# FILED
January 25, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NA SHVILLE (HEARD AT SHELBYVILLE)

FOR PUBLICA

TION Filed: January 25, 1999 MARTHA P. JORDAN, Administratrix ) of the Estate of Mary Sue D ouglas, ) Deceased, ) ) PLAINTIF F/APPE LLANT, ) HUMPHRE YS CIRCUIT ) v. ) Hon. Robert E. Burch ) BAPTIST THREE RIVERS HOSPITAL, ) No. 01S01-9706-CV-00142 MARK W. ANDERS

ON, M.D., ) NOEL DOMINGUEZ, M.D., AND ) PATRICK J. M URPHY, M .D., ) ) DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES. )

FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT : DAVID R ANDOLPH

SMITH ROBERT BLAKE MENZEL Nashville FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, BAPTIST THREE RIVERS HOSPITAL : GAYLE MALONE, JR. KATHRYN J. LADD KARA E. SHEA Nashville FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, MARK W. ANDERSON, M.D. : DAN L. NOLAN SUZANNE M . PEARSON Clarksville FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, NOEL DOMINGUEZ, M.D. : THOMAS F. RAINEY Jackson FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, PATRICK J. MURPHY, M.D. : ROBERT E. HOEN JOHN R. CALLCOT

T Nashville FOR AMICUS CURIAE, STEFFONE M cCLENDON : H. NAILL FALLS JR. JAMES B. JOHNSON Nashville FOR AMICUS CURIAE, TENNESSEE TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION : JOHN A. DAY DONALD CAPPARELLA Nashville STEVEN W. TERRY Morristo wn



# O P I N I O N

TRIAL COURT REVERSED HOLDER, J.2 OPINION
We granted this appeal to determine whether spousal and parental consortium losses should be permissible in wrong ful death actions. Tennessee law previously

permitted the anomalous result of allowing spousal cons ortium losses in personal injur y cases but not in cases of wrongful death. Upon rev iew of the m odern tre nd of au thority an d carefu l scrutiny o f our sta tutory sch eme, we hold that loss of consortium cl aims should not be limited to per sonal injury suits. We hold that the pecuniary value of a deceased's life includes the element of damages commo nly referr ed to as loss

of consortiu m.

BACKGROUND

This cause of action arises out of the death of Mary Sue Douglas ("decedent"). The plaintiff, Martha P. Jordan, is a survi ving child of the decedent and the administratrix of the decedent's estate. The plaintiff, on behal f of the decedent's estate, filed a medical malpractice act ion against the defendants, Baptist Three Rivers H ospital, Mark W. Anderson, M.D., Noel Dominguez, M.D., and Patrick Murphy, M.D. The plaintiff has alleged that the def endants' negligence caused the decede nt's death.
The plaintiff's complaint sought damages for loss of consortium and for the decedent's loss of enjoyment of life or hedonic damages. The defendants filed a motion to strike and a moti on for judgment on the pleadings asserting that Tennessee law does not permit r ecovery for loss of parental consortium and for hedonic damages.
The trial court granted th e defendants' motion to strike and g ranted the plaintiff permission to file an interlocutory appeal. The C ourt of Appeals found1 Ora l argu me nt wa s hea rd in th is cas e on A pril 2, 1 998 , in Sh elbyville , Bed ford Cou nty, Tenn essee , as part of this Cou rt’s S.C.A.L .E.S. ( S upreme C ourt A dvancing L ega l E ducation fo r S tudents ) project.

2 This Cou rt has prev ious ly held th at cla ims for he don ic dam age s are not via ble in Tenn essee in wrongf ul death c ases. See Spencer v. A-1 Crane Serv., I nc. , 880 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tenn. 1994). 3 that the plaintiff's application for appe llate review was untimely. Nevertheless, the appellate court "revi ewed the plaintiff's application and the responses of the defendants and [found] that this [was] not an appropriate case for an interlocutory appeal." The plaintiff's application for an interlocutory appeal w as denied. We granted appeal 1 to determine whether clai ms for loss of spousal and parental consortium in wrongful death cases are vi able in Tennessee under Tenn. Code Ann.§ 20-5-113. 2 We express no opinion as to whether the loss of parental consortium may be r ecovered in personal inj ury actions in whi ch the parent or parents survi

ve. That issue will

be addressed in an appropriate case.

