alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE DONNA
KARAN INTERNATIONAL INC. FORM 10-Q AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-03-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-27-1998
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<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  121,333
<ALLOWANCES>                                    38,452
<INVENTORY>                                     77,150
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               202,227
<PP&E>                                          67,664
<DEPRECIATION>                                  36,493
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 268,573
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           91,457
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<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                           216
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   268,573
<SALES>                                        476,576
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               476,576
<CGS>                                          359,118
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  359,118
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               109,571
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,768
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,142
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,825
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,317
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<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,317
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .15
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</TABLE>
1997 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-16-1997

In Re: Henry Fegeley

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 96-5428

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"In Re: Henry Fegeley" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 158.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/158
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 No. 96-5428 

 In Re: Henry Fegeley 

 The following modifications have been made to the Court's opinion issued on July 8, 1997 in 

the above-entitled appeal and will appear as part of the final version of the opinion: 

 In the above reference slip opinion, on page 3, after the second line please insert roman 

numeral "I." 

 On page 3, fourth full paragraph, line 3, insert the word "by" between the words "with the." 

 On page 3, fifth full paragraph, line 4, insert "26" before "I.R.C." 

 On page 5, roman numerals "I" and "II" should be changed to "II" and "III" respectively. 

 On page 9, roman numeral "III" should be changed to "IV." 

 Also please note that on page 6, line 4, page 7, line 16, and page 9, line 10, the single quote 

should appear before the double quote. 

 /s/ P. Douglas Sisk, 

 Clerk 

July 16, 1997
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2000

In re: ALVITA KAREN GUNN,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 

(8:09-cr-00213-RWT-4; 8:14-cv-00167-RWT)

Submitted: January 22, 2015 Decided: January 26, 2015

Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Alvita Karen Gunn, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Alvita Karen Gunn petitions for a writ of mandamus, 

seeking this court’s review of her motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

(2012) or, alternatively, an order recusing the district court 

judge. Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used 

only in extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 

426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Further, mandamus relief is available 

only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. 

United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 517 (4th Cir. 2003). 

Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. In re 

Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007).

We conclude that the relief sought by Gunn is not 

available by way of mandamus. Moreover, to the extent that Gunn 

argues delay by the district court, our review of the district 

court’s docket reveals that the court has ruled on Gunn’s 

motion. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus and 

the motion for bail or release pending appeal. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
_______________________________________ __ Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

September 28, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh 127622 & (39)(40) Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Stephen J. Markman, Plaintiff-Appellee, Justices

v SC: 127622 COA: 249892 Wayne CC: 03-004221-01 DAYLON LAMOND RANDALL, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the applicati on for leave to app eal the October 26, 2004 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The

motions for immediate consideration a nd for peremptory reversal are DENIED.

d0919 I, CORBIN R. DAVIS, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 28, 2005

Clerk
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 18

- 360 7

_____________________________ S EDRIC D EON B ROOKS J R

. , Appellant,

v.

S TATE O F F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. W. Joel Boles , Judge

. June 11, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

. W OLF , W ETHERELL , and M AKAR , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee
, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney Genera l, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
#### CRIDDLE v. STATE.

No. 20956.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 3, 1940.

T. R. Florey, Jr., of Ml. Pleasant, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., oí Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is assault with intent to murder; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for one year.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception. No question is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
#### JACKSON v. BIRK.

No. 13157.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

April 26, 1935.

Smoot &" Smoot, of Wichita Falls, for plaintiff in error.

John C. Kay and Bert King, both of Wichita Falls; for defendant in error.

LATTIMORE, Justice.

Plaintiff in error, being sued, filed no answer on appearance day, September 5, 1933. George Smoot filed a document which he styled a motion to quash the citation and which he signed as amicus curi®. He called this motion to the court’s attention, but the court declined to act on it at that time, whereupon the amicus requested the court to make entry of the filing of such motion on the trial docket, which was done.

Nothing further was done in the cause until a Saturday in November, 1933, when plaintiff’s attorney appeared and asked judgment by default, which was granted, and from which this appeal is taken.

The liberties of an amicus curi® are restricted to making suggestions to the court. Jones v. Jefferson, 66 Tex. 576, 579, 1 S. W. 903. In theory he does this as a “friend of the court.” Whether the court will hear him is wholly within the discretion of the judge. State v. Jefferson Iron Co., 60 Tex. 312. Correctly speaking, he has no right to file any “motion” (Andrews v. Beck, 23 Tex. 455, 459; Moseby v. Burrow, 52 Tex. 396, 403), and if he should, the same is still no more than his oral suggestion. If the court declines to hear him, no litigant can complain thereof on appeal. Of course, if the court does hear him and an error is thus called to the court’s attention, it is the court’s duty to avoid or correct it. Thus the amicus need not be an attorney or have any interest in the case, and litigants or their counsel who don the drab habits of amicus curi® are subject to having their acts laid to their true owner.

Therefore, plaintiff in error assigns no sustainable error to the action of the trial court in ignoring the motion of Smoot, amicus curi®.

We examine the record to see if same sustains a default judgment.

The citation summoned the defendant to answer a foreclosure suit; the judgment is for title and possession and damages for rental value. The citation does not support such a judgment, and the court was 'without jurisdiction of the person of defendant to render same. It does not state “the nature of the plaintiff’s demand.” Article 2022, R. S. The rights which a defendant has under a judgment of foreclosure even upon the same land are quite different from those in trespass to try title. Carlton v. Mayner, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 47, 103 S. W. 411.

Moreover, as to the damages, the trial court certifies to us that no evidence was taken thereon.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. §1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Webb Interactive Services, Inc. (the Company)
on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Lindley S. Branson, Vice President  General Counsel, the Companys principal
executive and principal financial officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: May 22, 2006



/s/ Lindley S. BransonVice President  General Counsel (Principal Executive and Principal Financial Officer)
EXHIBIT 32
                          __________

       CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND
                 PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
             PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
               AS ADDED BY SECTION 906 OF THE
                 SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the annual report of Union National
Financial Corporation on Form 10-K for the period ending December
31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the "Report"), I, Mark D. Gainer, Chairman/President/CEO, and I,
Clement M. Hoober, Treasurer/CFO, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as added pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.  The report fully complies with the requirements of
         Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
         1934.

     2.  To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report
         fairly presents, in all material respects the financial
         condition and results of operations of Union National as
         of the dates and for the periods expressed in the
         Report.

                  By  /s/ Mark D. Gainer
                      _______________________
                      Chairman/President/CEO

                  Date: March 31, 2006


                  By  /s/ Clement M. Hoober
                      _______________________
                      Treasurer/CFO

                  Date: March 31, 2006


<PAGE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ECHOSTAR SATELLITE BROADCASTING CORPORATION OF AND FOR
THE QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO THOSE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          42,156
<SECURITIES>                                     1,999
<RECEIVABLES>                                   87,423
<ALLOWANCES>                                     3,530
<INVENTORY>                                     81,974
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               232,095
<PP&E>                                         662,876
<DEPRECIATION>                                 127,547
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 989,557
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          338,827
<BONDS>                                      1,064,034
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   (441,258)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   989,557
<SALES>                                        681,139<F1>
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               696,944
<CGS>                                          417,330<F2>
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  735,788
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                88,410
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 8,201
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              90,735<F3>
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (127,254)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       220
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (127,474)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (127,474)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                (127,474)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                (127,474)
<FN>
<F1>Includes sales of programming.
<F2>Includes costs of programming.
<F3>Net of amounts capitalized.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### ROBERTSON v. STATE.

No. 20717.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 25, 1939.

Henry Taylor, of Temple, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

The conviction is for driving an automobile upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; penalty assessed at twenty-five days confinement in the county jail and a fine of $50.

The indictment appears to be in proper form. The record contains neither a statement of facts nor bills of exception. All matters of procedure appearing regular, the judgment is affirmed. •
#### SOUTHLAND GREYHOUND LINES, Inc., v. KING et ux.

No. 3169.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

March 14, 1935.

Rehearing Denied April 4, 1935.

E. L. Klett, of Lubbock, and Frank Stub-beman, of Midland, for appellant.

Whitaker & Peticolas, of El Paso, for ap-pellees.

' HIGGINS, Justice.

This is a suit by Buck King and wife, Savanna King, against appellant to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by Mrs. King in a collision between a Ford truck driven by Mrs. King and a bus of appellant at the intersection of Front and Wall streets in Midland, Tex. Upon special issue findings, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs for $4,250, from which the defendant appeals.

This is a companion case to Southland Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. King (Tex. Civ. App.) 77 S.W.(2d) 281, in which a writ of error had been granted by the Supreme Court. The plaintiff in that case was a passenger in the Ford truck. We refer to the opinion of this court in that case for statement of the circumstances under which the collision occurred.

All propositions submitted in the present appeal were presented in the appeal in the companion case. In this case, however, no question arises as to any improper remarks by the trial judge to the jury urging it to reach a verdict.

According to the Texas syllabi of February 13, 1935, the Supreme Court, in granting the writ of error in the companion case, did so upon the assignments complaining of said remarks and the refusal to submit appellant’s requested issue No. 12, inquiring whether the driver’s (Mrs. King’s) negligence in not undertaking to turn to the left was the sole proximate cause of the injury.

By its second proposition in this appeal, appellant complains of the refusal to submit the same requested issue No. 12, which reads:

> “(1) After Savanna King saw the motor bus approaching, did she undertake to cause •the Ford car to turn to the left?

> “(2) If not, was such failure negligence?

> “(3) Was such negligence, if any, a contributing proximate cause of the injury?

> “(4) Was such negligence, if any ,4 the sole proximate cause of the injury?”

*122We have again carefully considered the question so raised and adhere to the view expressed in the opinion of Justice Walthall in the companion case, that the refusal of such issue presents no error, because the same was sufficiently covered by other defensive issues in fact submitted.

We will not discuss the proposition further, for we assume the Supreme Court will also grant a writ of error in this case upon the ■ground that it was error to refuse submission of the issue. In view of'such probable action by the Supreme Court, further discussion by this court of its reasons for overruling the second proposition would be superfluous.

All other propositions here presented were decided against appellant in the other appeal and call for no further discussion.

Affirmed;
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7089

STEVEN WHEELER,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

R. ANGELONE, Director,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District

Judge. (CA-02-1562-AM)

Submitted: October 27, 2003 Decided: November 17, 2003

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Steven Wheeler, Appellant Pro Se. Mary Kathleen Beatty Martin,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Steven T. Wheeler seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)

(2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A petitioner satisfies this standard

by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his

constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, , 123 S. Ct.

1029, 1040 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000);

Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S.

941 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude

that Wheeler has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We also

deny Wheeler’s motion for the appointment of counsel. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-28-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-30-1997
<CASH>                                             223
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  118,042
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (25,895)
<INVENTORY>                                    101,863
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               231,867
<PP&E>                                          66,180
<DEPRECIATION>                                (30,673)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 290,159
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           73,773
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           215
<OTHER-SE>                                     204,291
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   290,159
<SALES>                                        158,776
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               158,776
<CGS>                                          113,738
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  113,738
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                44,556
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (280)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,494
<INCOME-TAX>                                       688
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                806
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       806
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.04
        

</TABLE>