### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00822- CV

Ins ur e Suit e , I nc ., App e lla nt

v. MJS Market ing, L .P ., Appellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TRAVIS COUNTY , NO. 28431 1, HO NORAB LE J. DAVID PH ILLIP S, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
T h i s i s a r e s t r i c t e d a

p p e a l f r o m a n o - an s w e r d e f

a u l tj u d g m e n taw ar d i n g a

p p e l l e e M JS Mark e tin g , L .P. $3 0, 75 0 in dama g e s, plu s pre jud g me nt int e re st an d atto rn e y ’s fe e s. I n thre e iss ue s, appellant InsureSuite, I nc. cha lleng es the tria l co u rt ’s personal jurisdiction over it; the fac tual sufficie ncy

of evide nce supporting the awa rd of damag es, including pr ejudg ment interest; and the absenc e of f

indings that MJS satisfied statutory prer equisites for rec overy under its Dec eptive Tra de Practice s-Consumer Protection Ac t (“DTPA” ) cla im. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 17.41- .63 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005). We af firm.
F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND The following fa cts are alleg ed in MJ S’s orig inal petition and taken a s true in light of InsureSuite’s def

ault. See Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp. , 675 S.W .2d 729, 732 (Tex. 1984).Th e pe tit ion e xpla ins that visit or s wou ld be g ive n the op tio n to opt- ou t of pr ov idi ngthe ir 1 pe rs on a l in fo rm a tio n a

nd e -m a il a dd

re ss t o M JS by

un c he c kin g a

bo x wi thi n MJS’s co nte nt. On ly vis ito rs wh o le ft

the ir bo x c he c ke d w ou ld h a ve the ir inf or ma tio n a nd e -m a il a dd

re ss f or wa rd e d to MJ S. Th e pe tit ion re fe rs to thi s We b s ite a s “ wi n. ins ur e su ite .c om. ” MJS’s br ie f a nd the a ff ida vit 2 testimony of Michae l Scotty , discussed below, te rm it “www.insure suite.com,” a nd we will use the latter de signation. 2 MJS is a Te xas l imi te d pa

rt ne rs hip in t

he bu sin e ss o f s up ply

ingI nte rn e t a dv e rt isi ngse rv ic e s to its
c u s to me r s . M JS p r o v id e s s u c h s e r v ic e s b y p u r c h a s in g e - ma il a d dr e s s e s in b u lk f r o m se llers who ag ree to place MJS’s copy on their own Web sites—a proc ess ca lled “co- reg istration”—and f orwa rd to MJ S the e-mail addr esses of pe rsons wh o v i s i t t h e seller s’ Web sites and elec t to rece ive communications from MJ S. I f visitors e lect to r ece ive MJ S communications, the seller f orwa rds 1 their information to MJ S for a pr ice. MJS benef its from this sy stem by

obtaining c urre nt information
and e -m a il a dd

re sse s f ro m pe rs on s w ill ingto b e con tac ted , whi c h it c an th e n a g g re g a te int o li sts thr ou g h w hic h it

c an e -m a il a dv e rt ise me nts and of fe rs . B ut, MJ S fur th e r a lle g e d, “ it i s c ru c ia lly important to obtain curre nt infor ma ti o n a n d v a lid e-mail addre sses only from per sons who are willing to be c o n ta c te d
. I n v a li d e - ma il a d dr e s s e s an d a d dr e s s e s f o r p e r s o n s w h o h a v e n o t c h o s e n to be contac ted ar e of no use to MJ S.”

I nsureSuite i s a De l awa

re c orporation whose “home of fice and princ ipal place of bu siness ” is “ 60 0 N . B ra nd B lvd ., Gl e nd a le , CA91 20 3- 42 07 .” I ns ur e Sui te c on ta c te d M JS in October 2003, offe ring to sell the persona l information and e-mail addre sses of vi sitors to it s Web sit e , w ww .in sure su ite .c om, wh o a g re e d to le t MJS c on ta c t th e m. MJS “ tol d I ns ur e Sui te that it did 2 not want and would not pay for ‘ bundled’ e -mai l ad d re s s es [t hose obtained f rom other se llers or ob ta ine d in

oth e r w ay s, su c h a s f

ro m bu lle tin

bo ard s o r c hat r oo ms], ” bu t wan ted onl y e -m a il3

inf or ma tio n f ro m c ur re nt vis ito rs to ww w. ins ur e su ite .c om wh o we re wi lli ng to be c on ta c te d b y MJS. I ns ur e Sui te ind ic a te d that it c ou ld pr od uc e a pp ro xima te ly 30 0, 00 0 va lid c o- re g ist ratio n e- ma il addre sses ea ch month. Ba sed on these r epre sentations, MJ S agr ee d t o pay I nsureSuite for e ach
a dd re ss t hat Ins ur e Sui te pr ov ide d. MJS’s pe tit ion state s th a t it

“ wo uld no t hav e e nte re d in to t

his ag ree ment but for InsureSuite’s re prese ntations t hat the e- mail addre sses it rece ived from I nsureSuite would be only from those c urre nt addre s s es provided by visitors to I nsureSuite’s [www].i nsuresuite.c om website who we re w illing to be conta cted by MJ S.” B y the su mme r o f 2 00 4, MJ S began noti c ingtha t a larg e numbe r o f t

he e -m a il
a d dr e s s e s i tw a s r e c e i v i n g f r o m I n s u r e S u i t e w e r e d

u p l i c a t i n g a d dr e s s e s M JS a l r e a dy h a d
. L a t e r , M JS discovere d that 90 perc ent of e- mail addre sses from InsureSuite duplicated a ddresse s provided by
ano the r s e lle r. A s ub se qu e nt i ndepende nt a ud it o f t he data re ve a le d th a t ma

ny of the e -m a il
a d dr e s s e s we re su bs c r i b e d f r o m e i t h e r

u n r o u t e d o r u n r o u t a b l e I P ( I n t e r

n e tp r o t o c o l ) s p a c e s . M JS also deter mined that the traff

ic at www.insure suite.com was not suff icient to y ield the number ofema il a dd re sse s Ins ur e Sui te ha d b e e n pr ov idi ng . Th e se fa c ts e na ble d MJS to de du c e that Ins ur e Sui te ha d n ot b e e n pro vid ing it g e nu ine e -m a il ad dr e sse s a c tua lly ob ta ine d thro ug h w ww .in sure su ite .c om, and had done so “knowing ly and fr audulently .” MJ S “estimates that it has paid InsureSuite over $30,750 for worthless e-ma il a ddresse s obtained from source s other than the ag ree d-upon we bsite.”
P ROCEDURAL HISTORY MJS fi le d s uit

a g a ins t Ins ur e Sui te , a lle g ingfr a ud , brea ch of c on tr a c t, a nd DT PA vio la tions . I t a lle g e d und e r e a c h c la im that Ins ur e Sui te ’s c on du c t c a us e d it “ a t le a st $ 30 ,7 50 ” in actua l damag es. Beca

use t he sui t arose out of busi ness conducted in Texas but I nsureSuite does not4

h a v e a p l a c e o f b u s i n e s s i nt h i s s t a t e an d h a s n o td e s i g n a t e d

ana g e n tf

o r s e r v i c e i nt h i s s t a t e , M JS
serve d I nsureSuite by

substitut e ser

vice on the Sec reta

ry of State. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.044 (b) ( West 1997). On April 4, 2005, the S ecr etar y of State issued a c ertificate, filed in the rec ord, stating that (1) the c itation and MJ S’s orig inal petition were rec eived by his office on Marc h 17, 2005; (2) his office forwa rded the citation and the pe tition t o I nsureSuite on Marc h 22, 2005, by cer tified mail, return r ece ipt requested to “ I nsureSuite, I nc., 600 N B rand B lvd, Glendale, CA 91203-4207”; and ( 3) t he S ecr etar y of S tate rece ived t he return re ceipt, bea ring the sig nature of addre ssee’ s (I nsureSuite’s) a g ent, on Marc h 28, 2005.

I nsureSuite did not file an a nswer. Adamag es trial w as h el d o n J une 15, 2005, at which InsureSuite did not appea r. The tr ial court he ard e vidence of MJ S’s damag es i n the form of an af fidavit from Micha el Scotty , manag er of the gene ral partner of MJ S. I n addition to echoing the liability alleg ations in MJ S’s petition, S cotty ’s af fidavit states that “MJS paid $30,750 for the se ema il a dd re sse s” and

that
wh e n Ins ur eS uite fa ile d to liv e up to i ts a g re e me nt b y pr ov idi ng

fr a ud ule nt e -m a il addre sses and a ddresse s that wer e not obtained f rom curr ent visitors to the ww w. ins ures uite .c om w e bs ite , a nd wh e n Ins ur e Sui te int e nti on a lly and kn ow ing ly misrepre sented the a

mount, source, validity , and authe nticity of the e -mail addre sses that it promised to provide, MJ S was damag ed in the amount of $30,750.00.
Th e tr ia l c ourt

re nd e re d ju dg me nt a

wa rd ingMJS $3 0, 75 0.00 , plus $4 70 .1 0 in prejudg ment interest, “c alculate d at the rate of 6 perc ent per annum, uncompounded, f rom Marc h 14, 2005,” the date suit was filed, “ until the date judg ment is signed.” The c ourt also awa rded
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.5 DI SCU SSIO N I nsureSuite bring s three issues on appea l. I n its first issue, I nsureSuite contends that citation and ser

v ice we re de fec tive, preve nting the tr ial court fr om acquiringpersona l jurisdiction over it. Alternatively , I nsureSuite contends that, if the trial cour t did have per sonal jurisdiction, the
e vid e nc e wa s f

a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt to su pp ort the dama g e s awa rd . In it s th ir d is su e , Ins ur e Sui te
argue s th at the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in awa rd ingdama g e s b e c a

us e it f a ile d to make fi nd ing s th a t a ll conditions prece dent under the DTPA we re satisfied.
Stand ard and s cope of review

A r e str ic te d a

pp e a l is a va ila

ble on ly if :
1. The a ppeal is broug ht within 6 mont hs of the date of judg ment 2. by a pa rt y to t he su it 3. who did not participate at trial; and 4. err or must be appa

rent fr om the fac e of the rec ord.
Te x. R. A pp . P. 26 .1 (c ) ( Wes t 20 03 ); Quaestor Inv s., Inc. v . State of Chiapas , 997 S.W .2d 226, 227 (T e x. 19 99 ). MJS ag re e s th a t Ins ur e Sui te ha s satis fi e d th e fi rs t thr e e re qu ir e me nts , so we ne e d o nly
a dd re ss w he the r e rr or

is a pp are nt o n th e fa c e of

the re c or d. Th e “ fa c e of

the re c or d” c on sis ts of

a ll paper s on file in the appe al, i ncluding the re porter’ s rec ord. Norman Communications v. Texas Eastman, Co. , 955 S.W .2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997).

The scope of our r eview is the same as in ordinar y appea ls; t h at i s , we re v iew the entire c ase. Id. This includes evidentiar y sufficie ncy

claims. Id.6

P ersonal jurisdiction

A trial court c an re nder a

defa ult judgment only

if it has persona l jurisdiction over the defe ndant and the ca s e is ripe for judg ment. Finlay v. J ones , 435 S.W .2d 136, 138 (Tex. 1968). This require s the trial cour t to determine that the de fenda nt was prope rly s er v ed with citation and that there is no answer

on file. Id. a t 1 3 9
. A d e f a u l tj u d g m e n tc an n o tw i t h s t an d d i r e c ta t t a c k

b y a de fe nd ant w ho de mon str a te s th a t he wa s n ot s erve d in st ri c t c omp lia nc e wi th a

pp lic a ble require ments. W

ilson v. Dunn , 800 S.W .2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990). Presumptions of valid issuance , service , and re turn of citation do not apply in a def ault judgme nt. Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silve r , 884 S.W .2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994).

