alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Cite as State v. Cody , 2022-Ohio-874.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE D ISTRICT OF OHIO

CLINTON COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, Appellee,

- vs -

AARON D. CODY, JR. Appellant. :

:

:

:

:

: CASE NO. CA2021-08-023

D E C I S I O N 3/21/2022

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLINTO N COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT Case No. TRC 21 00477 A

Andrew T. McCoy, Clinton County Prosecuting Attorney, and David Henry, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Rose & Dobyns Co., L.P.A., and Blaise Underwood, for appellant.

Per Curiam. {¶1} This cause came on to be considered upon a notice of appeal fil ed by appellant, Aaron D. Cody, Jr., the transcript of the docket and journal entries, the transcript of proceedings and original papers from the Clinton County Cour t of Common Pleas, and upon the brief filed by appellant's counsel. {¶2} Appellant's counsel has filed a brief with this court pursuant to Anders v.

California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), which (1) indicates that a careful review of the record from the proceedings below fails to disclose any err ors by the trial courtClinton CA2021-08-023

- 2 - prejudicial to the rights of appellant upon which an assignment of error may be predicated; (2) lists three potential errors "that might arguably support t he appeal," Anders , at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; (3) requests that this court review the record i ndependently to determine whether the proceedings are free from prejudicial error and wit hout infringement of appellant's constitutional rights; (4) requests permission to w ithdraw as counsel for appellant on the basis that the appeal is wholly frivolous; and (5) certifies that a copy of both the brief and motion to withdraw have been served upon appellan t. {¶3} Having allowed appellant sufficient time to respond, and no res ponse having been received, we have accordingly examined the record and find no error prejudicial to appellant's rights in the proceedings in the trial court. The motion of counsel for appellant requesting to withdraw as counsel is granted, and this appeal i s dismissed for the reason that it is wholly frivolous.

PIPER, P.J., S. POWELL and HENDRICKSON, JJ., concur.[Cite as State v. Cody , 2022-Ohio-874.]
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2246 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 2246

   To designate the health care center of the Department of Veterans 
 Affairs in Tallahassee, Florida, as the Sergeant Ernest I. ``Boots'' 
               Thomas VA Clinic, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           December 19, 2017

 Mr. Nelson (for himself and Mr. Rubio) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To designate the health care center of the Department of Veterans 
 Affairs in Tallahassee, Florida, as the Sergeant Ernest I. ``Boots'' 
               Thomas VA Clinic, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REDESIGNATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS CLINIC IN 
              FLORIDA.

    (a) Designation.--The Health Care Center of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs located at 2181 Orange Avenue in Tallahassee, Florida, 
shall after the date of the enactment of this Act be known and 
designated as the ``Sergeant Ernest I. `Boots' Thomas VA Clinic''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in any law, regulation, map, 
document, paper, or other record of the United States to the clinic 
referred to in paragraph (1) shall be considered to be a reference to 
the Sergeant Ernest I. ``Boots'' Thomas VA Clinic.
                                 <all>
```
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CRAIG ROSS ; NATALIE OPERSTEIN,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 17

- 56564 D.C. No. 2:16

- cv - 03778

- ODW

- JC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Otis D. Wright , II, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 22, 2018 ** Before: SILVERMAN, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges. Craig Ross and Natalie Operstein appeal pro se from the district court’s order denying their motion to reopen . W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

. We review for an abuse of discretion. Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health
Servs. , 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

OCT 29 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 17

- 56564

Sturgell , 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant s ’ motion to reopen because the instant action is duplicative of an earlier

- filed action, Ross, et al. v. White, et. al. , No. 2:17

- cv - 04149

- ODW

- JC. See Adams , 487 F.3d at 689 ( in determining whether a later

- filed action is duplicative, this court examines
“whether the causes of act ion and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same” ).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion
for reconsideration because appellant s failed to establish any basis for such relief

. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc. , 5 F.3d 1255, 1262

- 63 (9th Cir. 1993) (standard of review a nd grounds for reconsideration under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) ); see also C.D. Cal. R. 7

- 18 (grounds for reconsideration
under local ru les) ; Hinton v. P ac . Enters

. , 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993) (standard of review for compliance with local rules)

. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants ’ motion s to disqualify Judge Wright and Judge Oglu i n . See United States v. Johnson , 6 10 F.3d 1138, 1147

- 48 (9th Cir. 2010 ) (standard of review and standard for recusal)

. T he district court did not err in de nying appellants’ request to issue a3 17

- 56564

summons. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b ) (requiring that a complaint be filed before a plaintiff may request a summons)

. Appellants’ request s to disqualify Judge Wright , set forth in the ir reply briefs, are denied. Appellants’ m otion for j udicial n otice (Docket Entry No. 17 ) is granted.
AFFIRMED.
#### BOOKMAN v. STATE.

No. 15947.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 12, 1933.

W. R. Smith, Jr., of Austin, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, Presiding Judge.

Theft is the offense; penalty assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for two years.'

The evidence heard before the trial court is not brought up for review. The indictment appears regular and regularly presented.

There are no bills of exception making complaint of the procedure in the trial court. There are exceptions to the charge of the court, but the absence of the facts precludes the appraisement of the complaints.

In the absence of knowledge of the facts that were before the court, the complaint of the argument of counsel for the state presented in the motion for new trial cannot be made the basis of a reversal.

The judgment is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
registrant's unaudited consolidated financial statements as of March 31, 1999,
and the nine months then ended, and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001011991
<NAME> SUSA PARTNERSHIP, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  172,675
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               172,675
<PP&E>                                       1,635,237
<DEPRECIATION>                                  81,374
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,726,538
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          148,026
<BONDS>                                        816,127
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     65,000
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     697,385
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,726,033
<SALES>                                         59,409
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                60,928
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   32,670
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,860<F1>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              10,847
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 15,551
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             15,551
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    15,551
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.49
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.49
<FN>
<F1>Included in other expenses are minority interest expense and interest income
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report of Cephalon, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Frank Baldino, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, based on my knowledge, that:

(1)   The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

|/s/FRANK BALDINO, JR.Frank Baldino, Jr., Ph.D. Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer |  | 
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | 

February 28, 2008

---



QuickLinks
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS Appeals of

-- ) ) Genesis MW Joint Venture ) ) Under Contract No. W912DQ-l l-D-4006 ) APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT:

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: ASBCA Nos. 60721 , 60722

David S. Demian, Esq. Christopher R
. Sillari, Esq.

Finch, Thornton & Baird, LLP San Diego , CA Raymond M. Saunders , Esq.

Army ChiefTrial Attorney Dana J
. Chase, Esq
.

Trial Attorney ORDER OF DISMISSAL The parties have advised that the disputes underlying these appeals have been settled and final payment has been consummated. We grant appellant ' s unopposed motion of July 23 , 2019 , and dismiss these appeals with prejudice. Dated: July 29 , 2019

Administrative Judge Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals I certify that the foregoing is a true copy ofthe Order ofDismissal ofthe Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 60721 , 60722 , Appeals of Genesis MW Joint Venture , rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. Dated:
PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS Recorder, Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2146 

To extend the full Federal medical assistance percentage to urban Indian 

organizations. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

NOVEMBER 16, 2017 

Mr. UDALL (for himself, Mr. TESTER, Mr. HEINRICH, Mr. MERKLEY, Ms. 

WARREN, Ms. HARRIS, Ms. CANTWELL, and Mr. MARKEY) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs 

A BILL 

To extend the full Federal medical assistance percentage 

to urban Indian organizations. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Urban Indian Health 

5 Parity Act’’. 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2146 IS

1 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF FULL FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSIST2 ANCE PERCENTAGE TO URBAN INDIAN ORGA3 NIZATIONS. 

4 Section 1905(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 

5 1396d(b)) is amended by striking ‘‘Indian Health Care 

6 Improvement Act)’’ and inserting ‘‘Indian Health Care 

7 Improvement Act) or through an Urban Indian organiza8 tion (as defined in section 4 of the Indian Health Care 

9 Improvement Act) pursuant to a grant or contract with 

10 the Indian Health Service under title V of the Indian 

11 Health Care Improvement Act’’. 

Æ 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
A01A0968.

#### COBB v. SMITH.

(547 SE2d 796)

Phipps, Judge.

Norman Smith filed this action against Arty Cobb, individually and d/b/a Cobb Associates. Cobb appeals a summary judgment award to Smith.

In the complaint, Smith alleged that he and Cobb entered into a joint venture to manufacture and sell printed plastic bags to Bell-South Mobility and that, after receiving payment from BellSouth for hundreds of thousands of the bags, Cobb failed to pay Smith the full amount he was owed.

The trial court awarded Smith summary judgment in the principal amount of $25,382.46 based on its determination that the evidence showed without dispute: that Smith and Cobb entered into a written joint venture contract to sell bags to BellSouth at a price of $119.50 per 1,000 bags; that the contract specified that Cobb as manufacturer was to receive $69.85 per 1,000 bags and that Smith was to receive the remaining $49.15; that 659,000 bags were sold and invoiced to BellSouth at the price specified in the contract; that Bell-South paid Cobb $78,703.50 for delivery of the bags; that Smith was entitled to $32,398.85; and that Cobb remitted only $7,007.39 to Smith, thereby leaving a balance due of $25,382.46.

Cobb claims that the trial court misinterpreted his and Smith’s agreement, in that the agreement left open for future negotiation the respective amounts due the parties on the BellSouth contract. We disagree. While recognizing that the parties had not agreed upon the amounts each was to receive for bags to be sold under unbid contracts, the agreement did set forth such amounts for the bags sold to BellSouth. These amounts were correctly stated in the trial court’s order.

Cobb also argues that there are material issues of fact on the question of whether Smith is contractually entitled to the sums he seeks to recover, because the parties’ agreement provided that Smith would be entitled to these monies only if BellSouth’s business was obtained through his efforts, and Cobb has testified that he obtained such business through the efforts of others.

We cannot accept this argument either. Its resolution requires a review of the evidence. In part, the trial court based its judgment on evidentiary stipulations set forth in the transcript of the summary judgment hearing. The transcript of the hearing has not been *268included in the appellate record. Therefore, we must assume that the stipulations support the trial court’s ruling.1

Decided April 17, 2001.

*Smith, White, Sharma & Halpern, Jonathan Goldberg,*for appellant.

*Rubin & Hoyt, Robert P. Hoyt,*for appellee.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Smith, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur.*

1

 See *Ware v. Fidelity Acceptance Corp.,*225 Ga. App. 41, 44 (4) (482 SE2d 536) (1997); *Lee v. Trust Co. Bank,*204 Ga. App. 28, 29 (2) (418 SE2d 407) (1992).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-26-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-28-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-26-1998
<CASH>                                           6,172
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  219,599
<ALLOWANCES>                                     3,563
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               247,604
<PP&E>                                          47,797
<DEPRECIATION>                                (16,016)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 404,542
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          171,717
<BONDS>                                          4,323
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         4,725
<OTHER-SE>                                     217,662
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   404,542
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               580,904
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  384,142
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               163,843
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,743
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 29,176
<INCOME-TAX>                                    18,551
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             10,625
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    10,625
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.19
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.18
        

</TABLE>
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 2017 

To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide that overthe-road bus drivers are covered under the maximum hours requirements. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 26, 2017 

Mr. CASEY (for himself, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. FRANKEN, and 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND) introduced the following bill; which was read twice 

and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide 

that over-the-road bus drivers are covered under the 

maximum hours requirements. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Driver Fatigue Preven5 tion Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 

7 OF 1938. 

8 Section 13(b)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 

9 1938 (29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1)) is amended by inserting beVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:12 Oct 28, 2017 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2017.IS S2017

lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2017 IS

1 fore the semicolon the following: ‘‘, except a driver of an 

2 ‘over-the-road bus’ characterized by an elevated passenger 

3 deck located over a baggage compartment.’’. 

Æ 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350) In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Trimol Group, Inc. (the Company) on
Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned
Chief Executive Officer of the Company hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
that: (1)
the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (2)
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as
of and for the periods covered in the Report. No
purchaser or seller of securities or any other person shall be entitled to rely
upon the foregoing certification for any purpose. The undersigned expressly
disclaims any obligation to update the foregoing certification except as
required by law. /s/ Yuri
 BenensonYuri
 BenensonChief
 Executive OfficerTRIMOL
 GROUP, INC. November 13,
2008 [A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Trimol Group, Inc. and will be retained by Trimol Group, Inc. and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.] 25
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 7, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-41359

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSE GONZALEZ-ARREGA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 2:06-CR-178-ALL

--------------------

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Jose GonzalezArrega raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres

v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate

criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance

is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule contains summary information extracted from the consolidated
balance sheet and the consolidated statement of operations and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                    JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                          1,011,748
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   214,128
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     88,264
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                1,320,432
<PP&E>                          90,151
<DEPRECIATION>                  0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  2,075,328
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           151,940
<BONDS>                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     7,500
<COMMON>                        370
<OTHER-SE>                      1,915,518
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    2,075,328
<SALES>                         298,325
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                298,325
<CGS>                           234,344
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   378,533
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                13,077
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (451,218)
<INCOME-TAX>                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             (451,218)
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    (451,218)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                   (0.12)
<EPS-DILUTED>                   (0.12)
        


</TABLE>