FILED

November 24, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

(HEARD AT COOKEVILLE)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ( FOR PUBLICATION

(

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ( Filed: November 24, 1997

( 

(

v. ( Coffee Criminal

(

( Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Sr.,

WAYNE LEE YEARGAN, ( Judge 

(

 Defendant-Appellant. ( No. 01S01-9604-CC-00080

For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:

John Knox Walkup Donald E. Dawson

Attorney General & Reporter Bruce, Weathers, Corley,

Nashville, Tennessee Dughman and Lyle

Nashville, Tennessee

Daryl J. Brand

Senior Counsel

Nashville, Tennessee

Clinton J. Morgan

Counsel for the State

Nashville, Nashville, Tennessee

Kimbra R. Spann

Assistant Attorney General

Nashville, Tennessee

C. Michael Layne

District Attorney General

Manchester, Tennessee

Kenneth Shelton

Assistant District Attorney General

Manchester, Tennessee

O P I N I O N

AFFIRMED DROWOTA, J.
1Rule 37(b)(2)(i), Tenn. R. Crim. P., provides in pertinent part as follows:

(b) An appeal lies from any order or judgment in a criminal

proceeding where the law provides for such appeal, and from any

judg me nt of c onvic tion: (2 ) Upo n a ple a of g uilty or n olo

contendere if: (i) Defendant entered into a plea agreement under

Rule 11(e) but explicitly reserved with the consent of the state and

of the court the rig ht to a ppeal a ce rtified ques tion of law th at is

dispositive of the ca se. . . .

2Ora l argu me nts w ere h eard in this c ase in Co oke ville, Pu tnam Cou nty, as part o f this

Court’s S .C.A.L.E.S. (Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for Students ) project. 

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The certified question of law1

 presented in this appeal is whether the state

or federal constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated

when the motor vehicle which the defendant was operating was stopped by a city

police officer, who six months earlier, had arrested the defendant for driving under

the influence of an intoxicant and had been present in court when the defendant

was convicted of that offense and his driver’s license revoked for one year. 

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence of

the defendant’s intoxication obtained during the stop, and the Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Because we conclude that the officer’s

decision to stop was based upon reasonable suspicion supported by specific and

articulable facts that the defendant was driving on a revoked license, the judgment

of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On Thursday, January 28, 1993, at approximately 2:20 p.m., Tullahoma

Police Officer Jason Ferrell observed the defendant, Wayne Lee Yeargan, driving

a pickup truck on a public street in Tullahoma. Previously, Officer Ferrell had
3

The defendant was also fined $250 and sentenced to 11 months and 29 days in jail, which

was su spend ed upo n service of the 48 h our m andato ry period of inc arcera tion. 

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arrested the defendant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and had

been present in the general sessions court approximately six months earlier, on

July 2, 1992, when the defendant pleaded guilty to the offense and had his

driver’s license revoked for one year from the date of the judgment.3

When the officer began following the defendant's truck, Yeargan, according

to the officer's testimony, "sped up some, he wasn't going at a high rate of speed,

but he accelerated." In the officer's view, Yeargan "attempted to put some traffic

between us." The defendant then drove into the parking lot of Ruby’s Lounge, a

local bar. The officer followed and put on his blue lights. The defendant parked

and got out of his truck. The officer asked to see his driver’s license. Yeargan

produced a restricted license issued pursuant to a court order which permitted him

to drive “in Coffee County only as necessary to complete job tasks” between the

hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. The defendant’s employment was listed on the order

granting the restricted license as farming and "rental property owner." The officer

testified that when he asked Yeargan why he had driven to the bar, the defendant

replied that he “had come to the bar to meet a guy about a cow.” Based on his

observations and a field sobriety test, the officer concluded that the defendant was

under the influence of an intoxicant and arrested him for driving under the

influence and driving on a revoked license. 

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the
4

Tenn. Code A nn. § 55-10-401 (1993).

5

Tenn. Code A nn. § 55-50-504 (1993).

6We are aware that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-103(b) (Supp. 1996), provides that unless

probable cause exists, only members of the Tennessee highway patrol have the authority to stop a

motor vehicle for the sole purpose of examining or checking the operator license of the driver of the

vehicle. However, since the defendant did not reserve for appeal the statutory legality of the stop,

the effec t of tha t statu te is not at is sue in this a ppeal.

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stop, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to believe a crime

had been committed when he made the stop because the officer knew of the

procedure for obtaining a restricted license and had no reason to believe that the

defendant was operating outside the scope of his driving privilege. Testifying at

the suppression hearing, the police officer acknowledged that he was aware of the

availability of restricted licenses for driving offenders. However, the officer

testified it would have taken about 15 minutes for the police radio operator to

determine the status of the defendant’s license before the stop.

Upon consideration of the proof, the trial court denied the defendant’s

motion to suppress. Thereafter, the defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the

influence of an intoxicant, second offense,4

 and driving a motor vehicle with a

revoked driver’s license,5 but reserved the right to appeal a certified question of

law challenging the constitutionality6

 of the traffic stop leading to his arrest and

subsequent convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s

denial of the motion to suppress, finding that "a prudent officer could reasonably

have believed that the appellant was driving on a revoked license" and holding

that the officer had "probable cause to conduct an investigative stop." In reaching

that conclusion, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
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1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293

(Tenn. 1992). Thereafter, we granted the defendant permission to appeal and for

the reasons that follow, now affirm the decision of the trial court and Court of

Criminal Appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court recently clarified the standard of review under which a trial

court’s findings of fact on suppression issues are to be reviewed:

Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value

of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are

matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact. The party

prevailing in the trial court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view

of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all

reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that

evidence. So long as the greater weight of the evidence supports

the trial court’s findings, those findings shall be upheld. In other

words, a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be

upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. We also note

that this standard of review is consistent with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d),

which provides that in civil cases, findings of fact by a trial court are

presumed correct “unless the preponderance of the evidence is

otherwise.” Hereafter, the proper standard to be applied in reviewing

suppression issues is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The application of the law to the

facts found by the trial court, however, is a question of law which this Court

reviews de novo. Beare Co. v. Tennessee Dept. of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 906,

907 (Tenn. 1993). We apply these standards to resolve the issue in this appeal.

REASONABLE SUSPICION

In this Court, the defendant contends that the investigatory stop was
7

The F ourth Am endm ent is app licable to the s tates throu gh the Fourteen th Am endm ent. 

Map p v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1 081 (1961).

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unconstitutional because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion, supported

by specific and articulable facts, to believe that the defendant was violating the

law. In support of his claim, the defendant argues that even though the officer

knew the defendant’s license had been revoked six months earlier, the officer was

also aware of the availability of restricted licenses, and therefore, had no reason

to believe the defendant was violating the law by operating an automobile. The

State responds that given the totality of the information known to the officer, the

stop was based upon reasonable suspicion. The State also maintains that the

officer was not required to check the status of the defendant’s license before

initiating the stop.

We begin our analysis of this issue with the text of the Fourth Amendment 7

to the United States Constitution which provides:

Unreasonable searches and seizures. - The right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by

oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.

Similarly, Article 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee guarantees

that the people shall be secure in their persons,

houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable

searches and seizures; and that general warrants,

whereby an officer may be commanded to search
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suspected places, without evidence of the fact

committed, or to seize any person or persons not

named, whose offences are not particularly described

and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty

and ought not to be granted.

The purpose of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under

the Fourth Amendment is to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals

against arbitrary invasions of government officials.” Camara v. Municipal Court,

387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). “[A]rticle I,

section 7 is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment.” State v.

Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997), quoting Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn.

6, 13, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (1968).

Consequently, under both the federal and state constitutions, a warrantless

search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result

thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or

seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the

warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct.

2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 229-30

(Tenn. 1996). 

Though it was a temporary detention for a limited purpose, the stop of the

defendant’s vehicle in this case, without question, constitutes a seizure and

implicates the protection of both the state and federal constitutions. Whren v.

United States, ___ U.S. ____,___, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, ___ L.Ed.2d ___
8

The balancing test was first applied in Cama ra v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct.

1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). In his concurring opinion, Justice Reid maintains that courts must

engage in “detailed balancing” on a case-by-case basis to determine the constitutionality of an

investigatory stop. That statement indicates a misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of the

balancing test. The balancing test is not a matter for case-by-case application, but rather “a

technique for establishing the quantum of evidence needed for certain distinct kinds of official

action.” Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search & Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 9.1(d),

p.13 (3d ed. W est 199 6); See e.g. Chandler v. Miller, _ U.S. _, _, 117 S.Ct.1295,1301, 137 L.Ed.2d

513 (19 97); Whren, ___ U.S. at __, 116 S.Ct. at 17 76. W hile ca se-b y-cas e bala ncing “m ight well

be a stimulating exercise in the rarefied atmosphere of an appellate court or law school classroom,

it is clearly asking too muc h to expect policemen to m ake on-the-spot judgm ents in this way or,

indeed, to require trial jud ges to re view police condu ct in this fash ion.” Lafav e, § 9.1(d), p. 13. 

Unlike Justice Reid, we decline to adopt that approach, which is both contrary to well-established

law and unworkable in practice.

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(1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d

660 (1979); See also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S. Ct. 675,

679, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 n. 3, 101 S. Ct.

42, 44 n. 3, 66 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (When an officer turns on his blue lights, he or

she has clearly initiated a stop). Because it was not conducted pursuant to a

warrant, the investigatory stop was presumptively unreasonable. However, the

lower courts appropriately denied the defendant’s motion to suppress because the

seizure in this case was conducted pursuant to a narrowly defined exception to

the warrant requirement.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889

(1968), the United States Supreme Court applied a balancing test8

 to determine

whether the law enforcement practice of “stop and frisk” violated the proscriptions

of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In that case, a police

officer became suspicious of two men who separately and repeatedly walked up

and down a street peering into a store window. After each trek, the men talked to

a third man up the street. The officer, after observing this conduct for a short
9

In his conc urring opin ion, Justic e Re id con cludes that the stop in this c ase was invalid

under Terry, but constitutionally sound because based upon probable cause. It is well-settled that

“the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obv ious ly less d em anding than that for prob able

cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8, 109 S.Ct. 158 1, 1585, 1 04 L.Ed .2d 1 (19 89). 

Therefore, Justice Reid’s conclusion is legally inconsistent and is a result of his erroneous holding

that a constitutionally valid investigatory stop requires not only reasonable suspicion, but also

“exigent circumstances .” Contrary to Justice Reid’s concurring opinion, neither Terry nor its

progeny articulate a second “exigent circumstances” requirement. Indeed, the phrase, “exigent

circumstances” is itself a term of art which denotes an independent exception to the warrant

requirem ent of the F ourth Am endm ent. The cases cited by Jus tice Reid d o not sup port his ho lding. 

In State v. Pully , 863 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. 1993), the police officer initiated the investigatory stop upon

an anonymous informant’s tip that a person was driving through a neighborhood threatening

residents with a gun. To justify police action under Tennessee law an informant’s tip must be

reliable, whic h require s a sho wing of b oth the info rma nt’s credib ility and basis of know ledge. State

v. Jac um in, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989). This Court in Pully simply held that when a threat

of impending violence is involved the legal test of reliability of an anonymous informant’s tip need

not be strictly enforced. Since the stop in this case was not initiated as a result of an anonymous

inform ant’s tip, Pully is inapplicab le and do es not support J ustice R eid’s con clusion tha t Terry

articulated an “exigent circumstances” requirement. Moreover, Justice Reid’s assertion that our

holding “would allow the detention and at least a patdown search of any person suspected of

possessing illegal drugs or other contraband” is erroneous . A frisk is warranted under Terry only if

the police officer has a reasonable suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts that the

suspe ct is arm ed. Id., 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883.

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time, followed the suspects, stopped and frisked them, and discovered that two of

them were carrying pistols. Charged with the crime of carrying a concealed

weapon, Terry moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that the stop and

frisk was unconstitutional. Balancing the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment privacy interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental

interests, the Court in Terry determined that the law enforcement practice of a

brief investigatory stop is constitutionally permissible if the officer has a

reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal

offense has been or is about to be committed.9 Id.

