2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-3-2012

USA v. Shakira Williams

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 11-2267

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Recommended Citation

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 11-2267

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

SHAKIRA WILLIAMS,

Appellant

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal No. 2-03-cr-00776-002)

District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis

_____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

December 15, 2011

Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE and GREENBERG, 

Circuit Judges

(Filed April 3, 2012)

Robert Epstein, Esq.

Office of General Counsel
2

Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District 

of Pennsylvania

601 Walnut Street

The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellant

Frank R. Costello, Jr., Esq.

Office of United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street

Suite 1250

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellee

_____________

OPINION

_____________

VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.

Shakira Williams brings this appeal from the District 

Court‘s May 6, 2011 Order revoking her supervised release 

and imposing a 24-month prison sentence. Williams contends 

that this sentence exceeds the maximum term of 

imprisonment authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583. Finding no 

error in the District Court‘s sentencing decision, we will 

affirm the Judgment of the District Court.

I.

On January 28, 2004, Williams pled guilty to four 

counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a)

and 2, and one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 371. On May 3, 2005, Williams was sentenced to 48 
3

months‘ imprisonment, followed by a period of three years of 

supervised release. Williams completed her original prison 

sentence and began supervised release on May 16, 2007. 

Since then, she has been charged with numerous violations of 

the conditions of her supervised release, including, inter alia: 

failure to report for drug testing; failure to report to her 

probation officer; positive drug tests; leaving a residence 

where she was under house arrest; removing an electronic 

monitoring bracelet; expulsion from a halfway house for 

failing to follow the rules; lying to her probation officer about 

her employment status; and failing to appear for a court 

proceeding.

Williams‘ violations led to several modifications and 

revocations of her supervised release. On December 7, 2007, 

the District Court modified the conditions of her supervised 

release to include four months in a halfway house. On 

September 24, 2008, following a hearing, the District Court 

revoked her supervised release and sentenced her to five 

months‘ imprisonment and 31 months of supervised release. 

Williams resumed supervised release on December 16, 2008, 

but a month later she was charged with further violations. On 

February 23, 2009, following a hearing, the District Court 

again modified the conditions of her supervised release to 

include four months of home detention with electronic 

monitoring.

Williams‘ probation officer subsequently charged her 

with multiple violations of her supervised release. On July 

29, 2009, following a hearing on these violations, the District 

Court revoked Williams‘ supervised release and sentenced 

her to 19 months‘ imprisonment and twelve months of 

supervised release, with six of the twelve month supervised 
4

release term to be served in a halfway house, and the 

remaining six to be served under home detention.

On appeal of that sentence, Williams argued that her 

combined 25-month sentence of incarceration and home 

detention exceeded the 24-month maximum prison term

authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). She argued that any 

term of home detention counts as imprisonment under this 

provision, because § 3583(e)(4) states that a term of home 

detention ―may be imposed only as an alternative to 

incarceration.‖ Since Williams conceded that this issue was 

not preserved, this Court applied the plain error standard of 

review. United States v. Williams, 387 Fed. Appx. 282, 284 

(3d Cir. 2010). Due to a circuit split on the meaning of the 

statute—an issue of first impression in this Court—we found 

that the alleged error was not plain, and we therefore declined

to review the issue. Id. at 286.

On November 15, 2010, Williams was released from 

prison and began confinement in a halfway house. Several 

weeks later, she was charged with several new violations of 

her supervised release conditions. Williams argued that, in 

light of the cumulative revocation imprisonment already 

served—27 months and five days, including three months and 

five days of home detention1—the maximum prison term the 

Court could impose was eight months and 26 days. In 

response to Williams‘ arguments concerning the effect of 

prior sentences imposed for supervised release violations on 

the amount of prison time that could be imposed for her latest 

 

1 Williams did not complete the full six month home 

detention period, thus explaining why she claimed credit for 

only three months and five days. 
5

violations, the District Court concluded that the maximum 

prison term it could impose was not reduced by the aggregate 

length of previously-served revocation imprisonment. In an

Order issued on May 6, 2011, the District Court revoked 

Williams‘ supervised release and imposed what it viewed as 

the statutory maximum sentence: 24 months‘ imprisonment, 

with no term of supervised release to follow. Williams 

appeals this sentence as unlawful, and asks this Court to 

vacate and remand for resentencing.

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We exercise plenary 

review over matters of statutory interpretation. United States 

v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009).

When interpreting the disputed provisions of a statute, 

we look first to the language of the statute to determine the 

law‘s plain meaning. United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 

257 (3d Cir. 2000). ―If the language of the statute expresses 

Congress‘s intent with sufficient precision, the inquiry ends 

there and the statute is enforced according to its terms.‖ Id.

(citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 

241 (1989)); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (―If the 

intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . .‖). 

