In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 03-4091

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

AMIN W. WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 03 CR 65–John C. Shabaz, Judge.

____________

OCTOBER 6, 2005

____________

Before BAUER, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Amin Williams pleaded guilty to

unlawfully possessing a firearm following a felony conviction, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the district court ordered

him to serve a prison term of 115 months, the top of the

sentencing range specified by the United States Sentencing

Guidelines. In our opinion of June 9, 2005, we upheld

Williams’ conviction against an as-applied constitutional

challenge to the felon-in-possession statute and found no

plain error in any of the findings that the district court

rendered at sentencing. United States v. Williams, 410 F.3d

397 (7th Cir. 2005). We withheld judgment as to whether

Williams’ sentence constituted plain Sixth Amendment

error under United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005),
2 No. 03-4091

pending the outcome of a limited remand to the district

court allowing the sentencing judge an opportunity to

determine whether he would have imposed the same

sentence on Williams knowing that the Sentencing Guidelines are to be treated as advisory rather than mandatory.

See id. at 764-65; United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471,

483-84 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 2005 WL 1304753 (U.S.

Oct. 3, 2005).

By way of a written entry on remand, Judge Shabaz has

now informed us that he would be inclined to impose the

same 115-month sentence on Williams notwithstanding the

broader discretion in selecting a sentence that the judge

would enjoy today if we were to vacate the judgment and

remand for re-sentencing. R. 52. We must therefore determine whether the 115-month sentence is “reasonable.” See

Paladino, 401 F.3d at 484, citing Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765.

If it is, then any Sixth Amendment error that occurred in

the sentencing process did not affect his substantial rights

and therefore did not constitute plain error. See United

States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). We

have received and considered statements of position from

both Williams and the government in response to the

district court’s entry.

Williams’ sentence lies within the Guidelines range, and

there is no longer any contention that the district court

made any error in resolving the various factors that

established his offense level and the resulting sentencing

range. We therefore presume that the sentence is reasonable. Id. In order to rebut the presumption, Williams must

show that his sentence is unreasonable in light of the

factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id.

As is evident from the district court’s memorandum entry,

Judge Shabaz has considered the sentencing factors set

forth in section 3553(a). The judge noted that when he

sentenced Williams, he considered the seriousness of the
No. 03-4091 3

offense as well as the goals of deterring criminal conduct,

protecting the public, and providing Williams with structure that will help him become law-abiding. R. 52 at 2. On

remand, Judge Shabaz took those same factors into consideration, and again concluded that a substantial sentence

was called for to reflect the gravity of Williams’ criminal

conduct and “to hold defendant accountable and to protect

the community from further criminality on his part.” Id.

The judge also considered Williams’ character and history,

noting that he “was raised in a very rough environment

where most of the adults in his life were involved in

criminal activity” (the record indicates that Williams’

parents, as well as his aunts and uncles, were involved in

a gang) and that he “suffers from mental illness” (he has

been diagnosed as suffering from an unspecified psychotic

disorder and what is described as “intermittent explosive

disorder,” and he was complying with a regimen of antipsychotic and anti-depressant medications at the time of his

sentencing). Id. at 3. However, the judge found that “[t]hese

factors are counterbalanced by the defendant’s past criminal conduct and his continued violation of the law.” Id.

“Considering all these factors,” Judge Shabaz concluded, “a

sentence at the top of the advisory guidelines [range] is

reasonable and necessary for the statutory purposes of

sentencing.” Id.

Williams points out that Judge Shabaz did not expressly

address all of the section 3553(a) factors on remand. Our

cases make clear, however, that although the sentencing

judge is required to consider the statutory factors, see

United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“now that [the Guidelines] are advisory, while section

3553(a) remains unchanged, judges will have to consider

the factors that the section tells them to consider”), the

judge need not discuss and make findings as to each of

these factors, see United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470,

472-73 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[j]udges need not rehearse on the
4 No. 03-4091

record all of the considerations that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

lists”); Dean, 414 F.3d at 728-30. It is enough that the

record confirms that the judge has given meaningful

consideration to the section 3553(a) factors, and the record

supplies us with that assurance here.

Williams goes on to contend that his sentence is unreasonable both because the district court overstated the

gravity of his offense and because the court did not give

adequate consideration and weight to the mitigating factors

that suggest a lesser term in prison would be appropriate.

The court described the offense so as to make it appear

more serious than it was, in Williams’ view, when it stated

that at the time of his arrest, Williams “was in possession

of a stolen Smith and Wesson .44 magnum revolver which

was equipped with a scope and loaded with six rounds of

ammunition.” R. 52 at 2. In fact, Williams represents, he

was not “in possession” of the gun at the time of his arrest.

The record indicates that Williams acknowledged having

looked at the gun and touched it before either handing it

back to another individual or returning it to the location

where someone else had left it for safekeeping in his aunt’s

residence. Thus, in Williams’ own view, his offense conduct

“was as minor as it could possibly be and still qualify for

conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).” Williams’ Position

Statement at 8. In addition, Williams suggest that the

following factors mitigate in favor of a lesser sentence: he

had a rough childhood, surrounded by parents, aunts, and

uncles who were all involved in a gang; he has the

previously-mentioned mental illness which, in part, renders

him unable to control violent impulses; he has a long

history of alcohol and drug abuse for which he received no

treatment until his arrest in this case; although a Wisconsin state court, in sentencing Williams for state charges

that were pending at the time of his sentencing in 2003,

sought to make the sentences concurrent to his federal

sentence, the Federal Bureau of Prisons will not honor that
No. 03-4091 5

intent, portending additional time in prison; and finally,

pursuant to the firearms possession provision of the

Sentencing Guidelines, Williams’ prior convictions have

been considered in establishing his offense level as well as

his criminal history category. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2)

(requiring a base offense level of 24 if the defendant

possessed a firearm “subsequent to sustaining at least two

felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense”).

Deciding whether or not the sentence imposed by the

district court is reasonable entails deferential review.

Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 608; see also United States v. Mares,

402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 2005 WL

816208 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005). The question is not how we

ourselves would have resolved the factors identified as

relevant by section 3553(a)—“many [of which] are vague

and, worse perhaps, hopelessly open-ended,” Dean, 414 F.3d

at 729—nor what sentence we ourselves ultimately might

have decided to impose on the defendant. We are

not sentencing judges. Rather, what we must decide is

whether the district judge imposed the sentence he or she

did for reasons that are logical and consistent with the

factors set forth in section 3553(a). As we have noted, a

sentence imposed within a properly calculated Guidelines

range is presumptively reasonable. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d

at 408. We have left room for the possibility that there

will be some cases in which a sentence within the Guidelines range, measured against the factors identified in

section 3553(a), stands out as unreasonable. But those

cases, as we said in Mykytiuk, will be rare. Id.

Having considered the arguments that Williams’ able

counsel has made in his behalf, we cannot conclude that the

sentence imposed on Williams is unreasonable. We may

assume without deciding that the factors Williams’ attorney

has identified would support a sentencing judge’s discretionary decision to impose a sentence that was lower in the
6 No. 03-4091

range specified by the Guidelines, if not outside of that

range altogether. But the factors are not so compelling as to

require a lesser sentence. We acknowledge that Williams

had a difficult childhood and that he suffers from psychological problems, including drug and alcohol dependency, that

likely account for much of his criminal history. But that

history is, as Judge Shabaz noted, extraordinarily substantial for someone as young as Williams and it includes

convictions for crimes of violence. Williams’ unlawful

possession of a loaded firearm—however brief or minimal it

may have been—itself carried with it a concrete potential

for further violence, given Williams’ difficulty with impulse

control, his substance abuse, and his history of repeated

criminal acts. One can, in short, view the instant offense as

a grave harbinger of further trouble and further violence on

Williams’ part and of the need for a very substantial

sentence that will account for the gravity of his criminal

history, deter Williams and others from committing similar

crimes, protect the public, and allow a substantial period of

time apart from society for Williams to address his psychological problems and rehabilitate himself.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM Williams’ sentence as

a reasonable one.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—10-6-05