IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

January 12, 2022 Session

IN RE ESTATE OF PATSY GLOVER BONIFIELD

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Crockett County

No. 10290 George R. Ellis, Chancellor

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No. W2020-01593-COA-R3-CV

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Appellant, an attorney, filed a creditor’s claim against Decedent’s estate for legal fees

allegedly owed to Appellant for his representation of Decedent in her divorce action and

in her challenge of the seizure of certain assets by the State of Tennessee. Appellant argued 

that he represented Decedent in the seizure matter under a contingency fee agreement; 

however, Appellant failed to produce a valid contingency fee agreement. At the hearing, 

the only proof of fees Appellant produced was an invoice for $3,847.51, and the trial court 

awarded him the full amount of that invoice. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed and Remanded

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B. GOLDIN,

and CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JJ., joined.

David W. Camp, Jackson, Tennessee, appellant, pro se.

Randy C. Camp, Alamo, Tennessee, for the appellee, Estate of Patsy Glover Bonifield.

OPINION

I. Background

On November 11, 2013, Patsy Glover Bonifield (“Decedent”) hired Appellant 

David W. Camp to represent her in a divorce action against her husband, Glenn R. 

Bonifield (“Husband”). Decedent filed for divorce on November 25, 2013. In April 2016, 

while the divorce action was pending, agents with the drug task force raided Husband’s 

pharmacy. As a result of the raid, on May 4, 2016, the State of Tennessee (the “State”) 

03/07/2022
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seized several of Decedent and Husband’s marital assets, including: (1) a coin collection; 

(2) silver bars; (3) $13,280.74 in currency; and (4) the full value of Husband’s VOYA 

retirement account. Thereafter, Decedent allegedly asked Appellant to represent her in 

challenging the State’s seizure of these marital assets. 

On May 6, 2016, Appellant wrote a letter to Decedent concerning his representation 

of her in the seizure matter. In the letter, Appellant outlined a proposed contingency fee 

agreement whereby he would be compensated “33-1/3% of any and all amounts” Decedent 

recovered from the State. On May 13, 2016, Appellant filed a challenge to the seizure on 

Decedent’s behalf. During this time, Appellant continued to represent Decedent in the 

divorce action but charged her an hourly rate for those services. 

On December 5, 2016, Decedent and Husband settled their divorce action. Husband 

agreed to transfer his full interest in the seized assets, i.e., the coin collection, silver bars, 

bank accounts (including money seized), and the VOYA retirement account, to Decedent. 

This settlement was outlined in the couple’s Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) that 

was filed on January 19, 2017. On February 6, 2017, the final decree of divorce was 

entered. 

Despite being awarded all of the seized marital assets in the divorce, these assets 

were still in the State’s possession at the time of the entry of the final decree of divorce. 

Accordingly, Appellant continued to represent Decedent in the seizure matter. On January 

11, 2018, Decedent signed a formal settlement agreement with the State, and on January 

30, 2018 an Order of Compromise and Settlement was entered. Under the terms of the 

settlement, Decedent was awarded all of the silver bars and the remaining funds from the 

VOYA account after the State received $156,836.77. Decedent agreed to withdraw her 

claim to the remaining seized assets. After settling with the State, Appellant continued to 

work with VOYA to release the retirement funds to Decedent in accordance with the MDA. 

On March 7, 2018, Decedent died. Despite Decedent’s settlement of the seizure 

challenge, on March 21, 2018, Forrest Bonifield, Decedent’s son, executed an agreement

with Appellant for his representation of the Estate of Patsy Bonifield (the “Estate” or 

“Appellee”) against the State. This agreement provided that Appellant would receive 

“1/3%” of the assets recovered from the seizure.

On March 22, 2018, Mr. Bonifield filed a petition to be appointed the personal 

representative of the Estate in the Chancery Court for Crockett County (“trial court”). On 

March 30, 2018, Husband and Mr. Bonifield (as alternate payee and the alleged 

administrator of the Estate) executed the qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”)

required to transfer the VOYA funds to the Estate. On April 3, 2018, the trial court entered 

an order appointing Mr. Bonifield as the personal representative for the Estate. On June 

16, 2018, Mr. Bonifield died. 
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On July 12, 2018, Appellant filed a Verified Claim Against Estate (“Claim 1”)

seeking compensation for his “representation for recovery of proceeds from VOYA 

Retirement involving State of Tennessee seizure claim.” The date listed for Claim 1 was

March 21, 2018, the date Mr. Bonifield executed his agreement with Appellant on behalf

of the Estate. The total amount owed for Claim 1 was listed as “Pending,” but indicated 

that it should be “1/3 of all proceeds recovered on behalf of Estate.” On July 30, 2018, the 

trial court entered an order appointing one of Decedent’s daughters, Patricia Walls, as the 

successor personal representative of the Estate. On August 2, 2018, Appellant filed a 

second Verified Claim Against Estate (“Claim 2”) seeking payment of $3,847.51 for 

“Attorney Fees.” Attached to Claim 2 was a July 22, 2018 invoice addressed to Decedent 

for $3,847.51 in legal services. On August 15, 2018, Ms. Walls filed an objection to both 

claims.

During this time, Appellant continued to pursue the release of the VOYA retirement 

funds. On September 24, 2018, Appellant submitted a letter to VOYA threatening legal 

action if full disbursement was not provided. On October 8, 2018, pursuant to the MDA, 

VOYA released $360,018.87 to the Estate. Thereafter, under the settlement agreement,

$156,836.77 was paid to the State. At that time, the State released the silver bars to the 

Estate. 

The subject of this appeal concerns Appellant’s compensation for his representation 

in the seizure challenge, i.e., Claim 1. On November 18, 2019, the trial court entered an 

order finding, in pertinent part, that: (1) Decedent never executed a contingency fee 

agreement with Appellant for his representation in the seizure matter; (2) Claim 1 failed to 

satisfy the Rules of Professional Conduct, but assuming, arguendo, that the defects were 

cured, the amount requested in Claim 1 was unreasonable; (3) the agreement between 

Appellant and Mr. Bonifield was not a valid contingency fee agreement; and (4) at the time 

he entered into the agreement with Appellant, Mr. Bonifield did not have authority to bind 

the Estate. Therefore, the trial court found that Appellant was not entitled to 1/3 of the 

proceeds recovered from the seizure. However, the trial court acknowledged that 

Appellant “expended time on obtaining the VOYA retirement funds and should receive a 

reasonable fee” for such services. Accordingly, the trial court awarded Appellant a 

judgment of $3,847.51 against the Estate.

1

On December 13, 2019, Appellant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend, and the Estate 

responded on March 5, 2020. On October 19, 2020, the trial court entered an order denying 

the motion. Appellant appeals.

 

1 According to the Estate’s appellate brief, it has paid this Claim in full. Appellant does not appear 

to dispute this.
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II. Issue

We perceive the dispositive issue to be whether Decedent entered into a valid 

contingency fee agreement with Appellant.

III. Standard of Review

We review a non-jury case “de novo upon the record with a presumption of 

correctness as to the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is 

otherwise.” Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 

13(d)). The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and “are accorded no 

presumption of correctness.” Brunswick Acceptance Co., LLC v. MEJ, LLC, 292 S.W.3d 

638, 642 (Tenn. 2008). 

IV. Analysis

Appellant filed two claims against the Estate. See generally Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-

2-307. As discussed, supra, Claim 1, the focus of this appeal, alleged that the Estate owed 

Appellant “1/3 of all proceeds recovered on behalf of [the] Estate” from the seizure 

challenge. Appellant alleges that the contractual basis for Claim 1 is his March 21, 2018 

agreement with Mr. Bonifield, and the parties focus their appellate arguments on whether 

such agreement is a valid contingency fee contract and whether Mr. Bonifield had authority 

to bind the Estate to such contract. Based on the record, we conclude that the agreement 

Mr. Bonifield executed with Appellant provides no basis for Appellant to receive 

compensation for his representation in the seizure matter. Turning to the record, and as 

discussed supra, on January 30, 2018, an Order of Compromise and Settlement between 

Decedent and the State was entered. Under the terms of the settlement, the State agreed to 

release to Decedent the silver bars and the majority of the VOYA funds, and Decedent 

agreed to withdraw her claim to the other seized assets. This settlement marked the end of 

Decedent’s seizure challenge and the end of Appellant’s representation of her in that 

matter.2 Thus, when Mr. Bonifield executed the March 21, 2018 agreement with 

Appellant, there were no remaining claims for the Estate—and Appellant on the Estate’s 

 

2 We note that Appellant continued to represent Decedent but as her divorce attorney. Indeed, the 

record shows that, after settling with the State, Appellant endeavored to marshal the retirement funds from 

VOYA to Decedent as provided under the MDA. According to the invoice in the record, Appellant drafted 

the QDRO for the VOYA transfer in February 2018. A QDRO is a legal document often executed as part 

of a divorce proceeding that “creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee’s right to receive all 

or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under [a] plan . . . .” Jordan v. Jordan, 

147 S.W.3d 255, 259 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I)). Here, Appellant 

drafted a QDRO that recognized Decedent’s right to receive all of the retirement benefits in Husband’s 

VOYA account as provided under the MDA. Thereafter, as discussed, supra, on March 30, 2018, Husband 

and Mr. Bonifield signed the QDRO, which authorized the transfer of the VOYA funds from Husband to 

the Estate. The record shows that Appellant continued to pursue VOYA to complete this transfer, and the 

same was finalized on October 8, 2018.
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behalf—to pursue against the State. As such, Appellant’s agreement with Mr. Bonifield 

concerning the seizure challenge is of no consequence.

In determining what compensation, if any, Appellant is owed for his representation 

in the seizure challenge, we now focus on whether Appellant and Decedent entered into a

valid contingency fee agreement concerning the seizure matter. “In asserting a claim 

against an estate for services rendered the decedent, the cause of action necessarily is based 

upon either contract or quasi contract.” Cobble v. McCamey, 790 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 1989) (internal citations omitted). Appellant alleges that his May 6, 2016 letter 

to Decedent evidences his contingency fee agreement, i.e., contract for legal services, with 

her. See Williams v. Comer, No. 01A01-9701-CH-00008, 1997 WL 803586, at *4 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1997) (citing Alexander v. Inman, 903 S.W.2d 686, 694 (Tenn. App.

1995)) (“In construing a contract between an attorney and a client, the general rules of 

contract law apply.”). “Generally, a contingency fee agreement is understood to be ‘an 

agreement for legal services under which the amount or payment of the fee depends, in 

whole or in part, on the outcome of the proceedings for which the services were rendered.’” 

Williams, 1997 WL 803586, at *4 (quoting Alexander, 903 S.W.2d at 696). Contingency 

fee agreements are often an alternative to the traditional hourly billing and “enable clients

who are unable to pay a reasonable fixed fee to obtain competent representation.” 

Alexander, 903 S.W.2d at 696 (internal citations omitted). The Rules of Professional 

Conduct specifically allow for contingency fee agreements but expressly require that such 

agreements “shall be in writing [and] signed by the client . . . .” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 

1.5(c) (emphases added). 

In the May 6, 2016 letter, Appellant proposed that compensation for his services in 

the seizure challenge would “be a contingent fee of 33-1/3% of any and all amounts 

recovered by [Decedent]” from the State. This is the same amount Appellant alleges the 

Estate owes him under Claim 1, i.e., “1/3 of all proceeds recovered . . . .” Under Decedent’s 

settlement with the State, she was to receive $203,182.10 of the VOYA retirement funds 

and all of the silver bars. Thus, Appellant seeks a judgment against the Estate in the amount 

of $67,727.37 plus 1/3 of the value of the silver bars. In its order, the trial court denied 

Appellant’s request for such judgment, finding, in pertinent part, that Appellant presented 

no proof that Decedent ever signed a contingency fee agreement with him. The record 

supports the trial court’s finding. The May 6, 2016 letter bears Appellant’s signature only. 

On review, there is no document signed by Decedent that could form the basis of a 

contingency fee agreement between Appellant and Decedent. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, 

RPC 1.5(c). As such, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Appellant and Decedent never 

entered into a contingency fee agreement. Because Appellant and Decedent never entered 

into such agreement, there is no basis for Appellant to recover a 1/3 contingency fee from 

the Estate under Claim 1. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Claim 1.

Despite Appellant’s failure to provide proof of an enforceable contract for his legal 

services in the seizure matter, the trial court recognized that Appellant should receive a 
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reasonable fee for such services. Accordingly, the trial court allowed Claim 2 and entered

a judgment for $3,847.51 against the Estate. This was not error. Indeed, “[p]ersons who 

provide valuable services to another without an agreement regarding compensation are 

entitled to recover the reasonable value of their services (1) when the circumstances 

indicate that the parties to the transaction should have understood that the person providing 

the services expected to be compensated and (2) when it would be unjust to permit the 

recipient of the services to benefit from them without payment.” In re Estate of Marks, 

187 S.W.3d 21, 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn.,

Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 197-98 (Tenn. 2001); Castelli v. Lien, 910 S.W.2d 420, 427 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1995). Such principle applies to claims against a decedent’s estate. Id.; see also 

Cobble, 790 S.W.2d at 282 (“[I]f the plaintiffs establish that the decedent expressly or 

impliedly requested the services, and if plaintiffs prove that they rendered those services 

with the expectation that they were to be paid in some manner for those services, then a 

contract is made out entitling the plaintiffs to recover against the estate for the reasonable 

value of those services.”). Although Ms. Walls initially filed an objection to Claim 2, in 

its appellate brief, the Estate explains that it has paid Claim 2 in full and asks this Court to 

affirm the trial court’s order. Thus, the Estate does not appear to dispute that Appellant 

provided a service to Decedent and should be awarded $3,847.51 for the same.

On appeal, Appellant argues that the $3,847.51 award is insufficient for his services 

rendered in the seizure challenge, and that the limited fee unjustly enriches the Estate. As 

the creditor seeking to recover payment for his services, Appellant had the burden of 

proving the reasonable value of his services. See In re Estate of Marks, 187 S.W.3d at 32 

(citing CPB Management, Inc. v. Everly, 939 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Bokor

v. Holder, 722 S.W.2d 676, 680-81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)). Many practitioners prove the 

reasonable value of their attorney’s fees by presenting an affidavit to the court that details 

the number of hours and the work performed in a given case. 

Wright v. Wright, No. M2007-00378-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4340871, at *5 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Dec. 12, 2007) (quoting Hosier v. Crye-Leike Commercial, Inc., No. M2000-01182-

COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 799740, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2001)). It appears from 

the record that Appellant failed to present to the trial court any proof of the reasonable 

value of his representation in the seizure challenge.

3

 Instead, Appellant relied solely on his 

argument that the parties entered into a contingency fee agreement, and that he was entitled 

to 1/3 of all proceeds Decedent recovered from the State under such agreement. At oral 

 

3 We note that there is very little evidence in the appellate record of the proof submitted to the trial 

court. It is unclear whether the trial court ever held a hearing in this matter but if it did, this Court is unable 

to review the arguments and evidence presented in the same as Appellant did not file a transcript or 

statement of the evidence on appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24 (b), (c). Without a transcript or statement of 

the evidence, we must presume that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support its 

judgment. PNC Multifamily Capital Inst. Fund XXVI Ltd. P’ship v. Mabry, 402 S.W.3d 654, 661 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 10, 2013); Outdoor Management LLC v. Thomas, 249 

S.W.3d 368, 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); 

Baugh v. Moore, No. M2013-02224-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 832589, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2015).
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argument before this Court, the panel attempted to glean from Appellant how much time 

he devoted to the seizure challenge, but Appellant stated that he did not keep 

contemporaneous billing and maintained his argument that he had a contingency fee 

agreement with Decedent. In the absence of contemporary billing records or other 

evidence, Appellant has failed to provide any proof of the reasonable value of his services 

rendered during the seizure challenge. See In re Estate of Marks, 187 S.W.3d at 32.

In determining the reasonable value of Appellant’s services, it appears the trial court 

turned to the only proof in the record of Appellant’s legal fees, i.e., the invoice for 

$3,847.51 that was attached to Claim 2. The invoice is for legal services rendered from 

May 2017 through July 2018 and shows that Appellant billed 13.2 hours during this time 

period. The invoice also shows expenses (filing fees and postage) of $383.49 and appears 

to carry forward balances owed for previous invoices totaling $2,643.55. Although Claim 

2 and the attached invoice may relate to Appellant’s representation as Decedent’s divorce 

attorney, it is the only proof of Appellant’s legal fees that he presented to the trial court. 

Accordingly, the record demonstrates that Appellant is entitled to no more than $3,847.51 

for his services. Although Appellant argues that this amount is insufficient for the work 

performed, Appellant was provided the opportunity to prove the value of his services in

the seizure challenge and, for the reasons outlined above, he failed to do so. See Bokor, 

722 S.W.2d at 681 (“There is no proof in this record as to the value of Bokor’s services. 

Bokor has had his day in court with the opportunity to prove the value of his services. 

Through no fault except his own, he failed to do so.”). As such, we conclude that the trial 

court did not err when it found that $3,847.51 represented the reasonable value of 

Appellant’s services, and we affirm the award of same. 

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s final order. The case is 

remanded for such further proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this opinion. 

Costs of the appeal are assessed to the Appellant, David W. Camp, for all of which 

execution may issue if necessary.

 s/ Kenny Armstrong 

KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE