UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

) JOSE P H WAYNE EASTRIDGE, et al . ) ) P etitioner s, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 00-3045 (RM C) ) UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA ) ) Respondent. ) )
M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION After serving deca des in pr ison f or a murder they did not commit, Petit ioners Joseph W ay n e Ea stridge , J oseph N. Sousa, and the Estate of Salvatore Infantolino, a.k.a . Michae l A. Damien, now pe tition for a Certificate of Innocence so that they can pr ocee d with wrong ful conviction claims bef

ore the United States Court of Fe dera l Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § § 1495, 25 13 . In it s ha be as opini o n , t h i s C o u rt found “that this i s the rar e ca se in which Petitioners ca n pr ov e the ir

‘a c tua l inno c e nc e ’ o f t

he c ri me c ha

rg e d a s we ll a s vio latio ns of the ir c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts at trial.” Eastridge v. United States , 372 F. Supp. 2d 26 , 2 9 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 05). The U nited States opposes the petition, asserting that Petitioners are ineligible be cause they broug ht about their own prosec ution by

eng ag ing in misconduc t. The United States also argues that Mr. Da mien’s petition should be denied be cause he did not, and could not, re ceive habea s relief from the Court inasmuch
a s h e had die d in 20 02 , b e fo re the Court ’s de c isi on . T he Cou rt a g re e s th a t it

did no t f or ma lly
a dju dic a te Mr
. Da

mie n’ s inn oc e nc e and it c ann ot, the re fo re , iss ue a Ce rt if ic a te of I nn oc e nc e to h is Estate. The Court will otherwise g rant the pe titions of Messrs. Ea stridge and Sousa.-2- I. F AC TS J ohnnie Battle, a Bla ck man, was horribly stabbed to de ath by a g roup of White men in 1976 beca

use of r acia l animus and al co h o l
. The c rime occ urre d near Wis consin Avenue and El lic ott S tr eet s, N. W., Was hin g ton , D .C. I ts r a c ia l ov e rt on e s imme diate ly c a ptu re d th e int e ns e
a t t e n t i o no f

t h e e n t i r e c i t y. Dec edent Micha el A. Damien, J oseph W. Eastridg e, Stephen C. Jones, and J oseph N. Sousa wer e convic ted in the Superior Court of t he Dist rict of Columbi a of first deg ree murder, wh il e arm ed. Mr . Jon e s d id n ot a pp e a l hi s c on vic tio n. Me ssr s. Da mie n, Ea str idg e , a

nd Sou sa pursued – indivi d u al l y and collec tively – numerous appe als for the entire time they wer e incar cer ated. Mr. D amien died on Dec em b er 10, 2002, while incar cer ated at the Atlanta F eder al P en i t en t i ary . M r. S o u s a s erv edt we n t y y ea rs i nj ai l b ef o re b ei n g re l ea s edo np ar o l e. M r. E as t ri d ge
serve d twenty -nine y ear s (including time f or a pr ison assault on a guard) befor e beingrele ased on parole . For rea sons fully explained in its ear lier opi nion, this Court g rante d the writ of ha beas c orpus to Messrs. Eastridg e and Sousa under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See E astridge , 372 F. Supp. 2d at 29. The Court fo un d th e m inno c e nt o f m ur de r a s p ri ncip a ls a

nd inn oc e nt o f a idi ngand

a be tti ng . I t a lso deter mined that the rule imposed by the t rial j udg e reg arding cross-e x amination and introduction of
e vid e nc e vio late d th e ir

c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts . F ina lly , it fo un d th a t the pr os e c uti on ha d f a ile d to rele ase Gr an d J ury

transcr ipts that contained exculpatory testimony , in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 3 73 U. S. 8 3, 87 , 1 0 L . Ed. 2d 21 5, 81 3 S. Ct. 11 94 (1 96 3)
. Th e Court the n set a sid e the ir
c on vic tio ns . In its decision , th e Court c omm e nte d th a t “ Mr . D amie n, a c o- pe tit ion e r at th e tim e initial briefing was c ompleted, passed a way on Dec ember

9, 2002
. As a result, the habea s rec ord and brie fs do not focus on him. Presumably , the same a naly sis would a

pply .” See E

astridge , 372-3-

F. Supp. 2d at 29 n. 3. The Gover nment filed a notice of appe al of the g rant of habeas relief but then withdrew it. See G o v . N o ti c e o f I n te r lo c u to r

y Ap p e a l [ D kt. # 6 7 ] an d

D is mi s s a l O r d e r

[D kt. # 6 8 ]. On April 17, 2008, Petitioners fi l ed their Motion for Certific ate of I nnocenc e pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2513, the Unjust Conviction Act. I n order to rec eive c ompensation based on an unjust conviction, a pe titioner must prove:

(1) His c onviction has bee n reve rsed or set aside on the ground that he is not g uilty of the offe nse of which he was convicted, or on new trial or re hear ing he wa s found not g uilty

of such of

fense , as appe ars fr o m t he re cord or cer tificate of the cour t setting a side or re versingsuch convic tion . . . and (2) He did not commit any of the a cts cha

rg ed or his ac ts, deeds, or omissions in connec tion with such charg e constituted no off ense a g ainst the Un ite d St a te s, or any State , Te rr ito ry or the Di str ic t of Col umb ia , and he did not by misconduct or neg lect ca use or br ing a

bout his own prosecution. 28 U.S. C
. § 2 5 13(a) (1)& (2). “ A petitioner ha s the burden of proof showingan entitlement to the
cer tificate,” while “a district c ourt judge has broad discr etion in decidingwhether or not to issue such
a ce rtificate .” Humphrey

v. United States , 52 Fe d. Cl. 593, 597 (Fed. Cl. 2002), aff’d , 6 0 F e d
. Ap p x. 292 (F ed. Cir. 2003) (c itations omi tted).

I de a l jus tic e wo uld se e m to re qu ir e that in the ra re and un us ua l in sta

nc e s in wh ic h a per so n ha s ser

ve d the wh ole or pa

rt of a te rm or

imp ri so nme nt, is later f ound to be entirely innocent of the crime of which he w as convic ted, should rece ive some re dress. On the other ha nd, reve rsals in c riminal case s are more fr equent l y

had on the g round of insuff iciency of proof or on the qu e sti on a s to wh e the r the fa c ts ch arg e d an d pro ve n co ns tit ute d a n o ff e ns e under some statute. Consequently , it would be nece ssary to separate from the group of persons whose convictions have been r ever sed, those fe w who are in fac t innocent of a

ny offe nse whatever
. Burgess v. United States , 20 Cl. Ct . 701, 704 (Cl. Ct. 1990) II. AN AL YSI S The United States do es n ot dispute that Petit ioners fulfill the re quirements of 28-4-

U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1) : the ir convictions wer e re verse d on the g round that they wer e not g uilty

of the offe nse of whic h they

wer e convic ted. I t also does not dispute that they “did not commit any of the
a c ts c ha rg e d, ” a s r e qu ir e d b y

28 U. S.C. § 2 51 3( a )( 2) . It con cent rat es its argume nt o n th e la st provision of § 2513(a) (2) and ar g ues that both Petitioners, in varying w ay s, eng ag ed in misconduct that cause d or b ro u ght about their own prose cution. Petitioners dispute the g overnme nt’s int e rp re tatio n o f t

he statut e and

its ana ly sis of

the fa c ts. A. Statutory

I nterpre tation Th e Go ve rnme nt a

rgue s th a t Se c tio n 2 51 3( a )( 2) is no t satis fi e d be c a us e Pe tit ion e rs ’ “ac tions and/or failure to act contr ibuted to their prosec ution and made it ea sy for the jur

y to convict them.” Gov. Opp’ n [Dkt # 7 2 ] at 20. Petitioners respond that ther e ar e only two elements to the le g a l st and ard

and tha t th e y mee t bo th: (1 ) t

he Cou rt se t a sid e the ir

c on vic tio ns ba se d u

po n th e ir actua l innocence and (2) they did not commit t he ac ts charg ed. Pet’rs Reply [ Dkt # 75] at 4. Acc ording to Petiti oners, the statute should be rea d:

( 2 ) H e d id n o t c o mm it an y o f th e acts c harg ed or [a] his acts, dee ds, or omi ssi on s in

c onne c tio n w ithsu c h c ha rg e d c on sti tut e d n o o ff

e ns e a g a ins t the United States, or a

ny State, Terr itory

or the District of Columbia, and [b] he did not by

misconduct or neg lect ca u s e o r b ring about his own prosec ution. 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (1948) (emphasis and insertion adde d). Only if a pe titioner cannot prove that he did not commit a

ny of the acts char g ed might he, a s an alternative , prove what follows the “or ,” i.e. , no ne of his a c ts, de e ds , o r o mis sio ns in c onne c tio n w ith the c ri min a l c ha rg e s c on sti tut e d a

n o ff e ns e ag ainst the United States or any State and he did not by

misconduct or neg lect ca use or br ing a

bout his own prosec ution. I n other wor ds, acc ording to Petiti oners, if the y can pr o v e t h at t h ey

did not commit any

of t he cha

rg ed ac ts (alre ady

deter mined by the Court), they

do not need to prove that-5-

they did not in any

way cause or bringabout th ei r own prose cution. Petitioners’ rea ding of the statute may

be re asonable , but in the Court’s view, it is incorrec t. A brief exposi tion of the rele vant ca se law she ds light on the dispute. In Burgess v. United States , the Claims Court described a prior ca se, Hadley v . United States , 106 Ct. Cl. 81 9 ( Ct Cl. 1946), as holding that “construc tion of § 2513(a) (2) r equi re s that the ce rtificate of the c ourt establishing [petitioner’s] innocenc e must specific ally rec ite (1) that [petit ioner] did not commit any of the a cts with which he w as cha rg ed, and (2) that his conduc t did not constit ute a c rime ag ainst the United States or aga inst the s overe ignty within which the ac ts were committed.” 20 Cl. Ct. at 704
n. 4 ( e mph a sis in or ig ina l)
. Ho we ve r, the Cla ims Court the n c on tin ue d: “ I n c on tr a st, the F if

th C ir c uit has construe d these ne cessa ry rec itations as disjunctive. See Osborn v. United States , 322 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1963). The c ourt nee d not rea ch the issue of whether these re quirements should be interpre ted as be ing disjunctive or conjunctive” since it would not aff ect Mr. B urg ess’s ca se. Id
. I n contra st, the Fifth Circuit in Os bo rn clea rly held that the “a lternative c onditions of § 2513(a )(2) require that the claimant show either that he did not commit any of the a cts or that his a cts constituted no offe nse ag ainst the United States or a State.” Osborn v. United States , 322 F.2d at 841. The F ifth Circuit ex plained:

We acc ept appe ll an t ’s argument that the “or ” in the statute mea ns that he may prove e ither; he doe s not have to prove both. L og ically , it would not be justifiable to re quire a

claimant to prove both. I f he did not commi t the act c har g e d it w o u ld b e immate r ia l w h e th e r th e a c t w a s u n la w f u l, and conver sely , if the ac t was not criminal it should make no differe nce whether he ha d d on e it. Id . (citations omitted). Clearly , these ruling s focus on a particula r either / or question: if a petitioner can pr ove that “[h]e did not commit any of the a cts cha

rg ed,” 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2) , then he doe s-6-

not further

have to pr ove that his ac ts “in connec tion with such charg e” c onstitut ed no off ense. Th e qu e sti on

he re is s e pa

rate and dis tin c t: wh e the r, in a dd iti on to p ro vin g that he did
no t com mi t any of

the a c ts c ha

rg e d o r t hat hi s a c ts c on sti tut e d n o o ff e ns e , a pe tit ion e r m

us t a lso prove that his own misconduct or neg lect did not cause or bringabout his own prosec ution. The Court finds that a petitioner must indeed do so.

As a ma tt er of st atu to ry tex t, th e “and ” pre cedi ng th e la nguage on mis c on du c t st ro ng ly sug g ests that a petitioner must also prove that he did not cause or bringabout his own prosec ution. Moreove r, eve n in case s cited by Peti t i oner, c ourts have se parately analy zed the petitioner’s own misconduct or neg lect in br ingingabout his prosec ution. I n Os bo rn for e x ample, af ter findingthat the pe tit ion e r f

a ile d to satis fy

e ith e r a lte rn a tiv e pr e re qu isi te to r e c ov e ry (i .e ., that he did no t c omm it the ac ts charg ed or

t h at t h e a ct s i nco n n ec t i o n w i t h t h e c h ar ge c o n s t i tu t edn o o ff en s e) , J u d ge Wis dom also noted that the petitioner must show that his own mi sconduct or ne g lect did not bring
a bo ut h is p ro se c uti on

a s “ thi s, ho we ve r, is j us t w hat th e statut e re qu ir e s. ” 32 2 F .2 d at 84 3; se e als o B ett s v. United States , 1 0 F
. 3 d 1 2 7 8 , 1 2 8 4 ( 7 th

Ci r . 1 9 9 3 ) ( e v e nth o u g h“ f a c tu a ll y innoc ent,” petitioner must stil l show he did not b ri ng about his prosec ution through his own misconduc t or neg le c t)
. T h e Co u rt a g r e e s th a t Pe ti ti o n e r s mu s t ma k e an a d d it io n a l s h o w in g r e g ar d in g their own misconduct or neg lect in orde r to rec eive a Certificate of Innocenc e. B . A na ly sis of

the F a c ts The Gove rnment conte nds that Petiti oners e ng ag ed in “misconduc t” that prec ludes the g rantingof a cer

tificate of innocenc e because their “‘ acts be fore , during and af ter the murde r .

. . co n t ri b u t edt o b ri n g ab o u tt h ei r arre s t o r co n v i ct i o n . ’” Go v . Op p ’n at 2 1 -2 2 (c i t i n g Keegan , 7 1 F. Supp. at 628). The Government cites the following instances of misconduct: Petiti oners attemptedAt the evidentiar y hear ing he ld in this matter, Mr. Jones testified under oa th that he had 1 participated per sonally

in the murder of

J ohnnie B attle. Th e Court ’s ha be as opinion noted that Mr. Sousa’s ac t of picking up Mr. J ones “mig ht 2 constitute the distinct and separ ate c rime of a cce ssory afte r the fa ct.” 372 F . Supp. 2d at 56. -7- to help Mr. J ones to e scape ; Mr
. J ones adher ed to the “Pag an Code” and ref used to g ive information 1

a bo ut o the r me mbe rs of the Pa g ans and the se Pe tit ion e rs we re c omp lic it i n h is s ile nc e ; Pe tit ion e rs ’ conduct wa s tantamount to misprisi on of a f elony , under D .C. Code § 5- 121.05, beca use their silenc e assisted other Pag ans to “ esca pe full judicial examination by the withholding of any i n formation about a f elony ,” see Butler v . United States , 481 A.2d 431, 444-445 (D .C. 1984), cert. de nied , 470 U.S. 552, 557-558 (1980); P et itioners’ conduc t constituted the offe nse of a cce ssory afte r the fa ct be c a us e Mr . So us a

sto pp e d th e c ar a

nd pic ke d u p M r. Jone s a s h e wa s r

unni ng away ; Mr . So us a admitted to driving a fter c onsuming a larg e quan t i t y o f alc ohol; Petit ioners did not call the police to report a shooting or r emain in the ar ea; e ach Petitioner c oncea led a knife ; and Mr. Ea stridge was drunk in public in violation of D.C. Code § 25-1001(a ). See Go v. Op p’ n at 22- 36
. Th e se argume nts
are totally unpersua sive. “The statutory

phrase ‘in conne ction with such cha rge ’ wa s meant to pre clude the proof of some conte mporane ous, but unrelated c rime to bar r ecove ry .” Se e Os bo rn , 322 F.2d at 842 (c i t i n g Keegan , 71 F. Supp. at 638). Muc h of the alleg ed “misconduct” on which the Gove rnment
re lie s w a s, e ve n if

a c c ur a te , unr e late d to the a c tua l c ri me c ha rg e d – fi rs t de g re e mur de r. T he ir dr ink ing , M r. Sou sa ’s dr ivi ng , th e ir con ceal me nt o f u nu se d k niv e s, the ir

re lia nc e on the ir F if th Amendment rig hts to silence – none of these actions or om issions was related to the cha rg ed cr ime. The only issue at which one might pause is whether Mr. Sousa’s act of pickingup Mr. J ones as he 2

and Mr . E a str idg e we re dr ivi ng aro un d the blo c ks ne ar Wisc on sin Av e nu e (whe n ne ith e r M r. Sou saThe Court re jects the Gove rnment’s a rgument that Mr. Eastridg e wa s an ac cessor y afte r 3 the fa ct to murder

beca use, in the ca

r, he ha nded Mr. Jones a newspa per w ith which to wipe the blood off his hands. SeeGov. Opp’n at 28. -8- nor Mr. Ea stridge had see n, participated in, or had know ledg e of Mr . Batt l e’s murder) c ould be
s u f f i c i e n t l y c r i m i n a l an d

s u f f i c i e n t l y r e l a t e d

t o t h e c h ar g e o f

f i r s td e g r e e m u r d e r

a s t o b ar r e c o v e r y. The Court conclude s that the Government over- rea ds the statutory require ment that a petitioner show that “he did not by misconduct or neg lect ca use or b ri n g ab o u t his own prosec ution,” 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a) (2), under which the Gover nment argues that Messrs. Sousa and Ea str idg e we re a c c e sso ri e s. Th e F if th C ir c uit , s pe a kin g thr ou g h Jud g e Wisd om, a g a in p ro vid e s a 3

mor e se ns ibl e and

ba lanc e d inte rp re tatio n o f t he statut e tha

n do e s the Go ve rnme nt h e re : “ Con g re ss
e xclu de d f

ro m th e op e ratio n o f t

he re me dia l pro vis ion s of the statut e tho se wh o, tho ug h inno c e nt, had neglig ently or willfully failed to take the nec essar y measure s to avoid conviction.” Os bo rn , 322 F .2 d at 84 3; s e e a l

s o B e tts , 1 0 F. 3 d at 1285 (“The statute e x pressly require s a ca

usal conne ction betwee n the petitioner’s c onduct and his prose cution; it does not preclude r elief simply beca use the petitioner eng ag ed in misconduct or ne g lect, per iod.”).

At this point , it is useful to recount the r easo n s the Court g rante d habeas re lie f t o Me ssr s. Sou sa

and Ea str idg e . T he Go ve rnme nt’ s th e or y a t tr ia l wa s th a t, a s Mr . B a ttl e fl e d o n f oo t, these Petitioners (tog ether with Messrs. J ones and Damien) “g ave chase , with their knives dra wn, chasing. . . Mr. B attle up to Wisconsin Avenue , acr oss Wi sconsin Avenue , wher e Mr. B attle is seen tripping on a

curb, falling backwa

rds, wit h his arms up, and being stabbed repe atedly by these four defe ndants.” Eastridge , 3 72 F . Su pp . 2 d at 28 ; se e id . at 31 (“ In less time than it takes to tell, Mr. Battle suffer ed seve nteen knife wounds and wa s dead” ). I t is now clear , and the Gov ernme nt
c o n c e d e s , th a t M e s s r s . E a s tr id g e , So u s a an d D a mi e np la

y e d n o r o le in

th e mu r d e r. Se e id . at 32.-9-

“ Th e sh or

tc omi ng s in

the c a se a g a ins t Pe tit ion ers were e vid e nt e ve n to the pr os e c uti on a t tr ia l. Confronted with una

nswere d questions a

nd evidentiar

y inconsistencies, the prosec ution pressed a n alternative aiding -and- abetting theory at t he eleventh hour.” Id . at 54 ; se e id . ( “ the Go ve rnme nt d id not a rticulate a n aiding -and- abetting theory until it s closing a

rgument”). Convicted of

first deg ree
mur de r n on e the le ss,

Petit io n e r s w e r e s e n te n c e d to tw e n ty

y e ar s to li f

e . M r . So u s a

s e rved nineteen year s in jail befor e being relea sed on parole ; Mr. Eastridg e ser ved tw e nty -n ine y e ars be fo re be ingre le a se d o n p aro le . The te rm s o f t he ir parole s include sig nificant re strictions. They serve d this time as convicte d mur de re rs f

or a cri me w hic h it

is m or e lik e ly

tha n n ot t hat no re a so na

ble juror, base d on the full evidentiar y rec ord, would find them guilty beyond a re a so na ble do ub t. Id . at 33. On appe al, unlike at trial, the G overnme nt a cknowledg ed the exis tence of per sons other than these Petitioners at the site of J ohnnie Ba ttle’s murder but a rgued that a third g roup had followed in a ca

r. Id
. at 54. Thus,“[t] he role that the convicte d persons play ed, Petitioners her e, had become more hy

pothetical and the proof of their guilt more attenuate d.” Id . The Court found the Gover nment’s aiding and abe tting theor y “p u rely speculative.” Id . at 56. Contrary to law, the Go ve rnme nt wa s “ se e kin g to su sta in [Pet iti on e rs ’] c on vic tio ns of fi rs t- de g re e mur de r, a spec if ic intent crime, on an aiding -and- abettingtheory .” Id
. For these rea sons, the Court c oncluded that no
rea sonable juror

could find the Petitioners guilty of murder ing Johnnie Battle. Id
. I n addition to ruling that Petitioners prove d their “a ct u a l i nn o c e n c e , ” th e Cour

t further fo un d th a t an e vid e nti ary

ru lin g imp os e d b y

the tr ia l ju dg e int e rf

e re d with the ir

c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts
. Id . at 57 -5 8. F or

re a so ns no t c le ar f

ro m th e re c or d, the tr ia l ju dg e or de re d th a t “ ‘n o la wye r [i s] to ask any questions that would inculpate or e x culpate a ny other de fenda

nt unless he cleare d it with the defe nse attorne y .’” Id . T his Rul e vio late d Pe tit ion e rs ’ F if th a nd Sixth A me ndme nt r ig hts be c a us e4 As the 2004 He aringmade c lear , Ms. Heim was a witness who had observe d the shooting of

Br uce H unter a

nd the beg innings of the subsequent cha se of Johnnie Battle. Ms. He im testified before the Gra nd J ury that Mr. J ones wa s one of the Pag ans who c hased Mr . Battle after the shooting. A t trial, howeve r, she testified on dir ect e x amination that she did not see the c hase, a nd Mr. Sousa’s attorne y

was ba rre d from cross-e x amining he r to establish that she did not name Mr. Sousa a s one of the c haser s befor e the Gr and Jury but that she had named Mr. Jones. See Trial Tr. A t 1757-58, 1810 (Gr and Jury testimony

rea d to court outsi de the pr e se nc e of

the jur y ). Th e tr ia l ju dg e re fu se d to a llo w this cross-e x amination of Ms. Heim, which w as cle arly exculpatory

evidenc e for the de fenda

nts other than Mr. Jones. Id . at 1807, 1811. At sidebar , the tr ia l c ourt

a lso sp e c if

ic a lly de nie d a re qu e st b y

Mr . So us a ’s lawye r t o have Ms. He im enumerate and identify the individuals she saw g iving chase
. Id . at 1807-08. Counsel identified at least sevente en diffe rent issues on which he w ished to question Ms. Heim but was rebuf fed by the court in ea ch instance . Among other thing s, counsel wa nted to question Ms. He im a

