[Cite as Pfouts v. Pfouts, 2018-Ohio-4554.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

KNOX COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SHERRIE K. PFOUTS JUDGES: 

 Hon. John W. Wise, P.J 

 Plaintiff – Appellee Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

 Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- 

 Case No. 18CA4 

MICHAEL G. PFOUTS 

 

 Defendant – Appellant O P I N IO N 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Knox County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 16DV11-0224 

 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: November 8, 2018 

APPEARANCES: 

 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

ALYSSE L. GILES CHRISTIAN D. ROLAND 

Giles Law Group 5179 N. Bank Road 

109 E. High Street Buckeye Lake, OH 43008 

Mt. Vernon, OH 43050 

 

 
Knox County, Case No. 18CA4 2 

Hoffman, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Michael G. Pfouts appeals the decree of divorce entered by the 

Knox County Common Pleas Court. Appellee is Sherrie K. Pfouts. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} Appellee filed the instant divorce action on November 22, 2016. The parties 

were married in 1980, and have two children born as issue of the marriage, both adults 

at the time the action was filed. 

{¶3} On October 12, 2017, the parties appeared before a magistrate in the Knox 

County Common Pleas Court for a final hearing. The parties entered into a settlement 

agreement, which was signed by both parties and the magistrate. The settlement 

agreement was filed on October 13, 2017. 

{¶4} Appellee submitted her proposed decree for divorce on January 3, 2018, 

noting Appellant did not approve the decree because he wished to change the previously 

agreed upon provisions concerning spousal support to add the condition support would 

terminate upon the cohabitation of Appellee with an unrelated adult male. Appellant filed 

a response, asking the court to modify the proposed decree, adding language which 

would terminate spousal support upon the death of either party, the marriage or 

cohabitation of Appellee, or as a result of further court order. Appellant further requested 

the court retain continuing jurisdiction to modify the award. 

{¶5} The court signed the proposed decree without modifying the spousal 

support provisions as requested by Appellant. It is from the January 22, 2018 decree of 

divorce Appellant prosecutes this appeal, assigning as error: 
Knox County, Case No. 18CA4 3 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO HOLD AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING PRIOR TO ADOPTING THE PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE’S PROPOSED DECREE OF DIVORCE WHEN THERE WAS 

A DISAGREEMENT ABOUT THE TERMS OR EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF 

A COMPLETE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 

{¶6} This case comes to us on the accelerated calendar. App.R. 11.1, which 

governs accelerated calendar cases, provides, in pertinent part: 

(E) Determination and judgment on appeal. 

The appeal will be determined as provided by App.R. 11.1. It shall 

be sufficient compliance with App.R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason 

for the court's decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary 

form. 

The decision may be by judgment entry in which case it will not be 

published in any form. 

{¶7} This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned 

rule. 

{¶8} Appellant argues the court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing 

before adopting the proposed decree of divorce. However, in his response to the 

proposed decree, he did not request an evidentiary hearing, he merely requested terms 

be added concerning spousal support. 
Knox County, Case No. 18CA4 4 

{¶9} The settlement agreement states, “There may be other details to be 

negotiated upon finalization of entry. By signing below, you are acknowledging that you 

understand the terms and conditions set forth herein, and agree to be bound by them!!!” 

Appellant signed the settlement agreement, which included specific terms of spousal 

support. The form used for the agreement included a line which stated, “Reasons for 

spousal support to terminate, if any.” The line was left blank. The agreement further 

provided the court shall retain jurisdiction to modify the order in specific circumstances 

concerning Appellant’s retirement. Although the agreement stated other details may be 

negotiated upon finalization of the entry, the agreement specifically set forth the terms of 

spousal support, which Appellant agreed to be bound by when he signed the agreement. 

{¶10} At the hearing, Appellant testified as follows: 

Q Do you agree to the spousal support arrangement that is $2,500 

from you to your soon to be ex-wife until you reach the age of 65? 

A Yes. 

Q And that is qualified by the arrangement with your pension, 

correct? 

A Yes. 

{¶11} Tr. 9. 

{¶12} As such, Appellant indicated he agreed to the terms of spousal support as 

set forth in the signed agreement. 
Knox County, Case No. 18CA4 5 

{¶13} Appellant relies on Rulli v. Fan Company, 79 Ohio St. 3d 374, 683 N.E.2d 

337, 1997-Ohio-380, in support of his proposition the court was required to hold an 

evidentiary hearing prior to entering judgment. In Rulli, the Ohio Supreme Court held: 

Though upon first examination, the settlement terms as read into the 

record on June 23, 1993, appear reasonably clear, the parties were 

subsequently unable to agree upon the meaning and effect of those terms. 

They were unable to execute a formal purchase agreement and they did not 

provide the court with an entry as ordered by the court. The parties instead 

offered varying interpretations of the terms read into the record, and 

disputed nearly every major element of the purported agreement. 

Therefore, the language read into the record at the initial hearing reflects, 

at best, merely an agreement to make a contract. 

Given the lack of finality and the dispute that evolved subsequent to 

the initial settlement hearing, we hold that the trial judge should have 

conducted an evidentiary hearing to resolve the parties' dispute about the 

existence of an agreement or the meaning of its terms as read into the 

record at the hearing, before reducing the matter to judgment. Where 

parties dispute the meaning or existence of a settlement agreement, a court 

may not force an agreement upon the parties. To do so would be to deny 

the parties' right to control the litigation, and to implicitly adopt (or explicitly, 

as the trial court did here) the interpretation of one party, rather than enter 

judgment based upon a mutual agreement. In the absence of such a factual 
Knox County, Case No. 18CA4 6 

dispute, a court is not required to conduct such an evidentiary hearing. Mack 

v. Polson Rubber Co. (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 34, 14 OBR 335, 470 N.E.2d 

902, syllabus. 

Where the meaning of terms of a settlement agreement is disputed, 

or where there is a dispute that contests the existence of a settlement 

agreement, a trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to 

entering judgment. 

{¶14} Id. at 376-77. 

{¶15} The instant case is distinguishable from Rulli. The parties did not disagree 

about the meaning of terms of the settlement agreement, nor was there a dispute 

contesting the existence of a settlement agreement. Rather, Appellant wanted to change 

the previous agreement by adding additional terms regarding spousal support. We find 

the trial court did not err in failing to sua sponte hold an evidentiary hearing prior to 

adopting the proposed decree of divorce submitted by Appellee. 

 
Knox County, Case No. 18CA4 7 

{¶16} The assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶17} The judgment of the Knox County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. Costs 

are assessed to Appellant. 

 

By: Hoffman, J. 

Wise, P.J. and 

Baldwin, J. concur