I n a pp e a ls f ro m c a se s invo lvi ngthe te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts , th e ru le s o f a pp e llate 1 p ro ce d u re re qu i re t h e u s e o f a n al i as t o re fe r t o a m i n o r, “a n d i f n ec es s ary

t o p ro t ec tt h e m i n o r's identity , to the minor’s pare nt or other f amily member.” Tex. R. App. P . 9.8. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 9 -00 429 -CV

L.B . , A ppe lla nt
v. Texas Depart m ent of Fam ily and P rote ctive Service s , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF HAY S COUNTY , 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 08- 0027 , HO NORAB LE CHARLES R. RAMSAY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
The Texas D epar

tment of Family and Protective Servic es (TD FPS) petitioned for the termination of L .B.’ s pare ntal rig hts regarding her thre e childre n, J a.B ., J o.B., a nd J u.H. After

a 1 bench tria l, th e tr ia l c o u rt e n te r e d a f in a l o r d e r te r mi n a ti n g L
. B
. ’ s r ig h ts , f

in d in g th a t s tatuto ry g rounds for te rmination exi sted and that ter mination of L .B.’ s rig hts was in the best interest of the children. See Te x. F a m. Cod e Ann. § 16 1. 00 1 (We st Sup p. 20 09 ). L .B . f ile d a state me nt o f p oin ts on appea l with the trial court as require d by statute. See Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 2 63 .4 05 (b )( 2) (We st 2008). After

a h e a r in g o nL
. B
. ’ s s tate me n t o f p o ints , th e tr ia l c o u rt f

o u n d th a t L
. B
. ’ s a

p p e a l w as frivolous and ther efor e she w as not entitled to a fr ee r eporte r’s re cord of the trial. L .B. a

ppeals the fr ivo lou sn e ss f

ind ing . We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.Th e fa c ts r e c ite d h e re in a re take n f ro m th e te sti mony

and e xhibi ts a dmi tte d at tr ia l. 2 J a.B .’s fathe r (L .B.’ s uncle) w as inca rce rate d in I ndiana at the time of trial, while Jo.B.’s 3 fathe r wa s fac ing c harg es involving the sexual abuse of a child in Kentuc ky . The pa renta l rig hts of bo th m e n w e re te rm inate d at tr ia l. Jo.H . v olu

nta ri ly re lin qu ish e d h is p are nta l r ig hts re g ard ingJu.H . p ri or to t ri a l. 4 J o.H. has family members in the S an Marcos area, and he joined L .B. in San Mar cos af ter 5 his relea se fr om prison in I ndiana. 2 BACK GR OUND L .B. is the mother of three children, J a.B ., J o.B, and J u.H. J a.B
. and J o.B. w ere born in I nd iana po lis , Ind iana , whe re L .B .’ s p are nts liv e , an d J u. H. wa s bor n in San M arc os , T e xas. At 2 the conc lusion of trial, J a.B . was four y ear s old, Jo.B. was two y ear s old, a nd J u.H. was one y ear

old. Ac c or din g to L .B .’ s te sti mony , Ja. B . w a s c on c e ive d af te r L .B .’ s unc le se xua lly

a ssa ult e d h e r, wh ile J o.B.’ s fathe r is a man with w hom L .B. had a one -nig ht stand. J u.H.’s father is Jo.H., with whom 3 L .B . h a s h a d a

n o ng oin g re latio ns hip fo r t he pa st s e ve ra l y e ars . 4 Prior to moving to T exas, L .B. lived w ith her par ents in I ndiana, whe re she beg an dating J o.H. in late 2005. Ac cordin g t o Ar ac el i Ruppert, one of L .B.’ s case worke rs, the couple ’s lifesty le in I ndiana include d “smoking pot and drinking .” Their relationship also involved numerous incidents of domestic violenc e. L .B. te stified at trial that she could not reme mber the f irst time J o.H. had assa ulted her, a

nd stated that the violenc e included hitti ng her and biting he r on the fa ce. She also testified that J o.H. stabbed he r ar ms with a knife in the pre sence of Ja.B. and Jo.B. Jo.H. spent
sev eral mo nt hs in pri so n i n I nd ian a for do mes ti c vi ol ence i nv ol vi ng L .B. L .B . mo ve d f

