NO. 95-021 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1995 

SUSAN SCHNEELQCH, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v. 

WILLIAM R. CORNMAN and JOAN R. CORNMAN, 

and all other persons unknown, claiming, 

or who might claim any right, title, estate 

or interest in or lien or encumbrance 

upon the real property described in the 

Complaint adverse to the Plaintiff's 

title thereto, where such claim or 

possible claim be present or contingent, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

JirN 19 1995 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial 

District, In and for the County of Ravalli, 

The Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Michael Sol, Sol & Wolfe, 

Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Timothy D. Geiszler, Geiszler & Newcomer, 

Missoula, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: April 20, 1995 

Decided: June 19, 1995 

I'Clerk 
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The plaintiff, Susan Schneeloch, filed a complaint in the 

District Court for the Twenty-First Judicial District in Ravalli 

County to quiet title to certain real estate and to recover damages 

from the defendants, William R. and Joan R. Cornman. The Cornmans 

filed a counterclaim in which they sought title to the same 

property. 

Following a nonjury trial, the District Court found that the 

Cornmans were the owners in fee simple and entitled to possession 

of the real property described in Schneeloch's complaint. The 

District Court also awarded costs and attorney fees to the 

Cornmans, and entered judgment in their favor. Schneeloch appeals 

from the District Court's findings, conclusions, and judgment. We 

affirm the judgment of the District Court in part and reverse in 

part. 

The following issues are dispositive on appeal: 

1. Were the District Court's findings of fact clearly 

erroneous? 

2. Did the District Court err when it awarded attorney fees 

to the Cornmans? 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

On August 28, 1992, Susan Schneeloch filed a complaint against 

William R. and Joan R. Cornman. Schneeloch requested that title be 

quieted to a five acre tract of land located in Ravalli County next 

to her home, and sought damages from the Cornmans as well. 

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On December 8, 1992, the Cornmans filed an amended answer and 

counterclaim. They alleged that they, not Schneeloch, were 

entitled to judgment quieting title to the property. 

During a nonjury trial, Schneeloch testified that she met Joan 

Cornman in 1987 while looking at a parcel of five acres that Joan 

owned; she stated that she contacted the Cornmans again in 1990 in 

an effort to purchase the five acre parcel of property and that 

they agreed to accept $8000 in cash for the parcel; according to 

her, the Cornmans prepared a warranty deed and a realty transfer 

certificate, which they executed, along with a receipt for the 

$8000, and they gave all three documents to her. 

She also testified that because her husband became angry at 

her for spending this money without consulting him, she hid the 

real estate documents in some magazines. However, due to perceived 

threats from the Internal Revenue Service, Schneeloch then decided 

to have title to the property transferred to a third person. She 

asked the Cornmans to prepare a second deed transferring title to 

James Carpenter. According to Schneeloch, they agreed to do so and 

executed a deed for that purpose. 

Schneeloch put this deed away as well. However, she continued 

to explain that after returning from vacation, she found that her 

husband and son had cleaned the house and moved the stack of 

magazines in which she had placed the envelope containing the 

original deeds. Her husband had even burned certain items. She 

contacted the Cornmans again in early July 1990 and told them she 

believed the deed had been lost or destroyed. The Cornmans had 

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other buyers for the property, and Schneeloch attempted to contact 

these new buyers. Later, in September 1990, Schneeloch found and 

recorded the Carpenter deed. She later found the original deed. 

Schneeloch testified that it was around mid-September IYYO 

when she found both documents. Schneeloch was charged with forgery 

of the signatures on these deeds; however, these charges were later 

dropped. 

The Cornmans' testimony contradicted the previous allegations 

in every material respect. Joan Cornman testified that she did not 

sign an original warranty deed from the Cornmans to Schneeloch on 

April 30, 1990; that she did not prepare a realty transfer 

certificate; and that she did not receive any cash from Schneeloch. 

She also denied executing the second warranty deed by which the 

property was allegedly conveyed to James Carpenter. 

Detective James Bailey of the Ravalli County Sheriff's Office 

stated that he investigated this deed dispute in 1990. Be stated 

that he received many inconsistent statements from Schneeloch, and 

that she did not cooperate with him during the investigation. 

William Cornman testified that he was familiar with the 

April 30 and May 15 warranty deeds and that he did not sign either 

deed. William, like Joan, testified that he did not receive $8000 

from Schneeloch. Schneeloch's husband and son, and James 

Carpenter, did not testify. 

ISSUE 1 

Were the District Court's findings of fact clearly erroneous? 

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We will not overturn the findings of a trial court sitting 

without a jury unless the trial court's findings are clearly 

erroneous. Interstate Production Credit Ass’n v. De&ye (1991) , 250 Mont. 320, 

322, 820 P.2d 1285, 1287 (citing Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P.). 

Schneeloch argues that the District Court made findings 

unsupported by the evidence and that her allegations are 

corroborated by the circumstances, but that the Cornmans' 

allegations are not. She contends that the District Court 

disregarded the evidence at trial, including uncontroverted opinion 

evidence, and impermissibly based its decision on her lack of 

credibility. Schneeloch also asserts that properly notarized deeds 

are presumed to be authentic and cannot be controverted absent 

clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 

The Cornmans respond that the District Court's findings are 

supported by substantial evidence, that the District Court was not 

bound by the testimony of any single witness, and that there was 

clear and convincing evidence to overcome any presumption that 

attached to the notarized deeds. 

We have held that substantial evidence "'is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 

a conclusion.'" Accounts Management Corp. Y. Lyman Ranch ( 19 8 7 ) , 2 3 0 Mont . 

35, 41, 748 P.2d 919, 923 (quoting Bushnellv.Cooke (19861, 221 Mont. 

296, 300, 718 P.2d 665, 668). 

We have also held that even if conflicting evidence is 

presented, it is a trial court's duty to resolve such conflicts; 

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due regard is to be given to the trial court's ability to judge the 

credibility of witnesses; and it is not our function to substitute 

our judgment for that of the trial court. Williams v. De Vinney ( 19 9 3 ) , 

259 Mont. 354, 359, 856 P.2d 546, 549 (citing De&ye, 820 P.2d at 

1287-88). The District Court found that Schneeloch's testimony was 

not credible, was misleading, and that she tended to be evasive. 

By contrast, the District Court found that the Cornmans' testimony 

was corroborated, unequivocal, and unqualified. The District Court 

especially found Joan Cornman's testimony that she would never sign 

a blank warranty deed to be highly credib1e.l 

The Cornmans testified that they had never received any money 

from Schneeloch and that they had not signed the original warranty 

deeds in question. We have previously stated that it is within the 

province of the district court in a nonjury case to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses and to determine the weight to be 

given to their testimony, especially when the evidence is 

contradictory. Neilsv.Deist (1979), 180 Mont. 542, 547, 591 P.2d 652, 

655 (citing Olsonv. Carter (1977), 175 Mont. 105, 107, 572 P.2d 1238, 

1239). See&o § 26-l-301, MCA. We will not second guess the 

determination of the district court. A review of the record 

reveals substantial evidence on which the District Court could base 

its findings of fact and we conclude that they were not clearly 

erroneous. 

1 Schneeloch contended that the deed to Carpenter was 

executed without the transferee's name and that she later filled it 

out. 

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The judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1988 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as 

precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document 

with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its result 

to Montana Law Week, State Reporter and West Publishing Company. 

We concur: 

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