Filed 4/26/18 ; Certified for Publication 5/9/18 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

CONTRACTORS’ STATE LICENSE BOARD, Petitioner,

v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; BLACK DIAM OND ELECTRIC, INC., Real Party in Interest. A153684

(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. C1702451)

BY THE COURT * : The Contractors ’ State License Board (the Board ) seeks a writ of mandate and a stay to prevent the “apex deposition” of David R. Fogt. Fogt is the Board’s Registrar of Contractors, a position which makes him the Board’s secretary and chief executive

officer. After real party in interest , Black Diamond Electric, Inc. (BDE), noticed Fogt’s deposition in a declaratory judgment action BDE had brought against the Board, Fogt sought a protective order to prevent the deposition. Respondent court denied the motion for a protective order, and the Board now seeks writ review.

We conclude that under well

- established California law, the head of a government agency, such as Fogt, generally is not subject to deposition. “An exception to the rule

* Humes, P.J., Margulies, J., and Dondero, J.2

exists only when the official has direct personal factual information pertaining to ma terial issues in the action and the deposing party shows the information to be gained from the deposition is not available through any other source.” ( Westly v. Superior Court (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 907, 911 ( Westly ).) We hold that this exception does no t apply in this case. We therefore grant the Board’s petition and issue a peremptory writ in the first instance, as we previously informed the parties was possible. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177

– 180 ( Palma ).)

F AC TUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND BDE is a licensed electrical contractor and is currently the subject of a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Board. The Board’s March 20, 2017 accusation alleges that uncertified BDE employees performed work that required certification, and that certi fied trainee/employees performed work without required supervision by a certified electrician. The disciplinary proceeding is currently pending before the Office of Administrative Hearings. After the disciplinary proceeding was initiated, BDE filed a co mplaint in Contra Costa Superior Court. The complaint seeks a declaration as to the proper definition of certain terms used in the Labor Code, including “electrician,” “electrical work,” and “direct supervision.” (See Lab. Code, §§ 108, subd. (c), 108.2, subd. (a), 108.4,

subd. (a)(3).) In the alternative, the complaint seeks a declaration that the terms are impermissibly vague. Finally, the complaint seeks a “permanent injunction enjoining and restraining the [Board] from seeking to enforce the ‘direct supervision’ provision of Labor Code section 108.4[, subdivision ](a)(3) until the legislation provides the [Board]
with further clarification.” 1 BDE submitted interrogatories and document production requests to the Board on January 19, 2018. One week later, BDE served a notice of deposition for Fogt. Fogt

1 On February 5, 2018, the Board filed a demurrer to BDE’s complaint. Respondent had not ruled on the demurrer by the time the instant petition was filed, and the arguments raised in the demurrer are not before us.3

currently serves as the Board’s Registrar of Contractors

— the “executive officer and secretary of the board.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7011, subd. (b).) BDE noticed the deposition for February 16.

Th e Board then filed a motion for protective order to prevent the deposition. It argued the deposition was improper before a decision on the Board’s demurrer, and it contended that the deposition would be harassing and burdensome. As to the latter

contenti on, the Board argued that BDE was seeking to depose Fogt on the definition of statutory terms, which are issues of law, not fact. In its opposition to the motion, BDE made clear that it sought to depose Fogt concerning the Board’s “operating definition o f ‘electrician’ and ‘direct supervision’ .

. . for purpose of enforcement .

. . .” The Board filed a reply in which it raised an argument it had not developed in its motion. Citing numerous California cases, it contended that top government executives ar e normally not subject to deposition. On February 13, respondent issued a tentative ruling denying the motion. The following day, the parties appeared at a hearing on the motion. Before the hearing, counsel for the Board notified respondent and opposin g counsel that he would focus his argument on the law prohibiting the deposition of high government officials, noting that the argument had not been addressed in the tentative ruling. At the hearing, the parties engaged in what BDE’s counsel describes as a “robust argument” about the relevant

California and federal case law and the facts of the case. 2 On February 14, respondent issued a written order denying the Board’s request for a protective order. Its written order addressed the argument raised in the Board’s reply regarding the deposition of high government officials. Respondent distinguished the cases on which the Board relied, ruling that Fogt allegedly “has direct factual information

2 T he hearing was not transcribed, but counsel for both parties have filed declarations pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.486(b)(3)(A) “ fairly summarizing the pro ceedings, including the parties’ arguments and any statement by the court sup porting its ruling. ”4

and that he was directly involved in issues related to this c ase before his appointment as
Executive Officer.” On February 21, the Board filed the current petition seeking a writ of mandate and an immediate stay. The following day, we issued a temporary stay of the order pending further briefing and consideration by this court. In the stay order, we gave Palma notice, informing the parties that we might proceed by issuing a peremptory writ of mandate in

the first instance. BDE has submitted informal opposition, and the Board has filed a reply.

D ISCUSSION The Bo ard contends that high government officials like Fogt generally are not subject to deposition. 3 The Board acknowledges the existence of the exception for officials possessing direct, personal, factual information relating to material issues in the action, but it argues that the information BDE seeks is not factual in nature. In addition,

3 In its opposition, BDE objects that the Board first raised this argument in its reply papers below. Courts often will not consider arguments first raised in a reply brief because of the potential unfairness to the opposing party, wh o is deprived of the opportunity to respond to the new argument. (E.g., St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 783.) Here, however, we conclude that BDE had a sufficient opportunity to respond to the Board’s contention. First, the Board’s motion for protective order relied on the “policy of protecting senior officials of state agencies and professional boards from depositions” and cited Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 811. BDE’s oppositio n claimed the Board had cited that case “ seemingly for the proposition that agency heads can never be deposed. ” BDE therefore appears to have understood the basic thrust of the Board’s argument regarding the deposition of high government officials, even i f the Board did not fully develop the argument until its reply. Second, BDE’s counsel states that at the oral hearing, the parties were given “ unlimited time to argue [the Board’s] motion ” and engaged in “a robust argument” on the issue raised in the peti tion. BDE therefore had an opportunity to respond. Third, courts have discretion to accept arguments made for the first time in reply. ( Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1009.) In this case, respondent chose to consider the issue the Board

r aises in its petition, and the court resolved it adversely to the Board. Finally, BDE has briefed the issue fully in this court. In these circumstances, we conclude BDE will not be prejudiced if we address the arguments raised in the Board’s petition.5

the Board asserts that BDE has not met its burden of showing that the information is not available from any other source. We agree with the Board.

I. California Law Gen erally Prohibits Depositions of High Government Officials.

“ The general rule in California and federal court is that agency heads and other top governmental executives are not subject to deposition absent compelling reasons. ” ( Westly, supra, 125 Cal.App. 4th at p. 910.) “ The general rule is based upon the recognition that ‘.

. . an official’ s time and the exigencies of his everyday business would be severely impeded if every plaintiff filing a complaint against an agency head, in his official capacity, we re allowed to take his oral deposition. Such procedure would be contrary to the public interest, plus the fact that ordinarily the head of an agency has little or no knowledge of the facts of the case. ’ ” ( Nagle v. Superior Court (1994)

28 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1468 ( Nagle ), quoting Union Savings Bank of Patchogue, New

York v. Saxon (D.D.C. 1962) 209 F.Supp. 319 , 319

– 320.) This rule has been applied in numerous cases involving an array of constitutional officers, board members, and a gency heads. (See Westly, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at

p. 912 [granting writ of mandate to prevent depositions of state Controller and Attorney General]; Nagle , supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1467

– 1468 [granting peremptory writ to prevent depositions of direct or of California Employment Development Department and former director of California Department of Health Services]; Deukmejian v. Superior

Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 632, 635 ( Deukmejian ) [granting peremptory writ in first instance ordering superior cour t to quash notice to appear directed at Governor]; State Board of Pharmacy v. Superior Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 641, 644

– 646 ( State Board of Pharmacy ) [issuing peremptory writ of mandate directing superior court to quash subpoena for deposition of Attorn ey General]; Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior

Court , supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at pp. 813

– 814 [issuing writ of prohibition to prevent deposition of members of state licensing board].) As we observed 40 years ago, “ ‘ the administrative head of a large exec utive department should not be called upon personally to give testimony by deposition

. . . unless a clear showing is made that such a proceeding is essential to prevent prejudice or injustice to the party who would require it. ’ ” ( State6

Board of Pharmacy
, at p. 645, quoting Wirtz v. Local 30, International U. of Operating Engineers (S.D.N.Y. 1963) 34 F.R.D. 13, 14 .) Thus, where a party seeks to depose a high government official, and the official moves for a protective order, the burden is on the deposing party to show that compelling reasons exist for permitting the deposition. (See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1289 [deposition of corporate president].) An exception will be made to this rule only when the deposin g party makes two showings. First, the deposing party must show that the government official “ has direct personal factual information pertaining to material issues in the action

. . . .” ( Westly,

supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 911, italics added.) Second, the deposing party must also

show “ the information to be gained from the deposition is not available through any other

source. ” ( Ibid. )

II. BDE Has Failed to Show the Exception Applies. BDE does not dispute that California law generally does not allow high government officials to be deposed. Instead, it appears to contend that Fogt is not such an official because it seeks to depose him regarding information gained during his earlier career with the Board. BDE also argues that Fogt has unique personal knowledge of facts concerning the Board’s interpretation and enforcement of Labor Code section 108 et seq. For these reasons, BDE contends that Fogt’s deposition is proper.

A. As Registrar of Contractors, Fogt Is a Highly Placed Public Officer.

We reject BDE’s argument that Fogt is not the kind of “highly placed public officer” to whom the general rule applies. ( State Board of Pharmacy, supra,

78 Cal.App.3d at p. 644.) The general rule applies to “ agency heads and other top governmental executives ” ( Westly, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 910), and Fogt, as Registrar of Contractors, is the “executive officer and secretary of the board” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7011, subd. (b)). The rule that top governmental executives are generally not subject to depos ition has been applied to the heads of other California state agencies. (See Nagle, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1467

– 1468 [rule applied to director of7

California Employment Development Department and former director of California Department of Health Ser vices].) We see no reason why it should not apply to Fogt. It does not matter that BDE claims to seek information Fogt gained before he was elevated to his current position. The rule prohibiting the deposition of agency heads and other highly placed public officials is grounded on the concern that such proceedings will consume the officials’ time and hamper them in the conduct of government business. ( Nagle, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 1468; see State Board of Pharmacy, supra,

78 Cal.App.3d at p. 644 [“ It is patently in the public interest that the Attorney General be

not unnecessarily hampered or distracted in the important duties cast upon him by

law. ”].) This concern is present whether the official gained the information sought while

in his or her present position or while serving in prior, lower ranking positions at the agency. (See Deukmejian, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 634 [Governor alleged to have personal knowledge of prison conditions based on prior service as a state legislator and

years o f service in the Attorney General’s office].) We assume that agency heads will frequently be drawn from the ranks of agency employees with many years of experience. But the mere fact that a party seeks information acquired before the official assumed the position of agency head does not render the deposition any less time

- consuming or disruptive of government business.

B. The Information BDE Seeks Is Not Factual. In this court, BDE explains that the purpose of Fogt’s deposition is “ to inquire

about the [Board’s] prior administrative interpretations of the statute, and prior applications of it, that occurred by his direction, through his authority since his appointment as Enforcement Chief. ” We agree with the Board that these are issues of law, not fact. We begin by noting that BDE’s action is one for declaratory judgment, which asks the court to construe various statutory terms. The proper interpretation of terms used in

the Labor Code is an issue of law. ( See State Building & Construction Trades Coun cil of California v. Duncan (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 289 , 304 [proper interpretation of term “public work” in Labor Code is pure legal issue]; Handyman Connection of Sacramento,8

Inc. v. Sands (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 867, 881 [interpretation of Contractors’ St ate License Law is matter of law subject to independent review].) Put another way, BDE seeks to have respondent determine whether the Board’s interpretation and manner of enforcement of the specified Labor Code provisions are consistent with the statutes at issue. This is unquestionably a legal issue. ( Transcentury Properties, Inc. v. State of California (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 835, 842 ( Transcentury Properties ) [“ Respondents ’ contention that regulations promulgated by the state commission are not authorize d by

the [California Coastal Zone Conservation] Act raises a legal question. ”].) As BDE admitted below, “[t] he underlying issues are ones of legal interpretation

. . . .” The only information relevant to the Board’s interpretation of the Labor Code wil l be the text of the statutes, legislative history, and perhaps official administrative interpretations. 4 We fail to see what factual information Fogt could supply on those issues. Indeed, BDE does not appear to claim Fogt has such information. To the

c ontrary, its counsel states that “w e selected him because Mr. Fogt interpreted Labor Code section 108, et seq. and established the policies for enforcing his interpretation. ” While Fogt certainly has knowledge of the Board’s interpretation of the statutes and its enforcement history, that knowledge is not personal, factual information. ( Westly, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 911 [“ While the Controller and Attorney General unquestionably have knowledge of what their official duties are, those duties are a ma tter of law, not personal factual information. ”]; Deukmejian
, supra , 143 Cal.App.3d at pp. 634

– 635 [distinguishing Governor’s knowledge of administration policies from factual knowledge of prison conditions].)

