In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 14-1179 C

(Filed March 3, 2015)

1

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RAYMOND EXPRESS

INTERNATIONAL, LLC, 

 Plaintiff,

 v.

THE UNITED STATES,

 Defendant.

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Pre-Award Bid Protest; No

Violation of Statute or

Regulation; Adequate Market

Research; No Ambiguity in

Solicitation Price Evaluation

Scheme; Rational Test for

Price Reasonableness. 

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John E. Jensen, McLean, VA, for plaintiff. Alexander B. Ginsberg, Travis

L. Mullaney, and Meghan D. Doherty, McLean, VA, of counsel. 

Christopher J. Carney, United States Department of Justice, with whom

were Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. Kirschman,

Jr., Director, Claudia Burke, Assistant Director, Washington, DC, for defendant. 

Ralph J. Tremaglio, III, Defense Commissary Agency, Fort Lee, VA, of counsel.

________________________

OPINION

________________________

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/ This opinion was issued under seal on February 13, 2015. Pursuant to ¶ 4 of the

ordering language, the parties were invited to identify source selection, proprietary or

confidential material subject to deletion on the basis that the material was protected/privileged. 

Undisputed redactions were all acceptable to the court. Disputes over redactions were resolved

in favor of plaintiff, because the redacted information in question was not relied upon by the

court and the removal of this information does not prevent the reader from understanding the

legal issues resolved in this opinion. All redactions are indicated by brackets ([ ]).
Bush, Senior Judge.

Plaintiff Raymond Express International, LLC (REI) filed its pre-award bid

protest complaint on December 8, 2014 and amended its complaint on December

11, 2014. In its four-count amended complaint, REI challenges Solicitation No.

HDEC09-14-R-0002, a solicitation which has been amended six times. Some of

the amendments were in response to three prior protests brought by REI – an

agency-level protest and two protests at the Government Accountability Office

(GAO). 

The solicitation seeks bids on a contract (or contracts) to provide fresh fruit

and vegetables (FFV) to Department of Defense commissaries in South Korea,

Japan and Guam (the “Pacific Area”). The soliciting agency is the Defense

Commissary Agency (DeCA). In this protest, REI seeks injunctive and

declaratory relief regarding various terms and provisions of the solicitation.

The administrative record (AR) of this procurement was filed on December

19, 2014 and briefing was filed according to an expedited schedule. Oral

argument was held on January 26, 2015. As discussed below, plaintiff has not

shown that the terms of the solicitation violated procurement laws or regulations

or were arbitrary or capricious. Defendant’s motion for judgment on the

administrative record is therefore granted and plaintiff’s motion for judgment on

the administrative record is denied.

BACKGROUND

I. Introduction

This protest poses four basic questions: (1) Does DeCA have the discretion

under applicable laws and regulations to change its fresh fruit and vegetables

contracting from a model where the contractor procured most items in the United

States and had the items shipped at the government’s expense to the Pacific Area,

to a model where the contractor ships such items at its own expense to DeCA

commissaries in the Pacific Area?; (2) Did DeCA conduct adequate market

research to support this change in contracting for the Pacific Area?; (3) Is the

solicitation unambiguous as to how proposals would be evaluated when certain

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produce items were unavailable either locally (in South Korea, Japan or Guam) or

globally?; and, (4) Was the price evaluation scheme composed of rational

measures with which DeCA could determine the price reasonableness of the

proposals? All of these questions must be answered in the affirmative. The court

offers here a brief discussion of the background facts underlying its analysis.

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II. Incumbent Contract and FFV Contracts Elsewhere

REI is the incumbent contractor supplying FFV to DeCA commissaries in

South Korea, Japan – including Okinawa, and Guam. The incumbent contract is a

small business set-aside. AR at 3784. The incumbent contract includes a

transportation subsidy, because “[t]he Government [pays] transportation costs

from designated points within the United States to the commissary locations

located throughout South Korea, Guam, Okinawa and Japan.” Id. at 3804. One

effect of the subsidy is to lower the price that patrons of the commissaries in the

Pacific Area pay for fresh produce. See id. at 298 (noting that patrons of Pacific

Area commissaries “enjoy[] US quality produce at very low prices compared to the

local economy in any of the countries”).

It is undisputed that the transportation subsidy for the Pacific Area comes at

a substantial cost to the taxpayer. One estimate for the annual cost of the subsidy

for REI’s contract is $36 million. Oral Argument Transcript (Tr.) at 25. DeCA

has been able to contract elsewhere for FFV without providing the transportation

subsidy, which reduces the costs of the commissary program. AR at 298, 491 (no

transportation subsidy for FFV for commissaries in Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto

Rico); Tab 43 (no transportation subsidy for FFV for commissaries in Germany,

Belgium and the Netherlands); Tab 44 (no transportation subsidy for FFV for

commissaries in the United Kingdom). With the transportation subsidy removed,

the FFV contracts in other regions utilize the delivery term “F.O.B. Destination,”

where the contractor delivers the produce to each commissary and title to the

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/ The parties explore a wide-range of topics in their briefing. Similarly, the

administrative record, which includes extensive briefing and exhibits that were submitted for

review during the litigation of prior protests, is quite robust. Although all of the parties’

arguments have been considered by the court, this opinion focuses on the issues essential to the

resolution of this protest.

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goods passes to the government only upon delivery to that commissary. E.g., id. at

3889, 3897.

III. Acquisition Planning and Market Research

As REI’s incumbent contract was nearing its original completion date,

DeCA decided the time had come to remove the transportation subsidy from the

next Pacific Area FFV contract. AR at 491, 498-99. This decision was founded,

in part, on the agency’s understanding of the global market for produce. Id. at 491

(noting that the F.O.B. Destination business model “takes advantage of the

distribution process efficiencies that commercial industry has developed which

allows them to offer quality products from their worldwide sources”). DeCA also

believed it could replicate, in the Pacific Area, the newer business model’s success

in other regions such as Europe. Id. This belief was founded on market research

conducted by a DeCA contracting team based in Germany. See id. Tab 4.

The source selection plan was approved on January 30, 2014. AR at 532. 

Because much of the contract would be performed outside the United States,

DeCA removed the small business set-aside requirement. Id. at 492. An offeror

could bid on all three regions in the Pacific Area (South Korea, Japan and Guam),

or could bid on only one or two regions. Id. at 497. The contracting period would

be for an initial two-year base period, with three option years. Id. at 500. 

The original schedule called for DeCA to issue a Request for Proposals

(RFP or solicitation) in February 2014, make an award (or awards) in June 2014,

and have contract performance begin in September 2014. Id. at 504. That

projected schedule was interrupted and delayed by REI’s protests. See infra. REI

continues to fulfill the FFV needs of the Pacific Area commissaries and will

continue to do so through March 31, 2015. See id. Tab 41; Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 4. 

IV. The Solicitation

Solicitation No. HDEC09-14-R-0002, “Solicitation of Fresh Fruits &

Vegetables – Pacific Area,” was issued by DeCA on February 3, 2014. AR at 31-

204. The produce needs of the commissaries of South Korea, Japan and Guam

were divided into distinct Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs), so that an offeror

could submit a proposal for any number of the three CLINs. Id. at 33. The

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estimated value of the contract was $200 million for the base period and all option

periods if an offeror provided FFV for all three CLINs. Id. at 288, 293

(clarification provided by Amendment 0001). The F.O.B. Destination contract

term was clearly indicated in both the Solicitation itself and in letters sent to

potential offerors. Id. at 62-63, 206-37.

In its planning for the procurement, DeCA rejected an evaluation system

based on price alone, because “price will not be the sole determining factor in

selection of the awardee.” AR at 502. Instead, the agency recognized that

technical proficiency is key to the offeror’s success in providing FFV to the

Pacific Area commissaries:

It is essential that the contract awardee has the technical

approach to meet the merchandising support, meet or

exceed the [Pacific Area] Agricultural Standards, and the

other requirements that fall under the technical approach

sub-factor. In addition, the contract awardee must be

able to meet the inspection requirements, and have a

promotional plan to meet the additional support

requirements needed. This requirement is a program

buy; which means the resulting contract is an allinclusive commodity contract that provide[s] for the

addition of new items as they become available in the

marketplace. These additional items will be considered

within the scope of the contract and will not require

further competition. Evaluation of each sub-factor will

include the offeror’s participation in technological

advancements and its ability to provide products

available in the commercial marketplace. The

contracting officer must have latitude to make tradeoff

decisions between Combined Technical

Capabilities/Risk, Past Performance, and Price.

