NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

SHERRISA COOPER SMITH, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

DARRIN QUINTON SMITH, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0100 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2021-052517

 FC2021-093582

The Honorable Paula A. Williams, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Modern Law PLLC, Mesa

By Robyn Barrett

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Schill Law Group PLLC, Scottsdale

By David Yuhas

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

FILED 12-29-2022
SMITH v. SMITH

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Peter B. Swann1 joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Darrin Quinton Smith (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s 

order affirming an order of protection against him in favor of Sherrisa 

Cooper Smith (“Mother”). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In September 2021, the superior court granted Mother’s 

petition for an order of protection against Father. Father objected, and the 

superior court set a one-hour hearing on the petition in December. Mother 

and Father both moved to extend the hearing to two hours, but the court 

found that additional time was “unnecessary” and denied the parties’ 

requests.

¶3 At the hearing, Mother testified that Father broke into her 

home when he knew she was out of town and “destroyed” the house. She 

alleged Father broke several objects, including picture frames and a 

television set, and defecated on the bedroom carpet. In support of her 

testimony, Mother submitted photos of her vandalized and soiled home.

¶4 Father admitted he entered Mother’s home without telling 

her. Although Father testified the house was no longer in his name and that 

he had established a separate residence, he claimed he believed he had a

1 Judge Peter B. Swann was a sitting member of this court when the matter 

was assigned to this panel of the court. He retired effective November 28, 

2022. In accordance with the authority granted by Article 6, Section 3, of 

the Arizona Constitution and pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-145, the Chief Justice 

of the Arizona Supreme Court has designated Judge Swann as a judge pro 

tempore in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of participating in the 

resolution of cases assigned to this panel during his term in office and for 

the duration of Administrative Order 2022-162.
SMITH v. SMITH

Decision of the Court

3

right to enter Mother’s house without her permission because he was “still 

paying bills there at the time.”

¶5 The superior court affirmed the order of protection against 

Father. Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, 

Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) 

§ 12-2101(A)(1), (5)(b), and Arizona Rule of Protective Order Procedure 

42(a)(2).

¶6 We note that Mother’s counsel failed to submit an answering 

brief, despite being granted an extension to do so. “When debatable issues 

exist and an appellee fails to file an answering brief, we may consider such 

failure a confession of reversible error.” Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259,

¶ 9 (App. 2014). In our discretion, however, we address this appeal on the 

merits. 

DISCUSSION

I. The record supports the superior court’s finding that Father 

committed criminal trespass. 

¶7 The superior court may issue an order of protection “if the 

court determines that there is reasonable cause to believe . . . the defendant 

has committed an act of domestic violence.” A.R.S. § 13-3602(E)(2). Here, 

the superior court found that Father committed criminal trespass—an act 

of domestic violence sufficient to issue an order of protection. See A.R.S. 

§ 13-3601(A).

¶8 As relevant here, a person commits criminal trespass by 

“knowingly” “[e]ntering or remaining unlawfully in or on a residential 

structure.” See A.R.S. § 13-1504(A)(1). A person enters or remains

unlawfully in a house when his “intent for so entering or remaining is not 

licensed, authorized or otherwise privileged.” A.R.S. § 13-1501(2). “[T]hat 

the defendant [knew] his entry or remaining was unlawful” is an “essential 

element” of criminal trespass. State v. Kozan, 146 Ariz. 427, 429 (App. 1985). 

Father argues the superior court abused its discretion by finding he 

committed criminal trespass because Father believed he was entitled to 

enter Mother’s home, and therefore did not knowingly enter her home 

unlawfully.

¶9 Although Father denied knowingly entering Mother’s home 

unlawfully, sufficient evidence supports the court’s finding to the contrary.

Such evidence includes Father’s testimony that he disabled Mother’s 

security system before entering her home and Mother’s testimony that 
SMITH v. SMITH

Decision of the Court

4

Father had “no access to the house” when he broke in and “destroyed” it. 

See Maria G. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 253 Ariz. 364, 366, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (we 

will not re-weigh conflicting evidence or reevaluate the credibility of 

witnesses on appeal).

II. The superior court did not violate Father’s due process rights by 

imposing and enforcing a one-hour time limit at the hearing.

¶10 We review the superior court’s enforcement of a time limit for 

an abuse of discretion, and to prevail, Father must show he suffered harm 

because of the time limit. See Brown v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 194 Ariz. 85, 91, 

¶ 30 (App. 1998). We review constitutional issues de novo. State v. Moody,

208 Ariz. 424, 445, ¶ 62 (2004).

¶11 Due process guarantees Father a meaningful opportunity to 

be heard. See Wallace v. Shields, 175 Ariz. 166, 174 (App. 1992). Similarly, 

Rule 38(g)(1) of the Arizona Rules of Protective Order Procedure provides

that, at a contested hearing on an order of protection, “[t]he judicial officer 

must ensure that both parties have an opportunity to be heard, to present 

evidence, and to call and examine and cross-examine witnesses.” The 

superior court has broad discretion to manage its own docket and may 

impose “reasonable time limits” on hearings. See Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Ariz. 

343, 346 (1992); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 16(j) (“reasonable time limits”); Ariz. R. Prot. 

Ord. P. Rule 2 (rules of civil procedure apply unless inconsistent with 

protective order rules). 

¶12 Father argues the superior court’s time limit was 

unreasonable because he was “only given five minutes to present his direct 

testimony.” We disagree. The record shows the court gave each party

thirty-minutes to present its case and that Father chose to spend most of his 

time cross-examining Mother on matters that were irrelevant to the 

protection order. Thus, it was Father’s decision, not the court’s, to reserve

only five minutes for direct testimony. 

¶13 Father further argues the superior court reversibly erred by 

failing to extend the hearing to account for “an unexpected electronic 

glitch.” The record, however, demonstrates that any technological

“glitches” were minor, rapidly resolved, and did not deny Father a 

meaningful opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, the superior court did 

not violate Father’s due process rights by setting and enforcing a one-hour 

time limit on the hearing. 
SMITH v. SMITH

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.