U.S. Department of Transportation FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION



# REGULATORY EVALUATION

Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations, Part 91 Helicopter Operations, and Part 135 Aircraft Operations; Safety Initiatives and Miscellaneou s Amendments

FINAL RULE (14 CFR PART S 91 , 120 , AND 13 5 ) Jose Castedo Office of Aviation Policy and Plans Operations Regulatory Analysis Branch, APO

- 310 January 31 , 201 4TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page No. Executive Summary

................................ ................................ ................................ . i
I. Benefits

................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 1 A. O verview

................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 1 B. Accident Assessment

................................ ................................ ......................... 1 C. B enefit Model and Assumptions

................................ ................................ ....... 3 D. Accident Prevention Probability

................................ ................................ ....... 5 E. FAA Effectiveness and 2006 NTSB Helicopter Study

................................ ..... 6 F . Aircraft Replacement Value

................................ ................................ .............. 7 G . Results

................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 7
II

. Costs

................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 1 1 A. Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations

................................ ........................... 1 4 A.1. a. Applicability and Definitions ( §§ 135. 1, 135. 601)

............................. 1 4 A.1

. b. Operations Control Center ( § 135.619 )

................................ .............. 1 7 A

. 1.c

. Operational Requirements (§§ 135. 609

- 135.615 )

............................... 2 3 A. 1.d

. Pre

- flight Risk Analysis ( § 135.617 )

................................ .................. 2 8 A. 1.e

. Safety Briefing or Medical Personnel Training ( § 135.621 )

............... 29 A.2.a

. Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems ( § 135.605 )

..... 3 4 A.2.b

. Flight Data Monitoring System ( § 135.607 )

................................ ....... 3 5 A.3.a

. Instrument Rating ( § 135.603 )

................................ ............................ 3 7 B. Commercial Helicopter (Including Air Ambulance) Operations

.................... 3 9 B .1. a. IFR Alternate Weather ( § 135.221 )

................................ ..................... 3 9 B .2

. a. Radio Altimeter ( § 135.160 )

................................ ................................ 3 9 B .2 .b

. Ov er water Equipment Requirements (§§ 135.117, 135.168)

.............. 4 2 B .3. Competency in Instrument Meteorological Conditions ( § 135.293 )

...... 4 6 C.1. VFR Class G Airspac e Helicopter Weather Minimums ( § 91.155 )

....... 4 7 C.2 . Load Manifest ( § 135.63 )

................................ ................................ ....... 51
III. Comparison of Benefits and Costs and Sensitivity Analysis of Benefits

............. 5 2
IV. Comments

................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 61
V

. Appendix 1

– Accident History

................................ ................................ ............ 7 6
V I

. Appendix 2

– Fuel Prices

................................ ................................ ...................... 80
V I I

. Appendix 3

– Costs of the NPRM and Final Rule over 10 years

......................... 81
VIII. Appendix 4

– Results from two separate effectiveness measures analyses

.......... 8 2i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

To address an increase in fatal helicopter air ambulance accidents, the FAA will implement new operational procedures and additional equipment requirements for helicopter a ir ambulances. This final rule also revis es requirements for equipment, pilot training, and alternate airports for commercial helicopter operations, and i t increases weather minimums for helicopters operating under part 91

.

The estimat ed mean benefit val ue for the rule w ill be about $ 821 m illion or $ 577 million , in present value at 7% , over 10 years. The FAA estimates the cost of this rule w ill be approximately $ 3 11 million or $ 2 4 3 million, in present value at 7% , over 10 years.1 I

. Benefits
A. Overv iew
Benefits will accrue from the implementation of new operational procedures and additional equipment requirem ents for helicopter air ambulances. This final rule also increases safety for commercial helicopter operations by revising requirements for
equ ipment, pilot t raining, and alternate airports and i t increases weather minimums f or helicopters operating under part 91.

The FAA identified 1 31 accidents which could have been prevented by this rule. Of
these accidents 62 were air ambulance, 2 0 were c ommercial, and 49 were basic VFR
weather minimums accidents . These accidents resulted in nearly 2 27 fatalities from 1991
to 2010. The estimated me an ben efit value for preventing such future accidents w ill be $ 82 1 m illion or $ 577 million present value at 7% over 10 years
.

B . Accident Assessment FAA’s Flight Standards Service (AFS

- 250) reviewed each of the accidents and linked
them to the provisions of the rule that were developed to address each of these accident s, as shown in the a ppendix 1

. To m inimize the subjectivity of the accident review, FAA’s Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention (AVP

- 210) assessed the probability that
the rule w ould be effective for each of the aforementioned accidents using the applicable portions of the Commerc ial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and Joint Implementation
Measureme nt and Data Analysis Team (JIMDAT) methodology. CAST was developed by a U.S. government

- aviation industry partnership . They developed an integrated, data

-2 driven strategy designed to reduce the commercial aviation fatality rate in the United
St ates. The CAST process is straightforward: analyze causes of past accidents, identify areas where changes may have prevented them, implement promising safety enhancements, measure results, and repeat the process.

E ach safety enhancement in the rule was evaluated against each undesired condition to
determine the probability that the enhancement would eliminat e or mitigate these
conditions if the enhancement had been in place at the time of the accid ent . The resulting score represents the fatality risk reduct ion of a single safety enhancement acting on its

own.

Of the 131 accidents identified by the FAA , 89 involved one or more fatalities (about
6 8 %) and 42 had no fatalities (about 32 %)

. These acci dents resulted in a total of 2 27
fatalities , 48 serious injuries , and 60 minor injuries

. In addition to the injuries and fatalities, there was also substantial damage to the aircraft or complete hull loss as a result
of these accidents. More specifically , 92 aircraft were destroyed, and 39 aircraft were substantially damaged. Table 1 provides more details.3 Also, A ppendix 1 provides the accident date, location, number of casualties , casualty

cost s, the rule provisions associated with the accident, and r ule effectiveness 1 fo r each of
these accidents

.

C

. Benefit Mo del and Assumptions We developed a model to estimate the benefits of the final rule. The relationships of the model may be summarized as follows:
Benefits = [( Accidents × Aircraft) + ( Accidents × Medical & Legal ) + (Fatalities × VSL fatalities ) + (Serious injuries × VSL serious injuries ) + (Minor injuries × VSL minor injuries ) ] × Effectiveness
where:
Accidents = average num ber of accidents per year (1991

- 2010) ; Fatalities = average number of fatalities per year ; Serious injuries = average number of serious injuries per year ; Minor injuries = average number of minor injuries per year ; Medical & Legal = average medical and legal cost per accident ; Aircraft = avera ge aircraft damage cost per accident ; VSL = value of a statistical life;
E ffectiveness = accident prevention probability

. This model was used for fatal and nonfatal accidents. In the benefit model, we assumed
that:

• The rule would take effect in 201 3

.

1 The effectiveness measure assesses how effective the rule might have been in averting the accident at the time of the accident.4 • All monetary v alues were expressed in constant 20 1 3 dol lars.

• T he value of a statistical life (VSL) i s $ 9

. 1 million. 2

• VSL in future years were estimated to grow by 1.07 percent per year before discounting to present value.

• The value of medical and legal costs associat ed with fatal injuries was estimated at about $2 74 ,000. 3

• The value of a serious injury was $ 955 , 5 00

. 4

• The value of medical and legal costs associated with serious injuries was estimated at about $9 6 ,000. 5

• The value of a minor injury was $ 27 , 3 00

. 6

• Th e value of medical and legal costs associated with minor injuries was estimated at about $5,000

. 7

• Under the rule , air ambulance and commercial operators w ill have either zero , three, four, or five years from the effective date of the final rule to comply with the majority of their equipment requirements. To account for the compliance period, we adjusted our benefit estimate accordingly. As an example , for the HTAWS provision (§ 135.605) which requires compliance in 3 years , we assumed that 1/3 of the ben efits w ill be realized in 201 3 because we estimate that
33% of the affected entities w ill be in compliance during 201 3

. Likewise , we

2 Office of t he Secretary of Transportation Memorandum, "Treatment of Value of a Statistical Life in Departmental Analysis

– 2011 Interim Adjustment”, July 2011. 3 APO Bulletin APO

- 2

- 1, “Treatment of Value of Life and Injury in Economic Analyses”, February 2002, updated in 2010 and included in Appendix 4.

4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.5 assumed another 1 /3 of the affected entities w ill come into compliance in 201 4 , and all entities will be in full complianc e in 201 5

. We applied similar methodology for the following rule provisions which also have delayed compliance dates: radio altimeters (§ 135.160 ); emergency equipment for rotorcraft operations (§ 135.168); pilot

- in

- command instrument qualifications (§
13 5.603); flight data monitoring system (§ 135.607); and operations control centers (§ 135.619).

D. Accident Prevention Probability FAA’s initial analysis of how effective each provision of the rule would be in preventing future accidents resulted in unusu ally high estimates. To address co mments that these estimates may have been too high, FAA conducted a second analysis in which a second group of analysts separately reviewed the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) factual and probable cause report s on air ambulance, commercial and VFR weather minimums accidents to determine which final rule provisions would have been applicable. The second analysis used more conservative criteria , which result ed in lower
effectiveness scores for several accidents

. This final rule addresses well over 100 helicopter accidents . Although these accidents have few fatalities per accident , t he large number of preventable accidents dwarf the substantial reductions in the measures of the probability of effectiveness which were made for about a third of the accidents

. Changes in the effectiveness ratings reduced the estimated benefits from $725 million to $577 million, in present value at 7% over 10 years. Despite these changes the benefits of the6 rule still exceed costs and only one provision

— HTAWS

-- had its benefits fall below its

costs. For a full discussion of the results from the two separate analyses , see Appendix 4.

In both analyses , t he FAA assessed whether the rule would have had a high, medium, or
low likelih ood that the rule would be effective in preventing the accident. We then assigned the followi ng effectiveness numbers :

 Low effectiveness (0

- 33%)

.  Medium effectiveness (34

- 67%).  High effectiveness (68

- 100%).

Once the values were assigned, we calculated the weighted probability ave rage for every provision , as well as for each accident type (fatal or nonfatal)

. See section G for the
results.

E. FAA Effectiveness and 2006 N TSB Helicopter S t udy In 2006 the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) publ ished a study on emergency medical services accidents 8

. The study detailed 7 accidents, 5 of which involved helicopter emergency medical services. These 5 accidents, along with 13
others that had similar probable causes as those reported in the NTSB st udy , represent
45% of the preventable air ambulance accidents used in the benefits analysis for this rule.

8 Special Investigation Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations (Jan. 25, 2006), found at http://www.ntsb.go v/safety/safetystudies/sir0601.html (December, 10, 2013)7 In fact , 64 % of all the fatal air ambulance accidents between 2002 and 2010 were similar to those cited in the study.
F . Aircraft Replacement Va lue
W e valued destroyed aircraft at an average replacement cost of aircraft po tentially affected by this rule and we valued aircraft with substantial damage at an average restoration cost of aircraft potentially affected by this rule (which we estimated at about
15 % of the replacement cost). 9 After that, we calculated the average aircraft damage

cost per fatal or nonfatal accident by weighing the replacement and restoration costs by the number of destroyed aircraft and by the number of aircraft with subs tantial damage (See table 2 ).

G . Results The results are displayed in the next few table s , which are classified by rule provision.
Air Ambulance Benefits

9 Table 5.10 from the “Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions, A Guide”.89 Commercial Benefits10 VFR Class G Airspace Helicopter Weather Minimums Benefits

To tal Benefits11 II. Costs
From 2012 to 2021 , the cost of the final rule w ill be approximately $ 3 11 million ($ 2 4 3 million, present value) as shown in Table 7

.1213 General Cost Assumptions

• Monetary values are expressed in 20 1 3 dollars, unless noted otherwise

.

• Discount rate applied is 7 % as directed by the Office of Management and Budget.

• Using the FAA Aerospace Forecasts , for fiscal years 2011

- 2031 , the FAA estimated that the helicopter fleet would grow at 2.8 % per year. 10

• We use the following costs per hour as the burdened wage rates fo r this evaluation.

The societal costs include the overhead costs that are allocated to labor as well as the direct cost. Once the wage rates are established, to assess the incremental cost to society, we add Bureau of Labo r Statistics fringe benefits and overhead to calculate the actual employer c osts of employe e compensation. 11

10 Table 27, FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal Years 2011

- 2031. 11 http://www.bls.gov/bls/blswage.htm

.14 A. Helicopter Air Ambulance Operations
A

. 1

. a. Applicability and Definitions (§ § 135.1, 135.601)
The final rule will require that all helicopter air ambulance operations with medical personnel on board be conducted under part 135 thus eliminating the part 91 portions of the operation

. This change will result in: (1) a medical personnel briefing in addition to the normal briefing for passengers; (2 ) flight and duty time requirements applying to

more flight segments ; and (3) the increased possibility of flight cancellations or delays due to weather. As discussed below, although the FAA does not have specific cost data, we anticipate a minimal econom ic impact on the regulated community.

1. T he costs for briefing medical personnel are accounted for in section A.1.e. Safety Briefing or Medical Personnel Training.

2. Some flight time now accrued under part 91 would count toward flight and duty time
limitations. Generally flight time spent repositioning helicopters under part 91 does not count against a pilot’s daily flight time limitation. Moving flight segments from part 91 to part 135 will mean that additional flight time must be counted against the pilot’s maximum daily flight time. Although we do not have specific data on what this impact would be, we believe that the cost of this transition will be minimal for the following

reasons.

First, under current rules some part 91 flight time counts t oward the pilot’s daily flight time limitation. If a part 91 flight precedes a part 135 flight , the part 91 segment counts15 towards flight time. A part 91 flight that does not precede a part 135 flight would count as “other commercial flying” which does n ot count against daily limits, but must be factored into quarterly and yearly flight time limitations. Therefore, in the example of a
three

- segment operation consisting of a part 135 flight operated between two part 91 flight segments , the first part 91 f light is already being counted towards flight time , as is the part 135 flight. However, t he final part 91 flight does not count against the daily limits, but cannot take place during a pilot’s required rest period and needs to be factored into the pilot’ s quarterly and yearly limitations.

We note that duty time would not be affected because all flights assigned by a certificate holder currently count as duty time. This would not change under the new rule.

We also do not anticipate that pilots will ha ve difficulty with staying within flight time limitations because helicopter air ambulance flights are generally short, as explained above. The part 135 flight and duty regulations already allow for flight time to be exceeded when a flight is extended bey ond its scheduled time due to situations beyond the control of the operator.

Second, h elicopter air ambulance operators currently follow flight and duty rules and have pilot scheduling policies and systems set up to prevent exceeding flight time and duty period limitations. This is an operational issue they are familiar with and they would not need to implement new procedures for following these rules. Although, some operators may need to adjust pilot schedules, we anticipate that any minor modification s16 to these systems and policies that are needed can be made during the 60 days allotted for implementation following publication of the rule.

Although we anticipate that this rule’s impact on flight time limitations would be minimal, w e estimated that e ach certificate holder employs 3.1 pilots for each helicopter in its air ambulance operation and that each helicopter is staffed 24/7. Therefore, because we anticipate that the costs associated with the change from part 91 to part 135 with respect to flig ht time limitations would be minimal this conservative staffing model would adequately cover any costs incurred.

The risk to patients and medical personnel presented by a fatigued pilot justifies the anticipated limited circumstances that a flight would need to be delayed or cancelled. This rule gives protection to the medical personnel as well as to the pilots by taking care that the pilots are rested.

3. This rule assigns weather minimums for helicopter air ambulance flights with medical personnel on board which are more stringent than what is currently required for part 91 legs. Some flights may be cancelled or delayed. We d o not have specific data on how many helicopter air a mbulance flights will be cancelled or delayed due to the new rule’s
inc reased weather minimums for Visual Flight Rules (VFR) operations, however we anticipate the impac t will be minimal.17 It is possible that the first segment of each operation could be delayed or cancelled, which
could result in delay or cancel lation the foll ow
- on segments . We do not collect data on whether an operator cancels or delays a flight. However, because operators have tools to mitigate a situation where a cancellation or delay may occur, we do not believe this rule would lead to large amounts of de lay in or cancellation of patient transport. For example, the operation could be conducted under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), and then the VFR weather minimums would not apply. Certain transports, such as an inter

- facility transport , may be able to be rescheduled for later in the day if weather is indicated to be improving.

As an alternative to helicopter air ambulances, ground ambulances are often a viable means of patient transport even in circumstances where a helicopter is requested. In
circumstan ces where patient transport cannot be conducted via helicopter the patient may have other means of medical transport available.

A.1.b. Operations Control Center (§135.619)
This rule will require companies with 10 or more helicopter air ambulances to establish

o perations c ontrol c enter s ( OCCs ) to provide pilots with weather information, monitor flights , and help assess preflight risks to provide additional safety for complex operations. Operations Control Specialists (OCSs) must be trained by the cert ificate holder.18 Air ambulance operators with 10 or more helicopters that do not have an OCC 12

• Of the 15 air ambulance operators with 10 or more helicopters, 10 of them do not have an OCC yet.

• Based on FAA expertise, we estimated that operators with 1 0 or more helicopter
would create one OCS position for every 10 helicopters. We received no comments on this relationship and therefore continue to use this value.

• Currently there are 21 9 helicopters in use by these operators . Dividing the 21 9 helicopte rs by 10 helicopters per OCS position equals 2 2 OCS positions.

• To fill the 2 2 OCS positions which are functioning 24 hours a day, 10 hours per shift
and 7 da ys on/7 days off, a total of 11 9 OCSs will be needed in the first year (2 2 OCS positions x 2.4 sh ifts/day x 2 OCSs to provide 52 weeks coverage x 1,820 annual working hours/1,610 annual available working hours).

• Based on FAA forecasts, the helicopter fleet is expected to grow at 2.8% per year.

• The 11 9 OCSs must have 80 hours of initial training and pass a 2 hour practical

exam. 13 A total of 1 2 chief pilots will admini ster the training and exams (11 9 OCSs / 10 OCSs per chief pil ot = 1 2 chief pilots). The 11 9 OCSs would also need to take 40 hours of recurrent training and pass a 1 hour examination.

• 9. 9 hours (11 9 OCS x 5/60 hours) per year would be needed for a clerical person to maintain records of the training and examinations.

12 Air a mbulance operators with 10 or more helicopters that do not have an OCC = 10 operators; 21 9 helicopters (20%). Air ambulance operators with 10 or more helicopters that already have an OCC = 5 operators; 6 77 helicopters (63%). Air ambulance operators with fewer than 10 helicopters = 58 operators; 17 9 helicopters (17%). Helicopter data from FAA, Vital Information Subsystem (VIS) database. 13 Source: FAA (unless otherwise noted, the FAA is the source for all estimates of hours of training, testing, and reco rd maintenance).19 • In the first year, 60 new p ermanent OCSs will be hired (11 9 OCSs x 50% will be new). We estimate that 50% of employees who are already performing duties similar to an OCS will be assigned to the OCC. 14 This estimate was based on FAA expertise and we received no comments on it. Therefore, we have not changed the NPRM
estimate.

• 2 2 new computers and televisions will be needed per OCS position (21 is the same as the number of OCS p ositions).

• We assume all OCSs already have workstations. This is based on the assumptions that OCCs will be housed in existing space and the certificate holder will not need to buy new furnishings ot her than what we s tated here.

• The FAA determined 60 hours for a chief pilot and 30 hours for a clerk would be required to develop the OCS training (10 operators). 15

• We determined on a yearly basis 5% of the OCSs would be tested at random for drug
and alcoho l for 30 minutes at a cost of $ 65 per test. 16 Calc ulation in the first year = (11 9 OCSs x 5% x 0.5 hours x $41.55) + (11 9 OCSs x 5% x $65 per test) = $ 512

.

Using the preceding information, the FAA estimates the cost of this provision to air ambulance oper ators that do not have an OCC at about $ 6 8 million or $ 51 million pr esent
value at 7% , as shown in Table s 9

- 11

.

14 Source: FAA (unless otherwise noted, the FAA is the source for all percent estimates related to affected populations).

15 Source: FAA. 16 Source: FAA.202122 Operators with 10 or more helicopters that already have an OCC

• Of the 15 air ambulance operators with 10 or more helicopters, 5 of them already have an OCC. FAA data shows that that these 5 operators have a total of 6 77 helicopters.

• We calculated that 6 8 OCS positions will be needed in the first year (6 77 helicopters / 10 helicopters per OCS position = 6 8 OCS positions). We assume certificate holders will create one position for every 10 helicopters operated.

• Using the same procedures as above 3 69 OCSs are required based on 6 8 OCS positions.

• The 3 69 OCSs must have 40 hours of initial training and pass a 2 hour practical exam. A

to tal of 3 7 chief pilots will admini ster the training and exams (3 69 OCSs / 10 OCSs per chief pil ot = 3 7 chief pilots). There is no change in the number of required chief pilots as a function of the reduced training requirement because chief pilots are requ ired for other purposes. The 3 69 OCSs would also need to take 40 hours of recurrent training and pass
a 1 hour examination.

• 3 1 hours (3 69 OCS x 5/60 hours) per year would be needed for a clerical person to maintain records of the training and examination s.

• The FAA determined 60 hours for a chief pilot and 30 hours for a cler k would be required to develop the OCS training (3 operators).

• We determined 1 hour for a chief pilot and 30 minutes for a clerk to make small amendments to their existing manuals (2 o perators)

.

• The FAA estimates on a yearly basis 5% of the OCSs would be tested at random for drug
and alcohol for 30 minutes at a cost of $ 65 per test. Calc ulation in the first year = (3 69
OCSs x 5% x 0.5 hours x $41.55) + (3 69 OC Ss x 5% x $65 per test) = $1,5 87

.23 The FAA estimates the cost of this provision to air ambulance operators that already have an OCC at about $ 9 million or $ 7 million present value, as sh own in Table 12

.

Altho ugh we received very few economic comments on this provision, we adjus ted our NPRM results in the following three ways:
1. Because a few commenters pointed out that a 10

- hour work day for an OCS will add an additional full time employee to the OCC, we reassessed at our adjustment
factor . W e decided to increase the adjustment factor from 3.2 (in the NPRM) to
5.4.
2. We understood from the comments that this provision will affect fewer air ambulance operators than we had estimated in the NPRM because there are operators t hat already have an OCC at this time.
3. We failed to captu re a growth rate for the helicopter fleet in the NPRM, but we are estimating a 2.8% growth in this final rule.

A.1.c. Operational Requirements24 VFR Weather (§135.60 9 ) This provision w ill require helicopter air ambulance operations to comply with more

st ringent VFR weather minimums in uncontrolled airspace than those currently established in part 135. This requirement increases the safety margin and has a minimal cost impact because it utilizes existing infrastructure and implements requirements of Opera tions Specification A021 that are currently being used

. We received no comments regarding this cost estimate. Therefore, we have not changed the NPRM cost estimate.

Local Flying Area Additionally, we estimate that 50% of the air ambulance operators will designate local flying areas. A chief pilot would spend 2 hours mapping and describing it for the local
FAA office. The FAA estimates the cost to designate local flying areas at about $ 7.5 thousand or $7 .5 thousand present value, as shown in Table 1 3

.25 IFR O perations w ithout W eather R eporting (§135.611 )
The FAA will allow helicopter air ambulance operators to conduct IFR operations in certain circumstances at airports or heliports without a weather reporting facility. Currently, the regulations permi t only IFR operations into and out of airports with an on

site weather reporting source. This requirement will increase the use of IFR flight by helicopter air ambulance operators which will result in more aircraft operating in a positively controlled env ironment and within the existing infrastructure resulting in unquantified net benefit gains. Commenters noted that the rule as proposed, which did not allow for use of area forecasts, could have the effect of requiring operators to add approved automated weather stations near to locations from which they operate or operate VFR. The FAA notes that the final rule was amended to permit use of area26 forecasts for IFR operations at airports and heliports without weather reporting. Therefore, these final resu lts are unchanged from the NPRM results.

IFR /VFR Transitions (§135.6 13 )
The FAA will allow a helicopter air ambulance pilot to fly IFR to a point in space (PinS) within 3 nautical miles of the flight’s destination, at which the pilot w ill be able to

cont inue an approach to a heliport or landing area under VFR conditions, weather permitting.

The requirement w ill benefit pilots by enabling them to access more destinations by flying within the IFR structure, and then continuing VFR along approaches that h ave been flight checked for obstacles by the FAA. In the initial regulatory evaluation the FAA estimated that this provision would generate minimal additional costs . We received no comments regarding these results. Therefore, these final results are unc hanged from
the NPRM results.

VFR F light P lanning (§135.615 ) This provision is intended to prevent obstacle collisions by requiring pilots to be aware of the terrain and highest obstacles along a planned route. The FAA will require helicopter
air ambul ance pilots to perform preflight planning to determine the minimum safe altitude along the planned en route phase of flight when conducting VFR operations.
Pilots w ill be required to evaluate, document, and plan to clear terrain and obstacles along27 the pl anned route of flight by no less than 300 feet for day operations, or 500 feet for night operations.

Although we received no comments regarding this cost estimate, we increased the helicopter pilot wage from $48 to $75 because the previous estimate was based on a typical 40

- hour week as opposed to the actual working hours of a helicopter pilot (1,800 annual working hours). Also, because we failed to capture a growth rate for the helicopter fleet in the NPRM, we are estimating a 2.8 % growth in this fina l rule.

P ilots will have to look at a sectional chart , plan their course, and determine specific
altitudes which c ould be completed in conjunction with the risk assessment. The flight planning w ill be required prior to take

- off for all helicopter air amb ulance operators and
is estimated to take an additional 5 minutes. With an hourly pilot cost of $ 75 , the cost for 5 minutes of planning would be an additional $ 6

. 25 per operation. To calculate the 201 3

cost of $ 2. 5 million , we multiply the estimated addi tional cost ($ 6

. 25 ) by the number of affected air ambulance helicopters ( 1,0 73 ) and then by the estimated operations per year per aircraft ( 367). Additionally, we estimate operators will need change flight plan s on 5% of flights , which will take an additi onal 5 minutes per flight

. As summarized in T able
1 4 , when summed over the period of analysis, the total cost of the flight planning28 requirement is $ 2 9 million or $ 2 2 million present value.

A.1.d

. Pre

- flight Risk Analysis (§135.617)
This final rule w ill require operators to implement an FAA

- approved pre

- flight risk analysis program resulting in two cost categories. First, the operator w ill develop a risk

analysis program, and then the operator w ill implement and perform a risk analysis
before each fl ight in order to mitigate the risks.

We estimate that it w ill take a chief pilot and a clerk 30 hours each to design and implement an approved pre

- flight risk analysis program. 17 With a burdened hourly labor rate of $ 79 for the chief pilot and $25 for the clerk , the estimated cost per operator is $ 3 ,1 20 . When we multiply this cost per operator by the number of operators (73), the total industry cost is about $ 22 8 ,000 ($ 2 28 , 000 present value). An FAA inspector from
the FAA dis trict office will review the pre
- flight risk analysis program.

17 Source: FAA.29 In evaluating the minimum proposed requirements for a pre

- flight risk analysis program,
we estimate there w ill be roughly 3 9 3 , 791 affected flights 18 in the first year and that the accompanying risk analysis would take an a dditional 10 minutes per flight. 19 This equates to 6 5 , 632 hours i n the first year . When multiplied by the hourly cost of a pilot ($ 75 ), the first year cost is $ 4

. 9 million and the 10

- year cost is $5 5

. 8 million.

For the period of analysis, the total cost of this provision is about $ 5 6 million ($ 42 million present value).

Although we received no comments regarding this cost estimate, in this final rule , we increased the helic opter pilot wage and included a gro wth rate for the helicopter fleet.

A.1.e. Safety Briefing or Medical Personnel Training (§135.621)
This final rule w ill require that prior to each helicopter air ambulance operation, each pilot in command, or other flight crewmember designated by the certificate holder, must

18 1,073 helicopters x 367 operations per year per helicopter = 393,791 f lights. Source for operations per year per helicopter: FAA Flight Standards. 19 Depending upon the level or risk, the 10 minutes might be divided between pilot, director of operations or the OCS. We received no comment on this 10

- minute estimate, so we di d not change it.30 ensure that all medica l personnel receive a safety briefing. 20 As an alternative to the safety briefing, certificate holders will be permitted to provide training every 2 years to medical personnel through an FAA

- approved training program.

The safety briefing , which would af fect 50% of the operations, is estimated to tak e an additional 3 minutes. With an hourly pilot cost of $75 , the cost for 3 minutes to brief medical personnel will be an additional $ 3

. 7 5 per operation. To calculate the 201 3 cost of $ 7 3 8 thousand , we multi ply the estimated additional cost ($ 3

. 7 5) by the number of affected air ambulance helicopters (1,0 73 ) , by the estimated operations per year per aircraft ( 367) , and then by 50% . As summarized in T able 1 6 , when summed over the period of analysis, the total cost of the flight planning requirement is $ 8 million or $ 6

20 the maximum total pre

- flight time added by this rule is 18 minutes

— 5 minutes for VFR flight planning,+ 10 minutes for pre

- flight risk analysis + 3 minutes for safety briefing + some carriers will take another 5 minutes to change their flight plan.31 million present value.

As an alternative to the safety briefing, w e estimate that it will take a chief pilot and a clerk 10 hours each to design and implement an approved medical personnel tr aining. 21 The burdened hourly labor rate for the chief pilot is $7 9 and for the clerk is $25. An FAA inspector from the FAA district office will revi ew the medical personnel training. The total industry cost is estimated to be $4 1 , 464 ($ 41,464 present va lue).

21 Source: FAA.32 To estimate the cost of the training, w e multipl ied the hourly cost of medical personnel by the number of affected employees. We estimate 50% of medical personnel would need
additional trainin g. That product is then multiplied by the hourly estima te (8 hours) that will occur every other year. We assume one instructor will be assigned per group of 20
students. As shown in table 1 8 , when summed over th e period of analysis, the medical personnel training cost is $1 3 million or $ 10 million present va lue.33 Once the training has been performed, the operator will document the training provided to medical personnel employed by the certific a te holder. We estimate a clerk will spend 5 minutes per training record to document the training. 22 The total reco rdkeeping costs

a re estimated to be $6 1 ,0 2 0 or $4 7 , 408 present value.

For the period of analysis, the total cost of this provision i s about $ 2 2 million ($ 1 6 million present value).

22 Source: FAA.34 A

. 2 .a
. Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (HTAWS) ( §135.6 05)
The FAA will require that all helicopter s used in air ambulance operations be equipped
with HTAWS

. The costs of this provision consist of the cost of the device and installation, equipment downtime, and incremental fuel burn.

T he FAA projected the total number of helicopter air ambulances will rise from 1,1 3 3 in
201 5 to 1,3 78 in 202 2

. Of the 1,1 3 3 helicopter air ambulances in 201 5 ( at that time , all helicopter air ambulances will have to come into compliance) , we believe that approximatel y 20 % will be already equipped with H T A W S. T he remaining 80 % w ill incur the cost of this provision. Because c ertificate holders w ill have 3 years from the
effective date of the final rule to comply with this requirement , w e assume that from 201 3 through 201 5 appro ximately 1/3 of the helicopters w ill come into compliance with this requirement on a n annual basis

. W e estimate the unit cost to be equipped with HT A W S at $35,0 00. 23 Additionally, we estimate 2 days of equipment downtime 24 and a revenue loss of about $ 7 , 0 0 0 per helicopter per day.

T he additional fuel consumption per year was estimated by multiplying the amount of weight added (3.9 pounds for HTAWS 25 ) by the incremental fuel burn ( 0.005 gallons per

23 This cost includes installation. Source: NPRM. 24 About 40 hours are needed to install HTAWS. Of those hours only 16 hours represent equipment downtime because the rest of the installation would be done during an interval maintenance inspection. 25 Source: FAA (unless otherwise noted, the FAA is the source for all equipment weights).35 pound 26 ) times the annual utilization in flight hours (550 fl ight hours per year 27 ) times the
FAA foreca sted Jet A Kerosene price per gallon

. 28

Using the preceding information, the FAA estimates that the total cost of thi s provision would be about $ 5 4 million ( $ 4 8 million present value at 7%) as calculated in Table 2 0

.

Although we received no comments regarding this cost estimate, in this final rule, we provided a growth rate for the helicopter fleet.

A.2.b

. Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) System (§135.607)
The FAA will requir e certificate holders conducting heli copter air ambulance operations
to install a FDM system , which comprises a system or combination of systems that record a helicopter’s flight performance data. The costs of this provision consist of the cost of the device and installation, hardware, softw are license fee, equipment downtime, and
incremental fuel burn.

26 “Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory decisions, A Guide,” Oct.3, 2007 by GRA for the FAA, table 6

- 3. 27 Source: FAA

. 28 GA Jet A Kero Price

- Monthly Fuel Price Survey of U.S. fuel suppliers (FBOs nationwide) conducted by Aviation Research Group/US (ARGUS). See Appendix 2 for the forecast of Jet A Kero prices.36 W e projected the total number of helicopters will rise from 1,1 64 in 201 6 to 1,3 77 in
202 2

. Of the 1,1 64 helicopters that will be operating in 201 6 , approximately 15 % will be already equip ped with FDM systems . The remaining 85 % will incur the cost of this provision prior to the 201 7 effective date

. Because cer tificate holders will have 4 years from the effective dat e of the final rule to comply with this requirement, we as sume that
from 2 01 3 through 201 6 approximately 1/4 of the helicopters will come into compliance with this requirement on an annual basis. W e estimate the cost of the device and its
installation at $ 7,000 and $8,000 , respectively

. 29 We estimate two one

- time hardware
and s oftware license fee costs, respectively $2,500 and $750, per operator

. 30 Additionally, we estimate 2 hours of equipment downtime 31 and a revenue loss of about $ 7 , 0 00 per helicopter per day.

The additional fuel consumption per year was estimated by multip lying the amount of weight added ( 1 pound for FDM ) by the incremental fuel burn (0.005 gallons per pound) times the annual utilization in flight hours (550 flight hours per year ) times the FAA
forecasted Jet A Kerosene price per gallon

. 32

T he FAA estimate s that the total cost of th is provision will be about $ 20 million or $ 1 8
million present value , as shown in Table 21

.

29 Source: comments. 30 Ibid. 31 About 8 hours are needed to install an FDM system. Of those hours only 2 hours represent equipment downtime because the rest of the installation would be done during an interval maintenance inspection. Source: FAA. 32 GA Jet A Kero Price

- Monthly Fuel Price Survey of U.S. fuel suppl iers (FBOs nationwide) conducted by Aviation Research Group/US (ARGUS). See Appendix 2 for the forecast of Jet A Kero prices.37 Alth ough the NPRM did not contain proposed rule text, the FAA provided a d etailed discussion of the proposals under considerat ion and asked for comments in anticipation of including an FDM system requirement in the final rule. The FAA received a number
of comments on the cost of the FDM system . This cost estimate takes into account all the comments received (for details on the comments and our responses to those comments
see the comment section and the preamble to the final rule ).

A .3.a

. I nstrument Rating (§135.603)
The FAA will require helicopter air ambulance pilots to hold a helicopter instrument rating. Although pilots w ill have to complete so me cross
- country flight time as well as
actual or simulated instrument time to obtain the instrument rating, the FAA believes that this provision will impact a relatively small number of pilots. While the FAA believes very few pilot s will need to be instrument trained, we provide a very high estimate as the base case by estimating 5 percent of the pilots will need such training. W e received only one comment from a pilot stating that he would need to obtain an instrument rating.
Aft er receiving that comment we contacted three of the largest trade associations representing the helicopter air ambulance industry which reported that industry practice38 has been to hire only instrument rated pilots since at least 2006. Based on that
inform ation we believe that the actual number of pilots affected would be closer to the
2% low

- end estimate in our sensitivity analysis. Even at the 5 percent level of pilots needing training, the societal cost is very low at approximately $4 million (See table 22)

.

We estimate a one

- time cost of $13,000 per pilot for the instrument rating. 33 We also
estimate time costs of $8,625 ( 115 hours of classroom, flying, studying and testing time 34 at a wage of $75 per helicopter pilot ) and the cost of lodging and meal s at $129. 35 We assume that 80 percent of the affected pilot population would fly to their training locations, while the remaining 20 percent of the affected population travel by car. We estimate an air travel cost by taking the product of two times the domestic Origin

Destination Revenue per Passenger

. 36 Therefore, we estimate that the cost for pilots who travel by air is $ 356

. Pilots who travel by car would travel approximately 40 miles at a cost of $0.56 per mile. 37

Using the preceding information, t h e FAA estimates that the total co st of this provision
will be between $1 million to $4 million present value, as shown in Table 22

.

33 “The instrument rating,” Advanced Helicopter Concepts. Accessed on July 12, 2012 at http://www.advancedhelicopter.com/site/cou rsepricing.php

. 34 Source: http://www.usaviationacademy.com 35 2014 per diem standard rate. Source: http://www.gsa.gov. 36 Source: Airline Origin and Destination Survey, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. DOT

. 37 2014 Standard Mileage Rates. Source: h ttp://www.irs.gov.39 B. Commercial Helicopter (Including Air Ambulance) Operations B.1.a. IFR A lternate Weather (§135.221) This provision w ill increase the alternate airport weather minimums for IFR operations. This additional margin for weather at the alternate airport w ill increase t he likelihood that a pilot will be able land under IFR at the alternate airport if weather conditions at the destination airport deteriorate below the IFR weather minimums while the aircraft is

enroute.

The FAA estimates that the overall cost of this requirement w ill be minimal, as it w ill not prohibit flights from occurring and partial flights w ill still be a ble to occur. There is a possibility that some flights may be affected (potentially requiring more time) as a result of this requirement. However, we believe when operators are faced with inadequate and unsafe weather minimums, they w ill explore alternat ives and plan appropriately. As we received no comments regarding this estimate for the NPRM, we continue to believe this requirement w ill generate only minimal additional cost.

B.2.a . Radio Altimeter (§135.160)40 The FAA will require radio altimeters fo r all rotorcraft operated by part 135 certificate
holders. The costs of this provision consist of the cost of the device and installation, maintenance, equipment downtime, incremental fuel burn, and deviations.

We estimate that there will be 1,1 3 3 air ambulance helicopters, 2 31 air tour helicopters, and 1, 710 on demand helicopters that will need to be equipped with radio altimeters
before the 201 6 e ffective date . We assume an annual growth rate of 2.8 % for the helicopters. We estimate that approximate ly 30 % of air ambulance helicopters and 25 %
of commercial helicopters (air tour and on demand) will be already equipped with radio
altimeters. Because certificate holders will have 3 years from the effective dat e of the final rule to comply with this requ irement, we assume that from 201 3 through 201 5 approximately 1/3 of the helicopters will come into compliance with this requirement on
an annual basis. We estimate the cost of the device and its installation at $9,000 and $1 ,000, respectively. 38 We estima te an a nnual cost of $ 500 to maintain the radio
altimeter. 39 Additionally, we estimate 2 hours of equipment downtime 40 and revenue losses of about $7,000 and $1,700 per helicopter per day for air ambulance operators and air tour operators, respectively. 41

T he additional fuel consumption per year was estimated by multiplying the amount of weight added (1.5 pound for radio altimeter ) by the incremental fuel burn (0.005 gallons

38 Source: comments. 39 Ibid. 40 About 8 hours are needed to install radio altimeters. Of those hours only 2 hours represent equipment downtime because the rest of the installation would be done during an interval maintenance inspection. 41 Source: NPRM.41 per pound ) times the annual utilization in flight hours (550 flight hours per year ) times
the FAA forecasted Jet A Kerosene price per gallon

. 42

Using the preceding information, the FAA estimates that cost of t h e device and installation, maintenance, equipment downtime and incremental fuel burn w ill be abo ut $ 2 1 million or $ 1 6 million pr esent value, as shown in Table 23

.

Although on

- demand operators may also incur the cost of equipment downtime, we received no comments and did not change the low to minimal cost estimate.

42 GA Jet A Kero Price

- Monthly Fuel Price Survey of U.S. fuel suppliers (FBOs nationwide) conducted by Aviation Research Group/US (ARGUS). See Appendix 2 for the forecast of Jet A Kero prices.42 Because not all rotorcraft have the room to incorpora te a radio altimeter, some operators may ask the FAA for a deviation. We estimate a total of 107 deviation s in 201 5 and that it will take chief pilots about 1 hour to write the deviation requests. An FAA inspector at Headquarters will review the request for the deviation. The FAA estimates the cost of the deviations at $ 2 0,65 1 or $ 1 8 , 037 pre sent value, as shown in Table 2 4

.

Overall, we estimate the total cos t of this provision at about $2 1 million or $1 6 million present v alue.

We received comments on this provision; based on those comments, we increased our cost estimate for the device from $3,750 to $9,000. Also, we now include a 2.8% annual growth for this final rule.

B.2.b

. Overwater Equipment Requirements (§ § 135.117, 135.168)43 The FAA will re quire safety equipment for overwater operations. The costs of this provision consist of the cost of the emergency locator transmitter, life preserver, and
incremental fuel burn.

I n 201 5 , all helicopter s will have to come into compliance . At that time there will be an estimated 1 ,1 3 3 air ambulance helicopters, and 1, 710 on
- demand helicopters. We assume an annual growth rate of 2.8 % for the helicopters. Of these helicopters, we
b elieve that this provision will impact approximately 5% of air ambulance h elicopters
and 15% of on

- demand helicopters. Because certificate holders w ill have 3 years from
the effective date of the final rule to comply with this requi rement, we assume that from
201 3 through 201 5 , approximately 1/ 3 of the helicopter s w ill come int o compliance with this requirement on an annual basis. W e assume on average 4 occupants per air
ambul ance helicopter and 6 occupants per on
- demand helicopter

. W e estimate a cost of $ 2,850 per emergency locator transmitter and $269 per life preserver

. 43

The additional fuel consumption per year was estimated by multiplying the amount of weight added ( 0.5 pounds for the emergency locator transmitter and 4 pounds for the life
preserver ) by the incremental fuel burn (0.005 gallons per pound ) times the annual utilization in flight hours (550 flight hours per year ) times the FAA forecasted Jet A Kerosene price per gallon

. 44

43 Source: NPRM. 44 GA Jet A Kero Price

- Month ly Fuel Price Survey of U.S. fuel suppliers (FBOs nationwide) conducted by Aviation Research Group/US (ARGUS). See Appendix 2 for the forecast of Jet A Kero prices.44 Using the preceding information, the FAA estimates that the total cost of this provision

w ill be about $ 2. 7 million or $ 2

. 2 million present value, as shown in Table s 2 5 and 2 6

.4546 We received several comments to extend the compliance deadline of this provision; however, we did not extend the compliance deadline because we removed the life raft requirement from the provision.

B

. 3. Compe tency in Instrument Meteorological Conditions ( I MC ) (§135.293) Current rules do not require a pilot to demonstrate safely maneuvering an aircraft back into visual meteorological conditions (VMC) following an inadvertent flight into
i nstrument m eteorologic al c onditions ( IMC ) during a § 135.293 competency check. The
FAA will require pilot testing on recovery from inadvertent flight into IMC to include
flat

- light, whiteout, and brownou t conditions. This testing w ill occur every year and w ill
include a demons tration of the pilot's ability to maneuver the rotorcraft solely by
reference to instruments.

In order to demonstrate compliance with this requirement, we estimate that each additional IMC recovery on an approach w ill take an additional 20 minutes.
To be in compliance with this requirement, all pilots for air ambulance operators w ill need to perform an additional IMC recovery every year. We conservatively estimate that all the other part 135 pilots (on demand, and air tours) w ill require an additional 20 minutes to demonstrate compliance with the additional IMC recovery on an approach each year. 45

45 Source: FAA.47 We estimate the total weighted average “blended” total hourly cost to operate an affected
aircraft at $1,4 13 . With an additional 20 minutes required to per form an IMC recovery, additional costs per pilot w ill be $4 71 annually.

We multiply the estimated affected number of pilots in the appropriate categories by the estimated annual cost per pilot of $4 71 . When summed over the period of a nalysis, the
total costs are $2 6 million or $1 9 million present value

.

As we received no comments regarding this estimate for the NPRM, we only update d our
estimates to reflect values in constant 201 3 dollars.

C.1

. VFR Class G Airspace Helicopter Weather Minimums ( §9 1.155) This requirement implements more stringent weather minimums for flights in uncontrolled (Class G) airspace. Pilots will need to maintain a designated amount of visibility, rather than staying “clear of clouds” which encourages pilots to take

unnece ssary risks. We anticipate that this rule could affect the following operations: 1. Helicopter Air Ambulance operators would encounter minimal additional cost because they would conduct a relatively small number of part 91 flights under the new rule. W ith48 the movement of helicopter air ambulance flight legs to part 135 as proposed, the only remaining types of flights that will be conducted under part 91 will be training flights, maintenance flights, and refueling flights which are all conducted in visua l flight rules (VFR). The FAA believes that these non

- revenue flights could be postponed for better weather at minimal cost to the operator.

This requirement will not impact helicopter air ambulance operations with medical personnel or patients on boar d because proposed § 135.609 establishes weather requirements for helicopter air ambulance operators in uncontrolled airspace. Those weather requirements are more restrictive than those proposed under new § 91.155.

