United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 14-3074

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Thomas A. Bowden,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

Steve Meinberg; Patrick Hawkins; Chris Hoffman,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants,

Vernon Martin,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant,

Benjamin Simmons; Aaron Gyurica; Wes Wagner,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants.

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No. 14-3075

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Thomas A. Bowden,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

Steve Meinberg; Patrick Hawkins; Chris Hoffman,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants,
Vernon Martin; Benjamin Simmons; Aaron Gyurica,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants,

Wes Wagner,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeals from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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 Submitted: April 16, 2015

 Filed: August 25, 2015

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Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Bowden sued several law enforcement officers and the county clerk

from Jefferson County, Missouri, alleging, among other claims, that they violated his

rights under the Fourth Amendment. Bowden asserts that Deputy Sheriff Vernon

Martin drafted, and the remaining defendants caused to be drafted, an affidavit in

support of a request for an arrest warrant that led to Bowden’s seizure without

probable cause. 

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment

claims based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, but we

conclude that the facts taken in the light most favorable to Bowden do not show a

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violation of his constitutional rights. We therefore reverse the decision of the district

court. 

I.

In a qualified immunity appeal, we have jurisdiction to resolve purely legal

issues based on the facts assumed by the district court, or facts likely assumed by the

court, when the record is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. 

Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 319 (1995). We therefore recite the facts in the

light most favorable to Bowden.

Benjamin Simmons and Aaron Gyurica were fishing on a bridge near

Bowden’s property in rural Missouri in 2009. Bowden shouted to the men to identify

themselves, and then fired a shotgun from his back deck when they failed to respond. 

After the gunshot, Bowden and Simmons engaged in a heated verbal altercation,

during which Bowden was holding his shotgun. Bowden and Simmons each called

the police, and Martin was dispatched to investigate.

Martin first spoke with Simmons and Gyurica at the residence of Simmons’s

grandmother, Barbara Voyles. Simmons and Gyurica reported their belief that

Bowden shot at them on the bridge. They explained that they heard a gunshot and

then saw leaves falling in front of them after the blast. Voyles stated that she could

call Howard Wagner, the Jefferson County circuit clerk, to see what Voyles could do.

Martin next spoke with Bowden. Bowden admitted that he had fired his

shotgun, but said that he shot the weapon in a direction away from Simmons and

Gyurica. Martin relayed these circumstances by telephone to his supervisor, Corporal

Chris Hoffman. Hoffman ordered Martin to seize the shotgun and to draft a statement

averring that there was probable cause that Bowden had unlawfully used a weapon.

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According to Martin, Hoffman informed him that a call was placed from

Voyles’s residence to Howard Wagner, the circuit clerk, who contacted Lieutenant

Colonel Steve Meinberg, who in turn contacted Lieutenant Patrick Hawkins. In

Martin’s account, Hawkins then directed Hoffman that Martin should be ordered to

seize the shotgun and draft the probable cause statement. Bowden initially named

circuit clerk Howard Wagner as a defendant, but later substituted the county clerk,

Wes Wagner, after discovery revealed that two calls were made from Voyles’s

residence to Wes Wagner’s office.

After receiving direction from Hoffman, Martin returned to Bowden’s

residence, seized his shotgun, and obtained a written statement from him. Bowden

explained that he had fired in a direction away from Simmons and Gyurica after they

failed to identify themselves, because he thought their actions were “suspicious.”

Martin also obtained written statementsfrom Simmons and Gyurica. They reiterated

their belief that Bowden shot at them on the bridge.

Martin then drafted a probable cause statement, which read:

1. I have probable cause to believe that . . . [Bowden] committed one or

more criminal offense(s):

Unlawful Use of a Weapon

2. The facts supporting this belief are as follows:

According to the victim’s [sic], they reported that they parked their pick

up truck on a low water bridge in the area of [Bowden’s address], to fish

off the bridge when a local resident Thomas Bowden shoot [sic] at them

with his shotgun.

App. 243. Martin later admitted that he did not personally believe the claims of

Simmons and Gyurica that Bowden had fired a weapon in their direction. Martin also

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said that he did not think the facts established that Bowden had violated any Missouri

law.

The Jefferson County prosecutor obtained an arrest warrant based on Martin’s

probable cause statement. Bowden learned that the warrant had been issued, and

turned himself in. A Missouri court then held a preliminary hearing and determined

that there was probable cause to believe that Bowden violated Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 571.030.1(4). Under that statute, a person commits the crime of unlawful use

of weapons if he “knowingly . . . [e]xhibits, in the presence of one or more persons,

any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner.” 

Bowden was acquitted following a jury trial in 2010.

Bowden filed his amended complaint in this case against Martin, Meinberg,

Hawkins, Hoffman, and Wes Wagner in December 2013. The amended complaint

alleged, asrelevant on appeal, that the defendants violated Bowden’s rights under the

Fourth Amendment by causing him to be arrested without probable cause. The

defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified

immunity and, alternatively, that collateral estoppel barred Bowden from relitigating

the Missouri court’s determination that there was probable cause to believe Bowden

violated Missouri law.

The district court denied the motions for summary judgment. The court ruled

that collateral estoppel did not apply, because Bowden now sought to challenge the

“integrity” of the evidence presented at the preliminary cause hearing. After noting

that Martin’s affidavit asserted probable cause to arrest Bowden even though Martin

did not believe that probable cause existed, the court denied summary judgment

because there was “a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of

probable cause.” The court ruled that Martin was not entitled to qualified immunity

because “the qualified immunity inquiry is identical to the probable cause question.” 

The district court did not specifically address the qualified immunity of the other

defendants, but denied their motion for summary judgment on that issue as well. All

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of the officials appeal the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, and all but

Martin appeal the court’s ruling on collateral estoppel.

II.

Bowden first challenges our jurisdiction over this appeal. We have jurisdiction

over interlocutory appeals of orders denying qualified immunity if the appeal seeks

review of a purely legal issue. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313. We do not have jurisdiction

to review “which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial.” Id. In this

case, the defendants contend that when the facts are viewed in the light most

favorable to Bowden, they did not violate Bowden’s clearly established rights under

the Fourth Amendment. This is a purely legal issue over which we have jurisdiction. 

Id.; Sherbrooke v. City of Pelican Rapids, 513 F.3d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 2008). We

review de novo the district court’s decision on qualified immunity, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to Bowden. Doe v. Flaherty, 623 F.3d 577, 583

(8th Cir. 2010). 

Public officials are immune from suit if “their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutionalrights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A plaintiff seeking

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show first that the defendant’s conduct

violated a constitutional right and, second, that the right was clearly established. 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). In this case, we elect to consider the 

questions in that order.

Bowden first argues that Martin violated his rights under the Fourth

Amendment by averring that he “ha[d] probable cause to believe” that Bowden

committed an offense when Martin did not actually believe that there was probable

cause. Whether probable cause existed, however, is an objective question of law. 

Martin’s subjective belief is irrelevant to whether his affidavit included sufficient

facts to establish probable cause. Indeed, we have upheld the lawfulness of an arrest

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based on probable cause even where the arresting officerstestified that they believed

probable cause waslacking. Warren v. City of Lincoln, Neb., 864 F.2d 1436, 1439-41

(8th Cir. 1989). Martin’s averment that he “ha[d] probable cause to believe” that

Bowden committed an offense was thus not a false statement, because the assertion

set forth a legal conclusion not a statement of historical fact.

Bowden also argues that Martin intentionally or recklessly included false

statementsin, and omitted facts from, other portions of the probable cause statement. 

Much of Bowden’s complaint is without merit, because it focuses on Martin’s

subjective beliefs. There was no falsehood in Martin’s report that “[a]ccording to the

victim’s . . . Bowden shoot at them,” because this was an accurate report of what

Simmons and Gyurica told him. That Martin personally did not believe the men was

not relevant to the existence of probable cause, so the omission of Martin’s subjective

belief did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

Bowden does complain about the omission of two historical facts: (1) that

Simmons and Gyurica did not actually see Bowden fire his shotgun and (2) that

Bowden told Martin that he fired the shotgun in a direction away from Simmons and

Gyurica. Even assuming for the sake of analysis that Martin intentionally or

recklessly omitted these facts from his affidavit, there was no violation of the Fourth

Amendment. If we reconstruct a hypothetical affidavit that includesthese additional

facts, see Hawkins v. Gage County, Neb., 759 F.3d 951, 959 (8th Cir. 2014), there

wasstill probable cause to believe thatBowden committed an offense. That Simmons

and Gyurica were not looking at Bowden when he fired does not establish that

Bowden was innocent. Circumstantial evidence of Bowden shouting at the men and

leavesfalling from trees above them after the gunshot could lead a man of reasonable

caution to infer that the gun was fired at the fishermen. Bowden’s denial merely

created a credibility question; it did not destroy probable cause.

Even if Bowden’s account had been included and believed, moreover, there

was still probable cause to believe that an offense was committed. The Missouri

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statute does not require proof that a defendant fired a weapon at another person. It

is an offense knowingly to “[e]xhibit[]” the firearm in the “presence” of another

person “in an angry or threatening manner” when the weapon is “readily capable of

lethal use.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4). While Bowden denied that he fired his

shotgun at the men on the bridge, he admitted that he purposefully fired the gun from

his property nearby because the men did not identify themselves and he thought their

behavior was suspicious. App. 245. There was probable cause to believe that

Bowden knowingly “exhibited” the shotgun in the presence of the fishermen when

he fired it, see State v. Johnson, 964 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), that the

exhibition was “angry or threatening” even if the gun was not aimed at the fishermen, 

see State v. Rogers, 976 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), and that the weapon

was “readily capable of lethal use” even if it had not yet been so used. See State v.

Wright, 382 S.W.3d 902, 904-05 (Mo. 2012).

Because we conclude that Martin did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the

alleged conspiracy by the remaining defendants to cause Martin’s conduct also does

not amount to a constitutional violation. Slusarchuk v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1178, 1183

(8th Cir. 2003). We need not address the separate question of whether any infringed

right was clearly established, although we note that the qualified immunity inquiry

is not identical to the question of probable cause: an official enjoys qualified

immunity for an objectively reasonable judgment about probable cause that turns out

to be incorrect. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987). We also do not

consider whether there would be jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision

on collateral estoppel, and we express no view on the merits of that issue.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court, R. Doc. 85, is

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

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