J-S09029-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CALVIN CAMPS 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1389 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 11, 2021,

n the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003915-2014.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MAY 27, 2022

Calvin Camps appeals from the order denying his first timely petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)1following his 

convictions for aggravated assault and possessing an instrument of crime. We 

affirm.

In Camps’ direct appeal, we reproduced the trial court’s summary of the 

pertinent facts as follows:

On January 17, 2014, [the victim] was at a speakeasy, 

located on the 2800 block of North Park Avenue in 

Philadelphia, getting a drink. [The victim], with her drink in 

hand, then stepped outside of the speakeasy to get to the 

corner. [Camps], who had previously sold drugs to [the 

victim], approached [the victim] in the street and accused 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.
J-S09029-22

- 2 -

her of using a counterfeit $20 bill during an earlier drug 

transaction. The two began arguing and [the victim] threw 

her drink in [Camps’] face. [Camps] then slashed [the 

victim] in the face from her left ear to her left cheek with a 

blade, causing blood to run from her face “like water.”

[The victim] ran to a nearby fire station[,] where the 

firefighters called an ambulance, which transported [the 

victim] to Temple University Hospital. At the hospital, 

doctors ensured that her facial nerves were not severed, 

though [the victim] was unable to lift her left eyebrow, and 

performed surgery to clear a blood clot in her face. 

Additionally, an artery in her face was severed, requiring a 

clamp on the artery to stop the bleeding. [the victim’s] 

salivary glands, the lower part of her left eye, and corner 

were also cut. Her wound was approximately five 

millimeters deep. A doctor had to sew her wound shut using 

multiple layers of stitching.

Once discharged from the hospital, [the victim] began to 

search for Camps. On February 18, 2014, [the victim] 

located [Camps] selling drugs, but she did not call the police 

for fear of angering the other drug dealers on the block. On 

February 20, 2014, [the victim] again saw [Camps] at a gas 

station near where she was attacked and called police, who 

arrested [Camps].

Commonwealth v. Camps, 181 A.2d 1281 (Pa. Super. 2017), nonprecedential decision at 1-2 (citation omitted).

On June 2, 2016, a jury convicted Camps of aggravated assault and 

possessing an instrument of crime. Thereafter, the trial court imposed an 

aggregate sentence of five to fifteen years of imprisonment. The trial court 

denied Camps’ post-sentence motion. 

Camps appealed to this Court claiming that the trial court erred and/or 

abused its discretion by denying his pretrial motion in limine to introduce 

evidence of the victim’s “schizophrenia diagnosis and untreated status[.]” 
J-S09029-22

- 3 -

Camps, supra, non-precedential decision at 3. In finding no merit to this 

contention, we agreed with the trial court that Camps “failed to present a 

medical, psychiatric or expert report, or any other evidence demonstrating 

that [the victim’s] diagnosis of schizophrenia was relevant to her credibility 

and her ability to recall the event and communicate what happened[.] Id. at 

5-6. We therefore affirmed his judgment of sentence on December 29, 2017. 

Camps did not seek further review. 

On December 20, 2018, Camps filed a pro se PCRA petition, and the 

PCRA court appointed counsel. PCRA counsel filed an amended petition and 

two supplemental petitions. On April 30, 2021, the PCRA court issued a 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Camps’ PCRA petition without 

a hearing. Camps did not file a response. By order entered June 11, 2021, 

the PCRA court dismissed Camps’ petition. This appeal followed. Both Camps 

and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Camps raises the following issue on appeal:

1. Did the [PCRA] court err, abuse its discretion, and/or 

make a mistake and/or error of law when it denied,

[Camps’ PCRA] petition seeking relief, without an 

evidentiary or other hearing, when the PCRA court 

reasoned it lacked merit, when [Camps] claimed his trial 

attorney was ineffective . . . for failing to consult with 

and/or call an expert witness within the mental health 

care profession, regarding whether the only eyewitness 

who admitted to using illegal narcotics immediately 

before the incident and having schizophrenia was able to 

accurately perceive the criminal event.

Camps’ Brief at 2.
J-S09029-22

- 4 -

This Court’s standard of review for an order dismissing a PCRA petition 

is to ascertain whether the order “is supported by the evidence of record and 

is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless 

there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth 

v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).

The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without 

a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no 

genuine issues concerning any material fact, the defendant 

is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no 

legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings. 

To obtain a reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a 

petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he 

raised a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in 

his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court 

otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing. 

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations 

omitted).

Camps’ issue challenges the effectiveness of trial counsel. To obtain 

relief under the PCRA premised on a claim that counsel was ineffective, a 

petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel’s 

ineffectiveness so undermined the truth determining process that no reliable 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Commonwealth 

v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009). “Generally, counsel’s 

performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will 

only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing by the petitioner.” Id. 

This requires the petitioner to demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is 

of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her 
J-S09029-22

- 5 -

action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's act or 

omission. Id. at 533. A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for 

ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim. Commonwealth v. Martin, 

5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010).

As noted above, Camps asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to call a mental health expert to impeach the testimony of the victim. 

According to Camps, “trial counsel never consulted with an expert about the 

effects cocaine, alcohol, and schizophrenia could have on a person’s ability to 

accurate[ly] view and recollect those events to others.” Camps’ Brief at 6. 

To establish that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 

and/or call a witness at trial, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that: 

(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available; (3) 

trial counsel was informed of the existence of the witness or 

should have known of the witness’s existence; (4) the 

witness was prepared to cooperate and would have testified 

on appellant’s behalf; and (5) the absence of the testimony 

prejudiced appellant.

Commonwealth v. Hall, 867 A.2d 619, 629 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation 

omitted). 

To establish the Hall factors, Camps attached to his PCRA petition a 

single page report from Mobin Chadha, a licensed clinical social worker. This 

report provided the following:

[The victim’s] medical case file was referred to Mobin 

Chadha, LCSW by [PCRA counsel] for review of potential 

impact from medical history and treatment affecting [the 
J-S09029-22

- 6 -

victim’s] decision making and ability to participate in 

identifying [Camps].

From the collateral information received, at time of incident, 

[the victim] was a 38 year old female presented to hospital 

for stab wounds on left side of her face. Reports indicate 

she presented with significant pain and corneal abrasions. 

Operating Room and medical treatment was noted at 

Temple University from 1/18/14 to 1/19/14. Medically, [the 

victim] also carries the diagnosis of Schizophrenia, Seasonal 

Allergies, and Bipolar Disorder. Some of her medications 

include Percocet, Zyprexa, and Acetaminophen. [The 

victim’s] chart indicates that she sustained severe pain, and 

appeared incoherent at the hospital, requiring medication 

supports. Socially, [the] medical report[s] indicate use of 

crack/cocaine [] once a week.

Based on brief collateral information and medical charts, it 

is unclear if [the victim’s] judgment may have been 

impaired. A further evaluation will be helpful in 

understanding [the victim’s] insight, judgment, and 

presentation at [the] time of identifying [Camps]. [The 

victim] appeared to have [a] long standing psychiatric 

history. There is no clear indication or evaluation noted on 

the medical charts regarding psychiatric stabilization. 

Although one of the notes [did] indicate [the victim] 

presented anxious, it does not further elaborate if [she] was 

psychiatrically stable or exhibited any level of mood 

instability. Combination of medical trauma (i.e. to eye), 

medications taken, and psychiatric history (if untreatedalthough unknown) can possibly affect her ability to 

accurately perceive, remember, and communicate what 

happened. A further evaluation will be beneficial. Time 

frame from medical trauma, medications taken, and 

identification may impact ability to clearly identify someone. 

Medical charts continue to indicate that some prescribed 

medications can impair decision making for at least 24[ ] 

hours. At this time, there is limited information provided to 

accurately determine [the victim’s] state of mind or ability 

to perceive things accurately.
J-S09029-22

- 7 -

Letter, 10/4/20, at 1. According to Camps, the review by Ms. Chadha 

“instantly demonstrated the only eyewitness had significant potential issues 

with perception.” Camps’ Brief at 6.

The PCRA court concluded that Camps’ reliance upon Ms. Chadha’s 

report did not entitle him to post-conviction relief, because he could not 

establish prejudice:

Here, [Camps] has failed to proffer evidence that he 

could establish that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s 

decision not to obtain an expert to impeach the testimony 

of the victim[.] . . . The report does not address any 

possible impact of [the victim’s] drug use. 

***

Ms. Chadha’s proffered testimony, as set forth in her 

report, would not have been admissible at trial. The report 

is grounded on mere possibilities instead of a reasonable 

degree of medical certainty. . . . Because [Camps] failed 

to proffer evidence to establish [the victim’s] medical 

condition “impaired her perception or recall of the critical 

events at the heart of this case,” the trial court would have 

properly excluded Ms. Chadha’s testimony if she had been 

available to testify at [Camps’] trial. Moreover, even if the 

court were to have permitted Ms. Chadha to testify, her 

testimony would not have been helpful to the defense.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/12/21, at 5-6 (citation omitted) . 

Our review of the record and appliable law regarding the admission of 

expert testimony supports the PCRA court’s conclusions. According to Camps, 

he “was greatly prejudiced because if the jury had heard evidence of [the 

victim’s] medical conditions, and how intoxicated she was at the time of the 
J-S09029-22

- 8 -

incident there exists a reasonable probability the proceeding would have 

terminated differently.” Camps’ Brief at 7. We cannot agree.

Ms. Chadha’s report makes no conclusive findings regarding the victim’s 

ability to identify Camps as her attacker. As such her testimony would not 

have been admissible. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 

711, 728 (Pa. Super. 2015) (explaining that expert opinion testimony based 

on mere possibilities is not competent evidence; expert testimony cannot be 

based solely on conjecture or surmise). The report merely states that it is 

unclear whether the victim’s judgment was impaired when she identified 

Camps as her assailant.

Moreover, given the uncertainties in Ms. Chadha’s assessment, the 

PCRA court did not err in denying Camps’ petition without first holding an 

evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Clark, 961 A.2d 80, 94 (Pa. 

2008) (explaining that, in the absence of a sufficient proffer, a petitioner’s 

bare assertions would inappropriately convert an evidentiary hearing into a 

“fishing expedition” for possible exculpatory evidence).

Finally, trial counsel extensively cross-examined the victim and 

impeached her credibility. See N.T., 6/1/16, at 60-78. “Trial counsel need 

not introduce expert testimony on his client’s behalf if he is able to effectively 

cross-examine prosecution witnesses and elicit helpful testimony.” 

Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 719 A.2d 242. 25 (Pa. 1998). Camps fails 

to explain how Ms. Chadha’s testimony could have added any value.
J-S09029-22

- 9 -

In sum, our review of the record provides ample evidence to support 

the PCRA court’s conclusion that Camps failed to meet his burden of 

establishing trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. We therefore affirm the PCRA 

court’s order denying him post-conviction relief.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/27/2022