To sustain a judg ment ag ainst an out-of- state def endant se rved by

substitut ed ser

vice throug h the Secre tary of State, the rec ord must show that the Secre tary of State complied with the require ments of t he long -ar m statute. GM

R Gy mn as tics Sa le

s, In c . v . W

alz , 117 S.W .3d 57, 59 n. 1 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth 2003, pet. denied) . The long -ar m statute provides, in rele vant par t, that if the Secr etar

y of State is serve d with proce ss for a non- re s i d en t , t h e documents “shall contain a statement of th e n a me an d a d dr e s s o f

th e n o n r e s id e n t’ s h o me o r h o me o f f ic e an d th e s e c r e ta

r y of
s tate s h a ll im me d iate ly

ma il a c o p y o f th e p r o c e s s to th e n o n r e s id e n t at t h e a d dr e s s p r o v id e d
. ” T e x. Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. § 17.045(a) (West Supp. 2005).

Pr oo f of p r o p e r s e r v i c e u n d e r

t h e l o n g - ar

m s t a tu t e c anb e s a t i s f

i e d b y a c e rt i f i c a te from the Sec reta

ry of State. Campus Invs., Inc . v. Cu l l ev er , 144 S.W .3d 464, 466 (Tex. 2004); Capitol Brick, I

nc. v. F leming Mfg. Co. , 7 22 S.W. 2d 39 9, 40 1 ( Te x. 19 86 ); W

hit ne yv . L &L Re alt

y Corp. , 500 S.W .2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1973). I n fac t, “[a]bsent fraud or mistake , the Secr etar y of State’s7

cer tificate is conc lusive eviden ce t h at t he Secr etar y of State, as a g ent of [the defe ndant], rece ived service of proce ss f

or [t he defe ndant] and forwa rded the service as re quired by the statute.” Capitol Brick, 722 S.W .2d at 401.

He re , th e Se c re tary

of State iss ue d a

c e rt if ic a te date d Apr il 4 , 200 5, statin g that hi s office rec eived “ a copy

of the Ci tation and [ MJ S’s] Orig inal Petition.
. . .” The cer tificate a lso states that a c op y wa s f or wa rd e d to I ns ur e Sui te , b y

c e rt ifie d ma il, re tur

n r e c e ipt re qu e ste d, and

that hi s of fi c e re c e ive d th e re tur

n r e c e ipt , s ig ne d b y

I ns ur e Sui te ’s a g e nt, on

Marc h 28 , 20 05
. Th is c e rt if ic a te conclusively

establishes that the Secre tary of State re ceive d service of proc ess for I nsureSuite and forwa rded it to I nsureSuite as require d by the long- arm statute. Capitol Brick, 722 S.W .2d at 401. Howeve r, fa cts showing defe ctive citation th r o u gh s u b s ti tu te d s e r v ic e ma y b e broug ht i n a restricted a

ppeal. See W

right Bros. Energy, Inc . v. Krough , 6 7 S
. W
. 3 d 2 7 1 , 2 7 2
- 7 3 ( T e x. App.—Houst o n[1 s t D is t. ] 2 0 0 1 , n o p e t. )
. I n s u r e Su it e c o n te n d s th a t s e r v ic e w a s d e f

e c ti v e h e re beca use the a ddress on the Secre tary of State’s ce rtificate omits t he floor numbe r on which its offic e i s l o ca t ed an d t h er eb y i n co rr ec t l y s t at es i t s b u s i n es s ad dre s s . Bu t t h er e i s n o t h i n g on the face of the record that shows that the address on the Secr etar y of State’s c ertificate is incorre ct. W olfe v. Grant Prideco, I nc. , 53 S.W. 3d 77 1, 77 4 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 01 , p e t. d e nie d) (h old ingthat, althoug h court cler

k sent notice to a ddress in c entra l r eg ister instead of addre ss on pleading s, nothing in r e c or d s ho we d a dd

re ss w a s in c or

re c t on date no tic e wa s se nt) ; Robert S. W ilson Invs. No. 16, Ltd. v. Blume r , 837 S.W .2d 860, 862 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (holding no err or on fac e of r ecor d beca

use nothing in rec o rd es t ab l i s hed post offic e box address wa s not corre ct mailing a ddress).8 I nsureSuite also c o n t ends that ser vice is def

ective be cause the Secr etar y of State’s
certif ic a te f a il s to s tate th a t th e a d dr e s s to w h ic h s e r v ic e w a s s e n t is th e h o me o r h o me o f f ic e of I ns ur e Sui te . We dis a g re e . T he lon g arm statut e re qu ir e s:
I f t he se c re tary

of state is s e rv e d w ithdu

pli c a te c op ie s of pr oc e ss f or a no nr e sid e nt, the documents shall conta in a st atement of the name and address of the nonr esident’s home or home office and the secr etar y of state shall immediately mail a copy of the proce ss to the nonresident at the a ddress provide d.
Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.045(a ) (West Supp. 2005). Her e, MJS provided a copy of the orig inal petition to the Sec reta ry of State. The pe tition s tates that ser vice of proce ss should be forwa rded to I nsureSuite “at I nsureSuite’s home office and princ ipal place of business, 600 N B rand Blvd, Gle ndale, CA 91203-4207.” The S ecr etar y of S tate’s certificate s tates t hat it rec eived a copy of the c itation and orig inal petition, that a copy was for war ded to I nsureSuite at 600 N B rand B lvd, Glendale , CA 91203-4207, and that it re ceive d the re turn rec eipt bear ing the signature of a ddresse e’s ag ent. This is evidence that the documents containing a st atement of the home off

ice a ddress we re
rec eived in compliance with the l ong -ar m statute. Cf. W

orld D istribs ., Inc. v. Knox , 968 S.W .2d 474, 477-78 (Te x . App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.) (holdingservice was defe ctive bec ause pe tition di d not
a lle g e and

no thi ngin r e c ord est a

bli sh e d th a t a dd

re ss p ro vid e d w a s h ome a dd re ss) ; W hiskeman v

. Lama , 8 47 S.W. 2d

32 7, 33 0 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 93 , no wr it) (h old ingc itatio n d e fe c tiv e be c a us e petition did not allege addres s provided wa s home or home of fice addre ss and nothing in r ecor d sh ow e d it wa s h ome a dd

re ss) ; Verges v . Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp. , 6 4 2 S. W. 2 d 8 2 0 , 8 2 3 ( T e x. App.—Dallas 1982, no w rit) (holding citation defe ctive bec ause pe ti t i o n p ro v ided “last known addre ss” which is not equivale nt to “home addr ess”)
.9 Concluding that the re is nothing on the fac e of the rec ord that demonstrates defe ctive service , we ove rrule I

nsureSuite’s first issue.
Dam ages I n it s se c on d iss ue , I ns ur e Sui te c la ims that th e e vid e nc e wa s f a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o
s u p p o rt t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s j u d g m e n t f o r u n l i qu i d at e d d a m a g e s . It d o e s n o td i s p u t e l e g a l s u f f i c i e n c y. I n a fa ctual suff

iciency rev i ew , an appellate court must consider a nd weig h all the evidenc e, and should set aside the ve rdict only if it is so contra

ry to the overw helming w eig ht of the evide nce a s to be wrongand unjust. Cai n v . B ain , 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

Once a def

ault judgme nt is taken, all alleg ations set forth in the petition are deeme d admitted, except the amount of unliqui dated damag es. Texas Commerc e Bank , N.A. v. New , 3 S.W. 3d 51 5, 51 6 ( Te x. 19 99 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt mus t he ar e vid e nc e re g ard ingun liq uid a te d d a ma g e s. Te x. R. C iv. P. 2 43 ; Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v . Heine , 835 S.W .2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992). Dama g es can be established through aff idavit testimony
. New , 3 S.W .3d at 516. Althoug h aff idavits are hear say , unobjected- to hear say constitutes probative e vidence and satisf i es t h e requirement f

or evidenc e of unliquidated da mag es. Id. at 517. The amount due under a written instrument ca

n be proven by

testimony
. Id. Additionally , a plaintiff in a defa ult judg ment must pre sent evidenc e of a “c ausal ne x us” betwe en the ba sis of the suit and the alleg ed injuries. Morgan , 675 S.W .2d at 732.

The only evidenc e of damag es is the aff idavit of Michae l Scotty . Scotty testified that MJ S paid $30,750.00 to I nsureSuite and was damag ed in this amount by I nsureSuite’s ac tions. He also supplied a causa l ne x us betwee n MJ S’s c laims a nd its injuries, stating that MJ S’s damag es we re10

c a u s e d b y In s u r e S u i t e “ i n t e n t i o n a l l y a n d kn o w i n g l y m i s r e p r e s e n t [ i n g ] t h e a m o u n t , s o u r c e , v a l i d i t y, and authe nticity

of the e -mail addre sses that it promised to provide . . . .” I nsureSuite insists t hat this t es t imony is factua lly

insufficient proof

of dama g es b e c a u s e i td o e s n o ts u

p p l y a b a s i s f

o r a w ar d i n g b e n e f

i t
- o f

- t h e - b ar g a i nd a m a g e s t o M J S ; s p e c i f i c a l l y, the value a ctu all y

rec eived by

MJ S. From the fa ctual alleg ations in MJ S’s petition, taken as true,
and Sc ott y ’s te sti mony , the re wa s fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e tha

t th e va lue of

the se rv ic e s a c tua lly provided by I nsureSuite was $0.00, supporting a benef it-of-the- barg ain damag es aw ard of $30,750, the entire amount MJ S paid to I nsureSuite.

We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s awa

rd of $3 0, 75 0 in

dama g e s to MJS.
P r e ju dgm e nt int e r e st

Also within i t s s ec o n d issue, I nsureSuite ar g ues that there is factua lly insufficient
e vid e nc e to s up po rt

an a wa rd of pr e jud g me nt i nte re st. Th e tr ia l co urt awa rd e d $ 47 0. 10 in prejudg ment interest, re prese nting six percent simple intere st on the $ 3 0 , 7 5 0 d amage s awa rd,
a c c ru ingbe g inn ingon

the date the pe tit ion

wa s f ile d thro ug h th e date jud g me nt w a s si g ne d. Th is calc ulation is consistent with the g ener ally -applica ble calc ulation methods gove rning equitable or common-law pr ejudg ment interest aw ards. See J ohnson & Higgins of T

ex., I nc. v. Ke nneco E

nergy, Inc. , 962 S.W .2d 507, 531-33 (Te x . 1998) (c onforming acc rual a nd compounding methods g overningequitable or

common-law pr ejudg ment interest aw ards to f ormer article 5069-1.05, § 6); Tex. Fin. Code Ann. §§ 304.003, .103, .104 (West Supp. 2005) (curr ent iterations of article 5069- 1. 05 , § 6; p ro vid ingtha

t pr e judgm ent i nte re st i n w ro ng fu l de a th, pe rs on a l in jur y and pr op e rt y damag e ca ses is at same r ate a s applicable p o s t judgme nt interest rate in case s where rate is not11

specifie d by

contra ct, computed a s simple inter est, and beg ins a ccr uing at ear lier of 180 day s after notice of c laim or date suit is filed). On t h e d at e t h e judgme nt was sig ned, the statutory postjudgment intere st rate ( and, therefor e, the prejudg ment interest rate in case s g overne d by financ e code se ction 304.104 or Kennec o ) wa s six perc ent. See Tex. F in. Code Ann. § 304.003 (West Supp. 2005); www
. o cc c. s t at e. t x . u s / p age s / i n t

_ rate s/J udgmentRateSummary .pdf (judg ment rate during

J une 20 05 wa s si x pe rc e nt) (l a st v isi te d July 5, 20 06 ); see also Tex
. Fin
. Co de Ann. § 3 04 .0 07 (We st Supp. 2005) (cour

ts shall take judicial notice of published judgme nt interest rate). I nsureSuite’s sole contention reg arding prejudg ment interest is that the t ri al co urt
c ou ld a wa rd it on ly if “ an a sc e rt a ina ble su m of

mon e y is d e te rm ine d to have be e n d ue and pa y a ble
a t a date c e rt a in p ri or

to j ud g me nt. ” B a se d o n th a t pr op os iti on , Insure S ui te con tends that th e re is fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d tha t an as c e rt a ina ble su m wa s due and

pa y a ble a t a date
cer tain prior to judg ment to permit the court to aw ard pr ejudg ment interest. Ins u re S u i t e’ s centra l premise is flaw ed.

For the proposition that the trial court c ould awar d prejudg ment interest only if there
wa s suf fi c ie nt ev ide nc e of an asc e rt a ina ble su m due and pa

y a ble on a date c e rt a in p ri or

to j ud g me nt, I nsureSuit e r el i es o nau t h o ri t i es ad dre s s i n g eq u i t ab l e o r c o m m o n -l aw i n t er es taw ar d s prior to Cavnar

v. Quality Control Parking
. Compare Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking , 696 S.W .2d 549, 551-54 (Tex. 1986), with Phil lips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co. , 569 S.W .2d 4 8 0 , 4 8 8
- 8 9 ( T e x. 1978). Cavnar

and its prog eny

abandone d the traditional limitation t hat equitable or common-law pr e jud g me nt i nte re st c ou ld b e awa rd e d o nly wh e n d a ma g e s w e re fi xed and asce rt ain a

ble pr ior to judgme nt. Cavnar , 696 S.W. 2d a t 55 1- 54 ; see also A Guide to Rece nt Changes & New Chall enges12

in Texas Prejudgme nt Interest Law , 30 T ex . Tec h L . Rev. 71, 77-81 (1999) . Whil e Kennec o modified Cavnar ’s a c c ru a l and c omp ound ingfo rm

ula s in a mann e r s e rv ingto r e du c e mos t awa rd s, it did not return to the pre- Cavnar “fixed and asc erta inable” limitation. Kennec o , 962 S.W .2d at 53 1- 33 . T he re is thu s no supp or t for I ns ur e Sui te ’s pr e mis e that MJS w a s r e qu ir e d to pr ov e that it s damag es we re f

ix ed and a scer

tainable pr ior to judgme nt, at least if prejudg ment interest is g overne d b y Kennec o . I n eff

ect, unde r the c urre nt leg al landsca pe g overningprejudgm ent intere st, the standards of Kennec o and fina nce c ode sec tion 304.003 gove rn ea ch ca se unless a diff ere nt standard is p r o v id e d b y c o n tr a c t o r a s p e c if ic p r e ju d g me n t in te r e s t s tatute
. See , e.g. , Exx onMobil Corp. v. ValenceOperating Co. , 174 S.W .3d 303, 319-20 (Te x . Ap p.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (b e c a us e no e na

bli ngstatut e a

pp lie d a nd c on tr a c t di d n ot sp e c if

y int e re st ra

te , pr e jud g me nt i nte re st in br e a c h- of

-c on tr a c t a c tio n pr op e rl y awa rd e d purs ua

nt to se c tio n 3 04 .0 03 ); Pe rk ins v . G ro up Life & Health Ins. Co. , 49 S.W .3d 503, 506 (Tex. A p p . — Austin 2001, pet. denied) ( denying r ecove ry for prejudg ment interest bec ause Te x as Employ ees U niform Group Insuranc e B enef its Act did not
a uth or ize it) ; AU Pharm., Inc . v. Boston , 986 S.W .2d 331, 334-35 (Te x . App.—Texarkana 1999, no pe t.) (s e c tio n 30 2. 00 2 of fi na nc e c od e ina

pp lic a ble wh e n pa

rt ie s a g re e d to ze ro pe rc e nt i nte re st) ; see als o P re jud gm e nt I nte re st , 1 State Ba

r of Te x . Prof. Dev. Prog ram, Adva nced Civil Trial Cou rs e, 8, 1 & n.3, 2 ( 2005). In addition to relying on pr e- Cavnar e qu ita ble pr e jud g me nt i nte re st c a se s, I ns ur e Sui te a lso inv ok e s aut ho ri tie s con str

uin g fo rm e r a

rt ic le 50 69 -1 .0 3 o f t

he re vis e d c ivi l st a tut e s. See R epublic Nat’l Bank v . Northw est Nat’l Bank , 57 8 S.W. 2d 10 9, 11 6- 17 (Tex . 1 979) ; se e als o G r e a t A m . I

n s . Co

. v . No r th A u s ti n M u n . U ti l. D is t. No . 1 , 950 S.W .2d 371, 372-75 (Te x . 1997);13

Pe rry Ro ofi ng Co. v . O lc ott , 7 4 4 S. W. 2 d 9 2 9 , 9 3 0 ( T e x. 1 9 8 8 )
. A rti c le 5 0 6 9
- 1
. 0 3 authorized prejudgme n t i n t er est at six perc ent per annum under

contra cts “a scer

taining the sum pay able,”
acc ruing thirty

day s after the date the sum became due a nd pay able. Ac t of May 24, 1979, 66th L eg ., R.S., ch. 707, § 1, 1979 Tex. Gen. L aws 1718, 1718, repeale d by Act of June 2, 1997, 75th L eg ., R.S., ch. 1396, § 48, 1997 Tex. Gen. L aws 5202, 5250 (ena cting Texas Credit Title). I n a bre ach of contra ct claim, this limi tation r eq u i re d that the contra ct provide the conditions upon which the lia bil ity de pe nd s, and

that it fi x a me a sure by

wh ic h th e su m pa

y a ble can be asce rt aine d w ith
rea sonable c erta inty
. North Austi n Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 , 950 S.W .2d at 373.

Th e re is curr e ntl y c on sid e ra ble do ub t whe the r the c ur

re nt statut or

y ite ra tio n of a rt ic le 5069-1.03 addre sses or re g ulates pre judgme nt interest. See Te x. F in. Cod e Ann. § 3 02 .0 02 (We st Sup p. 20 05 ); Pr e

jud gm e nt I nte re st , 1 State Ba

r of Te x . Prof. Dev. Prog ram, Adva nced Civil Trial Course, at 6-8 ( citing a

uthorities). We need not deter mine if it does, howeve r, bec ause e ven if MJS ’s brea ch-of -contra ct c la im

w a s g o v erne d by

that provision, the trial court c ould have a war ded Kennec o pr e jud g me nt i nte re st o n M JS’s f ra ud and DT PA c la ims
. We overrule I nsureSuite’s sec ond issue.
DTP A fin din gs

I n its t h i rd and final issue, I nsureSuite urg es that the trial c ourt err ed in awa rding damag es to MJ S because it failed to make f indings that MJ S met c onditions precede nt to recove ry under the DTPA. SeeT ex. B us. & C om. C ode Ann. § 17. 505(a) (We st 2002) (notice of claim). We need not re a c h th is is s u e b e c a u s e e v e nif

me r it o r io u s , th e tr ia l c o u rt c o u ld h a v e aw ar d e d

the dama g e s und e r M JS’s b re a c h o f c on tr a c t and c omm on -l aw f

ra ud the or ie s. “ Whe n th e re are mul tip le14

g rounds that could support the [tri al ] court’s decision, we will af firm unless all g rounds ar e disproved.” Lopez v. Texas W orkers’ Comp. I

ns. Fund , 1 1 S. W.3 d 49 0, 49 3 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 2 0 0 0 , p e t
. d e n i e d) ; s ee a l so Rogers v. Ric ane Enters., Inc

. , 7 7 2 S. W. 2 d 7 6 , 7 9 ( T e x. 1 9 8 9 )
. We
overr ule I nsureSuite’s third issue.
CO NC LU SION We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton Affir med Filed: Jul y

28, 2006