# FILED

November 24, 1997 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE SUPREME COUR T OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE (HEARD AT COOKEVILLE)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ( FOR PUBLICA TION ( Plaintiff-Appellee, ( Filed: November 24, 1997 ( ( v. ( Coffee Criminal ( ( Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Sr., WAYNE LEE YEARGAN, ( Judge ( Defendant-Appellant. ( No. 01S01-9604-CC-00080

For Plaintiff-Appellee : For Defendant-Appellant : John Knox Walkup Donald E. Dawson Attorney General & Reporte r Bruce, W eathers, Corle y, Nashville, Tennessee Dughman and Lyle Nashville, Tennessee Daryl J. Brand Senior Counsel Nashville, Tennessee Clinton J. Morgan Counsel for the State Nashville, Nashv

ille, Tennessee Kimbra R. Spann Assistant Attorney General Nashville, Tennessee C. Michael Layn e District Attorney General Manchester, Tennessee Kenneth Shelton Assistant District Attorney General Manchester, Tennessee

O P I N I O N

AFFIRMED DROWOTA, J.1 Rule 37(b)(2) (i), Tenn. R. Crim. P., provides i n pertinen t part as f ollows: (b) An appeal l ies from any or der or judgment i n a criminal proceeding where the law provides for such ap peal, and f rom any judg me nt of c onvic tion: (2 ) Upo n a ple a of g uilty or n olo contendere i f: (i ) Defendant entered into a plea agreement under Rule 11(e) but

explicitly

reserved with the consent of the state and of the cour t the rig ht to a ppe al a ce rtified ques tion o f law th at is dispositive of the ca se. . . .

2 Ora l argu me nts w ere h eard in this c ase in Co oke ville, Pu tnam Cou nty, as part o f this Court’s S .C.A.L.E .S. ( S upreme C ourt A dvancing L ega l E ducation for S tudents ) project.

-2- The certified question of law 1 presented in this appeal is whether the state or federal constitutional r ight to be free from unreasonable se izures was vi olated when the motor vehicle which the defendant was oper ating was stopped by

a city police officer, who six

months earlier, had arrest ed the defendant for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and h ad been present in court w hen the defendant was convicted of that offense and hi s driver’s licen se revoked for one year.

The trial court denied the defendant’ s motion to suppress the evi dence of the defendant’s intoxication obt ained during the stop, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Because we conclude that the officer’s decision to stop was bas ed upon reasonable suspicion su pported by specific and articulable facts that the defendant w as driving on a rev

oked license, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. 2

FACTUAL BA

CKGROUND On Thursday , January 28, 1993, at app roximately 2:20 p.m., Tullahoma Police Officer Jason Ferrel l observed the defendant, Wayne Lee Yeargan , driving a pickup truck on a public street in Tullahoma. Previ ously, Officer Ferrell had3 The defendant was also fined $250 and sent enced to 11 months and 29 day s in jai l, whi ch was su spend ed upo n service of the 48 h our m andato ry period of inc arcera tion.

-3- arrested the defendant for drivi ng under the influence of an intox icant and had been present in the general s essions court approximat ely six months earl ier, on July 2, 1992, when the defendant pleaded guilty to the off ense and had his driver’s license revoked for one year from the date of the judgment. 3

When the officer began following the defendant's tr uck, Yeargan, accordi ng to the officer's testimony, "spe d up some, he wasn't goin g at a high rate of speed, but he accelerated." In the officer's view, Yeargan "attempted to put some traffic between us." The defendant then drov e into the parking lot of Rub y’s Lounge, a local bar. The officer followed and put on his blue lights.The defendant parked and got out of his truck. The officer asked to see his drive r’s license. Yeargan produced a restricted license issued pursuant to a court order which permitted him to drive “in Coffee County only as necessary to complete job tasks” betw een the hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. The defendant’s employ ment was listed on the order granting the restri cted license as farming and "r ental property owner." The officer testified that when he asked Y eargan why he had dri

ven to the bar, the defendant replied that he “had come to the bar to meet a guy about a cow.” Based on his observations and a field sobr iety test, the officer concl uded that the defendant was under the influence of an intoxic ant and arrested him for driv ing under the influence and driving on a revoked license. The defendant moved to suppress the ev idence obtained as a result of the4 Tenn. Code A nn. § 55-10-401 (1993).

5 Tenn. Code A nn. § 55-50-504 (1993).

6 We are aware that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 7-103(b) (Supp. 1996), provi des that unl ess probable cause exi sts, onl y members of the Tennessee highway patrol h ave the authority to stop a motor vehicle

for the sol e purpose of examinin g or checking th e operator l icense of t he driver of the vehicle.However, since t he defendant di d not reserve for appeal the statuto ry leg alit y of the stop, the e ffec t of tha t statu te is n ot at is sue in this a ppe al.

-4- stop, argui ng that the o fficer did not

have reaso nable suspic ion to belie

ve a crime had been committed when he made the stop because the officer knew of the procedure for obtaining a re stricted license and had no r eason to believe that the defendant was operating outsi de the scope of his driving privilege. Testify

ing at the suppression hearing, the police officer acknowledg ed that he was aware of the availability of res

tricted licenses for dri

ving offenders. Howev er, the officer testified it would hav

e taken about 15 minutes for the polic e radio operator to determine the status of the defendant’s li cense before the stop.

Upon consideration of the proof, the trial court den ied the defendant’s motion to suppress. Thereafter, the defendant pleaded guilty to dr iving under the influence of an intoxicant, seco nd offense, 4 and driving a motor v ehicle with a revoked driver’s

license, 5 but reserved the rig ht to appeal a certified questi on of law challenging the constitutionality 6 of the traffic stop leading to his arrest and subsequent convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals aff irmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, finding that " a prudent officer could reasonably have believed that the appel lant was driving on a revoked license" and h olding that the officer had "probable cause to c onduct an investigativ

e stop." In reaching that conclusion, the Court of C riminal Appeals relied upo n Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S.-5-

1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968 ) and State v. Watkins , 827 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. 1992). Thereafter, we g ranted the defendant permission to appeal and for the reasons that follow, now affirm the decision of the trial c ourt and Court of Criminal Appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court recently clarified the standard of revi ew under which a tr ial court’s findings of fact on suppr ession issues are to be re viewed: Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the w eight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact. The p arty prevailing in the t rial court is entitl ed to the strongest legi timate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hea ring as well as all reasonable and legitimate i nferences that may be drawn fr om that evidence. So long as the greater weight of the

evidence supports the trial court’s findings, those findings shall be u pheld. In other words, a trial cour

t’s findings of fact in a suppres sion hearing will

be upheld unless the evidence pr eponderates otherwise. We also note that this standard of review is consistent with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), which provides that in civil cases, findings of fact by a trial court are presumed correct “unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Hereafter, the proper standard to be appli ed in reviewing suppression issues is the “preponderance of the evidence ” standard. State v. Odom , 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The application of the law to the facts found by the trial court, however, is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo. Beare Co. v. Tennessee Dept. of Revenue , 858 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tenn. 1993). We apply these standards to resolve the issue in this appeal.

REASONABLE SUSPICION In this Court, the defendant contends that the investigator

y stop was7 The F ourth Am endm ent is app licable to the s tates throu gh the F ourteen th Am endm ent. Map p v. O hio , 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1 081 (1961).

-6- unconstitutional because the officer did not have reasonable sus picion, supported by specific and articul able facts, to believe that th e defendant was violating the law. In support of his cl aim, the defendant argues that eve n though the officer knew the defendant’s license h ad been revoked six months earlier, the officer was also aware of the avail ability of restricted licenses, and therefore, had no r eason to believe the defendant was v iolating the law by

operating an automobile. The State responds that give n the totality of the information known to the officer, the stop was based upon reasonabl e suspicion. The State also maintains that the officer was not required to check the status of the defe ndant’s license before initiating the stop.

We begin our analysis of this issue w ith the text of the Fourth Amendment 7 to the United States Constitution which provides:

Unreasonable searches and seizures. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreas onable searches and seizures, shall not

be violated, and no war rants shall issue, but upon probabl e cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particular ly describing the place to be searched, and the pers ons or things to be seized.
Similarly, Articl e 1, Section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee guarantees

that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreaso nable searches and seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer may be commanded to search-7- suspected places, without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offences are not particularly described and supported by evidence,are dangerous to liberty and ought not to be granted.
The purpose of the prohibition agai nst unreasonable searches and s eizures under the Fourth Amendment is to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions of government officials.” Camara v. Municipal Court , 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730,18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). “[A]rticle I, section 7 is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendmen t.” State v. Downey , 945 S.W .2d 102, 106 (T enn. 1997), quo ting Sneed v. State , 221 Tenn. 6, 13, 423 S.W.2d 85 7, 860 (1968).

Consequently, under both the federal and state constitu tions, a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppress ion unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conduct

ed pursuant to one of the narrowl y defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Bartram , 925 S.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Tenn. 1996).

Though it was a temporary detention for a limited purpose, the stop of the defendant’s vehicle in this case, without questi on, constitutes a seizur e and implicates the protection of both the state and federal constitutions

. Whre n v. United States , ___ U.S. ____,___, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, ___ L.Ed.2d ___8 The balancing t est was fir

st appli ed in Cama ra v. Municipal Court , 387 U.S . 523, 87 S .Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed. 2d 930 (1967). In his concur ring opi nion, Just ice Reid maintai ns that court s must engage in “det

ailed bal ancing” on a case- by-case basi s to determine t he constit utional ity of an investi gatory st

op. That stat

ement indicates a misunderstandi ng of the nat ure and purpose of the balancing test. The balancing test is not a matter for case-by-case application, but rather “a technique f

or establishing the quant um of evidence needed for certain d isti nct kinds of of ficial action. ” Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search & Seizur e, A Treati se on the Fourth Amendment , § 9.1(d), p.13 (3d ed. W est 199 6); See e.g. Chandler v. Mi ller , _ U.S. _, _, 117 S.Ct. 1295,1301, 137 L. Ed.2d 513 (19 97); Whren , ___ U.S. at __ , 116 S.Ct . at 17 76. W hile ca se-b y-cas e bala ncin g “m ight w ell be a stimulat ing exerci se in the r arefied at mosphere of an appell ate court or law school cl assroom, it is clearly

asking too muc h to expect policemen to m ake on-the-spot judgm ents in this way or, indeed, to require trial jud ges to re view police condu ct in this fash ion.” Lafav e, § 9.1(d) , p. 13. Unlike Justi ce Reid, we decl ine to adopt that approach , which i s both contrar y to wel l-establ ished law and unworkabl e in pract ice.

-8- (1996); Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S. Ct. 1391,1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); See also United States v. Hensle y , 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S. Ct. 675, 679, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Colorado v. Bannister , 449 U.S. 1, 4 n. 3, 101 S. Ct. 42, 44 n. 3, 66 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (When an officer turns on his blue lights, he or she has clearly initiated a stop). Because it w as not conducted pursuant to a warrant, the investigatory stop was presumptively unreas

onable. However, the lower courts appropr

iately denied the defendant’s moti on to suppress because the seizure in this case was conducted pursuant to a n arrowly defined ex ception to the warrant requir

ement.

In Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 188 0, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court applied a balan cing test 8 to determine whether the law enforcement practice of “stop and frisk” violated the proscri ptions of the Fourth Amendment to the United St ates Constitution. In that case, a police officer became suspicious of two men who separately and repeatedly walked up and down a street peering into a store window . After each trek, the men talked t o a third man up the street. The officer, af ter observing this conduct for a short9 In his conc urrin g opin ion, J ustic e Re id con clud es th at the stop in this c ase was invalid under Terry , but const ituti onally sound because based upon probabl e cause. It is well -settl ed that “the lev el of suspi cion requi red for a Terry stop is obv ious ly less d em and ing th an th at for prob able cause.” United Stat

es v. Sokolow , 490 U.S . 1, 7-8, 109 S.Ct. 158 1, 1585, 1 04 L.Ed .2d 1 (19 89). Therefore, Just ice Reid’ s conclusion is legall y inconsi stent and i s a result of his err oneous holdin g that a const ituti onally valid investi gatory st op requires no

t only reasonable suspi cion, but also “exigent circumstances .” Contrary to Justice Reid’s concurring opinion, neither Terry nor its progeny art iculate a second “exigent circumstances” requi rement. Indeed, the phrase, “exigent circumstances” i s itsel f a term of art which denotes an independent exception to t he warrant requirem ent of the F ourth Am endm ent. The cases cited by Jus tice Reid d o not sup port his ho lding. In State v. Pully , 863 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. 1993), the poli ce officer init iated t he investi gatory st op upon an anonymous informant’ s tip t hat a person was dri ving thr ough a neighborhood threateni ng residents wi

th a gun. To justify pol ice acti on under Tennessee law an i nformant’s ti p must be reliable, whic h require s a sho wing of b oth the info rma nt’s credib ility and basis of know ledge. State v. Jac um in , 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1 989). This Court in Pully simply hel d that when a t hreat of impending vi olence is i nvolved t he legal t est of rel iabil ity

of an anonymous info rmant’s ti p need not be stri ctly

enforced. Si nce the stop i n this case was not init iated as a r

esult of a n anonymous inform ant’s tip, Pully is inapplicab le and do es not s upport J ustice R eid’s con clusion tha t Terry articul ated an “exi gent circumstances” requirement. Moreover, Justi ce Reid’s assertion that our holding “

would all ow the detent ion and at l east a patdown sear ch of any person suspected of possessing illegal drugs or other contraband” is erroneous . A frisk is warranted under Terry only if the poli ce officer has a reasonable suspi cion based upon speci fic and art iculabl e facts that the suspe ct is arm ed. Id ., 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883.

-9- time, followed the suspects, stopped and frisked them, and discov ered that two of them were carrying

pistols. Charged w

ith the crime of carryi ng a concealed weapon, Terry moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that the stop and frisk was unconstituti onal. Balancing the intr usion on the individual’ s Fourth Amendment privacy inter ests against the promotion of l egitimate governmental interests, the Court in Terry determined that the law enforc ement practice of a brief investigatory stop is constitutionally permissible if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, suppor ted by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed. 9 Id

.

Eleven years later in Delaware v. Prouse , the Court concluded that the same standard applied in the conte xt of investigatory

automobile stops. In that case a police officer on a “roving patrol” aimed at detecting unlicensed drivers made a suspicionless stop of an automobi le. The purpose of the stop was t o-10-

check the driver’s license and registration. The officer stopped Prouse’s automobile because he “saw the car in the area and was n’t answering any complaints. . . .” Id ., 440 U.S. at 651, 99 S.Ct. at 13 94. When the officer approached the car, he smelled mar ijuana and thereafter seized the marijuana, which was in plai n view on the floor of the ca r. In concluding that the suspicionless, random stop w as unconstitutional, the Prouse court described the balancing test as follows:

The essential purpose of the proscr iptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a stan dard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the ex ercise of discretion by government officials, incl uding law enforcement agents, in order to safeguar d the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invas ions. Thus, the permissibility of a par

ticular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interest agai nst its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Implemented in this manner, the reasonableness standard usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measuremen t against an objective standard, whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test. [footnote citing Terry] In those situations in which the balance of interests preclude s insistence upon some quantum of indi vidualized suspicion, other safeguards are generally rel ied upon to assure that the indivi dual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subj ect to the discretion of the official in the field.

Id ., 440 U.S. at 653-54, 99 S.Ct. at 1396 (emphasis added)(inter nal citations and quotations omitted). Uti lizing that test, th e Prouse Court held “that exceptin those situations in which there is at least articulable and r easonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed

or that an automobile is not r egistered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant i s otherwise subject t o seizure for violation of law, stopping10 Justice Reid maintains that our interpretation is inconsistent with the language of Prouse

. He quotes the fol lowing sent ence from that case: “We hold only t hat persons i n automobiles on public r oadways may not for that reason alone have t heir tr avel and pri

vacy int erfered with the unbridl ed discreti on of poli ce officers. ” In fact , that l anguage supports our interpr etatio n. The stop in Prouse was completely random and not based upon any level of indi vidualized suspici on. The police of

ficer’ s discreti on was unbridl ed. It was the absence of reasonable suspici on which invalidated th e stop, no t the abse nce of e xigent circ ums tances

. See also Hu ghes v. S tate , 588 S.W.2d 296 (Tenn. 1979) However, where, as here, an investi gatory st op is ini tiatedupon a reasonable suspi cion that a driver is unli censed, the pol ice offi cer is not exercisin g unbridl ed disc retion , and the s top is cons titution al.

-11- an automobile and detaining the dr iver in order to chec

k his license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable un der the Fourth Amendment.” Id ., 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 14 01 (emphasis added). Prouse , therefore, stands for the proposition that investigatory stops based upon reasona ble suspicion that a driver

is unlicensed are constitutionally permissibl e. 10 See also Chandler v. Miller, __ U.S. __, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1298, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997)(The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable sear ches and seizures “generally bars offici als from undertaking a searc h or seizure absent indi vidualized suspicion.”); See also Griffin v. State , 604 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tenn. 1980); State v. McCullough , 906 S.W.2d 3 (Tenn . Crim. App. 1995).

Likewise, in Watkins , this Court upheld the constitutionality of an investigatory s

top of a motor vehicle and the ens uing search, where the stop was based upon reasonable suspicion. Id. , 827 S.W.2d at 294. In that case, the officer initiating the stop h ad personal knowledge that a capias had been issued for the defendant’s arrest. Other off icers also had informed the arresting officers that the defendant often drove a black C adillac inscribed w

ith the words, “The Duke.” When the officers observed a car matc hing that description, th ey “decided-12-

to stop the vehicle and investigate the identity of the driver.” Id ., 827 S.W.2d at 295. After stopping the car, a sking for a driver’ s license, and learning that the defendant had none, the officers called in by radio to verify the c

ontinuing viabilit

y of the capias. Id . The capias was veri fied and the officers arrested the defendant and searched the vehicle. Considering the totality of the circumstances this Court refused to suppress the eviden ce discovered during the search, holding that the initial stop was constitutionally valid because it was based upon reasonable suspicion, supported by s pecific and articulable facts, “that the defendant was the driver of the vehicl e and that he was the person w anted on the outstanding capias.” Id ., 827 S.W.2d at 295.

In so holding, we obser ved that a court must consi der the totality of the circumstances when evaluating whether a police officer’s reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and ar ticulable facts. Id ., 827 S.W.2d at 294; United St ate v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed .2d 621 (1981). Circumstances relevant to that evaluation incl ude, but are not limited to, the officer’s personal objective observations, information ob tained from other police officers or agencies, informati on obtained from citizens, and the pattern of operation of certain offenders. A court must also consider the rati onal inferences and deductions that a trained officer may draw from the facts and ci rcumstances known to him. Watkins , 827 S.W.2d at 294; Cortez , 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at 695; Terry , 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.

