ne d to the tr a ini ngdiv ision , Bi lly Wust erha usen, wa s promoted to battalion chief, thus creating a nother c aptain vac ancy

in that12

division. W hiteaker

pled and a lso testified that, beg inning at some unspecifie d time, this vacanc y was filled by

a ca ptain previously

assig ned to suppression, Johnni e B o h a c , cre ating a ca ptain vaca ncy in suppression. Acc ording to Whi teake r, “Mr . Boha c continues to wor k in that position, and is listed in the RRFD website as a Captain in the Training Division.” Whit eake r’s pleading and e v i dence

c on c e rn ing thi s po ssi ble c a pta in va c anc y in su

pp re ssi on pr ov e s to be sig nif ic ant to ou r ul ti mate dis po sit ion

of thi s a pp e a l. Whit eake r testified that, on January 25, while he wa s on duty , De p u ty Fire Chief Da v i d Smit h prese nted him with a memorandum fr om Chief Hodg e, date d the same da y . The

m e m o r an d

u m s t a t e d

t h a t“ yo uar e p r o m o t e d t o c a p t a i ne f f e c t i v e 8 : 0 0 a . m . S a tu r d a y, J anuar y 2 8 , 2 0 0 6 , to fill the captain’s va canc y in Training cre ated by

[t he] promotion to battalion chief . Your fir st day

in Training wi l l b e Monday , J anuar y 30, 2006.” The memorandum fur ther order ed Whiteaker

to report to the c aptain in the training division for further instruction not later than 8:00 a.m., Monday , J anuar y 30, 2006. Whit eake r testified that “I explained to Chief Smit h that Iwas

un a ble to a c c e pt t

his pr omo tio n f

or the same re aso n th at I had e xpla ine d to Chi e f H od g e ba c k in N o v e mb e r . ” S m i t h d e p art e d an d r e l aye d W h i t e a k e r ’ s r e s p o n s e t o C h i e f H o d g e . L a t e r

t h a td a y, Smit h telephoned Whiteake r and “told me that Chief Hodg e had instruc ted him to say that Ihad bee n promoted, and if I wanted to avoid being promoted, I had to write a

letter a ccor ding to Civil Service. [S mith] said he would email me the lang uag e that neede d to be included.” Smit h subsequently sent

an e ma il t o W hi tea ker stat ingthat “ Ita lke d to Chi e f a nd the fo llo wi ngmus t be inc lud e d f or c ivi l service : Ireque st a voluntary demotion f

rom the ra

nk of F ire Captain to the r ank of F ire L ieutenant wi thi n th e Round

Roc k F ir e De pa

rtme nt. ” Whit e ake r “c a lle d De pu ty Chi e f S mith b a c k to pr ote st13

havin g to w ri te su c h a le tte r, ” to wh ic h Smit h re sp on de d that Ho dg e “ ha d sa id t hat if Idid n’ t w ri te

a letter, I had to show up at Training Monday morning at 8:00 a .m., a nd that if I didn’t, Iwould be considere d absent without leave and disciplinary action would be taken.” Whit eake r consulted with F irefig hters Association leade rship and counse l. Counsel draf ted an e mail to the city

attorney protesting Chief Hodg e’s a ctions and empha siz ing that “any le tte r w ri tte n a s r e qu ir e d b y the Chi e f wi ll no t be un de rs too d by us to pr e c lud e Whit a ke r’ s r ig ht t o pursue this matter f

urther thr oug h appropr iate leg al ac tion.” Whit eake r testified that he draf ted two letters, one r equesting a voluntary demotion and the second advising of his view that it was illeg al to remove him from the promotional elig ibilit y list because he had dec lined promotion to the training

c a pta in p os iti on . H ow e ve r, the re c or d d oe s n ot c on ta in t he se le tte rs , n or

ind ic a te wh a t ha

pp e ne d to the m. Wh ite a ke r s ub sequ e ntl y me t w ithChi e f H od g e and De pu ty Chi e f S mith. Ac c or din g to Whit eake r, Hodg e: explained that he was requiring me to w rite the letter reque sting a voluntary demotion beca use the City

Attorney had advise d him that the Civi l Service A ct would not allo w the City

to c re a te ano the r p ro mot ion a l e lig ibi lity lis t to fi ll the po sit ion

in Traininguntil thi s list was ex haus t ed

. He there fore instructed me to wr ite a letter reque sting de motion and advised me of w hat the letter should say

. Whit eake r “the n went to another room and draf ted the letter as instructed,” showed his dr aft to Chief Hodg e, “who revie wed it, a nd then direc ted that I

make f urther c hang es bef

ore he would acc ept it.” Once Hodg e appr ov ed the letter, Whiteake r sig ned it. A copy is included in the City ’s jurisdictional evidence :14

Chi e f Hod ge Iwo uld

lik e to t ha nk y ou fo r t he op po rt un ity y ou have of fe re d me to pr omo te to the ra

nk of Ca pta in i n tr a ini ng . A t th is t ime Ire g re t I wi ll h a ve to a sk

to be de mot e d f

ro m th e ra

nk of Ca pta in back to th e ra

nk of L ie ute na nt a nd to b e a ble to r e ma in at my

c ur re nt l oc a tio n at st a tio n # 2 o n “ C” sh ift. I have a fo ur y e ar o ld da ug hte r t hat is g oin g to a

pr ivat e sc ho ol a

nd my wi fe is a sc ho ol t e a c he r a

nd the ir sc he du le s c on fl ic t r e g ula

rl y . T his me ans Ihave the du ty of takin g my

da ug hte r t o sc ho ol a nd pic kin g he r u

p. . . . At thi s tim e in my

lif e wo rk ingsh if

t w or k b e ne fi ts m y fa mil y lif e the mos t. I

have me t w ithy ou

and Iun de rs ta

nd that in no wa y wi ll this be held a g ainst me on the n ex t Captains promotions and Iappre ciate your u n d e r s ta n d in g . Ip la

no nim me d iate ly

s ta rti n g b a c k

in to my s tu dy in g f

o r th e n e xt pr omo tio na l e xam a

nd pla n on impr ov ing on my ne xt sc or e and ho pe fu lly thi ng s w ill work out [] and [I ] ca

n be able to promote to the rank of Captain in the nea

r future

. Whit eake r testified that “I did as instructed. . . . The letter doe s not truly repr esent my

position, and Itold Chi ef H odg e as muc h. Isigne d the letter to avoid threate ned discipline.”

I na me mo r an d

u m d a te d th e f o ll o w in g d ay , Ch ie f

H o d g e f

o r ma ll y a c c e p te d Whit eake r’s letter , purported to de mote him from Captain to L i eu t en an t, “ef fec tive at 0701 hours J an u ary 2 8 , 2 0 0 6 , ” an d as s i gn ed h i m t o t h e s am e s h i ft an d s t at i o nh e h adp re v i o u s l y b ee nwo rk i n g. As no te d ab ov e , Hod g e ’s Janu ary 25 me mor and um ha d sta te d tha t White a ke r’ s pro mot ion to c a pta in was “ eff ective 8:00 am Saturday , J anuar y 28, 2006.” Rea d literally , Hodg e’s a cce ptance would have made Whiteaker ’s demotion from Captain eff

ect ive bef ore his promotion to Captain took eff ect. The parties ha ve not addr essed the sig nificanc e, if a ny , of this discrepa

ncy . Ho dg e te sti fi e d th a t, i n e arl y F e br ua ry , “ Ide c lare d th e Oc tob e r 6 e lig ibi lity lis t

e xha us te d b e c a

us e the re we re no oth e r L ie ut enan t candi date s o n th e e lig ibi lity lis t w ho Ic ou ld promote to th e Ca

p ta in in T r a in in g v a c an c y . ” T h e Co mm is s io n th e r e a f te r p o s te d n o ti c e of a promotional examination for Captain for Apr il 4, 2006. See Tex. L o c. Go v ’t Code Ann. § 1 43 .0 36 (a ), (d ). Whit e a ke r’ s c ouns e l, on be ha lf of Whit e a ke r an d the As so c ia tio n, wr ote the c ity15

a tto rn e y on F e br ua ry 6 dis pu tin g the F ir e De pa rtme nt’ s p os iti on

tha t th e Oc tob e r 2 00 5 e lig ibi lity lis t had been exhausted and that Whit eake r, for merly the top (sole) c andidate on that list , no longe r had a rig ht of promotion to the next capta in slot. He maintained that “ha ving d ec l i n ed to acc ept the po sit ion in T ra ini ngdo e s n ot de pr ive L t. White a ke r o f h is p la c e on the pr omo tio na l e lig ibi lity lis t. Th e F ir e Chi e f s imp ly

ha s b y pa sse d L t. Wh ite a ke r f

or a po sit ion he c ann ot, fo r p e rs onal re a so ns , acc ept.” F or these r easons, Whiteaker ’s name should “ be the first provided by the C ommissi on for the next C aptain vac ancy .” The letter c onclud ed with the wa rning that Whit eake r and the Association re serve d all options, including leg al ac tion.

The Commission proceede d to conduct a capta in promotional exam on April 4 and g ener ated a new pr omotion eligibility list of five ca

ndidates. Whiteaker did not take this ex am and he wa s not included on the new e ligibility list. The new list was used to fill a new capta in vaca

ncy in s up pr e ssi on

that ha d a ri se n o n F e br

ua ry 28 , a no the r o ne ari sin g in m id- Ap ri l, a nd tw o n e w c a

pta in po sit ion s th a t w e re c re a te d b y the City Cou nc il i n M ay . N on e of

the se po sit ion s w e re of

fe re d to Whit eake r, consist ent with the City ’s position that he had not qualified a s a ca ndidate on the ne w, applicable promotion eligibility list. I t is undisputed that Whit eake r did not f ile any formal pr ocee ding or

appea l with the Commi ssion. I nstead, he filed suit in district c ourt in Septe mber 2006. Whit eake r’s c entra l theory is that none of his a ctions, nor those of Chief H odg e or othe r City personne l, removed him fr om the Oc tob e r 2 00 5 p ro mot ion

e lig ibi lity lis t or exha

us te d the lis t; that he re ma ine d a s th e so le c and idate when the F ebrua

ry 28 capta in va canc y in suppr ession arose ; a nd that he acc ording ly

had a pr imary rig ht to be appointed to the vacanc y within six ty day s after

it arose. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann.16

§ 1 43 .0 36 (e ); Lee , 8 4 2 S

. W

. 2 d a t 6 49 ; Duc kett , 4 95 S.W. 2d a t 88 7; Klinger , 902 S.W .2d at 674. Be cause Hodg e fa iled to so appoint him, W hiteaker contends, he was e ntitled to the promotion, as a matter of l aw, on the last day of the sixt y -day

period, Apr il 29, 2006. See Lee , 842 S.W .2d at 649; Du c k e tt , 4 95 S.W. 2d

a t 88 7; Klinger , 902 S.W .2d at 674. B a se d o n th is the or

y , Wh ite a ke r a sse rt s th re e c a us e s o f a c tio n:

! a dec laration under the Unifor m Decla ratory J udg ments Act “of his rig ht to promotion under § 143.036 retroa ctive to April 2 9 , 2 0 0 6

. . . and to pay for that position at all times there afte r.” ! injunctive relief

“enjoining Def

endants fr om violating Plaintiff’s rig hts under § 143.036 by un l a w f u l l y r e m o v i n g h i m f

r o m t h e O c t o b e r 6 , 2 0 0 5 C a p t a i n ’ s p r o m o t i o n a l e l i g i b i l i t y lis t, fa ili ngto p ro mot e him

fr om t hat li st t o Ca

pta in o n Apr il 2 9, 20 06, and fr om f a ili ngto provide him with the pay and bene fits of the Captain ra nk afte r April 29, 2006.” ! mandamus to compel Hodge to perfor m his “non-discre tionary

duty ” to promote Whiteaker to captain r etroa ctive to April 29, 2006.

Whit eake r pra

y ed for the following relief

:

! A de c laratio n tha t “D e fe nd ants ’ f a ilure to p ro mot e Pla int if f t o th e po sit ion

of F ir e Ca pta in on or about Apr il 29, 2006 violated Defe ndants’ oblig ations and Plaintiff’s rig hts under Texas L ocal Gove rnment Code § 143.036.” ! A per

manent injuncti on ag ainst the Def endants e njoining them “f rom violating § 143.036 by failing and re fusing to promote plaintiff to the ra nk of Captain on Apr il 29, 2006.” ! “Or der the Def

endants to promote Plaintiff to Captain .

