NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GENE S. GROVES,

Claimant-Appellant,

v.

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Respondent-Appellee.

______________________ 

2013-7077

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 06-1252, Judge William P. 

Greene, Jr.

______________________ 

Decided: September 16, 2013

______________________ 

GENE S. GROVES, of Shafter, Texas, pro se. 

MICHAEL D. SNYDER, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. 

With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and KIRK T. MANHARDT, Assistant Director. Of coun-
2 GROVES v. SHINSEKI

sel on the brief were MICHAEL J. TIMINSKI, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, and MARTIN J. SENDEK, Attorney, 

United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC.

______________________ 

Before DYK, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Gene S. Groves appeals from a decision of the United 

States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans 

Court”) denying in part his application for an award of 

expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). See Groves v. Shinseki, No. 06-

1252(E) (Vet. App. Nov. 21, 2012) (“Groves II”). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Groves served in the U.S. Army from January 1970 to 

August 1971. In March 1971, he suffered a shell fragment wound to his right thigh. In September 1971, the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) regional office 

(“RO”) awarded him service connection with a 10% disability rating for that injury under diagnostic code (“DC”) 

7804, see 38 C.F.R. § 4.118, DC 7804 (1971) (covering 

“[s]cars, superficial, tender and painful on objective 

demonstration”). In June 1972, Groves complained of 

“tingling and burning pain from his anteromedial thigh to 

his knee,” and a VA physician noted that the shell fragment “may have nicked [Groves’] saphenous nerve.” 

Groves v. Shinseki, No. 06-1252, slip op. at 2 (Vet. App. 

Nov. 25, 2009) (“Groves I”).

In September 1972, Groves sought an increased disability rating for the service-connected injury to his right 

thigh. The same month, the RO recharacterized Groves’s 

injury under DC 5314, see 38 C.F.R. § 4.73, DC 5314 

(1972) (covering “muscle injuries” in the anterior thigh), 
GROVES v. SHINSEKI 3

still with a 10% disability rating. The RO separately 

granted service connection with a 10% disability rating 

for an injury to Groves’s right saphenous nerve under DC 

8627, see 38 C.F.R. § 4.124a, DC 8627 (1972), resulting in 

a combined disability rating of 20%. However, because it 

recharacterized Groves’s condition, the RO did not grant 

Groves’s request for an increased disability rating with 

respect to the service-connected injury initially awarded 

in 1971 under DC 7804.

In August 1998, Groves applied for vocational rehabilitation benefits. Several years passed in which the VA 

attempted to arrange for Groves to attend a required 

initial counseling session. Groves did not do so. In April 

2001, a VA counselor informed Groves that he was returning Groves’s records to the RO in discontinued status “due 

to [Groves’s] refusal to cooperate.” Groves I, slip op. at 5. 

Groves appealed to the Board, arguing that the VA’s 

handling of his application for vocational rehabilitation 

failed to comply with numerous regulations. For example, 

Groves asserted that the VA failed to comply with 38 

C.F.R. § 21.362(b), which requires the VA to, inter alia, 

“make a reasonable effort to inform the veteran and 

assure his or her understanding of . . . [t]he services and 

assistance which may be provided . . . to help the veteran 

maintain satisfactory cooperation and conduct and to cope 

with problems directly related to the rehabilitation process.”

In separate proceedings before the RO, Groves in October 2003 sought to reopen the September 1972 RO 

decision (denying an increased disability rating for his 

thigh injury) based on clear and unmistakable error 

(“CUE”). Groves contended that the September 1972 

decision “impermissibly severed service connection for 

[his] tender scar” and that he “was never notified of the 

severance.” Groves I, slip op. at 2 (quotation marks 

omitted). In July 2004, the RO found no CUE in the 
4 GROVES v. SHINSEKI

September 1972 decision. Groves also appealed to the 

Board from these proceedings.

On December 1, 2005, the Board issued separate decisions addressing Groves’s two appeals. Regarding 

Groves’s CUE claim, the Board found that, contrary to 

Groves’s argument, the September 1972 RO decision “did 

not sever service connection” and that the revised diagnosis was “required by the regulations to properly reflect 

changes in the medical evidence.” See id. at 3 (quotation 

marks omitted). The Board therefore found no CUE. The 

Board also rejected Groves’s appeal of the denial of vocational rehabilitation services, finding that Groves had 

“failed to cooperate by refusing to participate in VA 

counseling and evaluation.” Id. at 5. Groves, proceeding 

pro se, appealed both decisions to the Veterans Court, 

which issued a single decision addressing both appeals on 

November 25, 2009. See id.

The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s CUE decision. It reasoned that “because [Groves’] rating was not 

reduced, nor his award of service connection severed, the 

action taken by the September 1972 RO constituted only a 

nonsubstantive administrative act and not a severance 

action.” Id. at 4. The Veterans Court therefore concluded 

that the alleged lack of notice of a severed service connection provided no basis for a finding of CUE. Id. However, 

the Veterans Court vacated the Board’s vocational rehabilitation decision. As to that appeal, “the Secretary 

concede[d]” that “the Board erred by not addressing 

whether [the] VA had complied with various regulatory 

requirements before discontinuing services” to Groves. 

Id. at 6. The Veterans Court therefore concluded that the 

Board had failed to provide an adequate statement of the 

reasons or bases for its decision, as required by 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7104(d)(1). The Veterans Court remanded for further 

adjudication on the vocational services issue. 
GROVES v. SHINSEKI 5

On January 19, 2010, Groves filed an application for 

litigation expenses pursuant to EAJA, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d)(1). Groves sought a total of $22,727.72, consisting of $99.82 for postage, $1,184.00 for photocopying, and 

$21,443.90 for “computer legal/records research.” See

Groves II, slip op. at 1, 4 (alteration and quotation marks 

omitted). The government opposed Groves’s EAJA application. Although the government conceded that Groves 

was a prevailing party under EAJA with respect to his 

vocational rehabilitation appeal, it argued, inter alia, that 

he did not prevail with respect to his CUE appeal, and 

that his EAJA application did not differentiate between 

expenses incurred with respect to the two separate Board 

appeals. See id. at 2. The government also argued that 

the bulk of Groves’s claim was for his own time spent on 

research, an item for which Groves could not be compensated.

The Veterans Court awarded Groves $99.82 for postage, but denied his application as to the $1,184 in photocopying expenses and $21,443.90 in research costs. Id. at 

4. Regarding the postage expenses, the court found that 

“postage is a reasonable and necessary expense” and that 

“numerous pleadings were filed and that copies were 

mailed to both the Court and the Secretary.” Id. However, the court denied Groves’s application for photocopying 

expenses, finding Groves’s documentation of those expenses insufficient. Id. It explained that, for example, 

Groves may have included the cost of paper in his application, and the cost of paper was not recoverable under 

EAJA.1 Id. Finally, the court rejected Groves’s request 

1 The Veterans Court based its conclusion that the 

cost of paper was not recoverable on its prior decision in 

March v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 163, 170 (1994), which 

reasoned that the cost of paper used in photocopying is an 

“equipment-maintenance and overhead item[] of a type 

 
6 GROVES v. SHINSEKI

for $21,443.90 in expenses for “computer legal/records 

research.” Id. at 3–4 (quotation marks and alteration 

omitted). The court found that Groves did “not explain 

how much of his request [was] for the time he spent 

researching, which is unreimbursable, . . . versus the 

expenses he incurred in conducting his research.” Id.

(citation omitted). The court added that “[t]here is also no 

indication of whether research expenses were incurred in 

developing arguments against the first Board decision, 

the second Board decision, or both.” Id. at 4. The court 

therefore found Groves’s itemization “too vague and 

lacking in detail” to support his claim for legal research 

expenses. Id. at 3. 

Groves appeals. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to 38 

U.S.C. § 7292.

DISCUSSION

“We review the Veterans Court’s interpretation of 

EAJA de novo.” Kelly v. Nicholson, 463 F.3d 1349, 1352 

(Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Vaughn v. Principi, 336 F.3d 1351, 

1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). EAJA provides that 

[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by 

statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party 

other than the United States fees and . . . expenses

. . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought 

by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court 

finds that the position of the United States was 

[that] [it found] would not normally be billed to a client.” 

Id. In light of our disposition, we need not decide here 

whether the Veterans Court was correct that the cost of 

paper is not recoverable.

 
GROVES v. SHINSEKI 7

substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

In Kay v. Ehrler, the Supreme Court held that pro se 

litigants may not recover attorney’s fees under the Civil 

Rights Attorney’s Act of 1976, see 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and 

that this rule even extends to lawyers who litigate their 

own cases pro se. 499 U.S. 432, 435, 438 (1991). The 

same rule applies to all pro se litigants under EAJA. E.g., 

Krecioch v. United States, 316 F.3d 684, 687-88 (7th Cir. 

2003); SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 41 F.3d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 

1994). Prior to Kay, we held that pro se litigants may 

recover expenses, but not attorneys’ fees. Naelek v. Dep’t 

of Transp., 845 F.2d 976, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988). It is unsettled whether, in light of Kay, the recovery of expenses by

pro se litigants is still proper, and if so, exactly which 

types of expenses are recoverable.

Nonetheless, cases in other circuits have made clear 

that the time spent by a pro se litigant on such efforts as 

legal research is not recoverable. In Krecioch, a claimant 

who succeeded in part in a civil forfeiture proceeding 

sought attorney’s fees and expenses under EAJA. 316 

F.3d at 686. Among Krecioch’s “expenses” was $2,800.00 

for “paralegal services” performed by a fellow inmate, 

which included “research [and] drafting motions.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted) (alteration in the original). 

Although this “describe[d] the activities of an attorney,” 

the Seventh Circuit held that attorney’s fees were not 

recoverable because Krecioch was a pro se litigant. Id. at 

687-88. 

Similarly, in Kooritzky v. Herman, a pro se claimant 

sought attorney’s fees and expenses after successfully 

challenging a Department of Labor regulation. 178 F.3d 

1315, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Among the “expenses” 

claimed by Kooritzky was “expert witness” expenses for 

the time Kooritzky spent “acting as an immigration law 
8 GROVES v. SHINSEKI

‘expert’ in his own case.” Id. at 1321. The court held that 

“a pro se attorney-litigant may not evade the prohibition 

against recovery of attorney fees under the EAJA by 

seeking to characterize himself as an ‘expert witness.’” 

Id. The court reasoned that a contrary rule “would allow 

attorney-litigants to evade the [Supreme] Court’s pronouncement in Kay by proclaiming themselves legal 

‘experts’ and thereby allowing them to recover attorney 

fees relabeled as ‘expert expenses.’” Id. at 1323. The 

court therefore held that Kooritzsky’s claim for fees for his 

own time, “whether characterized as ‘attorney fees’ or 

‘expert expenses’ must fail.” Id. at 1322.

Here, Groves argues that the Veterans Court erred by 

failing to award him “computer/legal research” expenses. 

Appellant’s Br. 5. The Veteran’s Court noted that

Groves’s application “does not explain how much of his 

request is for the time he spent researching, which is 

unreimbursable.” Groves II, slip op. at 3. We agree with 

the Seventh and D.C. Circuits that compensation for time 

spent developing claims or legal positions is not recoverable under EAJA. See Kooritzsky, 178 F.3d at 1322–23; 

Naekel, 845 F.2d at 981. We therefore conclude that the 

Veterans Court committed no legal error in denying

Groves’s request for research expenses. For the same 

reason, the Veterans Court committed no legal error in 

denying Groves’s claims with respect to photocopying

expenses on the ground Groves failed to distinguish 

between expenses incurred with respect to the successful 

and unsuccessful claims.

Groves also appears to argue that the Veterans Court 

improperly held his pro se filings to the same standard as 

those filed by attorneys. However, while “pro se filings 

must be read liberally,” Harris v. Shinseki, 704 F.3d 946, 

948 (Fed. Cir. 2013), we cannot agree that the Veterans 

Court held Groves’s application to an inappropriately high 

standard. Such filings must still be clear enough to 

enable effective review. See, e.g., Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 
GROVES v. SHINSEKI 9

593, 597 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding “[e]ven after allowing 

for due deference to a pro se plaintiff,” “vague” and “conclusory” allegations were not sufficient to state a claim). 

Here, the Veterans Court identified significant and pertinent ambiguities that prevented it from effectively reviewing Groves’s application. We conclude that the 

Veterans Court did not err by failing to read Groves’s 

filings liberally.

We have considered Groves’s remaining arguments 

and find them to lack merit.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.