SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0432-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v. 

ANTHONY FIELD, a/k/a 

ANTHONY LEE HOWARD 

FIELD, and ANTHONY 

HOWARD FIELDS,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Submitted November 18, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Messano, Vernoia, and Susswein. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 14-09-2290. 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Marcia H. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Lucille M. 

Rosano, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

August 13, 2020
2

A-0432-17T4

PER CURIAM

Defendant Anthony Field appeals from his conviction and aggregate 

ninety-nine-year sentence for a 2013 Christmas morning shooting that left three 

victims dead and two others injured. Based on our review of the record, we 

reject defendant's claims the court erred in its jury instruction on flight, by

admitting testimony from a police detective, and in imposing sentence, and we 

affirm. 

I.

Just past midnight on the morning of December 25, 2013, Woodley Daniel 

stood in the vestibule entryway of Slick's GoGo Bar (Slick's) in Irvington. 

Daniel worked security at the bar's front door and collected cover charges from

its patrons. He became involved in a physical altercation with a prospective 

customer, later identified as Muhammad Bogar, that spilled out onto the street. 

Multiple gunshots were fired by a single perpetrator, leaving Daniel and two 

others dead and injuring two of the bar's patrons. During the ensuing police 

investigation, multiple witnesses identified defendant as the shooter. 

A grand jury indicted defendant for three counts of first-degree purposeful 

or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (counts one, two and three); two 

counts of first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(a) (counts five and six); two 
3

A-0432-17T4

counts of second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (counts 

seven and eight); first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1) (count four); 

fourth-degree aggravated assault by pointing a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4) 

(count nine); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

5(b) (count ten); and second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun for an 

unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C 39-4(a) (count eleven).1

The trial evidence showed Pierre Clervoyant, Sr. (Clervoyant, Sr.) was 

one of Slick's owners. On December 24, 2013, Clervoyant, Sr., his son, Pierre 

Clervoyant, Jr. (Pierre), and Camille Hedge tended bar while Daniel worked at 

the bar's front door.2 The door opened to a vestibule, which had a second door 

that opened into the bar. Once in the vestibule, patrons walked through a metal 

detector and were patted down by Daniel. There were surveillance cameras 

inside and outside the bar, which worked and recorded on December 24 and 25, 

2013. 

1

 Prior to trial, the court granted the State's motion to amend count four to charge 

a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(2), and counts five and six to charge 

violations of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1). 

2

 Because Pierre Clervoyant, Sr. and Pierre Clervoyant, Jr. share a surname, we 

refer to Pierre Clervoyant, Jr. as Pierre for clarity and to avoid confusion. We 

intend no disrespect by this informality. 
4

A-0432-17T4

Late in the evening on December 24, 2013, defendant entered the bar with 

Imani Sapini and a man Sapini knew as NuNu. Sapini was a friend of defendant, 

who Sapini knew by the name Bullet.3 Sapini was scheduled to perform as a 

singer at the bar. After spending some time in the bar, she exited through the 

front door to smoke, heard gunshots, and ran. At trial, Sapini testified she did 

not see defendant with a gun that evening and did not see the shooter. When 

asked whether she tried to "take a look at the shooter, to see who might 

be . . . pulling the trigger," she responded "No, . . . I didn't. I just ran." She

testified that, on the night of the incident, defendant wore a hat and a jacket with 

a gray stripe on the shoulder. 

Following a Gross4 hearing, portions of a December 31, 2013 statement 

Sapini gave to the police were played for the jury. In the statement, Sapini said 

that after the shooting, she saw defendant run toward Bogar's car with a small 

3

 The parties stipulated defendant's high school football coach gave him this 

nickname because of his quickness, and the judge read the stipulation to the jury, 

informing them they "should not draw any conclusion or inferences from this 

nickname." 

4

 A Gross hearing is a N.J.R.E. "104 hearing . . . the trial court conducts to 

determine the admissibility of a witness's inconsistent out-of-court statement --

offered by the party calling that witness -- by assessing whether the statement is 

reliable. See State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1, 10 (1990)." State v. Greene, ___ N.J. 

___, ___ n.2 (2020) (slip op. at 10).
5

A-0432-17T4

black gun, possibly a nine-millimeter handgun, in his hand. According to her 

statement, after the shooting she and Bogar entered Bogar's car first, and Bogar 

told defendant he could not get in the car "[b]ecause of what just happened." 

Sapini explained that defendant nevertheless entered the back seat of the car, 

"and that's when he put [the gun] to [Bogar's] head, and told [Bogar] that he had 

to take [defendant] and drop him off." 

Bogar knew defendant and Sapini prior to the incident. He testified that 

he and two friends, Mu Trills5and Mushir Cureton, went to the bar to see Sapini 

perform. Bogar drove Trills and Cureton to the bar and parked his car around 

the corner. A surveillance video recording shows Bogar and his friends arriving 

at the bar at 12:26 a.m. 

Bogar testified Sapini told him he would not have to pay the cover charge 

to enter the bar because Sapini was performing. According to Bogar, when he 

and his two friends arrived at the bar, Trills entered first, went through the metal 

detector, was patted down, and was admitted without paying the cover charge. 

5

 The police were unable to locate the individual identified as Mu Trills during 

their investigation. No one identifying themselves as Mu Trills testified at trial. 
6

A-0432-17T4

Daniel then patted Bogar down and told him he had to pay the cover charge.6 

Bogar argued with Daniel about the payment, and Bogar testified Daniel then 

"start[ed] pushing [him], tussling, [and they] started tussling inside the hallway. " 

Bogar explained that during the altercation, Daniel grabbed Bogar by his 

hair, and he and Bogar hit each other. Bogar was pushed out the front door onto 

the street, where he pulled away from Daniel and heard shots fired. Bogar saw 

defendant shooting a black gun, and Bogar ran to his car. 

Bogar explained that after arriving at his car, he started the engine and 

Sapini appeared, entered the car, and sat in the front passenger seat. Defendant 

appeared next, opened the rear door, and got in the car, but Bogar told defendant 

he would not take him anywhere because defendant "just shot them people." 

Defendant pointed a gun at Bogar, started cursing at him and told him to "drive." 

Bogar drove away, dropped defendant off at another location, and then dropped 

off Sapini. Bogar testified he did not have any weapons with him that evening. 

6

 Bogar referred to the individual who required he pay the cover charge and 

with whom he had the physical altercation as the "bouncer." It is undisputed the 

individual was Daniel. 
7

A-0432-17T4

Three days later, Bogar gave a statement to the Essex County Prosecutor's 

Office. Bogar was shown two photo arrays, and he identified defendant's 

photograph in the second array as the individual who was the shooter. 

At trial, Bogar acknowledged that, at the time of the shooting, he was a 

member of a street gang, but he denied knowing whether Sapini was also a 

member. He also denied speaking with Sapini during the three years following 

the shooting and prior to trial. He denied having had any contact with Trills 

following the incident, but he admitted he told the police Trills said he did not 

want to be involved with the investigation. 

Ravin Neal, a dancer at Slick's, also testified at trial, explaining she was 

about to go outside to smoke when she saw Daniel frisk a man at the front door 

and argue with him because the man did not want to leave his weapon outside. 

Neal saw Daniel "tussling" with the man and his friend, who Neal identified as 

one of the decedents. Neal also saw Pierre jump over the bar and join in the 

scuffle, which moved out of the vestibule and onto the street. As Neal stood in 

the doorway, she saw a young man in the middle of the street come toward 

towards the bar door, "and [he] started shooting." 

Neal testified the shooter was alone, had a gun in his hand, and was in the 

middle of the street walking toward the bar while shooting. According to Neal, 
8

A-0432-17T4

prior to the shooting, the man was in a car parked near the bar. Neal testified 

that after he got out of the car, the man went to the middle of the street and shot 

Daniel, Pierre, and a third man. Neal further testified she stood there for a "good 

minute," looked at the shooter's face, and was certain the shooter was not the 

person with whom Daniel tussled at the door. 

On December 25, 2015, Neal gave a statement to the police, explaining 

the shooter wore a hat and she would be able to identify him again. Two weeks 

later, Neal selected defendant's photograph from an array "as being the shooter 

who was outside [the bar]." Neal did not want to sign her name on the 

photograph when she made the identification, but the photo array identification 

procedure was played for the jury. Neal identified defendant as the shooter at 

trial. 

Guenson Adolphe, Pierre's friend and a regular patron of the bar, arrived 

at about 8:00 p.m. He left the bar, and, when he later returned, he saw Daniel 

fighting with a man near the bar's front door. Adolphe believed the argument 

started because the man did not want to be patted down. Adolphe testified the 

man fighting with Daniel was slim and had dreadlocks. 

Adolphe saw Daniel grab the man and attempt to escort him out the door, 

and the two men tussled inside the vestibule and swung at each other. Adolphe 
9

A-0432-17T4

saw Pierre jump over the bar to try to break up the fight, and Adolphe also 

attempted to break up the fight. The fight spilled onto the street, and Adolphe 

"followed everyone outside the bar as well." 

Adolphe testified that once outside, "he saw an individual, [and] the barrel 

of the gun pointing at [him]." He heard the shooter say "I'm going to kill all

y'all." Adolphe put his hands up and was shot in the forearm. He landed on the 

ground facing the bar with his back to the street, and he "played dead." He heard 

several more gunshots and was shot in his left foot. After the shooting ended 

and "people started coming out" of the bar, Adolphe stood up and a friend drove 

him to the hospital. The police first interviewed Adolphe on December 26, 

2013, after his admission to the hospital. He told the police that he believed a 

friend of the man who fought with Daniel was the shooter, and that the shooter 

also had dreadlocks. On January 15, 2014, Adolphe was questioned a second 

time, and he said the shooter was 5'6" or 5'7" tall, with light brown skin, a 

"Sunni-style" beard, and dark clothing. Adolphe was shown two photo arrays,

and he selected defendant's photograph and identified defendant as the shooter. 

Adolphe also identified defendant as the shooter at trial. 

Richard Duvivier was also at the bar when the shooting occurred. He 

testified that at around 12:30 a.m., he saw an altercation between Daniel and a 
10 A-0432-17T4

man at the front door, and he saw Pierre jump over the bar and head toward the 

door. Duvivier followed Pierre to the door, where he saw Daniel on top of a 

man, trying to restrain him. Duvivier heard multiple gunshots and saw the 

shooter fire at Daniel. Duvivier was shot in the ankle and the arm. 

On the day following the incident, Duvivier gave a statement to the police 

in which he described the shooter as being 5'6" or 5'7" tall, light-brown skin, 

with a "Sunni-style" beard, short hair, dark clothing, a burgundy shirt, and 

possibly a skully or hat. Duvivier said the gunman shot Daniel first and he 

assumed the shooter had arrived at the bar with the man who was involved in 

the altercation with Daniel. Two days after his initial statement, Duvivier 

identified defendant in a photo array as the shooter. 

Khaalia Mumford lived with defendant in December 2013 and is the 

mother of his children. She testified that on the night of the incident, defendant 

wore a black sweater with a gray stripe down the sleeve and black khaki pants 

with big pockets. At trial, Mumford identified defendant on the bar's 

surveillance recordings at different times during the incident and identified 

defendant in still photographs from the surveillance recordings. 

Mumford also testified defendant arrived at their home in the early 

morning on December 25, 2013 and told her, "[he] may be in trouble." He then 
11 A-0432-17T4

left and returned around noon with gifts for their children. Defendant left shortly 

after the children opened their gifts, and Mumford had not heard from him since 

that day. She later learned defendant went to Florida, but she was unaware he

had plans to travel there. 

After the shooting, Daniel and Cureton were found unresponsive and were 

pronounced dead at the scene. Cureton suffered six gunshot wounds, including 

wounds to the face, chest, back, right arm, and right hand. Daniel suffered three 

gunshot wounds—to his head, right forearm, and right hip. Daniel and Cureton 

shared the same cause of death: multiple gunshot wounds. 

Pierre was in and out of consciousness when the police arrived and was

later pronounced dead at the hospital. It was determined his cause of death was 

three gunshot wounds to his lower back and buttocks. 

Duvivier suffered two gunshot wounds, was in the hospital for three days, 

and continued to see a doctor as an outpatient for one-and-a-half years. As a 

result of his injuries, Duvivier has difficulty walking, and, at the time of trial, 

he could not rotate his arm. 

Adolphe was in the hospital for three days as a result of the gunshot 

wounds to his right arm, right hand, and left foot. He had surgery on his foot 

about three to four months after the incident and used crutches for six months 
12 A-0432-17T4

thereafter. As a result of his injuries, Adolphe has no feeling in his right hand 

and pain in his left foot during cold weather, and he was forced him to drop out 

of the state corrections academy. 

Ten shell casings and a partial bullet fragment from a .45 caliber 

semiautomatic pistol were recovered from outside the bar. No gun was ever 

recovered. On January 28, 2014, law enforcement arrested defendant in Florida 

and returned him to New Jersey. 

The jury convicted defendant of the murder of Daniel as charged in count 

two and the lesser-included offenses of aggravated manslaughter of Pierre and 

Cureton under counts one and three respectively. The jury also convicted 

defendant of the lesser-included offenses of third-degree aggravated assault by 

causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon to Duvivier (count seven) and 

Adolphe (count eight); of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun 

(count ten); and of second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful 

purpose (count eleven). The jury found defendant not guilty of kidnapping 

Bogar (count five) and Sapini (count six) and of carjacking Bogar (count four). 

The court sentenced defendant to forty-five years on the murder 

conviction subject to the requirements of the No Early Release Act (NERA), 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court sentenced defendant to twenty-seven years for 
13 A-0432-17T4

the aggravated manslaughter of Pierre and eighteen years for the aggravated 

manslaughter of Cureton, with each sentence subject to NERA's requirements. 

The court sentenced defendant to four-and-one-half years on each of the

aggravated assault convictions. The court merged the weapons offenses with 

defendant's murder conviction. The court ordered that the sentences be served 

consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of ninety-nine years with a 

seventy-six-and-one-half-year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to NERA.7 

This appeal followed.

Defendant offers the following arguments for our consideration: 

POINT I

THE INSTRUCTION ON FLIGHT AS 

CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT WAS 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT SHIFTED 

THE BURDEN OF PROOF FROM THE STATE TO 

THE DEFENDANT.