. . retroa ctive to A pril 29, 2006 and to make Plaintiff whole f or all pay and bene fits lost as a resul t of De fenda nts’ unlawful failure to promote Plaintiff on April 29, 2006.” ! A writ o f m an d am u s “dire cting Def endants to comply

immediately

with . . . § 143.036 by promoting Pl aintiff to the rank of C aptain effec tive April 29, 2006, and to pay him the salary presc ribed for

that position at all ti mes there afte r.” ! Prejudg ment interest “on a ll backpay owed to Plaintiff.” ! Attorney ’s fe es and c osts under the UD J A. ! Post-judgment intere st. ! Such further

relief , leg al or e quitable, as the c ourt dee ms nece ssary and just.17 AN AL YSI S I n four issues, the C ity asser ts that the di strict court erre d in denying its plea to the jur i s d i ct ion beca

use (1) Whit eake r lac ks standing; ( 2) Whiteaker’ s claims are barr ed by g o v e r n m e n t a l i m m u n i t y; ( 3 ) c h a p t e r 1 4 3 d o e s n o tw a i v e s u c h i m m u n i t y; an d , a l t e r n a t i v e l y, (4) Whiteaker

failed to e x haust administrative re medies.

St andi ng The City

asser ts that Whiteake r has no justiciable interest in his suit—and, theref ore, la c ks s t an d i n g

—

b e c a u s e h e h a d

n o r i g h to r

i n t e r e s ti np r o m o t i o nt o t h e F e b r u ar y 2 0 0 6 c a pta in

vaca ncy in suppression. Standing is a doctrine of justiciabilit y , a threshold question that implicates

su bje c t- ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n a nd e mph a size s the ne c e ssi ty of a c on c re te inj ur

y fo r a jus tic ia ble c la im to be pre sented. W

aco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson , 2 2 S

. W

. 3 d 8 4 9 , 8 5 1 (T ex . 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Patterson v. Planned Pare nthood , 971 S.W .2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998) ). The standing require ment stems from two limit ations on subject-matter jurisdiction: the s epar ation of powers doctrine and, in Texas, the open cour ts provision. Id. The g ener al t est for standing in Texas require s that there “ (a) shall be a

rea l controver sy

betwee n th e p a

r ties, which (b) will be actua lly deter mined by the judicial dec laration

s o u gh t.” Texas Ass’n of Bus ., 852 S.W .2d at 446 (c iting B o a rd o f W a te r E n g ’ r s v . City of San An ton io , 283 S.W .2d 722, 724 (Tex. 1955)).

I f, as Whiteaker

asser ts, he was the sole rema ining c andidate on the Oc t o b er 2005 promotion eligibility

list an d t h at l i s t rema ined in eff ect whe n the Fe bruar

y 2006 capta in vaca

ncy

arose , he had a

“primar y rig ht” under local gover nment code section 143.036 to be promoted to the

vaca ncy . Lee , 8 42 S.W. 2d

a t 64 9; Du c k

e tt , 4 9 5 S

. W

. 2 d a t 88 7; Klinger , 902 S.W .2d at 674.As no te d, Hodge ’s Janu ary 25 me mor and

um s ta te d th a t Whi te a ke r w a s p ro mot e d to 8 Captain “e ffe ctive 8:00 am Saturda y , J anuar y 28, 2006.” Hod g e ’ s s u

b s e q u e nt d e mo tion of

Whit eake r was made “ef

fec tive at 0701 hours January 28, 2006.” 18 Whit eake r has a lleg ed fac ts de monstrating a rea l c ontroversy reg arding the exis tence of such a rig ht

and c on c re te inj ur

y fr om i ts d e pr ivatio n, and he se e ks a

de c lara tio n o f t his ri g ht a nd re me dy fo r i ts deprivation. W hiteaker

clea rly has standing to assert his claims. The crux of t he C ity ’s s tanding challeng e is that Whit eake r had not, in fact, re mained as the top ca

ndidate on the Oc tober 2005 promotion elig ibilit y list at the time of the Fe bruar y 2006 capta in vaca

ncy beca use that list had been exhausted by Whit eake r’s promotion in J anuar y and wa s

no t c on tin

ue d o r r e viv e d a ft e r Whit e a ke r’ s vo lun tary de mot ion

. Th e City a dd s that Whit e a ke r d id

no t take the e xam to qu a lif y fo r the Ap ri l 20 06 pr omo tio na l e lig ibi lity lis t and c an c la im n o in te re st i n b ei n g promoted fr om the list. S imilarly , the City argues that Whiteaker w aived a ny interest he possessed in a pr omotion while on the October 2005 list, emphasizing his J anuar y 26 memorandum acknow ledg ing e x haustion of the list and advis i ngChief Hodg e that he w ould “immediately start back into studying f

or [his] next promot ional exam and plan on improving [hi s] nex t score.” The City ’s standing challeng e turns on disputed fa ct issues that overla p with the merits of Whiteaker’ s claims. These f act issues include the vol u n t ar i n es s of Whiteaker’ s “promotion” a

nd “demotion” a

nd related cor

responde nce. A s noted above , W h i teake r produc ed jurisdictional e vidence that Chief Hodg e threatened disciplinary action if he did not either re port for duty as a capta in in training or reque st a demotion a nd that Hodg e dictated the content of the J anuar y 26 memorandum. We also obser v e that the r ecor d is unclear whether Whit eake r’s January

26 promotion took effe ct bef ore he was de moted. The pre sence of fact i s sues fore closes dismissal 819

under Miranda

. M

iranda , 133 S. W.3 d at 22 7- 28 . F ur the r, the se fa c t is su e s are int e rt wi ne d w ith

sever al potentially controlling leg al issues, including (1) whether Hodg e and the City

had the r ight to unilaterally

promote Whiteaker to a capta in positi on ag ainst his wishes; (2) conve rsely , whether Whit eake r had a

rig ht under c hapter

143 to c ontinue to de cline promotions until a ca ptain position with a desira

ble sche duling a ssignment be came vaca nt; (3) whethe r the disposition of these leg al issues is affe cted by

the fa ct that no other ca n d i d at es besides Whiteaker rema ined on the Oc tob e r 20 05 pr omo tio na l e lig ibi lity lis t; and (4 ) w he the r H od g e ’s a c tio ns in p ur po rt ingto p ro mot e Whit eake r had the eff

ect of removing him from the Octobe r 2005 list, divesting him of his rig hts as the top candidate on the list, and/or exhausting the list. The parties have not y et joined issue on or develope d these leg al issues. Where the pa rties have not y et joined issue or developed the le g al iss ue s th a t po te nti a lly

c on tr ol Wh ite a ke r’ s st and ing , th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t e rr or a bu se its discretion in denying the City ’s pl ea to the j urisdiction as t o that g round. See H endee , 228 S.W .3d

a t 38 2; Davis v. Burnam , 137 S.W .3d 325, 335 & n.16 ( Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.).

The City also sug g ests that Whit eake r’s standingturns on whether he possessed a “veste d proper

ty interest” in pr omotion to the Fe bruar y 2006 capta in vaca

ncy . The City ’s attempt to link st anding to the exis tence of a vested proper ty interest in promotion appear s to be derive d from a misrea ding of City of Amarill o v. Hancoc k , 2 3 9 S

. W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. 1951), to t he ef fec t that “abse nt a prope rty

interest in a c ivil service position, t h e courts have no jurisdiction to hear the claim.” Hancoc k

ins te a d s tand s f

or the pr inc ipl e tha

t th e re is n o inhe re nt j ud ic ia l juri sd iction t o

e nte rt a in a

n a pp e a l f ro m a c ivi l se rv ic e c omm iss ion e xce pt w he re the agency act ion vio la te s a

con st itutio na l pr ov isi on

(s uc h a s d

ue pr oc e ss, wh ic h p re su pp os e s th e e xiste nc e of

a pr op e rt y20

interest). Hancoc k

does not mean that a per son whose statutory rig hts are be ing violate d could have no judicial rec ourse of

any kind, or standing to seek it, unless t he statutory rig ht impli cate s vested prope rty

rig hts. I n a ny e ve nt, e ve n und e r t

he City ’s vie w of sta

nd ing , the c on tr oll ingqu e sti on wo uld sti ll b e wh e the r White a ke r h a d r e ma ine d o n th e Oc tob e r 2 00 5 p ro mot ion e lig ibi lity

lis t a t th e tim e the Fe bruar

y 2006 capta in va canc y arose . The City states that, “[i] t has bee n long e stablished that

an in div idu a l on a promotional elig ibilit y list has a vested interest in a promotion onc e a v acancy

occur s,” and it cha

rac terize s the primary

statutory rig ht of the top ca

ndidate on a pr omotion el i gi b i l i t y list as a vested prope rty rig ht or interest in promotion. But the City ’s contention that Whit e ake r h a d b e e n p ro mot e d a nd no lon g e r r e m a ine d o n th e Oc tob e r 2 00 5 p ro mot ion e lig ibi lity

lis t, as pre viously

explained, is not a proper g round for dismiss al at this juncture. Th e City ’s su g g e sti on that one ’s pla c e me nt on a pr omo tio n e lig ibi lity lis t c on fe rs a vested prope rty

rig ht in a promotion is poten t i al ly more sig nificant in its impli cations for g overnme ntal immunit y . The City states that “a

limit ed waiver

of immunity

is allowed under [ ch ap t er 1 4 3 ] fo r c l ai m s i n v o l v i n g v este d r igh ts ” and Hancoc k would indeed sug g est that the district court would have inher ent j urisdiction to entertain a challeng e to City

actions alleg ed to violate such rig hts. But as Whiteaker observe s, a per son’s position as the top cand i d ate on a promotional

e lig ibi lity lis t, w hil e c on fe rr inga

statut or y pr ima ry ri g ht t o pro mot ion , doe s n ot c re a te an e qu ita ble proper ty interest in promotion. Se e Fi re me n’ s & Po lic e me n’

s Ci v il S e rv ic e Com m’n o

f Cit yof F or t W orth v. W illiams , 531 S.W. 2d 32 7, 33 0 ( Te x. 19 75 ); Firemen’ s & Policeme n’s Civil Serv. Comm’n of Cit y of Fort W

orth v. Kennedy , 5 14 S.W. 2d 23 7, 23 9- 40 (T e x. 19 74 ); see a l s o Hancock ,The City d o es n o t ap pear to dispute that the UDJA would waive its gove rnmental 9 immunit y on Whit eake r’s attorney ’s fe es cla im under its declar atory -judg ment action, see Tex as Educ. Age ncy v . Leeper , 893 S.W .2d 432, 445-46 (Tex. 1994) , but disputes whether the district court has subject- matter jurisdiction over this ca use of a ction. 21 239 S.W .2d at 791-92 (f

ire capta in had no vested pr operty interest in position under civil service act that c ou ld g ive ri se to inh e re nt ri g ht t o a pp e a l f ro m de mot ion ); but see City of F or t W or th v . Ny bo rg , 999 S.W .2d 451, 457 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1999, pet. denied) (de scribi n g i n t ere st of top candidate as “ an equitable proper ty rig ht in th[ e] vacated position and a primar y rig ht to promotion”). I n sum, we reject both the C ity ’s arg ument that Whit eake r lac ks standing to pur sue his claims and its premises that Whiteaker’ s stan d i ng depends upon the exis tence of a ve sted proper ty interest in a pr omotion and that a per s o n ’s p o s ition as the top candidate on a promotion elig ibilit y list confers suc h an intere st. W e over rule the City ’s standing issue.