bo ut t he state me nts ma de by

Me ssr s. B arb e r a

nd Jenn ing s, who had r eac hed the Richter house on foot. The court re fused to allow this avenue of

inquiry beca use it involved ref

ere nces to c o-def

endant Richter. Af

ter a bench c onfer ence cover ing twe nty -four pag es of tria l testimony , Pamela He im was dismissed without one single wor d of cross-e x amination direc ted to her. L ikewise, the e ffe ctive cr oss-examination of Ms. W illetts was prec luded when Petitioners’ attorney s were denied the r ight e ven to mention names of co- defe ndants to challeng e her testimony
. Id . at 1684-92. When Mr. Sou sa ’s lawy e r t

ri e d to c ro ss- e xami ne Ms. Wille ts a bo ut s pe c if

ic conver sations as they

related to both Messrs. Sousa and Ea stridge , he was prohibited f

rom doing so solely

beca use this line of questioning wo u l d i n v o l v e r ef

er en ce s t o M r. E as t ri d ge. As n o t edb y t h e t ri al j u d ge later, “ the Rule proved so r estrictive to Sousa’s attorney that he did not even attempt any

cross-e x amination of a w itness whose sworn te stimony was ve ry damag ing to his client.” United States v. Eastridge , 110 Wash. L . Re p. 11 81 , 1 18 7 ( 19 82 ). Ye t Ms . Wil le ts w a s th e on ly pe rs on wh os e testimony direc tly implicated Mr. Sousa and Mr . Eastridg e. Id
. Eastridge , 372 F. Supp. 2d at 58-59. -10- it “preve nted ef

fec tive and nec essar y cross-examination of key Gover nment witnesses.” Id
. 4 Con str a ine d b y

thi s Ru le a t tr ia l, t

he Go ve rnme nt’ s argume nt t hat Pe tit ion e rs bro ug ht a

bo ut t he ir-11-

own prosec ution by

not doing more to e x culpate themselves from the cha rg e of f irst deg ree murder is c omp le te ly

wi tho ut m e ri t. These Petitioners sat in prison for de cade s after a prose cution with shifting theor ies
and an unc on sti tut ion a l vi se that se ve re ly res tr icted the ir tr ia l de fe ns e . T he Go ve rnme nt c le arl y thought it had identifie d the m en who kill ed Johnni e B attle. Howe ver, w ith the exception of Mr. J on es, it was wr on g and

the se Pe tit ion e rs pa id d e arl y fo r t hat e rr or . “ I de a l ju sti c e wo uld se e m to require that in the rare and unusual instances in which a person who has serve d the whole or part of a ter m of imprisonment, is later fou n d t o b e entire ly innocent of the crime of which he w as convicted, should re ceive some redr ess.” Bu rgess , 2 0 C l
. C t
. a t7 0 4
. T h i s i s “ t h e r a r e c a s e . ” It would make a

mocker y of t he Unjust Conviction Act if these Petitioners we re de nied a r emedy for the unre late d mi sc on du c t up on wh ic h th e Go ve rnme nt r e sts its argume nt. III . C ON CL USI ON T h e C o u rt gra n t s t h e p et i t i o nfo r a C er t i fi ca t e o f I n n o ce n ce as t o M es s rs . E as t ri d ge and Sousa. Mr. Ea stridge and Mr. Sousa have demonstrated that they wer e ac tually

innocent of the crimes f or which the y

wer e convic ted. Neither Mr. Eastridg e nor Mr . Sousa committed any of the
a c ts w ithwh ic h the y

we re c ha rg e d. Ne ith e r M r. Ea str idg e no r M r. Sou sa , b y mis c on du c t or

ne g le c t,
c a us e d o r b ro ug ht a

bo ut h is o wn pr os e c uti on . Ame mor ia lizin g or de r a c c omp anie s th is memorandum opinion. ____________/s/___________________________ ROSEMARY M. COL L YER Un i t edS t at es Di s t ri ct J u d ge DATE: Mar ch 12, 2009