3164 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0108; Directorate 

Identifier 2013–CE–052–AD; Amendment 

39–18063; AD 2015–01–02] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Mitsubishi 

Heavy Industries, Ltd. Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 

Models MU–2B–30, MU–2B–35, MU– 

2B–36, MU–2B–36A, and MU–2B–60 

airplanes. This AD results from 

mandatory continuing airworthiness 

information (MCAI) issued by an 

aviation authority of another country to 

identify and correct an unsafe condition 

on an aviation product. The MCAI 

describes the unsafe condition as stress 

corrosion cracking in the flanges of the 

airframe at stations 4610 and 5605. We 

are issuing this AD to require actions to 

address the unsafe condition on these 

products. 

DATES: This AD is effective February 26, 

2015. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of February 26, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 

0108; or in person at Document 

Management Facility, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Mitsubishi Heavy 

Industries America, Inc., c/o Turbine 

Aircraft Services, Inc., 4550 Jimmy 

Doolittle Drive, Addison, Texas 75001; 

telephone: (972) 248–3108, ext. 209; fax: 

(972) 248–3321; Internet: http://mu2aircraft.com. You may view this 

referenced service information at the 

FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 

Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. 

For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call (816) 329– 

4148. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Kenneth A. Cook, Aerospace Engineer, 

FAA, Fort Worth Airplane Certification 

Office (ACO), 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort 

Worth, Texas 76137; telephone: (817) 

222–5475; fax: (817) 222–5960; email: 

Kenneth.A.Cook@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to add an AD that would apply 

to certain Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 

Ltd. (MHI) Models MU–2B–30, MU–2B– 

35, MU–2B–36, MU–2B–36A, and MU– 

2B–60 airplanes. The NPRM was 

published in the Federal Register on 

February 26, 2014 (79 FR 10710). The 

NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe 

condition for the specified products and 

was based on mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country. 

The Japan Civil Aviation Bureau 

(JCAB), which is the aviation authority 

for Japan, has issued AD No. TCD– 

8231–2013, dated August 6, 2013 

(referred to after this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to 

correct an unsafe condition for certain 

MHI Models MU–2B–30, MU–2B–35, 

and MU–2B–36 airplanes. You may 

examine the MCAI on the Internet at 

http://www.regulations.gov/

#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2014-0108- 

0002. 

The JCAB has informed us that as part 

of the MHI continuing aging aircraft 

program, Models MU–2B–30, MU–2B– 

35, and MU–2B–36 airplanes were 

subjected to detailed teardown 

inspections. During the inspections, 

structural cracks in the flanges of some 

long body airplane frames were found at 

frame station (STA) 4610 and STA 5605. 

It has been determined that the 

structural cracks resulted from stress 

corrosion. 

Japan is the State of Design for (MHI 

Models MU–2B–30, MU–2B–35, and 

MU–2B–36, which the MCAI applies to, 

and the United States is the State of 

Design for MHI Models MU–2B–36A 

and MU–2B–60 airplanes. Since the 

Models MU–2B–36A and MU–2B–60 

airplanes are of similar type design, the 

same structural cracks could exist. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the proposal and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Request To Extend Comment Period 

Mike Ciholas and seven others stated 

that they need more time for discussions 

at seminars and to obtain more 

information from MHI and Turbine 

Aircraft Services. 

The commenters requested the 

comment period be extended to allow 

for more time to gather and analyze 

data. 

We do not agree with the commenters. 

We have considered the request and 

have determined sufficient evidence 

and data exist, specifically information 

recently from MHI on the inspections of 

18 of the 119 airplanes in the U.S. fleet 

that indicate that 8 of them were 

cracked. Out of these eight, four have 

been removed from service. Based on 

the data presented in the NPRM and this 

more detailed information provided by 

MHI, the location of cracks, and the 

cause of cracking (stress corrosion), we 

have concluded that the inspections are 

necessary to address the unsafe 

condition. 

We have not changed the final rule 

AD action based on this comment. 