Gove rnm ental im m uni ty

The City asser ts that Whit eake r’s claims implicate its gove rnmental immunity , that

c ha pte r 14 3 do e s no t wa ive su c h immun ity , and that the dis tr ic t c ourt a c c or din g ly lac ks su bje c tmatter jurisdiction over Whiteake r’s suit. Specifica lly , it contends that Whit eake r’s claims for a n order “mak[ing] Plaintiff whol e fo r all pay and bene fits lost as a result of De fenda nts’ unlawful failure to promote P laintiff on April 29, 2006” and a writ of mandamus compelling the City to pay back salary

from that date seek “ money damag es” a

nd, there fore , implicate its gove rnmental i m m u n i t y. Whit eake r re sponds that his claims seek dec laratory , injunctive, and mandamus relief

9 to compel the City

to comply wi t h ch ap t er 143 and do not implicate the City ’s g overnme ntal immunit y . Alternatively , Whit eake r conte nds that chapter 143 waive s the City ’s g overnme ntal immunit y from his claims.22

General principles When perfor

ming g overnme ntal functions, politic al s ubdivisions of the state, including municipa lities li ke the City , enjoy g overnme ntal immunit y . Se e City of G alv esto n v . S

tat e , 217 S.W .3d 466, 467-68 (Te x . 2007). Gove rnmental immunity derive s from, or is a

n aspec t of

, the state’s sover eig n immunit y . See R eata Constr. C o r p . v. C ity of Dallas , 197 S.W .3d 371, 374 (T e x. 20 06 ); W

ichita Falls Stat e Hosp. v . Taylor , 106 S.W .3d 692, 694 n.3 (T ex . 2 0 0 3 ). Gover nmental immunity

protec ts municipaliti es ag ainst lawsuits for “mone y damag es.” S

e e C i ty of Galveston , 2 17 S.W. 3d at 468 ( “ We t a ke a s o ur sta rt ingpo int

the pr e mis e that in

Te xas a g overnme ntal unit is i mmune from tort liabili t y u n l ess the L eg islature has w aived immun ity .” ); Re ata Con str . Co rp . , 1 9 7 S

. W

. 3 d at 3 7 4 (q u o t i n g Te

x as Natural R es. Conservation Comm’n v. I T-Davy , 74 S.W.3 d 849 , 8 53 (T e x. 20 02 ) ( “ Sov e re ig n im mun ity pr ote c ts the State from lawsuits f

or money damag es.”) ). Sovereig n or g overnme ntal immunit y encompa sses two principles: immunity

from beingsued and immunity from liability

. IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d at 853. Whe n c lot

he d w ith governm e nta l im mun ity , mu nic ipa lit ie s e njo y

immun ity

fr om s uit

un le ss expressly waived by

the leg islature. City of Galv eston , 2 17 S.W. 3d a t 46 9; Re ata Con str . Co rp .,197 S.W .3d at 37 4

. I m m u n i ty from suit deprives a

trial court of

subject-matter

jurisdiction. Re ata Con str . Co rp . , 1 9 7 S

. W

. 3 d at 3 7 4 (c i t i n g Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 224). Sovereig n and g overnme ntal immunit y are judge -made , common-law doc trines that

are deeply rooted in Texas jurisprudenc e and its antec edents. Re ata Con str . Co rp .,197 S.W .3d at 37 4- 75 ; Too k

e v . Ci ty of M e x ia , 1 97 S.W.3d 32 5, 33 1-32 (T e x. 20 06 ); Hosner v. D e Y oung, 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1846). The contempora ry rationale or justification f or these doctrines is to protect23

state or loc a l g ov e rnme nt r e so ur c e s f ro m th e c os ts of pa

y ing jud g me nts and

de fe nd inga g a ins t th e m. Reata Constr. Corp. , 197 S.W .3d at 375 (“ A lack of immunit y may hamper g overnme ntal functions by requiringtax resour ces to be used for defending lawsuits and pay ing judg ments rather than using tho se re so ur c e s for the ir int e nd e d p ur po se s. ” ); Tooke , 1 97 S.W. 3d a t 33 1- 32 (s ov e re ig n im mun ity “re mains firmly

established, and a s it has come to be a pplie d t o the var ious gove rnmental e ntities in this S tate, an importa

nt purpose is pr ag matic: to shie ld the public from the costs and conse quence s of improvident ac tions of their g overnme nts”). Relate dly , the judiciary has def er r e d to the leg islature to decide w hen, if, or to what ext ent to waive immuni t y , as t h ese decisions entail sensitive policy judgme nts conce rning the use o f p u b l i c re source s and g overnme ntal functions that ar e the pr oper domain of the leg islative rather than judicial branc h. City of Galveston , 2 17 S.W. 3d a t 46 9 ( “ Th is heavy presumption in favor o f i m munity arises not just from sepa ration-of -powe rs principles but from pra cti ca l co n cer

ns. I n a wor ld with increa singly complex webs of g overnme nt units, t he L eg islature is better suited to m ak e the distinctions, ex ceptions, and limitations that differe nt sit ua tio ns requ ire . T he e xten t to wh ic h a ny pa rt ic ula r c ity , c ounty , p or

t, m un ic ipa l ut ili ty

dis tr ic t,

sc ho ol d istri c t, o r uni ve rs ity sh ou ld pay dama g e s invo lve s poli c y iss ue s the L e g isl a tur e is b e tte r a ble to b a lanc e .” ); R ea t a C o n str. Corp. , 197 S.W .3d at 375 (“ We have g ener ally defe rre d to the L eg is lature to wa ive immunity beca use the L eg islature is better suited to a ddress the c onflicting p o l i cy i s s u es i n v o l v ed

. ”) (c i t i n g IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d at 854 (“ We have c onsistently defe rre d to the L e g isl a tur e to w a ive so ve re ig n immun ity fr om su it, be c a us e thi s a llo ws the L e g isl a tur e to p ro te c t it s p o li c y ma k in g f u n c ti o n . ” ) )

. I n f

a c t, in r e c e n t y e ar s , th e le g is latu r e h a s e xp r e s s e d

it s in te n t t

h a t “ [i ]n

or de r t o p re se rv e [its] i nte re st i n mana g ing state fi sc a l matte rs thr ou g h th e a pp ro pr ia tio ns pr oc e ss, a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovere ign immunit y unless the waive r is eff ecte d byT h es e p ri n ci p l es an d ra t i o n al es ar e f

u rt h er i l l u s t ra t edb y

t h e s u p re m e c o u rt ’s j u ri s p ru d en ce 10 reg ardingcontra ct claims ag ainst g overnme ntal entities. Sovereig n or g overnme ntal immunit y has lon g be e n he ld to e xten d to “ su its a g a ins t . . . o ff ic ia ls s e e kin g to e sta

bli sha c on tr a c t’ s v a lid ity , to enfor ce pe rfor

mance under a

contra ct, or to impose contra ctu al liabiliti es.” Te x as Natural R es. Conservation Comm’n v. I T-Davy , 7 4 S. W.3 d 84 9, 85 5-5 6 ( Te x. 20 02 ); see W .D. Haden Co. v. Dodge n , 3 08 S.W. 2d 83 8, 84 0 (T e x. 19 58 ); Herring v. Houston Nat’l Exc h. Bank , 253 S.W . 813, 81 4 (T e x. 19 23 ). Th e c ourt re c e ntl y e xpla ine d tha t “w e de fe r to the L e g isl a tur e to w a ive immun ity from contr act c laims beca use:”

· the handling of contra ct claims ag ainst t h e go v er n m en t i n v o lves policy choice s more complex than simply waive r of immunity , including w hether to rely on administrative proc esses a nd what re medies to allow;

· the g overnme nt should not be kept from r esponding to chang ing c onditions for the publ i c welfare by prior policy

decisions re flec ted in long- term or ill -c on sid e re d o bli g a tio ns ;

· the claims proc ess is tied to the appropr iations proce ss, and the pr iorities that g uide the latter

should also inform the forme r; and

· the L e g isl a tur e is a ble to d e a l no t on ly

wi th thes e po lic y

c on c e rn s b ut a lso wi t h individual sit uations in deciding whether to waive immunity

by resolution, case s by

case , or by

statute. I n sum, in the c on tr a c t- c la ims c on te xt, leg isl a tiv e c on tr ol ove r s ov e re ig n im mun ity allows the L eg islature to re s p o n d t o chang ing c onditions and revise e x isting ag ree ments if doing so w ould benef it the public.

Tooke , 197 S.W .3d at 332 (c itations and quotations omit ted). 24 clea r and una mbiguous langua g e.” Act of Ma y 26, 2001, 77th L eg ., R.S., ch.1158, § 8, sec. 311.034, 2001 Tex. Gen. L aws 2570, 2572 (c urre nt version at Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 3 11 .0 34 ); se e Re ata Constr. Corp. , 1 97 S.W. 3d a t 37 5 (i n se c tio n 3 11 .0 34 , “ [t]he L e g isl a tur e ha s e xpre sse d it s d e sir e to prese rve its intere st in manag ing f iscal matters throug h the appr opriations proce ss by maintaining

sovere ign immunity

unless it has clea

rly and unambig uously

stated otherw ise”). 10Se e als o M c Lan e Co. v . S

tra y ho rn , 14 8 S.W. 3d

64 4, 64 9- 51 & n. 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 11 2004, pet. denied) (“Asuit that seeks to control a state officia l’s exercise of discretion with in her leg al authority

is a suit to control stat e ac t i o n and cannot be maintained w ithout legislative permission”; holding that beca use cha lleng ed ac tions were w ithin comptroller’s discret i o nary statutory authority , UDJA claim “is seeking to c ontrol state action and is a suit ag ainst the state”) ; J ames L . Har

tsfield, J r., Gove rnmental Immunity From Suit and Liability in T exas , 27 Tex. L . Rev. 337, 338 (1949) ( “Ge nera lly speaking , the rule is that a s u i t aga i n s t an offic er or depar tment or ag ency of the state, the purpose or eff ect of which is to impose liabilities upon, or enfor ce liabilities ag ainst, the state, is in effe ct a suit ag ainst the state, and the ref ore c annot be maintaine d without the consent of the sovere ign, e x presse d throug h leg islative acti o n . The prohibition likewise includes a c tio ns to re qu ir e state of fi c e rs or a g e nc ie s to pe rf or m, or re fr a in fr om pe rf or ming, pure ly g overnme ntal functions, involving their dis cr et ion, as distinguished fr om private a cts of i n d i v i d u al s . ”) ( q u o t i n g San Antonio Indep. Sch. D ist. v. Bd. of Educ. , 108 S.W .2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio 1937, no writ). 25

Th e su pr e me c ourt ha s als o sta te d th a t so ve re ig n im mun ity pr ote c ts the state a nd

its subdivisions ag ainst suits seeking to “ control state a ction.” IT-Davy , 7 4 S. W.3 d at 85 5- 56 ; Director of Dep’t of Agric. & E n v’ t v. Printing Indus. Ass’n , 600 S.W .2d 264, 265 (Tex. 1980); Gr iff in v . H awn , 341 S.W .2d 151, 152 (T ex . 1 9 6 0). In IT-Davy , the cour t sugg ested that the imposit ion of contra ct liability ag ainst the state is a fo rm o f “c ontrolling state a ction,” IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d at 855-56 (suit “attempt[ s] t o control st ate action by imposing l iability on the S tate”) , and it h as used the phra se to ref er to judg ments that would eff ectively direc t or control a g overnme nt officia l in the exercise of his or he r discre tionary st at u t o ry au thority

. See Printing Indus. Ass’n , 60 0 S.W. 2d

a t 26 5- 66 ; Gr iff

in , 341 S.W. 2d

a t 15 2- 53 ; Short v. W

.T. Cart er &Bro. , 126 S.W .2d 953, 96 2 ( Te x. 19 39 ) ( “ A s uit

. . . to enj oin the L and Com mis sio ne r, wh e n ac tin g wi thi n the sc op e of his

a uth or ity , f ro m ma kin g an a wa rd or e xec uti ng a le a se , is a su it to c on tr ol t he a c tio n o f t

he State in selling its public lands and is the ref ore in e ffe ct a suit ag ainst the State, which c annot be maintaine d, the State, not having consente d to be sued.” ). 11

The c onverse is also w ell-established: if the complained- of ac ts of a state of ficial a re illega l or outside his statutory authority , “an en t ity

or per son whose rig hts have be en violated . . .I n other words, the questi on of i mmunity substantially overla ps the m erits of the complaint 12 that a state of

ficial ha s exceede d his s t atut ory authority

. Cf. Te

x as De p’ t of Pa rk s & W ildlif e v. M iranda , 1 3 3 S.W .3d 217, 227-28 (Te x . 2004) (r eg ardingwhether parks a nd wildlife depar tme n t acte d with gr oss neg lige nce so a s to waive sover eig n immunit y under the rec reational use statute). 26 may br ing su it to re me dy the vio la tio n or pr e ve nt its oc c ur re nc e , an d suc h suit is not a su it a g a ins t the State re quiring leg islative or statutory authorization.” Printing Indus. Ass’n , 600 S.W .2d at 265- 66 ; see Tex as Highway Comm’n v. Tex as Ass’n o f S t ee l Imps., Inc ., 372 S.W .2d 525, 530-31 (T e x. 19 63 ); Cobb v. Harrington , 1 90 S.W. 2d 70 9, 71 2 ( Te x. 19 45 ); State v. Eppe rson , 42 S.W .2d 228, 231 (Tex. 1931). Thus, sovere ign immuni ty is not implicated by a sui t to enjoin a g overnme nt officia l from ac ting outside his statutory authority , Printing Indus. Ass’n , 600 S.W .2d at 265-66; Gr iff in , 341 S.W .2d at 153-54, nor one alleg ing a j u s t i ci ab l e controve rsy

reg ardingwhether

a g overnme nt official is ac ting outside his s tatutory authority and see king a

decla ration construingthat authority

. S

te el Imps ., 37 2 S. W.2 d at 53 0- 31 ; Cobb , 1 90 S.W. 2d a t 71 2; see also IT-Dav y , 74 S.W. 3d

a t 85 5 ( “ Pr ivate pa

rt ie s ma y se e k d e c lara

tor y re lie f ag a ins t sta te of

fi c ia ls w ho a lle g e dly

a c t w ith ou t le g a l or

statut or y a uth or ity .” ). F ur

the rm or e , in some c ir c ums tanc e s, mand a mus may lie to c ompel a g overnme nt of ficial to pe rfor

m a clea r mandatory , minist eria l statutory duty without implicating sove reig n immunit y . Epperson , 42 S.W .2d at 231.

