Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 491

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION III 

No. CV-17-352

MACEO ABRAHAM, SR., AND KARRI 

SMITH 

APPELLANTS 

V.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 

SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD

APPELLEES 

Opinion Delivered: September 27, 2017

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, 

EIGHTH DIVISION 

[NO. 60JV-15-1692] 

HONORABLE WILEY A. BRANTON, 

JR., JUDGE

AFFIRMED; MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW 

GRANTED

WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

Appellants Maceo Abraham and Karri Smith appeal separately from the termination 

of their parental rights to their son, M.A., born 12/03/15. Appellants’ respective attorneys 

have each filed a no-merit brief and motion to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Linker-Flores 

v. Arkansas Department of Human Services,

1 and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i), 

asserting that there are no issues of arguable merit to support the appeal. Counsel’s briefs 

contain an abstract and addendum of the proceedings below, detail all adverse rulings made 

at the termination hearing, and explain why there is no meritorious ground for reversal. 

The clerk of this court sent copies of the briefs and motions to withdraw to appellants, 

 1

359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004).
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 491

2 

informing them of their right to file pro se points for reversal. Smith has filed a statement 

of points. We affirm the termination and grant counsels’ motions to withdraw.

The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) took a seventy-two-hour hold 

on M.A. on December 8, 2015, due to the threat of immediate danger to the health or 

physical well-being of the child. The court issued an ex parte order for emergency custody 

on December 11, 2015. In that order, the court noted that DHS had an active foster-care 

case involving appellants and their daughter in which it was found that appellants had 

subjected the child to “extreme and repeated cruelty that could endanger the life of the 

[child].” In the probable-cause order filed on January 4, 2016, the court found the existence 

of probable cause for M.A. to remain in DHS’s custody, but granted Smith supervised 

visitation. M.A. was adjudicated dependent-neglected due to parental unfitness in an order 

filed on March 18, 2016. In that same order, the court noted that appellants’ parental rights 

to their daughter had been involuntarily terminated. The court filed a permanencyplanning order on July 5, 2016, setting the goal as reunification with Smith. However, in 

the permanency-planning order of October 27, 2016, the court changed the goal to 

adoption. 

DHS filed a petition to terminate appellants’ parental rights on November 23, 2016, 

alleging several grounds for termination.2

 The termination hearing took place on January 

 2

(1) Failure to remedy; (2) failure to provide significant material support or to 

maintain meaningful contact; (3) abandonment; (4) a sibling of the child has been found to 

be dependent-neglected as a result of abuse that could endanger the life of the child; (5) 

subsequent factors or issues arose demonstrating that a return to the parents is contrary to 

the child’s health, safety, or welfare; (6) a party was found to have committed a felony 

battery or assault that resulted in serious bodily injury to any juvenile or to have aided, 

abetted, or attempted to do so; (7) and the child has been subjected to aggravated 
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 491

3 

3, 2017. The court filed an order terminating appellants’ parental rights on February 6, 

2017. The court found that the termination of appellants’ parental rights was in M.A.’s best 

interest. It specifically found that M.A. was adoptable and that potential harm would result 

if he were returned to appellants. The court terminated appellants’ parental rights on all 

grounds pled by DHS except for failure to provide significant material support or to maintain 

meaningful contact and abandonment. Both parties timely filed notices of appeal. 

We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo.3

 At least one statutory 

ground must exist, in addition to a finding that it is in the child’s best interest to terminate 

parental rights; these must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.4

 Clear and 

convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm 

conviction as to the allegation sought to be established.5

 The appellate inquiry is whether 

the trial court’s finding that the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence 

is clearly erroneous.

6

 

 

circumstances in that (a) a determination has been made that there is little likelihood that 

services to the family will result in successful reunification, (b) a child or sibling has been 

neglected or abused to the extent that the abuse or neglect could endanger the life of the 

child, and (c) the parents have had their parental rights involuntarily terminated as to a 

sibling of the child.

3

Carroll v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 199. 

4

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341 (Repl. 2015); Thompkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 

2014 Ark. App. 413, 439 S.W.3d 81. 

5

Thompkins, supra. 

6

Id. 
Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 491

4 

In the no-merit briefs submitted to this court, appellants’ attorneys correctly assert 

that there can be no meritorious challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

terminations. The court took judicial notice of the previous involuntary termination of 

appellants’ parental rights to their daughter, without objection. Although the court found 

multiple statutory grounds supporting termination, only one ground is necessary. The trial 

court found by clear and convincing evidence that DHS proved that appellants had their 

parental rights to another child involuntarily terminated. Thus, the trial court’s decision to 

terminate appellants’ parental rights on this ground was not clearly erroneous.

Smith’s pro se points raise no issues of arguable merit; they involve sufficiency issues 

that are adequately covered in her attorney’s brief or issues that are not preserved for appeal. 

From our review of the record and briefs presented to us, we conclude that appellants’ 

counsel have complied with the requirements set by the Arkansas Supreme Court, and we 

hold that the appeal is wholly without merit. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motions to 

withdraw and affirm the order terminating appellants’ parental rights. 

Affirmed; motions to withdraw granted. 

GRUBER, C.J., and WHITEAKER, J., agree. 

Leah Lanford, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant Maceo Abraham. 

Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson, for appellant Karri 

Smith.

No response.