Eleven years later in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court concluded that the

same standard applied in the context of investigatory automobile stops. In that

case a police officer on a “roving patrol” aimed at detecting unlicensed drivers

made a suspicionless stop of an automobile. The purpose of the stop was to
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check the driver’s license and registration. The officer stopped Prouse’s

automobile because he “saw the car in the area and wasn’t answering any

complaints. . . .” Id., 440 U.S. at 651, 99 S.Ct. at 1394. When the officer

approached the car, he smelled marijuana and thereafter seized the marijuana,

which was in plain view on the floor of the car. In concluding that the

suspicionless, random stop was unconstitutional, the Prouse court described the

balancing test as follows:

The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the

Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of

‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by

government officials, including law enforcement

agents, in order to safeguard the privacy and security

of individuals against arbitrary invasions. Thus, the

permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice

is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s

Fourth Amendment interest against its promotion of

legitimate governmental interests. Implemented in this

manner, the reasonableness standard usually

requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which an

intrusion is based be capable of measurement against

an objective standard, whether this be probable cause

or a less stringent test. [footnote citing Terry] In those

situations in which the balance of interests precludes

insistence upon some quantum of individualized

suspicion, other safeguards are generally relied upon

to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation

of privacy is not subject to the discretion of the official

in the field.

Id., 440 U.S. at 653-54, 99 S.Ct. at 1396 (emphasis added)(internal citations and

quotations omitted). Utilizing that test, the Prouse Court held “that except in those

situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a

motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the

vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping
10Justice Reid maintains that our interpretation is inconsistent with the language of Prouse. 

He quotes the following sentence from that case: “We hold only that persons in automobiles on

public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with the

unbridled discretion of police officers.” In fact, that language supports our interpretation. The stop

in Prouse was completely random and not based upon any level of individualized suspicion. The

police officer’s discretion was unbridled. It was the absence of reasonable suspicion which

invalidated th e stop, no t the abse nce of e xigent circ ums tances . See also Hu ghes v. State, 588

S.W.2d 296 (Tenn. 1979) However, where, as here, an investigatory stop is initiated upon a

reasonable suspicion that a driver is unlicensed, the police officer is not exercising unbridled

disc retion , and the s top is cons titution al.

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an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his license and the

registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 

Id., 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401 (emphasis added). Prouse, therefore,

stands for the proposition that investigatory stops based upon reasonable

suspicion that a driver is unlicensed are constitutionally permissible.10

 See also

Chandler v. Miller, __ U.S. __, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1298, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997)(The

Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures

“generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent individualized

suspicion.”); See also Griffin v. State, 604 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tenn. 1980); State v.

McCullough, 906 S.W.2d 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

Likewise, in Watkins, this Court upheld the constitutionality of an

investigatory stop of a motor vehicle and the ensuing search, where the stop was

based upon reasonable suspicion. Id., 827 S.W.2d at 294. In that case, the

officer initiating the stop had personal knowledge that a capias had been issued

for the defendant’s arrest. Other officers also had informed the arresting officers

that the defendant often drove a black Cadillac inscribed with the words, “The

Duke.” When the officers observed a car matching that description, they “decided
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to stop the vehicle and investigate the identity of the driver.” Id., 827 S.W.2d at

295. After stopping the car, asking for a driver’s license, and learning that the

defendant had none, the officers called in by radio to verify the continuing viability

of the capias. Id. The capias was verified and the officers arrested the defendant

and searched the vehicle. Considering the totality of the circumstances this Court

refused to suppress the evidence discovered during the search, holding that the

initial stop was constitutionally valid because it was based upon reasonable

suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, “that the defendant was the

driver of the vehicle and that he was the person wanted on the outstanding

capias.” Id., 827 S.W.2d at 295.

In so holding, we observed that a court must consider the totality of the

circumstances when evaluating whether a police officer’s reasonable suspicion is

supported by specific and articulable facts. Id., 827 S.W.2d at 294; United State v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

Circumstances relevant to that evaluation include, but are not limited to, the

officer’s personal objective observations, information obtained from other police

officers or agencies, information obtained from citizens, and the pattern of

operation of certain offenders. A court must also consider the rational inferences

and deductions that a trained officer may draw from the facts and circumstances

known to him. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d at 294; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at

695; Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. 

The officer, of course, must be able to articulate

something more than an inchoate and unparticularized
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suspicion or hunch. The Fourth Amendment requires

some minimal level of objective justification for making

the stop. That level of suspicion is considerably less

than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the

evidence. We have held that probable cause means a

fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime

will be found and the level of suspicion required for a

Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for

probable cause.

Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (emphasis added)(internal citations

and quotations omitted).

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard

than probable cause not only in the sense that

reasonable suspicion can be established with

information that is different in quantity or content than

that required to establish probable cause, but also in

the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from

information that is less reliable than that required to

show probable cause.

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301

(1990); State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tenn. 1993); Cf. Peters v. New York,

392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968)(companion case to Terry in

which the Court held it was unnecessary to discuss reasonable suspicion since

the officer had probable cause for the arrest). 

Moreover, the availability of other less intrusive investigatory techniques is

not relevant to the constitutional validity of an officer’s decision to initiate the

investigatory stop, if an investigatory stop is based upon specific and articulable

facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion. Indeed, the United States Supreme

Court in Sokolow expressly rejected the notion that law enforcement officials are
11Jus tice R eid’s a ssertion th at the availa bility of le ss intrusiv e inve stiga tory m eans should

be con sidered by courts e valuating th e cons titutionality of investiga tory stops is directly contra ry to

Sokolow.

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obligated to use the least intrusive means to verify or dispel their suspicions. “The

reasonableness of the officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the

availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.” Id., 490 U.S. at 11, 109

S.Ct. at 1581. 11 In Watkins, this Court implicitly rejected that argument by

upholding the stop even though the police officers did not verify the capias until

after the automobile was stopped and the defendant identified.

Considering the totality of the circumstances of this case in light of the wellsettled principles of law set forth above, we conclude that the officer’s decision to

initiate the investigatory stop was based upon reasonable suspicion, supported by

specific and articulable facts, that the defendant was driving on a revoked license. 

The officer had previously arrested Yeargan, so he was acquainted with the

defendant and could identify the defendant by sight. In addition, the officer had

personal knowledge that Yeargan’s driver’s license had been revoked for a period

of one year, and that only six months had passed since the revocation. When the

officer observed Yeargan driving the automobile, therefore, he had a reasonable

suspicion based upon articulable and specific facts that Yeargan was committing

a criminal offense, driving on a revoked license. Prouse, supra; McCullough,

supra; Roberson v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Co., 56 Tenn. App. 729,

412 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tenn. App. 1966) (police officer who arrests a man for

drunk driving and testifies at trial against the man who was convicted and whose
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license was revoked for one year, may arrest him when he observes the man

driving the following day). Contrary to the defendant’s assertions, the officer had

no constitutional obligation to verify the status of the defendant’s license before

making the stop. Indeed, the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques

does not vitiate the constitutional validity of a stop which is supported by

reasonable suspicion.

CONCLUSION

In his concurring opinion Justice Reid contends that the investigatory stop

in this case was invalid because it was not supported by exigent circumstances as

well as reasonable suspicion. Rather than embarking on a path fraught with

unknown consequences, we adhere to the well-settled principle of law, that to be

constitutionally valid under either the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 7, a

brief investigatory stop simply must be based upon reasonable suspicion which is

supported by specific and articulable facts. Because the investigatory stop in this

case was based upon reasonable suspicion, it was valid under both the federal

and state constitutions. Accordingly, the lower courts properly refused to

suppress the evidence of intoxication derived from field sobriety tests and the

officer’s personal observation of the defendant after the stop. The judgment of the

Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s

motion to suppress is affirmed. 

 

______________________________

FRANK F. DROWOTA III,
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JUSTICE

Concur:

Anderson, C.J.,

Birch, J, and O’Brien, Sp.J..

Separate Opinion Concurring in Results

Reid, J.