PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 13-1380 and 13-1478

DOMINGO COLON MONTANEZ;

TIMOTHY A. HALE

 

v.

SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT 

OF CORRECTIONS; SCI ROCKVIEW INMATE 

ACCOUNTING OFFICE; SUPERINTENDENT F. J. 

TENNIS; FRANCIS M. DOUGHERTY; 

EARL E. WALKER; RAYMOND CINGEL; 

PENNSYLVANIA DOC; MICHAEL OPPMAN; 

DIAN DETWILER; HARRY E. WILSON

Domingo Colon Montanez,

Appellant in 13-1380

Timothy Hale,

Appellant in 13-1478

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No. 4-04-cv-02569)

District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
2

Argued on November 7, 2013

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE and 

ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 15, 2014)

Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Esquire (Argued)

Andrew M. Milz, Esquire

400 Spruce Street

Suite 300

Mellon Bank Building

Scranton, PA 18503

Counsel for Appellant Domingo Colon Montanez

Su Ming Yeh, Esquire (Argued)

Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project

718 Arch Street

Suite 304S

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellant Timothy A. Hale

Howard G. Hopkirk, Esquire (Argued)

Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania

Strawberry Square

15th Floor

Harrisburg, PA 17102

Counsel for Appellees 
3

A M E N D E D O P I N I O N

ROTH, Circuit Judge: 

Plaintiffs Domingo Colón Montañez and Timothy 

Hale appeal the District Court’s order granting summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants on claims for damages 

and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Defendants are officials of the Pennsylvania Department of 

Corrections (DOC) and its related prisons. For the reasons 

that follow, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the 

District Court’s judgment.

I.

This appeal involves the consolidated challenges of 

two inmates in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 

prison system to the DOC’s implementation of a program that 

automatically deducts funds from prisoners’ inmate accounts 

to cover court-ordered restitution, fines, and costs. The DOC 

maintains bank accounts for the inmates incarcerated in its 

facilities. Inmates use the funds in these accounts to cover 

the costs of certain goods and services they purchase during 

their time of incarceration. The DOC provides for the most 

basic needs of the inmates—such as food and shelter—

without charge to the inmates’ accounts. Inmates must pay 
4

for access to additional products and services, unless they 

qualify as indigent. For example, inmates must purchase 

items such as soap, deodorant, toothpaste, and over-thecounter medications. Inmates are also responsible for 

medical co-pays and the cost of access to legal services, 

although in some circumstances inmates’ constitutional rights 

compel the DOC to provide access to these services without 

regard to inmates’ ability to pay. See, e.g., Reynolds v. 

Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 1997). Inmates accrue 

money in their accounts through wages—capped at 51 cents 

an hour—for work conducted for the prison system or 

through gifts from friends and family.

In 1998, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted Act 84, 

which amended section 9728(b) of the Pennsylvania 

Sentencing Code. Through these amendments, the legislature 

authorized the DOC “to make monetary deductions from 

inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting 

restitution or any other court-ordered obligation or costs.” 42 

Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9728(b)(5). Act 84 also directed that the 

“Department of Corrections shall develop guidelines relating 

to its responsibilities under this paragraph.” Id.

The DOC exercised its obligation to develop 

guidelines relating to the collection of court-ordered monetary 

obligations of its inmates by promulgating policy DC-ADM005, effective October 16, 1998 (the DOC Policy).1

 The 

current version of the Policy provides, in relevant part, that 

 

1 The DOC policy has been amended several times since its 

initial promulgation, most recently in October 2007. Neither 

party suggests that the amendments impact Plaintiffs’ claims 

for damages or injunctive relief. 
5

the business office of each DOC facility makes “payments of 

20% of the inmate’s account balance and monthly income for 

restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines, and/or penalties 

associated with the criminal proceedings pursuant to” Act 84, 

“provided that the inmate has a balance that exceeds $10.00.” 

The DOC’s authority to make deductions is automatically 

triggered when it receives a sentencing order that includes a 

monetary portion. There is no requirement in the Policy that 

the relevant court order contain a provision for the automatic 

deduction of funds from an inmate account. The DOC does 

not provide inmates with any hearing or other opportunity to 

be heard before the deductions commence.

Montañez and Hale are two inmates in the DOC prison 

system who have had funds deducted from their inmate 

accounts pursuant to the DOC Policy. Each separately filed 

suit against DOC Secretary Jeffrey Beard, as well as other 

DOC officials responsible for processing the deductions 

(collectively, the Corrections Officials). The crux of both 

lawsuits is that the plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights 

were violated when the Corrections Officials enforced the 

DOC Policy and made automatic deductions from the 

plaintiffs’ inmate accounts.2 Because these claims depend on 

the notice and process granted to each plaintiff, we will 

discuss the specific process given to each plaintiff in some 

detail.

A.

 

2

In addition, Montañez asserted an additional claim that the 

DOC Policy violated his rights under the Equal Protection 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
6

On January 6, 2004, Hale was sentenced in a 

Pennsylvania criminal proceeding to 82 to 160 months in 

prison. As part of this sentence, Hale was ordered to pay 

restitution in the amount of $1,191.11, and a fine of $1,000. 

The sentencing judge also ordered Hale to pay an unspecified 

amount for “the cost of the proceeding.” The final total of the 

costs, $1,462.53, was not determined until sometime after the 

sentencing hearing. The sentencing judge made no reference 

to Act 84 or the DOC’s authority to make automatic 

deductions from funds held in an inmate account.

The parties dispute the exact parameters of the notice 

Hale received regarding the DOC Policy and Act 84 upon his 

intake to the DOC prison system. According to a sworn 

declaration submitted by the Corrections Officials, Hale 

underwent new prisoner orientation when he was first 

admitted, at which time he was informed that money could be 

deducted from his inmate account to satisfy court-ordered 

debts. The Corrections Officials also contend that Hale was 

shown a video orientation and given an inmate handbook that 

set forth pertinent provisions of the DOC’s grievance and 

debt collection policies. Further, Hale’s institutional file 

contains a form notice dated February 19, 2004—prior to the 

initiation of any deductions—which sets forth the substance 

of the DOC Policy. The record does not confirm, however, 

whether Hale actually received this form notice. Hale 

contradicts each of these assertions in a sworn declaration of 

his own. In particular, Hale asserts that he was never 

informed that the DOC would deduct funds from his inmate 

account and was unaware of the DOC Policy until after the 

deductions commenced. 
7

Hale admits that, during his initial orientation, he 

received an inmate handbook, which contains an explanation 

of the inmate accounts. While the handbook does not contain 

a copy of the DOC Policy, it does contain two references to 

the DOC’s ability to deduct funds from inmate accounts. In 

particular, the handbook explains, “If you were ordered to pay 

restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines, and/or penalties 

associated with court proceedings, the DOC will collect 

monies from your account to pay those amounts.” The 

handbook further provides:

1. In accordance with 42 Pa. C.S. 

§9728, the DOC shall collect monies 

from your account if the court orders you 

to pay restitution, reparation, fees, costs, 

fines, and/or penalties associated with 

the criminal proceedings.

2. The DOC shall also collect court 

costs and filing fees as ordered by a 

court.

. . .

7. For more information on the 

collection of debts, refer to DOC policy 

DC-ADM 005.

Hale also notes that there are several discrepancies 

with respect to his total amount of court-ordered restitution, 

fees, and costs. The judgment entered in Hale’s criminal case 

indicates that he owed a total of $2,783.86, while his 300B 
8

form3lists a total of $4,373.64. In addition, Hale’s 300B 

form erroneously inflated the amount Hale owed in restitution 

by over $700. 

It is undisputed that the DOC provided no opportunity 

for Hale to be heard regarding his record of court-ordered 

monetary obligations or the automatic deductions. Hale filed 

this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District 

of Pennsylvania on December 15, 2004.

B.

On January 7, 2000, Montañez participated in a 

Pennsylvania criminal sentencing hearing at which he 

received a sentence of 5.5 to 20 years in prison. Montañez 

was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $148.60, 

a fine in the amount of $100, and the costs of the prosecution. 

As with Hale, the costs portion of Montañez’s sentence was 

not calculated until after the hearing. At no point did the 

sentencing judge explain that the DOC had the authority to 

automatically deduct 20% of Montañez’s inmate account to 

pay these debts or otherwise refer to the DOC Policy.

Montañez asserts that he did not receive his 300B form 

or any other notice as to the total amount of his court-ordered 

 

3 The 300B is a form created by the DOC to assist it in 

determining the total amount of court-ordered obligations 

imposed on each inmate in the DOC system. The DOC 

provides these forms to the Court of Common Pleas for the 

county in which the inmate was sentenced. The Clerk of 

Court for each county supplies the information and fills out 

the form, which is then transmitted to the DOC.
9

obligations in time for him to move for reconsideration or file

a direct appeal from the District Court’s assessment of costs. 

Montañez did, however, file an appeal with respect to his 

conviction and sentence, and later filed petitions and other 

requests to modify his amounts owed.

As with Hale, the parties disagree as to the full extent

of notice Montañez received regarding the DOC Policy upon 

his intake to the DOC prison system. Montañez asserts that 

he was never informed about the total amount of his courtordered obligations, never received a copy of his 300B form, 

and was never informed about the DOC Policy. The 

Corrections Officials, on the other hand, dispute each of these 

claims. Both parties agree that the inmate handbook given to 

Montañez upon his admission to the DOC system contained 

no reference to the DOC policy. It is similarly undisputed 

that Montañez had no opportunity to be heard before the 

deductions commenced.

The DOC began deducting funds from Montañez’s 

account pursuant to its policy on April 6, 2000. These 

deductions continued until 2010, when Montañez’s debt was

satisfied. Montañez admits that he received an inmate 

account statement every month, which included a debit 

described as “Act 84 transaction.” 

Montañez asserts that he was not aware of the import 

of this description, or of Act 84 or the DOC policy, until 

“sometime in 2002.” Upon learning of the significance of 

these transactions, Montañez filed the first of a series of 

grievances with the DOC on November 17, 2002. These 

grievances were predicated on the fact that Montañez had not 

received any hearing to determine if he was able to afford the 
10

deductions, and questioned the lack of a court order 

authorizing the deductions. The DOC rejected Montañez’s 

grievance, stating that it would “continue to collect fines, 

restitution and costs from” Montañez “unless the sentencing 

court enters an order relieving” him from his obligations. On 

May 19, 2003, Montañez petitioned his sentencing judge 

seeking a copy of the order authorizing deductions from his 

account. The court denied this request, indicating that it had 

never entered an order initiating automatic deductions from 

Montañez’s inmate account. Montañez filed this lawsuit in 

the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 

Pennsylvania on November 29, 2004. 

C.

This is the third time these cases have been before our 

Court. In two previous appeals, we held that the allegations 

in the complaints submitted by Hale and Montañez were 

sufficient to state a claim that their due process rights were 

violated. See Montañez v. Beard, 344 F. App’x 833 (3d Cir. 

2009) (Montañez I); Hale v. Beard, 168 F. App’x 532 (3d Cir. 

2006). 

After post-remand discovery, the District Court 

granted the Corrections Officials’ motion for summary 

judgment on all claims. In particular, the District Court ruled 

that: (1) Montañez’s claims were barred by the applicable 

statute of limitations; (2) Hale received all process he was due 

under the Constitution; and (3) the Corrections Officials were 

entitled to qualified immunity from all claims for monetary 

damages in any event. Plaintiffs appeal from that decision.

II.
11

This Court reviews “an award of summary judgment 

de novo, applying the same test on review that the District 

Court should have applied” and views the facts in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of 

Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). A court “shall grant summary judgment if 

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Similarly, qualified 

immunity “raises a purely legal issue” that this Court reviews 

de novo. Burns, 642 F.3d at 170.

For the reasons stated below, we will reverse the 

District Court’s order with respect to Hale’s due process 

claim for injunctive relief. We will affirm on all other 

grounds.

A.

Montañez argues that the District Court erred in 

concluding that his procedural due process claim was barred 

by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for a § 

1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years. Kach v. 

Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). The District Court 

held that Montañez’s cause of action accrued, at the latest, 

when he filed a grievance asserting that the deductions from 

his account were “unconstitutional and a violation of due 

process” on November 17, 2002. Because Montanez did not 

file his complaint in this action until November 29, 2004, the 

District Court concluded that Montañez’s claims were 

untimely. We will affirm.

1.
12

The date of accrual in a § 1983 action is determined by 

federal law. Kach, 589 F.3d at 634. Under federal law, a 

cause of action accrues “‘when the plaintiff knew or should 

have known of the injury upon which the action is based.’” 

Id. (quoting Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 

582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998)). Montañez argues that his cause of 

action accrued on November 27, 2002, because this was the 

date the DOC denied his grievance challenging the 

deductions. 

Montañez’s cause of action is based on the injury he 

allegedly suffered when the DOC applied the DOC Policy to 

his inmate account without due process. This Court has 

previously noted with regard to deductions from inmate 

accounts that an “alleged violation of [an inmate’s] 

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process occur[s] at the 

moment he was deprived of his property interest without 

notice and a predeprivation hearing (i.e., when [prison] 

employees seized the money in his inmate account).” 

Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 694 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002). 

