2012 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d

S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

4-3-2012 

# U S A v . S h ak ir a W i l li a ms

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al

D ock e t N o . 11-2267

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al w ork s a t : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w

. v i l l a no v a

. e du/thir dc ir c uit_2012

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o y ou for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit a t V i l l a no v a

U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. I t h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2012 D e c i sion s b y a n a uthor i z e d a dmini s tr a t or of V i l l a no v a

U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. F or mor e infor m a t ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min

. C a rl s on@l a

w

. v i l l a no v a

. e du

. R e c omme nde d C it a t ion

" U SA v . S h ak ir a W

i l l i a m s " (2012). 2012 D e cisio n s

. P a pe r 1070.
h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w

. v i l l a no v a

. e du/thir dc ir c uit_2012/1070PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 11

- 2267

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

SHAKIRA WILLIAMS,

Appellant

_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern Distric t of Pennsylvania ( D.C. C riminal No. 2

- 03

- cr

- 00776

- 002 ) District Judge: Hon orable Legrome D. Davis

_____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

December 15 , 2011

Before: SLOVITER , VANASKIE and GREENBERG

,

Circuit Judges

(Filed April 3, 2012)

Robert Epstein , Esq.
Office of General Counsel2 Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
601 Walnut Street The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellant

Frank R. Costello, Jr., Esq.
Office of Un ited States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Su ite 1250 Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellee

_____________

OPINION

_____________

VANASKIE, Circuit Judge

.

Shakira Williams brings this appeal from the District Court‘s May 6, 2011 O rder revoking her sup ervised release and imposing a 24

- month prison sentence. Williams contends
that this sentence exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583

. Finding no
error in the Distr ict Court‘s sentencing decision , we will
affirm the Jud gment of the District Court.

I.

On January 28, 2004, Williams pled guilty to four counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a)
and 2 , and one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371

. On May 3, 2005, Williams was sentenced to 483 months‘ imprisonment, followed by a period of three years of supervised release

. Williams completed her original prison sentence and began supervised release on May 16, 2007. Since then, she has been charged with numerous violations of
the conditions of her supervised release, including, inter alia : failure to report for drug testing; failure to report to her probation officer; positive drug tests; leaving a residence where she was under house arrest; removing an electronic monitoring bracelet; expulsi on from a halfway house for failing to follow the rules; lying to her probation officer about her employment status; and failing to appear for a court proceeding

.

Williams‘ violations led to several modifications and revocations of her supervised release. On December 7, 2007, the District Court modified the conditions of her supervised release to include four months in a halfway house. On September 24, 2008, following a hearing, the District Court revoked her supervised release and sentenced her to five
months ‘ imprisonment and 31 months of supervised release. Williams resumed supervised release on December 16, 2008, but a month later she was charged with further violations. On February 23, 2009, following a hearing, the District Court again modified the conditions of her supervised release to
include four months of home detent ion with electronic monitoring.

Williams‘ probation officer subsequently charged her with multiple violations of her supervised release. On July 29, 2009, following a hearing on t hese violations , t he District Court revoked Williams‘ supervised release and sentenced her to 19 months‘ imprisonment and twelve months of supervised release, with six of the twelve month supervised4 release term to be served in a halfway house, and the

rem aining six to be served under home detention.

On appeal of that sentence , Williams argued that her
combined 25

- month sentence of incarceration and home
detention exceeded the 24

- month maximum prison term
authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)

. She argue d that any term of home detention counts as imprisonment under this provision, because § 3583(e)(4) states that a term of home detention ―may be imposed only as an alternative to
incarceration.‖ Since Williams conceded that this issue was not preserved, t his Court applied the plain error standard of
review. United States v. Williams , 387 Fed. Appx. 282, 284 (3d Cir. 2010)

. D ue to a circuit split on the meaning of the

statute

— an issue of first impression in this Court

— we found
that t he alleged error was n ot plain, and we therefore declined

to review the issue. Id. at 286

.

On November 15, 2010, Williams was released from prison and began confinement in a halfway house. Several weeks later, she was charged with several new violations of her supervised rel ease conditions

. Williams argued that

, in light of the cumulative revocation imprisonment already
served

— 27 months and f ive days, including t hree months and five days of home detention 1

— the maximum prison term the Court could impose was eight months and 2 6 days. In response to Williams‘ arguments concerning the effect of prior sentences imposed for supervised release violations on the amount of prison time that could be imposed for her latest

1 Williams did not complete the full six month home detention period, thus explaining why she claimed credit for only three months and five days.5 violation s , the District Court concluded that the maximum priso n term it could impose was not reduced by the aggregate length of previously

- served revocation imprisonment. In an Order issu ed on May 6 , 2011, the District Court revoked Williams‘ supervised release and imposed what it viewed as the statutory maximum sen tence : 24 months‘ imprisonment, with no term of supervised release to follow. Williams appeals this sentence as unlawful, and asks this Court to

vaca te and remand for resentencing.

