[Cite as Mickey v. Rokakis, 2012-Ohio-273.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 97053 

AUDREY (MICKEY) PRIVATE PARTY

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs. 

MR. JAMES ROKAKIS, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-751976 

BEFORE: Cooney, J., Boyle, P.J., and Rocco, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 26, 2012 
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FOR APPELLANT

Audrey (Mickey), private party 

P.O. Box 470142 

Broadview Heights, Ohio 44147 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Sara E. DeCaro 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

8th Floor, Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.: 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Audrey Mickey (“Mickey”), pro se, appeals the trial 

court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss filed by defendants-appellees James 

Rokakis, Cuyahoga County Board of Revision, and the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s 

Department. We find no merit to the appeal and affirm. 
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{¶ 2} Mickey’s complaint alleges that James Rokakis (“Rokakis”), the County 

Board of Revision, and the Sheriff’s Department (collectively referred to as “appellees”) 

wrongfully seized her property in foreclosure. She also alleges claims of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, trespass, and 

conspiracy, all of which relate to the alleged wrongful taking of her property in 

foreclosure. 

{¶ 3} Rokakis, as Cuyahoga County Treasurer, filed a complaint in foreclosure 

against Mickey personally, and as executrix of the Estate of Daniel Mickey, for collection 

of delinquent taxes, assessments, penalties, and interest. Mickey was properly served, 

and the case proceeded to a final foreclosure hearing in March 2011. The court granted a 

judgment in foreclosure in favor of Rokakis, on behalf of Cuyahoga County, and ordered 

a sheriff’s sale of Mickey’s property. 

{¶ 4} After two sheriff’s sales, there were no bids for the property. On July 18, 

2011, the common pleas court ordered the property forfeited to the State for lack of a bid. 

 Mickey never appealed the judgment of forfeiture or the judgment of foreclosure, but 

instead filed the complaint in the instant case. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief might be 

granted. The trial court granted the motion, and this appeal followed. 
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{¶ 5} In her two assignments of error, Mickey argues the trial court erred in 

granting the motion to dismiss. She contends the court’s bases for granting the motion 

were unfounded. We disagree. 

{¶ 6} Although the court’s judgment entry granting the motion to dismiss does 

not expressly state its reasons for dismissal, the State argued that the court did not have 

subject matter jurisdiction and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief 

might be granted. 

{¶ 7} In determining whether a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 

Civ.R. 12(B)(1), the trial court must consider whether the plaintiff has alleged any cause 

of action that the court has authority to decide. McHenry v. Indus. Comm., 68 Ohio 

App.3d 56, 62, 587 N.E.2d 414 (4th Dist. 1990); Avco Fin. Servs. Loan, Inc. v. Hale, 36 

Ohio App.3d 65, 520 N.E.2d 1378 (10th Dist. 1987). When making this determination, 

the trial court is not confined to the allegations of the complaint and “may consider 

material pertinent to such inquiry without converting the motion into a motion for 

summary judgment. Southgate Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 48 Ohio 

St.2d 211, 358 N.E.2d 526 (1976), paragraph one of the syllabus. We review the trial 

court’s decision on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. 

Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5. 

{¶ 8} Mickey claims the foreclosure of her property constituted an 

unconstitutional taking of her property because appellees did not have the right to take her 
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property from her. In short, Mickey is challenging the merits of her foreclosure case and 

thus attempting to collaterally attack the final judgment in foreclosure. However, “[i]n 

our jurisprudence, there is a firm and longstanding principle that final judgments are 

meant to be just that — final.” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 115 Ohio 

St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 22, citing Kingsborough v. Tousley, 56 

Ohio St. 450, 458, 47 N.E. 541 (1897). Collateral attacks are disfavored and succeed 

only in certain very limited situations. Id., citing Coe v. Erb, 59 Ohio St. 259, 267-268, 

52 N.E. 640 (1898). Therefore, subject to a few rare exceptions, a civil judgment may 

only be challenged by direct attack, i.e. an appeal. Id.

{¶ 9} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the reasons for disfavoring collateral 

attacks do not apply in two principle circumstances: (1) when the issuing court lacked 

jurisdiction or (2) when the order was the product of fraud. Ohio Pyro at ¶ 23, citing 

Coe at 271, and Lewis v. Reed, 117 Ohio St. 152, 159, 157 N.E. 897 (1927). Thus, a 

collateral attack on a judgment is really an attack on the integrity of the judgment rather 

than its merits. Id. “Consequently, the collateral-attack doctrine contains elements of 

the same considerations that come into play when considering whether a particular 

judgment is void or voidable.” Id. citing Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 

2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992. When a judgment was issued without jurisdiction or 

was procured by fraud, it is void and is subject to collateral attack. Id. citing Coe at 271. 

However, “in the absence of those fundamental deficiencies, a judgment is considered 
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‘valid’ (even if it might perhaps have been flawed in its resolution of the merits of the 

case) and is generally not subject to collateral attack.” Id. 

{¶ 10} Mickey never alleged that the court that decided her foreclosure case lacked 

jurisdiction or that the judgment in foreclosure was procured by fraud. The only method 

Mickey had to challenge the merits of the judgment was by direct appeal. The trial court 

had no jurisdiction to grant the relief she was seeking by collateral attack and properly 

dismissed her complaint. 

{¶ 11} Accordingly, we overrule both assignments of error. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

______________________________________________ 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and 

KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR