alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-7558

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ARTHUR EDWARD WILLIAMSON, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District

Judge. (8:02-cr-00324-HMH; 8:05-cv-01494-HMH)

Submitted: December 14, 2006 Decided: December 22, 2006

Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Arthur Edward Williamson, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Alan Lance Crick,

Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Arthur Edward Williamson, Jr., seeks to appeal the

district court’s oral order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)

motion and motions for access to court reporter’s records,

discovery, and for appointment of counsel in his underlying 28

U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) action. The order is not appealable unless a

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369

(4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue

absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that

any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court

is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Williamson has

not made the requisite showing as his action is a successive § 2255

motion. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal.

Additionally, we construe Williamson’s notice of appeal

and informal brief as an application to file a second or successive

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Winestock, 340
- 3 -

F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to

file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims

based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously

unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on

collateral review; or (2) newly discovered evidence, not previously

discoverable by due diligence, that would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the

movant guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), 2255

(2000). Williamson’s claims do not satisfy either of these

criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive

§ 2255 motion. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2096 

To amend the Federal Crop Insurance Act to prohibit payments of premium 

subsidy for harvest price policies. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 8, 2017 

Mr. FLAKE (for himself and Mrs. SHAHEEN) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 

A BILL 

To amend the Federal Crop Insurance Act to prohibit 

payments of premium subsidy for harvest price policies. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Harvest Price Subsidy 

5 Prohibition Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON PREMIUM SUBSIDY FOR HARVEST 

7 PRICE POLICIES. 

8 Section 508(e) of the Federal Crop Insurance Act (7 

9 U.S.C. 1508(e)) is amended by adding at the end the fol10 lowing: 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2096 IS

1 ‘‘(9) PROHIBITION ON PREMIUM SUBSIDY FOR

2 HARVEST PRICE POLICIES.—Notwithstanding any 

3 other provision of law, beginning with the 2018 rein4 surance year, the Corporation shall not pay any 

5 amount of premium subsidy in the case of a policy 

6 or plan of insurance that is based on the actual mar7 ket price of an agricultural commodity on the date 

8 of harvest.’’. 

Æ 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
The Board of Directors
Interlott Technologies, Inc.:


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement  Nos.
33-78092 and 333-39374 on Form S-8 of Interlott Technologies, Inc. of our report
dated  February 26, 1999,  relating to the  statements of income,  stockholders'
equity  and cash  flows  of  Interlott  Technologies,  Inc.  for the year  ended
December 31, 1998,  and the related 1998  financial  statement  schedule,  which
report appears in the December 31, 2000, annual report on Form 10-K of Interlott
Technologies, Inc.


                                     /s/KPMG LLP

Cincinnati, Ohio
March 30, 2001
#### TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. BUSSING.

No. 3840.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

June 1, 1939.

*417Frank C. Bolton, Jr., and Bramlette; Levy & Dotson, all of Longview, for appellant.

T. G. Jackson and Louis M. Hitch, both of Longview, for appellee.

HIGGINS, Justice

(after stating the case as above).

The entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc at a subsequent term of court is not authorized, unless a judgment was actually rendered at the previous term of the court. A judgment nunc pro tunc presupposes a judgment previously actually rendered at the proper time, but not entered of record. 25 Tex.Jur., Judgments, Sects. 68 and 70; Hannon v. Henson, Tex.Com.App., 15 S.W.2d-579; Camoron v. Thurmond, 56 Tex. 22; Finnigan-Brown Co. v. Escobar, Tex. Civ.App., 192 S.W. 256; Waggoner v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 261 S.W. 482; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Turner, Tex.Civ.App., 193 S.W. 1087; Frick-Reid Supply Co v. Jones, Tex.Civ.App., 286 S.W. 650.

But the action of the Court in ordering the entry of the judgment nunc pro tunc is presumptively correct. In the absence of evidence to -the contrary this Court must assume the facts authorized the entry.- Hannon-v. Henson, supra. Appellant calls attention to certain allegations contained in the motion for judgment nunc pro tunc as evidencing the fact that no judgment was actually rendered at the March Term of the Court, but we do not regard such allegations as so showing.

Issue No. 9’ reads: “What was the actual loss in money sustained by the owner on account of being deprived of the dog?” The jury answered $150, for which amount judgment was rendered.

 There is no evidence the dog had no market value. Dogs ordinarily have no such value. (Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Blake, 43 Tex.Civ.App. 180, 95 S.W. 393), but this is not true of all dogs.- Dogs of good breed and pedigree usually have- a market value. It is alleged the dog in question was “a female Boston Terrier of high breed and pedigree.” Plaintiff testified he paid $75.00 .for the dog’s mother and litter. In order for plaintiff to recover the' actual or intrinsic value of the dog it was incumbent upon him to show it had no market value. Young’s Bus Lines v. Redmon, Tex.Civ.App., 43 S.W.2d 266; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Roberts, Tex.Civ.App., 85 S.W. 479.

Having failed to do so, it was error to submit the issue quoted as the measure of plaintiff’s damage. See cases last cited.

Appellant’s assignment and proposition raising this question are sustained.

Appellant’s fourth proposition presents no error. Chicago R. I. & G. R. Co. v. Scott, Tex.Civ.App., 156 S.W. 294; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Pool, 24 Tex.Civ.App. 575, 59 S.W. 911; 8 Texas Jurisprudence, pp. 546, 553.

Reversed and remanded.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          90,672
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  106,397
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 3,275
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 265,317
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          129,944
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     135,373
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   265,317
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               195,717
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  323,488
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   740
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,535
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (117,496)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (117,496)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (117,496)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (9.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (9.13)
        

</TABLE>
Opinion issued November 19 , 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01 - 13 - 0 0 260 - CV

——————————— IN RE PICO MEXICO SERVI CIOS PETROLEROS DE R L. DE CV AND LONDON OFFSHORE CONS ULTANTS, INC. , Relator s
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION Relator s , Pico Mexico Servicios Petoleros de RL. De CV and London Offshore Consultants, Inc. have filed a petition for writ of mandamus, challenging the trial court’s March 19, 2013 order granting pre

- suit depositions in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202.4(b)
.2

T he underlying case was dismissed on September 6, 2013. On October 29, 201 3, we issued a notice of intent to dismiss to the parties requesting they notify the Court within 7 days as to why the case should not be dismissed as moot. No response was received. Accordingly, w e d ismiss the petition for writ of mandamus as moot
. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Jennings , Sharp , and Brown
.
#### Ex parte Houston JAMES.

No. 16721.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 28, 1934.

W. B. Moss, of Sinton, and J. W. Ragsdale, of Victoria, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

This appeal is from an order of the district judge of San Patricio county refusing to reduce the amount of bail in a ease where the charge was robbery by the use of firearms in which bail had theretofore been fixed at $5,000.

The record is precisely like that in the companion case of Ex parte Boyd Nelson, 69 S.W.(2d) 126, in which the judgment refusing to reduce bail was affirmed. For the reasons stated in that opinion the order here will be the same.

The judgment is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains financial information extracted from the Company's
quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2000 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                         9,504
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  208,012
<ALLOWANCES>                                   18,086
<INVENTORY>                                    342,925
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               593,845
<PP&E>                                         94,972<F1>
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 793,425
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          399,874
<BONDS>                                        164,277
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       15
<OTHER-SE>                                     217,996
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   793,425
<SALES>                                        185,984
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               185,984
<CGS>                                          150,937
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  150,937
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             13,372
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,831)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,131)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,700)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,606)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.11)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.11)
<FN>
<F1>Net of depreciation.
</FN>



</TABLE>
#### DREW v. STATE.

No. 15336.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 25, 1932.

*294Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, J.

Conviction is for possessing intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale, punishment being one year in the penitentiary.

The record is before this court without statement of facts or bills of exception. In such condition nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q, 3
MONTHS ENDED 3/31/98 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                          15,870
<SECURITIES>                                    24,450
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,253
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,169
<INVENTORY>                                      4,755
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                54,500
<PP&E>                                           2,131
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,463
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  58,463
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            5,751
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               12
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    58,963
<SALES>                                         11,312
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                11,312
<CGS>                                            5,385
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    7,019
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (564)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (528)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (185)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (343)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (343)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.03)
        

</TABLE>
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE O F FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME E XPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

PAUL THOMAS KARTSONIS ,

Appellant ,

v. Case No. 5D 23-206 LT Case No. 16 -2018- CF -005375-AXXX STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee

. ________________________________/ Decision filed Marc h 21, 2023 Appeal from Circuit Court f or Duval County, Tat iana Salvador, Judge. Curtis S. Fallgatt er and Lis a Paquette Varon , of Fallgatter Catlin & Varon, P.A. , Jacksonville, for Appellant. Ashley Moody , Attorney General, and Heat her Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, f or Appellee. PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED. MAKAR, EDWARDS and JAY, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 10.01


 


NEW
FRONTIER MEDIA, INC.

SUMMARY OF

DIRECTOR COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS


 


Each director who is not a New Frontier Media, Inc. employee
receives for general board services, including attendance at regular and
special board meetings, an annual fee of $80,000, payable in equal quarterly
installments. Each such director receives an additional annual fee of $7,500
for each board committee on which the director serves, and the chairman of each
committee receives an additional annual fee of $2,500 for such service. Each
director is also reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred in connection with
the services provided as a member of the board and its committees.


 


Subject to our corporate trading policies and general securities laws, each
non-employee director is obligated to purchase, in the open market or otherwise
during each one-year period beginning immediately after an annual meeting of
shareholders, shares of our common stock equaling in value at least 20% of the
amount of the annual board service fee. Directors are not permitted to sell or
otherwise transfer shares of our common stock while serving as a director if
the result would be to reduce the beneficial ownership to below 20,000 shares,
and directors are not permitted to sell any shares unless they were acquired
two years prior to any such sale.
**Exhibit
      21.1**





**ADDvantage
      Technologies Group, Inc.**





**Subsidiaries**








**Tulsat
      Corporation, an Oklahoma corporation**





**ADDvantage
      Technologies Group of Missouri, Inc. (dba “ComTech Services”), a Missouri
      corporation**





**ADDvantage
      Technologies Group of Nebraska, Inc. (dba “Tulsat - Nebraska”), a Nebraska
      corporation**





**ADDvantage
      Technologies Group of Texas (dba “Tulsat - Texas”), a Texas
      corporation**





**NCS
      Industries, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation**





**Jones
      Broadband International, Inc., a California corporation**





**Tulsat
      - Atlanta LLC, a subsidiary of Tulsat, an Oklahoma
      corporation**





**Tulsat
      - Pennsylvania LLC (dba “Broadband Remarketing
      International”)**
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 24
- 0058 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, VIDAL X NOTAFRAID JR,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including June 3 , 202 4 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

April 26 2024

04/26/2024

Case Number: DA 24-0058
#### BOOKER v. STATE.

No. 20201.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 22, 1939.

Rehearing Denied May 3, 1939.

Oliver W. Johnson, of San Antonio, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

Conviction is for assault, punishment assessed at a fine of ten dollars.

The record contains neither statement of facts nor bills of exception. In such condition nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant offers only one proposition in his motion, which lays down the doctrine that he having been charged with making an aggravated assault upon one Arthur Fisher by means of striking the said Fisher with an automobile, that the trial court had no -power under the law to find him guilty of a simple assault and fine him the sum of Ten Dollars. In other words, that if found guilty, the court had- no power other than to punish him for an aggravated assault, and fix his punishment within the bounds provided by law for an aggravated assault.

 There being no statement of facts, we presume that the facts uphold the judgment of the court. Under the law a charge of aggravated assault also contains a charge for the lesser offense of a simple assault. In Bennett v. State, 79 Tex.Cr.R. 380, 185 S.W. 14, 15, we said: “In every indictment or information charging aggravated assault, simple assault is necessarily included.” Also see Yelton v. State, 75 Tex.Cr.R. 38, 170 S.W. 318; Davis v. State, 20 Tex.App. 302; Bolding v. State, 23 Tex.App. 172, 4 S.W. 579.

In regard to appellant’s contention that if guilty at all, he was guilty of an aggravated assault, and should have been given a higher punishment for the greater offense, we quote from the Bennett case, supra:

> “In Powell v. State, 5 Tex.App. 234, the court held, as stated in the syllabus:

> “ ‘A conviction will not be set aside because the court below gave to the accused *461the benefit of a charge on a less degree of offense than the jury would have been warranted in convicting him of; nor because the jury, in view of mitigating circumstances, were unwilling to convict of the greater offense.’ Many cases could he cited, but the rule is so tersely stated by Judges Davidson and Henderson in their opinions in the case of Pickett v. State, 43 Tex.Cr.R. 1, 63 S.W. 325, we do not deem it necessary to cite other authorities. Judge Davidson says': ‘Other cases are numerous to the effect that, where there is evidence of a higher grade of offense, a conviction will not be disturbed for' the inferior degree, though there was no testimony showing the inferior degree.’ Judge Henderson says: ‘This doctrine is too well settled by our decisions to be controverted.’ ”

The motion will be overruled.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 19

- 445

_____________________________
J ESSICA N ICOLE R ANKIN , Appellant,

v.

S TATE O F F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County

. William E. Davis , Judge

. October 3, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

. R AY , C.J., and W OLF and M.K. T HOMAS , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Megan Long, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee
, for A ppellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.