97-236

 No. 97-236

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

THE DUCK INN, INC.,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

 MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY-NORTHERN,

 Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Hill,

 The Honorable John Warner, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Chris R. Young; Young & Brown, Havre, Montana

 For Respondent:

 LeRoy H. Schramm, Chief Legal Counsel, Montana 

 University System, Helena, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: October 9, 1997

 Decided: December 9, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

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 The Duck Inn, Inc. (Duck Inn) appeals from the judgment entered by the Twelfth

Judicial District Court, Hill County, on its order granting summary judgment to 

Montana

State University - Northern (Northern) and dismissing the Duck Inn's complaint. We

affirm.

 The issues on appeal are:

 1. Did the District Court err in concluding that Northern's conduct in renting 

its

facilities to private persons and organizations is authorized by õ 20-25-302, MCA 

(1993)?

 2. Did the District Court err in concluding that õ 20-25-302, MCA (1993), does

not violate the Montana Constitution?

 BACKGROUND

 The Duck Inn is a Montana corporation with its principal place of business in

Havre, Montana. As part of its business, the Duck Inn provides facilities, food and

beverages to the general public for the purpose of hosting parties, reunions, 

conventions

and receptions. 

 Northern is a tax-supported unit of the Montana university system; its buildings

and property belong to the State of Montana. Northern is funded via taxes and 

general

fund appropriations, student fees and tuition, fees charged to users of campus 

services

and facilities, federal grants, bond proceeds, interest income and private gifts. 

 Northern regularly rents its facilities to private persons and organizations for

parties, reunions, conventions and receptions. Its campus food service provider has 

the

exclusive right, pursuant to contract, to cater food service for all such gatherings 

on

Northern's campus and, in return, Northern receives 10% of the gross revenues 

realized

from the catering. In addition, Northern receives 100% of the revenues received as

payment for the rental of campus facilities. Northern applies these revenues to

supplement the operating funds available for maintenance of the rented facilities 

and to

pay off the bond issues to which the revenues have been pledged. 

 In 1994, the Duck Inn filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and application

for preliminary injunction against Northern. The complaint alleged that Northern's

leasing of its facilities to private persons and organizations for various events 

placed

Northern in direct competition with the Duck Inn's business and violated Montana

statutes. It also alleged that, if Northern's leasing activities did not exceed 

statutory

authority, the applicable statute violated the Montana Constitution. The Duck Inn 

sought

a declaratory judgment prohibiting Northern's leasing activities and an order to show

cause why its application for a preliminary injunction should not be granted.

 After a hearing, the District Court denied the Duck Inn's request for a 

preliminary

injunction. It determined that, while the Duck Inn had shown that Northern did 

compete

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with the Duck Inn's business, it was not clear that such competition was prohibited 

by

statute or the Montana Constitution. 

 Northern subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it failed

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After full briefing by the 

parties, the

District Court concluded that Northern's practice of renting its facilities did not 

violate

either õ 20-25-302, MCA (1993), or the Montana Constitution, but observed that the

record indicated that Northern might not have followed its own policies regarding 

the use

of facilities. On that basis, the District Court denied Northern's motion to 

dismiss and

granted the Duck Inn leave to amend the complaint to seek damages and injunctive 

relief

based on alleged violations of Northern's policies. Thereafter, the Duck Inn filed a

notice of appeal of the District Court's order and, on November 7, 1995, this Court

dismissed the appeal without prejudice because no final judgment had been entered. 

 The Duck Inn subsequently filed an amended complaint generally alleging, in

addition to the bases asserted in the original complaint, that Northern's leasing 

activities

violated its own policies. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and 

the

District Court ultimately granted Northern's motion relating to the alleged 

violation of

policies on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether 

Northern

violated its current policies relating to the rental of campus facilities. The court

incorporated its earlier decision that Northern's leasing practices did not violate 

either

Montana statute or the Montana Constitution into its order on summary judgment and

ordered the dismissal of the Duck Inn's complaint. Judgment was entered accordingly

and the Duck Inn appeals.

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

 We observe at the outset that the Duck Inn does not appeal from the District

Court's determination that no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to

whether Northern's rental practices violated its own policies. The Duck Inn's 

appeal is

limited to that portion of the District Court's order on summary judgment which

incorporated its earlier legal conclusions that Northern's leasing activities did 

not violate

õ 20-25-302, MCA (1993), or the Montana Constitution. Under such a circumstance, we

need only determine whether the district court correctly interpreted the law. See 

Ash

Grove Cement Co. v. Jefferson County (Mont. 1997), 943 P.2d 85, 89, 54 St.Rep. 756,

759 (citation omitted). 

 DISCUSSION

 1. Did the District Court err in concluding that Northern's conduct in 

renting its

facilities to private persons and organizations is authorized by õ 20-25-302, MCA 

(1993)?

 Section 20-25-302, MCA (1993), provides, in pertinent part, that the regents of

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the Montana university system may

 (5) rent the facilities to other public or private persons, firms, and

 corporations for such uses, at such times, for such periods, and at such

 rates as in the regents' judgment will be consistent with the full use thereof

 for academic purposes and will add to the revenues available for capital

 costs and debt service[.] 

The only portion of the statute which is at issue here is the meaning of the phrase

"consistent with." "In interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain meaning 

of the

words it contains." Werre v. David (1996), 275 Mont. 376, 385, 913 P.2d 625, 631

(citation omitted). Moreover, in the search for plain meaning, we give words their 

usual

and ordinary meaning. Werre, 913 P.2d at 631 (citations omitted).

 Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 247 (10th ed. 1993) defines

consistent as "free from variation or contradiction;" "compatible." The American

Heritage Dictionary 402 (3rd ed. 1992), also defines consistent as "compatible." 

Applying this definition to õ 20-25-302(5), MCA (1993), we conclude that the statute

expressly authorizes Northern to rent its facilities to any person or entity for any 

use, at

any time, which is compatible with--and does not contradict--the full use of the 

facilities

for academic purposes and which also adds to the revenues available for capital 

costs and

debt service. There is no showing on the record before us that Northern's rentals 

are

incompatible with, or contradict, the full use of the facilities for academic 

purposes. 

Furthermore, it is agreed that Northern receives revenues from the rentals which add 

to

revenues available for capital costs or debt service.

 The Duck Inn contends that the phrase "consistent with" means "directly related

to" Northern's academic purposes. It provides no authority for such a definition,

however. An appellant bears the burden of establishing error by the trial court and 

Rule

23, M.R.App.P., requires an appellant to cite to authority for the position being 

advanced

on appeal. The Duck Inn having failed to do so, it cannot establish error with 

regard to

the District Court's definition of "consistent" as, among other things, "compatible, 

not

contradictory" and the court's corresponding conclusion that õ 20-25-302, MCA (1993),

authorizes Northern's leasing activities.

 The Duck Inn also asserts, although obliquely, that it is unwise and unfair for 

taxsupported institutions such as Northern to rent their facilities in direct 

competition with

private sector businesses. Many people would agree with the Duck Inn's assertion. 

As

a general rule, however, the public policy of the State of Montana is set by the 

Montana

Legislature through its enactment of statutes, and this Court may not concern itself 

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with

the wisdom of such statutes. See, e.g., Gryczan v. State (Mont. 1997), 942 P.2d 112,

125, 54 St.Rep. 699, 708; Estate of Strever v. Cline (1996), 278 Mont. 165, 180, 924

P.2d 666, 675; Young v. Board of Trustees, Etc. (1931), 90 Mont. 576, 584, 4 P.2d

725, 728. 

 We also observe that the Duck Inn effectively concedes that õ 20-25-302, MCA

(1993), authorizes Northern's rentals by arguing that the statute authorizes such 

rentals

"only if its administrative rules allowing such conduct are strictly confined within 

the

applicable legislative guidelines, and only if its conduct strictly adheres to both 

the letter

and spirit of the policies and procedures adopted by the Board of Regents and 

Northern." 

While it cannot be gainsaid that administrative regulations or, as here, campus 

policies

cannot authorize conduct not within the purview of the statute (see, e.g., Bick v. 

State,

Dept. of Justice (1986), 224 Mont. 455, 457, 730 P.2d 418, 420), the Duck Inn did not

challenge the policies under which Northern rents its facilities on the basis that 

they are

too expansive or, indeed, at all. It merely contended in the District Court that 

Northern

was violating its own policies. The District Court determined otherwise and, as 

noted

above, the Duck Inn has not appealed that determination.

 Finally, the Duck Inn argues that several of the cases relied on by Northern in 

the

District Court are factually distinguishable from the present case and do not support

Northern's position here. We agree that the cases are, to a large extent, factually

distinguishable in that they address the leasing out of different public facilities 

by different

governmental units under different statutes than that at issue here. See, e.g., 

Colwell v.

City of Great Falls (1945), 117 Mont. 126, 157 P.2d 1013, overruled by Prezeau v. 

City

of Whitefish (1982), 198 Mont. 416, 646 P.2d 1186; Young, 4 P.2d 725. In this 

regard,

we need observe only that the cases noted by the Duck Inn were neither necessary to, 

nor

the basis for, the District Court's decision that Northern's leasing activities are 

authorized

by õ 20-25-302, MCA (1993). Likewise, those cases have no relevance to, or bearing

on, the conclusion we reached above under "plain meaning" principles of statutory

construction.

 We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that õ 20-25-302, MCA

(1993), authorizes Northern to rent its facilities to private persons and 

organizations so

long as the rentals are compatible with the full use of the facilities for academic 

purposes

and add to the revenues available for capital costs or debt service.

 2. Did the District Court err in concluding that õ 20-25-302, MCA (1993), does

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not violate the Montana Constitution? 

 The Duck Inn advances two challenges to the District Court's conclusion that õ 

20-

25-302, MCA (1993), does not violate the Montana Constitution. First, it contends 

that

the statute constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to an

administrative agency. Second, it argues that the leasing of facilities on 

Northern's

campus constitutes a use of tax-supported facilities for a private purpose--

competition with

private enterprise--which infringes on the constitutional requirement that taxes may 

be

levied only for public purposes. We address these arguments in turn. 

 Article V, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution provides that "[t]he 

legislative

power is vested in a legislature consisting of a senate and a house of 

representatives." 

The Duck Inn relies on White v. State (1988), 233 Mont. 81, 759 P.2d 971, and Douglas

v. Judge (1977), 174 Mont. 32, 568 P.2d 530, in arguing that õ 20-25-302, MCA (1993),

constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because it fails to 

prescribe

a policy, standard or rule for implementing the powers delegated to an administrative

agency. 

 It is true that White and Douglas set forth the general standard against which

legislative delegations of power are measured in Montana. In Douglas, where a

delegation of power to the Board of Natural Resources and Conservation was at issue,

we stated that, in delegating powers to an administrative body,

 "the legislature must ordinarily prescribe a policy, standard, or rule for

 their guidance and must not vest them with an arbitrary and uncontrolled

 discretion with regard thereto. . . ."

Douglas, 568 P.2d at 533-34 (citations omitted). We reiterated that standard in 

White in

the context of a challenge to the delegation of legislative power to the Science and

Technology Development Board. White, 759 P.2d at 975.

 Applying the principles set forth in Douglas and White to the present case, it 

is

clear that õ 20-25-302, MCA (1993), is not an unconstitutional delegation of 

legislative

authority to the board of regents. The policy underlying the statute is set forth 

in the

statute; that policy is to increase revenues available for the capital costs of, and 

debt

service on, campus facilities. The implicit, but clear, rationale behind the 

statute is to

minimize the tax support necessary to fund units of the Montana university system by

leasing campus facilities. Likewise, õ 20-25-302, MCA (1993), expressly constrains 

the

leasing of such facilities by mandating that the leasing must be consistent with 

full use

of the facilities for the academic purposes for which they were established. Here, 

this

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constraint on the board of regents is the "standard" or "guide" required by Douglas 

for

a proper legislative delegation of power. 

 The Duck Inn contends, in this regard, that the "regents' discretion" language

contained in õ 20-25-302, MCA (1993), provides insufficient limits on the legislative

delegation of power. It provides no legal authority for its position, however, and 

we

conclude that the regents' discretion is sufficiently limited by the statutory 

requirements

that the leasing be consistent with the full use of the facilities for academic 

purposes and

produce revenues for capital costs or debt service. 

 Moreover, the regents have authority over the Montana university system which

is independent of that delegated by the legislature. Article X, Section 9 of the 

Montana

Constitution expressly creates the board of regents as a constitutional entity and 

vests the

government and control of the Montana university system therein. Indeed, the regents

are given "full power, responsibility, and authority to supervise, coordinate, 

manage and

control the Montana university system . . . ." Art. X, Sec. 9, Mont. Const. Under a

similar circumstance involving independent authority, the United States Supreme Court

has held that limitations on legislative delegation are "less stringent in cases 

where the

entity exercising the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority 

over the

subject matter." United States v. Mazurie (1975), 419 U.S. 544, 556-57, 95 S.Ct. 

710,

717, 42 L.Ed.2d 706, 716 (citation omitted). We adopt the Supreme Court's reasoning

with regard to legislative delegations of power to the board of regents in Montana.

 The Duck Inn's second constitutional argument is that õ 20-25-302, MCA (1993),

permits the use of tax revenues of the State of Montana for private purposes in 

violation

of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution, which provides that "[t]axes 

shall

be levied . . . for public purposes." It relies on Hollow v. State (1986), 222 

Mont. 478,

723 P.2d 227, and cases from other jurisdictions in support of its argument, and

expressly urges this Court to adopt the rationale and holding set forth in White 

Eagle Oil

& Refining Co. v. Gunderson (S.D. 1925), 205 N.W. 614.

 We begin with the constitutional provision itself, which necessitates a

determination of whether the present case directly implicates the use of taxes 

levied for

a public purpose for a private use. We conclude that it does not.

 The Duck Inn does not challenge the levy of any tax--or a statute authorizing 

such

a levy--in this proceeding. Moreover, nothing in the record before us suggests that 

this

case involves tax monies levied for the proper public purpose of higher education 

being

expended directly for Northern's leasing activities or the private gatherings held 

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pursuant

thereto. To the contrary, as discussed above, the purpose of õ 20-25-302, MCA 

(1993),

is to relieve or contain, to at least a minimal extent, the tax burden associated 

with

university-level funding requirements. Thus, to the extent Article VIII, Section 1 

applies

here at all, õ 20-25-302, MCA (1993), and Northern's leasing activities thereunder 

appear

to have "public purposes" as that term is used in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 

Montana

Constitution.

 In this regard, the Duck Inn's reliance on Hollow is misplaced. There, 

legislation

permitted the Montana Economic Development Board to use coal severance tax revenues

from the in-state investment fund to satisfy guaranties of private debts or 

obligations. 

Hollow, 723 P.2d at 232. We held that the use of tax monies to satisfy private 

debts or

obligations violated the requirement of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Montana

Constitution that tax monies be used for public purposes. Hollow, 723 P.2d at 232. 

In

the present case, no tax monies are being spent to satisfy private debts or for any 

other

private purpose. Tax monies being used as a partial funding source for Northern

continue to be used for that purpose, and Northern's leasing activities only enhance

revenues available for capital costs and debt service which might otherwise require

supplementation by the taxpayers. Thus, Hollow is inapplicable here.

 We turn next to White Eagle Oil, the 1925 South Dakota case on which the Duck

Inn urges us to rely in holding Northern's leasing activities unconstitutional under 

Article

VIII, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution. There, a statute authorized the state 

to use

highway funds obtained from gasoline taxes for the purpose of buying gasoline, oil 

and

lubricants and selling them at retail. As the state began such activities, the 

plaintiffs--

retail gas distributors--brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the 

statute

authorizing use of gas tax funds for the stated purpose. White Eagle Oil, 205 N.W. 

at

615-16. The plaintiffs contended that the statute violated the South Dakota 

Constitution's

provision that taxes could be levied for public purposes only; the state contended 

that the

statute was within its police power and, therefore, that the use of gas taxes 

permitted

therein was a public purpose. White Eagle Oil, 205 N.W. at 618, 620. The South

Dakota Supreme Court assumed arguendo that the statute was an exercise of the police

power and, therefore, that the statutorily authorized use of gas taxes was a public

purpose, effectively rejecting the plaintiffs' constitutional argument. It observed,

however, that the law authorizing the levy of the gas tax specified that those taxes 

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were

appropriated for the construction and repair of highways; on that basis, the court

invalidated the statute under a constitutional provision which prohibited the 

diversion of

funds levied for a specific purpose to another purpose. White Eagle Oil, 205 N.W. at

620.

 White Eagle Oil is of no assistance to the Duck Inn. The South Dakota Supreme

Court rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional argument--which was similar to that 

advanced

by the Duck Inn here under the Montana Constitution--and held the statute

unconstitutional for reasons not at issue in the present case. White Eagle Oil has 

no

application here. 

 Finally, we briefly address the other authorities from sister jurisdictions on 

which

the Duck Inn relies, none of which supports its position in this case. In Wheelon v.

South Dakota Land Settlement Board (S.D. 1921), 181 N.W. 359, 360-62, a statute

authorizing the levy of taxes for the purpose of state loans to settlers was held

constitutional as a "public purpose." Similarly, in Albritton v. City of Winona 

(Miss.

1938), 178 So. 799, 803-810, a depression-era tax to be levied for the purchase of 

land,

construction of certain manufacturing enterprises and lease of the enterprises to a 

private

firm or individual fit to operate the enterprises was upheld against a variety of

constitutional challenges as promoting the public welfare. 

 The final case on which the Duck Inn relies is City of Cleveland v. Ruple (Ohio

1936), 200 N.E. 507. There, the city used public funds for the construction and

operation of an underground facility to be used for public exhibitions and vehicle 

parking

in conjunction with public events at its nearby civic center. City of Cleveland, 200 

N.E.

at 508-509. In its first 1« years of operation, the facility was used for public 

purposes

for a total of three months; it was operated as a parking garage in competition with

private business the remainder of the time. The receiver for a nearby private 

parking

garage sued to enjoin the city from using the facility in the above-described manner 

and

the Ohio Supreme Court held that it could be operated as a garage "so far as in 

doing so

there is involved a public function." City of Cleveland, 200 N.E. at 509, 511. It 

is this

holding on which the Duck Inn relies.

 The facts in City of Cleveland are clearly distinguishable from those presently

before us. There, the "public" function of the facility was essentially incidental 

to the

private use being made of it, in that the facility was operated for public purposes 

only

17% of the time. Indeed, the Ohio court distinguished City of Cleveland from the 

many

cases holding "that public buildings may be temporarily let for a consideration, but 

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in our

judgment the present case does not present a situation of that character." City of

Cleveland, 200 N.E. at 511. The case before this Court does present a situation 

where

Northern temporarily leases its facilities and the leasing is incidental to use of 

the

facilities for the public purposes for which they were funded. The record reflects, 

in

fact, that less than 5% of the activities in the Northern facilities at issue are of 

a private

social nature under leases with Northern. Thus, City of Cleveland is readily

distinguishable on the facts and, therefore, on the law.

 We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that õ 20-25-302, MCA

(1993), and Northern's leasing activities thereunder, do not violate the Montana

Constitution. Affirmed.

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

We concur:

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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