alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Summary of Interagency Comments Submitted during EO12866 Review 

Subject to Further Policy Review

1) We suggest that some clarification is needed with respect to statements in the rule 

regarding the date on which the Tailoring Rule will take effect. On page 11, the first 

sentence of the first full paragraph states: “The effect of EPA narrowing its approval in 

this manner is that there will be no federally-approved title V program that requires 

permits for sources due to emissions of GHG below the final Tailoring Rule threshold of 

100,000 tpy CO2e (and 100 tpy mass basis), which takes effect on July 1, 2011.”

The first phase of the Tailoring Rule, however, takes effect for both PSD and Title V on 

January 2, 2011 (although the second phase takes effect on July 1, 2011). See, e.g., 75 

Fed. Reg. at 31,516/2, 31,523/2. EPA should clarify why July 1, 2011 is the appropriate 

date. We also note that the July 1, 2011 date appears elsewhere in the Rule -- for 

example on page 9, line 1.

2) Page 1: Throughout the text, consider replacing “limit” with “revise” (or “narrow”) 

because the word “limit” carries an unnecessary negative connotation and, in this 

context, may be interpreted to broadly mean more SIPs than EPA intended, which could 

potentially confuse readers. The rest of the sentence on page 1 in the summary does a 

good job of explaining this rule’s purpose.

3) Page 11: For clarity, suggest qualifying the statement “[s]tates affected by this rule will 

not be required to take any action as a result of this rule” by explaining that states need 

not take any further action under the federal Clean Air Act as a result of this rule. Also, 

suggest referring the reader to the passages in “Limitation of Approval of Prevention of 

Significant Deterioration Provisions Concerning Greenhouse Gas Emitting-Sources in 

State Implementation Plans” where EPA urges states to amend state law to align with 

the Tailoring Rule.

4) Page 15: It might be helpful to add a citation to the first sentence of the first full 

paragraph to support the statement that CAA § 301(a) “incorporates the authority of an 

agency to reconsider its actions.”

5) Page 25: First sentence of the first full paragraph is redundant as a similar statement 

appears on the previous page, which could potentially confuse readers. Suggest deleting 

second instance on page 25.

6) Page 34: In the middle of the page, it might be helpful to provide a citation for the 

statement “Reconsidering prior rulemakings, when necessary, is part of ‘[EPA’s] 

functions’ under the CAA .”
EXHIBIT 23

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

Jones Apparel Group, Inc.New York, New YorkWe hereby
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Prospectus constituting a part
of the Registration Statement on Form S-8 filed May 15, 1996, August 23, 1999
and August 2, 2001 of our reports dated January 31, 2003 relating to the consolidated
financial statements and schedule of Jones Apparel Group, Inc. and subsidiaries
appearing in the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2002.We also consent to the reference to us under the
caption of "Experts" in the Prospectus.

/s/ BDO Seidman,
      LLPBDO Seidman, LLP


New York, New YorkMarch 25, 2003
[Cite as State v. Cody, 2022-Ohio-874.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

CLINTON COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Appellee, 

 - vs - 

AARON D. CODY, JR. 

 Appellant. 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

CASE NO. CA2021-08-023 

D E C I S I O N 

 3/21/2022 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLINTON COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT 

Case No. TRC 21 00477 A 

Andrew T. McCoy, Clinton County Prosecuting Attorney, and David Henry, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

Rose & Dobyns Co., L.P.A., and Blaise Underwood, for appellant.

 Per Curiam.

{¶1} This cause came on to be considered upon a notice of appeal filed by 

appellant, Aaron D. Cody, Jr., the transcript of the docket and journal entries, the transcript 

of proceedings and original papers from the Clinton County Court of Common Pleas, and 

upon the brief filed by appellant's counsel. 

{¶2} Appellant's counsel has filed a brief with this court pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), which (1) indicates that a careful review of 

the record from the proceedings below fails to disclose any errors by the trial court 
Clinton CA2021-08-023 

 - 2 - 

prejudicial to the rights of appellant upon which an assignment of error may be predicated; 

(2) lists three potential errors "that might arguably support the appeal," Anders, at 744, 87 

S.Ct. at 1400; (3) requests that this court review the record independently to determine 

whether the proceedings are free from prejudicial error and without infringement of 

appellant's constitutional rights; (4) requests permission to withdraw as counsel for 

appellant on the basis that the appeal is wholly frivolous; and (5) certifies that a copy of both 

the brief and motion to withdraw have been served upon appellant. 

{¶3} Having allowed appellant sufficient time to respond, and no response having 

been received, we have accordingly examined the record and find no error prejudicial to 

appellant's rights in the proceedings in the trial court. The motion of counsel for appellant 

requesting to withdraw as counsel is granted, and this appeal is dismissed for the reason 

that it is wholly frivolous. 

PIPER, P.J., S. POWELL and HENDRICKSON, JJ., concur. 
[Cite as State v. Cody, 2022-Ohio-874.]
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5.4.

1 United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED September 6, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-40497 Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee v. JESUS VALENCIA FARIAS, also known as Jesus Ballencia Farias, also known as Arturo Chavez Gonzales, also known as Chewy, also known as Chuy Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 4:04-CR-71-1 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * The attorney appointed to representJesusValencia Farias has moved for leave towithdrawand has filed a brief in accordance with Andersv. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Farias has not filed a response. Our independent review of the record and counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal.No. 05-41856

2 Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANT ED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R . 42.2.
*OPINION ISSUED OCTOBER 6, 2008*

#### ROBERT L. MYLES VS. DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS

(CC-06-0385)

Claimant appeared *pro se.*

Andrew F. Tarr, Attorney at Law, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Claimant brought this action for vehicle damage which occurred when his 1994 Ford Mustang struck a raised section of pavement on Route 25 near the Bayer Plant in Kanawha County. Route 25 is a road maintained by respondent. The Court is of the opinion to deny the claim for the reasons more fully stated below.

Claimant testified that his vehicle sustained damage as a result of his daily drive from St. Albans to Charleston on Route 25. Although claimant could not recall the date of the incident, he stated that it occurred sometime before December 21,2006. Claimant stated that his vehicle struck a raised section of pavement on Route 25 on more than one occasion. Water underneath the blacktop created an elevated section of asphalt on the road. He explained that every time he went across the road, the road condition was rough. Since Route 25 was the shortest route to Charleston, he did not take an alternate route. In addition, claimant stated that he did not use an alternative road such as Route 60 because the road condition is rough and there are holes on this road. Claimant notified respondent of the road condition after his vehicle struck the elevated area on the road. As a result of this incident, claimant’s vehicle sustained damage to its alignment in the amount of $49.98.

The position of the respondent is that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition on Route 25 at the site of claimant’s accident for the date in question. Respondent did not present any witnesses at the hearing of this matter.

The well-established principle of law in West Virginia is that the State is neither *140an insurer nor a guarantor of the safety of travelers upon its roads. *Adkins*v. *Sims,*130 W.Va. 645, 46 S.E.2d 81 (1947). In order to hold respondent liable for road defects of this type, a claimant must prove that respondent had actual or constructive notice of the defect and a reasonable time to take corrective action. *Chapman v. Dep’t. of Highways, 16 Ct.*Cl. 103 (1986).

In the instant case, the Court is of the opinion that respondent had, at the least, constructive notice of the hole on Route 25. The evidence also established that the claimant had notice of the road condition on Route 25. In a comparative negligence jurisdiction, such as West Virginia, the negligence of a claimant can reduce or bar recovery of a claim. A party’s comparative negligence or fault cannot equal or exceed the combined negligence or fault of the other parties involved in the accident. *See Bradley*v. *Appalachian Power Co.,*163 W.Va. 332, 342, 256 S.E. 2d 879, 885 (1979). In the instant case, the Court finds that the negligence of the claimant was equal to or more than the negligence of the respondent; therefore, the claimant may not make a recovery in this claim.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion to and does deny this claim.

Claim disallowed.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1345 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1345

 To amend title 5, United States Code, to eliminate the discriminatory 
   treatment of the District of Columbia under the provisions of law 
               commonly referred to as the ``Hatch Act''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 5, 2009

  Ms. Norton introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
              Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 5, United States Code, to eliminate the discriminatory 
   treatment of the District of Columbia under the provisions of law 
               commonly referred to as the ``Hatch Act''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``District of Columbia Hatch Act 
Reform Act of 2009''.

SEC. 2. EMPLOYEES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TO BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME 
              RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY AS APPLY TO STATE AND 
              LOCAL EMPLOYEES.

    (a) Applicability of Provisions Relating to State and Local 
Employees.--Section 1501(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended 
by striking ``a State or territory'' and inserting ``a State, the 
District of Columbia, or a territory''.
    (b) Provisions Relating to Federal Employees Made Inapplicable.--
Section 7322(1) of such title is amended--
            (1) by inserting ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (A);
            (2) by striking ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (B);
            (3) by striking subparagraph (C); and
            (4) by striking ``services;'' and inserting ``services or 
        an individual employed or holding office in the government of 
        the District of Columbia;''.

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    The amendments made by this Act--
            (1) shall take effect on the effective date of a law, 
        enacted by the government of the District of Columbia after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, which places restrictions on 
        political activities of employees of the government of the 
        District of Columbia; and
            (2) shall apply with respect to actions occurring on or 
        after the effective date referred to in paragraph (1).
                                 <all>
```
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

NOTICE DISMISSING APPLICATION OF MN AIRLINES, LLC 

D/B/A SUN COUNTRY AIRLINES 

Docket OST-2000-7182

NOTICE 

On January 25, 2012, Sun Country Airlines filed an application for exemptions from 14 

C.F.R. Part 93, Subparts K and S, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 41718(b), Special Rules for 

Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (within-perimeter slot exemptions). On 

January 26, Sun Country filed to withdraw its application for such slot exemptions.

In light of Sun Country’s filing to withdraw its application and pursuant to the 

Department’s Rules of Practice, we dismiss Sun Country’s application filed in this 

Docket, see 14 CFR § 302.3(d)(2).

We shall serve a copy of this notice on all certificated air carriers, the Metropolitan 

Washington Airports Authority, and the Federal Aviation Administration’s Slot 

Administration office. 

By:

Susan L. Kurland

 Assistant Secretary for 

Aviation and International Affairs

Dated: January 27, 2012

(SEAL)

An electronic version of this document will be available on the World Wide Web at:

http://dms.dot.gov/
Exhibit
31.2





Certification
of Principal Accounting Officer


Pursuant
to Rule 13a-14(a) or Rule 15d-14(a)


of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended





I,
William P. Stelt, Chief Financial Officer of Firepond, Inc. (the "Company"),
certify that:





1.
I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the three
months ended December 31, 2008;


2.
Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;


3.
Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;


4.
The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and I have:


a)
designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;


b)
designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal
control over financial reporting to be designed under my supervision, to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles;


c)
disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by this report that
has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting.


5.
The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent function):


a)
all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal  control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and


b)
any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting.







Firepond,
      Inc.Date: 
      February 4, 2009
            By:
            /s/ William
      P. SteltWilliam
      P. SteltChief
      Financial Officer
Exhibit 22

                                  SUBSIDIARIES


Set forth below is a list of all  subsidiaries  of Burlington  Industries,  Inc.
(the  "Corporation")*  and, as to each person  named,  the  percentage of voting
securities owned, or other bases of control, by its immediate parent.



                                          
                                                    Percentage of Voting
                                State or            Power Represented by
                              Jurisdiction          Securities Owned by
                                   of               the Corporation on
       Name                   Incorporation         September 28, 1996
-----------------------       -------------         ---------------------

Burlington Fabrics Inc.          Delaware                    100%

B.I. Funding, Inc.               Delaware                    100%








----------------------------

*       The names of 15 domestic  subsidiaries  (4 of which are  inactive) and 8
        foreign  subsidiaries  (one of  which is  inactive)  have  been  omitted
        because,  considered  in the  aggregate,  they  would not  constitute  a
        significant  subsidiary.  All of the foregoing subsidiaries are included
        in the consolidated financial statements of the Corporation.
#### CARDINELL v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF HOUSTON.

No. 9982.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.

April 13, 1934.

See, also, 42 S.W.(2d) 145.

Boyles, Scott & Fahey and Frank G. Dyer, all of Houston, for defendant in error.

GRAVES, Justice.

In this cause the plaintiff in error sued the bank for $1,740 alleged to be due him by it for a commission he claimed to have earned for having sold as its agent certain properties it owned in Brazoria county, declaring upon both an express contract and on quantum meruit.

The bank answered his petition with a general denial, further pleading the two-year statute of limitations (Rev. St. 1925, art. 5526) against the claim in so far as it was one on quantum meruit.

The cause came on for trial before a jury, and at the conclusion of the evidence the trial court, on the bank’s motion, instructed a verdict in its favor, which, being so returned, was followed by a judgment decreeing that the plaintiff in error take nothing; from that action this writ has been regularly sued out.

The cause comes up on a transcript, which discloses that the court below had jurisdiction of the parties, as well as of the cause of action, that the judgment is one it had the power to render under the pleadings, and that no fundamental error in the proceedings so taken is shown upon the face of the record; there is presented neither brief for the plaintiff in error, nor any statement *318of facts showing what the evidence was below.

Under the conditions stated, the appeal presents nothing for review here, the law applicable being thus stated in 3 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 538:

“As a general rule contentions or assignments of error which depend upon or r& quire a consideration of the evidence or the facts can not be considered or passed upon by the appellate court in the absence of a statement of facts, or, in cases tried by the court without a jury, when there is no statement of facts and no conclusions of fact were filed by the trial court. This is true, for example, of assignments of error depending upon the sufficiency of the evidence, or questioning the correctness of conclusions of law, when their correctness depends upon matters of fact not found by the court, and generally of assignments requiring a consideration of evidence presented on the hearing of motions or pleas or complaining of the admission or exclusion of evidence, or the giving of or refusal to give instructions.”

The judgment will be affirmed.

Affirmed.
#### COLLINS v. STATE.

No. 20377.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 26, 1939.

A. W. Pirtle, of Houston, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The offense is an assault with intent to murder; the punishment .assessed is confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of five years.

The indictment, omitting the formal parts, reads as follows:' “ * * * That Ernest Collins, on or about the 22nd day of October A. D. 1938, * * in the County of Fayette and State of Texas, did then and there unlawfully in and upon Ernest Young, Jr. make an assault with the intent then and there to murder the said Ernest Young, Jr. against the peace and dignity of the State.”

At the trial of the case, appellant waived a jury with the consent of the district attorney and the approval of the Court and entered a plea of guilty. The State offered the injured party as its only witness. He testified, in substance, that appellant called him a s— of a b- and he knocked him down. That after he had knocked appellant down, appellant cut him three times; once across the breast and twice across the hip.

The Court found appellant guilty of an assault with intent to murder and assessed his punishment at confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of five years.

It will be noted that the indictment does not charge that the assault was *452made with malice aforethought. Consequently it will not support a conviction for an assault to murder with malice aforethought.

Art. 1160, P.C., as amended by Acts 1931, 42d. Legis. p. 95, Ch. 61, Vernon's Ann.P.C., art. 1160 reads as follows: “If any person shall assault another with intent to murder, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor' more than fifteen years; provided that if the jury find that the assault was committed without malice, the penalty assessed shall be not less than one nor more than three years confinement in the penitentiary 3⁄8 * * »

The indictment failing to charge an assault with intent to murder with malice aforethought will not support a conviction for a higher offense than an assault to murder without malice, and the punishment assessed cannot be greater than three years. Therefore we cannot permit the judgment of conviction to stand. See Dunn v. State, 128 Tex.Cr.R. 229, 81 S.W.2d 87; Weathersby v. State, 129 Tex.Cr.R. 420, 87 S.W.2d 1102; McKee v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 309, 115. S.W.2d 943.

For the error hereinabove pointed out, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.