Request To Withdraw Proposed AD 

Mike Ciholas and eight others stated 

that the unsafe condition addressed in 

the proposed AD be handled as part of 

routine inspections. The commenters 

stated that there has never been any 

incident, accident, injury, or fatality 

attributed to this issue despite the 

millions of flight hours the MU–2B 

airplane has accumulated, including 

those hours that some airplanes have 

flown with a crack present. There has 

never been any damage to any airplane 

from this issue. None of the subject 

parts have failed to perform in service, 

cracked or otherwise. 

Mark James of Intercontinental Jet 

Service Corp. and two others stated that 

there have been no failures in the 

airframes. 

The commenters requested that the 

proposed AD be withdrawn. 

We do not agree with the commenters. 

While there have been no failures to 

date, the stress corrosion cracking 

exhibited is in primary load structure. 

Upon crack initiation, the frames will 

have diminished load carrying 

capabilities, which will propagate over 

time, potentially leading to failure. 

Although previous inspection 

requirements specify visual inspection 

of all frames, no instruction was 

provided for accessing the difficult to 

reach areas where the subject cracks 

have been found. In addition, we are 

issuing this AD to address the unsafe 

condition and prevent such failures of 

this airplane. 

We have not changed the final rule 

AD action based on this comment. 

Request To Delay Issuing the Final Rule 

AD Action 

David Klain and six others stated that 

they wanted the FAA to hold the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 3165 

proposed AD in abeyance and request 

additional data from the manufacturer, 

service centers, and the owner/operator 

community. At the very least, all 

inspections completed to date should be 

considered and an evaluation made as 

to what specifically is causing these 

cracks, other than the simple fact these 

are MU–2 long body airplanes. 

Additional data can be collected from 

ongoing inspections conducted in 

accordance with the maintenance 

manual as well. Once that data is 

collected, an informed decision based 

on facts instead of speculation can be 

made. 

The commenters requested that we 

delay issuing the final rule AD action. 

We do not agree with the commenters. 

We have considered the request to delay 

issuing the final rule AD action and 

have determined that sufficient 

evidence and data exist, specifically 

information recently from MHI on the 

inspections of 18 of the 119 airplanes in 

the U.S. fleet that indicate that 8 of them 

were cracked. Out of these eight, four 

have been removed from service. Based 

on the data presented in the NPRM and 

this more detailed information provided 

by MHI, the location of cracks, and the 

cause of cracking (stress corrosion), we 

have concluded that the inspections are 

necessary to address the unsafe 

condition. Further delay of the final rule 

AD action would allow a known unsafe 

condition to exist without AD action to 

address it. 

We have not changed the final rule 

AD action based on this comment. 

Request To Verify Cost of Compliance 

David Klain and three others stated 

that the Mitsubishi Service Centers have 

indicated that the time and cost 

estimates detailed in the proposed AD 

are not accurate and do not reflect the 

actual higher costs and time necessary 

to complete the inspection based on the 

inspections completed to date. 

The commenters requested a change 

to the Cost of Compliance section. 

We do not agree with the commenters. 

The cost provided by the original 

equipment manufacturer (OEM) is a 

rough order of magnitude estimate 

based on available information and 

standardized cost evaluation methods. 

We have not changed the final rule 

AD action based on this comment. 

Request To Withdraw Proposed AD 

David Klain and three others stated 

that the proposed AD is based on nonrepresentative airframes. The proposed 

AD was derived from a service bulletin 

that originated from inspections of a 

limited, non-representative sample of 

airframes that have been removed from 

service and represent the worst possible 

scenario with regards to airframe stress 

(freighters). 

The commenters stated that since 

Special Airworthiness Information 

Bulletin (SAIB) No. CE–03–26, dated 

February 28, 2003 (which can be found 

at http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_

Guidance_Library/rgSAIB.nsf/

(LookupSAIBs)/CE-03- 

26?OpenDocument), three additional 

airplanes with a total airframe time and 

operational use (non-freighter) that is 

more representative of the fleet have 

been inspected at several service centers 

and not a single plane exhibited the 

cracks in question. The commenters 

stated, based on these findings, there is 

a situation where a very small sample 

size may give some indication there is 

a correlation between total time and/or 

airplane utilization (freighters with 

heavy takeoff/landing weights and many 

cycles) and the cracks in question, but 

further empirical data is likely 

necessary to draw any firm conclusions. 

The commenters also stated that the 

costly inspection goes against the FAA’s 

mandate to encourage and promote 

aviation by potentially mandating a 

costly inspection that would result in 

the decommissioning of perfectly safe 

and flyable airplanes for no reason other 

than the high cost of an inspection 

mandated by the FAA without any 

engineering data to support such 

inspections. 

We infer that the commenters believe 

that the final rule AD action is 

unnecessary and want the proposed AD 

withdrawn. 

We do not agree with the commenters. 

More detailed information from MHI on 

the inspections of 18 of the 119 

airplanes in the U.S. fleet indicate that 

8 of them were cracked of which 5 were 

used as freighters. Out of these eight, 

four have been removed from service. 

Based on the data presented in the 

NPRM and this more detailed 

information provided by MHI, the 

location of cracks, and the cause of 

cracking (stress corrosion), we have 

concluded that the inspections are 

necessary to address the unsafe 

condition. 

The OEM has also provided the time 

and cost information presented in this 

final rule AD action. 

We have not changed the final rule 

AD action based on this comment. 

Request To Include a Less Expensive 

Repair Option 

Richard Wheldon and one other 

commenter stated that there is a less 

expensive repair available to the 

owners/operators of the affected 

airplanes. 

The commenters stated that the 

repairs specified in the Mitsubishi 

Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI Ltd.) MU– 

2 Service Bulletins No. 231, dated July 

2, 1997, and No. 073/53–002B, dated 

April 27, 1999, involve doublers and are 

much less intrusive and less labor 

intensive. The repairs in MHI Ltd. MU– 

2 Service Bulletins No. 242, dated July 

10, 2013, and No. 104/53–003, dated 

July 22, 2013, involve large splices and/ 

or frame segment replacements, which 

are very costly. It is not explained why 

the less expensive methods were not 

proposed. In discussions with 

experienced sheet metal mechanics and 

structures engineers, they expressed that 

other repair schemes are possible that 

adequately address any safety concerns 

and are much less costly. 

Many of the cracks found at the lower 

sections of the bottom frame segments 

might be repairable using doublers 

rather than replacing the entire lower 

frame segments, which is the only 

solution allowed in the proposed AD. 

Obviously, the replacement of an entire 

lower frame segment is a huge, 

potentially unnecessary undertaking 

involving considerable assembly and 

disassembly. Any conventional solution 

short of frame segment replacement 

should be investigated. 

The commenters also stated that an 

operator is not allowed to repair the side 

frame segments per MHI Ltd. MU–2 

Service Bulletins No. 231, dated July 2, 

1997, and No. 073/53–002B, dated April 

27, 1999, and still be in compliance 

with the proposed AD. The only 

solution to a side frame crack allowed 

per MHI Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletins 

No. 242, dated July 10, 2013, and No. 

104/53–003, dated July 22, 2013, is the 

much more expensive replacing of the 

side frame segment. 

The commenters requested 

compliance based on MHI Ltd. MU–2 

Service Bulletins No. 231, dated July 2, 

1997, and No. 073/53–002B, dated April 

27, 1999, at a minimum, be permitted in 

the final rule AD action. 

We do not agree with the commenters. 

MHI Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletins No. 

231, dated July 2, 1997, and No. 073/53– 

002B, dated April 27, 1999, require 

inspecting for cracks that are 

specifically located around rivet holes. 

The service bulletins specified in this 

AD require inspecting for cracks in a 

different area, specifically throughout 

the frame flanges. 

If lower cost repair methods exist that 

meet the intent of the proposed AD, you 

may propose an alternative method of 

compliance or a change in the 

compliance time that provides an 

acceptable level of safety using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 


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3166 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

We have not changed the final rule 

AD action based on this comment. 

Request To Consider Other Causes of 

the Cracks 

David Klain and one other commenter 

stated that the proposed AD does not 

accurately consider what the causal 

factors are that may have caused the 

cracks in question (airframe age, cycles, 

total time, utilization as freighters, etc.) 

due to lack of adequate representative 

data. 

The commenters requested the FAA 

to further investigate the cause of the 

cracks. 

We do not agree with the commenters. 

We have evaluated the data provided 

and have determined that the cause of 

cracking is stress corrosion. We have 

determined that is sufficient evidence 

and data of an unsafe condition and we 

should proceed with issuing the final 

rule AD action. 

We have not changed the final rule 

AD action based on this comment. 

Request To Utilize Special 

Airworthiness Information Bulletin 

(SAIB) No. CE–03–26, Dated February 

28, 2003 

Mark James of Intercontinental Jet 

Service Corp. stated that the inspections 

introduced and recommended in SAIB 

No. CE–03–26, dated February 28, 2003, 

which can be found at http://rgl.faa.gov/ 

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/

rgSAIB.nsf/(LookupSAIBs)/CE-03- 

26?OpenDocument, should be sufficient 

to cover inspections required from this 

AD because the stresses are the same. 

The commenter stated that the 

inspection criteria in the proposed AD 

require inspection of a different location 

of these same frames and the fact is that 

the frame materials and stresses are the 

same. 

We infer that the commenter believes 

the inspections introduced and 

recommended in SAIB No. CE–03–26, 

dated February 28, 2003, are sufficient 

in addressing the unsafe condition 

identified in this AD wants the 

proposed AD withdrawn. 

We do not agree with the commenter. 

It is stated in the proposed AD that 

stress corrosion cracking may be located 

throughout the area of the frame flanges. 

The inspections recommended in SAIB 

No. CE–03–26 are more limited and 

only inspect for stress corrosion 

cracking at screw holes in the flange. 

We have not changed the final rule 

AD action based on this comment. 

Request To Modify the Applicability 

Section 

An anonymous commenter stated that 

the statistical analysis and evaluation 

performed in support of the proposed 

AD is flawed. The commenter also 

stated that given the inconsistent data 

from a sample size that is not 

representative of the fleet, there appears 

to be no scientific or engineering basis 

for issuing the final rule AD action and 

mandating it for the entire fleet 

The commenter stated that Mark 

James of Intercontinental Jet Service 

Corp. also stated that the conclusions 

made by the FAA were not based on an 

adequate representation of the fleet and 

that thus far the only cracks found have 

been on two higher time airframes and 

not on the many airplanes that have less 

than one-third of the flight time and 

cycles 

The commenter requested the 

applicability of the final rule AD action 

be changed to apply only to high time, 

high-cycle airplanes. 

We do not agree with the commenters. 

More detailed information from MHI on 

the inspections of 18 of the 119 

airplanes in the U.S. fleet indicate that 

8 of them were cracked. Out of the 18 

airplanes, 5 of them are used as 

freighters and all 5 of these were among 

the 8 found cracked. Four of the eight 

airplanes found cracked have been 

removed from service. Based on the data 

presented in the NPRM and this more 

detailed information provided by MHI, 

the location of cracks, and the cause of 

cracking (stress corrosion), we have 

concluded that the inspections are 

necessary to address the unsafe 

condition. 

We have not changed the final rule 

AD action based on this comment. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

as proposed except for minor editorial 

changes. We have determined that these 

minor changes: 

• Are consistent with the intent that 

was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 

10710, February 26, 2014) for correcting 

the unsafe condition; and 

• Do not add any additional burden 

upon the public than was already 

proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 10710, 

February 26, 2014). 

Relevant Service Information 

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. has 

issued Service Bulletin No. 242, dated 

July 10, 2013, and Service Bulletin No. 

104/53–003, dated July 22, 2013. The 

actions described in this service 

information are intended to correct the 

unsafe condition identified in the 

MCAI. The service bulletin describes 

procedures to inspect and repair/replace 

the side and lower frame at stations 

4610 and 5605. You can find this 

service information on the Internet at 

http://www.regulations.gov by searching 

for and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 

0108. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD will affect 

119 products of U.S. registry. We also 

estimate that it will take about 100 

work-hours per product to comply with 

the basic requirements of this AD. The 

average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. 

Based on these figures, we estimate 

the cost of this AD on U.S. operators to 

be $1,011,500, or $8,500 per product. 

In addition, we estimate that any 

necessary follow-on actions will take up 

to 428 work-hours and require parts 

costing up to $14,400, for a cost up to 

$50,780 per product. We have no way 

of determining the number of products 

that may need such repair based on the 

results of the inspection. The extent of 

damage will vary on each airplane. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

the DOT Regulatory Policies and 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 3167 

Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 

1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 

0108; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains the NPRM, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Office (telephone (800) 647– 

5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. 

Comments will be available in the AD 

docket shortly after receipt. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2015–01–02 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 

Ltd.: Amendment 39–18063; Docket No. 

FAA–2014–0108; Directorate Identifier 

2013–CE–052–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes 

effective February 26, 2015. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to Mitsubishi Heavy 

Industries, Ltd. Models MU–2B–30, MU–2B– 

35, and MU–2B–36 airplanes, serial numbers 

502 through 651, 653 through 660, and 662 

through 696, and Models MU–2B–36A and 

MU–2B–60 airplanes, serial numbers 661SA, 

697SA through 799SA, and 1501SA through 

1569SA, certificated in any category. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association of America 

(ATA) Code 53: Fuselage. 

(e) Reason 

This AD was prompted by mandatory 

continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of another 

country to identify and correct an unsafe 

condition on an aviation product. The MCAI 

describes the unsafe condition as stress 

corrosion cracking in the flanges of the 

airframes at stations 4610 and 5605. We are 

issuing this AD to detect and correct 

structural cracks in the airframe flanges, 

which could reduce the structural integrity of 

the airplane. 

(f) Actions and Compliance 

Unless already done, do the actions in 

paragraphs (f)(1) through (f)(3) of this AD. 

(1) Within the next 1,000 hours time-inservice (TIS) after February 26, 2015 (the 

effective date of this AD) or within the next 

3 years after February 26, 2015 (the effective 

date of this AD), whichever occurs first, 

inspect the side and lower frames at frame 

station (STA) 4610 and STA 5605 for cracks 

and corrosion. Do the inspection following 

paragraphs 3.0 through 3.3 of Mitsubishi 

Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletin 

No. 242, dated July 10, 2013, or Mitsubishi 

Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletin 

No. 104/53–003, dated July 22, 2013, as 

applicable. 

(2) If any crack is found during the 

inspection required in paragraph (f)(1) of this 

AD, before further flight, do the actions in 

paragraphs (f)(2)(i) or (f)(2)(ii) of this AD: 

(i) Repair the frame following paragraphs 

4.0 and 5.0 of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 

Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletin No. 242, dated 

July 10, 2013, or Mitsubishi Heavy 

Industries, Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletin No. 

104/53–003, dated July 22, 2013, as 

applicable; or 

(ii) Replace the frame following paragraphs 

4.0, 6.0, and 7.0 of Mitsubishi Heavy 

Industries, Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletin No. 

242, dated July 10, 2013, or Mitsubishi Heavy 

Industries, Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletin No. 

104/53–003, dated July 22, 2013, as 

applicable. 

(3) If any corrosion is found during the 

inspection required in paragraph (f)(1) of this 

AD, before further flight, repair the damage 

following the instructions in paragraph 3.2 of 

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Service 

Bulletin No. 242, dated July 10, 2013, or 

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Service 

Bulletin No. 104/53–003, dated July 22, 2013, 

as applicable. 