ANAL YSIS
Development of Wrongful Death Statute
A wrongful death cause of acti on did not exist at common law

. See Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Denyi ng a Common-Law Recov ery for Wrongful Death , 61 A.L.R. 3d 906 (1975). Pur suant to the common law, actio ns for personal injuries that resulted in death terminated at the victim's death because "in a civil cou rt the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984) (" Prosser "). "The [legal] result w as that it was cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintif f than to injure him, and that the most grievous of all injur

ies left the bereaved family of the victim . . . wi

thout a remedy." Id. This rule of non-liabilit y for wrongful death w

as previously the prevailing vi ew in both England and in the United States. East Tennessee V. &3 "[W]hen any person may depart this l ife, by

or against

whom . . . any civil

action, whether the same be founded on wrongs or co ntracts, except acti ons for wrongs aff ecting t he person or character of the plai ntiff , may have commenced, it shal l be lawf ul to ren ew such suit by or against the personalrepresentat ive of such decede nt . . . " 1836 Tenn. Pub. Act s, ch. 77. 4 G. Ry. Co. v. Lilly , 18 S.W. 243, 244 (Tenn 1891); Hall v. Nashvil le & C. R. Co. , 1 Shan. 141 (Tenn. 1859).

In 1846, the British Parli ament enacted a wrongful death s tatute designed to abrogate the common law r ule's harsh effect of denying r ecovery for personal injuries resulting in death. The English statute was referred to as "Lord Campbell's Act" and created a c ause of action for designated surv ivors that accrued upon the tort vic tim's death. See Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death , 17 Stan. L. Rev. 1043, 1051 ( 1965); Prosser , § 127, at 945.

Jurisdictions in the U nited States were quic k to follow England's l ead. Id. In 1847, New York became the first American jurisdi ction to enact a wrongful death statute. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death and Injury , § 1:9 (3d ed. 1992). Presently, ev

ery jurisdiction i n the United States has a w rongful death statute. Id. ; see also Prosser , § 127, at 945. These statutes, inc luding that of Tennessee, embody the substantiv e provisions of Lord Campbel l's Act and permit designated beneficiaries to recover losses sustained as a result of the tort victim's death. Dixie Ohio Exp. C o. v. Butler , 166 S.W.2d 614, 61 5 (Tenn. 1942); East Tennessee , 18 S.W. at 244.

Tennessee was one of the earliest states to abrogate judici ally "[t]he artificial rule of the common law that every right of action for personal injury died with the person injure

d." East Tennessee , 18 S.W. at 244. As early as 1836, the Tennessee legislature enacted a statute providing for the survival of all civil actions for which suit had been commenced prior to the v ictim's death. 3 In 1850, our legislature made its initial attempt to permit r ecovery in wr

ongful death cases. The legislation permitted a recovery for wr ongful death by enacting l egislation4 "[I] n all and every case wher e any person shal l come to his deat h, by i njuries r eceived from anot her . . . f or wh ich inj uries , in ca se de ath h ad no t resu lted, a n act ion of dam age s wo uld lie at law, the personalrepresentat ive of t he person thus ki lled shal l have the right t o insti tute an action for

damages . . ." 1 850 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 58.
5 "[W]hen the death of one is caused by the wrongful

act or omission of another, the personal repr

esentati ves of the for mer may maintain an acti on against t he latter, if the former might have maintai ned an action h ad he liv ed, against

the lat ter for an injury

caused by the sa me act or omission .. ." 185 1 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 17.

6 "[T]he ri ght of acti on which a person, who dies from inj uries recei ved from another, or whose death is causedby the wron gful act, omission, or ki lli ng by another , would have had aga inst th e wro ngd oer in cas e dea th ha d not ensu ed, s hall no t aba te or b e ext inguis hed by his dea th, bu t sha ll pass to his wido w, an d in ca se th ere is no wid ow, to his ch ildren , or to h is personal repr

esentati ve, for t he benefit of his wi dow or next of ki n . . ." 1877 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 78. 5 that permitted a personal repr esentative to bring an action on behalf of a widow or next of kin for the wr ongful death of the victim regardless of whether suit ha d been commenced prior to the death. 4 This statute underwent re visions in 1851 5 and 1877 6 which moved the law closer to its present form.Thus, prior to 1850, Tennessee adhe red to the co mmon law rul e that, upon th e death of the v ictim, no cause of action for damages could be brought by the estate of the deceased for the benefit of third parties, suc h as family members, who sus tained losses as a result of the death. See Daniel v. East Tenn. Coal Co. , 58 S.W. 859, 860 (Tenn. 1900); Chambers v. Porter , 45 Tenn. 273, 276 (1868).
After more than a century of piecemeal revision by the l egislature and interpretation by the cour ts, Tennessee's modern wrong ful death law has taken shape. See generally , T. A. Smedley, Wrongful Death Actions in Tennessee , 27 Tenn. L. Rev. 447 (1960). Our present wrongful death statutes are substa ntially similar to the early codifications abandoning the r ule of non-liability for w rongful death.
Specifically, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-102, the direct descende nt of the 1836 statute, provides that
[n]o civil action commenc ed, whether founded on wrongs or contracts, except actio ns for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff, shall abate by the death of either party . . . ; nor shall any6 right of action arising

hereafter based on the wrong ful act or omission of another, except actions for wrongs affecting the character, be abated by the de ath of the party wronged ; but the right of action shall pass in like manner as [descri bed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106].
Moreover, Tenn Code Ann. § 20- 5-106, the modern version of the 1877 statute, provides in par t:
The right of action which a person, who dies from inj uries received from another, or whose death is caused by the wrong

ful act, omission, or killing

by another, would hav e had against the wrongdoer, in case dea th had not been ensued, shall not abate or be extinguished by the person's death but shall pas s to the person's survivi ng spouse and, in case there is no surviving spouse, to the person's children or next of kin; or to the person's personal representative , for the benefit of the person's surv iving spouse or next of kin.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a). Thus,an examination of the development of Tennessee's wrongful death l aw, from its inception to the present, establishes that the right of recover y in a wrongful death case is strictly a creation of statute. See Hogan v. McDaniel , 319 S.W.2d 221, 222-23 (Tenn. 1958); Jamison v. Memphis Transit Management C o. , 381 F.2d 670, 673 (6th Cir. 1967).

Because a cause of action for wr ongful death is a creation of statute, recoverable damages must be determined by reference to the particular statute involved. Although

all states have abolis hed the rule of non-liability when persona l injury res ults in de ath, the statuto ry method s of doin g so fall in to two distinct categories -

wrongful death statutes and survival statutes

. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet , 414 U.S. 573, 575 n.2 (1974).
The majority of states have e nacted "survival st atutes." These statutes permit the victim's ca use of action to surviv e the death, so that the victi m, through the victim's estate, recovers damages that would have been rec overed7 by the victim had the victim surv ived. Sea-Land , 414 U.S. at 575 n.2; Recovery for Wrongful Death at § 1:15; Prosser , § 126, at 942-43. Surviv al statutes do not create a new cause of action; rather, the cause of action v ested in the victim at the time of death is transfer red to the per

son designa

ted in the st

atutory sc

heme to pursue it, and the action i s enlarged to include damag es for the death itself. Prosser , § 126, at 942-43. "[T]he recovery is the same one the deceden t would have been entitled to at death, an d thus included such items as wages lost after injury and before death, medical expenses incurred, and pai n and suffering," and other appropriate compensatory damages suffered by the vic tim from the time of injury to the time of death. Id . at 943.

In contrast to surviv

al statutes, "pure wrong ful death statutes" create a
new cause of action in favor of the survivors of the victim for theirloss occasioned by the death. Recovery for Wrongful Deathat § 1:13; Willia m T. Gamble, Actions for Wrongful Death in Tennessee , 4 Vand. L. Rev. 289, 290 (1950). These statutes proceed "on the theory of compensating the individual beneficiaries for the loss of the economic be nefit which they might reasonably have expected to receiv e from the decedent in the form of support, ser vices or contributions during the remainder of [the decedent's] lifetime if [the decedent] had not been killed." Prosser , § 127, at 949. Hence, most wrongful death jurisdictions have ad opted a "pecuniary loss" st andard of recovery, all owing damages for economic contributi ons the deceased would hav e made to the survivors had death not occurred and for the economic v alue of the services the deceased would have render ed to the survivors

but for the death. Recovery for Wrongful Death at § 3:1.
Tennessee's approach to provi ding a remedy for death resu lting from personal injury is a hybrid between survival and wrongful death statutes, resulting in a statutor

y scheme with a "spli

t personality." 27 Tenn. L. R ev. at7 See 1883 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 186. 8 454. The pertinent damages statute, Ten n. Code Ann. § 20-5-113, has been in existence in one form or another since 1883. 7 It provides:
Where a person's death is caused by the wrongful act, fault, or omission of another, and suit is brought for damages . . . the party suing shall, if entitled to damages, have the rig ht to recover the mental and physical suffering, loss of time, and nece ssary expenses resulting to

the deceased from the personal inj uries, and also the damages resulting to the parties for whose use and benefit the right of action survives from the death consequent upon the injuries received

.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 (emphasis adde d).
The plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 reveals that i t may be classified as a survi

val statute because it pr eserves whatever

cause of action was vested in the v

ictim at the time of death. Jones v. Black , 539 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. 1976); Milligan v. Ameri can Hoist & Derrick Co. , 622 F. Supp. 56, 59 (W.D. Tenn. 1985). The survival char acter of the statute is evi denced by the language "the p arty suing shall have t he right to recover [d amages] resulti ng to the deceased from the p ersonal injuries ." Thrailkill v. Patter son , 879 S.W.2d 836, 841 (Tenn. 1994) (emphasis added) . Tennessee courts have decl ared that the purpose of this language i s to provide "for the continu ed existence and passing of the right of acti on of the deceased, and not for any new , independent cause of action in [survi vors]." Whaley v. Catlett , 53 S.W. 131, 133 (Tenn. 1899); see also Herrell v. Haney , 341 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tenn. 1960); Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Cooper , 313 S.W.2d 444, 447-48 (Tenn. 1958); Jamison v. Memphis Transit Management C o. , 381 F.2d 670, 673 (6th Cir. 1967). Accordingly, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 "in theory,preserve[s] the rig ht of action which the deceased hi mself would have had, and . . . [has] basically been construed as falling within the survival type of wrongful death statutes for over a9 century" because it conti nues that cause of action by per mitting recovery

of damages for the death itself. Jones , 539 S.W.2d at 123-25.
Notwithstanding the ac curate, technical characte rization of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 as survi val legislation, the statute also creates a caus e of action that compensates surviv ors for their losses. The s tatute provides that damages may be recovered " resulting to the parties for whose use and benefit the right of action survives from the death ." Id. (emphasis added). Hence, survivors of the deceased may recover damages for theirlosses suffered as a result of the

death as we ll as damage s sustained by the decea sed from the ti me of injury to the time of death. Jones , 539 S.W.2d at 124 (Tennessee's wrongful death legislation prov

ides "for elements of damages consis tent with a theory of survival of the rig ht of action of the deceased but also all ows damages consistent . . . with the creation of a new cause of action in the beneficiaries."). Our inquiry shall focus on whether sur vivors should be per

mitted to recover consor tium losses.

LOSS OF SPOUSAL CONSORTIUM

In 1903, this Court held in Davidson Benedict Co. v. Severson , 7 2 S .W. 967 (Tenn. 1903), that consortium damages were not availabl e under Tennessee's wrongful death st atute. The plaintiff urges this C ourt to revisit and reverse the holding i n Davidson based on the following ass ertions: (1) that the Davidson holding was contrar y to the plain languag e of the wrongful death statute; (2) that permitting consortium damages in personal injury but not in wrongful death cases is illogical; (3) that the majority of jurisdictions now permit loss of consortium damages in w rongful death cases; and (4) that the doctrine of stare decisis should not c ommit this Court "to the sancti fication of ancient fallacy ." Upon c

areful r eview , we ag ree with the pl aintiff.10 STARE DECISIS AND STA TUTORY CONSTRUC TION
The defendant urges this Court to decline revisiting the issue of the availability of cons

ortium damages under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 on the basis of stare decisis. "Were we to r ule upon precedent alone, wer e stability the only reason for our being, we would have no trouble with this case. . . . In so doing we would hav

e vast support from the dusty books. But dust [from] the decision would remain i n our mouths through the year s ahead, a reproach to law and conscience alike. Our oath is to do justice, not to perpetuate error." Montgomery v. Stephan , 101 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Mich. 1960).
The defendant asserts that any "chang e to the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 should be left to the legislature." The issue before us, however, involves a matter of statutory interpretation and not the implemen tation of public policy.
Next, the defendant argues that the wrongful death statute i s in derogation of the common law and, therefore, shoul d be strictly constr ued. The defendant maintains that interpreting the wrongful death statute t o permit recovery of "parental consortium claims . . . would be to afford the statut e a liberal construction."
Issues of statutory constr uction are questions of law and shall be reviewed de novo without a presumption of cor rectness. Beare Co. v. Tennessee Dep't of Revenue , 858 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tenn. 1993); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddl eston , 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (T enn. 1993). Statutes in derogation of the common law ar e generally stric

tly construed. The rule requiring strict construction amounts to a recognition of a presumpti on against the legislature's intenti on to change existing law. Stem. v Na shville In terurban Ry. ,11 221 S.W. 192, 195 (T enn. 1920). Remedial statutes, however, generally reflect a legislative inte nt to amend an area of the common law and shall be construed liberally. Id.

This Court's role in st

atutory interpretation is to ascertain and to effectuate the legislature's int

ent. State v. Sliger , 846 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn. 1993). Generally, legisl ative intent shall be der ived from the plain and ordinar y meaning of the statutory language when a statute's languag e is unambiguous. Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. Department of Reve nue , 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993). When a statute's lan guage is ambiguous and the parties legitimately derive different interpretations, we must look to the e ntire statutory scheme to ascertain the legislative intent. Owens v. State , 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995).
The defendant argues that this Cour t has previously hel d that Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 is a surv ival statute and that sur vival statutes g enerally do not permit recovery under

consortium theories. While this Cour t in Jones v. Black , 539 S.W.2d 123 (Tenn. 1976), previously classified Tennessee's wrong ful death statute as a surviv

al statute for purposes of limitations of action, we are not confined to interpret the statute according to the stric tures of a judicially i mposed classification when such an interpretation would ignore unambiguous statutory language. According ly, our analysis of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 shall focus on the statute's language and not on what damages "surv ival" statutes in other states generally per

mit. It must be remembered that, notw ithstanding the accurate, technical charac terization of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20- 5-113 as survival legislation, the statute also provides for a cause of action that compensates survivors for their

losses.8 "It i s thus apparent from the authori

ties t hat there ar

e ... t wo classes of damages recoverable in the same a ction. First, damages purely for the injury to the deceased himself; sec ond , the in cide ntal d am age s su ffere d by th e wid ow a nd ch ildren , or ne xt of k in, fro m h is death." Davidson Benedict Co. , 72 S.W. at 977.

