J-S54036-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RASHAWN MOSLEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 796 MDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 7, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0003813-2004

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 25, 2021

Rashawn Mosley (“Mosley”) appeals from the Order dismissing his first 

Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

In the early morning hours of July 6, 2004, Christopher Thompson 

(“Thompson”) and Daniel Giorgione (“Giorgione”) were in a vehicle in the Hall 

Manor area of Harrisburg, Dauphin County, when Thompson was shot and 

killed in a drug-related transaction. After the shooting, Giorgione provided

police with a description of the shooter, and identified the shooter in a photo 

array. Mosley did not match the description Giorgione gave of the shooter, 

and the photo identified by Giorgione as the shooter was not Mosley’s. During 

the investigation of the shooting, police interviewed Mosley’s brother, 

Christopher Stevenson (“Stevenson”). Stevenson identified Mosley as the 
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shooter. Police subsequently interviewed Mosley, who submitted a recorded 

statement admitting to shooting Thompson.

On September 7, 2005, Mosley entered a negotiated guilty plea to thirddegree murder, robbery, and carrying firearms without a license. The trial 

court sentenced Mosley to twenty to forty years in prison. 

In February 2006, Mosley, pro se, filed a PCRA Petition, asserting that 

his guilty plea was unknowingly entered based upon ineffective assistance of 

counsel. The PCRA court denied Mosley relief without a hearing. Mosley 

appealed to this Court, and we remanded in order for the PCRA court to hold 

an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in Mosley’s PCRA Petition. See 

Commonwealth v. Mosley, 929 A.2d 244 (Pa. Super. 2007) (unpublished 

memorandum). In January 2009, following a hearing, the PCRA court denied 

the Petition. On direct appeal, this Court concluded that, at the time of trial,

an exculpatory eyewitness existed and was available to testify that another 

individual was the shooter. This Court reversed the PCRA court’s denial of the 

Petition, and remanded the matter for a trial. See Commonwealth v. 

Mosley, 4 A.3d 676 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum).

Mosley’s initial trial resulted in a hung jury. At Mosley’s retrial, Mosley 

and Stevenson each testified that their statements to police were coerced, and 

that police assaulted them in order to elicit their statements. The jury also 

heard testimony from Giorgione that Mosley was not the shooter. Further, 

the jury heard testimony from Kevin Walker (“Walker”), Mosley’s cousin, that 
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he was in his mother’s house playing video games with Mosley and Stevenson 

on the night of the shooting. At the conclusion of trial, a jury convicted Mosley 

of criminal homicide, robbery, recklessly endangering another person, and 

carrying a firearm without a license. The trial court sentenced Mosley to an 

aggregate term of life in prison. This Court affirmed Mosley’s judgment of 

sentence, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Mosley, 104 A.3d 57 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished 

memorandum), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014).

On December 11, 2015, Mosley filed the instant, timely Petition. The 

PCRA court appointed Christopher F. Wilson, Esquire (“Attorney Wilson”), as 

counsel, and appointed an investigator in March 2018. Attorney Wilson filed 

a supplemental PCRA Petition in January 2019, alleging that Mosley’s trial 

counsel, Anne Gingrich Cornick, Esquire (“Attorney Cornick”), was ineffective 

in failing to investigate defenses and witnesses, failing to provide an 

adequately-funded defense, and failing to withdraw due to a conflict of 

interest. Attorney Wilson filed a second supplemental PCRA Petition in June 

2019, asserting Attorney Cornick’s ineffectiveness based upon a claim that 

police generated incorrect mugshot information, and a third supplemental 

PCRA Petition in August 2019, asserting that the testimony of eyewitness 

Abismael Bruno (“Bruno”) constituted after-discovered evidence under the 

PCRA.
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The PCRA court conducted several hearings regarding Mosley’s Petitions. 

The Commonwealth and Mosley filed memoranda with the PCRA court after 

the hearings. On May 4, 2020, the PCRA court dismissed Mosley’s Petition. 

Mosley filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.

Mosley raises the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred by denying relief based upon 

the assertion that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

properly investigate the case, in failing to interview multiple 

identified alibi and eyewitnesses, and in failing to investigate a 

clearly erroneous mugshot created by the Harrisburg Police which 

matched the height description of the perpetrator provided by the 

two eyewitnesses, but was more than three inches off of 

[Mosley]’s actual height[?]

B. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in failing to find that [Mosley]’s 

defense was inadequately funded[,] violating [Mosley]’s state and 

federal right to counsel, and state and federal due process and 

equal protection rights, because appointed counsel was only 

compensated at a rate of less than $30 per hour and 

approximately $800 per each trial, and the fact that there was no 

funding allocated for an investigator[?]

C. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred [in] not appointing new counsel 

after [Mosley] filed a request for substitute counsel prior to trial[,]

and erred in not providing a new trial based upon this asserted 

ground for relief where trial counsel had conflicts of interest in the 

case given that the Commonwealth’s case hinged on a confession 

which [Mosley] claimed was under duress made to the Harrisburg 

Police when [Attorney Cornick]’s husband worked for the 

Harrisburg Police and was indirectly involved with the instant case 

itself by communicating with [Mosley]’s brother about the instant 

case[?]

D. Alternatively, whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in failing to 

provide relief to [Mosley] concerning the newly discovered 

evidence regarding [] Bruno’s witness of the criminal episode 

which was communicated to [Mosley] in late 2015[,] who timely 
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submitted that information in a PCRA filing and thus meeting the 

test under 42 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 9543(a)(2)(vi)[?]

E. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred to the extent that its denial of 

relief was potentially based on the concept that prejudice cannot 

be established, as noted on page [ten] of the [Rule] 1925[(a)] 

Opinion, due to [Mosley] having prior trial where his conviction 

was affirmed ...[,] where the prior trial introduced a confession 

and a denial of a suppression of that confession, and thus the law 

of the case would establish that no possible prejudice could be 

shown by [Mosley] on collateral review[?]

Brief for Appellant at 3-4 (renumbered).

“The standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is 

whether that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free 

of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Weimer, 167 A.3d 78, 81 (Pa. Super. 

2017). “The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no 

support for the findings in the certified record.” Id. (citation omitted).

Mosley’s first three issues challenge Attorney Cornick’s effectiveness as 

trial counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under 

the PCRA, a petitioner must plead and prove, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that counsel’s ineffectiveness “so undermined the truth-determining 

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Specifically,

[t]o be entitled to relief on an ineffectiveness claim, a PCRA 

petitioner must establish: (1) the underlying claim has arguable 

merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or 

failure to act; and (3) he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s 

error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable 

probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, ... 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011) 

(employing ineffective assistance of counsel test from 
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Commonwealth v. Pierce, ... 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987)). 

Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance. 

Additionally, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to 

raise a meritless claim. Finally, because a PCRA petition must 

establish all the Pierce prongs to be entitled to relief, we are not 

required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness claim in any 

specific order; thus, if a claim fails under any required element, 

we may dismiss the claim on that basis.

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015) (footnote and 

some citations omitted).

In his first issue, Mosley argues that Attorney Cornick was ineffective 

for failing to properly investigate potential alibi witnesses, eyewitnesses, and 

mugshot evidence. See Brief for Appellant at 14-37. Mosley asserts that

Attorney Cornick failed to properly investigate the possible testimony of 

Tandra and Shavelle Walker, potential alibi witnesses, and Bruno, a potential 

eyewitness. Id. at 14-33. Specifically, Mosley asserts that these witnesses 

would have either buttressed the credibility of—or, in some cases, been more 

credible witnesses than—the witnesses Attorney Cornick used at trial. Id. at 

18-33. Additionally, Mosley claims that Attorney Cornick failed to properly 

investigate, and raise at trial, the “clearly erroneous” mugshot of Mosley 

introduced at trial by the Harrisburg police, which listed Mosley as six feet tall, 

rather than Mosley’s actual height of approximately five feet, nine inches. Id.

at 34. Mosley claims that the mugshot constituted either a “sloppy mistake” 

by police, or that the mugshot was fabricated to match Giorgione’s description 

of a six-foot-tall shooter. Id. at 34-37. In either case, Mosley claims, 

Attorney Cornick fell short of providing effective assistance of counsel by not 
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investigating the reason for the discrepancy, and for failing to exploit it at trial. 

Id.

Counsel has a duty to undertake reasonable investigations 

or to make reasonable decisions that render particular 

investigations unnecessary. Where counsel has made a strategic 

decision after a thorough investigation of law and facts, it is 

virtually unchallengeable; strategic choice made following a less 

than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent 

that reasonable professional judgment supports the limitation of 

the investigation. As noted, an evaluation of counsel’s 

performance is highly deferential, and the reasonableness of 

counsel’s decisions cannot be based upon the distorting effects of 

hindsight. Furthermore, reasonableness in this context depends, 

in critical part, upon the information supplied by the defendant.

Thus, assuming a reasonable investigation, where there is no 

notice to counsel of particular mitigating evidence, he cannot be 

held ineffective for failing to pursue it.

Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 735 (Pa. 2000) (citations 

omitted).

During the PCRA hearing, Attorney Cornick testified as follows regarding 

her consideration of an investigator to evaluate potential alibi witnesses:

In this case, I will reiterate, I found no need to [utilize an 

investigator] with regard to our defense. The prime witness was 

... Giorgione, who not only couldn’t identify [] Mosley as the 

shooter but, in fact, positively said that [Mosley] was not the 

shooter. He had given that statement to police. It was clear as 

day. I would never have subjected that to someone else’s 

secondary or speculative questioning that would have elicited a 

response from [] Giorgione that was different from the one I was 

already quite happy with as far as what we’d say for [] Mosley.

[] Mosley himself testified. [] Stevenson testified. If you 

look at [] Walker’s testimony, he says that [] Stevenson was with 

him at the time during this alibi as well. [] Stevenson never 

testified on the stand that he was with [] Mosley during the time 

of the shooting. Furthermore, [] Mosley himself did not testify 

that he was somewhere other than - - anywhere else. He didn’t 
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bring up his own supposed alibi that now, I suppose, you have 

some people coming in to testify about.

What I thought was the most reliable testimony was what 

had already been elicited from police statements prior to trial, 

because our arguments were twofold: [o]ne, that [] Mosley was 

coerced in his confession; and, two, that [] Giorgione, the only 

eyewitness to the crime, testified that [] Mosley was not the 

shooter.

There was no reason to have a third party investigate or 

interview those people because what was already taken and 

satisfied on the record was exactly the testimony I hoped to elicit 

at trial. And I certainly wouldn’t want to put myself in the position 

of an attorney to get testimony that had been contradicted by that 

witness through my own investigator[’]s furthering of questioning.

N.T., 4/29/19, at 28-30 (some paragraphs combined). 

Specifically, with respect to investigating Bruno’s account of the 

shooting, Attorney Cornick testified that she did not reach out to Bruno, as 

she did not want to “reach out to a person on whom [she would] want to point 

the finger of being a perpetrator of a crime to give him the opportunity to 

deny that on the stand to a jury.” Id. at 35. Attorney Cornick reiterated her 

strategy at trial was as follows:

The point of my defense was that the eyewitness to the crime, [] 

Giorgione, could testify clearly that [] Mosley was not the 

perpetrator. That was the best evidence ... for me to present at 

trial.

* * *

I did not need to talk to [] Bruno. The best witness with regard 

to whatever was testified to about [] Bruno was [] Giorgione, who 

took the stand and testified that it was not [] Mosley who was the 

shooter.

* * *
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[] Giorgione told the police in a recorded statement that it was not 

[] Mosley who shot [] Thompson. There was nothing about a 

statement like that that was in [] Mosley’s interest that I try to 

tease apart or elicit something that was not as helpful as what it 

was on its own.

Id. at 35, 37, 38.

Thus, the record supports the PCRA court’s determination that Attorney 

Cornick had a reasonable basis for her actions. See Treiber, supra;

Basemore, supra.

Regarding Mosley’s challenge to the failure of Attorney Cornick to 

investigate the mistakes on his mug shot, Attorney Cornick testified as 

follows: 

A. [Attorney Cornick:] Giorgione saying that [Mosley] was 6 feet 

tall and 150 pounds means squat to me, frankly, when I was faced 

with a statement from [] Giorgione who said the shooter was not 

Rashawn Mosley. So I elicited from [] Giorgione that [] Mosley 

was not the shooter in this homicide. ... I’m explaining to you why 

[the issue of Mosley’s reported mugshot height] was not 

something about which to make hay when [] Giorgione testified 

that the shooter was not [] Mosley.

Q. [Attorney Wilson:] Okay. You did not ask anything with the 

Harrisburg police, assuming he’s - - his height is his height. It’s 

not even 5 foot, 9, probably. You didn’t ask anything concerning, 

why is there a mugshot from the Harrisburg police that has 

inaccurate information that matches [] Giorgione’s information?

A. Because, quite frankly, Mr. Wilson, I think it would have 

resulted in the same rigamarole of an exchange that’s occurring 

right now and would have been of no benefit to my client in front 

of the jury.

* * *

A. ... [M]ore importantly, when [Giorgione was] asked, [“ I]s 

[Mosley] the shooter?[”] He answered, [“ N]o.[”] That’s the best 
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evidence for a jury to hear, or that was my strategic ... 

determination at that time.

N.T., 4/29/19, at 50-52. 

The PCRA court addressed Mosley’s argument as follows:

We [] dismiss [Mosley]’s argument that trial counsel was 

ineffective in not seeking to investigate why the booking 

information was incorrect and by failing to cross-examine or 

impeach any of the Harrisburg police witness[es] on the erroneous 

information. As stipulated, the standard procedure at the 

Harrisburg Police/Dauphin County Booking Center when someone 

is booked and a mugshot is taken is to measure the defendant by 

height and estimate the weight, or use the weight provided in the 

police criminal complaint if one is listed by the officer. Joint 

Stipulation as to Dauphin County Booking Procedure for Purposes 

of PCRA Hearing, filed August 19, 2019. [Mosley] asserts that 

either the police made a sloppy mistake in creating a mugshot 

that noted a height more than three (3) inches taller than 

[Mosley]’s 5’8 7/8” height, or [Mosley]’s mugshot was created to 

match the description giv[en] by [] Giorgione. Again, there was 

no reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the 

outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Further, 

in light of all the conflicts in testimony, this dispute in observed 

measurement is de minimis in nature.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/4/20, at 10-11 (footnotes omitted).

We agree with the sound analysis of the PCRA court, and affirm on the

basis of its Opinion with regard to this issue. See id. Because Mosley has 

not demonstrated that Attorney Cornick lacked a reasonable basis for her 

decision to investigate the mugshot discrepancy, or that he suffered prejudice 

as a result, we cannot grant him relief on this claim. See Chmiel, supra.

In his next issue, Mosley argues that the PCRA court erred when it 

concluded that his defense was not inadequately funded. Brief for Appellant 

at 42-52. Mosley asserts that trial counsel’s compensation—which amounted 
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to approximately $30 per hour and $800 for Mosley’s trial—was insufficient to 

satisfy the minimum level of representation to satisfy his constitutional due 

process. Id. at 42-43. Further, Mosley alleges that his defense was not 

provided with sufficient resources to hire an investigator, which he argues was 

critical to his defense. Id. at 43-44. Mosley brings to our attention the costs 

associated with maintaining a law practice, including servicing an attorney’s 

student loan debt, and asserts that Dauphin County’s compensation for 

conflict attorneys, like Attorney Cornick, was insufficient to meet constitutional 

muster. Id. at 44-45. While Mosley concedes that Attorney Cornick is “a 

more than capable attorney,” he concludes that she would have put forth a 

more substantial defense had she been paid more to do so. Id. at 48, 51-52.

In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed this issue as follows:

Here, there is simply no evidence presented by [Mosley] that 

[Attorney Cornick] was underfunded and, therefore, ineffective. 

While a precise compensation figure was not elicited at the PCRA 

hearing, the testimony revealed that trial counsel was not 

underfunded in terms of her representation of [Mosley]. Th[e

PCRA c]ourt pointedly asked Attorney Cornick: “[D]id you feel you 

were inadequately compensated for this case to the point that it 

impinged on your ability to be able to give the resources necessary 

to defend the defendant?” Attorney Cornick: “No.” N.T., 

4[/]29[/]19, [at] 18-19. Attorney Cornick also testified that there 

were no other cases that were drawing her attention away from 

[Mosley]’s case and affecting her ability to put forth a defense. 

[Id. at] 20. Attorney Cornick zealously advocated on behalf of 

[Mosley] and presented the strongest evidence in an attempt to 

prove that [Mosley] was not the shooter. As set forth previously, 

the appointment of an investigator for PCRA purposes would not 

uncover any additional witnesses that could have helped [Mosley]. 

Rather, trial counsel decided the best defense would be to present 

the eyewitness to the crime, [] Giorgione, who could testify that 

[Mosley] was not the perpetrator.
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PCRA Court Opinion, 5/4/20, at 11-12 (footnote omitted).

We agree with the sound analysis of the PCRA court, and affirm on this 

basis in regarding Mosley’s second claim. See Chmiel, supra.

In his third issue, Mosley argues that the PCRA court erred in failing to 

appoint Mosley new counsel due to a conflict of interest. Brief for Appellant 

at 52-59. Mosley asserts that Attorney Cornick suffered from a conflict of 

interest, as her husband, Sean Cornick (“Corporal Cornick”), was, at the time 

of trial, a corporal with the Harrisburg Police Department. Id. at 53. Mosley 

claims that because his theory of the case hinged on his contention that 

Harrisburg police officers illegally coerced him and Stevenson into providing 

incriminating statements, Attorney Cornick could not effectively present that 

contention given her relationship with an officer in the same department. Id.

at 54-56. In support of this contention, Mosley points to a history of 

interactions between Corporal Cornick and Mosley’s brother, where Corporal 

Cornick had asked Mosley’s brother for assistance in other, unrelated 

investigations at around the same time as Mosley’s trial. Id. at 58-59.

We review ineffectiveness claims based on a conflict of interest as 

follows:

[A]n appellant cannot prevail on a preserved conflict of interest 

claim absent a showing of actual prejudice. We presume prejudice 

when the appellant shows that trial counsel was burdened by an 

“actual”—rather than mere “potential”—conflict of interest. To 

show an actual conflict of interest, the appellant must 

demonstrate that: (1) counsel “actively represented conflicting 

interests”; and (2) those conflicting interests “adversely affected 

his lawyer’s performance.” Commonwealth v. Collins, ... 957 
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A.2d 237, 251 ([Pa. ]2008). Clients’ interests actually conflict 

when “during the course of representation” they “diverge with 

respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action.” 

Id.

Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1147 (Pa. 2012).

In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed this issue as follows:

A review of the record reveals [Mosley] failed to present any 

credible evidence that trial counsel’s relationship with her 

husband, who was a corporal working in the vice unit of the 

Harrisburg City Police at the time of [Mosley]’s trials, adversely 

affected her representation of [Mosley]. It is true that Attorney 

Cornick rested her defense on police coercion in obtaining 

[Mosley]’s and [] Stevenson’s testimony; however, her marriage 

to a police officer in the same department did not prevent her from 

attacking the conduct in interviewing [Mosley]. Attorney Cornick 

testified that “[t]here was no conflict of interest in my 

representation of [] Mosley due to my husband’s position.” [N.T., 

4/29/19, at 40.] Additionally, she noted that she had “no problem 

... raising issues ... with the competence of Harrisburg police, prior 

to this trial and post this trial.” [Id.]

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/4/20, at 13-14.

Our review of the record confirms that Attorney Cornick zealously 

represented Mosley’s interests at trial, and Mosley has presented no evidence 

that Attorney Cornick’s relationship with Corporal Cornick “adversely affected” 

her performance in representing Mosley, or that it represented an actual 

conflict of interest. As the PCRA court states, Mosley’s contention is belied by 

Attorney Cornick’s theory of the case, which directly attacked the Harrisburg 

police department for its conduct in interviewing Mosley and Stevenson. In 

light of the foregoing, we conclude that Mosley’s claim that Attorney Cornick 
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provided ineffective assistance of counsel on these grounds lacks arguable 

merit, and we can grant him no relief on this claim. See Sepulveda, supra.

In Mosley’s fourth issue, he argues that the PCRA court erred in failing 

to conclude that Bruno’s testimony constituted after-discovered evidence 

under section 9543(a)(2)(vi). Brief for Appellant at 37-42. Mosley reiterates 

that Attorney Cornick failed to properly investigate the case, and asserts that 

“the only way to conclude that [Attorney Cornick] was not ineffective for failing 

to interview Bruno ... would be to conclude that Bruno was not available during 

[Mosley]’s ... [] trials due to his previous status as a suspect and because he 

originally indicated that he would not cooperate.” Id. at 37-38. Mosley points 

to the reliability of Bruno’s testimony because Bruno knew Mosley “well,” due 

to seeing Mosley at the Hall Manor basketball court throughout the summer 

of 2004, while Giorgione had never met Mosley prior to the night of the 

shooting. Id. at 41-42. Further, Mosley asserts that Bruno’s testimony was 

not merely cumulative, as Giorgione had identified Bruno as being near the 

scene of the shooting. Id. In light of this purported after-discovered 

evidence, Mosley requests a new trial. Id. at 42.

Under the PCRA,

[w]here a petition is otherwise timely, to prevail on an afterdiscovered evidence claim for relief under [42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§] 9543(a)(2)(vi), a petitioner must prove that (1) the 

exculpatory evidence has been discovered after trial and could not 

have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable 

diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being 

used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel 

a different verdict. Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 
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823 (Pa. 2004); see [Commonwealth v.] Cox, 146 A.3d 221,] 

227-28 [(Pa. Super. 2016)] ([stating that] “[o]nce jurisdiction has 

been properly invoked, ... the relevant inquiry becomes whether 

the claim is cognizable under [Section 9543] of the PCRA.”).

Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted).

In this case, Mosley failed to demonstrate that Bruno’s potential 

testimony could not have been discovered prior to trial through reasonable 

diligence. The record reflects that Giorgione had originally identified Bruno in 

a photo array, and police executed a search warrant on Bruno’s residence as 

part of their initial investigation into the shooting. See N.T., 4/29/19, at 33-

35 (wherein Attorney Wilson introduces a search warrant for Bruno’s 

residence, and Attorney Cornick testifies that Giorgione had identified Bruno

to police on the night of the shooting). Further, Bruno’s testimony would have 

been cumulative, as his identification of the shooter substantially mirrored the 

identification of another eyewitness, Giorgione, who was in the car with 

Thompson when he was shot. N.T., 6/17/19, at 23-25 (wherein Bruno testifies 

that the shooter was a dark-skinned male wearing a baseball cap); see also

N.T., 9/13/12, at 32-33 (wherein Giorgione testifies that the shooter was a 

dark-skinned male wearing a baseball cap). Accordingly, Mosley’s afterdiscovered evidence claim is without merit, and we cannot grant him relief. 

See Burton, supra.

Finally, Mosley claims that the PCRA court erred when it concluded that 

prejudice could not be established, because his conviction was affirmed by 

this Court on direct appeal. Brief for Appellant at 59-61. Mosley asserts that 
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this Court’s acceptance of the PCRA court’s rationale in this regard would 

“damage the integrity of the present criminal justice system[,]” as it would 

“create an ever[-]stronger incentive for law enforcement to obtain a 

confession[.] Id. at 60. Mosley urges this Court to reject such an analysis, 

and that he should receive a new trial. Id. at 61.

In a footnote in its Opinion, the PCRA court stated the following, in its 

analysis under the prejudice prong of the Pierce test, regarding Mosley’s 

contention that Attorney Cornick provided ineffective assistance of counsel in 

failing to properly investigate witnesses:

Moreover, in addition to the foregoing analysis, th[e PCRA c]ourt 

echoes the Commonwealth’s position with regard to [Mosley]’s 

confession to the crimes. Specifically, the Commonwealth offers 

that the law of this case is that [Mosley]’s confession was 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given and, therefore, 

there is no probability that the outcome of the trial would have

been different. In its memorandum opinion filed on May 23, 2014, 

th[is] Court adopted th[e trial c]ourt’s reasoning in finding that 

[Mosley]’s confession was knowing, voluntary, and intelligently 

given. Commonwealth v. ... Mosley, [104 A.3d 57 (Pa. Super.

2014) (unpublished memorandum)]. [Mosley]’s theory of the 

case throughout trial was that statements made by both him and 

[Stevenson] were the result of police coercion. He further argued 

that he did not understand his rights and consistently asked for 

an attorney. [Mosley] took the stand at trial and had an 

opportunity to testify that he was somewhere else at the time of 

the crime. He did not do so.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/4/20, at 10 n.3.

The PCRA court’s statements, which Mosley challenges in this argument,

addressed the prejudice prong of the Pierce test for ineffective assistance of 

counsel. See id. However, the PCRA court also found that Attorney Cornick 
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possessed a reasonable basis for not investigating other potential witnesses. 

See id. at 9-10 (wherein the PCRA court analyzes Attorney Cornick’s 

reasonable basis for her strategic decisions). Accordingly, because Mosley’s 

ineffectiveness claim fails on reasonable basis grounds, we need not address 

the PCRA court’s analysis under the prejudice prong of the Pierce test. See 

Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010) (stating that if an 

ineffectiveness claim fails under any one of the Pierce prongs, we may 

dismiss the claim on that basis).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Order of the PCRA court 

dismissing Mosley’s Petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/25/2021