[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

State ex rel. Williams v. Trim, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3372.] 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-3372 

THE STATE EX REL. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT, v. TRIM, WARDEN, APPELLEE. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Williams v. Trim, Slip Opinion 

No. 2015-Ohio-3372.] 

Mandamus—Prohibition—Injunction—Sua sponte dismissal on the merits without 

notice warranted only when complaint is frivolous or claimant obviously 

cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint—Court of appeals 

lacks original jurisdiction to issue prohibitory injunction—Dismissal 

affirmed in part and reversed in part—Cause remanded. 

(No. 2014-0899—Submitted April 14, 2015—Decided August 25, 2015.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Union County, No. 14-13-18. 

_____________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this appeal of an 

original action, to allow briefing and consideration of the mandamus claim of 

appellant, Agatha Martin Williams. Williams, an inmate, objects to the Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s attachment of money in her prison 

account because it originated from a pension, and she claims that the money is 

therefore exempt from garnishment or attachment under R.C. 2329.66. 

{¶ 2} In her complaint below, Williams sought several different forms of 

relief, including an injunction, a writ of prohibition, and a writ of mandamus. 

Following a preliminary motion below, the court of appeals, without notice, 

dismissed Williams’s entire case. The court of appeals correctly dismissed most 

of Williams’s complaint, even without notice. However, her mandamus claims 

regarding, among other things, the exempt status of the pension money placed in 

her prison account, should not have been dismissed. Rather, the court should 

have given her notice that it intended to consider her mandamus claims and 

allowed her to brief the issues before deciding the merits. 

{¶ 3} Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the court 

of appeals to allow Williams to brief her mandamus claims before the court of 

appeals decides them on the merits. 

Facts 

{¶ 4} Williams was convicted in Stark County on various counts of theft, 

grand theft, and forgery. She is serving a 102-month sentence at the Ohio 

Reformatory for Women. 

{¶ 5} Williams is the beneficiary of a lifetime pension benefit from the 

Timken Company, based on a qualified domestic-relations order, and she began 

receiving $412.18 per month on March 1, 2011. Williams alleges that the benefit 

is deposited directly into a checking account that she holds jointly with her adult 

daughter, who occasionally transfers a portion of the funds from the checking 

account into Williams’s prison account. 

{¶ 6} In December 2012, Williams was served with a court order to pay an 

obligation. The sentencing judgment in her criminal conviction ordered her to 

pay restitution in the amount of $166,354.94 and a fine of $27,500. Williams 
January Term, 2015 

3

went through the allowed prison procedures to object to the attachment of the 

funds in her prison account, claiming that they were pension benefits exempt from 

garnishment under R.C. 2329.66. Nevertheless, a hold was placed on her prison 

account. 

{¶ 7} Williams completed the inmate grievance process regarding her 

objection to the collection of her funds. This and other grievances were 

ultimately denied. She claims that the business office placed her account on 

legal-hold status and allowed her only $25 per month to spend at the commissary 

and that starting in January 2013, everything greater than that amount was 

garnished and sent to the Stark County Clerk of Courts. 

{¶ 8} In her complaint before the court of appeals, Williams sought 

injunctive relief, a writ of prohibition, and a writ of mandamus ordering the 

warden to exempt the funds in Williams’s account from attachment or 

garnishment. 

{¶ 9} The warden filed an answer to the complaint. Approximately three 

weeks later, Williams filed a one-page motion seeking a temporary restraining 

order and preliminary injunction, with no memorandum in support. The warden 

filed a memorandum in opposition. Williams did not reply. Based on this 

briefing alone, the court of appeals dismissed the case in its entirety. Williams 

appealed to this court. 

Analysis 

{¶ 10} We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing an 

appellate court’s decision to deny a writ of mandamus. State ex rel. Mun. Constr. 

Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. Cleveland, 141 Ohio St.3d 113, 2014-Ohio4364, 22 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 24, citing State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers 

Retirement Bd. of Ohio, 136 Ohio St.3d 103, 2013-Ohio-1777, 991 N.E.2d 218, 

¶ 55. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

{¶ 11} Sua sponte dismissal of a case on the merits without notice is 

warranted only “ ‘when a complaint is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot 

prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.’ ” State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer 

v. Ronan, 124 Ohio St.3d 17, 2009-Ohio-5947, 918 N.E.2d 515, ¶ 3, quoting State 

ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, 

¶ 14, and citing State ex rel. Duran v. Kelsey, 106 Ohio St.3d 58, 2005-Ohio3674, 831 N.E.2d 430, ¶ 7. 

