MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2016	ME 128 Docket: Wal

- 16

- 46 Submitted

On	Briefs: July	20,	2016 Decided: August	11,	2016 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and ALEXANDER ,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.
KRISTIN	(HANSON)	HUTT

v. TODD	HANSON

ALEXANDER ,	J. [¶1] Todd	 Hanson	 appeals	 from	 a	 divorce	 judgment	 entered	 in	 the District	Court	(Belfast, Worth,	J. ),	which	ordered , in	part , that	Kristin	(Hanson) Hutt	would	receive	 the	 first	$325,000	in	net	proceeds	upon	 the	sale	of	any	of five	 parcels	 of	 real	 estate	 owned	 by	 the	 parties	 to	 compensate	 Hutt	 for	 her nonmarital	interest	in	one	parcel	and	her	investment	of	her	nonmarital	 funds

to pay	off	a	marital	debt. See 19

- A M.R.S.	§ 953(1)

- (3)	(2015)

. Hanson	argues that	 the	 court erred	 in	 not	 specifically	 addressing	 each	 factor	 listed	 in
section 953(1) , clearly	erred	in	its	findings	of	fact, and	abused	its	discretio n	in its	division	of	prop erty.		Because	the	record	supports	the	equitable	division	of marital	property	ordered	by	the	court,	we affirm.2 I.		CASE	HISTORY [¶2 ] After	a	contested	hearing regarding	property	division	and	spousal support	issues ,	the	court	made	the	following	findings,	w hich	are	supported	by the	trial	record. See Ehret	v.	Ehret ,	2016	ME	43,	¶	2,	135	A.3d	101

. [¶3 ] When	Hutt	 commenced	 this	 action,	 t he	 parties had	 been	married for about seventeen	 years

. T hey have	 two	minor	 children together ;	 p arental rights	issues	were resolved	and	were	not	contested	at	trial.		The	parties own or have	 an	 interest	 in six	 parcels	 of	 real	 property:	 (1) a	 parcel	 in	 Northport containing	 the	 marital	 home;	 (2)	 a	 parcel	 in	 Northport	 next	 to	 the	 marital home consisting	 of	 forty

- eight	 to	 fifty	 acr es	 of	 land	 and containing	 a	 garage with	an	apartment	over	it (“the	carriage	house	lot”);	(3) property	in	Old	T own owned	by	a	limited	liability	company	 (LLC) ,	 “of	which	 the	parties	collectively own	 51%”;	 (4)	 property in	 Bucksport	 owned	 by a second LLC,	 whic h	 the parties	wholly	own;	 (5) property	in	Lincoln owned	by	a	 third LLC,	which	 the parties	wholly	own; and (6)	an	undeveloped	parcel	in	Northport,	whi ch	was	a gift	to	Hutt	alone. [¶4 ] Hutt’s	mother	and	stepfather	conveyed	the	carriage	house	lot	as	a gift	 to Hutt alone	during	 the	course	of	 the	marriage. Her	stepfather	intended that	Hutt	alone	would	own	the	par cel,	which	was	unimproved	land	when it	was3 transferred

. The	 land,	 without	 imp rovements,	 is	 worth	 $75,000. Hutt	 and Hanson	improved	the	land	with	earthwork	and	by	constructing	the	garage	and

a partment. [¶5 ] During	 the	 marriage, Hutt	 received	 $250,000	 in	 life	 insurance proceeds	upon	her	mother’s	death.		Hutt	paid	off	a	marital	d ebt	related	to	the property	in	Bucksport	with	those	funds. [¶6 ] Hutt	 filed	 a	 complaint	 for	 divorce	 in	 January	 2015. The	 parties attended	mediation	twice	and	resolved	child

- related	and	some	property	issues prior	 to	 the	 contested	 trial. After	 the	 trial, the	 court	 entered	 a	 divorce judgment	granting	the	parties	a	divorce	on	the	ground	of	irrec oncilable	marital differences. See 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	902(1)(H)	(2015). [¶7 ] The	 court	 set	 aside	 to	 Hutt	 the	 undeveloped	 Northport	 parcel	 as her	 nonmarital	 property	 and ordered	 the	 parties	 to	 sell	 the	 remaini ng	 five properties ,	 consistent	with	 their	agreement	at	mediation

. The	 court	 ordered that	 “[a]fter	 sale	 of	 one	 or	more	 properties	 and	 payment	 of	 ordinary	 closing costs,	 [Hutt]	 shall	 receive	 the	 first	 $325,0 00	 of	 the net	 proceeds.” The	 court determined	 that	 such	 an	 award	 was	 “equitable	 under	 the	 circumstances,” citing	Hutt’s	contribution	of $250,000	of	inherited	 funds	 to the	marital	estate and Hutt’s $75,000 no nmarital	 interest	 in the	 carriage	 house	 lot

. The	 court4

or dered	 the	 parties	 to	 “equally	 divide	 the	 remaining	 net	 pro ceeds	 from	 each sale.” [¶8 ] The	court	ordered	neither	party	 to	pay	child	support	 to	 the	other and	ordered	that	each party would	claim	one	c hild	for	tax	purposes. Although Hutt	 argued	 that	 she	 sh ould	 be	 paid	 spousal	 support,	 the	 court	 declined	 to make	any	such	award	“ now	or	in	the	future.” Neither	party	was	ordered	to	pay the other’s	attorney	fees. [¶9 ] Hanson	fi led	this	timely	appeal.
II.		LEGAL	ANALYSIS [¶1 0 ] The	 statute	 governing	 disposition	 of property,	 19

- A	 M.R.S. § 953(1),	 directs	 that	 the	 court	 “shall	 divide	 the	 marital	 property	 in proportions the	 court	 considers	 just	 after	 cons idering	 all	 relevant	 factors. ” This	direction	requires	that	marital	property be	divided	equitably,	though	not necessarily	 equally.	 	 Thus,	 in Doucette	 v.	 Washburn ,	 2001	 ME	 38,	 ¶	 24,
766 A .2d 578,	we	held: “ A	just	distribution	of	property	is	not	synonymous	with an	equal	distribution.		To	the	contrary,	we	have	made	it	clear	that	a	cou rt	is	not required	 to	 divide	 the	 marital	 property	 equally,	 but	 is	 required	 to	 make	 the division	fair	and	just	considering	all	of	the circumstances	of	the	parties.”5 [¶1 1 ] The governing	 principle	 of	 an equitable, though not necessarily equal,	 distribution	 o f	 marital	 property	 is	 emphasized	 by	 the	 factors that section	 953(1)	 lists	 as	 included	 among	 the	 relevant	 factors	 the	 court	 is	 to consider:
A. The	contribution	of	each	spouse	to	the	acquisition	of	the	marital property,	including	the	contribution	of	a	spouse	as	homemaker;
B. The	value	of	the	property	set	apart	to	each	spouse;	and
C. The	 economic	 circumstances	 of	 each	 spouse	 at	 the	 time	 the divi sion	 of	 property	 is	 to	 become	 effective,	 including	 the desirability	of	awarding	the	family	home	or	the	right	to	live	in	the home	 for	 reasonable	 periods	 to	 the	 spouse	 having	 custody	 of	 the children. [¶1 2 ] I n	 its	 application	 of	 section	 953(1) the	 trial	 cou rt	 need not

“ specifically	 enumerate	 [its]	 findings	 on	 each	 factor,” Shanoski	 v.	 Miller , 2001 ME	 139,	 ¶	 25,	 780 A.2d	 275,	 as long	 as	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 court	 has considered	those	factors,	and all other	“relevant	factors,” 19

- A	M.R.S. §	953(1), in	reaching	its	decision. The	court	is	only	required	to	“ make	findings	that	are sufficient	 to	 inform	 the	 parties	 of	 the	 court’s	 reasoning	 and	 sufficient	 for effective	appellate	review

. ” Shanoski , 2001 ME	139,	¶	25,	780 A.2d	275 .		Here, the	tri al	court’s	findings	are	sufficient	for	effective	appellate	review. [¶1 3 ] Thus,	contrary	to	Hanson’s	argument,	the	court	was	not	required

to make	 specific	 findings	 addressing	 each	 factor	 stated	 in	 section	 953(1).6 Further,	 the court	 d id	 not	 clear ly	 err	 in finding (1 ) the	 value	 of	 Hutt’s

n onmarital	 interest,	 $75,000 , in	 the	 carriage	 house	 lot ,	 or	 (2 ) that	 Hutt contributed $250,000 in	nonmarital	funds to the	marital	estate

. 1 See Starrett	v.
Starrett ,	 2014	ME	 112,	 ¶ 11, 101	A.3d	 435 ; Burrow	 v.	Burrow ,	 201 4 ME	 1 11 , ¶ 22 , 100 A.3d 1104

. [¶1 4 ] “We defer	 to	 the	 trial	 court’s	 determination	 of	 witnesses’ credibility

.	.	.	. ” Violette v.	Violette ,	2015 ME 97,	¶ 15 ,	120	A.3d	667 .		T he	trial court	specifically	found	Hutt’s	testimony on	the	land’s	value to	be “persuasive , ” although	Hanson	had	testified	to	a	lower	value. Further,	the	trial	court	did	not err	 by relying	 on	 Hutt’s	 testimony. See	 Peters	 v.	 Peters ,	 1997	 ME	 134,	 ¶	 14,
697 A.2d	 1254	 ( stating	 that	 a court	may	 accept a party’s	 testimony	 as	 to the value of	his	or	her	own	property); see	also	Violette , 2015	ME	97, ¶	27 ,	120	A.3d
667 ( concluding	 that	 there	 was	 no	 clear	 error	 when	 the	 trial	 court	 made	 a finding	of	a	business’s	value	without	the	benefit	of	expert	testimony ). [¶1 5 ]	 	 We	 review	 a	 marital property	 distribution	 for	 an abuse	 of discretion

. Viola	v.	Viola ,	2015	ME	6 ,	¶	9, 109 A.3d 634. Upon review	 for	an abuse	 of	 discretion, we	 ask	 three	 questions: “ (1)	 whether	 factual	 findings,	 if

1 Although	 the	 court was	 imprecise	 in	 its	 terminology

— finding	 that	 Hutt	 had	 reduced	 the indebtedness	 on	a	 “mortgage” on	 certain	 property	when	 the	evidence	was	 that	 she	 had	 paid	 off	a loan	 that	 she	 and	 Hanson	 had	 borrowed	 for	 the down	 payment on	 that	 property

— the	 error	 was harm less. See M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 61; Gordon v.	 Cheskin ,	 2013 ME	 113,	 ¶	 12,	 82	 A.3d	 1221 ( “A	 court’s misstatement	of	fact	should	be	disregarded	if	it	does	not	affect	the	substantial	rights	of	the	parties.” )

.7 any,	 are	 supported	 by	 the	 record	 pursuant	 t o	 the	 clear	 error standard; (2) whether	 the	 court	 understood	 the	 law	 applicable	 to	 its	 exercise	 of discretion;	 and (3) given	 the	 facts	 and	 applying	 the	 law,	 whether	 the	 court weighed

.	 .	 . the	 applicable	 facts	 and	 made	 choices	 within	 the	 bounds	 of reasonableness

. ” Charett e	v.	Charette ,	2013	ME	4, ¶	7 ,	60	A.3d	1264

. [¶1 6 ]		Section	953(1)	requires	the court to	set	aside	to	the	parties	their nonmarital	assets	prior	to	dividing	the	marital	property. Violette ,	2015	ME	97, ¶	21,	120 A.3d 667. Section	953(1)(A) also requires the	court to	consider	the parties’	 contributions	 to	 the	marital	estate .	 	Here , the	court did	 not	abuse	its discretion by	ordering	an allocation	 to	Hutt	of	 the	 first	 $325,000	in	proceeds
from the	 future sale	 of	 the	 marital	 real	 estate: $75,000	 to	 recognize her nonmarital	interest	in	 the	 carriage	 house	 lot ,	 and	 $250,000 to	 recognize her contribution	of nonmarital	funds	to	pay	off	a	marital	debt

. [¶1 7 ] Further,	c on trary	to	Hanson’s	contentions,	the	court	was	under	no obligation to	order	that	the	funds	be	dist ributed	to	Hutt	only	upon	the	sale	of
any particular	 property.	 	 T he	 court’s	 order	 was	 well	 “within	 the	 bounds	 of reasonableness.” Charette ,	 2013	 ME	 4,	 ¶	 7,	 60	 A.3d	 1264

. The	 court’s judgment	 reflects	 that	 it	 thoughtfully	 exercised	 its	 discretion	 in dividing	 the8 marital	estate	after	considering	the	factors	required	by	sec tion 953(1),	and	the record	supports	the	court’s	judgment. See Viola ,	2015 ME 6 ,	¶	9, 109 A.3d 634

. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

On	the	briefs: Steven	C.	Peterson,	Esq.,	West	Rockport,	 for	appellant	Todd Hanson Joseph	 W.	 Baiungo,	 Esq.,	 Belfast,	 for	 appellee	 Kristin (Hanson)	Hutt

Belfast	District	Court	docket	number	FM

- 2015

- 13 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY