1

Rule 2 3 or der filed NO. 5-10-0123 Marc h 24, 2010; M otion t o pu blish gran ted I N THE Apri l 9, 2010. AP PE LLA TE C O U R T O F IL LIN O IS FI FTH DI STRI CT

________________________________________________________________________ RH ON DA BA RT L OW a nd J A CK BA RT L OW, ) Appeal f rom the d/b /aJac k' s Roof

ing , RYAN TOWLE, ) Circui t Court of d/b/a J ack' s Si ding and Windows, and ) Frank lin County. CHARL ES ERI C MODGLI N, ) ) Plaintif fs-Appellants , ) ) v. ) No. 10-CH-35 ) CATHE RINE M. SHAN NON , in Her Capaci ty as ) Director of Labor, State of I llinois, and ) LIS A MA DIGAN , in Her Capacity as Ill inois ) Attorne y G enera l, ) Ho nora ble ) Robert W. Lew is, Defendants-Appellees. ) Jud ge, p resid ing.

________________________________________________________________________ JUST ICE ST EW ART delivered the op inion o f the co urt: This interlocutor

y a ppe al concer

ns ongoi ng inv esti gat ions of t he plai ntif

fs by the Illinois Department of Labor (t

he Department ) pu r suant t o the I llinois Employee Classi fication Act (the Act) (82 0 ILCS 1 85/1 et seq. (West 2008)). On M arch 12, 2010, t he plaintiff s–Rhonda Bartlow and Jack Bartlow, doing business as Jack 's Roofing, Ryan Towle, doing business as Jack 's Sidi ng and W indows, and Charles Er ic Modgli n–fil ed a complai nt in the ci rcuit

court of Fran klin Co unt y, Illin ois, for a dec larat ory jud gmen t and for injun ctive reli ef aga inst th e defendant s–Catheri ne M. Shannon, in her capacit y as the di rector

of the De partm ent, and Lis a Madigan, i n her capaci ty as t he Il lino is Attorney Genera l. The plaintiffs also filed a motion fo r a temporary restraining order (TR O) and for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff s all eged i n their

complai nt and in t

heir mot ion that

the Department is attemp ting to en force th e Act a gainst the m an d that th e Act viola tes the Illinois2

Constit utionand the Unit ed States Con sti tuti on and is, t herefor e, unenfor ceable. The defen dants evi dently r eceiv ed notic e of the hearing on the reque st for

a TRO, and all the parti es presented a rgument. The Attorne y G enera l entere d an a ppea rance for the defen dants but did not f

ile an answ er befo re the h earing. T he circ uit court denied the plainti ffs' request for a TRO, and the plaintiff s fil ed a ti mely noti ce of an i nterl ocutory appe al pur suan t t o Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 307 (188 I ll. 2d R. 307). For t he following reasons, we revers e th e c ir cu it

co urt' s d en ia l o f aTRO. BACKGR OUND Supr eme Court Rule 307(d) provi des an ex pedite d timeta ble for a re viewin g court to consider the denial of a TR O. 18 8 Ill. 2d R. 307 (d). To a ppea l the de nial of a TR O re ques t, the petitioner mus t fi le a not ice of a ppeal anda petition with th e appe ll at e c our t with intwo days of the deni al of t

he TRO request, and the peti tioner may al so fil e a m emorandum supporti ng th e pe ti ti on, al ongwit h the p et it io n an d a n ot ic e of app eal . 18 8 I ll . 2d

R. 307(d)(1). The res pondent must fil e any respondi ng memorandum wit hin two days foll owing the fi lingof

the no tice of a ppea l. 188 Ill. 2d R . 307 (d)(2). The appe llate cou rt is requir ed to deci de the pet iti on within f ive days aft er the time for fil ing any respondi ng memorandum has expi r ed. 1 88 Ill. 2d R . 307 (d)(4). "[T]h e sup reme c ourt's inten tion in imposi ng the shorter time frame fo r appeals from the granting or denial of temp orary restraini ng orders was t o provi de an expedit ed appeal pr ocess due t o the nat ure of t he temp orar y restraini ng order , an emerg ency remedy g ranted on a summary showingby the movant [citation]." Frie dman v. Thorson , 303 I ll. App. 3d 131, 135-36 (1999). " Provi ding for an exp edited app eal from the en try or denial of a temporar y restraini ng order

promotes the in terests of justice by allow ing the parties to more qu ickly reach the preliminary injunction hearing st age[, ] where the court wil l bett er be abl e to det ermine t he right of t

he moving party t o the injunctiv e relief r equested." Frie dman , 303 I ll. App. 3d at 136.3

In an al yz in g t he ci rc ui t c ou rt 's denial of a TRO in the pres ent case, we fi rst t urn to t he statutory and r egulator y fram ew ork in w hich th e D epartm ent c on ducts i ts i nvest igations under the Act

and deter

mines whether

a vi olati on of the Act

has occurr ed. The Act was enactedon January 1, 2008, and it e stabl ishes c rit eria t o determine w heth er an individua l perfor ming services for a constr uction c ontractor is a

n employee of the cont

ractor or is an independent

contra ctor. Ind ividuals perfor ming s ervi ces for

contractors on or after January 1, 2008, are pr esumed to be empl oyees of t he contra ctor unl ess the y meet criteri a specif ied in section 10 o f the Ac t. 820 ILCS 18 5/10 (West 2008). The Act seek s to ensur e that workers in the c onstru cti on ind ustry are offered prot ections under numerous labor laws, including minimum wage, overtime, workers'compensati on, and unemployment insurance, and are not mi sclas sifi ed as indepe ndent contrac tors in order to av oid tax and labor l aw obligat ions. 820 ILCS 18 5/3 (W est 2008); 56 Il l. Adm. Code §240.100, adopted at 32 Ill. Reg. 135 08, eff. July 3 1, 2008

. The Illinois De partm ent of L abor is charge d with the dut y of enfor cingthe Act

and the rules, re gulation s, and orde rs prom ulgated p ursua nt to the Act. 820 ILCS 185/25 (West 2008). An inve sti gat ion under the Act begins by the filing of a complai nt by any int erest ed party or by the Depart

ment. 820 I LCS 185/25( a) (West 2008); 56 Il l. Adm. Code §240.200, adoptedat 32 Ill. R eg. 135 12, e ff. July 31, 2008. Upon the fi lingof a complaint, t he Department

conducts a pr eliminary inv esti gat ion to determine whether there is cause for an inve sti gat ion. 56 Il l. Adm. Code §240.220( a), adopt ed at 32 Ill. Re g. 135 12, 1 351 3, eff. J uly 31, 2008. I f the Depart ment det ermines that t here is cause for

an inv esti gat ion , t he Department

is obl igated to c onduct the inve sti gat ion to det ermine whethe r a vi olati on of the Acthas occurr ed, and the Department may inv esti gat e using"any method or combinat ion of methods deem ed su itable at the discretion of the D epartment." 56 Il l. Adm. Code §240.300, adopted at 32 Ill. Reg. 13514 , eff. July 31, 2 008.4

"Before making

a finaldeterminationof a vi olati on, the Depart ment shal l noti fy the contractors of the s ubstance of the Department' s inv esti gat ion and aff ord the contrac tors an opp ortun ity to pres ent any writ ten inform ation, w ithin 30 calendar days, for the Department to cons ider in re achin g its determination." 5 6 Ill. Adm. Cod e §240 .300(d), adop ted at 3 2 Ill. Reg. 13514, ef

f. Jul y 31, 2008. "As part of its inve sti gat ion, t

he Department

may convene

a fact-find ing con ferenc e in person or by telephone for the purpose of obtai ning a dditi onal infor mation or

evi dence, ide ntif

ying t he issues in dis pute, ascert aining the posi tions of the parties[,] and exploring the possibi lit y of settlement." 56 Il l. Adm. Code §240.310, adopted at 32 I ll. Reg. 13514, eff. July 31, 2 008. Once the Department concludes i ts i nvest igation and determines that

a vi olati on of the Act

has occu rred, th e D epa rtme nt th en m ay s eek a voluntary settlement w ith the contractor; recommend the commencement of a civ il ac tion; issue a cea se-an d-de sist orde r; assess civil pena lties; colle ct deni ed or los t wages, salar y, empl oyment bene fit s, or compens ation owed t o the empl oyee; pl ace the cont ractor on a debarment

lis t pursuant to s ecti on 42 of the A ct (820 ILCS 185 /42 (W est 2008)); and /or ta ke any other r easonable acti on to eliminate the unlawful practice and/or r emedy the eff ect of t he viol ation. 56 Ill. A dm. Code §240.510, adopte d at 32 I ll. Reg. 13519, ef f. Jul y 31, 2008. The contrac tor canseek a revi ew of the Department' s fina l dete rminat ion by fi linga writt en request foran informal co nference w ith the director of the D epartment. 56 Il l. Adm. Code §240.5 00(e), adopted at 32 Il l. Reg. 13518, 13519, eff . July 31, 200 8. At t

he infor mal conferenc e, the contractor can present

writt en or oralinfor

mationand a rgumen ts regarding why the D epartm ent's final de termina tion sh ould be amended or re consider ed. 56 Il l. A dm. Cod e §240 .500(e)(1), ad opted at 32 Ill. Reg. 13518, 13 519, eff. July 31, 200 8. W ith this statuto ry an d regula tory fra mew ork in min d, w e turn to the plainti ffs' request fora TRO. The ci rc ui t c ourt d eni ed t he p la in ti ff

s' re que st fo r aTRO based on the plaintiff s' plea din gs and affi davi ts bef ore the c ourt. A cc ord ingly, for purpose s of this interlocutory5

appe al, we will ass ume as true all we ll-plead ed fac ts con tained in the ple adings a nd affidavits in the rec ord. Se e Ambassador Foods Corp. v. Montgomery Ward & Co. , 43 Ill. Ap p. 2d 100, 101 (1963) (" Defendant appear ed in the tri al court [] but fil ed no pleading, so the case

comes b efore us solely o n the c omp laint. U nder those circum stance s, the fa cts pro perly pleadedwill be c onsider ed as tr ue"). The f

acts al leg ed in the pl eading s and aff idav its are as follows. Rho nda an d Jack Ba rtlow are spouses and g eneral partner s in agenera l partne rship that has been doing business as Jac k's Roofin g since 1 977 . Jack's Ro ofing is in the business of entering int o contrac ts for sidi ng, window, seaml ess g utter , and roof instal lations. Ryan Tow le and Charles Er ic Modgli n perfor m sidi ng, window, and roof inst allation s ervi ces for Ja ck 's Roo fing. The com plaint alleges that Tow le and M odglin are not employe es of Ja ck 's Roofing but are subc ontrac tors an d op erate their own businesses as sole prop rietors. T ow le operates his sole propri etorship under the business name Jack' s Sidingand W indows. On Septe mber 3, 2008, the Department s ent Jack's Roofing a"noti ce of inv esti gat ion and request

for document s." The Department' s reques t for do cum ents so ught do cum ents concerni ng Jack' s R oo fi ng 's relationship with Towle, Modgli n, and other persons t

he Department

"cont ends are or were [Ja ck' s Roofing ] employees ." The inv esti gat ion was identi fiedas fi le No. 2009-CA-JD08-0017. On October 15, 2008, Jack' s Roofingfurni shed the De partm ent nu mero us do cum ents, in cludin g certificate s of su bcon tractor liab ility insurance, cancelled checks evi dencing payments from Jack' s Roofing to subcontractors, copies of bids by s ubcontrac tors f or jobs available through Jack' s Roofing , and copies of contracts between Jack' s Roofing and subcontractors. In Aprilof

2009, Jack

Dombrowski, a Depart

ment conci liator, conduct ed a tel ephone inter vie w with Rhonda Bartl ow and w it h v ar io us in di vi du al s w ho ha d c on tr ac te d w it h J ac k's Ro ofin g. On Fe brua ry16, 201 0, th e De pa rt me ntse ntJa ck ' s Ro of in g a "No ti ce of6

Preliminary Investigative Findings" that stated that the D epartment ha d made a preliminary determinationthat Jac k's Roofin g "had faile d prop erly to c lassify te n sub contra ctors in viol ationof the Act." The notice stat ed that Jack' s Roofing "m ay be assess ed a fine of $1,683,000" an d r eq ue st ed Ja ck 's Roofing to res pond within 30 days of the dat e of the notice. The notice furthe r stated, "[U ]pon receip t and re view o f the res pon se, [the De partm ent]

wo uld issue a

writt en decisi on infor

ming t he parti es of

the final determination in the matter." In additi on, on March 1, 2010, the Department s ent Jack's Roofing anotif icat ion of

a second inve sti gat ion "of

a complai nt reg ardingwork do ne at 311 W est Grand , Carterville, Ill inois." In this notif

icat ion, t he Department

request ed the "pr oduct ion of documents within 15 calendar days of the date of

the le tter " and identifi ed the i nvest igation as fil e No. 2010-CART12-0050. Ja ck 's Roofing, Towle, and M odglin filed their complaint for a declar atory j udgment and forinjunctive reli ef on March 12, 2010, and t hey all eged t

hat the Department ha d not provi ded them an "oppor tunit y for hearing, " that

their tele phone call s to t

he Department request ing settl em ent dis cussions had not been r eturned, and that the Act and the pendi ng investi gations hav e created uncertainty concerninghow they are to conduct their business. The plaintiffs a lle ge that th e only way Jack's Roofing can prove curr ent and past compliance with the Ac t is to pro vide in f orma tion tha t can o nly b e obta ined fr om its subcontractors, including federal tax returns. Jack's Roofing ma intains that there is no means to determine whether the D ep ar tm en t wi ll "con cede it to be in com plianc e w ith the A ct, withoutdisco ntinuin g its relations hip with [its subcontract ors] an d h ir in g e m pl oy ee s. " J ac k's Roofing alleges tha t it is "at risk of su bstan tial pen alties as a result o f its lack of a ccess to information that w ill enable it to prove that it is in compliance w ith the Act." The pl ai nt if

fs ' fiv e- count complaint maintains t hat the Act vi olates the due process clauses of the Il linoi s Constit ution and t

he United S tate s Constit ution, the speci al-l egi slat ion7

clause of the Illinois Constit ution, the equalprotection cla uses of t he Il linoi s Constit

ution and the Unite d Stat es Consti tuti on, and the pr ohibition of bil ls of attainder in t he UnitedStat es Co nsti tuti on. The plaintiffs r equested a TRO and a preliminary injunct ion against th e Department to prevent

the enforcementof the Act duringthe pendencyof the ac tion. The plaintiffs alle ge that immedi ate and i rrepar able har m will r esult

if a determi nat ion by the Department

is al lowed to proce ed without an oppor tunity fo r Jack 's Roofing t o be heard. "Immed iate and irr eparabl e harm," t he plaintiffs a llege, "w ill result if the A ct is app lied to

assess a fine aga inst [Jac k's Roofin g, wh en it is] in compliance with [t he] requi rements of the Actand/o r is unc ertain a s to w hat is ne cessa ry in o rder to com ply with the A ct. The threat ened fine of

$1,6 83,0 00 w ill destroy [Jack's Ro ofing's] livelihoo d and subje ct its membe rs to loss of allof thei r persona l asse ts." In addi tion, the pla inti ffs al leg e that imme diate and irr eparabl e harm would res ult i f Jack 's Roofing is requ ired to d iscon tinue its relation ship with Towle, Modgli n, and other subcontractors and to hir e employees because of unce rtainty re garding w hat is req uired in orde r to com ply w ith the A ct. The harm includes

a loss of business g oodwill, a loss of success ful busi ness re lationsh ips w ith its subcontractors, and a restriction of t heir freedom to operate a contracting business. The plaintiff

s' complai nt requested the court to enjo in the e nforc emen t of the A ct until the cour t " d eclar es the Act unconsti tuti onal and, t herefor e, unenfor ceable or , in t he alte rnati ve, declar es wh at steps are ne cessa ry in o rder to provide certain ty to [Ja ck's Ro ofin g]

as to w hat is ne cessa ry to ensure com plianc e w ith the A ct." O n M arch 1 5, 20 10, th e circu it court conducted acontested h earing on the plaintiffs' request for a TRO, at which the parties present ed argument s in su ppo rt of their p osition s. Th e cou rt denie d the T RO requ est. Pursuant to Illinois Sup reme C ourt R ule 30 7 (18 8 Ill. 2d R . 307), the pla intiffs filed a timely notic e o f appe al fo r i nt er lo cu to ryre vi ew.8 DI SC USS I ON "A tempo rary restrainin g order is a dras tic reme dy w hich m ay issu e only in excepti onal circumstance s and for a brief duration." American Federation of St ate, County, & Municipal Employees v. Ryan , 332 Ill. App. 3d 9 65, 966 (2002). A TR O's pu rpose is to pres er ve the statu s quo until the cour t cond ucts a h earing to determ ine w hethe r it shou ld grant a preliminary injun ction. Stocker Hinge Manufacturi ng Co. v. Darnel Indus tri es, Inc. , 94 Il l. 2d 535 , 541 (19 83). To be entitled to temporary inj unctive rel ief, plai ntiffs must dem onstra te that they (1) possess aprotect able ri ght, (2) will s uffer irr eparabl e harm without the protec tion of a n injun ction, ( 3) ha ve no a dequ ate remedy at l aw, and (4) ar e likely to be successf ul on the me rits of theirac tion. Murges v. Bowman , 254 I ll. App. 3d 1071, 1081 (1993). "The plai nt iff i s not re quired to make out a c ase w hich w ould entitle him to judgment

at trial; r ather, he only needs to show that he r aises a ' fair questi on' a

bout the exist ence of his right

and that the court should preserv e the status quo untilthe cause can be decidedon the merits." Stocker HingeManufacturing Co. , 94 I ll. 2d at 542. Gen er al ly , we will affi rm the t

rialcourt' s denialof a t emporary restraining order unless the trial cou rt abused its discretion. C.D. Peters Construct ion Co. v. Tri-City Regional Port Distri ct , 281 Ill. App. 3d 41, 47 (1996). How ever, the st andard of review is de novo on the is sue of whe ther there is a "f

air ques tion" concerni ng the consti tuti onalit y of the Act . See Caro v. Blagojevi ch , 385 Ill. App. 3d 7 04, 708 -09 (200 8). In the pre sent ca se, the defen dants argue th at the c ircuit co urt did not a buse its di sc re ti on i n de nyi ng th e TRO because the Department has exclus ive juri sdict ion ove r the inve sti gat ion under the Ac t and th e plain tiffs cann ot seek re view in the courts without fi rst exhausti ng al l of t

heir administrati ve reme dies. We disagree. The plaint

iff s' complai nt seek s a declarator y judgment

concerni ng the consti tut ionalit y of the Act , and they r equested a TRO and a preliminar y injunction unti l the c ourt can9

determine the me rit s of the ir claim. Se ction 2 -701 (a) of th e Co de of Civil Pro cedu re sets forth the gener al requirements for a justici able declaratory j udgment action, as fol lows: "No acti on or proceeding is open to obje ction on t he gr oun d that a merely declaratory judgment

or order is sought ther eby. The court may, in cas es of act

ual controv ersy, make bindingdeclar ations of right s, having t he force of final j udgments, whetheror not any co nseque ntialreli ef is or could be c laime d, including t he determination, at the instance of anyone int erest ed in the controv ersy, of the constr uctionof any st atute *** or other gove rnmentalregul ation *** and a declar ation of the right s of

the parties i nteres ted. The for egoi ng enumeration does not exclude other cases of actu al con troversy . Th e cou rt shall refu se to enter a declarato ry judgment

or ord er[] if it appears t hat the judgment

or order [] would not

termi nate the controversyor some p art thereof[] gi vingrise to the proceeding ." 735 I LCS 5/2- 701(a) (W est 2008). As the I lli nois S upreme Court has recogni zed, " ' "[T]he mere e xis tenc e of a c lai m, assertion[,] or ch al le ng e t o p la in ti ff 's leg al int erest s, *** which cast[ s] doubt, insecurity, and uncert ai nty upo n plain tiff's rights or status, dam ages pla intiff's pecu niary o r materia l interests and establish es a co ndition of justicia bili ty." ' " Alternat e Fuels, Inc. v. Director of the Illinois Environmental

Prote ction Agency , 21 5 Ill. 2d 219 , 23 1 (2 004 ) (qu otin g Firs t of America Bank, Rockford, N.A. v . Netsch , 166 I ll. 2d 165, 175 (1995) (qu otin g Roberts v. Rob erts , 90 Ill. App. 2d 18 4, 187 (1 967))). "Co ncep ts of ju sticia bility are d ivided into diffe ren t cate go ries , such as ad visory opinions, feigned and collusi ve cases, standi ng, ripeness, mootness, political questi ons, and adm inistr ative questions." Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Bl agojevi ch , 231 Ill. 2d 474 , 488 (200 8). W ith respect to ripen ess, "[t]h e bas ic ration ale of th e ripen ess do ctrine is to 'prevent the c ourts, thro ugh avoi dance of pre mature adj udicat ion, from entang lingthemsel ves i n abstr act10

dis agr eeme nts over adminis trative polici es, and al so to prot ect the agenci es from j udicia l inter ference until a n a dminis trative decisi on has been for maliz ed and it s effe cts f elt in a

conc rete way by the challengi ng parties. ' " Morr-Fitz, Inc. , 23 1 Ill. 2d at 49 0 (q uot ing Abb ott Laboratori es v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 148- 49, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681, 691, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515 (1967)). The issue of

ju st ic ia bi li typr es en ts a q ue st io n of law th at we r ev ie w de novo

. MorrFit z, Inc. , 231 I ll. 2d at 488. The Il linoi s Supre me Court has adopt ed a two-part test to ev aluat e ripene ss, a t est t hat

was set f orth by t he United S tate s Supre me Court in Abbott La boratori es : "[F]irst, c ourts look at whether

the is sues are fit

for j udicia l deci sion; and second, t hey look at an y har dship to the parties t

hat would result from withholding j udicial considerat ion." Mo rr-F itz , Inc. , 231 Ill. 2d a t 49 0 (c iting Abbott Laborat ories , 387 U.S. at 149 , 18 L. Ed. 2d at 6 91, 8 7 S. C t. at 1515). In th e p re se ntca se , we belie ve that the plaintiffs' complaint is ripe under the tw o-part Abb ottLaboratori es test. W ith resp ect to the f irst p ron g of th e tes t, w e be lieve that t he issue s the plaintiffs rais ed in the ir compl aint are fi t for judici al deci sion beca use th ey are basica lly leg al in nature, i.e. , whetherthe Act is constitutionally val id. S ee Morr-Fit z, Inc. , 231 Ill. 2d at 49 1-9 2 (c iting Minnesota Cit izens Concerned for Life v. Federa l Election C omm 'n , 113 F.3d 129, 132 (8th C ir. 1997) ("Fi tness f or judi cial decisi on means, most often, that t

he issue is legal rather than factual")). W ith respect

to the s econd prong of

the test, w e find th at a sufficient h ardsh ip exists to make j udicia l rev iew appropri ate. The plaintiff s argue that

the Act and its regulations are unconsti tuti onal and that the Department has t

hreate ned a po ssi ble fine of mo re than $1.6 mill ion, among othe r sanct ions, f or vi olati ons of the Act without prov idingthem with a meaning ful opportunit

y to be hear d. The plaintiffs a llege that th is unc ertainty affects th eir business operati ons on a day-t o-day basi s, aff ects t heir bus iness r elat ionships and contracts,11

and exposes them to ve ry large fin es. Jac k's Roofin g alleges tha t it will be f orced to disco ntinue its relation ships w ith its subcontr actors or ri sk bei ng fi ned mill ions of dollars. The plaintiff

s all ege t hat the Department' s inv esti gat ions under the Act and its enforcement of the Act will res ult in t he loss of business goodwill, the loss of successfulbusi nes s relati onships, and un due restrictions on the operation o f their contracting business. W e belie ve that t

his cas e is subs tanti ally s imil ar to Morr-Fit z, Inc. , 231 I ll. 2d at 492, w here the supr eme court al lowed a preenf orcement chall enge t o an admini strativ e rule t hat aff ectedthe plaintif fs' "busines s operat ions on a day- to-day bas is and expos e[d] pl ainti ffs t o strong sanctions." This case is also similar to Abb ottLaboratori es , where the Court found that

the plaintiffs could not be denied access to the courts under a ripeness theory, st ating as f ollows: "[T]he regul ation i s dire cteda t them in parti cular; it r equires them to make signifi cant changes in their everyd ay bu siness p ractices ; if they fa il to ob serve the Co mmiss ioner's rule they are qu ite clearly exposed to the imposition of st rong sanctions." Abb ottLaboratori es , 387 U.S. at 154, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 87 S. Ct. at 1518. The Act and t

he regul ations giv e the Department authorit y to conduct

its inve sti gat ion by any m ethod or co mbin ation o f meth ods it d eems suitable at its discre ti on . The Department

has not giv en any indi cati on that it int ends to conduct an admini strativ e heari ng on the plaintiffs' alleged violations of the A ct befo re it conc ludes its investigation . In their

com plaint, the plaintiff

s rai se const itutional chall enges, but the A ct and i ts re gulations appear not to pro vide an y adm inistrative he aring du ring w hich th e plai nt iffs can rai se these chall enges prior

to the Departmentconcludi ng it s inv esti gat ion andfindi ng the m in vi olati on of the Act. Under these circumstances, we believe th at a preenfor cement chal leng e by way of a declaratory jud gment procee ding is proper. Hays v. City of Urbana , 104 F.3d 102, 103 (7th Cir . 1997) (" Long ag o, the Supr eme Court hel d that a person who must comply with a law or face s ancti ons has st andingto chal leng e its applic ation to him, ev en if t he threat of12

prosecut ion is not im med iate–in deed , even if the law is not yet

in eff ect") . We believ e that the plaintiffs' complaint raises a justiciable controversy. We also bel iev e that

the circui t court

abused it s discr etion in denyingthe plainti ffs' TRO requ est. T he pla intiffs' five-coun t comp laint ma intains th at the A ct violat es, among other cons tit

utionalprovi sions, the due process c lauses of the I llinois Constituti on and the UnitedStat es Consti tut ion. We believe t hat the plaintiff

s have r aised a " fair

questi on" concerni ng whether the Act v iolat es procedural due process, because the Act and t he procedures promulg ated purs uant to t he A ct do not a

ppear to pr ovide an accused wit h a meaning ful opportunity to be heard. Since t he plaintif

fs h ave ra ised a fair

questi on

conc erningtheir

proceduraldue process rights, we need not address whether the ot he r consti tuti onal cont entions also r aise a f air ques tion. Notice and an opportuni ty to be he ard are ne cessar y principles of

pr oce dural due process. Peop le ex re l. Illinois Comm erce Comm'n v. Operator Communication, I nc. , 281 Ill. App . 3d 2 97, 3 02 (1 996 ). "D ue pr oces s of law is served where there is aright to pr esent evi dence an d a rg um en t i n o ne 's own behalf, a right to cross-examine adver se witnes ses, and impar tiality in rul ings upon the ev idence whichis offered." Piot rows ki v. State Po lice M erit Board , 85 Ill. A pp. 3d 3 69, 373 (19 80) (citin g Lakeland Construction Co. v. Department of Revenue , 62 Ill. App. 3d 10 36, 104 0 (1978 )). "Before a person is deprived of a prot ected interest , he must be afford ed op portu nity forsome kind of a hearin g, 'except fo r extrao rdinar y situatio ns w here s ome valid gove rnmentalinterest is at stake that justifi es postpon ing the hearing until after the event.' " Board of Regents of

State C ollege s v. R oth , 408 U.S. 564, 570 n. 7, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 556 n.7, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705 n.7 (1972) ( quoting Boddie v. Connecticut , 401 U.S. 371, 379, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113, 119, 91 S. Ct. 780, 786 (1971) ). A fundamental requir ement of due process i s the opport unit y to be heard

"at a meani ngf

ul t ime and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v.13

Man zo , 380 U .S. 545, 55 2, 14 L. E d. 2d 62 , 66, 85 S. C t. 1187, 1 191 (19 65). In the present

case, our

revi ew of the Act and t he Department 's regul ations indicates that neithe r the Act

nor the r egul ations that t he Department

has impl ementedfor enf orcing the Act appear

to pro vi de an accused wit h a meaning ful hearing prior t o the Department findi ng a violation of the Act. W e believe that the plaintiffs have ra ised a fair questi on concerni ng whetherdue proc ess r equ ires th e D epa rtme nt to pro vide a n ad min istrati ve hearing wh en the re exis ts a disp ute co ncern ing mate rial facts b efore it can asses s fine s and penalt ies or seek other san ctions or remed ies against Jack's Roofing. The su preme co urt has stat ed tha t ther e i s "no doubt" that a dminis trative proceedi ngs ar e gov erned by the fundamentalprinciples and requiremen ts of due pro cess. Balmora l Racing Club, Inc. v. Illinois Racing Board , 151 Ill. 2d 367, 4 05 (199 2). The due pro cess analysis b egins with a de termination of w hether a pro tectab le interest –in life, l iberty, or propert y–exists. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc. , 151 I ll. 2d at 405. We believe t

hat the present

controv ersy i nvolv es a prot ectabl e propert y inter est. The fines at issue, obvious ly, i nvolv e a prote ctabl e inte rest in proper

ty. In additi on, the p la intif fs' contrac tual relation ships a re also protec table p rope rty intere sts. "T o have a con stitutiona lly protect ed prop erty inte rest, a plai ntif f must s how that he has a leg iti mate cl aim of

entitlement to it." Akmakjian v. Depart ment of Professional Regulation , 287 Ill . App. 3d 894, 896 (19 97). "A leg iti mate cl aim of entitl ement may ar ise f rom statute, regul ation, municipa l ordinance , or express or implied contract ." Akmakjian , 287 I ll. App. 3d at896. We hold that the remedies the Department may uti lize agai nst a cont ractor under the Ac t inv oke i ssues involvingth e c ont

ra ct or ' s p ro te ct ab le pr ope rt y i nt er es ts wh ich cannot be i nvoke d without affording t

he contractor procedural due process. How ever, it appe ars t o us that t he Actand its regul ations may all ow for the as sessment of penalties and sancti ons againstan accused cont ractor without providingbasic due process14

protections. The Department i s charg ed with the responsibili ty of i nvest igatingalle ged viol ations of the A ct and can c ond uct its in v esti gat ion by any means i t deems des irabl e. Alth ough the regulati ons requi re the Departmen t t o giv e the accus ed notic e and an opp ortun ity to submi t writ ten inf ormati on, ther e appears t o be no procedure under the regul ations that would a llow the con tractor a n op portu nity to c onfro nt its acc users, to examine witnesse s, to t esti fy, to pr esent witne sses, and to ins pect the evi dence offe red against it. Pro cedural due process is lacking where the Stat e does not provide these minimumguarantees. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc. , 151 Ill. 2d at 408. Although due process is a flexible concept, t hese mini mum guarant ees must be provi ded to ensur e that an adm inistrative tribu nal pro vides a fa ir and imp artia l hea ring. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc. , 151 Ill. 2d at 408. The Department argues that t he Act meets the requir ements of procedural due process because any party c an request an inform al con ferenc e after th e D epartm ent issu es its final determinationand the cont ractor may presen t written or oral i nformation and arguments. This proc edur e, ho we ver, do es no t provid e th e contra ctor wit h an opportuni ty to conf ront accusers, examine wit

nesses, or ins p ect the eviden ce offe red aga inst it. Th e Act a nd its regul ations authorize the Department to iss ue a cease-and-desist order; assess civi l penalties ; colle ct mon ies for w ages, sa lary, an d em ploy men t bene fits; and " [t]ake an y oth er reas onab le acti on to eliminate the unlawful pract ice and/ or remedy t he effect o f the violatio n" (56 Ill. Adm. Code §240.510( g), adopted at 32 Ill. Reg. 13519 , 13520 , eff. July 31, 2 008). According ly, it appe ars that the Department c an levy sig nifi cant fines, penal ties , and sancti ons merely upon i ts own deter minati on that a

viol ation of

the Acthas occurr ed, without ever affording the con tractor a meanin gful hearing. The Act prov ides that the civil pena lties asse ssed b y the D epartm ent, as well as any other relief requested, are recove rable in an acti on brought in the name of the peopl e of the15

State of Illinois by the Attorney G eneral. 8 20 ILC S 185/25(b) (West 2008). Once the Department makes i ts final det ermination that a viol ationhas occurr ed, it may recommend the commencement of

a civ il ac tion. 56 Il l. Adm. Code §240.510, ado pted at 32 Ill. Re g. 13519, eff. J

uly 31, 2008. However, the Ac t does not specif y what the Department' s burden

o f proof w ould be in th at action, and th e Act and its regulations grant the D epart men t th e power to "[t ]ake any other r easonable acti on to eliminate the unlawful pract ice and/ or remedy the effect

of the v iolation" (56 Ill. Adm. C ode § 240 .510 (g), ado pted a t 32 Ill. Reg. 13519, 13520, eff. July 31, 2008). The pl ainti ffs, theref ore, hav e rais ed a fair

questi on concerni ng whether this statut ory and regulatory scheme provi des adequate procedural due process. The Illinois legislature has e nacte d the Illinois Adm inistr ative Pro ced ur e Ac t ( 5 I LCS 100/1-1 et seq. (West 2008)), which addr esses p roced ural du e pro cess c once rns in adm inistr ative hearing s, and secti on 10-5 of the Il linoi s Admini strativ e Procedure Ac t requir es all a genci es to adopt rul es establishing proced ures for con tested case he arings (5 I LCS 100/10 -5 (W est 2008)). In comp liance with the Illinois A dmin istrative Pro cedu re Act, the Department ha s enacte d regul ations that e stabl ish the rules of pro ced ure in ad min istrati ve hea rings before t

he Department involv ing "contes ted case s." 56 I ll. Adm. Code §120.100 et seq. , amend ed at 30 Ill. Reg. 104 28, eff. M ay 24, 2 006. These pr ocedu ral rules afford parti es with a meani ngfulopportuni ty to be heard and prov ide the minimumguarant ees that must be pr ovided to ens ure tha t an administ rati ve tribunalprovi des a fai r and impar tial hearing. It appears t

hat the Act and i ts re g ulatio ns were draf ted in s uch a way that t he Department

is not requir ed to compl y with the I llinois Admi nistrati ve Proc edure Act or

com ply with the D epartm ent's ow n regula tions fo r adm inistrative he arings. Ind eed, in its reply memorandum fi ledin this interloc utory appe al, the D epartm ent do es no t claim th at it is bound by the proce dural protections af forded by t

he Il linoi s Admini strativ e Procedure Ac t16

or the De partment's rules of proced ure in adm inistra tive heari ngs. Ac cording ly, t he plaintif fs' proceduraldue p roces s claim prese nts a fa ir ques tion, sin ce the De partm ent's factfindi ng investigations and enforce ment sanc tions under the Actapp ear to f all out side t

he proceduralprotections normally affor ded to pers ons subject to admini strativ e inv esti gat ions and administrati ve penalties

. In orde r to be e ntitled to a TR O, th e plain tiffs, in ad dition to prese nting a fa ir questi on concerni ng their right to relief, must a lso esta blish irre parab le harm and n o ade quate remedy at law . W e be lieve th at the plain tiffs h ave met these requir ements f or a TRO as well. As notedabove, f

or purposes of thi s int erlocutory appeal , we must consi der the wel l -pleade d alle gat ions of the c omp laint as tru e. Th e plain tiffs alleged th at imme diate a nd irre parab le harm to Jack 's Roofing' s rel ations hips with its subc ontrac tors w ill occu r with out a TRO, due to the thre at of a $ 1.6 m ill ion pe nalty and the uncertainty of t he pending investi gations. Ja ck 's Roofing ha s all eged t hat it wo uld be req uired to disco ntinue its relation ships w ith its ski lled subcontr actors and would suffe r a diminution in t he val ue of the bus iness. See Aus tin Congress Corp. v. Mannina , 46 Il l. App. 2d 192, 195-96 (1964) (the grant of a TRO was a pr oper exerci se of di scretion on the ba sis of alle gat ions t

hat the nursing

home owner ' s propert y, business , reput ation, and goodw ill wou ld be s ubsta ntially d amage d if the pic ket ing continued ). Because of the potent ial harm to t he plai ntif

fs'busine sses , they hav e an inadequat e remedy at

law. See Prent ice Medical Corp. v. Todd , 145 Il l. App. 3d 692, 701 (1986) ("It is reason able to infer that pl ainti ffs may s uffer a consequent

loss of good willand dam age to their competi tiv e posit ion and that d efendant 's acti ons willbe of a cont inuing nature. As a result plaintiffs sufficiently established a thre at of irreparable harm "). W e believe t hat a TRO is necessary in thi s case to prevent a continuinginjury to the pl aintiff s' businesse s until the circuit court can h ear the merits of their requ est for a preliminary injunction. A TRO in this cas e will pr eserv e the st atus quo wit h the le ast i njury t o the parties17

concerned. S ee Limestone Development Corp. v. Vi llage of Lemont , 284 Ill. App. 3d 848, 853 (1996) (" [T]he st atus quo, whic h is the last actual , pea ceable, unc ontest ed stat us preceding the co ntroversy, is to be prese rved with the least injury to the parties"). Pursuant to our aut

hor it y un der I ll in oi s S upr eme Cour

t Ru le 366 (a )( 5) (1 55 I ll . 2d R. 366(a)(5)), we rem and this case to the circuit court with dir ecti ons to ent er a TRO in favor of the plainti ffs. The TRO shall enjoin t he Department from enforcing the Act only ag ainst the plaintif

fs; it s hall not

enjoin t he Department

from conduct ing invest igations under the Ac t or oth erw ise enf

orcing th e Act a gainst an yon e not a party to this law suit. TROs that are granted with out n otice to the adverse party must expir e within 10 days. 735 IL CS 5/11-101 (West 2008). "The obv ious purpos e behind the 10-day limitation is not present when the adver se part

y has noti ce and the oppor tunit y of a hearing." Kable Pri nting Co. v. Mount Morris Bookbinder s Union Local

65-B , 63 Il l. 2d 514, 521 ( 1976). In the present case, t he Department

has had th e opp ortun ity for a h earing. A ccord ingly, the circuit

co ur t's TRO shallremain in effect untilthe ci rcuit

court conduc ts a f

ull hearingon th e plaintiff s' request for a pr eliminary inj unction.

CONCL USI ON For the foregoing reasons, w e reverse the order of th e circ uit cour t denying

the plaintiffs' mo tion for a TR O, a nd w e rema nd w ith direc tions fo r the circ uit cour t to enter a TRO in fav or of

the pla inti ffs enj oiningthe Department from enforcingthe Act agai nst the plaintiffs untilthe cou rt can c on duct a hea ring on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.

Reversed; cause remanded with directions.

W ELCH and D ON OV AN, JJ., c oncur.NO. 5-10-0123 I N THE AP PE LLA TE C O U R T O F IL LIN O IS

FI FTH DI STRI CT

___________________________________________________________________________________ RH ON DA BA RT L OW a nd J A CK BA RT L OW, ) Appeal f rom the d/b /aJac k' s Roof

ing , RYAN TOWLE, ) Circui t Court of d/b/a J ack' s Si ding and Windows, and ) Frank lin County. CHARL ES ERI C MODGLI N, ) ) Plaintif fs-Appellants , ) ) v. ) No. 10-CH-35 ) CATHE RINE M. SHAN NON , in Her Capaci ty as ) Director of Labor, State of I llinois, and ) LIS A MA DIGAN , in Her Capacity as Ill inois ) Attorne y G enera l, ) Ho nora ble ) Robert W. Lew is, Defendants-Appellees. ) Jud ge, p resid ing.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Rule 23 Order Fil ed : March 24, 2010 Motion to Pub lis h Grant ed : April9, 2010 Opini on Fi led : April9, 2010

___________________________________________________________________________________ Justi ces : Honorable B ruce D. Stewart, J.

Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J., and Hon orable Jame s K. D onovan, J., Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________ Attorn eys Jana Yocom, Terry S harp, The Sharp Law Firm, P.C., 1115 Harri son, P.O. Box for 906, Mt. Vernon, I L 62864 Appellants

___________________________________________________________________________________ Attorn eys Lisa M adigan , Attorn ey G enera l of Illinois, M ichae l A. Scod ro, Solicito r Ge neral, for Ma ry E. W elsh, Assistant Attorney G eneral, 100 W est Rand olph Street, 12th F loor, Appell ees Chicago, IL 60601

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