NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 12a0972n.06
No. 11-3191
UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

MI CHAEL

A. HORTON, Petitioner-Appellee ,

v. WARDEN, TRUMBUL L COR RECTI ONAL I NSTI TUTI ON, Respondent-Appe llant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DI STRI CT OF OH I O

BEFORE: COLE, GILMAN, and WHITE , Circuit Judges.
HELE NE N. WHITE , Circuit Ju d g e. Respondent-Appe llant Warden of the Trumbull
Correc tional I nstitut ion appea ls the district court’s order conditionally g ranting Petitioner-Appellee
Michae l Horton’s petition for a writ of habea s corpus based on the Ohio state trial court’s ref usal to issue a self-de fense instruction in Horton’s 2007 trial for murder, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.02(A), and for discharg ing a firea rm while in a motor vehicle, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.16(A). Be cause we conclude that the state court adjudication of Horton’s due proce ss claim
did not involve an unrea sonable a pplication of cle arly

established fe dera l law, we REVERSE

. I. The Ohio Court of Appe als summarized the fac ts of the ca se as f ollows: ¶2 On Aug ust 11, 2006, 18-y ear -old April Kienzle was cele brating her birthday

. A party for Kie nzle and her friend, Amanda, was planned at a house on 15th Street in the City of Canton occupie d by Amanda’ s brother. Kienzle arr ived at the party aboutNo. 11-3191

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arden, Trumbull Corr . Inst. 2:30 p.m. t o h el p s et up. There was a mix of people at the party - “older folk, y oung er folks, middle-ag e folks.” Among the party g oers wer e the Delg ado brothers, J ames a nd J esse, Per

ry Carlisle, Coty

Cricks and Ricky

J oiner. ¶3 L ater that day , [Horton] called K ienzle on her c ell phone and a sked her to come meet him. Ki en z le dated [Horton] for about a y ear befor e the party

. Kienzle told [Horton] she could not meet him beca use she was at the party drin k ing beer and doing shots. [Horton] then told Kienzle he wanted to see her. Kienzle chec ked with Amanda, J oiner, the Delg ado Br others and others, asking them if they had a “proble m if Mike came over? ” Kienzle then told [Horton] he could come over, that “nothing was g oing to ha

ppen” a nd g ave him dire ctions to the party

. ¶4 [Hor t on] asked his friend, Mario Carbenia , if he would drive him to the party offe ring him $ 10.00 for g as. Carbenia had use of his c ousin’s g ree n For d Ex plorer that day and ag ree d to take [Horton] to the party

. [Horton] took a .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun with him to the party , tucked in his pants at the belt line. On the way over to the party , Carbenia and [Horton] we re l o s t and called Kienzle for additional direc tions. By the time the pair arr ived at the party it was dark. Carbenia pulled the Ex plorer over to the south side of the road acr oss from the p ar t y h o u s e. Carbenia left the Ex plorer’ s motor runni n g. T here wer e 10 to 14 people on the p o rc h

. [Horton] called Kienzle on his cell phone and told her he was outside. Kienzle came out of the house with two other g irls and went to the passeng er side of the Ex plorer next to the curb to talk to [ Horton]. [ Horton] remained in the car and the couple exchang ed g ree tings. Kienzle saw the handg un tucked in [Horton’s] pants and told him “if he was g oing to start any thing, he could g o ahea d and leave beca use we wer en’t having that.” One of the g irls standing by the Ex plorer with Kienzle left and we nt back into the home. ¶5 Whil e Kienzle and [Horton] wer e talking, Coty Cricks came up to the driver’ s side window, looked in a

nd walked over to K ienzle, sa y ing “[I ]s this who I ’m supposed to be holdi n g R i ck y back from? ” Hea ring this, Carbenia tapped [Horton] on the chest say ing, “something ’s wrong , let’s g o.” [Horton] and Carbe nia did not le ave. ¶6 J oiner, J esse Delg ado and Perry Carlisle went out to the Ex plorer. J oiner ran up to the passeng er side wi n d ow and rea ched inside the vehicle. Kienzle hear d some y elling a nd then a g unshot. J oiner fe ll to the gr ound and the Explorer pulled off

. ¶7 After t he shoot ing, there was a lot of screaming and panic - “mil lions of people running around and scre aming

. Kienzle and her g irlfriend le ft in a car and went to the home of Carol Kemp. They wer e hy sterica l, scre aming and say ing, “we just saw somebody g et shot in the head.” Kemp called 911. A detec tive called her back and
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arden, Trumbull Corr . Inst.

as ked her to send the g irls down to the police station to make a sta t em en t

. Ke m p overhe ard Kienzle talking on her cell phone say ing, “I t was my fault beca use I g ot him there.” ¶8 The D elg ado brothers, Cricks and C arlisle went to the aid of Joiner. They wer e holding J o i n er who had been shot in the left chee k. Cody Cricks put a shirt over J oiner’s face and put pressure on the g unshot wound. The para medics wer e dispatched at 11:32 pm. They found J oiner ly ing on the g round wi t h a g unshot would [si c] to his h ea d u n d er his left ey e. About 15 minutes later, they arr ived at Aultman Hospital. J oiner was pronounce d dead of a g unshot wound in the emer g ency

room of the hospital. ¶9 Afte r [Horton] s hot J oiner, Car benia “ took off” in the Ex plorer. When they g ot down the street, Carbenia testified that there was a clea r beer bottle on [Horton’s] lap. [Horton] threw the bottle out the window. Carbenia asked [Horton] what happene d to the expelled bullet jacket and [ Horton] told hi m it was still in the g un. [Horton] took off his shirt and direc ted Carbenia to the home of his g irlfriend in East Canton, Anna Rukav i n a. [Horton] and Carbenia arr ived around midnight. [Horton] took Rukavina in the bedroom and told he r that he thought he killed some one. [Horton] told her that the truck he was riding in was surrounde d by fiftee n people and that he shot out the window to back ever y one awa y from the truck. He was wea ring a g rill on his f ront teeth and complained that it f elt differ ent. [Horton] told Rukavina that he had be en hit in the mouth with a beer bottle. ¶10 [Horton] stay ed the night with Ruka v i n a. T h e next morning about 5:30 a.m., Rukavina rec eived a call from J oiner’s cousin who told her that [Horton] had killed J oiner. Rukavina later rec eived calls that there wer e people out looking for [Horton]

. Rukavina told [Horton] about the telephone calls. ¶11 A day afte r the shooting, [Horton] , acc ompanied by his mother , turned himself in to authorities at the Stark County Sheriffs De partment. ¶12 Dete ct i v e Vic Geor g e of the Canton Police Depa rtment was assig ned to investiga te the shooting of J oiner. Geor g e interviewe d witnesses and learn ed the name of a suspect, Michae l Horton, J r. Detec tive Geor g e lear ned that [Horton] had turned himself in and went out to the Stark County J ail to interview him. Detec tive Geor g e observe d no injuries on [Horton] and [Horton] complained of none. [Horton] t o l d De t ective Geor g e it [t he shoot ing] wasn’t his fault — that it was an acc ident

. [Horton] further told Detec tive Geor g e that J oiner struck him in the fac e with a clea r colore d beer bottle. When that happene d, he pulled a g un out of the waistband of his pants with his left hand and drew his arms acr oss his chest to fire it out the window
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arden, Trumbull Corr . Inst.
to scar e off the person. Detec tive Geor g e asked [Horton] about the gu n
. [Horton] responde d that it was in a saf e plac e. ¶13 Detec tive Geor g e was unable to locate the beer bottle wher e [ Ho rt o n ] s aid he threw it. The g un was not found. ¶14 The Chief Deputy Coroner, P. S. Murthy , perf ormed an aut o p s y o n J oiner’s body

