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State v. Delacruz-Gomez

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RAIKES

Y. DELACRUZ-GOMEZ

(SC 20828)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,

Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment

of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of conviction of assault

of public safety personnel and interfering with an officer. The defendant

claimed that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the trial court

had not abused its discretion when it allowed testimony naming the felony

charges in the warrant for the defendant’s arrest and identifying the task

force that executed that warrant as the ‘‘Violent Fugitive Task Force.’’ Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the names of

the felony charges listed in the arrest warrant as evidence of uncharged

misconduct, as the probative value of the evidence was strong and the trial

court undertook sufficient measures to mitigate any potentially undue

prejudice.

Although the testimony concerning the name of the task force should not

have been admitted because it had no probative value and was unfairly

prejudicial, the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that

the error was harmful.

Argued March 27—officially released July 25, 2024*

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of assault of public safety personnel and

interfering with an officer, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the court,

Klatt, J., overruled the defendant’s objection to the admission of certain evidence and denied the defense’s

motion to exclude certain evidence; thereafter, the case

was tried to the jury before Klatt, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to

the Appellate Court, Bright, C. J., and Moll and Vertefeuille, Js., which affirmed the judgment of the trial

* July 25, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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State v. Delacruz-Gomez

court, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Jennifer B. Smith, assistant public defender, for the

appellant (defendant).

Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s attorney, Don E. Therkildsen, Jr., supervisory assistant

state’s attorney, and Alexandra Arroyo, assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

DANNEHY, J. In this appeal, we address two claims

that the trial court improperly admitted unduly prejudicial evidence. The defendant, Raikes Y. DelacruzGomez, was convicted, following a jury trial, of assault

of public safety personnel in violation of General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 53a-167c (a) (1),1 and interfering

with an officer in violation of General Statutes (Rev.

to 2015) § 53a-167a (a),2 after injuring a police officer

assigned to a joint federal and state task force that

was executing a warrant for his arrest. We granted

certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment of

conviction.3 The defendant contends that the Appellate

Court incorrectly held that the trial court had not

abused its discretion by admitting testimony naming the

1 Hereinafter, all references to § 53a-167c are to the version of that statute

in the 2016 supplement of the statute. 2 Hereinafter, all references to § 53a-167a are to the 2015 revision of

the statute. 3 We granted certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1)

‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the trial court had not

erred in admitting uncharged misconduct evidence about the names of

outstanding felony charges from an unrelated case in the defendant’s arrest

warrant?’’ And (2) ‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the

admission of evidence that the Violent Fugitive Task Force arrested the

defendant was not unfairly prejudicial?’’ State v. Delacruz-Gomez, 346 Conn.

925, 925, 295 A.3d 419 (2023).
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State v. Delacruz-Gomez

felony charges in the defendant’s outstanding warrant

(warrant charges) and identifying the task force that

executed that warrant as the ‘‘Violent Fugitive Task

Force.’’ We conclude that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion by admitting the evidence pertaining to

the warrant charges. We further conclude that, although

the evidence pertaining to the name of the task force

should not have been admitted, that evidence did not

substantially sway the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. On November 18, 2016, members of a multiagency

law enforcement task force went to the defendant’s

residence in Waterbury to serve two arrest warrants,

one for the defendant and one for his son, Hendimbert

Delacruz. The defendant’s arrest warrant included charges

of assault in the first degree and criminal possession

of a firearm. The personnel assigned to execute the

warrants included the following: United States Marshal

James Masterson; Waterbury Police Department Detectives Daniel Chalker, Edward Mills, and Jeffrey Taylor;

Connecticut Probation Officer Timothy McMahon; and

three Connecticut parole officers.4 Before going to the

residence, the task force held a briefing, during which

the officers reviewed the suspects’ names and photographs, the layout of the apartment, and the nature of

the charges for which the warrants were issued.

Upon arrival, the task force established a perimeter

around the defendant’s apartment, which was a twostory end unit with front and rear entrances. The officers were outfitted in bulletproof tactical vests labeled

‘‘Police,’’ ‘‘Probation,’’ or ‘‘Parole,’’ clearly identifying them

as law enforcement personnel. Masterson, Chalker, Mills,

4 Chalker and McMahon testified that they were not officially deputized

members of the task force, but they had been assigned to work with the

task force that day.
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State v. Delacruz-Gomez

and Taylor were assigned to enter the residence and

search for the defendant and his son. The entry team

approached the front door, repeatedly knocked loudly

and announced their presence. During this time, Masterson and Mills observed an individual, whom they

recognized as the defendant, looking out of one of the

upstairs windows.

After about five minutes had passed with no response,

the officers decided to use force to enter the residence.

Mills attempted to open the front door with a battering

ram but inadvertently jammed the door shut. A woman,

later identified as the defendant’s wife, tried unsuccessfully to open the front door, and then let the officers

in through the apartment’s rear entrance. The officers

showed the defendant’s wife a photograph of the defendant and asked whether he was inside the residence.

She nodded and pointed upstairs. When the officers

called for anyone upstairs to come down, an adult male

and two children did so, but neither the defendant nor

his son appeared. The officers determined that they

would need to clear the second floor.

