FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDGAR RENE CORDOBA,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR,

Respondent.

No. 17-71655

Agency No.

A096-085-156

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 10, 2020*

San Francisco, California

Filed June 16, 2020

Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson and Consuelo M. Callahan, 

Circuit Judges, and Robert S. Lasnik,

** District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Lasnik

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

** The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for 

the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
2 CORDOBA V. BARR

SUMMARY***

Immigration

Denying a petition for review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum and withholding of 

removal, the panel held that the Board properly concluded 

that petitioner’s proposed social group of “wealthy 

landowners” in Colombia is not cognizable because it lacks 

particularity and social distinction.

The panel explained that to have the social distinction 

necessary to establish a particular social group, there must 

be evidence showing that society in general perceives, 

considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular 

characteristic to be a group. The panel concluded that 

petitioner failed to establish that “wealthy landowners” in 

Colombia are somehow set-apart, or distinct from other 

persons within the society in some significant way, and that 

petitioner’s failure to tie his persecutors’ perceptions of 

“wealthy landowners” to any broader notions of Colombian 

society was fatal to his claim.

COUNSEL

Susan E. Hill, Hill & Piibe Immigration Attorneys, Los 

Angeles, California, for Petitioner.

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
CORDOBA V. BARR 3

Imran R. Zaidi, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for 

Respondent.

OPINION

LASNIK, District Judge:

This case calls upon us to decide whether “wealthy 

landowners” in Colombia constitute a particular social group 

for purposes of asylum and withholding of removal. For the 

reasons set forth below, we conclude that they do not.

I.

A.

Edgar Rene Cordoba is a native and citizen of Colombia 

who applied for and was denied asylum, withholding of 

removal, and protection under the Convention Against 

Torture (“CAT”). He alleges that he and his family were 

persecuted by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

(“FARC”) due to their status as wealthy landowners. The 

additional relevant facts underlying Cordoba’s applications 

for relief are summarized in our prior decision in this matter, 

Cordoba v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1106, 1109–11 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(hereinafter “Cordoba I”).

B.

We previously affirmed the Board of Immigration 

Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of Cordoba’s applications for CAT 

relief and for asylum to the extent they were based on 

persecution on the basis of his political opinion. See id. at 

1117 n.3. However, we granted Cordoba’s petition for 
4 CORDOBA V. BARR

review of his asylum and withholding of removal claims in 

part and remanded to the BIA for reconsideration of whether 

Cordoba’s proposed particular social group of wealthy 

landowners in Colombia is cognizable in light of our 

decision in Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (en banc). See Cordoba I, 726 F.3d at 1117.

In remanded proceedings, the IJ again denied Cordoba’s 

applications for asylum and withholding of removal. The 

BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that 

Cordoba failed to establish that “wealthy landowners” in 

Colombia constitute a cognizable particular social group, 

and dismissing Cordoba’s appeal. Cordoba again petitions 

this Court for review.

II.

We have jurisdiction over Cordoba’s petition for review 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). “Where, as here, the BIA cites 

[Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994)] 

and also provides its own review of the evidence and law, 

we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.” See Ali v. 

Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation 

omitted). We review the agency’s factual findings for 

substantial evidence, but review “de novo both purely legal 

questions and mixed questions of law and fact requiring us 

to exercise judgment about legal principles.” MendozaPablo v. Holder, 667 F.3d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Whether 

a group constitutes a ‘particular social group’ is a question 

of law.” Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citation omitted).
CORDOBA V. BARR 5

III.

We agree with the BIA that Cordoba has not established 

the requisite particularity or social distinction for his 

proposed particular social group of “wealthy landowners” in 

Colombia.

A.

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the 

Attorney General may, in his discretion, grant asylum to 

applicants determined to be refugees. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1). The INA defines “refugee” as an individual 

who is “unable or unwilling to return to [his last country of 

residence] . . . because of persecution or a well-founded fear 

of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political 

opinion.” Cordoba I, 726 F.3d at 1108 (quoting 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(42)(A)).

B.

In Henriquez-Rivas and Cordoba I, we commented that 

“the perception of the persecutors may matter the most” in 

ascertaining whether a particular social group is cognizable 

for purposes of asylum or withholding of removal. 

Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1089; see also Cordoba I, 

726 F.3d at 1115. However, after we issued HenriquezRivas and Cordoba I, two companion precedential BIA 

decisions clarified the elements underlying the agency’s 

particular social group analysis. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 

26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & 

N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014).
6 CORDOBA V. BARR

In Matter of M-E-V-G-, the BIA clarified that,

[A]n applicant for asylum or withholding of 

removal seeking relief based on ‘membership 

in a particular social group’ must establish 

that the group is

(1) composed of members who share a 

common immutable characteristic,

(2) defined with particularity, and

(3) socially distinct1 within the society in 

question.

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237. We have since 

accorded Chevron deference to the particular social group 

factors elucidated in Matter of M-E-V-G-. See Reyes v. 

Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1133–37 (9th Cir. 2016). In Reyes, 

we deferred to the BIA’s determination that “[t]o have the 

‘social distinction’ necessary to establish a particular social 

group, there must be evidence showing that society in 

general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing 

the particular characteristic to be a group.” Matter of W-GR-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 217; see also Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1136 

(“[T]he proper inquiry is whether a proposed particular 

social group’s shared characteristic or characteristics would 

generally be recognizable by other members of the 

community, or whether . . . the proposed group would be 

perceived as a group by society.” (quoting Henriquez-Rivas, 

707 F.3d at 1088–89 (internal quotation marks and citation 

1 The BIA previously defined this factor as “social visibility,” but 

renamed it “social distinction” to eliminate any misconception that a 

particular social group must be characterized by “‘ocular’ or ‘on-sight’ 

visibility.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 236.
CORDOBA V. BARR 7

omitted))). While the BIA has indicated that the persecutor’s 

perspective “may be relevant” to the extent “it can be 

indicative of whether society views the group as distinct,” it 

has also emphasized that “the persecutors’ perception is not 

itself enough to make a group socially distinct, and 

persecutory conduct alone cannot define the group.” Matter 

of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242 (citations omitted); see 

also Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1136 (deferring to the BIA’s “social 

distinction” requirement).

C.

Applying the particular social group analysis, the agency 

correctly concluded that Cordoba’s arguments, and the 

majority of the evidence he submitted, pertain to FARC’s 

perception of wealthy landowners rather than to Colombian 

society’s perception of the purported group. See Reyes, 

842 F.3d at 1136. For example, rather than link FARC’s 

views to those of Colombian society generally, Cordoba 

offers a history of FARC and its “Marxist” origins, and 

makes broad, unsupported allegations about Marxism in 

Colombia. Further, Cordoba’s evidence of “his name on 

deeds, titles to property, and other business documents” 

establishes property ownership, but does not evince 

Colombian societal views regarding that ownership.

Cordoba has not established that “wealthy landowners” 

in Colombia are somehow “set-apart, or distinct from other 

persons within the society in some significant way.” Matter 

M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238. His failure to tie FARC’s 

perceptions of “wealthy landowners” to any broader notions 

of Colombian society at each stage of his proceedings is fatal 

to his petition for review. See, e.g., id. at 244; Reyes, 

842 F.3d at 1136. Accordingly, he has not established 

eligibility for asylum based on membership in his proposed 
8 CORDOBA V. BARR

particular social group. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec.

at 237.

IV.

Because we affirm the BIA’s determination that Cordoba 

has not established a cognizable particular social group, we 

need not address whether he established the requisite nexus

between the asserted persecution and his status as a wealthy 

landowner in Colombia. See Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1132 n.4; 

see also Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

V.

In addition, because Cordoba has not met his burden of 

proof for asylum under the INA, the agency correctly denied 

his application for withholding of removal under the more 

stringent standard. See Al-Harbi v. I.N.S., 242 F.3d 882, 

888–89 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that the standard “for 

withholding of removal is more stringent than the wellfounded fear standard governing asylum” (citation 

omitted)).

VI.

For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that the BIA 

properly determined “wealthy landowners” in Colombia do 

not constitute a cognizable particular social group for 

purposes of asylum and withholding of removal under the 

INA. The agency properly denied Cordoba’s applications 

for relief.

PETITION DENIED.