FILED

January 25, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

(HEARD AT SHELBYVILLE)

FOR PUBLICATION

Filed: January 25, 1999

MARTHA P. JORDAN, Administratrix )

of the Estate of Mary Sue Douglas, )

Deceased, )

)

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, ) HUMPHREYS CIRCUIT

)

v. ) Hon. Robert E. Burch

)

BAPTIST THREE RIVERS HOSPITAL, ) No. 01S01-9706-CV-00142

MARK W. ANDERSON, M.D., )

NOEL DOMINGUEZ, M.D., AND )

PATRICK J. MURPHY, M.D., )

)

DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES. )

FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:

DAVID RANDOLPH SMITH

ROBERT BLAKE MENZEL

Nashville

FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,

BAPTIST THREE RIVERS HOSPITAL:

GAYLE MALONE, JR.

KATHRYN J. LADD

KARA E. SHEA

Nashville

FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,

MARK W. ANDERSON, M.D.:

DAN L. NOLAN

SUZANNE M. PEARSON

Clarksville

FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,

NOEL DOMINGUEZ, M.D.:

THOMAS F. RAINEY

Jackson

FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,

PATRICK J. MURPHY, M.D.:

ROBERT E. HOEN

JOHN R. CALLCOTT

Nashville

FOR AMICUS CURIAE,

STEFFONE McCLENDON:

H. NAILL FALLS JR.

JAMES B. JOHNSON

Nashville

FOR AMICUS CURIAE,

TENNESSEE TRIAL LAWYERS

ASSOCIATION:

JOHN A. DAY

DONALD CAPPARELLA

Nashville

STEVEN W. TERRY

Morristown

O P I N I O N

TRIAL COURT REVERSED HOLDER, J.
2

OPINION

We granted this appeal to determine whether spousal and parental

consortium losses should be permissible in wrongful death actions. Tennessee

law previously permitted the anomalous result of allowing spousal consortium

losses in personal injury cases but not in cases of wrongful death. Upon review

of the modern trend of authority and careful scrutiny of our statutory scheme, we

hold that loss of consortium claims should not be limited to personal injury suits.

We hold that the pecuniary value of a deceased's life includes the element of

damages commonly referred to as loss of consortium.

BACKGROUND

This cause of action arises out of the death of Mary Sue Douglas

("decedent"). The plaintiff, Martha P. Jordan, is a surviving child of the decedent

and the administratrix of the decedent's estate. The plaintiff, on behalf of the

decedent's estate, filed a medical malpractice action against the defendants,

Baptist Three Rivers Hospital, Mark W. Anderson, M.D., Noel Dominguez, M.D.,

and Patrick Murphy, M.D. The plaintiff has alleged that the defendants'

negligence caused the decedent's death.

The plaintiff's complaint sought damages for loss of consortium and for

the decedent's loss of enjoyment of life or hedonic damages. The defendants

filed a motion to strike and a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting that

Tennessee law does not permit recovery for loss of parental consortium and for

hedonic damages.

The trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike and granted the

plaintiff permission to file an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals found
1Ora l argu me nt wa s hea rd in th is cas e on A pril 2, 1 998, in Shelbyville , Bed ford Cou nty,

Tenn essee , as part of this Cou rt’s S.C.A.L .E.S. (Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for

Students ) project.

2

This Cou rt has prev ious ly held th at claims for he donic dam ages are not via ble in

Tenn essee in wrongf ul death c ases. See Spencer v. A-1 Crane Serv., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 938, 943

(Tenn. 1994).

3

that the plaintiff's application for appellate review was untimely. Nevertheless,

the appellate court "reviewed the plaintiff's application and the responses of the

defendants and [found] that this [was] not an appropriate case for an

interlocutory appeal." The plaintiff's application for an interlocutory appeal was

denied. We granted appeal1 to determine whether claims for loss of spousal and

parental consortium in wrongful death cases are viable in Tennessee under

Tenn. Code Ann.§ 20-5-113.2

 We express no opinion as to whether the loss of

parental consortium may be recovered in personal injury actions in which the

parent or parents survive. That issue will be addressed in an appropriate case.

ANALYSIS

Development of Wrongful Death Statute

A wrongful death cause of action did not exist at common law. See

Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Denying a Common-Law Recovery for

Wrongful Death, 61 A.L.R. 3d 906 (1975). Pursuant to the common law, actions

for personal injuries that resulted in death terminated at the victim's death

because "in a civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of

as an injury." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts

§ 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984) ("Prosser"). "The [legal] result was that it was

cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him, and that the most

grievous of all injuries left the bereaved family of the victim . . . without a

remedy." Id. This rule of non-liability for wrongful death was previously the

prevailing view in both England and in the United States. East Tennessee V. &
3

"[W]hen any person may depart this life, by or against whom . . . any civil action, whether

the same be founded on wrongs or contracts, except actions for wrongs affecting the person or

character of the plaintiff, may have commenced, it shall be lawful to renew such suit by or against

the personal representative of such decedent . . ." 1836 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 77.

4

G. Ry. Co. v. Lilly, 18 S.W. 243, 244 (Tenn 1891); Hall v. Nashville & C. R. Co., 1

Shan. 141 (Tenn. 1859).

In 1846, the British Parliament enacted a wrongful death statute designed

to abrogate the common law rule's harsh effect of denying recovery for personal

injuries resulting in death. The English statute was referred to as "Lord

Campbell's Act" and created a cause of action for designated survivors that

accrued upon the tort victim's death. See Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful

Death, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 1043, 1051 (1965); Prosser, § 127, at 945.

Jurisdictions in the United States were quick to follow England's lead. Id.

In 1847, New York became the first American jurisdiction to enact a wrongful

death statute. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death and Injury, § 1:9 (3d ed.

1992). Presently, every jurisdiction in the United States has a wrongful death

statute. Id.; see also Prosser, § 127, at 945. These statutes, including that of

Tennessee, embody the substantive provisions of Lord Campbell's Act and

permit designated beneficiaries to recover losses sustained as a result of the tort

victim's death. Dixie Ohio Exp. Co. v. Butler, 166 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tenn. 1942);

East Tennessee, 18 S.W. at 244.

Tennessee was one of the earliest states to abrogate judicially "[t]he

artificial rule of the common law that every right of action for personal injury died

with the person injured." East Tennessee, 18 S.W. at 244. As early as 1836,

the Tennessee legislature enacted a statute providing for the survival of all civil

actions for which suit had been commenced prior to the victim's death.3 In 1850,

our legislature made its initial attempt to permit recovery in wrongful death cases. 

The legislation permitted a recovery for wrongful death by enacting legislation
4

"[I]n all and every case where any person shall come to his death, by injuries received

from another . . . f or wh ich injuries , in case de ath had no t resu lted, a n action of dam ages would lie

at law, the personal representative of the person thus killed shall have the right to institute an

action for damages . . ." 1850 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 58.

5

"[W]hen the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the

personal representatives of the former may maintain an action against the latter, if the former

might have maintained an action had he lived, against the latter for an injury caused by the same

act or omission . . ." 1851 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 17.

6

"[T]he right of action which a person, who dies from injuries received from another, or

whose death is caused by the wrongful act, omission, or killing by another, would have had

against th e wro ngdoer in case dea th had not ensu ed, shall no t abate or b e extinguis hed by his

death, bu t shall pass to his widow, an d in ca se there is no wid ow, to his ch ildren , or to h is

personal representative, for the benefit of his widow or next of kin . . ." 1877 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch.

78.

5

that permitted a personal representative to bring an action on behalf of a widow

or next of kin for the wrongful death of the victim regardless of whether suit had

been commenced prior to the death.4

 This statute underwent revisions in 18515

and 18776 which moved the law closer to its present form. Thus, prior to 1850,

Tennessee adhered to the common law rule that, upon the death of the victim,

no cause of action for damages could be brought by the estate of the deceased

for the benefit of third parties, such as family members, who sustained losses as

a result of the death. See Daniel v. East Tenn. Coal Co., 58 S.W. 859, 860

(Tenn. 1900); Chambers v. Porter, 45 Tenn. 273, 276 (1868).

After more than a century of piecemeal revision by the legislature and

interpretation by the courts, Tennessee's modern wrongful death law has taken

shape. See generally, T. A. Smedley, Wrongful Death Actions in Tennessee, 27

Tenn. L. Rev. 447 (1960). Our present wrongful death statutes are substantially

similar to the early codifications abandoning the rule of non-liability for wrongful

death.

Specifically, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-102, the direct descendent of the

1836 statute, provides that 

[n]o civil action commenced, whether founded on wrongs or

contracts, except actions for wrongs affecting the character of the

plaintiff, shall abate by the death of either party . . . ; nor shall any
6

right of action arising hereafter based on the wrongful act or

omission of another, except actions for wrongs affecting the

character, be abated by the death of the party wronged; but the

right of action shall pass in like manner as [described in Tenn.

Code Ann. § 20-5-106].

Moreover, Tenn Code Ann. § 20-5-106, the modern version of the 1877

statute, provides in part:

The right of action which a person, who dies from injuries received

from another, or whose death is caused by the wrongful act,

omission, or killing by another, would have had against the

wrongdoer, in case death had not been ensued, shall not abate or

be extinguished by the person's death but shall pass to the

person's surviving spouse and, in case there is no surviving

spouse, to the person's children or next of kin; or to the person's

personal representative, for the benefit of the person's surviving

spouse or next of kin.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a). Thus, an examination of the development of

Tennessee's wrongful death law, from its inception to the present, establishes

that the right of recovery in a wrongful death case is strictly a creation of statute. 

See Hogan v. McDaniel, 319 S.W.2d 221, 222-23 (Tenn. 1958); Jamison v.

Memphis Transit Management Co., 381 F.2d 670, 673 (6th Cir. 1967).

Because a cause of action for wrongful death is a creation of statute,

recoverable damages must be determined by reference to the particular statute

involved. Although all states have abolished the rule of non-liability when

personal injury results in death, the statutory methods of doing so fall into two

distinct categories - wrongful death statutes and survival statutes. See Sea-Land

Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 575 n.2 (1974).

The majority of states have enacted "survival statutes." These statutes

permit the victim's cause of action to survive the death, so that the victim, 

through the victim's estate, recovers damages that would have been recovered
7

by the victim had the victim survived. Sea-Land, 414 U.S. at 575 n.2; Recovery

for Wrongful Death at § 1:15; Prosser, § 126, at 942-43. Survival statutes do not

create a new cause of action; rather, the cause of action vested in the victim at

the time of death is transferred to the person designated in the statutory scheme

to pursue it, and the action is enlarged to include damages for the death itself. 

Prosser, § 126, at 942-43. "[T]he recovery is the same one the decedent would

have been entitled to at death, and thus included such items as wages lost after

injury and before death, medical expenses incurred, and pain and suffering," and

other appropriate compensatory damages suffered by the victim from the time of

injury to the time of death. Id. at 943.

In contrast to survival statutes, "pure wrongful death statutes" create a

new cause of action in favor of the survivors of the victim for their loss

occasioned by the death. Recovery for Wrongful Death at § 1:13; William T.

Gamble, Actions for Wrongful Death in Tennessee, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 289, 290

(1950). These statutes proceed "on the theory of compensating the individual

beneficiaries for the loss of the economic benefit which they might reasonably

have expected to receive from the decedent in the form of support, services or

contributions during the remainder of [the decedent's] lifetime if [the decedent]

had not been killed." Prosser, § 127, at 949. Hence, most wrongful death

jurisdictions have adopted a "pecuniary loss" standard of recovery, allowing

damages for economic contributions the deceased would have made to the

survivors had death not occurred and for the economic value of the services the

deceased would have rendered to the survivors but for the death. Recovery for

Wrongful Death at § 3:1.

Tennessee's approach to providing a remedy for death resulting from

personal injury is a hybrid between survival and wrongful death statutes,

resulting in a statutory scheme with a "split personality." 27 Tenn. L. Rev. at
7See 1883 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 186.

8

454. The pertinent damages statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113, has been in

existence in one form or another since 1883.7 It provides:

Where a person's death is caused by the wrongful act, fault, or

omission of another, and suit is brought for damages . . . the party

suing shall, if entitled to damages, have the right to recover the

mental and physical suffering, loss of time, and necessary

expenses resulting to the deceased from the personal injuries, and

also the damages resulting to the parties for whose use and

benefit the right of action survives from the death consequent

upon the injuries received.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 (emphasis added).

 The plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 reveals that it may be

classified as a survival statute because it preserves whatever cause of action

was vested in the victim at the time of death. Jones v. Black, 539 S.W.2d 123

(Tenn. 1976); Milligan v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 622 F. Supp. 56, 59

(W.D. Tenn. 1985). The survival character of the statute is evidenced by the

language "the party suing shall have the right to recover [damages] resulting to

the deceased from the personal injuries." Thrailkill v. Patterson, 879 S.W.2d

836, 841 (Tenn. 1994) (emphasis added). Tennessee courts have declared that

the purpose of this language is to provide "for the continued existence and

passing of the right of action of the deceased, and not for any new, independent

cause of action in [survivors]." Whaley v. Catlett, 53 S.W. 131, 133 (Tenn.

1899); see also Herrell v. Haney, 341 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tenn. 1960); Memphis

St. Ry. Co. v. Cooper, 313 S.W.2d 444, 447-48 (Tenn. 1958); Jamison v.

Memphis Transit Management Co., 381 F.2d 670, 673 (6th Cir. 1967). 

Accordingly, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 "in theory, preserve[s] the right of

action which the deceased himself would have had, and . . . [has] basically been

construed as falling within the survival type of wrongful death statutes for over a
9

century" because it continues that cause of action by permitting recovery of

damages for the death itself. Jones, 539 S.W.2d at 123-25.

Notwithstanding the accurate, technical characterization of Tenn. Code

Ann. § 20-5-113 as survival legislation, the statute also creates a cause of action

that compensates survivors for their losses. The statute provides that damages

may be recovered "resulting to the parties for whose use and benefit the

right of action survives from the death." Id. (emphasis added). Hence,

survivors of the deceased may recover damages for their losses suffered as a

result of the death as well as damages sustained by the deceased from the time

of injury to the time of death. Jones, 539 S.W.2d at 124 (Tennessee's wrongful

death legislation provides "for elements of damages consistent with a theory of

survival of the right of action of the deceased but also allows damages consistent

. . . with the creation of a new cause of action in the beneficiaries."). Our inquiry

shall focus on whether survivors should be permitted to recover consortium

losses.

LOSS OF SPOUSAL CONSORTIUM

In 1903, this Court held in Davidson Benedict Co. v. Severson, 72 S.W.

967 (Tenn. 1903), that consortium damages were not available under

Tennessee's wrongful death statute. The plaintiff urges this Court to revisit and

reverse the holding in Davidson based on the following assertions: (1) that the

Davidson holding was contrary to the plain language of the wrongful death

statute; (2) that permitting consortium damages in personal injury but not in

wrongful death cases is illogical; (3) that the majority of jurisdictions now permit

loss of consortium damages in wrongful death cases; and (4) that the doctrine

of stare decisis should not commit this Court "to the sanctification of ancient

fallacy." Upon careful review, we agree with the plaintiff.
10

STARE DECISIS AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The defendant urges this Court to decline revisiting the issue of the

availability of consortium damages under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 on the

basis of stare decisis. "Were we to rule upon precedent alone, were stability the

only reason for our being, we would have no trouble with this case. . . . In so

doing we would have vast support from the dusty books. But dust [from] the

decision would remain in our mouths through the years ahead, a reproach to law

and conscience alike. Our oath is to do justice, not to perpetuate error." 

Montgomery v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich. 1960).

The defendant asserts that any "change to the meaning of Tenn. Code

Ann. § 20-5-113 should be left to the legislature." The issue before us, however,

involves a matter of statutory interpretation and not the implementation of public

policy.

Next, the defendant argues that the wrongful death statute is in derogation

of the common law and, therefore, should be strictly construed. The defendant

maintains that interpreting the wrongful death statute to permit recovery of

"parental consortium claims . . . would be to afford the statute a liberal

construction."

Issues of statutory construction are questions of law and shall be

reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Beare Co. v.

Tennessee Dep't of Revenue, 858 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tenn. 1993); Union

Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). Statutes in

derogation of the common law are generally strictly construed. The rule requiring

strict construction amounts to a recognition of a presumption against the

legislature's intention to change existing law. Stem. v Nashville Interurban Ry.,
11

221 S.W. 192, 195 (Tenn. 1920). Remedial statutes, however, generally reflect

a legislative intent to amend an area of the common law and shall be construed

liberally. Id.

This Court's role in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and to effectuate

the legislature's intent. State v. Sliger, 846 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn. 1993). 

Generally, legislative intent shall be derived from the plain and ordinary meaning

of the statutory language when a statute's language is unambiguous. Carson

Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn.

1993). When a statute's language is ambiguous and the parties legitimately

derive different interpretations, we must look to the entire statutory scheme to

ascertain the legislative intent. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.

1995).

The defendant argues that this Court has previously held that Tenn. Code

Ann. § 20-5-113 is a survival statute and that survival statutes generally do not

permit recovery under consortium theories. While this Court in Jones v. Black,

539 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. 1976), previously classified Tennessee's wrongful death

statute as a survival statute for purposes of limitations of action, we are not

confined to interpret the statute according to the strictures of a judicially imposed

classification when such an interpretation would ignore unambiguous statutory

language. Accordingly, our analysis of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 shall focus

on the statute's language and not on what damages "survival" statutes in other

states generally permit. It must be remembered that, notwithstanding the

accurate, technical characterization of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 as survival

legislation, the statute also provides for a cause of action that compensates

survivors for their losses.
8

"It is thus apparent from the authorities that there are ... two classes of damages

recoverable in the same a ction. First, damages purely for the injury to the deceased himself;

second, the incidental dam ages suffere d by the widow and ch ildren , or ne xt of k in, fro m h is

death." Davidson Benedict Co., 72 S.W. at 977.

12

Damages under our wrongful death statute can be delineated into two

distinct classifications. Thrailkill v. Patterson, 879 S.W.2d 836 (Tenn. 1994);

Davidson Benedict Co. v. Severson, 72 S.W.2d 967 (Tenn. 1903). The first

classification permits recovery for injuries sustained by the deceased from the

time of injury to the time of death. Damages under the first classification include

medical expenses, physical and mental pain and suffering, funeral expenses,

lost wages, and loss of earning capacity. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113

("right to recover the mental and physical suffering, loss of time, and necessary

expenses resulting to the deceased from the personal injuries").

The second classification of damages permits recovery of incidental

damages suffered by the decedent's next of kin. See Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 20-5-113 ("and also the damages resulting to the parties for whose use and

benefit the right of action survives from the death consequent upon the injuries

received.") (emphasis added); see also Thrailkill, 879 S.W.2d at 841; Davidson

Benedict Co., 72 S.W. at 977.8

 Incidental damages have been judicially defined

to include the pecuniary value of the decedent's life. Spencer v. A-1 Crane

Serv., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tenn. 1994). Pecuniary value has been

judicially defined to include "the expectancy of life, the age, condition of health

and strength, capacity for labor and earning money through skill, any art, trade,

profession and occupation or business, and personal habits as to sobriety and

industry." Id. Pecuniary value also takes into account the decedent's probable

living expenses had the decedent lived. Wallace v. Couch, 642 S.W.2d 141

(Tenn. 1982); Hutton v. City of Savannah, 968 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1997).
13

The wrongful death statute neither explicitly precludes consortium

damages nor reflects an intention to preclude consortium damages. The

statute's language does not limit recovery to purely economic losses. To the

contrary, the statute's plain language appears to encompass consortium

damages.

Indeed, this Court has recognized that pecuniary value cannot be defined

to a mathematical certainty as such a definition "would overlook the value of the

[spouse's] personal interest in the affairs of the home and the economy incident

to [the spouse's] services." Thrailkill, 879 S.W.2d at 841. We further believe

that the pecuniary value of a human life is a compound of many elements. An

individual family member has value to others as part of a functioning social and

economic unit. This value necessarily includes the value of mutual society and

protection, i.e, human companionship. Human companionship has a definite,

substantial and ascertainable pecuniary value, and its loss forms a part of the

value of the life we seek to ascertain. While uncertainties may arise in proof

when defining the value of human companionship, the one committing the

wrongful act causing the death of a human being should not be permitted to seek

protection behind the uncertainties inherent in the very situation his wrongful act

has created. Moreover, it seems illogical and absurd to believe that the

legislature would intend the anomaly of permitting recovery of consortium losses

when a spouse is injured and survives but not when the very same act causes a

spouse's death.

We are constrained to interpret statutes so that no part or phrase of a

statute will be rendered inoperative, superfluous, void, or insignificant. Tidwell v.

Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tenn. 1975). Accordingly, we reverse Davidson

Benedict v. Severson, 72 S.W.2d 967 (Tenn. 1902), to the extent that Davidson
9All cases precluding recovery of spousal conso rtium losses in wrongful death cases are

overruled to the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion.

14

Benedict prohibits consideration of spousal consortium losses when calculating

the pecuniary value of a deceased's life under the wrongful death statute.9 

LOSS OF PARENTAL CONSORTIUM

The wrongful death statute precludes neither a minor child nor an adult

child from seeking compensation for the child’s consortium losses. Moreover,

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-110 provides that "a suit for the wrongful killing of the

spouse may be brought in the name of the surviving spouse for the benefit of the

surviving spouse and the children of the deceased." This provision when read in

pari materia with Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 seemingly permits consideration

of parental consortium damages. See Foster v. Jeffers, 813 S.W.2d 449, 451

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding all wrongful death statutes must be construed

with reference to one another).

A review of case law in other jurisdictions indicates a trend to expand

consortium claims to include the impairment of a child's relationship with a

parent. Comment, Belcher v. Goins: West Virginia Joins the Distinct Minority of

Jurisdiction in Recognizing a Claim for Loss of Parental Consortium, 94 W. Va.

L. Rev. 261, 262 (1991). In cases involving a parent's death, "[t]he general rule

. . . followed is that a child's loss of nurture, education and moral training which it

probably would have received from a parent wrongfully killed is a pecuniary loss

to be considered as an element of the damages suffered by the child." Recovery

for Wrongful Death at § 3:47 (listing thirty-four jurisdictions so holding). See also

94 Va. L. Rev. at 266 ("Most states . . . allow a surviving . . . child . . . to recover

for loss of consortium where a parent is tortiously killed."); Prosser, § 127, at 952

("Even jurisdictions that have rejected the loss of society or consortium claim, as
15

such, have permitted one form of it, namely a loss of guidance and advice that

the decedent would have provided [to the child].").

A basis for placing an economic value on parental consortium is that the

education and training which a child may reasonably expect to receive from a

parent are of actual and commercial value to the child. Accordingly, a child

sustains a pecuniary injury for the loss of parental education and training when a

defendant tortiously causes the death of the child's parent. Moreover, we

recognize that: 

"normal home life for a child consists of complex incidences in

which the sums constitute a nurturing environment. When the

vitally important parent-child relationship is impaired and the child

loses the love, guidance and close companionship of a parent, the

child is deprived of something that is indeed valuable and precious. 

No one could seriously contend otherwise.

Still by Erlandson v. Baptist Hosp., 755 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tenn. App. 1988)

(quoting Hoffman v. Dautel, 368 P.2d 57, 59 (Kan. 1962)). 

The additional considerations employed for spousal consortium may be

applicable to parental consortium claims. We agree with the observation of one

court that "companionship, comfort, society, guidance, solace, and protection . . .

go into the vase of family happiness [and] are the things for which a wrongdoer

must pay when he shatters the vase." Spangler v. Helm's New York-Pittsburgh

Motor Exp., 153 A.2d 490 (Penn. 1959).

Adult children may be too attenuated from their parents in some cases to

proffer sufficient evidence of consortium losses. Similarly, if the deceased did

not have a close relationship with any of the statutory beneficiaries, the statutory

beneficiaries will not likely sustain compensable consortium losses or their

consortium losses will be nominal. The age of the child does not, in and of itself,
16

preclude consideration of parental consortium damages. The adult child inquiry

shall take into consideration factors such as closeness of the relationship and

dependence (i.e., of a handicapped adult child, assistance with day care, etc.).

CONCLUSION

We hold that consortium-type damages may be considered when

calculating the pecuniary value of a deceased's life. This holding does not

create a new cause of action but merely refines the term "pecuniary value." 

Consortium losses are not to limited to spousal claims but also necessarily

encompass a child's loss, whether minor or adult. Loss of consortium consists of

several elements, encompassing not only tangible services provided by a family

member, but also intangible benefits each family member receives from the

continued existence of other family members. Such benefits include attention,

guidance, care, protection, training, companionship, cooperation, affection, love,

and in the case of a spouse, sexual relations. Our holding conforms with the

plain language of the wrongful death statutes, the trend of modern authority, and

the social and economic reality of modern society.

The decision of the of the trial court granting the defendants' motion to

strike is reversed. Costs of this appeal shall be taxed to the defendants for

which execution may issue if necessary.

JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE

Concurring:

Anderson, C.J.

Drowota, and Birch, J.J.

Russell, Sp.J.