alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-60238 Conference Calendar

RICHARD SIMS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus CHRISTOPHER EPPS; EDWARD HARGETT, SUPERINTENDENT, MISSISSIPPI STATE PENITENTIARY; EARL JACKSON, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 4:95CV174-B-D

- - - - - - - - - - August 22, 1996 Before KING, DUHÉ, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Richard Sims, Mississippi prisoner #55462, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Sims contends that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his claims that the extension of his solitary confinement under a new prison policy violated his due process rights and the Ex Post Facto Clause. Sims’ placement in solitary confinement did not violateNo. 96-60238 - 2 - his due process rights because it did not impose an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v. Conner , 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995). Assuming that the new prison policy which allows prison officials to extend solitary confinement is a law within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the application of the policy to Sims did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it did not make his punishment more burdensome by increasing the length of his term of imprisonment or affecting his good-time credits. Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990). Sims also argues that the district court failed to address his claims that his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights and his Equal Protection rights were violated. The district court considered and dismissed his claim that under the Fifth Amendment he was entitled to notice and a hearing before the application of the new prison policy to him. Sims’ Eighth Amendment claim lacks merit as he has not shown that the conditions of his solitary confinement caused more than mere discomfort or inconvenience.
See Wilson v. Lynaugh , 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 493 U.S. 969 (1989). Sims’ equal-protection claim lacks merit as he has not shown that he was treated differently from similarly-situated prisoners, or that the defendants had a discriminatory purpose for the alleged singular treatment. See Lavernia v. Lynaugh , 845 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1988). Sims’ appeal is without arguable merit and is thusNo. 96-60238 - 3 - frivolous. See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Therefore his appeal is DISMISSED. 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
## FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 09/25/98 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK 

### PUBLISH IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________________ No. 95-8459

________________________________ D.C. Docket Nos. 1:91-CV-2399-ODE 1:91-CV-2400-ODE 1:91-CV-2401-ODE STACY C. GRAY, individually and as Surviving Spouse of Lt. Douglas G. Gray, and as Personal Representative of Lt. Douglas G. Gray, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,
versus LOCKHEED AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS COMPANY, a division of Lockheed Corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,

----------------------------------------------------------------- GRACE M. SCHUMACHER, individually and as Surviving Parent of Lt. John T. Hartman, and as Personal Representative of Lt. John Hartman, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, versus LOCKHEED AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS COMPANY, a division of Lockheed Corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,

----------------------------------------------------------------- WILMA J. JENNINGS, individually, and as Surviving Parent of Lt. David S. Jennings, and as Personal Representative of Lt. David S. Jennings, Deceased,2 Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,
versus LOCKHEED AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS COMPANY, a division of Lockheed Corporation, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,

_________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

_________________________________________________________________ (September 25, 1998) ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, Circu it Judge, and CLARK, Senior Circuit Judge. PER CURIAM: This case is before the court on remand from the United States Supreme Court for further consideration of our earlier opinion in light of Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. , 118 S. Ct. 1890 (1998). In accord with the Court’s opinion, we reverse our previous holding that appellees may recover damages for pain and suffering on their survival action claims based on general maritime law in conjunction with the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 761-768. See Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co. , 125 F.3d 1371, 1381-86 (11th Cir. 1997). We affirm the remainder of our decision that does not touch such survival action claims, and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with our decision and Dooley
. REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-1300

ANTHONY CURTIS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

MARYLAND NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING

COMMISSION,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-97-4266-AW)

Submitted: May 25, 1999 Decided: May 28, 1999

Before ERVIN, WILKINS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony Curtis, Silver Spring, Maryland, Appellant Pro Se. William

Charles Dickerson, MARYLAND NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING

COMMISSION, Riverdale, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* The district court order was filed January 29, 1999.

2

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Curtis appeals the district court’s order granting Defendant summary judgment in Curtis’s racial discrimination action

filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We

have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find

no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the

district court. See Curtis v. Maryland Nat’l Capital Park, No. CA97-4266-AW (D. Md. Feb. 2, 1999).* We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Charles F. Scott, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Boklan, J.), rendered September 27, 1989, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the defendant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631; *cf., People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606). We note that the defendant pleaded guilty based upon the understanding that all motions, decided or undecided, were withdrawn. Thompson, J. P., Brown, Balletta, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
#### COMPTON v. STATE.

No. 19992.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 19, 1938.

Geo. J. Jennings, of Tulia, for appellant

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

Conviction is for felony theft by conversion, punishment being two years in the penitentiary.

The indictment properly charges the offense. No statement of facts or bills of exception are found in the record. Nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.-,
#### CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI v. JOHNSON.

No. 8926.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

July 20, 1932.

John S. McCampbell, of Corpus Christi, for appellant. .

Sidney P. Chandler, of Corpus Christi, for appellee.

FLY, C. J.

Appellee seeks to dismiss the appeal to this court because appellant did not file the transcript of the proceedings in the justice’s court on the first day of the first term of the county court after the rendition of the judgment in the justice’s court, nor on the first day of the second term showing good cause for the failure to file at the first term. It is not claimed that the appeal had not been perfected by appellant to the- county court, unless a failure to give notice as shown by the transcript prevented the perfection of an appeal. The county court sustained the appeal, and it will be presumed that he found that appellant had done all that was required of it to perfect its appeal. The county court overruled a motion to dismiss.

When the appeal was perfected by appellant, it was the duty of the justice of the peace to file a transcript of the proceedings in his court in the county court, as required by law, and the appellant would not be held liable for a failure of the justice of the peace to perform his duty. Patty v. Miller, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 308, 24 S. W. 330; Campbell v. Bechsenschutz (Tex. Civ. App.) 25 S. W. 971; Tevebaugh v. Smith Land Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 146 S. W. 647; Imperial Motor Sales Co. v. Brannon (Tex. Civ. App.) 217 S. W. 761; McCorvey v. Huddleston (Tex. Civ. App.) 262 S. W. 567; Gillaspie v. Streeter (Tex. Civ. App.) 300 S. W. 966; Wells v. Driskell, 105 Tex. 77, 145 S. W. 333. The statute, article 2459, Revised Texas Statutes, requires the justice of the peace, when an appeal is taken from his court, to prepare the transcript and to send the same to the proper court. When a party has perfected his appeal to the *county*or district court from a justice’s court, there is no further duty resting upon him in connection with the transcript.

The county judge overruled a motion to dismiss the appeal made on the grounds that no notice of appeal was given in the justice’s court and that the transcript was not filed in the statutory time. It must have been found that no notice was required by the statute, but, if required, that the justice of the peace had notice of the appeal, because otherwise he would not have prepared a transcript, and that it was his fault that the same was not filed, as required by law, and appellant should not be deprived of the appeal because of the delinquency of the justice of the peace. The city did all it was required to do, and the county court had jurisdiction of the cause.

The motion to dismiss the appeal in this court is overruled.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0524-12

DERWIN TRISHON BROWN, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

A jury found Appellant guilty of failure to register as a sex offender and assessed

punishment at sixteen years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed

the conviction. Brown v. State, No. 05-10-00162-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011). Appellant

has filed a petition for discretionary review contending the Court of Appeals erred in holding
(1) the State does not have to establish that the Department of Public Safety made a finding

that an out of state conviction is substantially similar to a Texas offense that requires sex

offender registration; and (2) it was not error for the trial court to charge the jury that, as a

matter of law, his previous conviction in Louisiana is for an offense that is substantially

similar to a Texas offense that requires sex offender registration.

This Court granted discretionary review in Crabtree, in order to address whether article

62.003(a) means that an out-of-state conviction cannot be found to be substantially similar to

a Texas offense for purposes of triggering the sex offender registration requirement unless the

Department of Public Safety has already made that determination. We concluded that such

a determination is an essential element of the offense of failing to comply with sex offender

registration requirements. Crabtree v. State, S.W.3d (Tex. Crim. App. No. PD-0645-11,

delivered October 31, 2012), slip op. at 23. The State's motion for rehearing was denied on

January 16, 2012. The Court of Appeals in the instant case did not have the benefit of our

opinion in Crabtree. Accordingly, we grant Appellant’s petition for discretionary review,

vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals

for consideration in light of our opinion in Crabtree.

Delivered: February 6, 2013

Do Not Publish
exv10w3






Exhibit 10.3




MERCANTILE BANCORP, INC.




AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT




     This Amendment to Employment Agreement (“Amendment”) is made as of this 15th day of
July, 2008, by and between Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Company”) with its
principal office located at Quincy, Illinois, and Daniel J. Cook, of Quincy, Illinois (“Employee”).



     WHEREAS, Company and Employee entered into an Employment Agreement effective as of January 1,
2008 the “Employment Agreement”); and



     WHEREAS, Company and Employee wish to amend the Employment Agreement to provide for an
increase in Employee’s incentive compensation plan; and



     NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises, covenants, and conditions set forth
herein, and the performance of each, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Company and Employee hereby agree to amend the
Employment Agreement as follows:



     1. Section 3.2 is hereby deleted and inserted in lieu thereof is the following:




“Incentive bonus. In addition to the base salary as provided in Section 3.1
above, Company shall pay Employee an annual incentive bonus in an amount up to forty
percent (40%) of base salary in accordance with the incentive compensation plan
established by the Compensation Committee and Board of Directors of Company during
2008. The bonus shall be prorated for any partial year. Further, Employee must be
employed on December 31 of each year to be entitled to a bonus for such year.”



     2. This Amendment is effective January 1, 2008.



     3. Except as set forth in this Amendment, the Employment Agreement shall remain
unaltered and in full force and effect according to its terms and conditions.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment to the Employment Agreement has been executed by Company
and Employee as of the date first above written.



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	MERCANTILE BANCORP, INC.
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	By:

Name:
	 	/s/ Ted T. Awerkamp
 

Ted T. Awerkamp
	 	 
	 

	 	Title:
	 	President & CEO	 	 






	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	          /s/ Daniel J. Cook
 

DANIEL J. COOK
#### LLOYD v. STATE.

No. 15707.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 9, 1932.

H. L. Tooker, of Stanton, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, J.

Conviction is for receiving and concealing stolen property; punishment being assessed at two years’ confinement in the penitentiary.

The indictment properly charges the offense. The record contains neither statement of facts nor bills of exception. "In such condition nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
Exhibit 31.1


CERTIFICATIONS





I, Brian Bronson, certify that:





1. I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Radisys Corporation for the fiscal year ended


December 31, 2013; and





2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact


necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.





RADISYS CORPORATIONDate: April 30, 2014By:/s/ Brian BronsonBrian BronsonChief Executive Officer, President, and Director
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-50637

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

OSCAR MATA-HUERTA, also known as

Oscar Mata,

Defendant-Appellant;

____________________

Consolidated with

No. 00-50704

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BERNARDO GARZON-SERNA,

Defendant- Appellant;

____________________

Consolidated with

No. 00-50771

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

AMADOR GARAVITO-REYES, also known as

Amador Garavito,

Defendant-Appellant;
No. 00-50637

c/w Nos. 00-50704 & 00-50771 &

00-50774

- 2 -

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

____________________

Consolidated with

No. 00-50774

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BERNARDO EDUARDO CASTANEDA-QUINTANA,

also known as Eduardo Quintana,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

- - - - - - - - - -

February 15, 2001

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Oscar Mata-Huerta, Bernardo Garzon-Serna, Amador GaravitoReyes, Bernardo Eduardo Castaneda-Quintana (collectively the

Defendants) appeal their sentences following their guilty plea

convictions for illegal re-entry after deportation in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The Defendants argue that their sentences

should not have exceeded the two-year maximum sentence under 8

U.S.C. § 1326(a). The Defendants acknowledge that their argument

is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224

(1998), but they seek to preserve the issue for Supreme Court

review in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466. 
No. 00-50637

c/w Nos. 00-50704 & 00-50771 &

00-50774

- 3 -

The Defendants’ argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres,

523 U.S. at 235. 

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that the judgments of the district court be affirmed and that an

appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is granted.

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
**Exhibit
      13**




CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report of Berkley Resources
      Inc. (the "Company") on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report").
      I, Matt Wayrynen, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, of the
      Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge
      and belief:





(1)
            the
                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
            the
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.











Dated:
      February 10,
      2006 */s/
      Matt Wayrynen*


Matt
      Wayrynen, Chief Executive Officer


(Principal
      Executive and Financial Officer)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         619,511
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   90,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               809,583
<PP&E>                                       1,302,906
<DEPRECIATION>                                   7,774
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,127,164
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          264,001
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        11,732
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,787,473
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,127,164
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               404,447
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              10,604
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (377,500)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (377,500)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (377,500)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains financial information extracted from the Company's
quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 1999 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                         8,725
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  171,576
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    343,912
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               552,273
<PP&E>                                         85,861
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 759,653
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          324,866
<BONDS>                                        164,231
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       15
<OTHER-SE>                                     264,157
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   759,653
<SALES>                                        526,460
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               526,460
<CGS>                                          400,317
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  400,317
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             25,607
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                38,856
<INCOME-TAX>                                   15,210
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            23,646
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   24,766
<EPS-BASIC>                                  1.83
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  1.79



</TABLE>