* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-10231

 

LYN-LEA TRAVEL CORP. doing business as

First Class International Travel Management,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee,

SABRE GROUP, INC.,

Intervenor Defendant-Appellee.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:-96-CV-2068-BC)

 

March 9, 1998

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

I.

First Class International Travel Management filed suit

against American Airlines alleging tortious interference with

FCI’s business relationships, breach of contract and deceptive
 

** FCI agrees that access to the documents filed with the

DOT is not limited. Even if FCI had complied with the DOT’s

sealing requirements, it appears that the filed documents would

still be open to American’s competitors in a public rulemaking at

the DOT.

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trade practices. The parties consented to proceed before a

magistrate judge. The magistrate judge granted American 

Airlines’ motion for summary judgment on grounds that FCI’s

claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and

abated trial on American Airlines’ counterclaim for breach of

contract to allow FCI to initiate a complaint with the Department

of Transportation on the preempted claims. Magistrate Judge

Boyle also granted FCI permission to file certain documents,

which were covered by protective orders, under seal at the DOT. 

However, the manner in which these documents were filed at the

DOT by FCI assertedly permitted access to them by American

Airlines’ competitors, in violation of the court’s protective

orders.** To rectify FCI’s DOT filing, the magistrate judge

ordered FCI to withdraw immediately its filing of the documents

at the DOT, without prejudice to a pending challenge to the

protective orders of the magistrate judge. FCI then requested

that this court stay the order requiring the return of the

documents, characterizing it as a “mandatory preliminary

injunction.” 

II.
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We are met at the threshold with a question of jurisdiction,

specifically, whether the district court’s withdrawal order is

appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1). We are persuaded

that the district court’s order is best characterized as an

interlocutory discovery order and not as a preliminary

injunction.

Here, the district court was administering its protective

orders after FCI filed documents in a manner it concluded

violated those protective orders. When the district court

permitted FCI to file the DOT complaint, it required that the

documents be filed under seal. Persuaded the DOT filing did not

maintain the ordered confidentiality, it took remedial action to

preserve its protective orders. 

The line between an unappealable discovery order and an

appealable grant of a preliminary injunction is not always

bright. We are persuaded that the order we are asked to stay

pending review is best seen as a discovery order. The focus of

the magistrate judge’s order was on maintaining the

confidentiality of the documents and not on the pursuit of the

DOT complaint. See Phillips v. Chas. Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d

127, 130 (5th Cir. 1990); Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d

1060, 1066 (5th Cir. 1986). Discovery orders are, of course, not

appealable under 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1). Hamilton v. Robertson,

854 F.2d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 1988). Section “1292 is intended to

carve out limited exceptions” to the general final judgment rule
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and hence the exceptions to it are to be “construed narrowly.” 

Sierra Club v. Glickman, 67 F.3d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1995). 

We do not pass on the merit of this dispute and do not

preclude any future appeal for which there is jurisdiction.

The request for stay pending review is DENIED for want of

appellate jurisdiction over the order of the magistrate judge.