alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SERVED FEBRUARY 16,2010 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

• OFFICE OF HEARINGS OrPI OF TBANSPORMN 

WASHINGTON, D.C. ^^ '" 

IN THE MATTER OF 

REDOX TECH, LLC, 

Respondent, 

FAA DOCKET NO. CP09AL0013 

(Civil Penalty Proceeding) 

DMS NO. FAA-2009-0978 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S ORDER 

RESCHEDULING HEARING 

The Complainant has submitted a motion requesting a postponement 

of the date of the hearing. In support of the request, counsel says that he has 

a conflict in his schedule because the March 11, 2010 date for the hearing in 

this case is the same as the date for a hearing before the EEOC in which he 

is to represent his agency. The motion papers also say that Respondent's 

representative does not oppose the relief sought. 

Respondent's representative has informed me that he would prefer to 

have the hearing held during the week of March 15, 2010. Regrettably, my 

calendar does not permit me to accommodate that request, as I have hearings 

in two other cases scheduled for hearing that week. 

In consideration of the foregoing, and for good cause shown, the date 

of the hearing is postponed to March 25, 2010, The hearing will be held in 

Raleigh, North Carolina, The deadline for the exchange of witness lists and 

proposed exhibits is also postponed. The new deadline for those exchanges 

0 
is March 11, 2010. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Administrative law Judge
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Orion Acquisition Corp. II (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), each
of the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.

November 14, 2003                    By: /s/ Anthony DiGiandomenico
                                        ---------------------------
                                         Anthony DiGiandomenico
                                         Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit
32.1




Certification
by the Chief Financial Officer and Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350




Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. 1350, each of the undersigned officers of Sterling Construction
Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), does hereby certify that
the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31,
2009 (the "Report")
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Report fairly
represents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.






Dated:
March 15,
2010                         /s/ Patrick T.
Manning


Patrick T. Manning


Chief Executive Officer






Dated:
March 15,
2010                         /s/ James H. Allen,
Jr.


James H. Allen, Jr.


Senior Vice President & Chief
Financial Officer




This
certification accompanies this Report on Form 10-K pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by
that act, be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act or
otherwise subject to the liability of that section.  This
certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing
under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the
Company specifically incorporates it by reference.
*OPINION ISSUED DECEMBER 12, 2008*

#### JOHN B. MOWERY JR. VS. DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS

(CC-07-0086)

Claimant appeared *pro se.*

Jason C. Workman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Claimant brought this action for vehicle damage which occurred when excess gravel from the road struck the windshield of his 2000 Honda Civic on 1-79 North in Elkview, Kanawha County. 1-79 North is a road maintained by respondent. The Court is of the opinion to deny this claim for the reasons more fully stated below.

The incident giving rise to this claim occurred at approximately 8:45 p.m. on October 19, 2006. Claimant was driving towards mile marker seven at approximately fifty-five miles per hour when the vehicle in front of him “kicked up” loose asphalt, and the asphalt struck and cracked his vehicle’s windshield. Claimant observed that paving work was being performed at this location and assumed that either the respondent or a contractor left the excess gravel in this area. As a result of this incident, claimant’s vehicle sustained damage to its windshield in the amount of $210.94.

The position of the respondent is that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition on 1-79 at mile marker seven. The respondent did not present any witnesses at the hearing.

The well-established principle of law in West Virginia is that the State is neither an insurer nor a guarantor of the safety of travelers upon its roads. *Adkins v. Sims,*130 W.Va. 645, 46 S.E.2d 81 (1947). In order to hold respondent liable for road defects of this type, a claimant must prove that respondent had actual or constructive notice of the defect and a reasonable time to take corrective action. *Chapman v. Dep’t. of Highways,*16 Ct. Cl. 103 (1986).

In the instant case, the Court is of the opinion that respondent did not have notice of the loose piece of gravel which struck claimant’s vehicle on 1-7 9 at mile marker seven. Since it is too speculative to determine where the piece of asphalt came from, the Court cannot find respondent liable. Thus, there is insufficient evidence of negligence upon which to base an award.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion to and does deny this claim.

Claim disallowed.
<PAGE>



Exhibit 32.1
                          GENESIS HEALTH VENTURES, INC.

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350
of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code), each of the undersigned
officers of Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. (the "Company"), does hereby certify
with respect to the Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K/A for the fiscal
year ended September 30, 2002 (the "Report") that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.




Date:  October 10, 2003                              Robert H. Fish
       ---------------------------                   ---------------------------
                                                     Robert H. Fish
                                                     Chief Executive Officer


Date:  October 10, 2003                              George V Hager, Jr.
       ---------------------------                   ---------------------------
                                                     George V. Hager, Jr.
                                                     Chief Financial Officer


         The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of
Title 18 of the United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report
or as a separate disclosure document.
<PAGE>   1
                                                              Exhibit 10.18


                               AMENDMENTS TO THE
                        1994 DIRECTOR STOCK OPTION PLAN
                       1994 EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLAN
                                      AND
                           1994 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN
                                       OF
                            FUISZ TECHNOLOGIES LTD.


         The following resolutions were adopted by the Board of Directors of
Fuisz Technologies Ltd. (the "Company") and approved by the Company's
stockholders at the Annual Meeting of Stockholders held on August 4, 1997:

         Resolution I:

         RESOLVED, that each of the Company's 1994 Director Stock Option Plan,
1994 Employee Stock Purchase Plan and 1994 Stock Incentive Plan be, and hereby
is, amended to provide that up to 4,900,000 shares of Common Stock be available
for issuance in the aggregate under those plans together with the Company's
1991 Stock Option Plan and that the 1994 Director Stock Option Plan be and
hereby is further amended by multiplying the number of shares set forth in
clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph 5(a) by 3 (to 30,000 and 3,000, respectively)
to reflect the three-for-two stock split adopted by the Board of Directors on
March 22, 1996 and effective as of April 16, 1996.

         Resolution II:

         NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that Section 6(a)(i) of the [1994
Stock Incentive] Plan is hereby amended by adding to the end of the first
sentence the following provision:

         "provided, however, that in no event shall any person eligible to
         receive options hereunder be granted options to purchase in excess of
         an aggregate of 400,000 share of Common Stock during any calendar
         year."
#### OIL AND PRODUCTS OF OIL IN CERTAIN PITS IN GREGG COUNTY et al. v. STATE.

No. 8675.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

June 8, 1938.

*619Culbertson & Morgan, of Fort Worth, for appellants.

Wm. McCraw, Atty. Gen., and Wm. C. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BAUGH, Justice.

Appeal is from a judgment of the trial court overruling the plea of privilege of Bill Gary to be sued in Gregg County, Texas, the county of his residence.

This is a suit in rem filed by the State under the provisions of Vernon’s Ann.Civ. St. Article 6066a, Sec. 10(b), to confiscate certain oil located in Gregg County, alleged to be illegal oil; and against Bill Gary as claiming an interest therein. The statute above cited authorizing this action provides that it may be brought either in Travis County, oi* in the county where such property is located.

The State duly controverted Gary’s plea of privilege, and after a hearing thereon same was overruled.

On the hearing on' the plea the State introduced only its petition in evidence. The contention is made that the plea should have been sustained because the State made no proof of any of the allegations of fact contained in its petition.

 This contention is not sustained. The rule is now well settled, beginning with, and as announced in, Yates v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 3 S.W.2d 114, and repeatedly reaffirmed since then, that where venue in an action is fixed by statute, and a plea of privilege'is filed, the court may look to the petition to determine the character of the cause of action, and whether or not the suit as brought comes within its provisions. As stated in the syllabus of Schoellkopf Company v. Daves, Tex.Civ.App., 71 S.W.2d 340, “where venue is fixed by statute, question of whether suit may be maintained in given county is one of law, and a formal plea of privilege tenders no issue of fact in absence of allegation that nature of suit was fraudulently or falsely characterized to show local venue.”

Under the undisputed facts and circumstances of the instant case therefore, the provisions of the statute above cited, and the State’s pleadings in this cause, no issue of fact was presented and none necessary to be proved. The issue as to whether the suit was properly laid in Travis County was consequently a matter of law for the trial court to determine, and the State’s general demurrer to Gary’s plea of privilege should have been sustained. See, also, to same effect, the following: McCook v. Amarada Petroleum Corp., Tex.Civ.App., 73 S.W.2d 914; Houston Printing Co. v. Tennant, Tex.Civ.App., 76 S.W.2d 762; Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Maples, 127 Tex. 633, 95 S.W.2d 1300.

It follows, therefore, that from the rule announced in the above cases, and under the undisputed record presented, the judg-' ment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Affirmed.
Exhibit
      32.2








CERTIFICATION
      OF ACTING CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the amended Annual Report of USCorp (the “Company”) on Form
      10-KSB for the period ending September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Spencer Eubank, Acting
      Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as
      adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/
                Spencer Eubank
              Spencer
                Eubank
              Acting
                Chief Financial Officer





Date:
      December 30, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Statement of Financial Condition at March 31, 1997 (Unaudited) and the
Statement of Income for the three months ended March 31, 1997 (Unaudited)
and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                             341
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   341
<PP&E>                                          79,624
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  79,965
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           15,300
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         8,980
<OTHER-SE>                                      55,685
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    79,965
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 7,495
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (7,495)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (7,495)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (7,495)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### JONES v. STATE.

No. 19995.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 19, 1938.

*457Harvey W. Lindsay, of Dallas, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is robbery; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for five years.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception. No question is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
#### Peck, Appellant, *v.*State Board of Optometry et al., Appellees.

(No. 28606

Decided May 28, 1941.)

*Messrs. Bushnell, Burgess é Fulton,*for appellant.

*Mr. Thomas J. Herbert,*attorney general, and *Mr. Howard Bernstein,*for appellees.

It is ordered and adjudged that this appeal as of right he, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional question is involved.

*Appeal dismissed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Turner, . Williams, Hart, Zimmerman .and Bettman, JJ., concur.

Matthias, J., not participating.
#### PLANES v. STATE.

No. 20122.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 25, 1939.

No attorney for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

Conviction is for robbery, punishment assessed being confinement in the penitentiary for forty years.

The record is before us without statement of facts or bills of exception. The indictment appears to be in proper form. Nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### Carrier, Appellee, *v.*Neal, Admx., Appellant.

(No. 28348

Decided April 9, 1941.)

*Messrs. Nichols, Wood, Marx S Ginter*and *Messrs. Heilker é Heilker,*for appellee.

*Mr. Walter Dressel*and *Mr. Wilbur E. Benoy,*for appellant.

By the Court.

The essential facts in this case, insofar as they relate to .the question of law presented, are substantially the same as in the case of *Snavely*v. *Wilkinson, Exr., ante,*125, this day decided. For the reasons set forth in the opinion in that case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals herein is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Turner, Williams, Matthias, Zimmerman and Bettman, JJ., concur.

Hart, J., dissents.
Order entered September 9, 2013

In The



## Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 13

- 00324

- CR

MARK CLIFT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 006

- 85128

- 2012



### O RDER

We GRANT the State’s September 4 , 2013 first motion for extension of time to file the

State’s brief. The State = s brief tendered to the Clerk of the Court on September 4, 2013 is

DEEMED timely filed as of the date of this order.

/s/ DAVID EVANS

JUSTICE
#### NESMITH v. ARCHER-COX FUNERAL HOME, Inc.

No. 2789.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

Feb. 9, 1933.

Olin E. Nesmith, R. T. Meador, and Dwight Whitwell, all of Dallas, for appellant.

John G. Whitaker and Oren Parmeter, both of Dallas, for appellee.

HIGGINS, Justice.

Appellee brought this suit in the justice court against Olin E. Nesmith,- administrator of the estate of Geo. S. Starrs, deceased, to recover a balance of $121, upon an open account for funeral expenses of the deceased. Judgment for said amount was rendered in favor of .appellee, and upon appeal to the county court at law a like judgment was rendered.

As we understand the only proposition here presented by appellant,. is to the effect that in the county court at law the ap-pellee set up a new and different cause of action, from that asserted in the justice court, which is forbidden by article 958, R. S.

There is nothing in the record to justify the assumption upon which such proposition is predicated.

The original itemized account, verified as required by article 3514, R. S., and bearing the rejection of the administrator, was filed with the justice of the peace.

The notations upon the transcript show that on April 20, 1931, “Plaintiff files First Amended Original Petition.” The inference is that this was a written pleading, but it does not appear in the transcript before this court. In the county court at law plaintiff filed a third amended original petition declaring upon the account, a copy of which is attached to the petition as an exhibit. This petition sets up that the items in the account were riecessaries in burying the deceased, the charges were reasonable, etc., and shows liability upon quantum meruit. This is the only pleading of the appellee shown by the record before this court, and it cannot be assumed it set up a new or different cause of action from that declared upon by the plaintiff in its previous pleadings, whether they were oral or written. Error is not to be presumed. The presumption is that the judgment of the court below is correct and it is incumbent upon appellant to affirmatively show by the record that error has been committed. 3 Tex. Jur. title Appeal and Error, § 734. The record here does not support the assumption upon which appellant predicates the only proposition he presents.

Affirmed.