1

The Honorable Susan Richard Nelson, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-2870

___________

Gary L. Quinnett, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Southern District of Iowa. 

State of Iowa; Iowa Department of *

Administrative Services; Roy Williams; * 

Mollie Anderson, *

*

Appellees. * 

___________

Submitted: March 16, 2011

Filed: July 7, 2011

___________

Before LOKEN and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and NELSON,1

 District Judge.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Gary Quinnett brought this suit under the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, and the Family and Medical Leave

Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654, against the State of Iowa, the Iowa

Department of Administrative Services (“DAS”), and two officials of the DAS. The
2

The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

-2-

district court2

 dismissed all of Quinnett’s claims, and he appeals the court’s ruling

with respect to his FMLA claims. We affirm.

I.

The FMLA authorizes qualified employees to take up to twelve weeks of

unpaid leave annually in several circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). One such

circumstance is when “a serious health condition . . . makes the employee unable to

perform the functions of [his] position.” Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). This provision is

commonly described as the “self-care provision.” 

Quinnett is a former employee of the Department of Administrative Services.

According to Quinnett’s complaint, he was treated for various medical conditions

during his employment with the DAS, and he took leave from work under the

FMLA’s self-care provision. Quinnett alleges that the defendants eventually asked

him to apply for long-term disability benefits rather than take more FMLA leave, and

then terminated him while claiming that he had resigned.

Quinnett sued the State of Iowa, the DAS, the then-director of the DAS, and his

supervisor at the DAS. His complaint alleged, as relevant here, that the defendants

interfered with his FMLA leave and retaliated against him for exercising his rights

under the FMLA. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the

complaint on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred Quinnett’s FMLA

claims against all of the defendants.
3

This court held in Miles v. Bellfontaine Habilitation Center, 481 F.3d 1106

(8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), that Congress did not validly abrogate the States’

Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting the FMLA’s self-care provision, and

Quinnett does not raise that point on appeal. Id. at 1107; cf. Coleman v. Md. Court of

Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, No. 10-1016, 2011 WL

500227 (U.S. June 27, 2011).

-3-

II.

On appeal, Quinnett argues only that the State of Iowa waived its Eleventh

Amendment immunity with respect to suits brought under the FMLA’s self-care

provision. He asserts that state regulations, a DAS “Benefit Guide,” and the DAS

benefits website waived the State’s immunity. We disagree.

The Eleventh Amendment, as understood by the Supreme Court, “confirm[s]

the structural understanding that States entered the Union with their sovereign

immunity intact,” and that the States thus may not be sued in federal court without

their consent, unless Congress has validly abrogated the immunity. Va. Office for

Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1637-38 (2011).3

 A State may waive

the immunity by making a “‘clear declaration’ that it intends to submit itself to [the]

jurisdiction” of the federal courts. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary

Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999) (quoting Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read,

322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944)). In McKlintic v. 36th Judicial Circuit Court, 508 F.3d 875

(8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), this court held that the State of Missouri did not waive

its immunity by offering FMLA leave in its employee handbook. Id. at 877. The

court explained that “a state’s grant to an employee of a substantive right with no

mention of whether that right can be enforced against the state in federal court does

not effect a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. 

There is no material distinction between this case and McKlintic. The State of

Iowa has not “clearly declared” its intent to submit itself to federal-court jurisdiction.
-4-

The principal sources on which Quinnett relies merely describe the FMLA benefits

that DAS employees are eligible to receive. The DAS “Benefit Guide,” for example,

provides that “[y]ou may be eligible for leave under the Family and Medical Leave

Act (FMLA),” and describes eligibility requirements, summarizes the benefits, and

explains the procedure for receiving leave. See also Iowa Admin. Code r. 11-63.4.

These materials do not state that an employee can enforce his rights to these benefits

in federal court. 

The DAS benefits website, in its section on the FMLA, does state that

“[e]mployees may also bring a private civil action against an employer for violations,”

but it does not specify that such an action may be brought in federal court. A State

does not consent to suit in federal court “by stating its intention to sue and be sued or

even by authorizing suits against it in any court of competent jurisdiction.” Coll. Sav.

Bank, 527 U.S. at 676 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted). For the same

reason, the decision of the Iowa Court of Appeals in Lee v. State, No. 07-1879, 2009

WL 398330 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009), that the State of Iowa waived its statecourt immunity in FMLA cases, id. at *9, has no bearing on the State’simmunity from

suit in federal court. We therefore conclude that the State of Iowa has not waived its

Eleventh Amendment immunity.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________