United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 7, 2019*

Decided January 9, 2019

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18-2958

RONALD L. KUPSKY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

OUTAGAMIE COUNTY and

MICHAEL W. GAGE, 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 18-C-757

Lynn Adelman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Ronald Kupsky, a Wisconsin inmate, sued the judge who presided over his 

state-court criminal case and the county where the proceedings were held for violations 

of his due-process rights during the taking of his plea of no contest. Specifically, 

Kupsky alleged that the judge failed to inform him of all potential consequences of the 

plea, including the possibility that he could be placed on the sex-offender registry. The 

district court dismissed Kupsky’s complaint for failure to state a claim, see 28 U.S.C. 

 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). The defendants were not 

served with process in the district court and are not participating in this appeal.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18-2958 Page 2

§ 1915A(b). To the extent Kupsky seemed to challenge the validity of his state-court 

conviction, the court found his case barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 

(1994), because success on his claim—that the judge erroneously accepted his plea—

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction. And insofar as he 

wished to proceed with a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court concluded that the 

state-court judge was protected by absolute immunity. Finally, the court explained that 

Kupsky had not stated a claim against the county because he had not asserted that any 

deprivation of his constitutional rights arose out of an official policy or established 

custom. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 

On appeal, Kupsky argues only that the state-court judge was not entitled to 

absolute immunity because his handling of the case was “egregious.” He does not 

mention his claim against Outagamie County, and so we consider it abandoned at this 

point and do not discuss it further.

Whether a judge has absolute immunity turns on whether the act in question was 

judicial in nature; the severity of any possible error is irrelevant. See Stump v. Sparkman, 

435 U.S. 349, 359–60, 363 (1978). Kupsky does not argue, nor could he, that the 

acceptance of his no-contest plea is not a “function normally performed by a judge.” See

id. at 362. And even if the judge were not entitled to immunity, Kupsky’s suit would 

still be Heck-barred, as the district court properly explained. See Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 

429, 435–36 (7th Cir. 2012). 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the dismissal of Kupsky’s suit and assess 

a strike, in addition to the one he incurred in the district court, under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). See Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000).