Following this rule, Montañez’s alleged injury occurred on 

April 6, 2000, when the DOC first deducted funds from his 

account.4 It was at this point that the DOC deprived

 

4 Montañez also argues that his cause of action did not accrue 

until he should have known that his due process rights had 

been violated. This is not correct; a cause of action accrues 

upon “a plaintiff’s discovery of the actual, as opposed to the 

legal, injury . . ..” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & 

Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994). Montañez’s 

actual injury occurred on the date that funds were deducted 

from his inmate account.
13

Montañez of his property interests, allegedly without due 

process. Montañez “knew or should have known of” this 

injury within a month of the first deduction, as he received an 

inmate account statement that reflected the debit from his 

account. See Kach, 589 F.3d at 634. As a result, Montañez’s 

claim accrued in April or May of 2000, and the statute of 

limitations had expired by the time he filed his complaint in 

this action.

2.

Montañez seeks to avoid application of the statute of 

limitations by invoking the continuing violation doctrine. 

Under that doctrine, “when a defendant’s conduct is part of a 

continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act 

evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations 

period.” Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 

2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

There are several barriers that preclude Montañez from 

invoking this doctrine. Initially, the continuing violation

doctrine does not apply when the plaintiff “is aware of the 

injury at the time it occurred.” Morganroth & Morganroth v. 

Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 406, 417 n.6 

(3d Cir. 2003). As we have just explained, Montañez was 

aware of the relevant injury—the government seizure of 

funds from his inmate account—very shortly after it occurred. 

Despite this knowledge, Montañez failed to assert his rights 

in a timely fashion. 

Furthermore, Montañez’s argument that he suffered a 

continuing violation is based on the fact that the DOC 

continued to make deductions from his account. But a 

“continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful 
14

acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation.” 

Weis-Buy Servs., Inc. v. Paglia, 411 F.3d 415, 423 (3d Cir. 

2005) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The DOC’s decision to enforce the DOC Policy against 

Montañez and its first deduction from his prison account 

constituted a discrete and independently actionable act, which 

triggered Montañez’s obligation to assert his rights. The fact 

that the DOC made subsequent deductions pursuant to the 

DOC Policy does not make out a continuing violation. See 

Cowell, 263 F.3d at 292–93.

3.

In addition to his arguments regarding accrual, 

Montañez also argues that the statute of limitations should be 

equitably tolled, either because the DOC “fraudulently 

concealed its responsibility for the deductions” or because 

Montañez engaged in the inmate grievance process to settle 

his claims. We disagree, and find no basis to equitably toll 

the statute of limitations.

Generally, “state tolling principles also govern § 1983 

claims” unless they conflict with “federal law or policy.” 

Kach, 589 F.3d at 639. “Pennsylvania’s fraudulent 

concealment doctrine tolls the statute of limitations where 

‘through fraud or concealment the defendant causes the 

plaintiff to relax vigilance or deviate from the right of 

inquiry.’” Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 F.3d 502, 516 (3d Cir. 

2006) (quoting Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 

F.2d 548, 556 (3d Cir. 1985)). Even if a plaintiff can 

establish that the defendant engaged in fraudulent 

concealment, the statute of limitations “begins to run when 

the injured party knows or reasonably should know of his 
15

injury and its cause.” Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 861 

(Pa. 2005). 

Montañez argues that the DOC “fraudulently 

concealed its responsibility for the deductions” by suggesting 

that he take his complaints about the deductions to his

sentencing court. The statements Montañez identifies, 

however, were made in response to the grievances he filed 

more than two years after his cause of action accrued. As a 

result, any alleged fraud by the DOC could not possibly have 

been the reason that Montañez delayed asserting his rights. 

See Uber v. Slippery Rock Univ. of Pa., 887 A.2d 362, 366 

(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). When he finally did file a 

grievance, it requested “inmate account staff and business 

office staffs [sic] to stop deducting 20% out of” the funds in 

his account, which shows that Montañez was not confused 

about the source of his injury. In other words, Montañez

waited over two years after learning of the deductions to take

any action to protect his rights. Montañez simply delayed too 

long to take advantage of equitable tolling doctrines.5

 

5 Montañez also argues that the statute of limitations should 

be tolled while he exhausted his administrative remedies. 

Specifically, he argues that the limitations period should be 

tolled from November 17, 2002, when he filed his first 

grievance, until December 5, 2003, when the DOC denied his 

last grievance. But Montañez’s claim accrued in April or 

May of 2000. Thus, even if the administrative process could 

toll the statute of limitations, the complaint would still be 

untimely because Montañez waited too long to file his first 

grievance. 
16

In sum, the statute of limitations on Montañez’s claims 

expired before he initiated this lawsuit, and no basis for 

equitable tolling applies. We will therefore affirm the District 

Court’s holding that Montañez’s claims are time-barred.6 

Because there is no question that Hale’s due process claim 

was timely filed, however, we will now consider the merits of 

his appeal.

B.

 To analyze a claim for procedural due process, a 

court “must first ‘determine whether the nature of the interest 

is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ 

language of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Evans v. 

Secretary Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 663 (3d Cir. 

2011) (quoting Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 

2010)). If the court determines that “the interest asserted is 

protected by the Due Process Clause, the question then 

becomes what process is due to protect it.” Newman, 617 

F.3d at 783 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

Both parties agree that inmates have a constitutional 

property interest in funds held in prison accounts. See 

Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 179. Thus, the only remaining question 

on the merits of Hale’s due process claim is whether the 

Corrections Officials provided sufficient process when they 

 

6 Because we hold that Montañez’s claims are barred by the 

statute of limitations, we need not consider his argument that 

the District Court erred by failing to consider his claims under 

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
17

implemented the DOC Policy and deducted funds from 

Hale’s inmate account. 

1.

Before turning to the merits of Hale’s due process 

challenge, we wish to emphasize the narrowness of Hale’s 

constitutional claim. Hale does not seek in this action to 

challenge the final amount of fines, restitution, and costs 

imposed against him by the sentencing judge in his state 

criminal proceeding. Nor does he otherwise seek to 

undermine the validity of his criminal sentence. Such a 

challenge would not be cognizable in a § 1983 action unless 

the prisoner could prove that he had previously obtained a 

favorable termination of his state court criminal proceeding. 

See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Gilles v. 

Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2005). Further, Hale 

does not suggest that any additional process must be given by 

the Pennsylvania courts rather than DOC administrators. Cf. 

Buck v. Beard, 879 A.2d 157 (Pa. 2005) (rejecting the 

argument that the due process considerations require a 

judicial default hearing before deductions may be made from 

inmate accounts). 

Instead, Hale’s due process claim is narrowly focused 

on whether inmates must be provided with notice of the DOC 

Policy and an opportunity to be heard regarding application of 

the Policy prior to the first deduction,7and, if they must, 

 

7 As Hale’s counsel acknowledged during oral argument, Hale 

seeks only notice and a single opportunity to be heard prior to 

the first deduction. He does not argue that inmates must 
18

whether the current procedures implemented by the 

Corrections Officials are sufficient. It is to these narrow 

issues that we now turn.

2.

The District Court ruled that the DOC’s postdeprivation grievance procedures are sufficient to meet Hale’s 

procedural due process rights, and that no pre-deprivation 

hearing was required. We disagree and will reverse.

Procedural due process claims are governed by the 

standard first enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 

319, 335 (1976). Under that standard, a court is to weigh 

three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by 

the official action”, (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation 

of such interest through the procedures used” and the value of 

“additional or substitute procedural safeguards”, and (3) the 

governmental interest, “including the function involved and 

the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 

substitute procedural requirements would entail.” Id. 

State prisoners plainly have a property interest in the 

funds in their inmate accounts. See, e.g., Reynolds, 128 F.3d 

at 179. As other courts have held, however, this interest is 

reduced because inmates “are not entitled to complete control 

over their money while in prison.” See Mahers v. Halford, 76 

F.3d 951, 954 (8th Cir. 1996). Further, the government has 

 

receive notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to each 

and every subsequent deduction.
19

an “important state interest” in collecting restitution, costs, 

and fines from incarcerated criminal offenders to compensate 

victims. See id. at 956. 

The question remains, however, whether additional 

pre-deprivation process would be effective and whether that 

process would be overly burdensome on the government. As 

a default matter, “[i]n situations where the State feasibly can 

provide a predeprivation hearing before taking property, it 

generally must do so regardless of the adequacy of a 

postdeprivation tort remedy to compensate for the taking.” 

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990). Thus, where 

the pre-deprivation safeguards “would be of use in preventing 

the kind of deprivation alleged,” the state must provide such a 

hearing. Id. at 139. We have previously applied this default 

rule to state actions pursuant to “an established state 

procedure” that would deprive inmates of the funds in their 

inmate accounts. Higgins, 293 F.3d at 694; see also Burns v. 

Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 171–73 (3d Cir. 2011). 

Where pre-deprivation process is not feasible, this 

default rule does not apply. Thus, in the “unusual case” 

where “the value of predeprivation safeguards . . . is 

negligible in preventing the kind of deprivation at issue,” the

state is not constitutionally required to provide any predeprivation process. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 129. Following 

this rule, we have held that assessments against inmate 

accounts to defray the costs of medical treatment, Reynolds, 

128 F.3d 166, or the application of a fixed fee to defray the 

costs of room and board, Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. 

Facility, 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2000), present the types of 

situations where pre-deprivation hearings are impractical or 

would be meaningless. Most pertinently, the court in Tillman
20

reasoned that a program involving “routine matters of 

accounting, with a low risk of error,” requires no predeprivation process. Id. at 422. 

Taken together, these cases make clear that when predeprivation process could be effective in preventing errors, 

that process is required. See Burns, 642 F.3d 163; Higgins,

293 F.3d at 693–94. When deductions from inmate accounts 

involve “routine matters of accounting” based on fixed fees or 

where temporal exigencies require immediate action, predeprivation hearings are not required. Tillman, 221 F.3d at 

422; Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 180. In either event, however, 

inmates are entitled to some pre-deprivation notice of the 

prison’s deduction policy. See Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 180. 

Applying this distinction, we find that the District 

Court erred in determining that pre-deprivation process was 

not constitutionally required. Unlike the cases in which we 

have held that pre-deprivation process is unnecessary, there is 

nothing about the DOC Policy that requires the DOC to take 

immediate action to deduct funds from inmate accounts to 

satisfy court-ordered obligations. Any short delay that might 

result from offering inmates an opportunity to be heard on 

application of the DOC Policy before it is applied would not 

seriously undermine the Commonwealth’s ability to recover 

costs.

The DOC Policy does not involve fixed assessments 

that uniformly apply to all inmates. Each inmate in the DOC 

system has a unique judgment, with individualized amounts

of court-ordered obligations. This case is thus unlike the 

room-and-board assessments in Tillman, which were a fixed 

$10 daily charge for each inmate. Tillman, 221 F.3d at 414. 
21

For this reason, the DOC’s process of seeking deductions is 

not a mere “accounting” issue that applies a fixed dollar 

amount per day to each inmate. Id. at 422. It requires 

individualized process to determine each inmate’s total cost 

prior to the commencement of the deductions. 

Further, additional pre-deprivation process would 

mitigate at least some risk of error in the application of the 

DOC Policy. Viewing the evidence in his favor, Hale did not 

obtain individualized information as to how much he actually 

owed for costs, fines, and restitution prior to deductions being 

made. Hale had no opportunity to object to the total amounts 

entered into the DOC system. In fact, Hale’s 300B form 

erroneously inflated the amount of his court-ordered 

restitution by nearly $800. This error might have been 

prevented if Hale had been provided with a pre-deprivation

opportunity to review his personalized information and lodge 

objections to the deductions. In other cases, a pre-deprivation 

opportunity to object to the assessments might prevent 

deductions from being made from funds exempt from the 

DOC’s policy. See Higgins, 293 F.3d at 694 (suggesting that 

a pre-deprivation hearing might have prevented prison 

administrators from improperly seizing VA benefits).

Requiring that the DOC provide pre-deprivation 

process need not be administratively burdensome. Other 

jurisdictions have been able to implement pre-deprivation 

process in similar circumstances. The State of Iowa, which 

requires nearly all of its criminal offenders to pay restitution 

while incarcerated, requires that prison administrators provide 

“[w]ritten notice of the amount of the deduction . . . to the 

inmate, who shall have five days after receipt of the notice to 

submit in writing any and all objections to the deduction.” 
22

Iowa Code § 904.702(1); see also Walters v. Grossheim, 525 

N.W.2d 830, 832–33 (Iowa 1994) (holding that due process 

considerations required similar procedures). In Ohio, prison

administrators must provide “notice to the inmate of the debt 

and its intent to seize money from the inmate’s account,” 

“inform the inmate of a right to claim exemptions,” and 

provide the inmate with “an opportunity to assert any 

exemption or defense” before any money may be withdrawn 

from the account. State v. Peacock, 2003-Ohio-6772 (Ct. 

App. 2003); see also Ohio Admin. Code 5120-5-03(C).

In sum, considering the factors required by Mathews, 

the government’s interest in collecting restitution, fines, and 

other costs from convicted criminals does not overcome the 

default requirement that inmates be provided with process 

before being deprived of funds in their inmate accounts. The 

District Court therefore erred in holding that the DOC’s postdeprivation grievance procedures were all that the 

Constitution required.

3.

Having determined that no sufficient reason exists to 

deviate from the default of pre-deprivation notice and an 

opportunity to be heard, we now consider whether Hale 

received sufficient process in this case. The Corrections 

Officials argue that Hale’s sentencing hearing and subsequent 

appellate rights provide all the pre-deprivation process Hale is 

due. We disagree and hold that Hale’s sentencing hearing 

was insufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. 
23

The Corrections Officials’ argument primarily relies 

on the decision in Buck v. Beard, 879 A.2d 157, 161 (Pa. 

2005). In Buck, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 

the Pennsylvania and federal Constitutions did not require the 

DOC to obtain a judicial determination of ability to pay prior 

to deducting funds from an inmate account. Id. at 159–60. 

As the prior Third Circuit panel in this very case noted, the 

“Court’s reasoning in Buck informs our analysis,” but “it is 

not dispositive.” Montañez I, 344 F. App’x at 835. 

The simple response to the Corrections Officials’ 

reliance on Buck is that we largely agree with that decision. 

Pennsylvania need not provide an additional judicial hearing 

for every inmate to determine ability to pay before making 

deductions from their inmate account when the sentencing 

court has already considered the inmate’s ability to pay when 

entering the sentence. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9726(d) (“In 

determining the amount and method of payment of a fine, the 

court shall take into account the financial resources of the 

defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will 

impose.”). Hale’s challenge, however, is not that the DOC 

must provide a judicial default hearing prior to the 

commencement of inmate deductions. Rather, Hale argues 

that, regardless of the source of the information, inmates must

be at least notified of the DOC Policy and the final amount of 

costs to be deducted and be given an opportunity to be heard 

on objections to the amounts prior to the deductions. Buck 

simply does not address this argument.

Our prior cases make plain that the mere fact that an

inmate’s sentence includes a fine, coupled with a state statute 

compelling prison administrators to deduct funds from the 

inmate’s prison account, does not satisfy the requirements of 
24

pre-deprivation due process. Higgins, 293 F.3d at 694. In 

Higgins, we considered a similar cost recovery scheme in 

New Jersey and held that the inmate had “alleged sufficient 

facts to establish that he was entitled to a predeprivation 

notice and hearing” despite the fact that he had an opportunity 

to challenge the monetary portion of his judgment during 

sentencing. Id. Similarly, the existence of a general statutory 

provision and implementing regulations providing the DOC 

with authority to collect funds from inmates’ accounts does 

not satisfy the Commonwealth’s obligation to provide prior 

notice and an opportunity to be heard to inmates regarding 

deductions from inmate accounts. See Montanez I, 344 F. 

App’x at 835–36 (“[A] general statement of financial 

obligations and notice of the state’s ability to debit an 

unspecified amount from an inmate account does not settle 

the legal question of whether violations of due process 

occurred . . ..”). 

At a minimum, federal due process requires inmates to 

be informed of the terms of the DOC Policy and the amount 

of their total monetary liability to the Commonwealth. See 

Higgins, 293 F.3d at 694. In particular, the DOC must 

disclose to each inmate before the first deduction: the total 

amount the DOC understands the inmate to owe pursuant to 

the inmate’s sentence; the rate at which funds will be 

deducted from the inmate’s account; and which funds are 

subject to deduction. Further, inmates must have a 

meaningful opportunity to object to the application of the 

DOC Policy to their inmate accounts before the first 

deductions commence. This opportunity to object is required 

to protect against the possibility of error in the application of 

the DOC Policy, such as mistakes in reporting of an inmate’s 

total liability or to ensure that deductions are not made from 
25

funds that are exempt. See Id. at 693 (Veterans 

Administration disability benefits are not subject to deduction 

to satisfy criminal fines). 

To be clear, we do not suggest that the DOC must 

provide each inmate with a formal, judicial-like hearing 

before the onset of deductions. Moreover, we find nothing 

substantively unreasonable about the DOC’s refusal to 

provide exceptions to its across-the-board 20% rate of 

deduction, in light of the fact that the DOC will not make 

deductions when an inmate’s account falls below a certain 

minimum. Because we find the deduction rate to be 

reasonable, the DOC need not entertain a challenge to the rate 

of deduction, though it must provide an opportunity for 

inmates to object to potential errors in the deduction process.

We also do not mean to suggest that inmates must 

have an opportunity to be heard prior to each deduction. 

Rather, after providing the required initial notice the DOC 

could provide inmates with an informal opportunity to supply 

written objections to prison administrators prior to the first 

deduction. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 904.702(1); Ohio Admin 

Code 5120-5-03(C). We need not set forth specific 

procedures, and the DOC retains discretion, consistent with 

its constitutional obligations, to implement such procedures in 

a flexible and cost-effective manner.

4.

Applying these principles to Hale’s case, there exist 

genuine disputes of material fact that preclude summary 

judgment for the Corrections Officials. First, Hale’s 

sentencing hearing, standing alone, did not satisfy his federal 
26

due process rights with regard to deductions pursuant to the 

DOC Policy. See Montañez I, 344 F. App’x at 836. At no 

point during the sentencing hearing was Hale ever informed 

of the DOC Policy or of the fact that the DOC would 

automatically deduct 20% of all funds to pay for the monetary 

portion of Hale’s sentence. Second, the parties submitted 

conflicting evidence as to the exact extent of the notice Hale 

received regarding his sentence and the DOC Policy. The 

Corrections Officials submitted a declaration asserting that 

during new inmate orientation, Hale received an inmate 

handbook that set forth “pertinent provisions” of the DOC 

Policy, was orally informed of the Policy, and was shown an 

orientation video that also included a description of the 

Policy. Further, a document in the record from Hale’s 

institutional file, dated prior to the first deduction from Hale’s 

account, contains a form notice outlining the parameters of 

the DOC Policy. 

Although Hale admits that he received the inmate 

handbook, he specifically denies that the DOC informed him 

that funds would be taken from his account or the rate at 

which it would be deducted. Notably, the inmate handbook 

Hale received did not explain the 20% deduction rate. Hale 

also specifically denies that he received any memo or other 

notice regarding the DOC Policy. In addition, Hale states that 

he only learned that funds would be deducted from his inmate 

account after the first such deduction. There is also a dispute 

of fact as to whether Hale was promptly informed of the total 

amount of his criminal judgment because it was sent to his 

home address while he was incarcerated. Moreover, the 

Corrections Officials concede that Hale was not provided 

with any opportunity to be heard before the DOC began 

making deductions to his account. 
27

Because disputes of fact exist regarding notice and 

because Hale never had any opportunity to be heard prior to 

being deprived of funds in his inmate account, we will reverse 

the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the 

Corrections Officials.

C.

Hale also argues that the District Court erred in 

holding that the DOC was entitled to qualified immunity with 

regard to Hale’s claims for monetary relief. We will affirm 

the District Court on this issue. 

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from 

suit even if their actions were unconstitutional as long as 

those officials’ actions ‘d[id] not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known.’” Burns, 642 F.3d at 176 (quoting 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (alteration in 

original). 

At the time that the deductions from Hale’s account 

first occurred in February 2004, it was not clearly established 

in this Court that the failure to provide prison inmates with a 

pre-deprivation opportunity to object to automatic deductions 

from their prison accounts violated the Due Process Clause. 

In 2005, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Buck v. 

Beard, which could be read to suggest that a sentencing 

hearing was the only pre-deprivation hearing constitutionally 

required. 879 A.2d 157 (Pa. 2005). Further, earlier decisions 
28

of our Court had held that, in some circumstances, postdeprivation remedies were sufficient constitutional process

for deductions. See, e.g., Tillman, 221 F.3d at 422. For these 

reasons, there was a sufficient lack of clarity in Third Circuit 

and Pennsylvania case law regarding automatic deductions 

that the Corrections Officials should be entitled to qualified 

immunity in this case.

Hale also argues that certain of the defendants are not 

entitled to qualified immunity because they performed only 

ministerial functions. Some courts have held that government 

officials conducting ministerial acts are not entitled to 

qualified immunity. See, e.g., Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 

844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001). Hale’s claim, however, is 

predicated on the discretionary decision regarding the 

necessity or not of a predeprivation hearing and the nature of 

that hearing. Therefore, qualified immunity applies.

The fact that the defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity on Hale’s damages claim does not prevent this case 

from moving forward on Hale’s claim for injunctive relief. 

Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 244 (3d Cir. 

2006) (“[T]he defense of qualified immunity is available only 

for damages claims—not for claims requesting prospective 

injunctive relief.”). As a result, Hale may still proceed to trial 

on his claim for injunctive relief.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 

Court’s order to the extent that it granted summary judgment 

to the Corrections Officials on Hale’s due process claim, and 

will remand this case for further proceedings regarding Hale’s 
29

claim for injunctive relief. We will affirm the District Court’s 

order in all other respects.