UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2174

KATRINA OKOLI,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

THE CITY OF BALTIMORE; JOHN P. STEWART, Executive Director; 

MARTIN O’MALLEY, Mayor; MICHAEL R. ENRIGHT, 1st Deputy 

Mayor; COLM O’COMARTUN, Special Assistant; COMMISSION ON 

AGING & RETIREMENT ED. (CARE),

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, Senior District 

Judge. (1:06-cv-03025-WMN)

Submitted: January 31, 2013 Decided: March 14, 2013

Before KING, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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Katrina Okoli, Appellant Pro Se. Gary Gilkey, Assistant 

Solicitor, Allyson Murphy Huey, BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF 

LAW, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Katrina Okoli proceeded to trial on her claims of 

employment discrimination on three grounds. The jury found for 

Okoli on her retaliation claim only, awarding her $60,000 in 

nominal damages for that claim. Thereafter, the district court 

granted Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law in 

part, reducing Okoli’s nominal damages award to one dollar. The 

court also denied Okoli’s motion to reconsider the matter. On 

appeal, Okoli challenges the district court’s reduction of her 

jury award and denial of her motion to reconsider. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm.

Okoli failed to submit any evidence to establish 

compensatory or other economic damages that occurred as a result 

of Defendant’s termination of her employment. Thus, the 

district court instructed the jury that, if it found for Okoli, 

it could only award nominal damages. Despite the district 

court’s clear instructions that nominal damages was an award of 

only one dollar, or other small sum, the jury awarded Okoli 

$60,000. The district court therefore granted the Defendant’s 

motion for judgment as a matter of law to reduce the award to 

one dollar. 

On appeal, Okoli does not contest the fact that she 

entered no evidence to support the jury’s award. We review 

grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, and 
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view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. Sloas v. CSX Transp. Inc., 616 F.3d 380, 392 (4th Cir. 

2010). We find no reversible error and therefore affirm the 

district court’s order granting, in part, Defendant’s motion for 

judgment as a matter of law and the order denying 

reconsideration of the matter. See Okoli v. Mayor & City 

Council of Baltimore, No. 1:06-cv-03025-WMN (D. Md. June 28, 

2012; Sept. 25, 2012). 

We further deny Okoli’s motion for transcripts at 

Government expense. An appellant has the burden of including in 

the record on appeal a transcript of all parts of the 

proceedings material to the issues raised on appeal. Fed. R. 

App. P. 10(b); 4th Cir. R. 10(c). An appellant proceeding on 

appeal in forma pauperis is entitled to transcripts at 

Government expense only in certain circumstances. 28 U.S.C.

§ 753(f) (2006). Under 28 U.S.C. § 753(f), Okoli is not 

entitled to a transcript at Government expense unless a circuit 

judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous, but rather, 

presents a substantial question. Rhodes v. Corps of Eng’rs of 

U.S. Army, 589 F.2d 358, 359-60 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); 

see Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 460 F.2d 150, 152 

(4th Cir. 1972) (noting that “[i]t is settled in this circuit 

that ‘an indigent is not entitled to a transcript at government 

expense without a showing of the need, merely to comb the record 
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in the hope of discovering some flaw.’” (quoting United States 

v. Glass, 317 F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir. 1963))). On this record, 

we conclude that Okoli has not made the requisite showing and 

these arguments, in their current form, fail to provide 

“specific issues and supporting facts and arguments raised on 

appeal” as required by Local Rule. 4th Cir. R. 34(b).

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED