This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A23-1726

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Latisha Marie Townley,

Appellant.

Filed August 26, 2024

Affirmed

Reyes, Judge

Isanti County District Court

File No. 30-CR-23-222

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey R. Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Nicholas J. Colombo, Assistant County 

Attorney, Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Max B. Kittel, Assistant Public 

Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Halbrooks, 

Judge.

∗

 

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

REYES, Judge

In this direct appeal from her conviction of fifth-degree drug possession, appellant 

challenges the constitutional validity of her guilty plea, arguing that it was inaccurate 

because the factual basis did not establish that her possession of methamphetamine was 

unlawful and because the district court erroneously relied on the allegations in the 

complaint. We affirm. 

FACTS

In March 2023, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Latisha Marie 

Townley with felony fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance under Minn. Stat. 

§ 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2022). The charge arose after law enforcement found 

methamphetamine residue on a hypodermic needle and two pipes located near where 

appellant was sitting in a stopped vehicle.

In August 2023, appellant pleaded guilty to an amended, reduced count of grossmisdemeanor fifth-degree possession. The district court accepted appellant’s plea and 

sentenced her to 364 days in jail, stayed for two years, with two years of supervised 

probation. 

This appeal follows.

DECISION

Appellant seeks to withdraw her guilty plea and argues that she entered an 

inaccurate plea because she never admitted to unlawfully possessing methamphetamine,
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an essential element of the crime, and there were no facts elicited at the plea hearing to 

support that finding.1

 We disagree. 

A criminal defendant may challenge the validity of a guilty plea on direct appeal 

even though the defendant did not first move the district court to withdraw the plea. Brown 

v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). Although a “defendant has no absolute right 

to withdraw a guilty plea,” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010), a “court 

must allow a defendant to [do so] upon” satisfactory proof that “withdrawal is necessary

to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A “manifest injustice” 

exists when a plea is invalid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. To be constitutionally valid, a 

guilty plea “must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 

716 (Minn. 1994). The burden is on the defendant to show that their plea was invalid. 

Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Appellate courts review de novo whether a plea is valid. Id.

The accurate-plea requirement “protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more 

serious offense than that for which [s]he could be convicted if [s]he insisted on h[er] right 

to trial.” Id. To be accurate, a plea must include a proper factual basis. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 

at 716. It is the district court’s responsibility to “ensure that an adequate factual basis has 

been established in the record.” Id. Although district courts generally elicit a factual basis 

by asking the defendant to explain what happened, “a defendant may not withdraw [their]

1 Appellant also relies on Rosendahl v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. App. 2021), to argue 

that the district court erred by relying on the complaint when accepting the factual basis 

because appellant never admitted that the complaint’s allegations were truthful or accurate. 

Because we conclude that appellant’s plea, even without the complaint’s allegations, 

established a sufficient factual basis for the district court to infer that appellant unlawfully 

possessed the methamphetamine, we need not address this argument. 
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plea simply because the [district] court failed to elicit proper responses if the record 

contains sufficient evidence to support the conviction.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. “Even 

if an element to an offense is not verbalized by the defendant, a district court may 

nevertheless draw inferences from the facts admitted to by the defendant.” Rosendahl, 955 

N.W.2d at 299 (emphasis omitted). 

The elements of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance under Minn. Stat. 

§ 152.025, subd. 2(1), are that the defendant (1) possessed one or more controlled 

substances; (2) knowing or believing that the substance was a controlled substance;

(3) without lawful authority; (4) on the applicable date and within the applicable county. 

10A Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 23.22 (7th ed. 2023). Methamphetamine is a Schedule 

II controlled substance. Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 3(d)(2) (2022). The offense is a felony 

if the person has a prior conviction for a violation of Minnesota Statutes chapter 152 or a 

similar offense in another jurisdiction. Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a) (2022).

During the plea hearing, appellant affirmed that she “had enough time to talk with 

[her] attorney,” and was “satisfied that [she had] been given all the facts of [her] case 

necessary to go forward.” Appellant agreed that she was waiving her probable-cause 

challenges by moving forward with the plea. Prior to establishing a factual basis, defense 

counsel reviewed the plea petition with appellant on the record. As part of that review, 

defense counsel asked: 

[Defense:] And this document contains the contents 

of the agreement which is you’re going to enter a plea of guilty 

to count one which is possession of fifth-degree controlled 

substance crime in violation of Minnesota Statute 152.025 

subdivision 2(1), possession of methamphetamine on March 
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30th. You understand that? And that the agreement calls for you

[to] plead[] guilty, and you’ll be sentenced – it will be a gross 

misdemeanor. In other words that you possessed 

methamphetamine on the date in less than 0.25 grams. You 

understand that that is the agreement, and you would have 

satisfaction for time served with 364 days stayed for up to two 

years.

[Appellant:] Yes. 

The factual basis portion of the plea colloquy followed:

[Court:] And so, to the charge then of possession 

of controlled substance in the fifth-degree, Minnesota Statute 

152.025 subdivision 2(1), a gross misdemeanor with the 

maximum possible penalty of 364 days in jail a $3,000 fine or 

both occurring in Isanti county on March 30, 2023, how did 

you wish to plead today: guilty or not guilty?

[Appellant:] Guilty.

[Court:] And, [appellant], what did you do that 

makes you guilty of that offense?

[Appellant:] I possessed methamphetamine. 

[Court:] And did you know it was 

meth[amphetamine]?

[Appellant:] Yes.

[Court:] And where were you in Isanti County 

when you did that?

[Appellant:] In a vehicle with a friend.

[Court:] Okay. Do you remember where in the 

county it was?

[Appellant:] Cambridge.

[Court:] All right. And the Court will incorporate 

the information contained in the complaint. Any other 

questions about the facts [prosecutor]?

[Prosecutor:] [Appellant], just to the best of your 

knowledge was that back on March 30th of 2023?

[Appellant:] I – I’m sure –

[Defense:] To the best of your knowledge.

[Appellant:] Yes. Yes. 

[Court:] Okay. 

[Prosecutor:] And then, Your Honor, I don’t know if it 

– we’re agreeing to a gross misdemeanor though it was charged 

as a felony. Just for the record it’s based on prior fifth degree 

drug convictions. So –
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[Court:] All right. 

[Prosecutor:] -- I don’t know if we need to establish that 

given the resolution. 

[Court:] Not necessary for the gross misdemeanor, 

but as background I’m incorporating it in the facts that are in 

the complaint as part of the factual basis. And so those facts 

are enough to support your plea of guilty. The 

meth[amphetamine] that you had, did you – where did you 

have it? Was it in the c- it was in the car in the city of 

Cambridge?

[Appellant:] Yes. 

[Court:] Okay. All right. Those are facts enough to 

support that plea, and I do find observing [appellant] today that 

you’ve knowingly and intelligently and voluntarily given up 

your trial rights and I intend to accept this agreement. 

To argue that the plea colloquy failed to establish that she possessed 

methamphetamine “without lawful authority,” appellant attempts to distinguish her case 

from State v. Clarin, 913 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 7, 

2018).2

 In Clarin, this court concluded that circumstantial evidence supported that 

appellant unlawfully possessed methamphetamine. 913 N.W.2d at 721. This court relied 

on the fact that the methamphetamine was “a white powder in an unlabeled clear plastic 

2 Appellant also relies upon two nonprecedential cases, State v. Schirmer, No. A16-2050, 

2017 WL 4766994 (Minn. App. Oct. 23, 2017) and State v. Garbow, No. A23-0541, 2024 

WL 543191 (Minn. App. Feb. 12, 2024). In Schirmer, this court concluded that, although 

appellant did not explicitly concede the unlawful-possession element, his guilty plea 

established that element because the complaint provided that the methamphetamine found 

on his person was “in crystal form instead of pills and . . . was found in an unmarked bag 

instead of a prescription bottle.” 2017 WL 4766994 at *2. In Garbow, this court concluded 

that, even though the appellant had not admitted to possessing methamphetamine

unlawfully, the circumstances of the case and plea supported the inference that he 

unlawfully possessed it, including that an officer found the methamphetamine in a syringe 

mixed with alcohol, that he admitted to possessing it, and that he was pleading guilty to the 

controlled-substance offense. 2024 WL 543191 at *3. These opinions do not impact our 

analysis. 
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baggie,” as opposed to being “in capsule or tablet form” within “a labeled container with 

appellant’s name on it.” Id. 

Here, the facts appellant admitted at the plea hearing support an inference that she 

unlawfully possessed the methamphetamine. Rosendahl, 955 N.W.2d at 299. The district 

court explicitly asked appellant an open-ended question of “what did you do that makes 

you guilty of [fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance]?” and appellant responded 

that she had “possessed methamphetamine.” Appellant (1) admitted to possessing 

methamphetamine “[i]n a vehicle with a friend” while pleading guilty to the controlledsubstance offense; (2) filed a plea petition; (3) did not claim that she had lawfully possessed

the methamphetamine; and (4) had prior fifth-degree drug convictions, which supports that 

she understood the implications of the charge. Based on its observation of appellant during 

the plea colloquy, the district court found that she had “knowingly and intelligently and 

voluntarily” waived her trial rights. Relying on the reasonable inferences a district court 

may draw from the facts admitted by appellant, her plea established a sufficient factual 

basis for the district court to infer that her possession of methamphetamine was unlawful. 

Id. Further, because appellant pleaded guilty to a gross misdemeanor that had been reduced 

down from a felony charge, there is no risk that she pleaded guilty to “a more serious 

offense” than that which she could have been convicted of had she proceeded to trial. 

Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. We therefore conclude that appellant entered an accurate guilty 

plea and that she therefore is not entitled to withdrawal. 

Affirmed.