IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lower Bucks County Joint :

Municipal Authority :

:

v. :

:

Patricia Koszarek, : No. 686 C.D. 2020

Appellant : Argued: November 9, 2020

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge (P.)

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE COVEY FILED: December 11, 2020

Patricia Koszarek (Koszarek) appeals from the Bucks County Common 

Pleas Court’s (trial court) April 6, 2020 decision (April 6, 2020 Decision) finding for 

the Lower Bucks County Joint Municipal Authority (Authority) and against Koszarek 

in the amount of $26,399.77, in an action seeking to recover employer overpayments 

the Authority made to Koszarek.

1

 Koszarek presents five issues for this Court’s review: 

(1) whether the trial court erred by concluding that the Authority may recover alleged 

overpayments; (2) whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion by failing to

conclude that the Authority was estopped from seeking repayment of wages and 

benefits it previously approved; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion by

finding that wage and benefit overpayments were made; (4) whether the trial court 

erred or abused its discretion by rejecting Koszarek’s counterclaim based on a 

settlement agreement and release (Settlement Agreement) between Koszarek and the 

Authority; and (5) whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion by concluding

1 The April 6, 2020 Decision was docketed and mailed on April 9, 2020.
2

that the Authority recouped overpayments from other employees. After review, this 

Court affirms.

The Authority initially employed Koszarek as its Finance Director2 on a 

temporary basis effective December 3, 2007. On May 21, 2008, the Authority 

promoted Koszarek to Financial Assistant to the Managing Director, paying her

$72,189.00 annually, plus benefits.

3

 Koszarek was not an officer of the Authority, and 

had no power to make policy. Koszarek’s duties included completing and signing any 

and all payroll forms and regular pay submissions, as well as tracking employees’

vacation and/or sick time and usage. 

The Authority’s Managing Director Vijay Rajput, Ph.D. (Rajput) was 

Koszarek’s supervisor. Rajput testified that his expertise was in agriculture and civil

engineering, not finance. Rajput explained that he deferred to Koszarek’s expertise 

and trusted that the information she presented to him was accurate. He further noted 

that his reliance on Koszarek was normal, as he also supervised other departments and 

relied on the department managers and superintendents to perform their jobs and to 

present him with honest information.

On April 25, 2013, Koszarek submitted a resignation letter to the 

Authority (2013 Resignation letter), therein claiming to the Authority’s Board of 

Directors (Board) that Rajput discriminated against and belittled her. See Reproduced 

Record (R.R.) 510a-512a. She also raised concerns regarding potential violations of 

the Family and Medical Leave Act,4 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act

2 The Finance Director for the Authority is essentially the equivalent of a Controller for a large 

corporation.

3 Koszarek’s compensation was governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement for 

supervisory employees in place at the time and amended from time to time thereafter.

4 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
3

of 1985,

5

and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

6 However, because the Board 

refused to accept her resignation, Koszarek continued in her position.

On September 25, 2013, Koszarek filed a discrimination charge against 

the Authority with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC), and subsequently filed a “whistleblower” claim with the EEOC. On March 

13, 2014, Koszarek submitted a retirement letter to the Authority in which she stated

that her last day in the office would be March 27, 2014. She requested a payout in her 

last paycheck for her remaining vacation time and further requested to use “personal, 

family illness and compensation time beginning March 28, 2014, as is consistent with 

Authority practice.” R.R. at 475a. The Board approved her request in executive 

session without the need for an audit, because the Board trusted the accuracy of 

Koszarek’s representations.

At the next public meeting, the Board publicly expressed its appreciation 

for Koszarek’s service. After Koszarek retired in 2014 from the Authority’s 

employment, Susan Wallover (Wallover) was assigned to assist with payroll. Upon 

discovering an employee payroll discrepancy resulting in the employee’s overpayment, 

Wallover researched the payroll records for other employees and prepared a written 

report for Rajput listing the employee names and discrepancies she discovered in their

pay. See R.R. at 669a-671a.

After reviewing Wallover’s report, the Authority retained Certified Public 

Accountant (CPA) Louis Polaneczky (Polaneczky) to review Wallover’s report. 

Polaneczky was familiar with the Authority’s finances because he had previously been 

consulted in the Authority’s financial statement preparation. Polaneczky reviewed the 

Wallover report and verified the information contained therein. On November 17, 

5 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1169.

6 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
4

2014, Polaneczky prepared and presented his own written report to the Authority’s

Board, in which he recommended that further research was required and a forensic 

accounting should be completed. Polaneczky also opined in his report that the number 

and extent of the payroll discrepancies suggested either gross incompetence or possible 

fraud.

The Authority retained Forensic Accountant Joseph Barbagallo, CPA 

(Barbagallo) who was given complete access to the Authority’s financial records, 

reports, policies, procedures, contacts, and anything else he believed necessary for his 

investigation. Barbagallo’s forensic analysis revealed that Koszarek had overpaid 

herself $26,399.77 from December 3, 2007 to April 27, 2014, as follows: (1) $4,646.13

regular pay; (2) $5,420.76 vacation pay; (3) $10,841.52 sick pay; (4) $3,500.91

compensatory time; and (5) $1,990.45 in other payments. Barbagallo also determined 

that Koszarek had failed to properly withhold more than $2,600.00 in total federal, state 

and local income taxes for the pay period ending March 30, 2014.

By April 30, 2015 letter, the Authority’s Solicitor notified the Bucks

County District Attorney’s Office (District Attorney’s Office) of the irregularities. See

R.R. at 496a-497a. Also in April 2015, the State Ethics Commission’s (Ethics 

Commission) Investigative Division (Investigative Division) received information 

pertaining to alleged overpayments to Koszarek. After an investigation, the Ethics 

Commission elected not to pursue the matter further because of “a good faith and 

legitimate concern as to the authenticity, completeness, accuracy, and/or sufficiency of 

those records maintained by the [Authority].”7 R.R. at 506a. On June 10, 2015, 

7 The Ethics Commission explained in its May 16, 2016 Praecipe to Withdraw Investigative 

Complaint/Findings Report and Discontinue Matter With Prejudice, in pertinent part:

14. Following the issuance of the Investigative Complaint/Findings 

Report on April 11, 2016, [the Ethics Commission’s special 

investigator] received additional information from representatives of 

the [Authority], who provided what appeared to be additional 
5

Koszarek executed the Settlement Agreement, settling her discrimination and 

whistleblower claims against the Authority in exchange for $70,000.00. By March 28, 

2016 letter, Bucks County District Attorney David Heckler (D.A. Heckler) responded 

that, after conducting an investigation, the District Attorney’s Office did not have

sufficient evidence to charge Koszarek for criminal conduct.8 See R.R. at 498a-500a.

On April 1, 2016, the Authority commenced the instant action by writ of 

summons in the trial court. On February 17, 2017, the Authority filed its Complaint

against Koszarek seeking repayment of the alleged overpayments totaling $28,999.77.

9

 

Therein, the Authority averred that Koszarek had intentionally overpaid herself and 

failed to withhold necessary taxes. Koszarek filed an answer thereto and,subsequently, 

on July 26, 2018, filed an Amended Answer, New Matter, Affirmative Defenses, and 

Counterclaim. In her counterclaim, Koszarek alleged retaliation and abuse of process.

documentation and/or verification concerning the sick leave 

overpayment as alleged against Koszarek.

15. Upon review of those records, it is the opinion of counsel for the 

Investigative Division that a serious question has arisen as to whether 

or not an overpayment was actually received by Koszarek.

16. The receipt of this information was received after the issuance of 

the Investigative Complaint/Findings Report, and was not previously 

provided to the Investigative Division, despite multiple requests for any 

and all documentation regarding leave, sick leave, leave payouts, and 

any other financial records which would be responsive to the 

allegations levied against [Koszarek].

17. Upon review of the forensic audit that was initially provided to the 

Investigative Division, several of those findings were dispelled through 

the efforts of the Investigative Division, and at the very least, the 

records of the [Authority] are incomplete, inaccurate and give 

questions as to creditability and/or potential authenticity.

R.R. at 504a-05a (italic and underline emphasis added).

8

In his letter, D.A. Heckler criticized the Authority, admonishing its counsel: “I am sure that 

you recognize that this loss of taxpayer[s’] money is a product of wholly inadequate fiscal procedures 

at the [A]uthority. I trust that your clients [sic] will follow the recommendations of the Barbagallo 

audit.” R.R. at 500a.

9 This amount included the $2,600.00 in taxes that Koszarek allegedly failed to withhold.
6

At trial, on January 28 and 29, 2020, the Authority presented witnesses 

including Rajput, Wallover, Polaneczky and Barbagallo, and documentary evidence 

that Rajput paid the Authority for an overpayment it made to him. The Authority 

indicated it was continuing its efforts to collect other overpayments. Koszarek disputed 

the Authority’s evidence, maintaining that all payments to the listed Authority

employees were appropriate. However, Koszarek did admit that she had overpaid 

herself $906.30, allegedly due to a coding error. See R.R. at 860a. Koszarek did not 

present any independent testimony from an accountant or other Authority employee in 

support of her assertions.

In the April 6, 2020 Decision, the trial court ruled:

Based upon the facts presented at trial, [the Authority] has

proven by clear and substantial evidence overpayments to 

[Koszarek] from December 3, 2007 to April 27, 2014 totaling 

$26,399.77. These overpayments were in the following 

categories: (1) overpayment of regular pay, $4,646.13; (2) 

overpayment of vacation pay, $5,420.76; (3) overpayment of 

sick pay, $10,841.52; (4) overpayment of compensatory time 

pay, $3,500.91; and ([5]) other payments determined to be 

paid back to the Authority of $1,990.45. This amount totals 

$26,399.77. This Court concludes the evidence proves 

damages as owed to [the Authority] from [Koszarek] in the 

total amount of $26,399.77 representing total employer 

overpayments to her to which she was not entitled.

[Koszarek’s] overpayment is by far the highest amount due 

of the overpayments to employees.
7

April 6, 2020 Dec. at 4. On April 20, 2020, Koszarek filed a notice of appeal.

10,11,12

10 On April 13, 2020, Koszarek filed a post-trial motion (Post-Trial Motion) seeking 

reconsideration. Before the trial court took any action on the Post-Trial Motion, on April 17, 2020, 

Koszarek filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and then, on April 20, 2020, 

filed a notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On May 18, 2020, the trial court issued 

an opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925(a). On May 26, 2020, 

the Pennsylvania Superior Court transferred the matter to this Court.

Importantly, “[o]nce a post-trial motion is timely filed, judgment cannot be entered until the 

trial court enters an order disposing of the motion or the motion is denied by operation of law one 

hundred and twenty days after the filing of the motion. Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.4.” Melani v. Nw. Eng’g, 

Inc., 909 A.2d 404, 405 (Pa. Super. 2006). Entry of judgment is a prerequisite to an appealable order. 

See id. Notwithstanding, the trial court never ruled on the Post-Trial Motion. On August 6, 2020,

this Court issued an order directing the parties to address the appealability of the April 6, 2020

Decision, given that the trial court had not yet entered judgment. 

On August 7, 2020, Koszarek filed an amended brief and explained therein:

The Court should understand that[,] on March 21, 2020, the [trial court]

issued Emergency Order 2020-6 in response to the COVID-19 crisis, 

in which it directed that ‘the Office of the Prothonotary shall not enter 

judgment in any matter.’ This order having expired, judgment was 

entered on the non-jury verdict on August 7, 2020. This has now 

rendered the underlying order an appealable matter and not 

interlocutory. Sovereign Bank v. [Valentino], . . . 914 A.2d 415, 419 

[n.6] (Pa. Super. 2006) (‘A final judgment entered during the pendency 

of an appeal is sufficient to perfect appellate jurisdiction.’). . . .

Koszarek Amended Br. at 2 n.1.

Further complicating matters, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court issued numerous 

blanket orders suspending all time calculations, ultimately until May 8, 2020. Therefore, as of August 

7, 2020, given the trial court’s orders, 120 days had not passed since the filing of the Post-Trial 

Motion, and absent a ruling on the Post-Trial Motion, the trial court did not have authority to enter 

the August 7, 2020 entry of judgment. Notwithstanding, it appears that, as of the date of the issuance 

of this opinion, despite the time calculation suspension, 120 days have now expired since Koszarek 

filed the Post-Trial Motion. Therefore, the Post-Trial Motion has been denied as a matter of law, and 

the trial court no longer has jurisdiction to rule thereon. Accordingly, as of this date, this Court could 

only remand for the trial court to properly enter judgment. 

Rule 105(a) provides:

These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and 

inexpensive determination of every matter to which they are applicable. 

In the interest of expediting [a] decision, or for other good cause shown, 

an appellate court may . . . disregard the requirements or provisions of 

any of these rules in a particular case on application of a party or on its 
8

Koszarek first contends that the trial court erred by concluding that the 

Authority may recover alleged overpayments. This Court disagrees.

Here, the trial court noted that Section 5607(b)(2) of the Municipality 

Authorities Act (Act)13 specifies that the purpose of each authority is to “benefit the 

people of the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth)] by, among other 

things, increasing their commerce, health, safety and prosperity . . . .” 53 Pa.C.S. §

5607(b)(2). In furtherance of that purpose, the trial court concluded that the Authority 

own motion and may order proceedings in accordance with its 

direction.

Pa.R.A.P. 105(a). Accordingly, for the purposes of judicial economy, this Court regards the August 

7, 2020 entry of judgment valid upon the expiration of the 120 days.

11 The decision to grant a new trial based on a challenge to the weight of 

the evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent an 

abuse of discretion, we will not reverse the trial court’s ruling. It is 

well established that the trial court should award a new trial on the basis 

requested by appellant only where a verdict is so contrary to the 

evidence so as to shock one’s sense of justice and make the award of a 

new trial imperative. An appellate court may review the trial court’s

decision to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion, but it 

may not substitute its judgment for that of the lower court.

Commonwealth v. Lilliock, 740 A.2d 237, 241 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations omitted).

An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court has rendered a 

judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, has 

failed to apply the law, or was motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias, 

or ill will. A finding by an appellate court that it would have reached a 

different result than the trial court does not constitute a finding of an 

abuse of discretion. ‘Where the record adequately supports the trial 

court’s reasons and factual basis, the court did not abuse its discretion.’ 

[Morrison v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 646 A.2d 565, 570-71 (Pa. 1994)]

(quoting Coker [v. S.M. Flickeringer Co., Inc.], 625 A.2d [1181,] 1187 

[(Pa. 1993)]). 

Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah, 756 A.2d 1116, 1123 (Pa. 2000) (citations omitted).

12 On November 12, 2020, following oral argument, Koszarek applied for permission to 

submit a post-argument statement for the panel’s consideration (Post-Argument Application) 

pursuant to Rule 2501, Pa. R.A.P. 2501. The Authority did not file a response. Upon consideration, 

this Court grants the Post-Argument Application.

13 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5601-5623.
9

must spend its funds responsibly, and that when those funds are improperly used, the 

Authority must correct its error.14 The trial court explained that it “did not enter verdict 

on any theory of conversion, mistake, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary duty or 

fraud.” May 18, 2020 Trial Ct. Op. issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(a) (Rule 1925(a) Opinion) at 6, R.R. at 911a. Rather, the trial court’s 

opinion is founded in the principle of restitution. 

Long ago, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared “that money paid 

under a mistake of fact may be recovered back is authoritatively settled.” Donner v. 

Sackett, 97 A. 89, 91 (Pa. 1916). Similarly, in Greenwich Bank v. Commercial Banking 

Corp., 85 Pa. Super. 159 (1925), the Pennsylvania Superior Court explained:

The defendant is in possession of money of the plaintiff 

which in good conscience it is not entitled to keep and the 

law requires its return.

It is of no moment that no privity of contract existed between 

the plaintiff and defendant. ‘Where one has in his hands 

money which in equity and good conscience belongs and 

ought to be paid to another, an action for money had and 

received will lie for the recovery thereof. No privity of 

contract is necessary to sustain this action, for the law, under 

these circumstances, implies a promise to pay’[.] McAvoy & 

McMichael v. [Commonwealth] Title Ins. & Tr[.] Co., 27 Pa. 

Super. 271[, 276-77 (1905)][.]

Greenwich Bank, 85 Pa. Super. at 163; see also Smith v. Capital Bank & Trust Co., 191 

A. 124 (Pa. 1937); McKibben v. Doyle, 34 A. 455 (Pa. 1896); Glen Alden Corp. v. 

Tomchick, 130 A.2d 719, 720 (Pa. Super. 1957) (“[I]t is clear that the defendant 

obtained money from the plaintiff to which she was not entitled, and under the theory 

of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff is entitled to restitution of the sum improperly 

paid.”). 

14 This Court notes that Section 5612 of the Act, 53 Pa.C.S. § 5612, imposes comprehensive 

duties, specific prohibitions and reporting requirements upon an Authority with respect to the 

management of its finances. 
10

More recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

looked to the Restatement [(First)] of Restitution [Am. Law. 

Inst. (1937) (Restatement)] as a source of authority in 

determining whether the retention of a particular benefit 

would be unjust. Section [20] of the Restatement provides 

as follows:

§ 20 MISTAKE AS TO EXTENT OF DUTY 

OR AMOUNT PAID IN DISCHARGE 

THEREOF:

A person who has paid another an excessive 

amount of money because of an erroneous belief 

induced by a mistake of fact that the sum paid 

was necessary for the discharge of a duty, for 

the performance of a condition, or for the 

acceptance of an offer, is entitled to restitution 

of the excess.

Lucey v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Vy-Cal Plastics PMA Grp.), 732 A.2d 1201, 

1204 (Pa. 1999) (citations omitted). 

[In order] to recover . . . , two elements of the remedy of 

restitution must be found to exist: (1) a requisite mistake, and 

(2) consequent unjust enrichment. It is well-settled that 

equitable relief will generally not issue to correct a mistake 

of law but may issue to rectify a mistake of fact which has 

been defined by our Supreme Court as ‘any mistake except a 

mistake of law.’ Betta v. Smith, . . . 81 A.2d 538, 539 ([Pa.] 

1951) . . . .

Dep’t of Gen. Servs. v. Collingdale Millwork Co., 454 A.2d 1176, 1179 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1983) (footnote omitted).

Here, in support of its analysis, the trial court cited Lucey and this Court’s 

decision in Mino v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Crime Prevention Ass’n), 

990 A.2d 832 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), wherein this Court rejected a claimant’s assertion 

that his employer should not be entitled to an offset based on the theory of unjust 

enrichment. The Mino Court concluded: “[The insurer’s] payment of workers’
11

compensation benefits to [the c]laimant . . . was based on [the insurer’s] mistaken belief 

as to the discharge of its duties . . . and [the c]laimant was unjustly enriched by [the 

insurer’s] mistake.” Id. at 842.

Koszarek attempts to distinguish Mino, claiming that “the decision was 

based entirely on the statutory scheme of workers’ compensation and decisions 

interpreting this scheme, a set of rules and regulations not relevant to the case at bar.” 

Koszarek Amended Br. at 47. Koszarek misreads Mino. Although Mino involved 

workers’ compensation law, nothing in the opinion limits the Court’s analysis thereto. 

Based on the principle of restitution, this Court concluded that claimant was unjustly 

enriched by the insurer’s mistake, and accordingly, the insurer was entitled to an offset.

Koszarek further asserts that “as a matter of law, where there is an express, 

written agreement, the theory of unjust enrichment does not apply.” Koszarek 

Amended Br. at 39. In support, Koszarek references Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21

(Pa. Super. 2006). Therein, a company’s suspended vice president sought, inter alia, 

restitution pertaining to the value of patents the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office issued for devices, some of which the vice president had designed. The vice 

president assigned the patents to the corporation. “All of the assignments explicitly 

provided that the patents were assigned ‘in consideration of One Dollar ($1.00) and 

other good and valuable consideration paid to [the vice president] by [the] assignee, 

receipt whereof [the assignor] hereby acknowledge[s].’” Lackner, 892 A.2d at 25

(quoting the record). 

In rejecting the restitution claim, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 

explained:

[T]he record contains fully-executed written agreements 

wherein [the vice president] assigned the patents ‘in 

consideration of One Dollar ($1.00) and other good and 

valuable consideration’ acknowledged as received by [the 

vice president]. As previously noted, [the vice president]
12

testified that he freely assigned the patents without coercion. 

[The vice president’s] unjust enrichment action cannot 

proceed in the face of fully-executed, express contracts.

Lackner, 892 A.2d at 34 (record citations omitted).

Unlike in Lackner, the restitution sought in the instant case is for monies 

paid in error. The existence of Koszarek’s employment contract does not preclude 

restitution for payments intended to be made in accordance with that agreement, but 

made in error and in excess of those required under the agreement. Therefore, Lackner

is distinguishable. Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, the trial court did not 

err by concluding that the Authority proved that Koszarek had been overpaid, and that 

the Authority could recover the overpayments under the principle of restitution.

Koszarek next argues that the trial court erred or abused its discretion by 

failing to conclude that the Authority was estopped from seeking repayment of wages

and benefits it previously approved. Koszarek specifically contends that the Authority

should be estopped from recovering the alleged overpayments “because her salary 

payments and benefits were approved by both of her supervisors at the time, and 

because her post-retirement benefits were also implicitly approved by the Board [] in 

executive session without objection.” Koszarek Amended Br. at 49. She further asserts 

that 

[i]n making the decision to retire, [Koszarek] reasonably 

relied upon the Authority’s approval of her wages and future 

benefits payment package, which served as an inducement to 

retire at that time. The Authority should therefore have been 

estopped from changing its mind and demanding repayment 

of funds which it previously approved. 

Koszarek Amended Br. at 50. 

In support of her argument that the Authority is estopped from seeking 

repayment, Koszarek cites Kellams v. Public School Employes’ Retirement Board, 403 

A.2d 1315 (Pa. 1979), wherein an equally divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
13

considered whether the Commonwealth was entitled to restitution, where, over a period 

of several years, as a result of its own error, it paid public school employees more 

retirement benefits than the applicable law allowed. In an Opinion in Support of 

Affirmance,15 Justice Roberts stated: “Not a particle of evidence suggests the retirees 

improperly induced the overpayments. Indeed, the overpayments were made solely 

because the Commonwealth mistakenly interpreted the [law]. And nothing would 

suggest the retirees sought to perpetuate the Commonwealth’s error.” Kellams, 403 

A.2d at 1316 (Roberts, J., Op. in Support of Affirmance). Justice Roberts further noted:

The Commonwealth Court . . . fully explained:

[H]ere the issue is not the correctness of the 

Commonwealth claim, it is whether it would be 

unconscionable to permit the Commonwealth to 

demand restitution in this unusual situation. 

Perhaps the things that make the plaintiffs’

position so unique are that all the facts were well 

known to everyone, as far as the record 

shows the original incorrect ruling was made 

unilaterally by the Commonwealth after a 

request and full disclosure by the plaintiffs, and 

the Commonwealth persisted in its error over a 

number of years while the plaintiffs used the 

funds presumably for the purposes for which 

retirement payments are intended, i.e., to pay for 

living expenses after the income from gainful 

employment has ended.[]

[Kellams v. Pub. Sch. Emps.’ Retirement Bd.,] . . . 391 A.2d

1139, 1141 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1978).

The Commonwealth Court recognized that the manifest 

hardship repayment would impose must be avoided. On this 

record, devoid of any indication that the retirees were in any 

15 An opinion of affirmance by an equally divided court has no precedential value. See 

Commonwealth v. Covil, 378 A.2d 841 (Pa. 1977).
14

way responsible for the Commonwealth’s error in making 

overpayments, the Commonwealth Court’s order refusing to 

direct repayment is eminently proper. 

Kellams, 403 A.2d at 1316 (Roberts, J., Op. in Support of Affirmance). 

Kellams is distinguishable. Here, unlike in Kellams, the Authority did not 

wait years but, rather, discovered the alleged overpayments shortly after Koszarek’s 

retirement. The Authority promptly commissioned a forensic accounting review, 

approached both the District Attorney’s Office and the Ethics Commission, and 

thereafter initiated the instant action. Further, unlike in Kellams, there is at least “a 

particle of evidence [that] suggests [Koszarek] improperly induced the [alleged] 

overpayments.” Kellams, 403 A.2d at 1316. Thus, the facts in the instant matter are 

far different from those in Kellams. 

Moreover, in Greenwich Bank, the Superior Court declared:

[I]t [does not] matter that the negligence of the plaintiff 

contributed to the double payment. ‘Negligence in making a 

mistake does not deprive a party of his remedy on account 

thereof; it is the fact that one by mistake unintentionally pays 

money to another to which the latter is not entitled from the 

former, that gives the right of action[.’] Kunkel v. Kunkel, 

110 A. 73 [(Pa. 1920).]

Greenwich Bank, 85 Pa. Super. at 163. Notwithstanding, the Kunkel Court specifically 

distinguished negligent overpayments from those overpayments “paid . . . intentionally, 

[with the payor] not choosing to investigate the facts.” Kunkel, 110 A. at 75 (quoting 

Girard Tr. Co. v. Harrington, 23 Pa. Super. 615, 621 (1903)); see also McKibben. The 

Kunkel Court emphasized, however, “[t]he mere omission to take advantage of means 

of knowledge within the reach of the party paying [money under mistake of fact] does 

not prevent a recovery.” Kunkel, 110 A. at 75 (quoting McKibben, 34 A. at 455). Here, 

there is no evidence that the Authority knew the payments it was approving exceeded 

the amounts to which Koszarek was entitled. Rather, the record evidence reflects that 
15

the Authority unknowingly approved the alleged overpayments under what were, at 

worst, negligent circumstances. 

Further, the record evidence does not support Koszarek’s assertion that 

“[i]n making the decision to retire, [she] reasonably relied upon the Authority’s 

approval of her wages and future benefits payment package[.]” Koszarek Amended 

Br. at 50 (emphasis added). In her March 13, 2014 resignation letter, Koszarek

described her reasons for retiring as her concerns regarding the Authority’s alleged 

possible “illegal and unethical actions” and the Authority’s failure to “take seriously 

[her] complaints, to investigate them . . . and address them[.]” R.R. at 475a. Therein,

she requested “a payout in [her] last pay [for her] current vacation and sick time held 

on the Authority’s books and to use [her] personal, family illness and compensation 

time beginning March 28, 2014[,] as is consistent with current Authority practices.” 

Id. Notably, the Board approved her retirement in response to the March 13, 2014 

resignation letter. Thus, Koszarek’s decision to retire could not have been based on 

the Authority’s subsequent “approval of her wages and future benefits payment 

package[.]”

16

 Koszarek Amended Br. at 50. Accordingly, the trial court did not err or 

abuse its discretion when it held that, regardless of the Board’s approval of the alleged 

16 Koszarek also cites Borkey v. Township of Centre, 847 A.2d 807 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), for 

the proposition, “[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is an equitable remedy that may be asserted 

against the Commonwealth or one of its political subdivisions.” Id. at 811. This Court does not hold 

otherwise. Notably, the Borkey Court explained:

In order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the 

Commonwealth, it must be shown that the Commonwealth (1) 

intentionally or negligently misrepresented some material facts, (2) 

knowing or having reason to know that the other party would rely on 

that misrepresentation, and (3) thereby induced the party to act to his 

or her detriment.

Id. at 811 (emphasis added). Koszarek’s March 13, 2014 resignation letter, wherein she described 

her reasons for retirement, undermine Koszarek’s assertion that the Authority’s perceived 

acquiescence in the alleged overpayments induced her to retire.
16

overpayments, the Authority was entitled to recover any proven overpayments from 

Koszarek.

Koszarek next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding 

that wage and benefit overpayments were made. According to Koszarek, “without 

making any credibility determinations, the [trial c]ourt discussed the Authority’s 

expert witnesses and ignored [] Koszarek’s own testimony, concluding only that she 

‘did not present any independent testimony from an accountant or other [Authority] 

employee supporting her assertions.’” Koszarek Amended Br. at 53 (quoting Rule 

1925(a) Op. at 4).

Contrary to Koszarek’s contention, the trial court did not ignore 

Koszarek’s testimony. Rather, it specifically noted that “Koszarek disputed the 

findings of [the Authority’s] witnesses, including its outside accountant and forensic 

account[ant] and maintained that all payments to the employees listed were 

appropriate.” Rule 1925(a) Op. at 4, R.R. at 909a. Further, “[f]ailure to mention 

testimony does not compel a conclusion that it was not considered.”17 Colt Indus. v. 

Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 415 A.2d 972, 974 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980).

Importantly, “it [is] within the province of the trial court to weigh 

conflicting testimony, to make credibility determinations and to make findings of fact 

based on those assessments[.]” In re Dauphin Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau, 834 A.2d 1229, 

1232 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). “This Court is bound by the trial court’s findings of fact 

unless those findings are not based on competent evidence in the record. Likewise, we 

are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations.” Big Bass Lake Cmty. Ass’n 

17 Koszarek also contends that the trial court automatically discounted her testimony because 

she was not presented as an expert witness. See Koszarek Amended Br. at 54. There is nothing in 

the trial court’s opinion indicating such. Rather, in its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court referenced 

Koszarek’s testimony and noted that she did not present corroborating or expert witness testimony. 

See Rule 1925(a) Op. at 4, R.R. at 909a. It did not state that simply because Koszarek was not 

presented as an expert witness, her testimony was less compelling.
17

v. Warren, 23 A.3d 619, 625 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (citation omitted). “A trial court’s 

factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless ‘the record affords them 

inadequate evidentiary support or when they have been premised upon erroneous 

inferences and deductions . . . from the evidence.’” Big Bass Lake Cmty. Ass’n v. 

Warren, 950 A.2d 1137, 1147 n.16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (quoting Moyerman v. 

Glanzberg, 138 A.2d 681, 684 (Pa. 1958)). “That the record may contain evidence that 

supports a different result than that reached by the [fact finder] is irrelevant so long as 

the record contains substantial evidence supporting the [fact finder’s] decision.” Lyft, 

Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 145 A.3d 1235, 1240 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016); see also

Gnagey Gas & Oil Co. v. Pa. Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Fund, 82 

A.3d 485 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). “On appeal, it is not the duty of the appellate court to 

find the facts, but to determine whether there is evidence in the record to justify the 

trial court’s findings of fact.” Bold Corp. v. Cnty. of Lancaster, 801 A.2d 469, 477 (Pa. 

2002) (quoting Torbik v. Luzerne Cnty., 696 A.2d 1141, 1145 (Pa. 1997)).

Here, according to the trial court, “[t]he facts established that [the 

Authority] overpaid Koszarek in the total amount of $26,399.77[,]” R.R. at 911a-912a, 

and the overpayments were “proved by clear and substantial evidence[,]” R.R. at 910a. 

The trial court further determined:

[The Authority] received no return additional benefit but 

believed that the payments were properly calculated and due 

to Koszarek in exchange for her employment as previously 

agreed. This was not the case, however, as [the Authority] 

later discovered after Koszarek left. Koszarek was neither 

entitled to[,] nor in any way earned[,] the extra money she 

received and therefore must pay restitution to [the Authority]

as a result. 

Id. at 7, R.R. at 912a.

Koszarek argues:
18

The analysis and conclusions of . . . Barbagallo, upon which 

[the Authority] bases its case, were seriously flawed and 

subject to dispute at trial, both through cross[-]examination 

and by [] Koszarek on rebuttal, demonstrating that []

Barbagallo did not rely on the entirety of the Authority’s

policies and procedures. He admitted, for instance that a 

missing wage letter and sticky note referenced at note 8 of 

his own report was not considered. He admitted that he was 

not aware that comp [sic] time was usually accounted for as 

regular pay due to limitations in the computerized payroll 

accounting system. He admitted that he did not consider that 

vacation pay was approved by Koszarek’s supervisors and 

the Board [] upon her resignation. He admitted regarding 

sick time that he did not consider Authority policy as 

developed from prior grievance decisions or the approval of 

[] Koszarek’s retirement letter. He admitted that he did not

consider that [] Koszarek’s comp [sic] time was approved by 

her supervisor and the Board and further admitted that he 

relied on the hearsay interpretation of collective bargaining 

agreements that directly contradicted the plain language of 

those agreements. And he admitted that he had no 

knowledge concerning the accounting system and how it was 

managed.

Koszarek Amended Br. at 53-54 (emphasis added).

“It has long been Pennsylvania law that, while conclusions recorded by 

experts may be disputed, [determinations regarding] the credibility and weight 

attributed to those conclusions . . . reside in the sole province of the trier of fact[.]” 

Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1161 (Pa. 2010). 

‘An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case 

that the expert has been made aware of or personally 

observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably 

rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on 

the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be 

admitted.’ Pa.R.E. 703; In re D.Y., 34 A.3d 177, 182-83 (Pa.

Super. 2011) . . . . ‘If the expert states an opinion the expert 

must state the facts or data on which the opinion is based.’

Pa.R.E. 705 and Comment (explaining otherwise 

inadmissible facts and data supporting expert opinion are 

considered only to explain basis for expert’s opinion, not as 

substantive evidence). ‘Once expert testimony has been 
19

admitted, the rules of evidence then place the full burden 

of exploration of facts and assumptions underlying the 

testimony of an expert witness squarely on the shoulders 

of opposing counsel’s cross-examination.’ In re D.Y., [34 

A.3d] at 183. Opposing counsel bears the burden of 

exposing and exploring ‘any weaknesses in the 

underpinnings of the expert’s opinion.’ Id.

Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 358 (Pa. Super. 2014) (emphasis added),

impliedly overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103, 

1106 (Pa. 2015).

Here, Barbagallo testified regarding the basis for his expert opinion that 

Koszarek had been overpaid. He explained: “[W]e looked at the hiring documents and 

contract, and we looked at the dates involved. And what we did was look at what was 

paid during those dates in accordance with [B]oard actions, hiring letter, contract, [sic] 

and determine whether she was overpaid in accordance with those documents.” R.R. 

at 756a. The alleged inadequacies of his analysis were explored on cross-examination. 

Notably, “[e]xpert testimony is competent to support a finding of fact even where the 

witness admits to uncertainty, doubt, reservation, or a lack of information with regard 

to medical and scientific details; provided that the witness does not recant the opinion 

or belief first expressed.” Corcoran v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Capital 

Cities/Times Leader), 725 A.2d 868, 872 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).

In the instant matter,

through cross-examination, [Koszarek] had the opportunity, 

and in fact did point out, what [she] perceived to be errors . . 

. in the [Authority’s] expert’s testimony. It is the function of 

the [fact finder] to determine and resolve the discrepancies in 

the testimony of the expert witnesses. The weight of the 

testimony may be affected, but not its admissibility.

In re Condemnation by Dep’t of Transp., 501 A.2d 1172, 1175 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985)

(emphasis added). The trial court, as it was empowered to do, weighed the evidence, 

including Barbagallo’s testimony both on direct and cross-examination, and concluded 
20

that the Authority had proven Koszarek’s overpayments. Although the trial court did 

not explicitly declare Barbagallo’s testimony credible, it unambiguously credited the 

Authority’s evidence (which included Barbagallo’s testimony calculating the 

overpayments) as “clear and substantial[.]” Rule 1925(a) Op. at 5, R.R. at 910a. 

Barbagallo’s testimony and expert report,18 along with that of the Authority’s other 

witnesses is substantial evidence which supports the trial court’s decision. Thus, this 

Court is bound by the trial court’s factual findings. Further, because “the record 

adequately supports the trial court’s reasons and factual basis, the [trial] court did not 

abuse its discretion.” Harman, 756 A.2d at 1123 (quoting Coker, 625 A.2d at 1187).

Next, Koszarek argues that the trial court erred or abused its discretion by 

rejecting Koszarek’s counterclaim based on the Settlement Agreement. According to 

Koszarek, “[her] counter[]claims concern actions by the Authority that clearly occurred 

after she signed the release of all claims. This [] Koszarek could not have waived as a 

matter of law.” Koszarek Amended Br. at 56. 

In consideration of the $70,000.00 settlement payment, Koszarek agreed, 

inter alia, to 

refrain from filing any future claims, complaints, or 

lawsuits[19] with any federal, state, or local court, 

administrative body or agency against [the Authority] and 

any entity or individual related to [the Authority] . . . arising 

from Koszarek’s employment, her separation from 

employment, any employment-related or non-employment 

related conduct by [the Authority], or any entity related to 

[the Authority] in or outside any workplace(s), or for any 

other reason, whether currently known or unknown.

R.R. at 477a. 

18 The trial court admitted Barbagallo’s expert report into evidence on agreement of both 

counsel. See R.R. at 748a.

19 In exchange for the release of her claims, the Authority did not similarly agree to refrain

from filing future claims, complaints, or lawsuits against Koszarek.
21

Further, Koszarek

irrevocably and unconditionally release[d], acquit[ted], 

h[e]ld harmless and forever discharge[d the Authority] . . . 

from any and all causes of action, suits, appeals, damages . . 

. whether known or unknown, now existing or 

subsequently arising . . . which were brought or could have 

been brought, whether or not filed, pertaining to (1) the 

events and transaction that are the subject matter of the 

[a]ction; (2) Koszarek’s employment with and separation 

from [the Authority]; and/or (3) any and all claims based on 

state, federal or local laws . . . arising out of or related to any 

wage, compensation, or bonus payments claim resulting 

from Koszarek’s employment with [the Authority], 

separation from employment with [the Authority], or [] due 

to any employment-related or non-employment conduct in or 

outside of any of the [Authority] workplace(s), or for any 

other reason, whether known or unknown as of the effective 

date of this release . . . .

R.R. at 477a-478a (emphasis added).

20

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

‘[A] long line of Pennsylvania cases has held that a release 

covers only those matters which may be fairly said to have 

been within the contemplation of the parties when the release 

was given.’ Restifo v. McDonald, . . . 230 A.2d 199, 201 

([Pa.] 1967).

Waivers which release liability for actions not accrued at the 

time of the release are generally only invalid if they involve 

20 The Settlement Agreement also contains a Non-Disparagement provision which provided

in relevant part:

(a) . . . [W]ithout the prior written consent of [the Authority], neither 

Koszarek nor any person acting on behalf of or under her direction or 

control, shall provide any testimony, statements, declarations . . . or 

shall otherwise assist, any person adverse to [the Authority], . . . in 

connection with any legal proceeding or investigation . . . .

(b) Koszarek agrees that she will not take any action or make any 

statements, verbal or written, which disparage [the Authority.]

R.R. at 480a. There is no similar language constraining the Authority.
22

future actions entirely different than ones contemplated by 

the parties at the time of the release. 

Bowman v. Sunoco, Inc., 65 A.3d 901, 909 (Pa. 2013).

In her first counterclaim, Koszarek alleged that the Authority violated 

whistleblower laws by retaliating against her and filing unfounded complaints with the 

Ethics Commission and the District Attorney’s Office, and reporting the allegations to 

the press. Specifically, Koszarek asserts:

The post-release activities about which [] Koszarek 

complained in her counterclaim included continuing to 

cooperate with the District Attorney’s [Office’s] 

investigation after the June 10, 2015 release, and up to 

March 28, 2016, when the District Attorney[’s Office]

declined to prosecute. The Authority also referred []

Koszarek for prosecution before the . . . Ethics Commission 

sometimes [sic] in April of 2015, but continued to cooperate

with the [Ethics] Commission and push for prosecution until 

the [Ethics] Commission dismissed the investigation with 

prejudice on its own motion on May 16, 2016, well after the 

June 10, 2015 release was executed. Moreover, well after

the release was signed, an unflattering article concerning []

Koszarek appeared on February 19, 2016 in 

Levittownnow.com that reported on the nonpublic 

Barbagallo [r]eport, which had been secretly released to it 

by someone at the Authority with access to that internal 

report.[21] And Board Member Richard Altmiller published 

an opinion editorial in the very same newspaper on July 18, 

2016, in which he publicly regretted that the District 

Attorney[’s Office] had refused to prosecute [Koszarek22] --

yet another action that occurred well after the June 10, 2015 

execution of the release. Further, the Authority’s actions to 

sue [] Koszarek occurred well after the release was signed.

21 Contrary to Koszarek’s assertion, there is no record evidence demonstrating that “someone 

at the Authority” released Barbagallo’s report to Levittownnow.com. Koszarek Amended Br. at 56.

22 In her Reply Brief, Koszarek similarly contends that the Authority “allowed the release of 

confidential material to the press which resulted in publication of an unflattering article about 

[Koszarek], and allowed one of its board members to publish an aggressively critical op-ed piece 

regarding [Koszarek.]” Koszarek Reply Br. at 3 (emphasis added). There is no record evidence 

establishing that the Authority consented to or otherwise allowed the release of Barbagallo’s report,

or that the Board participated in its member’s decision to publish the July 18, 2016 opinion editorial.
23

Koszarek Amended Br. at 55-56 (italic emphasis added). 

In the Settlement Agreement, Koszarek irrevocably and unconditionally 

released the Authority “from any and all causes of action, suits, appeals, damages . . . 

whether known or unknown, now existing or subsequently arising . . . which were 

brought or could have been brought, whether or not filed, pertaining to . . . Koszarek’s 

employment with and separation from [the Authority.]” R.R. at 478a (emphasis 

added). The Authority notified both the District Attorney’s Office and the Ethics 

Commission in April of 2015 of the alleged overpayments, before Koszarek signed the 

Settlement Agreement on June 10, 2015.23 See R.R. at 496a, 501a. Whether or not 

Koszarek was aware of the Authority’s conduct in contacting the District Attorney’s 

Office or the Ethics Commission, Koszarek released the Authority from liability

therefor. Further, the Authority’s continued cooperation in preexisting, ongoing 

investigations was consistent with its duty to “benefit the people of the Commonwealth 

by, among other things, increasing their commerce, health, safety and prosperity . . . 

[,]” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(b)(2), and with its fiscal responsibilities under Section 5612 of 

the Act, and is not indicative of retaliatory behavior.

Given that the Authority is a public entity, Koszarek should have 

contemplated the possibility that it might make public and release relevant information 

concerning investigations and any money it believed it was owed.

24

 Except for the 

release of the Barbagallo report and the opinion editorial, the actions which form the 

basis for Koszarek’s retaliation counterclaim were in process when she signed the 

23 Koszarek characterizes the Authority’s “continuing” cooperation with the District 

Attorney’s Office and Ethics Commission investigations after Koszarek signed the Settlement 

Agreement as retaliatory. Koszarek Amended Br. at 55 (emphasis added). Koszarek’s position 

necessarily acknowledges that both investigations and the Authority’s cooperation therewith began 

before Koszarek signed the Settlement Agreement. 

24 Neither the February 19, 2016 article in Levittownnow.com nor Board Member Richard 

Altmiller’s July 18, 2016 opinion editorial identified Koszarek by name.
24

Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed Koszarek’s first 

counterclaim. 

In Koszarek’s second counterclaim, she alleged that the Authority abused 

the legal process by, inter alia, filing the instant lawsuit after both the District 

Attorney’s Office and the Ethics Commission determined that the Authority’s 

allegations were meritless, for the alleged purpose of retaliating against her for filing 

and settling her discrimination and whistleblower complaints, and for having raised 

complaints with the Authority about Rajput. See R.R. at 64a. 

This Court acknowledges:

‘The tort of ‘abuse of process’ is defined as the use of legal 

process against another ‘primarily to accomplish a purpose

for which it is not designed.’’ Rosen v. Am[.] Bank of Rolla, 

. . . 627 A.2d 190, 192 ([Pa. Super.] 1993) (quoting 

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 [Am. Law Inst. 

(1977)]). ‘To establish a claim for abuse of process it must 

be shown that the defendant (1) used a legal process against 

the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which 

the process was not designed; and harm has been caused to 

the plaintiff.’ Id. . . . The gravamen of abuse of process is 

the perversion of the particular legal process for a purpose of 

benefit to the defendant, which is not an authorized goal of 

the procedure. Id. In support of this claim, the [plaintiff]

must show ‘‘some definite act or threat not authorized by the 

process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of 

the process . . . ; and there is no liability where the defendant 

has done nothing more than carry out the process to its 

authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions.’’ Di 

Sante v. Russ Fin[.] Co., . . . 380 A.2d 439, 441 ([Pa. Super.]

1977) (quoting PROSSER, TORTS, § 100, at 669 (2d [e]d. 

1955)).

Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1236 (Pa. Super. 1998).

It is not enough that the defendant had bad or malicious 

intentions or that the defendant acted from spite or with an 

ulterior motive. Rather, there must be an act or threat not 

authorized by the process, or the process must be used for an 

illegitimate aim such as extortion, blackmail, or to coerce or 
25

compel the plaintiff to take some collateral action. ‘There is 

no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than 

carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even 

though with bad intentions.’ Shaffer v. Stewart, . . . 473 A.2d 

[1017,] 1019 [(Pa. Super. 1984)][.]

Al Hamilton Contracting Co. v. Cowder, 644 A.2d 188, 192 (Pa. Super. 1994)

(emphasis added; citations omitted).

Here, the Authority successfully pursued the instant action against 

Koszarek to recover money which the trial court found the Authority was rightfully 

owed.25 Notably, of all the employee overpayments Koszarek made, the overpayments 

she made to herself constituted the most significant and costly loss of the Authority’s 

funds. See R.R. at 521a-522a. Even assuming, arguendo, that the Authority pursued 

this action with “bad or malicious intentions,” it has “done nothing more than carry out 

the process to its authorized conclusion[.]” Id. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed 

Koszarek’s abuse of process claim.26

Finally, Koszarek argues that the trial court erred or abused its discretion 

by concluding that the Authority recouped overpayments from other employees.

Notably, the record contains a $47.38 check dated April 21, 2015 from Rajput 

reimbursing the Authority for his overpayment.27 See R.R. at 570a. The record 

evidence further reflects that on April 25, 2018, the Authority sent letters to several 

employees notifying them of payroll overpayments and requesting repayment. See

R.R. at 562a-569a. As addressed supra, under restitution principles, the Authority was 

entitled to recover alleged overpayments to Koszarek, if such overpayments were 

proven. This recovery is permissible, regardless of whether the Authority sought to 

25 In fact, Koszarek admitted that she had overpaid herself $906.30. 

26

“An appellate court is permitted to affirm an order of the trial court on other grounds if the 

correct result was reached.” Citimortgage, Inc. v. KDR Invs., LLP, 954 A.2d 755, 756 n.2 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2008).

27 The memo line on the check describes the payment as “[r]eimbursement of overpayment of 

wages 2012-2014.” R.R. at 570a.
26

recover overpayments from other employees and whether those employees actually 

reimbursed the Authority. In fact, the Authority pursued investigations of the 

individual allegedly responsible for the overpayments. Upon confirming such 

overpayments, the Authority sought Koszarek’s repayment before seeking repayment 

from other employees. 

Finally, with respect to Koszarek’s assertion that the trial court erred by 

concluding that the Authority recouped overpayments from other employees, such is 

harmless error because the Authority did recoup repayment from one employee and it 

is not relevant or determinative with respect to the Authority’s rights to restitution from 

Koszarek for the overpayments. Accordingly, this Court discerns no reversible error 

or abuse of discretion.

For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lower Bucks County Joint :

Municipal Authority :

:

v. :

:

Patricia Koszarek, : No. 686 C.D. 2020

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 11th day of December, 2020, the Bucks County Common 

Pleas Court’s April 6, 2020 decision is affirmed. Patricia Koszarek’s Application to 

File Post-Argument Communication is granted.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge