Vol. 79 Monday, 

No. 22 February 3, 2014 

Part IV 

Department of Homeland Security 

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Personnel Surety Program; 

Notice 


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6418 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

1See 78 FR 17680 (March 22, 2013). The 60-day 

Federal Register notice for Information Collection 

1670–NEW, which solicited comments for 60 days, 

may be found at https://federalregister.gov/a/2013- 

06184. 

2See 78 FR 29759 (May 21, 2013). The Federal 

Register notice that extended the comment period 

an additional 14 days may be viewed at https://

federalregister.gov/a/2013-12059. 

3For more information about CVI see 6 CFR 

27.400 and the CVI Procedural Manual at http://

www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_cvi_

proceduresmanual.pdf. 

4For more information about SSI see 49 CFR part 

1520 and the SSI Program Web page at http://

www.tsa.gov/ssi. 

5For more information about PCII see 6 CFR part 

29 and the PCII Program Web page at http://

www.dhs.gov/protected-critical-infrastructureinformation-pcii-program. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

[Docket No. DHS–2012–0061] 

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards Personnel Surety Program 

AGENCY: National Protection and 

Programs Directorate, DHS. 

ACTION: 30-Day notice and request for 

comments; New Information Collection 

Request: 1670–NEW. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), National Protection and 

Programs Directorate (NPPD), Office of 

Infrastructure Protection (IP), 

Infrastructure Security Compliance 

Division (ISCD) will submit the 

following Information Collection 

Request (ICR) to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) for 

review and clearance in accordance 

with the Paperwork Reduction Act 

(PRA) of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13, 44 U.S.C. 

Chapter 35). The Department previously 

published a notice about the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program Information 

Collection Request in the Federal 

Register on March 22, 2013, for a 60-day 

public comment period.1 On May 21, 

2013, the Department extended the 

comment period an additional 14 days.2

In this notice, NPPD is (1) responding to 

28 comments submitted in response to 

the 60-day notice previously published 

about this ICR, and (2) soliciting public 

comments concerning this ICR for an 

additional 30 days. This notice also 

describes the nature of the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program Information 

Collection Request, the categories of 

respondents, the estimated burden (in 

hours), and the estimated burden cost 

necessary to implement the Chemical 

Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 

(CFATS) Personnel Surety Program 

pursuant to 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv). 

DATES: Comments are encouraged and 

will be accepted until March 5, 2014. 

This process is conducted in accordance 

with 5 CFR 1320.8. 

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are 

invited to submit written comments on 

the proposed information collection to 

the Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, OMB. Comments should be 

addressed to OMB Desk Officer, 

Department of Homeland Security, 

National Protection and Programs 

Directorate. Comments must be 

identified by the docket number DHS– 

2012–0061 and may be submitted by 

one of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

• Email: oira_submission@

omb.eop.gov. Include the docket 

number in the subject line of the 

message. 

• Fax: (202) 395–5806. 

Instructions: All submissions received 

must include the words ‘‘Department of 

Homeland Security’’ and the docket 

number for this action. Comments 

received will be posted without 

alteration at http://www.regulations.gov, 

including any personal information 

provided. 

Comments that include trade secrets, 

confidential commercial or financial 

information, Chemical-terrorism 

Vulnerability Information (CVI),3

Sensitive Security Information (SSI),4 or 

Protected Critical Infrastructure 

Information (PCII) 5 should not be 

submitted to the public regulatory 

docket. Please submit such comments 

separately from other comments in 

response to this notice. Comments 

containing trade secrets, confidential 

commercial or financial information, 

CVI, SSI, or PCII should be 

appropriately marked and submitted by 

mail to the Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs, OMB. Comments 

should be addressed to OMB Desk 

Officer, care of the DHS/NPPD/IP/ISCD 

CFATS Program Manager at the 

Department of Homeland Security, 245 

Murray Lane SW., Mail Stop 0610, 

Arlington, VA 20528–0610. Comments 

must be identified by docket number 

DHS–2012–0061. 

OMB is particularly interested in 

comments that: 

1. Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

2. Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

3. Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

4. Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology, 

e.g., permitting electronic submissions 

of responses. 

Table of Contents 

I. Supplementary Information 

• Summary of Options Available to HighRisk Chemical Facilities To Comply 

With RBPS 12(iv) 

• Scope of This Notice and Commitment 

To Explore Additional Options in the 

Future 

• Who is Impacted by the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program? 

• What/Who is the Source of the 

Information Under Option 1 and Option 

2 

• CSAT User Roles and Responsibilities 

• Burden Resulting From the Submission 

of Duplicate Records About an Affected 

Individual 

• Compliance With RBPS 12(iv) and the 

Potential for Increased Burden to Enter 

the Restricted Areas or Critical Assets at 

a High-Risk Chemical Facility 

• Additional Data Privacy Considerations 

II. Information Collected About Affected 

Individuals 

• Option 1: Collecting Information To 

Conduct Direct Vetting 

• Option 2: Collecting Information To Use 

Vetting Conducted Under Other DHS 

Programs 

• Option 3: Electronic Verification of 

TWIC 

• Other Information Collected 

III. Request For Exception To the 

Requirement Under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) 

IV. Responses to Comments Submitted 

During 60-Day Comment Period 

V. The Department’s Methodology in 

Estimating the Burden 

• Summary of Changes From 60-Day 

Notice 

• Frequency 

• Affected Public 

• Number of Respondents 

Æ Number and Type of High-Risk 

Chemical Facilities 

Æ Estimated Number of Affected 

Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk 

Chemical Facility—Unescorted Visitors With 

Access to Restricted Areas or Critical Assets 

Æ Estimated Number of Affected 

Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk 

Chemical Facility—Facility Personnel 

With Access To Restricted Areas or 

Critical Assets 

Æ Summary of Alternatives to Estimate the 

Number of Respondents 

Æ Limitation of Respondents To Tier 1 and 

Tier 2 Facilities 

• Total Annual Burden Hours 


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6For more information about the TSDB, see DOJ/ 

FBI—019 Terrorist Screening Records System, 72 

FR 47073 (August 22, 2007). 

7U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has 

introduced SENTRI and Global Entry as Trusted 

Traveler Programs since the publication of CFATS 

in April 2007. The Department, therefore, intends 

to enable high-risk chemical facilities (or their 

designees) to submit information about affected 

individuals’ SENTRI and Global Entry enrollments 

to DHS under Option 2, even though SENTRI and 

Global Entry were not listed along with the other 

Trusted Traveler Programs in the CFATS IFR 

preamble. See 72 FR 17709 (April 9, 2007). 

8Each of the DHS programs referenced conducts 

recurrent vetting, which is equivalent to the 

terrorist ties vetting conducted under Option 1. 

Recurrent vetting compares an affected individual’s 

information against new and/or updated TSDB 

Continued 

• Estimated Time per Respondent 

• Total Burden Cost (Capital/Startup) 

Æ Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3— 

Number and Type of High-Risk Chemical 

Facilities That May Choose to Use Option 3 

Æ Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3— 

TWIC Reader Costs 

Æ Consideration of Other Capital Costs 

• Recordkeeping Costs 

• Total Burden Cost (Operating/

Maintaining) 

VI. Solicitation of Comments 

VII. Analysis 

I. Supplementary Information 

Section 550 of the Department of 

Homeland Security Appropriations Act 

of 2007, Public Law 109–295 (2006) 

(‘‘Section 550’’), provides the 

Department with the authority to 

identify and regulate the security of 

high-risk chemical facilities using a riskbased approach. On April 9, 2007, the 

Department issued the CFATS Interim 

Final Rule (IFR) implementing this 

statutory mandate. See 72 FR 17688 

(April 9, 2007). 

Section 550 requires that the 

Department establish risk-based 

performance standards (RBPS) for highrisk chemical facilities and under 

CFATS the Department promulgated 18 

RBPS. Each chemical facility that has 

been finally determined by the 

Department to be high-risk must submit 

a Site Security Plan (SSP), or an 

Alternative Security Program (ASP) if 

the facility so chooses, for Department 

approval that satisfies each applicable 

RBPS. RBPS 12—Personnel Surety— 

requires high-risk chemical facilities to: 

Perform appropriate background checks on 

and ensure appropriate credentials for 

facility personnel, and as appropriate, for 

unescorted visitors with access to restricted 

areas or critical assets, including, (i) 

Measures designed to verify and validate 

identity; (ii) Measures designed to check 

criminal history; (iii) Measures designed to 

verify and validate legal authorization to 

work; and (iv) Measures designed to identify 

people with terrorist ties[.] 

See 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12). 

As explained by the Department in 

the preamble to the CFATS IFR, the 

ability to identify affected individuals 

(i.e., facility personnel or unescorted 

visitors with access to restricted areas or 

critical assets at high-risk chemical 

facilities) who have terrorist ties is an 

inherently governmental function and 

necessarily requires the use of 

information held in governmentmaintained databases that are 

unavailable to high-risk chemical 

facilities. See 72 FR 17709 (April 9, 

2007). Thus, under RBPS 12(iv), the 

Department and high-risk chemical 

facilities must work together to satisfy 

the ‘‘terrorist ties’’ aspect of the 

Personnel Surety performance standard. 

As a result, the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program will identify individuals with 

terrorist ties that have or are seeking 

access to the restricted areas and/or 

critical assets at the nation’s high-risk 

chemical facilities. Accordingly, in the 

preamble to the CFATS IFR, the 

Department outlined two potential 

approaches to help high-risk chemical 

facilities satisfy that particular standard, 

both of which would involve high-risk 

chemical facilities submitting certain 

information to the Department. See id. 

The first approach would involve 

facilities submitting certain information 

about affected individuals to the 

Department, which the Department 

would use to vet those individuals for 

terrorist ties. Specifically, identifying 

information about affected individuals 

would be compared against identifying 

information of known or suspected 

terrorists contained in the federal 

government’s consolidated and 

integrated terrorist watchlist, the 

Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), 

which is maintained on behalf of the 

federal government by the Department 

of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) in the Terrorist 

Screening Center (TSC).6

In order to avoid unnecessary 

duplication of terrorist screening, the 

Department also described an additional 

approach under which high-risk 

chemical facilities would submit 

information about affected individuals 

possessing certain credentials that rely 

on security threat assessments 

conducted by the Department. See 72 

FR 17709 (April 9, 2007). 

The Department has developed a 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program that 

will provide high-risk chemical 

facilities additional options to comply 

with RBPS 12(iv) while continuing to 

make available the two alternatives 

outlined in the preamble to the CFATS 

IFR. In addition to the alternatives 

expressly described in this document, 

the Department also intends to permit 

high-risk chemical facilities to propose 

other alternative measures for terrorist 

ties identification in their SSPs or ASPs, 

which the Department will consider on 

a case-by-case basis in evaluating highrisk chemical facilities’ SSPs or ASPs. 

As a result of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program, regardless of the option 

selected by the high-risk chemical 

facility, the Department will identify 

individuals with terrorist ties that have 

or are seeking access to the restricted 

areas and/or critical assets at the 

nation’s high-risk chemical facilities. 

The first option is consistent with the 

primary approach described in the 

CFATS IFR preamble, as discussed 

above. Under Option 1—Direct Vetting, 

high-risk chemical facilities (or others 

acting on their behalf) would submit 

certain information about affected 

individuals to the Department through a 

Personnel Surety application in an 

online technology system developed 

under CFATS called the Chemical 

Security Assessment Tool (CSAT). 

Access to and the use of CSAT is 

provided free of charge to high-risk 

chemical facilities (or others acting on 

their behalf). 

Under this option, information about 

affected individuals submitted by, or on 

behalf of, high-risk chemical facilities 

would be vetted against information 

contained in the federal government’s 

consolidated and integrated terrorist 

watchlist. 

The second option is also consistent 

with the second approach described in 

the CFATS IFR preamble. Under Option 

2—Use Of Vetting Conducted Under 

Other DHS Programs, high-risk chemical 

facilities (or others acting on their 

behalf) would also submit certain 

information about affected individuals 

to the Department through the CSAT 

Personnel Surety application. 

Option 2 would, however, allow highrisk chemical facilities and the 

Department to take advantage of the 

vetting for terrorist ties already being 

conducted on affected individuals 

enrolled in the Transportation Worker 

Identification Credential (TWIC) 

Program, Hazardous Materials 

Endorsement (HME) Program, as well as 

the NEXUS, Secure Electronic Network 

for Travelers Rapid Inspection 

(SENTRI), Free and Secure Trade 

(FAST), and Global Entry Trusted 

Traveler Programs.7 All of these 

programs conduct terrorist ties vetting 

equivalent to the terrorist ties vetting 

that would be conducted under Option 

1.8 Under Option 2, high-risk chemical 


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records as those new and/or updated records 

become available. Recurrent vetting is a Department 

best practice. 

9When the Department notifies the appropriate 

designee of the high-risk chemical facility of 

significant changes in the status of an affected 

individual’s enrollment, such a notification should 

not be construed to indicate that an individual has 

terrorist ties or be treated as derogatory information. 

10 Verification and validation of an affected 

individual’s TWIC requires authentication that the 

affected individual’s TWIC is (1) a valid credential 

issued by TSA, and (2) contains the Card Holder 

Unique Identifier and correct digital signature. 

11The Department currently offers two ways to 

determine if a TWIC has been revoked (or reported 

lost or stolen). One is the Canceled Card List (CCL), 

the other is the Certificate Revocation List (CRL). 

More information about the Canceled Card List may 

be found at http://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/

publications/pdf/twic/canceled_card_list_ccl_

faq.pdf. More information about the CRL may be in 

the TWIC NPRM published on March 29, 2009 at 

74 FR 13364 which may be accessed at https://

www.federalregister.gov/articles/2009/03/27/E9- 

6852/transportation-worker-identificationcredential-twic-reader-requirements#p-122. 

12On March 22, 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard 

published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 

titled ‘‘TWIC Reader Requirements.’’ The 

procedures for using TWIC readers that are 

discussed in that NPRM would not apply to highrisk chemical facilities regulated under CFATS. 

Likewise, the ways in which high-risk chemical 

facilities could leverage TWICs as part of the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program do not apply to 

maritime facilities or vessels regulated by the U.S. 

Coast Guard. 

facilities, or their designees (e.g., third 

parties), could submit information to the 

Department about affected individuals 

possessing the appropriate credentials 

to enable the Department to 

electronically verify the affected 

individuals’ enrollments in these other 

programs. The Department would 

subsequently notify the Submitter of the 

high-risk chemical facility whether or 

not an affected individual’s enrollment 

in one of these other DHS programs was 

electronically verified. The Department 

would also periodically re-verify each 

affected individual’s continued 

enrollment in one of these other 

programs, and notify the appropriate 

designee of the high-risk chemical 

facility of significant changes in the 

status of an affected individual’s 

enrollment (e.g., if an affected 

individual who has been enrolled in the 

HME Program ceases to be enrolled, the 

Department would change the status of 

the affected individual in the CSAT 

Personnel Surety application and notify 

the Submitter).9 Electronic verification 

and re-verification would enable the 

Department and the high-risk chemical 

facility to ensure that an affected 

individual’s credential or endorsement 

is appropriate to rely on (i.e., an 

indicator that the affected individual is 

being recurrently vetted for terrorist 

ties) in compliance with RBPS 12(iv). 

In addition to Option 1 and Option 2, 

the Department has considered other 

potential options to help high-risk 

chemical facilities satisfy RBPS 12(iv). 

In particular, the Department has 

investigated the feasibility of options 

that would not involve the submission 

of information about an affected 

individual if the affected individual 

participated in one of the programs 

identified under Option 2. The 

Department believes that, for the 

purpose of compliance with RBPS 

12(iv), simply relying on a visual 

inspection of a credential or 

endorsement is inadequate because the 

credential or endorsement could be 

expired, revoked, or fraudulent. 

However, the Department has 

concluded that information about an 

affected individual, enrolled in a DHS 

program that conducts vetting for 

terrorist ties equivalent to the vetting 

that would be conducted under Option 

1, would not need to be submitted to the 

Department if the credential in the 

possession of the affected individual is 

electronically verified and validated. 

Accordingly, the Department plans to 

offer high-risk chemical facilities a third 

option. Under Option 3—Electronic 

Verification of TWIC, a high-risk 

chemical facility (or others acting on 

their behalf) would not submit 

information about affected individuals 

in possession of TWICs to the 

Department if the high-risk chemical 

facility (or others acting on their behalf) 

electronically verify and validate the 

affected individuals’ TWICs 10 through 

the use of TWIC readers (or other 

technology that is periodically updated 

using the with revoked card 

information).11 Any high-risk chemical 

facilities that choose this option would 

need to describe in their SSPs or ASPs 

the procedures they will follow if they 

choose to use TWIC readers for 

compliance with RBPS 12(iv).12

High-risk chemical facilities would 

have discretion as to which option(s) to 

use for an affected individual. For 

example, even though a high-risk 

chemical facility could comply with 

RBPS 12(iv) for certain affected 

individuals by using Option 2, the highrisk chemical facility could choose to 

use Option 1 for those affected 

individuals. Similarly, a high-risk 

chemical facility, at its discretion, may 

choose to use either Option 1 or Option 

2 rather than Option 3 for affected 

individuals who have TWICs. High-risk 

chemical facilities also may choose to 

combine Option 1 with Option 2 and/ 

or Option 3, as appropriate, to ensure 

that adequate terrorist ties checks are 

performed on different types of affected 

individuals (e.g., employees, 

contractors, unescorted visitors). Each 

high-risk chemical facility will need to 

describe how it will comply with RBPS 

12(iv) in its SSP or ASP. 

In addition to the options described 

above for satisfying RBPS 12(iv), highrisk chemical facilities are welcome to 

propose alternative or supplemental 

options not described in this PRA notice 

in their SSPs or ASPs. The Department 

will assess the adequacy of such 

alternative or supplemental options on 

a facility-by-facility basis, in the course 

of evaluating each facility’s SSP or ASP. 

Although outside the scope of this 

PRA notice and the underlying ICR, the 

Department would like to highlight that 

high-risk chemical facilities also have 

other methods to address, or minimize 

the impacts of, compliance with RBPS 

12(iv). For example, facilities may 

restrict the numbers and types of 

persons whom they allow to access their 

restricted areas and critical assets, thus 

limiting the number of persons who will 

need to be checked for terrorist ties. 

Facilities also have wide latitude in how 

they define their restricted areas and 

critical assets in their SSPs or ASPs, 

thus potentially limiting the number of 

persons who will need to be checked for 

terrorist ties. High-risk chemical 

facilities also may choose to escort 

visitors to restricted areas and critical 

assets in lieu of performing the 

background checks required by RBPS 

12. For example, high-risk chemical 

facilities could propose in their SSPs or 

ASPs traditional escorting solutions 

and/or innovative escorting alternatives 

such as video monitoring (which may 

reduce facility security costs), as 

appropriate, to address the unique 

security risks present at each facility. 

Summary of Options Available to HighRisk Chemical Facilities To Comply 

With RBPS 12(iv) 

The purpose of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program is to identify 

individuals with terrorist ties that have 

or are seeking access to the restricted 

areas and/or critical assets at the 

nation’s high-risk chemical facilities. As 

described above, under the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program, for each 

affected individual a high-risk chemical 

facility would have at least three 

options under RBPS 12(iv): 

• OPTION 1—DIRECT VETTING: 

High-risk chemical facilities (or their 

designees) may submit information to 

the Department about an affected 

individual to be compared against 

information about known or suspected 

terrorists, and/or 

• OPTION 2 –USE OF VETTING 

CONDUCTED UNDER OTHER DHS 

PROGRAMS: High-risk chemical 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6421 

13CSAT user registration and the assignment of 

user roles within CSAT are covered under a 

different Information Collection (i.e., 1670–0007), 

which can be found at http://www.reginfo.gov/

public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201001-1670-007#. 

facilities (or their designees) may submit 

information to the Department about an 

affected individual’s enrollment in 

another DHS program so that the 

Department may electronically verify 

and validate that the affected individual 

is enrolled in the other program, and/or 

• OPTION 3—ELECTRONIC 

VERIFICATION OF TWIC: High-risk 

chemical facilities may electronically 

verify and validate an affected 

individual’s TWIC, through the use of 

TWIC readers (or other technology 

which is periodically updated with 

revoked card information), rather than 

submitting information about the 

affected individual to the Department. 

Regardless of the option, in the event 

that there is a potential match, the 

Department has procedures in place that 

it will follow to resolve the match and 

coordinate with appropriate law 

enforcement entities as necessary. 

The Department intends to provide 

high-risk chemical facilities, and their 

designees, the ability to create an alert 

within the CSAT Personnel Surety 

application that can notify them when 

the Department has received 

information about an affected 

individual(s), under Option 1 or Option 

2. Further, the Department will also 

allow high-risk chemical facilities the 

ability to view the status (e.g., that some 

information about an affected individual 

has been inputted into CSAT but not yet 

submitted to the Department under 

Option 1 or Option 2; that information 

about an affected individual has been 

submitted; etc.) of records about affected 

individuals associated with their facility 

within the CSAT Personnel Surety 

application. 

Scope of This Notice and Commitment 

To Explore Additional Options in the 

Future 

Between August 2012, and 

publication of the 60-day notice in 

March 2013, the Department had 

substantial dialogue with key CFATS 

stakeholders. The discussion included 

program design issues, the CSAT 

Personnel Surety application, options 

the Department has been considering to 

date, and additional options 

stakeholders have recommended for the 

Department’s consideration, both in the 

short and long term. 

The options described in this notice 

and, if approved, the ICR that the 

Department will submit to OMB would 

allow high-risk chemical facilities and 

the Department to implement the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

within the Department’s existing 

statutory and regulatory authority, and 

U.S. Government watchlisting policies. 

The Department is committed, 

however, to continuing to work with 

interested stakeholders to identify 

additional potential options that could 

further reduce the burdens related to the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program, 

while still meeting the national security 

mandate to reduce the risk of an 

individual with terrorist ties obtaining 

access to the restricted areas or critical 

assets at a high-risk chemical facility. 

The Department will consider and 

review any alternatives suggested as 

part of public comments on this notice. 

Through both the PRA process and 

other ongoing dialogues, the Department 

will, as appropriate, also continue to 

work with stakeholders to identify 

potential additional alternatives as new 

technologies emerge, and as other 

terrorist ties vetting programs are 

modified or become available over time, 

so as to reduce the burden of this new 

information collection. 

Who is Impacted by the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program? 

The CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

will provide high-risk chemical 

facilities the ability to submit certain 

biographic information about affected 

individuals to the Department. As 

explained above, affected individuals 

are (1) facility personnel who have 

access, either unescorted or otherwise, 

to restricted areas or critical assets, and 

(2) unescorted visitors who have access 

to restricted areas or critical assets. 

There are also certain groups of 

persons that the Department does not 

consider to be affected individuals, such 

as (1) Federal officials that gain 

unescorted access to restricted areas or 

critical assets as part of their official 

duties; (2) state and local law 

enforcement officials that gain 

unescorted access to restricted areas or 

critical assets as part of their official 

duties; and (3) emergency responders at 

the state or local level that gain 

unescorted access to restricted areas or 

critical assets during emergency 

situations. 

In some emergency or exigent 

situations, access to restricted areas or 

critical assets by other individuals who 

have not had appropriate background 

checks under RBPS 12 may be 

necessary. For example, emergency 

responders not described above may 

require such access as part of their 

official duties under appropriate 

circumstances. If high-risk chemical 

facilities anticipate that any individuals 

will require access to restricted areas or 

critical assets without visitor escorts or 

without the background checks listed in 

RBPS 12 under exceptional 

circumstances (e.g., foreseeable but 

unpredictable circumstances), facilities 

may describe such situations and the 

types of individuals who might require 

access in those situations in their SSPs 

or ASPs. The Department will assess the 

appropriateness of such situations, and 

any security measures to mitigate the 

inherent vulnerability in such 

situations, on a case-by-case basis as it 

reviews each high-risk chemical 

facility’s SSP or ASP. 

What/Who is the Source of the 

Information Under Option 1 And 

Option 2 

High-risk chemical facilities are 

responsible for complying with RBPS 

12(iv). However, companies operating 

multiple high-risk chemical facilities, as 

well as companies operating only one 

high-risk chemical facility, may comply 

with RBPS 12(iv) in a variety of ways. 

High-risk chemical facilities, or their 

parent companies, may choose to 

comply with RBPS 12(iv) by identifying 

and submitting the information about 

affected individuals to the Department 

directly. Alternatively, high-risk 

chemical facilities, or their parent 

companies, may choose to comply with 

RBPS 12(iv) by outsourcing the 

information submission process to third 

parties. 

The Department anticipates that many 

high-risk chemical facilities will rely on 

businesses that provide contract 

services (e.g., complex turn-arounds, 

freight delivery services, lawn mowing) 

to the high-risk chemical facilities to 

identify and submit the appropriate 

information about affected individuals 

they employ to the Department for 

vetting pursuant to RBPS 12(iv). 

Businesses that provide services to highrisk chemical facilities may in turn 

choose to manage compliance with 

RBPS 12(iv) themselves or to acquire the 

services of other third party companies 

to submit appropriate information about 

affected individuals to the Department. 

CSAT User Roles and Responsibilities 

To minimize the burden of submitting 

information about affected individuals, 

under Options 1 and 2 (as described 

above), high-risk chemical facilities 

would have wide latitude in assigning 

CSAT user roles to align with their 

business operations and/or the business 

operations of third parties that provide 

contracted services to them.13

Furthermore, the Department intends to 

structure the CSAT Personnel Surety 

application to allow designees of highVerDate Mar<15>2010 21:19 Jan 31, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\03FEN3.SGM 03FEN3

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14A Web-service is software system designed to 

support interoperable machine-to-machine 

interaction over a network. 

risk chemical facilities to submit 

information about affected individuals 

directly to the Department on behalf of 

high-risk chemical facilities. 

High-risk chemical facilities and their 

designees will be able to structure their 

CSAT user roles to submit information 

about affected individuals to the 

Department in several ways: 

(1) A high-risk chemical facility could 

directly submit information about 

affected individuals, and designate one 

or more officers or employees of the 

facility with appropriate CSAT user 

roles; and/or 

(2) A high-risk chemical facility could 

ensure the submission of information 

about affected individuals by 

designating one or more persons 

affiliated with a third party (or with 

multiple third parties); and/or 

(3) A company owning several highrisk chemical facilities could 

consolidate its submission process for 

affected individuals. Specifically, the 

company could designate one or more 

persons to submit information about 

affected individuals on behalf of all of 

the high-risk chemical facilities on a 

company-wide basis. 

The Department may, upon request, 

also consider allowing CSAT users with 

the ability to submit information about 

affected individuals to the Department 

via a Web-service. The ability to submit 

information about affected individuals 

via a Web-service will be provided on 

a case by cases basis, when in the 

opinion of the Department, sufficient 

additional security and privacy 

safeguards have been agreed to by the 

CSAT user.14

Burden Resulting From the Submission 

of Duplicate Records About an Affected 

Individual 

The Department is aware that an 

affected individual may be associated 

with multiple high-risk chemical 

facilities, and thus information about an 

affected individual may be submitted to 

the Department multiple times by 

different high-risk chemical facilities 

and/or their designated third parties. 

However, the Department has learned in 

its dialogue with stakeholders 

(including third-party companies that 

conduct background checks for highrisk chemical facilities) that the 

duplicate submission of records about 

affected individuals is a common 

industry practice for companies when 

managing information about 

individuals. Specifically, when a person 

who has already had a background 

check (e.g., verification of legal 

authorization to work or criminal 

history) needs a new background check 

for different companies or for a new or 

different purpose (e.g., change in jobs or 

contract), third parties that routinely 

conduct background checks routinely 

will submit information about a person 

again to agencies responsible for 

maintaining relevant information (e.g., 

state government agencies responsible 

for maintaining state motor vehicle 

databases). Therefore, for the purpose of 

this notice, the Department’s estimation 

of burden accounts for potential 

multiple submissions of information 

about affected individuals by high-risk 

chemical facilities and their designated 

third parties. 

Compliance With RBPS 12(iv) and the 

Potential for Increased Burden To Enter 

the Restricted Areas or Critical Assets at 

a High-Risk Chemical Facility 

Since the Department first began 

seeking to implement the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program, stakeholders 

have expressed concern that the 

submission of information about 

affected individuals under Option 1 and 

Option 2 to the Department would 

impede the ability of affected 

individuals to enter the restricted areas 

or critical assets at high-risk chemical 

facilities. The Department does not 

believe that if a facility complies with 

RBPS 12(iv) the high-risk chemical 

facility will, on a routine basis, 

experience an unreasonable impact in 

allowing affected individuals access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

In general, the Department expects 

that high-risk chemical facilities or their 

designees (e.g., third parties or 

companies employing affected 

individuals that provide services to 

high-risk chemical facilities) will 

already possess much, if not all, of the 

necessary information about affected 

individuals as a result of standard 

business practices related to 

employment or managing of service 

contracts. In the event that high-risk 

chemical facilities, or their designees, 

need to collect any additional 

information for the purpose of 

complying with RBPS 12(iv), they have 

significant flexibility in how to collect 

this information since CFATS does not 

prescribe how to do so. 

The Department also expects that 

high-risk chemical facilities will likely 

consolidate RBPS 12(iv) processing with 

related routine hiring and access control 

procedures involving background 

checks that are already occurring prior 

to access by facility personnel or 

unescorted visitors to restricted areas or 

critical assets. Consolidating RBPS 

12(iv) processing with these other 

routine procedures would allow 

submission of personal information 

already collected and maintained by 

facilities or their designees (e.g., a third 

party, contracted service company, or 

third party acting on behalf of a 

contracted service company) to the 

Department under RBPS 12(iv) before 

affected individuals require access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

As mentioned above, third parties 

could submit screening information to 

the Department on behalf of high-risk 

chemical facilities as part of facilities’ 

routine hiring and access control 

procedures. Some stakeholders have 

expressed concerns to the Department 

about submission of screening 

information by third parties, suggesting 

that in such cases facilities would not be 

able to adequately oversee third parties’ 

work to ensure appropriate information 

submission to the Department. The 

Department expects, however, that highrisk chemical facilities could audit and/ 

or review their third party designees’ 

information collection and submission 

processes, to ensure that their designees 

submit appropriate information. 

The Department has provided below 

several illustrative examples about how 

high-risk chemical facilitates or 

designees are likely to consolidate RBPS 

12(iv) processing with routine 

background check activities related to 

those required by RBPS 12(i)–(iii), 

namely, (i) measures designed to verify 

and validate identity; (ii) measures 

designed to check criminal history; and 

(iii) measures designed to verify and 

validate legal authorization to work. By 

consolidating RBPS 12(iv) with routine 

background check activities related to 

RBPS 12(i)-(iii), high-risk chemical 

facilities will likely choose to 

incorporate the submission of 

information about affected individuals 

to the Department under RBPS 12(iv) 

into the routine background check 

activities required by RBPS 12(i)–(iii). 

Although estimating the burden of 

RBPS 12(i)–(iii) is not within the scope 

of this Paperwork Reduction Act notice, 

when and how high-risk chemical 

facilities could collect information for 

submission to the Department has 

influenced the Department’s design of 

the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. 

The Department believes that the 

illustrative examples provided below 

show how, if the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program is implemented, a highrisk chemical facility and its associated 

third party companies could access the 

CSAT Personnel Surety application for 

purposes of submitting terrorist ties 

screening information to the Department 

on its behalf under RBPS 12(iv), in 


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coordination with other normal 

business activities not required by RBPS 

12(iv). 

SCENARIO #1: Employees Who Are 

‘‘Facility Personnel’’ 

This scenario could apply to a highrisk chemical facility that has a number 

of employees it deems in its SSP or ASP 

to be ‘‘facility personnel’’ with access to 

restricted areas and/or critical assets. 

In its SSP or ASP, the high-risk 

chemical facility could choose to 

comply with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) for these 

employees by either: 

• Hiring a third party background 

check company to perform identity, 

criminal history, and legal authorization 

to work background checks on these 

employees. 

Æ A contract or agreement between 

the high-risk chemical facility and the 

third party could establish the criteria 

for these background checks, and could 

establish which background check 

results qualify individuals to access the 

restricted areas or critical assets at the 

high-risk chemical facility or disqualify 

individuals from accessing the restricted 

areas or critical assets at the high-risk 

chemical facility. 

Æ The third party could submit 

appropriate information, under Option 1 

and/or Option 2, to the Department 

while it conducts these identity, 

criminal history, and legal authorization 

to work background checks. 

Æ The high-risk chemical facility 

could audit or review the background 

checks being conducted to ensure 

contractual compliance. 

Or, 

• Performing identity, criminal 

history, and legal authorization to work 

background checks itself. 

Æ The high-risk chemical facility 

could establish the criteria for these 

background checks, and could establish 

which background check results qualify 

individuals to access the restricted areas 

or critical assets at the high-risk 

chemical facility or disqualify 

individuals from accessing the restricted 

areas or critical assets at the high-risk 

chemical facility. 

Æ The facility could submit 

appropriate information, under Option 1 

and/or Option 2, to the Department 

while it conducts these identity, 

criminal history, and legal authorization 

to work background checks. 

Prior to an employee being granted 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets (i.e., prior to being issued a 

facility-specific access credential/card, 

or door/gate key(s)), identity, criminal 

history, and legal authorization to work 

background checks could be completed 

by the third party or the high-risk 

chemical facility in accordance with the 

high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP. 

If appropriate, based upon the results of 

those background checks, the employee 

could then be determined suitable to 

access the high-risk chemical facility’s 

restricted areas and/or critical assets. 

The third party or the high-risk 

chemical facility could then report its 

suitability finding to the appropriate 

party at the high-risk chemical facility 

so that facility-specific access 

credentials/cards, or door/gate key(s) 

could be granted, if appropriate. 

Completion of submission of 

information about the affected 

individual to the Department in 

compliance with RBPS 12(iv) therefore 

would not impede the routine access 

control procedures of the high-risk 

chemical facility because the 

information submission would likely be 

accomplished in concert with the other 

background check activities, prior to 

access. 

SCENARIO #2: Resident Contractors 

Who Are ‘‘Facility Personnel’’ 

This scenario could apply to a highrisk chemical facility that has a number 

of resident contractors it deems in its 

SSP or ASP to be ‘‘facility personnel’’ 

with access to restricted areas or critical 

assets. 

In its SSP or ASP, the high-risk 

chemical facility could choose to 

comply with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) for 

resident contractors by: 

• Stipulating in a contract between 

the high-risk chemical facility and the 

company employing the resident 

contractors that the contractors’ 

employer will perform or provide for 

identity, criminal history, and legal 

authorization to work background 

checks to be conducted on the resident 

contractors. 

Æ A contract or agreement between 

the high-risk chemical facility and the 

company employing the resident 

contractors could establish the criteria 

for these background checks, and could 

establish which background check 

results qualify individuals to access the 

restricted areas or critical assets at the 

high-risk chemical facility or disqualify 

individuals from accessing the restricted 

areas or critical assets at the high-risk 

chemical facility. 

Æ The high-risk chemical facility 

could audit or review the background 

checks being conducted to ensure 

contractual compliance. 

• Prior to a resident contractor being 

granted access to the restricted areas or 

critical assets of the high-risk chemical 

facility (i.e., being issued a facilityspecific access credential/card, door/

gate key(s)), identity, criminal history, 

and legal authorization to work 

background checks could be completed 

by the company employing the resident 

contractor in accordance with the highrisk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP. 

Æ The company employing the 

resident contractor could conduct these 

identity, criminal history, and legal 

authorization to work background 

checks. 

Æ The company employing the 

resident contractor could submit 

appropriate information, under Option 1 

and/or Option 2, to the Department 

while it conducts these identity, 

criminal history, and legal authorization 

to work background checks. 

• The company employing the 

resident contractor, however, might not 

perform the actual background checks 

itself. Rather, the company employing 

the resident contractor could hire a 

third party background check company 

to perform identity, criminal history, 

and legal authorization to work 

background checks on its employees 

(including the resident contractors at 

the high-risk chemical facility). 

Æ If the company employing the 

resident contractor hires a third party 

background check company for this 

purpose, a contract or agreement 

between the company employing the 

resident contractor and the third party 

background check company could 

establish the criteria for these 

background checks and could establish 

which background check results are 

acceptable for access to the restricted 

areas and critical assets at the high-risk 

chemical facility for which the resident 

contractor performs services. 

Æ The third party background check 

company could submit appropriate 

information, under Option 1 and/or 

Option 2, to the Department while it 

conducts these identity, criminal 

history, and legal authorization to work 

background checks. 

Prior to the resident contractor being 

granted access to restricted areas or 

critical assets of the high-risk chemical 

facility (i.e., being issued a facilityspecific access credential/card, or door/ 

gate key(s)), identity, criminal history, 

and legal authorization to work 

background checks could be completed 

by the company employing the resident 

contractor, or by a third party 

background check company in 

accordance with the high-risk chemical 

facility’s SSP or ASP. If appropriate, 

based on the results of those background 

checks, the resident contractor could 

then be determined suitable to access 

the high-risk chemical facility’s 

restricted areas and/or critical assets. 

The company employing the resident 

contractor, or a third party background 


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6424 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

check company, could then report 

suitability findings to the high-risk 

chemical facility. The appropriate party 

at the high-risk chemical facility could 

then grant the resident contractor 

facility-specific access credentials/

cards, or door/gate key(s), if appropriate 

based on those suitability findings. The 

submission of information about the 

affected individual to the Department in 

compliance with RBPS 12(iv) therefore 

would not impede the routine access 

control procedures of the high-risk 

chemical facility because the 

submission of information would likely 

be accomplished in concert with the 

other background check activities, prior 

to access. 

SCENARIO #3: Frequent ‘‘Unescorted 

Visitors’’ 

This scenario could apply to a highrisk chemical facility that has a number 

of frequent unescorted visitors that have 

or are seeking repeated access to the 

restricted areas or critical assets of the 

facility, pursuant to a contractual 

relationship with a company employing 

the frequent unescorted visitors. 

In its SSP or ASP, the high-risk 

chemical facility could choose to 

comply with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) for 

frequent unescorted visitors by: 

• Stipulating in a contract between 

the high-risk chemical facility and the 

company employing the frequent 

unescorted visitors that the frequent 

unescorted visitors’ employer will 

perform or provide for identity, criminal 

history, and legal authorization to work 

background checks to be conducted on 

the frequent unescorted visitors. 

Æ A contract or agreement between 

the high-risk chemical facility and the 

company employing the frequent 

unescorted visitors could establish the 

criteria for these background checks, 

and could establish which background 

check results qualify individuals to 

access the restricted areas or critical 

assets at the high-risk chemical facility 

or disqualify individuals from accessing 

the restricted areas or critical assets at 

the high-risk chemical facility. 

Æ The high-risk chemical facility 

could audit or review the background 

checks being conducted to ensure 

contractual compliance. 

• Prior to a frequent unescorted 

visitor being granted access to the 

restricted areas or critical assets of the 

facility (i.e., being issued a facilityspecific access credential/card, door/

gate key(s)), identity, criminal history, 

and legal authorization to work 

background checks could be completed 

by the company employing the frequent 

unescorted visitor in accordance with 

the high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or 

ASP. 

Æ The company employing the 

frequent unescorted visitor could 

conduct these identity, criminal history, 

and legal authorization to work 

background checks. 

Æ The company employing the 

frequent unescorted visitor could 

submit appropriate information, under 

Option 1 and/or Option 2, to the 

Department while it conducts these 

identity, criminal history, and legal 

authorization to work background 

checks. 

• The company employing the 

frequent unescorted visitor, however, 

might not perform the actual 

background checks itself. Rather, the 

company employing the frequent 

unescorted visitor could hire a third 

party background check company to 

perform identity, criminal history, and 

legal authorization to work background 

checks on its employees (including the 

frequent unescorted visitors that access 

the restricted areas or critical assets of 

a high-risk chemical facility). 

Æ If the company employing the 

frequent unescorted visitor hires a third 

party background check company for 

this purpose, a contract or agreement 

between the company employing the 

frequent unescorted visitor and the third 

party background check company could 

establish the criteria for these 

background checks and could establish 

which background check results are 

acceptable for access to the restricted 

areas and critical assets at the high-risk 

chemical facility for which the frequent 

unescorted visitor performs services. 

Æ The third party background check 

company could submit appropriate 

information, under Option 1 and/or 

Option 2, to the Department while it 

conducts these identity, criminal 

history, and legal authorization to work 

background checks. 

Prior to the frequent unescorted 

visitor being granted access to restricted 

areas or critical assets of the high-risk 

chemical facility (i.e., being issued a 

facility-specific access credential/card, 

or door/gate key(s)), identity, criminal 

history, and legal authorization to work 

background checks could be completed 

by the company employing the frequent 

unescorted visitor, or by a third party 

background check company in 

accordance with the high-risk chemical 

facility’s SSP or ASP. If appropriate 

based on the results of those background 

checks, the frequent unescorted visitor 

could then be determined suitable to 

access the restricted areas or critical 

assets at the high-risk chemical facility. 

The company employing the frequent 

unescorted visitor, or a third party 

background check company, could then 

report suitability findings to the highrisk chemical facility. The appropriate 

party at the high-risk chemical facility 

could then grant the frequent 

unescorted visitor facility-specific 

access credentials/cards, or door/gate 

key(s), if appropriate based on those 

suitability findings. The submission of 

information about the affected 

individual to the Department in 

compliance with RBPS 12(iv) therefore 

would not impede the routine access 

control procedures of the high-risk 

chemical facility because the 

information submission would likely be 

accomplished in concert with the other 

background check activities, prior to 

access. 

SCENARIO #4: Infrequent ‘‘Unescorted 

Visitors’’ 

Since the Department first began 

developing the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program, some stakeholders have 

expressed concern that the submission 

of information to DHS about unescorted 

visitors who have only rare or 

infrequent access to high-risk chemical 

facilities would be overly burdensome 

and would make access by such 

infrequent unescorted visitors too 

difficult. As a general matter, however, 

the Department does not believe it likely 

that many high-risk chemical facilities 

will propose in their SSPs or ASPs to 

allow large numbers of visitors who 

visit the high-risk chemical facility 

infrequently to have unescorted access 

to restricted areas and critical assets, 

because then all four types of 

background checks listed in RBPS 12 

would be required to be conducted for 

them. High-risk chemical facilities 

could choose to escort infrequent 

visitors in lieu of performing the four 

types of RBPS 12 background checks on 

them. 

However, even for infrequent 

unescorted visitors on whom the highrisk chemical facility chooses to 

conduct all four types of background 

checks, the Department does not expect 

data submission to the Department in 

compliance with RBPS 12(iv) to impede 

routine access procedures because the 

data submission is likely to be 

accomplished in concert with the other 

routine hiring and access control 

background checks related to RBPS 

12(i)–(iii) described above. The 

Department believes that the data 

submission for RBPS 12(iv) will likely 

be accomplished in concert with the 

routine hiring and access control 

background checks related to RBPS 

12(i)–(iii) because doing them in concert 


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15This ICR does not estimate the potential cost 

savings high-risk chemical facilities or their 

designees could achieve as a result of submitting 

data in concert with the other routine hiring and 

access control background checks related to RBPS 

12(i)–(iii) because the scope of this ICR is limited 

to the Departments obligation to estimate the 

burden of submitting information about affected 

individuals to identify terrorist ties under RBPS 

12(iv) in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction 

Act. 

16Examples of the international privacy 

instruments which the United States has endorsed 

are: (1) Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Development (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection 

of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data 

(1980), and (2) Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 

(APEC) Privacy Framework (2004). 

17The Safe Harbor Framework, which applies to 

commercial information, was developed by the U.S. 

Department of Commerce in consultation with the 

European Commission in order to provide a 

streamlined means for U.S. organizations to comply 

with the European Union Data Protection Directive 

95/46/EC. More information on the Safe Harbor 

Framework can be found at http://export.gov/

safeharbor. 

