IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs March 3, 2020

EDDIE H. PITTMAN v. SHAWN PHILLIPS, WARDEN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County

No. 19-CR-10658 R. Lee Moore, Jr., Judge

No. W2019-01474-CCA-R3-HC

The petitioner, Eddie H. Pittman, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ 

of habeas corpus, which petition challenged his 2015 Madison County Circuit Court jury 

conviction of reckless aggravated assault. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L.

EASTER, and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Eddie H. Pittman, Tiptonville, Tennessee, pro se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Assistant 

Attorney General; Jerry Woodall, District Attorney General; and Andrew Craig Coulam, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Madison County Grand Jury charged the petitioner with two counts of 

attempted first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated burglary, and one count 

of aggravated assault for his March 7, 2014 assault of the victim, Rodricus Morris. Prior 

to trial, the trial court “modified the indictment” to reflect the parties’ agreement that the 

second count of attempted first degree murder should be dismissed. The case proceeded 

to trial on the remaining three counts in 2015, and a Madison County Circuit Court jury 

convicted the petitioner of the lesser included offenses of felony reckless endangerment, 

aggravated criminal trespass, and reckless aggravated assault. The trial court merged the 

conviction of felony reckless endangerment into the conviction of reckless aggravated 

assault and imposed a sentence of 12 years’ incarceration aligned consecutively to the 

sentence of 11 months and 29 days that was imposed for his conviction of aggravated 

criminal trespass. On direct appeal, the petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the 

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convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentence. This court affirmed the judgments 

of the trial court, and the petitioner did not file an application for permission to appeal to 

our supreme court. See generally State v. Eddie H. Pittman, No. W2016-00745-CCAR3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, May 16, 2017).

In a July 2019 petition for writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleged 

entitlement to habeas corpus relief on grounds that the judgment for his conviction of 

reckless aggravated assault was void because “count three (3) of superseding indictment 

#15-58” did “not charge petitioner with the offense of aggravated assault.” The habeas 

corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner had failed to 

state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. The court noted that “[i]t is obvious 

that the court charged the jury with reckless aggravated assault as a lesser included 

offense of aggravated assault.”

In this appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily 

dismissing his petition, asserting that the habeas corpus court “failed to address” his “true 

argument that count three of indictment #15-58, under which count three” the court 

“imposed conviction and sentencing . . . for reckless aggravated assault, does not charge 

. . . the offense of aggravated assault nor reckless aggravated assault.” The State 

contends that the habeas corpus court did not err.

“The determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a 

question of law.” Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Hart v. 

State, 21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)). Our review of the habeas corpus court’s 

decision is, therefore, “de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded to the 

[habeas corpus] court.” Id. (citing Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 

406, 408 (Tenn. 2006)). The writ of habeas corpus is constitutionally guaranteed, see

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15, but has been regulated by statute for 

more than a century, see Ussery v. Avery, 432 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tenn. 1968). Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 29-21-101 provides that “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained 

of liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, except in cases specified in § 29-21-102, may 

prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and 

restraint.” T.C.A. § 29-21-101. Despite the broad wording of the statute, a writ of 

habeas corpus may be granted only when the petitioner has established a lack of 

jurisdiction for the order of confinement or that he is otherwise entitled to immediate 

release because of the expiration of his sentence. See Ussery, 432 S.W.2d at 658; State v. 

Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326 (1868). The purpose of the state habeas corpus 

petition is to contest a void, not merely a voidable, judgment. State ex rel. Newsom v. 

Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tenn. 1968). A void conviction is one which strikes at 

the jurisdictional integrity of the trial court. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 
-3-

1993); see State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tenn. 1979); Passarella 

v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Initially, the State correctly observes that the petitioner exhibited to his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus only the first three counts of the superseding 

indictment. The record reflects that the four-count superseding indictment charged the 

petitioner with two alternative counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of 

especially aggravated burglary, and one count of aggravated assault. As the petitioner 

notes in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, the State dismissed the second count of the 

indictment, which charged attempted first degree murder, prior to trial. Thus, the case 

proceeded to trial on three counts: attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated 

burglary, and aggravated assault. The petitioner was convicted of three lesser included 

offenses, felony reckless endangerment, aggravated criminal trespass, and reckless 

aggravated assault, that aligned with the charged offenses. To be sure, the judgment form 

for the petitioner’s conviction of reckless aggravated assault indicates that the judgment 

was rendered on “Count 3” of the indictment. In all likelihood, this memorialization 

reflects a renumbering of the counts following the pretrial dismissal of the second count 

of the indictment. Even if that was not the case, however, the inclusion of “Count 3” on 

the judgment form for the petitioner’s conviction of reckless aggravated assault would 

not render that judgment void. Instead, it would be, at most, a clerical error that could

easily be remedied by the trial court at any time.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

_________________________________ 

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE