IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 13-1148

Filed June 25, 2014

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LAWRENCE DALE SPIDLE,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Virginia Cobb 

(motion to dismiss), District Associate Judge, and Bradley McCall (sentencing), 

Judge.

Lawrence Spidle appeals from the judgment and sentence entered 

following his guilty plea to violating a sex-offender exclusion zone. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather Quick, Assistant Attorney 

General, and Wayne Reisetter, County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., McDonald, J., and Eisenhauer, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2013).
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EISENHAUER, S.J.

Lawrence Spidle appeals from the judgment and sentence entered 

following his guilty plea to violating a sex-offender exclusion zone. He argues 

Iowa Code section 692A.113(1)(f) (2011) is unconstitutional under both the 

United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution.

1

 Because Spidle has failed 

to show the statute is unconstitutional, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS.

The statute in question provides:

1. A sex offender who has been convicted of a sex offense 

against a minor or a person required to register as a sex offender in 

another jurisdiction for an offense involving a minor shall not do any 

of the following:

. . . .

f. Be present upon the real property of a public library 

without the written permission of the library administrator.

Iowa Code § 692A.113. 

The uncontroverted facts establish that Spidle, who in 1997 was convicted 

in Missouri of statutory rape of a person under the age of fourteen and is required 

to register in Iowa as a sex offender, entered the Perry Public Library in 2012 

without first receiving permission from the library administrator. He was charged 

with violating the exclusion zone and moved to dismiss the charge, claiming the 

statue is unconstitutional. After the district court denied the motion, Spidle pled 

guilty as charged. 

On appeal, Spidle contends section 692A.113(1)(f) is unconstitutional on 

three grounds: (1) it violates his federal and state right of information and 

 

1

In the event he failed to preserve error on any claim, Spidle asks they be considered 

under an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel rubric. For simplicity’s sake, we will address 

the merits of each claim.
3

association under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and 

article I, section seven of the Iowa Constitution; (2) the statute is 

unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United 

States and Iowa Constitutions; and (3) it improperly delegates legislative 

authority, in violation of article III, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution. We address 

each in turn. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

As with all constitutional challenges to a statute, our review is de novo. 

State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 483 (Iowa 2013). We are mindful statutes 

are cloaked with a presumption of constitutionality, and Spidle bears the heavy 

burden of proving the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt and 

refuting every reasonable basis upon which it could be found to be constitutional. 

See id. Further, if the statute is capable of being construed in more than one 

manner, we will adopt the one that construes the statute as constitutional. Id.

III. RIGHT OF INFORMATION AND ASSOCIATION.

Spidle first contends the statute violates his right of information and 

association. He argues it implicates his rights under the First Amendment of the 

United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Iowa Constitution 

because it prevents sex offenders from attending meetings or other gatherings at 

the library. He also argues it restricts his right to receive information and ideas.2 

 

2 Spidle argues the First Amendment provides a right to receive information or ideas, 

and by limiting his access to public libraries, section 692A.113 abridges that right. The 

State argues no such right exists. Although we assume a constitutional right has been 

implicated for purpose of analysis, we do not resolve the question of whether publiclibrary access is protected by the First Amendment.
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In support of his argument, Spidle cites Doe v. Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 

1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2012). In Doe, the plaintiff challenged the City of 

Albuquerque’s ordinance prohibiting sex offenders from entering public libraries, 

arguing it violated the First Amendment right to receive information. 667 F.3d at 

1115. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and 

the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Id. However, the Doe decision rests on the City’s 

failure to properly litigate the matter, with the court noting the City had relied on a 

“mistaken interpretation of case law regarding facial challenges” and, as a result, 

“failed to present any evidence as to the reasons or justification for its ban, 

whether the ban was narrowly tailored to address the interest sought to be 

served, or whether the ban left open alternative channels for receiving 

information.” Id. The court noted that if the City had presented such evidence, “it 

is not difficult to imagine that the ban might have survived Doe’s challenge, for 

we recognize the City’s significant interest in providing a safe environment for its 

library patrons, especially children.” Id.

Spidle argues a public library is a place the State has opened for the 

public to engage in expressive activity and therefore, any regulation of its use 

must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. See Perry 

Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). Even 

applying this heightened standard, we conclude the State provided ample 

evidence the statute is narrowly tailored. Unlike the restriction in Doe, which 

applied to all sex offenders, section 629A.113 only applies to sex offenders who 

have committed crimes against minors. 667 F.3d at 1116. Nor is the ban 

absolute, allowing those affected to obtain permission to enter. Iowa Code 
5

§ 629A.113(1)(f). It further provides exceptions for parents or legal guardians 

transporting their children to the location and for voters whose polling place is 

located inside a library. Id. § 629A.113(2). 

We also conclude the statute promotes a significant government interest. 

As the court found in Doe, the case Spidle relies upon, providing a safe 

environment for young library patrons is a significant government interest. See 

Doe, 667 F.3d at 1115. 

The restriction must also “leave open ample alternative channels of 

communication.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. Although the statue requires permission 

before sex offenders can enter the building, the State notes there are alternate 

means by which they can access the library’s information, including home 

delivery and online access. We conclude section 629A.113(1)(f) does not 

impermissibly restrict Spidle’s access to information. 

Likewise, to the extent Spidle urges the statute on its face (he makes no 

claim to being denied the opportunity to attend any meeting) infringes his right to 

assembly our analysis is the same; the statute is narrowly tailored, there is a

significant government interest involved, and the statute leaves open alternative 

channels—including allowing those affected to obtain permission to enter the 

library for the limited purpose of attending a meeting.

Because the sex-offender restriction does not impermissibly violate any 

constitutional right of information and association, we affirm.

IV. VAGUENESS.

Spidle next contends section 692A.113(1)(f) is unconstitutionally vague. 
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A statute is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore void, if a reasonable 

person could not know what conduct is outlawed or those charged with 

enforcement are not provided explicit standards to apply. State v. Baker, 688 

N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2004). Section 692A.113(1)(f) is clear as to the conduct 

it prohibits—a sex offender who has committed a crime against a minor may not 

be on library property without permission from the library administrator. Without 

question, a reasonable person would know Spidle was violating the statute. He 

has failed to show the statute is unconstitutionally vague. 

V. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY.

Finally, Spidle argues the statute improperly delegates authority to the 

library administrator without setting forth any standards to guide the 

administrator’s discretion on whether to permit a sex offender access to the 

library. 

“A legislative function may be delegated to another branch of government 

only if adequate guidelines for its exercise accompany the delegation.” Warren 

County v. Judges of Fifth Judicial Dist., 243 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Iowa 1976). 

However, 

the general doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative 

authority has no application to the vesting in political subdivisions of 

powers to govern matters which are local in scope. . . . [T]his 

principle has been employed to sustain a delegation of powers 

ordinarily exercisable only by the legislature to such subdivisions as 

county committees, park commissioners, school districts and 

counties or county boards. 

Koelling v. Bd. of Trustees, 146 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Iowa 1966). 
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Delegating the authority to grant permission to sex offenders to enter 

library property to library administrators is not impermissible. Spidle has not 

shown the statue is unconstitutional.

AFFIRMED.