Id. at 502-03. In the solicitation, the evaluation system is generally described as

“Best Value, Trade-Off.” Id. at 51. More specifically, the evaluation scheme

provides that technical capability is significantly more important than past

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performance, and that these two factors, when combined, are significantly more

important than price. Id.

It is not necessary to review all of the solicitation terms, but a few terms

have been highlighted by the parties to this litigation (and in earlier protests

brought by REI) and merit mention here. The contractor is required to provide “a

full line of quality products available world-wide that is better than, or equal to

U.S. . . . Grade #1.” AR at 33, 242. Produce must be available for delivery, as a

general rule, twenty-four hours after an order has been placed by a commissary. 

Id. at 62, 246. Prices are to be evaluated for reasonableness, and proposals would

also provide the government with the opportunity to perform a price realism

assessment. Id. at 54, 243, 3774. Consumer prices at the commissaries must

provide shoppers with at least a fifteen percent discount compared to competing

prices at nearby local stores; this discount is known as the Patron Savings

Discount, or PSD. Id. at 54, 243, 293, 3774. 

Offerors were invited to submit questions regarding the solicitation in

writing. These questions were answered by Amendment 0001 to the solicitation

which was communicated to the offerors on February 24, 2014. AR at 286-92. 

Various price evaluation terms were clarified during the course of the procurement

and will be discussed further in the analysis section of this opinion. Offers in

response to the solicitation were initially due by March 19, 2014. Id. at 31.

V. Offers Received

[ ] offerors responded to the solicitation, but only [ ] proposals were deemed

to be responsive. AR Tabs 24-29, 33-38. Of the [ ] responsive proposals, [ ] for

Guam only, [ ] for Guam and South Korea only, and the remaining [ ] for all three

regions (South Korea, Japan and Guam). [ ]. 

VI. Protests and Related Solicitation Amendments

Some of REI’s concerns about the solicitation, and in particular its concerns

about the elimination of the transportation subsidy and DeCA’s increased reliance

on locally-grown produce from the Pacific Area, were expressed in the questions

submitted to DeCA and answered by Amendment 0001. See AR at 288. Although

DeCA provided its answers to the offerors’ questions on February 24, 2014,

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Amendment 0001 was not posted on FedBizOpps until March 4, 2014. Id. at 280. 

Soon thereafter, on March 14, 2014 DeCA extended the deadline for the receipt of

proposals until April 4, 2014 by issuing Amendment 0002. Id. at 276-77.

On April 3, 2014, one day before the proposal submission deadline, REI

lodged an agency-level protest which requested a decision from a level above the

contracting officer involved in the procurement. AR Tab 6. The agency-level

protest raised many of the issues that must be decided by this court in the subject

matter. Proposals were received by the agency on April 4, 2014 as previously

scheduled. On May 16, 2014, Mr. Lawrence P. Hahn, the Director of Acquisition

Management for DeCA, denied REI’s protest. Id. Tab 7. Mr. Hahn noted,

however, that some of REI’s requested clarifications of allegedly ambiguous terms

in the solicitation had been addressed by Amendments 0003 and 0004. These

amendments issued on March 24, 2014 and May 16, 2014, respectively. Id. at

249-75.

Undeterred, REI filed a timely challenge to the solicitation on May 27, 2014

with GAO. AR Tab 8. REI’s first GAO protest raised many of the issues that

must be decided by this court in the subject matter. When the agency announced

corrective action in response to some of the issues raised by REI, this first GAO

protest was dismissed as academic on June 25, 2014. Pl.’s Mot. at 12. DeCA’s

proposed corrective action included clarifying terms of the solicitation and

providing offerors with the opportunity to submit revised proposals. Id. 

Amendment 0005 issued on July 11, 2014 and clarified several terms of the

solicitation. AR at 241. This amendment to the solicitation addressed topics

which are still in controversy in the subject matter. Amendment 0005 explained

when certain High Volume Core Items of produce (HVCI) could be considered to

be “not available” for the price evaluation of proposals. Id. at 242. This

amendment also explained how an offeror could judge whether its proposed

produce meets the quality standard of U.S. Grade #1. Id. Another clarification

was provided as to the delivery requirement for “24-hour Ordering Lead Time.” 

Id. Finally, Amendment 0005 addressed the overall evaluation approach for

comparing the offeror’s prices, including a lengthy explanation of the importance

of the Patron Savings Discount, or PSD, as well as the importance of the offerors’

accurate understanding of competing local prices that a consumer would pay for

produce in the regions of the Pacific Area.

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Discussions were apparently opened with the responsive offerors on July

14, 2014. AR at 240. On July 16, 2014, DeCA requested revised proposals from

the offerors. Pl.’s Mot. at 12. Revised proposals were due on July 31, 2014. AR

at 693. One day before revised proposals were due to be received by DeCA, REI

filed its second GAO protest on July 30, 2014. Id. Tab 10. REI’s second GAO

protest also raised many of the issues that must be decided by this court in the

subject matter. Revised proposals were apparently received from the five

responsive offerors on July 31, 2014. Id. Tabs 33-38; Pl.’s Mot. at 12. 

VII. GAO Decision and Amendment 0006

REI’s second GAO protest was vigorously litigated, but a detailed account

of the substance of the parties’ positions in that protest serves no purpose here. 

The same basic challenges to the solicitation that arose in REI’s prior protests and

that are carried forth in REI’s amended complaint before this court were debated.

Each side introduced declarations and exhibits. REI commissioned a study from

[ ] (hereinafter, [ ] Study) titled “Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Japan and Korea Local

Sourcing Feasibility Study” and submitted this study to GAO. AR at 1385-1503. 

DeCA responded with its own declarations and exhibits. Id. at 1308-14, Tab 19. 

The documents submitted in the second GAO protest encompass approximately

900 pages.

On that record, on November 6, 2014 GAO sustained two of the protest

grounds raised by REI and denied the rest. AR Tab 39.3 REI was not able to

persuade GAO that any statute or regulation forbids the elimination of the

transportation subsidy for the FFV contract for the Pacific Area. Id. at 3761-64.

Nor did GAO find that DeCA’s market research, which confirmed the feasibility

of the F.O.B. Destination contracting model for the Pacific Area, was inadequate

under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) or infirm for any other reason. 

Id. at 3764-65. GAO’s analysis of these two issues is thorough and persuasive. 

GAO also brushed aside “numerous” less weighty challenges to solicitation terms

that REI had raised in its second GAO protest. Id. at 3761.

3

/ Although the record in this case contains only the sealed, unredacted version of the

GAO decision, the public, redacted version of the decision appears to be identical and is

available on GAO’s website.

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GAO agreed with REI, however, that the price evaluation scheme set forth

in the solicitation was flawed in two respects. First, GAO identified an ambiguity

in the solicitation’s description of the method DeCA would use to compare the

prices of each offeror’s performance:

We view the evaluation method described by the agency

in response to the protest – i.e., using the proposed

patron savings discount percentage to evaluate the

competitiveness of proposals and using the July 14

“snapshot-in-time” pricing to evaluat[e] price

reasonableness and realism – as reasonable. However, it

is different from the evaluation methodology in the

solicitation in two key respects. First, nowhere does the

solicitation state that the evaluation of price is to be

based on an offeror’s proposed patron savings discount

percentage. Second, the solicitation includes a provision

that is reasonably interpreted as establishing the July 14

“snapshot-in-time” pricing – rather than the proposed

patron savings discount percentage – as the basis of the

agency’s award decision. Specifically, the solicitation

states that “[t]he Government will calculate and evaluate

as basis of contract award the total evaluated price for all

HVCI for the base period and all option years.” RFP,

amend. No. 0005, at 4. As illustrated by [REI],

evaluating the competitiveness of proposals based on the

offerors’ unit pricing for the week of July 14 could lead

to misleading results because a proposal offering a lower

patron savings discount percentage could be evaluated

more favorably than a proposal offering a higher patron

savings discount percentage.

AR at 3758. 

GAO therefore made two recommendations specific to this flaw in the

solicitation. First, DeCA should add language if the PSD is intended to be

determinative of price competitiveness:

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[I]f it is the agency’s intent to evaluate competitiveness

on the basis of an offeror’s proposed patron savings

discount percentage – as the agency has argued in

response to this protest – then the agency should amend

the solicitation to clearly state its intent [to do so.]