Sua sponte dismissal of injunction and prohibition claims 

{¶ 12} The court of appeals correctly dismissed Williams’s claims for 

injunctive relief. A court of appeals lacks original jurisdiction to grant 

prohibitory injunctions. State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health, 77 

Ohio St.3d 247, 248, 673 N.E.2d 1281 (1997). “Neither [the Supreme Court] nor 

a court of appeals has original jurisdiction in prohibitory injunction.” Id., citing 

State ex rel. Governor v. Taft, 71 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 640 N.E.2d 1136 (1994), and 

State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967), 

paragraph four of the syllabus. Because Williams “obviously cannot prevail on 

the facts alleged in the complaint” with regard to injunctive relief, the court below 

was correct in dismissing this part of her complaint, even without notice. See

Ronan, 124 Ohio St.3d 17, 2009-Ohio-5947, 918 N.E.2d 515, at ¶ 3. 

{¶ 13} The court of appeals also correctly held, even without notice, that 

Williams obviously cannot prevail on her claim for a writ of prohibition. To be 

entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Williams must establish that (1) the 

warden is about to or has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power 

is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which 

no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Bell v. 

Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18, 23; State ex 

rel. Miller v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 130 Ohio St.3d 24, 2011-Ohio-4623, 

955 N.E.2d 379, ¶ 12. The last two elements may be established by showing that 
January Term, 2015 

5

the respondent who is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power patently 

and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil & 

Gas Comm., 135 Ohio St.3d 204, 2013-Ohio-224, 985 N.E. 2d 480, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 14} The warden is not alleged to have engaged in judicial or quasijudicial power by putting a hold on Williams’s account. Judicial or quasi-judicial 

power is defined as the power “to hear and determine controversies that require a 

hearing resembling a judicial trial.” (Emphasis omitted.) State ex rel. Bruggeman 

v. Ingraham, 87 Ohio St.3d 230, 231, 718 N.E.2d 1285 (1999), citing State ex rel. 

Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 72 Ohio St.3d 69, 71, 647 N.E.2d 

769 (1995). 

{¶ 15} Therefore, Williams “obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged 

in the complaint” as to her claims in prohibition, and those claims were properly 

dismissed sua sponte by the court below. See Ronan, 124 Ohio St.3d 17, 2009-

Ohio-5947, 918 N.E.2d 515, at ¶ 3. 

Sua sponte dismissal of mandamus claims 

{¶ 16} The court of appeals erred in dismissing Williams’s mandamus 

claims without giving her the opportunity to brief them. To be entitled to 

extraordinary relief in mandamus, Williams must establish a clear legal right to 

the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of the warden to provide it, and 

the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. 

Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. 

Williams must prove that she is entitled to the writ by clear and convincing 

evidence. Id. at ¶ 13. 

{¶ 17} Williams’s first request for relief involves the substantive question 

whether the money transferred from her checking account into her inmate account 

may be attached because it originally comes from a pension. R.C. 5120.133 

allows the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to take and transmit funds 

in a prisoner’s account to a court for payment of a stated obligation. R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

5120.133(A). The department may also make rules specifying that a portion of the 

inmate’s money may be retained and not used to satisfy the obligation. R.C. 

5120.133(B). However, the rules cannot permit the disbursement of funds if 

those funds are exempt under R.C. 2329.66. Id. R.C. 2329.66 exempts certain 

pension benefits from garnishment or attachment. R.C. 2329.66(A)(10). 

{¶ 18} In Daugherty v. Cent. Trust Co. of Northeastern Ohio, N.A., 28 

Ohio St.3d 441, 504 N.E.2d 1100 (1986), we explored the question whether funds 

remain exempt under R.C. 2329.66 when deposited in a checking account. We 

concluded that statutorily exempt funds do not lose their exempt status when 

deposited in a personal checking account and held that the rationale for that 

conclusion was “to protect funds intended primarily for maintenance and support 

of the debtor’s family.” Id. at 445. That rationale would be frustrated “if exempt 

funds were automatically deprived of their statutory immunity when deposited in 

a checking account * * * in order to pay by check those regular subsistence 

expenses [the debtor] incurs.” Id. 

{¶ 19} In Daugherty we held that “personal earnings exempt from 

execution, garnishment, attachment, or sale to satisfy a judgment or order * * * 

retain their exempt status when deposited in a personal checking account, so long 

as the source of the exempt funds is known or reasonably traceable.” Id.

{¶ 20} Unlike in Daugherty, the funds in this case are not simply 

deposited in a checking account. The pension funds are deposited into a bank 

account held jointly by Williams and her college-age daughter. Williams alleges 

that her daughter uses most of the money to support Williams’s family but 

periodically places amounts from this account into Williams’s inmate account for 

her use at the prison. She claims that the source of the exempt funds is, as it was 

in Daugherty, “known or reasonably traceable.” 

{¶ 21} Because Williams has a colorable argument that the funds in her 

inmate account are exempt from attachment, the court of appeals erred in 
January Term, 2015 

7

dismissing Williams’s mandamus claim, sua sponte, on the merits. Her 

arguments are not frivolous, nor is it true that she “obviously cannot prevail on 

the facts alleged in the complaint.” Ronan, 124 Ohio St.3d 17, 2009-Ohio-5947, 

918 N.E.2d 515, at ¶ 3. 

{¶ 22} Williams’s complaint raises some issues for which she may not be 

able to satisfy the requirements for a writ of mandamus. Specifically, she alleges 

that the warden violated her constitutional rights and did not follow the guidelines 

for collection procedures in Ohio Adm.Code 5120-5-03 and federal and Ohio 

laws governing collections. These laws and state and federal civil-rights statutes 

such as 42 U.S.C. 1983 may provide Williams with adequate remedies for the 

possible violation of due process and collections procedures. If that is the case, 

her mandamus claims would be subject to dismissal, as Williams “obviously 

cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint” where alternate remedies 

exist. See Ronan at ¶ 3. 

{¶ 23} However, the court below dismissed these claims on the basis that 

the statutes and procedures authorizing collections are constitutional. Williams is 

not asserting that the laws are unconstitutional, but that the procedures were 

improperly followed. Williams must be given the opportunity to brief the 

mandamus issue with regard to these claims before they may be dismissed. 

{¶ 24} In addition, “ ‘if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of 

mandamus indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a 

prohibitory injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in 

mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’ ” State ex rel. Satow 

v. Gausse-Milliken, 98 Ohio St.3d 479, 2003-Ohio-2074, 786 N.E.2d 1289, ¶ 13, 

quoting State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson, 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 N.E.2d 

704 (1999). If Williams’s complaint in mandamus is really asking for a 

prohibitory injunction, she has an alternate remedy at law and a writ of mandamus 

is precluded. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

{¶ 25} To divine the true objects of Williams’s mandamus action, the 

court “ ‘must examine [her] complaint “to see whether it actually seeks to prevent, 

rather than to compel, official action.” ’ ” Satow at ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel. 

Cunningham v. Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A., 94 Ohio St.3d 323, 324, 762 

N.E.2d 1012 (2002), quoting State ex rel. Stamps v. Montgomery Cty. Automatic 

Data Processing Bd., 42 Ohio St.3d 164, 166, 538 N.E.2d 105 (1989). 

{¶ 26} Williams couches her request for relief in mandamus as a request 

for an order compelling the performance of an affirmative duty, that is, to exempt 

her account from attachment. The warden in her brief below and before this court 

asserts that Williams is actually seeking a prohibitory injunction preventing 

official action by blocking the hold placed on Williams’s account. This too is a 

close question, requiring notice to Williams before the court can dismiss her 

complaint sua sponte. It is not clear as to this question that she “obviously cannot 

prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.” Ronan, 124 Ohio St.3d 17, 2009-

Ohio-5947, 918 N.E.2d 515, at ¶ 3. 

{¶ 27} Because the court of appeals erroneously dismissed Williams’s 

mandamus claims on the merits without notice, we reverse and remand for that 

court to allow briefing and presentation of evidence before deciding Williams’s 

mandamus claims. “ ‘ “Generally, reversal of a court of appeals’ erroneous 

dismissal of a complaint based upon failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted requires a remand [to that court] for further proceedings.” ’ ” 

(Brackets sic.) State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contractors Assn. v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. 

Servs., 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 184, 699 N.E.2d 64 (1998), quoting State ex rel. 

Rogers v. McGee Brown, 80 Ohio St.3d 408, 410–411, 686 N.E.2d 1126 (1997), 

quoting State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner, 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 163, 656 N.E.2d 1288 

(1995). 

{¶ 28} Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand the 

case so that the court of appeals may order briefing with regard to Williams’s 
January Term, 2015 

9

mandamus claims, both on the question of the true nature of her complaint and on 

the merits of her claims. Once the issues are fully briefed, the court of appeals 

may then decide the case. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 29} The court of appeals was correct in dismissing most of the relief 

requested by Williams even without notice and a response from Williams. 

However, the court of appeals’ dismissal of Williams’s request for a writ of 

mandamus was in error. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand 

the case to the court of appeals for full briefing and decision of the outstanding 

issues. 

Judgment affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, 

and cause remanded. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and

O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

O’DONNELL, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 

appeals. 

_____________________ 

 Agatha Martin Williams, pro se. 

 Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Mindy Worly, Principal 

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 

_______________