―Where the statutory language does not express Congress‘ 

intent unequivocally, a court traditionally refers to the 

legislative history and the atmosphere in which the statute 

was enacted in an attempt to determine the congressional 

purpose.‖ Gregg, 226 F.3d at 257.

III.
6

Williams first contends that her 24-month sentence 

exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under

18 U.S.C. § 3853, and that the Court misconstrued the statute 

by finding otherwise. At the crux of this appeal is the 

meaning of § 3583(e)(3), which governs the modification and

revocation of supervised release following imprisonment. It

provides that a court may:

[R]evoke a term of supervised release, and 

require the defendant to serve in prison all or 

part of the term of supervised release 

authorized by statute for the offense that 

resulted in such term of supervised release

without credit for time previously served on 

postrelease supervision, if the court . . . finds by 

a preponderance of the evidence that the 

defendant violated a condition of supervised 

release, except that a defendant whose term is 

revoked under this paragraph may not be 

required to serve on any such revocation . . . 

more than 2 years in prison if such offense is a 

class C or D felony . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (emphasis added). The maximum 

statutorily-authorized term of supervised release that a court 

can impose on a defendant for ―the offense that resulted in 

such term of supervised release‖ is specified in § 3583(b):

(b) Authorized terms of supervised release. –

Except as otherwise provided, the authorized 

terms of supervised release are –

. . .
7

(2) for a Class C or Class D felony, not more 

than three years . . . .

Therefore, under subsection (e)(3), the maximum term 

of imprisonment that the District Court could impose in this 

case for a violation of supervised release conditions was the 

lesser of ―the term of supervised release authorized by statute 

for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised 

release,‖ i.e., three years, or the cap for the particular class of 

felony offense set by the concluding clause, i.e., two years. 

Accordingly, the District Court determined that 24 months

was the maximum prison term that it could impose on 

Williams for each supervised release revocation.

Williams contends that in cases like hers, where more 

than one term of post-revocation imprisonment has been 

imposed, ―subsection (b) functions in tandem with a second 

provision, subsection (h).‖ (Appellant Br. at 17-18.) Section 

3583(h) concerns the term of supervised release that may be 

imposed following a term of post-revocation imprisonment, 

and provides:

When a term of supervised release is revoked 

and the defendant is required to serve a term of 

imprisonment, the court may include a 

requirement that the defendant be placed on a 

term of supervised release after imprisonment. 

The length of such a term of supervised release 

shall not exceed the term of supervised release 

authorized by statute for the offense that 

resulted in the original term of supervised 

release, less any term of imprisonment that was 

imposed upon revocation of supervised release.
8

Thus, subsection (h) provides that the term of supervised 

release following a term of revocation imprisonment—also

known as the supervised release ―tail‖—cannot exceed the 

term of supervised release that could be imposed for the 

original offense (in this case, three years), less the aggregate 

length of imprisonment imposed for all prior revocations of 

supervised release. In other words, the authorized term of a 

supervised release tail progressively diminishes by the length

of successive terms of post-revocation imprisonment.

Williams asserts that the aggregate limit on the

supervised release tail under subsection (h) interacts with 

subsection (e)(3) to impose a similar limit on post-revocation 

imprisonment. She reasons that under subsection (e)(3), the 

statutorily ―authorized term of supervised release is also the 

authorized length of post-revocation imprisonment.‖ 

(Appellant Br. at 19.) She further contends that ―[s]ubsection 

(h) is clearly a  ̳statute,‘ and thus it—not only subsection (b), as 

held by the district court—must inform the meaning of  ̳term of 

supervised release authorized by statute for the offense.‘‖ (Id.

at 20.) She concludes that, since the authorized term of 

supervised release is reduced by the amount of prison time a 

defendant served for previous release violations, the maximum 

term of post-revocation imprisonment under subsection (e)(3) 

is likewise progressively reduced.

We reject Williams‘ interpretation of § 3583 because, 

as the District Court aptly observed, it rests on a ―selective 

use of statutory language, not the statute itself.‖ (A. 8.) 

Subsection (e)(3) refers to the ―term of supervised release 

authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term 

of supervised release.‖ (Emphasis added). This language 

unambiguously sets the maximum prison sentence by 
9

reference to the length of supervised release statutorily 

authorized for the conviction offense, not for the length of 

supervised release authorized after a revocation 

imprisonment. It is only by ignoring the words emphasized 

above—―for the offense that resulted in such term of 

supervised release‖—that Williams can maintain that 

subsection (h) sets the terms of supervised release for the 

purposes of subsection (e)(3).

Indeed, subsections (b) and (h) establish a ―term of 

supervised release‖ for different purposes: subsection (b) 

defines the term of supervised release for the original offense, 

and subsection (h) defines the term of a supervised release 

tail. Subsection (e)(3) clearly fixes the term of postrevocation imprisonment according to the former, and gives 

no indication that the aggregate limit of supervised release 

time under subsection (h) applies as well to the term of 

imprisonment that may be imposed when supervised release 

is revoked. We therefore reject Williams‘ construction as 

contrary to the plain language of the statute, and agree with 

the District Court that subsection (e)(3) is not subject to the 

aggregate limit of subsection (h).

We find support for our holding in United States v. 

Hampton, 633 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2011). In Hampton, the 

Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the phrase ―term of 

supervised release authorized by statute‖ in subsection (e)(3) 

itself imposes an aggregate limit on post-revocation 

imprisonment. Id. at 338-39. Although the Hampton Court 

did not directly consider whether subsection (h) imposes an 

aggregate limit on post-revocation imprisonment by defining

the ―term of supervised release authorized by statute,‖ it did 

conclude that its ―reading of § 3583(e) is harmonious with § 
10

3583(h).‖ Id. at 339.2 In this respect, the Court explained the 

effects of subsection (h) on post-revocation imprisonment:

Section 3583(h) . . . acts as a cap on the 

aggregate amount of post-revocation supervised 

release a defendant may receive. This, in turn, 

imposes an indirect limit on the aggregate 

amount of revocation imprisonment. Once a 

defendant has received as much revocation 

imprisonment as § 3583(b) authorizes for 

supervised release, the defendant is no longer 

eligible for post-revocation supervised release. 

Because the defendant will no longer be eligible 

for supervised release, she cannot be at risk for 

―an endless cycle of consecutive terms of 

imprisonment and supervised release based on a 

single underlying offense.‖

Id. (quoting United States v. Jackson, 329 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 

2003) (per curiam)). The Hampton Court‘s interpretation of 

the statute—and particularly its view of the relationship 

between these two subsections—is therefore consistent with 

and supports our reading of the statute.

 

2 Although Hampton did advance this argument about 

subsection (h) as an alternative to her principal claim under 

subsection (e)(3), the Court did not substantively address it. 

633 F.3d at 342, n.4. Instead, the Court briefly dismissed the 

argument, observing that ―Hampton provides no support for 

her reading,‖ and concluding: ―it is merely a recapitulation of 

her aggregation argument, which we have addressed at length 

in this opinion.‖ Id.
11

Williams contends that the principle of statutory 

construction known as the ―anti-superfluousness canon,‖ 

Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 n.5 (2009),

requires that subsection (e)(3) be read together with 

subsection (h) to impose an aggregate limit on revocation 

imprisonment. Williams asserts that because the limitation on 

revocation imprisonment expressed in the concluding clause 

of subsection (e)(3) is always equal to or less than ―the term 

of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that 

resulted in such term of supervised release,‖ subsection (e)(3) 

must be construed by interpreting ―the  ̳term of supervised 

release authorized by statute‘ limitation to apply in the 

aggregate.‖ (Appellant‘s Br. at 24.) Otherwise, she asserts,

―the  ̳term of supervised release authorized by statute‘

language never has any effect.‖ (Id. at 25.)

This argument ignores the legislative history of 

subsection (e)(3). The language in question—―to serve in 

prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized 

by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of 

supervised release‖—was added in 1994 to authorize courts 

―to impose a term of revocation imprisonment without being 

limited by the amount of supervised release the original 

sentencing court imposed.‖ Hampton, 633 F.3d at 341 (citing 

Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 705 (2000)). Prior to 

this legislative change, subsection (e)(3) was interpreted to 

preclude a court from imposing a revocation term greater than 

the period of supervised release initially imposed by the 

court. Id. Thus, the provision in question is independent of 

the concluding clause of subsection (e)(3), which was 

amended in 2003 to plainly establish ―a per revocation limit 

on revocation imprisonment.‖ Id. Considered in light of the 

―legislative history and the atmosphere in which the statute 
12

was enacted,‖ Gregg, 226 F.3d at 257, it is evident that 

Congress did not intend to set an aggregate cap on successive 

revocation imprisonment in subsection (e)(3) when it added 

language that authorized courts to impose a term of 

revocation imprisonment that exceeded the supervised release 

term originally imposed. Accordingly, Williams‘ reliance 

upon the anti-superfluousness canon is misplaced. See 

Hampton, 633 F.3d at 341.

Finally, maintaining that § 3583 is ambiguous, 

Williams argues that the rule of lenity supports her 

interpretation. Since we conclude that subsection (e)(3) is 

unambiguous, the rule of lenity is inapplicable in this case. 

See Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 241; Reno v. Koray, 

515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (―The rule of lenity applies only if, 

after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we 

can make  ̳no more than a guess as to what Congress 

intended.‖) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

3

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 

of the District Court.

 

3 Williams also challenges her sentence on the ground 

that the period of home detention she served must be counted 

towards the aggregate limit on post-revocation imprisonment 

under subsection (h). This argument is moot in light of our 

finding that subsection (h) does not impose an aggregate limit 

on successive revocation imprisonment.