While McMahon remained downstairs with the defendant’s wife and the other individuals, Masterson led

Chalker, Mills, and Taylor upstairs, where they began

searching each room. Masterson carried a ballistic shield

and the other officers had their guns drawn. After clearing the bathroom, Masterson provided cover in the hallway while Chalker, Mills, and Taylor entered the first

bedroom, which was small and cluttered with a bed, a

nightstand, and a dresser. There was a large pile of

clothing on the floor at the foot of the bed. While Taylor

stood guard, Mills opened the closet door, and Chalker

climbed onto the bed and began searching the clothing

pile, which was almost the same height as the bed.

As he moved aside articles of clothing, Chalker uncovered what appeared to be part of a person’s body and
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State v. Delacruz-Gomez

yelled, ‘‘ ‘show me your hands.’ ’’ Hearing no response,

Chalker grabbed the person’s hand, saw his face, and

recognized the defendant. Chalker, standing on the

‘‘squishy’’ bed, began pulling the defendant out of the

clothing pile, while instructing him that he was under

arrest. Although the defendant resisted by making himself ‘‘dead weight,’’ Chalker was able to place one handcuff on his wrist. As Chalker pulled the defendant onto

the bed, however, the defendant lunged at him, causing

Chalker to fall backward and land on the adjacent

nightstand, which was adorned with a pointed metal

prong. After Mills and Taylor finished handcuffing the

defendant, removed him from the bedroom, and called

for assistance for Chalker, they continued their search

and found the defendant’s son hiding in the same pile

of clothing. Chalker was taken to the hospital, where

he was diagnosed with a traumatic pneumothorax and

multiple rib fractures.

The defendant was subsequently charged in a substitute information with one count of assault of public

safety personnel in violation of § 53a-167c (a) (1), and

one count of interfering with an officer in violation of

§ 53a-167a (a). The jury returned a verdict of guilty on

both counts, and the trial court sentenced the defendant

to a total effective sentence of eight years of incarceration, followed by two years of special parole. The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the

Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly

had admitted into evidence (1) testimony naming the

warrant charges, and (2) testimony identifying the ‘‘Violent Fugitive Task Force’’ as the particular task force

that executed that warrant. State v. Delacruz-Gomez,

218 Conn. App. 260, 262–63, 291 A.3d 609 (2023). The

Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the evidence was relevant and that its probative value outweighed its prejudice to the defendant.

Id., 277, 281. This certified appeal followed. Additional
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facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

We begin by setting forth the following well established principles that apply to both of the defendant’s

evidentiary claims. ‘‘Relevant evidence may be excluded

if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice or surprise, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue

delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’’ Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3. This balancing

inquiry is necessary ‘‘to militate against the risk that

the attention of a jury may be distracted from consideration of the proof of the charges at hand, and, instead,

and for improper reasons, fix the defendant’s guilt on

evidence of marginal evidentiary value.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Raynor, 175 Conn. App.

409, 450–51, 167 A.3d 1076 (2017), aff’d, 334 Conn. 264,

221 A.3d 401 (2019). Accordingly, this court has identified four situations in which ‘‘the potential prejudicial

effect of relevant evidence would suggest its exclusion.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. James G.,

268 Conn. 382, 398, 844 A.2d 810 (2004). ‘‘These are:

(1) [when] the facts offered may unduly arouse the

[jurors’] emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) [when] the

proof and answering evidence it provokes may create

a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the

main issues, (3) [when] the evidence offered and the

counterproof will consume an undue amount of time,

and (4) [when] the defendant, having no reasonable

ground to anticipate the evidence, is unfairly surprised

and unprepared to meet it.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘[T]he primary

responsibility for conducting the balancing test to determine whether the evidence is more probative than prejudicial rests with the trial court, and its conclusion will

be disturbed only for a manifest abuse of discretion.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 396. ‘‘On review
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State v. Delacruz-Gomez

by this court, therefore, every reasonable presumption

should be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. James K.,

347 Conn. 648, 668, 299 A.3d 243 (2023).

I

The defendant first argues that the names of the warrant charges should not have been admitted because

they had little probative value and were unduly prejudicial, portraying him as a ‘‘violent, dangerous individual’’

who was likely to have assaulted Chalker. We conclude

that the Appellate Court correctly held that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the

names of the warrant charges.

The following procedural facts are relevant to our

resolution of this issue. Before the evidentiary phase

of the trial began, the state filed a notice of its intent

to introduce evidence of uncharged misconduct pursuant to § 4-5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.

Specifically, the state indicated that it would elicit testimony that, on the morning of the defendant’s arrest,

the members of the task force were ‘‘in possession of

an arrest warrant charging the defendant with . . .

assault in the first degree and criminal possession of

a firearm.’’5 The defendant filed an objection to the

introduction of the evidence not on the grounds that

the evidence lacked relevance or probative value but,

rather, on the basis that it was inflammatory and would

lead the jury to conclude that he had a propensity for

violence. During oral argument on the objection, the

prosecutor maintained that the names of the charges

were necessary to explain the officers’ conduct during

their entry, including the use of the ballistic shield and

holding the defendant at gunpoint. Specifically, the

prosecutor contended that the names of the charges

5 We note that the prosecutor did not attempt to introduce evidence of

the other charges in the warrant.
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State v. Delacruz-Gomez

were relevant to prove that the officers acted in the

performance of their duties, to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony, and to ‘‘[complete] the story.’’ Defense

counsel argued that the names of the charges were

unduly prejudicial because the charge of assault in the

first degree was similar to the charge being tried,

namely, assault of public safety personnel. Therefore,

defense counsel argued, the evidence was potentially

confusing, and there was a serious risk that the jury

would treat it as propensity evidence. In the event that

the court decided to admit the evidence, defense counsel asked the court to instruct the jury that it should

not be concerned with the nature of the charges, whereas

the prosecutor argued that an instruction that the

charges could not be used to infer propensity would

be sufficient.

The court ruled that the names of the warrant charges

were admissible, stating: ‘‘From the argument[s] that I

heard from both parties, it would appear to be relevant

evidence on the charge of interference. It goes to the

reasonable belief of the officers, and it does . . . help

establish the prosecution testimony, as well as complete the story of why they’re there. I do find, listening

again to the argument[s] of both parties, that it would

appear to be more probative than prejudicial, and that

any prejudice could be eliminated through an appropriate jury charge.’’ The court also notified the parties

that it would give the standard jury instruction on

uncharged misconduct but invited counsel to submit

any proposed modifications. Four of the state’s witnesses subsequently testified as to the nature of the

charges in the defendant’s warrant.

The Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s ruling,

reasoning that the warrant charges ‘‘provided an explanation for the manner in which the officers conducted

themselves while they were at the apartment,’’ for the

purpose of establishing that they were acting in the
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State v. Delacruz-Gomez

performance of their duties. State v. Delacruz-Gomez,

supra, 218 Conn. App. 273–74. The court also determined that any risk of undue prejudice was mitigated

by the trial court’s limiting instruction and by the fact

that the jury did not hear the details of the warrant

charges. Id., 275–77.

‘‘[A]s a general rule, evidence of prior misconduct is

inadmissible to prove that a criminal defendant is guilty

of the crime of which the defendant is accused. . . .

Such evidence cannot be used to suggest that the defendant has a bad character or a propensity for criminal

behavior.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Collins, 299 Conn. 567, 582, 10 A.3d 1005, cert. denied,

565 U.S. 908, 132 S. Ct. 314, 181 L. Ed. 2d 193 (2011).

‘‘We have developed a two part test to determine the

admissibility of such evidence. First, the evidence must

be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions [set forth in § 4-

5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence].’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. Specifically, that provision allows evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts

to be admitted ‘‘to prove intent, identity, malice, motive,

common plan or scheme, absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, a system of criminal activity, or an

element of the crime, or to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony.’’ Conn. Code Evid. § 4-5 (c). ‘‘Second,

the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its

prejudicial effect.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Collins, supra, 582.

As the Appellate Court observed, the state ‘‘bore the

burden of demonstrating that the officers were ‘acting

in the performance of [their] duties’ to prove the elements of the charged offenses of assault of public safety

personnel and interfer[ing] with an officer.’’6 State v.

6 ‘‘A person is guilty of assault of public safety, emergency medical, public

transit or health care personnel when, with intent to prevent a reasonably

identifiable peace officer . . . from performing his or her duties, and while

such peace officer . . . is acting in the performance of his or her duties
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Delacruz-Gomez, supra, 218 Conn. App. 273. In State

v. Davis, 261 Conn. 553, 804 A.2d 781 (2002), this court

concluded that a defendant was not entitled to raise

the defense of self-defense to a charge of either interfering with or assault of a peace officer. Id., 574. Instead,

‘‘the proper defense to those charges in cases in which

the defendant claims that the police officer had used

unreasonable and unnecessary physical force is that

the police officer was not acting in the performance of

his duty.’’ Id. In reaching that conclusion, the court

noted that a police officer’s use of physical force during

the course of an arrest must be reasonable to fall within

the scope of the officer’s duties. Id., 572; see also State

v. Baptiste, 133 Conn. App. 614, 627, 36 A.3d 697 (2012)

(reasonable force is inherent component of whether

police officers are acting in performance of their

duties), appeal dismissed, 310 Conn. 790, 83 A.3d 591

(2014). This court made clear in Davis that a defendant

who presents evidence that an officer was not acting

in the performance of his duties—no matter how weak

or incredible—is entitled, in lieu of an instruction on

self-defense, to an instruction that the officer’s use of

physical force must have been reasonable under the

circumstances for that officer to have been acting in

the performance of his duties. State v. Davis, supra,

571–72.7

. . . such person causes physical injury to such peace officer . . . .’’ General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 53a-167c (a).

‘‘A person is guilty of interfering with an officer when such person

obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer . . . or firefighter

in the performance of such peace officer’s . . . or firefighter’s duties.’’

General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-167a (a). 7 Before a trial court admits evidence under § 4-5 (c) of the Connecticut

Code of Evidence for the limited purpose of allowing the state to explain

the reasonableness of a police officer’s use of force in a prosecution for

interfering with an officer or assault of public safety personnel, it should

have a basis for concluding that the defendant has challenged the reasonableness of that force or intends to do so. In the present case, defense counsel

promptly raised this issue by repeatedly asking Chalker, the state’s second

witness, if he had struck the defendant with his gun. It is not surprising,

therefore, that defense counsel chose not to contest the relevance of the
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State v. Delacruz-Gomez

In the present case, the names of the warrant charges

explained why the amount of force the officers used

in effectuating the defendant’s arrest was reasonable.

