alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### BURGESS v. STATE.

No. 15120.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 24, 1932.

Rehearing Denied April 20, 1932.

Davenport & Crain, of Wichita Falls, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, P. J.

The oifense is burglary; penalty assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for eight years.

The indictment appears regular and regularly filed. The facts before the trial court are not brought up for review. There are exceptions to the charge of the court and bills of exception asserting that there was a variance between the allegation and proof. The sufficiency of the evidence is also challenged by a special charge. There are other exceptions to the charge not necessary to describe; also exceptions to the reception of the, evidence. In the absence of a statement of facts showing the evidence that was .before the trial court, it is not possible for this court to determine whether the complaints made are meritorious or not. In the absence of a record showing the contrary, the presumption of regularity of the action of the trial court must prevail.

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

HAWKINS, J.

It 1⁄8 now made to appear that the present case and that of N. H. Michaels v. State, 49 S.W.(2d) 444, were companion cases; that, although prosecuted under different indictments, the criminal act was one and the same, and by agreement the two cases were tried together; it being understood between the state and appellants that one statement of facts would be sufficient. It was filed in the Michaels Case. A duplicate statement of facts has now been filed in this case, and, upon the explanation made, it has been considered.

The facts will not be repeated; they are set out at some length in the opinion in the Michaels Case, this day decided. The questions of law arising under the record here are precisely the same as those discussed and disposed of in the companion case.

Giving appellant the benefit of the record now on file, we are constrained to overrule his motion for rehearing for the same reasons that • supported the affirmance of the judgment in the companion case.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BAYCORP HOLDINGS, LTD. FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,949
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<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   139,980
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<CGS>                                           28,806
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,169
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
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</TABLE>
This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

Be fore KING, STEWART, and GEIS

Appellate Military Judges

_________________________ 

### UNITED STATES Appellee

v. Derick D. CLARK Lance Corporal (E

- 3 ), U.S. Marine Corps Appellant
No. 202000010

Decided: 29 June 2020 Appeal from the United States Navy

- Marine Corps Trial Judiciary
Military Judge : Michael Libretto
Sentence adjudge d 24 September 2019 by a genera l court

- martial convened at Marine Corps Base Parris Island, South Carolina , consisting of a m ilitary judge sitting alone

. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment : reduction to E

- 1, confinement for 18 months 1 , and a bad

conduct discharge.
For Appellant: Captain Brian L. Farrell, USMCR
For Appellee: Brian K. Keller, Esq.

1 Pursuant to the pre

- trial agreement, the convening authority suspended all confinement in excess of 15 months.United States v. Clark , NMCCA No. 202000010 Opinion of the Court

2 _________________________ This opinion does not serve as binding precedent under NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2 (a)

.

_________________________
PER CURIAM : After careful consideration of the record, submitted without assignment of error, we have determined that the findings a nd sentence are correct in law and fact and that no error materially prejudicial to A ppellant’s substantial rights occurred. Articles 59 and 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice , 10 U.S.C. §§ 859, 866. T he findings and sentence are AFFIRMED

.

FOR THE COURT:

RODGER A. DREW, JR. Clerk of Court
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<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,034,113
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (10,092)
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<DEPRECIATION>                               1,145,672
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,826,100
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,826,100
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            10,525,608
<CGS>                                       10,270,445
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               10,365,314
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,392
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               (2,234)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              47,872
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                113,264
<INCOME-TAX>                                    41,908
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             71,356
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<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.00
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</TABLE>
#### RANDALL v. STATE.

No. 20387.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 26, 1939.

*457Currie McCutcheon, of Dallas, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The .offense -is an aggravated assault; the punishment, a fine of $100 and confinement in jail for 90 days.

The transcript fails to reveal a judgment of conviction. Under the circumstances, this court is without jurisdiction.

The appeal is dismissed.

PER CURIAM:

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
**EXHIBIT32**

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**ANDPRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER**

**PURSUANTTO**

**18U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACTOF 2002**

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, Judd D. Hoffman, President and ChiefExecutive Officer of American Medical Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”), andBarbara Woody, Controller and principal accounting officer of the Company,certify that:

1.                                       theAnnual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the year ended December 31,2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.                                       theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| /s/ Judd D. Hoffman                         |   | Dated: April 16, 2007 |
|---------------------------------------------|--------|-----------------------|
| Judd D. Hoffman                             |   |                  |
| President and Chief Executive Officer       |   |                  |
|                                        |   |                  |
|                                        |   |                  |
| /s/ Barbara Woody                           |   | Dated: April 16, 2007 |
| Barbara Woody                               |   |                  |
| Controller and principal accounting officer |   |                  |
|                                             |        |                       |  |

 

 

 

----
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002* Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C §
1350, as adopted), James A.D. Smith, President and Chief Executive Officer of
Genelabs Technologies, Inc. (the Company), and Matthew M. Loar, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies that, to the best of
his knowledge: 1. The Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December
31, 2003, to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 (the
Periodic Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 2. The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition of the Company at the end of the
period covered by the Periodic Report and results of operations of the Company
for the period covered by the Periodic Report. Dated: March 15, 2004/S/ James A.D. Smith
    
    /S/ Matthew M. LoarJames A.D. SmithPresident and Chief Executive Officer
    
    Matthew M. LoarChief Financial Officer
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authentication, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this statement
required by section 906, has been provided to Genelabs Technologies and will be
retained by Genelabs Technologies and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) or its staff upon request.   * This certification accompanies the Form 10-K to which it relates, is not
deemed filed with the SEC and is not to be incorporated by reference into any
filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the
date of the Form 10-K), irrespective of any general incorporation language
contained in such filing.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AND STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                           5,786
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   47,019
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (2,263)
<INVENTORY>                                     54,301<F1>
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                68,427
<PP&E>                                         159,570
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 264,413
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           37,123
<BONDS>                                        185,751<F2>
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     40,931
<COMMON>                                           146
<OTHER-SE>                                         462<F3>
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   264,413
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               227,337
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               250,555
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,793
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (4,984)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (25,027)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (25,027)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (3.28)
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<FN>
<F1>Includes the following assets: prepaid expenses and other of $7,875, 
prepaid income taxes of $7,860, deferred income taxes--current of $2,150, 
deferred income taxes--long-term of $71, restricted cash of $5,031, note 
receivable of $7,487, and intangible assets, net of $23,827.
<F2>Includes the following long-term liabilities: deferred income of $2,460, 
capital lease obligation of $51,503, and long-term debt of $131,788.
<F3>Includes the following equity accounts: additional paid-in capital of 
$205,972, treasury stock $(183,746), and retained earnings of $(21,764)
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

**Certification of Chief Executive Officer **

**Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

I, Charles J. Hogarty, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary tomake the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a)designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: November 10, 2003
#### McCORMICK et ux. v. WEST TEXAS LUMBER CO.

No. 7812.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

Nov. 30, 1932.

Kerr & Gayer, of San Angelo, for appellants.

Upton & Upton, of San Angelo, for appel-lee.

BAUGH, J.

Appeal is from an order of the district court overruling appellants’ plea of privilege to be sued in Selileicher county, the place of their residence.

Appellee sued appellants on two promissory notes executed by them, payable to the order of appellee, in Tom Green county, and for foreclosure of deed of trust lien executed by them on real estate in Schleicher county, to secure the payment of these notes. Appellants’ plea of privilege was duly controverted by appellee. Upon the trial of the issue of venue, appellee proved the execution and delivery of the notes, and that they were payable in Tom Green couhty. Appellants thereupon offered in evidence a release executed by appellee, acknowledging payment of the notes and releasing the lien sought to be foreclosed, which had been executed prior to the filing of the suit, and had been duly recorded in Schleicher county. This evidence was excluded by the trial court, and exception duly taken.

*192It is tlie contention of the appellants that this evidence should have been-admitted, and that if it had been admitted would have shown that venue did not lie in Tom Green county.

We do not agree with this contention. Appellants admitted upon the trial the execution of the notes, and that they were payable in Tom Green county. The testimony offered was tantamount to a plea of payment, which was clearly a matter going to the merits of the suit and not determinative of the proper forum in which the suit could he brought. When the appellee proved the execution and delivery to it of a written, instrument payable in Tom Green county, it rebutted the prima facie case authorizing transfer of the, suit made by the plea of privilege. All matters, therefore, relating to payment of such notes, failure of consideration, or breach of contract otherwise, were matters of defense to the merits of the suit and not pertinent to the issue of venue. Had this testimony been admitted on the issue of venue, the appellee would doubtless have countered that the notes had not in fact been paid, and the question of whether anything was yet due upon them would then have been litigated on the issue of venue. In other words, it would have been necessary to have tried the case on its merits on the issue of venue. This the statute does not contemplate and the authorities do not sustain. Bradley v. Trinity State Bank, 118 Tex. 274, 14 S.W.(2d) 810; Davis v. Texas Life Ins. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 22 S.W.(2d) 960.

 In testing the issue of venue the contract sued upon must be looked to alone to determine that question, where undeniably executed by the parties to the suit. Russell v. Green (Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W. 448. And when looked to in this case it affirmatively appears that the district court of Tom Green county was the proper tribunal in which to try the case. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                               22,205,704
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            18,022,159
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               837,875
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<INCOME-TAX>                                 3,487,050
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.64
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</TABLE>
#### MONTEZ et al. v. LANGE.

No. 10736.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Sept. 9, 1939.

Tabor Stone and Whipple & Rabel, all of San Antonio, for plaintiffs in error.

Andrew Dilworth and William H. Shire-man, both of San Antonio, for defendant in error.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

In this case the parties have joined in a motion to affirm as a result of a settlement ■of the matters in controversy. Accordingly, the motion will be granted and the judgment affirmed, at the cost of plaintiffs in error, as further stipulated by the parties.

Affirmed.