POINT II

IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE 

DETECTIVE TO GIVE HIS OPINION ON THE 

ULTIMATE ISSUE IN THE CASE AND TESTIFY 

THAT, HAVING VIEWED THE SAME VIDEO AS 

THE JURY, HE HAD IDENTIFIED THE PERSON 

"WHO MURDERED THE PEOPLE AT SLICK' S."

7

 The court later entered an amended judgment of conviction reflecting a fifteenyear period of parole supervision following defendant's release from 

incarceration. 
14 A-0432-17T4

POINT III

THE IMPOSITION OF FIVE CONSECUTIVE

TERMS, AMOUNTING TO A SENTENCE OF 99 

YEARS, WITH A PAROLE DISQUALIFIER OF 76 

1/2 YEARS, IS A DE FACTO TERM OF LIFE 

WITHOUT PAROLE. IT WAS IMPOSED WITHOUT 

SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT'S 

YOUTH AND ON QUESTIONABLE FACTUAL 

FINDINGS, IS GROSSLY EXCESSIVE FOR THIS 

TEENAGER, AND AMOUNTS TO CRUEL AND 

UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.

II.

A.

Defendant objected to the State's request for a jury instruction on flight as 

consciousness of guilt. The court overruled the objection and, during the charge 

conference, addressed with counsel the substance of the flight charge. As part 

of the court's final charge to the jury, it included the model jury instruction on 

flight.8 See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Flight" (rev. May 10, 2010). 

Defendant did not object to the substance of the charge as instructed by the court. 

8

 The court deviated from the model jury charge by including a sentence 

distinguishing the jury's consideration of flight as evidence of consciousness of 

guilt and flight as an element of the kidnapping offense for which defendant was 

charged. Defendant does not challenge the inclusion of the sentence, or the 

distinction it made, on appeal. 
15 A-0432-17T4

"The appropriate time to object to a jury charge is 'before the jury retires 

to consider its verdict.'" State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016) (quoting 

R. 1:7-2). Where a defendant fails to object to a jury charge at trial, we review 

for plain error and "disregard any alleged error 'unless it is of such a nature as 

to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'" Ibid. (quoting R.

2:10-2). "To warrant reversal . . . , an error at trial must be sufficient to raise 'a 

reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise 

might not have reached.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 361 

(2004)). 

For the first time on appeal, defendant claims the flight instruction 

improperly shifted the burden to him to prove the reason for his flight and to 

"disprove flight in order to avoid the damaging consciousness-of-guilt 

inference." Defendant also argues the court erred by giving the flight instruction 

prior to instructing the jury on the substantive offenses, including the State 's 

burden of proving the elements of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable 

doubt. We find defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), beyond the following brief 

comments.
16 A-0432-17T4

The court's flight charge was comprised of a nearly verbatim restatement 

of the model jury charge, which is consistent with our Supreme Court's standard

for an instruction on "the inferences the jury may draw" from evidence of flight 

as consciousness of guilt. State v. Mann, 132 N.J. 410, 420 (1993). As the 

Court explained in Mann, an instruction on flight requires the jury "first . . . find 

that there was a departure, and then to find a motive for the departure . . . that 

would turn the departure into flight." Id. at 421. The Court further explained 

that if the defendant "offers an explanation for the departure, the trial court 

should instruct the jury that if it finds the defendant's explanation credible, it 

should not draw any inference of the defendant's consciousness of guilt from the 

defendant's departure." Ibid. 

The model jury charge is in precise accord with the Court's instructions in 

Mann, and, contrary to defendant's claim, the charge did not expressly or 

implicitly impose any burden of proof on defendant or any requirement that he 

disprove anything. The instruction merely explained the manner in which the 

jury should consider the evidence, but only if it first determined "defendant, 

fearing that an accusation or arrest would be made against him on the charge 

involved in this indictment, took refuge in flight for the purpose of evading the 

accusation or arrest." See, e.g., State v. Randolph, 228 N.J. 566, 594-95 (2017) 
17 A-0432-17T4

(explaining "[f]light will have 'legal significance' if the circumstances 

'reasonably justify an inference that it was done with a consciousness of guilt'"

(quoting State v. Ingram, 196 N.J. 23, 46 (2008))); see also State v. Latney, 415 

N.J. Super. 169, 175-76 (App. Div. 2010) (same). The instruction did not 

impose any burden on defendant or define any elements of the offenses for 

which he was charged. 

In reviewing the adequacy of a court's charge to the jury, we must consider 

the charge as a whole in determining whether it is prejudicial. See State v. 

Figueroa, 190 N.J. 219, 246 (2007). As part of its final charge to the jury, the 

court repeatedly stated the State has the burden of proving the elements of the 

offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that the burden "never shifts to 

[ ] defendant." There is nothing in the court's flight instruction suggesting 

anything to the contrary. 

We therefore find no error in the model jury charge or in the court's use 

of it to instruct the jury on flight as consciousness of guilt. See State v. 

Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017) (finding where a defendant does not object 

to the charge, "'there is a presumption that the charge was not error and was 

unlikely to prejudice . . . defendant's case'" (quoting State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 

157, 182 (2012))); State v. Whitaker, 402 N.J. Super. 495, 513-14 (App. Div. 
18 A-0432-17T4

2008) ("When a jury instruction follows the model jury charge, although not 

determinative, 'it is a persuasive argument in favor of the charge as delivered.'"

(quoting State v. Angoy, 329 N.J. Super. 79, 84 (App. Div. 2000))); see also

State v. Rodriguez, 365 N.J. Super. 38, 53-54 (App. Div. 2003) (finding no error 

in a jury charge reciting verbatim a model jury charge consistent with New 

Jersey precedent). 

B.

During the presentation of the State's case, Newark Police homicide 

detective Murad Muhammad testified about the investigation leading to 

defendant's arrest. Early in the investigation, Muhammad reviewed surveillance 

recordings from Slick's that "contain[ed] the actual shooting." During the 

playing of one of the recordings at trial, the prosecutor questioned Muhammad 

as follows:

PROSECUTOR: Now, Detective, you've viewed this 

video before; correct?

MUHAMMAD: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: Were you able to make any sort of 

determination with regards to the shooter, upon your 

viewing of this video?

MUHAMMAD: Yes.
19 A-0432-17T4

PROSECUTOR: And can you tell us what . . . some 

determinations that you made with regard to this 

particular video. Of the shooter. 

 . . . . 

PROSECUTOR: What determinations did you make, 

Detective?

MUHAMMAD: The identity of the -- who the shooter 

was.

PROSECUTOR: Identity in what sense?

MUHAMMAD: Who murdered the people at Slick's.

PROSECUTOR: And is that by the body type?

DETECTIVE MUHAMMAD: Yes. 

Defendant argues the recordings were of poor quality; Bogar's, Neal's, 

Adolphe's, and Duvivier's identifications of him as the shooter "were less than 

rock-solid"; and the State impermissibly buttressed its case by having 

Muhammad testify he identified defendant as the shooter. Defendant claims 

Muhammad's testimony constituted either inadmissible lay opinion, see N.J.R.E. 

701, or expert opinion, see N.J.R.E. 702, because it constituted an opinion 

concerning defendant's identity and guilt. 

We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 260 (2013). Where, as here, 

defendant did not object to the challenged testimony, if the evidence was 
20 A-0432-17T4

admitted in error we also must determine whether its admission is "plain error. 

We may reverse on the basis of unchallenged error only if the error was 'clearly 

capable of producing an unjust result.'" See State v. Ross, 229 N.J. 389, 407 

(2017) (quoting R. 2:10-2). "To warrant reversal . . . an error at trial must be 

sufficient to raise 'a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to 

a result it otherwise might not have reached.'" Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 79

(citation omitted) (quoting Jenkins, 178 N.J. at 361).

Defendant's argument is based on the inaccurate factual premise that 

Muhammad opined defendant was the shooter and was guilty. A plain reading 

of the questions posed by the prosecutor and Muhammad's responses 

demonstrates otherwise. Neither the prosecutor nor Muhammad mentions

defendant; Muhammad does not identify defendant on the video recording or 

otherwise as the shooter; and Muhammad does not opine on defendant's guilt.

We also reject defendant's claim that despite the lack of any reference to 

defendant as the shooter, "the sole and inexorable inference from the detective's

testimony that he identified the shooter was that he had determined it was "

defendant. The argument is undermined by the record. 

The prosecutor inquired about Muhammad's investigation and whether, 

based on his review of the recording, he made "any determinations with regards 
21 A-0432-17T4

to the shooter." Muhammad explained he made a determination as to "the 

identity of the . . . shooter," but the prosecutor did not ask if Muhammad

identified a particular person as the shooter and Muhammad never said he 

identified defendant or anyone else as the shooter. To the contrary, the 

prosecutor asked only "in what sense" had Muhammad determined the "identity"

of the shooter, and Muhammad vaguely explained it was "by the body type." 

Muhammad did not suggest his determination about the shooter's body type 

resulted in defendant's identification or that he relied on the determination to 

take any other actions during the investigation. Cf. State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9,

21-22 (2012) (finding improper detective's testimony explaining why he put a 

defendant's photo in an array because it "enhanced the victim's credibility and 

intruded on the jury's role"). 

In sum, we are not convinced Muhammad's vague reference to his 

determination concerning the identity of the shooter by his or her body type

constituted an opinion concerning defendant's identity as the shooter, 

defendant's guilt, or anything else. He testified he made a determination, but he 

did not explain it in any discernable manner related to defendant, and he did not 

offer any opinions based on it. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's 

admission of the testimony. 
22 A-0432-17T4

Moreover, even accepting defendant's claim Muhammad's testimony may 

have been interpreted in some inexplicable manner as an opinion about 

defendant's identity or guilt, we do not find its admission raises "a reasonable 

doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have 

reached." Ross, 229 N.J. at 407. 

