[Cite as State v. Bell, 2011-Ohio-5016.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO : 

Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 24356 

vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 10CR513 

SHAQUANA BELL : (Criminal Appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

 . . . . . . . . . 

 O P I N I O N

 Rendered on the 30th day of September, 2011. 

 . . . . . . . . . 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Pros. Attorney; Johnna M. Shia, Asst. Pros. 

Attorney, Atty. Reg. No. 0067685, P.O. Box 972, Dayton, OH 45422 

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 

William T. Daly, Atty. Reg. No. 0069300, 1250 W. Dorothy Lane, 

Suite 105, Kettering, OH 45409 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . 

GRADY, P.J.: 

{¶ 1} Defendant, Shaquana Bell, appeals from her conviction 

and sentence for aggravated burglary and intimidation of a crime 

victim. 

{¶ 2} Defendant was indicted on one count of aggravated 
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burglary-deadly weapon, R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), with a three year 

firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145, one count of felonious 

assault-deadly weapon, R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), with a three year 

firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145, and one count of intimidation 

of a crime victim by force or threat, R.C. 2921.04(B). Defendant 

entered pleas of guilty to the aggravated burglary and intimidation 

of a crime victim charges. In exchange, the State dismissed the 

firearm specification attached to the aggravated burglary charge 

as well as the felonious assault charge and its firearm 

specification. The trial court sentenced Defendant to consecutive 

prison terms of three years for aggravated burglary and one year 

for intimidation of a crime victim, for an aggregate sentence 

of four years. 

{¶ 3} Defendant timely appealed to this court from her 

conviction and sentence. 

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 4} “THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 

CRIMINAL RULE 11(C)(2) AND FAILED TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT, DURING 

THE RULE 11 DIALOGUE, OF HER RIGHT TO WAIVE A JURY TRIAL, PRIOR 

TO ACCEPTING DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA.” 

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 5} “THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADVISE THE DEFENDANT THAT HER 

PLEA OF GUILTY WAS A COMPLETE ADMISSION OF GUILT.” 
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{¶ 6} In these related assignments of error, Defendant argues 

that her guilty pleas were not entered knowingly, intelligently 

and voluntarily because, in accepting her pleas, the trial court 

failed to comply with the requirements in Crim.R. 11(C)(2) in two 

respects: (1) the trial court failed to advise Defendant that she 

could waive her right to a jury trial and instead be tried by the 

court, and that her guilty pleas likewise waived her right to a 

bench trial; (2) the trial court failed to advise Defendant about 

the effect of her guilty pleas: that they were a complete admission 

of her guilt. 

{¶ 7} To be constitutionally valid and comport with due 

process, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, intelligently, 

and voluntarily. Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 

1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. Compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) in 

accepting guilty or no contest pleas portrays those qualities. 

State v. Fisher, Montgomery App. No. 23992, 2011-Ohio-629, at ¶6. 

{¶ 8} Crim. R. 11(C)(2) provides: 

{¶ 9} “In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea 

of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea 

of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant 

personally and doing all of the following: 

{¶ 10} “(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea 

voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and 
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of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the 

defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of 

community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. 

{¶ 11} “(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that 

the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no 

contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may 

proceed with judgment and sentence. 

{¶ 12} “(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the 

defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving 

the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or 

her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the 

defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant 

cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.” 

{¶ 13} In State v. Russell, Clark App. No. 10CA54, 

2011-Ohio-1738, we stated: 

{¶ 14} “¶7. The Supreme Court of Ohio has urged trial courts 

to literally comply with Crim.R. 11. Clark at ¶ 29. The trial court 

must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), as it pertains to 

the waiver of constitutional rights. Clark at ¶ 31. The failure 

to adequately inform a defendant of his constitutional rights would 

invalidate a guilty plea under a presumption that it was entered 

involuntarily and unknowingly. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 
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85, 2004–Ohio–4415, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 15} “¶8. However, because Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) 

involve non-constitutional rights, the trial court need only 

substantially comply with those requirements. State v. Nero (1990), 

56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108; Greene at ¶ 9. Substantial compliance means 

that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant 

subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the 

rights he is waiving. State v. Miller, Clark App. No. 08 CA 90, 

2010–Ohio–4760, ¶ 8, citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 

2008–Ohio–5200, ¶ 15. A defendant who challenges his guilty plea 

on the ground that the trial court did not substantially comply 

with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) must show a prejudicial effect, 

which requires the defendant to show that the plea would otherwise 

not have been entered. Griggs at ¶ 12.” 

{¶ 16} The record of the plea colloquy in this case demonstrates 

that the trial court strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) 

in advising Defendant of the various constitutional rights she 

would be giving up by entering pleas of guilty, including the right 

to a jury trial. Furthermore, Defendant signed a written waiver 

acknowledging that she understood that by pleading guilty she was 

giving up her right to a jury trial. Defendant complains, however, 

that the trial court did not inform her that she had the right 

to both waive a jury trial and instead be tried before the court 
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pursuant to R.C. 2945.05, and that Defendant’s guilty pleas waived 

that right to a bench trial. 

{¶ 17} The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the Sixth 

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Prior to 

accepting a guilty plea, the court must inform the defendant of 

that right. State v. Ballard (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 473. The right 

to instead be tried by the court that R.C. 2945.05 confers is a 

non-constitutional right. Crim.R. 11(C)(2) does not require the 

trial court to advise a defendant that she has the right to be 

tried by the court when she waives a jury trial. Neither is the 

court then required to advise the defendant that her pleas of guilty 

waive her right to a bench trial. Crim.R. 11(C)(2) only requires 

that Defendant be advised, and the court to determine that she 

understands, that her plea of guilty waives her right to a jury 

trial, which the trial court did in this case. 

{¶ 18} Defendant additionally complains that the trial court 

failed to advise her of the effect of her guilty pleas, as required 

by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). During the plea, the trial court did not 

advise Defendant or ask if she understood that her guilty plea 

was a complete admission of her guilt. Crim.R.11(B)(1), 

(C)(2)(b). Nevertheless, such an omission is not presumed to be 

prejudicial under the facts in this case. 

{¶ 19} In State v. Russell, supra, at ¶10-11, this court stated: 
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{¶ 20} “[A] defendant who has entered a guilty plea without 

asserting actual innocence is presumed to understand that, by 

pleading guilty, he has completely admitted his guilt. Griggs,

supra. In such circumstances, the trial court's failure to inform 

the defendant of the effect of his guilty plea, as required by 

Crim.R. 11(C), is presumed not to be prejudicial. Id.; State v. 

Thomas, Cuyahoga App. No. 94788, 2011–Ohio–214, ¶ 32. 

{¶ 21} “{¶ 11} Russell has not claimed that he was innocent 

of the charges. Moreover, Russell signed a plea form, in which 

he stated that he understood that he was waiving his constitutional 

rights and that ‘by pleading guilty I admit committing the offense 

and will tell the Court the facts and circumstances of my guilt. 

I know the judge may either sentence me today or refer my case 

for a presentence report. * * *.’ Russell stated at the plea hearing 

that he had reviewed, understood, and signed the plea form. The 

court did not proceed directly with sentencing; instead, it 

referred the matter for a presentence investigation. Under these 

circumstances, Russell's plea was not rendered invalid by the 

court's failure to orally inform him of the effect of his guilty 

plea or that the court may proceed with judgment and sentencing.” 

{¶ 22} The same is true in this case. Defendant never asserted 

at the plea hearing that she was innocent of the charges. To the 

contrary, the trial court asked Defendant: “Do you admit that you 
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caused or threatened to cause physical harm to the person in the 

commission of this offense?” Defendant responded: “Yes.” It is 

presumed that Defendant understood that by then pleading guilty 

she has completely admitted her guilt. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio 

St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415. The substantial compliance standard 

is satisfied. Defendant’s guilty pleas are not rendered invalid 

by the trial court’s failure to also orally inform her of the effect 

of her guilty pleas, which is presumed not to be prejudicial. 

Id. 

{¶ 23} Defendant’s first and second assignments of error are 

overruled. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

DONOVAN, J. And WAITE, J., concur. 

(Hon. Cheryl L. Waite, Seventh District Court of Appeals, sitting 

by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.) 

Copies mailed to: 

Johnna M. Shia, Esq. 

William T. Daly, Esq. 

Hon. Barbara P. Gorman