They were relevant, therefore, to the jury’s determination that the members of the task force were acting in

the performance of their duties. The defendant has not

disputed the relevance of the charges but, rather, claims

that the trial court should have allowed into evidence

only the fact that the task force was at the residence

to serve a warrant. Unlike the mere fact of an arrest

warrant, however, the names of the charges are what

explained why the officers used significant, extensive

force in the form of precautionary measures—such as

entering the home with a battering ram, carrying a ballistic shield, and drawing their weapons while searching

for the defendant and his son—that, under different

circumstances, a jury may have found to be unreasonable. Although the reasonable use of force is not itself

an element of either offense, evidence establishing why

the amount of force used was necessary is relevant to

the state’s burden of proving that the officers were

acting in the performance of their duties, because, as

we made clear previously in this opinion, the officers

would not have been doing so if they had used unnecessary or unreasonable force while arresting the

defendant.8

warrant charges when the prosecutor argued at the outset of trial that their

admission was necessary to explain the officers’ use of force. 8 The trial court did not give a ‘‘reasonable force’’ instruction as to the

assault of public safety personnel charge. Although the defendant does not

claim on appeal that the failure to give that instruction was improper, he

argues that its omission diminished the probative value of the warrant

charges. Such an instruction—which the defense did not request—would

have specified that the reasonableness of Chalker’s use of force was relevant

to whether he was acting in the performance of his duties. Although the

court did not explicitly connect the reasonableness of Chalker’s use of force

to the performance of his duties when it instructed the jury on the assault

charge, it did do so for the same element when it instructed the jury on

the interference charge, which followed the assault instruction. Moreover,

defense counsel conceded during his closing argument that Chalker had

been acting in accordance with his official duties. We therefore agree with
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Our conclusion that the evidence was relevant and

had probative value does not end our inquiry. That

probative value must outweigh any prejudicial effect,

which, the defendant argues, included improperly suggesting that he had a propensity for violence, arousing

the emotions and hostilities of the jurors, and inviting

the jurors to speculate about the facts underlying the

warrant charges. This court has previously stated that,

‘‘[when] the prior crime is quite similar to the offense

being tried, a high degree of prejudice is created and

a strong showing of probative value would be necessary

to warrant admissibility.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Graham, 200 Conn. 9, 12, 509 A.2d

493 (1986). In the present case, therefore, in which

the defendant has been charged with assault of public

safety personnel, and the warrant charged the defendant with assault in the first degree, a ‘‘strong showing

of probative value’’ is required. (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id.

Under the circumstances of the present case, the probative value of this evidence was sufficiently strong. As

we explained previously in this opinion, the names of

the warrant charges were relevant to an inherent component of an element of both offenses with which the

defendant was charged, namely, that the officers were

acting in the performance of their duties.9 Our review

the defendant’s candid admission in his reply brief to the Appellate Court

that, under the facts of this case, any error in omitting the reasonable force

instruction as to the assault charge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 The defendant claims that, because defense counsel conceded in his

closing argument that Chalker and the other officers were acting in the

performance of their duties, the names of the warrant charges were no

longer probative as to that element. We agree that any probative value

is significantly diminished when the evidence in question pertains to an

undisputed element of the crime. See, e.g., State v. Juan J., 344 Conn. 1,

33, 276 A.3d 935 (2022) (trial court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged

misconduct to prove irrelevant issue); see also E. Prescott, Tait’s Handbook

of Connecticut Evidence (6th Ed. 2019) § 4.4.2, p. 151 (observing that ‘‘an

adverse party’s willingness to stipulate to a fact in order to obviate the need

for prejudicial evidence should . . . be given due consideration’’).
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of the record reveals that the sole basis for the officers’

use of the battering ram, ballistic shield, and drawn

weapons was the nature of the charges in the warrant.

Furthermore, defense counsel cross-examined multiple

officers regarding their use of force against the defendant, and the defendant and his son testified that one

of the members of the task force had restrained and

beaten the defendant, making the officers’ use of force

a contested issue at trial. In light of that testimony and

the relevance of the warrant charges to establishing the

reasonableness of the use of force—which, in turn, was

relevant to proving the ‘‘performance of duties’’ element

of both offenses—the ‘‘strong showing of probative

value’’ called for in State v. Graham, supra, 200 Conn.

12, has been made.

Although we recognize the heightened risk of undue

prejudice, given that some form of assault was charged

in both the warrant and the case being tried, the trial

court mitigated the potential prejudice in several ways.

The court did not allow the jury to hear any details of the

alleged conduct that gave rise to the warrant charges.

Accordingly, the jury was unable to compare the cases

in a way that we have previously cautioned is likely to

bring about undue prejudice. There was no evidence,

for instance, that the conduct charged in the warrant

was more egregious than the defendant’s alleged assault

of Chalker. See State v. Campbell, 328 Conn. 444, 522–

23, 180 A.3d 882 (2018) (‘‘prejudicial impact of uncharged

misconduct evidence is assessed in light of its relative

‘viciousness’ in comparison with the charged conduct’’).

This concession, however, was not made until defense counsel’s closing

argument, long after the court ruled on the admissibility of the evidence.

Before that time, defense counsel provided no indication that he planned

to concede this element. To the contrary, defense counsel cross-examined

Chalker and Mills about their use of force at the defendant’s residence,

advancing the allegations that one of the officers struck the defendant with

his pistol, and later eliciting testimony from both the defendant and his son

that one of the officers had used excessive force.
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The jury, moreover, could not identify factual similarities that might suggest a common perpetrator. See State

v. Raynor, 337 Conn. 527, 563–65, 254 A.3d 874 (2020)

(increased risk of undue prejudice when evidence highlights shared characteristics between uncharged misconduct and offense being tried). Because the officers’

testimony was limited to stating the relevant charges

for the purpose of explaining their conduct during the

execution of the warrant, the jury did not hear the kind

of graphic details that could have prevented it from

properly weighing the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Morlo

M., 206 Conn. App. 660, 693–94, 261 A.3d 68 (emphasizing that prior misconduct evidence alleged by defendant

to be unduly prejudicial ‘‘did not involve gruesome

details, facts or photographs’’ and that trial court had

given appropriate limiting instruction as to its use), cert.

denied, 339 Conn. 910, 261 A.3d 745 (2021).

The court also mitigated the potentially undue prejudice by intervening when defense counsel began to

cross-examine Chalker about the outcome of the warrant charges. After defense counsel began this line of

questioning, the court excused the jury, then cautioned

defense counsel that his questioning could open the

door to further exploration of the details of the warrant

charges. Defense counsel responded that he intended

to call into question Chalker’s knowledge of the facts

underlying the warrant charges, thus casting doubt on

the suggestion that the defendant was a violent felon.

While recognizing that defense counsel was free to conduct cross-examination as he saw fit, the court offered,

as an alternative, to provide a cautionary instruction

regarding the warrant charges and directed Chalker not

to discuss the underlying facts relating to the warrant

charges. Defense counsel withdrew the question and

agreed to the court’s proposal to give a limiting

instruction.
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State v. Delacruz-Gomez

The limiting instructions that the court gave as a

result of this colloquy, as well as the court’s final

instructions, lessened any potential undue prejudice

from the admission of this evidence.10 The first instruction emphasized that the defendant enjoyed the presumption of innocence and that the officers’ testimony

about the charges ‘‘reflect[s] their preparation for the

service of a . . . warrant that charges a violent felony

. . . nothing more.’’ The court further advised the jury

that the execution of the warrant did not mean that the

defendant committed the offense and that ‘‘[t]he details

involved in that warrant are not pertinent to this, not

relevant, and should not be considered by you.’’ The

court’s final instruction stated explicitly that the jury

was not to ‘‘consider such evidence as establishing a

predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit

any of the crimes charged, or to demonstrate a criminal

propensity.’’ Rather, the jury could use the evidence if

it ‘‘logically, rationally, and conclusively supports the

issue for which it is being offered by the state, but only

as it may bear on the issue of reasonableness of force

as used by the peace officers.’’ The court further clari10 The defendant claims that these instructions failed to reduce the prejudicial impact of the evidence because the court did not give an instruction

during the testimony of Masterson, Mills, or Taylor. He then undermines

this claim, however, by arguing that the instruction given during Chalker’s

testimony—which he now contends should have been repeated during the

testimony of Masterson, Mills, and Taylor—unnecessarily highlighted the

severity of the warrant charges. We find these arguments unpersuasive. The

first limiting instruction referred to the officers’ testimony, making clear

that it applied to the testimony of multiple witnesses and not only to that

of Chalker. That instruction must be understood in conjunction with the

limiting instruction that the court provided in its final charge to the jury,

which, likewise, encompassed all instances in which the state offered evidence pertaining to the warrant charges. See, e.g., State v. Blaine, 334 Conn.

298, 308, 221 A.3d 798 (2019) (‘‘individual instructions are not to be judged

in artificial isolation from the overall charge’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)). The court’s instructions, therefore, appropriately alerted the jury

as to the limited purpose for which this evidence could be used, without

unduly emphasizing that evidence.
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fied that ‘‘[y]ou may not consider evidence of other

misconduct of the defendant for any purpose other than

the one I’ve just told you, because it may predispose

your mind uncritically to believe that the defendant may

be guilty of the offense here charged merely because

of the alleged other misconduct . . . . [Y]ou may consider this evidence only on the issue of reasonableness

of force used, and for no other purpose.’’

‘‘Proper limiting instructions often mitigate the prejudicial impact of evidence of prior misconduct.’’ State

v. Ryan, 182 Conn. 335, 338 n.5, 438 A.2d 107 (1980).

In the absence of an indication to the contrary, we

presume that the jury followed the court’s instructions

and considered this evidence solely for the purpose for

which it was admitted. See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 341

Conn. 387, 429, 267 A.3d 81 (2021); see also State v.

Pereira, 113 Conn. App. 705, 715, 967 A.2d 121 (limiting

instructions, which were presumed to have been followed, ‘‘lessen any prejudice resulting from the admission of [evidence of prior misconduct]’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 292 Conn. 909,

973 A.2d 106 (2009). On the basis of the foregoing

record, we are satisfied that the court’s handling of

the evidence at issue effectively mitigated the risk of

undue prejudice.11

In sum, because the probative value of the evidence

was strong and the trial court undertook sufficient measures to mitigate any potential undue prejudice, the

Appellate Court correctly concluded that, on the basis

of the facts of the present case, there was no abuse of

discretion in admitting the names of the charges listed

in the warrant.

11 We emphasize, however, that, because of the nature of the warrant

charges and the limited purpose for which they were admitted, the trial

court should also have considered further mitigating the prejudicial impact

by limiting the number of references to those charges during testimony.
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II

We turn next to the defendant’s claim that the trial

court abused its discretion in admitting testimony that

the defendant had been arrested by the ‘‘Violent Fugitive

Task Force.’’12 Specifically, the defendant contends that

any probative value of the name of the task force was

outweighed by its prejudicial effect. We conclude that

the testimony regarding the name of the task force

had no probative value and was unfairly prejudicial.

Because the defendant has failed to satisfy his burden

of showing that the error was harmful, however, we

affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment.

After the trial court overruled the defendant’s objection to the state’s motion seeking to introduce testimony

naming the warrant charges, defense counsel orally

moved to exclude evidence ‘‘that these police officers

and this federal marshal were part of this Violent [Fugitive] Task Force . . . this special task force for violent

offenders.’’ He argued that allowing the jury to hear the

name of the task force would be highly prejudicial and

that it would be sufficient for the officers to testify that

12 Given the significance of the name of the task force to this appeal, we

make the following observations. Throughout trial, the parties and witnesses

used inconsistent terminology to describe the task force. Defense counsel,

for instance, referred to it as the ‘‘Violent Gang Task Force,’’ whereas one

of the prosecutors called it the ‘‘Violent Felony Task Force.’’ Although the

United States Marshals Service manages various task forces responsible for

the apprehension of dangerous fugitives, the names of these task forces vary

by jurisdiction. See U.S. Marshals Service, Fugitive Task Forces, available

at https://www.usmarshals.gov/what-we-do/fugitive-investigations/fugitivetask-forces (last visited July 24, 2024); U.S. Marshals Service, District Offices,

https://www.usmarshals.gov/local-districts (last visited July 24, 2024).

Three of the state’s witnesses, Chalker, McMahon, and Taylor, used the

phrase ‘‘Violent Fugitive Task Force.’’ We note that two other witnesses,

however, Mills and Masterson, the lone United States marshal who participated in the arrest, referred to the task force simply as the ‘‘Fugitive Task

Force.’’ The language to which the defendant has objected—‘‘Violent Fugitive

Task Force’’—was the predominant usage during trial, and that is the name

we use throughout this opinion.
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they reported to the defendant’s home as part of a

task force to execute an arrest warrant. The prosecutor

objected, claiming that the name of the task force

explained ‘‘why they were there’’ and ‘‘the manner in

which they serve the warrant.’’ The court denied the

motion, concluding that the name of the task force was

‘‘relevant and probative’’ because it was ‘‘an acronym’’

used to identify it, and suggesting that defense counsel

could ‘‘explore it on cross-examination regarding any

prejudice you think might exist because of the name

of the unit. It’s simply identifying themselves, and . . .

the court feels that that’s relevant and probative.’’13 Five

officers representing multiple agencies subsequently

testified that they had been assigned to the task force

when they executed the arrest warrants for the defendant and his son. The officers also testified as to the

purpose of the task force and its role in apprehending

individuals wanted for violent felonies.

The Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s ruling

on the ground that ‘‘the officers’ brief testimony about

the name and purpose of the Violent Fugitive Task

Force, like the evidence regarding the charges against

the defendant, was relevant to the issue of whether

Chalker and the other officers were acting in the performance of their duties.’’ State v. Delacruz-Gomez, supra,

218 Conn. App. 279. The court reasoned that the name

of the task force ‘‘provided an explanation for why

Chalker and the other officers were at the defendant’s

apartment’’ and ‘‘helped explain, even if only to a slight

degree, why the officers executed the arrest warrants

in the manner that they did, including why they had

their weapons drawn when they searched the apart13 We emphasize that, even when a trial court finds that the evidence in

question is relevant and material, it should articulate on the record its

reasons for determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighs

any prejudicial impact. See, e.g., State v. Sierra, 213 Conn. 422, 434–36, 568

A.2d 448 (1990).
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ment.’’ Id., 280. Moreover, the court stated that the

testimony relating to the task force was ‘‘not likely to

arouse the emotions of the jurors any more than the

testimony about the nature of the charges in the defendant’s arrest warrant . . . .’’ Id.

From the outset, we are unable to discern how the

name of this task force is relevant to any material fact,

particularly given the varied titles that were used to

describe it during trial. See footnote 12 of this opinion.

Indeed, we are hard-pressed to conceive of any scenario in which the name of the responding task force

would be relevant to proving that its use of force was

reasonable. To the extent that it was necessary to

explain the presence of the task force, testimony that

multiple agencies were involved in executing the warrant and that members of the task force had received

specialized training would have been sufficient. The

state’s argument with respect to the probative value

of this evidence is largely duplicative of its argument

relating to the names of the warrant charges. Indeed,

at oral argument before this court, the state conceded

that the name of the task force did not ‘‘offer anything

significantly more probative’’ than the warrant charges.

But, although the nature of the warrant charges explained

the reasonableness of the use of force under the circumstances and, thus, was probative of an element of both

crimes charged in the present case—that is, whether

the officers were acting in the performance of their

duties—the name of the task force had no such probative value. The particular name of the task force

assigned to apprehend the defendant was wholly immaterial to any issue in the case.

In addition, the name of the task force presented a

significant risk of undue prejudice because it suggested

that the defendant was a violent fugitive. Specifying

that the ‘‘Violent Fugitive Task Force’’ was assigned to

arrest the defendant unavoidably implied that he was
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actively attempting to evade law enforcement.14 Black’s

Law Dictionary defines ‘‘fugitive’’ as ‘‘[s]omeone who

flees or escapes; a refugee,’’ or, more specifically, ‘‘[a]

criminal suspect or a witness in a criminal case who

flees, evades, or escapes arrest, prosecution, imprisonment, service of process, or the giving of testimony,

[especially] by fleeing the jurisdiction or by hiding.’’

Black’s Law Dictionary (12th Ed. 2024) p. 809. The court

made no finding, and the state did not introduce any

evidence, that the defendant had fled or otherwise tried

to escape arrest. Consequently, there appears to be no

legal basis for the usage of this terminology, which

invited the jurors to speculate on facts not in evidence

and was likely to arouse their emotions in a prejudicial

fashion. We are concerned by the implication that a

prosecutor may arbitrarily characterize a defendant as

a ‘‘fugitive’’ by introducing the name of a self-styled

task force into evidence, then use that subjective title

to justify the conduct of a law enforcement unit, and

we decline to countenance that practice here.15

On this record, therefore, we do not share the Appellate Court’s confidence that the name of the task force

was no more likely to arouse the hostilities of the jurors

14 We recognize that the name of the task force also included the term

‘‘violent.’’ The implication that the defendant was ‘‘violent,’’ however, was

addressed through the admission of the warrant charges, as the court properly instructed the jury that the defendant maintained his presumption of

innocence as to those charges, as well as the charges in the present case,

and that it was not to infer any criminal propensity from that evidence.

Accordingly, we focus our discussion primarily on the prejudicial impact

of the term ‘‘fugitive.’’ See State v. James G., supra, 268 Conn. 400 (evidence

is less likely to arouse jurors’ emotions when similar evidence already exists). 15 We likewise find unpersuasive the trial court’s rationale that the members of the task force were ‘‘simply identifying themselves . . . .’’ This

reasoning risks the inclusion of inflammatory language under the pretext

of identification. It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which the name

of a law enforcement unit could be used as a vehicle to introduce information

about gang activity, terrorism, or other misconduct that might otherwise

be precluded by our rules of evidence.
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than the names of the warrant charges. See State v.

Delacruz-Gomez, supra, 218 Conn. App. 280. The name

of the task force includes the same allusion to violent

crime but adds the inflammatory label of ‘‘fugitive,’’

which is not rooted in any legal ruling or factual finding

in the present case, has no independent probative value,

and is highly prejudicial. The state contends that,

because the jury had already heard the names of the

warrant charges, it would not have been surprised to

hear that a task force for ‘‘[v]iolent [fugitives]’’ was

assigned to execute the warrant. The fact that the defendant had been charged with assault in the first degree

and criminal possession of a firearm, however, does not

suggest that he was a ‘‘fugitive.’’ That characterization

originated with, and was limited to, the name of the

task force. Moreover, the trial court failed to mitigate

the risk of undue prejudice by giving a limiting instruction on the name of the task force, as it did for the

names of the warrant charges, or by limiting the number

of references during testimony. For all these reasons,

we disagree with the Appellate Court’s conclusion that

the trial court properly admitted testimony identifying

the name of the task force. See State v. Delacruz-Gomez,

supra, 280–81.

We are not persuaded, however, that the admission

of this evidence was harmful. ‘‘When an improper evidentiary ruling is not constitutional in nature, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the error

was harmful. . . . [W]hether [an improper ruling] is

harmless in a particular case depends [on] a number

of factors, such as the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony

was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence

corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination

otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength

of the prosecution’s case. . . . [T]he proper standard
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for determining whether an erroneous evidentiary ruling is harmless should be whether the jury’s verdict was

substantially swayed by the error.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Bouknight, 323 Conn. 620, 626,

149 A.3d 975 (2016).

Given the strength of the state’s case—including, but

not limited to, evidence that Chalker’s injuries were

caused by the defendant’s attempts to prevent him from

performing his duties—and the defense’s strategic decision to focus exclusively on whether the defendant

caused Chalker’s injuries, we conclude that the jury’s

verdict was not substantially swayed by the admission

of the name of the task force. The testimony of the

state’s witnesses indicates that, from the moment the

task force arrived at his residence, the defendant deliberately hindered the officers’ efforts to carry out their

duties. Multiple members of the task force testified that

they knocked on the apartment door for at least five

minutes with no response before the defendant’s wife

let them in through the rear entrance, and that, during

that time, they saw the defendant looking at them from

an upstairs window. Rather than surrendering when the

task force entered the residence, however, the defendant admitted that he hid himself and his son under a

pile of clothes in an upstairs bedroom. Chalker testified

that, when he located the defendant and directed him

to show his hands, there was no response. Both Chalker

and Taylor also described how the defendant resisted

by making himself ‘‘dead weight’’ as Chalker tried to

pull him out of the clothing pile to effectuate the arrest.

Most significant, Chalker, Mills, and Taylor all testified

that the partially handcuffed defendant lunged at

Chalker as the defendant was being pulled from the

clothing pile, causing Chalker to fall backward and land

on the nightstand.16

16 Masterson waited in the upstairs hallway while Chalker, Mills, and Taylor

cleared the bedroom and, as a result, did not see whether the defendant

struck Chalker. He testified, however, that the other officers told him that
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Any differences in the officers’ testimony were limited to details such as the extent to which the defendant

used the wall as leverage, the manner by which he

knocked Chalker off balance, and the point in time at

which Chalker first climbed onto the bed. For example,

Mills and Taylor both described seeing the defendant

pushing off the wall as Chalker pulled him out of the

clothing pile and, then, Chalker flying backward off the

bed. Chalker testified that the defendant’s head and

shoulder struck him in the chest but that he did not

know if the defendant’s feet were on the floor or the

wall when the defendant lunged at him, and Taylor

testified simply that the defendant ‘‘pushed’’ Chalker.

Although Chalker stated that he got onto the bed before

searching through the clothing pile, Mills recalled that

he did not do so until after he saw the defendant hiding

there. There was no disagreement among the officers,

however, that the defendant’s actions while resisting

arrest caused Chalker to fall off the bed and to sustain

his injuries. See State v. Nixon, 32 Conn. App. 224, 238,

630 A.2d 74 (1993) (noting that ‘‘a person is guilty under

§ 53a-167c (a) (1) if he intends to prevent a reasonably

identifiable [peace officer] from performing his duty

and, in doing so, causes injury to the [peace officer]’’),

aff’d, 231 Conn. 545, 651 A.2d 1264 (1995).

The jury reasonably could have credited the officers’

testimony, which was consistent as to the essential

facts of the incident, as opposed to the contradictory

narrative advanced by the defense. At trial, the defense

claimed that Mills, not Chalker, entered the bedroom

alone, pulled him out of the clothing pile, and began

pistol-whipping him before being told by another officer

to stop. The defendant denied resisting arrest and

claimed that he had no idea until hours later that an

the defendant’s resistance caused Chalker’s injuries, and that his report thus

reflected that Chalker was hurt when ‘‘the [defendant] jumped up,’’ causing

Chalker to ‘‘[fall] back and [strike] a nightstand.’’
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officer had been hurt at the apartment. This assertion

strains credulity, as all of the testifying members of the

task force recalled Chalker’s injury—Mills even testified

that he heard Chalker scream out in pain—and hospital

records confirmed that Chalker sustained fractured ribs

and a traumatic pneumothorax. The defendant’s son

similarly testified that he heard the defendant being

beaten by a police officer but that he did not hear

anyone fall off the bed.17 During his closing argument,

however, defense counsel stated that, contrary to the

defendant’s testimony, Chalker had been in the room

but was injured because he lost his balance and fell off

the bed, and suggested that the defendant ‘‘didn’t know

what was happening . . . .’’ In arguing that Chalker

had simply slipped, defense counsel informed the jury

that it was ‘‘reasonable to find [the defendant] guilty

of interfering with a police officer,’’ and that the officers

were acting in the performance of their duties, asking

the jury to concentrate, instead, on the causation element of the assault charge. This defense strategy

ensured that causation was the only contested issue

remaining before the jury, and the state presented a

strong case that the defendant’s actions in resisting

arrest caused Chalker’s injuries.18

17 Other than this testimony, there was no evidence that any law enforcement officer struck the defendant, and there was no evidence to suggest

that any of the officers had entered the bedroom alone. 18 Because neither Masterson’s report nor the hospital report indicates

that the defendant knocked Chalker off the bed, the defendant claims that

his characterization as a ‘‘violent fugitive’’ likely led the jury to conclude

that he did so. We disagree. The hospital report indicates that Chalker ‘‘was

standing on a bed . . . while taking someone into custody, and as he was

pulling them, he fell off the bed . . . .’’ Chalker testified, however, that he

had, in fact, told hospital staff that he had been ‘‘knocked off the bed’’ but

that he had no control over how the report was ultimately written. Masterson

testified at length as to what he included in his report and why. As the trial

court observed, defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the

officers and did so. The jury reasonably could have credited Masterson’s

explanation for his language and Chalker’s testimony about what he had

told the hospital staff.
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On the basis of the foregoing, it is unlikely that hearing the name of the task force is what persuaded the

jury of the defendant’s guilt. The state presented a

strong case supported by eyewitness testimony from

several law enforcement officers, all of whom connected the defendant’s uncooperative behavior and

resistance to arrest with Chalker’s subsequent injuries.

The name of the task force did not bolster the credibility

of the officers, whose testimony was critical to the

state’s case. Moreover, given that the defendant’s testimony was so erratic that his own counsel rejected his

version of events, there is no reason to believe that

the jury would have found him credible but for the

discussion of the task force. Although the prosecutor

mentioned the name of the task force in his closing

argument, he did so only twice while discussing the

state’s legal responsibility for executing the warrant,

not as a means of characterizing the defendant. This is

hardly the ‘‘frequent and repeated emphasis’’ on inadmissible evidence that this court has previously recognized as incompatible with harmless error. State v.

Culbreath, 340 Conn. 167, 195, 263 A.3d 350 (2021).

Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that

the admission of the name of the task force, although

inappropriate, had any bearing on the question before

the jury—whether the defendant, in fact, had caused

Chalker’s injuries—and we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same

if that evidence had not been introduced. See, e.g., State

v. Jordan, 314 Conn. 89, 104, 101 A.3d 179 (2014).

Accordingly, we will not disturb the Appellate

Court’s decision.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.