II 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2391 

To prohibit the United States Government from using or contracting with 

an entity that uses certain telecommunications services or equipment, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 7, 2018 

Mr. COTTON (for himself, Mr. CORNYN, and Mr. RUBIO) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

A BILL 

To prohibit the United States Government from using or 

contracting with an entity that uses certain telecommunications services or equipment, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Defending U.S. Gov5 ernment Communications Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 

8 (1) In its 2011 ‘‘Annual Report to Congress on 

9 Military and Security Developments Involving the 


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1 People’s Republic of China’’, the Department of De2 fense stated, ‘‘China’s defense industry has benefited 

3 from integration with a rapidly expanding civilian 

4 economy and science and technology sector, particu5 larly elements that have access to foreign technology. 

6 Progress within individual defense sectors appears 

7 linked to the relative integration of each, through 

8 China’s civilian economy, into the global production 

9 and R&D chain . . . Information technology compa10 nies in particular, including Huawei, Datang, and 

11 Zhongxing, maintain close ties to the PLA.’’. 

12 (2) In a 2011 report titled ‘‘The National Secu13 rity Implications of Investments and Products from 

14 the People’s Republic of China in the Telecommuni15 cations Sector’’, the United States China Commis16 sion stated that ‘‘[n]ational security concerns have 

17 accompanied the dramatic growth of China’s telecom 

18 sector. . . . Additionally, large Chinese companies— 

19 particularly those ‘national champions’ prominent in 

20 China’s ‘going out’ strategy of overseas expansion— 

21 are directly subject to direction by the Chinese Com22 munist Party, to include support for PRC state poli23 cies and goals.’’. 

24 (3) The Commission further stated in its report 

25 that ‘‘[f]rom this point of view, the clear economic 


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1 benefits of foreign investment in the U.S. must be 

2 weighed against the potential security concerns re3 lated to infrastructure components coming under the 

4 control of foreign entities. This seems particularly 

5 applicable in the telecommunications industry, as 

6 Chinese companies continue systematically to ac7 quire significant holdings in prominent global and 

8 U.S. telecommunications and information technology 

9 companies.’’. 

10 (4) In its 2011 Annual Report to Congress, the 

11 United States China Commission stated that ‘‘[t]he 

12 extent of the state’s control of the Chinese economy 

13 is difficult to quantify . . . There is also a category 

14 of companies that, though claiming to be private, are 

15 subject to state influence. Such companies are often 

16 in new markets with no established SOE leaders and 

17 enjoy favorable government policies that support 

18 their development while posing obstacles to foreign 

19 competition. Examples include Chinese telecoms 

20 giant Huawei and such automotive companies as 

21 battery maker BYD and vehicle manufacturers 

22 Geely and Chery.’’. 

23 (5) General Michael Hayden, who served as Di24 rector of the Central Intelligence Agency and Direc25 tor of the National Security Agency, stated in July 


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1 2013 that Huawei had ‘‘shared with the Chinese 

2 state intimate and extensive knowledge of foreign 

3 telecommunications systems it is involved with’’. 

4 (6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in a 

5 February 2015 Counterintelligence Strategy Part6 nership Intelligence Note stated that, ‘‘[w]ith the ex7 panded use of Huawei Technologies Inc. equipment 

8 and services in U.S. telecommunications service pro9 vider networks, the Chinese Government’s potential 

10 access to U.S. business communications is dramati11 cally increasing. Chinese Government-supported tele12 communications equipment on U.S. networks may be 

13 exploited through Chinese cyber activity, with Chi14 na’s intelligence services operating as an advanced 

15 persistent threat to U.S. networks.’’. 

16 (7) The FBI further stated in its February 

17 2015 counterintelligence note that ‘‘China makes no 

18 secret that its cyber warfare strategy is predicated 

19 on controlling global communications network infra20 structure’’. 

21 (8) At a hearing before the Committee on 

22 Armed Services of the House of Representatives on 

23 September 30, 2015, Deputy Secretary of Defense 

24 Robert Work, responding to a question about the 

25 use of Huawei telecommunications equipment, statVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:18 Feb 09, 2018 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2391.IS S2391

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1 ed, ‘‘In the Office of the Secretary of Defense, abso2 lutely not. And I know of no other—I don’t believe 

3 we operate in the Pentagon, any [Huawei] systems 

4 in the Pentagon.’’. 

5 (9) At that hearing, the Commander of the 

6 United States Cyber Command, Admiral Mike Rog7 ers, responding to a question about why such 

8 Huawei telecommunications equipment is not used, 

9 stated, ‘‘As we look at supply chain and we look at 

10 potential vulnerabilities within the system, that it is 

11 a risk we felt was unacceptable.’’. 

12 (10) In March 2017, ZTE Corporation pled 

13 guilty to conspiring to violate the International 

14 Emergency Economic Powers Act by illegally ship15 ping U.S.-origin items to Iran, paying the United 

16 States Government a penalty of $892,360,064 for 

17 activity between January 2010 and January 2016. 

18 (11) The Department of the Treasury’s Office 

19 of Foreign Assets Control issued a subpoena to 

20 Huawei as part of a Federal investigation of alleged 

21 violations of trade restrictions on Cuba, Iran, Sudan, 

22 and Syria. 

23 (12) In the bipartisan ‘‘Investigative Report on 

24 the United States National Security Issues Posed by 

25 Chinese Telecommunication Companies Huawei and 


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1 ZTE’’ released in 2012 by the Permanent Select 

2 Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep3 resentatives, it was recommended that ‘‘U.S. govern4 ment systems, particularly sensitive systems, should 

5 not include Huawei or ZTE equipment, including in 

6 component parts. Similarly, government contrac7 tors—particularly those working on contracts for 

8 sensitive U.S. programs—should exclude ZTE or 

9 Huawei equipment in their systems.’’. 

10 SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 

11 SERVICES OR EQUIPMENT. 

12 (a) PROHIBITION ON AGENCY USE OR PROCURE13 MENT.—The head of an agency may not procure or obtain, 

14 may not extend or renew a contract to procure or obtain, 

15 and may not enter into a contract (or extend or renew 

16 a contract) with an entity that uses any equipment, sys17 tem, or service that uses covered telecommunications 

18 equipment or services as a substantial or essential compo19 nent of any system, or as critical technology as part of 

20 any system. 

21 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

22 (1) AGENCY.—The term ‘‘agency’’ has the 

23 meaning given that term in section 551 of title 5, 

24 United States Code. 


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1 (2) COVERED FOREIGN COUNTRY.—The term 

2 ‘‘covered foreign country’’ means the People’s Re3 public of China. 

4 (3) COVERED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIP5 MENT OR SERVICES.—The term ‘‘covered tele6 communications equipment or services’’ means any 

7 of the following: 

8 (A) Telecommunications equipment pro9 duced by Huawei Technologies Company or 

10 ZTE Corporation (or any subsidiary or affiliate 

11 of such entities). 

12 (B) Telecommunications services provided 

13 by such entities or using such equipment. 

14 (C) Telecommunications equipment or 

15 services produced or provided by an entity that 

16 the head of the relevant agency reasonably be17 lieves to be an entity owned or controlled by, or 

18 otherwise connected to, the government of a 

19 covered foreign country. 

Æ 


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