(g) Other FAA AD Provisions 

The following provisions also apply to this 

AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, Standards Office, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to 

ATTN: Kenneth A. Cook, Aerospace 

Engineer, FAA, Fort Worth Airplane 

Certification Office (ACO), 2601 Meacham 

Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone: 

(817) 222–5475; fax: (817) 222–5960; email: 

Kenneth.A.Cook@faa.gov. Before using any 

approved AMOC on any airplane to which 

the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate 

principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight 

Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking 

a PI, your local FSDO. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any 

reporting requirement in this AD, a federal 

agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a 

person is not required to respond to, nor 

shall a person be subject to a penalty for 

failure to comply with a collection of 

information subject to the requirements of 

the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that 

collection of information displays a current 

valid OMB Control Number. The OMB 

Control Number for this information 

collection is 2120–0056. Public reporting for 

this collection of information is estimated to 

be approximately 5 minutes per response, 

including the time for reviewing instructions, 

completing and reviewing the collection of 

information. All responses to this collection 

of information are mandatory. Comments 

concerning the accuracy of this burden and 

suggestions for reducing the burden should 

be directed to the FAA at: 800 Independence 

Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20591, Attn: 

Information Collection Clearance Officer, 

AES–200. 

(h) Special Flight Permit 

We are allowing special flight permits with 

the following limitations: 

(1) Essential crew only; 

(2) Minimum weight; 

(3) Limit ‘‘G’’ loading to minimum; and 

(4) Most direct flight to repair center. 

(i) Related Information 

Refer to MCAI Japan Civil Aviation Bureau 

(JCAB) AD No. TCD–8231–2013, dated 

August 6, 2013, for related information. You 

may examine the MCAI on the Internet at 

http://www.regulations.gov/#!document

Detail;D=FAA-2014-0108-0002. 

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU– 

2 Service Bulletin No. 242, dated July 10, 

2013. 

(ii) Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU– 

2 Service Bulletin No. 104/53–003, dated July 

22, 2013. 

(3) For Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 

service information identified in this AD, 

contact Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 

America, Inc. c/o Turbine Aircraft Services, 

Inc., 4550 Jimmy Doolittle Drive, Addison, 

Texas 75001; telephone: (972) 248–3108, ext. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
3168 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 

209; fax: (972) 248–3321; Internet: http://mu2aircraft.com. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 

Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call (816) 329–4148. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on 

December 30, 2014. 

Robert Busto, 

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–00007 Filed 1–21–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Bureau of Prisons 

28 CFR Part 540 

[BOP Docket No. 1148–F] 

RIN 1120–AB48 

Communications Management Units 

AGENCY: Bureau of Prisons, Justice. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: In this document, the Bureau 

of Prisons (Bureau) finalizes regulations 

that establish and describe 

Communications Management Units 

(CMUs) by regulation. The CMUs 

regulations serve to detail the specific 

restrictions that may be imposed in the 

CMUs in a way that current regulations 

authorize but do not detail. CMUs are 

designed to provide an inmate housing 

unit environment that enables staff 

monitoring of all communications 

between inmates in a Communications 

Management Unit (CMU) and persons in 

the community. The ability to monitor 

such communication is necessary to 

ensure the safety, security, and orderly 

operation of correctional facilities, and 

protection of the public. These 

regulations represent a ‘‘floor’’ beneath 

which communications cannot be 

further restricted. The Bureau currently 

operates CMUs in two of its facilities. 

This rule clarifies existing Bureau 

practices with respect to CMUs. 

DATES: This rule is effective on February 

23, 2015. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Sarah Qureshi, Office of General 

Counsel, Bureau of Prisons, phone (202) 

307–2105. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This final 

rule codifies and describes the Bureau’s 

procedures for designating inmates to, 

and limiting communication within, its 

CMUs. Currently, the Bureau operates 

two CMUs, separately located at the 

Federal Correctional Complex (FCC), 

Terre Haute, Indiana (established in 

December 2006), and the United States 

Penitentiary (USP), Marion, Illinois 

(established in March 2008). A proposed 

rule was published on April 6, 2010 (75 

FR 17324). We received 733 comments 

during the 2010 comment period. We 

later reopened the comment period on 

March 10, 2014, for 15 days (79 FR 

13263). We received an additional 443 

comments during the 2014 comment 

period. Similar issues were raised by 

most of the commenters. We respond 

below to the issues raised. 

Designation to a CMU Is Not 

Discriminatory or Retaliatory 

Several commenters felt that there 

exists in CMUs an ‘‘overrepresentation 

of Muslim and political prisoners, 

showing that CMUs are not designed for 

legitimate purposes, but rather to 

discriminate and remove and isolate 

politically active members of society.’’ 

The Bureau does not use religion or 

political affiliation as a criterion for 

designation to CMUs. 28 CFR 551.90 

states the Bureau’s non-discrimination 

policy: ‘‘Bureau staff shall not 

discriminate against inmates on the 

basis of race, religion, national origin, 

sex, disability, or political belief. This 

includes the making of administrative 

decisions and providing access to work, 

housing and programs.’’ Further, 

§ 540.201, which describes the 

designation criteria, must be read in 

tandem with § 540.202, particularly 

subparagraph (b), which states that after 

the Bureau becomes aware of one or 

more of the criteria described in 

§ 540.201, the Bureau’s Assistant 

Director for the Correctional Programs 

Division must conduct a review of the 

evidence found and make a finding that 

designation to the CMU is necessary to 

ensure the safety, security, and orderly 

operation of correctional facilities or 

protection of the public. An inmate 

cannot, therefore, be designated to a 

CMU based upon religious or political 

affiliation, both because neither are part 

of the stated criteria, and because it is 

also necessary to have credible evidence 

of a threat to the safety, security, and 

good order of the institution or 

protection of the public to support 

designation to a CMU. 

Instead, an important category of 

inmates that might be designated to a 

CMU is inmates whose current 

offense(s) of conviction, or offense 

conduct, included association, 

communication, or involvement, related 

to international or domestic terrorism. 

Past behaviors of terrorist inmates 

provide sufficient grounds to suggest a 

substantial risk that they may inspire or 

incite terrorist-related activity, 

especially if ideas for or plans to incite 

terrorist-related activity are 

communicated to groups willing to 

engage in or to provide equipment or 

logistics to facilitate terrorist-related 

activity. The potential ramifications of 

this activity outweigh the inmate’s 

interest in unlimited communication 

with persons in the community. 

Communication related to terroristrelated activity can occur in codes that 

are difficult to detect and extremely 

time-consuming to interpret. Inmates 

involved in such communication, and 

other persons involved or linked to 

terrorist-related activities, take on an 

exalted status with other like-minded 

individuals. Their communications 

acquire a special level of inspirational 

significance for those who are already 

predisposed to these views, causing a 

substantial risk that such recipients of 

their communications will be incited to 

unlawful terrorist-related activity. 

The danger of coded messages from 

prisoners has been recognized by the 

courts. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 

78, 93 (1987) (‘‘In any event, prisoners 

could easily write in jargon or codes to 

prevent detection of their real 

messages.’’); United States v. Salameh, 

152 F.3d 88, 108 (2nd Cir. 1998) 

(‘‘Because Ajaj was in jail and his 

telephone calls were monitored, Ajaj 

and Yousef spoke in code when 

discussing the bomb plot.’’); United 

States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 673 

(7th Cir. 2000) (‘‘And we know that 

anyone who has access to a telephone 

or is permitted to receive visitors may 

be able to transmit a lethal message in 

code.’’); United States v. Hammoud, 381 

F.3d 316, 334 (4th Cir. 2004) (‘‘A 

conversation that seems innocuous on 

one day may later turn out to be of great 

significance, particularly if the 

individuals are talking in code.’’); 

United States v. Moncivais, 401 F.3d 

751, 757 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that 

seemingly nonsensical conversations 

could be in code and interpreted as 

indicative of drug dealing activity). 

Also, an Al Qaeda training manual 

contains the following advice regarding 

communications from prison: ‘‘Take 

advantage of visits to communicate with 

brothers outside prison and exchange 

information that may be helpful to them 

in their work outside prison. The 

importance of mastering the art of 

hiding messages is self-evident here.’’ 


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