12 Damages u nder our wro ngful de ath stat ute can b e delinea ted into two distinct classifications

. Thrailkill v. Patter son , 879 S.W.2d 836 (Te nn. 1994); Davidson Benedict Co. v. Severson , 72 S.W.2d 967 (Ten n. 1903). The first classification permits r

ecovery for injuri es sustained by the deceased fr om the time of injury to the time of death.Damages under the first cl assification include medical expenses, physical and mental pain and suff ering, funeral expenses, lost wages, and loss

of earning capacity. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 ("right to recover the mental and physical suffering, loss of time, and nece ssary expenses resulting to the deceased from the personal injuries").
The second classification of damages permits recovery of incidental damages suffered by the decedent's ne xt of kin. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 (" and

also the damages resulting to the parties for whose us e and benefit the right of action surv ives from the death consequent upon the injuries received.") (emphasis a dded); see also Thrailkill , 879 S.W.2d at 841; Davidson Benedict Co. , 72 S.W. at 977. 8 Incidental damages have bee n judicially defined to include

the pecuniary value of the decedent's life. Spencer v. A-1 Crane Serv., Inc. , 880 S.W.2d 938, 943 (Tenn. 1994). Pecuniary v alue has been judicially defined to in clude "the expectancy of li fe, the age, condition of health and strength, capacity for labor and earning money through skill, any art, trade, profession and occupation or busi ness, and personal habits as t o sobriety and industry." Id. Pecuniary value also takes into account the decedent's probable living expenses had the decedent lived. Wallace v. Couch , 642 S.W.2d 141 (Tenn. 1982); Hutton v. City of Sav annah , 968 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).13 The wrongful death statute neither explicitly precludes consortium damages nor reflects an intenti on to preclude consortium damag es. The statute's language does not limit recovery to purely economic losse s. To the contrary, the statute's

plain language appears t o encompass consortium damages.
Indeed, this Court has recog nized that pecuniary v alue cannot be defined to a mathematical certainty as such a definition "would overlook the value of the [spouse's] personal interes t in the affairs of the home and the economy incident to [the spouse's] servi ces." Thrailkill , 879 S.W .2d at 84 1. We further believe that the pecuniary val ue of a human life is a compound of many elements . An individual family member has value to others as par t of a functioning social and economic unit. This value n ecessarily includes the value of mutual society and protection, i.e, human companionshi p. Human companionship has a definite, substantial and ascertainabl e pecuniary value, and its loss forms a part of the value of the life we seek to ascertain. While uncertainties may arise in proof when defining the value of human companionship, the one committing the wrongful act causing

the death of a human being should not be permitted to seek protection behind the uncertainties inherent in the very situation his wrongful act has created. Moreover,it seems illogical and absurd to believe that th e legislature would intend the anomaly of permitting recovery of consorti um losses when a spouse is injured and survives but not when the very same act causes a spouse's death.

We are const rained t

o inter pret st atutes s o that no part or phrase o

f a statute will be render

ed inoperative, superfluous,void, or insignificant. Tidwell v. Collins , 522 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tenn. 1975). Accordingly, we reverse Davidson Benedict v. Severson , 72 S.W.2d 967 (Tenn. 1902), to the extent that Davidson9 All cases precluding recovery of spousal conso rtium losses in wrongful death cases are overruled to the extent they are inconsi stent with this opi nion.

14 Benedict prohibits consideration of spousal consortium losses w hen calculating the pecuniary value of a dec eased's life under the wron gful death statute. 9

LOSS OF PARENTAL CONSORTIUM
The wrongful death statute precludes neither a minor child nor an a dult child from seeking compensation for the child’s consortium losses. Moreover, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-110 provi des that "a suit for the wron gful killing of the spouse may be brought in the name of the surviving spouse for the benefit of the surviving spouse and the children of the deceased." This provision when read in pari materia with Tenn. C ode Ann. § 20-5-113 seemingly permits consideration of parental consortium damages. See Foster v. Jeffers , 813 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding all wrongful death statutes must be construed with reference to one another).

A review of case law

in other jurisdiction s indicates a trend to ex pand consortium claims to incl ude the impairment of a child's r elationship with a parent. Comment, Belcher v. Goins: West Virgini a Joins the Distinct Mi nority of Jurisdiction in Recog nizing a Claim for Los s of Parental Consortium , 94 W. Va. L. Rev. 261, 262 (1991). In cases involving a parent's death, "[t]he general rule . . . followed is that a child's loss of nurture, education and moral training which it probably would have received from a parent wrongfully killed is a pecuniary loss to be considered as an element of the damages suffered by the child." Recovery for Wrongful Death at § 3:47 (listing thi rty-four jurisdictions so holding). See also 94 Va. L. Rev. at 266 ("Mos t states . . . allow a surviving . . . child . . . to recov er for loss of consortium where a parent is tortiously

killed."); Prosser , § 127, at 952 ("Even jurisdictions

that have rejected the los s of society or consorti um claim, as15 such, have permitted one form of it,namely a loss of guidance an d advice that the decedent would have provided [to the child].").
A basis for placing an economi c value on parental consor tium is that the education and

training which a ch ild may reasonably ex pect to rece ive from a parent are of actual and commercial value to the child. Accordingly, a child sustains a pecuniary i njury for the loss of parental education and training w hen a defend ant torti ously caus es the de ath of th e child's parent. Moreover, we recognize that:
"normal home life for a child consists of comp lex incidences in which the sums constitute a nurturing enviro nment. When the vitally important parent-child relationship is impaired and the child loses the love, guidanc e and close companionship of a parent,the child is deprived of somethi ng that is indeed valuabl e and precious. No one could seriously contend otherwise.
Still by Erlandson v. Baptist Hosp. , 755 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tenn. App. 1988) (quoting Hoffman v. Dautel , 368 P.2d 57, 59 (Kan. 1962)).

The additional considerations employed for spousal consorti um may be applicable to parental consor tium claims. We agree with the obser vation of one court that "companionship, comfort, s ociety, guidance, sol ace, and protection . . . go into the vase of family happiness [and] are the things for which a wrong doer must pay when he shatters the vase." Spangler v. Helm's Ne w York-Pittsburgh Motor Exp. , 153 A.2d 490 (Penn. 1959).
Adult children may be too at tenuated from their parents in some c ases to proffer sufficient evidence of con sortium losses. Similarly, if the deceased did not have a close relationship with any of the statutory beneficiaries, the statutory beneficiaries will not likely sustain compensable consortium losses or their consortium loss

es wil l be nomi nal. The age of th e child

does not , in and o

f itself,16 preclude consideration of parental consortium da mages. The adult child inquiry shall take into consideration factors such as closeness of the relationship and dependence (i.e., of a handicapped a dult child, assistance with day care, etc.).

CONCLUSION
We hold that consortium-type damages may be considered when calculating the pecuniar y value of a deceased's l ife. This holding does not create a new cause of action but merely refines the term "pecuniary value." Consortium losses are not to limited to spousal claims but also necessarily encompass a child's loss, whether minor or adult. Loss of consortium consists o f several elements, encompassing not only tangible services provided by a family member, but also intangible ben efits each family member receiv es from the continued existence of other famil y members. Such benefits incl ude attention, guidance, care, protecti on, training, companionship,cooperation, affection, love, and in the case of a spouse, sexua l relations. Our holding conforms with the plain language of the wr ongful death statutes, the trend of moder n authority, and the socia l and econ omic real ity of mod ern socie ty.

The decision of the of the trial cour t granting the defendants' moti on to strike is revers

ed. Costs of this appeal shall be taxed to the defendants for which execu tion may is sue if ne cessary.

JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE Concurring: Anderson, C.J. Drowota, and Birch, J.J. Russell, Sp.J.