2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10-1-2009

Siravo v. Country Wide Home

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 07-4108

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Recommended Citation

"Siravo v. Country Wide Home" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 528.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/528
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-4108

___________

N.V. SIRAVO; *F.A. SIRAVO

vs.

COUNTRY WIDE HOME LOAN; DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST

COMPANY, Trustee; MORGAN STANLEY ABS CAPITAL I, INC., TRUST 2004-

NCZ, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-NCZ

N.V. SIRAVO, Appellant

*(Dismissed per Clerk’s Order of 12/4/07)

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-07-cv-01112)

District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 14, 2009

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges

 (Opinion filed: October 1, 2009) 

 

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Nicholas V. Siravo appeals from the dismissal of his civil suit
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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, we will

affirm. 

On June 28, 2007, Nicholas and Felicia Siravo filed suit in federal district

court against Appellees Countrywide Home Loan (“Countrywide”), Deutsche Bank

National Trust Company and Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I., Inc. alleging breach of

contract, predatory lending, negligence, and unspecified civil rights and due process

violations. Their claims arose out of Countrywide’s alleged misrepresentations about their

mortgage, including Countrywide’s alleged failure to properly notify them of the change

in mortgage servicers and their resultant problems in obtaining credit and financing. 

Ultimately, the Siravos lost their home to a foreclosure action. 

Prior to the initiation of their federal suit, the Siravos had filed three

lawsuits in state court alleging harm arising out of the same initial set of facts alleged

here. The November 2004 suit, filed by Nicholas Siravo only, sought damages against

Countrywide for lack of notice regarding the change in the company servicing the

mortgage. Siravo claimed that the lack of notice resulted in a missed mortgage payment. 

Siravo v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., November Term, 2004, No. 1774 (Pa. Ct.

Com. Pl. Nov. 2004). That lawsuit settled on March 3, 2005, with an agreement by

Siravo to a general release of all existing claims against Countrywide arising out of the

mortgage loan. The second suit, filed in July 2005, sought damages against Countrywide

for breach of the settlement agreement. Siravo v. Deutsche Countrywide Home Loans,
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Inc., July Term, 2005, No. 1914 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. July 2005). The court dismissed the

case without prejudice for Siravo’s failure to substantiate breach of the settlement

agreement and for his failure to demonstrate what damages were suffered. Apparently,

Siravo did not appeal or seek reconsideration of the court’s order. 

In December 2005, the Siravos filed a third lawsuit. The complaint once

again sought damages for Countrywide’s failure to notify and breach of the settlement

agreement. See Siravo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. et. al., December Term, 2005,

No. 2259 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 2005). In addition to naming Countrywide, the Siravos

sought damages against Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley with regard to the mortgage

foreclosure resulting from the missed loan payments. On August 21, 2006, the Court of

Common Pleas dismissed the suit as repetitive of the first. The court also advised the

Siravos that their proper remedy was to re-open the order disposing of the 2004 suit. 

Taking the court’s suggestion, Siravo attempted to re-open his first case against

Countrywide, arguing that Appellees breached the settlement agreement resolving that

action. Siravo also filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The Court of

Common Pleas denied both of motions and Siravo did not appeal those orders.

 Following dismissal of their third lawsuit in state court, the Siravos filed the

instant complaint alleging that Appellees violated their civil rights and various federal

laws. Countrywide moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that it was barred by res

judicata and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The District Court granted its motion and,
 Felicia Siravo has been dismissed from this appeal pursuant to a Clerk’s order. 1

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citing the doctrine of res judicata, dismissed the case. This appeal followed. 

1

We have jurisdiction over final orders of district courts under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. Our review of the district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) is plenary. McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009). 

We agree with Appellees that Siravo’s claims are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine and therefore the District Court should have dismissed the case for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prohibits District Courts

from adjudicating actions in which the relief requested requires determining whether the

state court’s decision is wrong or voiding the state court’s ruling.” Walker v. Horn, 385

F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) Here, to

the extent that Siravo attempts to challenge Countrywide’s servicing of his loan, those

claims were resolved in a state court settlement agreement. Siravo attempted to file a

separate lawsuit concerning the agreement and, when that failed, attempted to re-open the

original case and also filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The Court of

Common Pleas denied both motions and Siravo did not appeal. (Supp. App. 12-13.) The

relief Siravo now seeks would require a federal court to either invalidate the settlement

agreement or determine that the state court’s refusal to re-examine the parties’

compliance with the agreement was wrong. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, neither

is permissible. See Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir.
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2003).

Further, even if Siravo’s claims were not barred by Rooker-Feldman, they

would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The principle of res judicata bars claims

that were brought, or could have been brought, in a previous action. In re Mullarkey, 536

F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). The District Court properly applied the same factors a

Pennsylvania court would apply in determining whether res judicata bars Siravo’s federal

claims, namely: 1) whether the action in the Court of Common Pleas involved the same

“cause of action” as the federal claims; 2) whether the parties had the capacities to sue or

be sued in the Court of Common Pleas; and 3) whether the litigation in the Court of

Common Pleas resulted in a decision on the merits. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459,

466 (2006); Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir.

2006) (listing factors necessary for res judicata inquiry).

Here, the first element is satisfied inasmuch as Siravo’s first complaint,

which led to the settlement agreement, contained the same allegation as his federal

complaint: that miscommunications regarding his loan and errors Countrywide committed

led to the foreclosure of his house. (Supp. App. 61-67.) Further, Siravo’s third lawsuit

brought claims related to Countrywide’s breach of the settlement agreement. Second,

while Siravo named only Countrywide in the first complaint, he could have named both

Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley and did so in the third lawsuit. In any event, though

he names both Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley in the caption, it does not appear that
Siravo makes any claims against either of these defendants in his federal complaint. 

Third, under Pennsylvania law, a court-approved settlement, such as the one Siravo

agreed to, constitutes a final, valid judgment for purposes of claim preclusion. Bearoff v.

Bearoff Bros., Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 75 (Pa. 1974). Finally, the Court of Common Pleas

dismissed Siravo’s third state court lawsuit with prejudice but noted that Siravo had an

option to re-open the 2004 action. As discussed above, Siravo’s attempts to re-open that

action were unsuccessful. We therefore find that the state courts also rejected the merits

of Siravo’s claims based on breach of the settlement agreement. See Gambocz v.

Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1972) (“[d]ismissal with prejudice constitutes an

adjudication of the merits as fully and completely as if the order had been entered after

trial”) (citation omitted). Thus, even if not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

Siravo’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District

Court.

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