Docket Nos. 1 08289, 1 08290 co ns.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PEOPLE OFTHE STATE OFILLINO IS, Appellant, v. ZACH ARY B OECKMA

NN, Appel

le e.–THE PEOPLE OF THE ST AT E OF ILLI NOI S, Appellant, v. CHE LSE Y MASCH OFF, Appel le e.
Opinion filed June 24, 2010.

JUSTICE KI LB RI DEde l i v ered th e j udgm

en t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chief Just ice Fit zge ra ld co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. Justice Garm an spe cial l y conc urred, w i th opi ni on, j oi ned by Justice Thomas. Justice Freem an di ssen ted, with opin

ion, j oine d by

Justice Burke. Jus t ice Kar meier t oo k no par t in the d ecisio n.

OPINI ON

The ci rcuit court o f Cl

in to n Coun ty decl ared unconsti

tut iona l
se cti on 6–206 (a )(43) of the Illin ois Vehi cle Code (625 ILCS 5/6–206( a)(43) (West 2008) ) on due pr ocess gro unds. As a pp lied in t his case, secti on 6–206(a)(43) requ ires s usp ensio n of d riving priv il eges if a person receives c our t supervi si on for unl awful
consu m ption of alcohol un

der 21 ye ar s of

ag e. I l l i noi s S ec reta ry of Sta te Jess e White (S ecr et ar y) ap pea led t he circ uit co ur t ’s judg ment-2- dir ec t ly to this court un der Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603). Fo rt he fo llo win g r easo ns, we r everse t he circuit co urt ’s jud gme nt de cla r ing se ct io n 6 –2 06 ( a) ( 43 ) un co nst it ut io na l.

I. BACKG

ROUND The defendan

ts in thi s co nsoli

dated ap peal, Zachary

R. Bo eck mann

and Ch el sey M. Ma sch

hof f , w ere e ach

ch arge d w i th unl awful cons um pti on of alcohol by a pers on un

der 21 ye ar s of age (235 ILCS 5/6–20(e) (West 20 08 )). The def en da n ts f i l ed moti on s to decl areunconsti

tut iona l s ections 6–20 6(a)(3 8) and ( a) (4 3) of t he Ve hic le Code (625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(38), (a) (43 ) (We st 2008 )). Those sections

general ly authorizeth e S ecre tar

y of Sta te to sus pend
orrevoke a de f

en da nt’ s d ri vi ng pri vi l eg esupon

con vi cti on or disposition of cour t super vi sion f or t he charged offen

ses. De f en da n ts alle ged sec tions 6–206(a)(38) and (a)(43) vi olated t he ir con sti tuti on al ri gh ts to due proc es s a nd eq ual prote cti on of t he la w. Def e ndan ts pled gui

lty to unl awful consum ption of al

cohol as charged. The trial

cou rt pl ac ed the m on co ur t su pe rvis io n fo r90 da ys and, the fol

lowi ng day , decl ared sections

6–206(a)(38) and (a)(43)
un co nst it ut io na l. Af ter those orders were fi le d, the Secretary en tered an appearan

ce and the trial

court granted hi

m l eave to fi le pe ti ti o ns t o va cat e t he fi ndi ngso f u nc o ns t it ut io na lit y. In hi s petitions, the Secretary asse rted he did no t re ceive no t ice o f the def endan ts’ motions

seeki ng a de cl ara ti on th at t h e st at ut e wa s unc ons t itu t ional. In r esp ons e t o t he peti ti ons , t he t rial co ur t vaca t ed it s o rd er s de claring sec t ions 6–206(a)(38) an

d ( a) (4 3) un

con sti tuti on al an d al l owe d th

e def en da n ts to f i l e s upp l em en tal moti ons ch al l en gi ng the consti tution ali t y of t he statut e. De f en da n ts then fi le d motions

alle gin g sections 6–206(a)(38) and (a)(43 ), as ap pli ed , vi ol atethe due proc es s a

nd eq ual prote cti on cl ausesof the United Stat es and Ill in ois Constitut ions as well as t he pr opor ti on ate penalties clause of the Illi nois C ons t itu t ion. The Secre tary sti pul ated that under sect io n 6 –2 06 ( a) ( 43 ) o f t he Ve hic le Code, he wa s re quir ed t o s usp end fo r t hre e mont hs t he dr iving priv il eges of a ny

pe rs on r ec ei vi ng cou rt su pe rvi si on f or a v i ol ati on of-3- se cti on 6–20 o f the Li

quor Contr ol Act (235 I LCS 5/6–20 ( West 2008) ). The trial court subse quently

found s ection 6–206(a)(43) unconsti tut iona l on du e p roc es s g

rou n dsas appl i ed to the defendants. The tri al cou rt h el d th i s c ourt’ s dec i si

on in People v. Lindner , 12 7 I ll. 2d 124 (1989), cont rolled becaus e a ve hic le was not involved in t he
com m i ss i on of t he o ffenses. The defend ant s’ o t her co ns ti tutional chal le nges b ased

on the equal

prot ection an

d propo rtionate penal

ties
c la uses were reje cted by

the trial court . The trial

court ma

de th e addi tional fi ndi ngs m andated by

Supreme C ourt Rul e 18 (210 Ill . 2d R. 18 ) , wh en a s t at ut e is de cla r ed un co nst it ut io na l. The Secre tary appe aled th e tri al

court’s ordersde cl

ari ng se cti on 6–206(a)(43) unc onsti

tution al di rectl y to thi s court as

perm i tted by Supreme Court Ru

l e 603 (134 Il

l . 2d R. 6 03).

II. AN AL YSIS The Secretary conten ds the tri al cou rt er red i n f i nd i ng se cti on 6–206(a)(43) vio lates d ue pro cess as appli ed to the defendants. Accordi ng t o t he Se cr et ar y, sus pens ion o f the defend ant s’ dr iving priv il eg es f or unl awful consum ption of al

cohol b ears a rational
r ela t io nsh ip t o t he le giti

ma te governmen

tal i nterest in hi ghway sa fe t y. The Se cr et ar y maint ain s t ha t pr ev en t ing yo un g p eo ple wh o co nsu me al coh ol from driv in g is a reasonabl

e m e ans of f urt herin g the interest in hi ghway saf ety . The Secre tary al so a rguesthe su sp en si on of defendan ts’ driv in g priv il ege s un der sect ion 6–206(a)(4 3) is a
r ea so na ble me ans of

promoting the l

egi tim ate pu bli c in t er es t in de t er r ing un de r ag e c o nsu mpt io n o f alc o ho l. Citing t his co ur t ’s de cision in Lindner , defen dants contend that
sus pend ingt heir d rivingpri vi l eges does n ot bear a r at io na l re lat io nsh ip to the publi

c in terest in the safe operat ion of m

ot or vehicl

es because
no vehi cle was i

nvolv ed in the commission of thei r offenses. De f en da n ts fur t he rar gu e s us pe nsio n o f dr iving pr ivileg es in all cases of underage consum

ption of al

co ho l i s n

ot a re as ona

bl e m ea ns of pr o mo t ing t he pu blic int er es t in h ig hw ay s af et y. We be gi n by n otin g t ha t st at ut es ar e p r es ume d c o nst it ut io na l. People v. W il liams , 2 35 I ll. 2d 1 78, 199 (2 009 ). To re but t he pr esu mpt ion, t he pa r t y ch alle ng ing t he st at ut e mu st cle ar ly es tabli sh-4- a constituti

onal vi ola tion

. People

ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski , 23 3 I ll. 2d 185, 200 (2009). T hi s court mus t co ns true a stat ute in a ma nne r upho ldingi ts cons

tituti onal i ty i f reas onab l

y possi bl e. Cook C

ounty Republican Party

v. Illinois S

tate Board of Elections , 23 2 I ll. 2d 231, 239 (2009). Accordingl y, we wi

ll reso lve any do ubt on t he
constru cti on of a statute i n f avor of i ts va l i di ty. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdal e , 229 Ill . 2d296, 307 (2 00 8) . T he c o nst it ut io nalit y of a sta tute is reviewed de novo

. In re L aki sha M

. , 227 Ill . 2d 259, 263 (2008 ). T his court has h

el d a driv er’s l ic ense i s a nonf undam ental pr ope rty i ntere st. Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 179. Wh en a statut e does not im

pact
a f un da men tal consti tutiona l righ t, th e a ppl i ca bl e s tan da rd f or r ev ie wing wh et he rit co nfo rms w it h su bst an t ive du e p r o ce ss is th e rational ba si s test. Williams , 2 35 Il l . 2d at 2 05 . G en

eral l y , a sta tute violates the constitutional

gua ra nt ee o f due pr oc ess u nder t he rational ba sis test i f

i t doe s n ot b ea r a ra ti on al re l ati on sh i p to a l eg i ti mate legislat ivepurpos e, or i s arbi trary or di scri m i na tory. Napleton , 22 9 I ll. 2d at 307 ; Village of Lake Villa v . Sto kovich , 211 Ill . 2d 106, 122 (2004 ); Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 180. I n appl yi ng the rational

b as i s te st, we m us t i den ti f y th e pub l i c i

n terest th e statu

te is i n ten de d to prote ct, det er mine whet he r the statut e bears a rational relationshi

p to that i n terest, an d e x am i n e w h eth er th e m eth od ch ose n to prot ect or further that i ntere st i s rea sona

bl e. Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 180. Rational ba sis r ev iew is hig hly d efe r en t ial, bu t it i s n ot “toothl ess .” People v. Jones , 22 3 I ll. 2d 5 69, 596 (2 006 ), quo t ing Mathew s v. De Castro , 429 U.S. 181, 185, 50 L. Ed. 2d 389, 394, 97 S. Ct . 431, 434 (19 76) . Le gi sl

ati on m us t be uph el d if the re i s a con ce i va bl e b as i s f or finding it is r at io na lly

related to a le gi tim ate state i ntere st. Stokovich , 211 Il l . 2d at 12 6. The

l egi slature’ s j udgm

en ts i n dr af tin g a s tatute are not subj ect to judi

ci al fact f in din g and “ ma y b e based on rational sp ecul ati on unsu ppo rt ed byevi

dence or em

piri cal data.” Arangold

v. Zehnder , 204 Il

l . 2d 142 , 147 (2 003). We must first det er mine the pu blic in terest section 6–206(a)(43) is int en de d t o pr o t ec t

. I n e xa mining t he pu blic in t er es t o f simi la r Ve hic le Co de p ro visions in Lindner , thi s court co nsid er ed t he Ve hic le Code asa w

hol e, th e sub sta nti ve prov i si ons of the chal le nged sections, and the V ehi cle Code ’sstatem en t of pur pose. Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 181-82. We observ

ed that the stat ed pur

pose o f the Veh

ic le Code-5- contain ed in se ct io n 6 –2 04 ( a) is pre

ve nti ng pe ople f rom driv in g if they dem onstra te an unf i tnes s to operate a

motor vehi cle saf

el y
. Lindner , 127 Il l . 2d at 1 82 . F ur

th er, t he ch alle ng ed st at ut e s ec t io ns g en er ally
en um erate of f ense s c onn

ec ted to ope rati

ng orownin g a ve hic le s afe ly and l egal l y
. Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 182. We concluded, theref ore, t hat t he challen

ged pro vi sions were i

ntended to pro tect the publi c in terest in “the safe an

d legal oper ation and ownership of m ot or vehicl

es. ” Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 182. The stat emen

t o f purpose in se ction 6– 204 is stil l di rected at pr event ing

peo ple fro m driving after they have sh own an unfi

tness to opera te a veh ic l e saf ely . 625 IL CS 5/6

–204( a) (West 200 8). Ad di t io na lly, t he st at ut e s ec t io n c ha lleng ed he r e d es cr ib es off enses and beh avi or largel y c onnected to o perating a motorvehicle safe ly and leg ally. 625 ILCS 5/6–206 (Wes t 200 8) . Ac co rd ingly, as in Lindner , we co nc lud e s ec t io n 6 –2 06 is int end ed t o pr o mo t e t he s afe and l egal oper ation and ownership of m ot or vehicl

es. We mus t , t her efo re, determ i ne wh ethe r section 6–206 (a)(43 ) be ars a reasonable relationsh ip to the publ ic in terest in the saf

e and l egal ope rati on an d o wn er ship o f mo t o rve hic le s. As appl ie d in this case, sect io n 6– 20 6( a) ( 43 ) pr o vid es fo rsu sp en sio n o f dr iving pr ivile ge s when a person has

recei ved court supervi si on for underage
consu m ption of alcohol. 625 ILCS 5/6–2 06(a)(43) (W est 200 8). The statut e w ill be u ph eld if a c o nc eiv ab le b as is e xist s fo rfind ing it
r at io na lly related to t he i

de ntif ie d le giti ma te publi c i nterest. See Stokovich , 211 Ill . 2d at 126. Here, the General

Asse mbly ma y h ave b elie v ed t hat a you ng pe rs on who has a dr iver’s license and consum es alcohol i

ll egally ma y take the addi

tional step o f dr iving aft er co nsu ming alc o ho l. I t is
r ea so na ble t o b eli

eve a y oung perso n di sobeyi

ng the law agai

nst underageco ns umpt io n o f a lco ho l may a l so l ack th e j udgm en t to dec line to driv e after drin kin g. Pr event ing you ng pe op le fro m driving after co nsuming alc o ho l un qu es t io na bly fur t he r s t he pu blic in t er es t in the safe and l

egal operat ion of m

ot or vehicl

es. Defendan ts, none t heless, co nt end this cour t’s dec ision in Lindner
co mpe ls a fi

ndi ng that sect ion 6–206(a)(4 3) violates due process. Acco rd ingto def

endan ts, Lindner he ld

th at sus pend ing dr iving pr iv i le ges vio lat es t he c o nst it ut io nal g ua ra nt ee o f du e p ro ce ss if a veh ic le was not in

volv ed i n the com mi ssion of the off

ense.-6- In Lindner , t he dis pu t e fo cu se d o n id en t ifying t he pu blic in terest t he chal le nged sta tute wa s i n ten de d to protect. Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 180. This court

no t ed t hat t he St at e ap par ent ly conce ded t he
un con sti tuti on al i ty of th e statu t e if t he de fendant ’s ar gument on t he statut e’s purpose were accepted. Lindner , 127 Ill. 2d at 180 -8 1. We agreed with the defendan

t’s argument t hat the st atut e se rve d t he pu blic int er es t in

the saf e a nd l eg al ope rati on a nd own ers hi p of motor vehi cles. Lindner , 12 7 I ll. 2d at 182 . Wit hou t any arg ument fro m the Sta te on the point, we t hen co nclude d r evo cat ion o f the defendant’s driver’s li cense d id no t be ar a r ea so na ble r ela t io nsh ip t o t ha t pu blic in terest because a veh

ic le was not involved in t he co mmi

ssio n of t he def endan t’s s ex off en ses

. Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 182-83. De f en da n ts as se rt this co ur t sho uld fo llo w “ [ t ] he pr inc iple in Lindner tha

t i f no c ar i s i nv ol ve d, l i kehe re, the n to susp end d riving priv il eges wo uld vi

ola te due process .” Def

endan ts, howe ver, rel y on a nar ro w r ea ding o f Lindner . We ha ve sub s equ ent ly explained t he
r at io na le in Lindner , stating “[t]here was no r at io na l re lat io nsh ip between sex o ffender s and safe d riving, a nd o n t hat basis t he sta tute was found un

constitutional .” People v. Adams , 144 Ill . 2d 3 81, 391 (1991 ), ci ting Lindner , 12 7 I ll. 2d at 183. We h ave f urther explai

ned that in Lindner , t he revoc ation o f the defendant’s dr iver’s lice nse did not b ea r a ra ti on al re l ati on sh i p to the publ

ic in terest t o be served because t he defen

dant’s cri me s “ ne i the r i nv ol ve d a m otor v eh i cl e n or borean y rati on al re l atio nsh ip t o his a bilit y t o dr ive a mo t o rve hic le saf el y .” Jones , 223 Ill . 2d at 604, citing Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 182-83. Acc or ding ly, t he r at ionale in Lindner is br o ad er t ha n simp ly det er mini ng wh ethe

r a ve hic le was involved in t he o ffense. Rat her , t he critical det er minatio n is whet her t he rev oca ti on of dri vi ng pri vi le ges be arsa r at io na l re lat io nsh ip t o t he pu blic in t er es t in t he s afe ope rati

on of motor vehi

cles. In Lindner , there was no connection between the def endan t’s sex off enses and h i s a

b i l i ty to dr i v e a motor v eh i cl e s af el y . In con tra st, defendan ts’ un de rag e c ons

um ption o f alc o ho l wo uld certainl

y i mpa ct t he ir ability to dr ive a mot or vehicle safe ly. The leg islatu re co uld have
r at io na lly bel iev ed young people who have a driv er’s l ic ense and
co ns ume alc o ho l illeg ally ma y als o dr ive aft er co nsu ming alc o ho l, regardless of w het her a mot or vehicle is inv olve d in the charged off ense. On thi s poin

t, we not e that the appell ate co ur t ha s he ld-7- su sp ensi on of drivi ng privi leges f or t he use of f

alse i de nti f i ca ti on in an attempt to obta

i n a l coh ol i s rati ona l l y rel ate d to the saf

e a nd legal ope rati on of a motor vehi cle. Freed v. Ryan , 301 Ill . App. 3d 952, 957 (1998 ). T he ap pe llat e c o ur t he ld t he le gi sla t ur e c o uld r at io na lly sp ecul ate t hat li censees under 21 years of age m ay use f alse i de nti f i ca ti on t o o bt ain alco hol, leading o n balance t o a n inc rease i n dr iving unde r t he influ en ce o rdr iving aft er co nsu ming alc o ho l. Freed , 301 Ill . App. 3d at 957. See also Horvat h v. White , 35 8 I ll. App. 3d 844, 852-53 (2005) (disti

ngui shi ng Lindner an

d h ol di ng su sp en si on of driver’s l i cens e f

orpo ss es sio n o f an o t he r ’s ide nt ifica t io n c ar d is
r at io na lly related to t he saf

