alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CASA v. STATE.

No. 16463.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 17, 1934.

Manuel Diaz de' Leon, of Houston, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty,, of Austin, for the State.

, LATTIMORE, Judge.

Conviction for burglary of a private residence; punishment, thirty-five years in the penitentiary.

Appellant, a .Mexican, was not represented by counsel upon his trial, and there are no bills of exception in the record. The only question raised is the sufficiency of the testimony.

A Mr. Schlief testified that he occupied a private residence with his wife and family, one member of which was his daughter, a young woman twenty-three years of age. On the night in question, and some time after midnight apparently, the family was aroused by screams from the young lady. Investigation disclosed that a screen on a window in the young woman’s room was torn partly loose. She testified that appellant jumped out at that window and tore the screen. She did not know whether he entered at that place or not; nor is there anything in the testimony to show or indicate that force had been applied to that window or that screen prior to the time appellant jumped through it, and made his escape. She said she was awakened by a noise in the room and turned on a bed light by which she was in the habit of reading. She said appellant was standing up facing her and told her to turn the light off or he would shoot her. She said she turned the light off and he came to the side of her bed and began fighting her and trying to get at her; trying to catch her hands, or get to her throat. She said she screamed again and he ran and jumped out tearing loose the screen as he went.

The occurrence was on the night of the 20th of June. We have searched the record to find therefrom whether there be testimony that the windows, doors, and other openings in the building on the night in question were closed or open, and find nothing. Nothing in the record shows that any force was applied to the window referred to to effect an entrance from the outside. It is manifest that, if appellant entered the building through some other aperture without force, that his exit through the window in question would not make him guilty of burglary. No one testified that he entered through this window. Appellant himself denied being the party who entered the house, and testified in his own behalf to that effect.

We are also in much doubt as to the sufficiency of the testimony to sustain the conviction for burglary with intent to commit theft, which is the charge against appellant. There is not a suggestion that any property, had been moved, or of anything done by appellant while in the house to indicate any intention on his part to commit theft. There is some evidence which might be taken by the jury to indicate that, if he entered the house, his purpose was to commit an assault upon the young woman.

Being in such doubt as to the sufficiency of the two matters above mentioned, we are unwilling to allow the conviction to stand. The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2331 

To extend the period during which vessels that are shorter than 79 feet 

in length and fishing vessels are not required to have a permit for 

discharges incidental to the normal operation of the vessel. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 23, 2018 

Mr. SULLIVAN (for himself and Ms. MURKOWSKI) introduced the following 

bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation 

A BILL 

To extend the period during which vessels that are shorter 

than 79 feet in length and fishing vessels are not required to have a permit for discharges incidental to the 

normal operation of the vessel. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF MORATORIUM. 

4 Section 2(a) of Public Law 110–299 (33 U.S.C. 1342 

5 note) is amended by striking ‘‘January 19, 2018’’ and in6 serting ‘‘March 23, 2018’’. 

Æ 


ebenthall on DSK3GDR082PROD with BILLS
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</TABLE>
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Environmental Protection Agency

          - [FRL-12091-01-R8]

# AGENCY:

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

# ACTION:

Notice of final order on petition.

# SUMMARY:

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator signed an order dated May 24, 2024, granting in part and denying in part a petition dated January 30, 2024, from Center for Biological Diversity and WildEarth Guardians. The petition requested that the EPA object to a Clean Air Act (CAA) operating permit issued by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) to Arch Coal, Inc. for its West Elk Coal Mine located in Gunnison County, Colorado.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Julia Witteman, EPA Region 8, telephone number: (303) 312-6156, email address:                         *witteman.julia@epa.gov.*                         The final order and petition are available electronically at:                         *https://www.epa.gov/​title-v-operating-permits/​title-v-petition-database.*

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The EPA received a petition from the Center for Biological Diversity and WildEarth Guardians dated January 30, 2024, requesting that the EPA object to the issuance of operating permit no. 20OPGU411, issued by CDPHE to Arch Coal, Inc. in Gunnison County Colorado. On December 8, 2023, the EPA Administrator issued an order granting in part and denying in part the petition. The order itself explains the basis for the EPA's decision.

Sections 307(b) and 505(b)(2) of the CAA provide that a petitioner may request judicial review of those portions of an order that deny issues in a petition. Any petition for review shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit no later than November 12, 2024.

KC Becker,

Regional Administrator, Region 8.

[FR Doc. 2024-20673 Filed 9-11-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

June 8, 2018

d0605 

# Order

Clerk June 8, 2018

156670 & (87)(90)

In re RHEA BRODY LIVING TRUST,

dated January 17, 1978, as amended.

_________________________________________

ROBERT BRODY,

Intervenor

- Appellant,

v SC: 156670

COA: 330871

Oakland Probate Court:

CATHY B. DEUTCHMAN, 2015

- 361379

- TV

Petitioner

- Appellee,

and

MICHAEL BARTON, Special Fiduciary,

Intervenor,

and

JAY BRODY,

Intervenor

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motions to file a reply brief are GRANTED. The

application for leave to appeal the September 12, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals

is considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we

VACATE S ection II of the Court of Appeals opinion, and we REMAND this case to the

Court of Appeals for reconsideration of its standing analysis. On remand, the Court of

Appeals should consider whether the terms “child” and “beneficiary” in MCL 700.1105

are modifi ed by the phrase “and any other person that has a property right in or claim

against a trust estate.” If so, then the Court of Appeals shall consider whether Cathy

Deutchman is an “interested person” under this reading of the statute. The Court of

Appeal s may also consider the arguments made in this Court by the Probate and Estate

Planning Section of the State Bar of Michigan, including that Cathy Deutchman has

standing in light of MCR 5.125(C)(33)(g) and MCL 700.7603(2) and is a present (not

contingent) beneficiary of the trust. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED,

because we are not persuaded that the remaining question presented shou ld be reviewed

by this Court.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19

- 1043 Filed April 29, 2020
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

vs. BRIAN JACOB COREY , Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Tod Deck , Judge. Brian Corey appeals his prison sentence. AFFIRMED.

Priscilla E

. Forsyth , Sioux City , for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller , Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J. , and Doyle and May, JJ.2

MAY , Judge

. Brian Cor e y pled guilty to possessing marijuana, third offense, a class “D” felony, as well as delivery of m ethamphetamine, a class “C” felony. On appeal, Cor e y argues the sentencing court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive prison terms instead of probation. We affirm.
We review sentencing challenges “ for abuse of discretion or defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. Hopkins , 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015). We
bear in mind that “[t]he district court ’ s sentence is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor. ” State v. Goad, No.17

- 1057, 2018 WL 2084834, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 2, 2018) (citing State v. Formaro , 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002) )

. And “[w]e afford [a] strong presumption of regularity to the sentencing court due to the great confidence we place in our judges to exercise their discretion appropria tely. ” Id. (citing State v. Sailer , 587 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Iowa 1998)). W e will find an abuse of discretion only “ when a court acts on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Hopkins , 860 N.W.2d at 553 (citation omitted). Cor e y claims the sentencing court failed to consider his testimony concerning mitigating factors such as his attendance at treatment, his acceptance into college, his employment and business opportunities, his lengthy period of sobriety , and his mental

- health struggles. We disagree. Rather, the record shows the court considered Cor e y’ s testimony but did not find him believable

. We decline
to second guess the sentencing court’s credibility evaluation s

. State v. Farnum , 397 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Iowa 1986) (“ The trial court was free to accept or disregard evidence according to its own evaluation of credibility. ” )

.3 Moreover, the record shows the sentencing court specifically considered Corey’s age, intelligence, ambition, likelihood of success on probation, and p ro social activities (“assistance you’ve provided”). Additionally, the court specifically considered the presentence investigation report, which contained extensive mitigating information

— and even recommended probation. So we find “ no merit ” in Cor e y’s “ contention that the court failed to give adequate consideration to the mitigating circumstances of the case. ” State v. Witham , 583 N.W.2d 677, 679 (Iowa 1998)

. The sentencing court properly exercised its discretion. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of State

          - [Public Notice: 12518]

Pursuant to section 7008(b) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024 (Div. F, Pub. L. 118-47) (FY 2024 SFOAA), I hereby certify that it is in the national security interest of the United States to waive the restriction under section 7008(a) of the FY 2024 SFOAA with respect a maritime security assistance program for the government of Gabon and thereby waive the application of section 7008(a) with respect to such assistance.

                    This Certification and the accompanying Memorandum of Justification shall be promptly reported to the Congress. This Certification shall be published in the                     **Federal Register**                    .                

Dated: August 07, 2024.

Kurt M. Campbell,

Deputy Secretary of State.

