IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,

 Respondent,

 v.

DONALD JANEL LEGRONE,

 Appellant.

No. 85116-1-I

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

BOWMAN, J. — Donald Janel Legrone appeals his jury convictions and 

sentence for first degree kidnapping and second degree assault, both with 

domestic violence (DV) designations. Legrone argues the trial court violated his 

constitutional right to present a defense by excluding evidence and erred by 

imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) under the 

Persistent Offender Accountability Act of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 

(POAA), chapter 9.94A RCW. He also makes several arguments in three 

statements of additional grounds for review (SAGs). We remand to the trial court 

to strike the $500 victim penalty assessment (VPA) from Legrone’s judgment and 

sentence. Otherwise, we affirm. 

FACTS

In September 2021, the State charged Legrone with one count of DV first 

degree kidnapping of his former girlfriend, Dorin Rankin Cerbillo, one count of DV 
No. 85116-1-I/2

2

second degree assault of Rankin,

1 and one count of theft of Rankin’s motor 

vehicle. Legrone pleaded not guilty.

At trial, Rankin testified that on July 29, 2021, she was completing her 

evening shift as a security guard at Pima Medical Institute in Renton. At around 

11:00 p.m., Legrone showed up at her work, and another employee let him in “to 

use the restroom.” At the time, Rankin was on the phone with her best friend, 

Gabriella Wheeler. When Rankin left work and got to the parking lot, she saw 

Legrone standing by her car. She told Wheeler to stay on the phone and mute 

herself so Legrone would not hear her. 

When Rankin got in her car, Legrone got in on the passenger side. 

Rankin told Legrone to get out, but he refused, began cussing at her, and told 

her to drop him off in Des Moines. When Rankin said no, Legrone “balled up his 

fists and started strangling” her with both hands around her neck. At the same 

time, a security patrol car pulled up behind Rankin’s car. She was going to 

scream for help, but Legrone told her that if she did, he “was going to kill” her. 

Rankin then bit Legrone in the chest. After he let go “for a few seconds,” 

he punched her in the head and started strangling her again. Rankin tried to take 

her key out of the ignition, but Legrone stopped her and told her to drive away 

because the security guard was still behind them. Rankin “drove off recklessly,”

hoping that she “would catch someone’s attention.” But Legrone made her stop 

 

1 We refer to Dorin Rankin Cerbillo as Rankin because that is how she identified 

herself at trial.
No. 85116-1-I/3

3

at a stop sign, hit her in the head, and told her to switch seats with him, which 

she did. Legrone told Rankin that if she left the car, he would kill her.

Once Legrone was in the driver’s seat, he sped off toward Tukwila, hitting 

Rankin in the head and “calling [her] the b-word.” Legrone eventually left the 

highway and drove down a back road in SeaTac. He was “ranting” about why 

Rankin “couldn’t love him the way [she] loved [her] family” or her “past partners.” 

He punched Rankin in the mouth and “busted” her lip, then “poked” her in the 

eye. 

Legrone drove to a back road in Des Moines by a Safeway and Bartell 

Drugs. He parked on the side of the road, backhanded Rankin in the face, and 

started strangling her again. Legrone again brought up Rankin’s past 

relationships. He then grabbed a knife out of his pocket and told her to get out of 

the car and go into the bushes, where they would “stab each other,” and “only 

one of us was going to make it out alive.” After a struggle, Rankin jumped out of 

her car, ran barefoot across the street, and asked some people if she could use 

their phone. They offered to call the police, but she refused because Legrone 

had told her that if she did so, he would hurt Rankin, Wheeler, and Wheeler’s 

children. They did not let her use their phone. 

Rankin testified that she then hid for a few minutes before walking to a bus 

stop, where she paid someone $20 to use their phone to call Wheeler because

“that’s the only number [she] had memorized.” Rankin asked Wheeler to call 

Rankin’s mother, who later picked up Rankin from the nearby Safeway.
No. 85116-1-I/4

4

For most of the incident, Rankin’s phone was in the car and still connected

with Wheeler. Wheeler testified that she could hear Legrone threatening to kill 

Rankin and hitting her, stating, “I’m hearing thumps, and her reaction to them, . . . 

like, stop hitting me.” Wheeler could also hear Legrone choking Rankin, 

testifying that she “could hear . . . the struggle when someone chokes. . . . [L]ike, 

that they are gasping for air and that they can’t breathe. And after he let go, you 

could tell her voice was faint, like, stop choking me. I can’t breathe. Like, stop.”

Wheeler said that she could see the location of Rankin’s phone using the Life360

app, and when she saw Rankin’s car “on the move,” she used another phone to 

call 911 so she could focus on Rankin’s location and help the police “find her.” 

The trial court admitted a recording of Wheeler’s 911 call and played it for the 

jury.

Legrone’s defense theory was that Rankin was jealous of his relationships 

with other women and falsified her accusations against him. Before trial, 

Legrone moved in limine to admit evidence of a March 2021 incident involving 

Rankin and Legrone. According to a Federal Way police report, officers 

responded to a domestic dispute on March 20 between Legrone and Rankin. 

Officer Colleen Borders spoke with Rankin and reported:

Rankin stated her and Le[g]rone have been dating on and off again 

throughout the years. Rankin stated Le[g]rone wanted to get back 

with Rankin, and he arrived at her house in Auburn. Rankin stated 

she got into his vehicle and Le[g]rone took off towards Federal 

Way.

Rankin stated she was kidnapped by Le[g]rone and they ended up 

at the Commons Mall parking lot in Federal Way. I asked Rankin if 

she left the vehicle once stopped at the Commons Mall, she stated 

“no.” Rankin made the comment she punched Le[g]rone in the face 
No. 85116-1-I/5

5

multiple times but she claimed “Self-defense,” because she was 

being kidnapped. I asked again if Rankin attempted to try and flee 

the vehicle and she stated no. I asked if Rankin was held against 

her will and she refused to comment and kept saying “it was 

self[-]defense.” 

Rankin stated Le[g]rone also punched her in her face around her 

mouth area. I could not see any physical injuries on Rankin. She 

stated she was not in pain and did not need aid.

I saw fresh blood outside the driver’s door. I asked Rankin if she 

was bleeding and she stated no. When asked whose blood was 

that she stated she did not know. 

Officer Borders also asked Legrone “what had happened.” According to 

Officer Borders’ report, Legrone

stated he helped Rankin purchase a phone from another 

female. . . . As Le[g]rone spoke to me I could see blood pooling 

inside his mouth. I asked why he was bleeding, he stated, Rankin 

struck him in the face multiple times and caused his tooth to crack. 

I had Le[g]rone open his mouth on the left side I could see a tooth 

that was halfway missing and Le[g]rone’s gums actively 

bleeding. . . . Le[g]rone stated Rankin went “crazy” because of a 

cellphone and struck him, unknown the amount of times. 

Le[g]rone stated he pushed Rankin off of him while he was being 

struck. He stated that was the only time he put hands on Rankin. 

Le[g]rone refused any medical attention on scene.

Because of Legrone’s “visible injuries” and Rankin’s admission “that she 

struck [him] multiple times,” Officer Borders placed Rankin in custody for DV 

fourth degree assault. But when Legrone saw Officer Borders arresting Rankin, 

he “recanted his whole story” and stated he would not cooperate with police, give 

any statements, or consent to being photographed. 

Legrone argued that evidence of the March 20, 2021 incident was “central 

to the defense theory” because Rankin “lied to the police” and told them that he 

kidnapped her, “the same allegation as in this case.” He argued the fact that 
No. 85116-1-I/6

6

Rankin assaulted Legrone and falsely accused him of kidnapping “is admissible 

as motive and similar plan or conduct” under ER 404(b), and because Rankin 

claimed she bit Legrone in the chest in self-defense in the July 2021 incident, her 

“false claim of self-defense in March of 2021 is admissible to show a similar 

plan.” Legrone also argued that under ER 608(b), evidence of the March 2021 

incident was admissible “to impeach [Rankin] with specific instances of 

misconduct, including falsely accusing Mr. Legrone of assaulting and kidnapping 

her in March 2021.” 

The trial court excluded evidence of the March 2021 incident, explaining:

The Court finds that while the fact the incident occurred has 

been shown by a preponderance of the evidence, there is nothing 

to show that Ms. Rankin actually lied to the police. This is 

particularly true given the dynamics surrounding [DV] relationships. 

Notably the officers could not testify as to what happened, rather 

they could only testify as to injuries observed and hearsay 

statements made to them, so it would result in a trial within a trial 

on a collateral matter. Furthermore, the Court finds that the 

probative value is not very high. The Court finds that this incident 

does not meet the threshold for modus operandi under the 

evidentiary rules and its tie to a theory that Ms. Rankin lied because 

she was jealous is tenuous. In contrast, the prejudicial effect is 

quite high given that Ms. Rankin was arrested in the earlier incident 

for assault because she did not have visible injuries and Mr. 

Legrone did. In the end, the Court finds the incident merely 

amounts to impermissible propensity evidence, the prejudice of 

which far outweighs any probative value.[2]

The jury ultimately hung on the charge of theft of a motor vehicle, which 

the trial court later dismissed. The jury found Legrone guilty of first degree 

kidnapping and second degree assault, and it also found that Legrone and 

 

2 The court indicated that it would allow defense counsel “to raise the incident in 

a sanitized manner” to impeach Rankin if she testified, consistent with a defense 

interview, that she had not seen Legrone since November 2020. That part of the court’s 

ruling is not at issue. 
No. 85116-1-I/7

7

Rankin were “intimate partners prior to or at the time the crime[s] were 

committed.” 

At sentencing, the trial court found that Legrone was a persistent offender 

under the POAA, also known as the “three strikes” law, and imposed LWOP on 

both convictions. In doing so, the court declined Legrone’s invitation to “hold the 

three strikes law is unconstitutional as administered for all defendants and as to 

Mr. Legrone.” 

Legrone appeals. 

ANALYSIS

Legrone argues the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a 

defense by excluding evidence of the March 20, 2021 incident and erred by 

imposing an LWOP sentence under the POAA. He also asks us to remand to the 

trial court to strike the $500 VPA from his judgment and sentence due to his 

indigency. Finally, Legrone raises several arguments in three SAGs. We 

address each of his arguments in turn.

Right to Present a Defense

Legrone argues that the trial court erred under ER 404(b) and 608(b) and 

violated his right to present a defense by excluding evidence of the March 20, 

2021 Federal Way incident. We disagree.

“ ‘A criminal defendant’s right to present a defense is guaranteed by both 

the federal and state constitutions.’ ” State v. Butler, 200 Wn.2d 695, 713, 521 

P.3d 931 (2022) (quoting State v. Jennings, 199 Wn.2d 53, 63, 502 P.3d 1255 

(2022)). We apply a two-part analysis to determine whether the exclusion of 
No. 85116-1-I/8

8

evidence violates that right. State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 797-98, 453 P.3d 

696 (2019). First, we review the evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. Id. at 

797. Then, we consider de novo whether the ruling deprived the defendant of his 

constitutional right to present a defense. Id. at 797-98. 

Legrone sought to admit evidence of the March 2021 incident under ER 

404(b). That rule provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 

conformity therewith,” but it “may . . . be admissible for other purposes, such as 

proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident.” ER 404(b). To admit evidence of other acts 

under ER 404(b), the trial court must (1) identify the purpose for which the 

evidence is sought to be introduced, (2) determine whether the evidence is 

relevant to prove an element of the charged crime, (3) weigh the probative value 

of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, and (4) find by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the act actually occurred. State v. Lough, 125 Wn.2d 847, 853, 

889 P.2d 487 (1995). 

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that 

evidence of the March 2021 incident was inadmissible under ER 404(b). As 

much as Legrone offered the evidence to show that because Rankin lied about 

that incident, she must be lying now, that is exactly the kind of propensity

evidence the rule prohibits. Furthermore, the evidence was, as offered by 

Legrone, relevant only to the extent it showed that Rankin lied to officers during 

the incident. But as the trial court observed, the responding officers could not 
No. 85116-1-I/9

9

testify as to what happened between Legrone and Rankin—only what they 

observed at the scene. So, as much as Legrone sought to admit the evidence to 

show something other than propensity, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by determining that Legrone failed to show by a preponderance that Rankin lied 

about what happened before the officers arrived on March 20. 

Legrone also sought to admit evidence of the March 2021 incident under 

ER 608(b) to impeach Rankin. As relevant here, that rule provides that specific 

instances of a witness’ conduct may, “in the discretion of the court, if probative of 

truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross examination of the 

witness . . . concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” 

ER 608(b).

3

 

Again, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under ER 608(b). When 

asked what testimony Legrone planned to present to show that Rankin lied in 

March 2021, Legrone responded that he planned to present the officers’ 

testimony and, “potentially,” his own. But testimony about the incident from the 

officers and Legrone was not admissible under ER 608(b), which clearly states 

that except for convictions of certain crimes, instances of conduct “may not be 

proved by extrinsic evidence.” So, if Rankin denied on cross-examination that 

she lied to officers during the March 2021 incident, the inquiry would be at an 

end. See State v. Barnes, 54 Wn. App. 536, 540, 774 P.2d 547 (1989) (in an 

attempt to impeach a witness, cross-examiner must take the answer of the 

 

3 Emphasis added. 
No. 85116-1-I/10

10

witness and may not call a second witness to contradict the first witness). The 

trial court did not err by excluding evidence of the March 20, 2021 incident.

Finally, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings did not deprive Legrone of his 

constitutional right to present a defense. Legrone himself says he had witnesses 

“waiting in the wings” to testify that Rankin was jealous of his relationships with 

other women. Yet he did not call any of those witnesses. And he does not 

articulate how the trial court’s ruling about the March 2021 incident prevented 

him from calling them. 

In any event, Legrone effectively impeached Rankin’s credibility. For 

example, he elicited inconsistencies between Rankin’s testimony and her 

interview with detectives, her testimony and her interview with defense counsel, 

her testimony and Wheeler’s testimony, and her description of being strangled 

and a nurse’s testimony about physical signs of strangulation. He also elicited 

testimony from Rankin that she claimed not to remember the name of her 

boyfriend at the time of the incident, yet she also testified that she set up her 

phone so that any missed calls would go to him. And as defense counsel 

pointed out in closing, Wheeler could be heard in the 911 call identifying the male 

voice in the background as “Nathan” or “Michael Johnson.” In short, the trial 

court’s exclusion of evidence about the March 2021 incident did not prevent 

Legrone from presenting his defense theory that Rankin falsified her accusation. 

Legrone disagrees, relying mainly on State v. Young, 48 Wn. App. 406, 

739 P.2d 1170 (1987). In that case, defendant Young, charged with vehicular 

homicide, claimed that Vince Setzer, one of the victim passengers, caused the 
No. 85116-1-I/11

11

accident by reaching over and grabbing the steering wheel. Id. at 408. Young

offered proof that three witnesses would testify that within the last year and a 

half, Setzer had grabbed the steering wheel away from a driver on four different 

occasions. Id. The trial court excluded the evidence under ER 403 as unduly 

prejudicial. Id. at 409. Division Three reversed, explaining that “ER 403 does not 

extend to the exclusion of crucial evidence relevant to the central contention of a 

valid defense.” Id. at 413. The court observed that “evidence of Mr. Setzer’s 

conduct on the night of the accident was highly probative and crucial” to Young’s 

theory that it was not him, but Setzer, who caused the accident. Id. 

Here, as discussed, Legrone could offer no testimony to prove that Rankin 

committed the relevant act on March 20, 2021—a false kidnapping and assault 

accusation. So, the evidence was neither highly probative nor crucial to his 

defense theory. Young does not require reversal. 

LWOP Sentence

Legrone next argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him to LWOP

under the POAA, which he asserts is unconstitutional. We review constitutional 

challenges de novo. State v. Ross, 28 Wn App. 2d 644, 646, 537 P.3d 1114 

(2023), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1026, 544 P.3d 30 (2024). 

Relying on State v. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 1, 427 P.3d 621 (2018), Legrone

asserts that we “should hold the three strikes law is unconstitutional as 

administered for all defendants and as to [him]” because of the substantial racial 

disparity in three strikes defendants, and because only 10 other states impose 

such sentences. In Gregory, our Supreme Court held that Washington courts 
No. 85116-1-I/12

12

imposed the death penalty in an arbitrary and racially biased manner, violating

the state constitutional prohibition on cruel punishment.4 192 Wn.2d at 35;

WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines 

imposed, nor cruel punishment inflicted.”). In so holding, the court converted all 

death sentences to life imprisonment. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d at 35-36. 

Legrone correctly points out that the Gregory court “decline[d] to require 

indisputably true social science to prove that [Washington’s] death penalty is 

impermissibly imposed based on race.” 192 Wn.2d at 21. Still, the court 

“afford[ed] great weight” to a statistical analysis that went through a “rigorous 

review process,” including factfinding by a commissioner. Id. at 19, 20 n.7. And 

the analysis showed that the “process by which the death penalty [was] imposed”

was administered in an arbitrary and racially biased manner. Id. at 14, 18-19.5 

For example, the analysis showed that “[a]t the very most, there is an 11 percent 

chance that the observed association between race and the death penalty . . . is 

attributed to random chance rather than true association.” Id. at 20. And the

commissioner found that 

“special sentencing proceedings in Washington State involving 

Black defendants were between 3.5 and 4.6 times as likely to result 

in a death sentence as proceedings involving non-Black defendants 

 

4 Legrone also argued below that the POAA violates equal protection. But he 

does not engage in an equal protection analysis in his briefing before this court. 

Accordingly, to the extent he renews his equal protection argument, we decline to 

consider it because it is inadequately briefed. See Norcon Builders, LLC v. GMP Homes 

VG, LLC, 161 Wn. App. 474, 486, 254 P.3d 835 (2011) (“We will not consider an 

inadequately briefed argument.”). 

5 Emphasis added. 
No. 85116-1-I/13

13

after the impact of the other variables included in the model has 

been taken into account.”

Id. at 19.

Legrone points out that Black men like himself are overrepresented 

among defendants sentenced to LWOP under the POAA. But, unlike Gregory,

he provides no analysis showing that this is because courts administer the POAA 

in an arbitrary and racially biased manner. As Division Two recently observed in 

State v. Nelson, ___ Wn. App. 2d ___, 550 P.3d 529, 535 (2024), “imposition of 

a[n] LWOP sentence under the POAA involves a different procedure than the 

imposition of the death penalty addressed in Gregory.” It pointed out that “the 

POAA is not administered on a case by case basis as the death sentence was 

administered in Gregory”; instead, it “is administered the same way no matter 

who the defendant; all offenders who commit three [strike] offenses will be 

sentenced to LWOP.”6 Id. So, it declined to invalidate the POAA under 

Gregory’s framework. Id. 

Furthermore, our Supreme Court has held that LWOP sentences do not 

constitute cruel punishment. See State v. Moretti, 193 Wn.2d 809, 820, 446 P.3d 

609 (2019) (“We have continually upheld sentences imposed under the POAA as 

constitutional and not cruel under article I, section 14.”); cf. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 

at 14 (“ ‘The death penalty differs qualitatively from all other punishments, and 

 

6 We recognize that racial disproportionality may occur before an offender appears before 

the court facing an LWOP sentence. For example, police may disproportionally arrest Black 

offenders for offenses that result in an LWOP sentence and/or prosecutors may disproportionally 

charge Black offenders with crimes that result in an LWOP sentence. But those issues occur 

outside the court’s administration of POAA sentences.
No. 85116-1-I/14

14

therefore requires a correspondingly high level of reliability.’ ”) (quoting State v. 

Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 663, 904 P.2d 245 (1995)). 

In short, while we share Nelson’s “serious concerns about the racially 

disproportionate impact of the POAA,” Legrone does not show that this impact 

results from racially biased administration of the POAA. 550 P.3d at 535. The 

trial court did not err by sentencing Legrone to LWOP as mandated by the 

POAA. 

VPA

Legrone next asserts we should remand to the trial court to strike the $500 

VPA from his judgment and sentence based on his indigency. We agree.

Effective July 1, 2023, the legislature prohibited courts from imposing the 

VPA on indigent defendants. See LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1 (amending RCW 

7.68.035). The trial court sentenced Legrone on March 17, 2023, before the 

amendments took effect. But the amendments to RCW 7.68.035 apply to cases 

on direct appeal. State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023). 