Defendant correctly argues identification was the central issue at trial, but 

the identification evidence against him was overwhelming. Defendant was 

separately and independently identified as the shooter by four different 

witnesses, one of whom knew defendant prior to the shootings. In her statement 

to the police following the shooting, Sapini, who arrived at the bar that evening 

with defendant, explained that defendant, armed with a handgun, entered 

Bogar's car immediately following the shooting. Defendant was also identified 

on the video recordings by the mother of his children, and the jury was able to 

review the recordings during the trial. Muhammad's vague testimony about a 

determination he made about the shooter's body type added nothing, and the 

testimony, even if improper, does not raise reasonable doubt that its admission 

led to a result the jury would not have otherwise reached. See Ross, 229 N.J. at

407; R. 2:10-2. 
23 A-0432-17T4

C.

Defendant argues his aggregate ninety-nine-year sentence is excessive, 

constitutes a de facto life sentence, and is an unconstitutional cruel and unusual 

punishment. He contends the court erred by failing to consider his age—

nineteen—in its sentencing determination, and by failing to apply the standards 

for imposition of consecutive sentences established in State v. Yarbough, 100 

N.J. 627 (1985). 

Our review of a court's sentencing decision "is relatively narrow and is 

governed by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 

297 (2010). We "must affirm the sentence of a trial court unless: (1) the 

sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and 

mitigating factors were not 'based upon competent credible evidence in the 

record;' or (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shock[s] 

the judicial conscience.'" State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (quoting 

State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)). 

We are further "bound to affirm a sentence, even if [we] would have 

arrived at a different result, as long as the trial court properly identifies and 

balances aggravating and mitigating factors that are supported by competent 
24 A-0432-17T4

credible evidence in the record." State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989). 

An appellate court should modify a sentence "only when the trial court's 

determination was 'clearly mistaken.'" State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1, 6 (1990) 

(quoting State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 401 (1989)).

Defendant argues that, because he was nineteen years old when he 

committed the offenses for which he was convicted, the sentencing court was 

required to apply the principles established in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 

(2012), and State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017), for the determination of a 

juvenile's sentence that is "the practical equivalent of life without parole,"

Zuber, 227 N.J. at 429. We reject the argument because Miller and Zuber

considered sentencing principles applicable to juveniles, and defendant was an 

adult when he committed the murder, two aggravated manslaughters, and two 

aggravated assaults for which he was convicted and sentenced. See N.J.S.A. 

2A:4A-22(a) (defining, under the Code of Juvenile Justice, a "[j]uvenile" as "an 

individual who is under the age of 18 years"). The principles addressed and 

established in Miller and Zuber are inapposite here. 

Although the court correctly rejected defendant's reliance on Miller and 

Zuber, it nonetheless considered defendant's age and the Zuber factors in its 

sentencing decision. In Zuber, the Court explained that a court determining 
25 A-0432-17T4

whether to impose a lengthy term of imprisonment for a juvenile "should 

consider factors such as [the] defendant's 'immaturity, impetuosity, and failure 

to appreciate risks and consequences'; 'family and home environment'; family 

and peer pressures; 'inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors' or his 

own attorney; and 'the possibility of rehabilitation.'" 227 N.J. at 453 (quoting 

Miller, 567 U.S. at 478).

Here, the court addressed defendant's "chronological age and its hallmark 

features[,]" Zuber, 227 N.J. at 445 (quoting Miller, 576 U.S. at 477), noting 

defendant's "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 

consequences" and that, at age nineteen, defendant made decisions he would not 

make with more "worldly experience." The court also considered defendant's 

family environment and family and peer pressures, see ibid., concluding 

defendant's family environment appeared "entirely solid" and there was no 

evidence family or peer pressure played any part in defendant's crimes. To the 

contrary, the judge found defendant's "independent act or decision to . . . rachet 

it up into a homicidal act was that in the mind of [defendant] . . . alone." 

The court further found defendant's actions suggested a level of "some 

sophistication," explaining defendant left the jurisdiction following the 

shootings. The court also addressed defendant's prospect for rehabilitation, 
26 A-0432-17T4

explaining that was the "only factor that really mitigates in any significant form 

towards [defendant]" because, as a young man, rehabilitation is "more likely to 

occur as [a] . . . youthful offender ages and neurological development 

increases." Thus, contrary to defendant's contention, the court considered 

defendant's age, characterizing it as "a non-statutory mitigating factor," and 

defendant's potential for rehabilitation in its sentencing calculus.9

In addition to its consideration of defendant's age, the court found and 

weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and 

(b). The court's findings are supported by the record. Bolvito, 217 N.J. at 228 

(explaining a court's finding of aggravating and mitigating factors must be 

supported by competent record evidence). The court found aggravating factor 

three, the risk defendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3). 