[FR Doc. 2024-20313 Filed 9-9-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4710-25-P
Exhibit 10.37.1



November 19, 2008


Mr. Gary Muto

Dear Gary,

The Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation of Associates and Non-Competition Agreement (the Confidentiality
Agreement) dated November 6, 2008, that you entered into with Ann Taylor, Inc. (the Company), is hereby amended, effective immediately to add following new Paragraph 10:

10. Termination for Good Reason. If you terminate your employment for Good Reason (as defined below) you will not be deemed to have
voluntarily resigned and you will be entitled to the benefits set forth in Paragraph 2 of this Agreement as if you had been terminated by the Company without Cause. As used herein, Good Reason shall mean: (1) a change in your
reporting relationship so that you no longer report to the CEO of Ann Taylor Stores Corporation; (2) action by the Company resulting in a diminution of your responsibilities as the head of the Ann Taylor LOFT Division; (3) the
Companys relocation of your principal place of employment outside of the New York City metropolitan area; or (4) the Companys breach of any contractual agreements with you, provided the Company does not cure such breach within
fourteen calendar days of notice from you. If you terminate your employment without Good Reason, the Company will not waive the provisions of Paragraph 2(b) of this Agreement or shorten the Non-Competition period pursuant to Paragraph 2(c) of this
Agreement.

Except as amended hereby, all other terms and conditions of the Confidentiality Agreement shall remain in full force and
effect.



Very truly yours,/s/ Kay KrillKay KrillPresident & Chief Executive Officer


Agreed:



|                          
|--------------------------
|/s/ Gary Muto             
|Gary Muto                 
|President, Ann Taylor LOFT
|Dated: 11/24/08
#### LINN MOTOR CO. v. SABINE DEVELOPMENT CO.

No. 3439.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

April 6, 1939.

George Sonfield, of Beaumont, for appellant (on appeal only).

Fred A. White, of Port Arthur, for ap-pellee.

WALKER, Chief Justice.

This appeal was prosecuted from the County Court of Jefferson County, at Law, Jefferson County. Appellant’s demand, as plaintiff, on a promissory note, against appellee, as defendant, exceeded $1,-000. Appellee answered by pleas of general demurrer, general denial, fraud, cancellation of the note sued upon, and for $300 damages. On trial to a jury, judgment was for appellee for the relief prayed for. Since the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdiction of the County Court, the judgment of the lower court must be reversed and the case dismissed. Constitution of Texas, Art. 5, sec. 16, Vernon’s Ann.St. The dismissal will be at cost of appellant. Consumers’ Fertilizer Company v. J. M. Badt & Co., Tex.Civ.App., 157 S.W. 226; Murray v. Snodgrass, Tex.Civ.App., 71 S.W.2d 1110; Wadsworth v. Chick, Administrator, 55 Tex. 241; Beaumont Majestic Company v. Berwick, Tex.Civ.App., 87 S.W.2d 1116; Griffay v. Robbins, Tex.Civ.App., 91 S.W.2d 1160; North Texas Coach Co. v. Morten, Tex.Civ.App., 92 S.W.2d 263; Janes v. Busby, Tex.Civ.App., 93 S.W.2d 788.

Judgment reversed and the case dismissed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1549

CLARK PHILOGENE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

IA2, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior

District Judge. (1:15-cv-00180-TSE-IDD)

Submitted: September 17, 2015 Decided: October 2, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Clark Philogene, Appellant Pro Se. Joon Hwang, Elizabeth Anne 

Lalik, LITTLER MENDELSON PC, McLean, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Clark Philogene appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing with prejudice Philogene’s civil complaint in which 

he asserted employment discrimination claims. The district 

court found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the 

complaint, because Philogene “failed to file a charge of 

discrimination as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) within 

the statutory period,” and failed to establish grounds for 

equitably tolling the applicable 300-day period for filing such 

a charge. See Philogene v. IA2, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00180-TSEIDD, slip op. at 2-3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2015).

We have previously observed that the “failure to timely 

file an EEOC charge . . . does not deprive the district court of 

subject matter jurisdiction.” See Hentosh v. Old Dominion 

Univ., 767 F.3d 413, 417 (4th Cir. 2014). But we may affirm on 

any ground apparent in the record. See United States ex rel. 

Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2015). And, 

after review, we agree that each act of alleged discrimination 

set forth in the complaint took place more than 300 days before 

Philogene filed his EEOC charge. Accordingly, Philogene’s 

claims are time-barred, see Agolli v. Office Depot, Inc., 548 F. 

App’x 871, 875 (4th Cir. 2013), and we affirm the district 

court’s order on that basis. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 
3

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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<CIK> 0001012466
<NAME> BIGMAR, INC.
       
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Attachment 15

Acute Dermal

Sanitized