United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-50838

H.W., by and through her next friend, JENNIE W, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Comal Independent School District, 

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:21-CV-344

Before Stewart, Clement, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.

Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge:

H.W. is an elementary school student in the Comal Independent 

School District (the District). Over the past few years, she has received a 

variety of special education supports and services because of her disabilities. 

In March 2020, the District found that despite the accommodationsit offered 

her, H.W. was not making appropriate progress. It accordingly decided to 

move her from general education into an essential academics program.

H.W.’s mother objected to the District’s decision and sought a due 

process hearing under the IDEA. A hearing officer concluded that the 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 27, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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District’s proposal was: (1) H.W.’s least restrictive environment; and (2) 

appropriate in light of her circumstances. H.W. appealed to the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Texas, which affirmed the 

hearing officer’s decision. She then appealed to us. We AFFIRM.

I.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 20 

U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., “offers States federal funds to assist in educating 

children with disabilities.” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. 

Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017). The Act was passed to ensure that 

disabled children are neither excluded from public education nor left to fend 

for themselves in inappropriate environments. See Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of 

Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1989). The “cornerstone” of the IDEA 

is the statutorily mandated “free appropriate public education,” or 

“FAPE.” Id. at 1043; see also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. 

v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 209 (1982) (holding that the Act establishes a 

substantive right to a FAPE for qualifying children).

While the FAPE is the cornerstone of the IDEA, the individualized 

education program (IEP) is “the centerpiece of the statute’s education 

delivery system for disabled children.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 

(1988). An IEP is a comprehensive plan that, among other things, sets out 

“measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals.” 

Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994 (citing § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(III)). In short, 

“[t]he IEP is the means by which special education and related services are 

‘tailored to the unique needs’ of a particular child.” Id. (quoting Rowley, 458 

U.S. at 181).

An IEP is developed at an admission, review, and dismissal committee 

(ARDC) meeting. See § 1414(d)(1)(B). The ARDC generally consists of the 

child’s parents, the child if appropriate, relevant teachers, and district 

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employees. See generally id. The ARDC discusses “the child’s present levels 

of academic achievement and functional performance” and sets future 

goals/objectives for the child, which the parents sign-off on. E.R., 909 F.3d 

at 758 (citing § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)).

In 2010, the Supreme Court held that to meet the IDEA’s substantive 

requirements, “a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a 

child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” 

Endrew F., 137. S. Ct. at 999. The Court noted that its holding did not 

necessarily mean that an IEP must aim for “grade-level advancement” to 

demonstrate progress. Id. at 1000. Rather, the Court clarified that a child’s 

educational program “must be appropriately ambitious in light of his 

circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately 

ambitious for most children in the regular classroom.” Id.

Critically, the IDEA’s text reflects Congress’ “strong preference in 

favor of mainstreaming,” which consequently affects the parameters for 

developing IEPs. Daniel R.R., 874 F. 2d at 1044. Mainstreaming refers to 

“[e]ducating a handicapped child in a regular education classroom with 

nonhandicapped children[.]” Id. at 1039. Pursuant to § 1412(5)(B)’s “least 

restrictive environment” clause, a school district must ensure that its 

handicapped students are educated with nonhandicapped students to the 

“maximum extent appropriate.” This preference is only overcome “when 

education in a regular classroom cannot meet the handicapped child’s unique 

needs.” Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1045.

II.

H.W. is an elementary school student in the District. In April 2017, 

H.W.’s mother, J.W., became concerned that H.W. “may require specially 

designed instruction.” So, she requested a Full and Individual Evaluation 

(FIE), without cognitive assessment, of her daughter. The FIE report 

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recommended that H.W. receive “special education supports and services” 

as a student with primary and secondary disabilities, including Down 

Syndrome—or Trisomy 21—Hypothyroidism, Attention Deficit 

Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Asthma, and a speech impairment. Given 

the report’s recommendation, an ARDC formed to develop an IEP for H.W. 

prior to her kindergarten year—the 2017-2018 academic year. The ARDC 

agreed to place H.W. in general education with a modified curriculum, 

inclusion support, and occupational and speech therapy.

Kindergarten: 2017-2018

H.W. began kindergarten in the Fall of 2017. Throughout her first 

semester, the District began noticing challenging behaviors. The District 

alerted H.W.’s parents to these behaviors and enlisted a behavioral analyst to 

conduct a Functional Behavior Assessment (FBA). The FBA identified four 

behavioral issues: (1) physical aggression; (2) noncompliance with 

commands; (3) unexpected verbal utterances; and (4) property destruction. 

At its annual meeting in the Spring of 2018, the ARDC approved a Behavior 

Intervention Plan (BIP) aimed at addressing the identified behavioral issues. 