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 an d 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)

. We exercise plenary review over matters of statutory interpretation. United States

v. Doe , 564 F.3d 305, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009)

.

When interpreting the disputed provisions of a statute

, we look first to the language of the statute to determine the law‘s plain meaning. United States v. Gregg , 226 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2000) . ―If the language of the statute expresses Congress‘s intent with sufficient precision, the inquiry ends there and the statute is enforced according to its ter ms.‖ Id. ( citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters. , Inc. , 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) ) ; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842

- 43 (1984) (―If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter

. . . ‖). ―Where the statutory language does not express Congress‘ intent unequivocally, a court traditionally refers to the legislative history and the atmosphere in which the statute was enacted in an attempt to determine the congressional purpose.‖ Gregg , 2 26 F.3d at 257

.

III.6 Williams first contends that her 24

- month sentence exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3853 , and that the Court misconstrued t he statute by finding otherwise. At the crux of this appeal is the
meanin g of § 3583 (e)(3) , which governs the modification and
revocation of supervised release following imprisonment. It provides that a court may:

[R] evoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of sup ervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for time previously served on postrelease supe rvision, if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant viol ated a condition of supervised release, except that a defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve on any such revocation

. . . more than 2 years in prison if such offense is a class C or D felony

. . .

18 U.S.C. § 358 3(e)(3) (emphasis added). T he maximum statutorily

- authorized term of supervised release that a court can impose on a defendant for ―the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release‖ is specified in § 3583(b):

(b) Authorized terms of supervised release.

– Except as otherwise provided, the authorized terms of supervised release are

–

. . .7 (2) for a Class C or Class D felony, not more than three years . . . .

Therefore, under subsection (e)(3)

, the maximum term of imprisonment that the District C ourt could impose in this

case for a violation of supervised release conditions wa s the
lesser of ―the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised
release

, ‖ i.e., three years, or the cap for th e particular class of felony offense set by the concluding clause, i.e., two years. Accordingly, the District Court determined that 24 months
was the maximum prison term that it could impose on
Williams for each supervised release revocation

.

Williams co ntends that in cases like hers, where more than one term of post

- revocation imprisonment has been imposed, ― subsection (b) functions in tandem with a second provision, subsection (h )

. ‖ (Appellant Br. at 17

- 18.) S ection
3583 (h) concerns the term of superv ised release that may be imposed following a term of post

- revocation imprisonment, and provides:

When a term of supervised release is revoked and the defendant is required to serve a term of imprisonment, the court may include a requirement that the defend ant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment. The length of such a term of supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised
release , less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.8 Thus , subsection (h) provides that the term of supervised release following a term of revocation imprisonment

— also known as the supervised release ―tail‖

— cannot exceed the

term of supervised release that could be imposed for the original offense (in this case, three years)

, less the aggregate length of imprisonment impo sed for all prior revocations of supervised release. In other words, the authorized term of a supervis ed release tail progressively diminishes by the length
of successive terms of post

- revocation imprisonment.

Williams a sserts that the aggregate limit on the supervised release tail under subsection (h) interacts with subsection (e)(3) to impose a similar limit on post

- revocation imprisonment. She reasons that under subsection (e)(3), the statutorily ―authorized term of supervised release is also the authorized length of post

- revocation imprisonment

. ‖ (Appellant Br. at 19.) She further contends that ―[s] ubs ection (h) is clearly a  ̳statute

, ‘ and thus it

— not only subsection (b), as held by the district court

— must inform the meaning of  ̳term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense.‘‖ ( Id.

at 20

. ) S he conclud es that , s ince the authorized term of supervised release is reduced by the amount of prison time a
defendant served for previous release violations, the maximum term of post

- revocation imprisonment under subsection (e)(3) is likewise progressively reduced.

We reject Williams‘ interpretation of § 3583 because, as the District Court aptly observed, it rests on a ―selective use of statutory language, not the statute itself.‖ ( A. 8 .)
S ubsection (e)(3) refers to the ―term of supervised release authorized by s tatute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release .‖ ( E mphasis added). This language unambiguously sets the maximum prison sentence by9 reference to the length of supervised release statutorily
authorized for the conviction offense , n ot for the length of supervised release authorized after a revocation imprisonment

. It is only by ignoring the words emphasized
above

— ― for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release‖

— that Williams can maintain that subsection (h) sets th e term s of supervised release for the purposes of subsection (e)(3).

Indeed, s ubsections (b) and (h) establish a ―term of supervised release‖ for different purposes: subsection (b) defines the term of supervised release for the original offense,
and subse ction (h) defines the term of a supervised releas e tail. Subsection (e)(3) clearly fixes the term of post

revocation impr isonment according to the former, and g ives
no indication that the aggregate limit of supervised release
time under subsection (h) app lies as well to the term of imprisonment that may be imposed when supervised release
is revoked

. We therefore reject Williams‘ construction as contrary to the plain language of the statute, and agree with the District Court that subsection (e)(3) is not s ubject to the aggregate limit of subsection (h).

W e find support for our holding in United States v. Hampton , 633 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2011). In Hampton , the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the phrase ―term of supervised release authorized by stat ute‖ in subsection (e)(3) itself imposes an aggregate limit on post

- revocation imprisonment. Id . at 338

- 39. Although t he Hampton Court
did not directly consider whether subsection (h) imposes an aggregate limit on post

- revocation imprisonment by defining the ―term of supervised release authorized by statute ,‖ it did conclude that its ―reading of § 3583(e) is harmonious with §10 3583(h)

. ‖ Id. at 339. 2 In this respect, the Court explained the effects of subsection (h) on post

- revocation imprisonment:

Sectio n 3583(h) . . . acts as a cap on the aggregate amount of post

- revocation supervised release a defendant may receive. This, in turn, imposes an indirect limit on the aggregate
amount of revocation imprisonment. Once a
defendant has received as much revoca tion imprisonment as § 3583(b) authorizes for supervised release, the defendant is no longer eligible for post

- revocation supervised release. Because the defendant will no longer be eligible for supervised release, she cannot be at risk for ―an endless cy cle of consecutive terms of imprisonment and supervised release based on a single underlying offense.‖

Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson , 329 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)). T he Hampton Court ‘s interpretation of
the statute

— and particularly it s view of the relationship
between these two subsections

— i s therefore consistent with and supports our reading of the statute

.

2 Although Hampton did advance this argument about subsection (h) as an alternative to her principal claim under subsection (e)(3), the Court did not substantively address it. 633 F.3d at 342, n.4. Instead, the Court briefly dismissed the argument, observing that ―Hampton provides no support for her reading,‖ and concluding: ―it is merely a recapitulation of her aggregation argument, which we have addressed at length in this opinion.‖ Id.11 Williams contends that the principle of statutory
construction known as the ―anti

- superfluousness canon,‖ Corley v. United State s , 556 U.S. 303, 314 n.5 (2009)

, requires that subsection (e)(3) be read together with subsection (h) to impose an aggregate limi t o n revocation imprisonment. Williams asserts that because the limitation on revocation imprisonment expressed in the conclud ing clause
of sub section (e)(3) is always equal to or less than ―the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release,‖ subsection (e)(3) must be construed by interpreting ―the  ̳term of super vised release authorized by statute ‘ limitation to apply in the aggregate.‖ (Appellant‘s Br. at 24.) Otherwise, she asserts

, ―the  ̳term of supervised release authorized by statute ‘ languag e never has any effect.‖ ( Id. at 25.)

This argument ignores the legislative history of subsection (e)(3). The language in question

— ―to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release‖

— was added in 1994 to authorize cou rts ―to impose a term of revocation imprisonment without being limited by the amount of supervised release the original sentencing court imposed.‖ Hampton , 633 F.3d at 341 (citing
Johnson v. United States , 529 U.S. 694, 705 (2000)). Prior to this legisla tive change, subsection (e)(3) was interpreted to preclude a court from imposing a revocation term greater than the period of supervised release initially imposed by the

court. Id. Thus, the provision in question is independent of the concluding clause o f subsection (e)(3), which was
amended in 2003 to plainly establish ―a per revocation limit on revocation imprisonment.‖ Id. Considered in light of the ―legislative history and the atmosphere in which the statute12 was enacted,‖ Gregg , 226 F.3d at 257, it is evident that Congress did not intend to set an aggregate cap on successive revocation imprisonment in subsection (e)(3) when it added language that authorized courts to impose a term of revocation imprisonment that exceeded the supervised release

term o riginally imposed. Accordingly, Williams‘ reliance upon the anti

- superfluousness canon is misplaced. See Hampton , 633 F.3d at 341.

Finally, maintaining that § 3583 is ambiguous, Williams argues that the rule of lenity support s her interpretation. Since we conclude that subsection (e)(3) is unambiguous, the rule of lenity is inapplicable in this case.
See Ron Pair Enters., Inc. , 489 U.S. at 241 ; Reno v. Koray

, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (―The rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from whi ch aid can be derived, we can make  ̳no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended. ‖) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)

. 3

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment
of the District Cou rt.

3 Williams also challenges her sentence on the ground that the period of home detention she served must be counted towards the aggregate limit on post

- revocation imprisonment under subsection (h). This argu ment is moot in light of our finding that subsection (h) does not impose an aggregate limit on successive revocation imprisonment.