AR at 3759. DeCA should also, to ensure that its intent in this regard is clear,

“delete or revise the solicitation provision describing the offerors’ HVCI unit

pricing as the basis of award.” Id. at 3759-60. GAO had no objection to the use

of snapshot-in-time price data, as long as the purpose of soliciting this data was to

establish a proposal’s price reasonableness or price realism:

[T]he solicitation terms regarding the evaluation of price

reasonableness and price realism using

“snapshot-in-time” unit pricing could remain; the

solicitation simply would be amended to clearly

communicate that the agency’s comparative evaluation

of the proposals’ pricing terms (i.e., the basis for award)

will be based on the level of an offeror’s proposed patron

savings discount.

Id. at 3760 n.7.

On a distinct but related topic, GAO found ambiguity in the solicitation’s

description of DeCA’s evaluation of “an offeror’s understanding of . . . how the

patron savings discount is applied.” AR at 3760. Offerors had been warned that

their projected minimum PSD would be tested through a comparison of the

offeror’s snapshot-in-time prices for HVCI and the agency’s snapshot-in-time

survey of HVCI prices. If a deviation of plus or minus ten percent separated the

agency’s calculation of the PSD for that offeror and that offeror’s projected

minimum PSD, the offeror’s price proposal could be rejected as unacceptably

inaccurate. Id. According to GAO, however, the language in the solicitation

describing the comparison methodology was “unclear” and did not reveal “the

agency’s intended methodology.” Id. at 3760-61.

GAO therefore recommended that “the agency amend the solicitation to

clarify the provision regarding the evaluation of offerors’ understanding of the

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application of the patron savings discount.” AR at 3761. Once all of these

recommended changes to solicitation terms were implemented, GAO also

recommended that offerors be permitted to submit revised proposals. Id. at 3766. 

Finally, GAO suggested that DeCA should reimburse REI for its protest costs. Id.

DeCA implemented GAO’s recommendations by issuing Amendment 0006

on December 1, 2014 and by inviting revised proposals from the [ ] responsive

offerors which were due on December 22, 2014. AR Tab 40. This amendment

stated that “the government defines ‘PRICE’ as the Minimum Percentage of Patron

Savings for the purpose of proposal evaluation.” Id. at 3773. Amendment 0006

also changed the snapshot-in-time week for price comparisons to December 8-14,

2014. Id. The amendment further stated that DeCA “will analyze the HVCI unit

prices provided by offerors for the specified [snapshot-in-time] period for price

reasonableness or price realism, however, the HVCI unit prices will not be the

basis of contract award.” Id. at 3774. In addition, proposals would no longer

explicitly risk rejection if the offeror’s projected PSD varied more than ten percent

from the government’s calculation of that offeror’s PSD. Id. at 3775.

In the court’s view, DeCA, by issuing Amendment 0006, addressed all of

the flaws noted by GAO in the solicitation. REI nonetheless renewed most of its

challenges to the solicitation by filing a three-count complaint in this court on

December 8, 2014. REI added a fourth count when it filed an amended complaint

on December 11, 2014. 

VIII. Claims Before This Court

Count I of the amended complaint argues that DeCA cannot eliminate the

transportation subsidy for the Pacific Area FFV contract without violating certain

statutes and regulations. As the court noted supra, GAO rejected that contention

and the court finds no error in GAO’s analysis of this issue. Count II of the

amended complaint argues that DeCA’s market research was both insufficient

pursuant to FAR requirements and not “rationally sufficient.” Am. Compl.

¶¶ 85-88. Again, as noted supra, GAO rejected REI’s challenge to the sufficiency

of DeCA’s market research and GAO’s analysis of this issue is sound.

Count III of the amended complaint suggests that the solicitation terms that

explain how “unavailable” produce will be considered in the agency’s price

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evaluation are ambiguous, arbitrary and capricious. Finally, Count IV of the

complaint contends that the agency’s approach to determining the price

reasonableness and price realism of proposals is illogical and contravenes various

laws and regulations.4 The court will, of course, consider all of plaintiff’s

challenges to the solicitation, whether or not GAO has already covered the same

ground. 

Revised proposals were received on December 22, 2014. Pl.’s Mot. at 12;

Tr. at 74. DeCA agreed to suspend its award decision during the pendency of this

protest. The court agreed to issue its decision on the merits no later than February

13, 2015.

DISCUSSION

I. Bid Protest Jurisdiction 

This court “shall have jurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an

interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or

4

/ Both plaintiff and GAO appear to misread the solicitation as requiring a price realism

analysis. See Pl.’s Reply at 23 (mistakenly referencing “the Solicitation’s proposed evaluation of

the HVCI unit prices for price reasonableness and realism”) (emphasis added); AR at 3754

(GAO Decision) (“The solicitation stated that the agency would evaluate the proposed unit prices

 as adjusted to include the patron savings discount for price reasonableness and realism.”)

(emphasis added) (citing Amendment 0005). The solicitation commits only to a price

reasonableness analysis, with a price realism analysis to be conducted at the option of the

government. This is true whether one looks at the text of Amendment 0005, as did GAO, or the

revised price evaluation language of Amendment 0006. See AR at 243 (“The Government may

also conduct a price realism evaluation . . . .”); 3774 (“The proposed unit prices for the HVCI

provided by each offeror will be analyzed for price reasonableness . . . . The Government will

analyze the HVCI unit prices provided by offerors for the specified period of time for price

reasonableness or price realism . . . .”) (emphasis added). Because there is no requirement in the

solicitation for a price realism analysis, and plaintiff has not pointed to any FAR requirement

mandating that a price realism analysis be conducted in this type of procurement, the court will

restrict its analysis of Count IV to an examination of the solicitation’s measures for determining

price reasonableness. The court notes, however, that the solicitation terms identifying the data to

be submitted to support the offerors’ price proposals would, in the court’s view, provide

sufficient data for an adequate and rational price realism analysis, if DeCA chooses to test the

proposals for price realism. 

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proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a

contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a

procurement or a proposed procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2012). The

jurisdictional grant is “without regard to whether suit is instituted before or after

the contract is awarded.” Id. As a threshold jurisdictional matter, however, the

plaintiff in a bid protest must show that it has standing to bring the suit. Info.

Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

(ITAC); Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366,

1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

II. Standard of Review for Judgment on the Administrative Record

Rule 52.1(c) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims

(RCFC) provides for judgment on the administrative record. To review a motion,

or cross-motions, under RCFC 52.1(c), the court asks whether, given all the

disputed and undisputed facts, a party has met its burden of proof based on the

evidence in the record. Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1356-57

(Fed. Cir. 2005). The court must make factual findings where necessary. Id. The

resolution of RCFC 52.1(c) cross-motions is akin to an expedited trial on the paper

record. Id.

III. Bid Protest Review

The court first examines whether the plaintiff in a bid protest has standing to

bring the suit. ITAC, 316 F.3d at 1319. An interested party whose direct

economic interest in the procurement has been prejudiced by the government’s

actions has standing. Id. (citing Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. United States,

258 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (AFGE)). Bid protest standing is limited to

those plaintiffs who are “‘actual or prospective bidders or offerors whose direct

economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by the failure

to award the contract.’” Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1359

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting AFGE, 258 F.3d at 1302). In the context of a pre-award

bid protest, a plaintiff must establish that it has suffered or will suffer a

“non-trivial competitive injury which can be addressed by judicial relief” to meet

the economic prejudice requirement. Id. at 1362. 

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As the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated,

“the proper standard to be applied [to the merits of] bid protest cases is provided

by 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) [(2012)]: a reviewing court shall set aside the agency

action if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.’” Banknote Corp. of Am. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345,

1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States,

216 F.3d 1054, 1057-58 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Under this standard, sometimes

referred to as the “APA standard” or the “arbitrary and capricious standard,” a

procurement decision may be set aside if it lacked a rational basis or if the

agency’s decision-making involved a clear and prejudicial violation of statute,

regulation or procedure. Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 264

F.3d 1071, 1085-86 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Impresa Construzioni Geom.

Domenico Garufi v. United States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 

“The arbitrary and capricious standard applicable [in bid protests] is highly

deferential.” Advanced Data Concepts, 216 F.3d at 1058.

De minimis errors in the procurement process do not justify relief. 

Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d 990, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing

Andersen Consulting v. United States, 959 F.2d 929, 932-33, 935 (Fed. Cir.

1992)). The bid protest plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a significant

error marred the procurement in question. Id. (citing CACI Field Servs., Inc. v.

United States, 854 F.2d 464, 466 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Examples of arbitrary and

capricious agency action include “when the agency ‘entirely failed to consider an

important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs

counter to the evidence before the agency, or [the decision] is so implausible that

it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency

expertise.’” Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. Birmingham v. United States, 586 F.3d

1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (alteration in original). The court

will, however, “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path

may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas Best Freight

Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974) (citation omitted).

“‘If the court finds a reasonable basis for the agency’s action, the court

should stay its hand even though it might, as an original proposition, have reached

a different conclusion as to the proper administration and application of the

procurement regulations.’” Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644, 648

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(Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289, 1301

(D.C. Cir. 1971)). If, on the other hand, the protestor has shown a significant error

in the procurement process, the court must determine whether that error prejudiced

the protestor, because both error and prejudice are required for the protestor to

prevail. Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

(citing Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 

Plaintiff bears the burden of proof to establish prejudice. Bannum, 404 F.3d at

1358. “Prejudice is a question of fact.” Id. at 1353 (citing Advanced Data

Concepts, 216 F.3d at 1057).

IV. Standing

Although defendant has not challenged REI’s standing to bring this bid

protest, standing is a threshold inquiry that the court must address. ITAC, 316

F.3d at 1319. As stated supra, the protestor must first show that it is an interested

party, i.e., that the protestor is an actual or prospective bidder for the contract. 

E.g., Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1359. The court notes, at the outset, that REI is

an actual bidder in this procurement and is the incumbent contractor. Because REI

is an actual bidder, the first element required to establish standing is satisfied. See

id.

Whether REI has suffered a non-trivial competitive injury, the second

element of pre-award bid protest standing (which is also referred to as prejudice),

id. at 1362, is a closer question. In order to address this inquiry into economic

prejudice, the court must first decide whether plaintiff may introduce a declaration

for the court’s consideration which supports its allegations of prejudice. This

court has often considered such declarations for the inquiry into prejudice. See,

e.g., East West, Inc. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 53, 57-58 (2011) (stating that

declarations from company officials assist the court in determining whether a

protestor has been prejudiced by agency action). The Declaration of [a senior REI

official], Exhibit 1 attached to plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the

administrative record, is an appropriate submission for this purpose. Defendant

conceded at oral argument that the court may consider [the REI official’s]

declaration to examine the issue of competitive prejudice. Tr. at 84.

The proper inquiry into prejudice and standing, in the pre-award context, is

provided by Weeks Marine. Several parallels between Weeks Marine and this

15
protest are apparent. In Weeks Marine, the protestor alleged that the challenged

solicitation was irrational and that the company was not built to compete under

such terms. 575 F.3d at 1360. Further, the protestor asserted that the solicitation

“violated . . . statutes and regulations and lacked a rational basis.” Id. at 1361

(internal quotations omitted). REI makes similar allegations here.

More specifically, the protestor in Weeks Marine established that the

challenged solicitation, were the procurement to go forward, would likely have a

direct monetary impact on the company’s bottom line. Id. at 1362. The Federal

Circuit concluded that the protestor had “a definite economic stake in the

solicitation being carried out in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.” 

Id. Here, too, REI has persuasively described the significant economic impacts of

the challenged solicitation’s terms on its business model. See [REI Official’s]

Decl. ¶¶ 5-10. In similar circumstances, the Federal Circuit found that the

protestor had established a “non-trivial competitive injury which can be redressed

by judicial relief.” Weeks Marine, 575 F.3d at 1362. As in Weeks Marine, REI

has demonstrated a non-trivial competitive injury and standing to bring its bid

protest. The court now considers whether the record of filings before GAO should

be considered to resolve the merits of plaintiff’s protest.

V. The Scope of the Administrative Record of DeCA’s Procurement

The parties have largely focused on the merits of this protest and have not,

for the most part, argued that the court should exclude from its consideration

documents included within the administrative record or attached as exhibits to the

pleadings or the parties’ briefs. The only substantive dispute raised by the parties

as to the scope of the record regards the weight to be accorded the [ ] Study, AR at

1385-1503, submitted by plaintiff to GAO, and the rebuttal declarations of Mr.

Joseph E. Jeu and Mr. David C. Carey, id. at 1308-14, Tab 19, submitted by DeCA

to GAO. See Def.’s Mot. at 36-37; Pl.’s Reply at 19-20. Plaintiff also suggests, in

a footnote, that DeCA has attempted to substitute “post-hoc rationalization”

presented to GAO for “sufficient[] espress[ions of] its intentions in the

Solicitation.” Pl.’s Reply at 20 n.16.

In the court’s view, it is appropriate to ignore the parties’ submissions to

GAO when considering the merits of this bid protest. First, the bare

contemporaneous record of the agency’s decision is adequate to resolve all of

16
plaintiff’s challenges to the solicitation. Second, in the court’s experience,

declarations from the contracting officer and other agency officials may proffer, in

many cases, post-hoc rationalization and argument rather than a fact-driven

explanation of the agency’s decision-making process. See, e.g., Sotera Def.

Solutions, Inc. v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 237, 263 n.16 (2014) (declining to

consider a source selection authority’s statements presented to GAO because these

contained post-hoc rationalization); CRAssociates, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed.

Cl. 357, 377 (2010) (suggesting that a contracting officer’s declarations before

GAO should be viewed with a “healthy dose of skepticism” so as to not “frustrate

effective judicial review under the APA standards”); cf. Glenn Def. Marine

(ASIA), PTE Ltd. v. United States, 720 F.3d 901, 911 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (noting

the protestor’s objection to the trial court’s consideration of the government’s

submissions to GAO, but declining to decide whether such submissions were

“appropriately considered” by the trial court). Third, REI’s [ ] Study was not

before the agency when it made its decision regarding the competitive market for

providers of FFV in the Pacific Area and its decision to remove the transportation

subsidy that had been provided in the incumbent contract. Thus, the court cannot

view the [ ] Study as pertinent under the APA standard of review by which the

court must judge the solicitation. See, e.g., RhinoCorps Ltd. v. United States, 87

Fed. Cl. 261, 282 (2009) (declining to consider declarations submitted by the

protestor because these “documents proffer facts that substitute plaintiff’s opinion

for the [agency’s] technical determinations”).

In certain circumstances, documents submitted to GAO may be considered

as the court renders a decision on the merits of a bid protest. For example, a

contracting officer’s statement may be needed to explain the record documents or

to fill in gaps in the procurement files. See, e.g., D & S Consultants, Inc. v. United

States, 101 Fed. Cl. 23, 35 (2011) (“The Court may consider explanatory materials

that do not offer new rationales for past decisions and that illuminate the

methodology the agency employed in making its determination.” (citing

CRAssociates, 95 Fed. Cl. at 376-77 & n.15)). The administrative record here

requires no post-hoc explanation. 

Also, where the agency has taken corrective action in a procurement as a

result of a GAO protest, documents before GAO may have been considered by the

agency as it crafted the corrective action, and may therefore be relevant to the

court’s review of that agency action. See, e.g., Vanguard Recovery Assistance v.

17
United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 765, 785 n.21 (2011) (considering declarations from

agency officials because “those declarations played a role in GAO’s First Decision

and the ensuing corrective action by” the agency); Jacobs Tech. Inc. v. United

States, 100 Fed. Cl. 198, 208 (2011) (considering the “contracting officer’s

statements [in documents before GAO in an earlier protest] pertaining to the initial

procurement [because these] may contain information that reasonably informed,

and were the basis of, the agency’s reprocurement decisions”). Here, on the other

hand, the only decisions revisited by DeCA were related to solicitation evaluation

terms, not the fundamental issue of whether produce availability in the Pacific

Area is sufficient to support the new contracting model embodied in the

solicitation. The court therefore concludes that none of the GAO documents in the

administrative record are relevant to its review of the merits of this protest.

Plaintiff argues, and the court does not disagree, that the [ ] Study could be

considered when the court examines prejudice to REI. Tr. at 75. Defendant

argues that documents before GAO are useful in understanding the holding of

GAO as it discusses protest grounds that were not sustained by that body. Def.’s

Mot. at 36-37; Def.’s Reply at 15. The court agrees with this contention as well. 

Thus, although the court has not considered, for its determination on the merits,

any of the various declarations, memoranda, exhibits, and studies submitted to

GAO by the parties, those items have been considered for the limited purpose of

determining prejudice to REI and as context for GAO’s analysis of various protest

grounds advanced by REI.

 

VI. Analysis of the Merits

A. Introduction

Plaintiff’s predominant factual allegations are that DeCA’s elimination of

the transportation subsidy will cause unacceptably large price increases for patrons

of the Pacific Area commissaries, and that the increased focus on locally-grown

produce in the new contract will offer patrons FFV that are unacceptably lower in

quality, availability and safety. Neither of these allegations is supported by the

administrative record. First, as to the prices patrons will pay for FFV in the

Pacific Area, DeCA informed offerors that “DeCA is aware that the cost of the

[FFV] products will increase.” AR at 288.

18
Plaintiff appears to argue that DeCA is constrained to keep prices at the

commissaries at approximately the same level as they are under the incumbent

contract. See Am. Compl. ¶ 30 (arguing that the [ ] Study concludes that [ ]); Pl.’s

Mot. at 30 (condemning DeCA’s market research for failing to address obvious

concerns about significant price increases); Pl.’s Reply at 16-17 (reiterating

plaintiff’s concerns about price increases). The court cannot discern in plaintiff’s

arguments, however, any statutory or regulatory underpinning which would forbid

the next FFV contract in the Pacific Area from raising the prices patrons will pay

for FFV. Further, the solicitation provides price evaluation measures with which

DeCA can minimize the price increases for FFV in Pacific Area commissaries. 

AR at 3773-74.

Plaintiff also condemns the solicitation’s increased focus on locally-grown

produce, arguing that DeCA fails to understand the limited availability of

reasonably priced, good quality, safe FFV in South Korea, Japan and Guam. The

solicitation, however, imposes no minimum percentage of local produce as

compared to imported produce for the new contract. See AR at 291. In the court’s

view, the solicitation adequately balances a preference for locally-grown produce

with a rational alternative of imported produce when imported produce better

meets the needs of commissary patrons. Having addressed plaintiff’s speculative

factual allegations as to the dire consequences of the new contracting model set

forth in the solicitation, the court turns to plaintiff’s challenges to the solicitation’s

terms.

B. Transportation Subsidy and Relevant Statutes and Regulations

(Count I)

1. Section 2483(b)(5) and Related Regulatory Provisions

The parties vigorously debate whether appropriated funds must be used to

subsidize the transportation of produce from the United States to the Pacific Area

commissaries. Certainly, appropriated funds are used in this fashion in the

incumbent contract. Just as certainly, appropriated funds are not used in this

fashion in DeCA’s European FFV contracts. As plaintiff conceded at oral

argument, there is no commentary in relevant legislative history that is helpful on

this issue. Tr. at 23.

19
Instead, plaintiff relies on the following language contained in 10 U.S.C.

§ 2483 (2012):

Appropriated funds shall be used to cover the expenses

of operating commissary stores and central product

processing facilities of the defense commissary system. 

For purposes of this subsection, operating expenses

include the following:

. . . .

(5) Second destination transportation costs within or

outside the United States. 

10 U.S.C. § 2483(b). Although the statute does not define “[s]econd destination

transportation costs,” the plain meaning of this phrase is consistent with a

definition which distinguishes a “first destination,” such as a centralized

Department of Defense facility, and a “second destination,” such as an actual

commissary. Defendant argues that it is precisely this interpretation of

§ 2483(b)(5) that allows DeCA to pay a transportation subsidy in the incumbent

FFV contract, and to eliminate the transportation subsidy in the new FFV contract.

“Second destination transportation costs” are defined by regulation, even

though these costs are defined more by what they are not, than by what they are.5

According to Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation

7000.14-R (Oct. 2008) (DoD FMR 7000.14-R):

First Destination Transportation (FDT) is that

transportation required to deliver new, an upgraded

model, or recapitalized production items from the

manufacturer’s plant or source of procurement to the first

point of delivery where the Military Service or Defense

Agency takes possession and/or ownership of that item. 

The procurement source, as used herein, is any supplier

5

/ In lieu of regulations codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, pertinent regulatory

guidance is provided in Department of Defense Instructions (DoD Instr.) and the Department of

Defense Financial Management Regulations (DoD FMR). Both parties treat these

pronouncements as regulatory in nature, as does the court.

20
outside the DoD supply system or any DoD industrial

activity that fabricates new materiel. The procurement

source or the first point of delivery may be in the

Continental United States (CONUS) or overseas. FDT is

not applicable to components or items reworked by an

industrial activity. In the case where the Government

accepts the production item at the manufacturer’s plant

or source of production and legally owns the item, FDT

extends to the first point of delivery for either use or

storage by the Military Service or Defense Agency. For

shipments destined to overseas locations that will enter

the Defense Transportation System, FDT terminates at

the port of embarkation (CONUS or overseas).

Second Destination Transportation (SDT) is any

transportation other than FDT.

Def.’s Mot. App. at A2-A3. Generally, because first destination transportation

costs are those costs for transportation that brings the item to “the first point of

delivery” where the government takes possession of the item, second destination

transportation costs are incurred by the government to transport (or to have

transported) the item, after delivery has been accepted, to a second location where

it will be used. Further, the first delivery point may be overseas. Finally, “[f]or

shipments destined to overseas locations that will enter the Defense Transportation

System,” first destination transportation may terminate either in the United States

or overseas. Thus, overseas transportation of commissary goods may be first

destination transportation or second destination transportation, depending on

where the government takes possession of the item.

According to defendant, these statutory and regulatory directives explain

why the incumbent contract (where DeCA takes possession of REI’s FFV in the

United States and then pays for overseas transport to a second destination)

involves second destination transportation costs (which are paid with appropriated

funds pursuant to § 2483(b)(5)), whereas the new contract (where DeCA will take

possession of the contractor’s FFV at the Pacific Area commissaries), will involve

only first destination transportation costs (which do not require appropriated funds

21
pursuant to § 2483(b)(5)). GAO concurred with the agency’s explanation of the

relevant statutory and regulatory framework:

Since the solicitation here provides that the agency takes

possession and title of the FF[]V at the commissaries in

the Pacific Area, we conclude that the solicitation does

not contemplate second destination transportation. Since

the solicitation does not contemplate second destination

transportation, we agree with the agency that the

provision of 10 U.S.C. § 2483(b) regarding the use of

appropriated funds for second destination transportation

costs is inapplicable.

AR at 3764. Although plaintiff attempts to find support for its contrary view of

this issue in both § 2483(b)(5) and DoD FMR 7000.14-R, Pl.’s Mot. at 14-17 &

n.4, 25-27; Pl.’s Reply at 3-7 & n.2, the court cannot ignore the plain meaning of

the statutory and regulatory text. The court finds no violation of § 2483(b)(5), as

explained by DoD FMR 7000.14-R, in the solicitation.

The definition of the terms first destination transportation and second

destination transportation provided by DoD FMR 7000.14-R is also referenced in

the glossary of Department of Defense Instruction 1330.17 (June 18, 2014) (DoD

Instr. 1330.17).6 Pl.’s Mot. App. 4 at 6, 57-58. Plaintiff argues, however, that

DoD Instr. 1330.17, Enc. 5, Para. 1 contains a definition of these costs that is

different from the one endorsed by DeCA, GAO and this court. Because the

agency, GAO and this court have all based their interpretation of these terms on

the plain meaning of § 2483(b)(5) and DoD FMR 7000.14-R, plaintiff bears a

heavy burden to show that DoD Instr. 1330.17, Enc. 5, Para. 1 rewrites or

otherwise alters § 2483(b)(5) and DoD FMR 7000.14-R. Plaintiff does not meet

this burden.

6

/ The court relies on the 2014 version of DoD Instr. 1330.17, as does plaintiff in its reply

brief. The agency’s solicitation was challenged in this court on December 11, 2014 when the

2014 version of DoD Instr. 1330.17 was already in effect. The new version of the instruction

was also already in force when the agency issued Amendment 0005 and solicited revised

proposals, and when REI challenged the elimination of the transportation subsidy before GAO in

late July 2014. In any case, there are no substantive changes from 2008 to 2014 in the relevant

text of this instruction. 

22
DoD Instr. 1330.17, Enc. 5, Para. 1 states in relevant part that:

(2) Appropriated funds will be used to cover the

following expenses of operating the commissary

program . . . .

. . . .

(b) Transportation. Second destination transportation

costs of commissary merchandise, supplies, and

equipment within or outside the United States to include

transoceanic movement of goods to and from overseas

and U.S. sea and aerial ports of embarkation to first

destination overseas; movement of U.S. and foreign

goods within foreign areas; and movement of U.S. goods

between DoD installations.

Pl.’s Mot. App. 4 at 31. According to plaintiff, DoD Instr. 1330.17, Enc. 5, Para. 1

clashes with the agency’s interpretation of “second destination transportation

costs,” and the solicitation’s F.O.B. Destination delivery term, because it

“unequivocally specifies that second destination transportation includes

transoceanic movement of goods to first destination overseas.” Pl.’s Mot. at 27.

The court disagrees for the following reasons.

First, plaintiff’s interpretation of DoD Instr. 1330.17, Enc. 5, Para. 1

conflicts with the only reasonable interpretation of § 2483(b)(5) and DoD FMR

7000.14-R. Second, DoD Instr. 1330.17 incorporates the definition of the terms

first destination transportation and second destination transportation provided by

DoD FMR 7000.14-R by including these in the glossary of DoD Instr. 1330.17 –

any use of such terms in DoD Instr. 1330.17, Enc. 5, Para. 1 necessarily applies

that definition, not some conflicting definition. Third, a harmonizing reading of

this portion of DoD Instr. 1330.17, Enc. 5, Para. 1, which parallels the underlying

statute, is that this text only addresses second destination transportation costs, and

that the reference to “first destination” in the text is not a reference to “first

destination transportation” but to a first stop in the second destination

transportation itinerary of an item of commissary merchandise.7 Fourth, the court

7

/ The court does not rely on the government’s argument that the term “commissary

(continued...)

23
must defer to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulatory provision if it is

ambiguous. E.g., Price v. Panetta, 674 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing

White v. United States, 543 F.3d 1330, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Because the

court does not find that DoD Instr. 1330.17, Enc. 5, Para. 1 unambiguously defines

all overseas transportation of commissary items to be second destination

transportation, the court finds no violation in the solicitation of § 2483(b)(5), DoD

FMR 7000.14-R or DoD Instr. 1330.17, Enc. 5, Para. 1.

2. Section 2484 and a Related Regulatory Provision

Plaintiff also argues that the solicitation violates 10 U.S.C. § 2484 (2012)

and a related regulatory provision, DoD Instr. 1330.17, Enc. 5, Para. 2. This line

of argument is somewhat forced. Whereas § 2483(b)(5) addresses when DeCA

shall use appropriated funds for transportation purposes, § 2484(e) does not

address DeCA’s use of appropriated funds for transportation but instead addresses

the pricing of goods at commissaries. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 2483 (titled

“Commissary stores: use of appropriated funds to cover operating expenses”),

with 10 U.S.C. § 2484 (titled “Commissary stores: merchandise that may be sold;

uniform surcharges and pricing”); id. § 2484(e) (titled “Sales price

establishment”). The elimination of the transportation subsidy which REI

challenges in the solicitation is more a cost of operations term than a pricing term,

in the court’s view. For this reason, § 2483 more directly bears on the challenge to

the solicitation raised by plaintiff in Count I of the amended complaint, and

§ 2484, if it is indeed relevant to the dispute, has significantly less relevance.8

The next problem with plaintiff’s reliance on § 2484(e) is that it does not

appear to have any applicability to the Pacific Area FFV contract. In relevant part,

the statute states that:

7

(...continued)

merchandise” has a special, post-delivery meaning in this regulatory text. Def.’s Mot. at 29-30;

Def.’s Reply at 9-10. 

8

/ Of course, the logical connection between transportation costs and pricing cannot be

ignored. This does not necessarily mean, however, that plaintiff may impose § 2484 and its

interpreting regulation upon a claim that fits squarely within the scope of § 2483 and its

interpreting regulations.

24
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall establish the sales

price of each item of merchandise sold in, at, or by

commissary stores at the level that will recoup the actual

product cost of the item.

. . . .

(3) The sales price of merchandise and services sold in,

at, or by commissary stores shall be adjusted to cover the

following:

(A) The cost of first destination commercial

transportation of the merchandise in the United States to

the place of sale. . . .

10 U.S.C. § 2484(e). The solicitation obviously does not violate § 2484(e)(1),

because the F.O.B. Destination delivery term does function to “recoup the actual

product cost of the item.” Id. 

Plaintiff relies, primarily, on § 2484(e)(3)(A). Pl.’s Mot. at 17; Pl.’s Reply

at 4-5. In the court’s view, § 2484(e)(3)(A) indicates that first destination

transportation costs “in the United States” are passed on to commissary patrons

through unsubsidized pricing, and are not paid for by appropriated DeCA funds. 

Is such a provision incompatible with the court’s interpretation of § 2483? It is

not. Neither statute requires DeCA to pay for first destination transportation costs

with appropriated funds.

Is § 2484(e)(3)(A) incompatible with the solicitation? It is not. The

solicitation addresses overseas first destination transportation costs (these will be

borne by the contractor); § 2484(e)(3)(A) limits its focus to first destination

transportation costs “in the United States.” The most logical reading of

§ 2484(e)(3)(A) is that it is inapplicable to overseas transportation costs of any

kind.

9

 The only other logical reading of § 2484(e)(3)(A) which is consistent with

9

/ Plaintiff, in its reply brief, cursorily suggests that § 2484(e)(3)(A) must be read to

define all overseas transportation as second destination transportation, pursuant to the canon of

statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, citing the readily distinguishable

analysis in Archuleta v. Hopper, 773 F.3d 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Pl.’s Reply at 4-5 &

nn.3-4. This canon suggests that when a statute expresses or includes one thing, the implication

is that the statute excludes the other, or the alternative. Black’s Law Dictionary 701 (10th ed.

(continued...)

25
§ 2483(b)(5), although it is a strained one, is that commissary prices overseas will

be adjusted to reflect actual product cost (without a transportation subsidy) when a

contractor delivers “merchandise in the United States” directly to a place of sale

such as an overseas commissary. This alternate reading of § 2484(e)(3)(A)

likewise poses no conflict with the delivery terms of the solicitation. The court

sees no violation of § 2484(e) in the solicitation.

Plaintiff’s remaining argument regarding overseas transportation costs

focuses on DoD Instr. 1330.17, Enc. 5, Para. 2, titled “Sales Price and Surcharge

Assessment.” Pl.’s Mot. App. 4 at 33. The court notes that this instruction’s focus

is on pricing, not operating costs or the use of appropriated funds for operating

costs. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. The text relied upon by plaintiff,

Pl.’s Mot. at 27-28, simply states that:

Pursuant to section 2484(e) . . . , the sales price of each

item of merchandise and services sold in, at, or by

commissary stores will recoup: the actual product cost

of the item, commercial first destination transportation of

9

(...continued)

2014). The court does not agree that this canon, or Archuleta, is of any applicability here. 

The canon is sometimes applied to exclude an unlisted item from the scope of a statute

when a limited list of items has been provided. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.

153, 188 (1978) (refusing to expand the exceptions to the Endangered Species Act beyond those

enumerated in the statute) (citation omitted); Archuleta, 773 F.3d at 1295 (citing the canon to

hold that “no exceptions should be read into [5 U.S.C.] § 7512 beyond the five that Congress

specifically created”) (citations omitted). The canon should not be applied, however, “unless it is

fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it.” 

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (citation omitted). Because

§ 2484(e)(3)(A) does not appear to contemplate overseas transportation at all, it is not fair to

suppose that Congress excluded overseas transportation from the scope of the term “first

destination commercial transportation” as that term is used in § 2484(e)(3)(A). 

Further, as plaintiff recognizes, Congress has historically treated funding for the

transportation of goods for domestic commissaries differently than funding for the transportation

of goods for overseas commissaries. Pl.’s Mot. at 16 n.4. To infer that § 2484(e)(3)(A) governs

overseas transportation of commissary goods is a thesis not grounded in the plain meaning of this

statute or in any applicable canon of statutory construction. 

 

26
the merchandise in the United States to the place of sale

. . . .

Pl.’s Mot. App. 4 at 33. Because the text of this instruction merely restates the

relevant content of § 2484(e), it is of no more use to plaintiff than the text of the

actual statute. See supra. The court finds no violation of § 2484(e)(3)(A) or its

implementing regulatory provision in the solicitation. 

C. Market Research (Count II)

The amended complaint notes at least three alleged flaws in DeCA’s market

research: failing to discover the fact that the transportation subsidy is necessary to

support the FFV needs of the Pacific Area commissaries; failing to take into

account the high prices of FFV in the Pacific Area; and, failing to understand that

requiring twenty-four hour delivery will place an unrealistic dependence on

locally-grown produce. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-23, 26-27. In plaintiff’s motion, the

alleged flaws in DeCA’s market research are criticized as rendering the market

research grossly inadequate:

[I]n the place of any findings on availability, price,

quality or safety, DeCA’s market research consists

instead of describing the steps DeCA took to elicit

possible interest in submitting proposals for this

requirement. There is an important difference, however,

between finding companies interested in submitting a

proposal and determining that the procurement strategy

likely will result in the acquisition of produce at

acceptable levels of availability, price, quality, and

safety. DeCA’s market research fails to address these

fundamental subjects.

Pl.’s Mot. at 32.

The court notes, first, that this solicitation seeks fresh fruit and vegetables,

not sophisticated body armor or state-of-the-art information technology. Agencies

appropriately vary the type and amount of market research they conduct depending

on the items procured. Second, DeCA has been managing FFV contracts in a wide

27
variety of settings for over ten years and must be presumed to have a baseline

understanding of the need for crafting agreements which will ensure the

“availability, price, quality, and safety” of produce. Third, as noted supra, the

solicitation favors local sourcing of produce but does not require that contractors

abandon imported produce as a means for fulfilling the FFV needs of the Pacific

Area commissaries. The court now turns to REI’s specific challenges to the

adequacy of DeCA’s market research.

Plaintiff asserts that “DeCA violated FAR 10.002(b)(1)(iv)[10] by failing to

consider ‘[t]he requirements of any laws and regulations unique to

the item being acquired’ – namely the second destination transportation statutes

and regulations.” Pl.’s Mot. at 32. This challenge fails because, as noted supra,

the solicitation does not violate the “second destination transportation statutes and

regulations.” The court sees no violation of FAR 10.002(b)(1)(iv) in this

procurement.

Plaintiff also asserts that “DeCA . . . violated FAR 10.001(a)(3)(i) because it

had no rational basis upon which to draw any conclusions regarding ‘sources

capable of satisfying the agency’s requirements.’” Pl.’s Mot. at 32. On the

contrary, at least three highly-praised technical proposals were received for each

region in the Pacific Area, including REI’s proposal and its former subcontractor’s

proposal. In the court’s view, this fact, as well as the documents provided to

substantiate the agency’s market research, AR Tab 4, show that DeCA’s market

research rationally determined that there were sources capable of meeting the FFV

needs of the Pacific Area commissaries under the terms of the solicitation. The

court sees no violation of FAR 10.001(a)(3)(i) in this procurement.

Plaintiff also claims that FAR 10.002(b)(1) was violated by DeCA:

DeCA’s research was not “specific to the item being

acquired” – i.e., FF[]V for DoD commissaries in the

Pacific Area – for which availability, price, quality, and

safety are critical considerations. Instead, the research

10

/ All citations to the FAR in this analysis section are to the 2013 version of Part 10 in

Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 

28
merely identified firms [that] may be interested in

bidding for the work.

Pl.’s Mot. at 32 (quoting FAR 10.002(b)(1)). The court notes, first, that all of the

market research in Tab 4 appears to be specific to “FF[]V for DoD commissaries

in the Pacific Area.” See, e.g., AR at 302-03 (noting the goal of replacing the

incumbent Pacific Area FFV contract with a new one and listing the market

research techniques used in furtherance of this goal); 304-07 (listing companies

identified through market research as potential sources, including some which

responded to the solicitation and became actual offerors). Thus, DeCA’s market

research is in accord with FAR 10.002(b)(1) and does not violate the terms of that

regulation as asserted by plaintiff.

Second, to the extent that REI asserts that the agency was obliged, either by

the FAR or by any rational procurement planning process, to consider the

“availability, price, quality, and safety” of produce for the Pacific Area

commissaries, the court finds the record of the agency’s acquisition planning and

market research adequate in this regard. As plaintiff is forced to concede, the

agency acknowledged the particular challenges of providing FFV to the Pacific

Area commissaries as it implemented its decision to eliminate the transportation

subsidy. See Pl.’s Mot. at 31-32 (citing AR at 331, 418, 484). Just because

DeCA’s analysis disagreed with the position advanced here by REI (that a

transportation subsidy is the only rational way to obtain FFV for the Pacific Area),

does not mean that the agency’s market research was not “rationally sufficient.” 

Am. Compl. ¶ 88. Indeed, the proposals submitted by offerors tended to legitimize

the agency’s analysis and discredit REI’s contentions in this regard.

Finally, plaintiff asserts that

DeCA’s market research violated FAR 10.001(a)(2)(i)

because it plainly was not “appropriate to the

circumstances,” having failed to consider any of the

substantive factors relevant to this procurement – and

having ignored the concerns raised in internal DeCA

emails.

29
Pl.’s Mot. at 32 (quoting FAR 10.001(a)(2)). Apparently, REI interprets FAR

10.001(a)(2) to command that DeCA’s market research focus primarily on the

“availability, price, quality, and safety” of produce for the Pacific Area

commissaries, rather than on determining whether the market for potential

contractors for the requirement was adequately robust. Whatever the logic of this

proposition, a mandate of the focus proposed by REI is nowhere to be found in the

text of FAR 10.001(a)(2). The court finds no violation of FAR 10.001(a)(2)(i) in

DeCA’s market research, which, in the court’s view, was appropriate under the

circumstances.

11

As to the more general question of whether DeCA was obliged to both

identify sources to perform the contract as well as investigate potential challenges

to contract performance as part of its market research, defendant notes that the

agency has substantial discretion in the scope and manner of conducting market

research. Def.’s Mot. at 31-32 (citing a number of FAR provisions, including

FAR 10.002(b)(1)). Defendant has also catalogued the solicitation terms which

will aid DeCA in assuring that the “availability, price, quality, and safety”

concerns raised by REI are adequately addressed by the offerors. Id. at 33. 

Finally, defendant contends that the positive evaluations of most of the proposals

received show that REI’s concerns as to the “availability, price, quality, and

safety” of produce were adequately addressed in DeCA’s market research and by

the offerors themselves. Id. at 33-34.

GAO agreed with the agency’s position on this issue, and stated that

[w]hile the record reflects that the agency’s market

research may not have been as expansive as the market

research commissioned by [REI in the [ ] Study], we

view it as adequate under the circumstances of this

procurement. In this regard, it is evident that the agency

conducted market research to identify sources capable of

11

/ The agency’s market research did not include many of the more formal exchanges

with industry noted in FAR 15.201. As defendant notes, however, DeCA’s market research team

met with two representatives of REI, in accordance with FAR 10.002(b)(2) and FAR

15.201(c)(4). See AR at 338-39. DeCA clearly did more than merely identify potential sources

for the contract as it conducted market research. 

30
satisfying the agency’s requirement, as described in FAR

§ 10.001(a)(3)(i).

AR at 3765 (citations to the GAO record omitted). GAO noted, too, that DeCA

has plans to monitor price increases paid by commissary patrons so that these

remain “reasonable,” and that the PSD will ensure that patrons pay prices that are

at least fifteen percent below comparable FFV prices in local stores. Id. The court

agrees with GAO that DeCA’s market research in this procurement was reasonable

and did not violate the FAR. 

D. Unavailable Produce in the Price Evaluation Scheme (Count III)

Count Three of the amended complaint contains a two-pronged challenge to

the solicitation’s price evaluation scheme:

The Solicitation’s price evaluation provisions contain

ambiguous and contradictory statements regarding the

meaning of “available” FFV. The Solicitation also

establishes an illogical scheme for pricing and evaluating

FF[]V that an offeror determines are unavailable.

Am. Compl. ¶ 37. Defendant argues in rebuttal that the relevant solicitation terms,

which must be considered together, are not ambiguous. Def.’s Mot. at 40. A

logical place to test plaintiff’s contentions is the text of the solicitation itself.

High Volume Core Items (HVCI) are thirty-five mainstream produce items

in the typical American diet such as apples, bananas, carrots and tomatoes. AR at

59, 113-24. Each offeror must supply price information for its HVCI. See id. at

3774 (“Unit prices are required for each HVCI for each CLIN.”). In general, the

list of HVCI is fixed by the solicitation and the offer of substitute produce may be

reason for elimination of an offeror. Id. (“Proposed alternate HVCI submissions

in lieu of the HVCI stated in the solicitation will be disregarded without the

Contracting Officer’s consent. Failure to provide the HVCI required by the

solicitation may result in removal from further consideration for contract award.”).

