IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-12-00153-CV

ROBERT WALTER BONNER,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 413th District Court

Johnson County, Texas

Trial Court No. C200700320

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In his docketing statement, appellant, Robert Bonner, indicated that he wishes to 

appeal from an “Agreed Final Judgment of Forfeiture” signed by the trial court on June 

5, 2009. On June 19, 2012, this Court sent appellant a letter notifying him that his notice 

of appeal appeared to be untimely. Accordingly, we requested a response from 

appellant showing grounds for continuing the appeal. In his response, appellant stated 

that he intends to appeal from a motion he filed on February 1, 2012 instead. According 

to appellant, the February 1, 2012 motion, entitled “Motion to Reconsider ‘Respondent’s 
Bonner v. State Page 2

Motion to Return Property Seized by Unauthorized Search and Seizure’ and Written 

Objection” was overruled by operation of law on April 1, 2012.1 In his response, 

appellant does not provide any legal authority to support his contention that this Court 

has jurisdiction over this appeal.

On June 5, 2009, the trial court signed an “Agreed Final Judgment of Forfeiture,” 

which authorized the forfeiture of a number of appellant’s belongings. This judgment 

was also signed and agreed to by Sharon Bonner, as appellant’s designated 

representative. Approximately two-and-a-half years later, on January 17, 2012, 

appellant filed “Respondent’s Motion to Return Property Seized by Unauthorized 

Search and Seizure.” The trial court denied this motion, referring to the June 5, 2009 

agreed judgment of forfeiture and stating that the court is without jurisdiction to 

entertain appellant’s motion. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d) (stating that the trial court has 

plenary power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment 

within thirty days after the judgment is signed). In response to this ruling, appellant 

filed his February 1, 2012 motion to reconsider, which was not ruled upon by the trial 

court.

It is clear to us that the substance of appellant’s January 17, 2012 and February 1, 

2012 motions challenges the validity of the trial court’s June 5, 2009 agreed judgment of 

forfeiture. Specifically, appellant contends that the forfeiture was premised on an 

 

1 Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(c), appellant’s February 1, 2012 motion, if 

timely, would have been overruled by operation of law on April 16, 2012, not April 1, 2012. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 329b (providing that if a motion for new trial or a motion to modify, correct, or reform is not 

determined by written order within seventy-five days after the judgment was signed, it is deemed 

overruled by operation of law).
Bonner v. State Page 3

invalid seizure. Because the substance of appellant’s January 17, 2012 and February 1, 

2012 motions addresses the validity of the June 5, 2009 agreed judgment of forfeiture, it 

was incumbent upon appellant to file his motions challenging the judgment within 

thirty days of June 5, 2009, unless a timely motion for new trial, among other things, 

was filed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1 (providing that the notice of appeal must be filed 

within thirty days after the judgment is signed); TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a) (stating that a 

motion for new trial must be filed within ninety days after the judgment is signed); see 

also Surgitek v. Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. 1999) (stating the 

general proposition that the substance, not the title, of the motion will determine the 

relief granted); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) (explaining that 

“[w]e look to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, 

not merely at the form of title given to it”).2 If a timely motion for new trial had been 

filed, the filing deadline for appellant’s notice of appeal would have been extended to 

ninety days from June 5, 2009. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a). However, appellant chose to 

wait until April 24, 2012 to file his notice of appeal in this matter—more than two-anda-half years after the trial court ordered that some of appellant’s belongings be forfeited. 

See Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Tex. 2005) (holding that, 

absent a timely notice of appeal, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider an 

appeal); Garza v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 227 S.W.3d 233, 233-34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see also Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). Thus, 

 

2 Because we must look to the substance of appellant’s motions, appellant cannot save this 

untimely appeal by relying on different titles affixed to his January 17 and February 1, 2012 motions. See 

Surgitek v. Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. 1999); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 

829, 833 (Tex. 1980).
Bonner v. State Page 4

appellant’s notice of appeal in this matter is untimely. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. And 

because appellant did not timely file his notice of appeal, we dismiss his appeal in this 

matter. See id. at R. 42.3, 44.3.

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed July 26, 2012

[CV06]