ro m Ind iana to San M a

rc os in N ov e mbe r 2 00 7, sh or tly be fo re the bir

th of Ju.H. L .B. ha d tested positive for dr ug use duringher pr eg nancy , and testified at trial t h at she 5C h er y l Boyd, a volunteer with Texas Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA), 6 indicated that the r emoval af fidavit included an ad m i s sion by L .B. that she had a

prior history

of illega l drug use. T h e r e c o r d

d o e s n o ti n d i c a t e w h e nJ a . B
. an d J o . B
. w e r e t a k e ni n t o t h e s t a t e ’ s c u s t o dy. 7 3 had us ed unprescribe d Vicodin for ba ck pain while pr egnant with J u.H. J u.H. was bor n sever al 6
wee ks prematur e and suf fer s from a be nign c y stic tumor in his brain that has impeded the development of

his speech. H e wa s removed f rom L .B.’ s custody

direc tly from the maternity war d. On Fe bruar

y 29, 2008, a st atus hear ing was held unde r Chapter 263 of the fa

mily code reg ardingL .B.’ s three c hildren, all of whom wer e in the s tate’s custody by that time. See Te x. F a m.

7 Code Ann. § 263.201(a) (West 2008)
. The court’s order specifie d that L .B. was to attend counse ling for ang er manag ement, pare nting, and domestic violenc e, and a lso mandated that L .B. a cquire “two bedroom housing .”

L .B.’ s counse l i n g service s were initially provided by

case worke r L indi Butler a nd thera pist Gayle Mihalek. B utler t estified that the service pla n was “ nontraditional,” involving more
one-on- one counse ling than most plans. Mihalek initially met wee kly

with L .B., but the se ssions
cea sed af ter Jo.H. returned f

rom pris o n i n I n d i ana. Mihalek, who wa s uncomforta ble holding
s e s s i o n s i nL
. B
. ’ s h o m e a f t e r J o . H
. ’ s r e tu r

n , s c h e d u l e d o n e m e e t i n g w i t h L
. B
. a ta p u b l i c l i b r ar y, which L .B. c ance led. Afte r that, Mihalek wa s un ab l e t o contact L .B. to sche dule any additional
me e tin g s. B utl e r i nd ic a te d th a t Mih a le k a lso fe lt that th e va lue of the se ssi on s w a s li mit e d d ue to L
. B
. ’ s r e f u s a l t o s u b m i tt o a p s y c h i a t r i c e xam an d

s p e n d t i m e i na g r o u p h o m e . A n e w t h e ra

pis t, Rox anne Mc Millan, was assig ned to L .B. in Aug ust 2008, but w as also unable to establish a re g ularRuppert testified that L .B. indicated that she wa s also “drunk and hig h” at the time of the 8 inc ide nt. L .B.’ s brief indicates that J o.H. pleade d g uilty to the charg es, t houg h L .B. testified that she 9 a sk e d th e dis tr ic t atto rn e y to d ro p th e c ha

rg e s. L .B
. , w h o w a s p r e g n an tw i t h a f o u rt h c h i l d

a tt h e t i m e , t e s t i f

i e d t h a ts h e r e tu r

n e d to 10 I ndiana be cause “I

alre ady knew if I had my daug hter in t he S tate of Texas y ou-all would take her too.” Ag ainst the advice of doctors, L .B. had chec ked herself out of the hig h-risk pre g nancy war d of St. David’s Medica l Center to make t h e t ri p . I n J anuar y 2009, L .B.’ s fourth child wa s born prematurely

in I ndiana, more than three months before the due date, and died soon the rea fter. 4 mee ti ng sch edu le w it h L .B. But ler in di cat ed tha t L .B. deci ded to di sco nt in ue coun sel in g, andL .B. he rs e lf a dmi tte d at tr ia l th a t sh e ha d n ot c omp le te d th e c ouns e lin g pr og ra m or de re d b y

the c ourt
. On September 5, 2008, Scott Johnson, a corpor al with the San Marc os p o l i ce depar tment, testified that he re sponded to a domestic- abuse c all involving L .B. Johnson testi f ie d that L .B. told him that the man she wa s living with, who was in the midst of a two-day binge on alcohol
and dr ug s, ha d s tr ang le d h e r o n a n a pa rtme nt b a lc ony

a ft e r s he ha d r e fu se d his se xua l a dv anc e s. 8 L .B. ha d beckone d onlookers to ca ll for help, which the y did, a fter which the man bit her on the fac e. John so n sa id L .B
. wa s c ry ingand sh a kin g , h a d mi ssi ngc lum ps of ha ir on he r h e a d, and

ha d a bit e
m ar k o nh e r f a c e t h a tl o o k e d

l i k e a s c ar . F o l l o w i n g t h e i n c i d e n t , J o . H
. w a s ar r e s t e d o nf a m i l yvio le nc e c ha

rg e s, and re ma ine d in

pr iso n thro ug h th e tim e of tr ia l. 9 I n J anuar y 2009, L .B. r eturne d to I ndiana, a nd as a result did not eng ag e in thera py
or see J a.B ., J o.B., or J u.H. during t he mont hs of J anuar y , Fe bruar y , Marc h, or April 2009. Ruppert 10 testified that the childre n wer e in foster homes during that period a nd wer e “a ll doing fa

ntastic.” She
a lso tes tifie d th a t, w he n s he fi rs t e nc ounte re d Ja. B . a nd Jo.B ., the c hil dr e n w e re unus ua lly

“ u n c o n t r o l l a

b l e , ” a s “ t h e y

w o u l d s p i t , t h e y w o u l d b i t e , t h e y

w o u l d k i c k , [ an d ] u s e p r o f

an i t y . ” In5

pa rt ic ula r, Jo.B . w ou ld of

te n bit e a du lts wh o a

pp ro a c he d h im. Ho we ve r, a c c or din g to R up pe rt , th e se tendenc ies diminis hed afte r J a.B
. and J o.B wer e place d in a foster home. Ruppert also testified that J u.H. had been place d in a home that provided him with the individualiz ed attention require d d ue to his special nee ds.

At the time of t rial, L .B. had returne d to Texas and wa s living in women’s she lters and community

cente rs, thoug h she testified that she w as about to obtain housing in a one- bedroom apar tment. She visit ed Jo.H. in prison on t he morning of tria l , an d ex plained at tria l that she had g otten J o.H.’s name tattooed on her neck w ithin the previous three months. W hen aske d if she thought Jo.H. was an unfit fathe r, L .B. testified, “No, I do not, sir.” Ruppert testified that, a fter she
wa s a pp oin te d L .B .’ s c a se wo rk e r in Marc h 20 09 , L .B
. tol d he r “ pe rs on a lly that sh e wa s in lov e wi th [J o.H.], they

wer e g oing to stay

toge ther, [and] thi s was someone s h e wanted to r aise he r family with.” After

a benc h trial, the trial cour t found that

L
. B
. ’ s a c ti o n s v io la

te d section 161.001(1) of the fa mil y c od e , a nd fu rt he r f ound that te rm inatio n o f L .B .’ s r ig hts wo uld be in t he be st i nte re st of Ja.B., Jo.B., and Ju.H. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.001. Acc ording ly , the trial cour t entere d
a fi na l or de r t e rm inatin g L .B .’ s p are nta l r ig hts
.

As requir ed by

the family

code, L .B. f

iled a stateme nt of points on appeal w i t h the trial court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.405( b)(2) . L .B.’ s fili n g al so included a motion for a court-a ppointed attorney and a motion for a fre e appellate record based on her indig ent status. After a hea ring on L .B.’ s statement of points, the t rial court signe d an order findingthat L .B. w as indig ent and entitled to a court-a

ppointed attorney

on appea l, but also found that her a ppeal wa s frivolous and6

the re fo re sh e wa s n ot e nti tle d to a fr e e re po rt e r’ s re c or d of the tr ia l. L .B . ap pe a le d the fr ivo lou sn e ss deter mination to this Court. As we wer e unable to de termine whether L .B.’ s appea l was fr ivolous based on the rec ord of the hear ing, we ordered the trial rec ord prepare d. Havingrec eived that r ecor d,
we p ro ce edt o re v i ew t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fr i v o l o u s n es s fi n d i n g.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We reviewa trial c ourt ’ s f

r iv o lo u s n e s s f

inding unde r an a

buse-of -discre tion standard. In re M .N.V. , 216 S.W .3d 833, 834 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.). Unde r this standard,
we decide whether the trial court acte d without refe renc e to guiding r ules and princ iples or if the a ct complained of

is arbitrar

y and unre asonable
. Lum

pk in v. Te x as De p’ t of Fa mi ly & Pr ote c tiv e Sv c s. , 260 S.W .3d 524, 527 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2008, no pet.).

As the natura l rig ht that exis ts betwee n pare nts and their children is of c onstitut ional dimensions, Sta nle

yv. Il lin ois , 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972), due pr ocess r equire s that the petitioner justify termination of tha t rig ht by clea r-a nd-convinc ing e vidence . Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 1 61 .2 06 (a ) ( Wes t 20 08 ); In re J .F .C. , 96 S.W .3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002). This intermediate standard falls betwe en the pr eponder ance standard of o rd i n ary civil proce eding s and the re asonable doubt standard of

criminal proc eeding s. In re G.M

. , 596 S.W .2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980). I t is defined as the “mea sure or

deg ree of proof

that will prod u ce i n t h e m ind of the trier of fa ct a f

irm belief or conviction as to the t ruth of the a lleg ations sought to be e stablished.” Te x . Fam. Code Ann. § 1 01 .0 07 (We st 2 00 8) ; In re S.B. , 207 S.W .3d 877, 884 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2006, no pet.).7 Acc ording ly , we c onduct our frivolousness revie w i n light of the heightene d clearand-c onvincing burden of p ro o f, and inquire w hether the trial cour

t abused its discretion by deter mining that the e vidence is such that a fa ct-finde r could have re asonably formed a firm be lief or convic tion that its finding s were true. Lum pk in , 260 S.W .3d at 528. We reviewa trial c ourt’s dec isio n t o ad m i t or exclude evidenc e for abuse of discretion. State v. Bristol Hotel Asset Co. , 65 S.W .3d 638, 647 (Tex. 2001). A trial court abuses its discretion in admitti ng or excluding evidence if it acts without ref ere nce to any

g uiding r ules and p r in c ip le s o r if th e a c t c o mp la in e d o f is ar b it r ar y an d u n r e asonable
. Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydroc arbons Corp. , 98 S.W .3d 682, 687 (Tex. 2002). We must uphold a trial court’s evide ntiary
ru ling i f ther e is a

ny le g iti mate ba sis in t

he re c or d to su

pp or t it
. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone , 972 S.W .2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998).

DI SCU SSIO N Our re view is limit ed to analy sis of the trial court’ s finding that L .B.’ s statement of p oints presented no substantial que stion for appe llate re view, re nderingher a ppeal f rivolous. See Te x. F a m Co de Ann. § 2 63 .4 05 (g ); Lum pk in , 2 60 S.W. 3d

a t 52 7. An

a pp e a l is fr ivo lou s w he n it lacks a n arguable ba sis either in law or in f act. Lum pk in , 260 S.W .3d at 527. L .B. a rg ues that she prese nted substantial questions for appe ll at e re v iew conc erning(1) the statutory basis for the t e r m i n a t i o no f

h e r p ar e n t a l r i g h t s an d

( 2 ) t h e a dm i s s i b i l i t y o f

W e n dy C u n n i n g h a m ’ s t e s t i m o n y.The trial court also found by clea r-a nd-convinc ing evidenc e that termin at i o n o f L .B.’ s 11 pare ntal rig hts was in the best intere st of the childre n, a findingL .B. doe s not challeng e. 8 Statutory Grounds for T

ermination I n L .B .’ s fi rs t po int on a

pp e a l, s he argue s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly and fa c tua lly insufficient to support the trial c ourt’s findingof statutory g rounds for the termination of her pare ntal rig hts. See T e x . F a m . C o d e A n n . § 1 6 1
. 0 0 1 ( 1 ) ( l i s t i n g g r o u n d s f o r t e r m i n a t i o no f

r i g h t s )
. In pr oc e e din g s to te rm inate the pa re nt- c hil d re latio ns hip br ou g ht un de r se c tio n 1 61 .0 01 of the fa mil y code, the petitioner must establish by clea r-a nd-convinc ing e vidence (1) that one statutory g round for ter mination is satis fied a

nd (2) that termination is in the best intere st of the child. Id. § 161.001; 11 In re J .L. , 163 S.W .3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). The trial court relied on three g rounds for te rmination lis te d in se c tio n 1 61 .0 01 (1 ), wh ic h r e a ds in r e le va nt p art :
The c ourt may

order termination of the pa

rent-c hild relationship if the court finds by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e: (1 ) t hat th e pa re nt h a s:

