alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1



Written Statement of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350)



The undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer and the Acting Chief Financial Officer of Novoste Corporation (the Company), each
hereby certify that, to his knowledge on the date hereof:



|1. | The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2004 filed on the date hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                  |  |                                                                        
|----------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: May 7, 2004 |  | /s/ ALFRED J. NOVAK                                                    
|                  |  | Alfred J. Novak, Chief Executive Officer of Novoste Corporation        
|                  | 
|Date: May 7, 2004 |  | /s/ SUBHASH C. SARDA                                                   
|                  |  | Subhash C. Sarda, Acting Chief Financial Officer of Novoste Corporation



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to
Novoste Corporation and will be retained by Novoste Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



The foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the Form 10-Q and shall not be deemed to be considered filed as
part of the Form 10-Q.
**Exhibit 99.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANTTO****18 U.S.C. §1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Webb Interactive Services, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the “Report”), I, William R. Cullen, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to thebest of my knowledge:

(1)

The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 

|   |   |   |   |                                                                            |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |        |   |   | /s/ WILLIAM R. CULLEN                                                           |
|   |   |   |   |                                                                                 |
|   |   |   |   | **William R. Cullen****Chief Executive Officer and****Chief Financial Officer** |

 

Date: May 15, 2003

A signedoriginal of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Webb Interactive Services, Inc. and will be retained by Webb Interactive Services, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff uponrequest.
#### In the Matter of Vincent Gerald C. Suffolk County Child Protective Services, Appellant; Jerry P., Also Known as Jerry D., Respondent.

In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b and Family Court Act article 6 to terminate the parental rights of the respondent natural father on the ground of permanent neglect, the petitioner appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Auperin, J.), entered May 4, 1989, which dismissed the petition.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The Family Court properly determined that the petitioning agency failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent natural father had failed to keep the agency apprised of his location for a period of six months. Accordingly, the agency was not relieved of its obligations under Social Services Law § 384-b (7) (a) *(see, Matter of Brown,*139 Misc 2d 550; *Matter of Antoinette Frances G.,*135 Misc 2d 1034; *see also, Matter of Sheila G.,*61 NY2d 368, 383, n 5). In this regard, we note that the agency’s trial counsel failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission into evidence of the file of the caseworker assigned to the infant *(see, Matter of Leon RR,*48 NY2d 117; Carrieri, Practice Commentary, Mc*680Kinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 52A, Social Services Law § 384-b, at 133-134). Further, contrary to the Law Guardian’s appellate contention, the agency did not seek to be relieved of its obligations on the ground that it would not be in the best interest of the infant to be reunited with his natural father. Consequently, the Family Court did not address that issue.

However, we would be remiss if we did not make the following observations; at oral argument, it was disclosed that during the pendency of this appeal, the agency has apparently taken no further action to discharge its statutory responsibilities with regard to the infant. The agency cannot "retain [this infant] in the limbo of foster care while taking neither the actions deemed essential by the Legislature to facilitate the [infant’s] return to [his natural father] nor those necessary to otherwise secure a permanent home for [him]” *(Matter of Antoinette Frances G.,*135 Misc 2d 1034, 1043, *supra).*Therefore, under the circumstances, our determination is without prejudice to the agency expeditiously commencing further appropriate proceedings *(see,*Social Services Law § 384-b; *see also,*L 1983, ch 911, § 1). Lawrence, J. P., Kooper, Sullivan and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judge McCl anahan, Senior Judges Coleman and Annunziata

DERRICK HORTON MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0063-06-1 PER CURIAM JUNE 27, 2006 CITY OF HAMPTON DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON William C. Andr ews, III, Judge (M. Woodrow Griffin, Jr., on brief), for appellant. (Rachel F. Allen, Assistant Ci ty Attorney ; Tonya Henderson–Stith, Guardian ad litem for the infant child; McDe rmott, Roe & Walter, on brief), for appellee.
Derrick Horton appeals the trial court’s deci sion terminating his parental rights to T.H. pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-283(C)(1) and (2). Horton contends (1) the evidence failed to prove termination was justified and (2) his incarceration was an insufficient basis to terminate his parental rights. The trial court terminated Horton’s residual parental rights based upon Code §§ 16.1-283(C)(1) and (2). On appeal, Horton presen ts no argument that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights pu rsuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) (i.e ., that he “failed to maintain continuing contact with and to pr ovide or substantially plan for the future of the child for a period of six months after the child’s placement in foster care”). When termination of parental rights under one subdivision of C ode § 16.1-283 is upheld or not cont ested, we need not consider termination under alternative subdivisions. See Fields v. Dinwiddie Count y Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ,

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - 46 Va. App. 7, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005). Acco rdingly, because Horton fails to contest termination pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1), we summarily affirm the decision of the trial
court. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.
#### MITCHELL v. STATE.

No. 16595.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 4, 1934.

Reinstated May 9, 1934.

Kirby, King & Overshirier and Letcher D. . King, all of Abilene, for appellant.’

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, Presiding Judge.

Robbery is the offense; penalty assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for five years.

The appeal cannot be considered for the reason that it appears that appellant is on bail and the bail bond fails to comply with the statutory requirement that it contain n<5t only the approving signature of the trial judge but also of the sheriff. See article 818, C. C. P. 1925; also, Leal v. State, 112 Tex. Cr. R. 479, 17 S.W.(2d) 1064; Franks v. State, 118 Tex. Cr. R. 96, 42 S.W.(2d) 1016. The bond in the present instance fails to contain the approval of .the sheriff.

In view of the condition of the record, the appeal is dismissed.

On Motion ’to Reinstate Appeal.

LATTIMORE, Judge.

The defect causing the dismissal of this case having been, remedied, the. appeal is reinstated and the ease considered on its merits.

There are no bills of exception in the record. We think the facts sufficient. Brown testified that appellant offered to take him in his car to a certain place. .After going a short distance a codefendant, Setters, appeared upon the roadside with a grip, apparently seeking a ride. .Appellant stopped the car and took Setters in. According to Brown, after they had gone a little way appeliant claimed his fan belt was off and his engine hot and got out of his car and gave some kind of signal to Setters, who also got out, and they came up on the side of the car, and appellant presented what appeared ,to witness to be a • pistol, commanding him to throw up his hands, which he. did, and while appellant held on witness what appeared to him to be a.revolver, Setters.took from witness his money, a $5 bill and a $i bill. They then directed Brown to get on. down the road. He went to the next town and reported the occurrence. Appellant and Setters testified that they got. $6 from Brown, but claimed they got it-by means of á card trick. They admitted that they had been going together some time, and that Setters waited beside the road until ..appellant could go downtown and pick up some one upon whom they could play their card trick. They admitted that when appellant brought Brown by in his car that *280it was a part of their scheme to pretend not to know each other. We think the facts sufficient to meet the allegations in the indictment, which were that appellant by putting in fear of life or bodily injury took from Brown his property. Brown testified that after being ordered to throw up his hands, and while appellant was holding on him what he took to be a pistol, he let Setters take his money because he was afraid they would shoot him if he did not.

The judgment will be affirmed.
#### SIMMONS v. STATE.

No. 16005.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 31, 1933.

A. B. Geppert and Ellen Victery, both of Teague, and H. L. Williford,, of Fairfield, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is manufacturing intoxicating liquor; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for one year.

After secreting themselves near a still, officers saw three men in the act of manufacturing intoxicating liquor. While these men were engaged in putting mash in the boiler appellant rode up on a horse. The officers’ testimony was to the effect that appellant asked the men at the still if they had gotten everything ready. Further, they testified that appellant said: “I have got this stuff sold and it will not be ready. If you do not like your job I will hire some boys to run this thing.” The officers said they saw appellant pour some mash into the boiler. Appellant finally left the still with the statement that he would be back in a little while. The three men remaining at the still were arrested.

Testifying in his own behalf, appellant admitted his presence at the still, but declared that he had gone there for a drink of whisky. He denied that he had any interest in the still, saying that he had in no manser aided the parties in manufacturing intoxicating liquor.

Several witnesses testified that appellant’s general reputation as a peaceable and law-abiding citizen was good. It is shown in bill of exception No. 1 that, after the witness Bob Holloway had testified that the general reputation of. appellant in the respect mentioned was good, he was asked the following question by the district attorney: “What was Dave Simmons’ general reputation in that community down there as a manufacturer of intoxicating liquor?” Appellant’s objection was overruled, and the witness answered: “I heard he made liquor.” Several bills of exception disclose that the same question was propounded to other witnesses testifying to appellant’s good reputation. The matter presents reversible error. Appellant was on trial for manufacturing intoxicating liquor, and his reputation, as a manufacturer of intoxicating liquor was not available to prove his guilt. Mitchell v. State, 116 Tex. Cr. R. 249, 82 S.W.(2d) 199, and authorities cited. In McMullen v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 229, 265 S. W. 582, 583, a similar situation arose. In reversing the judgment, this court, speaking through Judge- Lattimore, used language as follows: “Nor do we think the state can ever prove by other witnesses that the accused has a general bad reputation for doing the very thing involved in the charge against him on the trial — in the instant case, the making of intoxicating liquor.” The statement of the witness that he had heard that appellant made liquor was hearsay.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.
EX-10.5










Exhibit 10.5




(Amendment to U.S. Version)




AMENDMENT TO THE

RESTRICTED SHARE UNIT AWARD AGREEMENT





     THIS AMENDMENT (the “Amendment”) to the Restricted Share Unit Award Agreement (the
“Agreement”), effective as of the ___day of ____________, 200[ ], between Aspen Insurance
Holdings Limited, a Bermuda corporation (the “Company”), and ____________(the “Participant”), is
made effective as of the ___day of ____________, 2008:



RECITALS:




     WHEREAS, the Company has adopted the Aspen Insurance Holdings Limited 2003 Share Incentive
Plan, as amended from time to time (the “Plan”), which Plan is incorporated herein by reference and
made a part of this Amendment. Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the same
meanings as in the Plan; and



     WHEREAS, the Committee has determined that it would be in the best interests of the
Participant to amend the Agreement to comply with Section 409A of the Code, and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder.



     NOW THEREFORE, the Agreement is amended as follows:



     Section 6 is restated in its entirety as follows:



     “6. Payment. Except as otherwise elected by the Participant in accordance with the
provisions of Section 7, payment for the value of the Participant’s Restricted Share Units shall be
made to the Participant (or, in the event of the Participant’s death, the Participant’s
beneficiary, or, in the event that no beneficiary shall have been designated, the Participant’s
estate) as soon as practicable following the date on which such Restricted Share Units vest, but in
no event later than March 15th of the calendar year following the end of the calendar year in which
the Restricted Share Units vest. Restricted Share Units shall be paid in Shares, less any Shares
withheld in accordance with the provisions of Section 9, with one (1) Share paid for each Unit.”



     Except as expressly amended herein, the provisions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and
effect.



     This Amendment may be signed in counterparts, each of which shall be an original, with the same
effect as if the signatures thereto and hereto were upon the same instrument.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	ASPEN INSURANCE HOLDINGS LIMITED

 	 
	 	By:  	__________________________
 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 





	 	 	 	 	 
	 	AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS

OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE

AMENDMENT ABOVE WRITTEN:

 	 
	 	  	__________________________
 	 
	 	 	Participant
Amendments to Allscripts, Amended and Restated 1993 Stock Incentive Plan



 Exhibit 10.11 
 AMENDMENTS TO ALLSCRIPTS HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS, INC. AMENDED AND RESTATED 1993 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN (the “1993 Plan”) 
 1. Section 6(d) of the 1993 Plan hereby is amended to add the following at the end of the first sentence thereof: 
 “In addition, in lieu of paying the purchase price upon the exercise of a Nonqualified Option in cash or in Common Shares of the Company, a grantee of a Nonqualified Option may pay the purchase price of the
shares subject to such Nonqualified Option by authorizing the Company to withhold whole Common Shares of the Company that would otherwise be delivered to the grantee, valued at their fair market value on the date of exercise, in an amount not in
excess of the aggregate purchase price (or the portion thereof elected by the grantee); provided, however, that such authority to authorize the withholding of Common Shares shall only apply in connection with the exercise of Nonqualified Options
prior to the consummation of the transactions contemplated by the Agreement and Plan of Merger dated as of March 17, 2008 by and among Misys plc, Misys Healthcare Systems, LLC, Allscripts Healthcare Solutions Inc. and Patriot Merger Company,
LLC (the “Merger Agreement”). Any fraction of a Common Share that would be required for the payment of such purchase price shall be disregarded and the remaining amount due shall be paid in cash by the grantee.” 
 2. Section 15 of the 1993 Plan hereby is amended to add the following sentence at the end thereof: 
 “A grantee may elect to satisfy the withholding requirement in connection with the exercise of a Nonqualified Option, in whole or in part, by
authorizing the Company to withhold whole Common Shares of the Company that would otherwise be delivered to the grantee, valued at their fair market value on the date of exercise of such Nonqualified Option, not in excess of any applicable
withholding taxes; provided, however, that the Common Shares of the Company to be withheld may not have an aggregate fair market value in excess of the amount determined by applying the minimum statutory rate; and provided further that such
authority to authorize the withholding of Common Shares shall only apply in connection with the exercise of Nonqualified Options prior to the consummation of the transactions contemplated by the Merger Agreement. Any fraction of a Common Share that
would be required to satisfy such withholding requirement shall be disregarded and the remaining amount due shall be paid in cash by the grantee.” 
 As
adopted by the Board of Directors in August, 2008.
<page>									 EXHIBIT 31.02
 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Jeffrey D. Hahn, Chief Financial Officer of Demeter Management
Corporation ("Demeter"), the general partner of the registrant,
certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of the
registrant;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present
in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the
periods presented in this report;

4.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-
15(e)) for the registrant and have:

   a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under
our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this
report is being prepared;

   b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

a)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred
during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably
likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting; and




<page>
5.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
committee of Demeter's board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):

a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal controls over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and

   b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting.





Date:   March 15, 2004     /s/	Jeffrey D. Hahn
                               Jeffrey D. Hahn
                               Chief Financial Officer,
                               Demeter Management Corporation,
                               general partner of the
                               registrant
**EXHIBIT 23.2**

 

 

 

 

Consent of the Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm 

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (Form S-8 Nos. 33-43001, 33-49234, 333-27613, 333-31464, 333-31379,333-61002, 333-95725 and 333-125062 and Form S-3 No. 333-101514) of ESB Financial Corporation, of our report dated March 8, 2005, with respect to the consolidated financial statements relative to the year ended December 31, 2004, ofESB Financial Corporation and subsidiaries included in its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 

 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 

March 5, 2007