18For more information about Redress Numbers, 

please go to http://www.dhs.gov/one-stop-travelersredress-process#1. 

is likely to generate the potential for 

cost savings.15

Additional Data Privacy Considerations 

There are various privacy 

requirements for high-risk chemical 

facilities, their designees, and the 

Department related to the exchange of 

personally identifiable information (PII) 

for the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program. Upon receipt of PII, the 

Department complies with all 

applicable federal privacy requirements 

including those contained in the Privacy 

Act, the E-Government Act, the 

Homeland Security Act, and 

Departmental policy. The United States 

also follows international instruments 

on privacy, all of which are consistent 

with the Fair Information Practice 

Principles (FIPPs).16 High-risk chemical 

facilities, or their designees, are 

responsible for complying with the 

federal, state, and national privacy laws 

applicable to the jurisdictions in which 

they do business. The Department 

believes that high-risk chemical 

facilities, or their designees, have 

multiple, established legal avenues that 

enable them to submit PII to the 

Department, which may include the 

Safe Harbor Framework,17 and meet 

their privacy obligations. 

II. Information Collected About 

Affected Individuals 

Option 1: Collecting Information To 

Conduct Direct Vetting 

If high-risk chemical facilities select 

Option 1 to satisfy RBPS 12(iv) for any 

affected individuals, the following 

information about these affected 

individuals would be submitted to the 

Department: 

• For U.S. Persons (U.S. citizens and 

nationals as well as U.S. lawful 

permanent residents): 

Æ Full Name 

Æ Date of Birth 

Æ Citizenship or Gender 

• For Non-U.S. Persons: 

Æ Full Name 

Æ Date of Birth 

Æ Citizenship 

Æ Passport information and/or alien 

registration number 

To reduce the likelihood of false 

positives in matching against records in 

the federal government’s consolidated 

and integrated terrorist watchlist, highrisk chemical facilities would also be 

able to submit the following optional 

information about affected individuals 

to the Department: 

• Aliases 

• Gender (for Non-U.S. Persons) 

• Place of Birth 

• Redress Number 18

If a high-risk chemical facility chooses 

to submit information about an affected 

individual under Option 1, the 

following table summarizes the 

biographic data that would be submitted 

to the Department. 

TABLE 1—AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA UNDER

OPTION 1 

Data elements 

submitted to 

the department 

For a U.S. 

person 

For a 

non-U.S. 

person 

Full Name ...... Required.

Date of Birth ... Required.

Gender ........... Must provide 

Citizenship 

or Gender.

Optional. 

Citizenship ..... ........................ Required. 

Passport Information and/

or Alien 

Registration 

Number.

N/A ................ Required. 

Aliases ........... Optional.

Place of Birth Optional.

Redress number.Optional.

Option 2: Collecting Information To Use 

Vetting Conducted Under Other DHS 

Programs 

In lieu of submitting information to 

the Department under Option 1 for 

terrorist ties vetting, chemical facilities 

would also have the option, where 

appropriate, to submit information to 

the Department to electronically verify 

that an affected individual is currently 

enrolled in one of the following DHS 

programs: 

• TWIC Program; 

• HME Program; 

• Trusted Traveler Programs, 

including: 

Æ NEXUS; 

Æ FAST; 

Æ SENTRI; and 

Æ Global Entry. 

Information collected by the 

Department about affected individuals 

under Option 2 would not be used to 

conduct duplicative vetting against the 

federal government’s consolidated and 

integrated terrorist watchlist. 

To verify an affected individual’s 

enrollment in one of these programs 

under Option 2, the Department would 

collect the following information about 

the affected individual: 

• Full Name; 

• Date of Birth; and 

• Program-specific information or 

credential information, such as unique 

number, or issuing entity (e.g., State for 

Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) 

associated with an HME). 

To further reduce the potential for 

misidentification, high-risk chemical 

facilities may also submit the following 

optional information about affected 

individuals to the Department: 

• Aliases 

• Gender 

• Place of Birth 

• Citizenship 

If a high-risk chemical facility chooses 

to submit information about an affected 

individual under Option 2, the 

following table summarizes the 

biographic data that would be submitted 

to the Department. 

TABLE 2—AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA UNDER OPTION 2 

Data elements 

submitted to the 

department 

For affected individual with a 

TWIC 

For affected individual with an 

HME 

For affected individual enrolled in 

a trusted traveler programs 

(NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST, or 

global entry) 

Full Name ...................................... Required.


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19See 6 CFR 27.300–345. 

20More information about access, correction, and 

redress requests under the Freedom of Information 

Act and the Privacy Act can be found in Section 

7.0 of the Privacy Impact Assessment for the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program, dated May 4, 2011, and 

available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/

privacy/privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf. 

TABLE 2—AFFECTED INDIVIDUAL REQUIRED AND OPTIONAL DATA UNDER OPTION 2—Continued 

Data elements 

submitted to the 

department 

For affected individual with a 

TWIC 

For affected individual with an 

HME 

For affected individual enrolled in 

a trusted traveler programs 

(NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST, or 

global entry) 

Date of Birth ................................... Required.

Expiration Date .............................. Required.

Unique Identifying Number ............ TWIC Serial Number: Required ... CDL Number: Required ................ PASS ID Number: Required. 

Issuing State of CDL ..................... N/A ................................................ Required ....................................... N/A. 

Aliases ........................................... Optional.

Gender ........................................... Optional.

Place of Birth ................................. Optional.

Citizenship ..................................... Optional.

Under the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program, a high-risk chemical facility 

would be able to choose to follow the 

process described for Option 1, and 

would not have to implement Option 2, 

even if an affected individual seeking 

access to the high-risk chemical facility 

is already enrolled in the TWIC 

Program, HME Program, or one of the 

Trusted Traveler Programs. 

Option 3: Electronic Verification of 

TWIC 

Under Option 3, a high-risk chemical 

facility would not need to submit 

information about an affected individual 

enrolled in the TWIC Program to the 

Department, if the high-risk chemical 

facility is able to electronically verify 

and validate the affected individual’s 

TWIC through the use of a TWIC reader 

(or other technology that is periodically 

updated with revoked card 

information). 

As discussed above, under the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program, high-risk 

chemical facilities would also be able to 

choose to follow the processes described 

for Option 1 and/or Option 2, for some 

or all affected individuals already 

enrolled in the TWIC Program, in lieu 

of or in addition to Option 3. 

Other Information Collected 

In addition to the information about 

affected individuals collected under 

Options 1 and 2, the Department plans 

to collect certain information that 

identifies the high-risk chemical facility, 

or facilities, at which each affected 

individual has or is seeking access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

The Department may also contact a 

high-risk chemical facility or its 

designees to request additional 

information (e.g., visa information) 

pertaining to affected individuals in 

order to clarify suspected data errors or 

resolve potential matches (e.g., in 

situations where an affected individual 

has a common name). Such requests 

will not imply, and should not be 

construed to indicate, that an affected 

individual’s information has been 

confirmed as a match to a record of an 

individual with terrorist ties. 

In the event that a confirmed match 

is identified as part of the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program, the 

Department may obtain references to 

and/or information from other 

government law enforcement and 

intelligence databases, or other relevant 

databases that may contain terrorism 

information. 

The Department may collect 

information necessary to assist in the 

submission and transmission of records, 

including electronic verification that the 

Department has received a particular 

record. 

The Department may also collect 

information about points of contact who 

the Department or federal law 

enforcement personnel may contact 

with follow-up questions. A request for 

additional information from the 

Department does not imply, and should 

not be construed to indicate, that an 

individual is known or suspected to be 

associated with terrorism. 

The Department may also collect 

information provided by individuals or 

high-risk chemical facilities in support 

of any adjudications requested under 

Subpart C of the CFATS regulation,19 or 

in support of any other redress 

requests.20

The Department may request 

information pertaining to affected 

individuals, previously provided to the 

Department by high-risk chemical 

facilities or their designees, in order to 

confirm the accuracy of that 

information, or to conduct data accuracy 

reviews and audits as part of the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program. 

The Department will also collect 

administrative or programmatic 

information (e.g., affirmations or 

certifications of compliance, extension 

requests, brief surveys for process 

improvement) necessary to manage the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program. 

Under Options 1 and 2, the 

Department will also collect information 

that will allow high-risk chemical 

facilities and their designees to manage 

their data submissions. Specifically, the 

Department will make available to highrisk chemical facilities and their 

designees blank data fields. These blank 

data fields may be used by a high-risk 

chemical facility or its designees to 

assign each record of an affected 

individual a unique designation or 

number that is meaningful to the highrisk chemical facility. Collecting this 

information will enable a high-risk 

chemical facility to manage the 

electronic records it submits into the 

CSAT Personnel Surety application. 

Entering this information into the CSAT 

Personnel Surety application will be 

voluntary, and is intended solely to 

enable high-risk chemical facilities and 

their designees to search through, sort, 

and manage the electronic records they 

submit. 

III. Request for Exception to the 

Requirement Under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) 

The Department is requesting from 

OMB an exception for the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program to the PRA 

notice requirement in 5 CFR 

1320.8(b)(3), which requires federal 

agencies to confirm that their 

information collections provide certain 

reasonable notices under the PRA to 

affected individuals. If this exception is 

granted, the Department will be relieved 

of the potential obligation to require 

high-risk chemical facilities to collect 

signatures or other positive affirmations 

of these notices from affected 

individuals. Whether or not this 

exception is granted, Submitters must 

affirm that the required privacy notice 

regarding the collection of personal 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6427 

21For more information, please see the Privacy 

Impact Assessment for the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program, dated May 4, 2011 and available at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/

privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf. 

22One private sector company submitted two 

distinct comments. 

23See Table 6 in the 60-day notice published on 

March 22, 2013 at 78 FR 17690. 

information has been provided to 

affected individuals before personal 

information is submitted to the 

Department.21

The Department’s request for an 

exception to the PRA notice 

requirement under 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) 

would not exempt high-risk chemical 

facilities from having to adhere to 

applicable federal, state, local, or tribal 

laws, or to regulations or policies 

pertaining to the privacy of affected 

individuals. 

IV. Responses to Comments Submitted 

During 60-Day Comment Period 

The Department solicited comments 

on four questions: 

(1) Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

(4) Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology, 

e.g., permitting electronic submissions 

of responses. 

In response to the 60-day notice that 

solicited comments about the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program ICR, the 

Department received 28 comments from 

2 private citizens, 8 private sector 

companies 22, 14 trade associations, 1 

union, 1 training council, and the 

Ranking Member of the House of 

Representatives Committee on 

Homeland Security. 

Comments Related to Whether the 

Proposed Collection of Information is 

Necessary for the Proper Performance of 

the Functions of the Agency, Including 

Whether the Information Will Have 

Practical Utility 

The Department did not receive any 

comments suggesting that the proposed 

collection of information was not 

necessary for the proper performance of 

the functions of the agency. 

Comments Related to the Accuracy of 

the Agency’s Estimate of the Burden of 

the Proposed Collection of Information, 

Including the Validity of the 

Methodology and Assumptions Used 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that the annual turnover rate 

of 71% for frequent unescorted visitors 

estimated by the Department in the 60- 

day notice underestimated the annual 

turnover rate for delivery personnel.23

One commenter suggested that the 

Department adopt a higher annual 

turnover rate of 81.75% for all frequent 

unescorted visitors. 

Response: The Department agreed to 

adopt the higher estimated rate for 

frequent unescorted visitor annual 

turnover of 81.75%. The Department’s 

burden estimates reflect this revised 

assumption. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the Department made an error in 

Table 18 of the 60-day notice by not 

differentiating between the turnover 

rates of employees, frequent visitors, 

and infrequent visitors. 

Response: In this notice, the 

Department explicitly distinguishes the 

turnover rates of employees, frequent 

visitors, and infrequent visitors when 

estimating the annual burden estimate. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the Department did not accurately 

estimate the annual burden estimate in 

Table 19 of the 60-day notice. 

Specifically, the commenter suggested 

that Table 19 of the 60-day notice 

reflects a figure ‘‘0.50’’ hours for initial 

submission rather than ‘‘0.5425’’ hours 

which was the estimated time per 

respondent calculated in Table 18 of the 

60-day notice. 

Response: The Department disagrees 

and believes that in Table 19 it was 

accurate to use the figure ‘‘0.50’’ hours 

when estimating the annual burden. The 

figure 0.50 hours is distinct and is only 

associated with initial submission and 

not the other types of transactions 

covered by the ICR such as updates, 

corrections, and removals. The figure 

0.5425 hours represented the weighted 

average of all types of transactions and 

thus would have been inappropriate to 

use in Table 19 of the 60-day notice 

when estimating the annual burden. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the Department did not account for 

costs imposed by information 

submission requests the Department 

may require. Specifically, when the 

Department ‘‘may’’ require facilities to 

provide other pieces of information 

pertaining to affected individuals 

including visa information, the 

submission and transmission of records 

such as electronic verification that the 

facility provided a particular record, 

points of contact at a facility, and 

information supporting any 

adjudications or redress requests. 

Response: In the 60-day notice, 

Department estimated the average time 

per respondent to be 0.54 hours. The 

Department believes that the burden 

associated with requests from the 

Department for additional information 

about the affected individuals will be 

very rare and thus de minimus in 

nature. The Department also believes 

that the burden associated with 

information requests to support 

adjudication or redress requests will 

also be very rare and thus de minimus 

as well. Finally, the Department will 

collect submission and transmission of 

records, including electronic 

verification that the Department has 

received a particular record, 

automatically via system log files. This 

collection will not impose a burden on 

the high-risk chemical facility or 

designee. Therefore, for the reasons 

expressed above, the Department 

believes it has accurately estimated the 

estimated time per respondent. 

Comment: One commenter states that 

the Department did not account for the 

cost facilities will incur for a ‘‘facilityby-facility vetting of individuals 

accessing multiples facilities.’’ 

Response: As mentioned earlier in 

this notice, the Department is aware that 

an affected individual may be associated 

with multiple high-risk chemical 

facilities, and thus information about an 

affected individual may be submitted to 

the Department multiple times by 

different high-risk chemical facilities 

and/or their designated third parties. 

Therefore, for the purposes of this 

notice, the Department’s estimation of 

burden accounts for the notion that an 

affected individual’s information may 

be submitted by multiple times by highrisk chemical facilities and their 

designated third parties. 

Comment: Several commenters 

objected to the Department’s 

assumptions related to the potential 

recordkeeping burden associated with 

RBPS 12(iv). Namely, they objected to 

the idea that no potential recordkeeping 

should be estimated in this notice in 

accordance with 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(2), 

which directs federal agencies to not 

count the costs associated with the time, 

effort, and financial resources incurred 

in the normal course of their activities 

(e.g., in compiling and maintaining 

business records) if the reporting, 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
6428 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

24See footnote 8, supra. 

recordkeeping, or disclosure activities 

are usual and customary. Furthermore, 

commenters objected to the 

Department’s belief that the types of 

recordkeeping associated with RBPS 

12(iv) are usual and customary costs 

that high-risk chemical facilities would 

incur to conduct background checks for 

identity, criminal history, and legal 

authorization to work as required by 

RBPS 12(i)–(iii) and also by various 

other federal, state, or local laws or 

regulations. 

Response: As mentioned earlier in 

this notice, the Department expects that 

high-risk chemical facilities or their 

designees (e.g., third parties or 

companies employing affected 

individuals that provide services to 

high-risk chemical facilities) will 

already possess much, if not all, of the 

necessary information about affected 

individuals as a result of standard 

business practices related to 

employment or managing of service 

contracts. Furthermore, the Department 

also expects that high-risk chemical 

facilities will likely consolidate RBPS 

12(iv) processing with related routine 

hiring and access control procedures 

involving background checks that are 

already occurring prior to access by 

facility personnel or unescorted visitors 

to restricted areas or critical assets. 

Consolidating RBPS 12(iv) processing 

with these other routine procedures 

would allow submission of personal 

information already collected and 

maintained by facilities or their 

designees (e.g., a third party, contracted 

service company, or third party acting 

on behalf of a contracted service 

company) to the Department under 

RBPS 12(iv). In this notice, the 

Department provides several illustrative 

examples to further clarify the 

Department’s continued belief that the 

types of recordkeeping associated with 

RBPS 12(iv) are usual and customary 

costs that high-risk chemical facilities 

(or designees) would incur to conduct 

background checks for identity, criminal 

history, and legal authorization to work 

as required by RBPS 12(i)–(iii). 

Comments Related to the Quality, 

Utility, and Clarity of the Information to 

be Collected 

Comment: One commenter requested 

specifics about the mechanics of the 

process on how to submit information 

about affected individuals to the 

Department. 

Response: The Department will 

publish a user manual when the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program is 

implemented. The user manual will 

contain the necessary details about how 

information about affected individuals 

may be submitted, under Option1 or 

Option 2, through CSAT to the 

Department. 

Comment: One commenter requested 

specific information about the security 

or information protection requirements 

necessary to serve as a Submitter. 

Response: While an owner or operator 

of a chemical facility may designate 

someone to submit information on its 

behalf, the owner or operator is 

responsible for satisfying all the 

requirements of 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv). 

The Department provides at 6 CFR 

27.200(b)(3) that any such submitter 

must be an officer of the corporation or 

other person designated by an officer of 

the corporation, and must be domiciled 

in the United States, and is responsible 

for attesting to the accuracy of the 

submitted information. 

When a high-risk chemical facilities 

relies on third party companies to 

submit appropriate information about 

affected individuals to the Department 

the same requirements will apply. The 

submitter(s) must be designated by an 

officer of the corporation, must be 

domiciled in the United States, and is 

responsible for attesting to the accuracy 

of the submitted information. 

Comments Related to Minimizing the 

Burden of the Collection of Information 

on Those Who are to Respond, 

Including Through the Use of 

Appropriate Automated, Electronic, 

Mechanical, or Other Technological 

Collection Techniques or Other Forms of 

Information Technology, e.g., Permitting 

Electronic Submissions of Responses 

Comment: One commenter requested 

the ability to submit information about 

affected individuals ‘‘via some type of 

file (spreadsheet) upload as opposed to 

direct data entry into CSAT.’’ 

Response: When implemented, highrisk chemical facilities (and their 

designees), under Option 1 and Option 

2, will have the ability to input records 

about affected individuals in three 

ways: (1) Manual entry, (2) bulk upload 

via Microsoft Excel file or an Extensible 

Markup Language (XML) file, and (3) a 

direct Web Service connection. 

Comment: One commenter requested 

clarification about Option 3, 

specifically, if the phrase ‘‘other 

technology’’ means computer access to 

the Internet. 

Response: The Department’s phrase 

‘‘other technology which is periodically 

updated using the CCL’’ was intended to 

cover a variety of ways a high-risk 

chemical facility could, in its SSP or 

ASP, describe how it would determine 

if a TWIC was revoked for cause, or 

revoked because it was reported lost or 

stolen. Revoked cards could be 

determined from the CCL by using an 

electronic card reader to compare the 

TWIC’s Federal Agency Smart 

Credential Number (FASC–N) to those 

listed on the CCL. This could be 

accomplished by periodically 

downloading the current CCL from the 

Internet to either a TWIC reader or a 

Physical Access Control System 

(PACS).24 The status of a TWIC can also 

be confirmed by using a TWIC reader or 

PACS to check the Certificate 

Revocation List (CRL) for TWIC cards. 

The Department will also consider, in 

an SSP or ASP, any other specific 

innovative technologies that could 

allow high-risk chemical facilities to 

leverage the CCL or CRL for compliance 

with RBPS 12. 

Other Comments Submitted in Response 

to the Information Collection Request 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested the Department develop 

substantially different processes than 

the processes described by the 

Department in the CFATS IFR 

published in April 2007. One 

commenter suggested that the 

Department establish a process to certify 

vendors so that high-risk chemical 

facilities could rely on the certification 

as proof that the vendor has 

implemented security measures to 

ensure that its employees do not have 

terrorist ties. Several commenters 

suggested establishing a voluntary 

process by which the Department could 

collect information directly from 

affected individuals, and subsequently 

issue individuals unique submission 

numbers. The commenters suggested 

that an affected individual could then 

present the unique submission number 

to the high-risk chemical facility as 

evidence that the Department had 

conducted a security threat assessment 

to determine whether or not they had 

any terrorist ties. 

Response: Neither the notice 

published by the Department on March 

22, 2013, nor this notice are rulemaking 

notices. These notices are published in 

accordance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act and are not seeking to 

expand or change CFATS. Rather, these 

Paperwork Reduction Act notices are 

seeking comments on the burden 

associated with collecting information 

necessary to implement the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program described in 

the CFATS IFR. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the Department’s ‘‘preconditions’’ 

(i.e., the collection of information under 

Option 2 to verify enrollment in the 

TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6429 

25Recommendation 16 of the Surface 

Transportation Security Priority Assessment may be 

found on page 21 of the 2010 White House report 

at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/

rss_viewer/STSA.pdf. 

26The online form may be found at https://

hazprints.tsa.dhs.gov/Public/STAStatus.aspx 

Programs) ‘‘ipso facto do not provide 

reciprocal recognition of these vetting 

programs.’’ The commenter further 

suggested that the Department was not 

following White House 

recommendations to promote 

comparability and reciprocity across 

credentialing and screening programs.25

Specifically, recommendation 16 of the 

Surface Transportation Security Priority 

Assessment, which recommends that 

the federal Government ‘‘create a more 

efficient Federal credentialing system by 

reducing credentialing redundancy, 

leveraging existing investments, and 

implementing the principle of ‘enroll 

once, use many’ to reuse the 

information of individuals applying for 

multiple access privileges.’’ 

Response: The collection of 

information under Option 2 to verify 

enrollment of an affected individual in 

the TWIC, HME, and the Trusted 

Traveler Programs does recognize and 

leverage the vetting activities of the 

TWIC, HME, and Trusted Traveler 

Programs. Further, the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program aligns with 

the recommendations of the Surface 

Transportation Security Priority 

Assessment. 

In discussions with high-risk 

chemical facilities over the past several 

years, the Department has attempted to 

correct the persistent misinterpretation 

held by commenters about the concept 

of ‘‘enroll once, use many’’ as meaning 

that an individual should only need to 

submit information to the Department 

once, and that the Department should 

never collect information from that 

individual again. Rather, the 

Department has defined, and continues 

to define, the ‘‘enroll once, use many’’ 

concept as the ability to reuse 

previously submitted program 

enrollment information and/or vetting 

results upon collection of sufficient 

information to confirm an individual’s 

prior enrollment in a Department 

program or prior vetting results. 

One example of how the Department 

has implemented ‘‘enroll once, use 

many’’ in a DHS program other than the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program is 

when a person whose is enrolled in the 

TWIC Program seeks to obtain an HME. 

TSA collects sufficient information from 

the person enrolled in the TWIC 

Program to verify the person’s identity 

and verify the existence of a current and 

valid security threat assessment.26 If 

verified, the existing STA is leveraged 

for the HME, which provides for 

efficiencies such as reduced enrollment 

cost and shorter processing time. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that the collection of 

information under Option 2 to verify an 

affected individual’s enrollment in the 

TWIC, HME, and the Trusted Traveler 

Programs qualifies as a duplicative 

background check. 

Response: The information collected 

by the Department under Option 2 is 

used to verify an affected individual’s 

enrollment in a DHS program. The 

information collected under Option 2 is 

not used to conduct a duplicative 

background check. 

Comment: Another commenter 

suggested that the collection of 

information under Option 2 from 

affected individuals in possession of an 

HME as a proposal to ‘‘screen drivers 

carrying hazardous materials’’ violates 

49 U.S.C. 5103a(g)(1)(B)(i) which states 

that ‘‘[a]n individual with respect to 

whom the Transportation Security 

Administration—(I) has performed a 

security threat assessment under this 

section; and (II) has issued a final 

notification of no security threat, is 

deemed to have met the requirements of 

any other background check that is 

required for purposes of any Federal law 

applicable to transportation workers if 

that background check is equivalent to, 

or less stringent than, the background 

check required [to receive an HME].’’ 

Response: Collecting information to 

verify an affected individual’s 

enrollment, so that if verified the 

Department may rely on the results of 

the security threat assessment already 

performed and being recurrently 

performed, is not prohibited by 49 

U.S.C. 5103a(g)(1)(B)(i), and comports 

with the means of vetting verification 

described in the CFATS IFR. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the credentials be accepted ‘‘at face 

value.’’ The commenter further 

suggested that, ‘‘[t]he fact [that affected 

individuals] have a valid card meets the 

requirement specifically detailed in 

RBPS 1[2] and any further collection 

and submission of PII not only exceeds 

DHS’ authority but results in 

duplication of effort and unnecessary 

cost to both the facilities and to DHS.’’ 

Another commenter suggested that 

possession of a credential was ‘‘proof’’ 

that the affected individual was vetted 

and is being revetted for terrorist ties. 

Another commenter took an opposing 

view, and supported Option 2. The 

commenter agreed with the 

Department’s intention to collect 

information to electronically verify and 

re-verify affected individuals’ 

enrollments in the TWIC, HME, and 

Trusted Traveler Programs. 

Response: While visual inspection has 

some security benefits, electronic 

verification is significantly more reliable 

than visual inspection for ensuring that 

a TWIC, HME, or Trusted Traveler 

Credential is not counterfeit or expired, 

or has not been reported lost, stolen, 

damaged, or revoked. Accordingly, if a 

high-risk chemical facility chooses to 

implement Option 2, the high-risk 

chemical facility (or its designees) must 

submit information to the Department 

about affected individuals possessing 

the appropriate credentials to enable the 

Department to electronically verify, 

with the relevant component of DHS 

(i.e., CBP or TSA) using their 

authoritative and original data, the 

affected individuals’ enrollments in 

these other programs. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that the Department was 

requiring all visitors to have their 

information submitted to the 

Department 48 hours in advance of 

entering the site, which does not 

comport with the operational realities of 

the trucking industry. 

Response: The Department disagrees 

that this ICR does not comport with the 

operational realities of the trucking 

industry. The Department disagrees for 

four reasons. First, if a high-risk 

chemical facility chooses to allow 

visitors (e.g., truck operators) access to 

the high-risk chemical facilities, for only 

those visitors with unescorted access to 

restricted areas or critical assets will the 

facility need to comply with RBPS 12. 

Second, the Department does not 

believe it likely that many high-risk 

chemical facilities will propose in their 

SSPs or ASPs to allow large numbers of 

visitors who visit the high-risk chemical 

facility infrequently to have unescorted 

access to restricted areas and critical 

assets, because then all four types of 

background checks listed in RBPS 12 

would be required to be conducted for 

them. If the historical practice of a 

chemical facility has been to allow 

unescorted visitors access to the 

restricted areas or critical assets, 

without performing any background 

checks on them, the Department 

recognizes that the business practices of 

such a high-risk chemical facility will 

need to change as a result of RBPS 12(i), 

(ii), (iii), and (iv). Third, the Department 

generally expects that high-risk 

chemical facilities and designees will 

likely consolidate RBPS 12(iv) 

processing with related routine hiring 

and access control procedures already 

occurring prior to access by facility 

personnel or unescorted visitors to 

restricted areas or critical assets. As a 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
6430 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

27One example applied from the illustrative 

scenarios would be that the high-risk chemical 

facility would have in it contract clauses that 

require any contractors that provides emergency 

repair or maintenance to have background checks 

completed prior to arrival at the high-risk chemical 

facility, to include the submission of information 

about the affected individuals to the Department 

under Option 1 or Option 2. 

28The revised TWIC application form may be 

viewed at (http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/

PRAViewIC?ref_nbr=201210-1652-001&icID

=182269). 

29See 33 CFR 101.514 at (http://www.ecfr.gov/cgibin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=ef5225aac07

eddf7f914e57c3fda36bf&ty=HTML&h=L&r=PART&

n=33y1.0.1.8.49#33:1.0.1.8.49.5.26.4) 

result of discussions with industry 

stakeholders the Department 

understands that, in general, routine 

hiring and access control procedures are 

already in place for individuals, likely 

to be designated as affected individuals 

because of access to restricted areas or 

critical assets, working on behalf of 

trucking companies. Fourth, in the 

default schedule provided later in this 

notice, the Department suggests that 

information about a new affected 

individual could be provided to the 

Department no later than 48 hours prior 

to that affected individual obtaining 

access to the restricted areas or critical 

assets at a high-risk chemical facility. 

The Department would like to highlight 

that information about a particular 

affected individual does not need to be 

re-submitted to the Department 48 hours 

prior to each instance of access by that 

particular affected individual. Rather, if 

a high-risk chemical facility, or its 

designees, are able to determine that an 

affected individual requires repeated 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets, the high-risk chemical facility 

may structure the data submission to 

CSAT so as to indicate that the affected 

individual about whom the high-risk 

chemical facility or designee is 

submitting information to the 

Department will have access to 

restricted areas or critical assets on an 

ongoing basis. A high-risk chemical 

facility, or its designees, may also 

structure the data submission to CSAT 

to indicate that the affected individual 

will have access to restricted areas or 

critical assets for a discreet period of 

time. 

Therefore, for the reasons provided 

above, the Department disagrees that 

this ICR does not comport with the 

operational realities of the trucking 

industry. 

Comment: Several commenters raised 

objections to submitting a new affected 

individual’s information at least 48 

hours prior to their access to restricted 

areas or critical assets at high-risk 

chemical facilities. Some commenters 

suggested that submission of a new 

affected individual’s information should 

occur, rather, only at the time the new 

affected individual actually accesses 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

Alternatively, some commenters 

suggested that that submission of a new 

affected individual’s information should 

occur after the affected individual 

accessed restricted areas or critical 

assets. 

Response: The Department, in the 

default schedule provided later in this 

notice, suggests that information about 

new affected individuals could be 

provided to the Department no later 

than 48 hours prior to the affected 

individual obtaining access to the 

restricted areas or critical assets at the 

high-risk chemical facility. The 

Department believes that 48 hours is a 

reasonable amount of time, which is 

necessary for the Department to 

successfully perform a background 

check for terrorist ties. Therefore the 

Department has suggested a period of 

time (i.e., 48 hours) as a default for 

when high-risk chemical facilities could 

submit information to the Department 

for new affected individuals rather than 

at the time, or after the time, a new 

affected individual obtains access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. Later 

in this notice, the Department also 

reiterates that it will consider 

alternative schedules suggested by highrisk chemical facilities in their SSPs or 

ASPs, for Option 1 or Option 2, based 

on their unique circumstances. 

Comment: Several commenters 

expressed concern about contractors 

and visitors arriving upon short or no 

notice such as when a production unit 

goes down or otherwise requires 

emergency maintenance. 

Response: The Department 

understands that contractors and 

visitors may arrive with only short or no 

notice such as when a production unit 

goes down or otherwise requires 

emergency maintenance. The 

Department described, in the illustrative 

examples provided earlier in this notice, 

how a high-risk chemical facility could 

comply with RBPS 12, ensuring that all 

four background checks are conducted 

in such situations. High-risk chemical 

facilities should describe in their SSP or 

ASP the procedures and process 27 to 

plan for and prepare for exceptional 

circumstances (e.g., unpredictable but 

foreseeable situations) that result in 

situations that require an affected 

individual to have short or no notice 

before accessing the restricted areas or 

critical assets at high-risk chemical 

facilities such as when a production 

unit goes down or otherwise requires 

emergency maintenance. 

Comment: Several commenters 

pointed out to the Department that TSA 

recently modified the TWIC application 

form 28 to expand the population of 

individuals eligible to apply for a TWIC. 

The commenters uniformly suggested 

that the Department expand the 

population of individuals eligible to 

apply for a TWIC to include affected 

individuals that have or are seeking 

access to the restricted areas or critical 

assets of high-risk chemical facilities. 

Response: Any determination the 

Department or TSA makes to expand or 

revise the population of individuals 

eligible to apply and pay for TWICs is 

outside the scope of this notice. 

Comment: Some commenters 

supported the Department’s 

determination that certain groups are 

not affected individuals, specifically, (1) 

Federal officials that gain unescorted 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets as part of their official duties; (2) 

state and local law enforcement officials 

that gain unescorted access to restricted 

areas or critical assets as part of their 

official duties; and (3) emergency 

responders at the state or local level that 

gain unescorted access to restricted 

areas or critical assets during emergency 

situations. One commenter did not 

support the determination and 

suggested that this determination only 

incentivized terrorists to assume the 

identities of law enforcement officials 

rather than workers. 

Response: The Department has opted 

to align how CFATS treats certain 

groups of persons with how those same 

populations are treated under the TWIC 

Program.29

Comment: One commenter objected to 

the inclusion of railroad employees as 

potentially affected individuals. 

Response: Railroad employees may be 

affected individuals if the high-risk 

chemical facility has defined railroad 

employees in their SSP or ASP as either 

(1) facility personnel who have access, 

either unescorted or otherwise, to 

restricted areas or critical assets, or (2) 

unescorted visitors who have access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

Each high risk chemical facility can 

choose which option or options it 

wishes to implement with regard to 

railroad employees that would be 

affected individuals. The Department 

notes that many railroad employees 

have TWICs and encourages high-risk 

chemical to consider whether Option 2 

or Option 3 may provide a reasonable 

solution. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the 60-day notice was unclear as to 

which set of individuals would be 

subject to vetting for terrorist ties. The 


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commenter pointed out that the 

Department used the term ‘‘affected 

individuals’’ inconsistently. In parts of 

the 60-day notice, the Department 

described the term to mean ‘‘facility 

personnel or unescorted visitors with 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets at high-risk chemical facilities.’’ 

In other parts of the 60-day notice the 

Department described the term to mean 

‘‘(1) facility personnel who have access, 

either unescorted or otherwise, to 

restricted areas or critical assets, and (2) 

unescorted visitors who have access to 

restricted areas or critical assets.’’ 

Response: 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12) defines 

the scope of individuals for whom RBPS 

12 (and thus RBPS 12(iv)) background 

checks are required. 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12) 

defines the scope as ‘‘facility personnel, 

and as appropriate, for unescorted 

visitors with access to restricted areas or 

critical assets’’ at high-risk chemical 

facilities. The Department has provided 

additional clarity in previous notices 

that affected individuals are (1) facility 

personnel who have access, either 

unescorted or otherwise, to restricted 

areas or critical assets, and (2) 

unescorted visitors who have access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

In response to public comments 

received on earlier notices, the 

Department clarified, and does so here 

in this notice, that individual high-risk 

facilities may classify particular 

contractors or categories of contractors 

either as ‘‘facility personnel’’ or as 

‘‘visitors.’’ This determination should be 

a facility-specific determination, and 

should be based on facility security, 

operational requirements, and business 

practices. 

Comment: One commenter objected to 

the Department’s intention to collect 

information that identifies the high-risk 

chemical facility or facilities at which 

each affected individual has or is 

seeking access. 

Response: The Department requires 

this information so that in the event of 

a positive match, the Department may 

provide the information to appropriate 

federal law enforcement entities. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the ICR approach was deficient 

because the Department, based on 

public comments received, is unable to 

amend the text of 6 CFR part 27. The 

commenter suggested that without the 

benefit of a rule published in the Code 

of Federal Regulations, covered facilities 

will not know what identifying 

information is to be provided on 

individuals, and within what 

timeframes thus rendering the standards 

for personnel surety invisible. 

Response: The ICR and the associated 

60-day and 30-day notices do not 

modify 6 CFR part 27. The ICR and 

associated notices provide descriptions 

of the nature of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program’s information collection, 

categories of respondents, estimated 

burden, and costs. The Department is 

publishing this notice in accordance 

with the Paperwork Reduction Act 

because, although the Department has 

the authority to implement the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program, the 

Department must still comply with the 

Paperwork Reduction Act and its 

implementing regulations before 

collecting the necessary information 

from high-risk chemical facilities or 

designees. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the three options described in the 

60-day notice are an impermissible 

mandate. The commenter states that 

RBPS 12 does not require that a facility 

continuously vet covered individuals 

against the TSDB. 

Response: In April 2007, the CFATS 

IFR outlined two options, described 

earlier in this notice, for high-risk 

chemical facilities to identify 

individuals with terrorist ties. Both 

options rely on recurrent vetting, which 

was one of the underlying bases for 

including those options in the CFATS 

IFR. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program outlined in the ICR 

exceeds the Department’s statutory 

authority, because the proposed CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program design 

conflicts with Section 550. Commenters 

suggested that the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program’s design eliminates a 

high-risk facility’s flexibility to achieve 

compliance with RBPS–12. The 

commenters cited the following 

examples: (1) The ‘‘48-hour rule,’’ (2) 

‘‘submission of PII on valid TWIC, DOT 

HAZMAT, or Trusted Traveler card 

holders,’’ and (3) ‘‘notification when 

personnel depart a regulated site[.]’’ 

Response: The CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program will not exceed the 

Department’s statutory authority, nor 

will it violate or conflict with Section 

550. With respect to the specific 

examples cited by commenters, the 

Department does not believe these 

examples demonstrate a violation of the 

statutory requirement that the 

Department not disapprove a Site 

Security Plan on the basis of the 

presence or absence of a particular 

security measure. 

Not only does the Department 

disagree that 48-hour advance 

submission violates Section 550, the 

Department also disagrees with the 

characterization of the default schedule 

as a ‘‘rule.’’ As discussed earlier in this 

notice, the Department is not seeking to 

implement a new regulation. Rather, 

this notice is published in accordance 

with the Paperwork Reduction Act. 

The Department disagrees that a 

default expectation that high-risk 

chemical facilities or designees submit 

information about new affected 

individuals at least 48 hours in advance 

of access eliminates a high-risk facility’s 

flexibility to achieve compliance with 

RBPS–12. A high-risk chemical facility 

may suggest alternative schedules, for 

Option 1 or Option 2, based on their 

unique circumstances in their SSPs or 

ASPs. 

The Department also disagrees that 

the ‘‘submission of PII on valid TWIC, 

DOT HAZMAT, or Trusted Traveler 

card holders’’ violates Section 550. The 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program will 

not exceed the Department’s statutory 

authority, nor will it violate or conflict 

with Section 550 because the 

Department will provide and approve 

sufficient alternative methods for a 

high-risk chemical facility to satisfy the 

terrorism ties background check portion 

of RBPS 12. A high-risk chemical 

facility does not have to select Option 

2. Rather, if a high-risk chemical facility 

or its designees is unable or unwilling 

to submit information about affected 

individuals to verify their enrollment, a 

high-risk chemical facility may select 

Option 1, Option 3, or propose another 

alternative. 

The Department also notes the 

commenter’s use of the term ‘‘valid.’’ 

Collection of information is necessary 

under Option 2 because it would be 

inappropriate to have confidence in the 

validity of a credential based solely on 

a visual inspection of the credential. 

Electronic verification of the affected 

individuals’ enrollments in other 

programs provides significantly greater 

confidence that the credential in the 

possession of the affected individual is 

not counterfeit or expired, or has not 

been reported lost, stolen, damaged, or 

revoked. 

Finally, the Department disagrees that 

‘‘notification when personnel depart a 

regulated site’’ violates Section 550. The 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program does 

not require ‘‘notification when 

personnel depart a regulated site.’’ 

Rather the Department requires 

notification when an affected individual 

whose information has been submitted 

under Option 1 or Option 2 no longer 

has access to restricted areas or critical 

assets. This distinction is important— 

the Department has not suggested that it 

expects high-risk chemical facilities to 

update the information it sends to DHS 

through CSAT in real time as 

individuals depart the workplace, nor 


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6432 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

has it suggested that notifications are 

required under Option 3 or under any 

other options high-risk chemical 

facilities might propose to DHS in their 

SSPs or ASPs. Notifications about 

individuals whose information has been 

submitted to DHS under Option 1 and 

Option 2, and who will subsequently 

lose access to restricted areas or critical 

assets, could occur before or after access 

is lost—high-risk facilities could 

propose schedules for this type of 

notification to DHS in their SSPs or 

ASPs, and DHS would evaluate these 

proposals on a case-by-case basis, taking 

into account unique facility operational 

and security needs. 

The primary distinction between 

‘‘notification when personnel depart a 

regulated site’’ and the Department’s 

requirement to be notified under 

Options 1 and 2 when an affected 

individual no longer has access is that 

the CFATS Personnel Surety Program is 

not tracking the real-time access of an 

affected individual at a high-risk 

chemical facility. Rather, the 

Department, under the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program is seeking to 

ensure that affected individuals 

(whether they enter several times a day 

or only once over the time period in 

which they have the capability to enter) 

are checked for terrorist ties. This 

difference means that high-risk 

chemical facilities or their designees 

only need to notify the Department 

when to cease vetting once. This is in 

stark contrast to the multiple 

notifications that would be necessary if 

the Department required notification 

when ‘‘personnel depart a regulated 

site.’’ 

High-risk chemical facilities and their 

designees have at least two alternatives 

in how to notify the Department that an 

affected individual whose information 

has been submitted to DHS under 

Option 1 or Option 2 no longer has 

access. The first alternative is to submit 

the notification when the affected 

individual no longer has access. Under 

this alternative, a high risk chemical 

facility or designee would submit 

information about the affected 

individual initially and later in a 

separate communication notify the 

Department that the affected individual 

no longer has access. A second 

alternative the Department has provided 

is to allow the high-risk chemical 

facility or designee the ability to specify 

when the Department should stop 

vetting at the time of the initial 

submission. 

There are also additional alternatives 

available to high-risk chemical facilities. 

Under Option 3, the high risk chemical 

facilities may electronically verify and 

validate an affected individual’s TWIC, 

through the use of TWIC readers (or 

other technology which is periodically 

updated with revoked card 

information), rather than submitting 

information about the affected 

individual to the Department. 

Consequently, there is no need for a 

high risk chemical facility to notify the 

Department when the affected 

individual no longer has access if the 

affected individual’s TWIC is 

electronically verify and validated, 

through the use of TWIC readers (or 

other technology which is periodically 

updated with revoked card 

information). As previously discussed 

in this notice, high-risk chemical 

facilities are also able to propose other 

options for DHS consideration as part of 

their SSPs or ASPs. 

In conclusion, the only way the 

Department will know that an affected 

individual no longer has or is seeking 

access, under Option 1 or Option2, is if 

the facility (or their designee) notifies 

the Department when personnel no 

longer have (or no longer are seeking) 

access to a regulated facility’s restricted 

areas or critical assets. The Department 

disagrees that this aspect of the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program exceeds the 

Department’s statutory authority, 

violates, or conflict with Section 550. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that the Department, in 

particular NPPD, has in the design of 

the CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

refused to leverage credentials from 

comparable programs. The commenter 

implied that NPPD could consider how 

TSA opted to implement the ‘‘Air Cargo 

Screening Program’’, and how ATF 

implemented the Employee Possessor 

Program. 

Response: Not all federal background 

checks conduct checks for terrorist ties 

that are equivalent to the background 

check for terrorist ties being conducted 

by the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program. The Department has evaluated 

the ATF Employee Possessor Program 

and identified that the Employee 

Possessor Program conducts point-intime vetting against the TSDB, which 

means that ATF’s checks are conducted 

at only specified times, not on a 

recurrent basis. Recurrent vetting is a 

DHS best practice and compares an 

affected individual’s information against 

new and/or updated TSDB records as 

new and/or updated records become 

available. 

The Indirect Air Carrier (IAC) and the 

Certified Cargo Screening Program 

(CCSP) programs both conduct terrorist 

ties vetting equivalent to the terrorist 

ties vetting that would be conducted 

under Option 1. After the initial 

implementation of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program, if (A) the Department 

learns through interactions with CFATS 

stakeholders that a reasonable 

percentage of affected individuals 

participate in the IAC and CCSP 

programs, and (B) there is substantial 

interest from members of the regulated 

community in leveraging the IAC and 

CCSP programs, then NPPD may 

consider allowing high-risk chemical 

facilities to submit the full name, date 

of birth, and appropriate programspecific information or credential 

information necessary to enable the 

Department to electronically verify the 

affected individuals’ enrollments in IAC 

and CCSP programs. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that the ICR claims to leverage 

the TWIC, HME, and the Trusted 

Traveler Programs, but facilities or their 

designees must submit more 

information under Option 2 than if the 

high-risk chemical facility or designee 

opted to submit the minimum 

information required under Option 1. 

The commenters conclude those who 

have already been screened face more 

burdens and greater scrutiny than those 

lacking any screening at all. 