9

 Although age is not distinctly identified as a factor to be considered under our 

sentencing statutes, see, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b), a court may properly 

consider a defendant's age in its assessment of mitigating factors two, "[t]he 

defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious 

harm," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2); four, "[t]here were substantial grounds tending 

to excuse or justify the defendant's conduct, though failing to establish a 

defense," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4); eight, "[t]he defendant's conduct was the 

result of circumstances unlikely to recur," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8); and thirteen, 

"[t]he conduct of a youthful defendant was substantially influenced by another 

person more mature than the defendant," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(13). Here, 

however, defendant presented no evidence, other than he was nineteen when the 

crimes were committed, supporting a finding of any of these mitigating factors.
27 A-0432-17T4

As noted by the sentencing court, the factor is supported by evidence showing 

defendant's prior minor brush with the law—a 2013 municipal court 

conviction—did not dissuade him from committing the knowing and purposeful 

murder, aggravated manslaughters, aggravated assaults, and weapons offenses 

for which he was convicted. Although the court did not expressly correlate 

defendant's failure to accept any responsibility for his actions and lack of any 

remorse as a basis for its finding of aggravating factor three, those facts also 

support its finding there is a risk defendant will commit another offense. See

State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 427 (2001) (finding defendant's failure to accept 

responsibility for his crimes "does not irrefutably prove that [the] defendant is 

likely to re-offend, but it does provide support for" such a conclusion). 

The evidence also supports the court's finding of aggravating factor nine, 

the need to deter defendant and others from violating the law, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(9). The court found there was a need for general and specific deterrence 

because defendant engaged in gun violence, caused the death of three 

individuals, and caused long-lasting injuries to two others. The court correctly 

noted that the need for deterrence increases proportionately with the degree of 

the offenses for which a defendant is sentenced, and that defendant committed 

the most serious crime found in our Criminal Code, knowing and purposeful 
28 A-0432-17T4

murder, as well as two aggravated manslaughters and two aggravated assaults. 

See Carey, 168 N.J. at 427; see also State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 501 (1996) 

("[D]emands for deterrence are strengthened in direct proportion to the gravity 

and harmlessness of the offense and the deliberateness of the offender." (citation 

omitted)). 

The court further appropriately considered "defendant's role in the 

incident to determine" there was a "need to deter him from further crimes and 

the corresponding need to protect the public from him." Megargel, 143 N.J. at 

501. "As the Court has held, '[t]he paramount reason we focus on the severity 

of the crime is to assure the protection of the public and the deterrence of others. 

The higher the degree of the crime, the greater the public need for protection 

and the more need for deterrence.'" State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 74 (2014) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Megargel, 143 N.J. at 500). Here, the number 

and seriousness of the crimes defendant committed support the court's finding 

of aggravating factor nine. 

The court found mitigating factor seven, defendant has no prior history or 

prior delinquency or criminal activity and lead a law-abiding life for a 

substantial period of time prior to the commission of the present offenses, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). The court explained that but for his municipal court 
29 A-0432-17T4

conviction, defendant had led a law-abiding life, and concluded defendant's 

record supported a finding of the factor. 

The court's weighing of the factors also finds support in the record. The 

court weighed defendant's age and "lack of . . . criminal sophistication" against 

the need for general and specific deterrence, to which the court assigned heavy 

weight. The court further found the aggravating factors preponderated over the 

mitigating factors. We discern no basis to "second guess" the court's findings 

and determination, see Megargel, 143 N.J. at 494 ("Judges who exercise 

discretion and comply with the principles of sentencing remain free from the 

fear of 'second guessing.'" (citation omitted)), because they are supported by the 

record. 

We also find no abuse of the court's discretion in its imposition of the 

terms of imprisonment for each of the offenses. The court's finding the 

aggravating factors preponderate over the mitigating factors supported the terms 

of imprisonment imposed for each of the offenses. 

We reject defendant's assertion the court erred by imposing consecutive 

sentences for the murder, two aggravated manslaughters, and two aggravated 

assaults. Defendant argues that because the indictment charged defendant with 

three counts of murder but the jury convicted him of only one count of murder, 
30 A-0432-17T4

the jury found defendant had only one purpose—to kill Daniel—and therefore, 

"the crimes and their objectives were not predominantly independent of each 

other[.]" Defendant claims that "[b]y rejecting murder convictions for two of 

the decedents and returning manslaughter verdicts for them, the jury concluded 

that their deaths were the reckless byproduct of the singular objective to kill the 

third victim." Moreover, defendant contends that his crimes were committed so 

closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior. 

When a defendant receives multiple sentences of imprisonment "for more 

than one offense, . . . such multiple sentences shall run concurrently or 

consecutively as the court determines at the time of sentence." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

5(a). The statute does not define when consecutive or concurrent sentences are 

appropriate. In Yarbough, the Court set forth the following guidelines for 

determining whether a consecutive sentence is appropriate:

(1) there can be no free crimes in a system for which 

the punishment shall fit the crime;

(2) the reasons for imposing either a consecutive or 

concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the 

sentencing decision;

(3) some reasons to be considered by the sentencing 

court should include facts relating to the crimes, 

including whether or not:
31 A-0432-17T4

(a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly 

independent of each other;

(b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or 

threats of violence;

(c) the crimes were committed at different times or 

separate places, rather than being committed so closely 

in time and place as to indicate a single period of 

aberrant behavior;

(d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims;

(e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be 

imposed are numerous;

(4) there should be no double counting of aggravating 

factors;

(5) successive terms for the same offense should not 

ordinarily be equal to the punishment for the first 

offense[.]

[100 N.J. at 643-44 (footnote omitted).]

"A sixth factor, which imposed 'an overall outer limit on the cumulation 

of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses not to exceed the sum of the 

longest terms,' was eliminated by the Legislature in a 1993 amendment to"

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a). State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359, 372 n.4 (2019). The statute 

now provides "[t]here shall be no overall outer limit on the cumulation of 

consecutive sentences for multiple offenses." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a). 
32 A-0432-17T4

The court's imposition of consecutive terms for the murder, two counts of 

aggravated manslaughter, and two counts of aggravated assault was based on a 

reasoned application of the Yarbough standards. Although we find the court's 

determination the crimes were not committed so closely in time as to indicate a 

single period of aberrant behavior is not supported by the record, the court's 

other findings support its imposition of consecutive terms for what it found were 

crimes involving "separate acts of violence or threats of violence" involving 

"multiple victims." See, e.g., Carey, 168 N.J. at 427-28 (explaining a 

consecutive sentence can be imposed even if a majority of the Yarbough factors 

support concurrent sentences). 

"[C]rimes involving multiple victims represent an especially suitable 

circumstance for the imposition of consecutive sentences because the 'total 

impact of singular offenses against different victims will generally exceed the 

total impact on a single individual who is victimized multiple times.'" State v. 

Molina, 168 N.J. 436, 442 (2001) (quoting Carey, 168 N.J. at 428). Thus, "the 

multiple-victims factor is entitled to great weight and should ordinarily result in 

the imposition of at least two consecutive terms when multiple deaths or serious 

bodily injuries have been inflicted upon multiple victims by the defendant." 

Carey, 168 N.J. at 429-30. As the Court has explained, a "core principle" in 
33 A-0432-17T4

determining whether to impose consecutive sentences is that "by virtue of their 

impact on multiple lives, crimes involving two or more victims are particularly 

suited for the imposition of consecutive sentences." Liepe, 239 N.J. at 375. That 

principle "resonates most clearly in cases in which a perpetrator intentionally 

targets multiple victims" but it also applies in "cases in which . . . the defendant 

does not intend to harm multiple victims but it is foreseeable that his or her 

reckless conduct will result in multiple victims." Ibid. (quoting Carey, 168 N.J. 

at 429).

Defendant caused the death of three individuals and bodily injury to two 

others. The court correctly determined defendant's violent crimes committed 

against five separate victims constituted separate crimes for which consecutive 

sentences were appropriate. We are therefore satisfied the court's application of 

the Yarbough factors and decision to impose consecutive sentences for the five 

violent crimes for which defendant was convicted was supported by the record, 

see, e.g., id. at 377-78 (finding three consecutive custodial sentences were 

warranted where there were "injuries inflicted on multiple victims"); Carey, 168 

N.J. at 430-31 (finding it "appropriate to impose consecutive sentences on 

defendants" whose crimes "result in multiple deaths or multiple persons 

sustaining serious personal injuries"), and not so wide of the mark as to require 
34 A-0432-17T4

our intervention, see ibid. (applying abuse of discretion standard to review a trial 

court's imposition of consecutive sentences). 

The fairness of the overall sentence should be considered in reviewing the 

imposition of consecutive sentences, State v. Sutton, 132 N.J. 471, 485 (1993), 

and defendant argues his aggregate ninety-nine-year sentence should shock our 

judicial conscience and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. To be sure, 

the court imposed a very long sentence, but the sentence's validity is not 

measured by its length. A determination of whether a sentence shocks the 

judicial conscience requires consideration of the court's "application of the 

guidelines to the facts of [the] case." Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70. The court properly 

applied the sentencing guidelines to defendant's unspeakable and indiscriminate 

gun violence that resulted in the death of three innocent victims and bodily 

injury to two others. As the Court explained in Liepe, "defendant may spend 

the rest of his life in jail[,]" however, the trial court's task "was not to ensure 

defendant's eventual release, but to devise a sentence commensurate with 

defendant's crimes." 239 N.J. at 379. Because the "consecutive terms do not 

violate statutory or judicial guidelines for sentencing," and the aggregate term 

imposed "do[es] not shock the judicial conscience[,]" we find the court did not 

abuse its discretion. Ibid.
35 A-0432-17T4

Any other arguments made by defendant that we have not expressly 

addressed are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.