e and l egal operat ion of m ot or vehicl

es, pa r t icu lar ly

when the ide ntif ic ation card ref

le cted a legal

dri nki ng a ge). We l i kewi se c oncl ude that sus

pen sion of

def endan ts’ dr i vi ng pri vi le ges for underage

consum ption of al

cohol b ears a rational

re l ati on sh i p to the safe and l

egal operat ion of m

ot or vehicl

es. Defend ant s al so contend that suspendi ng thei r driv in g priv il eges is not a rea so nabl e method of pro tect in g the public in

terest because they had n o plan s to drive af

ter consumi

ng al cohol. As we hav e found, there is a rational relationship betwe en suspending a perso n’s driver’s li censefor unde ra ge c ons umpt ion o f alcoho l and t he sa fe an d le gal ope rati on of motorve hi cl es , re ga rdl es s of whether a

motorve hic le is in volv ed i n the parti

cul ar of f en se. The l eg isla t ur e ma y re as o na bly det er mine a y oung person consum

in g al cohol un

der the lega

l a ge m ay also dr ive aft er dr ink ing

. Pr ev en t ing yo un g p eo ple fro m driving after
co nsu ming al cohol f

urthers the publ

ic in terest in the saf

e and l egal ope rati on of motor vehicl es. We, theref ore, co ncl ude that su sp en si

on of defend ant s’ dr iving

priv il eges f or un de rag e c ons

um ption of al coh ol is a r eas ona ble metho d of p ro mot ing t he pu blic inter est des pit e t he absence of a m

ot or vehicl

e or p lans to drive i

n these circum

stances. W e f urth er n ote that c ourts

f rom o t he rjur isd ict io ns h av e u ph eld si mi la rstatut es agai

nst substantive

due process chal

le nges. See State
v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 171 -72, 125 P.3 d 522, 527-28 (2005) (r eject ingsubstan

tive d ue p ro ces s cha llenge t o s t at ut e r equ iring driver’s l i cens e suspe ns i on f or un de rag e p urchase , pos se ss i on, or consu m ption of alco hol); State v. Niede r meyer , 14 P.3d 264, 268 (Alaska 2000) (rejecti

ng sub stantiv

e due process chal

le ngeto s tatu

te re quir ing rev oca ti on of d rivingpri

vi l eg esf or un de rag e c ons

um ption of alcohol ); People v. Valen zuela , 3 Ca l. Ap p. 4t h S up p. 6, 10 , 5 C al.-8- Rptr. 2d 4 92, 494 (1 991 ) ( re ject ingsubstantive due process chal le nge to sta tute r eq ui ri ng su sp en si on of drivi ng pri vi le ges f or underage pos se ss i on

of alco hol); Commonw

ealth v. Strunk

, 400 Pa. Super. 25, 33-34, 582 A.2d 1326, 1330 (1990) (rejecti ng sub stantiv

e due pro cess chal le ngeto statut e requiri

ng dri ver’s l ic ense s uspens ion f

or underage pos se ss i on

or co nsum

ption of alcohol). Those co ur t s ha ve ge ne r ally recogniz ed

a r at ional r elat ionship be t wee n su spending a perso n’s driver’s l i cens e f

or un de rag e p oss es si

on or consu m ption of al coh ol and the g overn

me ntal i nterest in hi ghway saf ety. See Bennett, 142 Id aho at 172, 12 5 P.3d at 528; Niedermeyer , 14 P.3d at 267-68; Valenz uela , 3 Cal . Ap

p. 4th S upp. a

t 9-10, 5 C al . Rptr. 2d at 493-94. While these decisions are n ot binding o n t his co ur t , t hey may be considered

as pe r su as iv e a uthority. See People ex rel. O’Malley v. 6323 North LaCross e Avenue , 158 I ll. 2d 4 53, 458 -59 (19 94) ; Cooper v. Hinrichs , 10 Il

l . 2d 269 , 275 (1 957). The special

concurre nce asserts Lindner was wrongl y de ci ded and sh ou ld be o ver ru led bec aus e it d efined t he pu blic pur po se o f the sta tute to o narro wly. The part ies d o no t as k t his c o ur t t o o ve rrule Lindner or present any

ar gu me nt on t hat issue, how ever . U nder t he do ct rine o f stare dec isis , t hi s co ur t ’s pr ior dec isions sho uld no t be overturnedab se nt “good cause” or “compel li ng reasons.” People v. Colon , 225 Il l . 2d 125 , 146 (2 007). Lindner engaged i n a detaile d
an alys is of the st atu te’s purpose that has been accepted for m ore t han 21 years

. Lindner should n ot b e o ver ru led wit ho ut t he b ene fit o f a devel oped argumen

t by the pa

rties on the i ssue. We need n

ot overrule Lindner t o c onclude that t he l icense sus pens ions in this ca se d o no t o ffen d d ue pr o ce ss

. We ne ed o nly appl y the hi ghl y de feren tial rati onal ba si s stan

dard t o d ecide t hat t he li censesus pens ions do n

ot v i ol ate de f en da n ts’ con sti tuti on al ri gh ts to due pr oc ess. The rational basis test is sati sfi ed if there is a co nc eiv ab le ba sis f or f i nd i ng a s tatute

rati on ally re l ate d to a

l eg i ti mate sta te i n terest. Stokovich , 211 Ill. 2d at 126 . As d iscuss ed a bove , t he weight of au th ori ty f rom our appe l l ate cou rt a n d oth er j ur i sd i cti on s s uppor ts
a fi ndi ng that suspensi

on of dri

vi ng pri vi le ges f or underage
consu m ption of al coh ol b ea rsa rati on al re l ati on sh i p to th e l eg i ti mate st at e in t er es t in h ig hw ay s af et y. Ac co r di ng ly, wit hou t any arg ument fro m the pa rti eson the is sue, we sho uld no t re ach Lindner . Moreo ver, overruli ng Lindner wi

l l not-9- aff ect the re sul

t in thi s ca se. Of

course , parties i

n a f uture case may argue th at Lindner shoul d be overr ule d a nd t his c o ur t may p r o pe r ly
co nsid er t he issue at t hat t ime. We o nly conclud e t hat it is no t appr opri ate

to address the is sue i

n thi s case wh

ere the partiesha

ve not
rai se d or argu ed i t. In sum , we concl

ude that sus pe nding d efenda nt s’ dr iving priv il eges f or un de rag e c ons

um ption of alc o ho l is ra

ti on al l y re l ate d to the legi timate publ

ic i nterest in the s afe and l eg al ope rati on of motor vehi cles. Section 6–206(a)(43), as applie d in this case, provides a
r ea so na ble metho d o f furt her ingt ha t i nte res t. A cc ordi

ngl y , se cti on 6–206(a)(43) doe s n

ot v i ol ate de f en da n ts’ con sti tution al ri gh ts to substantive due process. De f en da n ts als o ar gu e s ec t io n 6 –2 06 ( a) ( 43 ) is u nc o nst it ut io na lly arb i trary as appl i ed b ec au se th e Sec re t ar y doe s no t exer cise t he di screti on gr an ted b y th e statu te in det er mini

ng whether to suspend a perso n’s dr iving pr iv ileges fo run de r ag e c o nsu mpt io n o f alc o ho l. Rather, the Secretary i ssues a s uspens ion i

n every cas e . D ef

en da n ts co nt end t he Se cr et ar y’s failure t o e xer cise d iscre t ion is ar bitr ar y and
re sult s in a du e pr oc ess vio latio n. In his re ply to t his arg ument , t he Se cr et ar y cont ends he doe s n ot have discr et ion in det er mini ng whether to suspend a p erso n’s dr iving priv il eges unde r s ect ion 6 –20 6( a) (4 3) . T he Se cr et ar y maintains
se cti on 6–2 06( a) (4 3) re quir es a t hre e- mont h sus pens io nwhen a pe rs on recei ves court supervi si on for underage co ns um ption of alc o ho l. Defe ndan ts’ argumen

t is prem is ed on th e c ons tructi on of

se cti on 6–206(a)(43) as g ra nt ing t he Se cr et ar y discre t ion in d eterm ining whether to suspe

nd a pers on’ s dri

vi ng pri vi l eges f or underag e consu m ption of al coh ol . Acc ordi

n gl y , th i s a rgum en t pre sents a que sti on of sta tutory constru cti on s ub j ec t to de novo review . Se e People v. Lew is , 234 Il l . 2d 32, 4 4 (200 9). The f

undam ental objec t ive of sta tutor y con str uc ti on i s to as certai

n an d g i v e e f f ec t to t he inte nt of t he l egi slature. People v. Davison , 233 Ill . 2d 30, 40 (2009 ). The best i nd i ca ti on of l eg i sl ati ve i nte nt i s th e l an gua geof th e statu te, gi v en i ts pla in an d ordi na ry mean i ng. Pe o ple v. Cardamone , 232 Ill . 2d 504, 512 (2 009).-10- Sec ti on 6–206 of the Vehi

cl e Code is

entitled, “Di scretionar

y au th ori ty to sus pen d or revoke l

i cense or pe

rm i t; Ri ght to a heari

ng.” 625 ILCS 5/6–206 (West 2008). Section 6–206 ge ne r ally authorizes t he Secre tary to is sue a suspen si on or revocat ion of driv in g priv il eges in 45 en um erated ci rcum stan ces . In many of t hos e circ umst ance s, t he statutory lan gu ag e is pu r ely d is cr eti ona ry . F or i ns tan ce , su bs ec ti on (a)(3) al l ows the Secre tary to suspe nd or re voke dr iv in g priv il eges upon a sho wing t ha t a p er so n ha s be en r ep ea t ed ly invo lve d in
co lli sions or h

as repe ate d tra f

f i c of f ense s i n di ca ti n g a n i n ab i l i ty to opera te a m otorveh ic le saf el y or di srespect for traff

ic la ws. See 625 ILCS 5/6–2 06(a)( 3) (West 200 8). Other su bs ec t io ns r eq ui r e s pe cif ic a ct io n by t he Se cr et ar y, howe ver. In pa rticul ar, seve

ral su bs ec ti ons cal l f or s uspe ns i on of dr iving privi leges f or a cer tain length of time. See 625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(15) (Wes t 200 8) ( “ the su sp en si on s ha l l be f orone year” upon con v i cti onof crim

in al trespass to a vehi

cle); 625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(21) (Wes t 200 8) (“t he su spe nsion s hall be for one year” upon con vi cti on of lea ving t he sc en e o f an ac cid en t invo lving ve hic le dam age over $1,000); 625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(29) (West 2008) (“d rivingpri

vi l eg essh al l be su sp en de d f or one y ea r” u pon con vi cti on of certain l is ted offenses com

mi tt ed whi le o per ating a

veh ic le); 625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(30) (West 200 8) ( “dr iving privileges s hall be suspen ded f or 5 yea rs ” u pon se con d or su b se qu en t c onv i ction of off enses l isted in paragrap h 29); 625 ILCS 5/6– 206(a)( 32) (West 2008 ) (“the su sp ensi

on s ha l l be f or 3 y ea rs ” u pon con vi cti on of aggra va ted di sch arge of a f i rearm whi l e i ns i de a m otor veh i cle). The pro vi sion i

nvolv ed in this case, section 6–206(a)( 43), st ates: “The Se creta

ry of Sta te is aut hor ized t o s usp end or revoke t he driv in g priv il eges o f an y pers on wi

thout prel

i m i na ry hear ingupon a showi

ng o f the person’s records or ot her sufficient evidenc e t hat t he pe rso n:

* * * [h]as recei

ved a di sp osi ti on of c ourt supervisi

on f or a vi ol ati on of su bs ec ti on ( a), (d) , or (e ) of Section 6–20 of t he Liqu o r C o nt ro l Act o f 1 934 or a s i m i l ar provi si

on of
a local ord in ance, in which casethe

su sp en si on s ha l l be f or-11- a pe riod of 3 months[.]” 625 ILCS 5/6–20 6(a)( 43) (West 2008)

. Sim il ar to the othe r s ub se cti

ons de scri be d a bov e, s ub se cti on (a)( 43) req ui

res s peci f i c ac tion wh en a pers on rec ei

ve s court su pe rvi si on for t he und er age co ns ump tion of al cohol off enses in volv ed he re. Th e s tatute

prov i de s “i n w hi ch ca se the su sp en si on s ha l l be f or a period of 3 m

onths.” 625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(43) (W est 200 8). Sub se cti on ( a) ( 43 ) pr o vid es fo rsu sp en sio n a s t he o nly pos si bl e acti on as shown by t he ph r as e “ t he su sp en sio n sh all be.” The l egi sl ature used “the suspen si on” rather than a le ss sp ecific re fere nce s uch a s “any
sus pension.”Moreover, the

us e of “sh all b e” ind ica t es su sp en sio n is t he ma ndatory action. See Peo

ple v . O usley , 235 Ill . 2d 299, 311 (2009) (when

t he issue is whet her t he st at ut or y languag e has t he force of a co mmand, t he wo rd “sha ll ” ge ne ral l y i ndi cates the l egi slature in tended to im pose a mandatory

obl i gation). The

mandatory

na ture of the su sp ensi on i s a l so show n b y the prov i si on of a s pe cif i c p eri od of three months . The statut ory language , t he ref ore, provi

desf or a mandatory

consequenc e o f a three-mont h suspensi on in these circumstances. Thus, we c onc lude t he Se cr et ar y doe s no t have d iscre t ion i n det er mini ng wh ethe

r to is sue a su spens i on of

def endan ts’ dr i vin g priv il eges under s ection 6–206(a)(43). Rather, section 6–206(a)(43) provides f or m an da tory su sp ensi on . We n ote t ha t our i

nte rpreta ti on of section 6–206 (a)( 43) i s consi stent with our duty to construe statut es in a

man ne rup ho ldin g t he ir c o nst it ut io na lit y wh en r ea so na bly possible

. Se e Cook C

ounty Repu blican P

arty , 232 Ill . 2d at 239. Giv en ou r c onc lusion t hat sec t ion 6 –20 6( a) (4 3) do es no t al l ow f or exercise of discretion by

the Secret ary, we must reject defendan ts’ cla im that t he statute is arbi

trary as ap plie d a nd , t he r efo r e, r es ult s in a du e pr oc ess vio latio n. Fin ally, defen

dants renew thei

r argumen

t t hat su sp en si on o f t he ir dri vi ng pr ivil

ege s und er sec t ion 6 –20 6( a) (4 3) violat es t he pr op or t ionat e pe nalties claus e o f the Il l i n oi s C on sti

tuti on (Il l . C on st. 1970, art. I, §11). De fen da nt s a r gu e t ha t su sp en sio n o f t he irdriver’s li censes, in ad dition to the crim

in al penal ties i mposed f or underage
con su m pti on of al coh ol , re su l ts i n cr ue l an d deg ra di n g p un i sh men t. The pro por tionate penalties clause int he I llino is C o nst it ut io n is
co ext ensive with the f

ederal constitution’s

prohib ition of crue l and-12- unusual pun i sh men t. Konetski , 23 3 I ll . 2d

at 2 06 -0 7. B oth

pr ovisio ns ap ply only t o t he cr imi

nal pr oc ess invo lving a dire ct act ion by t he governm en t to i nf l i ct pun i sh men t. In re Rodney H. , 223 Ill . 2d 510, 518 (2006) . The critical deter mi nation, therefore, is wh ether
sus p ensi on of t he de fendant s’ dr iving privileges is a dire ct act ion by th e g ov er n men t to i n f l i ct pun i sh men t. We have d et er mined t hat s ec ti on 6– 20 6( a) (4 3) ’s

pu rp ose i s to pr om ote t he saf e a nd l eg al ope rati on a nd own ers hi p of m otorvehi cles. Sec ti on 6–206(a)(43) is, theref ore, intended

t o pr o vide fo r s afe highways , not t o punis

h l ic ensees for underage cons

um pt ion o f alc o ho l. Indeed, we hav e prev i ousl y stated statutory s

um mary su sp ensi on of a driver’s l

icense i s not pe na l in na t ur e b ec au se it is in tended to protect the p

ubl i c rather tha

n pu nish a l i censee

. People

v. Esposito , 12 1 I ll. 2d 491, 501 (1 988 ). Acco rd ingly, we c onc lude t he pr opor ti on ate pen al tie s cl aus e does not app l y he re because su sp en si

on of def endan ts’ driv in g priv il eges under

section 6–206(a)(43) i s n ot a di re ct acti on b y th e g ov er

n men t to i n f l i ct pun i sh men t. In su m , we con cl ude tha t su sp en si

on o f defend ant s’ dr iving priv il eges un der s ec ti on 6– 20 6( a) ( 43 ) do es no t vio lat e t he ir constitutional

righ ts to due p roces s or the pro port iona te penal ties cl ause. The

tria l court’s ordersdecl arin

g section 6–206(a)(43) unconsti tut iona l m ust, t heref

ore, be reversed.

III. CONCLUSION For t he foregoing reasons, we r everse t he jud gme nt o f t he cir cu it courtdecl arin

g section 6–206(a)(43) of the Veh ic le Code unconsti tut iona l and rem and this m atter to the ci

rcui t court f orfurther pr oc eed ings co nsist ent wit h t his op inion.
Circuit court judgment rev ersed; cause remanded.

JUSTICE KA

RMEIER to ok no par t i n th e c ons i de rati

on or deci si on of thi s case.-13- JUSTICE GARMA

N, speci ally

concurrin

g: Al thoughI ag

ree wi th th e l ead opi ni on that section 6–206(a)(43) of t he Ve hic le C o de is c o nst it ut io na l, I b el i ev e th at People v. Lindner , 127 Ill. 2d 174 (1 989 ), was wr ong ly decided t o t he ex t en t t ha t it
re quires any st at ut or y pro vision t hat mandat es o r p er mits t he
rev oca ti on or sus pens ion o f a dr iver’s license t o d irect ly serve t he publ ic in terest in ensurin

g that “d ri vers who have dem

onstrated t hey
areun fit t o sa fely

ope rate ve hi cl esare not allowed to drive” (

Lindner , 127 Ill. 2d at 18 2) by t ying r evo ca t io n o r s us pe nsio n “t o o ffe nse s involvingthe use of a m

ot or vehicl e” (

Lindner , 127 Il

l . 2d at 18 1-82). In Lindner , thi

s c ourt f oun d the p ub l i c p urp ose

of section 6–205 of t he Ve hic le Code b

y exam i ni ng “ the sta tem en t of pur pos e i n s ec ti on 6–204 (a)”and “the s

ubs tanti ve provisions of

section 6–205 .” Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 181 . I n my opinion, Lindner defi ned the publi

c purpo se of section 6–205 of

the Vehi cl e Code to o narro wl

y an d f ai l ed to recogniz e that dif

feren t publi c purposes might be ser ved by differe nt statutory provisi ons that man

date or pe r m

i t the rev oca ti on or sus pen si on of a dri ver’sl i cense, w

hether th ose prov i sions a re contain ed in se ct io n 6 –2 05 , se ct io n 6 –2 06 , o rels ew he r e in t he Ve hic le Code. Chapter 6 of the Vehi

cl e Code is

the D r iv er Li censi

ng Law. Ar t icle II of chapt e r 6 g ove rn s th e “ Ca nc el l ati on, Sus pe ns i on, or Revoc ati on of Lice nses a nd

Per m i ts.” Thi s a rticl e doesnot

co nt ain a prov i si on ex pr es sly s t at ing an o ve r ar ch ing pu r po se

. Ra t he r , it
enum erates the c ir cu mst an ce s in w hic h t he Se cr et ar y o f St at e is required to cancel a driver’s l

icense (625 IL CS 5/6

–201 (We st 2008 )), required to im pose ama ndatory revocation (625 ILCS 5/6–205 (West 2008) ), and p ermi

tt ed to suspend or r evoke a driver’s license as a matter of d

i scre tion (625 IL CS 5/6

–206 (We st 2008 )). In addi ti on, arti cl e II con tai ns proc ed ura l prov isions , includ ing
se cti on 6–204, which

is ent itled “When Co ur t t o fo rw ar d Lice nse a nd Reports.” Sec ti on 6 –20 4 di rects th at w he n a pe rs on i s c on v i cte d of
one of the off

enses enum erated els ew he r e in ar t icle I I , t he jud ge sha ll requi re the p erson

to surren der h i s dri ver’ s license or per mit t o t he clerk of th e c our t, wh o sha ll

f orward the l

i cense or pe

rm i t and a report of conv i cti on to the Se cretary

of State . 625 IL CS 5/ 6–204(a)(1) (We st 2008 ).-14- In Lindner , this court fi

rst considered

“ the sta tem en t of purpo se in section 6–204(a).” Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 181. Yet this section does not contain la nguage that can

be i de nti f i ed asan ex pre ss sta tem en t of t he purpose of article II as a whol e. Rather, sect ion 6 –204 sets out pro cedures “[f]or t he purpose of pr ov i di n g to th e S ecre tar

y of Sta te t he records essenti al

to the perform

ance of the Secr etary ’s duties”
un d er arti cl e II . 62 5 IL CS 5/6

–20 4(a ) (W es t 200 8). Thi s s ec ti on further provides that t he Veh

ic le Code recognizes

that co nvictio ns of
ce r t ain off

enses or t ra ffi c violat ions a nd

adj udic ations of

delin quency are“evidenc e r elat ingto unf i tne ss to sa f el y ope rate motorvehi

cles.” 625 ILC S 5 /6 –20 4( a) (Wes t 200 8) . T his is the la nguageth at Lindner found to be a “ statement of purpose.” Lindner , 127 Il l . 2d at 18 1. In my op inion, t his co ur t in Lindner gave ent irely to o mu ch we ight to this si ngl e phrase in

se ction 6–2 04 (a ). While a co nvict io n o f a
ce r t ain offense or t ra ffi

c violat ion o r a n a djudication of del in quency ma y be evide nce r evea ling

un fit ne ss t o sa fely

operate a moto r vehi

cl e, a con vi cti on or adjud icat ion having no t hing to do w ith the indiv

idual’s ope rati on of a veh

ic le ma y a ls o be a re aso nabl e bas is for t he
r ev oca ti on or suspensi

on of the i

ndi vi dual ’s dri ver’s l ic ense. Thus , one’s li cense m ay be revoked or suspende d for permi tt in g “an unl awful or fraudule

nt use of a dri

ver’s l ic en s e” (625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(5) (Wes t 200 8)) ; f or m ak i ng a f alse sta tem en t or kn o win gly

conc eal i ng a material f act i n a n a ppl i cation f or adr ive r’s li cense(625 ILCS 5/6–206 (a )(9) (West 2008)); for possessi ng, displaying or at temptin

g to fraudul

ently use the l ic ense of

another pe rs on (625 ILCS 5/6–20 6 (a) (10 ) (W es t 200 8)) ; or

f or al teri ng or at t empt ingto alter a li

censeor p ossessi

ng an al tered license (625 ILCS 5/ 6–

20 6( a) (2 6) (West 20 08 )). Non e of th es e of f ense s rel ate to t he in div idua l’s abi li ty to safel

y operate a m

ot or vehicl e. In each in stance, however, the legi sl ature has determi ned that the i ndi

vi dual who com m i ts s uc h a n of fens e may

forfei t his right t o dr iv

e, at least t emp o r ar ily. Sec ti on 6–204’s m

en t i on of “ unf i tne ss to sa f el y ope rate motor vehi cles,” t her efo re , c anno t be viewed asthe l eg i sl atu re’ s expres si

on o f a s ing le o ve r ar ch ing pu r po se fo rall of t he pr ovisio ns of a rtic l e II, chapter 6, o f t he Ve hicle Co de. It is ent irely po ssible t hat sec t ions 6–201, 6–2 05, and 6–206 arei nte nd ed to serv e di f

f ere nt p urp ose s, or that so me of t he 43 s ubse ct ions o f sect ion 6 –20 6 ar e inte nded t o s er ve-15- different or mu

l tip l e purp oses

. Lindner

sho uld be o ver ru led t o t he ext ent t ha t it so na rr o wly

defi nesthe publ

ic purpose of this

article and, t he r eb y, l i

m i ts c on si dera ti on of ot her public pu rp os es t hat may be
serv ed b y a ch al l enged provi sion. In ad di ti on to rel

y i ng on section 6–204 , Lindner

inferre d t he pu blic purpo se of

se cti on 6– 20 5 a s a wh ol e f rom th e f ac t th at wi

th t he
exce ption o f t he cha llenged s ect ion, “ever y subsec t ion o f sect ions 6–2 05(a) a nd ( b) ha s so me affini t y with a mo t or vehicle–e ither t he ope rati on o ro wn er ship of

th e v eh i cl e, or th e p ap er wor k c on n ec ted to such ope rati on or o wnersh

ip.” Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 181. T hus, even wh ile a ck n owl ed gi n g th at s ec ti on 6– 20 5(b )(2 ) p rov

i de d f or re v oca ti o n of a d ri ve r’ s l i cens e “ reg ard l es s of wh et he ra v eh icle wa s u se d in t he ir
co mmi ssio n” of the cri me, th e c ourt n everth el es s c on cluded that “sect io n 6–2 05( a) (3 ) c learly re flect s t he legislat ur e’s int ent t hat rev oca ti on be t ied t o o ffenses invo lving t he u se o f a

m otor vehi cle.” Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 181-82. That is, this cour t determi ned that when t wo se ct io ns o f t he sa me s t at ut e r efle ct ed dif fe re nt legislat ive in tents, one section was a true ex press ion of

purpose and the other section was

not a tr ue express ion of

purpose. As the di ss en ti ng j us ti cepoi

nte d out, thi

s c onc l us i on defi es logic. Lindner , 127 Il l . 2d at 19 0-91 (Mi l l er, J., dis se nt ing ) ( t he pr es en ce in
se cti on 6–205 o f su

b se cti on ( b) (2) , wh i ch req ui res rev oca ti on f or off enses not rel ate d to the op era

ti on of a m otorveh ic le , dem onstrates that “t he st at ut o ry sc he me mu st ac t ua lly serve at le ast one additional purpo se not spe cified in the general st at ement of int ent ” t hat t he
maj ori ty f ound i n s ection 6–2 04). T hus, by i nc l udi ng a p rovi si

on wit hin sec t ion 6 –20 5 t hat re quir ed licens e r ev o ca t io n o n so me b as is ot he r t han an o ffense involving t he us e o f a mot or vehicle, t he l egi slature c l earl

y had an other pu rpose i n m i nd. In my opini on, the Lindner

court’s “u nn ece ssa ri l y cri mpe d view of th e pur pos e of th e l eg i sl ati on an d th e i n terests s er

v ed b y i t” ( Lindner , 12 7 I l l . 2d

at 1 88 (M i l l er , J ., d

i ss en ti ng) ) led dire ct ly and ine vit ab ly to i ts finding the chal

le nged provi si on unconsti

tut iona l. Had t he le gis la

tive purpose b een v

ie wed m ore broad ly, a s t he pla in la nguage of t he statut e required, the court could then have determi

ned whether that p urpo se was a legit imate leg islative p ur po se a nd whether t he chal le nged provi si on was rational ly related to t hat purpose.-16- Instead, that anal

ys is was sh ort ci rcuited by the cour t’s answ er t o t he thres hol d que sti on. I have n o o pin io n on whether the Lindner co ur t re ache d t he correct resul

t in that ca se . It i s p oss i

bl e that s ec ti on

6–205(b)(2) may have been found un constitutional

even if the le gis la

tive purpose h

ad been pr o pe r ly de fine d. T his co ur t mighthave fo und t hat t he legislat ive purpo se was not legit imate o r t hat t he pr ovisio n was no t r at io na lly related to that pu

