IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-60100

Summary Calendar 

GUO CHAO-QING, also known as Chao-Qing Guo, 

Petitioner 

v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent 

Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals 

BIA No. A098 718 261

Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:* 

 Chao-Qing Guo, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, 

petitions this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) 

decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against 

Torture (CAT). Guo contends that he is a Christian and a member of an 

underground church in China; that he was subject to police intimidation and 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 5, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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brutality on the basis of his religious practices; and that he would face statesponsored oppression and torture if he were to return to China. Guo was the 

only witness at the asylum hearings, though he submitted documentation in 

support of his application, including statements from family members in 

China, a pastor from a church he attended in China, and pastors from the 

churches he has attended in the United States. Guo argues that the BIA erred 

in affirming the IJ’s denial of relief based on an adverse credibility 

determination. He also contends that the IJ and BIA erred in requiring

corroborative evidence and discounting or discrediting the documentary 

evidence submitted in support of his application. 

Because the BIA approved of and relied upon the IJ’s decision, this court 

may review the decisions of both the BIA and the IJ. See Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 

F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2002). The BIA and the IJ’s factual findings are 

reviewed for substantial evidence and their legal conclusions are reviewed de 

novo. Id. Credibility determinations are factual findings that are reviewed for 

substantial evidence. See Vidal v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Under the REAL ID Act, a trier of fact must consider “the totality of the 

circumstances” and “all relevant factors” in making a credibility 

determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The IJ and BIA “may rely on any

inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as 

long as the ‘totality of the circumstances’ establishes that an asylum applicant 

is not credible.” Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 538 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008)). We will defer to a “credibility 

determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no 

reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Id.

(quoting Lin, 534 F.3d at 167). 

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Guo argues principally that there were no inconsistencies between or 

among his statements and that the alleged inconsistencies relied on by the IJ 

and the BIA were minor and did not go to the heart of his claims for relief. 

However, the IJ and BIA’s adverse credibility determinations relied on specific, 

record-based inconsistencies. For example, when asked who his pastor was, 

Guo took a long pause before testifying that he only knew Pastor Liu. He later

testified that he had forgotten about Pastor Ho, the senior pastor at the church 

who had submitted a letter in support of Guo’s application. In his subsequent 

written statement, Guo stated both that he saw Pastor Ho nearly every 

Wednesday at church and that he was “not familiar with Pastor Ho.” Further, 

Guo’s written statement says that his friend Bobby did not attend church 

service and did not testify or submit a statement in support of Guo’s asylum 

application because Bobby “had no knowledge on church.” This conflicts with 

Guo’s testimony that Bobby went to church with Guo “a couple of times.” 

Although we acknowledge that these discrepancies may be explainable, 

the record does not compel the conclusion that the IJ and BIA erred in relying 

on them. See Mwembie v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 2006) (“where 

the judge’s credibility determinations are supported by the record, we will 

affirm them even if we may have reached a different conclusion”). Cf. Kompany 

v. Gonzales, 236 F. App’x 33, 38 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Although we believe these 

inconsistencies may be explainable and are on the outer perimeter of 

materiality, they nevertheless support the IJ’s credibility determination, and 

the IJ is entitled to rely on them.”). Guo’s argument that the inconsistencies 

identified were unrelated to his claim fails, as inferences about credibility can 

be drawn from inconsistencies “without regard to whether [they] . . . go[] to the

heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Wang, 569 

F.3d at 538. 

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To the extent Guo raises other arguments, including that the only true 

inconsistency resulted from translation issues and that he was precluded from 

presenting evidence explaining the alleged inconsistencies, we find these 

arguments unexhausted and, as a result, jurisdictionally barred. The only 

challenges to the credibility finding raised in Guo’s brief before the BIA were 

that Guo was nervous at his hearing, he had testified consistently as to his 

Christian faith and persecution, and he had corroborated his claims with 

documentary evidence. Because Guo failed to raise additional arguments 

challenging the credibility determination in his appeal to the BIA, this court 

lacks jurisdiction to review such arguments. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (“[a] 

court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted 

all administrative remedies available to [him] as of right”); Ahmed v. Holder, 

368 F. App’x 489, 492 (5th Cir. 2010) (court lacked jurisdiction to consider 

argument that “various inconsistencies in his testimony . . . were the result of 

his inability to understand English,” as it had not been raised before the BIA);

Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 2009) (failure to exhaust an issue 

before the BIA is a jurisdictional bar to judicial review). 

Guo also argues that the IJ and BIA failed to give sufficient weight to 

his documentary evidence. Guo faults the IJ for discounting statements from 

two American pastors and from a doctor in China on the grounds that they did 

not reflect firsthand knowledge of Guo’s experience being beaten by police. 

Guo claims that he offered the statements from the pastors in support of his 

claim that he is a practicing Christian and that he offered the statement from 

the doctor as proof that he required treatment after being beaten by police. 

However, the IJ was not unreasonable in drawing a negative inference from 

the fact that although the pastors said that they had known Guo for four years,

and that he was “like a son” to them, Guo testified that he did not know their 

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last names. See Mwembie, 443 F.3d at 413 (noting that “an IJ can base some 

of his determinations on his understanding of general human behavior”). And 

while the doctor’s statement says that she treated Guo’s bruising and aches, it 

reflects that Guo’s mother told the doctor that he had been “beaten by 

somebody,” not specifically the police. Thus, while this evidence is obliquely 

corroborative, it does not directly support Guo’s claimed persecution by 

Chinese authorities. Guo also claims that it was error to discount statements 

from Guo’s mother and aunt because the translator did not provide a name for 

the aunt and because Guo’s mother reported no harm as a result of her church 

attendance in China. However, the IJ noted that these statements did have 

evidentiary value, but did not overcome the inconsistencies in Guo’s testimony, 

particularly in light of the fact that Guo’s aunt and mother were not subject to 

cross-examination. 

Because Guo has failed to show that, under the totality of the 

circumstances, the evidence is so compelling that no reasonable factfinder 

could fail to find otherwise, we defer to the IJ’s and BIA’s adverse credibility 

determinations. See Wang, 569 F.3d at 538–39. Guo does not argue that his 

documentary evidence alone supports his claims for relief. Therefore, in light 

of the adverse credibility determination, Guo has failed to show that the BIA 

erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of his application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the CAT. See Dayo v. Holder, 687 F.3d 653, 657–59 

(5th Cir. 2012); Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 906–08 (5th Cir. 2002); Chun v. 

INS, 40 F.3d 76, 78–79 (5th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, Guo’s petition for review 

is DENIED. 

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