Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 47A04-1705-JV-944 | January 11, 2018 Page 1 of 17

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Laura R. Anderson

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

R.R.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner

January 11, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

47A04-1705-JV-944

Appeal from the Lawrence Circuit 

Court

The Honorable John M. Plummer, 

III, Judge Pro Tempore

Trial Court Cause Nos.

47C01-1409-JD-294, 47C01-1609-

JD-342

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] When R.R., a seventeen-year-old juvenile, did not appear for the combined 

factfinding hearings in his juvenile delinquency and probation violation cases, 

the trial court held the hearings in his absence and found that he committed the 
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charged offenses and violated his probation. R.R. now appeals, arguing that he 

had a constitutional right to be present at the hearings and that the trial court 

violated that right by holding them in his absence. The State argues that R.R. 

waived any such right by refusing to appear. In response, R.R. argues that 

under the juvenile waiver statute, Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-1, he could not 

validly waive that right because he was not emancipated.

[2] We hold that although juveniles have a constitutional right to be present at 

factfinding hearings in delinquency and probation proceedings, the trial court 

had the authority to find R.R. to be in a position of procedural default under the 

particular facts of this case, where R.R. knowingly and intentionally refused to 

appear. The legislature would not have intended for the juvenile waiver statute 

to allow nearly emancipated young adults to ignore trial court orders and 

thwart the operation of the juvenile justice system by intentionally refusing to 

appear at dispositional hearings. Therefore, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In September 2014, under cause number 47C01-1409-JD-294 (“JD-294”), the 

State filed a petition alleging that R.R. was a delinquent child for committing 

criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor if committed by an adult. R.R. 

admitted to the allegation and was placed on supervised probation until the 

following September. 
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[4] Between May and September 2015, the State filed seven petitions to modify 

R.R.’s probation.1 Eventually the trial court placed R.R. in residential 

treatment at Southwest Indiana Regional Youth Village. In June 2016, the 

court released R.R. from residential treatment and ordered him to remain on 

supervised probation for six months. 

[5] Between August 2016 and January 2017, the State filed four additional petitions 

to modify R.R.’s probation in JD-294.

2

 In September 2016, under cause 

number 47C01-1609-JD-342 (“JD-342”), the State filed a petition alleging that 

R.R. was a delinquent child for committing the new offenses of auto theft, a 

class D felony if committed by an adult, and false informing, a class B 

misdemeanor if committed by an adult. 

[6] On October 31, 2016, a joint pretrial conference was held in JD-294 and JD342; R.R. was present at this hearing along with his attorney and his mother, 

with whom he lived. Tr. Vol. 2 at 183. The trial court went off the record and

scheduled factfinding hearings in both cases for January 17, 2017. Id. at 188; 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 127 (JD-294), 157 (JD-342). On January 5, the State 

 

1 The petitions alleged that R.R. (1) had unexcused absences at school; (2) failed to attend therapy sessions at 

Youth Village; (3) failed to complete community service; (4) violated curfew; (5) had contact with a person 

on probation; and (6) tested positive for marijuana. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 50-71.

2 The petitions alleged that R.R. (1) failed to complete GED orientation and attend GED classes; (2) 

committed new offenses (auto theft and false informing); (3) failed to complete treatment at 

Centerstone; (4) violated curfew; (5) consumed alcohol; (6) failed to appear for a urine drug screen; (7) 

failed to attend probation appointments; (8) failed to complete community service; and (9) had contact 

with a person on probation. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 111-32. 
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filed a motion to continue the hearings. The next day, the court granted the 

State’s motion and issued an order rescheduling the hearings for February 7 and 

directing R.R. and his mother to appear. Id. at 129 (JD-294), 157 (JD-342). 

[7] On January 20, 2017, in JD-294, the State requested an order from the trial

court to take R.R. into custody. The State alleged that R.R. “ha[d] not been in 

compliance with the terms and conditions of probation since he was discharged 

from the Southwest Indiana Regional Youth Village on June 23, 2016[,]” in 

that he had failed to attend his probation appointments on January 6 and 20 

and failed to attend his urine drug screen on January 17. Id. at 133; see also id. at 

131-32 (alleging that R.R. had also failed to attend GED classes and complete 

community service). The court issued an order authorizing law enforcement to 

take R.R. into custody and detain him at the Jackson County Juvenile 

Detention Center. Id. at 135. As it turned out, R.R. remained at large for over 

two months. 

[8] R.R., who by then was nearly seventeen and a half years old,3 did not appear at 

the factfinding hearings on February 7. R.R.’s attorney and mother both 

appeared. When the trial court asked R.R.’s mother if she knew where R.R.

was, she responded, “No. He hasn’t even called me since he left. I thought we 

had an appointment on the 30th and I tried to make him go and he took off and 

I haven’t seen him since.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 2. The court responded, “Well, let the 

 

3 R.R. turned eighteen years old on October 10, 2017. 
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record reflect that this child’s whereabouts are unknown. The child’s mother is 

here. She doesn’t know where he is. Sounds like he’s been gone for seven (7) 

or eight (8) days.” Id. The court then confirmed with R.R.’s mother that she 

had not heard from him at all. The court asked the prosecutor what she wanted 

to do, and the prosecutor said that she wanted to proceed in R.R.’s absence. 

Defense counsel objected and requested a continuance “so that [R.R.] can be 

present at his hearing.” Id. at 3. Notably, neither defense counsel nor R.R.’s 

mother alleged that R.R. did not have notice of the rescheduled factfinding 

hearings. The court denied defense counsel’s motion to continue because “the 

child’s whereabouts are unknown, mother is present, [and] the child has taken 

off.” Id. The court then held factfinding hearings in both JD-294 and JD-342. 

At the conclusion of the hearings, the court entered true findings for auto theft 

and false informing in JD-342 and found that R.R. violated his probation in JD294. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 136 (JD-294), 180 (JD-342). 

[9] R.R. was finally detained on the outstanding pick-up order on March 29, 2017, 

and he appeared in court the next day with his attorney and mother for the 

dispositional hearings in JD-294 and JD-342. At the beginning of the hearing, 

the prosecutor reiterated R.R.’s failure to appear on February 7. When R.R. 

took the stand, he testified that “[a]bout two (2) weeks ago,” he started 

“hanging out at a boys home in Bedford.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 74. However, R.R. 

proffered no reason for his failure to appear on February 7. The director of the 

Bedford Boys Home then testified that R.R. “came to us about ... five (5) days 

ago” and that after talking with R.R. he learned that there was an outstanding 
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pick-up order for him. Id. at 80. The director testified that he told R.R. that he 

should turn himself in. The trial court awarded wardship of R.R. to the 

Department of Correction in both cases. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[10] R.R. contends that he had a constitutional right to be present at the factfinding 

hearings in JD-294 and JD-342 and that the trial court violated that right by 

holding them in his absence. He first notes that “the right of a child to be 

present at delinquency fact-finding [hearings] has not been squarely addressed 

by [Indiana] appellate courts[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 9. It is well established that 

defendants in criminal proceedings have the constitutional right to be present at 

all stages of their trial. See Jackson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ind. 2007) 

(citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI and IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13). And although 

probation revocation hearings are in the nature of a civil action, probationers 

have the constitutional right to be present because revocation implicates their 

liberty interest. Mathews v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1079, 1081-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2009). “Juvenile delinquency proceedings are civil proceedings, not criminal 

proceedings, and are based on a philosophy of social welfare rather than 

criminal punishment.” D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 327, 333 n.6 (Ind. 2011). 

Nevertheless, because delinquency and probation proceedings threaten a 

juvenile’s loss of liberty, we see no reason why juveniles should not be afforded 

the same constitutional right as criminal defendants and probationers and 

therefore recognize that juveniles have a general right to be present at 

delinquency and probation factfinding hearings. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-
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57 (1967) (holding that juveniles in delinquency proceedings are 

constitutionally entitled to notice of charges, right to counsel, rights of 

confrontation and cross-examination, and privilege against self-incrimination).4 

Notably, the State does not argue otherwise. See Appellee’s Br. at 15 (State 

assuming arguendo that juveniles have right to be present at delinquency 

factfinding hearings).

[11] Having established that R.R. had the right to be present at the February 7 

factfinding hearings, the question then becomes whether a hearing can ever be 

held in his absence. If a criminal defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives 

the right to be present, a trial may occur in the defendant’s absence. Jackson, 

868 N.E.2d at 498. As the Indiana Supreme Court has stated:

When a defendant fails to appear for trial and fails to notify the 

trial court or provide it with an explanation of his absence, the 

trial court may conclude that defendant’s absence is knowing and 

 

4

Indiana Code Chapter 31-32-2 lists the rights of juveniles. Indiana Code Section 31-32-2-1 provides:

Except when a child may be excluded from a hearing under IC 31-32-6, a child is entitled to:

(1) cross-examine witnesses;

(2) obtain witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory process; and

(3) introduce evidence on the child’s own behalf. 

In addition, Indiana Code Section 31-32-2-2 provides:

In addition to the rights described in section 1 of this chapter, a child charged with a delinquent 

act is also entitled to:

(1) be represented by counsel under IC 31-32-4;

(2) refrain from testifying against the child; and

(3) confront witnesses.

Although the right to be present is not a listed right, constitutional rights are not determined by the legislature 

in statutes. 
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voluntary and proceed with trial when there is evidence that the 

defendant knew of his scheduled trial date.

Id. (quoting Freeman v. State, 541 N.E.2d 533, 535 (Ind. 1989)). “The best 

evidence that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her right to 

be present at trial is the ‘defendant’s presence in court on the day the matter is 

set for trial.’” Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1273 (Ind. 1997) (quoting 

Fennell v. State, 492 N.E.2d 297, 299 (Ind. 1986)), modified on other grounds on 

reh’g, 685 N.E.2d 698. Thus, when a defendant knows of the trial date but fails 

to appear, the trial court may presume that the defendant knowingly and 

voluntarily waived the right to be present at the trial and try the defendant in 

absentia. Brown v. State, 839 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied

(2006). A defendant who has been tried in absentia “must be afforded an 

opportunity to explain his absence and thereby rebut the initial presumption of 

waiver.” Id. This, however, does not require a sua sponte inquiry from the trial 

court. Holtz v. State, 858 N.E.2d 1059, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied

(2007). Rather, the defendant cannot be prevented from giving an explanation. 

Id. Upon appellate review, we look to the entire record to determine whether 

waiver of the right to be present at trial was knowing and voluntary. Brown, 839 

N.E.2d at 228.

[12] Applying these principles to R.R., the record shows that he was present in court 

and represented by counsel on October 31 when the trial court scheduled the 

factfinding hearings for January 17. On January 5, the State filed a motion to 

continue the hearings. The next day, the court granted the State’s motion and
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entered an order rescheduling the hearings for February 7. Appellant’s App. 

Vol. 2 at 129. R.R. was living with his mother at this time. During this same 

time, however, R.R. was not complying with his probationary requirements. 

That is, he missed appointments with his probation officer on January 6 and 20 

and a drug screen on January 17. He also was not attending GED classes or 

completing community service. As a result, on January 20, the court issued an 

order authorizing law enforcement to take R.R. into custody. R.R.’s mother 

tried to get R.R. to go to an appointment on January 30, but he “took off.” Tr. 

Vol. 3 at 2. At the February 7 factfinding hearings, R.R. still had not returned 

home and his mother had not heard from him. R.R.’s counsel requested a 

continuance but offered no grounds other than R.R.’s absence. Accordingly, 

the court held the factfinding hearings in R.R.’s absence. R.R. was ultimately 

detained on the pick-up order on March 29, and he appeared in court the next 

day for the dispositional hearings. R.R.—who was aware of the outstanding 

pick-up order, which notably was issued after the trial court rescheduled the 

factfinding hearings—testified that he had been at the Bedford Boys Home for 

the past two weeks. R.R., however, did not say why he did not appear for the 

factfinding hearings on February 7. And on appeal, R.R. again offers no 

explanation for his absence. As such, the record viewed in its entirety, 

including R.R.’s familiarity with and pattern of noncompliance with the

juvenile justice system at the time of his factfinding hearings, the fact that he 

knew about the pick-up order, and his failure to provide an explanation for his 

absence, supports the conclusion that R.R.’s absence from the February 7 
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factfinding hearings was knowing and voluntary. But this is not the end of the 

matter. 

[13] In his reply brief, R.R. cites the juvenile waiver statute, Indiana Code Section 

31-32-5-1, which reads as follows:

Any rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the 

United States, the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any 

other law may be waived only:

(1) by counsel retained or appointed to represent the child if the 

child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver;

(2) by the child’s custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or 

guardian ad litem if:

(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the 

right;

(B) that person has no interest adverse to the child;

(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that 

person and the child; and

(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the 

waiver; or

(3) by the child, without the presence of a custodial parent, 

guardian, or guardian ad litem, if:

(A) the child knowingly and voluntarily consents to the 

waiver; and
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(B) the child has been emancipated under IC 31-34-20-6 or 

IC 31-37-19-27,[5] by virtue of having married, or in 

accordance with the laws of another state or jurisdiction.

(Emphasis added.) R.R. observes that neither his counsel nor his mother 

waived his right to be present at the factfinding hearings, and he argues that he 

could not validly waive that right pursuant to the statute because he was not 

emancipated. 

[14] Under R.R.’s interpretation of the juvenile waiver statute, unemancipated 

juveniles could hijack trial court dockets and avoid responsibility for their 

delinquent behavior by knowingly and voluntarily (and repeatedly) refusing to 

appear at factfinding hearings. We can safely say that our legislature would not 

have intended such an absurd result when it enacted the statute back in 1997. 

See State ex rel. Hatcher v. Lake Super. Ct., Room Three, 500 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Ind. 

1986) (stating that courts cannot presume that legislature “intended to do an 

absurd thing”). Unlike confrontation or cross-examination, appearing at a 

factfinding hearing is not only a constitutional right; it is also a responsibility 

imposed by court order. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 129 (trial court’s order 

directing R.R. and his mother to appear at February 7 hearings). By refusing to 

appear for a factfinding hearing, an unemancipated juvenile defaults on his 

court-ordered obligation, and he cannot rely on the juvenile waiver statute to 

 

5 Both statutes require the juvenile court to find that the juvenile “wishes to be free from parental control and 

protection and no longer needs that control and protection,” “has sufficient money for the child’s own 

support,” and “has an acceptable plan for independent living.” See Ind. Code §§ 31-34-20-6, 31-37-19-27. 
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rescue him from this default. See Jackson, 868 N.E.2d at 497 (“Of course, the 

constitutional rights of Jackson and every other accused must be strictly 

enforced. But a defendant cannot be permitted to manipulate the system simply 

by refusing to show up for trial.”). In sum, we conclude that the legislature 

would not have intended for the juvenile waiver statute to apply in this 

situation. Therefore, we affirm. 

[15] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., concurs.

Vaidik, C.J., dissents with opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 47A04-1705-JV-944 | January 11, 2018 Page 13 of 17

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Shaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Laura R. Anderson

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

R.R.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner

January 11, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

47A04-1705-JV-944

Appeal from the Lawrence Circuit 

Court

The Honorable John M. Plummer, 

III, Judge Pro Tempore

Trial Court Cause No.

47C01-1409-JD-294

47C01-1609-JD-342

Vaidik, Chief Judge, dissenting.

[16] I agree with the majority that juveniles have a constitutional right to be present 

at delinquency and probation fact-finding hearings. But my agreement with the 

majority ends here. 
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[17] Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1, the juvenile waiver-of-rights statute, governs 

the waiver of “any rights” guaranteed to a child under the United States and 

Indiana Constitutions and sets forth three ways that waiver can occur:

Any rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the 

United States, the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any 

other law may be waived only:

(1) by counsel retained or appointed to represent the child if the 

child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver;

(2) by the child’s custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or 

guardian ad litem if:

(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the 

right;

(B) that person has no interest adverse to the child;

(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that 

person and the child; and

(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the 

waiver; or

(3) by the child, without the presence of a custodial parent, 

guardian, or guardian ad litem, if:

(A) the child knowingly and voluntarily consents to the 

waiver; and
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(B) the child has been emancipated under IC 31-34-20-6 or 

IC 31-37-19-27, by virtue of having married, or in 

accordance with the laws of another state or jurisdiction.

(Emphases added). I believe that Section 31-32-5-1 is unambiguous and 

therefore must be given its clear and plain meaning. See State v. Evans, 810 

N.E.2d 335, 337 (Ind. 2004) (“If a statute is unambiguous, that is, susceptible to 

but one meaning, we must give the statute its clear and plain meaning.” 

(quotation omitted)), reh’g denied. Under the plain meaning of this statute, any 

right guaranteed to a child by the constitution (which we all agree includes the 

right to be present at delinquency and probation fact-finding hearings) may be 

waived in only one of three ways, and if one of these three ways is not satisfied, 

the right simply may not be waived. 

[18] In addition, I believe that reading the statute this way fits in with the structure 

of the juvenile code as a whole: to protect children. See ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of 

Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016) (“Our first task when 

interpreting a statute is to give its words their plain meaning and consider the 

structure of the statute as a whole.”). The juvenile-justice system is founded on 

the notion of parens patriae, which allows the court the power to step into the 

shoes of the parents; this is because children, by definition, are not assumed to 

have the capacity to take care of themselves. In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635 

(Ind. 2004). As our Supreme Court explained in K.G., although children 

generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against 

governmental deprivations as adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal 
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system to account for children’s vulnerability and their needs for concern, 

sympathy, and paternal attention. Id. at 636. Moreover, it is the policy of this 

State and the purpose of the juvenile code to “ensure that children within the 

juvenile justice system are treated as persons in need of care, protection, 

treatment, and rehabilitation.” Ind. Code § 31-10-2-1(5). 

[19] My colleagues, however, believe that the legislature could not have intended for 

the juvenile waiver-of-rights statute to apply to a juvenile’s right to be present at 

delinquency and probation fact-finding hearings because applying the statute to 

the right to be present produces “absurd” results. Slip op. at 11. The Indiana 

Supreme Court recently examined the absurdity doctrine in Calvin v. State, No. 

02S03-1709-CR-611 (Ind. Dec. 21, 2017). In that case, the State argued that 

under the plain meaning of Indiana’s habitual-offender statutes, the fact that 

prior non-Indiana felonies count as Level 6 felonies (and a habitual-offender 

finding cannot be based on two Level 6 felonies) leads to absurd results. Our 

Supreme Court—acknowledging that the absurdity doctrine is “strong 

medicine” that can defeat the plain meaning of statutes—concluded that the 

absurdity doctrine did not apply. Slip op. at 5. The Court reasoned that case 

law had upheld the plain meaning of the statutes for nearly three decades and 

that invoking the absurdity doctrine would “expand criminal liability beyond 

the habitual-offender statutes’ long-settled plain meaning—a result at odds with 

separation-of-powers principles and our narrow construction of criminal 

statutes.” Id. The Court specifically noted that “the legislature is 
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constitutionally subject to process requirements and political responsibility in 

ways that the judiciary is not.” Id. at 6. 

[20] I believe that many of these same concerns apply here and that this case 

likewise “falls outside the doctrine’s boundaries” given the plain meaning of 

Section 31-32-5-1. Id. at 7. Admittedly, this case is difficult because R.R. was 

over seventeen years old when he failed to appear, as opposed to ten years old. 

But Section 31-32-5-1 does not make distinctions based on age. See Hickman v. 

State, 654 N.E.2d 278, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“The taped confession at issue 

was taken on October 7, 1993, at which time Hickman was two months away 

from his eighteenth birthday. Thus . . . Hickman was a ‘child’ at the time of the 

confession and entitled to the protections provided to children under our 

juvenile code.”). At the end of the day, this is the call of our legislature, and if 

this is not what they intended (as my colleagues believe), then “[a]ny change 

must . . . fall to the legislature’s corrective pen.” Calvin, slip op. at 7. Because it 

is undisputed that R.R. did not waive his right to be present pursuant to one of 

the three ways set forth in Section 31-32-5-1, I would reverse the juvenile court 

and remand this case for further proceedings.