It also modified H.W.’s curriculum below grade level for the rest of her 

kindergarten year and her upcoming first-grade year.

First Grade: 2018-2019

H.W. began first grade in the Fall of 2018. In November 2018, H.W.’s 

ARDC reconvened to amend her IEP after determining that she was showing 

inadequate progress in reaching her goals/objectives. The amended IEP 

provided for more inclusion support, resource instruction for math and 

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reading,1 movement breaks, and 20 minutes per week of social skills 

instruction in a special education setting.

Around this time, H.W.’s parents requested an independent FBA. 

The District obliged. The independent analyst, Board Certified Behavior 

Analyst Anissa Moore, largely agreed with the District’s FBA, noting that 

H.W. “demonstrated maladaptive behaviors that interfered with her learning 

and/or the learning of others.” She offered some minor recommendations 

for H.W.’s BIP, including noting that H.W. had an elopement issue that 

should be addressed.

After receiving Moore’s FBA, the District convened an ARDC 

meeting in February 2019 to modify H.W.’s BIP. At that meeting, the 

District proposed increasing H.W.’s resource room time, implementing an 

alternative curriculum rather than a modified curriculum, and obtaining an 

expedited FIE in all areas. H.W.’s parents disagreed with the proposals, and 

the issues were tabled until the next meeting.

The ARDC then held two meetings in March 2019. First, it held a 

meeting to resolve the tabled differences from the February 2019 meeting. 

Second, it held its annual ARDC meeting to finalize an IEP for H.W.’s 

upcoming 2019-2020 second-grade year. During the March meetings, the 

District proposed that H.W. “receive part or all instruction in a special 

education setting.” Specifically, it recommended, among other things, 

increased resource room time, doubled inclusion support, and that half of her 

speech-language therapy take place in a special education setting. 

1 A resource setting is a “special education setting . . . where direct instruction can 

be provided to the student at a different ability level than the general education grade 

level.”

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The District based its recommendation on four grounds: (1) general 

education prohibited H.W. from meeting her IEP goals/objectives “even 

though supplementary aids and services [were] used”; (2) H.W.’s 

competency was significantly below grade level; (3) modifications required 

for H.W. to achieve her IEP goals/objectives could not be implemented 

without “eliminating essential components of the general 

curriculum/activity”; and (4) H.W.’s speech impairment necessitated “a 

less distracting environment than the general education classroom.” The 

ARDC concluded that the benefits of removal outweighed any potentially 

harmful effects. Further, it noted that H.W. would “have the opportunity to 

participate with students without disabilities in all nonacademic, 

extracurricular, and other activities[.]”

H.W.’s parents disagreed with the proposed alternative curriculum 

and the District relented. The ARDC eventually agreed on placing H.W. in 

extended school year (ESY) services. ESY services are special education 

services that are provided “beyond the normal school year.” The services 

are required if, “in one or more critical areas addressed in the current IEP 

goals/objectives, the student has exhibited, or reasonably may be expected to 

exhibit, severe or substantial regression that cannot be recouped within a 

reasonable period of time.” It also agreed on modifying her curriculum to a 

“pre-K to prerequisite skills level.” H.W. was subsequently promoted to 

second grade even though she received a mark indicating “Below Grade 

Level and Requires Urgent Intervention” in every academic area.

Second Grade: 2019-2020

H.W. began second grade in the Fall of 2019. At that time, the ARDC 

revised her IEP to significantly increase her inclusion support and provide for 

more movement breaks. The District’s staff maintained daily progress 

reports to track H.W.’s performance. Based on the data it was collecting, the 

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District informed H.W.’s parents that she was “having trouble making 

academic progress or regressing.” It recommended a cognitive evaluation to 

ascertain her “current levels of intellectual functioning.”

The ARDC met on November 7, 2019. J.W. withheld consent for 

cognitive testing but agreed to lower H.W.’s mastery criteria in math, 

reading, and writing—despite previously requesting that the District 

increase the rigor of H.W.’s goals. The ARDC also agreed on increasing her 

amount of special education instruction. Thus, H.W.’s newly amended IEP 

provided for an increase in resource room time and for three-quarters of her 

speech-language therapy in a special education setting.

After the November 2019 modifications, special education staff 

members noted that despite the modifications, H.W. was making 

inconsistent or inadequate progress toward meeting many of her goals and 

was failing every subject. Further, the District noted that the rigors of the 

general education environment were triggering some of her challenging 

behaviors. These findings led to the proposed IEP that is at the center of this 

litigation.

The Proposed Blended Placement IEP: 2020-2021

On March 4, 2020, the ARDC convened to develop H.W.’s IEP for 

the 2020-2021 third grade school year. The District again proposed that 

H.W. “receive part or all instruction in a special education setting.” 

Specifically, the District recommended that she be removed from general 

education into an Essential Academics setting—or a self-contained “special 

education classroom that provides different formats of instruction,” such as 

“repetitive hands-on activities” and an alternative curriculum with no 

typically developing students.

The District believed removal was warranted on four grounds, one of 

which differed from the March 2019 justifications: (1) H.W.’s competency 

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was significantly below grade level; (2) modifications required for her to 

achieve her IEP goals could not be implemented without “eliminating 

essential components of the general curriculum/activity”; (3) her behavior 

required a specialized environment for the implementation of her IEP and

BIP; and (4) her speech impairment necessitated “a less distracting 

environment than the general education classroom.” In other words, the 

District believed that H.W. could not progress toward her modified 

curriculum or IEP goals in the general education curriculum.

The District reiterated that it made “efforts to modify and 

supplement [H.W.’s] participation in the general education setting . . .” but 

that despite those efforts, H.W. still could not “make progress towards her 

goals.” It further noted that H.W. was having a detrimental impact on her 

peers because she often grunted, struck at other students, and swiped 

materials off desks. On the other hand, the District found that “there ha[d] 

been more progress noted during the times [H.W.] receive[d] instruction in 

the resource classroom[, which could have been] attributed to the small 

group environment and fewer distractions.” And it reiterated that H.W. 

would “have the opportunity to participate with students without disabilities 

in all nonacademic, extracurricular, and other activities[.]” The proposed 

blended placement IEP provided for: 235 minutes per day in special 

education (plus additional time for speech) and 150 minutes per day in 

general education.

H.W.’s parents disagreed with the proposed blended placement IEP. 

Instead, J.W. requested an Independent Educational Evaluation (IEE) to 

supplement the data the ARDC was considering. The District accepted 

J.W.’s request. With a lack of agreement, the District then sent H.W.’s 

parents a prior written notice on May 28, 2020, stating that it would soon 

implement the blended placement IEP. On August 20, 2020, the District 

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reminded H.W.’s parents about the pending IEP implementation, which 

would occur on August 31, 2020.

On August 31, 2020, J.W. filed an administrative complaint requesting 

a due process hearing to challenge the proposed IEP as a denial of a FAPE. 

A prehearing conference was held on October 22, 2020, and the due process 

hearing was scheduled to begin on January 19, 2021. A speech and language 

IEE was subsequently conducted on January 3, 2021. The evaluator, SpeechLanguage Pathologist Sabina Duhon, concluded that the general education 

environment was ideal for H.W. because it would give her more access to her 

grade level peers.

On January 6, 2021, Dr. Laura Eskridge, a licensed psychologist, 

conducted J.W.’s requested behavioral, intellectual, and academic IEE 

virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Doctor Eskridge opined that 

H.W.’s current pre-blended placement programming “appear[ed] 

appropriate for her needs[,]” and that placing her in “a more restrictive 

environment appear[ed] inappropriate for [her] at [that] time.”

A due process hearing was then held from January 19 to January 21, 

2021. The hearing officer concluded that the District did not deny H.W. a 

FAPE because the proposed blended placement IEP was, among other 

things: (1) H.W.’s least restrictive environment; and (2) appropriate in light 

of her circumstances. H.W. appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the 

United States District Court for the Western District of Texas on April 6, 

2021. After reviewing the administrative record and party briefing, the 

district court affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. H.W. timely appealed.

III.

Under the IDEA, a district court reviews a hearing officer’s decision 

“virtually de novo.” Seth B. ex rel. Donald B. v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 810 

F.3d 961, 967 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); cf. id. at 961 (noting that a 

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district court must accord due weight to a hearing officer’s findings). A 

district court’s decision “is not directed to discerning whether there are 

disputed issues of fact, but rather, whether the administrative record, 

together with any additional evidence, establishes that there has been 

compliance with [the] IDEA’s processes and that the child’s educational 

needs have been appropriately addressed.” Id. at 967 (citation omitted). 

Given the uniqueness of this summary judgment standard, we have held that 

our own standard of review must adapt. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. 

v. Michael F. ex rel. Barry F., 118 F.3d 245, 252 (5th Cir. 1997).

We review mixed questions of law and fact, such as whether the 

district court correctly decided whether a local school district’s IEP or its 

proposed alternative placement was appropriate, de novo. E.R. ex rel. E.R. v. 

Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 909 F.3d 754, 762 (5th Cir. 2018) (per 

curiam). We review findings of fact, such as “findings that a disabled student 

obtained educational benefits under an IEP,” for clear error. Id. (citation 

omitted). “The clear error standard precludes reversal of a district court’s 

findings unless we are ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed.’” Id. at 766 (citation omitted). Because the 

IDEA “creates a presumption in favor of a school system’s educational 

plan,” the burden of proof rests on the party challenging that plan. White ex 

rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2003). 

Importantly, it is not our role “to second guess state and local policy 

decisions; rather it is the narrow one of determining whether state and local 

school officials have complied with the Act.” Id. (citation omitted).

IV.

H.W. asserts that her IEP erroneously strips her of a FAPE by 

removing her from the general education classroom and placing her in an 

overly restrictive environment. The District counters that its proposed IEP 

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is appropriate in light of her circumstances and that it placed her in her least 

restrictive environment. The District has the better argument.

We look to four factors when reviewing “whether an IEP is reasonably 

calculated to provide a meaningful education benefit under the IDEA”; 

namely, whether: “(1) the program is individualized on the basis of the 

student’s assessment and performance; (2) the program is administered in 

the least restrictive environment; (3) the services are provided in a 

coordinated and collaborative manner by the key ‘stakeholders’; and (4) 

positive academic and non-academic benefits are demonstrated.” Michael F., 

118 F.3d at 253; see also E.R., 909 F.3d at 765 (“Our court’s four Michael F. 

factors and the Supreme Court’s holding in Endrew F. do not conflict.”). 

While we have “never specified precisely how these factors must be 

weighed,” Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286, 293 (5th 

Cir. 2009), we have “long held that the fourth factor is critical.” Renee J. ex

rel. C.J. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 913 F.3d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation

omitted).

When the issue before us is whether the Act’s mainstreaming 

requirement has been met, the second Michael F. factor is guided by the twopart test set out in Daniel R.R. See R.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 607 F.3d 

1003, 1013 (5th Cir. 2010). Under that test, we must first ask “whether 

education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and 

services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child.” Daniel R.R., 874 

F.2d at 1048 (citing § 1412(5)(B)). If the answer is no, and the school 

“intends to provide special education or to remove the child from regular 

education,” we then ask “whether the school has mainstreamed the child to 

the maximum extent appropriate.” Id. (citing § 1412(5)(B)). A variety of 

factors inform us at each stage of this inquiry, though the factors are by no 

means exhaustive, nor a single factor dispositive. Id. Rather, each case must 

be reviewed through an “individualized, fact-specific inquiry.” Id.

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This case revolves around the least restrictive environment/

mainstreaming inquiry. Consequently, although we briefly address Michael 

F. factors 1, 3, and 4 at the outset,2 the majority of our analysis will concern 

Michael F. factor 2 and the corresponding Daniel R.R. inquiry.

A.

H.W.’s IEP was undoubtedly individualized. Between kindergarten 

and the beginning of her third-grade year, the ARDC developed at least ten 

IEPS and/or IEP amendments. These IEPs accounted for an FIE, FBAs and 

corresponding BIPs, and numerous progress reports. The ARDC showed 

that it was vigilant in its evaluation, observation, and assessment of H.W. and 

that it routinely updated H.W.’s IEP to reflect its individualized findings.

The ARDC overseeing H.W.’s IEPs was also comprised of key 

stakeholders who collaborated to reach the best possible decisions for H.W. 

For example, the ARDC members and participants who reviewed the 

proposed blended placement IEP were J.W., H.W.’s grandmother, a campus 

administrator, two general education teachers, a special education teacher, a 

licensed specialist in school psychology, two speech-language pathologists, 

an occupational therapist, a behavioral specialist, a coordinator for 

elementary special education services, and two parent advocates. This 

composition was common as a variety of family members, educators, 

specialists, and administrators frequently comprised H.W.’s ARDC.

Finally, it is undisputed that H.W. received some academic and nonacademic benefits from being educated in the general education classroom. 

The District concedes as much. The extent and meaningfulness of that 

2 The District summarily asserts that H.W. abandoned any challenge “to the lion’s 

share of Michael F. factors and limits her appeal to the second factor.” We disagree and 

address each factor.

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benefit, however, is disputed. We consider that dispute (which is 

encompassed in the first Daniel R.R. factor) along with the second Michael F. 

factor in the next section. 

B.

We must now determine whether the proposed blended placement 

IEP is H.W.’s least restrictive environment. As previously stated, we must 

first ask if H.W. could be satisfactorily educated in the regular classroom with 

supplemental aids and services. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048. If the answer 

is no, then we must ask whether the District mainstreamed H.W. “to the 

maximum extent appropriate.” Id.

i.

When deciding “whether education in the regular classroom, with the 

use of supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a 

given child[,]” we consider several non-exhaustive factors. Daniel R.R., 874 

F.2d at 1048. Those factors include: 

(1) “whether the state has taken steps to accommodate the 

handicapped child in regular education”; 

(2) “whether the child will receive an educational benefit from 

regular education”; 

(3) “the child’s overall educational experience in the 

mainstreamed environment, balancing the benefits of regular 

and special education for each individual child”; and 

(4) “what effect the handicapped child’s presence has on the 

regular classroom environment and, thus, on the education 

that the other students are receiving.”

Id. at 1048–49.

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The District took steps to accommodate H.W.

It is apparent from the record that the District tried to accommodate 

H.W. in the general education setting. The next question is whether the 

District’s efforts were sufficient. Id. at 1048. The answer is yes. The District 

provided H.W. with an FIE before she started kindergarten and, based on the 

results, implemented a modified curriculum with inclusion support and 

therapy. After noticing behavioral issues, it ordered an FBA, developed a 

BIP, and amended her IEP to address those issues. The ARDC also further 

modified H.W.’s curriculum while keeping her in general education.

Throughout H.W.’s first- and second-grade years, the ARDC 

repeatedly amended H.W.’s IEP to address her inadequate progress. It kept 

her in general education while increasing her inclusion support, resource 

room time, and special education components; addressing her behavioral 

problems; and providing her with ESY services. It was only after multiple 

attempts at keeping H.W. in a general education classroom that the District 

proposed the blended placement IEP. These are not the “mere token 

gestures” that Daniel R.R. prohibits. Id. at 1048. Quite the opposite, the 

District provided H.W. with individualized, one-on-one care that it 

frequently adapted to meet her evolving needs.

H.W. did not receive meaningful academic and non-academic benefits 

in general education.

The next factors to consider are: (1) whether H.W. was receiving an 

educational benefit from the District’s efforts; and (2) H.W.’s overall 

experience in general education when “balancing the benefits of regular and 

special education for [her].” Id. at 1048–49. The parties agree that H.W. 

was receiving some academic and non-academic benefits in general education; 

however, they disagree on whether those benefits were meaningful.

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To determine whether H.W. was receiving an educational benefit in 

general education, we must focus on her “ability to grasp the essential 

elements of the regular education curriculum.” Id. at 1049. This means that 

we must “pay close attention to the nature and severity of [her] handicap as 

well as to the curriculum and goals of the regular education class.” Id. And, 

again, we cannot be satisfied with a “de minimis” educational benefit; 

instead, we must ascertain “progress appropriate in light of [her]

circumstances.” Endrew F., 137. S. Ct. at 999.

This leads us to the critical question in this case: how should we 

measure H.W.’s “progress”? Put another way: should we primarily rely on 

H.W.’s progress toward her IEP goals or instead look to her overall academic 

record when determining whether she is making appropriate progress? H.W. 

advocates for the former and the District advocates for the latter. We agree 

with the District and write to provide clarity on this matter.

For a child fully integrated into general education, an IEP is 

appropriate when it is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve 

passing marks and advance from grade to grade.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204. 

If grade-level enhancement “is not ‘a reasonable prospect for the child,’” 

such as in H.W.’s case, then the educational program for a disabled student 

must be “appropriately ambitious in light of [her] circumstances, just as 

advancement from grade to grade is appropriately ambitious for most 

children in the regular classroom.” R.S. ex rel. Ruth B. v. Highland Park 

Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting 

Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000).

This does not mean that grade-level advancement and tests scores 

cannot be considered when determining whether a student in the second 

category is appropriately progressing. Advancement and test scores are still 

valid, important metrics that we can consider. See Leigh Ann H. v. Riesel

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Indep. Sch. Dist., 18 F. 4th 788, 798 n.12 (5th Cir. 2021) (Elrod, J.); D.C. v.

Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 860 F. App’x 894, 904–05 (5th Cir. 2021); Hous.

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349–50 (5th Cir. 2000). It simply 

means that test scores and advancement from grade to grade are not per se 

indicators for either removal or the provision of a FAPE. See Endrew F., 137 

S. Ct. at 1000 & n.2.

Further, we have held that “[a] disabled child’s development should 

be measured not by his relation to the rest of the class, but rather with respect 

to the individual student.” Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349; see also Hous. Indep. 

Sch. Dist. v. V.P. ex rel. Juan P., 582 F.3d 576, 589 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding 

the same). In fact, Daniel R.R. held that the IDEA requires states to “tolerate 

educational differences” and “accepts the notion that handicapped students 

will participate in regular education but that some of them will not benefit as 

much as nonhandicapped students will.” 874 F.2d at 1047; see id. (“[W]e 

cannot predicate access to regular education on a child’s ability to perform 

on par with nonhandicapped children.”); but see id. at 1049 (holding that 

“mainstreaming would be pointless if we forced instructors to modify the 

regular education curriculum to the extent that the handicapped child is not 

required to learn any of the skills normally taught in regular education”).

Reading some tension or ambiguities into our precedents, and relying 

on an out-of-circuit case, H.W. asserts that the court should adopt an IEPcentric test to measure the adequacy of her educational progress. According 

to H.W., Hovem; A.B. ex rel. Jamie B. v. Clear Creek Independent School 

District, 787 F. App’x 217 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished); and a 

Sixth Circuit case, L.H. v. Hamilton County Department of Education, 900 

F.3d 779, 793 (6th Cir. 2018), all stand for the proposition that that “the IEP 

is precisely the proper yardstick for measurement of progress.” H.W. is 

incorrect.

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Considerfirst the cases H.W. relies on to argue for an IEP-centric test. 

According to H.W., Hovem held that “an IEP cannot be held inadequate 

merely because it does not address all of the specific weaknesses a child might 

have by virtue of that child’s disability.” In one sense, H.W. is correct. 

Hovem did hold that an IEP that did not lead to improved writing and spelling 

skills—the disabilities at issue—still provided a FAPE. 690 F.3d at 397. But 

H.W.’s conclusion that Hovem consequently made the IEP the proper 

benchmark for measuring progress does not follow. 

Hovem held that the underlying district court legally erred when it 

focused on disability remediation rather than overall academic record. Id. 

Relying on Rowley, we concluded that the “educational benefit” inquiry 

cannot be defined “exclusively or even primarily in terms of correcting the 

child’s disability.” Id. Rather, the inquiry should properly focus on a 

holistic, overall academic record perspective instead of a narrow, disability 

remediation perspective. Id. at 399; see also id. at 406 (Stewart, J., dissenting) 

(“[T]he majority reasons that educational benefit in the area of disability is 

not a primary concern under the IDEA.”).

A.B., an unpublished case, is likely unavailing. There, the school 

district argued that A.B.’s progress “was entirely the result of his modified 

curriculum and paraprofessional support, such that his success had nothing 

to do with his being in a general-education environment.” A.B., 787 F. App’x 

at 222. We rejected that argument, holding that A.B. “[did] not need to 

demonstrate that he was receiving a special benefit from the generaleducation setting in order to merit being placed there,” because the 

“preference for general education is built into the IDEA.” Id. at 223–24. 

A.B. certainly stands for the proposition that the effect that special education 

support and services are having on a student’s academic progress must be 

considered. But it does not mean that the IEP is the litmus test for measuring 

said progress.

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Finally, H.W. turns to the Sixth Circuit’s holding in L.H. to support 

her IEP-centric test. There, the Sixth Circuit held that “the appropriate 

[mainstreaming] yardstick is whether the child, with appropriate 

supplemental aids and services, can make progress toward the [ ] IEP[’s] 

goals in the regular education setting.” 900 F.3d at 793 (citation omitted). 

We have never adopted such a test and L.H. is obviously not binding on us. 

More importantly, as we demonstrate next, L.H.’s test is at odds with our 

holistic approach. See, e.g., Hovem, 690 F.3d at 397; Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 

349; Michael F., 118 F.3d at 253; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1047.

Despite an attempt to read tension into our precedents, our 

precedents—and the Supreme Court’s for that matter—favor an overall 

academic record-based review. Rowley, Endrew F., Michael F., Daniel R.R., 

Hovem, A.B., D.C., and the like all have one thing in common: they require 

courts to review each student’s case in a fact-intensive, individualized, 

holistic manner. Hovem places overall academic record, rather than disability 

remediation, at the forefront. 690 F.3d at 398. A.B. states that special 

education support and services cannot be discounted. 787 F. App’x at 222–

23. Endrew F. focuses on individual, appropriate progress. 137 S. Ct. at 999. 

Daniel R.R. rejects the temptation to compare a disabled student to her 

typically developing peers. 874 F. 2d at 1047. And D.C. says that while test 

scores and the like are not dispositive, they are important metrics. 860 F. 

App’x at 904–05.

So, here, rather than assessing whether H.W. is receiving an 

educational benefit by comparing her progress to her typically developing 

peers, we must assess H.W.’s individual progress. Daniel R.R., 847 F.2d at 

1047. To make this judgment, we must look to her overall academic success, 

not whether her disability has been remedied. Hovem, 690 F.3d at 397–99. 

The extent to which H.W. has progressed on her IEP goals and objectives, as 

well as her test scores and percentile rankings, can aid this process, but no 

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one factor can overwhelm it. D.C., 860 F. App’x at 904–05; see also Hovem, 

690 F.3d at 397 (considering the student’s “IEPs, his high school educational 

record, his assessments[,] and the administrative hearing record); A.A. v.

Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d 678, 691 (5th Cir. 2020) (Stewart, J.) 

(Clement, J., concurring) (considering overall academic progress and IEP 

progress reports); P.P. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 839 F. App’x 848, 856 (5th 

Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished) (same). And while we cannot affirm 

the District’s proposed blended placement IEP simply because H.W. is 

falling behind her typically developing peers, we can do so if we agree that 

her “individual needs” make removal appropriate. Daniel R.R., 847 F.2d at 

1049.

Here, the district court correctly reviewed H.W.’s overall academic 

record and found that she was not making appropriate progress in light of her 

circumstances. Indeed, that record—which includes test scores, percentile 

rankings, IEP progress reports, testimony from qualified professionals, and 

the like—reveals that H.W. could not “grasp the essential elements of the 

regular education curriculum.” Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049. 

Start with H.W.’s progress reports for March 2, 2020—H.W.’s most 

persuasive evidence. The progress reports tracked H.W’s progress toward 

17 IEP goals/objectives. H.W. “mastered” 11 of those 17 goals. While H.W. 

undoubtedly mastered many of her IEP goals, she was still unable to make 

consistent and/or appropriate progress toward several of those goals in a 

general education setting. The ARDC frequently reconvened to try and help 

her meet her goals. It gradually increased the assistance afforded to her. And 

it even lowered her mastery criteria with her parent’s consent—an implicit 

acknowledgement from H.W.’s parents that she was making inadequate 

progress. Yet H.W. still struggled in many regards. What is more, some of 

those goals were not mastered until October 2020, seven months after the 

blended placement IEP was proposed. Although later completion does not 

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negate H.W.’s mastery, it does provide even more clarity for why the District 

proposed the blended placement IEP. 

As we previously stated, progress toward IEP goals is not dispositive. 

Even though H.W. ultimately mastered many of her goals, she was still 

regressing and falling behind in other areas, such as test scores and percentile 

rankings. For instance, from the spring of first grade to the winter of second 

grade, H.W. declined in percentage correct on math and reading questions 

on the Universal Screener Test. Similarly, the same test showed that H.W. 

was in the first percentile in every category for first and second grade. As the 

District argues, these test scores and percentile rankings had real classroom 

consequences; namely, that H.W. could no longer functionally engage with 

her peers or the general education curriculum.

H.W.’s second-grade year is illustrative. For that year, her 

curriculum had to be modified from a second-grade level to a prekindergarten or prerequisite level. Even with a significantly modified 

curriculum and constant one-on-one assistance, she failed every subject and 

fell further behind the general education curriculum. And the record reveals 

numerous examples of the disparity between her modified curriculum and 

the general education curriculum. Contrary to H.W.’s protestations, this 

remark is not a comparison of her to her typically developing peers; rather, it 

is a statement of her factual stagnation. 

H.W.’s overall educational experience also favors the District’s 

decision. Both the district court and the hearing officer found, and the record 

supports, that H.W.’s overall “benefit from the regular classroom setting 

was minimal at best”; she was “less aggressive and exhibited her disruptive 

behaviors less in the special education setting”; and her “abilities, along with 

her needs for attention, consistent prompts, redirection, and reinforcement, 

and her limited engagement with her peers in the regular classroom activities 

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emphasize her need for specialized instruction.” The district court did note

that H.W. could potentially “benefit from the language models of her peers 

in the regular education setting or in other ways.” Nevertheless, it correctly 

concluded that the preponderance of the evidence supported the District’s 

decision.

H.W. had a disruptive effect on the classroom.

We must also consider what effect, if any, H.W. had on the general 

education classroom. The hearing officer and district court found that 

although there was no direct evidence of H.W. impairing the education of 

other students, the totality of the evidence established that she had a 

“negative, detrimental” effect on others. H.W. argues that the district court 

and hearing officer erred in finding that she had a disruptive effect on others. 

Her arguments again fall short.

First, the record shows that H.W. occasionally bit, kicked, or struck 

staff members or teachers resulting in the need for a trip to the school nurse. 

Her proposed blended placement IEP further states that she hit, bit, and 

kicked staff and peers; yelled, screamed, moaned, and grunted in the 

classroom; and swiped materials off desks. That document also describes 

other inappropriate behavior that eventually ceased. It concludes by stating 

that the challenging behaviors are “least likely to occur during movement 

breaks, resource time, and recess.” Testimony at the due process hearing 

confirmed the contents of H.W.’s proposed IEP. And, contrary to her 

arguments on appeal, the March 2020 proposal evinces that the District did 

note her problematic behaviors as a ground for removal.

