73612 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 176 / Wednesday, September 11, 2024 / Proposed Rules 

Branch, mail it to the address identified in 

paragraph (o) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: 9-AVS-AIR-730-AMOC@faa.gov. 

(i) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the responsible Flight Standards Office. 

(ii) AMOCs approved for AD 2023–05–02 

are approved as AMOCs for the 

corresponding provisions of paragraph (g) of 

this AD. 

(iii) AMOCs approved previously for AD 

2023–05–02 are approved as AMOCs for the 

corresponding provisions of EASA AD 2024– 

0046 that are required by paragraph (j) of this 

AD. 

(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any 

requirement in this AD to obtain instructions 

from a manufacturer, the instructions must 

be accomplished using a method approved 

by the Manager, International Validation 

Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus SAS’s 

EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). 

If approved by the DOA, the approval must 

include the DOA-authorized signature. 

(o) Additional Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Timothy Dowling, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 

410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 206– 

231–3667; email Timothy.P.Dowling@faa.gov. 

(p) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the material listed in this paragraph 

under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) You must use this material as 

applicable to do the actions required by this 

AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise. 

(3) The following material was approved 

for IBR on [DATE 35 DAYS AFTER 

PUBLICATION OF THE FINAL RULE]. 

(i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA) AD 2024–0046, dated February 19, 

2024. 

(ii) [Reserved] 

(4) The following material was approved 

for IBR on April 18, 2023 (88 FR 15600, 

March 14, 2023). 

(i) EASA AD 2022–0102, dated June 8, 

2022. 

(ii) [Reserved] 

(5) For EASA material identified in this 

AD, contact EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 

50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 

8999 000; email ADs@easa.europa.eu; 

website easa.europa.eu. You may find this 

EASA material on the EASA website at 

ad.easa.europa.eu. 

(6) You may view this material at the FAA, 

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Issued on September 5, 2024. 

Peter A. White, 

Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate 

Management Division, Aircraft Certification 

Service. 

[FR Doc. 2024–20381 Filed 9–10–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

15 CFR Part 702 

[Docket No. 240905–0231] 

RIN 0694–AJ55 

Establishment of Reporting 

Requirements for the Development of 

Advanced Artificial Intelligence Models 

and Computing Clusters 

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and 

Security, Department of Commerce. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; request for 

comment 

SUMMARY: This proposed rule would 

amend the Bureau of Industry and 

Security’s (BIS) Industrial Base 

Surveys—Data Collections regulations 

by establishing reporting requirements 

for the development of advanced 

artificial intelligence (AI) models and 

computing clusters under the Executive 

order of October 30, 2023, ‘‘Safe, Secure, 

and Trustworthy Development and Use 

of Artificial Intelligence.’’ 

DATES: Comments on this proposed rule 

must be received by BIS by no later than 

October 11, 2024. 

ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposed 

rule may be submitted to the Federal 

rulemaking portal 

(www.regulations.gov). The 

regulations.gov ID for this proposed rule 

is: BIS–2024–0047. Please refer to RIN 

0694–AJ55 in all comments. 

Anyone submitting business 

confidential information should clearly 

identify any business confidential 

portion of a comment at the time of 

submission, file a statement justifying 

nondisclosure and referring to the 

specific legal authority claimed, and 

provide a non-confidential version of 

the submission. 

For comments submitted 

electronically containing business 

confidential information, the file name 

of the business confidential version 

should begin with the characters ‘‘BC.’’ 

Any page containing business 

confidential information must be clearly 

marked ‘‘BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL’’ 

on the top of that page. The 

corresponding non-confidential version 

of those comments must be clearly 

marked ‘‘PUBLIC.’’ The file name of the 

non-confidential version should begin 

with the character ‘‘P.’’ Any 

submissions with file names that do not 

begin with either a ‘‘BC’’ or a ‘‘P’’ will 

be assumed to be public and will be 

made publicly available through https:// 

www.regulations.gov. Commenters 

submitting business confidential 

information are encouraged to scan a 

hard copy of the non-confidential 

version to create an image of the file, 

rather than submitting a digital copy 

with redactions applied, to avoid 

inadvertent redaction errors which 

could enable the public to read business 

confidential information. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Sean Delehanty, Office of Strategic 

Industries and Economic Security 

Bureau of Industry and Security, 

Department of Commerce. Phone: 202– 

316–5765; Email: Sean.Delehanty@

bis.doc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Section 4.2(a)(i) of Executive Order 

14110 of October 30, 2023, ‘‘Safe, 

Secure, and Trustworthy Development 

and Use of Artificial Intelligence’’ (E.O. 

14110), directs the Secretary of 

Commerce to require companies 

developing, or demonstrating an intent 

to develop, potential dual-use 

foundation AI models to provide certain 

information to the Federal Government 

on an ongoing basis. Additionally, 

section 4.2(a)(ii) of E.O. 14110 directs 

the Secretary of Commerce to require 

companies, individuals, or other 

organizations or entities that acquire, 

develop, or possess a potential largescale computing cluster to report any 

such acquisition, development, or 

possession, including the existence and 

location of these clusters and the 

amount of total computing power 

available in each cluster. 

As defined under E.O. 14110, a ‘‘dualuse foundation model’’ is ‘‘trained on 

broad data; generally uses selfsupervision; contains at least tens of 

billions of parameters; is applicable 

across a wide range of contexts; and that 

exhibits, or could be easily modified to 

exhibit, high levels of performance at 

tasks that pose a serious risk to security, 

national economic security, national 

public health or safety, or any 

combination of those matters.’’ The 

reporting requirements proposed in this 

regulation are intended to apply to dualuse foundation models that meet 

technical conditions issued by the 

Department. The Department expects to 

update the technical conditions, based 

on technological advancements, as 


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1Shield AI, ‘‘Shield AI Conducts AI-Piloted 

Flights on Sixth Aircraft, the Kratos MQM–178 

Firejet’’ (Mar. 29, 2024), https://shield.ai/shield-aiconducts-ai-piloted-flights-on-sixth-aircraft-thekratos-mqm-178-firejet/; RTX, ‘‘Raytheon 

Technologies Unveils Next-Generation ElectroOptical Intelligent-Sensing Capability (Apr. 24, 

2023), https://www.rtx.com/news/news-center/ 

2023/04/24/raytheon-technologies-unveils-nextgeneration-electro-optical-intelligent-sensing. 

2National Instruments, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence in 

Software-Defined SIGINT Systems’’ (Feb. 6, 2024), 

https://www.ni.com/en/solutions/aerospacedefense/radar-electronic-warfare-sigint/artificialintelligence-in-software-defined-sigintsystems.html; Northrop Grumman, ‘‘Artificial 

Intelligence Helps Protect Troops in Denied GPS 

Environments’’, https://

www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/artificialintelligence-helps-protect-troops-in-denied-gpsenvironments. 

3NVIDIA, ‘‘NVIDIA and Booz Allen Hamilton 

Expand Partnership to Bring AI-Enabled 

Cybersecurity to Public and Private Sectors’’ (Sept. 

20, 2022), https://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/ 

nvidia-and-booz-allen-hamilton-expandpartnership-to-bring-ai-enabled-cybersecurity-topublic-and-private-sectors; IBM, ‘‘AI and 

Automation for Cybersecurity’’ (June 2022), https:// 

www.ibm.com/thought-leadership/institutebusiness-value/en-us/report/ai-cybersecurity. 

necessary and appropriate, as directed 

by section 4.2(b) of E.O. 14110. 

E.O. 14110 directs the Department of 

Commerce (Department) to collect 

information about dual-use foundation 

models in accordance with the Defense 

Production Act (DPA) (50 U.S.C. 4501 et 

seq.). Under the DPA, the President is 

authorized to take actions that ensure 

the U.S. industrial base is prepared to 

supply products and services to support 

the national defense. In this context, the 

term ‘‘national defense’’ means 

‘‘programs for military and energy 

production or construction, military or 

critical infrastructure assistance to any 

foreign nation, homeland security, 

stockpiling, space, and any directly 

related activity’’ (50 U.S.C. 4552(14)). 

Additionally, the DPA makes clear that 

the international competitiveness of the 

U.S. industrial base directly affects its 

ability to support the national defense 

(see 50 U.S.C. 4502(a)(7)). 

Among other authorities, the DPA 

authorizes the President ‘‘by regulation, 

subpoena, or otherwise, to obtain such 

information from, require such reports 

and the keeping of such records by, 

make such inspection of the books, 

records, and other writings, premises or 

property of, and take the sworn 

testimony of, and administer oaths and 

affirmations to, any person as may be 

necessary or appropriate, in his 

discretion, to the enforcement or the 

administration of’’ the DPA (50 U.S.C. 

4555(a)). The DPA further specifies that 

this grant of authority ‘‘includes the 

authority to obtain information in order 

to perform industry studies assessing 

the capabilities of the United States 

industrial base to support the national 

defense’’ (50 U.S.C. 4555(a)). 

To carry out its obligations under 

section 4.2(a) of E.O. 14110, BIS is 

exercising its DPA authority, which was 

delegated to the Department by the 

President in Executive Order 13603, and 

subsequently re-delegated within the 

Department to BIS, to collect 

information from U.S. companies that 

are developing, have plans to develop, 

or have the computing hardware 

necessary to develop dual-use 

foundation models. AI models are 

quickly becoming integral to numerous 

U.S. industries that are essential to the 

national defense. For example, 

manufacturers of military equipment 

(e.g., aircrafts, tanks, and missile 

launchers) use AI models to enhance the 

maneuverability, accuracy, and 

efficiency of equipment.1 Similarly, 

manufacturers of signal intelligence 

devices (e.g., satellites, cameras, and 

radar) use AI models to improve how 

those devices capture signals and 

eliminate noise.2 As a final example, 

developers of cybersecurity software, 

which can be applied to protect a wide 

range of systems and infrastructure that 

are critical to the national defense, use 

AI models to increase the speed at 

which that software detects and 

responds to cyberattacks.3

Dual-use foundation models could 

increase the capabilities of these 

products and services to an even greater 

extent. Specifically, integrating dual-use 

foundation models into products like 

military equipment, signal intelligence 

devices, and cybersecurity software 

could enable those products to operate 

more effectively across a wider range of 

environments, to respond more 

effectively to unexpected signals, and to 

combat additional types of cyberattacks. 

Given those potential capabilities, it is 

essential to the national defense that the 

defense industrial base is able to 

integrate dual-use foundation models. 

Indeed, because industries and 

governments across the world are 

actively working to integrate dual-use 

foundation models into their defense 

capabilities, the U.S. defense industrial 

base will need to integrate dual-use 

foundation models to remain 

internationally competitive. 

Accordingly, the U.S. Government 

must be ready to take actions that 

ensure dual-use foundation models 

produced by U.S. companies are 

available to the defense industrial base. 

To do so, the U.S. Government needs 

information about how many U.S. 

companies are developing, have plans to 

develop, or have the computing 

hardware necessary to develop dual-use 

foundation models, as well as 

information about the characteristics of 

dual-use foundation models under 

development. Such information will 

allow the U.S. Government to determine 

whether action is necessary to stimulate 

development of dual-use foundation 

models or to support the development 

of specific types of models. 

The integration of AI models into the 

defense industrial base also requires the 

U.S. Government to take actions as 

needed to ensure that dual-use 

foundation models operate in a safe and 

reliable manner. Products integrating 

these models may operate in 

unpredictable or unreliable ways, 

potentially resulting in dangerous 

accidents, and a lack of reliability will 

make it difficult for the U.S. 

Government to use those products in 

contexts where the margin for error is 

small, including defense-related 

activities where accidents could result 

in injury or even loss of life. Thus, the 

U.S. Government needs information 

about how companies developing dualuse foundation models are training 

those models to respond to different 

kinds of inputs and information about 

how those companies have tested the 

safety and reliability of their models. 

Such information will allow the U.S. 

Government to determine the extent to 

which certain dual-use foundation 

models can be used by the defense 

industrial base and whether action is 

needed to ensure that the defense 

industrial base produces the safest and 

most reliable products and services in 

the world. 

For similar reasons, the U.S. 

Government must minimize the 

vulnerability of dual-use foundation 

models to cyberattacks. Dual-use 

foundation models can potentially be 

disabled or manipulated by hostile 

actors, and it will be difficult for the 

U.S. Government to rely on a particular 

model unless it can determine that the 

model is robust against such attacks. 

Accordingly, the U.S. Government 

needs information about the 

cybersecurity measures that companies 

developing dual-use foundation models 

use to protect those models, as well as 

information about those companies’ 

cybersecurity resources and practices. 

Under 15 CFR 702.3 all information 

submitted to the Department under this 

rule will be treated as confidential and 

afforded all the protections of section 

705(d) of the DPA. Such information 

will allow the U.S. Government to 

determine which models are secure 

enough to be integrated into products or 

services that are essential to the national 

defense and to assess whether action is 

needed to ensure that the defense 


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industrial base is producing the most 

secure products and services in the 

world. 

Finally, the U.S. Government must 

prepare the defense industrial base for 

the possibility that foreign adversaries 

or non-state actors will use dual-use 

foundation models for activities that 

threaten the national defense, including 

to develop weapons and other 

dangerous technologies. Accordingly, 

the U.S. Government requires 

information about the safety and 

reliability of AI models, including any 

potentially dangerous capabilities that 

developers of dual-use foundation 

models have identified with respect to 

those models. This includes the results 

of tests related to reliability as well as 

the results of any red-team testing that 

the company has conducted relating to 

lowering the barrier to entry for the 

development, acquisition, and use of 

biological, weapons by non-state actors; 

the discovery of software vulnerabilities 

and development of associated exploits; 

the use of software or tools to influence 

real or virtual events; and the possibility 

for self-replication or propagation. Such 

information will enable the U.S. 

Government to determine whether 

investments in the defense industrial 

base are needed to ensure the United 

States has access to safe and reliable AI 

systems, as well as to counteract the 

dangerous capabilities identified or to 

ensure that adequate safeguards are in 

place to prevent the theft or misuse of 

dual-use foundation models by foreign 

adversaries or non-state actors. 

In short, dual-use foundation models 

will likely drive significant advances in 

numerous industries on which the 

national defense depends. These 

advances require BIS to conduct an 

ongoing assessment of the AI industry to 

ensure that the U.S. Government has the 

most accurate, up-to-date information 

when making policy decisions about the 

international competitiveness of the 

industrial base and its ability to support 

the national defense. 

Section 4.2(a)(i) of E.O. 14110 

mandates that the Secretary shall 

require companies developing dual-use 

foundation AI models to provide 

information, reports, or records 

regarding the following: 

1. any ongoing or planned activities 

related to training, developing, or 

producing dual-use foundation models, 

including the physical and 

cybersecurity protections taken to 

assure the integrity of that training 

process against sophisticated threats; 

2. the ownership and possession of 

the model weights of any dual-use 

foundation models, and the physical 

and cybersecurity measures taken to 

protect those model weights; and 

3. the results of any developed dualuse foundation model’s performance in 

relevant AI red-team testing, including a 

description of any associated measures 

the company has taken to meet safety 

objectives, such as mitigations to 

improve performance on these red-team 

tests and strengthen overall model 

security. 

4. Other information pertaining to the 

safety and reliability of dual-use 

foundation models, or activities or risks 

that present concerns to U.S. national 

security. 

Section 4.2(a)(ii) of E.O. 14110 also 

mandates that companies, individuals, 

or other organizations or entities that 

acquire, develop, or possess a potential 

large-scale computing cluster must 

report any such acquisition, 

development, or possession, including 

the existence and location of these 

clusters and the amount of total 

computing power available in each 

cluster. To the extent that these entities 

are companies developing dual-use 

foundation models, they are also subject 

to obligations 1–3, above. 

Discussion of the Proposed Rule 

This proposed rule outlines a 

potential notification and reporting 

process for companies developing or 

intending to develop dual-use 

foundation AI models and for 

companies, individuals or other 

organizations or entities that acquire, 

develop, or possess computing clusters 

that meet technical conditions issued by 

the Department. Such entities would be 

required to report the required 

information to the BIS on a quarterly 

basis for activities that occurred during 

that quarter or that are planned to occur 

in the six months following the quarter. 

BIS collected information responsive 

to the requirements of section 4.2(a) of 

E.O. 14110 via a mandatory survey of 

companies identified as developing or 

planning to develop potential dual-use 

foundation models. That survey was 

issued on January 26, 2024. Under this 

proposed rule, companies that 

completed the survey and any other 

companies that have developed or are in 

the process of developing dual-use 

foundation models or large-scale 

computing clusters would be required to 

submit information about these 

activities on a quarterly basis. 

For companies that have already 

submitted complete information via the 

survey, the reporting requirements will 

not require that the company report 

activity already reported to BIS in the 

survey but would require the reporting 

of any additions, updates, or changes to 

the information since the survey. Any 

company that has filed at least one 

report would be required to continue to 

file reports on a quarterly basis for as 

long as it continues to meet the 

reporting requirements or, if it no longer 

meet the requirements, until it has filed 

seven quarterly reports affirming that it 

has no additions, updates, or changes to 

the information in the last report. The 

reporting system will allow for 

companies that have no additions, 

updates, or changes since the last report 

to make a simple notification to that 

effect. 

Request for Comments 

BIS welcomes public comment on all 

aspects of this proposed regulation. 

While much of the information that 

entities must report is dictated by 

section 4.2(a) of E.O. 14110, BIS is 

particularly interested in public 

comments on the following: 

1. Quarterly Notification Schedule: 

BIS has proposed that all covered U.S. 

persons with models or clusters 

exceeding the technical thresholds for 

reporting should notify BIS on a 

quarterly basis. Covered U.S. persons 

would be required to make quarterly 

notifications of ‘applicable activities’ 

that meet the criteria under 

§ 702.7(a)(1)(i) or (ii) planned to occur 

in the next six months related to dualuse foundation models and/or 

computing clusters, as well as quarterly 

notifications required for any 

‘applicable activities’ (i.e., an 

‘‘applicable activity’’ that meets the 

criteria under § 702.7(a)(1)(i) or (ii)) and 

§ 702.7(a)(2)(v) (Affirmation of no 

applicable activities), as applicable. 

‘Applicable activities’ are defined to 

include developing, or having the intent 

to develop within the next six months, 

an AI model or computing cluster above 

certain technical thresholds specific in 

this proposed rule. If a covered U.S. 

person has any ‘applicable activities’ to 

report, then they will notify BIS, and 

BIS will follow up with more detailed 

questions, to which the Covered U.S. 

person must respond within 30 calendar 

days. If Covered U.S. persons have no 

‘applicable activities’ to report, they 

would only be required to affirm that 

fact to BIS each quarter. BIS has 

proposed a quarterly notification 

schedule to provide the U.S. 

Government with timely information on 

the safety and security of large AI 

models and computing clusters, while 

offering a regular notification schedule 

to facilitate respondent planning and 

ease respondent burden. BIS welcomes 

comments on the frequency of the 

proposed notification schedule, as well 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 176 / Wednesday, September 11, 2024 / Proposed Rules 73615 

as alternatives for achieving timely 

reporting of the required information. 

2. Collection and Storage: BIS 

recognizes that the information 

collected through these reporting 

requirements is extremely sensitive. In 

the interest of gathering information on 

prioritizing the safety of respondents’ 

data, BIS welcomes comments related to 

how this data should be collected and 

stored. 

3. Collection Thresholds: BIS has 

included the technical conditions 

specified in E.O. 14110 for models and 

computing clusters that would trigger 

the proposed reporting requirements. As 

directed by section 4.2(b) of E.O. 14110, 

BIS will update these technical 

conditions as appropriate. In addition to 

the technical parameters in E.O. 14110, 

BIS is also seeking comments on the 

following proposed updated collection 

parameters. BIS welcomes comments on 

the following sets of technical 

parameters. 

• A dual-use foundation model 

training run triggers reporting 

requirements if it utilizes more than 

10∧26 computational operations (e.g., 

integer or floating-point operations). 

Models trained on primarily biological 

sequence data, but at the lower 

threshold of 10∧23 computational 

operations, as specified by section 4.2(b) 

of E.O. 14110, will be addressed in a 

separate survey. 

• Large-scale computing clusters are 

defined as clusters having a set of 

machines transitively connected by 

networking of over 300 Gbit/s and 

having a theoretical maximum 

performance greater than 10∧20 

computational operations (e.g., integer 

or floating-point operations) per second 

(OP/s) for AI training, without sparsity. 

Rulemaking Requirements 

1. This proposed rule has been 

determined to be a significant regulatory 

action for purposes of E.O. 12866. 

2. Notwithstanding any other 

provision of law, no person is required 

to respond to, nor shall any person be 

subject to a penalty for failure to comply 

with, a collection of information subject 

to the requirements of the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 

et seq.) (PRA), unless that collection of 

information displays a currently valid 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) Control Number. This proposed 

rule involves a currently approved 

information collection National Security 

and Critical Technology Assessments of 

the US Industrial Base (OMB Control 

Number 0694–0119). The authority for 

this collection is section 705 of the 

Defense Production Act of 1950, as 

amended and related Executive Orders 

12656 and 13603. Under this 

information collection, BIS conducts 

surveys and assessments of critical U.S. 

industrial sectors and technologies. 

Undertaken at the request of various 

policy, research and development, and 

program and planning organizations 

within the Department of Defense and 

the Armed Services, Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA), and other agencies, BIS 

research, data collection and analysis 

provide needed information to 

benchmark industry performance and 

raise awareness of diminishing 

manufacturing capabilities. 

Most surveys include questions 

necessary to obtain data on 

employment, supply chain, financial 

performance, production, technology 

and service capabilities, research and 

development (R&D), investment, 

competitive outlook, export controls 

and other relevant information. Some 

surveys include a few non-standard 

questions, depending on the industry 

and the needs of the partner agency. The 

number of surveys required per 

assessment varies with the size of the 

sector and the scope of the project. 

Information gathered from these 

surveys is deemed business confidential 

and will be treated in accordance with 

section 705 of the Defense Production 

Act of 1950 which prohibits the 

publication or disclosure of such 

information unless the President 

determines that its withholding is 

contrary to the national defense. To 

review previous surveys cleared under 

this generic collection—including all 

background materials—please visit at 

https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 

PRAMain and use the search function to 

enter either the title of the collection or 

the OMB Control Number. 

When this proposed rule is finalized, 

BIS intends to use this existing 

information collection for the 

collection/reporting requirement 

required by E.O. 14110. BIS estimates 

the specific survey required by this 

proposed rule will have an estimated 

burden of 5,000 hours per year 

aggregated across all new respondents. 

BIS believes this increase in respondent 

burden does not require a change to the 

burden or cost estimates for the overall 

umbrella clearance. Please see the 

request for comment section of the 

proposed rule for more information the 

potential information collection 

elements BIS is considering for the final 

rule and subsequent surveys. 

3. These proposed changes do not 

contain policies with federalism 

implications as that term is defined in 

E.O. 13132. 

4. The Regulatory Flexibility Act 

(RFA), as amended by the Small 

Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA) (5 U.S.C. 

601 et seq.) generally requires an agency 

to prepare a regulatory flexibility 

analysis of any rule subject to the notice 

and comment rulemaking requirements 

under the Administrative Procedure Act 

(5 U.S.C. 553) or any other statute. 

Under section 605(b) of the RFA, 

however, if the head of an agency 

certifies that a rule will not have a 

significant impact on a substantial 

number of small entities, the statute 

does not require the agency to prepare 

a regulatory flexibility analysis. 

Pursuant to section 605(b), the Chief 

Counsel for Regulation, Department of 

Commerce, certified to the Chief 

Counsel for Regulation, Small Business 

Administration that this proposed rule 

will not have a significant impact on a 

substantial number of small entities for 

the reasons explained below. No other 

law requires such an analysis. 

Consequently, no regulatory flexibility 

analysis is required, and none has been 

prepared. 

Number of Small Entities 

Small entities include small 

businesses, small organizations, and 

small governmental jurisdictions. For 

purposes of assessing the impacts of this 

proposed rule on small entities, a small 

business, as described in the Small 

Business Administration’s Table of 

Small Business Size Standards Matched 

to North American Industry 

Classification System (NAICS) Codes 

(effective March 17, 2023), has a 

maximum annual revenue of $47 

million and a maximum of 1,500 

employees (for some business 

categories, these numbers are lower). A 

small governmental jurisdiction is a 

government of a city, town, school 

district or special district with a 

population of less than 50,000. A small 

organization is any not-for-profit 

enterprise which is independently 

owned and operated and is not 

dominant in its field. The most apt code 

to apply here is NAICS 518—Computing 

Infrastructure Providers, Data 

Processing, Web Hosting, and Related 

Services. 

The reporting requirements in this 

proposed rule are expected to apply to 

only a small number of entities—only 

those companies developing or 

intending to develop a dual-use 

foundation model and those companies, 

individuals, or other organizations or 

entities that acquire, develop, or possess 

potential large-scale computing clusters. 

For the purposes of this rulemaking, the 

term ‘‘covered U.S. persons’’ includes 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
73616 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 176 / Wednesday, September 11, 2024 / Proposed Rules 

4Rahman, Owen, and You. ‘‘Tracking Large-Scale 

AI Models’’ (April 5, 2024), https://epochai.org/ 

blog/tracking-large-scale-ai-models. 

all U.S. persons subject to the reporting 

requirements of E.O. 14110, section 

4.2(a), and is defined as any individual 

U.S. citizen, any lawful permanent 

resident of the United States as defined 

by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

any entity—including organizations, 

companies, and corporations— 

organized under the laws of the United 

States or any jurisdiction within the 

United States (including foreign 

branches), or any person (individual) 

located in the United States. At present, 

BIS assesses that there are between zero 

and 15 companies exceed the reporting 

thresholds for models and computing 

clusters at the time of publication. All 

of these entities are well-resourced 

technology companies. Exceeding the 

technical thresholds for models and 

computing clusters requires access to 

vast computing power, which is not 

typically available to small entities. The 

minimum computational threshold that 

would trigger a reporting requirement 

established in E.O. 14110 currently 

exceeds all or virtually all models in 

use.4

As AI technology development and 

implementation are expected to advance 

over the next few years, the number of 

covered U.S. persons involved in it will 

also increase. However, as directed by 

E.O. 14110, the Secretary will update 

the technical conditions that trigger the 

reporting requirements over time, which 

may limit the number of additional 

impacted entities over time. 

Impact 

For the reasons discussed above, BIS 

believes that this proposed rule, which 

would impose reporting requirements 

on large technology companies, would 

have no significant impact on small 

entities. 

Conclusion 

BIS believes that the overall impact of 

this proposed rule on small entities 

would not be significant, as it would 

only apply to entities with large 

monetary and computational resources, 

which BIS believes are not small 

entities. For the reasons set forth above, 

the Chief Counsel for Regulations at the 

Department of Commerce has certified 

that this action would not have a 

significant impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. 

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(4), 

a summary of this proposed rule may be 

found at www.regulations.gov. The 

regulations.gov ID for this proposed rule 

is: BIS–2024–0047. 

List of Subjects in 15 CFR Part 702 

Business and industry, Confidential 

business information, Employment, 

National defense, Penalties, Research, 

Science and technology. 

Accordingly, 15 CFR part 702 is 

proposed to be amended as follows: 

PART 702—INDUSTRIAL BASE 

SURVEYS—DATA COLLECTIONS 

■ 1. The authority citation for 15 CFR 

part 702 is revised to read as follows: 

Authority: 50 U.S.C. 4501 et seq.; E.O. 

13603, 77 FR 16651, 3 CFR, 2012 Comp., p. 

225; E.O. 14110, 88 FR 75191, 3 CFR, 2023 

Comp., p. 657. 

■ 2. Section 702.7 is added to read as 

follows: 

§ 702.7 Special requirements for on-going 

reporting regarding the development of 

advanced artificial intelligence models and 

computing clusters. 

(a) Reporting requirements. (1) 

Covered U.S. persons are required to 

submit a notification to the Department 

by emailing ai_reporting@bis.doc.gov on 

a quarterly basis as defined in paragraph 

(a)(2) of this section if the covered U.S. 

person engages in, or plans, within six 

months, to engage in ‘applicable 

activities,’ defined as follows: 

(i) Conducting any AI model training 

run using more than 10∧26 

computational operations (e.g., integer 

or floating-point operations); or 

(ii) Acquiring, developing, or coming 

into possession of a computing cluster 

that has a set of machines transitively 

connected by data center networking of 

greater than 300 Gbit/s and having a 

theoretical maximum greater than 10∧20 

computational operations (e.g., integer 

or floating-point operations) per second 

(OP/s) for AI training, without sparsity. 

Note 1 to paragraph (a)(1): Consistent 

with industry conventions, one 

multiply-accumulate computation, D = 

A × B + C, should be counted as two 

operations. 

(2) Timing of notifications and 

response to BIS questions—(i) 

Notification of applicable activities. 

Covered U.S. persons subject to the 

reporting requirements in paragraph 

(a)(1) of this section must notify BIS of 

‘applicable activities’ via email each 

quarter, identifying any ‘applicable 

activities’ planned in the six months 

following notification. Quarterly 

notification dates are as follows: Q1— 

April 15; Q2—July 15; Q3—October 15; 

Q4—January 15. For example, in a 

notification due on April 15, a covered 

U.S. person should include all activities 

planned until October 15 of the same 

year. 

(ii) Response to BIS questions. 

Following a notification of ‘applicable 

activities’ by a covered U.S. person, the 

covered U.S. person will receive 

questions from BIS. The covered U.S. 

person must respond to all questions 

within 30 calendar days of receiving the 

request. 

(iii) Corrections. If any notification of 

‘applicable activities’ or response to BIS 

questions filed under this section is 

incomplete when filed, BIS will notify 

the covered U.S. person and require a 

revised resubmission within 14 calendar 

days after BIS provides notice of 

incompletion. BIS will continue to 

require revisions within 14 calendar 

days of notification if a resubmission 

remains incomplete. 

(iv) Clarification questions. If, after 

receipt of responses described in 

paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section, BIS 

has additional questions to clarify those 

responses, the covered U.S. person will 

provide additional responses to such 

additional questions within seven (7) 

calendar days. If the covered U.S. 

person needs additional time to provide 

an additional response, it can request an 

extension from BIS. 

(v) Affirmation of no applicable 

activities. For each of the seven quarters 

following the quarter covered by a 

notification of ‘applicable activities,’ if 

the covered U.S. person has no 

‘applicable activities’ (i.e., an 

‘‘applicable activity’’ that meets the 

criteria under paragraph (a)(1)(i) or (ii) 

of this section) to report, they must 

submit an affirmation of no applicable 

activities by emailing ai_reporting@

bis.doc.gov on the quarterly notification 

date. If the covered U.S. person submits 

an affirmation of no applicable activities 

for seven consecutive quarters, they 

need not provide BIS with any 

affirmation thereafter until they have 

‘applicable activities’ to report. 

(b) Content, form, and manner of 

response to BIS questions. (1) All 

information submitted under this 

section shall be filed with BIS in the 

form and manner that BIS will prescribe 

in instructions sent to the covered U.S. 

person after BIS has received a 

notification of ‘applicable activities.’ 

(2) BIS will send questions to the 

covered U.S. person which must 

address, but may not be limited to, the 

following topics: 

(i) Any ongoing or planned activities 

related to training, developing, or 

producing dual-use foundation models, 

including the physical and 

cybersecurity protections taken to 

assure the integrity of that training 

process against sophisticated threats; 

(ii) The ownership and possession of 

the model weights of any dual-use 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 176 / Wednesday, September 11, 2024 / Proposed Rules 73617 

foundation models, and the physical 

and cybersecurity measures taken to 

protect those model weights; 

(iii) The results of any developed 

dual-use foundation model’s 

performance in relevant AI red-team 

testing, including a description of any 

associated measures the company has 

taken to meet safety objectives, such as 

mitigations to improve performance on 

these red-team tests and strengthen 

overall model security; and 

(iv) Other information pertaining to 

the safety and reliability of dual-use 

foundation models, or activities or risks 

that present concerns to U.S. national 

security. 

(c) Definitions. For purposes of the 

reports required by paragraph (a) of this 

section, apply the following definitions. 

AI red-teaming means a structured 

testing effort to find flaws and 

vulnerabilities in an AI system, often in 

a controlled environment and in 

collaboration with developers of AI. In 

the context of AI, red-teaming is most 

often performed by dedicated ‘‘red 

teams’’ that adopt adversarial methods 

to identify flaws and vulnerabilities, 

such as harmful or discriminatory 

outputs from an AI system, unforeseen 

or undesirable system behaviors, 

limitations, or potential risks associated 

with the misuse of the system. 

AI model means a component of an 

information system that implements AI 

technology and uses computational, 

statistical, or machine-learning 

techniques to produce outputs from a 

given set of inputs. 

AI system means any data system, 

software, hardware, application, tool, or 

utility that operates in whole or in part 

using AI. 

Artificial intelligence or AI has the 

meaning set forth in 15 U.S.C. 9401(3). 

Company means a corporation, 

partnership, association, or any other 

organized group of persons, or legal 

successor or representative thereof. This 

definition is not limited to commercial 

or for-profit organizations. For example, 

the term ‘‘any other organized group of 

persons’’ may encompass academic 

institutions, research centers, or any 

group of persons who are organized in 

some manner. The term ‘‘corporation’’ is 

not limited to publicly traded 

corporations or corporations that exist 

for the purpose of making a profit. 

Covered U.S. person means any 

individual U.S. citizen, lawful 

permanent resident of the United States 

as defined by the Immigration and 

Nationality Act, entity—including 

organizations, companies, and 

corporations—organized under the laws 

of the United States or any jurisdiction 

within the United States (including 

foreign branches), or any person 

(individual) located in the United 

States. 

Dual-use foundation model means an 

AI model that is: 

(i)(A) Trained on broad data; 

(B) Generally uses self-supervision; 

(C) Contains at least tens of billions of 

parameters; 

(D) Is applicable across a wide range 

of contexts; and 

(E) Exhibits, or could be easily 

modified to exhibit, high levels of 

performance at tasks that pose a serious 

risk to security, national economic 

security, national public health or 

safety, or any combination of those 

matters, such as by: 

(1) Substantially lowering the barrier 

of entry for non-experts to design, 

synthesize, acquire, or use chemical, 

biological, radiological, or nuclear 

(CBRN) weapons; 

(2) Enabling powerful offensive cyber 

operations through automated 

vulnerability discovery and exploitation 

against a wide range of potential targets 

of cyberattacks; or 

(3) Permitting the evasion of human 

control or oversight through means of 

deception or obfuscation. 

(ii) Models meet this definition even 

if they are provided to end users with 

technical safeguards that attempt to 

prevent users from taking advantage of 

the relevant unsafe capabilities. 

Knowledge has the meaning set out in 

15 CFR 772.1. 

Large-scale computing cluster means 

a cluster of computing hardware that 

meets the technical thresholds provided 

by the Department in paragraph (a)(1) of 

this section. 

Model weights means the numerical 

parameters used in the layers of a neural 

network. 

Training or training run refers to any 

process by which an AI model learns 

from data using computing power. 

Training includes but is not limited to 

techniques employed during pretraining like unsupervised learning and 

employed during fine tuning like 

reinforcement learning from human 

feedback. 

United States (U.S.) includes the 50 

states, the District of Columbia, Puerto 

Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. 

Virgin Islands, and the Northern 

Mariana Islands. 

Thea D. Rozman Kendler, 

Assistant Secretary for Export 

Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2024–20529 Filed 9–9–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–JT–P 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

AGENCY 

40 CFR Part 55 

[EPA–R01–OAR–2024–0367; FRL–12222– 

01–R1] 

Outer Continental Shelf Air 

Regulations; Amendment to State 

Requirements Incorporated; 

Massachusetts 

AGENCY: Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA). 

ACTION: Proposed rule; amendment to 

state requirements. 

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) is proposing to update a 

portion of the Outer Continental Shelf 

(OCS) air regulations. Requirements 

applying to OCS sources located within 

25 miles of states’ seaward boundaries 

must be updated periodically to remain 

consistent with the requirements of the 

corresponding onshore area (COA). The 

portion of the OCS air regulations that 

is being updated pertains to the 

requirements for OCS sources for which 

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts is 

the designated COA. The intended effect 

of this proposed rule is to amend 

existing regulations incorporated by 

reference into the Massachusetts section 

of EPA’s OCS air regulations. 

DATES: Written comments must be 

received on or before October 11, 2024. 

ADDRESSES: Submit your comments, 

identified by Docket ID No. EPA–R01– 

OAR–2024–0367 at https://

www.regulations.gov, or via email to 

collins.patrick@epa.gov. For comments 

submitted at Regulations.gov, follow the 

online instructions for submitting 

comments. Once submitted, comments 

cannot be edited or removed from 

Regulations.gov. For either manner of 

submission, the EPA may publish any 

comment received to its public docket. 

Do not submit electronically any 

information you consider to be 

Confidential Business Information (CBI) 

or other information whose disclosure is 

restricted by statute. Multimedia 

submissions (audio, video, etc.) must be 

accompanied by a written comment. 

The written comment is considered the 

official comment and should include 

discussion of all points you wish to 

make. The EPA will generally not 

consider comments or comment 

contents located outside of the primary 

submission (i.e., on the web, cloud, or 

other file sharing system). For 

additional submission methods, please 

contact the person identified in the FOR

FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. 

For the full EPA public comment policy, 

information about CBI or multimedia 


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