rpose. In ke ep i n g w i th t he d o ct rine o f stare

decisi s , t his cou

rt doe s n ot o ve rrule a prior decision ab sent goo d cause or a co mpelling rea so n. Tuite v. Corbitt , 224 Ill . 2d 490, 505 (20 06) . W e do not d ep art f rom establ is hed pre ce de nt, such

asour dec i si

on in Lindner , merel

y b ecause we mi ght have decided otherwise if we were wri

ting on a bla

nk sl ate. Howev er, good cause to depart f rom stare decisis exi sts when “seri ous de t r iment pr eju dic ial t o pu blic in t er es t s is l i ke l y to re su l t” and when a g o ve rnin g d ec isio n is “u nw o rka ble o r[ is] ba dl y rea son ed.” Tuite , 224 Il

l . 2d at 50 5-06. T his court is

now fac ed

wit h t he pr ecise s itu at ion envisio ned by t he dis senti

ng j ustice i

n that case. By

continui ng t o a dhe reto Lindner ’s “un

nec es sa ril y cri m pe d v i ew ” of the pur pos e of se cti on 6–205, w e f

ind o ur selves c ons t ra ined in ou r c ons ider at ion o f the
con sti tuti on al i ty o f a p r o visio n in section 6–206. W e m ust either acknowl edge th at Lindner was badl

y reasoned on this po in t, producing a res

ult thatis detrim ental to the pub l i c i

ntere st, or af

f i rm the tri al court, wh

i ch f ound s ection 6–2 06(a)(43) un constituti onal

. Rather t han exp re ssly over ru ling Lindner , the le ad opin ion a ppli es i ts rule i n s uch a way as to ren der i t al most mean

i ngl ess

. Lindner con

tai n s f our sta tem en ts i n w hi ch thi s court ident ifi ed t he pu rp ose of th e statu te. Fi rs t, “We t hink sec t ion 6 –20 5( a) (3 ) c learly re flect s t he legisl atu re’s intent t hat re voc at ion be t ied t o o ffenses invo lving the use of
a m ot or vehicl e.” Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 181-82. Second, “The st at ed p ur po se is t o e nsur e t hat dr ivers w ho ha ve dem onstrated they

are unf it to safel y operate veh

ic le s arenot allowed to drive.” Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 182.-17- Thi rd, “[W ]e co nc lu d e that the public in terest t he statute was in tended to prote ct i s th

e i nte res t i n k ee pi ng the road s f ree of two kin ds of drivers: those who t hreaten the safety of others, and t hos e who have a buse d t he pr ivil ege t o d rive by

do ing so il le gally *** .” Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 182. And fo ur t h, “In short , t he publ

ic i nterest is the

saf e a nd l eg al ope rati on of motor vehicl es.” Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 182. T he l ea d o pin io n find s t ha t se ct io n 2 06 ( a) ( 43 ) “u nq ue st io na bly f urthe rs t he pu blic inter est in the s afe and legal o per at ion and
o wn er ship of

motor v eh

i cl es ” (s l i p op. at 5 ), b

ut doe s not acknowl edge tha

t the of f en se of pos se ss i on of

al coh ol by a p ers on under the age of 21 (235 ILCS 6/6–20 (West 2008)) is n ot tied to an offense involvingt he u se o f a ve hic le, o rt ha t ind ividua ls w ho co mmit t his off ense h ave n ot dem onstrated t hat

t he y ar e u nfit to s af

el y ope ra te
a v eh i cl e, or th at s uc h pers on s h av e n ot th re ate n ed th e s af ety of othe rs orabus ed t he pr ivil

ege of d riving by

doi n g s o i l l eg al

l y . In ef f ec t, t he le ad opini on chooses the broadest and m ost expansi

ve statemen

t of purpo se f rom Lindner , whi

le ign oring the s

ubstance o f Lindner . T he trial cou rt, however, properly

applie d Lindner

and f ound th at the v ery na rrow purpose e xpressed i

n the f irst three of the f

our passages quoted ab ove w as n

ot met. The lea d o pin io n t he n find s t his bro ader publ ic purpose served based on t he legislat ur e’s p os sible belief “that a you ng per so n who has
a dri ve r’ s l i cens e a nd consum es a lcoho l il

legally may

t ake t he addi tional step o f dr iving aft er co nsu ming alc o ho l. I t is r ea so na ble to believe a y

oun g pe rs on di sob ey in g the la w agai nst underage
consu m ption of al coh ol may also lack t he judg ment t o d ecline t o d rive after dri nki ng.” Slip op. at 5. T his concl

usi on ma y ref l ect the l ead opi ni on’ s ef f ort t o r es o lve all dou b ts in fa vo ro f find ing t he pr o visio n c o nst it ut io na l and t o g ive ef f ect to the s trong pre sum

pti on of constituti onal i ty. In re Marriage of Miller , 227 Ill . 2d 185, 195 (2 007). How ev er , by re ach i n g s o f ar to find a rational

relati onsh

i p be tween the n ow m ore bro ad ly

defi ned legislat ivepur po se a nd t he cha lleng ed sta tut e, the lea

d opini on has saved Lindner b y renderin g it m eani ngless. In ess ence, the l ead-18- opi ni on co nclude s t hat beca use an individual may co mmi t one crim e, he ma y l ack th e j udgm en t to declin e to co mm

it another cri

me . Under t his r ea so ning , t he leg isla ture co ul d pr ovi detha t a c onv i cti on of do mes t ic bat t er y is gr o und s fo r t he s us pe nsio n o f t he o ffe nde r’ s dr ive r ’s lice nse be ca us e h is anger i ssuesmak e h im like ly t o su cc umb to r o ad r ag e; o rt ha t a p er so n w ho ha s be en fo un d li abl e in a civ il
ac ti on for negligenc e ca using t he de at h or injury of ano t her per so n, even if no mo t o rve hic le was in volved, should h

ave his li cense suspen ded or revoked because he

has dem onstrated tha

t he ca nn ot be counted upon to exercise ordin ary ca re. I nd ee d, t he st at ut e a t iss ue in Lindner wo uld like ly su rvive t his anal ysi s because an individual who
wo uld com

m i t acts of s ex

ual ass aul t agai nst hi s m i nor s tepdau

ghters can not be trusted to res i st the tem

ptati on to l

ure a c hi l d i nto hi s ca r. In addi tion, i f this court were t o overrule Lindner to th e exten

t I
su gg est, i t coul d also correct an i

m preci se statem en t in that ca se. In definingthe rational

basis test, t hi s court st at ed t hat t he legislat ive
enac tmen t m us t b ea r a “‘ “ re as on ab l e rel

ati on sh i p to the pu blic in terest in tended to be pro tec ted .” ’ ” (Em

phasi s ad ded.) Lindner , 127 I ll. 2d at 180, quo ting People v. Wick , 107 Ill . 2d 62, 65-66 (1985 ), quo t ing Illinois Gamefowl Breeder s Ass’n v. Block, 75 Il l

. 2d 443, 453 ( 19 79 )

. I mmed iat ely

t he r ea ft er , t his court ci

ted Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. , 111 Ill . 2d 350, 36 8 ( 198 6), f or th e p ropos i

ti on that a “ st at ut e w ill be u ph eld if it be ar s a r at io na l re lat io n to a l eg i ti mate l egi slati ve purpos e an

d i s nei

ther ar bi trar

y nor di scri m i na tory.” (Em phasi s ad ded.) The Lindner

co ur t impr o pe r ly shift ed it s fo cu s fr o m d i sce rning whether there mi ght have been a legit imate leg islative p ur po se fo r t he chal le nged pr ovisio n t o t he que sti

on of whether the provisi on served the pu b l i c i n terest th e statu

te a s a wh ol e w as i n ten de d to pr ot ect and then set abo ut finding tha t pur po se. The differenc e is subt l e, but si gn i f i ca n t. In People v. Cornelius , 213 Ill . 2d 178, 203-04 (2004), we stated th at the “rationa

l b asi s test is sati sf

ie d where the ch

alle nged sta tute bears a ration al

relati onsh

i p to the pur

pose the legi slature in tended t o a chieve in ena ct ing

t he st at ut e. ” T hus, if the le gis la ture has ide ntif ie d a purpo se f

or i ts ena ctm en t of a stat ute, and i f that purpo se is le g itim ate, the rat ional

basi s test is sati sfi

ed if the stat ute bears a rati onal relati onsh

i p to that purpos e.-19- However a c ha lleng ed st at ut e w ill st ill sat isfy the r at io na l ba sis test if it bears a r ea so na ble r ela t io nsh ip to a l egi tim ate legisl ative

purpose. Thus, we s aid in People v. Johnson , 225 Ill . 2d 573, 584 (2007), that “[u]nder the ra tion al ba si s test, our i

n quiry is twofold: we must det er mine whet her t her e is a leg itimat e st at e inte re st behind t he legisl at ion, an d if s o , wh et he rt he r e is a r ea so na ble r ela t io nsh ip between th at i n terest an d th e m ea n s th e l eg i sl atu reh as ch ose n to pursue i t.” Furth er, “ [t]he ra

ti on al b as i s te st i

s h i gh l y de f eren ti al ; i ts focusis not on t he wisd om o f the st at ut e. [Cit at ion. ] I f the re is any
co nc eiv ab le set of

f ac ts to sh ow a rati ona l basis f ort he st at ut e, it will be uphel d.” Johnson , 225 Ill . 2d at 585. See also Napleton v. Village of Hinsdal e , 2 29 I ll. 2d 2 96, 307 (2 008 ) ( “a legit imate leg islative purpos e”); Davis

v. B ro wn , 221 Ill . 2d 435, 450 (2 00 6) (“ a l eg i ti mate sta te inter est ”); In re D .W. , 21 4 I ll. 2d 28 9, 3 10 (2 00 5) (“ a l

eg i ti mate st at e inter est ”); People v. Wright , 194 I ll. 2 d 1 , 24 ( 20 00 ) ( “apu blic in terest t o be serve d”) ; People v. Adams , 14 4 I ll. 2d 381, 390 (1991) (“a publ ic in terest t o be served”). Taki ng a b roader view

o f t he legislat ivepurpose porti on of the i nqui ry is consi stent with due proces s de ci sions of

the U ni ted States S uprem

e Court. Defendan ts’ constitutional

chal le nge to section 6–206(a)(43) in voked the d ue pr oc ess c lause s o f bot h t he Unit ed S t at es a nd t he I llino is Co nst itu t ions. The le ad opini on does not distin

guis h be tween t he t wo , t re at ing t he du e pr oc ess p ro t ect ions o f the state and federal
co nst itu t ions as c oe xt ensive. This is co nsist ent with our past practice when the la nguage of the

two co nsti

tut ions is ide ntica l o rne ar ly ident ica l. People v. Caballes , 221 Il l . 2d 282 , 335 (2 006). Th us, i n Mi ll er , we discerned “

no reaso n to co nstrue o ur due pr ocess clause dif f eren tl y thanthe fede

ral due process c la

use on the speci

fi c i ssue be f ore us,” and theref

ore t reated the two cl ausesand c oe xt ensive and
were gui ded b y f edera l prece den t. Miller , 227 Il

l . 2d at 19 6. Un der feder al pr ece dent , a co ur t will not st rike do wn a statut e under t he r at io na l ba sis test ev en if t he r ea so na ble r ela t io nsh ip b etw een the statut e and a l

egi tim ate legisl ative

purpose i s hy pothetical . It is

en tire l y appropri ate f or the cour

t to consider

what purpo se the le gis la

ture might have i

ntended to serve o r w h at t he l egi slature“m

igh t have concl

uded” ( Williamson v. Le e Optical of Oklahoma , 348 U.S. 483, 487, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464 (1955 )) abo ut t he r elat ionship be t wee n it s i nte nt a nd the meth od-20- chosen to ef fectuate i t. “[T]he law n

eed not be i

n every res

pect lo gic ally co nsist ent wi

th its ai ms to be consti

tut iona l. It is enough that there is a n e vil at hand fo r c or re ct ion, and t hat it might be thought that t he part icul

ar legi slati

ve m easure wa s a ra

tion al way to correct i

t.” Williamson , 358 U.S. at 487-88, 99 L. Ed. at 572, 75 S. Ct. at 464. A court wil l n ot strike down a l

aw on due proces s gr o un ds mer ely because the la

w ma y b e “un wis e, im providen t, o r out of ha rmo ny

wi th
a particular school of thought.” Willia mson , 358 U.S . at 488, 99 L. Ed at 57 2, 75 S. Ct . a t 46 4. In su ch ins t anc es , if the peopl e seek chan ge i n th e l aw , they “‘m us t re sor t to the pol l s, n ot to the co urt s.’ ” Williamson , 358 U.S. at 48, 99 L. Ed. at 572, 75 S. Ct. at 464-65, quo t ing Munn v. Illinois , 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L. E d. 77, 87(1876 ). I note that sect ion 6–206(a)(43) wase na cte d i n 2 007an

d took eff ect on January

2, 2008, decades a fte r t he ena ct ment o f the prov i si on that is n ow codifi ed at section 2–206

. La

ter addi ti on s to se cti on 2–206 do not necessarily

share the same l

egisl ative purpose as earli er en ac t men t s o r , if t he y sh are the sam e general purpose, t hey
ma y be i ntended to serve an

addi tional purpose as well. See Lindner , 127 Ill. 2d at 190 (Miller, J., dissent ing). The de cisio n t o co dify t his pro vi si oninsection 6–206(a) m ay be a resul

t o f the organi

zational sch eme of chapter 6 r ather t han an expression of i

dentical purpo se

. W i th this in mi nd, and gui

ded by the prin ci ple s set ou t by the Su pr eme Courtin Williamson , I w oul d l ook bey ond sections

6–204 and 6–205 of th e V eh i cl e C ode to disce rn t he evil that t he legislat ur e might have i nten ded to add

ress by enacti ng s ection 6–2 06(a)(

43). In 20 02 , t he Ge ne r al As se mbly enacted Publ

ic Act 92–804, which
am ended section 4–4of t he Li

quor Con trol A ct a nd adde d sub se cti

on (a)(38) t o s ect ion 6 –20 6 o f the Vehi cl e Code. The eff ect o f these
am en dm en ts wa s to pr ov i de

di scre ti on ar

y au th ori ty to the Secretary of Stat e for the su sp ens io n o r r evo ca t io n o f t he d rive r’ s lice nse o f a pe rs on “ convicted

o f a v io la ti on of

Sec ti on 6 –20 of the Li quor Con trol A ct of 1934 or a si

m i l ar prov i sion of a local ordi na nc e.” ( E mph as is added.) 62 5 ILC S 5/6–2 06( a)( 38)(Wes t 200 8). Sec ti on 6–20 de fi nes t he o ffenses o f il legal t ra nsfer, po sses sion a nd
consu m ption o f alc o ho lic li qu or by an underage person. 235 ILCS 5/6–2 0 (West 200 8). In 2007, the General

Ass emb ly

enacted Publ

ic Act 95–66, entitled “ANACT c onc er ningt ra nsp o rt at io n. ” P ub. Act 95 –1 66 , e ff. Jan uary-21- 1, 2008. A

gai n, the Act am

ended the Li

quor Con trol Act and t he Ve hic le Code. The eff

ect of these am

endm ents was to pro vi

de di scre tion ary au thor i ty to the Sec reta ry of State f or th e suspe ns i on or rev oca ti on of the dri

ver’s l ic ense of a person who rec eiv ed a di sp osi ti on of court supervis ion for a vi olation of section 6–20. 625 ILCS 5/6–2 06(a)(43) (W est 200 8). Dur ingth e thi

rd readi ng of the bi l l i n th e H ous e of Representat iv

es, its ch ie f spo nso r, Rep re sent at iveTom Cross, spoke: “T his is a Bill t ha t de als wi thdrinki ng by teenagers, sp ec ifica lly

mino r s. As w e a ll kn ow, the l aw s ays if

you’re under 2 1, yo u c an no t dr inkin t he St at e o f I llino is. T his B ill provides tha t i n th e eve nt of a co ur t sup er vision, which I t hink is a go od concept *** t hat y ou would lose y

our driver ’ s li censef or aperiod of three (3) m

onths. That has not been t he
case when

som eon e re ce i ve s c ourt s

upe rvi si on

. We h ad a rathert ra gic incid ent in Os we go , a co up le o f mont hs ag o, wh erefive (5) young childre n l ostth ei r li ves. A lc ohol was in volv ed. This i s an attempt to address that issue an d it has
un fo r t un at ely

been a p r o ble m ar o un d t he st at e. ” 9 5t h I ll. Gen. As sem., Ho us e P r o ce ed ing s, Ap r il 27, 2007, at 22 (s tate

men ts of R epres en tativ e Cros s). Rep re sent at iveCr o ss did no t sp ec ifica lly sta te t hat t he dr iver w ho caused this accident was a tee na ger who wa s the n un der cour t su pe rvi si on f or a v i ol ati on of se ct ion 6 –20 of t he Li

qu or C on trol A ct, al though thi s f act se ems to be i

m pli ed b y his rem arks

. Nevertheless, we a re no t co nst ra ined by the langua ge o f the sta tute or by the l egi slati ve history (of whi ch there i s very

li tt le) when disce rning what

“evil” the legislat ur e might have be en ad dr essing. We
may ask o ur selves, in li

ght of t he o ver all legislative sc heme and
common sense, what t he legisl ative purpose mighthave be en fo r t he
en ac tmen t. One pur po se o f add ing

subse ctions (a)(38) an

d (a )(4 3) to s ec ti on 6–206 may have been

to en cou rag e c om pl i an cewi th s ec ti on 6

–20 of Li quor Con trol A ct, wh i ch i s s pe ci f i ca l l y re f eren ce d i n th e b oth pro vi sions. The pur po se o f the Liquo r Co nt ro l Act is t hat “the healt h,
saf ety an d w elfa r e o f t he Pe o ple o f t he St at e o f I llin ois s hall be prot ectedan d t emp er an ce in t he co nsu mpt io n o f alc o ho lic liq uo r s s ha ll-22- be fostered and promoted

by sound and caref

ul con trol an d re gul ati on of the m anuf

acture, sale an

d dis tributi on of al

coholi c liquors.” 235 ILCS 5/1–2(We st 2008 ). Sec t ions 6–206(a)(38) and (a)(43) may bei n ten de d to e f f ec tua te t his legitimat e legislat ive pur po se by giv in g persons under the age

of 21 an i nc en tiv e to resist the p eer pr

ess ure to d rink by co ndit ioning t he ir con ti nu ed ab i l i ty to dri ve on c om pl i an cewi th s ec ti on 6–2 0 of t he Liquor Code. In the ab senc e of

anexpress s

tatement of the i

ntent of our own le gis la ture, we can al so look to sim il ar enactments in

ot her stat es, f

or our o wn leg isla t o r s ma y hav e h ad a s imilar pu r po se

. T he Ca li f

or nia l egi slaturema de s peci fi

c fi ndi ngs wh en i t enacted a statut e that
sus pend ed t he dr iving

pri vi l eg esof per so ns und er t he ag e o f 21 w ho commi tt ed offens es in

volvi ng contro ll

ed substances. “(a) The Legisl

atur e fi nds and declares as foll

ows: * * * ‘(3) Indi vi dual s who abus e drugs or alcohol dem on strate a dangerous di sreg ard

f or th e s af e l eg al ope rati on of moto r vehicles. The ri sk i s particul

arly acute for in

div idua ls under the age of 21. ‘(4) The i nc re as ed po t en t ial fo rt ee na ge de at h in v eh icle
co lli sions and ot her nondrivi

ng acciden

ts, ho mi cides, and sui

cides, wh ile bei ng under the inf

luen ce of drugs o r alcohol , requires special atte n ti on i n ord er to re du ce

th e state wi de y outh f ata l i ty rate a nd to contr ol unlawful and unsaf

e drivi ng practices. ‘(b) It is , therefore, the in tent of the Legi sl ature t o enactt his
meas ure in an attempt

to red uc e the i nc i de nc e of

youn g dr i ve rs on the hi gh wa y s a nd roads of this state who, because of the i r us e of al coh ol or o ther ill

ega l dru gs, po se a dang er t o t he hea lth and
saf ety of o t her dr ivers byal l or a co mbinatio n of t he fo llowing methods: ‘(1) To pr event us e of

motor vehicl es by

driv ers under the age of 21 ye a rs by

suspen din g their dri

vi ng pri vi le ges f or o ne y ear f rom the date of convi

ction, beca

use a one ye ar su sp en si

on of these dri vers’ pri vi le ges m ay pr ovid e a mea ns o f det er ring us e of alco hol, and o t her ill

ega l dru gs by

these young p ersons.”People
v. Valenz uela , 3 C al. App. 4th Supp. 6, 9-10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 493 (1 991), q

uotin g Stats. 19 88, ch . 1254, § 1, at 417 5-76.-23- These legislat ivefindings ar e ent irely co nsist ent wit h t he co ncer ns ex pre ss ed by the sp ons or of

t he bi l l tha t res ul ted i n th e ena ctm en t of
se cti on 6–2 06( a)(43) . I w ou ld find tha t t he legit imate leg islative purposes of the en

actm en t wereto en

cou rag e c om pl i an cewi th s ec ti on 6–20 of the L iqu or Co nt ro l Act a nd t o p ro t ect t he individual you ng pe rs on an d t he pu blic b y su sp en din g t he dr iving pr iv i leges of those young pe rs ons

wh o, by violat ing sec t ion 6 –20 , ha ve dem onstrated t hat they should not be entrusted with the operation of a motor vehicl e. If the mea ns ch osen–su sp en si

on of t he driver’s l

icense–bears a
r ea so na ble re l ati

on sh i p to t his pur po se, t he st at ut e may not be struck do wn. Johnson , 225 Ill . 2d at 585. The l ead opin ion a cknowl edges that t he st at ut e “must be up held if the re is a co nceivabl e basis f or finding it is r at io na lly

related t o a legit imate s t at e inte re st ” and t hat t he legisl atu re’s j udgm

en t i s “ n ot s ub j ec t to judi

ci al fact fi ndi ng an d ‘m ay be base d on

rati ona l sp ecul ati on un su ppor ted by ev i de nc e or em piri cal data.’ ” Sli

p op. at 4, quot in

g Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder , 204 Ill . 2d 142, 14 7 (200 3). It is e nt ir ely rat ional fo r t he legislat ur e t o c onc lude t hat t he po ss ible su sp ensi

on of one’s dri ver’s l ic ense m ay serve as an incent ive to com pl y wi th a l aw or cou rt ord er. For

exam ple, s ec ti on 6–201(a)(3) of the Vehi

cl e Code provides that

th e S ecre tar

y of Sta te
ma y cancel a l i cens e or p erm

i t f orfai lure to pay f

ees or civ il penal ties owed t o t he Illinois Co mmerce C ommission. 625 ILCS 5/6–201(a)(3) (West 200 8) . S ect ion 6 –20 1( a) (9 ) p ro vides t ha t t he S ecretary m ay c a ncel the li cense of any person who “h

as been convi cted of a sex offense as de fine d in the Sex Of fen der Regi stration Act,” and that t he li censesha ll re main c an ce lled un t il t he pe rso n re gist er s as r equ ired and hasot her wise c omp lied wit h t he req ui rem en ts of the Re gi stra ti on A ct. 625 ILC S 5 /6 –20 1( a) (9 ) ( West 200 8) . S ect ion 6–103( 14) provides that the Sec reta ry “ sh al l not i ss ue , rene w, or al l ow the re ten ti on of any driver’s l i cens e n

or i ss uean y pe rm i t un de r thi s C od e * ** [t] o a ny pe rs on wh o is 9 0 d ays o rmo r e d elinq ue nt in c o ur t o r de r ed ch ild
s upport payment s o r ha s bee n adjud icat ed in ar re ar s in an amo unt equal t o 90 da ys’ o blig at io n o rmo r e a nd wh o ha s be en fo un d in
co ntempt of co urt for fail

ure t o pa y the suppo rt .” 62 5 ILC S 5/6–1 03(14 ) (We st 2008 ). Under t he re as o ning o f Lindner , t hese pr ovisio ns wo uld be unconsti tut iona l b ec au se th ey do n ot re l ate di re ctl y t o t he na rr o wly-24- defi ned public int er est in ensur ing t hat “dr ivers w ho hav e dem onstrated they

areun f i t to s af el y opera te veh ic le s are not all

owed to driv e.” Lindner , 127 Ill . 2d at 182. Ho wever , it is clear t hat t he le gis la ture, o n o cc as io n, us es t he p ro visio ns o f t he Vehic l e C ode to advance b roader publ

i c purp oses

. I would f in d that section 6–206(a)(43) bears a rational r ela t io nsh ip to th e l eg i ti mate pu b l i c pur pos es of en cou ra gi n g c om pl i an ce wi th
se cti on 6–2 0 o f the Liquo r Co nt ro l Act a nd o f pro t ect ing you ng dri vers and the pub li

c from the potentially

fatal consequenc es that may f ol l owwhen a young per so n who se jud gment is im pair ed byal

coh ol gets b ehi nd th e wh eel of a car.
JUSTICE THOMAS j oins in this special concurrence.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, di ssen ting: I dis se nt fro m t o da y’s r es o lut io n o f t his cas e bec aus e, unde r t he prin ci ple s set for t h in People v. Lindner , 12 7 I ll. 2d 174 (1989 ), t he cir cu it courtco rr ec t ly

ruled s ection 6–206(a)(43) of the Vehi cl e Code to be un constituti onal

. Justice Gar man’s as sess ment of Justice Kilbr ide ’s o pin io n is w ellt ake n, and I agree wi

th her that hi s anal

ysi s renders Lindner
mean in gless. Sl ip op . at 16-18 ( Garman , J., special

ly concurrin

g, joi ned by T ho mas , J. )

. Ju st ic e G arman al so accurately

ide ntif ie s our op t ions in t his c as e: eit he rwe o ve rrule Lindner ’s vi ew of the purpo se of section 6–205 or w e apply the case and affi rm the t rial court ’s ruli ng. Sli p op. at 16 (Garman, J., speci al ly co ncur ring, joined by Thom as, J .). Rather than ask th at Lindner

be o ver ru led, t he Stat e bel ie ves i t can be di sti ng ui sh ed f rom t his cas e. Lindner

canno t be dist inguished in any
me ani ngf ul way , Justice K

il bride’s sugges

tion notwithstan

din g, as Ju st ice Ga rman co rr ec t ly

recog ni zes. I migh

t also note that in the 21 years si nce Lindner

wa s a nn oun ce d, th ere has b een n

o i nd i ca ti on f rom t his cou rt th at Lindner

wa s e it he rwr o ng ly deci ded o rt o o na rr o wly def i ne d the purpos e of

section 6–205

. Stare decisi

s me ans, of course, thatpri or decisions, Lindner in cl uded, should be overturned onl y on a showi ng of go od caus e. People v. Colon , 225 Ill . 2d 125, 146 (2007). Beca us e n o o ne is-25- ask ingf or Lindner

to be overruled, t he co ur t do es no t ha ve t he be ne fit of a ny de ve l ope d a

rgu men t asto good

cau se. I t her efo re expr ess no opi ni on on w hether Lindner

should be overruled.

JU STI CEBU

RK E j oi n s i n th i s d i ss en t.