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Office petitioned to intervene as a party for the purposes of terminating 

the guardianship. After holding hearings on the matter, a hearing master 

issued a report recommending that the District Attorney's Office be 

allowed to intervene and that the guardianship be terminated. Upon 

receipt of the hearing master's report, the district court afforded the 

parties the opportunity to present new information at a hearing. 

Reviewing the evidence presented, the district court affirmed the 

recommendation of the hearing master and issued an order granting the 

intervention and terminating the guardianship. 2This appeal followed. 

On appeal, Christina contends that the District Attorney's 

Office lacked standing to both bring the petition and to intervene. 

Christina further argues that the district court improperly considered 

findings, established by a preponderance of evidence in a previous NRS 

432B.530 removal hearing, in the guardianship termination proceeding. 

She points out that clear-and-convincing evidence must support 

terminations of guardianship. NRS 159.1905. We disagree with Christina 

and therefore affirm the district court's order. 

The petition to intervene 

In support of her contention that the district court erred in 

granting the District Attorney's petition to intervene, Christina first 

argues that the District Attorney's Office lacked standing to bring the 

2The parties are familiar with the facts and we do not recount them 

further except as is necessary for our disposition. 

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petition. Standing is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. 

Arguello v. Sunset Stations, Inc., 127 Nev. 252 P.3d 206, 208 

(2011). In determining an issue of standing, this court examines statutory 

language to determine if the statute confers greater rights of standing 

than allowed by the Constitution. Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of 

Reno, 125 Nev. 625, 630-31, 218 P.3d 847, 851 (2009). NRS 159.1853(1)(e) 

provides that lalny other interested person" may petition a court to have 

a guardian removed. 

The District Attorney's duties and powers are defined in NRS 

252.110 and include any "duties as may be required of him or her by law." 

NRS 252.110(6). Pursuant to NRS 432B.510(2), the District Attorney is 

tasked with signing or countersigning petitions concerning child protection 

and representing the "interests of the public in all proceedings." 

Moreover, DFS can enlist the aid of the District Attorney to protect the 

interests of the child. NRS 432B.210; NRS 432B.350; NRS 432B.380. 

Thus, when enlisted by DFS, the District Attorney has a parallel and 

congruent interest in both protecting minor children and representing the 

public in guardianship termination proceedings. 3Therefore, we conclude 

that the District Attorney is an "interested person" within the meaning of 

NRS 159.1853(1)(e) and, as such, possesses the requisite standing to 

petition a court to have a guardian removed. 

3Christina cites NRS 432B.510 to assert that the District Attorney's 

Office cannot represent DFS because it must represent the interests of the 

public. However, we conclude that this dual representation is not 

necessarily mutually exclusive. 

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3 

--., -;, _ 
4 

Christina next argues that intervention by the District 

Attorney's Office was unwarranted under NRCP 24. NRCP 24 provides 

for intervention by right where "a statute confers an unconditional right to 

intervene or. . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to 

the . . . transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is 

so situated that the disposition of the action may. . . impair or impede the 

applicant's ability to protect that interest . . . ." NRCP 24(a)(2). 

This court has interpreted NRCP 24(a)(2) and held that an 

applicant must meet four requirements: "(1) that it has sufficient interest 

in the litigation's subject matter, (2) that it could suffer an impairment of 

its ability to protect that interest if it does not intervene, (3) that its 

interest is not adequately represented by existing parties, and (4) that its 

application is timely." American Home Ins, Co. u. Dist. Court., 122 Nev. 

1229, 1238, 147 P.3d 1120, 1126 (2006); see also NRS 12.130(1). 

"Determining whether an applicant has met these four requirements is 

within the district court's discretion." American Home Ins., 122 Nev. at 

1238, 147 P.3d at 1126. 

We conclude that the District Attorney's Office has a sufficient 

interest in A.M.'s guardianship, as its interest "is protected under the law 

and bears a relationship to the plaintiffs claims." Id. at 1239, 147 P.3d at 

1127. DFS's interest in A.M.'s general health and well-being becomes the 

District Attorney's interest when DFS requests assistance. NRS 

432B.210; NRS 432B.469. Moreover, the District Attorney is tasked with 

countersigning petitions concerning child protection and "represent[ing] 

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the interests of the public in all proceedings." NRS 432B.510. This 

provides the District Attorney with an additional and independent interest 

when the guardianship termination proceeding arises from protection and 

neglect proceedings. 

We also conclude that the inability of the District Attorney's 

Office to intervene in guardianship proceedings would significantly impair 

its ability to carry out legislatively mandated duties. See American Home 

Ins., 122 Nev. at 1240-41, 1241 n.40, 147 P.3d at 1128, 1128 n.40 

(recognizing that the intervenor has met the impairment requirement 

where a pending case would control the issues in which an intervenor 

holds an interest). 

Furthermore, the District Attorney's interest in protecting 

A.M. is not adequately represented by existing parties. Christina argues 

that A.M.'s interests should have been represented by his biological 

mother or his aunt with whom he had been placed. However, their 

testimony could not and did not encompass all of the District Attorney 

Office's arguments or interests. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 

F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that several factors dictate whether 

an intervenor's interest is represented by existing parties, including 

whether the party will make the same arguments the intervenor would 

make, the party is capable and willing to make those arguments, and the 

party's argument would neglect an important issue that the intervenor 

would not have neglected). Accordingly, we determine that the District 

Attorney's Office met the minimal burden to prove that current 

representation was inadequate. American Home Ins., 122 Nev. at 1241, 

147 P.3d at 1128. 

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" 111! 
MMial 

Finally, we conclude that the intervention was timely. The 

timeliness determination requires an examination of "the extent of 

prejudice to the rights of existing parties resulting from the delay and 

then weighing that prejudice against any prejudice resulting to the 

applicant if intervention is denied." Id. at 1244, 147 P.3d at 1130 (footnote 

and internal quotations omitted). The District Attorney moved to 

intervene concurrently with its petition to terminate the guardianship, 

providing Christina with advance notice of the intention to intervene. 

Therefore, Christina has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting 

from the timing of the intervention when she had ample opportunity to 

prepare for the termination hearing and was afforded the opportunity to 

provide additional testimony and evidence supporting her position. 4 

Since the District Attorney's Office properly demonstrated 

compliance with the intervention requirements, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition to 

intervene. 

NRS 159.1905's evidentiary standard 

Christina contends that the district court improperly relied on 

evidence presented at the original removal hearing to determine that the 

guardianship should be terminated. The evidentiary standard at a 

removal hearing is governed by NRS 432B.530(5), which requires a 

4Christina also argues that, as she had already been granted 

guardianship of A.M., the District Attorney's petition for termination was 

untimely since it was subsequent to an entry of final judgment. However, 

in a guardianship, the court retains "jurisdiction to enforce, modify or 

terminate [the] guardianship . . . until the child reaches 18 years of age." 

NRS 432B.468(1). Thus, the establishment of a guardianship does not 

prevent the District Attorney from filing a subsequent petition for 

termination. 

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• 

Es 

preponderance of evidence be shown supporting the removal. By contrast, 

hearings considering petitions for termination of guardianship are 

governed by NRS 159.1905(3), which mandates a showing by clear and 

convincing evidence that the termination is in the best interest of the 

child. See NRS 159.185(1)(g); Hudson v. Jones, 122 Nev. 708, 710, 138 

P.3d 429, 430 (2006) ("In determining the custody of a minor child, 'the 

sole consideration of the court is the best interest of the child." (quoting 

NRS 125.480(1))). 

Here, in accordance with the requirements of NRS 159.1905, 

hearings were held by a hearing master to consider the petition for 

termination of guardianship. Subsequent to the hearing master's 

recommendation, the district court held a hearing for the purpose of 

considering the recommendation. Christina argues that by adopting the 

recommendation and not deeming it clearly erroneous, the district court 

applied the wrong evidentiary standard. After the district court hearing, 

in which the court specifically requested further information from the 

parties and the clear-and-convincing evidence standard was discussed, the 

district court affirmed the master's recommendation to terminate the 

guardianship based on overwhelming evidence that terminating the 

guardianship was in A.M.'s best interests. 5 

5At the hearing before the district court, appellant's counsel 

specifically brought to the forefront the clear-and-convincing evidence 

standard. Based on the discussion of the clear-and-convincing evidence 

standard at the hearing and the reference by incorporation of NRS 

Chapter 159 in the hearing master's report and recommendation, we 

conclude that it may be inferred that the district court's findings were 

made under the clear-and-convincing evidence standard. 

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The district court "is not required to rely on the master's 

findings, but if the court chooses to rely on the master's findings, it may do 

so only if the findings are supported by the evidence and not clearly 

erroneous." In re A.B., 128 Nev. 291 P.3d 122, 128 (2012). We 

review a district court's decision regarding child custody for an abuse of 

discretion. Rivero v. River°, 125 Nev. 410, 428, 216 P.3d 213, 226 (2009). 

The district court's order acknowledged that the decision was 

based on arguments of counsel and the pleadings. The district court not 

only had before it the NRS Chapter 432B hearing determination and the 

biological mother's request that the guardianship be terminated, but it 

also had been provided information that: (1) Christina's husband sexually 

abused A.M., and she then brought A.M. to visit his abuser on a weekly 

basis, (2) Christina had a history of choosing sexually abusive partners, 

and (3) adoption or guardianship by the alternative placement family was 

a permanency goal for A.M. Further, Christina was afforded a distinct 

opportunity to challenge the evidence submitted and introduce additional 

evidence but declined to provide any supplementary information. 6This 

evidence was sufficient for the district court to terminate the guardianship 

6Christina contends that Matter of Guardianship & Estate of D.R.G., 

119 Nev. 32, 37, 62 P.3d 1127, 1130 (2003), requires that a suitability 

determination be made only on the facts as existing at the time of the 

hearing. However, in that case, this court considered the conduct of the 

father going back several years prior to the time of the hearing. Id. at 39, 

62 P.3d at 1131-32. Similarly, in this case, consideration of past conduct 

is logically necessary for a determination of current fitness. 

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Pickering 

C.J. 

Hardesty 

Parraguirre 

Saitta 

under the clear-and-convincing evidence standard. Therefore, we conclude 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Rivero, 125 Nev. at 

428, 216 P.3d at 226. 7 

Accordingly, we 8 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

7Christina also argues that the district court erred by failing to hold 

an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. The Legislature did not specify in 

NRS 159.1905 that an evidentiary hearing is required, which supports the 

proposition that the district court has discretion to determine when a 

hearing is necessary. See McKay v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'r, 103 Nev. 490, 492, 

746 P.2d 124, 125 (1987) (when a statute is silent "it is not the business of 

this court to fill in alleged legislative omissions based on conjecture as to 

what the legislature would or should have done"); Wheble v. Dist. Court, 

128 Nev. , 272 P.3d 134, 136 (2012) (this court will not look beyond 

a statute's plain language and will deduce legislative intent from the 

words used). Further, even if the statue did contemplate an evidentiary 

hearing, Christina did not request one nor did she present any additional 

information showing that an evidentiary hearing was warranted. Thus, 

we conclude that the district court was not required to hold a separate 

evidentiary hearing and therefore did not abuse its discretion in this 

regard. 

8All other arguments on appeal lack merit and will not be discussed 

further. 

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cc: Hon. Charles J. Hoskin, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Special Public Defender 

Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada 

Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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