No. 68469 

FILED 

APR 1 5 2016 

ND,EMAN 

EPE..Q0 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL 

RIGHTS AS TO K.M.C. AND M.M.C., 

A/K/A M.D., MINORS. 

CLARK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

KRYSTAL D.; AND WILL C., 

Respondents. 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a district court order denying a petition 

to terminate parental rights. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family 

Division, Clark County; Cynthia N. Giuliani, Judge. 

K.M.C. was initially removed from respondents' care in May 

2012, and was reunified in March 2013. Later that March, however, 

Krystal D. gave birth to M.M.C. and both tested positive for 

methamphetamine. As a result, K.M.C. and M.M.C. were removed from 

respondents' care. The main concern regarding respondents' parenting 

was their drug use. Will C. engaged in his case plan, attended substance 

abuse treatment programs, attended parenting classes, and submitted 

drug tests as required by appellant. Except for one relapse in the summer 

of 2014, Will C.'s drug test results showed no recent drug use and he 

testified that he was not using drugs and had a strong support system in 

place to maintain his sobriety. He also generally maintained employment 

and consistently visited the children. At the termination hearing, the 

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district court found that appellant had failed to establish parental fault 

grounds as to Will C. by clear and convincing evidence and denied the 

petition. This court reviews questions of law de novo and will uphold 

district court factual findings when they are supported by substantial 

evidence. In re Parental Rights as to A.L., 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 91, 337 P.3d 

758, 761 (2014). 

Appellant first argues that the district court erred because it 

did not address in its order the presumption of token efforts in NRS 

128.109(1)(a) (1999), which is triggered when the child has been removed 

from his or her home under NRS Chapter 432B and resided outside of the 

home for 14 of 20 consecutive months.' Because appellant did not cite 

NRS 128.109(1)(a) (1999) or otherwise reference or invoke this 

presumption in either its petition or at the termination hearing, appellant 

failed to properly raise this issue in the district court and we need not 

consider it on appea1. 2 Old Aztec Mine, Inc. u. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 

P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to 

the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and will not 

be considered on appeal."); see In re A.S., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 664, 669 (Ct. 

'Because the district court independently determined that it was in 

thefl children's best interest to terminate respondents' parental rights, any 

error by the district court in failing to apply the best-interest presumption 

in NRS 128.109(2) (1999) does not affect the outcome of this appeal. 

Similarly, the district court's failure to enter specific written findings of 

neglect as to Krystal D. is inconsequential to the outcome of this appeal, 

as the district court found other parental fault grounds as to Krystal D. 

2The district court noted that the children had not been out of the 

home for 14 consecutive months, but made no express determination 

under NRS 128.109 (1999). 

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App. 2011) (holding that child welfare agency forfeited the application of a 

statutory presumption when it did not cite to the presumption or argue to 

the district court that the presumption applied); see also In re KR., 233 

P.3d 746, 751 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that reliance on a 

presumption of parental unfitness without pretrial notice that the State 

would invoke the presumption was improper). 

Appellant next asserts that the district court erred when it 

determined that it was barred from considering testimony presented at 

the termination hearing regarding two physical altercations between 

respondents. Although the district court was not barred from considering 

this testimony, appellant has failed to develop any argument addressing 

how this testimony was directly relevant to any particular ground of 

parental unfitness and thus that this issue warrants reversal. See NRS 

128.105(2) (1999). These incidents were not adjudicated in the NRS 

Chapter 432B proceeding, and addressing domestic violence was not part 

of respondents' case plans. See NRS 128.105(2) (1999). Additionally, 

contrary to appellant's assertions, the record demonstrates that the 

district court considered the NRS 128.106 factors to the extent that they 

were relevant. See In re J.D.N., 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 44, 283 P.3d 842, 850 

(2012) (providing that the district court need not expressly refer to 

statutory factors when the order demonstrates that the district court 

considered the appropriate factors). Appellant's remaining arguments 

lack merit as substantial evidence supports the district court findings. 3 In 

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3Appellant's termination petition and the district court's order only 

reference NRS 128.014 (defining a neglected child) without reference to 

NRS 128.105(2)(b) (1999) (identifying neglect as a parental fault ground). 

Because the district court order resolves the allegation of neglect as to Will 

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re Parental Rights as to A.L., 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 91, 337 P.3d at 761. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Hardesty 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. Cynthia N. Giuliani, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division 

Christopher R. Tilman 

Special Public Defender 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

...continued 

C. that was presented in appellant's petition, the district court did not err 

when it did not explicitly reference NRS 128.105(2)(b) (1999). 

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