I n such ca ses, Texas courts have labore d to dr aw two distinctions of relevanc e her e t h a tc o n t r o l w h e t h e r

t h e c l a i m s a s s e rt e d

i mp l i c a t e s o v e r e i g no r g o v e r n m e n t a l i m m u n i t y: (1) whe ther the a ctions alleg ed as the basis of the claim fall outside the ac tor’s statutory power s or in fac t are within the actor’s di scre tionary statutory power s and there by

seek to “ control state a ction,” see Printing Indus. Ass’n , 6 00 S.W. 2d a t 26 5- 70 ; Gr iff

in , 3 41 S.W. 2d

a t 15 3- 54 ; se e als o Hende e , 22 8 S. W.3 d at 36 8; McLane Co. , 148 S.W .3d at 649 ; and (2 ) whe the r t

he re me dy

a c tua lly 1227

establishes a r ight t o m o n ey d am ages. See , e.g. , IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d at 856 (“ [P ]rivate parties cannot circumvent the State’ s sovere ign immunity from suit by

char acte rizing a suit for mone y dama g e s, su c h a s a

c on tr a c t di sp ute , as a de c lara tor y -j ud g me nt c la im. ” ); see also Fe deral Sign v. Texas S. U

niv. , 951 S.W .2d 401, 404 (Tex. 1997) (“Astate off icial’s illeg al or una

uthorized actions ar e not ac ts of the State. Acc ording ly , an ac tion to determine or pr otect a pr ivate par ty ’s ri g hts a g a ins t a

state of fi c ia l w ho ha s a c te d w ith ou t le g a l or statut or y a uth or ity is n ot a su it a g a ins t the State that sovere ign immunity bars. I n other words, we dist inguish suit s to determine a party ’s rig hts ag ainst the State from suits seekingdamag es.”) (citations omitted).

Gove rnm ental im m uni ty and chapter 143 Chapter 143 e x plicitly

autho r iz e s r e tr o a c ti v e r e in s ta te me nt o r p r o mo ti o n and bac k pay

awa rds in cer tain instances. A f

irefig hter or police office r who rec eives a disciplinary suspension has the rig ht to appea l to the civil service commission, which may restore the per son to his posi tion and aw ard “ full compensation for the ac tual time lost as a result of the suspe nsion at a rate of pa y provided for the position or class of ser vice f rom which the pe rson was suspe nded.” See Tex. L oc. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 1 43 .0 52 (We st 1 99 9) , § 14 3. 05 3 ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 6) ; see also id. § 143.010(a) (We st 1 99 9) (p ro c e dure s f or a dmi nis tr a tiv e a

pp e a ls u nd e r c ha pte r 1 43 , in c lud ingre qu ir e me nt t hat, “if a fire f ighte r or police office r wa nts t o ap p ea l to the commission from an ac tion for which a n appea l or revie w is provided by this chapter, [the p er s o n ] n eed only file an a ppeal with the commission wi t h i n 1 0 day s after the date the action occ urre d”). Chapte r 143 also author izes administrative appe als to t h e co m m i s s i o n from: (1) the g radingof a pr omotional ex am, se e id

. § 143.034(a) (West 1999) (ca ndidate may appea l g rade to c ommissi on within f ive business day s);28

(2) pr o m o t i o nal pass-ove rs, as pre viously discussed, see id. § 1 4 3

. 0 3 6 ( f ) ( c an d i d a t e m ay “ a

p p l y” wi th c omm iss ion

fo r r e vie w o f “ va lid

re a so ns ” fo r p a ss- ov e r t hat de pa rtme nt h e a d f

ile d w ith

c omm iss ion ), (g ) ( c omm iss ion may “ se t a sid e ” by

pa ss) ; and

(3 ) a de pa rtme nt h ead’ s r e qu e st t o involuntarily

demote a f

irefig hter or o ff

i ce r. See id. § 1 43 .0 54 (We st 1 99 9) ; se e ge ne ra lly Sta uff e r v. City of S

an An ton io , 344 S.W .2d 158, 160 (Tex. 1961) (desc ribing these deleg ations of j urisdiction to civil service c ommissi ons); Cor bit t v . Ci ty of T e mp le , 9 4 1 S. W. 2 d 3 5 4 , 355 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, writ denied) ( same).

“I f a fire f ighte r or police office r is dissatisfied with any commission decision,” he may file a de novo appea l in dist rict cour t within ten day s after the decision is either se nt to him by

cer tified mail or per sonally rec eived by

him or h i s d es i gn ee. Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 143.015(a) -(b) (West 1999). I n such appeals, “[ t] he dis trict court may g rant the a

ppropriate leg al

or equitable relief nece ssary to c arr y out the purposes of this c hapter ,” which “may i nclude reinstateme nt or promotion with back pay if an orde r o f s u s p en s ion, dismi ssal or demotion is set aside.” Id. § 143.015(b). F urther, if “the c ourt finds for the fire fig hter or police office r, the c ourt shall order the m unicipality to pay lost wag es t o the fire fig hter or police officer .” Id. § 143.015(d).

The City acknow ledg es that these statutory administrative and a

ppellate r emedies

co n s t itute “limited waivers” of sover eig n immunit y . S e e, e . g . , Te

x a s D e p’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W .3d 170, 198 (Tex. 2004) (rig ht t o j u d icial re view in sec tion 2001.171 of the APA “provide s a limited waiver of soverei gn immunit y ” bec ause “ the L eg isla tu r e n e c e s s a r il y u n d e r stood that state ag encie s would be sued in cour t by pe rs on s e xer c isi ngtha

t r ig ht” ); Da lla s/F

or t W or th I nt’ l A irp or t B d. v . F

un de rb ur k , 188 S.W .3dSe e als o Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 143.009(a) (authorizing c ommissi on or a de signated 13 commission member to “investig ate a nd repor t on all matters relating to the enfor ceme nt and ef fec t of this chapter

. . . and shall dete rmine if the c hapter and rule s are being obey ed”)

. 29 233, 235-36 (Te x . App.—For t Worth 2006, pet. g rante d, judgm’ t vacated w.r.m.) ( statutory reme dy provided by

Texas Comm ission on Human Rig hts Act nec essar ily provides limited waiver of

so ve re ig n im mun ity

). Whit e a ke r d oe s n ot p ur po rt to h a ve inv ok e d a

ny of the re me die s e xpre ssl y provided unde r ch ap t er 143, however

. Cf. Ny bo rg , 999 S.W .2d at 453-54, 457 (top c andidate on promotion list asser

ted fa ilure-to-pr omote claim by filing r equest

w it h commission for investigation, hear ing, a nd deter mination that promotions of high er -u p s had cr eate d vaca ncy to which he wa s entitled, then appealing adver se commi ssion decision under se ction 143.015). I ns te a d, he po int s 13 to numerous Texas decisions over the y ear s acc epting that police office rs or fir efig hters ca n asser t claims in court for

civil service act violations independe nt of th e ac t ’s reme dies and re cover back pay or other monetary compensation. See Tijerina v. City of Tyler , 846 S.W .2d 825, 829 (Tex. 1992) (s uit to r e c ov e r o ve rt ime pa

y a lle g e dly wi thh e ld in vio la tio n of c ivi l se rv ic e a c t) ; Lee , 842 S.W .2d

a t 64 9 ( su it f

or de c larator

y and inj un c tiv e re lie f a

nd ba c k p ay by po lic e of fi c e rs c la imi ngri g ht t o pr omo tio n to job s f

ill e d b y c ivi lia ns ; ob se rv ingthat, “ I t is we ll s e ttl e d th a t w he n a c ity fa ils to f ill

a va c ant p os iti on

in a c c or da

nc e wi th t he Civ il Ser

vic e Ac t, the of

fi c e rs or fi re fi g hte rs wh o p ro pe rl y should have obtaine d such jobs are entitled t o retroa ctive promotion and ba ck pay”); Kie rst e ad v . City

of S an An ton io , 643 S.W .2d 118, 121-22 (Te x . 1982) (suit for ove rtime bac k pay ); Du c k e tt , 495 S.W .2d at 886-87 (ma ndamus ac tion by

top remainin g candidate on promotion elig ibilit y list to compel fire chief to f ill unfilled vaca

ncies a rising w hile list was in effe ct; aff irmedSe e City of H ou sto n v . D uc k

e tt , 486 S.W .2d 871, 872 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 14 [14 Dist.] 1972, writ g rante d) (notingthat trial court judg ment later a ffirme d by supreme c ourt th included “p ay [ i n g] b ack unpaid money above his then sa lary

acc ruing from [90 day s after date of vaca ncy ] pl us interest there on”). 30 tr ia l court jud g me nt a

wa rd ingba c k p ay

and int e re st) ; Stauffer , 344 S.W .2d at 161 (a ffirming trial

14

c ou rtju dgmen t aw ardi ng backsal ary andrei ns tat eme nt fol lo wi ng mi li tar y lea ve o f a bs e nc e ); se eals o City of San Antonio v. Bullock , 34 S.W .3d 650, 652 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 2000 , p et

. d en i ed) (af firming summary

judgme nt that city

was required to fill firefig hter c aptain vac ancie s and aw ard back pa y and bene fits to candidates on pr omotion eligibility list at ti me vacancy

arose ); City of A us tin v . Ca sti llo , 25 S.W .3d 309, 314 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) ( suit for bac k

a ssi g nme nt pay

a lle g e dly

ow e d) ; City

of H ar lin ge n v . A v ila , 942 S.W .2d 49, 51 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, writ denie d) (suit for ba ck pay arising from city ’s implementation of se nio ri ty pa y sy ste m) ; City of A u s t i n v. Austin Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n , 935 S.W .2d 179, 183 (Tex. App.—Austin 19 96, no writ) (va cate d pursuant to settlement) ( suit for dec laratory and inj un c tiv e re lie f re g ard ing c a lc ulatio n of lon g e vit y pa y ); City of Lubbock v. Eckle

s , 888 S.W .2d 621, 62 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —A mari llo 19 94 , w ri t den ie d) (s uit re g ard inga lle g e d und e rp ay me nt o f o ve rt ime pa y ); In te rn ati on al Ass ’n of Fir e Fi gh te rs, Loc al U

nio n No . 6

24 v . Ci ty of S an An ton io , 822 S.W .2d 122, 131-32 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied) ( awa rding retroa ctive promotion and ba ck pay to firef ighte rs on promotion elig ibilit y l i s t who had pr imary rig ht to promotions t o vaca ncies improperly

filled by civilians; observing that “[t] he cas e l aw i s replete with examples where fi re fi g hte rs have be e n pr ov ide d r e tr oa c tiv e pr omo tio n a nd ba c k p ay wh e re it w a s f

ound that th e City in qu est io n fai led t o f

ill a va c ant p os iti on

wi thi n th e sixty

or nin e ty da y s a s r e qu ir e d b y

the Civ il S e r v ic e Ac t” ); Cityof S an An ton io v . Ku

y k e nd all , 749 S.W .2d 169, 170-7131

(Tex. App.—San Antoni o 1 9 8 8 , writ denied) (suit reg ardingamount of injury leave to which fi re fi g hte r wa s e nti tle d) ; Bu rk ha rt v . M oo re , 580 S.W .2d 108, 109-11 (Te x . Civ. App.—Eastland,

no wr it) (m and a mus to c omp e l pr omo tio n fo llo wi ng inv a lid a bo lit ion of positio n) ; Michna , 52 1 S. W.2 d at 33 2-3 5 (m and a mus a c tio n b y po lic e lie ute na

nts on pr omo tio n e lig ibi lity

lis t challeng ing c ity ’s fa ilure t o fill capta in vaca ncies before abolishing positi ons by ordinanc e; held that lieutenants we re e ntitled to retroac tive promotion and bac k pay beg inning ninety day s after vaca ncy

u n t i l p o s i t i o n w a s a bo lis he d) ; B o s t ick v . Owens , 423 S.W .2d 471, 471-72 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1 9 6 8, writ ref ’d n.r.e .) (c ity

promoted top ca

ndidate on promotion

e lig ibi lity lis t c re a te d a ft e r v a c anc y aro se ; he ld i ns te a d th a t to p candi date on pr omo tio n e lig ibi lity list ex isting at time vaca

ncy arose was entitled to r etroa ctive promotion a nd back pay

eff ective on date wh e n p ro mot ion

wa s g ive n o the r c and idate ); see also Klinger , 902 S.W .2d at 673-74 (stating rule a s “[w] hen a c ity

fails to fill a vac ancy

in compliance w ith the [ civil service act], the person w ho p r o p e r l y s h o u l d

h a v e o b t a i n e d

t h e p r o m o t i o ni s e n t i t l e d t o r e t r o a c t i v e p r o m o t i o nan d b a c k p a y, eff ective the last day

the city could lawf

ully have f illed the vaca

ncy ”). Whit eake r appe ars to view these decisions as a pplications of

Stauffer v. City of San An ton io

. 3 4 4 S. W. 2 d 1 5 8 ( T e x. 1 9 6 1). S t a u ffer involved a suit by

a fire fig hter to compe l reinstateme nt after

milit ary leave . The c ivil service a ct guar antee d a right t o reinstateme nt following milit ary leave if the fire fig hter or police office r wa s phy sically and mentally

fit for duty

. The district court ha d rende red judgment for the firefig hter ordering reinstateme nt and awa rding back pa

y . The court of a ppeals, view ing the suit a s an attempt to appe al a c ivil service c ommissi on deter mination fo r wh i ch the act (a s it then ex isted) did not provide a r ight of appea l, held under City of32

Amarillo v. Hancoc k , that the district court lac ked s u b j ec t-matter jurisdiction. See City of San Antonio v. Stauffer , 331 S.W .2d 443, 446-47 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1959, w rit g rante d). The supre me court reve rsed the court of appea ls. Although it deter mined that the ac t did not provide

an administrati ve reme dy for the f irefig hter or an appe al from the c ommissi on to district court, the supreme c ourt h el d t hat the district cour t had g ener al subject-matter jurisdiction to determine a nd

e nf or c e the statut or

y ri g ht be c a

us e the le g isl a tur e ha d n ot p la c e d th a t juri sd ic tio n in ano the r t ri buna l. “Since the pow er to he ar a nd deter mine that question in a judicial sense is not confe rre d by law upon some other tribuna l,” the cour t rea soned, “the district court has jurisdiction to decide the same f rom

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e .” 34 4 S. W.2 d a t 16 1 (c iti ng Te x. Con st. art

. V, § 8 ). Th e su pr e me court a ffirme d the district court’s judg ment awa rding retroa ctive re instatement and ba ck pay

. Id. Stauffer did not ex plicitly

addre s s t h e possi ble implications of g overnme ntal immun it y , n o r d id a n y o f th e n u me r o u s o th e r

c a s e s c it e d

a b o v e . I n a s mu c h a s g o v e rnmental i m m u nity g oes to subject-matter jurisdiction and thus can be raised su a s po nte , see H

endee , 228 S.W .3d at 375, the outcomes in these case s ar gu ably imply that immunit y

does not bar the claims. See Cassidy v . City of Balch Springs , 223 S.W .3d 612, 615 (Te x . App.—Dallas 2007, pet. filed) (sug g esting as much). Yet these case s are silent reg ardingthe cour ts’ rea soning—w hether the cour ts believed the c laims did not i mplicate g overnme ntal immunit y , o r t hat immunity was implicated but the civil s er v ice a ct waive d it, or, as the City sug g ests, the cour

ts simpl y never

c on sid e re d th e se qu e sti on s.

Reg ardle ss, any

potential g o v e r

nme nta l- im

mu n it y im p li c a ti o n s from these c ases have been limited by

a more rec ent dec ision of the Texas Supreme Court. I n City of Houston v. W illiams ,33

a g roup of r etired f

irefig hters sought a declaratory judgme nt that the city had violated c hapter

143 in improp erly

calc ulating lump-sum pay ments of ac crue d vaca

tion and sick leave paid upon termination and in improper ly deducting alleg ed over

pay ments of over

time. 216 S.W .3d 827, 828 (T e x. 20 07 ) ( pe r c ur iam) ; see Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. §§ 142.0017, 143.115-.116. The c ity filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting g overnme ntal immunit y , which the district cour t denied and the court of a ppeals a ffirme d. The c ourt of appe als had reasone d that (1) the g ener al “sue and be sue d” and “ple ad and be impleaded” lang uag e of section 51.075, local g overnme nt code, wa ived the city ’s g overnme ntal immunit y

and (2) the city

had no immunity

from the r etiree s’ dec laratory jud gm ent

c la im b e c a

us e it s ou g ht c on str

uc tio n o f t

he pe rt ine nt s ta tut e s and th e tr ial co ur t ha d p ur po rt e d to

rese rve de termination of dama g es for a later date. The supreme c ourt reve rsed. I t relied on Tooke in r egard to the fi rs t g ro un d. As fo r t he se c on d g ro un d, the c ourt he ld t hat th e fi re fi g hte rs ’ dec la r ato r y ju d g me n t c la im

a c tu a ll y s o u g h t m o n e y

d a ma g e s an d , th e r e f

o r e , im p li c a te d th e c it y ’s g overnme ntal immunit y . W illiams , 2 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d

at 8 2 8 -8 2 9 (c i t i n g IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d at 856). The supreme court rea soned that “[t] he only injury the retire d firef ighte rs alleg e has alre ady occur red, le aving them with only one plausible re medy —an aw ard of

money damag es.” Id. at 829. I t further

observe d that beca

use none of

the re tired fire fig hters asse rted ri gh t s to future pa y me nts , th e y

la c ke d s tand ingto s e ek a pro sp ectiv e statut or y int e rp re ta tio n o n b e ha lf

of tho se

curr ently employ ed. Id. Th e su

pr e me c ourt

fu rt he r e xpla ine d th a t w het her th e pla int if fs so ug ht a d e c la r a ti o nr e g ar d in g a

“ le g it im a te qu e s ti o no f

s tatuto r y in te r p r e tati o n ” w a s i r

r e l e v a nt , b e c a u s e , “ [I ]n

e ve ry su it a g a ins t a

g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty

fo r m on e y

dama g e s, a

c ourt mus t f ir st d e te rm ine the pa

rt ie s’

c on tr a c t or

statut or y ri g hts ; if the so le purp os e of

su c h a de c laratio n is to o bta in a mon e y jud g me nt,34

immunit y is not waived.” Id. As for the trial court’ s rese rv ation of a da mag es dete rmination, the court obser

ved that “g overnme ntal immunit y does not spr ing into e x istence w hen a da mag es aw ard is finally made; it shields gove rnments from the c osts of any litigation leadingup to that goa l.” Id. Th e su pr e me c ourt re ve rs e d but re mand e d to the tr ia l court “ fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w ith this opini on” to consider

the implications of the newly -ena cted sections 271.151-.160 of the local g ov e rnme nt c od e , w hich w aiv es immun ity fr om s uit

fo r c e rt a in c on tr a c t c la ims a g a ins t g overnme ntal entities. Id.

W illiams ha s at le a st two imp or tant p ote nti a l im

pli c a tio ns fo r W hi te a ke r’ s c la ims

. First, while it did not expl icitly addre ss the issue or the implications of prior de cisions like Stauffer , W illiams ’s holding is log ically inconsistent with the e x istence of a g ener al waive r of g overnme ntal im mu n it y f o r c la im s ar is in g u n d e r c h a p te r 1 4 3. See Ca s sidy , 223 S.W .3d at 614-15 (notingthat “[a]lt houg h the supreme court did not direc tly addre ss whether a g ener al waiver of immunity

exis ted under the civil service statutes, the absenc e of a g ener al waiver is c lear ly implied by the outcome”

and ob se rv ingthat outc ome s in pr ior su pr e me c ourt case s “ar g ua bly c on fl ic t w iththe ou tc ome in W illiams ” ); see also Be ll v. City of Grand Prairi e, 221 S.W .3d 317, 323 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (sug g esting that the “import of the W illiams de c isi on ” is “ that Stauffer and the c ourt’s other opinions reac hing the merits under the Civil Service Act were incorre ctly decide d beca use the c ourt lacke d juris d i ct i o n ”)

. Second, W illiams holds that a dec laration of statutory rig hts conce rning an alleg ed underpay

ment of accrue d vaca

tion and si ck leave owed under c hapter 143—a ty

pe of ba ck pay —is a claim for

“money damag es” that impli cate s g overnme ntal immunit y .35 Th e City arg ue s th a t W

illiams “make s it a

bundantly clea

r . . . that a re quest for ba ck pa y is a re qu e st f

or mon e tary

re lie f, wh ic h r e qu ir e s a

fi nd inghe re that so ve re ig n i mm un ity is implicated.” In Be ll , which invol ved cla ims that a municipality underpa id firef

ighte rs in violation of section 143.041 of the local g overnme nt c ode, the Da llas Court of Appea ls viewed W ill iam s as

cr ea t i n g a di ch o t o m y b et we en d ec l ar at o ry an d i n j u n ct i v e c l ai m s re gar d i n g pa st statutory violations (w hic h, it c on c lud e d, imp lic a te g ov e rnme nta l im munity be c a us e the “ on ly

pla us ibl e re me dy” is money damag es) a

nd those seeking only to compel the city to follow the law in the futur e (w hich, i t h el d , d o not impli cate immunit y ). Be ll , 2 2 1 S. W. 3 d a t 3 2 4

- 3 2 6

. T h u s , th e c o u rt h e ld that the district court had subjec t-matter jurisdiction over the fire fig hters’ c laims to th e e xtent they conce rned futur e vio la tio ns and did no t se e k mon e y dama g e s, bu t no t to the e xten t th e c la ims c on c e rn e d p a st violations. Id. ; se e als o Ci ty of S e agov ill e v . Ly tle , 227 S.W .3d 401, 410-412 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, n o p e t. ) ( e mp lo y in g s im il ar an a ly s is in

h o ld in g th a t d e c la

r a to r y - ju d g me n t, ma

n d a mu s , a nd injunctive relief

claims alleg ing te rmination in violation of loc al g overnme nt code se ctions 614.022 and 614.023 we re ba

rre d by g overnme ntal immunit y

to th e ex t ent t hey

soug ht back pa

y or bac k be ne fi ts, bu t no t to the e xten t the y so ug ht pr os pe c tiv e re ins ta te me nt o nly ); City of D all as v . A lbe rt , 214 S.W .3d 631, 633, 637 (Tex. App.—Dallas 200 6, pet. filed) ( simil ar a naly sis in sui t alleg ing fa ilure to pay po lic e of

fi c e rs and fi re fi g hte rs in a c c or da nc e wi th v ote r- a

pp ro ve d p ay

re fe re nd um; su it ba rr e d by g ov e rnme nta l immun ity to the e xten t it so ug ht ba c k pay and ben e fi ts) ; City of Da lla s v . M

ar tin , 214 S.W .3d 638, 640, 644 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pe t. filed) (same). Whit eake r urg es that we should a pply the Dallas c ourt’s re asoning and hold that, at a minimum, the dist rict cour t had subject-matter jurisdiction over his cla ims to the ex tent they seek prospec tive relief

. We ag ree . L ibera lly

construing his pleading s, Whi teake r see ks both prospective36

decla ratory , injunctive, and mandamus relief reg arding his r ights to the promotion from the time of judgme nt goingforwa

rd and r etrospec tive relief re gar d i n g his rights to bac k pay and bene fits he would have r ece ived if he ha d been pr omoted on April 29, 2006. Whit eake r thus does not have the “only conce ivable re medy ” of mone y damag es, see W

illiams , 216 S.W. 2d a t 82 7, be c a us e his c la ims include a decla

ration of his statutory

rig hts to the promotion and to compel the City ’s compliance with these rights in the future

. Se e Be ll , 221 S.W .3d at 324-25. At lea st to thi s ext ent, Whiteaker’ s

cause s of ac tion for dec laratory , injunctive, and mandamus relief do not i m plicate the City ’s g overnme ntal immunit y . City of S e agov ill e , 227 S.W .3d at 410-412; Albe rt , 214 S.W .3d at 637; Ma rti n , 2 14 S.W. 3d

a t 63 4; Be ll , 221 S.W .3d at 324-25.

Does Whiteaker seek m oney damages? As for the other a spects of his cla ims, W hiteaker q u est ions the assumption that reque sts for bac k pay

or ot h er re t rospec tive monetary relief cate g orica lly

constitute claims for “money damag es” that impli cate go v ernmental immuni ty . He a rg ues that such a

war ds are not considere d money

damag es whe n awa

rded a s equitable r elief to pre vent unjust enrichment. See , e.g ., Burrow v. Arce , 99 7 S.W. 2d 22 9, 24 5 (T e x. 19 99 ) (c ha ra c te ri zing awa

rd of mon e y

to p re ve nt u

nju st enric hment as “a

n equitable reme dy ”). I n the context of g overnme nt employ ment, Texas courts have disting u is h e d

e qu it a b le b a c k

- p ay

aw ar d s f r o m t h o s e c o n s ti tuti n g mo n e y

d a ma g e s b a s e d

u p o nthe

rea sons why

the bac k pay

is sought: whethe r the pa y s o u gh t i s for wor

k actua lly perf ormed or service s provided to the employ er, w hich is actionable in equity , or is soug ht to compensate for the loss of pay

resulting from the e mploy ee be ing wrong fully preve nted from wor

king f or the e mploy er, which is money

damag es. See Nue ces County v . Ferguson , 97 S.W .3d 205, 220-21 & n.21This Court explained the distinction i n O’Bry ant , in the c on te xt of

a c on sti tut ion a l c la im: 15 [T]o d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he of fi c e rs ’ r e qu e st for back p ay un de r t he c on sti tut ion

is an equitable claim, we loo k t o the g ener al distinction between a ctions at law a nd a c tio ns in e qu ity

. B e c a

us e Te xas c ourt s tod ay may e nte rt a in bo th t y pe s o f a c tio ns in one lawsuit, the distinction is difficult t o discern in modern caselaw

. Historically , the differ ence betwee n the two ty pes of a ctions depende d upon the nature of the re lief desired. T y

pically , an ac tion “at law” is one broug ht for a mone y judgme nt while an a c tio n “ in e qu ity” is o ne br ou g ht f or oth e r t y pe s o f r e lie f, su c h as i nju

nc tio n, sp e c if

ic pe rf or manc e , r e sc iss ion , o r c anc e llatio n. I t is a lso ins tr uc tiv e to l oo k to the pa

rt ie s’ char acte rization of the relief soug ht in their pleading s to deter mine the leg al cha

rac ter of an a ction. I n light of the se principles, w e conc lude the office rs’ reque st for bac k pay for violations of their constitutional rights is essenti al l y an ac tion at law. The of fice rs do no t se e k mo ne y

to c omp e ns a te the m f

or se rv ic e s r e nd e red; n or

do the y se e k to preve nt the defe ndants from be ing unjustly enric hed. Instead, they seek mone y beca use they wer e pre vented f

rom confe rringa ce rtain ty p e of benefit to the defe ndants (i.e. se rving as license d police off icer s), a theor

y not based in traditional equitable principles. Our conclusion is c onsistent with the g ener al rule that an ac tion for moneta

ry relief is an ac tion at law rather than in e quity

. . . . Id. (citations omitted). 37 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (“A c laim for bac k pay , other than one to recov er f or

se rv ic es re nd

e re d o r to pr e v e nt u nju st e nr ic hm e nt, is a c la im for dam ag e s at la w. ” ) ( e mph a sis

a dd e d) ; O’Bry ant v . City of Midland , 949 S.W .2d 406, 414 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997) (op. on re h’g ), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds , 18 S.W .3d 209 (Tex. 2000) (discussing distinction betwee n equitable a

nd leg al back pa

y claims and holding that reque st for bac k pay for of fice rs who had bee n preve nted from se rving as license d peac e o ff i ce rs wa s a cla im for damag es). Th is 15 dis tin c tio n is c on sis te nt w iththe su prem e court ’s re c og nit ion , at le a st h ist or ic a lly , th a t su its to

rec over mone y or other proper ty wrong fully taken or withheld by state officia ls f rom their rig htful

owner s do not impl icate sove reig n immunit y beca use, in conc ept, the disputed prope rty never belong s to the state. Epperson , 42 S.W.2 d at 230 (i f ta x c oll e c tor is “w ro ng fu lly wi thh old ingfu nd s”38

owed a s commission for service s provided by private pa

rty in collecting delinquent taxes, “ac tion to co mpe l him to pa

y the same to a

pa rt y e nti tle d th e re to i s n ot o ne a g a ins t th e state wh ic h c an o nly be br ou g ht wit

h the c on se nt o f t

he state .” ); see also Dodge n , 308 S.W .2d at 841-41 (disting uishing Epperson and prior c ases on basis that “[i] n that class of c ases it is held that suits for proper ty alleg ed to b e un lawf

ull y or wr on g fu lly wi thh e ld fr om the ri g htf ul ow ne rs by

of fi c e rs of the state are no t su its

a g a ins t th e so ve re ig n it se lf and may be ma int a ine d w ith ou t pe rm iss ion of the so ve re ig n. ” ); c

f. S tat e

v . La in , 349 S.W .2d 579, 581-82 (Te x . 1961) (“ One who takes possession of anothe r’s land w ithout leg al rig ht is no less a trespasse r bec ause he is a st ate official or employ ee, and t he owner shoul d not be re qu ir e d to ob ta in l e g isl a tiv e c on se nt t o in sti tut e a su it to ou st him sim

ply be c a us e he a sse rt s a g ood faith but overzea lous claim that titl e or r ight of possession is in t he state a nd that he is ac ting fo r an d on be ha lf of the state

. . . . Th e ratio na le of the ru le is that in su c h ca se s poss e ssi on is n ot i n fac t held for the sove reig n but is wrong fully held.”)

. We n e e d n ot f

ur the r c on sid e r the po te nti a l a pp lic a bil ity of the se pr inc ipl e s b e c a

us e W h i t e ak e r ’ s c l a i m s f

o r b a c k p ay an d b a c k b e n e f i t s w o u l d n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d

ane qu i t a b l e r e m e dy. Whit e ake r d oe s n ot s e e k s a lary or be ne fi ts o we d f

or wo rk he act ually

pe rf or me d in the c a pta in position t hat bec ame va cant in F ebrua ry 2006, but compensation for salary and bene fits of which he was de prived t h ro u gh t h e C ity ’s alleg edly wrong ful ac tions preventing him from working in that position. See O ’Bryant , 949 S.W .2d at 414.

Whit eake r also sug g ests that his c l ai m s for back pay and bac k benef

its may be

rec overa ble throug h mandamus without impli catingg overnme ntal immunit y Mandamus will issue to compel a public of

ficial to per form a ministerial ac t—one for w hich “the la w clea rly spells out the du ty to b e pe rf

or me d by the of fi c ia l w ithsu ff

ic ie nt c e rt a int

y that no thi ngis l e ft

to t he e xer c iseI n Jernigan , a county trea surer soug ht mandamus from the supreme c ourt to compel the 16 c o mp tr o ll e r

to ma k e s tatuto r il y - r e qu ir e d

p r o r a ta d is tr ib u ti o n s f

r o m s c h o o l f

u n d r e v e n u e s . 3 8 S. W. 2 4 , 2 5 (T ex . 1 8 9 6 ). R ej ec t i n g t h e at t o rn ey gen er al ’s ar gu m en t t h at t h e s u i twa s b arre d b y s o v er ei gn immunit y , the cour

t rea soned that, upon the loca l authority ’s s atisfac tion of the statutory conditions fo r p ay me nt:

it b e c ome s th e pla in d

uty of the c omp tr oll e r t o d

ra w h is w arr ant fo r th e sum so apportioned. It is an imperative oblig ation, enjo i n ed u p o n him by the lawmaking power of the state. I

n pursuanc e of the power confe rre d upon it by amende d section 3 o f a rt ic le 5 o f t

he co ns ti tu ti on , th e le g isl a tur e ha s g ive n th is c ourt jur isd ic tio n to iss ue the wr it o f m and a mus a g a ins t any state of fi c e r, the g ov e rn or

e xce pte d; t

hat is , it ha s authorized a suit ag ainst any such off icer to compel him to perfor

m the duties imposed upon him by

law. I t can ha

rdly be said that such a s u i t i s o n e ag ainst the state; but, if it be such in any sense, it is, never

theles s , p ro p er a

nd maintainable, beca use the state ha s authorized it to be broug ht. It is otherwise when the leg islature has not enjoined [required] the perf ormanc e of the act, and the interests of the state, e ith e r i n it s p ro pe rt

y or fu nd s, wo uld

be inj ur iou sly

a ff e c te d b y awa rd ingthe wr it.

Id. a t 25 ; se e Lai dla w Br os . v . M arrs , 273 S.W . 789, 792 (Tex. 1925) (quoting t h i s holding of Jernigan and

statin g that “ [t]his ho ldi ng is c le arl y c or re c t, a nd ha s b e e n s o unif

or mly a pp lie d b y thi s court that seldom is the question ra ised o r re fe rr ed to in the case s”). Se e als o J esse n A sso c s. v. Bullock

, 53 1 S. W.2 d 5 93, 6 01 (T e x. 19 75 ) ( or ig . p ro c e e din g ); Cra me r v . S he pp ar d , 16 7 S. W.2 d 1 47 , 15 6 (T e x. 19 42 ) ( or ig . p ro c e e din g ); Car pe nte r v . S

he pp ar d , 145 S.W .2d 562, 569 (T e x. 19 40 ); Bu rtt

sc he ll v . S he pp ar d , 6 9 S. W.2 d 4 02 , 4 04 (T e x. 19 34 ); W oo ds v . Te rre ll , 2 8 5 S. W. 29 3, 29 5 ( Te x. 19 26 ); Fr e e ma n v . Te rre ll , 284 S .W

. 94 6, 94 9 ( Te x. 19 26 ); Fulmore v. Lane , 14 0 S. W. 4 05 , 4 12 (T e x. 19 11 ); Terrell v. Sparks , 135 S.W . 519, 522 (Tex . 1911); Escavaille v . Stephens , 119 S.W . 842, 843 (Tex. 1909). 39 of discre tion.” An de rso n v . Ci ty of S e v e n P oin ts , 806 S.W .2d 791, 793 (T ex . 1 9 91). Such minist eria l statutory

duties sometimes may entail the pay ment of money

and, as the supreme c ourt ha s lo ngreco gn ize d, so ve re ig n o r g ov e rnme nta l im mun ity do e s n ot b ar a

mand a mus a c tio n to compel the pe rfor

mance of such duties. See , e.g ., Jernigan v . Finley , 38 S.W . 24, 25 (Tex. 1896). 16 Whit e a ke r c ite s C i t

y o f W a c o v . B itt le for the br oad princ iple that g overnme ntal i m m u n i t y d o e s n o tb ar

a m an d a m u s a c t i o n s e e k i n g b a c k p ay u n d e r c h a p t e r 1 4 3 , n o r a d e c l ar a t o r

yjudgme nt action to decla

re the claimant’s rig ht to such pay ment. 167 S.W .3d 20 (Tex. App.—Waco40

2 0 0 5 , p e t. d e n ie d )

. T h e im p li c a ti ons of Bittleare more limited. Bi ttl e involved a fire fig hter’s administrative appeal from an indefinite suspension. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. §§ 143.052, .0 53 . In s uc h a

pp e a ls, a s d isc us se d a

bo ve , c ha pte r 1 43 ex pl ici tl y

a uth or ize s th e awa

rd of “ fu ll compensation for the ac tual time lost as a result of the suspension at the rate of pa y provided for

the position or class of ser v i ce from which the pe rson was suspe nded.” Id. § 143.053(f) . The a ppeal was he ard by

an indepe ndent hea

ring examiner, see id. § 143 .0 57 , w hic h o rd e re d r e ins ta te me nt w ith back pa y , as per mitted by section 143.053. Claiming that the city had not pa id him the back pay he had bee n awa

rded, the firef

ighte r sued for a decla

ration that the city had failed to c omply with the he ari nge xami ne r’ s d e c isi on and se c tio n 1 43 .0 53 (f

), c ou ple d wi th mand a mus c omp e lli ngthe c ity to pay the bac k pay

and bene fits it owed. The c ourt of appe als reje cted the c ity ’s asser tion of g ov e rnme nta l im mun ity

be c a us e the fi re fi g hte r’ s c la ims so ug ht to c omp e l the c ity to c omp ly

wi th the mandator

y require ments of sec tion 143.053(f). Bi ttl e , 167 S.W .3d at 26-27. Contrary to Whit eake r’s a rg uments, Bi ttl e do e s n ot s ug g e st that ba c k p ay is g e ne ra lly

rec overa ble throug h mandamus for chapte r 143 violations. T h e l egi s lature ne cessa rily waived g overnme ntal immunit y

for a dminist rative ba ck pay awa rds made by

civil service commissions or hear ing e x aminers unde r sec tion 143.053(f), a nd Bi ttl e ’s ho ldi ng s must be vie we d in th a t c on te xt. Howeve r, B i t tle i s consistent with the established principles that mandamus may lie to enforc e minist eria l duties of g overnme n t al en tities to m ake c erta in statutorily -re quired pa y ments and that such ac tions do not i mplicate g overnme ntal immunit y . Cf. Au sti n Nat’ l Ban k of Au sti n v. Sh e pp ar d , 71 S.W .2d

