NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EMMANUEL ARTHUR BALDOZ 

CORPUZ, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 17-71906 

Agency No. A097-994-901 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 5, 2020**

Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges. 

Emmanuel Arthur Baldoz Corpuz, a native and citizen of the Philippines, 

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order 

dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his 

application for special rule cancellation of removal under the Violence Against 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 11 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-71906 

Women Act of 1994. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review 

for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards 

governing adverse credibility determinations under the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v.

Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We review de novo questions of 

law. Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 832 (9th Cir. 2003). We deny in part 

and dismiss in part the petition for review. 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Corpuz and 

his witness, Antonio Ybanez, were not credible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) 

(adverse credibility finding must be based on totality of circumstances); Shrestha, 

590 F.3d at 1041 (“Doubtless the REAL ID Act requires a healthy measure of 

deference to agency credibility determinations.”). Corpuz’s explanations do not 

compel a contrary conclusion. See Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 

2011) (agency not required to accept explanations for inconsistencies). Corpuz’s 

contention that the agency erred in not applying the “any credible evidence” 

standard in reaching a decision is unpersuasive, where the record shows that all 

credible evidence was considered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(D). In addition, his

contention that the BIA violated due process by affirming the IJ’s adverse 

credibility findings, giving partial weight to the testimony of Dr. Bennett 

Williamson, and relying on speculation and conjecture is not supported by the 

record. See Padilla-Martinez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To 
3 17-71906 

prevail on a due-process claim, a petitioner must demonstrate both a violation of 

rights and prejudice.”). 

Because the agency did not find Corpuz and Ybanez credible and did not 

assign full weight to the psychological evidence, substantial evidence also supports 

the agency’s determination that Corpuz failed to establish he had been battered or 

subjected to extreme cruelty by his U.S. citizen spouse. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(I). As this determination is dispositive, we do not reach 

Corpuz’s remaining contentions regarding hardship and discretion. See Simeonov 

v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review Corpuz’s unexhausted contention that 

the IJ should have considered his personality disorder in proceeding with trial. 

Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.