31
The solicitation identifies a limited exception to the requirement that an

offeror submit prices for all HVCI, and the parties appear to agree that this

exception would be rarely, if ever, invoked:

Offerors may identify to the Contracting Officer any

HVCI that is not available globally within the

specification required by the solicitation. The

Contracting Officer will provide final disposition on

those HVCI identified.

AR at 3774. Thus, for example, unless an offeror believes that “carrots peeled

mini,” id. at 123, cannot be supplied from any worldwide producer and cannot be

priced, that offeror will not seek an exception from the general rule and will

provide an HVCI unit price for “carrots peeled mini” as required by the

solicitation. This text of the solicitation is not ambiguous.

Local availability is addressed by another set of provisions in the price

evaluation scheme set forth in the solicitation. These provisions explain that the

general methodology for evaluating the logic of an offeror’s Patron Savings

Discount (PSD) is for DeCA to compare an offeror’s HVCI unit prices to HVCI

prices in nearby stores in that region. AR at 3774. This price comparison,

however, will exclude certain HVCI that are not available in local markets during

the snapshot-in-time week:

If a HVCI is not available on the local economy for the

Market Basket Survey during the time 14-20 July 2014

. . . , the item will not be considered for evaluation under

the Price Evaluation Factor.

Id. at 242. The snapshot-in-time week later is identified by Amendment 0006 as

December 8-14, 2014. Id. at 3773. Thus, local availability does not affect the

requirement that an offeror submit a unit price for all HVCI, it affects the number

of items that will be used by DeCA to compare an offeror’s unit prices for HVCI

to local HVCI unit prices. These solicitation provisions, too, are rational and

unambiguous.

32
Although plaintiff contends that providing HVCI unit prices for locally

unavailable produce is naught but “a meaningless exercise” when these unit prices

will not be used to evaluate an offeror’s price proposal, Pl.’s Reply at 21, the court

does not view such an approach as irrational. As defendant notes, DeCA did not

pre-determine local unavailability of produce. Def.’s Reply at 17. It is far more

logical to sift through each offeror’s complete set of HVCI unit prices and weed

out those HVCI that have been determined by DeCA to be locally unavailable,

than to expect all of the offerors to uniformly identify and price only those items

that they believe are available locally. The court finds nothing arbitrary or

capricious in the agency’s definitions of available produce in the solicitation, or in

a price evaluation scheme that unambiguously takes local availability of produce

into account when comparing the offerors’ proposals.12

E. Price Reasonableness Measures (Count IV)

Plaintiff’s final attack on the solicitation focuses generally on the price

evaluation scheme:

The Solicitation violates statutory and regulatory

requirements because the hypothetical prices of HVCI

items that DeCA intends to evaluate for price

reasonableness and/or realism bear no meaningful

connection to the amounts that will be charged under the

contract and provide little insight into an offeror’s actual

ability to perform or the reasonableness of the cost of the

contract.

12

/ The agency’s discussion of produce availability evolved from the initial responses it

provided to offerors’ questions in Amendment 0001. See AR at 288-89. Amendment 0005, in

particular, replaced this earlier guidance. See id. at 242 (noting that this amendment changed the

solicitation’s terms for “High Volume Core Items (HVCI) and Item Substitution for Market

Basket Surveys”). Amendment 0006 further amended the price evaluation scheme. Id. at 3773-

78. As amended, the solicitation contains no ambiguity as to the “availability” of produce or the

effect of the availability of produce on the price evaluation of proposals. To the extent that there

theoretically might be some minor lingering ambiguity in the solicitation regarding the

availability of produce, such an error would be de minimis and would neither prevent offerors

from submitting rational price proposals nor prevent DeCA from conducting a rational evaluation

of price proposals.

33
Am. Compl. ¶ 96. In other words, REI argues that the solicitation’s price

evaluation methodology “will not meaningfully assess the cost under

the contract for any of the offerors.” Id. The court notes that GAO considered

DeCA’s stated price evaluation approach to be reasonable as long as the

solicitation was corrected to clarify how that price evaluation would be

implemented. AR at 3758, 3760 n.7.

In its motion, plaintiff explains that it is not the snapshot-in-time

methodology that renders the agency’s price evaluation scheme meaningless, but

the fact that DeCA refused to supply offerors with its baseline local market basket

prices upon which the offerors could calculate their proposed minimum PSD:

In sum, the Solicitation’s price reasonableness and

realism evaluation methodology is flawed, illogical, and

arbitrary because the HVCI prices will not be calculated

from a common baseline. It could lead to critical

miscalculations and the unequal treatment of offerors.

Pl.’s Mot. at 37. The object of a price reasonableness inquiry is to prevent the

government from paying too much for procured items.13

 E.g., DMS All Star Joint

Venture v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 653, 657 n.5 (2010). In plaintiff’s view,

DeCA would only be able to accurately compare the reasonableness of price

proposals if each offeror based its proposed PSD on a common baseline local

market basket price, rather than on an individually-conducted market basket

survey of local prices. See Pl.’s Mot. at 36 (“Without [a market basket survey]

equivalent common to all offers, different offerors invariably will start with

different perceptions of the market prices, meaning that any evaluation of the

resulting proposed HVCI prices will be arbitrary and capricious.”).

The court cannot agree with plaintiff’s assumptions. First, plaintiff

misunderstands the unit price data each offeror will supply to DeCA. Each offeror

is to communicate both its proposed PSD and its local price assumptions for

HVCI. See Def.’s Mot. at 45 (“After receiving offerors[’] proposed unit prices for

the snapshot time period, DeCA will have an understanding of what offerors

13/ As previously noted, a price realism analysis is not required by the solicitation and the

particularities of such analyses need not be discussed further in this opinion. See supra note 4.

34
perceive to be the local market price upon which they are applying their patron

savings discount.”). Thus, there will be adequate data for DeCA to avoid reliance

on any inaccurate market basket surveys or on any inaccurate PSDs.

14

Second, offerors commit to a minimum PSD for the base period and the

option years of the contract. See AR at 3774, 3776-78. The PSD in each proposal

therefore allows DeCA to compare the true cost of proposals, because the PSD and

fluctuating local market prices, together, will be a good predictor of the cost of

contract performance. The relevant text in the solicitation describes the overall

approach to determining price reasonableness based on the data provided by the

offerors:

The proposed unit prices for the HVCI provided by each

offeror will be analyzed for price reasonableness and the

accuracy of the application of the proposed Price

(minimum percentage of patron savings). The proposed

unit prices for the HVCIs shall reflect the application of

the proposed Price (minimum percentage of patron

savings) based on market basket survey equivalents

conducted during the period 8-14 December 2014 . . . . 

The Government will analyze the HVCI unit prices

provided by offerors for the specified period for price

reasonableness or realism, however the HVCI unit prices

will not be the basis of contract award.

Id. at 3774.

The court views the agency’s clarified focus on PSD for its price evaluation,

AR at 3772-78, as fundamentally rational and fulfilling the statutory and

regulatory requirements cited by plaintiff. Here, despite plaintiff’s arguments to

the contrary, the price evaluation scheme collects both sufficient and useful data

from the offerors and rationally explains how this data will be used to determine

14

/ If DeCA had provided a baseline market basket survey of local prices, as plaintiff

suggests, the agency would be forced to accept proposed PSDs largely on faith. There is no

advantage to plaintiff’s preferred price evaluation method.

35
the price reasonableness of proposals. The solicitation’s price evaluation scheme

violates no laws or regulations and is not arbitrary or capricious.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has failed to show that the solicitation is “arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A). Because plaintiff’s bid protest has not succeeded on the merits, the

court need not consider whether plaintiff has proved prejudicial error on the part

of the government and need not inquire further into the factors that might justify

injunctive relief. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record, filed

December 29, 2014, is DENIED;

(2) Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative

Record, filed January 12, 2015, is GRANTED;

(3) The Clerk’s Office is directed to ENTER final judgment in favor of

defendant, DISMISSING the amended complaint with prejudice;

(4) On or before February 27, 2015, counsel for the parties shall

CONFER and FILE with the Clerk’s Office a redacted copy of this

opinion, with any material deemed proprietary marked out and

enclosed in brackets, so that a copy of the opinion can then be

prepared and made available in the public record of this matter; and

(5) Each party shall bear its own costs.

/s/Lynn J. Bush 

LYNN J. BUSH

Senior Judge

36