The State does not dispute that Legrone is indigent and concedes that 

remand is appropriate. We accept the State’s concession and remand to strike 

the VPA. 

SAGs

Legrone makes several arguments in three SAGs. As discussed below, 

none require reversal. 

First, Legrone argues that the trial court erred by allowing certain 

testimony and that the prosecutor erred by eliciting the testimony. We disagree. 
No. 85116-1-I/15

15

At trial, Rankin testified on direct that after she and Legrone ended their 

relationship, she would see him “here and there.” Legrone points out that when 

the prosecutor asked Rankin, “[W]hat were those situations usually like,” Rankin 

responded, “Um, usually physical altercations.” Later, Rankin testified that when 

Legrone asked her during the incident why she could not love him the way she 

loved her family, she told him that she “couldn’t love him because he tried to 

keep [her] away from [her] family.” 

Legrone contends that the trial court erred under ER 404(b) by admitting 

the testimony, and that by eliciting it, the prosecutor either committed misconduct 

or opened the door to evidence of the March 2021 incident. But the trial court

sustained defense counsel’s objection and instructed the jury to disregard 

Rankin’s “physical altercations” testimony. And Legrone does not show that the 

jury ignored this instruction. See State v. Martinez, 2 Wn. App. 2d 55, 77, 408 

P.3d 721 (2018) (we presume jurors follow the court’s instructions). Further, to 

be entitled to relief, Legrone must establish that the “physical altercations” 

testimony prejudiced him. See State v. Agee, 89 Wn.2d 416, 419, 573 P.2d 355 

(1977) (“[E]rror without prejudice is not ground for reversal.”). But he shows no 

prejudice. 

As for Rankin’s testimony about why she told Legrone she could not love 

him, the trial court overruled Legrone’s ER 404(b) objection to that testimony. 

The court reasoned that the State did not offer it to show conformity with a prior 

act, but to explain Legrone’s motive. We are unpersuaded that this was an 

abuse of discretion. And even if it was, Legrone does not show that he was 
No. 85116-1-I/16

16

prejudiced by the admission of Rankin’s vague testimony in this regard. He also 

does not establish that this indefinite testimony opened the door to questioning 

about the March 2021 incident. See State v. Broussard, 25 Wn. App. 2d 781, 

791, 525 P.3d 615 (2023) (“ ‘A party may open the door to otherwise 

inadmissible evidence by introducing evidence that must be rebutted in order to 

preserve fairness and determine the truth.’ ”)7(quoting State v. Wafford, 199 Wn. 

App. 32, 36-37, 397 P.3d 926 (2017)). 

Next, Legrone contends that the trial court erred by admitting certain 

testimony of Rankin and Wheeler to the extent that Rankin and Wheeler 

contradicted one another or contradicted a police officer’s testimony. He points 

out that the conflicts called both Rankin’s and Wheeler’s credibility into question. 

But this is not a basis for relief because determining the credibility of witnesses 

and resolving conflicting evidence is the exclusive province of the jury, not the 

court. See State v. Allen, 116 Wn. App. 454, 466, 66 P.3d 653 (2003).

Finally, in a “Motion to Allow [Amended] Sta[t]ement of [A]dditional 

Grounds” attached to his May 9, 2024 SAG, Legrone claims “ineffective 

assistan[ce] of counsel,” “properly addressing a hostile [witness] by impeaching 

her and implementing ER 607,” and “violation of confrontation clause rights” 

under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.8 But he does not 

articulate the basis for these claims, so we do not consider them. See RAP 

10.10(c) (“Reference to the record and citations to authorities are not necessary 

 

7 Emphasis added.

8 As much as we have addressed the claims here, we grant the motion. 
No. 85116-1-I/17

17

or required [in a SAG], but the appellate court will not consider a defendant’s 

[SAG] if it does not inform the court of the nature and occurrence of alleged 

errors.”). 

We remand to the trial court to strike the $500 VPA from Legrone’s 

judgment and sentence. Otherwise, we affirm his convictions and sentence.

WE CONCUR: