IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 04/23/96

OF THE

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 93-KA-01428 COA

CHARLES TORNS, JR. A/K/A CHARLES TORNS

APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

APPELLEE

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION AND

MAY NOT BE CITED, PURSUANT TO M.R.A.P. 35-B

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. WILLIAM F. COLEMAN

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:

THOMAS FORTNER AND VICKI L. GILLIAM

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JOLENE M. LOWRY

DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ROBERT TAYLOR

NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL: COUNT I: MAIL FRAUD AND COUNT II: UTTERING

A FORGERY

TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: COUNT I: FIVE (5) YEARS AND COUNT II: FIFTEEN (15)

YEARS ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

BEFORE THOMAS, P.J., BARBER, AND SOUTHWICK, JJ.

SOUTHWICK, J., FOR THE COURT:
Charles Torns, Jr., was convicted of mail fraud and uttering a forgery in the Circuit Court of Hinds

County. He appeals raising issues regarding authentication of a tape recording admitted into

evidence, the denial of his motion for new trial, ineffective assistance of counsel, and merger of the

two offenses. We find his claims to be without merit and affirm.

FACTS

In February 1990, a minister in North Dakota received a collect telephone call from a man who

identified himself as Hollis McBride. The man told the minister that he was in prison in Mississippi.

He asked for the minister’s help to enable him to see his wife in North Dakota upon his release. On

March 7, 1990, the minister received a registered letter. The name on the package’s return address

was D.L. Durant of Mississippi, but the letter inside was from McBride. An eight thousand dollar

bank check was enclosed with the letter. The minister then contacted the police department and tape

recorded his subsequent telephone conversations with the man identifying himself as McBride. After

several telephone conversations, the man asked the minister to send seven thousand dollars in cash to

D.L. Durant at a particular street address in Jackson, Mississippi. On March 22, 1990, a postal

inspector attempted to deliver a package to this street address, but no one answered the door. After

the inspector got back into his mail truck, a man--later identified as Torns--approached him. The

inspector asked Torns if he was D.L. Durant and Torns answered affirmatively. The inspector then

gave Torns the package and he signed for it as D.L. Durant. Once the inspector identified himself as a

postal authority to Torns, Torns left the package and ran off. A detective at the scene captured

Torns.

A bank teller at a Jackson, Mississippi bank testified that she issued an official bank check for eight

dollars on March 5, 1990 to Torns. The bank check she issued to Torns was identified as the same

check which was received by the minister. The only difference in the check was the amount. The

amount of the check when it was issued was eight dollars, but it was eight thousand dollars at the

time the minister received it in the mail.

DISCUSSION

1. Authentication of the Tape Recording

Torns contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the tape recordings of the

minister’s telephone conversations with the man who identified himself as McBride. Torns maintains

that the tape recordings were not properly authenticated pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence

901(a) because no one identified the voice of the man who called himself McBride as being the voice

of Torns.

The requirement of authentication of evidence is governed by Rule 901(a) of the Mississippi Rules of

Evidence. Rule 901(a) provides: "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition

precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in

question is what its proponent claims." M.R.E. 901(a). Here, the State claimed that the tapes were
recordings of conversations between the minister and a man using the name Hollis McBride. At trial,

the minister properly identified the tapes and his voice on the tapes pursuant to Rule 901(a). This

identification satisfied the authentication requirement the Rule. Because the State did not offer the

tapes to prove that the voice of the man who identified himself as McBride was the voice of Torns,

the State was not required to provide identification of Torns as the voice of the man who called

himself McBride.

Torns points to the supreme court decision, Middlebrook v. State, to stand for the proposition that

"[v]oice identification is a prerequisite for the tape to be admissible." Middlebrook v. State, 555 So.

2d 1009, 1013 (Miss. 1990). We find Middlebrook to be inapplicable to the issue here because in

Middlebrook, unlike the case at hand, the State claimed that the voices on the tape were the police

officer’s and the defendant’s. Id. at 1013. Thus, compliance with Rule 901(a) under the facts

involved in the Middlebrook case required that the State identify the voices on the tape as those of

the police officer and the defendant.

Torns also argues that the jury was not at liberty to use circumstantial reasoning to decide whether

the voice of McBride was that of Torns because it was not given an instruction to do so. However,

our examination of the record reveals that the defense never requested such an instruction. "Failure to

request an instruction at trial works to bar assertion of error on appeal." Materials Transportation

Co. v. Newman, 656 So. 2d 1199, 1203 (Miss. 1995) (citation omitted). We consequently find the

issue procedurally barred.

2. Denial of Motion for New Trial and Effectiveness of Counsel

Torns contends that the trial court erred in denying his amended motion for new trial because of the

post-trial testimony of his mother and one of his nine brothers. Their testimony alleged that it was

Torns’ brother, Freddie Joe McKenzie, and not Torns, who purchased the altered check from the

bank. Torns claims that this testimony constitutes new and material evidence and as such, should

have justified the granting of a new trial pursuant to Rule 5.16(3) of the Uniform Criminal Rules of

Circuit Court Practice. Rule 5.16 provides:

The court on written notice of the defendant may grant a new trial on any of the following

grounds:

. . .

(3) Where new and material evidence is recently discovered which would probably

produce a different result at a new trial, and such evidence could not have been discovered

sooner, by diligence of counsel . . . .

It is clear from the record that defense counsel knew about the allegation of Torns’ mother at trial,

before closing arguments. Moreover, in addition to McKenzie, Torns has eight other brothers who

defense counsel could have questioned. Thus, as noted by the trial judge, these allegations could have

easily been discovered earlier and presented to the jury before its deliberation.

Torns raises an alternative argument that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because of
defense counsel’s knowledge of the possibility that such testimony could exist and his failure to

present it to the jury. In order to prevail on this issue, Torns must prove that his lawyer’s

performance was deficient, and that the deficiency was so substantial as to deprive him of a fair trial.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984); Moody v. State, 644 So. 2d 451, 456 (Miss.

1994). Torns must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been

different but for counsel’s deficiencies. Nicolaou v. State, 612 So. 2d 1080, 1086 (Miss. 1992). There

is a strong but rebuttable presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. Moody, 644 So. 2d at 456. Accordingly, appellate review of counsel’s

performance is "highly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

The alleged deficiency here relates to the defense’s trial strategy. Lawyers are permitted wide latitude

with such matters. Edwards v. State, 615 So. 2d 590, 597 (Miss. 1993); Woodward v. State, 635 So.

2d 805, 808-09 (Miss. 1993). Moreover, at least some would consider the testimony at issue to be

less than compelling, and even unbelievable. The testimony of Torns’ mother and brother appears to

be a two-edge sword, and perhaps more harmful then helpful. In fact, presenting testimony to a jury

which counsel believes that the jury would consider unbelievable would constitute ineffective

assistance. Under the circumstances, defense counsel’s decision not to present the testimony at issue

to the jury was understandable trial strategy and not prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel.

3. No Merger of the Two Offenses

Torns contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him for both convictions--mail fraud and

uttering a forgery--because of his claim that uttering a forgery is a lesser included offense of mail

fraud. We find no contemporaneous objection on this ground in the record. Generally, this Court will

not address an objection raised for the first time on appeal. Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660, 665-66

(Miss. 1991). The defense, however, characterizes this matter as erroneous sentencing with due

process and double jeopardy implications. Because these alleged errors may affect fundamental

rights, we address the merits of the issue. Id. at 666 (noting that errors affecting fundamental rights

are an exception to the rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first

time on appeal).

Torns was charged with mail fraud and uttering a forgery as two separate counts in a single

indictment. The elements of count one, mail fraud, are found in section 97-19-83(1) of the

Mississippi Code of 1972 which provides:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, . . . for

the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, transmits or

causes to be transmitted by mail . . . across county or state jurisdictional lines.

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-19-83(1) (1972). Section 97-21-59 provides the elements of count two,

uttering a forgery. This section provides:

Every person who shall be convicted of having uttered or published as true, and with

intent to defraud, any forged, altered, or counterfeit instrument, . . . , the forgery, altering,

or counterfeiting of which is declared by the provisions of this chapter to be an offense,
knowing such instrument or coin to be forged, altered, or counterfeited, shall suffer the

punishment herein provided for forgery.

Id. § 97-21-59.

The premise of the defense’s argument is that uttering a forgery is a lesser included offense of mail

fraud. Based upon this premise, Torns asserts that (1) he should have been sentenced only to the

greater charge of mail fraud, and (2) his rights against double jeopardy were violated. We disagree

with the defense’s premise. In an attempt to support its argument, the defense cites as authority the

following inapposite supreme court decisions: Miles v. State, 344 So. 2d 133 (Miss. 1977); Newburn

v. State, 205 So. 2d 260 (Miss. 1967); Holderfield v. State, 215 Miss. 564, 61 So. 2d 385 (1952);

Roberts v. State, 55 Miss. 421 (1877). These cases do not involve the issue at hand, but rather

pertain to the issue of how to read general jury verdicts of guilty when both larceny and burglary are

joined in a single count.

The cases which do relate to the present issue require this Court to ascertain if each statutory offense

requires proof of a fact which the other does not. E.g., Meeks v. State, 604 So. 2d 748, 751 (Miss.

1992) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303 (1932)). If so, then the offenses do

not merge. Meeks, 604 So. 2d at 751 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303 (1932)

). The offense of mail fraud requires proof of a fact which uttering a forgery does not--proof of

transmitting or causing to transmit a scheme to defraud by mail. The flipside is also true. Uttering a

forgery requires proof of a fact which the mail fraud statute does not require--proof of intentional

uttering or publishing as true a forged, altered, or counterfeit instrument. This proof of fact is not

required by the mail fraud statute. Thus, mail fraud and uttering a forgery are separate and distinct

offenses, even though here they arose out of the same sequence of events. We consequently find that

Torns is not entitled to prevail on this assignment of error.

We affirm.

THE JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY

OF COUNT I : MAIL FRAUD AND COUNT II: UTTERING A FORGERY AND

SENTENCE AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER OF FIVE (5) YEARS FOR COUNT I AND

FIFTEEN (15) YEARS FOR COUNT II ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY IS

AFFIRMED. COSTS ARE ASSESSED TO HINDS COUNTY.

FRAISER, C.J., BRIDGES AND THOMAS, P.JJ., BARBER, COLEMAN, DIAZ, KING,

McMILLIN, AND PAYNE, JJ., CONCUR.