### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE June 5, 200 8 S es sio n
DEN NIS P YLA NT v. ST ATE OF TEN NES SEE App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro m th e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Circuit Courtfor Cheatham County No. 13469 Robert

Burch, Jud ge

No. M2005- 02721-SC-R11- P C - F iled Septem ber 25, 2008

We acc epted this appe al to determine whether the post-conviction cour

t erre d in denying Petitioner Dennis Pylant’s claim of ine ffe ctive as s i s tance of counse l at trial. In 2001, a jury convicted Petitioner of the first deg ree felony murder of two-y ear -old S.J .D. i n the per petration of ag g ravated child abuse. The Court of Criminal Appe als aff irmed Petitioner’s convic tion and this Court denied Petitioner’s application for per mission t o appea l. Petiti oner filed a pe tition for post-conviction relief alleg ing ine ffe ctive assistance of counsel at trial. At the hear ing, Petitioner a dduced te stimony about self-inc riminating state ments made by the victim’s mother but which trial counsel did not pre sent to the jury at trial. The post-c onviction c ourt struck this testimony as hear say and denie d Petitioner’s claim for r elief. The C ourt of C riminal Appea ls aff irmed t he post -convic tion court. W e hold that the po st- c onvic tio n c ourt e rr e d in str iki ngthe pr of

fered tes ti mo ny

a s h e ars ay . We a lso ho ld t hat, beca us e the post-conviction cour t made no cr edibility

finding s with respec t to the proffe red witnesses, we are unable to re ach the merits of Petitioner’s cla im. Acc ording ly , we rever se t he Court
o f C ri m i n al Ap p ea l s ’ j u d gm en ti nth i s ca s e a n d re m an d fo r an ew p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nh ea ri n g. Tenn. R. App . P . 11; Judgme nt of th e Courtof Crim inal Ap peals Rever sed; Rem anded
C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., and J ANI CE M. H OL DER , G AR Y R. W ADE , and W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., J J ., joined.
Eri c S

. Car

te e and Pa ul B ru no (o ra l argume nt) Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, De nn is Pylant.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l E . M oo re , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; J. Ro ss Dy e r , Se n io r Co un s e l; D an M

. A ls o b r o o k s , D is tr ic t A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l; an d Ro b e rt S. Wilson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.T o p ro t ec t t he an o nym i t y of t he m i no r ch i l d ren , w e re f er to t he m b y t he i r i nit i als. 1

N e ithe r th e vic tim no r J .D . i s re la te d to P e tit io n e r. 2

Pet i t i on er di d n ot t es t i f y a t tr i al

. I n s t ea d, Pet i t i on er ’ s s t at eme n t s w er e as ce r t ai n ed f r om t h e t es t i mon y of 3 Ser gea nt Fl oy d D un can, Jr. , an i nv es t i gat or w i t h t he C r i mi nal I nv es t i gat i on D i vi s i on. Ser gea nt D un can i nt er vi ewed Pet i t i on er on Se pt embe r 24, 1999.
-2- OP IN ION
Pe tit ion e r c la ims tha

t he re c e ive d in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l duri ng his tr ia l f or the fi rs t deg ree felony

murder of

two-y ear -old S.J .D. (“the victim”) and that he is the ref ore entitled to a

new 1 trial. To place this matter in context, i t is necessa ry to understand the unde rlying f acts e l i ci t ed at Petitioner’s trial. Proof at Tr ial The proof ad du ce d duringthe State’s ca se-in-c hief e stablished that in September 1999, Pe tit ion e r a

nd Am and a Da vis sh are d a mobi le ho me in Che a tha m Coun ty

. Al so liv ing in the ho me wer e Petitioner’s seve n-y ear -old daug hter, R.P., a nd Ms. Davis’ two childre n, the victim and fivemonth-old J .D. Although the rec ord is unclea r, the testimony

sug g ested that Ms. D avis was a “live- 2 in” baby sitter to R.P

. R.P. t estified that she a

rrived home from school on the afte rnoon of Septembe r 23, 1999, at approximately

3:30. As she enter ed the home, she saw Ms. D avis and the victim on the c ouch. She testified to seeingMs. Davis “be ating ” the victim with a cooking spoon. She testified that she saw Ms. Davis beat the victim with the spoon four times and that Ms. Davis was strikingthe victim on his back.
Acc ordingto Petiti oner, Ms. Davis had a 4:00 appointment on that sa me afte rnoon. In order 3 for Ms. Davis to keep the a ppointment, Petit ioner lef t work ea rly to baby -sit R.P

. , J .D., and the vic tim . Pe tit ion e r a

rr ive d h ome to r e lie ve Ms. Da vis a t a pp ro ximate ly

3:3 0 p .m o r 4 :00 p. m.
R.P. te sti fi e d that sh e and Ms. Da vis we re sittin g a t the kit c he n ta ble and the vic timwa s in the liv ing ro om wh e n Pe tit ion e r c ame ho me
. Th e vic tim be g an to c ry wh e n he dis c ov e re d th a t Ms

. Davis wa s leaving . R.P. t estified that Ms. Davis be came ang ry at the victim and “snatched [ him] up by the ar ms and put him to bed.” Ms. Davis l eft at approxim ately 4:00 p.m. The victim continued to cry afte r Ms. Davis lef

t for her appointment and wa s still cry ing at approxim ately

4:30 p.m. At this ti me, Petitioner went to cha ng e his diaper . Whil e sitting in the l iving r oom, R.P . hear d noises coming from the victim’s bedr oom that sounded like Petitioner spankingthe vi ctim. After he aring two spankingnoises, R.P. went to see what the noise s were . As she looked in t o t h e victim ’s bedroom, she sa

w Petitioner spank the victim twice.Se r g ea n t D u n ca n t es t i f i ed at t r i al t h at h i s ph ot os w er e s u bs equ en t l y l os t by W al

- M ar t ’ s ph ot o pr oce s s i n g l ab. 4 T h e p h o to s w e re ne v e r re c o v e re d

.

D r. H arl an was t he C hi ef M ed i cal E xam i ner at t he t i m e o f t he t ri al i n t hi s m at t er but not at t he t i m e o f t he 5
p o st

- co nvi ct i o n heari ng.

D r
. H ar l an t es t i f

i ed t hat “ [ t ] he abdo men i s t hat po r t i on of t he t r un k whi ch ext ends f r om t he di aphr agm down 6
to w h e re the leg s a ttac h .” -3- R.P. te sti fi e d th at sh e saw Pet iti on e r hol din g the vic timup wi th o ne ha nd and sp ank inghim with the other ha

nd. She testified that Petitioner was holdingthe victim up by his arms but that the victim’s fee t were touchingthe g round. She testi fi ed that she saw Petitioner spank the victim’s buttocks and that the victim was we aringa diape r
Acc ordingto Petiti oner’ s statements, he lef t the victim in the victim’s b ed ro o m
. At
a pp ro ximate ly

5:3 0 p .m. , M s. Da

vis re tur ne d h ome fr om he r ap po intme nt. B y thi s ti me , th e vic tim ha d s top pe d c ry

ing . N e ith e r M s. Da

vi s no r P eti ti one r c he c ke d o n th e vic timthe re st o f t he night. At approximately

9:30 the next m orning , Ms. D avis, unable to w ake the victim, implored a neig hbor to call 9-1-1.
Sean Greer , an officer

with the Cheatham County Sheriff’ s Offic e, testified that he and two EMS parame dics arr ived at Petitioner’s home at approxim ately 10:00 a.m. After

t h e v i cti m was examined and pronounc ed dea d, Offic er G ree r established a crime scene . Serg eant F loy d Dunca n, J r., an inve stigator with the Criminal I nvestig ation Division, was call ed t o examine the scene

. Serg eant Dunc an testified that he observe d the victim ly ing on his left si de as if he wer e asle ep and that the victim wa s “cold a nd rig id to the touch.” He noted that there was no visible bleeding , but the victim did have “sputum or vomit” around his mouth. Serg eant Dunc an photog raphe d the sce ne 4
and the n q ue sti on e d M s. Da

vis . D ur ingthe c ours e of the ir c onve rs ation, Ms. Da

vis e xpla ine d to Se rg e ant D un c an th at th e vic timsu ff e re d f ro m lo w b loo d s ug ar a

nd so me tim e s w ou ld re fu se to e a t. Th e re fo re , Se rg e ant D un c an’ s in iti a l be lie f wa s that the vic tim ’s me dic a l c omp lic a tio ns c a us e d h is death.
Dr. Char les Har lan, the State’s Chi ef M ed i ca l Ex aminer, perf ormed a n autopsy on the 5 victim. The autopsy reve aled that the vic tim had “two lace rations of the g astric mese ntery , 100% lace ration disruption of the root of the mesente ry , s p lanchnic va soconstriction of the ileum; and hemoper itoneum of 520 cc ., which is about one a nd a third pints of blood in the abdomen.” Ba sed on these finding s, Dr. Ha rlan testified that the victim bled to death. Pursuant to his autopsy

finding s, Dr. Ha

rlan e stimated that death oc curr ed two to twelve ho ur s a ft e r i nju

ry . D r. Ha

rl an o bs e rv e d th a t th e vic timha d r e dd ish c on tus ion s o n “th e ba c k o f h is abdomen.” Dr. Ha

rlan opined that the injuries wer e ca used by one to three blows to the victim’s 6 body with a cylindrical objec t such as a pin, a rod, a

baseba ll bat, a lead pipe , the edg e of a hand, or fing ers. Dr . Har lan f

u rt her e x plained that thre e open ha nd blows to the victim’s back c ould have
c a us e d th e me se nte ry

te ar. He ackn owled g e d th a t a “ lig ht b a lsa

m w oo de n ty

pe sp oo n” c ou ldP e tit io n e r w a s re p re se n te d b y two a tto rn e ys a t t ria l. 7

T he St at e s ough t ne i t her t he deat h pen al t y nor l i f e i mp r i s onment wi t hout t he po s s i bi l i t y of par ol e. 8

P et i t i o ner i ni t i al l y al l eged other ground s i n s up p o rt o f his inef f ect i ve ass i st ance o f

co unsel cl ai m
. H o wever, 9 tho se gr o u n d s a re no t at issu e in this a p p e a l.

T wo of P et i t i o ner’ s wi t nesse s, B rent Sp url o ck and T eresa P o rt i l l o , off ered t est i m o ny i rr el evant t o t he 10
q u e stio n s ra ise d o n a p p e a l. T h e re fo re , d isc u ssio n o f t h e ir tes tim o n ie s is o m itt e d

.