H.W. also arguesthat the District should have exercised other options 

to dispel any behavioral issues rather than proposing a blended placement. 

H.W. concedes that the District tried to implement some of the very options 

she recommends. Still, she asks us for more. It is H.W.’s burden to establish 

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that the District’s decision violates the IDEA. As Endrew F. stated, our

review of an IEP must be limited to whether the IEP is reasonable, not ideal. 

137 S. Ct. at 999. Were it otherwise, we would be permitted to usurp the 

authority of state and local school officials and rewrite policy as we see fit. 

White, 343 F.3d at 377. But that is not the case. Our review is narrow, limited 

to simply deciding whether school officials have complied with the Act. Id. 

H.W. has not carried her burden to show that the District’s decision violated 

the Act; thus, our analysis must end here.3

ii.

Finally, we consider the second Daniel R.R. factor: whether the 

District mainstreamed H.W. to the maximum extent appropriate. H.W. 

asserts that the district court erred because the proposed blended placement 

IEP does not satisfy the IDEA’s least restrictive environment mandate. She

argues that her proposed IEP is analogous to the IEP in A.B., which we held 

to violate the IDEA, and concludes that we should reverse. We decline that 

invitation.

The IDEA requires “schools to offer a continuum of services.” 

Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050 (citations omitted). This means that schools 

“must take intermediate steps where appropriate[.]” Id. (footnote omitted). 

Because mainstreaming determinations require independent, case-by-case 

evaluations, “[t]he appropriate mix [of general to special education classes] 

will vary from child to child.” Id. To comply with the IDEA, a student’s 

3 Contrary to H.W.’s arguments on appeal, the district court did not predicate her 

access to general education on her ability to perform on par with her typically developing 

peers. Further, we need not rely on any testimony discussing the “class within a class” 

argument. See Lauren C. ex rel. Tracey K. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 904 F.3d 363, 374 

(5th Cir. 2018) (holding that we could affirm on any ground supported by the record).

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plan must provide for exposure to nonhandicapped students to the maximum 

extent appropriate.

In A.B., we held that A.B. could be, and had been, “educated 

satisfactorily in the regular classroom,” and that his removal from general 

education consequently violated the IDEA. 787 F. App’x at 223. We reached 

this holding based, in part, on three of the underlying district court’s findings: 

(1) A.B. received positive academic and non-academic benefits in general 

education; (2) he exhibited more progress in a general education than special 

education setting; and (3) he resolved his behavioral issues. Id. at 222–23. 

We also compared A.B. to the student in Brillon v. Klein Independent School 

District, 100 F. App’x 309 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished). 

In Brillon, we held that a student was properly placed in special 

education when he: (1) was not making academic progress in the general 

education setting and received an undiscernible social benefit from education 

among typically developing peers; (2) performed better in the special 

education setting; and (3) required a modified curriculum that changed the 

general education curriculum “beyond recognition.” Id. at 313–14. Noting 

that the student’s individual circumstances were critical to our holding in 

Brillon, and that those circumstances were not present in A.B., we held that 

unlike the student in Brillon, A.B. could not be removed to a special education 

setting. A.B., 787 F. App’x at 223.

H.W. asserts that she is more like the student in A.B. than the student 

in Brillon. That is simply not the case. As the District points out, the 

similarities between H.W. and A.B. begin and end with their heavily modified

curriculums, inclusion support, and inability to maintain the pace of their 

peers. Unlike A.B., though, H.W. received minimal academic benefit. 

Further, testimony evidenced that she often performed better in the resource 

room and the special education speech-language room than in general 

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education settings. Finally, while A.B. was primarily moved for behavioral 

issues that subsided, H.W. was primarily moved for academic issues and 

many of her behavioral issues have not subsided. H.W.’s placement is not 

analogous to A.B.—it is analogous to Brillon.

A.B. and Brillon aside, the record establishes that H.W. was placed in 

her least restrictive environment. H.W.’s IEP was incrementally amended 

over a course of approximately three years. Each amendment provided for 

either more inclusion support, special education, or resource room time. 

Although H.W. occasionally saw glimpses of progress, the bottom line was 

one of stagnation, minimal improvement, and, at times, even regression. The 

proposed blended placement IEP was the next logical step when the District 

found that H.W. was still not improving. H.W. has not carried her burden to 

establish that the District’s decision violated the IDEA.

* * *

AFFIRMED.

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