J-A17030-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHRISTOPHER WILEY BROWN,

Appellant. No. 1235 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, June 29, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000542-2016.

BEFORE: OTT, J., KUNSELMAN, J. AND MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2018

Christopher Wiley Brown appeals from the judgment of sentence,

contending that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence at trial 

to establish the elements of kidnapping, kidnapping of a minor, and false 

imprisonment, the crimes for which a jury convicted him. Upon review of 

the facts and evidence as summarized from the record set forth below, we 

affirm. 

Brown is a large, middle-aged man who lived with his disabled fiancée,

Helen Barricklow, in Brownsville, Pennsylvania. In 2015, Brown befriended 

J.A. In early 2016, Brown hired J.A., who needed extra money, to help fix 

up his apartment in exchange for $500. As part of this arrangement, Brown

also hired J.A.’s fifteen year old daughter, S.A., the victim in this case, to 

spend time with Barricklow and care for her at Brown’s apartment. 
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On February 9, 2016, shortly after this arrangement was made, Brown 

asked J.A. if S.A. could stay the night and spend some time with Barricklow; 

he agreed. After S.A. arrived, around 10:00 p.m., she and Barricklow 

watched television and played games. Around 12 or 1 a.m., Barricklow went 

to bed; S.A. stayed in the living room where she was to sleep. 

Sometime thereafter, while Barricklow was asleep in the bedroom, 

Brown came out of the bedroom and into the living room. He told S.A. that 

he was going to put metal leg shackles on her. S.A. was scared. He then 

put the shackles on S.A., which really frightened her and made her cry. 

While shackled, S.A. could not walk or run; she felt trapped in the 

apartment.

Brown then went back into the bedroom and came out with a box. In 

it were handcuffs and a ball gag. Brown cuffed S.A.’s hands behind her 

back. S.A. was scared and crying. He then put the ball gag in S.A.’s mouth; 

she could not talk. S.A. shook with fear. After about five minutes, thinking 

he heard someone at the door, Brown removed the cuffs and gag. He then 

went back into the bedroom, returning fifteen minutes later in just his 

boxers. Brown then took S.A.’s bare, shackled feet and rubbed his exposed 

privates with them for about five minutes. S.A. was frightened. He then 

made her grope him for two or three minutes. Brown again went back into 

the bedroom and did not return, leaving S.A. alone. 

Eventually, S.A. managed to free herself from the shackles, called her 

father and told him what happened. S.A. began walking home, which was 
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miles from Brown’s apartment, in the early hours of the morning, with J.A.

meeting her half way, also on foot. J.A. immediately reported what 

happened to the state police.

After investigation of this incident, Brown was charged with two counts 

of kidnapping, 18 Pa.C.S.A. sections 2901(a)(3), (a.1)(3); false 

imprisonment, 18 Pa.C.S.A. section 2903(b); corruption of minors, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. section 6301(a)(1)(ii); unlawful restraint, 18 Pa.C.S.A. section 

2902 (b); and two counts of indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. sections 

3126(a)(2), (8). On March 10, 2017, following a jury trial, Brown was 

convicted of all charges except unlawful restraint. On June 29, 2017, the 

trial court sentenced Brown to three to eight years of imprisonment. 

Additionally, as a Tier III sex offender, Brown was ordered to register under 

SORNA for life.

Brown filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on 

July 25, 2017. Brown now appeals and raises the following issues,

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions for 

kidnapping, kidnapping of a minor, and false imprisonment.

1

 Brown states 

his issues as follows: 

____________________________________________

1 Brown also claimed that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence, arguing that S.A.’s “testimony was vague, inconsistent and barely 

audible”. Appellant’s Brief at 16, 18. However, Brown did not raise this 

issue in his post-sentence motion and is therefore waived. See 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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A. Whether the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the 

crime of kidnapping?

B. Whether the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged victim was 

confined?

C. Whether the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to 

inflict bodily injury on or terrorize the alleged victim?

D. Whether the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant restrained the 

alleged victim unlawfully that exposed her to the risk of 

harm?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (excess capitalization omitted).

In reviewing a sufficiency claim, we must consider “‘whether the 

evidence, admitted at trial, and all the reasonable inferences derived 

therefrom viewed in favor of the Commonwealth as verdict winner, supports 

the jury's finding of all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt.’” Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1269 (2016) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Smith, 985 A.2d 886, 894-95)). Only “where the 

evidence offered to support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical 

facts, in contravention to human experience and the laws of nature, then the 

evidence is insufficient as a matter of law.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 

744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). In his appeal, Brown argues that the 

Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607; Commonwealth v. Muniz, 5 A.3d 345 (Pa. Super. 

2010). 
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elements of kidnapping and kidnapping of a minor in support of his 

convictions.

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the offense of kidnapping as:

Offense defined.—Except as provided in subsection (a.1), a 

person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another a 

substantial distance under the circumstances from the place 

where he is found or if he unlawfully confines another for a 

substantial period in a place of isolation, with any of the 

following intentions:

(1) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage.

(2) To facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter.

(3) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or 

another.

(4) To interfere with the performance by public officials of any 

governmental or political function.

18 Pa.C.S.A. §2901(a) (emphasis added). Kidnapping of a minor is similarly 

defined except that it pertains to “a person under 18 years of age”. 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2901(a.1).

 Brown’s sufficiency challenge is based primarily on the Commonwealth’s 

failure to prove that he unlawfully confined S.A. for a substantial period in a 

place of isolation. Appellant’s Brief at 13, 19, 22-23. Examining each 

element of this requirement in the context of this case, we conclude that the 

evidence presented at trial satisfies this requirement under the statute, and 

thus supports the jury’s conviction of kidnapping and kidnapping of a minor. 

Brown first argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that S.A. 

was confined. Instead, he claims S.A.’s own testimony indicated that she 
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was free to go and no one told her to stop. Appellant’s Brief at 20, 36. 

When Brown left the room, she did nothing to remove the shackles. Id. Her 

cell phone was within reach, but S.A. did not call anyone. Id. at 18-19. 

Moreover, instead of fleeing immediately, S.A. knocked on the bedroom 

door, said nothing to Barricklow about what happened, and asked for the 

$500 Brown promised to pay her father, J.A. Id. at 19.

Contrary to Brown’s argument, the evidence unequivocally showed that 

Brown “confined” the victim. Brown shackled and handcuffed S.A., 

restricting her ability to move. He gagged her with a ball gag, preventing 

her from screaming or calling for help. Under such circumstances, it would 

be absurd to conclude otherwise. Thus, there was sufficient evidence for the 

jury to find that the Commonwealth established the element of confinement.

Brown further argues that the Commonwealth failed to show that the 

victim’s confinement was unlawful because he exerted no force over S.A. 

Appellant’s Brief at 29. That Brown was an acquaintance of J.A.’s or that 

S.A. was shy, does not show that he exerted force over S.A. as required 

under the statute. Id.

Confinement is “unlawful” if accomplished by force, threat or 

deception.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2901(b). The trial court astutely observed:

[Brown] is a larger than average middle-aged male adult. He 

was in a position of authority over her as an acquaintance of her 

father, and as her employer. This offense occurred privately in 

the early hours of the morning. Force has been interpreted to 

include ‘moral, psychological or intellectual force’ in the context 

of other sexual offenses, such as rape. This shy and painfully 
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quiet fifteen year-old girl had no reasonable basis in her makeup to resist the defendant’s orders. 

Trial Court Statement, 1/18/18 at 3. Additionally, the evidence showed that 

Brown had a proclivity for bondage and dominance.

The trial court further opined that the evidence showed that Brown 

deceptively lured S.A. to his apartment for an overnight stay under the 

pretense that she was there to entertain and take care of Barricklow. Id. 

Thus, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find

that the confinement of S.A. was unlawful.

Brown next argues that the Commonwealth did not establish that the 

confinement was for a “substantial period”, pointing to the trial court’s 

statement that “the amount of time the victim was completely restrained is 

not precisely determinable.” Appellant’s Brief at 22; Trial Court Statement, 

1/18/18 at 2. 

“‘[S]ubstantial period’ subsumes not only the exact duration of 

confinement, but also whether the restraint criminally increased the risk of 

harm to the victim.” Commonwealth v. Markman, 916 A.2d 586, 600 

(Pa. 2007). In Markman, the victim was left alone before she was killed. 

Significantly, she was also gagged with a rag, increasing the risk of harm 

from oxygen blockage. The Court there found these circumstances sufficient 

for a jury to find the victim was confined for a “substantial period”. Id. 

Similarly here, S.A. was left alone at various times and gagged. Given these 
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circumstances, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the 

circumstances of S.A.’s confinement exposed her to the risk of injury. 

Moreover, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that S.A. was 

confined long enough to constitute a “substantial period”. In 

Commonwealth v. Hughes, 399 A.2d 694 (Pa. Super. 1979), where this 

Court sustained the conviction of kidnapping, we stated that “what is a 

‘substantial period’ in time can depend on the mental state of the victim. 

The fright that can be engendered in 30 minutes can have the same 

debilitating effect on one person as 30 hours may have on another.” Id. at 

698. No specific amount of time is defined by the statute. At trial, S.A. 

testified to the various phases of this incident and the approximate amount 

of time she endured each one. In total, it was at least a half hour. Thus, 

there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the Commonwealth

established the element of “substantial period”. 

Brown next argues that there was no evidence that the confinement 

was “in a place of isolation”. Appellant’s Brief at 23. S.A. came to Brown’s 

apartment voluntarily. Id. at 29. Brown’s fiancée was there the entire time. 

Id. at 24. Further, there is no case law to support the trial court’s 

conclusion that because S.A. is shy and soft spoken, a place of isolation for 

her may be different than a place of isolation for someone who is not. Id. at 

23. 

Our Supreme Court has stated that for purposes of the Pennsylvania’s 

kidnapping statute, a “‘place of isolation’ is not geographical in nature, but 
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contemplates the confinement of the victim where he or she is separated 

from the normal protections of society in a fashion that makes discovery or 

rescue unlikely.” Commonwealth v. Rushing, 99 A.3d 416 (Pa. 2014). 

Although the events in this case took place in a location that S.A. was 

familiar with and had previously visited, one’s own home or apartment may 

be regarded as a “place of isolation.” See id. (citing Model Penal Code § 

212.1 cmt. 3 at 224). Furthermore, while the evidence showed that 

Barricklow was present the entire time, Brown himself notes in his brief that 

the fact that other people are present does not necessarily negate the 

victim’s isolation from the usual protections of society. Appellant’s Brief at 

26 (citing Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 687 A.2d 836 (Pa. Super. 1996)). 

Thus, even though Barricklow was in the next room, the jury could still find 

that S.A. was in a place of isolation. As noted by the trial court, this incident 

occurred privately at Brown’s residence in the early hours of the morning, 

while most were asleep, including Barricklow, who slept in another room. 

Additionally, S.A. had no transportation readily available to her. 

Moreover, the evidence showed that S.A. was shackled and 

handcuffed, making her ability to flee unlikely. S.A. was gagged, unable to 

speak or yell, making rescue or discovery unlikely. S.A. was separated from 

others, except Brown, her abuser, and at times, was left alone. These 

circumstances made rescue or discovery unlikely. In Commonwealth v.

Housman, 986 A.2d 822 (Pa. 2009), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

concluded that, while the victim’s confinement in the living room of her 
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trailer, situated in a busy trailer park in the early evening arguably 

preserved the usual protections of society, her binding and gagging operated 

to confine her in a place of isolation “separated from the normal protections 

of society in a manner which made discovery or rescue unlikely.” Id. at 614. 

Thus, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find 

that the confinement occurred in a “place of isolation”.

Lastly, in regards to the kidnapping convictions, Brown contends that 

the Commonwealth failed to establish that he intended to inflict bodily injury 

on or terrorize S.A. 

Appellant’s Brief at 30. 

S.A. testified that he did not terrorize her, and she did not know if he 

threatened her that night. Id. Brown argues that there was no evidence 

that he inflicted any physical injury or harm upon S.A. 

However, as the trial court observed, Brown intended to terrorize S.A. 

Trial Court Statement, 1/18/18 at 3. From S.A.’s testimony, it is evident 

that this was a very traumatic situation for S.A. and had a negative 

psychological effect on her. At trial, S.A. had difficultly retelling the events 

of that night during which she was scared and really frightened; she 

physically shook from fear and cried. The manner in which he drew his 

actions out, leaving her alone at times causing her to wait in anticipation of 

what would happen next would allow the jury to conclude that he intended 

to terrorize her. As noted by the Commonwealth, Brown ignores this 

evidence and merely focuses on a few tentative responses rather than 
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considering all the evidence. Thus, there was sufficient evidence for the jury 

to find that Brown intended to terrorize S.A.

Finally, in his appeal, Brown also argues that the Commonwealth failed 

to establish the elements of false imprisonment.2 Appellant’s Brief at 34. 

Specifically, he claims that the Commonwealth did not demonstrate that 

Brown unlawfully restrained S.A. so as to interfere with her liberty as 

required to convict Brown of false imprisonment. Id. In support of this,

Brown argues that the court agreed that he did not do anything to cause 

injury to S.A., and therefore did not expose S.A. to a risk of harm. Id.

Little analysis of this issue is needed. Simply stated, given that Brown 

handcuffed, shackled and ball gagged S.A., the Commonwealth presented 

sufficient evidence for the jury to find that S.A. was restrained in a manner 

that interfered with her liberty.

In conclusion, having reviewed the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences derived therefrom in favor of the Commonwealth as the verdict 

____________________________________________

2 Within this issue, Brown also seems to argue that the Commonwealth failed 

to prove that he exposed S.A. to a risk of harm, which is necessary to 

support a charge of unlawful restraint under 18 Pa.C.S.A. section 2902(b). 

Appellant’s Brief at 34-35. However, the Commonwealth acknowledges that 

there was insufficient evidence to establish this offense, and therefore it is 

not at issue in this appeal. Id.; Appellee’s Brief at 15. Additionally, Brown 

argues in passing that there was insufficient evidence to establish the 

offenses of indecent assault and corruption of a minor. Appellant’s Brief at 

36. However, these claims were not raised in Brown’s statement of 

questions involved, and, therefore, shall not be considered. Pa.R.A.P. 

2116(a).
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winner, we conclude that they support the jury’s finding, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, of all the elements of kidnapping, kidnapping of a minor,

and false imprisonment to support Brown’s convictions for these offenses. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/27/2018