. . . (D) know ingly

place d or knowing ly

allowed the child to r emain in conditions or surrounding s which endang er the phy sical or emotional well-be ing of the child; (E) e ng ag ed in conduc t or knowing ly placed t h e ch ild with persons who eng ag ed in conduc t w hich endang ers the phy sical or emotional we ll-being of the child;

. . . (O ) f a i l e d t o c o mp l y

w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f

a c o u rto r d e r

t h a ts p e c if

ic a lly established the a ctions nece s sary for the pa

rent to obtain the re turn of the9 c hil d w ho ha s bee n in th e pe rm ane nt o r t e mpo ra ry mana g ingc on se rv a tor sh ip of the De partment of F amily and Protec tive Service s for not less than nine months as a re sult of the child’s remova l f rom the pare nt under Chapter 262 for the a buse or ne g lect of the child;

. . . . Te x. F a m. C od e An

n. § 1 61 .0 01 . T he tr ia l c ourt fo un d th a t te rm inatio n o f L .B .’ s p arenta l r ig hts reg ardingJ a.B . and Jo.B. was supporte d by the grounds described in subsections (D), (E), and (O), and that ter

mination of L .B.’ s rig hts reg ardingJ u.H. was suppor ted by subsections (E) a

nd (O). We beg in with subsec tion ( E), the f irst gr ound that impacts all three of the c hildren. I n deter mining whe ther t h e conduc t of the par ent has e ndang ere d the child’s we ll-being under subse c ti o n ( E ) , w e lo o k e xc lu s iv e ly to th e p ar e n t’ s c o n d u c t, in c lu d in g a c ti o n s , o mi s s io n s , and failure s to act. W

illiams v. W

illiams , 150 S.W .3d 436, 450 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied). Termination base d on this subsection m ust be based on more than a single act or

omission; rathe r, a volunt ary , deliberate, and conscious “course of conduct” that endang ere d the child’s phy sical and emotional well-be ing is re quired. Id. Th e e nd ang e ri ng a c ts ne e d no t have be e n d ir e c te d at th e c hil d or have cause d an ac tual injury or threat of injury

to the child to constitute conduct that enda ng ers the child’s phy sical or e motional well-being
. Id. Acc ording ly , acts dire cted at a parent’s other children may be considere d when deter mining endang erme nt to the child who is the subject of the termination proce eding s. See In re Baby Boy R. , 191 S.W .3d 916, 925 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) . Fur

ther, c ourts may

consider c onduct occ urringbefore a child was born. Se e In re D.M. , 58 S.W .3d 801, 812 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2001, no pet.) (“ [C ]ourts l ook to what the par ent did both before and af

ter the c hild’s birth to determine whe ther ter mination is necessar

y .”).10 As a g ener al matter, c o n d u ct t h at subjects a c hild to a life of unce rtainty and instabilit y may endang er the child’s phy sical and e motional well-beingunder subse ction (E). In re J.O.A. , 283 S.W .3d 336, 345 n.4 (Tex. 2009). Texas courts have found re levant conduc t to include exposure of childre n to domestic violence. See I n re M.R. , 243 S.W .3d 807, 819 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2007, no p et
. ) (c onsidering fac t that mother “e x posed her children to domestic violenc e,” including inc ident wher e mother w as “smac ked” in f ront of child, as e vidence of enda ng erme nt
un de r s ub secti on

(E )) . In a dd iti on , d

ru g us e , p art ic ula

rl y dr ugus e duri ng

pr e g na nc y , ma y a lso support a finding of enda

ng erme nt. Se e Du

pr e e v . Te x as De p’ t of Pr ote c tiv e an d R e

gu lator ySe rv s. , 907 S.W .2d 81, 84 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 1995, no writ) (conc luding that mother’s use of drug s during pr e g na nc y e nd ang e re d ch il d) ; s e e a l s o I n r e R

