19-3205-cr

United States v. Spells

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 6th day of November, two thousand twenty.

Present:

ROBERT D. SACK,

ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

WILLIAM J. NARDINI,

Circuit Judges.

United States of America,

Appellee,

v. No. 19-3205-cr

Ronnie Spells,

Defendant-Appellant.

For Defendant-Appellant: Allegra Glashausser, Federal Defenders of 

New York, New York, NY.

For Appellees: Jacqueline C. Kelly, Thomas McKay,

Assistant United States Attorneys, for Audrey 

Strauss, Acting United States Attorney for the 

Southern District of New York, New York,

NY.

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 

York (Castel, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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Defendant Ronnie Spells appeals from an order entered September 27, 2019, denying his 

motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 

115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. We assume familiarity with the factual and procedural background 

of this case and the issues on appeal. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Spells’s motion, and we therefore affirm. 

Spells pleaded guilty in 2005 to various firearms offenses, a heroin offense, and — as is 

most relevant here — one count of possessing at least five grams of cocaine base with intent to 

distribute, in violation of the offense then set forth at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). On 

October 4, 2006, the district court — the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch, who was then assigned to 

the case — sentenced Spells to a total of 232 months’ imprisonment. Spells appealed and we 

affirmed in part, vacated one aspect of the judgment of conviction, and remanded so that the district 

court could reconsider its sentence in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in 

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 

See United States v. Spells, 267 F. App’x 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2008). On remand, the district court 

resentenced Spells principally to a total of 186 months’ imprisonment. Upon Judge Lynch’s 

elevation to this Court, the case was reassigned to the Honorable P. Kevin Castel. 

On August 3, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. 

L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. As relevant here, Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act modified 

the statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses, like the one for which Spells was sentenced, that 

were subject to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)’s mandatory sentencing range. 124 Stat. at 2372; see 

United States v. Johnson, 961 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2020). Initially, the Fair Sentencing Act’s reforms 

did not apply retroactively to defendants like Spells who had been sentenced prior to its passage. 

See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 273 (2012). Eight years later, however, President 

Trump signed the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, which made certain 

provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive. In particular, Section 404 of the First Step Act 
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provides that, if a defendant was originally sentenced for a “covered offense” as defined by the 

Act, a district court “may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair 

Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” First 

Step Act. § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222. Section 404 also provides that “[n]othing in [Section 404]

shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to [Section 404].” Id. § 404(c), 

132 Stat. at 5222.

On July 25, 2019, Spells moved for a sentence reduction pursuant to Section 404 of the 

First Step Act. The government opposed. On September 27, 2019, the district court denied Spells’s 

motion in a written order. The district court concluded that Spells was eligible for Section 404 

relief, but exercised its discretion to deny the motion. The district court noted that Section 404 

“does not set forth the factors that a court should consider in exercising its discretion,” but 

considered “the purpose of the statute,” “the reasons why the sentence was imposed in the first 

place,” and the sentencing factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). App’x 106–07. The district 

court also reasoned that it was obligated to “consider the facts as they exist[ed]” at the time of its 

decision on the Section 404 motion, rather than as they existed at the time of the original sentence, 

and therefore also considered Spells’s post-sentencing conduct. App’x 107. The district court 

denied the motion based on its conclusion that the original sentence was based on the “seriousness 

and danger” of Spells’s firearms offenses, App’x 108, its conclusion that Spells’s “post sentence 

conduct has been poor,” id., and based on the § 3553(a) factors, “all of which” were considered, 

“even though not discussed,” by the district court, App’x 109. In particular, the district court noted 

that Spells’s offenses “remain worthy of just punishment and his sentence promotes respect for the 

law,” and that “[t]here remains a serious and important need to protect the public from further 

crimes of the defendant.” Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (requiring the district court to consider 

“the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect 

for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,” and “to protect the public from further 
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crimes of the defendant”). Finally, the district court explained why, in its judgment, Spells 

remained a significant risk for recidivism despite his increasing age. 

“Section 404 relief is discretionary,” Johnson, 961 F.3d at 191; see First Step Act § 404(c), 

132 Stat. at 5222, and we review the denial of a motion for such relief for abuse of discretion, see 

United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 2020). “[T]he First Step Act does not 

obligate a district court to consider post-sentencing developments,” but “a district court retains 

discretion to decide what factors are relevant as it determines whether and to what extent to reduce 

a sentence.” United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84, 92 n.36 (2d Cir. 2020).

On appeal, Spells argues that the district court failed to explain why its decision was 

supported by the sentencing factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But assuming without 

deciding that the district court was required to consider the § 3553(a) factors in this context, it 

remains the case that a district court is not required to “discuss every § 3553(a) factor 

individually,” or to make “robotic incantations,” when making sentencing decisions. United States 

v. Rosa, 957 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2020). Instead, we “presume[] that the sentencing judge has 

considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors and arguments unless the record suggests otherwise.” Id.

at 118. And we will not second-guess the weight that a district court has assigned to any particular 

sentencing factor; instead, we will only “consider whether the factor, as explained by the district 

court, can bear the weight assigned it under the totality of circumstances in the case,” and will 

vacate a sentence only where it “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” 

United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). Here, the district court 

explained in its written order how specific § 3553(a) factorssupported the denial of a discretionary 

reduction. Nothing in the record suggests that the district court failed to consider any relevant 

factors in arriving at its decision or that it assigned impermissible weight to any one factor. 

Spells suggests that the only factors the district court discussed actually favored a sentence 

reduction. While it is true that the district court noted the reduced recidivism risk of crack offenders 
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in general, the district court also relied on factors more particularized to Spells’s case, like his 

firearms convictions and his poor post-sentence conduct, that supported the district court’s 

conclusion that the goals of just punishment, promoting respect for the law, and protecting the 

public weighed against granting the motion. The fact that the district court also discussed evidence 

that might weigh in Spells’s favor did not make its overall decision less reasonable. 

Finally, while Spells objects that the district court failed to explain why, in particular, his 

proposed sentence reduction was unwarranted, “we never have required a District Court to make 

specific responses to points argued by counsel in connection with sentencing.” United States v. 

Bonilla, 618 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). Instead, the district court “must satisfy us only that it 

has considered the party’s arguments and has articulated a reasonable basis for exercising its 

decision-making authority.” Id. The district court did so here.

Spells also argues that it was an abuse of discretion to deny his motion because the First 

Step Act was enacted to grant relief to those sentenced under the pre-Fair Sentencing Act regime, 

when the statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses were even harsher, especially relative to 

those for powder cocaine offenses, than they are today. And, Spells points out, one of the stated 

goals of Judge Lynch’s original sentence was the avoidance of unwarranted sentencing disparities 

with similarly situated crack offenders. Spells reasons that the same principle favors a lower

sentence today, after the passage of the First Step Act. But it is clear that, notwithstanding the 

broad purposes of the First Step Act in favor of sentencing relief for crack cocaine offenders, see 

Johnson, 961 F.3d at 191, Section 404 does not require a court to grant relief in any particular case, 

see First Step Act § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222. It follows that, in some cases, a district court may 

properly deny a Section 404 motion because of a defendant’s particular circumstances, even 

though that means leaving in place a sentencing disparity of the type Section 404 authorizes district 

courts to address. The district court in this case acknowledged that Section 404 reflected 

Congress’s “concerns that some sentences imposed in the past may be too long in view of the 
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unwarranted disparity” between crack and powder cocaine sentences, but — as discussed above 

— also adequately explained why, in its judgment, a sentence reduction was not warranted in this 

particular case. App’x 107. 

As we have explained, it is not for us to consider that decision afresh as though we were 

the sentencing court. Instead, we must decide whether the district court abused its discretion in 

denying Spells’s motion. On the record before us, we conclude that it did not. See Moore, 975 F.3d 

at 93–94 (affirming denial of First Step Act relief where district court relied on post-conviction 

disciplinary record).

We have considered all of Spells’s arguments and found in them no basis for reversal. For 

the reasons set forth above, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk