alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### DAY v. ANDERSEN.

No. 9135.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

June 21, 1933.

A. B. Crane, of Raymondville, for appellant.

R. E. Robinson, of Raymondville, for ap-pellee.

MURRAY, Justice.

E. M. Day, appellant, instituted this suit in the county court of Willacy county against C. C. Andersen, alleging that Andersen entered into a contract with him to purchase about two thousand fruit trees and had breached this contract, whereby appellant was damaged in the sum of $985.85.

When appellant rested his case, appellee moved for an instructed verdict, which was granted by the trial court. Appellant assigns such action of the trial court as error. The evidence does not show that Andersen ever entered into such a contract with Day. It is shown that negotiations were going on between these two parties, but no definite contract was ever entered into. The trial court properly instructed a verdict for ap-pellee.

 Appellant next complains because the trial court would not permit him to reopen the ease and offer further testimony in support of appellant’s cause of action. He did not specify what witnesses he wanted to offer or what documents he might wish to offer or what he expected to prove if permitted to reopen the case.

The matter of reopening a case after the plaintiff has rested is a matter directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the action taken by him on such a matter will not be disturbed on appeal, unless a, clear abuse of discretion is shown. We find no abuse of discretion in this case. Pace v. Olvey (Tex. Civ. App.) 282 S. W. 940; Askey v. Power (Tex. Civ. App.) 21 S.W.(2d) 326, Id. (Tex. Com. App.) 36 S.W. (2d) 446; Mantel v. Mitchell (Tex. Civ. App.) 293 S. W. 835; Article 2181, R. C. S. 1925.

Appellant cites Ledbetter v. Martinez (Tex. Civ. App.) 12 S.W.(2d) 1042, in which case it was held to be error to refuse permission to reopen the case. However, in that case it was shown what evidence was to be offered and from which witnesses. In the present case we do not know yet what evidence was to be offered and from what witnesses, and under such circumstances it would •be impossible for us to conclude that an abuse of discretion was shown.

The judgment is affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 136 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 136

 To better provide for compensation for certain persons injured in the 
     course of employment at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory in 
                              California.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 6, 2009

  Mr. Gallegly (for himself and Mr. Sherman) introduced the following 
  bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in 
 addition to the Committee on Education and Labor, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
  of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
                               concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To better provide for compensation for certain persons injured in the 
     course of employment at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory in 
                              California.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEFINITION OF MEMBER OF SPECIAL EXPOSURE COHORT.

    (a) In General.--Section 3621(14) of the Energy Employees 
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 
7384l(14)) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph:
                    ``(D) The employee was so employed for a number of 
                work days aggregating at least 250 work days before 
                January 1, 2006, by the Department of Energy or a 
                Department of Energy contractor or subcontractor at the 
                Santa Susana Field Laboratory in California.''.
    (b) Reapplication.--A claim that an individual qualifies, by reason 
of section 3621(14)(D) of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 
Compensation Program Act of 2000 (as added by subsection (a) of this 
Act), for compensation or benefits under such Act shall be considered 
for compensation or benefits notwithstanding any denial of any other 
claim for compensation with respect to such individual.
                                 <all>
```
#### The State, ex rel. Julius et al., *v.*Shutrump et al., Board of Elections of Mahoning County.

(No. 28862

Decided October 22, 1941.)

*526
      *Mr. Carrington T. Marshall, Mr. Joseph E. Julius*and *Mr. Anthony F. Pacella,*for relators.

*Mr. William, A. Ambrose,*prosecuting attorney, and *Mr. Harold H. Hull,*for respondents.

*527By the Court.

A permanent injunction having been issued and remaining in effect against the board of elections on the ground of fraud, there is no clear legal duty resting upon the board which this court will command to be performed. Section 12283, General Code; 25 Ohio Jurisprudence, 997 and 1026, Sections 23 and 44; *Ohio & Indiana Rd. Co.*v. *Commrs. of Wyandot County,*7 Ohio St., 278.

*Writ denied.*

Weygandt, C. J., Turner, Williams, Hart, Zimmerman and Bettman, JJ., concur.

Matthias, J., not participating.
```

[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 176 (Wednesday, September 11, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 73740]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-20516]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 12529; No. 2024-05]

Determination Pursuant to the Foreign Missions Act

    Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of State under 
the Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. 4301, et seq. (``the Act''), and 
delegated pursuant to Department of State Delegation of Authority No. 
214, dated September 20, 1994, I hereby determine that the 
representative offices and operations in the United States of RT 
(formerly ``Russia Today''), including their real property and 
personnel, are a foreign mission within the meaning of 22 U.S.C. 
4302(a)(3).
    Furthermore, I hereby determine it to be reasonably necessary to 
protect the interests of the United States to require the 
representative offices and operations in the United States of RT and 
its agents or employees acting on its behalf, to comply with the terms 
and conditions specified by the Department of State's Office of Foreign 
Missions relating to the above-named entity's activities in the United 
States.

Rebecca E. Gonzales,
Director, Office of Foreign Missions, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2024-20516 Filed 9-10-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4711-11-P
```
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

REGION IX 

75 Hawthorne Street 

San Francisco, CA 94105 

November 7, 2013 

Ross Bell, Air Quality District Manager 

Shasta County Air Quality Management District 

1855 Placer Street, Ste. 101 

Redding, California 96001 

Subject: Request to retain public documents at the Shasta County AQMD for public 

inspection 

Dear Mr. Bell: 

The purpose of this letter is to request that the Shasta County Air Quality Management District 

retain the enclosed documents at the District office for at least sixty (60) days for public inspection. 

These documents are the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency's preliminary decision for the 

proposed Clean Air Act Prevention of Significant Deterioration permit for the expansion of the Sierra 

Pacific Industries facility located in Anderson, California. These documents are currently available for 

public comment. Please contact me at (415) 947-4156 or kelly.shaheerah@epa.gov ifyou have any 

questions. 

Enclosures 

Air 

Shaheerah 

Division, 

Kelly, 

Permits 

Envi~ngineer Office
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          12,885
<SECURITIES>                                    55,349
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                88,424
<PP&E>                                          45,931
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<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                           448
<OTHER-SE>                                      98,951
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   112,788
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                79,600
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               105,800
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (33,195)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (33,195)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (33,195)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.76)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.76)


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

       
<ARTICLE>5
<MULTIPLIER>1000
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                    SEP-30-1996
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                   683
<BONDS>                                   0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                     0
<PREFERRED>                               0
<COMMON>                                  8
<OTHER-SE>                           16,743
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         13,349
<SALES>                               1,758
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                      2,008
<CGS>                                   937
<TOTAL-COSTS>                           937
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                      1,806
<LOSS-PROVISION>                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                       44
<INCOME-PRETAX>                       (595)
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</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                5,618,236
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,689,792
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .02
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</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOISES ELIAS PEREZ TORRES,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 23

- 122

Agency No.

A070

- 289

- 956

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted September 12, 2024 **

Pasadena

, California

Before: SCHROEDER, R. NELSON, and MILLER, Circuit Judges

.

Moises Elias Perez Torres, a native and citizen of Nicaragua, petitions for

review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying his motion to remand

to seek cancellation of removal. We lack jurisdiction to review th at decision and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

SEP 16 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 23

- 122

therefore dismiss the petition.

We are barred from reviewing “‘ any judgment regarding the granting of

relief under ’ the provisions governing cancellation of removal

. . . except in

reviewing constitutional claims and legal questions .” Figueroa Ochoa v. Garland

,

91 F.4th 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). Th at

jurisdictional bar extends to rulings on procedural motions relating to a n alien’s

eligibility for discretionary relief

. Id. at 1293