4 As one federal court explained in a case seeking the testimony of members of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and its employees, “[t]he FCC .

. . acts officially only ‘through the adoption of rules, orders, policy statements which reflect its vi ews and commands.’ [Citation.] These statements are not subject to interpretation by an FCC Commissioner or employee (past or present) any more than a judicial decision is subject to elaboration or interpretation by way of the subsequent testimony of the judicial officer who rendered it.” ( U

. S

. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co. (D.D.C. 1981) 524 F.Supp. 1381, 1387.)9

Furthermore, in suits seeking review of admin istrative action, discovery is not available regarding pure issues of law. In State of California v. Superior Court (1974)

12 Cal.3d 237 ( State of California ), the court held that objections to interrogatories regarding the constitutionality of the statut e at issue should have been sustained “ because they seek to determine opinions of the [California Coastal Zone Conservation] Commission regarding the constitutionality of the [California Coastal Zone Conservation] Act, and such opinions have no relevance w hatever to the purely legal problem of determining the validity of the Act on its face. ” ( Id. at p. 256, fn. omitted.) It further held that the commission should not be compelled to answer interrogatories that

“ seek to determine what material the Commiss ion read and relied upon in reaching its

determination and

. . . seek to probe the mental processes of the Commission

. . . .” ( Id. at p. 258.) The court cited the seminal case of United States v. Morgan (1941) 313 U.S.

409 , in which the United States Su preme Court “ held

. . . that ‘it was not the function of the court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary [of Agriculture]. ’ [Citation.] Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny [citation] , so the integrity of the administrative pro cess must be equally respected. ” ( Id. at p. 422.) Thus, BDE is not permitted to ask agency officials how they personally interpret statutes administered by the Board, since their personal views are irrelevant to the purely legal issue of statutory constr uction. ( State of California, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 256.) To the extent BDE contends that the Board’s interpretation of the Labor Code is inconsistent with the statutes, “[t]here is no need for discovery with respect to this contention.” 5

5 It does not matter that BDE views Fogt as the person most knowledgeable in these matters. In State Board of Pharmacy , the issue in the underlying action related to an award of attorney fees, but we rejected the argument that the deposition of the Attorney General should be permitted because he “has a ‘unique perspective’ on the effect of this lawsuit and the factors related to fixing atto rneys’ fees.” ( State Board of Pharmacy
, supra , 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 644.) Similarly, in Nagle
, the plaintiff sought to depose the directors of the California Employment Development Department and Department of Health Services . ( Nagle
, supra , 28 Cal.App.4 th at p. 1467.) Division Four of this district rejected the argument that the directors should be deposed because they had not claimed that “ they ha [d] no knowledge of, for example, other cases in which10

( Transcentury Properties, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 842 [party’s contention that agency regulations were not authorized by enabling statute raised purely legal issue on which discovery was unnecessary]; see also Guilbert v. Regents of University of California (1979) 9 3 Cal.App.3d 233, 246 [official’s “ ‘understanding’ as to whether he was exercising adjudicatory powers or his ‘belief’ as to statutory constraints on the exercise of his powers are totally irrelevant to the issues of whether respondents granted Guilbert a fair trial, abused their discretion or exceeded their jurisdiction”].) Nor may BDE ask Fogt why the Board exercised its discretion to initiate any particular enforcement action. In Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Secretary of Labor (D.C. Cir. 1985) 766 F.2 d 575 ( Simplex ), the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an argument similar to the one BDE makes here, explaining, “Simplex has not suggested any information in the possession of these officials (regarding general enforcement proceeding s) that it could not obtain from published reports and available agency documents. From its brief, we gather that Simplex wishes to question these officials on purely discretionary decisions concerning enforcement of the OSHA Act.

This runs counter to th e cautions enunciated in Morgan, supra, et al .” ( Id. at p. 587.)

BDE ’s reli ance on Green v. Baca (C.D.C al. 2005) 226 F.R.D. 624 is misplaced. In that case, the court refused to preclude the testimony of the Los Angeles County Sheriff in an action challenging the s heriff’s implementation of jail release policies. But

the court based its decision, in part, on its view that the s heriff was not a high government official. It cited authority holding that police chiefs were not such of ficials, and it noted

that the s heriff had cited no contrary authority. ( Id. at p. 649

. ) As noted earlier, that is

not the case here. Green v. Baca also appears so mewhat inconsistent with Deukmejian
, where the court held that the Governor could not be deposed merely because he was knowledgeable about conditions in state prisons, since the true focus of the inquiry was

subpoenas were issued or general knowledge of depart mental requirements

. . . .” ( Id. at p. 1468.)11

executive policies, not prison conditions. ( De ukmejian, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at

pp. 634

– 635.)

D. BDE Has Not Shown t hat the Information Is Unavailable f rom Any Other Source. To satisfy the second prong of the exception, BDE must show that “ the information to be gained from the deposition is not avai lable through any other source. ” ( Westly, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 911.) BDE has not done so. In the court below, BDE argued that the Board’s enforcement of the statutory provisions at issue was “contrary to its own published interpretations.” BDE therefore recognizes that published interpretations of the statutes exist. BDE does not explain why it cannot use such “published reports and available agency documents” to discern how the Board construes the statutory terms it finds unclear. ( Simplex
, s upra , 766 F.2d at

p. 587; see State Building & Construction Trades Council of California v. Duncan
, supra , 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 304 [“the opinion of an administrative agency as to a statute’s meaning may be helpful even if it is ‘not binding or necessaril y even authoritative’ ”].) Thus, the information BDE seeks from Fogt might just as easily be
derived from “ ‘ orders [or] policy statements which reflect [the Board’s] views and

commands. ’ ” ( U

. S

. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co.
, supra , 524 F.Supp. at p. 1387.) BDE is free to seek such materials from the Board in discovery. BDE complains that the Board’s responses to its discovery requests have been inadequate and evasive. Even if this is true, BDE has not shown it has availed itself of the remedies pro vided by the Civil Discovery Act. If it is truly dissatisfied with the Board’s discovery responses, it may seek an order compelling more complete answers. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (b).) Although BDE has filed an appendix

of exhibit s, nothing in its appendix shows that it has moved to compel further responses

from the Board.

III. A Peremptory Writ in the First Instance Is Appropriate. In these circumstances, we will issue a peremptory writ in the first instance. Generally, we empl oy “the accelerated Palma procedure

. . . . only when petitioner ’ s12

entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary

consideration of the issue .

. . or where there is an unusual urgency requiring acceleration

of the normal process.” ( Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35 .) That is the case here. As we have explained, on the record before us, respondent abused its discretion in denying the Board’s motion for a protective order. Once Fogt’s deposition is tak en, the harm cannot be undone, and writ review is thus the only means of securing the relief the Board seeks. (See Board of Administration v. Superior Court (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 314, 324 [“Appeal is not an adequate remedy since if Board foregoes the right to review by prohibition it is left with the choice of supplying information to which City is clearly not entitled or suffering the risk of a default judgment on a debatable point of law. Board is entitled to a legal answer on the issue before it is comp elled to make that choice.”].)

“ Because there are no disputed factual issues, the legal error is clear and the matter should be expedited, a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate. ” ( Westly,

supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 912.) We have provi ded the parties with adequate notice by inviting and receiving preliminary opposition from BDE. “ ‘ Having complied with the procedural prerequisites, we are authorized to issue a peremptory writ in the first instance. ’ ” ( Johnny W. v. Superior Court (201 7) 9 Cal.App.5th 559, 568.)

D ISPOSITION Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent superior court in Black Diamond Electric, Inc. v. Contractors State License Board (Super. Ct. Contra Costa County, No. C1702451 ), to vacate its order of Fe bruary 14 , 201 8 , denying petitioner ’ s motion for a protective order , and to enter a new and different order granting petitioner’s motion. To prevent further delays in the superior court proceedings, this

decision shall be final as to this court five court days after its filing. (Cal. Rules of Court,

rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) The previously issued stay shall dissolve upon finality of this opinion.Filed 5/9/18 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

CONTRACTORS’ STATE LICENSE BOARD, Petitioner,

v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; BLACK DIAMOND ELECTRIC, INC., Real Party in Interest. A153684

(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. C1702451)

ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION

NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

THE COURT: The opinion in the above

- entitled matter filed on April 26, 2018, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. After the court’s review of a request under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120, and good cause established under rule 8.1105, it is hereby ordered that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports.

Dated:

___________________________ Humes, P. J.2

Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Judith Craddick

Counsel:

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson , Assistant Attorney General, Anthony R. Hakl and John W. Killeen , Deputy Attorney s General for Petitioner

.

Birka

- White Law Offices, David M. Birka

- White and Mindy M. Wong for Real Party in Interest.