IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

June 5, 2008 Session

DENNIS PYLANT v. STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Appeal by permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals

 Circuit Court for Cheatham County

No. 13469 Robert Burch, Judge

No. M2005-02721-SC-R11-PC - Filed September 25, 2008

We accepted this appeal to determine whether the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner

Dennis Pylant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. In 2001, a jury convicted

Petitioner of the first degree felony murder of two-year-old S.J.D. in the perpetration of aggravated

child abuse. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and this Court denied

Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. At the hearing, Petitioner adduced testimony about

self-incriminating statements made by the victim’s mother but which trial counsel did not present

to the jury at trial. The post-conviction court struck this testimony as hearsay and denied Petitioner’s

claim for relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court. We hold that

the post-conviction court erred in striking the proffered testimony as hearsay. We also hold that,

because the post-conviction court made no credibility findings with respect to the proffered

witnesses, we are unable to reach the merits of Petitioner’s claim. Accordingly, we reverse the Court

of Criminal Appeals’ judgment in this case and remand for a new post-conviction hearing.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Reversed; Remanded

CORNELIA A.CLARK, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM M.BARKER,C.J., and

JANICE M. HOLDER, GARY R. WADE, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined.

Eric S. Cartee and Paul Bruno (oral argument) Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Dennis

Pylant.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; J. Ross

Dyer, Senior Counsel; Dan M. Alsobrooks, District Attorney General; and Robert S. Wilson,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
 To protect the anonymity of the minor children, we refer to them by their initials. 1

 Neither the victim nor J.D. is related to Petitioner. 

2

 Petitioner did not testify at trial. Instead, Petitioner’s statements were ascertained from the testimony of 3

Sergeant Floyd Duncan, Jr., an investigator with the Criminal Investigation Division. Sergeant Duncan interviewed

Petitioner on September 24, 1999.

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OPINION

Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial for the first

degree felony murder of two-year-old S.J.D. (“the victim”) and that he is therefore entitled to a new 1

trial. To place this matter in context, it is necessary to understand the underlying facts elicited at

Petitioner’s trial. 

Proof at Trial

The proof adduced during the State’s case-in-chief established that in September 1999,

Petitioner and Amanda Davis shared a mobile home in Cheatham County. Also living in the home

were Petitioner’s seven-year-old daughter, R.P., and Ms. Davis’ two children, the victim and fivemonth-old J.D. Although the record is unclear, the testimony suggested that Ms. Davis was a “live- 2

in” babysitter to R.P. 

R.P. testified that she arrived home from school on the afternoon of September 23, 1999, at

approximately 3:30. As she entered the home, she saw Ms. Davis and the victim on the couch. She

testified to seeing Ms. Davis “beating” the victim with a cooking spoon. She testified that she saw

Ms. Davis beat the victim with the spoon four times and that Ms. Davis was striking the victim on

his back. 

According to Petitioner, Ms. Davis had a 4:00 appointment on that same afternoon. In order 3

for Ms. Davis to keep the appointment, Petitioner left work early to baby-sit R.P., J.D., and the

victim. Petitioner arrived home to relieve Ms. Davis at approximately 3:30 p.m or 4:00 p.m.

R.P. testified that she and Ms. Davis were sitting at the kitchen table and the victim was in

the living room when Petitioner came home. The victim began to cry when he discovered that Ms.

Davis was leaving. R.P. testified that Ms. Davis became angry at the victim and “snatched [him] up

by the arms and put him to bed.” Ms. Davis left at approximately 4:00 p.m. The victim continued

to cry after Ms. Davis left for her appointment and was still crying at approximately 4:30 p.m. At

this time, Petitioner went to change his diaper. While sitting in the living room, R.P. heard noises

coming from the victim’s bedroom that sounded like Petitioner spanking the victim. After hearing

two spanking noises, R.P. went to see what the noises were. As she looked into the victim’s

bedroom, she saw Petitioner spank the victim twice. 
 Sergeant Duncan testified at trial that his photos were subsequently lost by Wal-Mart’s photo processing lab. 4

The photos were never recovered. 

 Dr. Harlan was the Chief Medical Examiner at the time of the trial in this matter but not at the time of the 5

post-conviction hearing.

 Dr. Harlan testified that “[t]he abdomen is that portion of the trunk which extends from the diaphragm down 6

to where the legs attach.”

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R.P. testified that she saw Petitioner holding the victim up with one hand and spanking him

with the other hand. She testified that Petitioner was holding the victim up by his arms but that the

victim’s feet were touching the ground. She testified that she saw Petitioner spank the victim’s

buttocks and that the victim was wearing a diaper 

According to Petitioner’s statements, he left the victim in the victim’s bedroom. At

approximately 5:30 p.m., Ms. Davis returned home from her appointment. By this time, the victim

had stopped crying. Neither Ms. Davis nor Petitioner checked on the victim the rest of the night.

At approximately 9:30 the next morning, Ms. Davis, unable to wake the victim, implored a neighbor

to call 9-1-1. 

Sean Greer, an officer with the Cheatham County Sheriff’s Office, testified that he and two

EMS paramedics arrived at Petitioner’s home at approximately 10:00 a.m. After the victim was

examined and pronounced dead, Officer Greer established a crime scene. Sergeant Floyd Duncan,

Jr., an investigator with the Criminal Investigation Division, was called to examine the scene.

Sergeant Duncan testified that he observed the victim lying on his left side as if he were asleep and

that the victim was “cold and rigid to the touch.” He noted that there was no visible bleeding, but

the victim did have “sputum or vomit” around his mouth. Sergeant Duncan photographed the scene4

and then questioned Ms. Davis. During the course of their conversation, Ms. Davis explained to

Sergeant Duncan that the victim suffered from low blood sugar and sometimes would refuse to eat.

Therefore, Sergeant Duncan’s initial belief was that the victim’s medical complications caused his

death. 

Dr. Charles Harlan, the State’s Chief Medical Examiner, performed an autopsy on the 5

victim. The autopsy revealed that the victim had “two lacerations of the gastric mesentery, 100%

laceration disruption of the root of the mesentery, splanchnic vasoconstriction of the ileum; and

hemoperitoneum of 520 cc., which is about one and a third pints of blood in the abdomen.” Based

on these findings, Dr. Harlan testified that the victim bled to death. 

Pursuant to his autopsy findings, Dr. Harlan estimated that death occurred two to twelve

hours after injury. Dr. Harlan observed that the victim had reddish contusions on “the back of his

abdomen.” Dr. Harlan opined that the injuries were caused by one to three blows to the victim’s 6

body with a cylindrical object such as a pin, a rod, a baseball bat, a lead pipe, the edge of a hand, or

fingers. Dr. Harlan further explained that three open hand blows to the victim’s back could have

caused the mesentery tear. He acknowledged that a “light balsam wooden type spoon” could
 Petitioner was represented by two attorneys at trial. 7

 The State sought neither the death penalty nor life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

8

 Petitioner initially alleged other grounds in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However,

9

those grounds are not at issue in this appeal. 

 Two of Petitioner’s witnesses, Brent Spurlock and Teresa Portillo, offered testimony irrelevant to the 10

questions raised on appeal. Therefore, discussion of their testimonies is omitted. 

 Dr. Levy succeeded Dr. Harlan as the State’s Chief Medical Examiner.

11

-4-

conceivably have caused the wounds if the spoon was applied with enough force, but Dr. Harlan

opined that the wounds were more consistent with a blow from a hand. Dr. Harlan clarified,

however, that three open hand blows to the victim’s buttocks would not have caused the fatal

injuries. Finally, Dr. Harlan conceded that he was unsure of the victim’s exact time of death; but,

he explained that the victim’s body was rigid upon its discovery at 9:30 a.m. and that rigor mortis

sets in approximately six hours after death.

The defense called no witnesses to testify. Instead, as defense proof, trial counsel entered 7

into evidence: (1) the presentment charging Ms. Davis with the felony murder of the victim; (2) Ms.

Davis’ plea of nolo contendere to child neglect, a class D felony; and (3) the judgment of conviction

against Ms. Davis reflecting that she received a four-year sentence. During closing argument, trial

counsel argued that it was Ms. Davis, not Petitioner, who caused the victim’s death.

 

After deliberating, the jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree felony murder during the

perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The trial court subsequently sentenced Petitioner to life

imprisonment. 

8

Post-Conviction Proceeding

Petitioner timely filed a pro se post-conviction petition on March 29, 2004. After counsel

was appointed, Petitioner filed an amended petition, alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective

because they: (1) failed to call witnesses in support of the defense theory that Ms. Davis, and not

Petitioner, was responsible for the injuries that caused the victim’s death; and (2) failed to hire or

otherwise obtain a forensic expert to attack Dr. Harlan’s testimony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 9

106(d) (2006).

At the post-conviction hearing, Petitioner proffered the testimony of twelve witnesses.10

Petitioner first called Dr. Bruce Levy, the State of Tennessee’s Chief Medical Examiner and an 11

expert in the area of forensic pathology. Prior to testifying, Dr. Levy reviewed Dr. Harlan’s autopsy

report and trial testimony, as well as other forensic evidence relevant to Petitioner’s case. Dr. Levy

testified that he disagreed with Dr. Harlan’s conclusions that the injuries to the victim were caused

by “a blow or blows to the back.” Instead, Dr. Levy opined that while the autopsy clearly

demonstrated injuries to the mesentery, a blow to the back could not cause such an injury. As Dr.
 Based on the facts presented to the trial court, if Ms. Davis administered the fatal blow or blows, the victim 12

would have gone into shock at approximately 6:30 p.m. If Petitioner administered the fatal blow or blows, the victim

would have gone into shock approximately one hour later at 7:30 p.m. 

 The State objected to the testimony of several of Petitioner’s witnesses, arguing that their testimony was

13

hearsay. Each objection was overruled during the hearing.

-5-

Levy explained, “when we see this type of injury[,] it is typically caused by a crushing blow from

the front. A blow is struck in the front, crushes the mesentery which is a fairly soft structure up

against the front of the back bone.” Dr. Levy further explained, “[t]he back is a very well protected

area; and would not cause the injury that [Dr. Harlan] observe[d] at the autopsy.” Dr. Levy also

explained that if he had been called to testify at the trial, his testimony would have been the same.

On cross-examination, Dr. Levy admitted that it is possible for a blow to the back to tear the

mesentery. Further, Dr. Levy agreed that the reddish marks that Dr. Harlan found on the victim’s

back could have been made by the palm of a hand. Dr. Levy testified that, if the victim squirmed

during the blows, the victim could have been hit in the stomach, causing the mesentery to tear.

Finally, Dr. Levy explained that he thought the victim would have bled out in less than twelve hours,

the amount of time provided by Dr. Harlan. Based on a review of Dr. Harlan’s notes, Dr. Levy

testified that he “would expect the bleeding out to occur within more of a two to four hour than a two

to twelve hour period.” 

On redirect, Dr. Levy explained that for a back blow to crush the mesentery, the mesentery

would have to be crushed up against the front of the back bone. “A blow to the back could do that

if the abdomen is supported in some way that pushes the abdomen in and causes that crushing

injury.” Specifically, when asked whether the mesentery could be torn with a blow to the back as

by Petitioner holding the victim up with one hand and whipping him with the other, Dr. Levy stated,

“[i]n that scenerio, I don’t see how [a back blow] could cause [the tear].” Dr. Levy also testified that

the cylindrical marks found on the victim could have been made by a wooden spoon. 

On recross-examination, however, Dr. Levy testified that a light-weight, wooden spoon

“could never generate enough force . . . to cause that kind of injury.” Finally, when asked what

symptoms the victim would have experienced as he was bleeding to death, Dr. Levy explained that

as the blood collected in the victim’s abdomen, it would have been very painful. “At a certain point

enough blood is lost that the person is going to go into shock, begin to lose consciousness and then

after that the person will die.” When asked how long it would take in this instance from the time of

the blows until “going into shock,” Dr. Levy estimated about three hours.12

Lyla Defosio, Petitioner’s grandmother, testified over objection. Ms. Defosio recollected

13

that after Ms. Davis testified at the preliminary hearing, she overheard Ms. Davis tell her attorney,

“I know I beat him but I didn’t aim to kill him; but I know I did.” Ms. Defosio testified that she told

trial counsel of this admission, and she would have testified to Ms. Davis’ admission had she been

called as a witness at trial. Ms. Defosio also testified that she was present at trial and wanted to
 This Court notes that the trial in this matter lasted three days. 

14

-6-

testify.

On cross-examination, the State attacked Ms. Defosio’s recollection of Ms. Davis’ admission

by illustrating that Ms. Defosio could not have heard the admission where she said she heard it and

that the admission could not have happened on the day Ms. Defosio recalled. When further

questioned about where she heard Ms. Davis’ admission, Ms. Defosio explained that she gets

confused in new buildings and could be mistaken as to where she heard the admission. On redirect

examination, Ms. Defosio further explained that she gets confused concerning dates, but that she

clearly remembered Ms. Davis making the statement.

The next witness, LeroyBinkley, Petitioner’s neighbor, testified that he observed Ms. Davis

burning “small bed sheets” and “kids[’] clothes” on the afternoon of the day that the victim was

found dead. He testified that he told Petitioner’s family, trial counsel, and John Holder of the

Cheatham County Sheriff’s Department about the incident. Mr. Binkley testified that he was

contacted by trial counsel and the evidence showed that he was subpoenaed for trial. Mr. Binkley

also testified that he was present at trial and was willing to testify. Finally, he stated that, if called

to testify at trial, he would have testified to the same facts. 

On cross-examination, the State attempted to attack Mr. Binkley’s credibility by: (1)

demonstrating that he was “on jury duty on the day of this trial” and thus could not have been, as he

testified, present at Petitioner’s trial; and (2) questioning him about his use of drugs. Mr. Binkley 14

denied being on jury duty and vigorously denied “smoking dope.”

Petitioner next called Trina Jackson, a co-worker of Ms. Davis. Ms. Jackson testified that

on one occasion she saw Ms. Davis “holding [the victim] up with arm [sic] and whipping him with

the other hand.” She further explained that while the victim was being whipped, “his feet were like

off the ground.” Ms. Jackson also testified that she overheard Ms. Davis talking on the telephone

while at work after the victim’s death. Ms. Jackson testified that Ms. Davis said “she couldn’t live

with herself knowing that she had killed [the victim].” Ms. Jackson testified that she was

subpoenaed for trial but did not remember speaking to trial counsel about the two incidents. 

On cross-examination, Ms. Jackson testified that she told Petitioner about the whipping she

had observed and that Petitioner’s family was present when Ms. Davis whipped the victim. Ms.

Jackson also testified that she told Petitioner and Petitioner’s father about Ms. Davis’ telephone

conversation.

Sheila Pylant Wilson, Petitioner’s sister, testified that after Petitioner was arrested, Ms. Davis

told her that “she had made a deal to get her [other] son back and she was going to lie and do

whatever it took to get [J.D.] back.” Mrs. Wilson recalled, “She said she was going to lie and do and

say anything she had to, to make sure that she got [J.D.] back even if [Petitioner] went to jail.”

Although Mrs. Wilson could not recall the date, she testified that Donald Pylant, father of Petitioner
 There were two preliminary hearings in this matter because of a recording system malfunction at the first

15

hearing.

-7-

and Mrs. Wilson, and Dorothy Mills, Donald Pylant’s ex-wife, were present when Ms. Davis made

the statement. 

Mrs. Wilson further testified that she witnessed Ms. Davis “punch” the victim in the back,

and she had observed Ms. Davis hitting the victim on more than one occasion. Mrs. Wilson testified

that she confronted Ms. Davis about hitting the victim, and Ms. Davis’ response was: “He won’t quit

crying; and he was just a brat.” Moreover, over objection, Mrs. Wilson testified that she heard Ms.

Davis say that if the victim was not around, she and Petitioner would have the perfect family. 

Mrs. Wilson testified that she received a subpoena to testify at trial and that she was

interviewed “somewhat” by trial co-counsel prior to trial. She also testified that trial co-counsel

asked if she would be willing to lie. When she responded in the negative, Mrs. Wilson testified that

trial co-counsel “had nothing more to talk to [her] about.” Finally, Mrs. Wilson testified that, if

called as a witness at trial, she would have testified to the same facts.

Lloyd Harris, a bail bondsman, testified that, after Petitioner was arrested and had contacted

him about his bond, he interviewed Ms. Davis. Mr. Harris testified that “[b]efore I make a bond, I

usually question them pretty good; and people that knows [sic] them [and] that are involved in it.”

Mr. Harris testified, over objection, that Ms. Davis stated that Petitioner “had nothing to do with [the

murder]” and that “[h]e didn’t even touch that child.” Mr. Harris stated that he was never contacted

by trial counsel but that he had informed Petitioner of Ms. Davis’ statements. He further testified

that he did not receive a subpoena to testify. Mr. Harris agreed that had he been called to testify,

he would have testified in the same way. Finally, on redirect examination, Mr. Harris stated that Ms.

Davis said “she was the only one involved in it[;] [t]hat she done it.” 

Donald Pylant, Petitioner’s father, testified that, on the night of Petitioner’s arrest, he went

to Petitioner’s home and saw Ms. Davis. She told him, “I’m the one that did this; but I’m going to

have to put the blame off on [Petitioner] if I can where I can try to keep my other baby.” Mr. Pylant

testified that his ex-wife, Dorothy Mills, and his daughter, Mrs. Wilson, were present when Ms.

Davis made this statement. Mr. Pylant further testified that Ms. Davis made a second, similar

statement after the first preliminary hearing. Mr. Pylant explained that Ms. Mills was also present 15

when Ms. Davis made the second statement and that an altercation between Ms. Davis and Ms. Mills

ensued after the statement was made. Mr. Pylant testified that he told trial counsel of Ms. Davis’

statements prior to trial but he did not receive a subpoena to testify. 

Mr. Pylant also testified that lead trial counsel sent him a letter requesting $10,000.00 “or

[trial counsel] couldn’t properly represent [Petitioner] because [lead trial counsel] needed to hire his

own investigator and medical examiner.” Mr. Pylant testified that he was unable to send trial

counsel the requested money but instead sent lead trial counsel the names of witnesses who he
 Mr. Anderson did not testify at the post-conviction hearing. Petitioner’s post-conviction counsel testified 16

that they had been unable to locate Mr. Anderson. Mr. Pylant, however, testified that Mr. Anderson was at the trial every

day, sitting in the witness room ready to testify. Mr. Anderson was never called at trial. 

Although the record does not reflect the exact date of their marriage, Mrs. Pylant and Petitioner were not

17

married at the time of the victim’s death.

 Ms. Mills was charged with assault, but the charges were later dismissed. 

18

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believed would testify favorably to Petitioner’s case, including Jimmy Anderson, Trina Jackson 16

and Lyla Defosio.

Mr. Pylant was also questioned about his involvement in his son’s case. Mr. Pylant testified

that he was present at each meeting between Petitioner and trial counsel. Mr. Pylant testified that

he never heard trial counsel discuss the felonymurder doctrine or the elements of first degree felony

murder and aggravated child abuse. Moreover, he testified that trial counsel discussed Petitioner’s

charge as being first degree murder. Mr. Pylant testified, over objection, that lead trial counsel told

Petitioner that the State “don’t [sic] have a first degree murder case on you” and that the State would

have to prove premeditation. Mr. Pylant further testified, over objection, that lead trial counsel

stated at the conclusion of trial, “I’ll either do the appeal for you free or I’ll sign papers right now

that I didn’t properly represent [Petitioner].”

On cross-examination, Mr. Pylant stated that trial counsel did not discuss with Petitioner

either the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions or the elements of first degree felony murder. Mr.

Pylant testified that he encouraged Petitioner not to accept any plea agreements offered by the State.

Mr. Pylant also offered testimony that supported Lyla Defosio’s testimony that she heard Ms. Davis

make statements about her involvement in the victim’s death.

Maya Pylant, Petitioner’s wife, testified that, had she been called as a witness, she would 17

have testified that Petitioner was “really good with kids” and that she had “never seen him be

verbally or physically abusive to a child.” Additionally, Mrs. Pylant testified that, before Petitioner’s

trial, Ms. Davis followed her and Petitioner to a laundromat where Ms. Davis threatened Petitioner.

Mrs. Pylant recalled Ms. Davis stating that if Petitioner did not leave the state with her, “she was

going to tell on him – even though she knew that he didn’t do it.” Finally, Mrs. Pylant testified that

she did not receive a subpoena to testify and was not present at the trial, but she could have been had

she been subpoenaed. 

Dorothy Mills, Donald Pylant’s ex-wife, testified that she witnessed Ms. Davis throw the

victim into a car “from the passenger’s side to the driver’s side.” Ms. Mills also testified that, after

the first preliminary hearing, she heard Ms. Davis say that she had killed the victim but “was going

to put it off on [Petitioner].” Ms. Mills further explained that after Ms. Davis made the statement,

she and Ms. Davis became embroiled in a fight that led to Ms. Mills’ arrest. Ms. Mills testified that 18

she told trial counsel of both incidents. Finally, Ms. Mills testified that she could not remember

whether she was subpoenaed at trial but that she would have testified at trial if she had been called

as a witness. 
 Although unclear, the record suggests that Ms. Hargrove is Ms. Davis’ maternal grandmother. 19

 Both Petitioner and lead trial counsel testified that the State plea agreement offer was three years at thirty 20

percent. The Notice of Proposed Plea Agreement and Declination of Same, apparently prepared by Petitioner’s trial

counsel, indicates in its typed portion that the State offered Petitioner the opportunity to plead guilty to reckless homicide

and be sentenced to four years, with manner of service to be determined by the trial court. In the same agreement,

however, the number “4” is struck through, and the number “3” written in along with words that are illegible. The record

is unclear in this regard. Copies of any plea agreements offered by the State are not included in the record.

-9-

Petitioner testified that he provided lead trial counsel with a list of “at least twenty” potential

witnesses, including Maya Pylant, Trina Jackson, Dorothy Mills, Teresa Porillo, June Hargrove,19

Leroy Binkley, and Lloyd Harris. Petitioner stated that trial counsel refused to subpoena some of

the witnesses and that trial counsel refused to take depositions of some of the witnesses, including

Maya Pylant. Petitioner further testified that trial counsel subpoenaed twelve witnesses but when

he asked which twelve, lead trial counsel refused to name them stating “he was not going to discuss

courtroom strategy.” 

Petitioner also testified that he remembered seeing a letter from lead trial counsel requesting

an additional $10,000.00 so that he could be represented properly. He testified that he was unable

to raise the money needed for trial counsel to hire an investigator and a medical expert. Petitioner

further testified that, prior to trial, he had never heard of being declared indigent.

Petitioner also testified that lead trial counsel informed him that the State would have to

prove that the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. Moreover, Petitioner testified that

he and trial counsel discussed possible plea agreements, including “five years probation” and “three

years at thirty percent.” Petitioner testified that he went to lead trial counsel’s office to discuss the

plea bargain and lead trial counsel informed him that “the state does not have what it takes to convict

[you] of first degree murder.” Petitioner also stated that lead trial counsel suggested that he “ask for

all or nothing.” Petitioner explained that lead trial counsel told him that the State could not prove

murder and if they got an all or nothing charge, he would walk away with nothing. He further

testified that, when he read the plea offer, he asked lead trial counsel why it said “felony first degree

murder.” Petitioner testified that trial counsel responded: “[W]hat did you think this was a

misdemeanor charge[?]” Also regarding the State’s plea offer, Petitioner testified that he told lead

trial counsel he would sign the agreement if it reflected a plea of “no contest or best interest.”

Finally, Petitioner testified that, if he had known that lead trial counsel was not going to call the

witnesses he provided or that “a judge must instruct the jury on all lesser included offenses,” then

he would have accepted the State’s offer and agreed to a sentence of three years at thirty percent.20

When questioned about the charges filed against him, Petitioner testified that he did not learn

about the felony murder doctrine until he read about it in the prison law library, but he did admit he

heard lead trial counsel discussing aggravated child abuse during closing arguments. He also

testified that he did not receive a copy of the indictment and was, therefore, not aware that he had

been charged with felony murder. He testified that lead trial counsel did not explain that, to prove

felony murder, the State “only needed to prove an inlaying [sic] felony to convict [him].” 
 It is unclear from the record why lead trial counsel reviewed “the warrants” with Petitioner since an

21

indictment was issued in this case.

-10-

On cross-examination, Petitioner testified that lead trial counsel, and not his father, persuaded

him to reject the plea offer. Petitioner reiterated that at no point before or during the trial did he

know that he was charged with “felony murder,” but he did admit that he heard the term during trial.

Petitioner explained, however, that he thought felony murder referred to the fact that every murder

is a felony. Petitioner agreed that, at one point before trial, lead trial counsel encouraged Petitioner

to “take the deal” because “they are willing to knock it down to reckless homicide.” 

Petitioner further insisted that he told trial counsel to call Ms. Davis as a witness, but that

both lead counsel and co-counsel did not want to call her to testify. Petitioner said that he did not

testify at trial because trial counsel encouraged him not to. Had he testified, Petitioner stated that

he would have explained that the “noise” R.P. heard was not him whipping the victim but instead

was him clapping his hands to get the victim’s attention when he entered the victim’s bedroom. He

stated that R.P. saw him help the victim to his feet after changing his diaper and saw him “pat [the

victim] on the butt.”

The State called lead trial counsel as its only witness. Lead trial counsel explained his habit

and custom when dealing with felony murder cases. He explained that it is his practice to send a

copy of every pleading to the client and that he was sure that he sent a copy of the indictment to

Petitioner. Lead trial counsel also explained that he reviewed “the warrants” with Petitioner and 21

that Petitioner was aware that he was charged with felony murder. Lead trial counsel further

explained that, without a doubt, when the plea bargain was offered he went over first degree felony

murder with Petitioner and explained what the State had to prove.

Lead trial counsel explained that when the plea agreement was offered, he and Petitioner

talked about the agreement and “the pros and cons of taking it versus going to trial.” Lead trial

counsel further explained that “we went over felony murder – I’m almost one hundred percent

positive I took the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction” and explained the charges.

Lead trial counsel testified that, after Petitioner rejected the plea bargain, he filed numerous

motions leading up to trial, including one requesting that no lesser-included offenses be charged to

the jury. Lead trial counsel explained that his strategy of “going all or nothing” was based in part

on a “case out of Massachusetts.”

Lead trial counsel testified that he had originally wanted to hire an independent medical

expert to pinpoint the victim’s time of death, but after talking with Dr. Harlan, he learned that the

time of death could not be conclusively pinpointed. Thus, he decided that a defense expert was not

needed because there “wasn’t a dispute about the manner of death.” Moreover, lead trial counsel

explained that after meeting with Dr. Harlan for more than six hours prior to trial, he was convinced

that Dr. Harlan’s testimony could support the theory that Ms. Davis, and not Petitioner, had actually

supplied the blow that killed the victim. 
 During the cross-examination of the victim’s father at trial, lead trial counsel attempted to question him about

22

Ms. Davis’ previous acts, including whether Ms. Davis: “made up a charge against [Mr. Davis] for domestic violence”;

lied under oath; and lied on an order of protection. The State objected to this line of questioning. In a jury-out

proceeding, the trial court sustained the State’s objection, stating:

The person on trial here today is [Petitioner]. [Ms. Davis] is not on trial. You’re wanting me

to let you impeach a witness before she ever testifies? I can’t do that . . . .

. . .

I’m not going to let you [impeach Ms. Davis] until the issue comes – right now her credibility is not

even an issue in this court and your [sic] trying to attack it.

-11-

Lead trial counsel next testified that “[a]ny witness [Petitioner] would have told me about

specifically that he even had a fact of the case, we would have interviewed or called.” Lead trial

counsel testified that he and co-counsel met with Petitioner and “voted” on whether to call Ms. Davis

as a witness. Lead trial counsel testified that he “voted to call her” because he had a “wealth of

cross-examination information about her” and could use prior bad acts to impeach her; however,

Petitioner and co-counsel, who had no previous jury trial experience, out-voted him. Based on this

“vote by committee,” Ms. Davis was not called at trial. Instead, lead trial counsel attempted to get

in prior bad acts of Ms. Davis through other witnesses, like the victim’s biological father. However,

the trial court refused to allow such testimony, unless and until Ms. Davis testified. 

22

On cross-examination, lead trial counsel testified that he was unsure whether he provided

Petitioner with a copy of the indictment and warrant but specifically remembered going over the

elements of first degree felony murder with Petitioner. Lead trial counsel explained that he did not

call many of Petitioner’s offered witnesses because, in his determination, they did not have much

to offer. Moreover, lead trial counsel testified that Petitioner did not insist on any particular

witnesses testifying. 

Lead trial counsel further testified that the “whole theory of the case” was that Ms. Davis

killed the victim. He admitted that he was aware of her prior inconsistent statements and prior bad

acts, but he defended the decision not to call her, saying it was a “vote by committee.” Lead trial

counsel continued to assert, however, that he had wanted to call Ms. Davis.

On redirect examination, lead trial counsel denied discouraging Petitioner from taking the

plea offer. He reiterated that Petitioner’s potential witnesses “had no relevant or probative value

whatsoever.” He also testified that he acquiesced to Petitioner’s wish not to call Ms. Davis and that

the decision was trial strategy.

At the close of all testimony, the State moved to strike as hearsay the testimony of all

witnesses who claimed to have heard Ms. Davis make statements admitting her culpability in the

victim’s death. Petitioner opposed the State’s motion. The post-conviction court informed the

parties that it would decide the issue in its written opinion. 
 Indeed, the court stated in its order that “the proof establishes that she was available.” It is unclear, however,

23

to what proof the post-conviction court was referring.

 The Sixth Amendment is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See State v. Howell, 24

868 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tenn. 1993). 

-12-

Procedure Below

The post-conviction court issued its memorandum decision four months after the hearing.

In its opinion, the court first addressed the State’s motion to strike the testimony characterized by

the State as hearsay. The court determined that Ms. Davis’ alleged statements were not admissible

under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b) as statements against penal interest unless Ms. Davis was

unavailable to testify at the post-conviction hearing. The court concluded that Petitioner failed to

show she was unavailable and therefore granted the State’s motion to strike all of the testimony 23

concerning any confession or admission by Ms. Davis. 

The court then considered Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in light of

the remaining proof and concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he had been prejudiced

by any of trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for postconviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with one judge

dissenting. Petitioner timely filed an application for permission to appeal.

We granted Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the postconviction court erred in: (1) striking as hearsay the testimony of certain witnesses; (2) granting the

State’s motion to strike without a hearing; (3) concluding that Petitioner’s trial counsel was not

ineffective for failing to properly investigate and present key witnesses at trial; and (4) concluding

that Petitioner’s trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to retain a forensic expert prior to trial.

Standard of Review

This Court is bound by a post-conviction court’s findings of fact unless the preponderance

of the evidence is otherwise. Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tenn. 2006). Our review of

legal issues or mixed questions of law and fact, such as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

however, is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 315

(Tenn. 2007). At the same time, questions concerning the admissibility of evidence generally are

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 392

(Tenn. 2008). 

Analysis

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the 24

Tennessee Constitution guarantee a criminally accused the right to representation by counsel.
-13-

Additionally, both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that the right to

such representation encompasses the right to “reasonably effective” assistance, that is, assistance

“within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim cognizable under Tennessee’s PostConviction Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-101 to -313 (2006). A petitioner for postconviction relief has “the burden of proving the allegations of fact by clear and convincing

evidence.” Id. § 40-30-110(f). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

the petitioner must establish both that his lawyer’s performance was deficient and that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. Vaughn, 202 S.W.3d at 116 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,

and Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936). To prove deficient performance, the petitioner must demonstrate

that his lawyer’s conduct fell below an objective standard of “reasonableness under prevailing

professional norms.” Vaughn, 202 S.W.3d at 116 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). As we have

stated previously,

the assistance of counsel required under the Sixth Amendment is counsel reasonably

likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. It is a violation of this

standard for defense counsel to deprive a criminal defendant of a substantial defense

by his own ineffectiveness or incompetence. Defense counsel must perform at least

as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law and must

conscientiously protect his client’s interest, undeflected by conflicting considerations.

Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 934-35 (quotingBeasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974)).

“Defense counsel must investigate all apparently substantial defenses available to the defendant and

must assert them in a proper and timely manner.” Id. at 935. Moreover, this Court has noted that

“the adversary system requires that ‘all available defenses are raised’ so that the government is put

to its proof.” Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 933 (quoting United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204

(D.C. Cir. 1973)). And if counsel’s choices not to raise substantial defenses are professionally

unreasonable “considering all the circumstances,” counsel’s performance is deficient. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 

To prove that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense, the petitioner “must

establish a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Vaughn, 202 S.W.3d at 116 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “A

‘reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

That is, the petitioner must establish that his counsel’s deficient performance was of such a degree

that it deprived him of a fair trial and called into question the reliability of the outcome. State v.

Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 463 (Tenn. 1999). A reasonable probability of being found guilty of a lesser

charge, or receiving a shorter sentence, satisfies the second prong of Strickland. See State v.

Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
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A. Deficient Performance

1. Failure to Call Witnesses at Trial

The main thrust of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is that trial counsel

failed to put before the jury proof that Ms. Davis killed the victim. Petitioner contends that trial

counsel had available two sources of proof about Ms. Davis’ culpability: Ms. Davis herself and

other persons who heard Ms. Davis make incriminating statements. He argues that trial counsel was

deficient in failing to call these witnesses at trial and that this failure resulted in prejudice. In support

of his claim, Petitioner called Ms. Defosio, Ms. Jackson, Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Harris, Mr. Pylant, and

Ms. Mills to testify at the post-conviction hearing about inculpatory statements they heard Ms. Davis

make. Petitioner did not call Ms. Davis to testify at the post-conviction hearing.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call a witness at trial,

a post-conviction petitioner should present that witness at the post-conviction hearing. Black v.

State, 794 S.W.2d. 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). “As a general rule, this is the only way the

petitioner can establish that . . . the failure to have a known witness present or call the witness to the

stand resulted in the denial of critical evidence which inured to the prejudice of the petitioner.” Id.

When a petitioner presents at the post-conviction hearing a witness he claims should have

been called at trial, the post-conviction court must determine whether the testimony would have been

(1) admissible at trial and (2) material to the defense. See McAlpin v. State, No. M2004-03043-

CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 2453983, at *8 (Tenn. Crim App. Oct. 5, 2005) (stating that even if the

evidence proffered at the post-conviction hearing were “admissible [at trial] under any exception to

the rule against hearsay,” the evidence was “neither so favorable nor so material as to warrant postconviction relief”); King v. State, No. 01C01-9603-CR-00086, 1997 WL 311923, at *3 (Tenn. Crim.

App. June 6, 1997) (stating that facts known by missing witnesses did “not make the witnesses

material, or that, if produced, their testimony would have been relevant and, therefore, admissible”);

cf. Newsome v. State, 995 S.W.2d 129, 135 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (stating that a court, when

addressing a petition for writ of error coram nobis on the basis of newly discovered evidence, must

find “that the newly discovered evidence may have resulted in a different judgment had it been

presented at the trial,” and that this “rule presupposes that the evidence would be admissible pursuant

to the applicable rules of evidence and is material to the issues or grounds raised in the petition”).

If the post-conviction court determines that the proffered testimony would not have been admissible

at trial or that, even if admissible, it would not have materially aided the petitioner’s defense at trial,

the post-conviction court is justified in finding that trial counsel was not deficient in failing to call

that witness at trial. Finally, if the proffered testimony is both admissible and material, the postconviction court must assess whether the witness is credible. See State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85,

107 (Tenn. 2006) (stating that the credibility of the witnesses is resolved by the trier of fact); State

v. Dych, 227 S.W.3d 21, 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006) (stating that “[a]ll questions involving the

credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, and all factual issues are

resolved by the trier of fact, not the appellate courts”). 
 We disagree, therefore, with the State’s assertion in its brief to this Court that “the post-conviction court

25

made clear that it found none of [Petitioner’s] witnesses to be credible.” 

-15-

 Here, the post-conviction court made none of these assessments with respect to the proffered

proof of Ms. Davis’ incriminating statements because it determined that the proof was inadmissible

hearsay at the post-conviction hearing. We now review that decision. 25

2. Hearsay Ruling

As set forth above, Petitioner called Ms. Defosio, Ms. Jackson, Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Harris, Mr.

Pylant, and Ms. Mills to testify about inculpatory statements they claimed to have heard Ms. Davis

make. The post-conviction court subsequently struck and refused to consider “all of the testimony

concerning any confession or admission by Amanda Davis” on the basis that it was inadmissible

hearsay. 

Initially, questions concerning the admissibility of evidence rest within the sound discretion

of the trial court, and this Court will not interfere in the absence of abuse appearing on the face of

the record. State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 392 (Tenn. 2008); see State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d

649, 652 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 477 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Harris, 839

S.W.2d 54, 73 (Tenn. 1992). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court applies an incorrect

legal standard or reaches a conclusion that is “illogical or unreasonable and causes an injustice to

the party complaining.” State v. Ruiz, 204 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Howell v. State,

185 S.W.3d 319, 337 (Tenn. 2006)). 

In this case, the post-conviction court’s refusal to consider “the testimony concerning any

confession or admission by Amanda Davis” on the basis that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay

was illogical, unreasonable and caused an injustice to Petitioner because the statements were being

offered, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted but instead, to show that Petitioner received

ineffective assistance of counsel. This illogical and unreasonable application of the hearsay doctrine

caused an injustice to Petitioner because this testimony was essential to his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines “hearsay” as “a statement, other than one made

by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the

matter asserted.” (Emphasis added). Although this definition appears straightforward, many

statements can be offered to prove more than one thing. For instance, if a police officer testifies that

the victim told him, “Mr. Jones shot me,” the statement is hearsay if it is offered to prove that Mr.

Jones was the shooter. However, if this statement is offered to prove that the police officer had

probable cause to arrest Mr. Jones, the statement is not hearsay because it is not being offered for

the truth of the matter asserted. Instead, the statement is offered to show the reason for the police

officer’s arrest of Mr. Jones.

In this case, Petitioner was offering the testimony of Ms. Defosio, Ms. Jackson, Mrs. Wilson,

Mr. Harris, Mr. Pylant, and Ms. Mills not for the truth of the matter asserted–that Ms. Davis was
 In his dissent, Judge Witt, citing Russell v. Crutchfield, 988 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), 26

advocates for review of the post-conviction court’s rulings on whether the proffered testimony was hearsay under a de

novo standard of review. Pylant, 2007 WL 1890178, at *12 (Witt, J., dissenting). As Judge Witt has previously noted,

[On being presented with a hearsay objection, a] trial court’s first duty is to determine whether the outof-court declarant’s statement is hearsay–that is, whether it is “offered in evidence to prove the truth

of the matter asserted.” No factual issue attends this determination, and it necessarily is a question

of law. If the statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and no exceptions apply,

the statement is, purely and simply, inadmissible. At this juncture, the court has no discretion to hold

otherwise, and to utilize an abuse of discretion standard at this point in the analysis “‘would have us

defer to a discretion that the trial court does not possess.’” State v. Edison, 9 S.W.3d 75, 78 (Tenn.

1999) (quoting State v. Edison, No. 03C01-9605-CC-00199, 1997 WL 1526501, at *8 (Tenn. Crim.

App. June 18, 1997) (Tipton, J., concurring)).

State v. Gilley, No. M2006-02600-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 3451007, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2008) (citations

omitted) (emphasis added). Although this Court continues to believe that questions concerning the admissibility of

evidence are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, we note that, in this instance, the post-conviction court

committed error under either standard of review. 

-16-

responsible for the victim’s death–but rather to demonstrate that trial counsel was deficient in not

calling these witnesses at trial. As noted by Judge Witt in his dissent below, “the statements were

offered to show that [Petitioner’s] trial attorneys were on notice and had knowledge of the various

witnesses’ accounts of Ms. Davis’s statements. Thus, the evidentiary significance of the statements

lies in the indication that trial counsel knew of potentially exculpatory evidence.” Pylant v. State,

No. M2005-02721-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 1890178, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2007) (Witt,

J., dissenting). Accordingly, the testimony was not hearsay for the purposes of the post-conviction

hearing. The post-conviction court therefore erred in striking this testimony as hearsayand, in doing

so, abused its discretion.26

3. Admissibility of Stricken Testimony at Trial

Our conclusion that the post-conviction court erred in striking this testimony does not end

our inquiry. As set forth above, the stricken testimony supports Petitioner’s claim of deficient

performance only if this evidence would have been admissible at trial. 

The testimony at issue centered around statements allegedly made by Ms. Davis which

implicated her in the victim’s death. At trial, these statements would have been offered to prove the

truth of the matter asserted: that Ms. Davis, not Petitioner, was responsible for the victim’s death.

Accordingly, at trial, these statements would have been properly characterized as hearsay.

Generally, hearsay statements are not admissible. Tenn. R. Evid. 802. Hearsay statements

may be admitted if they qualify as one or more of the enumerated hearsay exceptions. See Tenn. R.

Evid. 803, 804. One of these exceptions is for a statement “which . . . at the time of its making . .

. so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the

declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.” Tenn. R.

Evid. 804(b)(3). Proof of a statement against penal interest, however, is not admissible under this
 Ms. Davis was originally indicted along with Petitioner for the first degree felony murder of the victim. Her

27

subsequent guilty plea to child neglect may have rendered problematic any later attempt to invoke the Fifth Amendment.

See Floyd v. Prime Succession of TN, No. E2006-01085-COA-R9-CV, 2007 WL 2297810, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.

13, 2007). Regardless, we recognize that whether she would have been legally entitled to refuse to testify at Petitioner’s

trial, she may have done so, even if facing a finding of contempt. 

-17-

exception to the hearsay rule unless the proponent of the proof demonstrates that the declarant is

unavailable. Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b). In the context of a criminal trial, a declarant is unavailable if

she: (1) “[i]s exempted by ruling of the court on grounds of privilege from testifying”; (2) refuses

to testify despite a court order; (3) “[d]emonstrates a lack of memory”; (4) “[i]s unable to be present

or to testify at the hearing because of . . . death or then existing physical or mental illness or

infirmity”; or (5) is absent from the hearing because of the inability to procure her attendance by

process. Tenn. R. Evid. 804(a). 

The declarant of each of the statements in question is Ms. Davis. Had trial counsel called

her to the witness stand at trial, she could have done one of three things. First, in response to

questions about her responsibility for the victim’s death, she could have refused to answer pursuant

to her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Dotson, 254 S.W.3d at 392 & 27

n.11. In that event, the trial court could have declared her exempt from testifying and she would

have been deemed unavailable for purposes of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(a)(1). Id.

Petitioner’s witnesses could then have testified about her out-of-court statements pursuant to

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). See id. Second, Ms. Davis could have responded by denying

any involvement in the victim’s death and denying that she had ever made any inculpatory

statements. In that event, Petitioner’s witnesses could have testified about Ms. Davis’ alleged

statements in order to impeach her credibility. See Tenn. R. Evid. 613(b). Third, Ms. Davis could

have admitted to having made the inculpatory statements. In that event, the other witnesses’

testimony about those statements would have been inadmissible hearsay. However, Ms. Davis’ own

admissions then would have been helpful to Petitioner’s case.

Because Ms. Davis did not testify at the post-conviction hearing, we do not know how she

would have responded had she been called to testify at trial. However, under any of the three

scenarios discussed above, trial counsel could have presented to the jury proof about Ms. Davis’

inculpatory statements either directly through Ms. Davis or through Ms. Defosio, Ms. Jackson, Mrs.

Wilson, Mr. Harris, Mr. Pylant, and Ms. Mills.

In its brief to this Court, the State argues that “petitioner’s failure to produce Ms. Davis

during his post-conviction hearing precludes a finding that he was prejudiced by her absence at trial”

and therefore obviates his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State relies on Black for

the proposition that, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call a

witness at trial, a post-conviction petitioner should present that witness at the post-conviction

hearing. 794 S.W.2d. at 757. “As a general rule, this is the only way the petitioner can establish that

. . . the failure to have a known witness present or call the witness to the stand resulted in the denial

of critical evidence which inured to the prejudice of the petitioner.” Id. (emphasis added). This

case does not fit the “general rule,” however, because Petitioner presented the “critical evidence” of
 We note that our Rules of Evidence severely limit the extent to which a witness’ prior bad acts may be used 28

at trial. See Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b), 608(b). 

-18-

Ms. Davis’ alleged inculpatory statements through other witnesses–an acceptable alternative strategy

under the unique circumstances of this case given the very real possibility that Ms. Davis would

refuse to testify to any such admissions and/or her alleged culpability in the victim’s death. We

emphasize, however, that post-conviction counsel generally risks the denial of a post-conviction

claim if he or she fails to call at the post-conviction hearing all witnesses who they claim should

have been called at trial. 

4. Materiality of Stricken Testimony at Trial

Even if admissible at trial, the proof of Ms. Davis’ inculpatory statements that Petitioner

could have adduced at trial is of no avail to his claim of trial counsel’s deficient performance unless

that testimony was material to his defense. Here, the significance of the stricken testimony was that

Ms. Davis was responsible for the victim’s death, not Petitioner. The materiality of this proof to

Petitioner’s defense at trial, therefore, is clear.

5. Failure to Call Amanda Davis

We have determined that trial counsel could have put on proof at trial that Ms. Davis

incriminated herself in the victim’s death. In order to do so, however, trial counsel had to elicit Ms.

Davis’ testimony at trial or demonstrate that she was unavailable. As set forth above, Petitioner

would not have been able to put Ms. Defosio, Ms. Jackson, Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Harris, Mr. Pylant, and

Ms. Mills on the stand at trial unless and until Ms. Davis denied having made the inculpatory

statements or was unavailable to testify.

At the post-conviction hearing, lead trial counsel testified that he had wanted to call Ms.

Davis to testify at trial because he had a “wealth of cross-examination information about her” and

“prior bad acts.” Instead of relying on his professional judgment, however, lead trial counsel put 28

the decision of whether to call Ms. Davis to a vote among himself, co-counsel–who had no previous

jury trial experience–and Petitioner. When co-counsel and Petitioner “voted” not to call Ms. Davis

to the witness stand, lead trial counsel acquiesced.

Contrary to what lead counsel stated, Petitioner testified that he wanted Ms. Davis put on the

witness stand at trial. Significantly, the post-conviction court did not make a credibility finding on

this crucial issue. Moreover, the State did not call trial co-counsel to testify at the post-conviction

hearing. Therefore, the reasons why trial co-counsel desired not to call Ms. Davis are unknown.

Generally, “[w]hen counsel, retained or appointed, is challenged as ineffective and a [postconviction] hearing is held, the state should present the attacked counsel to show what occurred.”

Garrett v. State, 530 S.W.2d 98, 99 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975). 

With respect to placing the determination of whether to call a key witness to a “vote” in

which the defendant has an equal say, we emphasize that, “[s]trategic and tactical decisions should
 The American Bar Association Standards for the Defense Function also states that “[i]f a disagreement on

29

significant matters of tactics or strategy arises between defense counsel and the client, defense counsel should make a

record of the circumstances, counsel’s advise and reasons, and the conclusion reached.” A.B.A. Standards for Criminal

Justice § 4-5.2(c). If such a record was made, it does not appear in the record.

-19-

be made by defense counsel after consultation with the client . . . . Such decisions include what

witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, . . . and what evidence should be

introduced.” A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice § 4-5.2(b) (3d ed. 1993); see id. § 4-5.2 cmt.

(stating that “[b]ecause these decisions require the skill, training, and experience of the advocate,

the power of decision on them should rest with the lawyer” and that the lawyer should maintain “the

ultimate choice and responsibility for the strategic and tactical decisions in the case”); see also

Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936 (stating that “[t]rial courts and defense counsel should look to and be

guided by the American Bar Association’s Standards relating to the Administration of Criminal

Justice in general, and specifically to those portions of the Standards which relate to the Defense

Function [chapter 4]”). We therefore question the extent to which lead trial counsel’s

“determination” to not call Ms. Davis can be characterized as “strategic” or “tactical.” In any 29

event, by making this “decision,” trial counsel foreclosed the possibility of calling Ms. Defosio, Ms.

Jackson, Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Harris, Mr. Pylant, and Ms. Mills to testify about incriminating

statements they heard Ms. Davis make. Thus, in not calling Ms. Davis to the witness stand, trial

counsel disabled Petitioner from adducing material and admissible evidence in favor of his defense

at trial.

As we have often repeated, this Court will not second-guess trial counsel’s informed tactical

and strategic decisions. Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997). On this point, however,

we agree with Judge Witt’s dissent below:

[G]iven that counsel admitted in the post-conviction hearing that the defense theory

at trial was that Ms. Davis killed the victim, trial counsel’s failure to subpoena and

utilize an available Ms. Davis at trial or, alternatively, to establish that she was

unavailable to testify at trial, strongly suggests that counsel’s performance was not

within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. . . . Lead

trial counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that he did not call Ms. Davis as

a witness at trial because he was out-voted by co-counsel and [Petitioner]. I would

reject outright this explanation as a basis for an informed tactical and strategic

decision.

Pylant, 2007 WL 1890178, at *14 ( Witt, J., dissenting). Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner

has established that lead trial counsel performed deficiently in his method of “deciding” not to call

Ms. Davis to the stand at trial. 

B. Prejudice

Of course, even if Petitioner has established that his legal representation at trial was deficient

because it deprived him of proof about Ms. Davis’ alleged inculpatory statements, that deficiency
 The post-conviction court erroneously described the prejudice prong of an ineffective 30

assistance of counsel claim as requiring a petitioner to demonstrate that “but for his counsel’s error

the results of Petitioner’s trial would have been different.” No such certainty is required. See

Vaughn, 202 S.W.3d at 116 (stating that the petitioner “must establish a reasonable probability that

but for counsel’s errors the result of the proceeding would have been different”) (emphasis added).

-20-

does not entitle Petitioner to post-conviction relief unless Petitioner has demonstrated that the

deficient performance resulted in prejudice. See Vaughn, 202 S.W.3d at 116. As set forth above,

the test for prejudice on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is “whether there is a reasonable

probability that, absent [counsel’s unprofessional] errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable

doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” id. at 694, and “a court making the prejudice

inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would

reasonably likely have been different absent the errors,” id. at 696 (emphasis added).

Because the post-conviction court struck all extrinsic proof about Ms. Davis’ incriminating

statements and because Ms. Davis did not testify at the post-conviction hearing, the court never

considered whether trial counsel’s failure to call Ms. Davis at trial (and, depending upon her

response, the witnesses Petitioner proffered at the post-conviction hearing) resulted in prejudice to

Petitioner. We, too, are prevented from reaching this issue. Although we have determined that proof

of Ms. Davis’ alleged inculpatory statements was material to Petitioner’s defense and would have

been admissible at trial, we do not have the benefit of any findings by the post-conviction court that

the witnesses who offered this proof were credible. It is the role and function of a trial court to make

credibility findings and this Court will not usurp that power. Dych, 227 S.W.3d at 40. We find it

significant, however, that lead trial counsel never testified that he did not call Ms. Defosio, Ms.

Jackson, Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Harris, Mr. Pylant, and Ms. Mills to the stand because he did not believe

them. Rather, he testified that he did not call Petitioner’s witnesses at trial because, according to his

analysis of Petitioner’s case, they “had no relevant or probative value whatsoever.” 

We are constrained, therefore, to reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment and

remand for a new post-conviction hearing. At the new post-conviction hearing, the post-conviction

court must assess the credibility of those witnesses who proffer testimony material and admissible

at trial. Assuming Petitioner’s proof includes testimony about Ms. Davis’ statements, the postconviction court must then assess whether the absence at trial of proof of Ms. Davis’ inculpatory

statements brings into doubt Petitioner’s conviction. We emphasize, as did Judge Witt in the

proceeding below, that the test for prejudice under Strickland is not an inquiry into the sufficiency

of the State’s evidence adduced at trial. Indeed, “[t]he result of a proceeding can be rendered

unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by

a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694. 

30
-21-

Our conclusion that further proceedings are necessary in the post-conviction court renders

unnecessary our resolution of the remaining issues Petitioner raised in this appeal. 

CONCLUSION

The post-conviction court erred in striking as hearsay the testimony of witnesses presented

at the hearing and in failing to assess their credibility and the potential effect of their testimony on

the outcome of Petitioner’s trial. Without credibility findings, this Court is foreclosed from

determining whether Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Therefore, for the

reasons stated above, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment and remand this case to

the post-conviction court for a new hearing. It appearing that Petitioner is indigent, costs of this

appeal are taxed to the State of Tennessee.

___________________________________

CORNELIA A. CLARK, JUSTICE