The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized-13- suspicion or hunch. The Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objecti ve justification for making the stop. That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause means a fair probabi lity that contraband or evidence o

f a crime will be found and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously

less demanding than that for probable cause.

Sokolow , 490 U.S. at 7-8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (emphasis added)(internal citations and quotations omitted).

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be es tablished with information that is different in qu antity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspi cion can arise from information that is less rel iable than that required t o show probable cause.

Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); State v. Pulley , 863 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tenn. 1993); Cf. Peters v. New York , 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968)(companion case to Terryin which the Court held it was unnecessary to discuss reasonable suspicion since the officer had probable cause for the ar rest).

Moreover, the availability of other less intrusive investigatory techniques is not relevant to the constitutional validity of an officer’s decision to initi ate the investigatory stop, if an investigatory stop is based upon specific and articulable facts givi ng rise to a reasonable suspicion.Indeed, the U nited States Supreme Court in Sokolow

expressly rejected the notion that law enforcement officials are11 Jus tice R eid’s a sse rtion th at the availa bility of le ss int rusiv e inve stiga tory m ean s sh ould be con sidered by courts e valuating th e cons titutionality of investiga tory stops is directly contra ry to Sokolow

.

-14- obligated to use the least i ntrusive means to ver ify or dispel their su spicions. “The reasonableness of the officer’s deci sion to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.” Id. , 490 U.S. at 11, 109 S.Ct. at 1581. 11 In Watkins , this Court implicitl y rejected that argument by upholding the stop even though the police officers did not verify the capia s until after the automobile was stopped a nd the defendant identified.

Considering the totality of the circumstances of this case in light of the wellsettled principles of law set forth above, we concl ude that the officer’s decision to initiate the investigatory stop was based up on reasonable suspicion, suppor ted by specific and articulable facts , that the defendant was driv ing on a revoked lic

ense. The officer had previously ar rested Yeargan, so he w as acquainted with the defendant and could identify the defendant by sight. In addition, the officer had personal knowledge that Yeargan’s driv

er’s license had been rev oked for a period of one year, and that only si x months had passed since the r evocation. When the officer observed Yeargan driving the automobile, therefore, he had a reasonable suspicion based upon articul able and specific facts that Year gan was committing a criminal offense, driving on a revoked license. Prouse , supra ; McCullough , supra ; Roberson v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Co ., 56 Tenn. App. 729, 412 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tenn. App. 1966) (police officer w ho arrests a man for drunk driving and testifies at trial against the man who was convicted and whose-15-

license was revok

ed for one year, may arres t him when he observes the man driving the follow

ing day). Contrar

y to the defendant’s assertions , the officer had no constitutional obligation to verify the status of the defe ndant’s license before making the stop. Indeed, the av ailability of less i ntrusive investigatory techniques does not vitiate the consti tutional validity of a stop which is supporte d by reasonable suspicion.

CONCLUSION In his concurring opin ion Justice Reid contends that the investigatory stop in this case was inv

alid because it was not supported by exigent circumstances as well as reasonable sus picion. Rather than embarki ng on a path fraught with unknown consequences, w e adhere to the well-set tled principle of law, that to be constitutionally v

alid under either the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Secti on 7, a brief investigatory stop simply must be based upon reasonable suspicion which is supported by specific and articulable facts. Because the investigatory stop in this case was based upon reasonabl e suspicion, it was v alid under both the federal and state constitutions. Acc ordingly, the low

er courts properly r

efused to suppress the evidence of intox ication derived from field s obriety tests and the officer’s personal observation of the defendant after the stop. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court’s denial of the def endant’s motion to suppress is affirmed.

______________________________ FRANK F. DROWOTA III,-16- JUSTICE

Concur: Anderson, C.J., Birch, J, and O’Brien, Sp .J..
Separate Opinion Concurring in Results Reid, J.