2 4 2 , 2 4 4 ( T e x. 1 9 3 4 ) ( ma n d a mu s to e n f

o r c e p ay me n t o f c la im a u th o r iz e d and appropr iated by

leg islature).41 On the oth e r h and , Te xas co ur ts have lon g re c og nize d th a t a de pa rtme nt h e a d h a s a

mand a tor y , n on dis c re tio na

ry st a tut or

y du ty un de r c ha

pte r 1 43 to f

ill a va c anc y wi th a n e lig ibl e candidate. See Townsend , 6 22 S.W. 2d a t 56 3; Du c k

e tt , 4 95 S.W. 2d

a t 88 6- 87 ; Klinger , 902 S.W .2d at 6 7 3 -7 4

. Under

chapte r 143, this duty

nece ssarily

entails paying the appointee the salary and benef its attendant to other positions at that classification. Tex . L oc. Go v ’t C o d e Ann. § 141.041. As we ha ve see n, even while these statutory duties require monetary p ayments, g overnme ntal immunit y does not ba

r a mandamus action (or a decla ratory or injunctive claim) to the e x tent it seeks to compel compliance with the se statutory duties prospec tively

. Nor is it clea r, under case s such as J e rn igan , or

un de r t he c on te mpo ra

ry ratio na le s f

or the do c tr ine , w he the r g ov e rnme nta l im mun ity would, in all circumst an ce s , b e im plicated by a mandamus action to enfor ce the se mandatory statutory duties with r eg ard to pa y ments that have alre ady acc rued; i.e., to c ompel both retroa ctive prom o t i o n and back pay to a position to which a ca ndidate is entitled. Such ac tion would not

nece ssarily

infring e on municipalities’ budg etar y proce sses by

impos i n g liability

for improvident

a c tio ns —th e mod e rn

fo c us of so ve re ig n a

nd g ov e rnme nta l immun ity —b ut mig ht be sa id m e re ly to

e nf or c e the p r e vio us po lic y

and bu dg e tary

de c isi on s o f t

he le g isl a tur e and

the mun ic ipa l g ov e rn me nt, as manife sted in the duties imposed by chapte r 143, the municipal ordina nces c reating the c lassified positions, and the expressed will of local v o ters that their f ire or police depar

tments should be g overne d by

chapte r 143. S ev era l of the pre

- W

illiams c a s e s Wh it e a k e r

c it e s , w h il e n o t e xp li c it ly a d dr e s sing g ov er n m en t al i mmunity , are consistent with these obser vations. Among the pre

- W illiams case s Whit e ake r c ite s are tho se inv olv inga lle g a tio ns th a t a c and idate wa s d e pr ive d o f a pr omo tio n to whichh e o r

s h e c la im e d

a r ig h t u n d e r th e c iv il s e r

v ic e a c t a n d c o u rts h a v e aw ar d e d

r e tr o a c tive42

promotion and bac k pay . These case s fall i nto essentially three distinct cate g ories. The fir st involves failure -to-promote c laims where a municipality has alleg edly fa i l ed altog ether to fill a vaca

ncy as require d by

the civil service act. See, e .g., Townsend , 62 2 S.W. 2d a t 56 3; Du c k e tt , 495 S.W .2d at 88 6- 87 ; Bullock , 3 4 S. W.3 d at 65 2; Michna , 521 S.W .2d at 332-35. The second involves f ailure- topromote cla ims where the municipality has alleg edly

acte d wrong fully

in attempting to abolish or repla ce a classified position with a non-cla ssified one. See Lee , 842 S.W. 2d a t 64 9; International Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local Union No. 624 , 822 S.W .2d at 131-32. The third cate g ory involves not the elimination of a cla ssified position or the failure t o fi l l i t , b u t the promotion of another fi re fi g ht e r o r p o l i c e o f

f i c e r t o a p o s i t i o n t o w h i c h t h e p l a i n t i f f c l a i m s e n t i t l e m e n t u n d e r t h e a c t. Bostick , 4 23 S.W. 2d

a t 47 1- 72 . T he City

c ite s Townsend

and Bullock

(fr om t h e fi rst cate g ory

) as support for the pr oposition t hat “law suits seeking to enforc e the mandates of the C S A t h at do not reque st money

damag es, do not implicate sover eig n immunit y .” We ne e d n o t d e c id e w h e th e r

ma n d a mu s a c ti o n s in

th e f ir s t t w o c a te g o r ie s o f

c a s es might survive W

illiams beca

use Whiteaker’ s claim falls within the third cate g ory , and, we conclude , this ty pe of c laim impli cate s the City ’s g overnme ntal immunit y . Whit eake r’s suit, as cur rently pled, complains not that the City failed to pe rfor m a mandator

y statutory duty , but that it performe d that duty improperly

—by appointing another candidate to the Fe bruar y 2006 capta in va canc y

when he contends that slot should ha ve instead g one to him. I n substance, Whit eake r see ks his losses caused by the City ’s ac tions. This is a claim for money damag es that implicates the City ’s g overnme ntal immunit y . See Tooke , 1 97 S.W. 3d a t 33 1- 32 (g ov e rnme nta l immun ity se rv e s to “ sh ie ld t he pu bli c from the c osts and conseque nces of improvident actions of their g overnme nts”).The same would be true for inter est awa rded on the se sums. 17 43 We conclude t

h a t Wh it e a k e r ’ s d e c la

r atory , injunctive and mandamus causes of action imp lic a te the City ’s g ov e rnme nta l im mun ity to t he e xten t th e y seek back pay and ba c k b e ne fi ts

a c c ru ingpr ior

to j ud g me nt. Se e City

of S e agov ill e , 227 S.W .3d at 410-412. 17

Do es c hap te r 1 43 wai v eimm unity fo r Wh ite ake r’

s c lai ms? We also conclude that the leg isla t u re h as not waived the City ’s g overnme ntal immunit y ag ainst Whi teake r’s c laims for bac k pay and other retrospe ctive monetar

y relief

. We a g a in e mph a size the le g isl a tur e ’s mand a te that, “I n ord e r t o p re se rv e [its] i nte re st in manag ing state fiscal matters through the appropr iations proce ss, a statute shall not be construe d

as a waiver of sovere ign immunit y unless the waiver is e ffe cted b y cl ea r a n d unambig uous langua g e .” Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 3 11 .0 34 (We st Su pp . 2 00 6) ; see Re ata Constr . Corp. , 19 7 S. W.3 d at 37 5. Whit e a ke r p oin ts o ut t hat th is pr inc ipl e e xiste d at c omm on law e ve n p ri or

to section 311.034’s e nactment, see Taylor , 1 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d at 6 9 6 (c i t i n g Du ha rt v . S

tat e , 610 S.W .2d 740, 742 (Tex. 1981) ), and that it is not an end in itself, but mer ely a g uide for a scer

taining w hether

the l egi s lature intende d to waive sove reig n immunit y . See Ke rrville State Hosp. v. Fe rnandez , 28 S.W. 3d

1, 3 ( Te x. 20 00 ); City

of L aP or te v . B ar

fie ld , 898 S.W .2d 288, 292 (Tex. 1995). He urg es that even a fter the enac tment of section 311.034, the supreme court has rec og nized that “cle ar a nd unambig uous” leg islative intent to wa ive immunity need not be expli citly

stated in a statute, but may be infe rre d “whe n the provisi on in question would be mea ningle ss unless immuni ty wer e wa ived.” Taylor , 1 06 S.W. 3d

a t 69 7. Exa mpl e s in c lud e statut e s pr ov idi ng c la ims or ri g ht o r r e lie f a

pp lic a ble only ag ainst g overnme nt entities. See F ernandez , 2 8 S. W.3 d at 4- 6 ; Ba rfi e ld , 898 S.W .2d at 295-Whit eake r also attac hes importance to City of Swe e twa te r v . W ad de ll , 218 S.W .3d 80, 81 18 (Tex. 2007), which was decided a fter W illiams . I n W

ad de ll , a g roup of f

irefig hters alleg ed that the city had fa iled to promote Waddell in acc ordanc e with sec tion 143.036 and failed t o pay eac h of the m th e same ba se sa lary a s r e qu ir e d b y

se c tio n 1 43 .0 41 . T he y

so ug ht a de c laratio n th a t th e c ity ha d v iol a te d th e se pr ov isi on s, a n o rd e r t o p ro mot e Wadd ell , an d “ mon e tary dama g e s. ” Th e c ity asser ted a plea to the jurisdiction based on g overnme ntal immunit y , which the t ri al court g rante d. The court of appeals reverse d, holding the g overnme ntal immunit y was waived by “sue a nd be sued” lang uag e in the city

char ter. The supreme court reve rsed in lig ht of Tooke and re manded to the tria l court. 218 S.W.3d at 81. “On re mand,” the supr eme c ourt instructed, “ the trial cour t may consider, among other thing s, whether the C ity ’s i mmunity from suit is waived by

sections 271.151-.160 of the L ocal Gove rnment Code or other statutory provisions .” Id . ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . A t mo st, W ad de ll may imply that the supreme court ha s not squarely decide d whether

chapte r 143 wa ives g overnme ntal immunit y

as to claims under

section 143.036 or se ction 143.041, but it provides no particula r g uidance for r esolving such issues. 44 29 7; see also Mega Child C are, Inc ., 14 5 S. W.3 d at 19 8. Whit e a ke r u rg e s th a t, s imi larl y , h is statut or y ri g ht t o p ro mot ion

un de r s e c tio n 1 43 .0 36 wo uld be “ me anin g le ss” wi tho ut a ri g ht t o

rec over ba ck pay if he is denied a promotion in violation of t he provision. He adds that “six deca des of ca se law a

uthorizi ngback pa

y claims under th es e s t at u t es” are c onsistent with thi s impli ed leg islative intent beca

use “a ny other position would mean a city could violate the Civil Service Ac t

an d s i m i l a r s t at u t es go v ern i n g on ly mu nic ipa lit ie

s with impunit y

and cla im that it was immune from suit.” 18

We are not persuaded t hat the leg islature has w aived the City ’s g overnme ntal immunit y ag ainst Whi teake r’s c laims for back pay and other retrospe ctive monetar

y relief . Chapter 14 3 d oe s p ro vid e c e rt a in a dmi nis tr a tiv e and a pp e llate re me die s that, to thi s lim ite d e xten t, w a ive its g overnme ntal immunit y . See M ega Child Care, Inc., 14 5 S. W.3 d at 19 8; Fu nd e rb ur k , 188 S.W .3d at 235-236. Whiteaker

has not attempted to bringhis claims within these wa ivers, howe ver. Cf. Ny bo rg , 9 9 9 S

. W

. 2 d at 453-54. We ag ree with the rea soning of the Dallas Court of A

ppeals that W illiams is logica lly

inconsistent with the exi stence of a g ener al waiver of immunit y under c hapter45

143. See Cassidy , 223 S.W. 3d a t 61 4; Be ll , 22 1 S. W.3 d at 32 3. No r c an w e dis c e rn any oth e r b a sis in ch a pte r 143 —e xplic it or

imp lic it— fo r c on c lud ingthat th e le g isl a tur e c le arl y and un a mbi g uo us ly intended to waive g overnme ntal immunit y ag ainst a cla im like W hiteaker ’s in particula r. Whit eake r’s rig hts under section 143.036 are not rende red “ meaning less” if his bac k pa y c la im is ba

rr e d by g ov e rnme nta l immun ity . We have he ld t hat hi s prospective claims to enfor ce his rights a g ainst the City from the tim e o f j udg ment forwa rd ar e not bar

red. Be ll , 221 S.W .3d at 325. A claimant like Whiteaker could thus avoid acc ruing lost pay by promptly seekingto compel a municipality

to comply with se ction 143.036 once a promotion-related dispute arise s. Whi teake r ta c itl y ackn owled g e s th e ava ila bil ity of su c h a re me dy , urg ingthat a

“ nig htm are ” of

c la ima nts

se e kin g te mpo ra

ry re str a ini ng or de rs to pr e ve nt d isp ute d p ro mot ion s f ro m takin g e ff

e c t w ou ld r e su lt if g overnme ntal immunit y bars his back pay claim. Whatever the merits of this remedy as a matter of policy , its availability

compels us to co n cl ude that, as a matter of statutory

construction, the le g isl a tur e did no t e vin c e c le ar and un a mbi g uo us int e nt to wa ive the City ’s g ov e rnme nta l im mun ity ag ainst Whi teake r’s c laims for re trospective mone tary relief outside any

administrative re medies provided in cha

pter 143. Disposition of gove rnm ental im m uni ty issues I n summary , we have conc luded that Whit eake r’s claims do not impli cate the City ’s g overnme ntal immunit y

to the extent they

seek pr ospective declar atory , injunctive and mandamus relief from the date of judg ment forwa rd. We a lso hold that, as pled, Whiteaker ’s claims ar e bar red by g overnme ntal immunit y to the extent they

seek ba ck p ay , back be nefits, other r etrospec tive monetary relief , or dec larations or orders dire cted to such r elief.46 Whe re , as he re , w e c on c lud e that a pla int if f’ s p le a din g s d o n ot c on ta in s uf fi c ie nt f a c ts to affir matively demonstrate the trial court’ s jurisdiction over all or pa rt of a suit, our proper

reme dy depends upon w heth er that jurisdictional defec t can be cure d. We must affirm the district cour t’s de nia l of the City ’s ple a

to t he jur isd ic tio n if

the ple a din g s d o n ot a ff ir ma tiv e ly de mon str a te inc urab le defe cts in jurisdiction. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226-27. In such an instanc e, the pr oper

reme dy is not to di smiss but to affor d Whit eake r the opportunity to amend. Id

. W e c o n cl u d e th at W h i t ea k er i s en t i t l ed t o t h e op p o rt u n i t y t o am en d

. Hi s p l ea d i n gs and aff idavit te stimony allude to f acts sug g esting an alternative theory for seeking r et ro ac tive promotion to a capta in positi on and bac k p ay that might not implicate the City ’s g overnme ntal immun ity

. Spe c if

ic a lly , Wh ite a ke r a lle g e s and te sti fi e s th a t ( 1) on

Janu ary 14 , 2 00 6, Ca

pta in B ill y Wust erha usen, who occupie d one of the two capta in positi ons in the training division, was promoted to battalion chief, thus cr eatinganother capta in vaca

ncy in training ; (2) Captain J ohnnie B ohac, w ho orig inally had been promot ed from the October 2005 promotional elig ibilit y list t o fill a ca

ptain slot in s up pr e ssi on , b e g an w or kin g in t he va c ant c a

pta in p os iti on

in the tra ini ngdiv isi on ; ( 3) Ca pta in Boha c continues to wor

k in that positi on. The eff ect of these actions, Whit eake r sug g ests, has bee n to create a

no the r c a pta in v a c anc y

in s up pr e ssi on . T he re is n o in dic atio n in the re c or d th a t th is alleg ed vac ancy

in suppression has eve r bee n filled. Depe nding on th e t i m ing of this alleg ed

va c anc y , wh e the r it wa s e ve r fi lle d, and the me ri ts of Whit e a ke r’ s c on te nti on s r e g ard inghis ri g hts under section 143.036, Whit eake r m ay be able to state the ty pe of c laim presente d in Townsend and Du c k e tt . See, e .g., Townsend , 6 22 S.W. 2d a t 56 3; Du c k e tt , 4 95 S.W. 2d

a t 88 6- 87 ; Bullock , 34 S.W.3d at 6 52; Michna , 521 S.W .2d at 332-35. We hold that Whit eake r is entitled to the op po rt un ity to r e ple a d, if

po ssi ble , to state su c h a c la im. Aga in, we e xpre ss n o o pin ion a t th is juncture r eg arding whether this specific ty

pe of c laim would impli cate the City ’s g overnme ntal47

immunit y under W illiams and other applicable law, as the parties have not y et brief ed or de veloped that issue. We le ave that question for fur ther de velopment on re mand. See H endee , 228 S.W .3d at 38 3; Da v is , 137 S.W .3d at 335 & n.16.

On this basis, the district c ourt would not ha ve err ed in de ny ing the City ’s plea to the jurisdiction reg ardingg overnme ntal immunit y . We acc ording ly overr ule, in the ir entirety , the City ’s g ov e rnme nta l im mun ity

iss ue s.

Exhau stion of

rem edies The Ci ty asser ts, “in the alterna

tive,” that the district cour t lacked subje ct-matter jurisdiction be cause Whit eake r failed to e x haust administrative reme dies with the C ommissi on befor e filing suit. W e disag ree .

Our a naly tical starting point reg arding this issue is article V, se ction 8 of the Te x as Constit ution. I t provides that a d istrict court’s jurisdiction “c onsists of ex clusive, appe llate, and orig inal jurisdiction of all actions, proc eeding s, and re medies, except in ca s es whe re e x clusive, appellate , or orig inal jurisdiction may be conferr ed by this Constit ution or other la w on some other court, tribunal, o r ad m inistrative body .” Te x . Const. art. V, § 8. The leg islature has pr ovided by stat u t e t h at district courts possess “the jur isdiction provided by Article V , Section 8, of the Te x as Con sti tut ion ,” and “ may he ar an d d e te rm ine any c a us e that is c og niza

ble by c ourt s o f l aw o r e qu ity and may g rant a ny relief that could be g rante d by either courts of law or equity .” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.007-.008. T hus, “[c]ourts of ge nera l jurisdiction presumably have subje ct matter jurisdiction unless a contra ry showing is made.” Subaru of A m., Inc . v. Dav id McDav id Niss an, Inc ., 84 S.W .3d 212, 220 (Tex. 2002).

Unlike cour

ts, “there is no presumption that administrative age ncies a re a uthorized to r e so lve dis pu te s. Ra the r, the y may e xer c ise only

tho se po we rs the law, in c le ar a nd e xpre ss48

statutory lang uag e, confe rs upon them.” David Mc David Nissan , 84 S. W.3 d at 22 0. “ Court s w ill

no t im ply a dd iti on a l a

uth or ity to a g e nc ie s, no r m ay

a g e nc ie s c re a te fo r t

he mse lve s a

ny e xce ss power s.” Id. Th e c ourt s ar e no t dive ste d by an ag e nc y of the su bje c t- ma tte r jur isd ic tio n th e y wo uld otherwise posse ss to adjudicate a dispute unless the leg islatur e h as gra nted the ag ency

exclusive jurisdiction, or the sole power to make t h e i n i t i al deter mination in the disput e. Id. a t 22 1; Bex ar Metro. W ater Dist. v. City of Bulverde , 156 S.W .3d 79, 90 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied)

. I f a n a dmi nis tr a tiv e a g e nc y

ha s excl us ive jur isd ic tio n ove r a de te rm inatio n, a

pa rt y must ex haust all administrative re medi es bef ore se eking judicial revie w of the a g ency ’s dec ision. See Thomas v . Long , 207 S.W .3d 334, 340 (Tex. 2006). Until the party has satisfied this exhaustion require ment, the trial cour t lacks subject- matter jurisdiction and must dismiss those claims without prejudice to refiling

. Id. Whether an a g ency has exclusive jurisdiction is de termined by construction of the re levant statutory

scheme

. See id. Th e le gisl atu re’s int e nt t o g ra nt a n a g e nc y the so le authority to make the initial dete rmination in a dispute may be ref lected in e ither express statutory lang uag e to that ef

fec t or the over all statutory scheme

. Id . at 340-42. I n S ta u ffe r , as pre viously

noted, the supre me cour

t held that the leg islature has not deleg ated c ivil service c ommissi ons g ener al authority to decide issues aff ecting rig hts under cha

pter 143. 344 S.W .2d at 160. To the c ontrary , the court held, the leg islature had authorized only (1) “ a hear ing a nd decision by the Commi ssion whe never a depa rtment hea d is dismi ssed . . . or a n office r is inde finitely suspended,” (2) “[a] hea ring . . . befor e an e mploy ee is de moted,” (3) appea ls by “any applicant who is dissatisfied with the gra ding of his examination,” and (4) “[p] ower to revie w the

ac t i o no f a d ep ar tm en th ea d i np as s i n g o v er

ca n d i d at es wi t h h i gh er

gra d es o r i n o r d er i n g a disciplinary

suspension. Id. ; see Te x. L oc . G ov ’t Cod e Ann. §§ 14 3. 03 4, .0 36 , . 05 2- .0 54 ; Cor bit t , 94 1 S. W.2 d at 35 5 n .1 . O the r iss ue s ari sin g un de r c ha pte r 14 3, the c ourt re a so ne d, re ma ine d w ith in49

the di s t ri ct court’s g ener al jurisdiction (as opposed to that of the commission) under article V, sec tion 8. Stauffer , 34 4 S.W. 2d a t 16 1; c f. B e x ar Me tro . W

ate r D ist

. , 156 S.W .3d at 90. We a re bo un d to fo llo w thi s e xplic it ho ldi ng re g ard ing the sc op e of c omm iss ion jur isd ic tio n unle ss and until the supreme c ourt instructs us otherwise.

The City condemns Whiteaker

for “ lay i n g b eh ind the log” afte r the Commission

cre ated the A

pril 2006 promotion e ligibility list and beg an making promotions f rom it, sugg esting that he should have instead of f iled a complaint reg arding these a ctions with the Commi ssion. But the City fails to identify

any specific statute g iving the Commission exc lusive jurisdiction over the issues Whi teake r has r aised. See Stauffer , 344 S.W .2d at 160.

Terming it “an exclusi ve remedy ” for “dispute[s] aris[ing] in reg ard to the creation of an e lig ibi lity

lis t,” the City

fi rs t po int s to the a dmi nis tr a tiv e a pp e a l un de r s e c tio n 1 43 .0 34 , b ut t his provision is ex plicitly

limit ed to disputes conce rning the g radingof promotio n al exams. S ee T e x . L o c . G o v ’ tC o d e A n n . § 1 4 3

. 0 3 4 ( a )

. Ini t s r e p l y b r i e f , t h e C i t y , s i m i l ar l y

u np e r s u a s i v e l y, attempt s to p ig e onhole Whiteaker’ s alleg ations into two other administrative re medies under chapte r 143. I t sugg ests that Whit eake r was require d to exhaust t he re medy provided unde r sec tion 143.036, which author izes a by

passed top ca

ndidate o n a p rom otion lis t to seek commission review of the depar tment head’ s proff

ere d rea sons for re fusing the promotion. Id. § 1 43 .0 36 (f ). B ut, jus t a s in Du c k e tt , it is u n d i s p u t ed that Chief Hodg e “did not purpor t to invoke this st atutory

proce dure f

or reje cting [W hi t eaker] as an other wise elig ible person,” Du c k e tt , 495 S.W .2d at 887, but took the position t hat Whiteaker’ s rig ht to a promotion had bee n exhausted. The City als o sug g ests that Whit eake r is challeng ing a n involuntary

demotion, see Te x. L oc . Go v’ t Cod e Ann. § 1 43 .0 54 , b ut, ag ain, Hodg e’s a ctions did not im plicate the a s s er t ed adminis trative re medy . Depa rtment hea ds cannot unilater ally

demote, but may

only rec ommend and r eq u es t i n writing that the civil service50

c o mm is s io nta

k e s u c h ana ction. Id. § 1 43 .0 54 (a )- (b ). I f t he c omm iss ion

be lie ve s th a t pr ob a

ble

cause exis ts f

or order ing the demotion, it must g ive the af fec ted fire fig hter or police office r notice and an opportunity

for “ a full and c omplete public hea ring .” Id. § 143.054(c) -(d) . L eavingaside the fac tual disputes conce rning whet h er W hiteaker was promoted or

subsequently

“demoted,” any actions by Hodg e potentially constituting a “demotion” were undisputedly not made in ac corda nce with the p r o c e d

u r e s f o r inv o lu n ta r y d e mo ti o n s , an d

Wh it e a k e r

d id n o t f a il to e xh a

u s t a ny administrative re medies that would have applied in such a case . Cf. Du c k

e tt , 495 S.W .2d at 887. We overrule the City ’s exhaustion-of-re medies issue.

CO NC LU SION We h a ve ov e rr

ule d th e City ’s iss ue s c on c e rn i n g sta nd ingand e xha us tio n o f r e me die s. Whil e Whiteaker ’s suit as pled is barr ed by g overnme ntal immunit y

to the extent it seeks ba ck pay or other r etrospec tive monetary relief , we c onclude that he is entitled to an opport u n i ty to replea d his claims. On this basis, we overr ule the C ity ’s i ssues reg arding g overnme ntal immunit y and af firm the district court’s or der de ny ing the City ’s plea to the jur isdiction.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop; ConcurringOpinion by J ustice Patterson Affir med Filed: September

14, 2007