D r. Levy s ucceed ed D r. H arl an as t he Stat e’ s C hi ef M ed i cal E xam i ner. 11

-4- conce ivably

have c aused the wounds if the spoon wa s applied wi t h en oug h forc e, but Dr. H arla n opined that the wounds wer e more consistent with a blow from a hand. Dr . Har lan clar ified, howeve r, that three open hand blo ws t o t h e v ictim’s buttocks would not have ca used the fatal inj ur ie s. F ina lly , D r. Ha

rl an c on c e de d th a t he w a s uns ur e of the vic tim ’s e xac t ti me of de a th; but, he e xpla ine d th at th e vic tim ’s bo dy wa s rig id upo n its disc ov e ry a t 9:30 a .m. and that r ig or mor tis sets in approxim ately

six hours af

ter de ath.
The de fense called no witnesses t o testify

. Instead, a s defe nse proof , trial counsel enter ed

7 int o e vid e nc e : ( 1) the pr e se ntm e nt c ha rg ingMs. Da

vis wi th t he fe lony mur de r o f t

he vic tim ; ( 2) Ms. Davis’ plea of nolo c ontender e to c hild ne g lect, a class D felony ; a nd (3) the judg ment of convic tion ag ainst Ms. Davis ref

lectingthat she re ceive d a four -y ear sentenc e. Dur ing closing argument, trial counsel a rgued that it was Ms. Davis, not P etitioner, who c aused the victim’s death.
After deliberating, the jur

y found Petitioner guilty of first degr ee f elony murder dur ing the perpe tration of ag g ravated child abuse . The trial c ourt subsequently sentenc ed P et i t i o n er to li fe imp ri so nme nt. 8

Post-Conviction Procee ding
Petitioner timely

filed a pr o s e post-conviction petition on Marc h 29, 2004. After counsel
was appointed, Petitioner filed an amended pe tition, allegingthat his trial counsel we re ine ffe ctive beca use they : (1) fa iled to call witnesses in support of the de fense theory that Ms. Davis, and not Petitioner, was re sponsible for the injuries that c aused the victim’s death; and ( 2) fa ile d t o hire or otherwise obta in a fore nsic expert to attack Dr. Harlan’s testim ony
. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 9 106(d) ( 2006).
At the po st- c onvic tio n h e ari ng , Pe tit ion e r p ro ff e re d th e te sti mony

of tw e lve wi tne sse s. 10 Petitioner first called D r. B ruce L evy , the State of Te nnessee ’s Chief Medic al Examiner and an 11
e xpe rt in t he are a of fo re ns ic patho logy . Pr ior to te sti fy ing , Dr . L e vy

re vie we d D r. Ha

rl an’ s a uto ps y repor t and trial testimony , as we ll as other for ensic e vidence rele vant to Petitioner’s ca se. Dr. L evy testified that he disagree d with Dr. Ha rlan’s c onclusions that the injuries to the victim we re c aused by “ a blo w o r b low s to the ba c k. ” Ins te a d, Dr . L e vy op ine d th a t whi le the a uto ps y c le arl y demonstrated injurie s to the mesenter y , a blow to the bac k could not cause such an injury . As Dr.B a se d o n the fac ts p re se n te d to the tr ia l c o u rt, if M s. D a v is a d m iniste re d th e fa ta l b lo w o r b lo w s, the vic tim 12

w o u ld ha v e go n e into sh o c k a t ap p ro x im a te ly 6 :3 0 p .m . If P e tit io n e r a d m iniste re d the fata l b lo w o r b lo w s, the vic tim
w o u ld ha v e go n e into sh o c k a p p ro x im a te ly o n e ho u r la te r a t 7 :3 0 p .m
.

T he St at e objec t ed to the testi mo ny of s eve r al of

P et i t i oner ’ s wi t nes s es , ar gu i ng t hat t hei r t es t i mo ny was 13 hearsay

. E ach o b ject i o n was overrul ed duri ng t he heari ng. -5- L evy explained, “when w e see this ty pe of injury [,] it is t y

pically cause d by

a cr ushing blow f

rom the front. A blow is struc k in the front, cr ushes the mese ntery

which is a fa irly

soft s t ru ct u re up ag ainst the front of the back bone .” Dr. L evy further explained, “[t] he bac k is a very well protec ted
are a ; and wo uld no t c a us e the inj ur

y that [Dr . H arl an] ob se rv e [d] at th e a uto ps y .” Dr . L e vy

a lso explained that if he had be en ca lled to testify at the trial, his te stimony would have been the same.

On cross-examination, Dr. L evy admitted that it is poss ible for a blow to the back to tea

r the mesenter y . Fur ther, Dr

. L evy ag ree d that the reddish marks that Dr. Harlan found on the victim’s back could have be en made by the palm of a

hand. Dr . L evy

testified that, if the victim squirmed duringthe blows, the victim could have been hit in the stomach, c ausing the mesente ry to tear. F ina lly , D r. L e vy

e xpla ine d th at he tho ug ht the vic tim wo uld have ble d out in les s than tw e lve ho ur s, the amount of time provided by Dr. Ha rlan. B ased on a

revie w of Dr . Har lan’s notes, Dr. L evy testified that he “would expect the bleedingout to occur w ithin more of a two to four hour than a

two to twelve hour pe riod.”
On re direc t, Dr. L evy

explained that f

or a back blow to crush the mese ntery , the mesente ry would have to be crushe d up ag ainst the front of the back bone. “A blow to the back could do that if the abdome n is support ed i n s o me way that pushes the abdome n in and ca uses that cr

ushing injury .” Specif

ically , when a sked whe ther the me sentery could be torn with a blow to the bac k as by Petitioner holding the vic tim up with one hand and whippinghim with the other, Dr. L evy stated, “[i] n that scene rio, I don’t see how [a ba ck blow] could cause [t he tear ].” Dr. L evy also testified that the cylindrical marks f

ound on the victim could have be en made by a woode n spoon.
On re cross-e x aminati o n, howeve r, Dr. L evy testified that a lig ht-weig ht, wooden spoon “could ne ver g ener ate e noug h forc e . . . to ca u s e t h at kind of injury .” F inally , when a sked what sy mptoms t he victim would have e x perie nced a s he wa s bleedingto death, Dr . L evy explained that as the blood collec ted in the victim’s abdomen, it would have bee n very painful. “A t a ce rtain point enoug h blood is lost that the per son is goingto go into shock, begin to lose consciousness and then afte r that the pe rson will die.” When aske d how long it would take in this i nstance from the time of the blo ws un til “ g oin g int o s ho c k, ” Dr . L e vy e sti mate d a

bo ut t hr e e ho ur s. 12

Lyla Def osio, Petit ioner’s grandmother , testified over objection. Ms. D efosio re collecte d 13 th a ta f t e r M s
. D av i s t e s t i f

i e d atth e p r e l i m i n ar

y h e ar i n g , s h e o v e r

h e ar d M s
. D av i s t e l l h e r

a t t o r n e y,

“ Ikn owIbe at hi m bu

t I did n’ t aim to kill him ; but I

kn owIdid .” Ms. De fo sio te sti fi e d th a t sh e tol d trial counsel of

this admission, and she w ould have testified to Ms. Davis’ admission had she bee n c a lle d a s a

wi tne ss a

t tr ia l. M s. De fo sio a lso te sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s p re se nt at tr ia l and wa nte d toT h is C o u rt n o te s tha t t h e trial in th is m a tter las te d thr e e d a ys. 14
-6- t e s t i f y.
On cr oss-examination, the St ate attacked Ms. De f o s io ’ s r e c o ll e c ti o n

of Ms. Davis’ a dmission by illust ratingthat Ms. Defosio could not have he ard the admission where she said she he ard it and that the admission could not have ha ppened on the d ay

Ms. Defosio re called. When f urther qu e sti on e d a

bo ut whe re sh e he ard

Ms. Da vis ’ a dmi ssi on , M s. Def os io e xpla ine d th a t sh e g e ts confuse d in new buildings and could be mistaken as to where she hea rd the a dmission. On redirec t examination, Ms. Defosio further explained that she g ets confuse d conce rningd ates, but that she
c le arl y re me mbe re d M s. Da

vis makin g the state me nt.
Th e ne xt wit

ne ss, L e ro y B ink le y , Peti tio ne r’ s nei g hb or , tes tif ie d that he obs e rv e d Ms. D avis burning“small bed shee ts” and “ kids[ ’] clothes” on the a fternoon of t he day that the victim was found dea d. He testified that he told Petiti oner’ s family , trial co u nsel, and John Holder of the Cheatham County

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment about the incide nt. Mr. Binkley tes t i fied that he was contac ted by

trial counsel a

nd the evidence showed that he was subpoenae d for tria l. Mr. Binkley also testified that he w as pre sent at trial and w as willing to testify

. Finally , he st ated that, if c alled to testify at trial, he w ould have testified to the sa me fa cts.
On cr oss-examination, the St ate attempted to attack Mr. B inkley ’s cr edibility by : (1) demonstratingthat he wa s “on jury duty on the day of this trial” and thus could not have been, a s he testified, pre sent at Petitioner’s trial; and (2) questioning him about his use of dr ug s. Mr. Binkley 14 denied be ing on jur

y duty and vig orously

denied “ smoking dope .”
Petitioner next called T rina Jackson, a co-worke r of Ms. Davis. Ms. J ackson te stified that

on on e oc c a sio n s he saw M s. Da vis “ ho ldi ng[the vic tim ] up wi th arm [sic ] an d whip pin g him wi th the other ha

nd.” She fur

ther e x plained that while the victim wa s being whipped, “his fee t were like off the ground.” Ms. Jackson also testified that she overhea rd Ms

. Davis t alking on the telephone while at wor

k afte r t he victim ’s death. Ms. J ackson te stified that Ms. Davis said “she couldn’t live with herself

knowingthat she had killed [the victim] .” Ms. J ack s o n t es t i fi ed that she w as subpoenae d for tria l but did not remember spe akingto trial counsel about the two inc idents.
On cr oss-examination, Ms. J ackson te stified that she t old Petitioner about t he whipping she ha d o bs e rv e d a

nd tha t Pe tit ion e r’ s f

amil y wa s p re se nt whe n M s. Dav is whip pe d th e vic tim . M s. J ackson a l s o testified that she told Petitioner and Petitioner’s father a bout Ms. Davis’ telephone
conver sation.
She ila Pylant Wi lso n, Pe tit ion e r’ s si ste r, te sti fi e d th a t a ft e r P e tit i o n e r w a s a r r e s t e d , M s . D avis told her that “she had made a dea l to ge t her [other] son back and she was g oing to lie a nd do whateve r it took to ge t [ J .D.] back.” Mr s. Wi lson rec alled, “She said she wa s g oing to lie a nd do and say any thing she had to, to make s u re that she g ot [ J .D.] back eve n if [P etitioner] went to jail.” Although Mr s. Wi lson could not rec all the date, she t estified that Donald P ylant, fathe r of Petit ionerT he re w ere t w o p reli m i na ry hea rings i n thi s m att er b ec au se o f a re co rd i ng syst em m alf un cti o n at t he f

i rst 15 heari ng. -7- and Mrs. Wilson, and Dorothy Mills, Donald Py lant’s ex-wife, were prese nt when Ms. Davis made the statement.

Mrs. Wil son further testified that she witnessed Ms. Da vis “punch” the victim in the back, and she ha d observe d Ms. Davis hitting the victim on more than one occa sion. Mrs. Wil son testified that sh e c on fr on te d M s. Da vis a bo ut h itt ing the vic tim , and Ms. Da vis ’ r e sp on se wa s: “ He wo n’ t qu it
c ry ing ; and he wa s ju st a

br at.” Mo re ov e r, ov e r ob je c tio n, Mr s. Wils on te sti fi e d that sh e he ard Ms. Davis say that if the victim was not ar ound, she and Petitioner would have the pe rfe ct family

. Mrs. Wil son testified that she re ceive d a subpoena to tes t i fy at trial and that she was interviewe d “somewhat” by trial co-c ounsel prior to trial. She also testified t h at trial co-c ounsel asked if she would be willing to lie. When she responde d in the neg ative, Mrs. Wilson testi fied that tr ia l c o- c ouns el “had no th in g mor e to t a lk t o [he r] a bo ut. ” F ina lly , M rs . Wil so n te sti fi e d th a t, i f
c a lle d a s a

wi tne ss at tr ia l, s he wo uld have te sti fi e d to the same fa c ts.
L loy d Har

ris, a bail bondsman, testified that, afte r Petitioner was a rre sted and ha d contac ted him a bout his bond, he interviewe d Ms. D avis. Mr. Har ris testified that “[b]efore I make a bond, I usually question them pretty

g ood; and people that knows [si c] the m [ and] that are involved in it.” Mr. Harris testified, over objection, t hat M s. Davis st ated that Petitioner “had nothing to do with [ the murder]” a

nd that “[h] e didn’t even touch that child.” Mr. Har ris stated that he w as neve r conta cted by trial counsel but tha

t he had informed Petitioner of Ms. Davis’ stateme nts. He fur ther testified th a th e d i d

n o tr e c e i v e a

s u b p o e n a t o t e s t i f y. M r
. H ar

r i s a g r e e d th a t h a d h e b e e nc a l l e d

t o t e s t i f y, he wo uld have te sti fi e d in the same wa y
. F ina lly , on re dir e c t e xami natio n, Mr

. Ha rr is state d th a t Ms

. Davis said “she was the only one involved in it[ ;] [t ]hat she done it.” Donald Pylant, Petitioner’s fathe r, t estified that, on the ni g ht of P etitioner’s a rre st, he went to P e tit ion e r’ s h ome and saw Ms. Da vis . She tol d h im, “ I ’m

the on e that di d th is; but I ’m g oin g to have to put the blame off on [Petiti oner] if Ican where Ican tr y to ke ep my

other ba by .” Mr. Pylant te sti fi e d that his e x-w if

e , Do ro thy Mil ls, and his da ug hte r, Mr s. Wils on , we re pr e sent whe n Ms. Davis made this statement. Mr. Py lant further testified that M s
. Davis made a sec ond, simil ar s t at em en t af

t er th e fi rs t p re l i m i n ary

h ea ri n g. Mr. Pylant explained that Ms. Mil ls was also pre sent

15 wh e n M s. Da

vis ma de the se c on d state me nt and that an a lte rc a tio n be tw e e n Ms. Da vis and Ms. Mil ls
e ns ue d a ft e r t

he state me nt w a s ma de . M r. Pylant t e sti fi e d th a t he to ld tr ia l c ouns e l of Ms. Da vis ’ statements prior to trial but he did not re ceive a subpoena to testify

. Mr. Pylant also testified that lea d trial counsel se nt him a letter re questi n g $ 1 0 , 0 0 0

. 0 0 “or [tr ia l c ouns e l] c ou ldn ’t pr op e rl y re pr e se nt [Pet iti on e r] be c a us e [le a d tri a l cou

ns e l] ne e de d to hir e his own investig ator a

nd medical e x aminer.” Mr. Pylant testified that h e wa s unable to send tria l counsel the r equeste d money but instead sent lead tr ial cou n s el t h e n am es of witnesse s who heM r
. Anders on di d not t es t i f y at t he po s t

- convi ct i on he ar i ng
. P et i t i oner ’ s p ost

- convi ct i on coun s el t es t i f i ed 16
t hat t hey had b een unab l e t o l o cat e M r. A nd ers o n. M r. P y l ant , how ever, t est i f i ed t hat M r. A nd ers o n was at t he t ri al every d a y, sit ting in the w itne ss r o o m re a d y to tes tif y. M r. A n d e rs o n w a s n e v e r c a lled a t t ria l.

Al t h ou g h t h e r ec or d does n ot r ef l ec t t h e ex ac t dat e of t h ei r ma r r i ag e, M r s
. Py l an t a n d Pet i t i on er w er e n ot 17

m arri ed at t he t i m e o f

t he vi ct i m ’ s d eat h.

M s. M ill s w a s c h a rg e d w ith a ssa u lt, b u t t h e c h a rg e s w e re late r d ism isse d

. 18
-8- believed w ould testify

favor ably

to Petiti oner’ s case , including Jimm y Ander son, Trina Jackson

16 and Lyla Def

osio. Mr. Pylant was also questioned about his i nvolvement in his son’s case . Mr. Pylant testified that he was prese nt at each meeting between Petiti oner and trial counsel. Mr. Pylant testified that he neve r hea

rd trial counse l discuss the felony murder doctrine or the e lements of first de g ree felony murder and ag g ravated child abuse . Moreove r, he te stified that trial counsel discusse d Petitioner’s
c ha rg e a s b e ing fi rs t de g re e mur de r. Mr . Pylant t e sti fi e d, ov e r o bje c tio n, that le a d tr ia l c ouns e l to ld Pe tit ion e r t

hat th e State “ do n’ t [sic ] h ave a fi rs t de g re e mur de r c a se on y ou ” and that th e State wo uld have to pr ove pre meditation. Mr. Py lant fu rt h er te stified, over obje ction, that lead tria l counsel stated at the conclusion of trial, “I ’ll either do the a ppeal f or you fre e or I ’ll sign pa

pers r ight now that Ididn’t proper ly

repr esent [Petiti oner].”
On cr o s s -e x amination, Mr. Pylant stated that trial counse l did not dis cuss with Petitioner either the Tenne ssee Patter n J ury Instructions or the ele ments of fi rs t d egr ee felony murder. Mr

. Py lant testified that he e ncoura g ed Petitioner not to acc ept any plea a g ree ments offe red by the State. Mr . Pylant a lso of

fe re d te sti mony

that su pp or te d L yla De fo sio ’s te sti mony that sh e he ard

Ms. Da vis make state ments about her involveme nt in the victim’s death.

May a Pylant, Pe tit ion e r’ s w if

e , te sti fi e d th a t, h a d s he be e n ca lle d as a witne ss, sh e wo uld 17 have te stified that Petitioner was “r eally g o od with kids” and that she ha d “neve r see n him be verba lly or phy sically

abusive to a c hild.” Additionally , Mrs. Py lant testified that, bef ore Petitioner’ s trial, Ms. Davis followed her a nd Petitioner to a laundromat whe re Ms. Da vis threatene d Petitioner. Mrs. Py lant rec alled Ms. Davis statingthat if Petitioner did not leave the state with her , “she w as g oing to tell on him – even though she knew that he didn’t do it.” Finally , Mrs. Py lant testified that she did not rec eive a

subpoena to testify

and wa s not present at the trial, but she could have been ha d she bee n subpoenae d. Dorothy Mills, Donald Py lant’s ex-wife, testified that she witnessed Ms. D av i s t hrow the victim into a car “from t he passeng er’ s side to the driver’s s ide.” Ms. Mills also testified that, af ter the first preliminary

hear ing, she hear d Ms. Davis say that she had killed the vic tim but “was g oing to p ut it o ff

on [Pet iti on e r]. ” Ms. Mil ls f ur the r e xpla ine d th a t a ft e r M s. Da vis ma de the state me nt, she and Ms. Da

vis became embroiled in a fig ht that led to Ms. Mills’ arr est. Ms. Mill s testified that 18 she t o l d trial counsel of

both incidents. Finally , Ms. Mill s testified that she could not re member whether she wa s subpoenae d at trial but that she would have testified at trial if she ha d been c alled
as a w itness.A l t ho ugh uncl ear, t he reco rd sugges t s t hat M s. H argrove i s M s. D avi s’ m at ernal grandm o t her. 19

B o th P e tit io n e r a n d lea d trial c o u n se l t e stif ie d tha t the S ta te p le a a g re e m e n t o ff e r wa s thr e e ye a rs a t t h irty 20
perc ent

. T he N ot i ce of P r op ose d P l ea A gr eement an d D ecl i nat i on of Sam e, appare nt l y pre pare d by P et i t i oner ’ s t r i al
cou n s el , i n di ca t es i n i t s t y ped por t i on t h at t h e St at e of f er ed Pet i t i on er t h e oppor t u n i t y t o pl ea d g u i l t y t o r ec k l es s h omi ci de
a n d b e se n te n c e d to fo u r ye a rs , w ith m a n n e r o f ser v ic e to b e d e te rm ine d b y the trial c o u rt. In th e s a m e a g re e m e n t, ho wever, t he num b er “ 4 ” i s st ruck t hrough, and t he num b er “ 3 ” wri t t en i n al o ng wi t h wo rds t hat are i l l egi b l e. T he reco rd i s u n cl ea r i n t h i s r eg ar d. Copi es of a n y pl ea a g r ee men t s of f er ed by t h e St at e ar e n ot i n cl u ded i n t h e r ec or d. -9- Petitioner testified that he provide d lead tria l counsel with a list of “at least twenty” potential witnesses, includingMay a Pylant, Trina Jackson, Dorothy Mills, Ter esa Porillo, June Harg rove, 19 L eroy Binkley , and L loy d Ha rr is. Petit ioner stated that trial counsel re fused to subpoena some of the witnesses a

nd that trial counsel ref

used to take depositions of some of the witnesses, including May a Pylant. Petitioner further testified that trial counse l subpoenae d twelve witnesses but when he a sk e d w hic h tw e lve , le a d tr ia l couns e l re fu se d to nam e the m st a tin g “ he wa s n ot g oin g to d isc us s courtroom strateg y .”
Petitioner also testified that he reme mbere d seeing a letter fr om lead trial c ounsel reque sting
an a dd iti on a l $1 0, 00 0. 00 so that he c ou ld be re pr e se nte d p ro pe rl y . H e te sti fi e d th a t he wa s una ble to raise the money neede d for tria l counsel to hire a n investigator and a

medical e x pert. Petitioner fu rt he r t e sti fi e d th at, p ri or

to t ri a l, h e ha d n e ve r h e ard

of be ingde c lare d in dig e nt.
Petition e r a lso te sti fi e d th at le a d tr ia l c ouns e l in fo rm e d h im that th e State wo uld have to prove that the killing was willful, deliberate, and preme ditated. M oreove r, Petitioner testified that he and trial counsel discussed possible plea ag ree ments, including “five y ear s probation” a nd “thre e y ear s at thirty

perc ent.” Petitioner testified that he went to lea d trial counsel’ s office to discuss the plea ba rg ain and lea d trial counsel informed him that “the state does not ha ve what it takes to convict [y ou] of first deg ree murder.” Petitioner also stated that lea d trial counsel sugg ested that he “ask f or all or nothing .” Petitioner explained that lead tria l counsel told him that the State could not prove murder and if they g ot a

n all or nothing char g e, he would walk awa y with nothing

. He fu rther testified that, when he rea d the plea of fer , he asked lead trial counsel why it said “felony

first deg ree mur de r. ” Pe tit ion e r t e sti fi e d th at tr ial cou ns e l r e sp on de d: “ [W]hat di d you thi nk thi s w a s a misdemeanor char g e[? ]” Also reg arding the S tate’s plea offer, Petitioner testified that he told lead trial counsel he would sign the ag ree ment if it refle cted a plea of “no contest or best interest.” Finally , Petitioner testified that, if he ha d known that lead tr ial co u n s el was not g oing to c all the witnesses he pr ovided or that “a j udg e mus t instruct the j ury on all lesser inc luded offe nses,” then he wo uld have a c c e pte d th e State ’s of fe r a nd a g re e d to a

se nte nc e of

thr e e y e ars a t th ir

ty pe rc e nt. 20 When questioned about the c harg es filed ag ainst him, P etitioner testified that he did not learn about the fe lony

murder doctrine unti l he read about it in the prison l aw libra ry , but he did admit he he ard le a d tr ia l c ouns e l di scu ss in g ag g ra vate d c hil d a

bu se duri ngc los ingargume nts . H e a lso testified that he did not re ceive a copy of the indictment and was, there fore , not a war e that he had been c harg ed with fe lony murder. H e testified that lead trial counsel did not explain that, to prove felony murder, the State “only

neede d to prove a

n inlaying [sic] felony

to convict [him ].”I t i s un cl ear f r om t he r ecor d why l ead t r i al coun s el r evi ewed “ t he war r ant s ” wi t h Pet i t i oner sin ce an 21 i ndi ct ment was i s s ued i n t hi s ca s e. -10- On cr oss-examination, P etitioner testifi e d th a t l e a d tria l c o u n s e l, a n d n ot his father, pe rsuade d him to reject the ple a off er. Petit i o n er re i t erated that at no point befor e or dur ing the trial did he kn ow that he wa s cha

rg e d with “ fe lony mur de r, ” but he did a dmi t that he he ard the te rm duri ngtr ia l. Petitioner explained, however , that he thoug ht felony murder r efe rre d to the fac t that ever y murder is a felony

. Petitioner ag ree d that, at one point before trial, lead tria l counsel enc ourag ed Petitioner to “take the deal” beca

use “the y are willing to knock it down to re ckless homicide.”
Petitioner furth e r

in s is te d th at h e to ld

tr ia l c o un s e l t o c a ll M s
. D av is a s a w it n e s s , but that both lead counse l and co- counsel did not want to ca ll her to testify . Petitioner s ai d t hat he did not testify at trial bec ause tria l counsel enc ourag ed him not to. Had he testified, Petitioner stated that he would have explained that the “noise” R.P. hear d was not him whipping the victim but ins tead was him clappinghis hands to g et the victim’s attention whe n he enter ed the victim’s bedroom. He stated that R.P. saw him help the victim to his feet afte r cha ng ing his dia

per and saw him “ pat [the victim] on the butt.”

Th e State c a lle d le a d tr ia l c ouns e l a s it s o nly wi tne ss. L e a d tr ia l c ouns e l e xpla ine d h is h a bit and custom whe n dealingwith felony murder c ases. He explained that it is his pract i ce to send a
c op y of e ve ry ple a din g to t

he c lie nt a

nd that he wa s su

re that he se nt a c op y

of the ind ic tme nt t o Petitioner. L ead trial counsel also explained that he re viewed “ the war rants” with Petiti oner a

nd 21 that Pe t i t i o n erwas a

war e that he w as cha

rg ed with fe lony

murder. L ead tr ial counsel fur ther explained that, without a doubt, when the plea barg ain was of

fer ed he went over first deg ree felony murder w ith Petit ioner a

nd explained what the State had to pr ove.
L ead tr ial counsel e x plained that whe n the plea a g reem en t wa s offe red, he and Petitioner talked about the agr ee m en t and “the pros and c ons of takingit versus g oing to tria l.” L ead tr ial counsel fur

ther e x plained that “w e we nt over fe lony murder – I ’m almost one hundred pe rce nt po sit ive Itoo k th e Te nn e sse e Patte rn Jury Ins tr uc tio n” and

e xpla ine d th e c ha

rg e s.
L ead trial counsel testified that, after Petitioner rejec ted the plea barg ain, he f

iled numerous mot ion s le a din g up to tr ia l, inc lud ing on e re qu e sti ng that no le sse r- inc lud e d of fe ns e s be c ha

rg e d to the jury . L ead tr ial counsel e x plained that his strategy of “g oing all or nothing” was ba sed in part on a “c ase out of Ma ssachuse tts.”

L ead tr ial counsel testified tha t h e had orig inally wanted to hire an indepe ndent medica l expert to pinpoint the victim’s time of death, but after ta lking with Dr . Har lan, he lea rned that the time of death could not be conclusively pinpointed. Thus, he decide d that a defe nse expert was not neede d beca

use there “wa sn’t a dispute about the ma nner of death.” Moreover, l ea d t rial counse l explained that after

meeting with D r. Har lan for more than six hours prior to tr ial, he wa s convince d that D r. Ha

rl an’ s te sti mony

c ou ld s up po rt

the the or y that Ms . D avis , a

nd no t Pe tit ion e r, ha d a c tua lly supplied the blow that killed the victim.D uri ng t he cross- exam i nat i o n of t he vi ct i m ’ s f at her at t ri al , l ead t ri al co unsel at t em p t ed t o q uest i o n hi m ab o ut 22 M s
. D avi s ’ pre vi ous ac t s , i ncl udi ng whe t her M s
. D avi s : “ mad e up a cha r ge aga i ns t [ M r
. D avi s ] f or dom es t i c v i ol enc e”; l i ed und er o at h ; a n d l i ed on a n or der of pr ot ec t i on
. T h e St at e obj ec t ed t o t h i s l i n e of qu es t i on i n g
. I n a j u r y - out p roce ed i ng, t he t ri al co urt s ust ai ned t he Stat e’ s o b ject i o n, s t at i ng:

T h e pe r s on on t r i a l h e r e t od a y i s [ Pe t i t i on e r ]

. [ M s
. Dav i s ] i s no t on t r i a l

. You ’ r e w a n t i n g me to let yo u im p e a c h a w itne ss b e fo re sh e e v e r te stif ie s? I c a n ’t d o tha t .

. . .

. . . I ’ m n ot g oi n g t o l et y ou [ i mpea ch M s
. D av i s ] u n t i l t h e i s s u e come s – r i g h t n ow h er c r edi bi l i t y i s n ot
e v e n a n issu e in this c o u rt a n d yo u r [s ic ] tryin g to a ttac k it

. -11- L ead tr ial counsel ne x t testified that “[a]ny witness [P etitioner] would h av e t old me about spec if ic a ll y th at h e e v e n h a d a f a c t o f th e c a s e , w e w o u ld h av e inte r v ie w e d o r c a ll e d

. ” L ead tr ial
c ouns e l te sti fi e d th at he and c o- c ouns e l me t wi th P e tit ion e r a nd “ vo te d” on

wh e the r t o c a ll M s. Da

vis
as a w itness. L ead tr ial counsel testified that he “voted to c all her” beca use he ha d a “w ealth of
cross-e x amination information about he r” an d could use prior bad ac ts to im peac h her; howe ver, Pe tit ion e r a

nd c o- c ouns e l, wh o ha d no pr e vio us jur y tr ia l e xpe ri e nc e , o ut- vo te d h im. B a se d o n th is “vote by committee,” Ms. Davis was not called at trial. Instead, lea d trial counsel attempted to ge t in prior bad acts of Ms. D avis throug h other witnesses, like the victim’s biolog ical fathe r. Howeve r, the trial cour

t refuse d to allow such testimony , unless and until Ms. Davis testified. 22

On cr oss-examination, lead trial co u n s el testified that he wa s unsure whe ther he provided Petitioner with a copy

of the indictment and w arr ant but specific ally reme mbere d g oin g over the elements of first deg ree felony murder with Petitioner. L ead trial counsel explained that he did not call many of Petitioner’s off

ere d witnesses bec ause, in his deter mination, t h ey d i dnot have much to offer . Moreove r, lea d trial counsel testified that Petiti oner di d not insist on any particula r witnesses testifying.

L e a d tr ia l c ouns e l f

ur the r t e sti fi e d th a t th e “ wh ole the or y of the c a se ” wa s that Ms . D avis killed the victim. He admitted that he was awa re of her prior inconsistent statements and pr ior bad acts, but h e d e f e n d e d th e d e c is io nn o t t o c a ll h e r , s a yin g it w a s a “ v o te b y c o mm itte e
. ” L e a d

tr ia l
c ouns e l c on tin

ue d to a sse rt , h ow e ve r, that he ha d w ante d to c a ll M s. Da vis

. On re direc t examination, l ead tr ial counsel de nied discoura g ing Petitionerfrom takingthe plea of fer . He r eiterated that Petitioner’s potential witnesses “ had no rele vant or probative value whatsoeve r.” H e also testified that he ac quiesce d to Petitioner’ s wish not to call Ms. Davis and that th e d e c i s i o nw a s tr i a l s tr at e g y.
At the c los e of

a ll t e sti mony , th e State moved to str ike a s h e ars ay the te sti mony

of a ll witn e s s e s w h o c la im e d to h av e h e ar d M s
. D av is ma k e s tate me n ts a dmi tt in g h e r c u lp a b il it y in the victim’s death. Peti t i o ner oppose d the State’s motion. The post-convic tion court informed the parties that it would dec ide the issue in its written opinion.I nd eed , the co urt st at ed in i t s o rder t hat “ t he p roo f est ab l i shes t hat s he was avai l ab l e. ” It i s uncl ear, how ever, 23
t o what pro o f

t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n co urt was r ef erri ng.

T h e S ixth A m e n d m e n t i s a p p lica b le to the S ta te s thr o u g h the F o u rte e n th A m e n d m e n t. S e e S ta te v. H o w e ll, 24 8 6 8 S .W .2 d 2 3 8 , 2 5 1 (T e n n . 1 9 9 3 ).
-12- ProcedureBelow

T h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nco urt i s s u edi t s m em o ra n d u md ec i s i o nfo ur m o n th s af t er th e h ea ri n g. In its opini on, the cour

t first addre ssed the State’s motion to strike the testimony char acte riz ed by the State a s hea

rs ay . T he c ourt

de te rm ine d th a t Ms . D avis ’ a lle g e d s tate me nts we re no t a dmi ssi ble under Te nnessee Rule of Evi dence 804(b) as statements aga inst penal interest unless Ms. Davis was
un ava ila ble to t e sti fy at the po st- c onvic tio n h e ari ng . T he c ourt c on c lud e d th a t Pe tit ion e r f a ile d to show she wa s unavailable and ther efor e g rante d the State’s motion to strike all of the testimony 23
conce rningany

confe ssion or admission by Ms. Davis.
The c ourt then consider ed Petitioner’s claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel in light of the re maining pr oof and c oncluded that Petitioner failed to de monstrate that he had be en pre judiced by any of tr ia l c ouns e l’ s a lle g e d d e fi c ie nc ie s. Accord ing ly , th e c ourt de nie d th e pe tit ion

fo r p os tco n v i ct i o nre l i ef

. T h e C o urt o f C ri m i n al Ap p ea l s af fi rm edth e t ri al co urt ’s d ec i s i o nwi tho n e j u d ge dis se nti ng . Pe tit ion e r t ime ly fi le d a n a pp lic a tio n f

or pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l.

We g ra nte d Pe tit ion e r’ s a

pp lic a tio n fo r pe rm iss ion to a pp e a l to de te rm ine wh e the r t he po stconviction cour

t erre d in: (1) striking a s hear say the testimony of cer tain witnesses; (2) grantingthe State’s motion to st rike without a he aring ; (3) concluding that Petiti oner’ s trial counsel wa s not ineffe ctive for failing to proper ly investigate and prese nt key witnesses at trial; and (4) concluding that Pe tit ion e r’ s tr ia l c ouns e l w a s n ot i ne ff e c tiv e in f a ili ngto r e ta in a

fo re ns ic e xpe rt

pr ior to t ri a l.
Stand ard of Review This Court is bound by

a post-convic tion c ourt’s finding s of fac t unle ss the preponde ranc e of the e vidence is otherwise. Vaug hn v. State, 202 S.W .3d 106, 115 (Tenn. 2006) . Our re view of le g a l is su e s o r m ixed

qu e sti on s o f law a

nd fa c t, s uc h a s a

c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, howeve r, is de novo with no p re s umption of corre ctness. F inch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307, 315 (Tenn

. 2007). At the same time, que stions concer ning the admissibili ty

of evide nce g ener ally

are revie wed unde r an a

buse of discr etion standard. See , e.g ., State v. Dots o n , 2 5 4 S

. W

. 3d 378, 392 (Tenn. 2008)

. Ana lys is Ineffec tive Assistance of Counsel
Both the Six th A mendment to the United States Constit ution and ar ticle I , section 9 of the 24 Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion

g ua ra nte e a c ri min a lly

accus e d th e ri g ht t o r e pr e se ntatio n b y c ouns e l.-13-

Ad dit ion a lly , b oth

the Un ite d St ate s Su

pr e me Court

and thi s Co ur t ha ve re c og nize d that the ri g ht t o such repr esentation e ncompasses the rig ht to “re asonably eff ective” assistance , that is, as s istance “w it h in th e r an g e o f c o mp e te n c e d e ma n d e d o f a tt o r

n e y s in c r im in a l c a s e s
. ” Str ic k la n d v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see Bax ter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975).
A c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l is a

c la im c og niza

ble un de r T e nn e sse e ’s Pos tConvic ti on Act . See Te nn . Co de Ann. §§ 40 -3 0- 10 1 to -3 13 (2 00 6) . Ape tit ion e r f or po stconviction re lief has “ the burde n of provingthe alleg ation s o f fac t by clea r and c onvincing
e vid e nc e .” I d. § 4 0- 30 -1 10 (f ). In o rd e r t o p re va il o n a c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e ass is tanc e of

c ouns e l, the petitioner must establish both that his lawy er’ s perf ormanc e was de ficient a

nd that the def

icient perf ormanc e pre

judiced the de fense . Vaughn, 202 S.W .3d at 116 (c iting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,
and B a xter , 5 23 S.W. 2d

at 93 6)

. To pr ov e de fi c ie nt pe rf or manc e , the pe tit ion e r m

us t de mon str a te that his lawy er’ s conduct fe ll below an ob jective standa

rd of “ rea sonablene ss under pre vailing profe ssional norms.” Vaughn, 202 S.W .3d at 116 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). As we have
s t a t e d p r e v i o u s l y,
the a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l r e qu ir e d und e r the Sixth Ame ndme nt is c ouns e l r e a so na bly lik e ly to r e nd e r a

nd re nd e ri ngre a so na

bly e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e . It is a vio latio n o f t

his sta nd ard fo r d e fe ns e c ouns e l to de pr ive a c ri min a l def e nd ant o f a

su bs tanti a l de fe ns e by his ow n in e ff

e c tiv e ne ss o r i nc omp e te nc e . D e fe ns e c ouns e l mu st p e rf or m at le a st a s w e ll a s a

lawye r w ithor dinar y tr ain in g a nd sk ill in t he c ri min a l la

w a nd mus t c on sc ie nti ou sly

pr ote c t hi s c l i e nt ’ s i nt e r e s t , u n d e f l e c t e d b y c o n f l i c t i n g c o ns ide ra tio ns
. Bax ter, 523 S.W.2d at 934- 35 (quoting Be asley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 ( 6th Cir. 1974)). “De fense counsel must investigate all appar ently substantial defe nses available to the def endant a nd must assert them in a prope r and timely manner .” I d. at 935. Moreove r, this Court has noted that “the a dversa

ry sy stem require s that ‘all ava ilable def enses a re r aised’ so that the g overnme nt is put to its proof.” B axter, 523 S.W .2d at 933 (quoting United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D .C. Cir . 1 97 3) ). An d if c ouns e l’ s c ho ic e s n ot t o r a ise su bs tanti a l de fe ns e s are pr of e ssi on a lly
unre a s o n a

b le “ c o n s id e r in g a ll th e c ir c u ms ta n c e s , ” c o un s e l’ s p e r f

o r ma n c e is d e f

ic ie n t. Se e Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
To pr ov e that c ouns e l’ s d e fi c ie nt p e rf or manc e pr e

jud ic e d the de fe ns e , the pe tit ion e r “ mus t e sta bli sha re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that but f or c ouns e l’ s e rr or s th e re su lt o f t he pro ceedi ngwo uld have be en diffe rent.” Vaug hn, 202 S.W .3d at 116 (c iting Str i ck l an d, 466 U.S. at 694). “A ‘re asonable probability

is a probability

sufficie nt to undermine conf idence i n t h e o u t come.’ ” I d. That is, the petitioner must establish that his counsel’s deficient perfor mance was of suc h a degree that it deprived him of a f air trial a nd cal l ed i n t o q u es t ion the reliability of the outcome . State v. Bur ns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 463 (Tenn. 1999) . A re asonable probability of being found g uilty of a lesser char g e, or r ece iving a

shorter se ntence , satisfies the sec ond prongof Strickland. S ee State v. Z immerman, 823 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).-14- A. Def icient Perfor

mance
1. Failure to Call

W itnesses at Trial
The main thrust of P etitioner’s claim of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel is that trial counsel failed to put bef

ore the jury proof that Ms. Davis kill ed the victim. Petitioner contends that tria l counsel ha d available two source s of proof a bout Ms. Davis’ culpab i l i t y : M s
. Davis her self and other pe rsons who hea

rd Ms

. Davis m ake incriminating statements. He argues t hat trial counse l was defic ient in failing to call these witnesses at trial and that this failure re sulted in prejudice. I n support of his claim, Petitioner ca lled Ms. Defosio, Ms. J ackson, Mr s. Wi lson, Mr. Harr is, Mr. Py lant, and Ms. Mil ls t o te sti fy

at th e po st- c onvic tio n h e ari nga bo ut i nc ulp a tor

y state me nts the y

he ard Ms. Da vis
m ak e. P et i t i o n er

d i d n o tca l l M s
. Da v i s t o t es t i fy atth e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nh ea ri n g.
To su c c e e d o n a c la im of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l fo r fa ilure to c a ll a wi tne ss at tr ia l, a post-convic tion petitioner should present that witness at the post -c o n v i ct ion hear ing. B lack v. State, 794 S.W .2d. 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) . “As a g ener al rule, this is the only way the petitioner ca