. Doctor Murthy noted that J oiner was an 18-y ear -old “very healthy y oung man.” Doctor Murthy first observe d a lot of blood and a g unshot wound in the reg ion of the left fac e. He saw a g razing wound o n t h e l ef t side of the nostril. Doctor Murthy also observe d a prominent are a of stippli ng on the fac e. Doctor Murthy descr ibed stippli ng as “whe n a firea rm is discharg ed, burnt powder and then unburnt power is discharg ed from the fi re arm; and this unburnt g unpowder particle s make small punctate reddish brown marks on the body and the skin surfa ce.” There wer e also are as of stipp l ing on J oiner’s rig ht fore arm. The prese nce of stippli ng can indicate how far the muzz le of the g un was from the skin surfa ce. Fr om the prese nce o f t h e stippli ng , Doctor Murthy was able to opine t hat t he gun was fired 1-1/2 to 3 fee t from J oiner’s fac e and chee k. Doctor Mur thy also opined that the stippling on J oiner’s r ight f

orea rm was c aused w hen Joi ner a ttempted to deflec t the g un. ¶15 Ba sed on his examination of the brain, Doctor Murthy was able to deter mine that the bullet trave led throug h J oiner’s skull essentially pulverizing it — pulpefa ction. The brain was torn into small piece s and beca me a soupy ty

pe of materia l

. J oiner died from he morrhag ing of the bra in cause d by

a gunshot wound to the fac e. ¶16 Doctor Murthy was able to collect some bullet fra g ments from the brain; the lead core of the bullet, two larg e fra g ments and the copper jacke t. Those fra g ments wer e turned ove r to the Stark County Crime L abora tory

for a naly sis. ¶17 Dennis Flore a, firea

rms expert, examined the bullet fra g ments and copper jacke t. Fr om that examination, Florea w as able to determine tha t the bullet was fire d from a firea rm having six lands and g rooves with a rig ht twist. Glock Fire arms, Hec kler & Koch Fire arms, I srae li Milit ary I ndustries or I MI , and Kahr Fire arms produce such a firea rm. Flore a examined the corone r’s pictures of J oiner’s body and no t ed t he stippli ng on his fac e. Flore a opined that the muzz le of the firea rm was held 12 to 18 inches fr om J oiner' s chee k when it was f ired.
State v. Horton , No. 2007-CA-00085, 2007 WL 4237098, at *1–3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec

. 3, 2007) (unpublished opinion).

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arden, Trumbull Corr . Inst.
I n October 2006, t h e p rosecuting attorney for Stark County , Ohio, char g ed Horton with murder, Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.02(A), discharg ing a firea rm while in a m o t o r vehicle, id

. § 2923.16(A), and having a wea pon while under a disability , id

. § 2923.13(A)( 3). Be fore trial,
Horton pleade d g uilty to having a wea pon while under a disability

. I n Fe bruar y 2007, the two

rema ining char g es proce eded to a jury trial. Following the pres en t at i o n of evidenc e, Horton
reque sted a jury instruction on self-de fense , but the court found that there was insufficient evidenc e
to support a self-de fense instruction. Ho rt o n al so reque sted instructions on neg lige nt homicide,

rec kless homicide, voluntary manslaug hter, involuntary manslaug hter, and ag g rava ted assault, all
of which the court de nied. The tria l court instructed the jury , in releva nt part:
Be fore y ou can find the Defenda nt g uilty , y ou must find that bey ond a reason able doubt that on or about the eleve nth day of Aug ust, 2006, in Stark C o u n ty , Ohio, Michae l Anthony

Horton, Jr., purposefully cause d the dea th of [J oiner].

. . . . Purposely

. Purpose to c ause death is a n essential element of the crime of murder. A per son acts purpose ly

when it is his spe cific intention to cause a cer tain result.
I t must be established in this case that at t he ti me i n question there was p rese nt in the mind of the De fenda

nt a spec ific intention to cause the death of [J oiner]. Purpose is a decision of the mind to do an act with a conscious objectiv e of producing a specific result or eng ag ing in a specific conduct. To do an act purposely is it [si c] do it intentionally and not acc identally

. Purpose and intent mean the same thing.
The purpose with which a person does an act is known only to hims el f u n l es s he expresses it to others or indicate s it by his conduct.
The purpose with which a person does an act or bring s about a result is deter mined from the manne r in which it is done, the means or wea pons used, and all the other fac tors and cir cumstance s in evidence

.

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arden, Trumbull Corr . Inst.
I f a wound is inflicte d upon a person with a deadly wea pon in a manner calc ulated to destroy life, t he purpose to cause the death may be in fe rr ed fr o m the us e of the wea pon. Proof of motive is not require d. The prese nce or absenc e of motive is one of the circ umstances be aring upon purpose. (Tr., R. 11-3, a t 880–83.) The jury convicted H orton of both counts, and on Fe bruar y 26, 2007, the court sentenc ed
Horton to an a g g reg ate ter m of 25 y ear s to life in prison.
On direc t appea l, Horton claimed, inter alia , that the trial court err ed by ref using to instruct
the jury on self-de fense

. The Ohio Court of Appea ls aff irmed Horton’s conviction and found that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ref using the inst ru ct i on. See Horton , 2007 WL 4237098, at *14–15. The c ourt conc luded: ¶111 I n the ca se at ba

r, [Horton] s imply

did not present suff

icient evidenc e in this case that would enable a juror to rea sonably believe that [Horton] had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent dang er of death or g rea t bodily harm from either the dece dent or any one else, or that any of the individuals at the party wer e involved in any common scheme or plan to rob and assault [Horton] , that war rante d [Horton’s] use of deadly forc e to defe nd himself ag ainst the dece dent. I n fac t, such an arg ument runs counter to [Horton’s] statement to the police that the shooting was acc idental. Finally , [Horton] was seate d inside a motor vehicle p ar k ed on the street with the motor running

. There is no evidenc e to s u ggest that [Horton] was impeded from simply driving awa

y from the pa

rty

. Id. at *15. On appe al to the S upreme Court of Ohio, Horton claimed, inter alia , that the trial cour t’s
ref usal to instruct the jury on self-de fense deprive d him of due proce ss. The Supreme Court of Ohio
dismiss ed Hor

ton’s appea l as not involving a substantial c onstitut ional issue.

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arden, Trumbull Corr . Inst. Horton then timely filed a writ of habea s corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United
States District Court for the Norther n District of Ohio. The Warden responde d that Horton’s habea s claims wer e all proce durally barr ed except for the claims t h at h e was deprive d of due proce ss beca use the trial court ref

used to gi v e i n s t ructions on self-de fense and on neg lige nt homicide.
Horton filed a trave rse in which he abandone d all but one g round for relief —namely , that “the state
appea ls court unre asonably applied Calif

ornia v

. Trombetta , 467 U.S. 479 (1984)[,] when it held
that Mr. Horton failed to prese nt sufficie nt evidenc e to support a self- d ef ense instruction.” (Tra verse , R. 9, at 5.)
A ma g is tr a

te ju d g e is s u e d a Re p o r

t a n d Recommenda tion (“R& R”) concluding that H o r to n ’ s petition should be g rante d unless the state of Ohio aff orded him a new t ri al. The district court incorpora ted in full the mag istrate’s R&R and conditionally g rante d Horton’s petition for a writ of
habea s corpus. (O p. & O rder , R. 13, at 10.) The Warde n timely appea led.
II.
T h e W ar d en first contends that in g ranting Horton’s habea s petition, the district court
“er roneously transfor med what should ha

ve bee n a non-c og nizable State law cha lleng e in habe as
to a revie wable question of the denial of t h e fe dera l due proce ss rig ht to prese nt a defe nse.” (Warden B r. at 18.) We disag ree
. “I n conducting habea s revie w, a federa l court is limit ed to deciding whether a conviction
violated the Constit ution, laws, or trea ties of the United States.” Estelle v . McG uire , 502 U.S. 62,
68 (1991) (citations omitted). “[I ]t is not the province of a fede ral habea s court to ree x amine statecourt deter

minations on state-law questions.” Id

. at 67–68. Her e, Horton’s habea s petition raises
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a fede ral constitutional question arising from a state-c ourt deter mination. Th e m agi s t rate judge

corr ectly stated that Horton’s habea s issue is whether “an err or of state law has resulted in a denial
of a fede ral constitutional rig ht”—spec ifically , the due proce ss rig ht to prese nt a complete defe nse. (R&R, R. 10, at 11.) Horton t hus ra i s ed a cog nizable habea s issue. See Bey v

. Bagley , 500 F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding cog nizable on habea s revie w a claim that the admission of “other
acts” evidenc e as a matter of state evidentiar y law was so prejudicia l that it violated due proce ss); Taylor v. W

ithrow , 288 F.3d 846, 851 (6t h C i r. 2002) (holding that “fa ilure to instruct a jury on self-de fense when the instruction has been reque sted and there is sufficie nt evidenc e to support such
a cha rg e violates a

criminal def

endant’ s rig hts under the due proce ss clause” ).

III.
The second question befor e this Court is whe t h er t he Ohio Court of Appea ls’ decision
involved an unrea sonable application of clea rly established fede ral law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)( 1). 1
The Warden argu es that Horton cannot succe ed on his habea s claim beca use he has failed to d emons trate either that a criminal defe ndant has a clea rly established due proce ss rig ht to a j u ry

Horton first alleg ed a violation of due proce ss a nd Trombetta on direc t a

ppeal to the Ohio 1 Supreme Court, and not to the Ohio Court of Appea ls, wher e he mere ly claimed p l ain err or. Howeve r, the Ohio Supreme Court dismiss ed Horton’s appea l as “not involving a s ubstantial constitutional question” in a one-se ntence order

. Acc ording ly , althoug h for § 2254(d) purposes the rele vant state-c ourt adjudication on the merits of the claim is the Ohio Supreme Court order , we will trea t that order as incorpora ting the rea soning used by the Ohio Court of Appea ls in finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court, and deter mine whether that rea son i n g, o r any other arg uments or theories, could have supported the Supreme Court’s dismiss al of his constitutional cl ai m
. See Harrington v. Richter , --- U.S.---, 131 S.Ct

. 770, 784, 786 (2011) (holding that wher e a state court decision i s unacc ompanied by an ex planation, t he habeas petiti oner m u s t never theless s how t here was no re asonable basis on which the state court c ould have de nied re lief). -8-No. 11-3191

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arden, Trumbull Corr . Inst. instruction on self-de fense , or that, even assuming such a rig ht exis ts under clea rly established law,
the Ohio Court of Appea ls’ adjudication of that claim involved an unrea sonable application of such
law.
This Court revie ws de novo t h e district court’s decision to g rant or deny a habea s corpus
p eti tion. Mitzel v . Tate , 267 F.3d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 2001). “When the district court relies on a
transcr ipt from the petitioner’s state trial and makes no independe nt deter minations of fac t, we revie w the district court’s fac tual finding s de novo , as well.” Bugh v. Mitchell , 329 F.3d 496, 500 (6th Cir. 2003) (c itation omit ted).
Pursuant to the Antiterror ism a nd Effe ctive Dea th Penalty Act of 1996 ( “AED PA”), “ this
Court revie ws defe rentially state court decisions aff irming the conviction of a habea s petitioner.”
Maldonado v . W

ilson , 416 F.3d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 2005). We presume state-c ourt fac tual finding s, including tho s e “made by a state court of appea ls based on the state trial rec ord,” to be corr ect,

u n l es s t h e habea s petitioner is able to rebut that presumption by clea r and convincing evidenc e. Mitzel , 267 F.3d at 530 (citation omitted). Habe as corpus relief is unavailable with respe ct to any claim adjudica ted on the mer its in st ate c ourt unless the state- court a djudication: (1) re s u l t ed in a decision that was contra ry to, or involved an unrea sonable application of, clea

rly established Fe dera l law, as deter mined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unrea s o n ab l e d et ermination of the fac ts in li g ht of the evide nce pr esente d in the State court proc eeding

. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Clearly established fede ral law ref ers only to the decision s of the Supreme Court, not those of lower fede ral courts. W illiams v

. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Howeve r,

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arden, Trumbull Corr . Inst. AEDPA does not require the Supreme Court to have decide d the prec ise case for clea rly established
law to exis t. Taylor , 288 F.3d at 850. Clearly established fede ral law “includes leg al principles and
standards e nunciated in the [ Supreme] Court’s decisions[,] ” ra ther than just “br ight- line rules laid down by the Court.” Id

. A state-c ourt decision unrea sonably applies clea rly established fede ral law “if the state court either unrea sonably ex tends a leg al principle from [S upreme Court] prec edent to a new context wher e it should not apply or unreasonably ref uses t o extend that principle to a new context wher e it should apply .” W

illiams , 529 U.S. at 407. I n addi tion, “a state-c ourt decision involves an

unrea sonable application of [S upreme Court] prec edent if the state court identifies the corr ect
g overning leg al rule from [t he Supreme] Court’s case s but unrea sonably applies it to the fac ts of the particula r state pr isoner’s c ase.” Id

. “The unrea son able application clause require s the state court decision to be more than
incorre ct or err oneous.” Lockye r v . Andrade , 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (citatio n and internal quotations omitted). “The state court’s appli ca t i o n of clea rly established law must be objectively

unrea sonable.” Id

. (citation omitted). Althou gh AE DP A does not completely bar “fe dera l court relitig ation of claims alre ady reje cted in state proce eding s[,] ” habea s relief is only a “g uard ag ainst

extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justic e s y s t em, not a substitut e for ordinary err or

corr ection through ap p ea l .” Harrington , 131 S.Ct

. at 786 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Unde r § 2254(d), a habea s court must de termine what arg uments or theories supported

or, as here , could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disag ree that those arg uments or theories are inconsistent with the
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arden, Trumbull Corr . Inst. holding in a prior decision of th[ e Supreme] Court.” W ogenstahl v. Mitchell , 668 F.3d 307, 327 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harrington , 131 S.Ct . at 786). A. Clearly

Established Fe dera l L aw
The due proce ss clause of the Four teenth Amendment aff

ords criminal defe n d ants “a meaning ful opportunity to prese nt a complete defe nse.” Trombetta , 4 6 7 U.S. at 485. Fur ther, “a
defe ndant is entitled to a

n instruction a s to a

ny rec og nized de fense for which there exis ts evidenc e

s ufficie nt for a rea sonable jury to find in his favor .” Mathews v. United States , 485 U.S. 5 8 , 6 3 (1988) (citing Steve nson v. United States , 162 U.S. 313 (1896))

. I n Taylor v. W ithrow , 288 F.3d at 851–52, this Court rea soned t hat a “nece s s ar y corollar y ” of the principle set forth in Trombetta is
the rule tha t a criminal defe ndant has a due proce ss r ight to a jur y instruction on self-de fense

. See
id. (“We hold that

... failure to instruct a jury on self-de fense when the instruction has been reque sted
and there is sufficie nt evidenc e to support such a char g e violates a criminal defe ndant’s rig hts under the due pr ocess c lause.” ). 2

I n Taylor , we ultimately reve rsed the district court’s g rant of habea s upon finding that the 2 state-c ourt’s determination that insufficient ev i d en ce exi sted to war rant a jury instruction on selfdefe nse did not involve an unrea sonable application of clea rly established fede ral law. 288 F.3d at 854. Ba sed on that reve rsal, this Court later descr ibed as dicta the purported holding in Taylor that failure to instruct a jury on self-de fense when the instruction is reque sted and supported by sufficie nt evidenc e violates the due proce ss clause

. Newton v. Million , 349 F.3d 873, 878–79 (6th Cir. 2003). Newton ultimately distinguis h ed T a yl o r on the basis that “Ne wton’s claim does not rest on the court’s denial of a self-de fense instruction. Rather, h e ch alleng es the specific content of the instruction,” namely that the trial court did not instruct the jury conce rning multipl e ag g ressors. Id. at 879. Wit hout disturbing the holdi n g i n Taylor , we conclude d that the Supreme Court had not clea rly established a r ight to a specific jury instruction. Id.
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arden, Trumbull Corr . Inst. Although there is “no Supreme Court decision unmistakably setting down this prec ise rule,”

we noted in Taylor that “re levant [S upreme Court] prec edents include not only brig ht-line rules but
also the leg al principles and standards flowing from prec edent.” Id

. at 852 (citing W illiams , 528 U.S.

at 407). I f a trial court could ref use to instruct the jury on a criminal defe ndant’s theory of defe nse sufficie ntly

supported by

the evidenc e, the r ight to pre sent a de fense would be mea ningle ss. Id.
B. Suff iciency of Evidenc e Unde r Ohio L aw
We now turn to whether the Ohio Court of Appea ls unrea sonably applied clea rly established
fede ral law when it deter

mined that Horton’s due proce ss rig hts wer e not violated by the trial court’s
ref usal to instruct the jury on self-de fense

. “When assessing whether a state court’s application of
fede ral law is unr easona

ble, ‘the rang e of rea sonable judgme nt c an depe nd in part on the nature of

t h e re l ev an t rule’ that the state court must apply .” Renico v. Lett , 130 S.Ct

. 1855, 1864 (2010) (quoting Y

arborough v . Alvarado , 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004))

. A fede ral habea s court must consider
the specific ity of the rule that the s t at e co u rt ap p lied. Y arborough , 541 U.S. at 664. “The more
g ener al the rule, the more leewa y courts have in rea ching outcomes in case -by case deter minations.”
Id

.
Her e, the trial court’s deter mination whether Horton prese nted sufficie nt evidenc e to war rant

a jury instruction on self-de fense involved a “substantial element of judgme nt.” Id

. To proper ly
raise self-de fense under Ohio law, a defe ndant has the burden of producing sufficie nt evidenc e for
each of the following : “(1) the slay er was not at fault in cre ating the situation g iving rise to the
aff ray ; ( 2) the slay er has a bona fide belief that he was in imminent dang er of death or g rea t bodily

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Horton v. W

arden, Trumbull Corr . Inst. harm a nd that his only

means of e scape from such da ng er was in the use of such forc e; and (3) the slay er must not have violated any duty to retre at or avoid the dang er.” State v . Melc hior , 381 N.E.2d 195, 199 (Ohio 1978) (citations omi t t ed). Evidence is sufficie nt when, viewed in a light most favor able to the defe ndant, and without considering the question of cre dibilit y , it raises the question
of self-de fense in the mind of a rea sonable juror. State v . Belanger , 941 N.E.2d 1265, 1269 (Ohio Ct.App.2010). “I f the evide n ce gen erates only a mere specula tion or possible doubt [rather than

rea sonab l e d o u b t o f g uilt] , such evidenc e is insufficient to raise the aff irmative defe nse, and
submissi on of the issue to the jury will be unwar

rante d.” Melc hior , 381 N.E.2d at 199.

Her e, there is evidenc e that, just befor e the g un was fired, J oiner ran up to the passeng er side
window and rea ched inside the vehicle t o h it Horton with a beer bottle. There is no evidenc e, howeve r, that Horton knew J oiner was swing ing a beer bottle, or even holding a beer bottle, at the
moment when Hor

ton fired his g un.
Fa irminded jurists could thus disag ree as t o whether the evidenc e is sufficie nt to raise the question in the mind of a rea son ab l e juror whether Horton had a bona fide belief that he was in
imminent dang er of death or g rea t bodily injury at the time he fired the g un, and that his only means of esca pe from t h at dang er was the use of deadly forc e. Acc ording ly , the district court err ed in finding that the s t at e co urt adjudication of Horton’s due proce ss claim involved an unrea sonable application of clea

rly established federa l law. See Harrington , 131 S. Ct. at 786 (“A state court’s
deter mination that a claim lacks merit prec ludes fede ral ha beas r elief so long as fairminded jurists
could disag ree on the corr ectne ss of the state court’s decision.” (interna l quotation marks omitted)).

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Horton v. W

arden, Trumbull Corr . Inst.
IV.

For the fore g oing r easons, we REVERSE the judg ment of the district cour t.

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