– 94

.

Perez Torres applied for cancellation of removal. The immigration judge

denied his application on several grounds , including that he lacked a qualifying

relative for such relief. On appeal, Perez Torres filed a motion to remand, arguing

that he

, in fact

, has a qualifying relative for purposes of cancellation of removal

and

, for the first time

, presenting evidence of that relative

. I n dismissing his appeal,

the Board denied the motion to remand because Perez Torres presented his

arguments “for the first time on appeal

, ” a s well as for the “independent reason”

that he had “not carried his heavy burden to show that he has a qualifying relative.”

See Matter of L

-

A

- C

- , 26 I

. & N

. Dec. 516, 526 (B

. I

. A

. 2015).

Because the agency denied Perez Torres’ s motion to remand based on its

determination that he failed to establish that he has a qualifying relative , it made a

judgment grounded in factual findings that we lack jurisdiction to review. See

Figueroa Ochoa , 91 F.4th at 1293

– 94 ; see also Patel v. Garland , 596 U.S. 328,3 23

- 122

347 (2022). A nd a lthough Perez Torres argu e s that the Board erred in applying the

standard for a motion to reopen when assessing his motion to remand, we have

held that the requirements for both types of motions are essentially the same. See

Angov v. Lynch , 788 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2015). Thus, because Perez Torres

raises no colorable constitutional or legal challenge to the agency’s decision, the

exceptions to the preclusion of jurisdiction do not apply.

PETITION DISMISSED.
#### DOUGLASS et al. v. MERCER.

No. 13506.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Sap Antonio.

Feb. 8, 1939.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1939.

Jas. D. O’Connor and Robert M. Vaughan, both of Dallas, for plaintiffs in error.

Dibrell, Mosheim & Campbell, of Seguin, for defendant in error.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

Judgment was rendered in this cause on April 2, 1938, from which relators herein sought to prosecute writ of error. Petition and bond in error were filed on September 26th. Service of the writ was had on September 30th.

It was the duty of relators, if they desired to prosecute the appeal, to promptly apply to the clerk of the trial court for a transcript of the proceedings, to enable them to timely file the same in this Court. On the contrary, however, relators delayed making such application for 43 days, or until November 13th. Upon receipt of this application the Clerk proceeded, as 'other duties of his office permitted, to make up the transcript as ordered. It was delivered in due course to relators on November 30th, the last day on which it could properly be filed in this Court. Relators tendered it here on the following day, which was too late, and upon its rejection, relators thereafter on December 6th, filed motion for leave to file the belated transcript.

After mature consideration of the facts stated above, in connection with other circumstances apparent of record, this Court denied the motion for leave to file. Re-lators have filed their motion for rehearing thereon.

We are of the opinion that relators’ own motion affirmatively shows such a lack of diligence in applying for and procuring the transcript from the Clerk of the trial court as to preclude the remedy sought. It is obvious that relators’ unexplained delay of 43 days in applying for the transcript was the sole cause of their failure to comply with the plain provision of the statute, and their motion for rehearing will be denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2214 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2214

  To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for the 
 recognition of attending physician assistants as attending physicians 
           to serve hospice patients, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           December 11, 2017

 Mr. Enzi (for himself and Mr. Carper) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for the 
 recognition of attending physician assistants as attending physicians 
           to serve hospice patients, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Medicare Patient Access to Hospice 
Act of 2017''.

SEC. 2. RECOGNITION OF ATTENDING PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS AS ATTENDING 
              PHYSICIANS TO SERVE HOSPICE PATIENTS.

    (a) Recognition of Attending Physician Assistants as Attending 
Physicians To Serve Hospice Patients.--
            (1) In general.--Section 1861(dd)(3)(B) of the Social 
        Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x(dd)(3)(B)) is amended--
                    (A) by striking ``or nurse'' and inserting ``, the 
                nurse''; and
                    (B) by inserting ``, or the physician assistant (as 
                defined in such subsection)'' after ``subsection 
                (aa)(5))''.
            (2) Clarification of hospice role of physician 
        assistants.--Section 1814(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Social Security 
        Act (42 U.S.C. 1395f(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)) is amended by inserting 
        ``or a physician assistant'' after ``a nurse practitioner''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to items and services furnished on or after January 1, 2019.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the
quarterly report of Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. (the Partnership) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Kelcy L.
Warren, Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Partnership.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: November 9, 2009



/s/ Kelcy L. WarrenKelcy L. WarrenChief Executive Officer


*A signed original of this written statement required by 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350 has been provided to and will be retained by Energy Transfer Partners, L.P.