2. On

- Demand operators , other than th ose operating helicopter air ambulances, also operate under part 135 rules . The weather requirements proposed in § 91.155 are already contained in § 135.205(b), i.e. 1⁄2 mile visibility during the day and 1 mile at night. On

demand operators use part 91 to reposition aircraft and for refueling, maintenance and training flights. These on

- demand operators will use part 91 to reposition helicopters more than helicopter air ambulance operators because as a result of this rulemaking helicopter air ambulances wi ll be conducting most repositioning flights under part 135. However, we do not have the data that shows how often this occurs. Nevertheless, we anticipate a minimal impact due to delayed or cancelled flights because some operations may be able to be resc heduled and training, maintenance, and refueling flights generally would not be conducted under marginal weather conditions. Therefore there should not be a large impact on these operators as a result of the new rule.49 3. Air Tour operators should not b e impacted because their revenue comes from passengers who want to sightsee. The changes introduced by this rule affect operations
conducted in marginal weather conditions. As discussed above, the rule requires a minimum of 1⁄2 mile visibility to conduct a VFR operation during the day. We therefore assumed that a passenger would not pay for a sightseeing flight when he or she cannot
see more than 1⁄2 mile from the aircraft. As such , u nder existing regulations , the operators
would likely have cancelled or de layed the flights because of the weather conditions. Moreover, the rule’s impact is mitigated by the fact that not all air tours are conducted under part 91. Many are conducted under part 135 which has its own weather requirement s
.

4. Part 133 Rot orcraft External Load operators and p art 137 Agricultural Aircraft operators conduct their revenue flights under the part 91 weather requirements. Therefore, changing § 91.155 would have an impact that is larger than for the part 135 helicopter air ambula nce operators and on

- demand operators based on the volume of operations.

In the absence of this rule change, w e projected that from 201 3 to 202 2 , part 137 helicopter operations will rise from about 5 9 , 000 to 7 6 , 000 , whereas part 133 helicopter operation s will rise from 1. 2 million to 1.5 million

. W e believe that this rule change will
result in cancellation of approximately 1 % of these operations

. 46 We estimated the potential loss using the opportunity cost of capital using a 7 percent discount rate. We

46 Source: FAA.50 estimate a capital cost of $ 2.70 per operation for part 137 operations and $ 0.14 per operation for p art 13 3 operat ions

. 47

Using the preceding information, the FAA estimates that the total cost of t his provision

w ill be $ 3 6 ,8 26 ($ 2 7 , 259 present value at 7 %) as calculated in Table 2 8

.

In th e NPRM, our assessment was that this provision was going to generate o nly minimal additional cost. However, commenters said that this provision will negatively impact their ability to do business in support of po wer line maintenance and construction operations ( part 133 operations). So we recalculated the cost of this provision and we quantified not only the impact to part 133 operators but also to part 137 operators.

47 The capital cost is based on the number of helicopter op erations and an estimated market value for the helicopter. The market value for the helicopter is from “Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory decisions, A Guide,” Oct.3, 2007 by GRA for the FAA, table 5

- 5.51 C .2 . Load Manifest (§ 135.63)
Currently, § 135.63 requires operators of multi

- engine aircraft to complete a load manifest in duplicate and carry one copy aboard the aircraft. No specific action is required for the second copy but certificate holders must retain a copy of the completed
load manife st for at least 30 days. Single engine aircraft currently have no requirement to prepare a load manifest. Based upon the re

- evaluation of the comments for this provision, the FAA has withdrawn the requirement from the final rule.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to apply the rule to all airplanes and helicopters, single and multiengine, operating under part 135, and to clarify the requirements for preparation and transmission of the load manifest. The FAA estimated this provision would impose costs of $8 2 million (present value) over 10 years while the benefits were estimated at $20 million (present value) over 10 years.

The FAA requested comments on the cost of the load manifest provision. The NTSB supported this revision and c ommented that it resp onds to NTSB Safety
Recommendation A

- 99

- 61. Association of Air Medical Services (AAMS), National EMS Pilot Association (NEMSPA), HAI (Helicopter Association International) and Angel One supported the intent to maintain accurate load manifest records, but they, and many commenters, expressed concerns about the cost, justification, and operational impact of this requirement. Commenters noted the high cost of this requirement and questioned how this provision would prevent accidents.52 Based on the commen ts received and additional review of the NPRM, the FAA has
withdraw n the load manifest requirement proposed in the NRPM due to the excessive cost of this provision. Therefore, the costs and benefits associated with this provision as
discussed in the NPRM are not included in this final regulatory evaluation

.

I II. Comparison of Benefits and Costs and Sensitivity Analysis of Benefits

Table s 2 9 and 30 show a comparison of benefits and quantified costs by rule provision for each kind of operation affected b y the rule

.535455 In comparison with the NPRM the b enefits are higher because the value of a statistical life increased from $6 .2 million to $ 9 .1 million and we added medical and legal costs associated with fatal, serious, and minor injuries . A lthough w e eliminated several
accidents from the a ir a mbulance and c ommercial categories we also added new
accidents to the VF R class G airspace helicopter w eather minimums category

.

As shown in T able 30, benefits are less than costs for s even provisions: § 135.61 5 VFR flight planning, § 135.621 Safety briefing or medical personnel training, § 135.605 Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (HTAWS), § 135.607 F light D ata
M onitoring (FDM) System , § 135.603 instrument rating, § 135.168 life preserver, and § 135.168 Emergency Locator Transmitter ( ELT ) . Although quantified benefits do not
exceed the estimated costs for these provisions, the FAA is retaining them in the rule for the following reasons.

VFR f light planning : The requirement to determine the high est obstacle along the planned route of flight increases a pilot’s awareness of the obstacles and terrain the pilot will encounter during a flight.

Safety briefing or medical personnel training : M edical personnel on helicopter air ambulance flights will benefit from an increased familiarity with the helicopter and emergency procedures due to their unique role of providing patient care while simultaneously working around an operating helicopter. The preflight briefing and56 training is intended to prevent medical personnel from inadvertently introducing risk to the operation when outfitting the passenger compartment for the purpose of providing medical treatment and when providing medical care to a patient.

HTAWS : The FAA is requiring HTAWS not only becau se it is Congressionally

m andated but also because of the demonstrated effectiveness that TAWS has had in reducing fatal accidents in fixed

- wing airplanes

. F or details on how we came to this
determination , see App endix 4, section V, subsection A 2

.

FDM : T hese systems can provide critical information to investigators in the event of an
accident. In addition, the data can be used proactively by an operator to modify operational and maintenance procedures for increased efficiency and lower costs, to provide immediate feedback to pilots in training, and to highlight areas where additional training may be needed.

Instrument Rating : T his regulation provides valuable instrument flight skills to pilots . It also more closely aligns helicopter air ambulance pilot s with a commercial pilot certificate to airplane pilots with a commercial pilot certificate who are required to hold an instrument rating to carry passengers without distance or time

- of

- day limitations. See 14 CFR § 61.133(b).57 Life preserver : the FAA i s retaining the requirement that a life preserver be worn when a helicopter is over water beyond power

- off glide distance of shore because the accident analysis shows that the life preserver provision would generate the most benefits of the proposed equipm ent requirements in § 135.168 and provide passengers the necessary personal survival equipment in the event of an accident over water.

E megency L ocator T ransmitter : E quip ping helicopters with a 406MHz emergency
locator transmitter will allow search and rescue responders to locate an accident site more precisely allowing them to reach the site as quickly as possible.

The FAA con ducted a sensitivity analysis of the effects on the benefits of the rule using alternative VSL values as shown in the following table.

More specifically T able s 3 2 a and 3 2 b shows a compa rison of present value benefits and costs by rule provision using the low alterna tive value of $5.2 million and the high alternative value of $12.9 million. We also considered t he se alternative VSL values when calculating the costs of injuries. To estimate the costs of serious injuries we58 multiplied the fraction of VSL for a serious injury (0.105) by the VSL and to estimate the costs of minor injuries we multiplied the fraction of VSL for a min or injury (0.003) by
the VSL.596061 For the base case (a VSL of $9.1 million) total benefit s of the rule will be about $ 821

m illion or $ 577 million, present value, over 10 years. Total cost s of the rule will be about $309 million or $242 million, present value, over 10 years. Overall, final rule benefits exceed costs by $ 336 million present value over 10 years.

IV. Comments

B.2.b. Overwater Equipment Requirements (§ 135.168 )

 The FAA received several comments that, because of the lack of available rafts and concerns with obtaining approval for external mounting, a 3

- year compliance period for externally mounted life rafts does not p rovide enough time.

FAA Response: The FAA has withdraw n the life raft requirement proposed in the
NPRM.

C.1. VFR Class G Airs pace Helicopter Weather Minimums (§ 91.155)

 Commenters said that t he proposed change would negatively impact their ability to support gr ound crews in marginal weather and would not offer the flexibility needed to do business in support of powerline mainte nance and construction operations

.

FAA Response: The FAA recognizes that this provision will affect not only p art 133 operators (which includes powerline and construction) but also p art 137 operators . In the
NPRM , we did not quantify the impact of this provision on these operators because we62 believed that it would generate only minimal additional cost

. I n the final rule, we quantified the impact of this provision to part 133 and part 137 operators

.

A.1.b. Operations Control Center ( OCC ) (§ 135.619)
S ome commenters opposed the proposed OCC requirement being dependent on fleet size (the rule only applies to operators with 10 or more helicopters), asserting the safety
benefit of an OCC is necessary for all air ambulance operators. A few commenters

note d that AC120

- 96, Integration of Operations Control Centers into Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations (May 5, 2008), provides guidance on how to scale an OCC to fit the size of the organization.

FAA R esponse: The FAA agrees that an operations c ontrol center could benefit all certificate holders. Nevertheless, the FAA is requiring an operations control center only
for certificate holders with 10 or more helicopter air ambulances , as proposed. The FAA believes that these larger certificate holde rs will gain the most benefit from an operations control center because their operations are more complex.
AC120

- 96 describes four basic models of integration of an OCC and enhanced operational control procedures into air ambulance operations. Model 2 r epresen ts the
minimum baseline that most air ambulance operators should strive to achieve. The OCC costs estimated for the final rule are based on this model’s configuration, which states that the operator should maintain an OCC staffed by air ambulance O CS s rather than allowing the fractional use of OCS s
.63  A few commenters asserted the proposed requirement of a 10

- hour workday effectively
adds an additional full

- time employee to the OCC and significant associated costs to the operator without a demonstrat ed benefit.

FAA Response: We agree with these commenters that the end result of an extended workday is that operators need to hire additional OCS s to provide coverage. In the final rule, we apply an adjustment factor based on a 10

- hour workday to determi ne the additional staffing that will be needed as a result of an extended workday ( s ee OCC costs for details).

As for the benefits, we disagree with these commenters. A ppendix 1 lists several accidents to support this provision.
Accidents The following T abl e 3 3 summarizes the accident comments :6465 Responses to A ccident C omments ( comment numbers correspond to T able 31 )
1 Commenters claim that they have identified several accidents that were listed as occurring under part 91 operations when they were cond ucted under part 135 rules, part 135 weather minimums, or higher. They claim the reason these accidents are categorized as part 91 operations is due to a “flawed accident investigation process and an agreement between the FAA and the NTSB, signed in a Mem orandum of Understanding (MOU) in 1992, that accidents involving an air medical flight without a patient on board would be categorized as part 91.”

The FAA acknowledges that the commenters correctly characterize how accidents are categorized pursuant to t he MOU. Accordingly, FAA’s Flight Standards Service conducted a subsequent review of the accidents cited in the NPRM as supporting this proposal. In the NPRM, the FAA determined that 33 accidents (see T able 3 4 below) occurred during part 91 operations an d would therefore support including those operations in part 135. Upon subsequent review, the FAA has now determined that 17 of those accidents occurred while flying in weather minimums below the minimums that would be required under §135.60 9 of the rule and, therefore, still support the part 135 all applicability and definitions provision discussed in A1a. The Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention reevaluated, in terms of the applicability to this rule, the 16 accidents that occurred in weather minimums at or
above the minimums that would be required under § 135.609 and decided to eliminate
6 of them (those scored with zero). The Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention scored the rest of the accidents using the applicable portions of th e CAST66 methodology except for accident ATL90FA073, which was not considered because it falls outside the period of analysis of this final rule

. These accidents are listed in
Table 32

. 2 We agree with this commenter. For the final rule, we reviewed the acci dent data once again and were able to identify 5 1 accidents to support this provision (see A ppendix
1 , T able A.3 ).
3 Pre

- flight risk analysis may have helped properly identify all risks associated with the flight and helped avoid this accident either by canc eling the flight or requiring the helicopter to carry extra fuel in case diverting was needed. We also considered that HTAWS would have been a possible accident preventer or risk mitigator if it would
have been in effect at the time of the accident.
4 An op erational radio altimeter would have helped the pilot avoid the river and therefore avoid the accident. We also considered that HTAWS, an OCC, preflight risk analysis, flight and duty time, and competency in IMC would have been possible risk mitigat ions if these items would have been in effect at the time of t he accident.
5 We concede that this accident is not the best example to support the radio altimeter. However, although a radio altimeter alone may not have prevented this a ccident ,

w hen you incorporate I MC training with HTAWS and a radio altimeter, this accident could have been avoided, even w ith non

- certified instruments. We have removed this accident from the accident analysis in this final regulatory evaluation.
6 The FAA withdrew the load manifest requirement proposed in the NPRM.
7 T he FAA disagrees that the change would be a profound shift in the regulatory structure as the changes to §§ 135.267 and 135.271 proposed in the NPRM only67 served to clarify the effect of applying part 135 rules to helico pter air ambulance flights previously flown under part 91. Nevertheless, the FAA removed the flight and duty time re ferences proposed in the rule because they were redundant

. 8 This accident is used to support HTAWS, the operations control centers, pre

- flig ht risk analysis, the radio altimeter, and VFR Class G airspace helicopter weather
minimums , not flight and duty time.
9 Although HTAWS alone would not have prevented this a ccident, when you incorporate the operations control centers, pre

- flight risk analysi s, the radio altimeter, and HTAWS, this acc ident could have been avoided.
10 Yes, t his accident was used to justify the radio altimeter and also support competency
in IMC

.6869 FDM S ystem C ost C omments (§135.607)
There were several comments on the device. So me commenters said that we underestimated costs; others that we overestimated them. Commenters also provided
estimates on the cost of the device. See T able 33 for details.

Additionally, there were comments on the FDM equipment standard that will be used , whether the device neede d to be crashworthy , and on the implementation time for the system

. Many commenters were critical of the cost estimates in the NPRM , stating that we did not include costs such as the hardware, the data analysis , or the FOQA progr am. Table 3 5 summarizes the FDM cost comments.7071 Response s to FDM S ys tem C ost C omments ( comment numbers correspond to T able 33 )

Equipment
1. In the NPRM, we asked for comment on whether a flight data monitoring (FDM) system should be required. We provided cost information and a list of representative functions that an FDM system is capable of. Our objective was to get feedback from commenters and see if the industry supported a mandate to require an FDM system in
the final rule.

However, commenters misi nterpreted the NPRM and assumed that the FAA was proposing that helicopter air ambulances be equipped with an FDM capable of recording the functions we described, rather than a piece of equipment that is capable of recording flight performance or operation al data. The FDM capability described in the NPRM was meant to illustrate the type of data that could be collected by this equipment. We d id not seek to mandate an FDM system that must record all information pertaining to the aircraft’s state (such as he ading, altitude, and attitude), condition (such as rotors, transmission, engine parameters, and flight controls), and system performance (such as full authority digital engine control, and electronic flight instrumentation system). Under this rule, the op erator would be able to determine the parameters that the FDM would record. Therefore, we believe that this misunderstanding of the NPRM is the underlying factor in the discrepancy in our equipment cost estimates of $6,450 ($5,950 plus $500 for installati on) and one of the

commenter ’s cost est imates of $40,000 (see T able 33 ).72 In the final rule, the FAA specifically identifies a set of performance standards that must be met. While these performance standards are based on certain requirements in
TSO

- C197 and ED

- 155, the final rule does not require equipment that is compliant
with TSO

- C197 or ED

- 155. The FAA is aware of equipment that meets TSO

- C197 requirements that is currently available for $7,000. We used this cost as the basis for

our estimate in th is final rule.
2. For the purposes of the regulatory evaluation we estimated the cost of a TSO

approved article. This rule does not require a TSO

- compliant device but a TSO

approved device would meet the rule’s requirements. Therefore, our cost model is
based on the TSO

- C197. The TSO

- C197 prescribes the Minimum Operational Performance Specification (MOPS) under standard and environmental conditions.
The TSO references EUROCAE ED

- 155 and RTCA/DO

- 160 to standardize the design and production approval of these information collecti on and monitoring systems

. 3. Our estimated cost of $7 , 000 per unit includes the crash survivability of the memory module as specified by the ED

- 155 standard.
4. We agree with this commenter. The FAA has determined that 4 years would provide additional time for equipment certification, development, production, and installation. The FAA has extended the proposed compliance time from 3 to 4 years after the
effective date of the rule.
5. In the NPRM we estimated installation at $500 per hel icopter (this cost was added to $5,950 for the device for a total cost of $6,450). We agree with commenters who said73 that we underestimated the installation costs. For the final rule, we estimate 80 hours will be required to install the device at a per

- h our rate of $100. The 80 hours of installation cost includes the cost estimate to run operational performance tests (run the aircraft, complete installed equipment aircraft testing, and retrieve the data).
6. Although the $750 per year for a software licen se fee is correct, we did not capture a

one
- time cost of $2,500 for the hardware . We will include this one

- time cost in the final rule. As for the $50,000 to $120,000, we disagree with this commenter. We believe that this operator/commenter included thi s large cost to include the total cost of implementing a flight data monitoring program corporation

- wide

. This commenter has multiple lines of business within its corporation and each line of business is set up
with this device installed.

Downtime
Co mmenters said that the FAA’s estimates had not included the cost of downtime. This is not correct. In the NPRM, we estimated 2 hours of equipment downtime and a revenue loss of about $7,000 per helicopter per day.

Data Analysis
Commenters said that the FAA’s estimates had not included the costs for the data analysis. In the final rule, we have not included costs for development, training,
pro cessing, and analyzing the data because this will not be required in the final rule.

F light Operational Quality Assurance (F OQA ) Program74 Commenters said that the FAA’s estimates had not included the costs for a FOQA program. FOQA is a currently existing, voluntary program. We are not mandating participation in the FOQA program ; therefore, these costs are not inclu ded in the final
rule.

Combined Costs
T h e combined cost estimate provided by the commenters includes data analysis, which is not part of the final rule . W e did not use it in this final evaluation

.

Radio Altimeter C ost C omments (§ 135.160) Commenters p rovided estimates on the cost of the device, the implementation time,
maintenance and downtime. T able 3 6 summarizes the radio altimeter cost comments:75 Response to R adio A ltime ter C ost C omments (from T able 34 ) : According to the
commenters, t he FAA u nderestimated the cost of th is device . For this analysis, the FAA
used the $9,000 from the commenters for the cost of the device, although we did not include the optional indicator or the opt ional night vision goggles indicator because these two options w ill not be required by this rule . We failed to capture $500 per year for maintenance, so we added it in this analysis. W e kept our two estimates for equipment
downtime because we received no new estimates.76 

### APPENDIX 177787980 

### APPENDIX 281 

### A PPENDIX 382 

### APPENDIX 4

I. Summary of Accident Effectiveness Evaluations
FAA’s initial analysis of how effective each provision of the rule would be in preventing future accidents resulted in unusually high estimates. To address concerns that these estimate s may have been too high, a second group of analysts separately reviewed the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) factual and probable cause reports on air ambulance, commercial and VFR weather minimums accidents to determine which final rule provis ions would have been applicable. The second analysis used more conservative criteria , which result ed in lower
effectiveness scores

This final rule addresses well over 100 helicopter accidents . Although these accidents have few fatalities per accident , t he large number of preventable accidents dwarf the substantial reductions in the measures of the probability of effectiveness which were made for about a third of the
accidents

. The purpose of the second review was to

—

• Determine the validity of the effec tiveness scores and identify where adjustments could
be made.

• Explain why the scores may be higher if compared to other rules.

After the second analyst team reviewed the 154 accidents, they removed 1 accident and lowered
the effectiveness scores for 48 ac cidents. In the cases where the second analyst team scored a higher effectiveness for an accident, the lower score estimated by the first team was still used in
order to be more conservative . These results are shown in the following table.83 Note : There are 3 categories: low (0

- 33%), medium (34

- 67%), and high (68

- 100%).

The second analyst team also removed the MIA08MA203 accident because the helicopter was conducting a public aircraft operati o n under p art 91 . Thus, p art 135 regulations d id not apply to that operation and would not have prevented this particular accident. However, prior to removing the accident , there was a thorough discussion acknowledging that there are aircraft being operated by part 135 certificate holders that may conduct both publi c aircraft operations
and at other times p art 135 operation s
. As discussed in the preamble ( Section E. General Comments, Public Aircraft Operations ), it is the nature of the operation, not the ownership of the
aircraft exclusively , that determines status as a public aircraft operation. In the end , since the helicopter was conducting a public aircraft operation , the accident was removed from the analysis . The team also reduced 22 accidents to zero (15 accident scores went from a score of 16 to 0; 5 from a score of 50 to 0; and 2 from a score of 84 to 0). For the accidents that were lowered between categories and within categories

— the decreases range from 5 to 88 percent.84 These changes reduced the estimated benefits from $725 million to $577 million, in present value at 7% over 10 years. Despite all of these changes the benefits of the rule still exceed costs and only one provision

— HTAWS

-- had its benefits fall below its costs.

II. Why this Final Rule has higher Effectiveness Scores than Some Other Rules

Th is appendix addresses the reasons for why the effectiveness scores are high and related issues which arise from the 2006 NTSB effectiveness study. There are multiple reasons why this rule has higher accident effectiveness probabilities than some other par t 121 rules. The operational improvements from the proposed new helicopter provisions are known to be highly effective and the resulting incremental improvement will benefit helicopter operations, which have a lower operational standard than part 121 oper ations. Recent rules affecting training and experience for part 121 pilots occur in a safer environment, than that experienced in helicopter operations. Part 121 flights have air traffic controllers directing take

- offs and landings. Most helicopter flig hts are under visual flight conditions without air traffic guidance. Airplanes flown under part 121 are certificated to a higher standard with redundancy required for critical systems , and also are already required to have the equipment improvements propo sed and adopted in this rulemaking. The recent part 121 rules improving training (RIN 2120

- AJ00, Qualification, Service, and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers) and requiring additional experience (RIN 2120

- AJ67, Pilot Certification and Qualificat ion Requirements), reinforce existing requirements, rather than initiate new requirements as in this final rule. For example, the proposed operations control center requirements in this final rule will be new for the affected helicopter operators , whereas dispatch centers have been a standard operating requirement for part 121 operators.85 In addition , a single accident may have a high probability of effectiveness rate simply due to multiple provisions. Each provision may have a low effectiveness, but as they are mutually exclusive, these low effectiveness rates , when summed , add to a high accident prevention rate.

III. Effectiveness Measures by Provision
In conducting this analysis, we have estimated the cost

- effectiveness for each regulatory provision, if possible. The FAA notes that we are more confident on the estimated effectiveness
values for the overall rule than for each provision. Nonetheless, the provision

- by

- provision cost

benefit analysis resulted in the recognition that two proposed requirem ents (life raft and load manifest) did not ha ve sufficient benefits and the FAA did not adopt those requirements in the
final rule.

For the provisions required specifically of helicopter air ambulance operators, we have
calculated an effectiveness score for each provision and then summed those scores for an overall
effectiveness score.

To calculate this overall score , we had to make a simplifying assumption that the provisions are mutually exclusive (i.e., multiple provisions cannot occur simultaneously ). This assumption86 allows us to add up the probabilities of each of the provisions for each accident , but in doing so, we are also not able to fully account for any overlap in effectiveness amongst the provisions. 48

This simplifying assump tion was necessary because in its absence, the complexity of the benefit
model would have increased so much so as to make it unusable. For instance , when dealing with
three provisions that are not mutually exclusive, we will have to consider the probabili ty of either A, B or C occurring one at a time, the probability of both A and B, A and C, and B and C occurring, and the probability of A, B, and C occurring simultaneously. 49

Thus, in assessing the benefits and costs of each provision in this manner, we estimate that the
result is a slightly higher effectiveness measure.

IV. Impact on Benefit s and Cost s The impact on benefits and costs of removing 1 accident and lowering the effect iveness scores
for 48 accidents is represented in the following table:

.

48 Example, for two provisions: P( A ∪ B ) = P( A ) + P( B )

– P( A ∩ B ). However, with mutually exclusive events the last term in the formula,

– P( A ∩ B ), is zero, so the formula simplifies to P( A ∪ B ) = P( A ) + P( B ).

49 P( A ∪ B ∪ C ) = P( A ) + P( B ) + P (C)

– [ P( A ∩ B ) + P( A ∩ C ) + P( B ∩ C ) ]

- P( A ∩ B ∩ C ).87 The following key provisions explain most of the changes in the benefits

We also analyzed whether the relationship between benefits and costs has changed for any of the provisions. As shown in the following table, it changes for only one provision: 135.605 (A2a)
HTAWS.8889 V. Helicopter Terrain Awareness Warning Systems The second team reviewed the 28 helicopter terrain awareness system (HTAWS) accidents.
Their review results in the removal of one accident and a lower effectiveness rate for three other
accid ents. The net effect of these changes resulted in the benefit

- cost result for the HTAWS requirement changing from benefits exceeding costs to costs now exceeding benefits. The four effectiveness changes reduced the present value benefit from $59 millio n to $44 million with the cost of comp liance remaining constant at $48 million. While the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012 directed the FAA to include HTAWS , , there are a host of other reasons to keep the HTAWS requirement in this rule . The pre vention of one more such accident and averting one fatality more than offsets the difference in $4 million in costs over benefits. We now present the reasons for including HTWAS in the rule beyond the fact that Congress has
directed the FAA to include HT AWS in a rulemaking.

A. Why Should HTAWS be Retained in the Rule
A.1. Congressional Action On February 14, 2012, President Obama signed into law the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112

- 95). Section 306 of the Act directs the FAA to conduct r ulemaking on helicopter air ambulance operations which will address safety

- enhancing technology and equipment including HTAWS.

A .2. Terrain Awareness and Warning System have been very e ffective in practice The only provision whose benefit and cost outc ome changed as a result of the second analysis was the requirement to add Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System ( H TAWS). To90 determine how effective HTAWS would be in practice we examined how effective TAWS has actually been in practice. We have determined that TAWS has been extremely effective on fixed wing aircraft

.

In the fixed wing TAWS final rule, the FAA identified 8 Controlled Flights into Terrain ( CFIT ) accidents in part 121 operations, 5 accidents in part 135 operations and 42 accidents in part 91 operations over the 10 years prior to the rule implementation. The FAA conducted a post review of this TAWS rule to determine if the requirements should continue. The study found t here were 5 CFIT accidents eight years after the publication o f the final rule. We calculated the average annual accidents before and after the TAWS final rule (See the following table)

Most importantly each of these 5 accidents that occurred after the implementation of the final rule might have been prevented wit h TAWS. T he airplanes were not yet outfitted with TAWS. These airplanes were not required to have TAWS installed , as the installation process required time to engineer, schedule, order, and install TAWS.

Honeywell has informed the FAA that although t here have been CFIT accidents where the aircraft was fitted with TAWS, a closer look shows the system was not maintained, did not have91 the latest database or software, there was a loss of control, or the system was turned off with no terrain display. The data shows TAWS is both reliable and useful in preventing the accidents that were quantified in the final rule.