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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

In re Estate of LEON ERSON BARRENGER 

TRUST. 

SCOTT BARRENGER, as TRUSTEE of the 

Estate of LEON ERSON BARRENGER TRUST, 

 Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

May 11, 2017 

v No. 332837 

Newaygo Probate Court 

LYNN BARRENGER, also known as BUTCH 

BARRENGER, 

LC No. 15-006131-DE 

 Appellee. 

Before: WILDER, P.J., and BOONSTRA and O’BRIEN, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Appellant, Scott Barrenger, as Trustee of the Estate of Leon Erson Barrenger, appeals as 

of right the probate court’s order denying the motion to confirm amendment to trust. We 

reverse. 

 On May 13, 2005, Leon E. Barrenger executed “THE LEON E BARRENGER TRUST,” 

which identified himself as both the trustor and the trustee. It provided, in pertinent part, the 

following with respect to how property was to be distributed upon his death: 

E. Distribution of Remainder of Trust Estate. Upon the death of the Trustor, 

the Trustee shall, after paying or reserving for all amounts payable, as provided in 

ARTICLE IV.A. through D., divide the remainder of the trust estate into four (4) 

equal shares set forth as follows and shall hold, administer and distribute each 

share according to the provisions of ARTICLE IV.F. hereinbelow: One (1) share 

each to Lynn H BARRENGER, GARY P BARRENGER, JUDY A GROOTERS, 

and SCOTT R BARRENGER. 

On that same day, Leon also executed the “LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF LEON E 

BARRENGER,” which provided, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll of [Leon’s] personal and household 

effects were transferred to the Trust . . .” and that “all the rest, residue and remainder of my 
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property of every kind and description (including lapsed legacies and devises), wherever situated 

and whether acquired before or after the execution of this Will” were “devise[d] and 

bequeath[ed]” “to the Trustee under the Trust executed by [him] on the same date of the 

execution of this Will.” 

 Over the next several years, it appears that Leon and one of his sons, Lynn, also known as 

Butch, Barrenger, who is the appellee in this matter, had “a falling out.” Appellant has provided 

four writings purportedly made by Leon to support this. The first (“Exhibit 1”) is typed, signed, 

and dated, and it states as follows: “I LEON BARRENGER DISOWN LYNN BARRENGER 

HE IS DISOWNED AND REMOVED FROM ANY INHEARATANCE ALSO I DON’T 

WANT HIM TO ANY MEMORIAL IF THEY HAVE ONE SIGNED.” The second (“Exhibit 

2”) is typed, and it states as follows: 

DEAR SCOTT, HAPPY EARLY HAPPY BIRTHDAY 

AM SENDING YOU YOUR PRESENT EARLY THIS YEARR AS I AM 

SKIPPING MAY 26 THIS YEAR ALSO SKIPPING BUTCH,S HEISNT 

GETTING NO MOREMOOLA FROM ME WILL SEND YOY ANOTHER 

CHECK AROUND XMAS,HOPE EVERYTHING IS K WILL CALL YOU 

LATER LOVE DAD 

 TO BOTH OF YOU 

The third (“Exhibit 3”) is partially typed, partially handwritten, and signed twice, and it states as 

follows: 

DEAR JUDY 

 HAPPY BIRTHDAY HOPE YOU HAVE A GOOD TIME I AM 

NOT GOING TO HAVE A BIRTHDAY PARTY THIS YEAR, IVE HAD 

ENOUGH PARTIES,I ALL READY TOLD GARY SO HE WILL KNOTIFY 

SOME OF THE REST OF THE GANG, I HAD MY SURGERY DONE THEY 

HAD TO GO IN FIVE TIMES TO GET ALL OF THE CANCER,GARY IS 

READY TO SWITCH DOCTORS HE ISNT TO HAPPY WITH THEWAY 

THINGS ARE GOING EATHER I AM THINKING ABOUT GETTING AGO 

CART SO I CAN GO TO THE STORE BY MY SELF IF THE WEATHER 

LOOKS LIKE LAST YEAR I WILL THYK ABOUT GOING SOUTH A WAYS 

FOR WARMER WEATHER 

 NO BIRTHDAY PARTY FOR ME THIS YEAR I 

HAVE HAD ENOUGH FOR NOW,AM AM SENDING YOU FOURTEEN 

HUNDRED DOLLARS FOR NOW,I DISENHEARTED BUTCH HE CALLED 

ME A STUPID IDIOT SO I WILL GIVE HIS SHARE TO THE GRANDKIDS 
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AT LEAST IT WON’T BE BUYING HIM BEER,I SENT QUINN AND 

KAIT_LYNN THE SAME THEY CAN USE IT OR SAVE IT FOR 

COLLEGE , GLAD YOU GUYS ENJOYED YOURSELF AT THE PARKS 

 WITH ALL MY BEST WISHES AND LOVE 

 DAD 

PS PLEASE FORGIVE MY ERRORS 

also to far to walk to get a birthday card 

 no CAR 

 Dad

The fourth (“Exhibit 4”) is handwritten and signed, and it states as follows: 

Dear Quinn, 

 save some for a rainy day, Butch got his big mouth going and he 

talked himself right out of the Barrenger trust fund, now I can leave you & 

Kaitlyn $14,000.00 a year Tax free. 

 Love 

 Grandpa

 Leon passed away on September 13, 2014. Upon his death, appellant was appointed as 

the estate’s personal representative according to Leon’s will. Proceedings commenced, 

interested parties were identified, and appellant eventually filed a “Motion to Confirm 

Amendment to Trust.” In support of his position, appellant argued that at least three of the four 

writings quoted above constituted amendments to the trust pursuant to MCL 700.7602(3) and 

binding caselaw. Appellee responded, moving to dismiss the motion because “it is unknown 

whether Leon E Barrenger typed this letter [presumably Exhibit 1] himself or knew what he was 

signing” and because the alleged amendments violated MCL 700.2502, which appears to apply 

only to wills. Over the next several months, the trial court had several hearings and the parties 

filed several more briefs, arguing and rearguing their positions as described above. 

 At the first hearing, the trial court decided to “give the parties approximately four to six 

weeks to further brief the issue [of “whether this is a valid amendment or not”] because [the trial 

court was] not satisfied . . . .” It elaborated as follows: 

My problem is he never said, “I hereby amend my trust.” 

* * * 

I’ve got to have something more, otherwise I’m left with basically, perhaps new 

law in Michigan or at least clarifying it because my gut reaction, frankly, is that 
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unless he says, “I’m hereby amending my trust,” it’s not amendment to the Trust. 

It’s got to be more clear than that. 

 The trial court expressed similar concerns at the second hearing, explaining that it was 

“tempted to either take this under advisement or adjourn it so [it could] read [cases cited by 

appellee], maybe issue a brief written opinion.” It explained its feelings at that point as follows: 

 Typically, we look at -- it’s like drafting a will. Normally you’re going to 

-- or a power of attorney; you normally revoke it the same way you created it. If 

it required two witnesses, you have two witnesses and it’s going to be labeled. 

* * * 

 [Appellant’s counsel], so you know where I’m coming from, if all you had 

was the first writing, “I Leon Barrenger, disown Lynn Barrenger,” I wouldn’t say 

that’s good enough to amend a Trust. I think he’s got to reference the Trust. At 

least reference the Trust, but he doesn’t do that, he says he disinherits him. On a 

broad, very broad plain, I understand that it could be interpreted to mean that, by 

golly, I don’t want him to get a dime, but he needs to say it. I think the 

legislature, my guess is, and maybe that’s all it is a[t] this point, maybe you two 

can furnish me with the legislative records, if any, showing what the intent was, if 

anybody is able to discern that ever. My guess is the legislature is thinking, well 

if somebody writes out, “I hereby amend my trust to disown so and so,” then 

signs it and dates it, then that ought to be allowed, if indeed extrinsic evidence 

like that or if it measures up to the formality set forth in the trust document then 

I’d go along with it. But it -- I’m not sure the legislature is just saying any old 

writing, especially when it doesn’t reference the Trust, is enough to amend the 

Trust. 

 At the third hearing, the trial court began by explaining that it was “leaning” toward 

“set[ting] it for trial [to] hear all the extrinsic evidence on both sides and see if that will enlighten 

the Court.” The trial court then expressed similar concerns with the lack of formality used to 

allegedly amend the trust: 

Was dad just blowing off steam or was he really making a -- what I’m looking for 

is kind of a formal amendment to a trust? That’s why I’m beginning to think, 

well, maybe I ought to take a second look and allow extrinsic evidence and see 

just what dad’s attitude was. 

* * * 

I think where they went to all the expense and trouble of signing formal trust, it 

seems to me the first thing you’d think about is I got to go back probably to the 

very same lawyer and get this sucker amended. I don’t think most lay people 

would say, “Gee, even though I had to go through all of this formality and all this 

expense to create this, I can just sign anything I want and amend it.” 

* * * 
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That was my original problem with this whole thing. I thought, “Boy, if you’re 

going to amend a trust, you ought to at least say I’m hereby amending my trust.” 

* * * 

It looked to me like when you say, I’m going to disinherit somebody or say I 

removed him from any inheritance, that’s about stuff going under your will either 

by laws of testacy or intestacy, it’s got nothing to do with a trust.” 

* * * 

And again thinking if I’m going to go to formalities of creating a trust, I ought to 

go to those same formalities in amending a trust, otherwise people are too much 

given to bursts of emotion where they say things that they regret. And to write 

something down doesn’t mean that’s really what he’s trying to do, but by golly, if 

he goes to a lawyer, has it drawn up, and signs the document then prepared by the 

lawyer, it’s pretty hard to argue with that. It’s pretty darn clear he wanted to 

disinherit and remove a beneficiary from a trust, but in this case Leon did none of 

that.” 

 Ultimately, because of its concerns in this regard, the trial court explained that it was 

“inclined to set a tentative trial date where [it planned] to hear all the extrinsic evidence.” 

However, no trial was ever held. Rather, on March 24, 2016, the trial court issued a written 

opinion, which addressed two issues: (1) “Is extrinsic evidence admissible in trust cases?” and 

(2) “If extrinsic evidence is admissible, did any of the four exhibits amend the Barrenger trust?” 

In addressing these issues, the trial court first “determine[d] that the grantor clearly set forth the 

method to be followed should he elect to amend the trust at a later date.” The pertinent trust 

provisions provides as follows: 

 A. Amendment and Revocation. During the lifetime of the Trustor, 

this trust may be altered, amended or revoked, in whole or in part, by written 

instrument signed by the Trustor and filed with the Trustee, and upon any 

revocation, all such assets shall return to the Trustor free of trust. By way of 

construction, all property transferred to the trust is separate property of the 

Trustor and shall remain separate property in this trust. After the death of the 

Trustor, this trust may not be altered, amended or revoked. 

Based on this “clear, and not ambiguous” language, the trial court concluded, the trust “d[oes] 

not allow for any other method to amend the trust.” 

 Consequently, the trial court next addressed whether the four writings offered by 

appellant did, in fact, amend the trust: 

 The Court finds that the four writings submitted by the Trustee hardly 

qualify as a “written legal document.” Indeed, three of the four are clearly 

personal letters, and in no way legal documents. The fourth addresses an 

inheritance, not a trust; a trust, after all, is something very different from an 

inheritance, being by its very essence more in the nature of a property interest 
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held by one person at the request of another for the benefit of a third party. 

[(citation omitted).] 

However, acknowledging “that MCL 700.7602(3)(b) provides two alternatives to allowing the 

amendment of a trust aside from substantially complying with a method provided in the terms of 

the trust itself,” the trial court proceeded to address each writing individually to determine 

whether the “alternatives” set forth in MCL 700.7602(3)(b) were satisfied. 

 With respect to Exhibit 1, the trial court recognized that there was “a clear indication that 

Lynn Barrenger is not to receive an inheritance, a bequest, or a devise,” but nevertheless 

concluded that the writing was “absolutely ineffective in creating an amendment of the trust 

itself” because it “does not at all refer to the trust, which is a completely different entity than an 

inheritance.” With respect to Exhibits 2 and 3, the trial court, relying on this Court’s opinion in 

In re Bisbikis Trust, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 

20, 2014 (Docket No. 317588), explained that it was insufficient because they are “simply 

personal letter[s].” “In any event,” the trial court elaborated, “[d]isinheritance . . . does not equal 

nor constitute amendment of a trust.” Finally, with respect to Exhibit 4, while the trial court 

acknowledged that it was “clear that Leon Barranger references the trust and his belief that he 

had excluded Butch,” it nevertheless concluded that this language “does not itself read as an 

amendment of the trust, and certainly is not a ‘written instrument.’ ” Ultimately, the trial court 

“h[eld] that a simple reference as in exhibit four to the trust is simply not clear and convincingly 

an amendment of the trust” and that it was only permitted to consider “another writing,” “not a 

group of writings taken as a whole.” 

 Accordingly, the trial court denied appellant’s motion and entered a written order 

reflecting the same shortly thereafter. The trial court offered the following as an explanation of 

its decision: 

 The finding and opinion of the Court is not intended to indicate that Leon 

Barrenger did not have a falling out with his son Butch. Nor that the falling out 

was not significant. The Court does however find that it was well within the 

power of the deceased to avoid the conflict now before the Court and if anyone is 

to blame it is certainly Leon E. Barrenger who being mindful of his creation and 

execution of a trust, nonetheless ignored a clear and unequivocal amendment of 

the same--or did he not ignore it but merely chose not to actually amend the trust 

but rather just publically posture through letters to the other relatives? 

 It is the Court’s conclusion that the legislature did not intend for the willynilly amendment of trusts to be accomplished without some clarity if not 

formality. Clarity strikes this Court as necessitating the trustor to make direct 

reference to the trust, to directly indicate that he is amending, altering, or revoking 

the trust, and to sign and date same. While not statutory requirements as such, 

this Court notes that the statutory standard is clear and convincing evidence, and 

that barring other forms of evidence, a writing that fails to meet these simple 

criteria simply cannot be imagined to meet the clear and convincing evidence 

criteria set forth by statute. 
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* * * 

 The Court notes that the parties were not asked to brief the question of 

extrinsic oral testimony. The Court holds that if the trust were an oral trust, then 

oral testimony would be appropriate, and the matter would be set for trial. 

However, by the settlor’s own trust provisions, any such alteration, amendment, 

or revocation had to be in writing. The Court has therefore, considered only all 

four writings. [(footnotes omitted).] 

 On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying the motion to confirm an 

amendment. We agree. 

 “The interpretation of a trust agreement is . . . a question of law reviewed de novo on 

appeal.” Bill & Dena Brown Trust v Garcia, 312 Mich App 684, 693; 880 NW2d 269 (2015). 

When resolving a dispute regarding the meaning of a trust’s provisions, this Court is required to 

ascertain and give effect to the intent of the settlor. In re Herbert Trust, 303 Mich App 456, 458; 

844 NW2d 163 (2013). This Court does so by looking to the language of the trust itself. In re 

Perry Trust, 299 Mich App 525, 530; 831 NW2d 251 (2013). If the trust’s language is 

unambiguous, this Court must enforce it according to its plain and ordinary meaning. In re 

Reisman Estate, 266 Mich App 522, 527; 702 NW2d 658 (2005). If the trust’s language is 

ambiguous, however, courts may look to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the trust 

as well as other rules of contract construction. In re Kostin Estate, 278 Mich App 47, 53; 748 

NW2d 583 (2008). 

 The issue of whether a trust can be amended is governed by the Estates and Protected 

Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq. In re Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich App 

122, 127-128; 748 NW2d 265 (2008). Similar to a trial court’s interpretation of a trust, this 

Court reviews a trial court’s interpretation of statutes in an attempt to ascertain and give effect to 

the intent of the Legislature. In re Jajuga Estate, 312 Mich App 706, 712; 881 NW2d 487 

(2015). MCL 700.1201 specifically sets forth rules of construction for applying and interpreting 

EPIC: 

 This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying 

purposes and policies, which include all of the following: 

 (a) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, 

missing individuals, protected individuals, minors, and legally incapacitated 

individuals. 

 (b) To discover and make effective a decedent’s intent in distribution of 

the decedent’s property. 

 (c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating a decedent’s 

estate and making distribution to the decedent’s successor. 

 (d) To make the law uniform among the various jurisdictions, both within 

and outside of their state. 
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 “The purpose of judicial statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent 

of the Legislature. In determining the Legislature’s intent, [courts] must first look to the 

language of the statute itself.” In re MKK, 286 Mich App 546, 556; 781 NW2d 132 (2009) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “When statutory language is clear and 

unambiguous, courts enforce the language as written.” Lee v Smith, 310 Mich App 507, 509; 

871 NW2d 873 (2015). “Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind 

the purposes of the act.” In re MKK, 286 Mich App at 556. “A court must give effect to every 

word, phrase, and clause, and avoid an interpretation that renders any part of a statute nugatory 

or surplusage.” Lee, 310 Mich App at 509. “The Legislature is presumed to be familiar with the 

rules of statutory construction and, when promulgating new laws, to be aware of the 

consequences of its use or omission of statutory language[.]” In re MKK, 286 Mich App at 556. 

 The issue in this case is whether Leon amended the trust, and MCL 700.7602(3)(a) 

controls in such a situation. It provides as follows: “The settlor may revoke or amend a 

revocable trust” “[b]y substantially complying with a method provided in the terms of the trust.” 

Therefore, the ultimate issue before us is whether the four writings offered by appellant reflect 

substantial compliance with the trust’s requirement that any alterations, amendments, or 

revocations of the trust be made “by written instrument signed by the Trustor and filed with the 

Trustee.” We conclude that three of the four do. 

 On appeal, appellant claims that the outcome of this case is controlled by In re Stillwell 

Trust, 299 Mich App 289; 829 NW2d 353 (2013). We agree. In that case, the language of the 

trust provided that the settlor could “by instrument in writing delivered to the Trustee . . . modify 

or alter this Agreement in any manner . . . .” Id. at 292 (internal quotation marks omitted). At 

some point prior to her death, however, the settlor instructed her adult grandchild to deliver an 

envelope, which was addressed to the successor trustee, that included several handwritten notes 

that purported to change the terms of her already-drafted trust. Id. at 292-293. The successor 

trustee sought to admit these notes as amendments to the trust, but a party objected on the 

grounds that they were insufficient because they were not signed and did not include the word 

“amendment.” Id. at 294. The trial court and this Court rejected that argument, holding that the 

notes clearly reflected the settlor’s intent to amend her trust. Id. at 295-299. 

 In this case, the trust expressly provided that it could “be altered, amended or revoked, in 

whole or in part, by written instrument signed by the Trustor and filed with the Trustee . . . .” 

(Emphasis added.) The noun “instrument” can be defined as “a means whereby something is 

achieved, performed, or furthered.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). It 

appears that at least one of the four writings identified by appellant was, in fact, a written means 

whereby something was achieved, performed, or further, i.e., a “written instrument,” that was 

signed by Leon and filed with himself that purported to amend how his property would be 

distributed upon his death. Specifically, Exhibit 1 provided as follows: “I LEON BARRENGER 

DISOWN LYNN BARRENGER HE IS DISOWNED AND REMOVED FROM ANY 

INHEARATANCE ALSO I DON’T WANT HIM TO ANY MEMORIAL IF THEY HAVE

ONE SIGNED.” While, as the trial court pointed out, this does not expressly include phrases 

like “amendment to trust,” it is quite apparent that it reflects an intent to remove appellee from 

any inheritance, and the only inheritance reflected in the record is that from the trust. The trial 

court avoided this apparent intent by hypothesizing that these letters were designed to “just 

publically posture . . . to the other relatives,” but nothing in the record supports that position. 
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Indeed, in our view, this writing, which was typed, signed, and dated, reflect evidence similar to, 

if not stronger than, that which was present in Stillwell, which this Court found sufficient. We 

are bound by Stillwell. MCR 7.215(J)(1). 

 Additionally, we conclude that Exhibit 3 amended the trust as well. Specifically, it 

provided that, in lieu of giving what was previously viewed as appellee’s “share” of his assets to 

appellee, he instead wished that “his share [be given] to the grandkids.” This writing was 

partially typed, partially handwritten, and signed twice, and we cannot find any authority to 

support the trial court’s conclusion that the “personal letter” nature of this automatically renders 

it invalid as an amendment. The trial court rejected Exhibit 3, as well as Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 4, 

based on this Court’s nonbinding decision in In re Bisbikis Trust. In that case, this Court 

differentiated between the writings at issue in that case and those at issue in Stillwell, concluding, 

ultimately, that “the handwritten letter in this case does not clearly indicate Bisbikis’s intent to 

amend the trust.” In re Bisbikis Trust, unpub at 3. Specifically, this Court relied on the fact that

“[t]he language used does not suggest that it was intended to alter the distribution of the trust 

assets” and the fact that “there is nothing in this case referring to the terms of the trust agreement 

in conjunction with the inconsistent language.” Id. at 3-4. In this case, however, the opposite is 

true. Exhibits 1 and 4 unambiguously reflect Leon’s intent to exclude appellee from his 

inheritance, and Exhibit 3 directs where that portion of his inheritance was to go. Consequently, 

In re Bisbikis Trust certainly does not control. 

 Ultimately, the trial court’s decision appears to have been premised on its repeated belief 

that something more than an informal note is required to amend a trust. As indicated above, the 

trial court repeatedly commented that “he never said, ‘I hereby amend my trust,’ ” “that unless he 

says, ‘I’m hereby amending my trust,’ it’s not an amendment to the Trust,”, that “he’s got to 

reference the Trust,” that its “guess [wa]s the legislature is thinking, well if somebody writes out, 

‘I hereby amend my trust to disown so and so,’ then signs it and dates it, then that ought to be 

allowed,” that “you ought to at least say I’m hereby amending my trust” (internal quotation mark 

omitted), and that “if I’m going to go to formalities of creating a trust, I ought to go to those 

same formalities in amending a trust.” But, Michigan law is clear in this regard: “It is a wellestablished rule of statutory construction that this Court will not read words into a statute.” 

Byker v Mannes, 465 Mich 637, 646-647; 641 NW2d 210 (2002). MCL 700.7602(3)(a) does not 

impose any type of language or formality requirement. Instead, it expressly imposes a relaxed 

standard—“substantially complying with a method provided in the terms of the trust.” If we 

were to require Leon, the decedent, to use specific and formal language to amend his trust prior 

to his death, we would be doing so in direct contradiction to the language he chose in his trust, 

the language the Legislature chose in MCL 700.7602(3)(a), and existing caselaw. We decline to 

do so. 

 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion to confirm 

amendment to trust and remand this matter for the entry of an order granting the same. 

 

 
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 Reversed and remanded. Appellant, as the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to 

MCR 7.219. 

/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra 

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien