alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Medivation, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:

(1) the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2007 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) the information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: November 14, 2007



|                         
|-------------------------
|/s/ David T. Hung, M.D.  
|Name: David T. Hung, M.D.
|Title: President and     
|Chief Executive Officer  

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,
and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any
general incorporation language in such filing.
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## SERVED FEBRUARY 2, 2010

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

., f) 

### OFFICE OF HEARINGS WASHINGTON, DC
IN THE MATTER OF PROSPECT AVIATION, CORP., Respondent. FAA DOCKET NO. CP09EA0022 (Civil Penalty Proceeding) DMS NO. FAA-2009-0732


### ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'SORDERDISMISSING PROCEEDING AND TERMINATING DOCKET Counsel for the Complainanthas informed me thatthe parties have settledthis case, and that a hearing will no longer be needed. I deem this advice a withdrawal ofthe complaint. In consideration ofthe foregoing, and pursuant to 

### § 13.215 ofthe Rules ofPractice, 14 C.F.R. 

### § 13.215, this proceeding is hereby dismissed with prejudice, and the docket is terminated. The hearing**schedul~d** 

### to take place onFebruary 9, 2010 is cancelled. 

### IT IS SO ORDERED. 

# 4P;LL

. Isaac D. Benkin

Administrative law Judge

lW'FAA Docket No. CP09EA0022 (Civil Penalty Action) 

### CORRECTED SERVICE LIST ORIGINAL & 

### ONE COpy Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, DC 20591 Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000 1 

### ONE COpy Gregory C. Taylor, President Prospect Aviation Corporation, Respondent Beaver County Airport 145 Cessna Drive Beaver Falls, PA 15010 TEL: 724-843-3222 Layden C. Sadecky, Respondent's Counsel 664 Fourth Street Beaver, P A 15009 TEL: 724-774-6272 FAX: 724-774-6271 Christian L. Lewerenz, Complainant's Counsel Office ofActing Regional Counsel Eastern Region, EA-7 Federal Aviation Administration 1Aviation Plaza Jamaica, NY 11434 TEL: ·718-553-327:2 FAX: 718-995-5699 The Honorable Isaac D. Benkin,Administrative LawJudge Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 New Jersey

### Avenue, S.E. East Building Ground Floor, Room E12-320 Washington, DC 20590 TEL: Attorney 202-366-2139 Legal Assistant 202-366-2132 FAX: 202-366-7536

Service was by U.s. Mail. For service in person orby expedited courier, use the following address: Federal Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000, Washington, DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430
.. I
Filed by Bowne Pure Compliance





EXHIBIT 10.3




Relocation Agreement between Michael O’Neill and Mentor Corporation dated October 28, 2008




October 28, 2008




Michael O’Neill




Dear Mike,




Based on the fact that circumstance of the business and the economy has changed significantly since
your start date, we are prepared to make a change to your initial relocation offer.



Every effort was made to evaluate your personal situation in light of the business need. As you
know, it is imperative that you, as an executive, make the commitment to reside in the Santa
Barbara area, at least Monday through Friday.



To facilitate this need, we are prepared to immediately offer you $180,000 as a lump sum relocation
bonus (subject to taxes/withholding). The purpose of this bonus is to offset the expenses of rent,
car rental, travel to and from your primary residence, etc. after October 31, 2008. No other
payment for these expenses will be covered by the company.



Within 3 years of the above mentioned October 31st date, should you decide to relocate
your primary residence to the company headquarters, you will be eligible to participate in the
Executive Relocation package (lump sum, mortgage mitigation, etc.) in place at the time of your
relocation.



To the extent of any conflict between this letter and your original offer letter and employment
agreement, the terms of this letter shall govern. Please execute a copy of this letter and return
the executed copy to me.



Sincerely,




	 	 	 
	/s/Vicki Chuck
 

Vicki Chuck

	 	 
	VP, Global Human Resources
	 	 






Agreed and Acknowledged:



	 	 	 	 	 
	/s/Michael O’Neill
 

Michael O’Neill

	 	October 28, 2008
 

Dated
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 9, 2023

No. 04

- 22

- 00577

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF L.M.W., A CHILD

From the 73rd Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2021PA01534

Honorable Kimberly Burley , Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

All previous requests for extensions of time to file briefs requested by appellants J.C. and

I.W. are GRANTED. The appellant briefs for J.C. and I.W. have been filed.

It is so ORDERED on January 9, 2023.

PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO:

________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, CLERK OF COURT
Order entered August 2, 2017

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-01359-CR

MAC A. DEGRAFFINRIED, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 86th Judicial District Court

Kaufman County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 15050738-86-F

ORDER

Appellant’s brief was initially due May 5, 2017. We granted two motions to extend time;

after granting the second motion, we cautioned appellant that the failure to file his brief by July 

17 would result in the appeal being abated for a hearing under rule 38.8. See TEX. R. APP. P.

38.8(b)(2). To date, no brief has been filed and appellant has had no communication with the 

Court.

Therefore, the Court ORDERS the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine why 

appellant’s brief has not been filed. In this regard, the trial court shall make appropriate findings 

and recommendations and determine whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal, whether 

appellant is indigent, or if not indigent, whether retained counsel has abandoned the appeal. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b). If the trial court cannot obtain appellant’s presence at the hearing, the 
trial court shall conduct the hearing in appellant’s absence. See Meza v. State, 742 S.W.2d 708 

(Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (per curiam). If appellant is indigent, the trial court is 

ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation, which 

may include appointment of new counsel.

We ORDER the trial court to transmit a record of the proceedings, which shall include 

written findings and recommendations, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this 

order.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order to the Honorable Blair Casey, 

Presiding Judge, 86th Judicial District Court; John Daniel Oliphant, Jr., and the Kaufman County 

District Attorney Erleigh Wiley.

This appeal is ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with the above order. The 

appeal shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the findings are 

received, whichever is earlier.

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
#### SUTHERLAND et ux. v. DALLAS JOINT STOCK LAND BANK et al.

No. 6696.

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 19, 1934.

Lloyd & Bloyd, of Alice, for plaintiffs in error.

Renfro, Ledbetter & McCombs, of Dallas, for defendants in error.

SMEDLEY, Commissioner.

Plaintiffs in error by their petition seek injunction to restrain defendants in error from selling several tracts of land at trustee’s sale under deeds of trust securing notes. Relief is sought as to all of the land under the terms of chapter 102, Acts of the Regular Session of the 43d Legislature, which act became effective May 1, 1933 (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 2218b), and is referred to as the Moratorium Act of 1933. As to 200 acres of the land, injunction is sought on the additional ground -that such land was homestead at the time the deed of trust was executed.

The trial court, after hearing the evidence, entered its order restraining defendants in error from selling the land under the deeds of trust for a period of 170 days from the date of the order, subject to further orders of said court, and also restraining defendants; in error from selling the 200 acres alleged to be homestead until the further orders of said court.

On appeal from this order toy defendants in error, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and dissolved the injunction, holding that the Moratorium Act was invalid. 04 S.W.(2d) 1117. The case is here through the granting of application for writ of error. There is no statement of facts. Defendants in error filed no assignment of error in the Court of Civil Appeals complaining of that part of the order of the trial court which enjoined the sale of the-200 acres alleged to be homestead, but merely made the statement in their brief that the 200 acres were not offered for sale at the-trustee’s sale sought to be enjoined.

The Moratorium Act of-1933 (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 2218b) is by its terms effective in no event beyond May 1, 1934. In accordance with the action of the Supreme Court in Plainview Building & Loan Association v. Mrs. Lillian Robbins and nine similar causes dismissed as moot on May 16, 1934, 73. S.W.(2d) 92, because the Moratorium Act was no longer operative (the views of Chief Justice Cureton concurring in the dismissal of such causes being expressed in a memorandum filed on the same day), this cause should be dismissed except that part of it in which injunction is sought to restrain the sale of the 200 acres of land alleged to be-homestead.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is set aside and judgment is here rendered dismissing the cause and dissolving the injunction as to all of the land except the 200 acres alleged by plaintiffs in error to be homestead and affirming the order of the trial court in so far as it restrains, and prohibits the sale of said 200 acres until the further orders of that court. Costs in the Supreme Court and in the Court of Civil Appeals and costs which have accrued in the trial court are taxed against plaintiffs in error.

Opinion adopted by the Supreme Court, June 19, 1934.
Belles' proposed language. See Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 

P.3d 582, 585 (2005). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

Ac, sAin , C.J. 

Saitta 

J. 

cc: Ninth Judicial District Court Dept. 2 

Derrick M. Lopez 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Douglas County District Attorney/Minden 

Douglas County Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A
| ** ** | **/**s**/**Kristen Wagner                                                                                                                                                                                                            |   |
|------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|       | (Signature of a director, president or other officer – if directors or officers have not been selected, by an incorporator - if in the hands of the receiver, trustee, or other court appointed fiduciary, by that fiduciary.) |   |
|       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |   |
|       | Kristen Wagner                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |   |
|       | (Typed or printed name of person signing)                                                                                                                                                                                            |   |
|       |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |   |
|       | Assistant Secretary                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |   |
|       | (Title of person signing)                                                                                                                                                                                                            |   |

----
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15** 

**- 1085** 

EWART ULRIC VANDECRUIZE, a/k/a Ewart Vandercruize

,

Petitioner

,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

,

Respondent

.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted : June 30, 2015 Decided: July 8, 2015

Before MOTZ

, KING , and AGEE , Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by un published per curiam opinion

.

Luis C. Diaz, LAW OFFICES OF JAY S. MARKS, LLC, Silver Spring, Maryland , for Petitioner. Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Derek C. Julius, Senior Litigation Counsel, Benjamin Mark Moss , Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Responde nt.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Ewart Ulric Vandecruize , a native a nd citizen of Guyana

,

petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigrati on

Appeals (“Board”) denying his motion to reopen . We ha ve

reviewed the administrative record and Vandecruize’s claims and

find no abuse of discretion

. See INS v. Doherty , 502 U.S. 314,

323

- 24 (1992) (setting forth standard of review). Accordingly,

we deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the

Board. See In re: Vandecruize (B.I.A. Dec. 22, 2014 ). We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately prese nted in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-26-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-24-2000
<CASH>                                           4,109
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  169,379
<ALLOWANCES>                                    13,073
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               178,545
<PP&E>                                          48,026
<DEPRECIATION>                                  17,718
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 290,636
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         4,725
<OTHER-SE>                                     185,918
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   290,636
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               293,622
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  218,259
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                97,156
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,637
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (24,219)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (9,282)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (14,937)
<DISCONTINUED>                                  13,578
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,359)
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .02
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .02


</TABLE>
#### MAHLER et al. v. J. R. WATKINS CO.

No. 12439.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.

Sept. 24, 1938.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 22, 1938.

*460James Spiller, of Panhandle, for appellants.

Crane & Crane and R. R. Conner, all of Dallas, for appellee.

BOND, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory order, overruling appellants’ pleas of privilege to be sued in the county of their residence. Plaintiff’s petition and evidence shows that the defendant, Vernon G. Belote, resides in Hutchinson County, Texas; appellants, Simms and Mahler, in Carson County, Texas; that the defendant, Vernon G. Belote, is indebted to appellee in the sum of $886.64, and that appellants executed a written agreement involving them, jointly and severally, as sureties or guarantors of Belote’s said indebtedness. Belote was a formal party to the suit, but, at the time of the hearing of appellants’ pleas of privilege, had not been served with citation, nor had he otherwise made his personal, appearance before the court.

The question of venue as to Belote was not an issue on the hearing of appellants’ pleas of privilege, and the appellants, Simms and Mahler, having been sued as sureties or warrantors of Belote, it is not believed that plaintiff was required to show that it had venue as to Belote to effect venue as to his sureties. The question of venue is a personal privilege, which may be waived by the party in whose favor a plea of privilege is available. So, we think venue of the suit as to Belote was not material on the issue of appellants’ pleas of privilege. If venue was laid in Dallas County as to the sureties, obviously the principal obligor was a necessary and proper party to the suit, therefore, plaintiff was only required to show that the principal Belote was indebted to the plaintiff, for which the sureties had obligated them-selv.es in writing to pay in Dallas County, Texas, to establish venue as to the sureties.

The pertinent language of the surety agreement here involved was before the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals, in the case of J. R. Watkins Co. v. Webb et al., 97 S.W.2d 284, copied therein in haec verba, in which that court held the venue of the suit was. properly laid in Dallas County. We are in accord with the holding. The written agreement to pay the debt of Belote at Winona or Dallas imposes upon the sureties an obligation performable by them in Dallas, at the option of the plaintiff. The optional place of payment meets the requirement of article 1995, subd. 5, R.S.1925, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 1995, subd. 5. Pavlidis et al. v. Bishop & Babcock Sales Co., Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 294.

We have carefully considered appellants’ several assignments and find no reversible error; the judgment of the court below is affirmed.

Affirmed.
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS**

 

The Board of Directors 

ICOS Corporation: 

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (Nos. 333-63790 and 333-108641) on Form S-3 and (Nos. 33-48401, 33-80680, 33-64762, 333-08485,333-78315, 333-72564 and 333-98071) on Form S-8 of ICOS Corporation of our report dated January 23, 2004, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of ICOS Corporation and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2003 and 2002, and the relatedconsolidated statements of operations, stockholders’ equity and comprehensive loss, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2003, which report appears in the December 31, 2003 annual report on Form 10-Kof ICOS Corporation. 

 

/s/ KPMG LLP 

 

Seattle, Washington 

March 12, 2004
EXHIBIT 32.2
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 Company Report
 1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 By:
    /S/ STEVEN L. KELLERName:
    Steven L. KellerTitle:
    Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:
    August 9, 2010