FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JORDAN GALLINGER; BRIAN HILL;

BROOKE HILL; CRAIG DELUZ; SCOTT 

DIPMAN; ALBERT DUNCAN; TRACEY 

GRAHAM; LISA JANG; DENNIS 

SERBU; MICHAEL VEREDAS;

FIREARMS POLICY FOUNDATION;

FIREARMS POLICY COALITION;

MADISON SOCIETY FOUNDATION;

THE CALGUNS FOUNDATION,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

XAVIER BECERRA, in his official 

capacity as Attorney General of 

California,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-56125

D.C. No.

2:16-cv-02572-

BRO-AFM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Beverly Reid O’Connell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 7, 2018

Pasadena, California

Filed August 3, 2018
2 GALLINGER V. BECERRA

Before: M. Margaret McKeown,* William A. Fletcher,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Owens

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an 

action challenging California’s 2015 amendment, Senate 

Bill 707, to its Gun-Free School Zone Act.

In 1994, the California Legislature enacted the Gun-Free 

School Zone Act, which banned the possession of firearms 

on school grounds and within school zones (the area within 

1,000 feet of school grounds). The Act exempted two 

groups: (1) individuals licensed to carry a concealed firearm 

under California law; and (2) retired peace officers 

authorized to carry a loaded firearm. In 2015, the 

Legislature passed Senate Bill 707, which preserved the 

retired-officer exception for firearm possession on school 

grounds, as well as within school zones, but prohibited 

concealed carry weapon holders from possessing a firearm 

on school grounds. Plaintiffs alleged that Senate Bill 707 

 * Judge McKeown was drawn to replace Judge Reinhardt on the 

panel following his death. Ninth Circuit General Order 3.2h. Judge 

McKeown has read the briefs, reviewed the record, and listened to oral 

argument.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
GALLINGER V. BECERRA 3

violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment because it treated concealed weapon permit 

holders differently from retired peace officers. 

The panel first rejected plaintiff’s argument that Silveira 

v. Lockyer, controlled the outcome. In Silveira, the court 

held that the provision of California’s Assault Weapons 

Control Act exempting retired peace officers from a 

statewide ban on assault weapons violated the Equal 

Protection Clause. 312 F.3d 1052, 1089-92 (9th Cir. 2002),

abrogated on other grounds by District of Columbia v. 

Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). The panel held that there 

was a meaningful difference between the conduct regulated 

by the Assault Weapons Control Act and Senate Bill 707. 

The panel held that permitting retired peace officers to carry 

firearms other than assault weapons on school grounds was 

sufficiently connected to the goal of ensuring such officers’ 

safety and public safety to survive rational-basis review. 

The panel also rejected plaintiff’s contention that Senate 

Bill 707 violates the Equal Protection Clause because it was 

enacted to favor a politically powerful group and to disfavor 

a politically unpopular one. The panel held that plaintiffs 

failed to plausibly allege that the Legislature enacted Senate 

Bill 707 to harm concealed carry permit holders.

COUNSEL

Stephen M. Duvernay (argued) and Bradley A. Benbrook,

Benbrook Law Group PC, Sacramento, California, for 

Plaintiffs-Appellants.

John D. Echevarria (argued), Deputy Attorney General; 

Mark R. Beckington, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; 
4 GALLINGER V. BECERRA

Marc LeForestier, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney 

General; Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the 

Attorney General, Los Angeles, California; for DefendantAppellee.

Ilya Shapiro and Thomas Berry, Cato Institute, Washington, 

D.C., for Amicus Curiae Cato Institute.

OPINION

OWENS, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Plaintiffs”), individuals with 

permits to carry concealed weapons (and interested 

organizations), appeal from the dismissal of their challenge 

to California’s 2015 amendment to its Gun-Free School 

Zone Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 

we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 

HISTORY

A. California’s Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1995 

and Senate Bill 707

In 1994, the California Legislature (“the Legislature”) 

enacted the Gun-Free School Zone Act, which banned the 

possession of firearms on school grounds and within school 

zones (the area within 1,000 feet of school grounds). GunFree School Zone Act of 1995, sec. 1, § 626.9(b), (e)(1), 

1994 Cal. Stat. 6191, 6191–92. The Act exempted two 

groups: (1) individuals licensed to carry a concealed firearm 

under California law (“CCW permit holders”); and 

(2) “retired peace officer[s] . . . authorized to carry a loaded 
GALLINGER V. BECERRA 5

firearm” (“retired peace officers”). § 626.9(l)–(m), 1994 

Cal. Stat. at 6193.

In 2015, the Legislature considered an amendment to the 

Gun-Free School Zone Act, Senate Bill 707 (“SB 707”), that 

would give school officials control “of who, if anyone,” 

could bring firearms onto their campuses. See Cal. S. 

Comm. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of S.B. 707, 2015–2016 

Reg. Sess., at 5 (Apr. 13, 2015). SB 707, sponsored by State 

Senator Lois Wolk, was introduced in response to the 

“disturbing increase in the number of active shooter 

incidents on . . . campuses across the country” and the 

“alarming number of sexual assaults on college and 

university campuses.” Id. Recognizing that “some gun 

rights proponents in other states ha[d] sponsored legislation 

to increase the opportunity for students and teachers to bring 

firearms on school campuses with CCWs, claiming this will 

deter” sexual assaults and active shooters, Senator Wolk 

highlighted research “indicat[ing] that bringing more 

firearms on campus will lead to more campus violence and 

increase the danger to students and others on campus.” Id. 

Senator Wolk thus introduced SB 707 to “ensure that 

students and parents who expect a campus to be safe and 

‘gun free’ can be confident that their expectation is being 

met.” Id.

In returning control over firearm possession to school 

officials, the version of SB 707 that Senator Wolk originally 

introduced would have eliminated the Gun-Free School 

Zone Act’s exception authorizing CCW permit holders and 

retired peace officers to carry firearms “on school grounds,” 

though it would have retained the exceptions authorizing 

both groups to carry firearms “within school zones.” Id.; see 

also S.B. 707, sec. 1, § 626.9(c)(5)–(6), (l), (o), 2015–2016 

Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (as introduced).
6 GALLINGER V. BECERRA

But after substantial opposition from law enforcement 

organizations,1 the Legislature passed a revised version of 

SB 707 that preserved the retired-officer exception for 

firearm possession on school grounds, as well as within 

school zones.2 See Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Pub. Safety, 

Analysis of S.B. 707, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess., at 1 (July 13, 

2015). Under the version of SB 707 that took effect, CCW 

permit holders could possess a firearm within school zones, 

but not on school grounds.3 See Act of Oct. 10, 2015, sec. 

1, § 626.9(b), (c)(5), 2015 Cal. Stat. 5689, 5690–92.

 1 We GRANT Plaintiffs’ motion for judicial notice, which contains, 

among other documents, pre-amendment letters of opposition from lawenforcement organizations. See Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 978 n.4 

(9th Cir. 2015).

2 To qualify under this exception, a peace officer must be honorably 

retired from service and must obtain an endorsement from the agency 

from which he retired stating that the officer should be permitted to carry 

a concealed weapon. Cal. Penal Code § 626.9(o)(1) (2018); see also id.

§ 25455(a)–(c). In addition to retired sheriffs, sheriff’s deputies, and 

municipal-police officers, the retired-officer exception covers certain 

retired employees of, among other agencies, the California Departments 

of (1) Fish and Game; (2) Parks and Recreation; and (3) Forestry and 

Fire Protection, as well as marshals who served at the California State 

Fair and retired federal agents. Id. § 626.9(o)(1); see also id.

§§ 25450(a), 830.1(a), 830.2(e)–(i).