. W. , 1 29 S.W. 3d

73 2, 73 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 20 04 , p e t. d e nie d) (“ Dr

ugus e and

its e ff e c t on a pa

re nt’ s lif e and [] a bil ity to p are nt m ay

e sta bli sh an enda ng eringcourse of conduc t.”). I n th is case, T DFP S pres ent ed ev id ence t hat J a.B. andJ o. B. wer e ex po sedto do me sti c vio le nc e wh ile in L .B .’ s c are . L .B . h e rs e lf te sti fi e d that Jo.H
. sta bb e d he r a

rm s w itha

kn if e wh ile J a.B
. an d J o.B. w ere prese nt. TDFPS also prese nted evidenc e that the incide nt was par t of an ong oing pattern of violence involving L .B. and J o.H., with the first repor ted incident o f v i o lence
occur ring prior to L .B.’ s reloca tion to Tex as in 2007. Trial testimony i n d i ca t es that the violence continued af

te r L
. B
. ’ s c hildren we re r emoved f rom her c are , including a

n incident in September 2008 during which Jo.H. attempted to strang le L .B. on a n ap ar t m en t b al co ny

and bit her on the fac e,I n h er br ief, L .B. a rg ues that “be ing a

victim of domestic violence[] is not, in [ and] of 12 i t s el f, gro u n d s fo r ap ar en tt o l o [ s e h er ] ch i l dre n , ” c i t i n g Lewelling v. Lewelling
. 796 S.W .2d 164 (Tex. 1990)
. I n Lewelling , which invol ved a custody dispute, the s upreme court he ld that “evidenc e that a par ent is a victim of spousal abuse , by itself, is no evidence that aw ar d i n g cu s t ody to that pare nt w ould sig nificantly impair the child.” Id. a t 167. Ho we ve r, nume ro us Te xas co ur ts o f a pp e a ls have he ld t

hat e xpos ingc hi ld ren to dome sti c vio le nc e —a matte r e xten din g be y on d th e fa c t th a t a p ar e n t h a s b e e nth e v ic ti m o f a b u s e
— ma y b e c o n s id e r e d in d e te r

mi n in g e n d an g e r

me n t in th e c o n te xt of a te rmination proce eding
. See, e .g. , In re J .J.S. , 27 2 S.W. 3d 74 , 79 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 8, pe t. denied) (upholding endang erme nt afte r t rial court found that mother “ conducte d herse lf in a manne r, namely her a busive relationships, which ex pos e d h e r childre n to a home whe re phy sical violence was pr e se nt” ); In re M

.R. , 243 S.W .3d 807, 819 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2007, no pet.) (consider ing f act that mother “e x posed her children to domestic violenc e” a s evidenc e of e n d an germe nt under su bs e c tio n ( E) ); In re J

.I.T.P. , 99 S.W .3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“Thus, the trial court c ould have c onsidered the domestic violence . . . as evide nce of endang erme nt to [the c hil d].” ); Sy lv ia M. v . Da lla s Co un ty W e lfa re Un it , 771 S.W .2d 198, 204 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ) (c onsidering “volatile an d chaotic” marria g e, alter cation duringpreg nancy , and mother’s re peate d rec onciliation with abusive spouse in termination ca se). 11 re su lti ng in Jo.H .’ s arr e st o n f a mil y vio le nc e c ha

rg e s. TDFP S als o p res ent ed ev id ence t hat L .B. 12
c on tin ue d to ma int a in c on ta c t w ithJo.H . f oll ow inghis arr e st, vis iti nghim in j a il a nd g e tti nghis
name ta tto oe d o n h e r n e c k. Ac c or din g to c a se wo rk e r R up pe rt , in 20 09 L .B . d e c lare d th a t sh e sti ll wanted to r aise a

family with J o.H. T DF PS also presented e vidence that J a.B . and Jo.B. wer e
unus ua lly a g g re ssi ve and

vio le nt a ft e r bei ng take n in to t he State ’s c us tod

y , a nd that Jo.B . in p ar t i cu l ar h ada p en ch an tfo r b i t i n g. TDF PS also presented e viden ce involving L .B.’ s drug use. L .B. te stified that she used Vicodin that had not been pre scribed to he r while she w as pre g nant with J u.H. Other witnesses te sti fi e d tha t L .B . h a d c on fe sse d to us ingdr ug s o n o the r o c c a sio ns , in c lud ingmari jua na us e pr ior to her move to Texas in 2007 and drug use in September 2008.

This evid en ce o f ex posure to domestic violenc e and dr ug use would allow a
rea sonable fa ct-finde r to form a firm belief

or convic tion that L .B. e ng ag ed in a c ourse of conductAs only one g round i s re q u i re d t o support a ter mination of pare ntal rig hts, we nee d not 13 addre ss L .B.’ s arguments challeng ing the trial court’ s findings r eg ardingsubsections (D) and (O) of section 161.001(1) of the fa mily code. See I

n re D.M. , 58 S.W. 3d 80 1, 81 3 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2001, no pet.) (de clining to addre ss othe r g rounds afte r upholding termination on one g round under section 161.00 1 (1 )). How ever , we note that the same e vidence that supports a finding of endang erme nt unde r subsection (E) also supports the trial court’s finding under subsection (D) that L .B.’ s actions subjected J a.B
. and J o.B. to “ conditions or surrounding s which enda ng er the phy sical or emotional we ll-being of th e ch i l d
. ” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001( 1)(D) (West Supp. 20 09 ); see also In reM.R.J.M

. , 280 S.W .3d 49 4 , 5 0 3 (T ex . App.—For t Worth 2009, no pet.) (e xpla ini ngthat “ e vid e nc e pe rt a ini ngto s ub se c tions (D ) a nd (E ) i s in te rr e late d” ); In re M .R. , 24 3 S.W.3 d at 81 9 ( ho ldi ngthat e vid e nc e of e xpos ur e to d ome sti c vio le nc e and fa ilure to c omp le te service plan was suf

ficient to satisfy

both subsections (D) a

nd (E))
. The trial c ourt also found the termination of L .B.’ s pare ntal rig hts to all three childre n was supported by subsection (O) , which involves fa ilure to complete a court-or dere d service plan. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.001( 1)(O)
. Other Texas courts have held that, under subsection (O) , the petitioner must prove by clea r-a nd-convinc ing e vidence that the subject child was re moved from the par ent’s ca

re due to abuse or n eglec t. See I n re A.A.A. , 2 6 5 S. W. 3 d 5 0 7 , 5 1 5 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st

Di st. ] 200 8, pe t. d e nie d) . T he tr ia l r e c or d in thi s c a se , h ow e ve r, do e s n ot c le arl y indicate the c ircumstance s under whic h J a.B ., J o.B., a nd J u.H. wer e re moved from L .B.’ s car e. 12 that endang ere d all three of her children. See I

n re Baby B oy R. , 191 S. W.3d at 925 (holding that
c o n d u c td i r e c t e d

t o w ar d s o t h e r c h i l dr e n i s r e l e v an t t o e n d an g e r m e n t o f s u b j e c tc h i l d )
. A c c o r d i n g l y, the t rial co u rt d id

n o t a b u s e it s d is c r e ti o nin

d e te r mi n in g th a t L
. B
. ’ s p o in ts o f e r r o r r e g ar d in g the statut or y ba sis fo r t e rm inatio n a

re fr ivo lou s. 13 Admission of T

estimony of W

endy Cunningham I n h e r s e c on d p oin t on a

pp e a l, L .B . ar g ue s tha t the tr ia l court a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in admitting the testimony

of Wendy

Cunningham , asser

ting that TD FPS’s disclosures re g arding Cunningham were inadequate. C unningha m, a social wor

ker w ho consulted with L .B. dur ing he r sta y a t St. Da

vid ’s Me dic a l Ce nte r, wa s no t de sig nate d a s an e xpe rt wi tne ss. Ac c or din g ly , T DF PS
wa s r e qu ir ed to d isc los e on ly Cunnin g ham’ s n a me , a dd re ss, and te le ph on e numbe r, a s w e ll a s aAd dit ion a l dis c los ur e s, su c h a s th e su bje c t ma tte r o f t he wi tne ss’ s te sti mony

and the ba sis 14 on wh ic h imp re ssi on s and op ini on s we re fo rm e d, are re qu ir e d o nly fo r t e sti fy

inge xpe rt wi tne sse s. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 194.2(f). Specifica lly , Cunningham testified, “Per my notes, specif

ic instance s of violence which 15 inv olv e d b iti ngthe fa ce, pu lli ngthe ha ir , s ta bb ingto t he arm s and

he a d, a s w e ll a s se xua l a ssa ult with a knife.” Other w itnesses testified of incide nts of domestic violence involving biting, pulling ha ir , a nd sta bb ingof L .B .’ s arm s. 13 “brie f st atement of [her] connec tion with the case.” Tex. R. C iv. P. 194.2(e). I n response to L .B.’ s 14 discovery reque sts, TDFPS provided Cunningha m’s n am e, address, telephone numbe r, and a descr iption of her as a

“socia l worker .” L .B. a sserts t h at t his description does not constitute a statement of Cunning ham’s “c onnection with t h e case,” a nd there fore the trial cour t was re quired to exclude Cun

n in gham’s testimony
. See id. R. 193.6(a) ( mandating exclusion of testim ony if proper witness disclosures ar e not made)
.

To obtain reve rsal of a judgment based upon an error by the trial cour

t, the appellant must show that (1) the cour t erred and ( 2) the e rror

probably cause d rendition of an imprope r jud g me nt in the c a se . Te x. R. Ap p. P. 4 4. 1( a ); In re D.I .B. , 988 S.W .2d 753, 756 n.10 (Tex. 1999). A succ essful cha lleng e to an e videntiary ruling usually

require s the complaining party to show that the j udg ment turns on the particular evidence excluded or admit ted. City of Brownsville v . Alvarado , 897 S.W .2d 750, 753-54 (Te x . 1995).

We begi nb y

n o t i n g t h at L
. B. d o es n o ti n d i ca t e w h at h arm re s u l t edfr o m t h e a dmission of Cunningha

m’s testimony
. Cunningham te stified about her inter action with L .B. w hile L .B. w as ho sp ita lize d. Th ou g h Cunn ing ham te sti fi e d r e g ard ingL .B .’ s r e po rt s o f i nc ide nts of do me sti c violence, te sti mony re g ard ing do me sti c vio le nc e wa s a lso pr e se nte d by se ve ra l other wi tn e sse s,

15 including L .B. he rself. See Beam v. A.H. Chaney, I nc. , 5 6 S. W.3 d 9 20 , 9 23 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor thWhil e Tex as l aw is uncle ar r eg ardingprec isely what information is required in a “ brief 16 statement of e ach ide ntified person’ s connec tion with the case,” we no t e that the description of Cunningham as a “ social worke r” r epre sents at least a n attempt to comply

with the rule. See id. R. 19 4. 2( e ); Beam v

. A.H. Chaney, I nc. , 5 6 S. W.3 d 9 20 , 9 23 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 1, pe t. denied) (holding that trial court e rre d in adm i t t i n g wi tness testimony when no state ment of connec tion of any

kind wa s provided). We fur ther note that the descr iption provided, including Cunnin g ham’ s n a me , a dd re ss, te le ph on e numbe r, and tit le , p ro vid e d L .B . w ithre a so na ble information with which to identify the witness, thus miti g ating any potential surprise or prejudice
. Cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 1 (instructing that rules of c ivil procedure are to be construe d liberally in order “to obtain a just, fair , equitab l e and impartial adjudication of the r ights of litig ants”), 193.6( a)( 2) (i ns tr uc tin g tha t tr ia l court s may

a dmi t te sti mony

of imp ro pe rl y

ide nti fi e d w itn e ss i f “ the fa ilure to make, amend, or supplement the discovery response will not unfairly surprise or unfa irly prejudice the other pa

rties”)
. 14 2001, pet. denied) (explaining that admission of testimony is ha rmless when it is cumulative of othe r proper ly admitted evidenc e). Fur ther, the judg ment did not “turn on” Cun n i ng ham’s other testimony , which detailed L .B.’ s decision to chec k out of the hospital during her fourth preg nancy and her f uture plans at th a t ti me . T h is te s ti mo n y d o e s n o t inv o lv e th e p r im ar y c o n d u c t u n d e r ly

in g th e te rmination of L
. B. ’s p ar en t al ri gh t s , i n cl u d i n g t h e ex p o s u re o f h er ch i l dre n t o d o m es t i c v i o l en ce an d u s e o f d ru gs
w h i l e p r e g n an t
. A c c o r d i n g l y, e v e n i f t h e t r i a l c o u rte r r e d i na dm i t t i n g C u n n i n g h a m ’ s t e s t i m o n y, 16 the rec ord does not suppor t the conclusion that the action probably cause d the rendition o f an imp ro pe r j ud g me nt.

Ac c or din g ly , w e de te rm ine that th e tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se it s d isc re tio n in de te rm ini ngthat L .B .’ s se c on d p oin t on a pp e a l is fr ivo lou s.15 CO NC LU SION We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Waldrop and He nson Affir med Filed: Apr il 9, 2010