* Under 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-60607

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

ANDY CHARLES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Mississippi

July 20, 1998

Before WISDOM, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Andy Charles was convicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiracy

to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine with

intent to distribute. He appeals his conviction and sentence. We affirm.

First, Charles argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence

obtained by narcotics officers when they executed a search warrant at the “Hy-N-Dry Mini Storage”

facilit y in Jackson, Mississippi. Charles argues that the search warrant was not supported by probable2 Probable cause to support a search warrant is deter mined under the totality of the

circumstances. United States v. Fisher , 22 F.3d 574, 578-9 (5th Cir. 1994).

3 See Id

.

4 We review the sufficiency of the evidence to su ppo rt a conviction in the light most

favorable to the verdict. If a reasonable t rier of fact could have found the defendant guilty, the

conviction must be upheld. United States v. Dean , 59 F.3d 1479, 1484 (5th Cir. 1995).

5 See Boren v. N.L. Indus., Inc. , 889 F.2d 1463, 1465 (5th Cir. 1989).

2 cause. 2 We disagree. A confidential informant notified t he narcotics officers of drug trafficking

activities invo lving Charles and the storage facilit y. The officers obtained co rroboration of the

informant’s stateme nt s t hro ugh surveillance and the use of a narcotics-sniffing dog. The search

warrant was supported by probable cause. 3

Next, Charles argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conv ictions. We

disagree. Charles was caught “red-handed”. Charles drove Morias Josephs, his coconspirator, to the

storage facilit

y and was arrested with Josephs in the facilit y containing drugs, drug paraphernalia, and

a loaded assault rifle. Charles also possessed keys to another storage unit that contained drugs.

From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude th at Charles was engaged in a conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The jury could also conclude that Charles was guilty

of the substantive offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and aiding and abetting that

offense. 4

Charles also argues that the magistrate judge erred by denying his motion for severance and

his motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant used by the officers. Charles did not

appeal these rulings to the district court. We do not have jurisdiction to hear these issues. 5

Finally, Charles argues that the district court erred during sentencing by increasing his base6 United States v. Garza , 118 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 1997).

7 United States v. Thomas , 120 F.3d 564, 574 (5th Cir. 1997).

3 offense level by two under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (b) (1) because Charles did not possess a firearm during

the drug-trafficking offense. The district court’s decisio n t o increase a defendant’s sentence level

under § 2D1.1 (b) (1) is a factual finding that we review for clear error. 6 In the present case, there

is ample evidence to support the increase. The officers found one firearm in the car driven by Charles

and another in the storage facilit y where Charles was arrested. Even if these firearms belonged to

Joseph as Charles alleges, Charles can still be held accountable for them since Joseph’s possession

of the firearms was reasonably foreseeable. 7 The district court did not err.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.