Filed 2/23/23 Hacker v. Levy CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

RON HACKER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

HENRI LEVY et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B317325

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19STCV12728)

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Theresa M. Traber, Judge. Affirmed. 

Law Offices of Vincent Quigg and Vincent Quigg for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

Krishel Law Firm and Daniel L. Krishel for Defendants 

and Respondents Henri Levy, Gabriel Perez and 4865 Bakman, 

LLC.

Hall Griffin, Howard D. Hall and Taylor R. Dalton for 

Defendants and Respondents Finance of America Commercial 
2

LLC and Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as Trustee of 

Antler Mortgage Trust 2019-RTL1.

____________________________

Plaintiff and appellant Ron Hacker appeals from two 

judgments, one in favor of defendants and respondents 

Henri Levy, Gabriel Perez, and 4865 Bakman LLC (collectively, 

the Levy defendants), and one in favor of defendants and 

respondents Finance of America Commercial LLC (FOAC) and 

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB (Wilmington). Hacker 

contends the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment 

in favor of respondents, and also erred in granting an earlier 

motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of FOAC.

Hacker’s appellate briefing suffers from numerous serious 

deficiencies. First, Hacker filed two opening briefs, one for each 

challenged judgment. This court rejected the brief concerning the 

Levy defendants, advising Hacker of its policy that multiple 

notices of appeal from the same trial court case filed within 

30 days of each other are combined into a single appeal, and 

therefore the appellant may file only one opening brief. Hacker 

took no action to combine the substance of the two briefs into a 

single brief, or otherwise address the deficiency in the briefing,

even after respondents’ briefing argued the absence of a filed 

brief concerning the judgment in favor of the Levy defendants 

constituted forfeiture of Hacker’s challenges to that judgment.

Thus, the only properly filed brief we have before us is the brief 

challenging the judgment as to FOAC and Wilmington. Any 

challenge to the judgment in favor of the Levy defendants is 

forfeited.
3

Second, Hacker’s arguments challenging the grant of 

summary judgment in favor of FOAC and Wilmington lack any 

citations to the record, and thus are forfeited as well.

Third, Hacker’s arguments concerning the judgment on the 

pleadings are entirely conclusory, with no discussion of the 

operative pleading, and are insufficient to demonstrate error.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgments.

BACKGROUND

Because we resolve this appeal based on deficiencies in 

Hacker’s briefing, we provide only a brief summary of the case

background.

On April 12, 2019, Hacker filed a lawsuit against Levy, 

4865 Bakman LLC, and others arising from an alleged real 

property transaction. As summarized by the trial court, Hacker 

alleged he and Levy entered into a joint venture to purchase real 

property with the intent to resell it for a profit. Hacker alleged 

after he and Levy purchased the property, Levy and others 

clouded title to the property, impeding Hacker’s ability to sell it. 

Perez and FOAC were listed as defendants in the second 

amended complaint, and Wilmington later was added via a Doe 

amendment. The third amended complaint is the operative 

pleading for purposes of this appeal. 

The trial court granted FOAC’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings, dismissing all causes of action against FOAC without 

leave to amend except the cause of action for judicial foreclosure.

FOAC and Wilmington later filed a motion for summary 

judgment on the remaining causes of action against them. The 

Levy defendants filed a separate motion for summary judgment 

on the causes of action against them.
4

The trial court granted both motions and entered two judgments, 

one in favor of FOAC and Wilmington, and one in favor of the 

Levy defendants. 

DISCUSSION

A. Appealability

Hacker filed notices of appeal after the trial court issued its 

order granting the summary judgment motions, but before the 

judgments were entered. We exercise our discretion to “treat a 

notice of appeal filed after the superior court has announced its 

intended ruling, but before it has rendered judgment, as filed 

immediately after entry of judgment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.104(d)(2); see Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 

1180, 1189.) Hacker’s notices of appeal therefore are timely.

B. Hacker Has Failed Properly To Brief Any Argument 

Concerning the Levy Defendants

Respondents argue, and we agree, that Hacker has 

forfeited any argument concerning the Levy defendants by failing 

properly to brief his appellate challenges to the trial court’s 

disposition of his claims against the Levy defendants.

Hacker submitted two opening briefs to this court, one 

challenging the judgment in favor of FOAC and Wilmington, and 

one challenging the judgment in favor of the Levy defendants. 

The clerk’s office accepted the brief concerning FOAC and 

Wilmington, but rejected the brief concerning the Levy 

defendants, informing Hacker that he was entitled to file only 

one opening brief. Rejection of the second brief was consistent 

with California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(1), which provides,
5

“Each appellant must serve and file an appellant’s opening brief.” 

(Italics added.)1

Hacker’s counsel then sent the clerk’s office an e-mail 

noting Hacker had filed separate notices of appeal from the two 

judgments, and asked if the matter could be treated as two 

appeals. Hacker’s counsel claimed because the two sets of 

respondents (the Levy defendants and FOAC/Wilmington) would 

each be entitled to file a respondent’s brief, limiting Hacker to 

only one brief would prejudice him. A clerk responded by e-mail 

that because Hacker’s two notices of appeal were filed within 

30 days of one another, the practice of the court was to file them 

under a single case number with a single opening brief. 

Hacker took no further action in response to this 

information from the clerk’s office, such as filing an amended 

opening brief that combined the substance of his two original 

opening briefs. Even when respondents in their own briefing 

noted the absence of a properly filed brief regarding Hacker’s 

claims against the Levy defendants, Hacker did nothing, and 

did not file a reply brief to address respondents’ forfeiture claim.2

1 When an appeal involves multiple appellants or multiple 

respondents, “[p]arties allied in interest . . . have the option of 

filing individual briefs or joint briefs.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. 

Prac. Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2022) 

Ch. 9-B, ¶ 9:79, p. 9-28; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).) 

It thus was permissible for the two sets of defendants in this 

appeal, the Levy defendants and FOAC/Wilmington, each to file 

its own respondent’s brief. No rule, however, permits a single 

appellant to file multiple opening briefs on the basis that there 

are multiple respondents. 

2 Indeed, we granted Hacker an extension of time within 

which to file a reply, but none was forthcoming. 
6

Accordingly, the only properly filed opening brief before us solely 

concerns the judgment in favor of FOAC and Wilmington, with no 

argument addressing the judgment in favor of the Levy 

defendants.

It is well established that failure to raise an issue in an 

opening brief forfeits the issue. (Golden Door Properties, LLC v. 

Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 786 [“issues not 

addressed as error in a party’s opening brief with legal analysis 

and citation to authority are forfeited”].) Because Hacker has 

failed to file a proper brief challenging the judgment in favor of 

the Levy defendants, any such challenge is forfeited. As noted 

above, Hacker has not filed a reply brief, and therefore offers no 

argument to the contrary.

There is sound policy behind the rule of accepting only one 

opening brief from a party. Even when a party appeals from 

multiple judgments in favor of multiple parties to a lawsuit, often 

the underlying facts and the applicable law overlap, and the 

requirement of a single brief prevents unnecessary duplication. 

To the extent the combined appeals present too many issues to 

address within the mandated word limits, a party may seek leave 

to file a longer brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(c)(6).) 

Hacker therefore had options to comply with the court’s singlebrief requirement without suffering any prejudice. His failure to 

avail himself of any of those options forfeits his arguments 

concerning the Levy defendants. 

C. Hacker Forfeits His Challenge to the 

FOAC/Wilmington Summary Judgment Motion By 

Failing To Provide Record Citations

In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we review 

de novo whether the record presents a triable issue. (See Wall 
7

Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 

164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1176.) Hacker argues he presented 

sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue as to whether FOAC 

and Wilmington were on actual or constructive notice of Hacker’s 

claim to the property in dispute, such that FOAC and Wilmington 

could not be deemed “a bona fide encumbrancer for value.” To 

demonstrate this evidence, Hacker lists a number of “key facts” 

he contends show FOAC and Wilmington had actual or 

constructive notice of his claim on the property. 

As FOAC and Wilmington note in their respondents’ brief, 

Hacker fails to provide any record citations for his “key facts.” 

Such citations either are absent entirely, or state only “AE” (for, 

we presume, “appellant’s exhibits”), without any page or exhibit 

numbers. The record here is substantial, consisting of over a 

dozen volumes of appendices. The court “ ‘ “cannot be expected to 

search through a voluminous record to discover evidence on a 

point raised by [a party] when his brief makes no reference to the 

pages where the evidence on the point can be found in the 

record.” ’ [Citation.] ” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 

178 Cal.App.4th 735, 745.) “Rather than scour the record 

unguided, we may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point 

urged on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to 

the record.” (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894–895.) We choose that course 

here, and deem Hacker’s arguments forfeited.3 

3 Given our conclusion that Hacker’s lack of record 

citations forfeits his challenge to the grant of summary judgment, 

we express no opinion as to respondents’ argument that Hacker 

failed to provide an adequate record on appeal to support that 

challenge. 
8

D. Hacker’s Conclusory Arguments Are Insufficient To 

Demonstrate That the Trial Court Erred In Granting 

Judgment on the Pleadings

Hacker contends the trial court erred in granting FOAC’s 

earlier motion for judgment on the pleadings, which dismissed all 

but one cause of action against FOAC. Alternatively, Hacker 

argues the trial court should have granted leave to amend to 

address any deficiencies in the complaint. We review a judgment 

on the pleadings de novo to determine whether the complaint 

states a cause of action. (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer 

Rights v. Nextel Communications, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 

131, 135.) “ ‘Denial of leave to amend after granting a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Hacker does not explain how, contrary to the trial court’s 

conclusion, he sufficiently stated causes of action against FOAC. 

He merely states that his “operative complaint clearly set forth 

sufficient facts to state viable claims against [FOAC].” Hacker 

does not discuss any specific allegations in the complaint to 

explain how they were sufficient or, if they were insufficient, 

amenable to amendment. Such conclusory argument is 

inadequate to demonstrate error. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam

(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287 [appellate court “may disregard 

conclusory arguments that . . . fail to disclose the reasoning by 

which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to 

adopt”].) 

Hacker notes that the trial court’s tentative ruling on the 

motion for judgment on the pleadings was more favorable to 

Hacker than the court’s final ruling, in that the tentative ruling 

denied the motion as to several additional causes of action. “[A]
9

trial court retains inherent authority to change its decision, its 

findings of fact, or its conclusions of law at any time before 

entry of judgment and then, the judgment supersedes 

any memorandum or tentative decision or any oral comments 

from the bench.” (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 

170 Cal.App.4th 229, 268.) The mere fact that the trial court’s 

ultimate ruling differed from its tentative ruling does not 

demonstrate error.

To the extent Hacker seeks to incorporate by reference the 

reasoning in the trial court’s tentative ruling, he cannot do so. 

(Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 854 

[“It is inappropriate for an appellate brief to incorporate by 

reference arguments contained in a document filed in the trial 

court.”].)

Hacker contends the trial court’s tentative ruling

“acknowledged” that his causes of action were amenable to 

amendment to address any deficiencies. Again, the fact that the 

trial court’s final ruling reached a different conclusion than the 

court’s tentative ruling does not, in itself, demonstrate error. 

Hacker, moreover, misreads the tentative ruling, which stated 

the trial court would grant leave to amend only if plaintiff 

“demonstrate[d]” at the hearing on the motion for judgment on 

the pleadings there was “a reasonable possibility of successful 

amendment.” In other words, the trial court did not issue a 

tentative ruling on leave to amend, but left the issue for the 

hearing, ultimately deciding in its final ruling not to grant leave 

to amend. 
10

DISPOSITION

The judgments are affirmed. All respondents are awarded 

their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

WEINGART, J.