3 The version of SB 707 enacted in 2015 allowed individuals to 

possess firearms on school grounds with the written permission of a 

school-district superintendent, his or her designee, or an equivalent 

school authority. Act of Oct. 10, 2015, sec. 1, § 626.9(b), 2015 Cal. Stat. 

5689, 5690–92. The Gun-Free School Zone Act has since been amended 

by Assembly Bill 424, which eliminated the authority of school officials 

to provide such permission. See Act of Oct. 14, 2017, sec. 1, § 626.9(b), 

2017 Cal. Stat. 5950, 5950 (codified at Cal. Penal Code § 626.9(b) 

(2018)). This amendment does not change our analysis.
GALLINGER V. BECERRA 7

B. This Lawsuit

In 2016, Plaintiffs filed suit, arguing that SB 707’s 

differential treatment of CCW permit holders and retired 

peace officers lacked a rational basis and thereby violated 

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The district court rejected that argument. While it agreed 

that the CCW permit holders and retired peace officers were 

“similarly situated” for constitutional purposes, the district 

court reasoned that the Legislature had a rational basis for 

treating retired peace officers differently on school 

grounds—unlike CCW permit holders, they risked facing 

enemies made during their law-enforcement careers, and this 

need for self-protection did not end when officers stepped on 

campus. “Therefore,” the district court concluded, 

“allowing retired peace officers an exemption from the 

general ban of carrying concealed weapons on school 

property is rationally related to the legitimate state interest 

of ensuring their protection.”

The district court also rejected Plaintiffs’ Equal 

Protection argument that the Legislature impermissibly 

favored retired peace officers over “unpopular” civilian gun 

owners. Relying on U.S. Department of Agriculture v. 

Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), the district court 

reasoned that “[a]bsent evidence of explicit legislative intent 

to cause harm to civilian gun owners,” Plaintiffs could not 

make out an Equal Protection violation.

Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to 

dismiss. See Mahoney v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 873, 877 (9th 

Cir. 2017). We take all factual allegations set forth in the 
8 GALLINGER V. BECERRA

complaint as true and construe them in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiffs. Id. “Conclusory allegations of 

law,” however, “are insufficient to defeat a motion to 

dismiss.” Id. (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any 

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 

laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons 

similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne 

v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing 

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).

In analyzing Equal Protection claims, our “first step . . .

is to identify the state’s classification of groups.” Country 

Classic Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Bureau, 847 F.2d 593, 

596 (9th Cir. 1988). Once we have identified a classified 

group, we look for a control group, Freeman v. City of Santa 

Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995), composed of 

individuals who are similarly situated to those in the 

classified group in respects that are relevant to the state’s 

challenged policy, Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 

855 F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 2017). If the two groups are 

similarly situated, we determine the appropriate level of 

scrutiny and then apply it. Id. at 969.

Here, retired peace officers are the classified group, and 

Plaintiffs argue that CCW permit holders are the control 

group that is similarly situated to retired peace officers for 

purposes of scrutinizing SB 707. The State counters that 

retired peace officers and CCW permit holders are not 

similarly situated and would have us deny Plaintiffs’ Equal 

Protection claim at this step. But we need not answer this 

question because, even assuming that the two groups are 
GALLINGER V. BECERRA 9

similarly situated, we hold that SB 707 does not violate the 

Equal Protection Clause, given the applicable level of 

scrutiny. See Nader v. Cronin, 620 F.3d 1214, 1218–19 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (declining to address whether two groups are 

similarly situated because the classification was rationally 

related to a legitimate governmental interest).

The parties agree that rational-basis review is the 

appropriate standard: SB 707 implicates neither a suspect 

classification nor a fundamental right. See Nordyke v. King, 

681 F.3d 1041, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see also 

McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (“We 

made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on 

such longstanding regulatory measures as . . . ‘laws 

forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 

as schools . . . .’” (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 

554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008)). The parties also agree on the 

basic formulation of rational-basis review—that “legislation 

is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 

classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a 

legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 

(citations omitted). But their agreement ends there.

Plaintiffs argue that our decision in Silveira v. Lockyer, 

312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds 

by Heller, 554 U.S. 570, requires that we deviate from the 

traditional application of rational-basis review by limiting 

the range of legitimate governmental interests available to 

sustain the classification drawn by SB 707. In Silveira, we 

held that the provision of California’s Assault Weapons 

Control Act (“AWCA”) exempting retired peace officers 

from a statewide ban on assault weapons violated the Equal 
10 GALLINGER V. BECERRA

Protection Clause.4 Id. at 1089–92. In applying rationalbasis review to this law, we noted that “the retired officers’ 

exception [was] contrary to the legislative goals of the 

AWCA.” Id. at 1091. According to Plaintiffs, this and 

similar language in Silveira requires that we “scrutinize the 

connection, if any, between the goal of a legislative act and 

the way in which individuals are classified in order to 

achieve that goal,” rather than consider any legitimate 

governmental interest in creating the classification. Further, 

Plaintiffs contend, the Legislature’s stated purpose in 

enacting SB 707 was to reduce the number of guns on school 

grounds, so, if we are to uphold the legislation, we must find 

the retired-officer exception—which would presumably 

increase the number of guns on campuses—rationally 

related to this specific goal. We disagree.

In reviewing the AWCA’s retired-officer exception, the 

Silveira court noted that the classification was “wholly 

unconnected to any legitimate state interest,” id. at 1091 

(emphasis added), and recognized its duty to “identify any

hypothetical rational basis for the exception,” id. at 1090. 

And if this language from Silveira did not persuade us to 

consider reasons for the classification beyond the 

Legislature’s stated purpose for SB 707, the Supreme Court 

has made clear that we should. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe ex 

rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“[A] classification must 

 4 More specifically, Silveira struck down a provision of the AWCA 

that allowed designated California agencies to sell or transfer assault 

weapons to sworn peace officers upon an officer’s retirement. 312 F.3d 

at 1090–92. In 2010, the California Attorney General’s Office issued an 

opinion concluding, in light of Silveira, that the AWCA also precludes 

retired peace officers who had purchased and registered assault weapons 

as active-duty officers from possessing those weapons in their 

retirement. See Opinion No. 09-901, 93 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 130 (Dec. 

31, 2010).
GALLINGER V. BECERRA 11

be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any 

reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a 

rational basis for the classification.” (emphasis added) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 

534 (explaining that because the “challenged statutory 

classification . . . is clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes 

of the Act,” it “must rationally further some legitimate 

governmental interest other than those specifically stated in 

the congressional ‘declaration of policy’” in order “to be 

sustained”).

In applying rational-basis review, we thus find ourselves 

free to consider any “legitimate governmental interest” the 

State has in permitting retired peace officers to carry 

firearms on school grounds. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. The 

State claims two such interests: (1) the protection of retired 

peace officers and (2) public safety. Plaintiffs contest the 

validity of both.

First, Plaintiffs argue that the classification is both too 

broad and too narrow to be rationally related to retiredofficer and public safety: It is too broad in that it includes 

many desk officers who have never carried or needed a 

firearm, and it is too narrow in that it leaves out people who 

have real and dangerous enemies. But this type of reasoning 

runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s clear precedent 

upholding classifications that are “to some extent both 

underinclusive and overinclusive” under rational-basis 

review. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979). “[I]n a 

case like this perfection is by no means required.” Id. 

(citations omitted); see also United States v. Thornton, 

901 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1990).

Second, Plaintiffs argue that Silveira forecloses victory 

for the State. Because we purportedly considered all 

possible reasons for the retired-officer exception in Silveira, 
12 GALLINGER V. BECERRA

see 312 F.3d at 1091, Plaintiffs contend that in so doing we 

necessarily held that a classification permitting retired peace 

officers to carry any kind of firearm on school grounds 

cannot be rationally related to retired-officer or public 

safety. Plaintiffs’ argument requires a logical leap that we 

decline to take.

The legislation at issue in Silveira was the AWCA, a law 

that bans the possession of assault weapons anywhere in the 

state without a permit.5 Id. at 1057. Silveira tells us that 

exempting retired peace officers from that state-wide general 

ban and permitting them to carry assault weapons on school 

grounds is not rationally related to permissible legislative 

goals, including retired officer or public safety. At the same 

time, Silveira says nothing about the rational relationship 

between permissible legislative goals and SB 707’s 

classification permitting retired peace officers to carry other

kinds of firearms on school grounds.6 Nor should it.

There is a meaningful difference between the conduct 

regulated by the AWCA and SB 707. This is true for the 

commonsense reason that assault weapons are more 

dangerous than other kinds of firearms. The particular 

danger posed by assault weapons motivated the Legislature 

to enact the AWCA in 1989. See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1057 

(citing Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989, 

sec. 3, § 12275.5, 1989 Cal. Stat. 60, 64 (codified as 

amended at Cal. Penal Code § 30505(a))). More 

specifically, it was the “random shooting” that year by an 

 5 The AWCA defines “assault weapon” both by reference to specific 

makes and models, see Cal. Penal Code § 30510, and certain generic 

characteristics, see id. § 30515. See also id. § 16200.

6 SB 707 defines “firearm” by reference to California Penal Code 

§ 16520(a)–(d). See Cal. Penal Code § 626.9(e)(2).
GALLINGER V. BECERRA 13

individual with an AK-47 semi-automatic weapon that left 

five children dead, as well as one teacher and twenty-nine 

children wounded, at a California elementary school. Id.

Nearly thirty years later, these same dangers persist. 

Evidenced by the mass shootings perpetrated by individuals 

with military-style rifles and detachable magazines in 

Newtown, Connecticut; Aurora, Colorado; San Bernardino, 

California; Orlando, Florida; Binghamton, New York; 

Tucson, Arizona; and Las Vegas, Nevada, among others, 

these dangers have moved other state and local legislatures 

to enact their own bans on assault weapons and detachable 

large-capacity magazines in more recent years. See, e.g.,

Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 

(upholding Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act); N.Y. State Rifle 

& Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 249–51, 261–64 (2d 

Cir. 2015) (upholding prohibitions on assault weapons and 

large-capacity magazines in New York’s Secure 

Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act and 

Connecticut’s Act Concerning Gun Violence Prevention and 

Children’s Safety); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 

784 F.3d 406, 407, 412 (7th Cir. 2015) (upholding City of 

Highland Park’s ordinance prohibiting possession of assault 

weapons and large-capacity magazines); Heller v. District of 

Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1263–64, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 

(upholding District of Columbia’s Firearms Registration 

Amendment Act). As the Fourth Circuit recognized in 

upholding Maryland’s ban on such arms in Kolbe, when 

“assault weapons and large-capacity magazines are used, 

more shots are fired and more fatalities and injuries result 

than when shooters use other firearms and magazines.”7 

 7 The legislation at issue in Kolbe, Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act, 

contained an exemption permitting retired officers to carry assault 

weapons that was challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. 
14 GALLINGER V. BECERRA

Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 127; see also Friedman, 784 F.3d at 409 

(“We know . . . that semi-automatic guns with large-capacity 

magazines enable shooters to fire bullets faster than 

handguns equipped with smaller magazines.”).

The exceptional lethality of such arms was not the Fourth 

Circuit’s only reason for upholding the legislature’s ban in 

Kolbe. The court also highlighted a “lack of evidence that 

the banned assault weapons and large-capacity magazines 

are well-suited to self-defense.” Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 127; see 

also Heller, 670 F.3d at 1262 (citing Gary Kleck & Marc 

Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and 

Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. Crim. L. & 

Criminology 150, 177 (1995), for the “finding that of 

340,000 to 400,000 instances of defensive gun use in which 

the defenders believed the use of a gun had saved a life, 

240,000 to 300,000 involved handguns”). This is consistent 

with the Supreme Court’s Heller decision, which recognized 

that “handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by 

Americans for self-defense.” 554 U.S. at 629. In short, 

while the inherent risks that accompany carrying assault 

weapons for self-defense or public-safety purposes may 

outweigh any increased benefits to a retired officer’s or the 

public’s safety, the same need not be true for other kinds of 

firearms.

 

849 F.3d at 146. The Fourth Circuit upheld the exemption, concluding 

that retired officers and the general public are not “similarly situated . . .

with respect to the banned assault weapons and large-capacity 

magazines.” Id. at 147. In so doing, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged 

its split from Silveira. See id. at 147 n.18. Because we hold that the 

classification in SB 707 is rationally related to legitimate governmental 

interests, we need not and do not address whether CCW permit holders 

are similarly situated to retired peace officers for purposes of SB 707.
GALLINGER V. BECERRA 15

And when we consider the distinction between assault 

weapons and other firearms through the lens of rational-basis 

review, we easily conclude that Silveira does not control the 

outcome here. To survive rational-basis review, the “State 

may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an 

asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction 

arbitrary or irrational.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446. 

A classification will be upheld, however, when “the statute 

is rationally related to a legitimate interest.” Id. at 440.

With regard to retired-officer safety, in Silveira we held 

that permitting retired peace officers to carry assault 

weapons was too attenuated from the goal of ensuring their 

safety. Here, we hold that permitting retired peace officers 

to carry other kinds of firearms on school grounds is 

sufficiently connected to the goal of ensuring such officers’ 

safety to survive rational-basis review. In so doing, we 

refuse to second-guess the Legislature’s determination that 

(1) retired peace officers are at a heightened risk of danger 

based on their previous exposure to crime, and (2) allowing 

them to carry firearms other than assault weapons on school 

grounds mitigates that risk and increases officer safety.

This brings us to the second reason the State advances 

for upholding this classification: public safety. While 

Silveira recognized that the Legislature’s interest in public 

safety was too attenuated from the retired-officer 

classification in the context of assault weapons, see 312 F.3d 

at 1091, here we hold that the Legislature’s interest in public 

safety is sufficiently connected to permitting retired peace 

officers to carry other kinds of firearms on school grounds. 

As the State argues, the Legislature is free to conclude that 

retired peace officers, as a class, are more skilled in the use 

of firearms due to the extensive training in the safe storage 

and operation of firearms that law enforcement personnel 
16 GALLINGER V. BECERRA

receive. And as the California College and University Police 

Chiefs Association argued in opposing the original version 

of SB 707 that applied the school-grounds ban equally to 

retired peace officers, their training further permits the 

Legislature’s conclusion that retired peace officers offer “a 

distinct asset in [the] ability to carry out” the mission of 

campus safety. See Cal. S. Comm. on Pub. Safety, Analysis 

of S.B. 707, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess., at 6 (Apr. 13, 2015). 

Accordingly, the Legislature may legitimately decide to 

authorize retired peace officers, and retired peace officers 

alone, to carry firearms other than assault weapons on school 

grounds.

Finally, we turn to Plaintiffs’ argument that SB 707 

violates the Equal Protection Clause because it was enacted 

to “favor[] a politically powerful group and to disfavor a 

politically-unpopular one.” Plaintiffs, as well as the Cato 

Institute as amicus curiae, argue that the district court erred 

in holding that Plaintiffs could not establish a violation of 

the Equal Protection Clause because they failed to present 

“evidence of explicit legislative intent to cause harm to 

civilian gun owners.” It is true that animus need not be 

explicit in the legislative history for a plaintiff to establish 

impermissible intent. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447–

50. At the same time, we do not credit conclusory 

allegations of law that are unsupported by specific factual 

allegations. See Mahoney, 871 F.3d at 877.

Here, Plaintiffs have not made any factual allegations to 

support their theory of “impermissible animus.” Animal 

Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1200 (9th Cir. 

2018) (citation omitted). They rely on SB 707’s legislative 

history, as well as letters and newspaper articles of which we 

have taken judicial notice, to demonstrate that the 

Legislature retained the retired-officer exception as the 
GALLINGER V. BECERRA 17

result of “political pressure,” after “potent lobbying efforts 

by the law enforcement community.” Undeniably, this 

record demonstrates that the retired-officer exception was a 

product of lobbying efforts by law-enforcement 

organizations. But the right to lobby is constitutionally 

protected. Cf. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of 

Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983). A plaintiff cannot 

establish invidious discrimination by merely alleging that a 

legislature responded to such efforts, and, not surprisingly, 

Plaintiffs fail to cite any authority to the contrary.8

Accommodating one interest group is not equivalent to 

intentionally harming another. Moreno and City of 

Cleburne, the two cases upon which Plaintiffs rely, make 

this distinction clear. In Moreno, the Supreme Court held 

that a classification making federal food stamps available to 

households of related persons but not to households of 

unrelated persons violated the equal-protection component 

of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because the 

legislative history revealed Congress’s purpose “to prevent 

socalled ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participating 

in the food stamp program.” 413 U.S. at 534 (citation 

omitted). Similarly, in City of Cleburne, the Court found 

that a municipal zoning ordinance requiring special-use 

permits for the operation of a group home for the 

intellectually disabled violated the Equal Protection Clause 

 8 Plaintiffs do not allege that the lobbying efforts by lawenforcement agencies advocated harming CCW permit holders. We do 

not suggest that legislatures may legitimately give effect to lobbying 

efforts that advocate harming another interest group. See City of 

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (“[T]he City may not avoid the strictures of 

[the Equal Protection] Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of 

some fraction of the body politic.”); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 

(1984) (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law 

cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”).
18 GALLINGER V. BECERRA

because the permitting requirement “appear[ed] to rest on an 

irrational prejudice against” and “negative attitudes, or fear,” 

about those with special needs. 473 U.S. at 448, 450. 

“[B]are [legislative] desire to harm a politically unpopular 

group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” 

Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.

In asserting that the Legislature exempted retired peace 

officers from the school-grounds firearm ban due to “potent 

lobbying efforts by the law enforcement community,” 

Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that the Legislature 

enacted SB 707 to harm CCW permit holders. Accordingly, 

we do not find that “impermissible animus toward an 

unpopular group prompted the statute’s enactment.” Animal 

Legal Def. Fund, 878 F.3d at 1200 (citation omitted).

In any event, we have already concluded that the 

classification at issue serves legitimate state interests in 

retired-officer and public safety. This conclusion, on its 

own, prevents Plaintiffs from succeeding on their Equal 

Protection claim.9 See id. (“[A] court may strike down [a] 

statute under the Equal Protection Clause if the statute serves 

no legitimate governmental purpose and if impermissible 

animus toward an unpopular group prompted the statute’s 

 9 A plaintiff arguing that impermissible animus motivated a 

legislature’s enactment of a law typically asks that we “apply a ‘more 

searching’ application of rational basis review” if we agree that the law 

was enacted, at least in part, “to harm an unpopular group.” Animal 

Legal Def. Fund, 878 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 

558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)). Here, 

Plaintiffs did not argue for a more searching rational-basis review based 

on their animus argument, and, regardless, we find that SB 707 was not 

enacted to harm CCW permit holders. Ordinary rational-basis review is 

thus appropriate.
GALLINGER V. BECERRA 19

enactment.” (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

We therefore affirm the district court.10

AFFIRMED.

 10 The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 

Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs cannot set forth facts that 

will establish an Equal Protection violation given the deferential nature 

of rational-basis review. Amendment would therefore be futile.