n establish that . . . the fa ilure to have a known witness pr esent or c all the witness to the stand resulted in the de nial of cr itical evidenc e which inured to the prejudice of the petit ioner.” I d. When a petitioner pre sents at t he post-convic tion hearinga witness he c laims should have been c alled at trial, the post-conviction cour t must determine whethe r the testimony would have be en (1) a dmissibl e at tria l and (2) material to the de fense . See McA lpin v. St ate, No. M200 4-03043- CCA-R3-PC, 2005 W L2453983, at *8 (Te nn. Crim App. Oct. 5, 2005) (stating t hat eve n if the
e vid e nc e pr of

fe re d at th e po st- c onvic tio n he ari ngwe re “ a dmi ssi ble [at tr ia l] un de r a

ny e xce pti on

to the ru le a g a ins t he ars ay ,” the e vid e nc e wa s “ne ith e r so f avo ra ble no r s o mate ri a l a s to wa rr ant p os tc onvic tio n r e lie f” ); Ki ngv. State , N o. 01 C01 -9 60 3- CR- 00 08 6, 19 97 WL31 19 23 , at *3 (T e nn . Cr im. App. J une 6, 1997) ( stating that fac ts known by m i s s i n g witnesses did “not make the witnesses materia l, or that, if produc ed, their testimony would have been r eleva nt and, there fore , admissible”); cf. N ew s o m e v
. State, 995 S.W .2d 129, 135 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (statingthat a cour t, when addre ssing a

petition for writ of e rror c oram no bis on the ba sis of ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e , mu st fin d “t h at t h e newly

discovere d evidenc e may have r esulted in a diff

ere nt judgment ha d it been prese nted at the tria l,” and that this “rule presuppose s that the evidenc e would be a dmissibl e pursua nt to the applicable rules of evidence and is material to the issues or grounds ra ised in the petition”). I f t he po st- c onvic tio n c ourt

de te rm ine s th a t th e pr of

fe re d te sti mony

wo uld no t ha ve be e n a dmi ssi ble
a t tr ia l or that, e ve n if

a dmi ssi ble , it

wo uld no t ha ve mate ri a lly

a ide d th e pe tit ion e r’ s d e fe ns e a t tr ia l, the po st- c onvic tio n c ourt

is j us tif ie d in fi nd ingthat tr ia l c ouns e l w a s no t de fi c ie nt i n f a ili ngto c a ll th a tw i tn e s s attr i a l

. F i n a l l y , i f th e p r o f f e r e d t e s t i m o n y

i s b o tha dm i s s i b l e an d

m a t e r i a l , th e p os tconviction cour

t must assess whether the wit ness is cre dible. See State v. Young , 196 S.W .3d 85, 10 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 6) (s tatin g that th e c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s is re so lve d by the tr ie r of fa c t) ; State v. Dy ch, 227 S.W.3d 21, 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006) (statingthat “[ a] l l questions involving the
cre dibilit y

of witnesses, the w eig ht an d v al u e t o b e g iven the evide nce, a nd all fac tual issues are resolved by

the trier of

fac t, not the appellate c ourts”).W e d i sagr ee, t heref o re, wi t h t he Stat e’ s ass ert i o n i n i t s b ri ef t o t hi s C o u rt tha t “t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n co urt 25 mad e c l ear t hat i t f

ound none of

[ P et i t i oner ’ s ] wi t nes s es t o be cr edi bl e. ”

-15- Her e, the post-c onviction court made none of these assessments with r espec t to the pr offe red pr oo f o f M s. Da

vis ’ inc ri min atin g state me nts be c a us e it de te rm ine d that th e pr oo f w a s in a dmi ssi ble h ea rs ay atth e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nh ea ri n g. We now revie w that dec ision. 25 2. Hearsay R uling
As set forth a

bove, Petitioner ca lled Ms. D efosio, Ms. J ackson, Mr s. Wi lson, Mr. Harr is, Mr. Pylant, and

Ms. Mil ls t o te sti fy

a bo ut i nc ulp a tor

y state me nts the y

c la ime d to hav e he ard Ms. Da vis make. The post-conviction cour t subse quently struck and r efuse d to consider “ all of the testimony
c on c e r n i n g an y c o n f e s s i o no r a dm i s s i o nb y

A m a n d a D av i s ” o nth e b a s i s th a ti tw a s i n a dm i s sib le hear say
. Initially , questions c oncer ning the admissibili ty of evidenc e rest within the sound discre tion of the trial c ourt, and this Court will not interfe re in the absenc e of abuse appea ring on the fac e of the record. State v. Dotson, 254 S.W .3d 378, 392 (Tenn. 2008) ; see State v. DuB ose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W .2d 465, 477 (Tenn. 1993) ; State v. Harr is, 839 S.W .2d 54, 73 (Tenn. 1992). An abuse of discretion occ urs when the trial court a pplies an incorr ect leg al standar d or

re a c he s a c on c lus ion

that is “ ill og ic a l or

unreason abl e an d c a

us e s a n in jus tic e to the par ty complaining .” State v. Ruiz, 204 S.W .3d 772, 778 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Howell v. State, 185 S.W .3d 319, 337 (Tenn. 2006) ).

In thi s ca se, the post-c onviction court’s re fusal to consider “the testimony

conce rningany confe ssion or admission by Amanda D avis” on the ba sis that the testimony was inadmissible hea

rsay was illog ical, unreasonable and caused an injusti ce to Petit ioner be cause the statements we re be ing offe re d , n o t to p r o v e th e tr u th o f th e matt e r a s s e rte d b u t in s te a d , to s h o w th a t Pe ti ti o n e r re ceive d ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. This illogica l and unreasonable application of the he arsa y doctrine
cause d an injus t i ce to Petit ioner be cause this testim ony was e ssential to his claim of ineffe ctive
a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l.

Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 801(c) define s “hea rsay” as “a statement, other than one made by the dec lara

nt while testifying at the trial or hearing , offe red in e vidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted .” (Empha sis added). A lt h o u gh this definition appear s straig htforwa rd, many statements ca

n be off ere d to prove more than one thing . For instance, if a police office r testifies that the vi ctim told him, “Mr. J ones shot me,” the statement is he arsa y if it is offere d to prove that Mr. J ones wa s the shooter. How ever , if this statement is offer ed to prove that the p o l i ce office r had probable cause to arre st Mr. J ones, the stateme nt is not hearsay beca use it is not being offe red f or the t ruth of t he matter asser ted. Instead, the statement i s offe red to show the r eason f or the police of fi c e r’ s arr e st o f M r. Jone s.
In this case, Petitioner wa s offe ringthe testimony of Ms

. Def osio, Ms. J ackson, Mr s. Wi lson, Mr . H arr is, Mr . Pylant, and Ms. Mil ls not

for the tr uth of the m at t er as serted–that Ms. Davis wasI n hi s d i ss ent , Jud ge W i t t , ci t i ng R uss el l v. C rut chf i el d , 98 8 S.W

. 2 d 16 8 , 17 0 ( T e n n
. C t

. A p p
. 19 9 8 ), 26 adv oca t es f

or r ev i ew of

t h e pos t

- con v i ct i on c ou r t ’ s r u l i n g s on w h et h er t h e pr of f er ed t es t i mon y w as h ea r s ay u n der a de
n ov o s t an dar d of

re v i ew
. Py l an t , 2007 W L 1890178, at * 12 (W i t t , J. , di s s en t i n g )

. As Ju dg e W i t t ha s pr ev i ou s l y n ot ed,
[O n b e ing p re se n te d w ith a he a rs a y o b je c tio n , a] trial c o u rt’s first d u ty is to d e te rm ine w h e the r th e o u to f- c o u rt d e c la ra n t’s sta te m e n t is h e a rs a y– tha t is, w h e the r it is “o ff e re d in e v id e n c e to p ro v e the tru th of t he mat t er as s er t ed. ” No f act ual i s s ue at t ends t hi s det er m i nat i on, and i t ne ce s s ar i l y i s a que s t i on o f l a w

. If the sta te m e n t i s o ff e re d to p ro v e th e tr u th o f t h e m a tter a sse rte d a n d no e x c e p tio n s a p p ly, the sta te m e n t i s, p u re ly an d sim p ly, ina d m issib le

. A t th is ju n c tur e , t h e c o u rt h a s n o d isc re tio n to ho ld
o t herwi se, and t o ut i l i ze an ab use of dis cret i o n s t and ard at t hi s p o i nt i n t he anal y si s “‘ wo ul d have us d ef er t o a dis cret i o n t hat t he t ri al co urt d o es not po ss ess
. ’ ” Stat e v. E d i son, 9 S

. W

. 3 d 75 , 78 (T enn. 19 99 ) ( qu ot i n g S t a t e v
. Edi s on , N o. 03 C01

- 96 05

- CC- 00 19 9, 19 97 W L 15 26 50 1, a t * 8 ( T e n n
. Cr i m. A p p
. June 1 8 , 19 9 7 ) ( T i p t o n, J. , co ncurri ng))

.
Stat e v. G i l l ey, N o
. M 2 0 0 6

- 0 2 6 0 0

- C C A

- R 3

- C D , 2 0 0 8 W L 3 4 5 1 0 0 7 , a t *16 (T enn. C ri m
. A p p
. A ug. 1 8 , 20 0 8 ) ( ci t at i o ns omi t t ed) ( emph as i s a dded)

. Al t h ou g h t h i s Cour t c on t i n u es t o be l i ev e t h at qu es t i on s c on ce r n i n g t h e admi s s i bi l i t y of evi d ence are revi ewed unde r an abuse o f d iscret i o n s t and ard, we note t hat , i n t hi s i nst ance, t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n co urt
c o m m itt e d e rr o r u n d e r e ithe r sta n d a rd o f re v ie w
. -16- responsible for

the victim’s death–but rather to demonstrate that trial counsel wa s deficie nt in not callingthese witnesse s at trial. As noted by J udg e W itt in his dissent below, “the statements wer e offe red to show that [Petiti oner’ s] t rial attorne y s were on notice and ha d knowledg e of the various wi tne sse s’ a c c ounts of

Ms. Da vis ’s state me nts . T hu s, the e vid e nti ary signif ic anc e of the state me nts lies in the indication that trial counsel kne w of potentially exculpatory

evidenc e.” Pylant v. State, No . M 20 05 -0 27 21 -C CA -R 3- PC, 2 00 7 WL 18 90 17 8, at * 1 3 ( T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. June 29 , 2 00 7) (Wi tt, J ., dissenting) . Acc ording ly , the testimony was not hea

rsay for the pur

poses of the post-c onviction hear ing. T he post-convic tion court there fore err ed in striking this testimony as hea rsay and, in doing so, abused its discre tion. 26
3. Admissibili ty of Stricken Testimony at Trial
Our c onclusion that the post-conviction court err ed in striking this testimony does not end our inquiry . As set forth a bove, the stricke n testimony supports Petiti oner ’s claim of deficient perf ormanc e only

if this evidence would have be en admissible at trial.
The testimony at issue cente red around statements alleg edly made by Ms. D av i s wh i ch implicated her

in the victim’s death. At trial, these statements would have been offer ed to prove the truth of the matter

asser ted: that Ms. Davis, not Petitioner, was responsible for the vic tim’s death. A c c o r d i n g l y, attr i a l , th e s e s t at e m e n t s w o u l d h av e b e e np r o p e r l y c h ar a c t e r i z e d a s h e ar s ay.
Ge ne ra lly , h e ars ay

state me nts are no t a dmi ssi ble

. Te nn
. R. Ev id. 80 2. He ars ay state me nts may be a dmi tte d if the y qu a lif y a s o ne or

mor e of the e nume ra

te d h e ars ay

e xce pti on s. Se e Te nn . R. Evid. 803, 804. One of the se exceptions is for a state ment “which . . . at t he ti me of its making

. . . so far tended to subjec t the decla rant to . . . cr iminal li ab i l i t y
. . . that a re asonable person in the de c lara nt’ s p os iti on

wo uld no t ha ve mad e th e state me nt u

nle ss b e lie vin g it t o b e tr

ue .” Te nn . R. Ev id. 80 4( b) (3 ). Pr oo f o f a state me nt a g a ins t pe na l int e re st, ho we ve r, is no t a dmi ssi ble un de r t hisM s
. D avi s was o r i gi nal l y i ndi ct ed al ong wi t h P et i t i oner f or t he f i r s t d egr ee f

el ony m ur der of

t he vi ct i m. H er 27

su b se q u e n t gu ilt y p le a to c h ild ne g le c t m a y ha v e re n d e re d p ro b le m a tic a n y late r a ttem p t t o inv o k e the F ift h A m e n d m e n t. Se e Floyd v. P ri m e Suc cess i o n of T N , N o
. E 2 0 0 6

- 0 1 0 8 5

- C O A

- R 9

- C V , 20 0 7 W L 2 2 9 7 8 1 0 , at * 7 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. A ug. 1 3 , 2 0 0 7 ). R e g a rd le ss, w e re c o g n iz e tha t wh e the r sh e w o u ld ha v e b e e n leg a lly e n tit le d to re fus e to tes tif y a t P e tit io n e r’s tria l, sh e m a y ha v e d o n e so , ev e n if fac ing a fi n d ing o f co n te m p t.

-17- e xce pti on to t he he ars ay

ru le un le ss t

he pr op on e nt o f t

he pr oo f d e mon str a te s th a t th e de c lara nt i s un ava ila ble . T e nn . R. Ev id. 80 4( b)

. In the c on te xt of a c ri min a l tr ia l, a

de c lara nt i s unava ila

ble if she: (1) “ [i ]s ex empted by ruling of t he court on g rounds of privileg e fr om testifying” ; (2) re fuses to testify despite a court order; (3) “[d] emonstrates a lack of memory”; (4) “[i] s unable to be pr esent or to testify

at the hea

ringbeca use of . . . de ath or then e x i s t i n g p h y s i cal or mental illness or infirmity ”; or (5) is absent from the he aringbeca use of the ina

b i l i t y t o procur e her

attendanc e by proce ss. Tenn. R. Evid. 804(a)

. The de clar ant of e ac h o f the stateme nts in question is Ms. Davis. Had tria l counsel ca lled he r t o th e wi tne ss s tand

at tr ia l, s he c ou ld h ave do ne on e of three t hi ngs. F ir st, in r e sp on se to questions a

bout he r responsibility for the victim’s de ath, she could have r efuse d to answer pursuant to her F ifth Amendment privileg e ag ainst self-inc rimination. See Dotson, 254 S.W.3d at 392 & 27 n.11. In th at e ve nt, the tr ia l c ourt c ou ld h ave de c lare d h e r e xemp t f ro m te sti fy

ingand sh e wo uld have be en d ee m ed u n available for pur poses of Te nnessee Rule of Evidenc e 804(a )(1) . I d. Pe t i t i o n e r ’ s w i tn e s s e s c o u l d th e n h av e t e s t i f i e d a b o u t h e r o u t

- o f

- c o urt s t a t e m e n t s p ur s u an t to Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 804(b)( 3). See id. Second, Ms. D avis could have responde d by denying any involvement in the victim’s death and de nying that she had e ver made a ny inculpatory
s t at em en t s. I n that event, Petitioner’s w itnesses could have testified about Ms. Davis’ a lleg ed state me nts in o rd e r to impe a c h he r cr e dib ili ty

. Se e Te nn . R. Evid . 613 (b ). Th ir d, Ms. Da vis c ou ld have a dmi tte d to havin g ma de the inc ulp a tor y state me nts . In that e ve nt, the oth e r w itn e sse s’ testimony about those statements would have been inadmissible he arsa y
. Howeve r, Ms. Davis’ own admissions then would have be en helpf ul to Petit ioner’s c ase.
Be cause Ms. Davis did not testify at t he post -convic tion hear ing, we do not know how she would have r esponded ha d she bee n called to testif y at t ri al. Howe ver, unde r any of the thre e sc e na ri os dis c us se d a

bo ve , tr ia l c ouns e l c ou ld h ave pr e se nte d to the jur y pr oo f about Ms. D avis ’ inc ulp a tor

y state me nts e ith e r d ir e c tly thr ou g h M s. Da

vis or thr ou g h M s. De fo sio , Ms. Jac ks on , M rs
. Wils on , M r. Ha

rr is, Mr . Pylant, and

Ms. Mil ls.

In it s b ri e f t o th is C ourt , th e State argue s th a t “ pe tit ion e r’ s f a ilure to p ro du ce Ms . D avis duri ng his po st- c onvic tio n he ari ng pr e c lud e s a fin din g that he wa s pre jud ic e d by he r ab se nc e a t tr ia l” and ther efor e obviates his claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel. The State relies on B lack f or the pr op os iti on

tha t, t o s uc c e e d o n a cl aim of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l f or fa ilure to c a ll a witness at t ri al, a post-conviction petitioner should present that witness at the post-conviction hear ing. 794 S.W .2d. at 757. “As a g ener al rule, this i s the only way the petitioner c an esta

blish that

. . . the failure t o have a known witness prese nt or call the witness to the stand resulted in the de nial of crit i ca l

ev i dencewh ic h in

ur e d to the pr e

jud ic e of the pe tit ion e r. ” I d. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T his
case does not fit the “g ener al rule,” howeve r, because Petiti oner presente d the “c ritical evide nce” ofW e n ot e t hat our Rul es of E vi dence s eve r el y l i mi t t he ext ent t o whi ch a wi t nes s ’ p r i or bad act s m ay be us ed 28

a t t ria l. S e e T e n n . R . E v id . 4 0 4 (b ), 6 0 8 (b ).
-18- M s
. Da v i s ’ a l l ege d

i n cu l p at o ry

s t at em en t s th ro u gho th er

witnesses–an a cceptable alter n at i v e s tra t egy un de r t he un iqu e c ir c ums tanc e s o f th is case g ive n th e ve ry re a l po ssi bil ity

that Ms . D avis wo uld
r e f u s e to te s ti f

y to any s u c ha dmi s s io n s an d /o r h e r a ll e g e d c u lp a b il it y in th e v ic ti m’ s d e a th

. We emphasize, howeve r, that post-conviction counsel g ener ally risks the denial o f a post-conviction cl ai mi f h e o r s h e f

ai l s t o ca l l atth e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o nh ea ri n g all wi tne sse s w ho the y c la im s ho uld have be en ca lled at trial. 4. Materiality of Stricken Testimony at Trial
Even if a dmissibl e at tria l, the proof of Ms

. Da vis’ inculpatory

statements that Petitioner
c ou ld h ave a dd

uc e d at tr ia l is of

no ava il t o h is c la im o f t

ri a l c ou ns e l’ s d e fi c ie nt p e rf

or manc e un le ss that testimony was material t o his defe nse. Her e, the signific ance of the stricke n testimony was that Ms. Da vis wa s r e sp on sib le fo r t

he vic tim ’s de a th, no t Pe tit ion e r. Th e mate ri a lity of thi s p ro of

to Petitioner’s defe nse at trial, ther efor e, is clea r.
5. Fa ilu reto C

all Am an da Da v is
We h ave de te rm ine d th at tr ia l c ouns e l c ou ld h ave put on pr oo f at tr ia l th a t Ms . D avis inc ri min a te d h e rs e lf

in t he vic tim ’s de a th. In o rd e r t o d o s o, ho we ve r, tr ia l couns e l ha d to e lic it M s. Davis’ testimony

at trial or de monstrate that she w as unava ilable. As s et fo rt h above, Petitioner would not have be en able to put Ms. Def osio, Ms. J ackson, Mrs. Wil son, Mr. Har ris, Mr. Pylant, and Ms. Mill s on th e st and at tria l unless and until Ms. Davis denied havingmade the inc ulpatory
s t a t e m e n t s o r

w a s un av a i l a

b l e t o t e s t i f

y.
At th e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n h e ar i n g , l e a d tr i a l c o un s e l t e s t i f i e d th a t h e h a d w an t e d t o c a ll M s. Davis to testify

at trial bec ause he had a “wea lth of cross-e x amination information about her ” and “prior ba d acts.” Instead of relying on his pr ofessional judgme nt, how ever , lead trial counsel put 28 the dec ision of whether

to call Ms. Davis to a vote among himself, co-c ounsel–who had no pr evious jur y tr ia l e xpe ri e nc e –a

nd Pe tit ion e r. Whe n c o- c ouns e l and Pe tit ion e r “ vo te d” no t to c a ll Ms. Da vis to the witness stand, lead tria l counsel ac quiesce d. Contrary to what lead c ounsel stated, Petitioner testified that he wanted Ms. Davis put on the witness stand at trial. Signif icantly , the pos t-conviction cour t did not make a cr edibility finding on this crucial issue. More over, the State did not call trial co-c ounsel to testify at the post-convic tion hear ing. T here fore , the re asons why trial co-c ounsel desire d not to call Ms. Davis are unknown. Ge ne ra lly , “ [w]he n c ouns e l, r e ta ine d o r a pp ointe d, is chal len g e d a s in e ff e c tiv e and

a [pos tconviction] hearing is held, the state should prese nt the attacke d counsel to show what occur red.” Gar rett v. State, 530 S.W.2d 98, 99 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975).
Withre sp e c t to pla c ingthe de te rm inatio n o f whe the r t o c a ll a ke y wi tne ss to a

“ vo te ” in wh ic h th e de fe nd ant h a s an e qu a l sa y , w e e mph a size that, “ [s]tr a te g ic and ta c tic a l de c isi on s sh ou ldT h e Amer i ca n B ar A s s oci at i on St an dar ds f or t h e D ef

en s e Fu n ct i on a l s o s t at es t h at “ [ i ] f a di s ag r ee men t on 29

s i gn i f i can t mat t er s of

t act i cs or s t r at egy ari s es bet ween def ens e c ouns el an d t he cl i ent , def ens e c ouns el s houl d m ake a r ecor d of t he ci r cums t anc es , couns el ’ s advi s e and r eas ons , and t he concl us i on r eac hed. ” A

. B

. A

. St andar ds f or Cri mi nal Ju s t i ce § 4- 5. 2( c)

. I f

s u ch a r ec or d w as ma de, i t doe s n ot a ppea r i n t h e r ec or d. -19- be made by

defe nse counse l after

consultation with the client . . . . Such dec is i o n s i n clude what witnesses to ca ll, whether a nd how to conduct c ross-examination, . . . and what evidence should be int ro du c e d. ” A. B .A . Stand ards for Crimi na l Just ic e § 4 -5 .2 (b ) ( 3d e d. 19 93 ); se e id. § 4 -5 .2 c mt. (stating that “[b] eca

use these de cisions require the skill, training, a nd experience of the a dvocate , the power of dec ision on them should rest with the lawy er” and that the lawy er should maintain “the ult imate c ho ic e and

re sp on sib ili ty

fo r t he str a te g ic and

ta c tic a l deci sions in t

he c a se ” ); se e a lso Bax ter, 523 S.W.2d at 936 (s t at i ng that “[t] rial cour ts and defe nse counse l should look t o and be g uided by the Amer ican B ar A ssociatio n ’s S tandar ds relatingto the Administration of Criminal Justi c e in g e ne ra l, a

nd sp e c if ic a lly to t ho se po rt ion s o f t

he Stand ard s w hic h r e late to t he De fe ns e Func tion [ chapte r 4]”). We there fore question the extent t o wh i ch lead trial counsel’ s “dete rmination” to not call Ms. Davis ca n be cha rac terized as “strateg ic” or “tac tical

. ” In any

29
e ve nt, by makin g thi s “ de c isi on ,” tr ia l couns e l f or e c los e d th e po ssi bil ity

of c a lli ngMs. De fo sio , M s. J ackson, Mr s. Wi lson, Mr. Harr is, Mr. Py lant, and Ms. Mills to t es t i fy about incriminating statements they

hear d Ms. Davis make. Thus, in not ca lling Ms. Davis to the witness stand, tria l
c ouns e l disa

ble d Peti tio ne r fr om ad du c ing mate ri a l and a dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e in f avo r o f h is d e fe ns e a t tr ia l.
As we ha

ve ofte n repe ated, this Court will not second- g uess t rial counsel’s informed tac tical and strate g ic dec isions. Henley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997)

. On this point, however,
we a g ree with J udg e Witt’s dis sent below: [G] iven that counsel admitted in the post-conviction hea ringthat the def

ense the ory at trial wa s that Ms. Davis killed the victim, tria l c ounsel’s fa ilure to subpoena a nd utiliz e an a

vailable Ms. Davis at trial or, alter natively , to establish that she was unavailable to testify

at trial, strong ly

sug g ests that counsel’s perf ormanc e was not within the rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorney s in c riminal case s.
. . . L ead trial counsel testified at the post-conviction hear ing that he did not call Ms. D avis as
a wi tne ss at tr ia l be c a

us e he wa s out- vo te d by c o- c ouns e l and [Pet iti on e r]. Iwo uld reje ct outrig ht this ex p l an at i o n as a ba sis for an inf or me d ta c tic al a nd

strate gic decision

. Py lant, 2007 WL1890178, at *14 ( Witt, J ., dissenting) . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that Petitioner ha s e sta bli sh e d th at le a d tr ia l c ouns e l pe rf or me d d e fi c ie ntl y in his me tho d o f “ de c idi ng ” no t to c a ll Ms. Davis to the stand at trial.

B. Pre judice
Of c ourse, e ven if Petitioner has e stablished that his le g al repr esentation at tr ial was de ficient beca use it deprived him of pr oof about Ms. Davis’ alleg ed inculpator y statements, that def

iciencyThe post-c onviction court e rr o n eously descr ibed the pre

judice prongof an ine ffe ctive 30 assistance of counse l claim as re quiring a petitioner to de monstrate that “but for his counse l’s err or the re sults of Petit ioner’s tria l would have be en diffe rent.” No such c er t ai n t y i s require d. See Vaug hn, 202 S.W .3d at 116 (stating that the petit ioner “ must establish a reasonable probability that but f or counsel’s err ors the result of the proce eding would have been differ ent”) (empha sis added).

-20- does not e ntitle Petitioner to post-c onviction r elief unless Petitioner has demonstrated that the defic ient perf

ormanc e resulted in prejudice

. See Vaug hn, 202 S.W .3d at 116. As set forth a bove, the te st f or pr e jud ic e on a c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l is “ wh e the r the re is a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that, a bs e nt [co un se l’ s un

pr of e ssi on a l] e rr or s, the fa c tf

ind e r wo uld have ha d a

re a so na ble do ub t r e sp e c tin g g uil t.” Str ic kla nd , 4 66 U. S. at 69 5. “ A r e a so nab le proba bil ity is a pr ob a bil ity sufficie nt to unde rmine conf idence in the outcome,” id. at 694, and “a court makingthe pre

judice inq uir y mus t a sk if the de fe nd ant h a s me t th e burd e n o f s ho wi ngth at th e decis ion re a c he d w ou ld reasonably likely have be en diffe rent a bsent the er

rors,” id. at 696 (empha sis added).

Be cause the post-conviction cour t struck all extrinsi c proof about Ms. Davis’ incr iminating statements and be cause Ms. Davis did n o t t es t ify at the post-convic tion hearing , the cour t never considere d whether t rial counse l’s failure to call Ms. Davis at trial ( and, depe nding upon he r re sp on se , the wi tne sse s Peti tio ne r pr of fe re d at the po st- c onvic tio n he ari ng ) r e su lte d in pr e jud ic e to Petitioner. We, too, are pr evente d from re achingthis issue. Although w e have deter mined that proof of Ms. Davis’ a lleg ed inculpatory statements was materia l to Petitioner’s defe nse and would have been a dmissibl e at trial, we do not ha ve the benef

it of any finding s by

the post-conviction cour

t that the witnesses who of

fer ed this proof we re cre dible. I t is the role and function of a trial court to make
c re dib ili ty

fi nd ing s and

thi s Co ur t w ill no t us ur

p th a t po we r. Dyc h, 22 7 S. W.3 d at 40 . We f ind it signif ic ant, ho wever, that le a d tr ia l c ouns e l ne ve r t e sti fi e d th a t he did no t c a ll M s. De fo sio , M s. J ackson, Mrs. Wil son, Mr. Harris, Mr. P ylant, and Ms. Mills to the s tand because he did not believe the m. Rathe r, he te sti fi e d that he did no t ca ll Pet iti on e r’ s witn e sse s at tri a l bec a us e , a c c or din g to h is analy sis of Petiti oner’ s case , they “had no r eleva

nt or probative va lue whatsoe ver.”
We are constraine d, there fore , to reve rse the Court of Criminal Ap peals’ judg ment and
rema nd for a new post-conviction hear ing. At the new post-c onviction hear ing, the post-conviction
c ourt mus t a sse ss t

he c re dib ili ty

of tho se wi tne sse s w ho pr of fe r te sti mon

y mate ri a l and

a dmi ssi ble
a t tr ial. As su min g Pe tit ion e r’ s p ro of inc lud e s te sti mony

a bo ut M s. Da

vis ’ s tate me nts , th e po stconviction cour

t must t hen asse ss whether the absence at trial of proof of Ms. Dav i s ’ i nculpatory statem en t s b ri n g s into doubt P etitioner’s c onviction. We emphasize, as did J udg e Witt i n the pr oc e e din g be low , th at th e te st f or pr e jud ic e un de r S tr ic kla

nd is not an inquiry

into the sufficienc y of th e St a te ’ s e v id e n c e a d d u c e d a t t r ia l. In d e e d , “ [t ]h e r e s u lt o f a p r o c e e d in g c anb e r e n d e r ed unreliable , and henc e the pr ocee ding itself unfair, even if the er rors of c ounsel ca

nnot be shown by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e to have deter mined the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694. 30-21-

Our c onclusion that further proce eding s are nece ssary in the post-conviction cour t rende rs unnece ssary

our re solution of the remainingissues Petiti oner r aised in this appea l.
CO NC LU SION The post-c onviction court erre d in striking as hear say the t estimony of witnesses pr esente d at the hea ringand in failing t o assess their cre dibilit y and the potential e ffe ct of their te stimony on th e o u tc o me o f Pe ti ti o n e r ’ s tr ia l. Wi th o u t c r e d ib il it y f in d in g s , th is Co urt is f

o r e c lo sed fr om deter mining whe ther Petitioner re ceive d ineffe ctive assistance of counse l at trial. Ther efor e, for the
re a so ns state d a

bo ve , w e re ve rs e the Cou rt of Cr imi na l Ap pe a ls’ jud g me nt and re mand thi s c a se to the po st- c onvict ion

c ourt fo r a ne w h e ari ng . It a

pp e ari ngthat Pe tit ion e r i s in dig e nt, c os ts o f t his appea l are taxed to the St ate of Tenne ssee.

___________________________________

CO RN EL I A A . CLARK, JUSTI CE