SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3112-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

TROY BUNERO, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________

Submitted January 9, 2024 – Decided April 15, 2024 

Before Judges Sumners and Smith. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 14-02-0010.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on

the brief).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Adam David Klein, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3112-21

 Defendant Troy Bunero, a former supervisor in the North Bergen 

Department of Public Works (DPW), was indicted on February 20, 2014, for his 

role in a scheme diverting DPW resources for private use. The nine-count 

indictment included a count for third-degree theft by unlawful taking or 

disposition, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a) and 2C:2-6, alleging defendant "knowingly did 

unlawfully take or exercise unlawful control over the movable property of 

[DPW], including tools, equipment, vehicles, and employee services, including, 

but not limited to" by directing DPW employees to "work on one or more 

election campaigns" and perform work on defendant's home, his co-defendant's 

car, and another DPW supervisor's home, "for which they were paid for regular 

or overtime hours by [DPW]." 

Defendant pled not guilty to all counts. At trial, the court indicated it 

planned to instruct the jury on theft of services, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8(b), instead of 

theft by unlawful taking, pursuant to the theft consolidation statute, N.J.S.A. 

2C:20-2(a). A week later,1 the court issued the jury instructions, quoting the 

theft of services statute and describing the crime as "theft as a third[-]degree 

1

 We briefly stayed the trial, allowing the State to file an emergent motion for 

leave to appeal the trial court's order to charge the jury on the affirmative defense 

of duress, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-9(a). The State's leave to appeal was granted and the 

trial court's order was summarily reversed. 
3 A-3112-21

offense." The jury found defendant guilty on all counts, and he was 

subsequently sentenced to a five-year prison term. The conviction was affirmed 

on direct appeal. State v. Bunero, No. A-2126-15 (App. Div. Apr. 2, 2018), 

certif. denied, 235 N.J. 464 (2018).2

Following his unsuccessful direct appeal, defendant petitioned for postconviction relief (PCR), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition 

was denied without an evidentiary hearing on December 5, 2019. We affirmed 

in part but remanded for the PCR judge to address defendant's claim that his trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial court's 

jury instruction on theft of services. State v. Bunero, No. A-1896-19 (App. Div. 

May 3, 2021) (slip op. at 11). 

On February 28, 2022, PCR Judge Angelo Servidio, who replaced the 

retired initial PCR judge, issued an order denying defendant's claim without an 

evidentiary hearing and a written opinion supplementing the initial PCR judge's 

decision. Judge Servidio reasoned the indictment alleged defendant used 

township workers' services for private use, giving him sufficient "notice that 

theft of services was within the four corners of his [i]ndictment." State v. Talley, 

2

 Separately, we reversed a trial court order granting defendant's bail pending 

appeal. State v. Bunero, No. A-1848-15 (App. Div. June 21, 2016). 
4 A-3112-21

94 N.J. 385, 390-93 (1983); Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, cmt. 

2 on N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2 (2020) (observing "the common unifying conception in 

all theft offenses is the 'involuntary transfer of property'" without the owner's 

consent). Thus, the theft consolidation statute allowed the trial court "to charge 

the jury on theft of services" and trial counsel was not ineffective when trial 

counsel failed to oppose this instruction. 

In a single point, defendant argues before us: 

MR. BUNERO IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT COUNSEL 

RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY 

FAILING TO OBJECT TO A JURY CHARGE ON 

THEFT OF SERVICES. 

PCR is appropriate when a criminal defendant was substantially denied a 

constitutional right, such as the right to effective assistance of counsel. R. 3:22-

2(a); State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021). To establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel, the defendant must show: 1) "counsel's performance was 

deficient," and 2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 

58 (1987). The failure to file a meritless motion is not ineffective assistance of 

counsel. State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007). 
5 A-3112-21

An evidentiary hearing is held "only upon the establishment of a prima 

facie case in support of post-conviction relief." R. 3:22-10(b). A "prima facie 

case" requires a defendant "demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his or her 

claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will 

ultimately succeed on the merits," ibid., and must be supported by "specific facts 

and evidence supporting his allegations," State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 

(2013). "We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR petition without an 

evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion." State v. Peoples, 446 N.J. Super. 

245, 255 (App. Div. 2016) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992)). 

Applying these principles, we conclude defendant's contentions lack 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), and 

affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Servidio's thorough and 

cogent thirteen-page written decision. We add these brief remarks. 

The theft consolidation statute provides, in pertinent part: 

Conduct denominated theft . . . constitutes a single

offense . . . . A charge of theft . . . may be supported 

by evidence that it was committed in any manner that 

would be theft . . . under this chapter, notwithstanding 

the specification of a different manner in the indictment 

. . . [unless] the defense would be prejudiced by lack of 

fair notice or by surprise. 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(a) (emphasis added).] 
6 A-3112-21

Considering the charges against defendant, the statute allowed the trial 

court to instruct the jury on theft of services. The indictment alleged defendant 

had DPW employees renovate homes, repaint his co-defendant's car, and work 

on external election campaigns, all at DPW's expense. Theft of services requires 

showing the defendant, "having control over the disposition of services of 

another, to which he is not entitled, . . . knowingly divert[ed] such services to 

his own benefit or to the benefit of another not entitled thereto." N.J.S.A. 2C:20-

8(b). Because "defendant was provided with adequate notice of the charges" 

that were ultimately given to the jury, State v. Dorn, 233 N.J. 81, 96 (2018), 

there is no merit to his claim that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to 

the trial court's theft of services jury instruction. In failing to make a prima facie 

showing of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, defendant was 

not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 

Affirmed.