NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ROBERT Z., SUSAN Z., Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.Z., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 21-0083 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD39223

The Honorable Karen A. Mullins, Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Terrea L. Arnwine PLLC, Tempe

By Terrea L. Arnwine

Counsel for Appellant Robert Z.

Crider Law PLLC, Mesa

By Brad J. Crider

Counsel for Appellant Susan Z.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Emily M. Stokes

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 12-14-2021
ROBERT Z., SUSAN Z. v. DCS, A.Z.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in 

which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Robert Z. (“Father”) and Susan Z. (“Mother”) (collectively 

“Parents”) appeal the juvenile court’s finding that their child, born March 

2003, is dependent. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

juvenile court’s findings. Willie G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231, 

235 ¶ 21 (App. 2005). The married parties are the biological parents of the 

child. The Department became involved when the child was 17 years old 

and lived with Parents and her older adult sister. Parents regularly became 

intoxicated and fought with the children. As a result, the child feared 

Parents, had previously voiced that she had thoughts about committing 

suicide and harming herself, and requested counseling, but Parents did not 

address her mental-health concerns. In March 2020, a particular argument 

escalated in the family, during which the child voiced her desire to harm

herself and Father stated that he would buy a gun to kill the family and 

himself—a statement he had made more than once—and would buy a gun 

for the child to kill herself. The day after the argument, Parents went to 

Sedona for five days, leaving the child and her sister alone. Meanwhile, the 

child and her sister left the home and checked into a motel. A few days later,

they moved in with the child’s classmate’s family. That same day, the 

Department obtained a court order to remove the child from Parents’ home, 

and the classmate’s family became the child’s placement.

¶3 A year later, the juvenile court found by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the child was dependent as to Parents based on neglect, 

specifically that (1) their excessive alcohol consumption made them 

“incapable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control and 

rendering the parents’ home unfit by reason of neglect”; (2) their failure to 

address the child’s mental health through services, or ensure her safety after 

she revealed her thoughts of suicide and self-harm to them, created “an 

unreasonable risk of harm to [the child’s] health and welfare”; (3) Mother 
ROBERT Z., SUSAN Z. v. DCS, A.Z.

Decision of the Court

3

failed and was unwilling “to exercise proper and effective parental care and 

control” in not protecting the child from Father’s threats to buy a gun and 

kill the family and buy a gun so the child could shoot herself; and (4) Father 

failed and was unwilling “to exercise proper and effective parental care and 

control” in making those threats. However, the court ordered that the 

dependency be dismissed three days later, the day that the child turned 18 

years old. Father and Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

¶4 Parents argue that the Department did not prove the 

dependency by a preponderance of the evidence, and Mother separately 

argues that the court abused its discretion in making an adverse inference 

against her for not testifying at the dependency adjudication hearing. We 

will review a dependency adjudication for an abuse of discretion. Louis C. 

v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 484, 488 ¶ 12 (App. 2015). Because the 

juvenile court was in the “best position to weigh the evidence, judge the 

credibility of the parties, observe the parties, and make appropriate factual 

findings,” In re Pima Cty. Dependency Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546 

(App. 1987), we will affirm a dependency adjudication unless no reasonable 

evidence supports it, Oscar F. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 235 Ariz. 266, 267 ¶ 6 

(App. 2014). 

¶5 The Department argues that this case is moot because the

child is now 18 years old. A juvenile court’s jurisdiction ends by operation 

of law when a juvenile becomes 18 years old. A.R.S. § 8–246(A); Matter of 

Appeal in Maricopa Cty., Juv. Action No. JD-6236, 178 Ariz. 449, 451 (App. 

1994). Because the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction over the child, a 

favorable ruling from this court on many of the issues that Parents raise on 

appeal—that the Department did not make reasonable efforts to unify the 

child with them, that the court relied too heavily on the child’s wishes about 

therapeutic visitation, and that they were entitled to obtain their own 

private services—will not affect their legal rights and responsibilities to the 

child. “A question is moot when any action the court may take will have no 

effect on the parties to the action.” Rohan Mgmt., Inc. v. Jantzen, 246 Ariz. 

168, 172 ¶ 9 (App. 2019) (quoting Lord v. City of Tucson, 10 Ariz.App. 54, 55 

(App. 1969)). Because a ruling on these issues would have no effect, we need 

not address them.

¶6 Nevertheless, this appeal is not moot because the resolution 

of one issue will affect Parents: whether the juvenile court properly found 

that they neglected the child. A finding of dependency based on neglect will 

place a parent on the central registry of child abuse reports maintained by 
ROBERT Z., SUSAN Z. v. DCS, A.Z.

Decision of the Court

4

the Department. A.R.S. § 8–804(A). Being placed on the registry may affect 

a person’s ability to become foster parents, their fitness to adopt a child, 

employment opportunities, and certain licensing abilities. A.R.S. § 8–804(B). 

A ruling affirming or reversing the juvenile court’s determination of 

dependency based on neglect will affect Parents’ rights and abilities.

¶7 Turning to the merits of the issue of neglect, the juvenile court 

did not abuse its discretion in finding that the child is dependent as to 

Mother and Father based on neglect because reasonable evidence supports

that finding. A child is dependent when the Department proves by a

preponderance of the evidence, A.R.S. § 8–444(C)(1), that she is “[i]n need 

of proper and effective parental care and control,” her parents are not

“willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care and control,” and her

“home is unfit by reason of . . . neglect” from the parents, A.R.S. 

§ 8–201(15)(a). The evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that 

Parents neglected the child in maintaining an unfit home through their 

regular intoxication, creating an unreasonable risk of harm to the child’s 

health and welfare by failing to address her mental-health concerns, and 

subjecting the child to Father’s threats.

¶8 Parents argue that the Department did not prove the 

dependency by a preponderance of the evidence. Mother argues that the 

Department has interfered in “family drama” and that the child does not 

have mental-health issues because she did not show signs of emotional 

distress. Further, Father argues that the child is delinquent, not dependent, 

and the Department did not offer evidence of abuse from a mental-health 

professional. Evidence from an expert witness is not required here, 

however, because the dependency finding was based on neglect and not 

abuse. Parental abuse results in “serious emotional damage . . . diagnosed 

by a medical doctor or psychologist,” A.R.S. § 8–201(2), while parental 

neglect results if parents’ unwillingness to provide the child with medical 

care “causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare,”

A.R.S. § 8–201(25)(a). Further, in determining a dependency, the court 

considers “the circumstances as they exist at the time of the dependency 

adjudication hearing.” Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, 48 ¶ 1 

(App. 2016). Thus, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that the 

child was dependent based on neglect. 

¶9 Mother also argues that the court abused its discretion in 

making an adverse inference against her for not testifying at the 

dependency adjudication hearing. She argues that because she testified at 

the Rule 59 hearing and had given her statement to the Foster Care Review 

Board, her testimony at the dependency adjudication hearing would have 
ROBERT Z., SUSAN Z. v. DCS, A.Z.

Decision of the Court

5

been redundant. The court did not abuse its discretion because a negative 

inference is appropriate when a party declines to testify. Melissa W. v. Dep’t 

of Child Safety, 238 Ariz. 115, 117 ¶ 5 (App. 2015); cf. Gordon v. Liguori, 182 

Ariz. 232, 236 (App. 1995) (an adverse inference is appropriate “under

limited circumstances” when a party fails to call a witness). The court stated

that Mother’s refusal to testify “justifies the inference that her testimony 

would have been unhelpful.” Because reasonable evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s findings, the court did not abuse its discretion. 

CONCLUSION

¶10 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.