Response: The Department has long 

conceded that the minimum number of 

data elements necessary to conduct 

vetting under Option 1 may, in some 

cases, be less than the minimum 

number of data elements to 

electronically verify an affected 

individual’s enrollment in the TWIC, 

HME or Trusted Traveler Programs. This 

is because of how the TWIC, HME, and 

Trusted Traveler databases were 

initially constructed, not because 

affected individuals undergo extra 

scrutiny when the Department 

electronically verifies their enrollment 

Comment: One commenter requested 

clarification about the process of 

releasing employee information. 

Response: The scope of this notice is 

limited to the information submitted by 

a high-risk chemical facility (or 

designee) to the Department, which is 

subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 

U.S.C. 552a). The Department will only 

release or disclose this information in 

accordance with the applicable Privacy 

Act System of Records Notice. The 

Submitter(s) of each high-risk chemical 

facility (or their designee) will be 

required to affirm that, in accordance 

with their Site Security Plans, notice 

required by the Privacy Act of 1974 has 

been given to affected individuals before 

their information is submitted to DHS. 

DHS has made available to high-risk 

chemical facilities a sample notice that 

complies with subsection (e)(3) of the 

Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3)) in the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6433 

30Available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/

assets/privacy/privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf. 

31See 72 FR 17688 (April 9, 2007) at https://

www.federalregister.gov/articles/2007/04/09/E7- 

6363/chemical-facility-anti-terrorism-standards#p302. 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

PIA.30 This notice would: (1) Notify 

those individuals that their information 

is being submitted to DHS for vetting 

against the Terrorist Screening Database, 

and that in some cases additional 

information may be requested and 

submitted in order to resolve a potential 

match; (2) instruct those individuals 

how to access their information; (3) 

instruct those individuals how to 

correct their information; and (4) 

instruct those individuals on procedures 

available to them for redress if they 

believe their information has been 

improperly matched by the Department 

of Homeland Security to information 

contained in the Terrorist Screening 

Database. Individuals have the 

opportunity and/or right to decline to 

provide information, however, if an 

individual declines to provide 

information, he or she may impact a 

high-risk chemical facility’s compliance 

with CFATS. 

In addition, high-risk chemical 

facilities (or designees) may have 

information about an affected individual 

obtained for other purposes (e.g., 

compliance with RBPS 12(i)–(iii)) that 

was never submitted to the Department 

and thus not subject to the Privacy Act. 

While under CFATS no specific controls 

are required for information collected by 

high-risk chemical facilities with regard 

to RBPS 12(i)–(iii), the Department 

expects that high-risk chemical facilities 

will protect and safeguard the 

information as outlined in their SSP and 

in accordance with any other federal, 

State, or local privacy laws which do 

have jurisdiction relative to the 

collection of the information. 

Comment: One commenter expressed 

concern about the Department’s request 

for an exception to the PRA notice 

requirement in 5 CFR 1320.8(b)(3) when 

the Department is also requiring that 

Submitters must affirm that the required 

privacy notice regarding the collection 

of personal information has been 

provided to affected individuals before 

personal information is submitted to the 

Department. Specifically, the 

commenter suggested that ‘‘in order to 

make such an affirmation in good faith, 

the facility would almost certainly need 

to obtain signatures or other positive 

affirmations from affected individuals to 

protect itself against any claims of noncompliance.’’ 

Response: The Department believes 

that it is possible for a high-risk 

chemical facility or designee to affirm, 

in good faith, that the affected 

individual has been given adequate 

notice pursuant to the Privacy Act 

without collecting a signature from each 

and every affected individual. For 

example, a high-risk chemical facility or 

its designees could consider including 

an appropriate statement in pay checks, 

posting a sign near a restricted area or 

critical asset, including an appropriate 

statement within existing standard 

privacy notices provided to individuals 

when collecting information during a 

routine and normal hiring process, or 

including an appropriate statement in a 

letter. 

Comment: One commenter requested 

clarification about what the Department 

will do with the information it collects. 

The commenter further suggested that 

reducing the security risk associated 

with personnel RBPS 12 could be in 

conflict with selecting the ‘‘best 

qualified personnel/contractor’’ to work 

in the restricted area or critical asset. 

Response: The Department will, 

under this ICR, collect the information 

necessary to implement the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program. The CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program will use the 

information to identify affected 

individuals with terrorist ties. 

With respect to the potential conflict 

between reducing security risk and 

selecting the best qualified personnel/

contractor, the Department stated in the 

CFATS IFR, ‘‘that the level of screening 

for employees and contractors should be 

commensurate with the access 

provided. As part of this approach, the 

facility shall identify critical assets and 

restricted areas and establish which 

employees and contractors may need 

unescorted access to those areas or 

assets, and thus must undergo a 

background check . . .’’.31 A facility’s 

approach to personnel surety, including 

its defined restricted areas and critical 

assets, shall be detailed in the Site 

Security Plan that the facility submits to 

the Department for approval. 

Comment: Some commenters 

suggested that without a commitment 

from the Department to be notified 

when an affected individual has 

terrorist ties, there was little value to the 

default schedule which has high-risk 

chemical facilities submitting 

information about new affected 

individuals 48 hours prior to access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

Response: The CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program, when implemented, 

will identify affected individuals with 

terrorist ties. The Department has 

procedures in place that it will follow 

to resolve the match and coordinate 

with appropriate law enforcement 

entities as necessary. The Department 

believes that 48 hours is a reasonable 

amount of time for the Department to 

successfully perform a background 

check for terrorist ties, and to coordinate 

with appropriate law enforcement 

entities as necessary. 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that by not committing to 

notify high-risk chemical facilities or 

designees when an affected individual 

has terrorist ties, the Department is 

increasing the risk of an affected 

individual with terrorist ties obtaining 

access to the restricted areas or critical 

assets at a high-risk chemical facility. 

Response: The Department’s design of 

the CFATS Program is intended to 

promote and enhance the security of 

high-risk chemical facilities; the 

Personnel Surety Program is one 

element of the larger CFATS Program. 

To prevent a significant threat to a 

facility or loss of life, a high-risk 

chemical facility will be contacted 

where appropriate and in accordance 

with federal law and policy, as well as 

law enforcement and intelligence 

requirements. 

Comment: One commenter suggested 

that the design of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program appears to indicate the 

Department is playing an investigative 

role rather than a preventative role. 

Response: The CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program is designed to identify 

affected individuals with terrorist ties 

who have or are seeking access to 

restricted areas or critical assets at highrisk chemical facilities. The Department 

does not lead the investigation of any 

affected individual with terrorist ties; 

rather the Department supports law 

enforcement investigation activity. The 

Department recognizes the significant 

and vested interest the high-risk 

chemical facility or designee may have 

in ensuring an affected individual with 

terrorist ties does not successfully carry 

out a terrorist attack against or involving 

a high-risk chemical facility. 

Comment: One commenter requested 

that the Department define what a highrisk chemical facility is. 

Response: Public Law 109–295 

required the Department to identify and 

regulate the security of high-risk 

chemical facilities. The CFATS 

regulations implement this statute and 

describe how DHS determines which 

chemical facilities are high-risk 

chemical facilities. Defining high-risk 

chemical facilities is beyond the scope 

of this notice and is beyond the scope 

of the ICR for the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program. 


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Comment: Several commenters 

pointed out that under Option 1, the 

Department will not be providing the 

results (i.e., that the affected individual 

does or does not have terrorist ties) to 

the high-risk chemical facility or 

designee, while under Option 2, the 

Department will be providing the results 

(i.e., that the Department was able to 

electronically verify that the affected 

individual is currently enrolled in either 

the TWIC, HME, or Trusted Traveler 

Programs). Some commenters suggested 

that not providing results under Option 

1 but providing results under Option 2 

was confusing. Some commenters 

suggested that by providing results 

under Option 2, high-risk chemical 

facilities will have greater confidence 

that the affected individual does not 

have terrorist ties (and the credential is 

not expired, has not been revoked, and 

is not fraudulent). The commenters 

pointed out that high-risk chemical 

facilities would also have greater 

confidence than when only relying on 

the visual inspection of the TWIC or 

other federal credential. 

Response: The Department has 

designed the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program to support high-risk chemical 

facilities’ compliance with RBPS 12(iv) 

through a variety of options. The 

Department does agree that the 

flexibility high-risk chemical facilities 

and designees have does increase the 

complexity of the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program, however, this flexibility 

increases the ability of each high-risk 

chemical facility to be able to tailor their 

SSP or ASP to their unique business 

operations when considering how to 

comply with RBPS 12(iv). 

The Department also believes that this 

flexibility provides ancillary benefits. 

Specifically, a high-risk chemical 

facility may choose to rely on the 

electronic verification and reverifications provided by the 

Department under Option 2 to 

demonstrate compliance with RBPS 

12(i)–(iii). A high-risk chemical facility 

may choose to rely on the Department’s 

electronic verification and reverification (provided via CSAT) under 

Option 2 not only for RBPS 12(iv) but 

also RBPS 12(i)–(iii) because an affected 

individual’s enrollment in the TWIC, 

HME, and Trusted Traveler Programs is 

dependent not only on an equivalent 

check for terrorist ties, but on several 

other factors such as a verification of 

identity, legal authorization to work, 

and a criminal history check. 

Therefore, a high-risk chemical 

facility may, in their SSP or ASP, 

choose to rely on the Department’s 

electronic verification and reverification that an affected individual 

is currently enrolled in the TWIC, HME, 

and Trusted Traveler Programs as a 

means of complying with RBPS 12(i)– 

(iii). High-risk chemical facilities should 

carefully consider whether the specific 

elements of the security threat 

assessments performed under the TWIC, 

HME, or Trusted Traveler Programs 

meet their business and security needs 

before choosing to rely on them for 

compliance with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) in 

their SSP or ASP. 

The Department would like to 

highlight that, under Option 2, high-risk 

chemical facilities or designees will be 

able to, for the first time, electronically 

verify an affected individual’s 

enrollment in either the HME Program 

or Trusted Traveler Programs. 

Consequently, a high-risk chemical 

facility or designee may choose to rely 

on the Department verification of 

enrollment, Under Option 2, to comply 

with RBPS 12(iv) and RBPS 12(i)–(iii). 

Comment: Several commenters 

suggested that providing information 

about an affected individual to the 

Department prior to access would 

complicate the ability of a high-risk 

chemical facility or designee to 

substitute contract workers, service 

providers, third party carriers, and the 

like on short notice in the event of an 

accident, illness or change in work 

assignment/scope. 

Response: Earlier in this notice the 

Department outlined its understanding 

about how high-risk chemical facilities 

and designees could include steps for 

RBPS 12(iv) in their normal business 

operations when conducting the routine 

and normal background checks required 

for RBPS 12(i)–(iii). The steps a highrisk chemical facility normally takes to 

comply with RBPS 12(i)–(iii) when 

faced with substitute contract workers, 

service providers, third party carriers, 

and the like on short notice in the event 

of an accident, illness or change in work 

assignment/scope should be a part of a 

high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or ASP. 

These steps, or specific alternative steps 

to comply with RBPS 12(iv) could also 

be a part of, or incorporated within, 

those steps a high-risk chemical facility 

implements to comply with RBPS 12(i)– 

(iii) in their SSP or ASP. 

In addition, high-risk chemical 

facilities are welcome to propose 

alternative or supplemental options not 

described in this PRA notice in their 

SSPs or ASPs. The Department will 

assess the adequacy of such alternative 

or supplemental options on a facilityby-facility basis, in the course of 

evaluating each facility’s SSP or ASP. 

Comment: Submitters further 

suggested that providing information 

about an affected individual to the 

Department prior to access could also 

complicate the admittance of 

specialized crews brought in to 

accomplish emergency repairs or 

provide emergency response services. 

Some commenters suggested that the 

Department’s approach to allow each 

high-risk chemical facility to address 

these issues in their SSP or ASP is not 

adequate because the absence of 

uniform guidance across all the sectors, 

programs and procedures will result in 

inconsistent processes and procedures. 

Response: Section 550 of Public Law 

109–295 established a standards based 

regulatory regime to allow each highrisk chemical facility to propose in their 

SSP or ASP those security measures 

which make sense for its business 

operations and security risk. This will 

naturally result in inconsistent 

processes and procedures across highrisk chemical facilities. The Department 

believes that the intent of Section 550 is 

that flexibility (and thus some 

subsequent variation) is in fact a desired 

outcome of CFATS rather than a 

negative and unanticipated result of the 

CFATS regulatory program. 

The Department would also like to 

point out that P.L. 109–295 and its 

implementing regulations do not 

prohibit high-risk chemical facilities 

from developing consistent approaches 

or from adopting consistent security 

measures or security protocols. 

Comment: Several commenters 

pointed out an apparent inconsistency 

between the Department’s statement 

that high-risk chemical facilities are not 

required to create, keep, or retain 

records under RBPS 12(iv) and the 

Department’s statement that it may 

request information pertaining to 

affected individuals, previously 

provided to the Department by high-risk 

chemical facilities, or their designees, in 

order to confirm the accuracy of that 

information, or to conduct data accuracy 

reviews and audits as part of the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program. Commenters 

suggested that if records are not 

required to be kept it is unclear (1) how 

the Department can expect facilities to 

provide information on affected 

individuals to confirm the accuracy of 

previously submitted information or (2) 

how the Department can subject highrisk chemical facilities to data accuracy 

reviews and audits. 

Response: The Department disagrees 

that there is a contradiction because 

high-risk chemical facilities or their 

designees will already possess or have 

access to information about many 

affected individuals as a result of 

standard business practices related to 

employment or managing of service 

contracts. The Department also 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6435 

32See section 5.3 of the Privacy Impact 

Assessment for the CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program, dated May 4, 2011, and available at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/

privacy-pia-nppd-cfats-ps.pdf. The Department also 

discussed ‘‘verification of receipt’’ in previous 

public notices related to an earlier (now withdrawn) 

ICR for the Personnel Surety Program—see for 

example NPPD’s June 14, 2011 PRA Response to 

Comments Document, 76 FR 34720, 34721. 

recognizes that, unrelated to this 

Information Collection, high-risk 

chemical facilities may propose to 

maintain different sorts of records or 

information related to RBPS 12 as part 

of their SSPs or ASPs, and the 

Department expects that the records or 

information available could vary from 

one high-risk chemical facility to 

another. The types of information the 

Department could request from highrisk chemical facilities as part of data 

accuracy reviews or audits could thus 

vary from facility to facility, based on 

each facility’s standard business 

practices and SSP or ASP. 

Comment: Several commenters stated 

that they do not routinely collect 

information about affected individuals 

who are not employees (e.g., contractors 

and visitors). 

Response: The Department 

understands that high-risk chemical 

facilities may not routinely collect 

information about affected individuals 

who are not employees. Earlier in this 

notice the Department outlined several 

illustrative scenarios which describe 

some common business operations as 

part of which high-risk chemical 

facilities could manage the background 

check requirements of contractors and 

visitors under RBPS 12. In these 

illustrative scenarios there is not an 

expectation high-risk chemical facilities 

will receive and subsequently retransmit the information to the 

Department under Option 1 or Option 2. 

Though such an approach is not 

precluded, the Department will allow 

wide latitude to high-risk chemical 

facilities to enable third parties to 

submit information about affected 

individuals directly to the Department, 

to satisfy RBPS 12(iv). 

Comment: Several commenters 

requested clarity about what records 

would be considered government 

records. 

Response: Information about affected 

individuals held by the Department are 

government records. Thus information 

about affected individuals obtained 

from the Department (via CSAT) by 

high-risk chemical facilities or their 

designees are government records. 

There is often confusion about copies of 

information which is best clarified 

through illustrations. 

• ILLUSTRATION #1: A high-risk 

chemical facility or designee holds 

information about affected individuals 

which it obtained to perform the four 

background checks required under 

RBPS 12. This information does not 

qualify as government records. 

• ILLUSTRATION #2: A high-risk 

chemical facility or designee holds 

information about affected individuals 

which it obtained to perform the four 

background checks required under 

RBPS 12. The high-risk chemical facility 

or designee submits portions of the 

information necessary under Option 1 

and Option 2 to the Department via 

CSAT. The information in the 

possession of the high-risk chemical 

facility or designee does not qualify as 

government records. 

• ILLUSTRATION #3: A high-risk 

chemical facility or designee holds 

information about affected individuals 

which it obtained to perform the four 

background checks required under 

RBPS 12. The high-risk chemical facility 

or designee submits portions of the 

information necessary under Option 1 

and Option 2 to the Department via 

CSAT. The high-risk chemical facility or 

designee logs into CSAT and 

downloads, prints, or copies one or 

more records about affected individuals. 

Only the records downloaded, printed, 

or copied from CSAT are government 

records. 

• ILLUSTRATION #4: A high-risk 

chemical facility or designee holds 

information about affected individuals 

which it obtained to perform the four 

background checks required under 

RBPS 12. The high-risk chemical facility 

or designee submits portions of the 

information necessary under Option 1 

and Option 2 to the Department via 

CSAT. The high-risk chemical facility or 

designee logs into CSAT and downloads 

only whether or not an affected 

individual, under Option 2, has or has 

not been electronically verified as 

enrolled in the TWIC, HME, or Trusted 

Traveler Programs. The record of an 

affected individual’s enrollment status 

provided by the Department is a 

government record. 

Comment: Commenters requested 

additional information about what 

information and records, related to the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program was 

and was not considered Chemicalterrorism Vulnerability Information 

(CVI). 

Response: The Department does not 

generally expect information and 

records related to the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program to contain CVI. 

In the May 2011 CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program Privacy Impact 

Assessment (PIA), the Department 

previously indicated that it would issue 

a ‘‘verification of receipt’’ and that the 

‘‘verification of receipt qualifies as 

Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability 

Information.[.]’’ 32 However, as 

discussed earlier in this notice, instead 

the Department now intends to provide 

high-risk chemical facilities, and their 

designees, the ability to create an alert 

within the CSAT Personnel Surety 

application that can notify them when 

the Department has received 

information about an affected 

individual(s). Such an alert would not 

be CVI. 

Comment: One commenter was 

troubled by the information pertaining 

to RBPS–12 contained in Appendix C of 

the May 2009 Risk-Based Performance 

Standards Guidance (http://

www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_

cfats_riskbased_performance_

standards.pdf), because the commenter 

believes that certain types of measures, 

procedures, policies, and plans 

mentioned in Appendix C are not 

appropriate for determining if chemical 

facility personnel are terrorist threats. 

Response: The Department expects 

high-risk chemical facilities to 

implement appropriate security 

measures to conduct identity, criminal 

history, and legal authorization to work 

background checks. These security 

measures can vary from facility to 

facility commensurate with facilityspecific risks, security issues, and 

business practices. The guidance 

referenced by the commenter (see pages 

180 to 186 of the Risk-Based 

Performance Standards Guidance) and 

other guidance addressing identity, 

criminal history, and legal authorization 

to work background checks, however, is 

not guidance addressing compliance 

with 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv), and as 

such is not the subject of this notice, nor 

is it the subject of the underlying ICR or 

of the 60-day notice preceding this 

notice. 

Comment: One commenter requested 

that the Department clarify what appeal 

or waiver options an affected individual 

has if his/her employer takes an adverse 

employment action against him/her 

based on RBPS–12 background checks 

or based on information received or 

obtained under the CFATS Personnel 

Surety Program. The commenter also 

requested that the Department prevent 

high-risk chemical facilities from using 

personal information collected from 

affected individuals as part of RBPS–12 

for purposes other than conducting the 

background checks required by RBPS– 

12. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
6436 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

Response: High-risk chemical 

facilities’ employment actions are not 

regulated by CFATS. 

The ICR the Department will submit 

to OMB, the 60-day notice, and the 30- 

day notice address the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program, not the 

identity, legal authorization to work, 

and criminal history background checks 

required by 6 CFR 230(a)(12)(i)–(iii). 

Discussion of information collected as 

part of those other three background 

checks, or employment decisions based 

on them, is beyond the scope of this 

notice. However, the Department 

expects that the high-risk chemical 

facilities and their designees will 

safeguard information collected and 

maintained under RBPS–12 as outlined 

in their SSP and in accordance with any 

other applicable federal, State, or local 

privacy laws which apply to the 

collection of the information. 

Comment: One commenter requested 

information about the controls to 

prevent an individual or the facility 

from using the personal information for 

purposes other than RBPS 12(iv). 

Response: The Department expects 

that high-risk chemical facilities and 

their designees will safeguard 

information collected and maintained 

under RBPS–12 as outlined in their SSP. 

While under CFATS, no additional 

specific controls are required by the 

Department for information collected by 

high-risk chemical facilities, the 

Department does expect that high-risk 

chemical facilities will protect and 

safeguard the information as outlined in 

their SSP or ASP in accordance with 

any other federal, State, or local privacy 

laws which apply to the collection of 

the information. 

The information collected by a highrisk chemical facility pursuant to RBPS 

12(iv) may be submitted to DHS under 

Option 1 and Option 2. Information 

collected or retained by the facility that 

has not been submitted to DHS and 

facility-generated copies of information 

that have been submitted to DHS are not 

considered government records and 

therefore are not covered under the 

Privacy Act of 1974. However, any 

information about affected individuals 

that is obtained from the CSAT 

Personnel Surety application is a 

government record and subject to the 

Privacy Act of 1974. Those government 

records must be protected as stated in 

the DHS CSAT Personnel Surety 

application Rules of Behavior, which 

every CSAT user will be required to 

affirm prior to receiving access to the 

application. 

V. The Department’s Methodology in 

Estimating the Burden 

Summary of Changes From 60-Day 

Notice 

When compared to the 60-day notice, 

the Department made only a few 

changes which impacted the burden 

estimates in this notice. Table 3 below 

briefly summarizes them. 

TABLE 3—SUMMARY OF CHANGES

ICR Burden Variables Description of changes 

Frequency ................................................................................................. No Changes. 

Affected Public .......................................................................................... No Changes. 

Number of Respondents .......................................................................... Revised the turnover rate of frequent visitors from 71% to 81.75%. As 

a result, the number of respondents increased from 192,000 affected 

individuals to 195,000 affected individuals. 

Estimated Time Per Respondent ............................................................. Updated from 0.54 hours to 0.58 hours as a result of the revised turnover rate increase. 

Total Burden Hours .................................................................................. Updated from 104,100 hours to 113,600 hours as a result of the revised turnover rate increase. 

Total Burden Cost (Capital/Startup) ......................................................... No Changes. 

Total Recordkeeping ................................................................................ No Changes. 

Total Burden Cost .................................................................................... Updated from $4,771,00 to $4,844,000 as a result of the revised turnover rate increase. 

Frequency 

The Department will expect, unless 

otherwise noted in an authorized or 

approved SSP or ASP, that high-risk 

chemical facilities submit information, 

under Option 1 and/or Option 2, about 

affected individuals in accordance with 

the schedule outlined below in Table 4. 

High-risk chemical facilities may 

suggest alternative schedules for Option 

1 or Option 2 based on their unique 

circumstances in their SSPs or ASPs. 

The default schedule below would not 

apply to Option 3. Schedules for 

implementing Option 3, or alternative 

security measures other than Option 1 

or Option 2, could vary from high-risk 

chemical facility to high-risk chemical 

facility, as described in individual 

facilities’ SSPs or ASPs, subject to 

approval by the Department. 

The Department will expect a highrisk chemical facility to begin 

submitting information about affected 

individuals under Option 1 and/or 

Option 2 under the schedule below 

after: (1) The high-risk chemical facility 

has been directed to comply with RBPS 

12(iv); and (2) the high-risk chemical 

facility has been notified that the 

Department has implemented the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program. 

TABLE 4—COMPLIANCE SCHEDULE FOR OPTION 1 AND OPTION 2 UNDER THE CFATS PERSONNEL SURETY PROGRAM

Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 

Initial Submission Of Affected Individuals’ Information. 60 days after the day 

when both conditions 

are true: 

60 days after the day 

when both conditions 

are true: 

90 days after the day 

when both conditions 

are true: 

90 days after the day 

when both conditions 

are true: 

(1) DHS directs the facility 

to comply with RBPS 

12(iv), AND 

(1) DHS directs the facility 

to comply with RBPS 

12(iv), AND 

(1) DHS directs the facility 

to comply with RBPS 

12(iv), AND 

(1) DHS directs the facility 

to comply with RBPS 

12(iv), AND 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6437 

33A blank copy of Standard Form 83(i) may be 

found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/

files/omb/inforeg/83i-fill.pdf. 

34See CFATS Regulatory Assessment Section 5.1 

(April 1, 2007), http://www.regulations.gov/

#!documentDetail;D=DHS-2006-0073-0116. 

TABLE 4—COMPLIANCE SCHEDULE FOR OPTION 1 AND OPTION 2 UNDER THE CFATS PERSONNEL SURETY PROGRAM— 

Continued 

Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 

(2) DHS provides notification that it has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. (2) DHS provides notification that it has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. (2) DHS provides notification that it has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. (2) DHS provides notification that it has implemented the CFATS Personnel Surety Program. 

Submission Of A New Affected Individual’s Information. 48 hours prior to access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

48 hours prior to access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

48 hours prior to access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

48 hours prior to access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

Submission Of Updates 

And Corrections To An 

Affected Individual’s Information 

Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need 

for an update or correction. 

Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need 

for an update or correction. 

Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need 

for an update or correction. 

Within 90 days of becoming aware of the need 

for an update or correction. 

Submission Of Notification 

That An Affected Individual No Longer Has 

Access 

Within 90 days of access 

being removed. 

Within 90 days of access 

being removed. 

Within 90 days of access 

being removed. 

Within 90 days of access 

being removed. 

Therefore, after evaluating the choices 

available to the Department under 

Question 16 on the Paperwork 

Reduction Act Submission form 

(Standard Form–83(i)),33 the 

Department believes that the description 

of ‘‘Other: In accordance with the 

compliance schedule or the facility SSP 

or ASP’’ is the most appropriate choice. 

Affected Public 

Most high-risk chemical facilities 

regulated under CFATS are private 

businesses, or parts of private 

businesses. Most people that access the 

restricted areas and critical assets of 

high-risk chemical facilities do so for 

business purposes. Therefore, after 

evaluating the choices available to the 

Department on Standard Form 83(i), the 

Department selected the description of 

‘‘Business or other for-profit’’ as the 

most appropriate selection for this 

proposed Information Collection. 

Number of Respondents 

The number of respondents under this 

collection is the number of affected 

individuals that high-risk chemical 

facilities or their designees submit 

information about in compliance with 

RBPS 12(iv). As described more fully 

below, for the purpose of this notice the 

number of respondents is estimated by 

multiplying: 

• The estimated number and types of 

high-risk chemical facilities, and 

• the estimated number of affected 

individuals at each type of high-risk 

chemical facility. 

For the purpose of this notice, the 

Department estimates the number of 

affected individuals at each type of 

high-risk chemical facility as the sum of: 

• the number of unescorted visitors at 

each type of high-risk chemical facility, 

and 

• the number of facility personnel 

and resident contractors at each type of 

high-risk chemical facility. 

Number and Type of High-Risk 

Chemical Facilities 

In the 60-day notice, the Department 

followed the methodology used in the 

2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment 34

which recognized that each chemical 

facility is unique. In the 2007 CFATS 

Regulatory Assessment the Department 

determined that it was impractical to 

estimate costs for each high-risk 

chemical facility. Therefore, the 

Department created four categories of 

facilities for each tier; three categories of 

facilities where loss of containment of 

the chemicals of interest is the primary 

concern and one category of facilities 

where theft and diversion of chemicals 

is the primary concern. Specifically, 

• Group A includes open facilities 

with 100 or more employees where loss 

of containment is the primary concern. 

These facilities are assumed to have five 

security entrances for the purpose of the 

cost analysis. 

• Group B includes open facilities 

with 99 or fewer employees where loss 

of containment is the primary concern. 

In addition, facilities that store 

anhydrous ammonia for commercial 

refrigeration in outdoor vessels are also 

considered ‘‘open’’ for the purpose of 

this analysis because it is the outdoor 

storage that requires protection. These 

facilities are assumed to have two 

security entrances for the purpose of the 

cost analysis. 

• Group C facilities are enclosed 

facilities where loss of containment is 

the primary concern (i.e., warehouses, 

enclosed manufacturing sites) that 

manufacture, process, use, store and/or 

distribute chemicals. The Department 

did not segment enclosed facilities by 

size because the same degree of 

variation between a large open facility 

(i.e., a 2,000-acre petrochemical 

complex) and a small open 3–5-acre 

facility does not exist. These facilities 

are assumed to have one security 

entrance for the purpose of the cost 

analysis. 

• Theft/Diversion facilities are 

typically merchant wholesalers (often 

called chemical distributors), chemical 

manufacturers, or other manufacturers 

that manufacture, process, use, store or 

distribute chemicals that could be the 

target of theft and diversion. The theft 

of chemicals could include theft of 

portable containers by employees, 

visitors or adversaries. The diversion of 

chemicals involves what often looks like 

a legitimate transaction where an 

adversary, impersonating a legitimate 

customer, purchases chemicals that 

could later be turned into weapons. 

These facilities are assumed to have one 

security entrance for the purposes of 

cost analysis. 

In the 60-day notice, the Department 

updated the number and type of highrisk chemical facilities estimated in the 

2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment. 

The updated analysis, hereafter referred 

to as the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program Analysis, determined the highrisk chemical facility count for each of 

the 16 model facility categories 

identified in the 2007 Regulatory 

Assessment by analyzing high-risk 

chemical facilities designated with a 

final tier under CFATS as of August 

2012. A comparison of the number of 

high-risk chemical facilities, estimated 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
6438 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

35The factor of 1.22 was used because (4,000 

facilities/3566 facilities) = 1.22. 

by the 2007 CFATS Regulatory 

Assessment, to the number of high-risk 

chemical facilities identified within the 

2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

Analysis is presented in Table 5. 

TABLE 5—NUMBER OF FACILITIES IN EACH MODEL FACILITY CATEGORY

2007 CFATS 

regulatory 

assessment 

2012 CFATS 

personnel surety 

program analysis 

(raw data) 

Tier 1 Group A ............................................................................................................................................. 81 4 

Tier 1 Group B ............................................................................................................................................. 89 6 

Tier 1 Group C ............................................................................................................................................. 24 10 

Tier 1 Theft .................................................................................................................................................. 6 93 

Tier 2 Group A ............................................................................................................................................. 166 8 

Tier 2 Group B ............................................................................................................................................. 64 16 

Tier 2 Group C ............................................................................................................................................. 80 15 

Tier 2 Theft .................................................................................................................................................. 189 400 

Tier 3 Group A ............................................................................................................................................. 315 22 

Tier 3 Group B ............................................................................................................................................. 438 33 

Tier 3 Group C ............................................................................................................................................. 329 66 

Tier 3 Theft .................................................................................................................................................. 718 935 

Tier 4 Group A ............................................................................................................................................. 242 72 

Tier 4 Group B ............................................................................................................................................. 690 190 

Tier 4 Group C ............................................................................................................................................. 599 13 

Tier 4 Theft .................................................................................................................................................. 970 1,683 

Total ...................................................................................................................................................... 5,000 3,566 

In the 60-day notice, the Department 

normalized the number of facilities in 

each model facility category of the 2012 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

Analysis to 4,000 facilities by 

multiplying the number of high-risk 

chemical facilities in each category by a 

factor of 1.22.35 The 2012 CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program Analysis 

revised (i.e., normalized) high-risk 

chemical facility count is compared to 

the 2007 CFATS Regulatory Assessment 

high-risk chemical facility count, by 

model facility category, in Table 6. 

TABLE 6—NUMBER OF HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES IN EACH MODEL FACILITY CATEGORY

[Normalized to 4,000 facilities] 

2007 CFATS 

regulatory 

assessment 

2012 CFATS 

personnel surety 

program analysis 

(normalized) 

Tier 1 Group A ............................................................................................................................................. 81 4 

Tier 1 Group B ............................................................................................................................................. 89 7 

Tier 1 Group C ............................................................................................................................................. 24 11 

Tier 1 Theft .................................................................................................................................................. 6 104 

Tier 2 Group A ............................................................................................................................................. 166 9 

Tier 2 Group B ............................................................................................................................................. 64 18 

Tier 2 Group C ............................................................................................................................................. 80 17 

Tier 2 Theft .................................................................................................................................................. 189 449 

Tier 3 Group A ............................................................................................................................................. 315 25 

Tier 3 Group B ............................................................................................................................................. 438 37 

Tier 3 Group C ............................................................................................................................................. 329 74 

Tier 3 Theft .................................................................................................................................................. 718 1,049 

Tier 4 Group A ............................................................................................................................................. 242 81 

Tier 4 Group B ............................................................................................................................................. 690 213 

Tier 4 Group C ............................................................................................................................................. 599 15 

Tier 4 Theft .................................................................................................................................................. 970 1,888 

Total ...................................................................................................................................................... 5,000 4,000 

As in the 60-day notice, this notice 

the Department continues to use the 

number and type of high-risk chemical 

facilities in each facility category 

estimated through the normalized 2012 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

Analysis because the distribution of 

facility type (i.e., facility count) is based 

upon actual historical data. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6439 

36This cost estimate has been posted to Docket 

DHS–2012–0061, which may be accessed through 

the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://

www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS2012-0061-0008. 37See CFATS Regulatory Assessment Section 

6.3.7, Table 15 (April 1, 2007), http://

www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS2006-0073-0116. 

Estimated Number of Affected 

Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk 

Chemical Facility—Unescorted Visitors 

With Access to Restricted Areas or 

Critical Assets 

For the purpose of estimating the 

potential burden this information 

collection could impose, the 

Department determined that it was 

appropriate to continue to use the 

conservative assumptions from the 

American Chemistry Council (ACC) 

about frequent and infrequent visitors 

and treat them all as unescorted 

visitors.36 Specifically, the ACC 

provided the Department with an 

estimate on the number and turnover of 

frequent and infrequent visitors at highrisk chemical facilities. 

ACC’s analysis suggests that 1,200 

total visitors per year should be 

expected at large open manufacturing 

facilities that align with Group A (Tier 

1 through 4) model facility categories; 

300 visitors each at small open 

manufacturing facilities (Group B model 

facility categories, Tier 1 through 4) and 

enclosed manufacturing facilities 

(Group C model facility categories, Tier 

1 through 4); and 50 visitors expected at 

theft/diversion model facilities (Tier 1 

through 4). ACC estimated an annual 

turnover rate of 71 percent for frequent 

visitors (e.g., delivery personnel) and an 

annual turnover rate of 20 percent for 

infrequent visitors that only visit the 

facility once or twice a year (e.g., 

corporate auditors). In response to the 

60-day notice, the Department received 

a comment from American Trucking 

Associations (ATA) that suggested the 

annual turnover rate for frequent 

visitors (e.g., delivery personnel) 

suggested by ACC is too low. ATA 

suggested that the Department use a 

turnover rate of 81.75% instead of 71%. 

As a result, the Department increased its 

estimate of the frequent visitor annual 

turnover rate to 81.75%. 

The Department also continues to 

maintain the assumption in the 60-day 

notice that frequent and infrequent 

visitors were expected to compose equal 

volume of traffic at high-risk chemical 

facilities. 

ACC’s analysis assumed that all 

visitors count towards the number of 

affected individuals. However, high-risk 

chemical facilities will only be 

responsible for submitting information 

for unescorted visitors with access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. The 

Department does not expect high-risk 

chemical facilities to allow large 

numbers of visitors to have unescorted 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets. As a general matter, the 

Department does not believe it to be 

likely that many high-risk chemical 

facilities will propose in their SSPs 

under CFATS to allow large numbers of 

visitors to have unescorted access to the 

restricted areas and critical assets of 

high-risk chemical facilities because 

then these visitors would be subject to 

all four types of background checks 

listed in RBPS 12. However, for the 

purpose of estimating the potential 

burden this information collection 

could impose, the Department continues 

to use ACC’s conservative assumptions 

about frequent and infrequent visitors 

and treat them all as unescorted visitors. 

Table 7 provides the Department’s 

estimated number of unescorted visitors 

that have or are seeking access to 

restricted areas or critical assets. 

TABLE 7—ESTIMATE OF UNESCORTED VISITORS THAT HAVE OR ARE SEEKING ACCESS TO RESTRICTED AREAS OR

CRITICAL ASSETS

A B C* D** E = C + D A + B + E 

Infrequent 

visitors 

Frequent 

visitors 

Infrequent 

visitor annual 

turnover 

(20%) 

Frequent 

visitor annul 

turnover 

(81.75%) 

Unescorted 

visitor annual 

turnover 

Unescorted 

visitor estimate 

Tier 1 Group A ......................................... 600 600 120 491 611 1811 

Tier 1 Group B ......................................... 150 150 30 123 153 453 

Tier 1 Group C ......................................... 150 150 30 123 153 453 

Tier 1 Theft .............................................. 25 25 5 20 25 75 

Tier 2 Group A ......................................... 600 600 120 491 611 1811 

Tier 2 Group B ......................................... 150 150 30 123 153 453 

Tier 2 Group C ......................................... 150 150 30 123 153 453 

Tier 2 Theft .............................................. 25 25 5 20 25 75 

Tier 3 Group A ......................................... 600 600 120 491 611 1811 

Tier 3 Group B ......................................... 150 150 30 123 153 453 

Tier 3 Group C ......................................... 150 150 30 123 153 453 

Tier 3 Theft .............................................. 25 25 5 20 25 75 

Tier 4 Group A ......................................... 600 600 120 491 611 1811 

Tier 4 Group B ......................................... 150 150 30 123 153 453 

Tier 4 Group C ......................................... 150 150 30 123 153 453 

Tier 4 Theft .............................................. 25 25 5 20 25 75 

* C = A × 0.20, ** D = B × 0.8175. 

Estimated Number of Affected 

Individuals at Each Type of High-Risk 

Chemical Facility—Facility Personnel 

With Access to Restricted Areas or 

Critical Assets 

The 2007 CFATS Regulatory 

Assessment also provided an estimate of 

full time employees and resident 

contractors for the 16 model facility 

categories, as shown in Table 8.37


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
6440 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

38The American Fuel and Petrochemical 

Manufacturers is the name of the former National 

Petrochemical & Refiners Association, whose 

comment may be found at http://

www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=DHS2009-0026-0029. 39See Response To Comments Received During 

30 Day Comment Period: New Information 

Collection Request 1670—NEW, 76 FR 34720 (June 

14, 2011). 

TABLE 8—2007 CFATS REGULATORY ASSESSMENT ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND RESIDENT

CONTRACTORS

A B C* D** A + C + D 

Number of 

full time 

employees per 

facility 

Resident 

contractors per 

facility 

(as percent of 

full time 

employees) 

Resident 

contractors 

per facility 

20% Annual 

turnover 

(full time 

employees 

and resident 

contractors 

per facility) 

Number of 

full time 

employees 

and 

resident 

contractors per 

facility 

(including 20% 

annual 

turnover) 

Tier 1 Group A ..................................................................... 391 30 117 102 610 

Tier 1 Group B ..................................................................... 35 20 7 8 50 

Tier 1 Group C ..................................................................... 152 10 15 33 200 

Tier 1 Theft .......................................................................... 35 10 4 8 47 

Tier 2 Group A ..................................................................... 279 30 84 73 436 

Tier 2 Group B ..................................................................... 34 20 7 8 49 

Tier 2 Group C ..................................................................... 317 10 32 70 419 

Tier 2 Theft .......................................................................... 35 10 4 8 47 

Tier 3 Group A ..................................................................... 487 30 146 127 760 

Tier 3 Group B ..................................................................... 47 20 9 11 67 

Tier 3 Group C ..................................................................... 310 10 31 68 409 

Tier 3 Theft .......................................................................... 35 10 4 8 47 

Tier 4 Group A ..................................................................... 283 30 85 74 442 

Tier 4 Group B ..................................................................... 139 20 28 33 200 

Tier 4 Group C ..................................................................... 201 10 20 44 265 

Tier 4 Theft .......................................................................... 35 10 4 8 47 

Total .............................................................................. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 

*C = A × B, **D = (A + C) × 0.20. 

In the June 2011 ICR, the Department 

updated the estimate of employees and 

resident contractors in the 2007 CFATS 

Regulatory Assessment in response to a 

survey submitted by the American Fuel 

and Petrochemical Manufacturers 38

during the 30 day comment period 

associated with the previous CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program ICR.39

Specifically, the Department increased 

the estimated number of full time 

employees/contractors in Group A 

facilities by 5, as shown in Table 9. 

TABLE 9—REVISED 2007 CFATS REGULATORY ASSESSMENT ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND

RESIDENT CONTRACTORS

A B C* D** A + C + D 

Number of 

full time 

employees per 

facility 

Resident 

contractors 

per facility 

(as percent of 

full time 

employees) 

Resident 

contractors 

per facility 

20% Annual 

turnover 

(full time 

employees 

and resident 

contractors per 

facility) 

Number of 

full time 

employees 

and 

resident 

contractors 

per facility 

(including 

20% annual 

turnover) 

Tier 1 Group A ..................................................................... 1,955 30 587 508 3,050 

Tier 1 Group B ..................................................................... 35 20 7 8 50 

Tier 1 Group C ..................................................................... 152 10 15 33 201 

Tier 1 Theft .......................................................................... 35 10 4 8 46 

Tier 2 Group A ..................................................................... 1,395 30 419 363 2,176 

Tier 2 Group B ..................................................................... 34 20 7 8 49 

Tier 2 Group C ..................................................................... 317 10 32 70 418 

Tier 2 Theft .......................................................................... 35 10 4 8 46 

Tier 3 Group A ..................................................................... 2,435 30 731 633 3,799 

Tier 3 Group B ..................................................................... 47 20 9 11 68 

Tier 3 Group C ..................................................................... 310 10 31 68 409 

Tier 3 Theft .......................................................................... 35 10 4 8 46 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6441 

TABLE 9—REVISED 2007 CFATS REGULATORY ASSESSMENT ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND

RESIDENT CONTRACTORS—Continued 

A B C* D** A + C + D 

Number of 

full time 

employees per 

facility 

Resident 

contractors 

per facility 

(as percent of 

full time 

employees) 

Resident 

contractors 

per facility 

20% Annual 

turnover 

(full time 

employees 

and resident 

contractors per 

facility) 

Number of 

full time 

employees 

and 

resident 

contractors 

per facility 

(including 

20% annual 

turnover) 

Tier 4 Group A ..................................................................... 1,415 30 425 368 2,207 

Tier 4 Group B ..................................................................... 139 20 28 33 200 

Tier 4 Group C ..................................................................... 201 10 20 44 265 

Tier 4 Theft .......................................................................... 35 10 4 8 46 

Total .............................................................................. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 

*C = A × B, **D = (A + C) × 0.20. 

In addition to submitting comments 

on the Department’s June 2011 

estimated burden about unescorted 

visitors, ACC also suggested that 80 

percent of employees/resident 

contractors have access to restricted 

areas and/or critical assets at Group A, 

B and C facilities and only 15 percent 

of employees/resident contractors have 

access to theft/diversion facilities. To 

provide an additional estimate of the 

number of respondents the Department 

applied this ACC assumption to the 

revised 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program Analysis. The resulting 

estimate, referred to as the ‘‘Adjusted 

June 2011 ICR Estimate of the Number 

of Full Time Employees and Resident 

Contractors’’ is shown in Table 10. 

TABLE 10—ADJUSTED JUNE 2011 ICR ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND RESIDENT

CONTRACTORS

A B C* D** A + C + D E (A+C+D) × E 

Number of 

full time 

employees per 

facility 

Resident 

contractors 

per facility 

(as percent of 

full time 

employees) 

Resident 

contractors 

per facility 

20% annual 

turnover 

(full time 

employees 

and resident 

contractors per 

facility) 

Number of 

full time 

employees 

and 

resident 

contractors 

per facility 

(including 

20% annual 

turnover) 

ACC’s 

estimate of 

full time 

employees 

and contractors 

with access 

to restricted 

areas or 

critical assets 

(percent) 

Number of 

full time 

employees 

and resident 

contractors 

per facility 

with access 

to restricted 

areas or 

critical assets 

(including 

20% annual 

turnover) 

Tier 1 Group A ............. 1,955 30 587 508 3,050 80 2,440 

Tier 1 Group B ............. 35 20 7 8 50 80 40 

Tier 1 Group C ............. 152 10 15 33 201 80 161 

Tier 1 Theft .................. 35 10 4 8 46 15 7 

Tier 2 Group A ............. 1,395 30 419 363 2,176 80 1,741 

Tier 2 Group B ............. 34 20 7 8 49 80 39 

Tier Group C ................ 317 10 32 70 418 80 335 

Tier 2 Theft .................. 35 10 4 8 46 15 7 

Tier 3 Group A ............. 2,435 30 731 633 3,799 80 3,039 

Tier 3 Group B ............. 47 20 9 11 68 80 54 

Tier 3 Group C ............. 310 10 31 68 409 80 327 

Tier 3 Theft .................. 35 10 4 8 46 15 7 

Tier 4 Group A ............. 1,415 30 425 368 2,207 80 1,766 

Tier 4 Group B ............. 139 20 28 33 200 80 160 

Tier 4 Group C ............. 201 10 20 44 265 80 212 

Tier 4 Theft .................. 35 10 4 8 46 15 7 

Total ...................... n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 

*C = A × B, **D = (A + C) × 0.020. 

For the purpose of this notice, the 

Department also evaluated whether or 

not the 2007 CFATS Regulatory 

Assessment should continue to be the 

basis for the estimate of full time 

employees and resident contractors. To 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
6442 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

40Top-Screen is defined at 6 CFR 27.105. 

41Q:1.45–400 refers to the specific question 

reference number in the online Top-Screen 

application which is not available to the general 

public. However, the exact text of the question is 

available on page 20 of the CSAT Top-Screen 

Survey Application User Guide v1.99 in the row 

entitled, ‘‘Number of Full Time Employees.’’ See 

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_

csattopscreenusersmanual.pdf. 

provide an additional estimate of the 

number of respondents, the 2012 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

Analysis analyzed actual information 

submitted by high-risk chemical 

facilities in response to Top-Screen 40

Question Q:1.45–400.41 Based upon the 

submitted information, the Department 

was able to estimate full time employees 

and resident contractors by each model 

facility category, as shown in Table 11. 

TABLE 11—2012 CFATS PERSONNEL SURETY PROGRAM ANALYSIS’ ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF FULL TIME

EMPLOYEES AND RESIDENT CONTRACTORS

A B A + B 

Response to 

top screen 

question 

Q:1.45–400 

Resident contractors 

per facility 

(as percent of 

full time employees) 

Resident contractors 

per facility 

20% annual 

turnover 

(full time employees and resident 

contractors per 

facility) 

Number of full 

time employees 

and resident contractors per facility 

(including 20% 

annual turnover) 

Tier 1 Group A ................... 599 120 719 

Tier 1 Group B ................... 36 7 43 

Tier 1 Group C .................. 300 60 360 

Tier 1 Theft ........................ 653 131 783 

Tier 2 Group A ................... 222 44 267 

Tier 2 Group B ................... 30 6 36 

Tier 2 Group C .................. 489 98 587 

Tier 2 Theft ........................ 416 N/A—Top Screen Question Q1:1.45–400 incorporates 83 499 

Tier 3 Group A ................... 594 estimate of resident contractors 119 713 

Tier 3 Group B ................... 33 7 39 

Tier 3 Group C .................. 188 38 225 

Tier 3 Theft ........................ 233 47 279 

Tier 4 Group A ................... 737 147 884 

Tier 4 Group B ................... 17 3 20 

Tier 4 Group C .................. 175 35 211 

Tier 4 Theft ........................ 195 39 234 

Total ............................ n/a n/a n/a 

* In question Top Screen Question Q:1.45–400, facilities provide both full time employees and resident contractors. 

Table 12 compares the estimates of 

full time employees and resident 

contractors in the: (1) 2007 CFATS 

Regulatory Assessment; (2) ICR 

submitted in June of 2011; (3) adjusted 

June 2011 ICR Estimate of the Number 

of Full Time Employees and Resident 

Contractors; and (4) 2012 CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program Analysis. 

TABLE 12—AVERAGE NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS PER FACILITY BY MODEL FACILITY

CATEGORY

2007 CFATS 

regulatory 

assessment 

Estimate used 

in June 2011 

ICR 

June 2011 

ICR 

(adjusted 

with ACC’s 

assumption 

on facility 

personnel 

with access to 

restricted 

areas or 

critical assets) 

2012 CFATS 

personnel 

surety 

program 

analysis 

Tier 1 Group A ................................................................................................. 610 3,050 2,440 719 

Tier 1 Group B ................................................................................................. 50 50 40 43 

Tier 1 Group C ................................................................................................. 200 201 161 360 

Tier 1 Theft ...................................................................................................... 47 46 7 783 

Tier 2 Group A ................................................................................................. 436 2,176 1,741 267 

Tier 2 Group B ................................................................................................. 49 49 39 36 

Tier 2 Group C ................................................................................................. 419 418 335 587 

Tier 2 Theft ...................................................................................................... 47 46 7 499 

Tier 3 Group A ................................................................................................. 760 3,799 3,039 713 

Tier 3 Group B ................................................................................................. 67 68 54 39 

Tier 3 Group C ................................................................................................. 409 409 327 225 

Tier 3 Theft ...................................................................................................... 47 46 7 279 

Tier 4 Group A ................................................................................................. 442 2,207 1,766 884 

Tier 4 Group B ................................................................................................. 200 200 160 20 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6443 

TABLE 12—AVERAGE NUMBER OF FULL TIME EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS PER FACILITY BY MODEL FACILITY

CATEGORY—Continued 

2007 CFATS 

regulatory 

assessment 

Estimate used 

in June 2011 

ICR 

June 2011 

ICR 

(adjusted 

with ACC’s 

assumption 

on facility 

personnel 

with access to 

restricted 

areas or 

critical assets) 

2012 CFATS 

personnel 

surety 

program 

analysis 

Tier 4 Group C ................................................................................................. 265 265 212 211 

Tier 4 Theft ...................................................................................................... 47 46 7 234 

When evaluating the reasonable 

alternatives (see next section) to 

estimate the total number of 

respondents, the Department did not 

consider alternatives that used an 

assumption about the full time 

employees and resident contractors 

estimates from the 2007 CFATS 

Regulatory Assessment or the estimate 

in the June 2011 ICR. 

Rather, when evaluating the 

reasonable alternatives to estimate the 

total number of respondents (see the 

next section of this document for this 

evaluation), the Department opted to 

use the best available industry 

estimates, as well as actual historical 

data collected directly from high-risk 

chemical facilities, to estimate the full 

time employees and resident 

contractors. Namely: 

(1) the adjusted June 2011 ICR 

estimate of full time employees and 

resident contractors, and 

(2) the estimate of full time employees 

and resident contractors in the 2012 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

Analysis. 

Summary of Alternatives To Estimate 

the Number of Respondents 

As mentioned above, for the purpose 

of this notice, the number of 

respondents is estimated by 

multiplying: 

• The number and type of high-risk 

chemical facilities, and 

• the number of affected individuals 

at each type of high-risk chemical 

facility. 

For the purpose of this notice, the 

Department estimates the number of 

affected individuals at each type of 

high-risk chemical facility as the sum of: 

• The number of unescorted visitors 

at each type of high-risk chemical 

facility, and 

• the number of facility personnel 

and resident contractors at each type of 

high-risk chemical facility. 

In light of the data submitted by 

commenters and the Department’s own 

analysis, three alternatives for the total 

number of respondents were considered 

by the Department. 

First, the total number of respondents 

is based on: 

a. The number and type of high-risk 

chemical facilities assumed in the 2012 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

Analysis; 

b. the ACC’s estimates about 

unescorted visitors; and 

c. the adjusted June 2011 ICR estimate 

of the number of full time employees 

and resident contractors. 

This alternative results in an estimate 

of an initial 995,944 respondents with 

an annual turnover of 313,819 

respondents. See Table 13. 

TABLE 13—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 1 

A B A B C (A + B) × 

C D E (D + E) × C 

Number of 

full time 

employees 

and resident contractors 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety program ICR 

withdrawn 

in July of 

2012 

(including 

20% annual turnover) 

(Table 8) 

Estimate of 

full time 

employees 

and 

contractors 

with access to restricted 

areas or 

critical assets 

(Percent) 

Full time 

employees 

and 

resident 

contractors 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety program ICR 

withdrawn 

in July of 

2012 with 

estimates 

of percentage of employees/ 

resident 

contractors 

with restricted 

area and/ 

or critical 

asset 

(Table 9) 

ACC 

unescorted visitor 

estimate 

(including 

81.75% 

turnover 

for frequent visitors, 20% 

turnover 

for infrequent visitors) 

Table 6) 

Number of 

facilities 

(Table 5) 

Number of 

initial respondents 

(includes 

20% 

annual 

turnover) 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety 

program 

ICR withdrawn in 

July of 

2011 20% 

annual 

turnover 

(Table 9) 

ACC 

unescorted 

visitors 

annual 

turnover 

(Table 6) 

Annual respondent 

turnover 

Tier 1 Group A ........... 3,050 80 2,440 1,811 4 19,071 508 611 5,020 

Tier 1 Group B ........... 50 80 40 453 7 3,318 8 153 1,084 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
6444 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

TABLE 13—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 1—Continued 

A B A B C (A + B) × 

C D E (D + E) × C 

Number of 

full time 

employees 

and resident contractors 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety program ICR 

withdrawn 

in July of 

2012 

(including 

20% annual turnover) 

(Table 8) 

Estimate of 

full time 

employees 

and 

contractors 

with access to restricted 

areas or 

critical assets 

(Percent) 

Full time 

employees 

and 

resident 

contractors 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety program ICR 

withdrawn 

in July of 

2012 with 

estimates 

of percentage of employees/ 

resident 

contractors 

with restricted 

area and/ 

or critical 

asset 

(Table 9) 

ACC 

unescorted visitor 

estimate 

(including 

81.75% 

turnover 

for frequent visitors, 20% 

turnover 

for infrequent visitors) 

Table 6) 

Number of 

facilities 

(Table 5) 

Number of 

initial respondents 

(includes 

20% 

annual 

turnover) 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety 

program 

ICR withdrawn in 

July of 

2011 20% 

annual 

turnover 

(Table 9) 

ACC 

unescorted 

visitors 

annual 

turnover 

(Table 6) 

Annual respondent 

turnover 

Tier 1 Group C ........... 201 80 161 453 11 6,878 33 153 2,087 

Tier 1 Theft ................. 46 15 7 75 104 8,592 8 25 3,457 

Tier 2 Group A ........... 2,176 80 1,741 1,811 9 31,870 363 611 8,733 

Tier 2 Group B ........... 49 80 39 453 18 8,826 8 153 2,886 

Tier 2 Group C ........... 418 80 335 453 17 13,248 70 153 3,741 

Tier 2 Theft ................. 46 15 7 75 449 36,957 8 25 14,868 

Tier 3 Group A ........... 3,799 80 3,039 1,811 25 119,671 633 611 30,689 

Tier 3 Group B ........... 68 80 54 453 37 18,759 11 153 6,067 

Tier 3 Group C ........... 409 80 327 453 74 57,744 68 153 16,348 

Tier 3 Theft ................. 46 15 7 75 1,049 86,387 8 25 34,754 

Tier 4 Group A ........... 2,207 80 1,766 1,811 81 288,842 368 611 79,018 

Tier 4 Group B ........... 200 80 160 453 213 130,592 33 153 39,638 

Tier 4 Group C ........... 265 80 212 453 15 9,695 44 153 2,870 

Tier 4 Theft ................. 46 15 7 75 1,888 155,496 8 25 62,558 

Total .................... n/a n/a n/a n/a 4,000 995,944 n/a n/a 313,819 

Second, the total number of 

respondents is based on: 

a. The number and type of high-risk 

chemical facilities assumed in the 2012 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

Analysis; 

b. the ACC’s estimates about 

unescorted visitors; 

c. the number of full time employees 

and resident contractors estimated by 

the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program Analysis; and 

d. ACC’s estimate of the percentage of 

resident employees and contractors with 

access to restricted areas or critical 

assets. 

This alternative results in an estimate 

of an initial 919,646 respondents with 

an annual turnover of 416,879 

respondents. See Table 14. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6445 

TABLE 14—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 2 

A B (A × B) = 

C D E (C + D) × E F G (F + G) × E 

2012 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety program analysis average number of full 

time employees 

and contractors 

(including 

20% 

turnover) 

(Table 10) 

Estimate of 

full time 

employees 

and 

contractors 

with access to restricted 

areas or 

critical assets 

(percent) 

Average 

number of 

full time 

employees 

and 

contractors 

(including 

20% turnover) 

ACC 

unescorted 

visitor 

estimate 

(including 

81.75% 

turnover 

for frequent visitors, 20% 

turnover 

for infrequent visitors) 

(Table 6) 

Number of 

facilities 

(Table 5) 

Number of 

initial respondents 

(includes 

20% 

annual 

turnover) 

2012 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety 

program 

analysis 

20% annual turnover 

(Table 10) 

ACC 

unescorted 

visitors 

annual 

turnover 

(Table 6) 

Annual respondent 

turnover 

Tier 1 Group A ........... 719 80 575 1811 4 10,702 120 611 3,277 

Tier 1 Group B ........... 43 80 34 453 7 3,278 7 153 1,075 

Tier 1 Group C ........... 360 80 288 453 11 8,304 60 153 2,384 

Tier 1 Theft ................. 783 15 118 75 104 20,127 131 25 16,273 

Tier 2 Group A ........... 267 80 213 1,811 9 18,161 44 611 5,877 

Tier 2 Group B ........... 36 80 29 453 18 8,645 6 153 2,848 

Tier 2 Group C ........... 587 80 469 453 17 15,514 98 153 4,214 

Tier 2 Theft ................. 499 15 75 75 449 67,405 83 25 48,700 

Tier 3 Group A ........... 713 80 571 1,811 25 58,760 119 611 17,999 

Tier 3 Group B ........... 39 80 31 453 37 17,917 7 153 5,892 

Tier 3 Group C ........... 225 80 180 453 74 46,854 38 153 14,079 

Tier 3 Theft ................. 279 15 42 75 1,049 123,087 47 25 75,533 

Tier 4 Group A ........... 884 80 707 1,811 81 203,357 147 611 61,209 

Tier 4 Group B ........... 20 80 16 453 213 99,897 3 153 33,243 

Tier 4 Group C ........... 211 80 168 453 15 9,057 35 153 2,737 

Tier 4 Theft ................. 234 15 35 75 1,888 208,578 39 25 121,538 

Total .................... n/a n/a n/a n/a 4,000 919,646 n/a n/a 416,879 

Third the total number of respondents 

is based on: 

a. The number and type of high-risk 

chemical facilities assumed in the 2012 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

Analysis; 

b. the ACC’s estimates about 

unescorted visitors; 

c. the number of full time employees 

and resident contractors estimated by 

the 2012 CFATS Personnel Surety 

Program Analysis; and 

d. does not include ACC’s estimate of 

the percentage of resident employees 

and contractors with access to restricted 

areas or critical assets. 

This alternative results in an estimate 

of an initial 1,830,356 respondents with 

an annual turnover of 416,879 

respondents. See Table 15. 

TABLE 15—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 3 

A B (A × B) = 

C D E (C + D) × E F G (F + G) × E 

2012 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety 

proram 

analysis 

average 

number of 

full time 

employees 

and contractors 

(including 

20% turnover) 

(Table 10) 

Estimate of 

full time 

employees 

and 

contractors 

with access to restricted 

areas or 

critical assets 

(percent) 

Average 

number of 

full time 

employees 

and 

contractors 

(including 

20% turnover) 

ACC 

unescorted 

visitor 

estimate 

(including 

81.75% 

turnover 

for frequent visitors, 20% 

turnover 

for infrequent visitors) 

(Table 6) 

Number of 

facilities 

(Table 5) 

Number of 

initial respondents 

2012 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety 

program 

analysis 

20% annual turnover 

(Table 10) 

ACC 

unescorted 

visitors 

annual 

turnover 

(Table 6) 

Annual respondent 

turnover 

Tier 1 Group A ........... 719 100 719 1,811 4 11,347 120 611 3,277 

Tier 1 Group B ........... 43 100 43 453 7 3,336 7 153 1,075 

Tier 1 Group C ........... 360 100 360 453 11 9,111 60 153 2,384 

Tier 1 Theft ................. 783 100 783 75 104 89,587 131 25 16,273 

Tier 2 Group A ........... 267 100 267 1,811 9 18,640 44 611 5,877 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
6446 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

TABLE 15—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS—ALTERNATIVE 3—Continued 

A B (A × B) = 

C D E (C + D) × E F G (F + G) × E 

2012 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety 

proram 

analysis 

average 

number of 

full time 

employees 

and contractors 

(including 

20% turnover) 

(Table 10) 

Estimate of 

full time 

employees 

and 

contractors 

with access to restricted 

areas or 

critical assets 

(percent) 

Average 

number of 

full time 

employees 

and 

contractors 

(including 

20% turnover) 

ACC 

unescorted 

visitor 

estimate 

(including 

81.75% 

turnover 

for frequent visitors, 20% 

turnover 

for infrequent visitors) 

(Table 6) 

Number of 

facilities 

(Table 5) 

Number of 

initial respondents 

2012 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety 

program 

analysis 

20% annual turnover 

(Table 10) 

ACC 

unescorted 

visitors 

annual 

turnover 

(Table 6) 

Annual respondent 

turnover 

Tier 2 Group B ........... 36 100 36 453 18 8,775 6 153 2,848 

Tier 2 Group C ........... 587 100 587 453 17 17,489 98 153 4,214 

Tier 2 Theft ................. 499 100 499 75 449 257,567 83 25 48,700 

Tier 3 Group A ........... 713 100 713 1,811 25 62,281 119 611 17,999 

Tier 3 Group B ........... 39 100 39 453 37 18,208 7 153 5,892 

Tier 3 Group C ........... 225 100 225 453 74 50,191 38 153 14,079 

Tier 3 Theft ................. 279 100 279 75 1,049 372,244 47 25 75,533 

Tier 4 Group A ........... 884 100 884 1,811 81 217,641 147 611 61,209 

Tier 4 Group B ........... 20 100 20 453 213 100,755 3 153 33,243 

Tier 4 Group C ........... 211 100 211 453 15 9,671 35 153 2,737 

Tier 4 Theft ................. 234 100 234 75 1,888 583,514 39 25 121,538 

Total .................... n/a n/a n/a n/a 4,000 1,830,356 n/a n/a 416,879 

These three alternatives are 

summarized in Table 16. 

TABLE 16—COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS FOR ALTERNATIVES 1, 2 AND 3 

Initial Year Year 2 Year 3 

Number of 

respondents 

(annual 

average) 

Alternative 1 ..................................................................................................... 995,944 313,819 313,819 541,194 

Alternative 2 ..................................................................................................... 919,646 416,879 416,879 584,468 

Alternative 3 ..................................................................................................... 1,830,356 416,879 416,879 888,038 

For the purpose of this notice the 

Department selected alternative 3. 

Alternative 3 reasonably reflects the 

type and number of facilities regulated 

by CFATS, is based upon the actual 

number of full time employees and 

contractors as reported by high-risk 

chemical facilities, and explicitly 

estimates unescorted visitors as a 

separate population from facility 

employees and resident contractors. 

Limitation of Respondents to Tier 1 and 

Tier 2 Facilities 

The Department is proposing to limit 

this information collection, and to limit 

initial CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

implementation, to only Tier 1 and Tier 

2 high-risk chemical facilities. A limited 

implementation would enable the 

Department to implement the CFATS 

Personnel Surety Program for those 

facilities presenting the highest risk, 

while not imposing the burden on all 

CFATS regulated facilities. Assuming 

this information collection request is 

approved, a subsequent ICR would be 

published and submitted to OMB for 

approval to incorporate any lessons 

learned and potential improvements to 

the CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

prior to collecting information from Tier 

3 and Tier 4 high-risk chemical 

facilities. Table 17 provides the estimate 

of the number of respondents using 

alternative 3 for Tier 1 and 2 high-risk 

chemical facilities. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6447 

TABLE 17—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF TIER 1 & 2 RESPONDENTS

A B (A × B) = 

C D E (C + D) × E F G (F = G) × E 

2012 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety program analysis average number of full 

time employees 

and contractors 

(including 

20% turnover) 

(Table 10) 

Estimate of 

full time 

employees 

and 

contractors 

with access to restricted 

areas or 

critical assets 

(Percent) 

Average 

number of 

full time 

employees 

and 

contractors 

(Including 

20% turnover) 

ACC 

unescorted 

visitor 

estimate 

(including 

81.75% 

turnover 

for frequent visitors, 20% 

turnover 

for infrequent visitors) 

(Table 6) 

Number of 

facilities 

(Table 5) 

Number of 

initial respondents 

2012 

CFATS 

personnel 

surety 

program 

analysis 

20% annual turnover 

(Table 10) 

ACC 

unescorted 

visitors 

annual 

turnover 

(Table 6) 

Annual respondent 

turnover 

Tier 1 Group A ........... 719 100 719 1,811 4 11,347 120 611 3,277 

Tier 1 Group B ........... 43 100 43 453 7 3,336 7 153 1,075 

Tier 1 Group C ........... 360 100 360 453 11 9,111 60 153 2,384 

Tier 1 Theft ................. 783 100 783 75 104 89,587 131 25 16,273 

Tier 2 Group A ........... 267 100 267 1,811 9 18,640 44 611 5,877 

Tier 2 Group B ........... 36 100 36 453 18 8,775 6 153 2,848 

Tier 2 Group C ........... 587 100 587 453 17 17,489 98 153 4,214 

Tier 2 Theft ................. 499 100 499 75 449 257,567 83 25 48,700 

Total .................... n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 415,852 n/a n/a 84,648 

Therefore, the annual average number 

of respondents is equal to 195,049, as 

shown in Table 18. The Department’s 

rounded estimate is 195,000 

respondents. 

TABLE 18—ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS FOR TIER 1 & 2 FACILITIES

A B C (A + B + C)/3 

Total 

respondents 

year 1 

Total 

respondents 

year 2 

Total 

respondents 

year 3 

Number of 

respondents 

(annual 

average) 

Tier 1 Group A ................................................................................................. 11,347 3,277 3,277 5,967 

Tier 1 Group B ................................................................................................. 3,336 1,075 1,075 1,829 

Tier 1 Group C ................................................................................................. 9,111 2,384 2,384 4,627 

Tier 1 Theft ...................................................................................................... 89,587 16,273 16,273 40,711 

Tier 2 Group A ................................................................................................. 18,640 5,877 5,877 10,132 

Tier 2 Group B ................................................................................................. 8,775 2,848 2,848 4,823 

Tier 2 Group C ................................................................................................. 17,489 4,214 4,214 8,639 

Tier 2 Theft ...................................................................................................... 257,567 48,700 48,700 118,322 

Total .......................................................................................................... 415,852 84,648 84,648 195,049 

Total Annual Burden Hours 

The total annual burden hours were 

estimated in a three step process. The 

first step was to derive from previous 

tables in this notice the estimated 

number of initial submissions for Tier 1 

and Tier 2 facilities: (1) Full time 

employees and contractors, (2) frequent 

visitors, and (3) infrequent visitors. The 

derived estimates are shown in Table 

18. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
6448 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

TABLE 19—STEP 1 OF ESTIMATING THE TOTAL ANNUAL BURDEN HOURS

[Estimate of initial submissions for Tier 1 & 2 facilities in Year 1] 

A B C D E = (A × D) F = (B × D) G = (C × D) 

Response to 

top screen 

question 

Q:1.45–400 

(Table 11) 

Initial 

submissions— 

frequent visitors 

(Table 7) 

Initial 

submissions— 

infrequent 

visitors 

(Table 7) 

2012 CFATS 

personnel 

surety 

program 

analysis 

(normalized) 

(Table 6) 

Initial 

submissions— 

full time employees and 

contractors 

(Year 1) 

Initial 

submissions— 

frequent visitors 

(Year 1) 

Initial 

submissions— 

infrequent 

visitors 

(Year 1) 

Tier 1 Group A ........................... 599 600 600 4 2,686 2,692 2,692 

Tier 1 Group B ........................... 36 150 150 7 241 1,010 1,010 

Tier 1 Group C ........................... 300 150 150 11 3,362 1,683 1,683 

Tier 1 Theft ................................ 653 25 25 104 68,098 2,608 2,608 

Tier 2 Group A ........................... 222 600 600 9 1,994 5,384 5,384 

Tier 2 Group B ........................... 30 150 150 18 543 2,692 2,692 

Tier 2 Group C ........................... 489 150 150 17 8,228 2,524 2,524 

Tier 2 Theft ................................ 416 25 25 449 186,433 11,217 11,217 

Total .................................... n/a n/a n/a n/a 271,585 29,809 29,809 

The second step of estimating the 

total annual burden hours was to 

estimate the average annual number of 

submission by the type of submission. 

The average annual number of 

submissions, by the type of submission 

for Tier 1 and Tier 2 Facilities over three 

years is shown in Table 20. 

TABLE 20—STEP 2 OF ESTIMATING THE TOTAL ANNUAL BURDEN HOURS

[Average annual estimate of total number of submissions, by type of submission, for Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities in each year] 

A B A × B = C (A + B) * 0.05 C 

Initial 

submissions 

Annual 

turnover 

percentage 

Additional 

submissions 

due to 

industry 

turnover 

Update/ 

corrections 

Removal due 

to turnover 

Year 1 

Full Time Employees and Contractors ......................... 271,585 20 54,317 16,295 54,317 

Frequent Visitors ........................................................... 29,809 81.75 24,369 2,709 24,369 

Infrequent Visitors ......................................................... 29,809 20 5,962 1,789 5,962 

Year 1 Submissions ............................................................. ........................ 415,853 ........................ 20,793 84,648 

Year 2 

Full Time Employees and Contractors ......................... 0 ........................ 54,317 2,716 54,317 

Frequent Visitors ........................................................... 0 ........................ 24,369 1,218 24,369 

Infrequent Visitors ......................................................... 0 ........................ 5,962 298 5,962 

Year 2 Submissions ............................................................. ........................ 84,648 ........................ 4,232 84,648 

Year 3 

Full Time Employees and Contractors ......................... 0 ........................ 54,317 2,716 54,317 

Frequent Visitors ........................................................... 0 ........................ 24,369 1,218 24,369 

Infrequent Visitors ......................................................... 0 ........................ 5,962 298 5,962 

Year 3 Submissions ............................................................. ........................ 84,648 ........................ 4,232 84,648 

Total Submissions Over 3 Years ......................................... ........................ 585,149 ........................ 29,257 253,944 

Number of Average Annual Submissions ............................ ........................ 195,050 ........................ 9,752 84,648 

The third, and final step of estimating 

the total annual burden hours, was to 

sum the average annual burden hours 

for each type of submission. 

The average annual burden hour for 

each type of submission was estimated 

by multiplying the average annual 

number of: (1) Initial respondents 

multiplied by the estimated time per 

initial respondent (0.50 hours or 30 

minutes); (2) respondents for which a 

high-risk chemical facility will need to 

update/correct information multiplied 

by the number of hours necessary to 

type and submit each update/correction 

(i.e., 0.17 hours or 10 minutes); and (3) 

respondents that are expected to no 

longer have access to a high-risk 

chemical facility’s restricted area(s) 

multiplied by the number of hours 

necessary to notify the Department (i.e., 

0.17 hours or 10 minutes). 

Both calculations described above are 

displayed below in Table 21. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6449 

42Facilities that are partially regulated under both 

MTSA and CFATS have the opportunity to identify 

themselves in the CSAT Top-Screen. The text of the 

question is available on page 22 of the CSAT TopScreen Survey Application User Guide v1.99. See http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_

csattopscreenusersmanual.pdf. 

TABLE 21—STEP 3 OF ESTIMATING THE ANNUAL BURDEN ESTIMATE

A B (A × B) = C 

Average annual respondents Duration 

(hours) 

Burden hours 

Initial Submissions ....................................................................................................................... 195,049 0.50 97,525 

Updates/Corrections .................................................................................................................... 9,752 0.17 1,658 

Removal—Turnover ..................................................................................................................... 84,648 0.17 14,390 

........................ ........................ 113,573 

Therefore, the average annual burden 

is estimated to be 113,573 hours. The 

Department’s rounded estimate is 

113,600 hours. 

Estimated Time per Respondent 

For the purpose of estimating the time 

per respondent, the Department 

considered making an assumption about 

the percentage of affected individuals 

under the three options outlined in the 

summary section of this notice (e.g., 

information about one-third of affected 

individuals would be submitted for 

direct vetting against the federal 

government’s consolidated and 

integrated terrorist watchlist, 

information about one-third of affected 

individuals would be submitted to 

verify enrollment in other DHS 

programs, and information about onethird of affected individuals would not 

be submitted because they possess 

TWICs that high-risk chemical facilities 

would electronically verify through the 

use of TWIC readers). However, the 

Department concluded that such an 

assumption was unwarranted because: 

(1) The assumption would be without 

any factual basis; (2) the burden to 

submit information about an affected 

individual for direct vetting is 

approximately the same as the burden to 

submit information in order to verify 

enrollment (i.e., similar number of 

required data elements); and (3) the 

most conservative burden estimate 

would assume that information is 

submitted for all affected individuals 

(i.e., no facilities will choose to 

electronically verify the TWIC in the 

possession of an affected individual). 

To avoid making unjustified 

assumptions, and to avoid 

underestimating the time per 

respondent, the Department decided to 

estimate the average burden per 

respondent by assuming each and every 

respondent’s information will be 

manually submitted, rather than 

uploaded via a bulk file or web-service, 

to the Department for vetting for 

terrorist ties. 

Accordingly, the Department’s 

‘‘estimated time per respondent’’ is 

estimated by dividing the average 

annual burden hours (113,573 hours) by 

the number of respondents (195,049). 

Therefore, for the purpose of this notice, 

the estimated time per respondent is 

0.5822 hours. The Department’s 

rounded estimate is 0.58 hours. 

Total Burden Cost (Capital/Startup) 

The Department expects no capital/

startup cost for high-risk chemical 

facilities that choose to implement 

Option 1 or Option 2. 

Although there are no costs associated 

with high-risk chemical facilities 

providing information to the 

Department under Option 3, the 

Department has nonetheless estimated 

the potential capital costs incurred by 

high-risk chemical facilities that choose 

to implement Option 3 under the 

CFATS Personnel Surety Program to 

ensure an appropriate accounting of the 

costs potentially incurred by this 

Information Collection. The capital cost 

of Option 3 can be estimated by 

multiplying (1) the number of high-risk 

chemical facilities that are likely to 

implement Option 3 by (2) the cost to 

acquire, install, and maintain TWIC 

readers at the high-risk chemical 

facilities. 

Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3— 

Number and Type of High-Risk 

Chemical Facilities That May Choose To 

Use Option 3 

High-risk chemical facilities and their 

designees have wide latitude in how 

they may implement Option 3, if they 

choose to do so. High-risk chemical 

facilities could propose, in their SSPs or 

ASPs, to share the costs of TWIC readers 

and any associated infrastructure at 

central locations, or high-risk chemical 

facilities could propose to purchase and 

install TWIC readers for their own use. 

The Department will assess the 

adequacy of such proposals on a 

facility-by-facility basis, in the course of 

evaluating each facility’s SSP or ASP. 

For the purpose of this notice, the 

Department estimates that the number 

of high-risk chemical facilities that are 

likely to implement Option 3 is the 

number of high-risk chemical facilities 

likely to have affected individuals who 

possess TWICs accessing their restricted 

areas or critical assets. Through the 

2012 CFATS Personnel Surety Program 

Analysis, the Department determined 

that there are currently 32 high-risk 

chemical facilities that have claimed a 

partial Maritime Transportation 

Security Act (MTSA) exemption 42 and 

have received a final tier determination 

under CFATS. The Department then 

normalized the facility count by 

multiplying the number of facilities that 

claimed a partial exemption in each 

category by a factor of 1.22 (as it did in 

estimating the total number of facilities 

in Table 6 above), as shown in Table 22. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
6450 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

43See 78 FR 17781 (March 22, 2013). The TWIC 

Reader Requirements NPRM Table 4 may be found 

at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/03/

22/2013-06182/transportation-workeridentification-credential-twic-readerrequirements#t-6. Future cost estimates for TWIC readers may change as a result of updates to price 

data and public comment received on the TWIC 

Reader Requirements NPRM. 

TABLE 22—ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT MAY CHOOSE TO USE TWIC READERS

A A × 1.22 

2012 CFATS 

personnel surety program 

analysis 

2012 CFATS 

personnel surety program 

analysis 

(normalized) 

Tier 1 Group A ......................................................................................................................................................... 0 0 

Tier 1 Group B ......................................................................................................................................................... 0 0 

Tier 1 Group C ......................................................................................................................................................... 0 0 

Tier 1 Theft .............................................................................................................................................................. 0 0 

Tier 2 Group A ......................................................................................................................................................... 0 0 

Tier 2 Group B ......................................................................................................................................................... 0 0 

Tier 2 Group C ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 1 

Tier 2 Theft .............................................................................................................................................................. 3 3 

Tier 3 Group A ......................................................................................................................................................... 3 3 

Tier 3 Group B ......................................................................................................................................................... 0 0 

Tier 3 Group C ......................................................................................................................................................... 2 2 

Tier 3 Theft .............................................................................................................................................................. 13 15 

Tier 4 Group A ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 1 

Tier 4 Group B ......................................................................................................................................................... 2 2 

Tier 4 Group C ......................................................................................................................................................... 0 0 

Tier 4 Theft .............................................................................................................................................................. 7 8 

Total .................................................................................................................................................................. 32 35 

Estimating Capital Costs for Option 3— 

TWIC Reader Costs 

For the purpose of this notice, the 

Department has based the potential per 

high-risk chemical facility capital costs 

related to Option 3 on the TWIC Reader 

Requirements notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM).43 In the TWIC 

Reader Requirements NPRM, the 

Department estimated the initial phasein costs annual recurring costs, and 

annual recurring costs that considers 

equipment replacement for container 

terminals, large passenger vessels/

terminals, petroleum facilities, breakbulk terminals and small passenger 

vessels/towboats. For the purpose of 

this notice, the Department has based 

the capital costs related to Option 3 on 

the costs incurred by the petroleum 

facilities (i.e., bulk liquid facilities) in 

the TWIC Reader Requirements NPRM. 

Specifically, the Department estimated 

the capital costs in this notice to be the 

average of the initial phase-in cost plus 

three years of the annual reoccurring 

cost without equipment replacement. 

NPPD opted to use the annual 

reoccurring cost without equipment 

replacement to align with the TWIC 

Reader Requirements NPRM assumption 

that equipment replacement cost occurs 

every five years. This notice estimates 

average annual costs for a three year 

period. Thus, for the purposes of this 

notice the estimated the capital costs 

per facility is $99,953.33, [(($256,267 + 

($14,531 × 3))/3]. 

The Department then calculated the 

capital costs for the 35 high-risk 

chemical facilities, as shown in Table 

23. 

TABLE 23—CAPITAL COST BURDEN ESTIMATE FOR HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT MAY CHOOSE TO USE TWIC 

READERS

A B (A × B) 

Number of 

facilities 

Average TWIC 

reader 

implementation 

cost per 

facility 

Capital cost of TWIC 

reader implementation 

Tier 1 Group A ............................................................................................................. 0 $99,953 $0 

Tier 1 Group B ............................................................................................................. 0 99,953 0 

Tier 1 Group C ............................................................................................................. 0 99,953 0 

Tier 1 Theft .................................................................................................................. 0 99,953 0 

Tier 2 Group A ............................................................................................................. 0 99,953 0 

Tier 2 Group B ............................................................................................................. 0 99,953 0 

Tier 2 Group C ............................................................................................................. 1 99,953 99,953 

Tier 2 Theft .................................................................................................................. 3 99,953 299,860 

Tier 3 Group A ............................................................................................................. 3 99,953 299,860 

Tier 3 Group B ............................................................................................................. 0 99,953 0 

Tier 3 Group C ............................................................................................................. 2 99,953 199,907 

Tier 3 Theft .................................................................................................................. 15 99,953 1,499,300 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 6451 

TABLE 23—CAPITAL COST BURDEN ESTIMATE FOR HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT MAY CHOOSE TO USE TWIC 

READERS—Continued 

A B (A × B) 

Number of 

facilities 

Average TWIC 

reader 

implementation 

cost per 

facility 

Capital cost of TWIC 

reader implementation 

Tier 4 Group A ............................................................................................................. 1 99,953 99,953 

Tier 4 Group B ............................................................................................................. 2 99,953 199,907 

Tier 4 Group C ............................................................................................................. 0 99,953 0 

Tier 4 Theft .................................................................................................................. 8 99,953 799,627 

Total ...................................................................................................................... 35 n/a 3,498,367 

The capital cost for the 35 high-risk 

chemical facilities totals $3,498,367.67; 

however, the Department intends to 

limit this information collection to only 

Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities. Therefore, 

for the purpose of this notice, the 

Department estimates the capital cost 

for the implementation of TWIC readers 

is $399,813, as shown in Table 24. The 

Department’s rounded estimate is 

$399,800. 

TABLE 24—CAPITAL COST BURDEN ESTIMATE FOR TIER 1 & 2 HIGH-RISK CHEMICAL FACILITIES THAT MAY CHOOSE TO

USE TWIC READERS

A B (A × B) 

Number of 

facilities 

Average TWIC 

reader implementation cost 

per facility 

Capital cost of 

TWIC reader 

implementation 

Tier 1 Group A ............................................................................................................................. 0 $99,953 $0 

Tier 1 Group B ............................................................................................................................. 0 99,953 0 

Tier 1 Group C ............................................................................................................................. 0 99,953 0 

Tier 1 Theft .................................................................................................................................. 0 99,953 0 

Tier 2 Group A ............................................................................................................................. 0 99,953 0 

Tier 2 Group B ............................................................................................................................. 0 99,953 0 

Tier 2 Group C ............................................................................................................................. 1 99,953 99,953 

Tier 2 Theft .................................................................................................................................. 3 99,953 299,860 

Total ...................................................................................................................................... 4 n/a 399,813 

Consideration of Other Capital Costs 

The burden estimates outlined in this 

notice are limited in scope to those 

activities listed in 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1). 

Specifically, 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(1) and 5 

CFR 1320.8 require the Department to 

estimate the total time, effort, or 

financial resources expended by persons 

to generate, maintain, retain, disclose or 

provide information to or for a federal 

agency. Therefore, many costs (e.g., 

physical modification of the facility 

layout) a facility may choose to incur to 

develop or implement its SSP or ASP 

should not be accounted for when 

estimating the capital costs associated 

with this information collection. 

The Department did consider 

estimating certain facility capital costs 

such as: (1) Capital costs for computer, 

telecommunications equipment, 

software, and storage to manage the data 

collection, submissions, and tracking; 

(2) capital and ongoing costs for 

designing, deploying and operating 

information technology (IT) systems 

necessary to maintain the data 

collection, submissions, and tracking; 

(3) cost of training facility personnel to 

maintain the data collection, 

submissions, and tracking; and (4) site 

security officer time to manage the data 

collection, submissions, and tracking. 

However, the Department has 

concluded that these costs should be 

excluded in accordance with 5 CFR 

1320.3(b)(2), which directs federal 

agencies to not count the costs 

associated with the time, effort, and 

financial resources incurred in the 

normal course of their activities (e.g., in 

compiling and maintaining business 

records) if the reporting, recordkeeping, 

or disclosure activities are usual and 

customary. 

The Department believes that the 

time, effort, and financial resources are 

usual and customary costs because these 

are costs that high-risk chemical 

facilities would incur to conduct 

background checks for identity, criminal 

history, and legal authorization to work 

under 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(i)–(iii), and 

also under various other federal, state, 

or local laws or regulations. 

Recordkeeping Costs 

High-risk chemical facilities are not 

required to create, keep, or retain 

facility records under 6 CFR 27.255 to 

comply with RBPS 12(iv). If a high-risk 

chemical facility elects, for its own 

business purposes, to create, keep, or 

retain facility records that identify and 

manage the submission of information 

about affected individuals, those records 

are not government records. 

The recordkeeping costs, if any, to 

create, keep, or retain facility records 

pertaining to background checks as part 

of a high-risk chemical facility’s SSP or 

ASP, are properly estimated in the 

recordkeeping estimates associated with 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3
6452 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 22 / Monday, February 3, 2014 / Notices 

44 Information Collection 1670–0007 may be 

viewed at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/

PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201001-1670-007#. 

the SSP Instrument under Information 

Collection 1670–0007.44

The Department considered 

estimating the potential recordkeeping 

burden associated with RBPS 12(iv), but 

subsequently concluded that no 

potential recordkeeping should be 

estimated in this notice in accordance 

with 5 CFR 1320.3(b)(2), which directs 

federal agencies to not count the costs 

associated with the time, effort, and 

financial resources incurred in the 

normal course of their activities (e.g., in 

compiling and maintaining business 

records) if the reporting, recordkeeping, 

or disclosure activities are usual and 

customary. The Department believes 

that the types of recordkeeping 

associated with RBPS 12(iv) are usual 

and customary costs that high-risk 

chemical facilities would incur to 

conduct background checks for identity, 

criminal history, and legal authorization 

to work as required by RBPS (12)(i)–(iii) 

and also by various other federal, state, 

or local laws or regulations. 

Total Burden Cost (Operating/

Maintaining) 

The annual burden cost is equal to the 

sum of the: (1) Annual burden hours 

multiplied by the hourly wage rate for 

appropriate facility personnel; (2) the 

capital costs ($399,800); and (3) 

recordkeeping costs ($0). 

Comments associated with the 

previous ICR suggested an appropriate 

wage rate between $20 and $40 per 

hour; the Department picked the 

midpoint of $30 to estimate the hourly 

direct wage rate, which corresponds to 

a fully loaded wage rate of $42. 

Therefore, the annual burden not 

including capital costs and 

recordkeeping costs is $4,770,051 as 

shown in Table 25. The rounded 

estimate is $4,770,000. 

TABLE 25—ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL BURDEN COST FOR TIER 1 & TIER 2 FACILITIES

A B (A × B) 

Burden 

(hours) 

Waste rate Cost 

Initial Submission ......................................................................................................................... 97,525 $42 $4,096,032 

Updates/Corrections .................................................................................................................... 1,658 42 69,633 

Removal-Turnover ....................................................................................................................... 14,390 42 604,386 

Total Burden Cost (operating/maintaining) .......................................................................... 113,573 42 4,770,051 

Therefore, the total annual burden 

cost is $4,844,008, after the inclusion of 

the $399,813 capital cost burden. The 

Department’s rounded estimate is 

$4,844,000. 

VI. Solicitation of Comments 

OMB is particularly interested in 

comments which: 

(1) Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

(4) Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology, 

e.g., permitting electronic submissions 

of responses. 

VII. Analysis 

Agency: Department of Homeland 

Security, National Protection and 

Programs Directorate, Office of 

Infrastructure Protection, Infrastructure 

Security Compliance Division. 

Title: Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards (CFATS) Personnel 

Surety Program. 

OMB Number: 1670—NEW. 

Frequency: Other: In accordance with 

the compliance schedule or the facility 

Site Security Plan or Alternative 

Security Plan. 

Affected Public: Business or other forprofit. 

Number of Respondents: 195,000 

affected individuals. 

Estimated Time per Respondent: 0.58 

hours. 

Total Burden Hours: 113,600 annual 

burden hours. 

Total Burden Cost (capital/startup): 

$399,800. 

Total Recordkeeping Burden: $0. 

Total Burden Cost (operating/

maintaining): $4,844,000. 

Dated: January 17, 2014. 

Scott Libby, 

Deputy Chief Information Officer, National 

Protection and Programs Directorate, 

Department of Homeland Security. 

[FR Doc. 2014–02082 Filed 1–31–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–9P–P 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES3