77252 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 238 / Monday, December 11, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

2461 note; 31 U.S.C. 330 and 5321; and 42

U.S.C. 4012a.

2. Subpart O is revised to read as

follows:

Subpart O—Civil Money Penalty

Inflation Adjustments

§ 19.240 Inflation adjustments.

The maximum amount of each civil

money penalty within the OCC’s

jurisdiction is adjusted in accordance

with the Federal Civil Penalties

Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 (28

U.S.C. 2461 note) as follows:

U.S. Code citation Description

Adjusted

maximum

penalty

12 U.S.C. 93(b), 504, 1817(j)(16), 1818(i)(2), and 1972(2)(F) ..... Tier 1 ............................................................................................

Tier 2 ............................................................................................

Tier 3 ............................................................................................

5,500

27,500

1,175,000

12 U.S.C. 164 and 3110(c) ........................................................... Tier 1 ............................................................................................

Tier 2 ............................................................................................

Tier 3 ............................................................................................

2,200

22,000

1,175,000

12 U.S.C. 1832(c) and 3909(d)(1) ................................................ ...................................................................................................... 1,100

12 U.S.C. 1884 ............................................................................. ...................................................................................................... 110

12 U.S.C. 3110(a) ......................................................................... ...................................................................................................... 27,500

15 U.S.C. 78u–2(b) ....................................................................... Tier 1 (natural person) .................................................................

Tier 1 (other person) ....................................................................

Tier 2 (natural person) .................................................................

Tier 2 (other person) ....................................................................

Tier 3 (natural person) .................................................................

Tier 3 (other person) ....................................................................

5,500

60,000

60,000

300,000

120,000

575,000

42 U.S.C. 4012a(f)(5) .................................................................... Per violation .................................................................................

Per year .......................................................................................

350

115,000

§ 19.241 Applicability.

The adjustments in § 19.240 apply to

violations that occur after December 11,

2000.

Dated: December 1, 2000.

John D. Hawke, Jr.,

Comptroller of the Currency.

[FR Doc. 00–31165 Filed 12–8–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4810–33–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. NM175; Special Conditions No.

25–169–SC]

Special Conditions: Boeing Model 777–

200 Series Airplanes; Overhead Crew

Rest Compartment

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions.

SUMMARY: These special conditions are

issued for the Boeing Model 777–200

series airplanes, modified by Flight

Structures, Inc. The modification

consists of the installation of a crew rest

compartment located in the vicinity of

door three in the overhead area of the

passenger compartment. The crew rest

compartment is to be certified for a

maximum of ten occupants for use only

during flight. The applicable

airworthiness regulations do not contain

adequate or appropriate safety standards

for this design feature. These special

conditions contain the additional safety

standards that the Administrator

considers necessary to establish a level

of safety equivalent to that established

by the existing airworthiness standards.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 1, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Jayson Claar, FAA, Transport Standards

Staff, ANM–115, Transport Airplane

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,

Renton, Washington, 98055–4056;

telephone (425) 227–2194; facsimile

(425) 227–1320.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

On June 25, 1999, Flight Structures,

Inc., 4407 172 Street NE, Arlington,

Washington, 98223, applied for a

supplemental type certificate to install

an overhead crew rest compartment in

Boeing Model 777–200 series airplanes.

The Boeing Model 777–200 series

airplane is a large twin-jet engine

transport airplane with four pairs of

Type A exits, a passenger capacity of

440, and a range of 5000 miles. The

overhead crew rest compartment is a

single compartment located above the

main passenger compartment in the

vicinity of door three. The crew rest

compartment will contain eight private

bunks and two seats, and is to be

certified for a maximum of ten

occupants. A stairwell entering from the

door three aisle is the main entry. Two

escape hatches are located on either side

of the entryway door. These special

conditions are written for an overhead

crew rest compartment that will be

occupied only in flight, not during taxi,

takeoff, or landing.

Type Certification Basis

Under the provisions of § 21.101,

Flight Structures, Inc., must show that

the Boeing Model 777–200 series

airplane, as changed, continues to meet

the applicable provisions of the

regulations incorporated by reference in

Type Certificate No. T00001SE or the

applicable regulations in effect on the

date of application for the change. The

regulations incorporated by reference in

the type certificate are commonly

referred to as the ‘‘original type

certification basis.’’ The regulations

incorporated by reference in Type

Certificate No. T00001SE for the Boeing

Model 777–200 series airplanes include

14 CFR part 25, as amended by

Amendments 25–1 through 25–82. The

U.S. type certification basis for the

Boeing Model 777–200 series airplanes

is established in accordance with 14

CFR 21.29 and 21.17 and the type

certification application date. The type

certification basis is listed in Type

Certificate Data Sheet No. T00001SE.

If the Administrator finds that the

applicable airworthiness regulations

(i.e., part 25) do not contain adequate or

appropriate safety standards for the

Model 777–200 series airplanes because

of a novel or unusual design feature,

special conditions are prescribed under

the provisions of § 21.16.

In addition to the applicable

airworthiness regulations and special

conditions, Boeing Model 777–200

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 238 / Monday, December 11, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 77253

series airplane must comply with the

fuel vent and exhaust emission

requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the

noise certification requirements of 14

CFR part 36.

Special conditions, as appropriate, are

issued in accordance with § 11.49, after

public notice, as required by §§ 11.28

and 11.29(b), and become part of the

type certification basis in accordance

with § 21.101(b)(2).

Special conditions are initially

applicable to the model for which they

are issued. Should the applicant apply

for a supplemental type certificate to

modify any other model included on the

same type certificate to incorporate the

same novel or unusual design feature,

the special conditions would also apply

to the other model under the provisions

of § 21.101(a)(1).

Novel or Unusual Design Features

While the installation of a crew rest

compartment is not a new concept for

large transport category airplanes, each

compartment design has unique features

by virtue of its design, location, and use

on the airplane. Previously, crew rest

compartments have been evaluated that

are installed within the main passenger

compartment area of the Boeing Model

777–200 and Model 777–300 series

airplanes; other crew rest compartments

have been installed below the passenger

cabin area, within the cargo

compartment. Similar overhead crew

rest compartments have also been

installed on the Boeing Model 747

airplane. The interfaces of the

modification are evaluated within the

interior and assessed in accordance with

the certification basis of the airplane.

However, part 25 does not provide the

requirements for crew rest

compartments within the overhead area

of the passenger compartment for the

Boeing Model 777–200 series airplanes.

This is a compartment that has never

been used for this purpose in any

previous Boeing Model 777–200 series

airplanes. Due to the novel or unusual

features associated with the installation

of this crew rest compartment, special

conditions are considered necessary to

provide a level of safety equal to that

established by the airworthiness

regulations incorporated by reference in

the type certificate.

Discussion of Comments

Notice of proposed special conditions

No. 25–00–02-SC for the Boeing Model

777–200 series airplanes modified with

a Flight Structures, Inc., overhead crew

rest compartment was published in the

Federal Register on September 25, 2000

(65 FR 57564). Six commenters

responded to the Notice.

Special Condition No. 1

Two comments address special

condition no. 1(a)(2), concerning a

placard near the crew rest compartment

entrance stating that occupants must be

trained in crew rest compartment

evacuation procedures. One commenter

proposes that the placarding include the

reference to the training material

document. The commenter states that

this would be consistent with the 747

door 5 overhead crew rest compartment

special conditions.

The 747 door 5 overhead crew rest

special conditions, issued November 13,

1987, do not include a requirement to

have a placard near the entrance of the

crew rest compartment stating that

occupants must be trained in crew rest

compartment evacuation procedures.

The requirement that the occupants

must be trained in the evacuation

procedures for the Boeing Model 777–

200 series airplane crew rest

compartment is contained in special

condition no. 2(d). After further

consideration, the FAA agrees with the

recommendation to modify the

placarding requirement of special

condition no. 1(a)(2) to include ‘‘that are

trained in the evacuation procedures for

the overhead crew rest compartment,’’

but not to include the reference to the

training material document.

One comment raises the question that

if lighted ‘‘No Smoking’’ signs are

provided in addition to the ‘‘No

Smoking’’ placarding in special

condition no. 1(a)(4) then the signs and

placarding could provide conflicting

and confusing information. If the lighted

signs are switchable then this would be

confusing to the occupants of the crew

rest compartment since the lighted signs

when not illuminated would allow

smoking and the placarding would

prohibit smoking. The commenter

recommends that if lighted signs are

provided that they remain on at all

times.

The FAA agrees that if lighted ‘‘No

Smoking’’ signs are provided that they

should remain on at all times.

Special Condition No. 2

One comment addresses special

condition no. 2, concerning the

requirement that the evacuation from

the crew rest compartment must be

rapid, which implies an undefined time

restraint that is not well understood or

required in other special conditions for

similar designs of remote compartments.

The commenter proposes removing the

word ‘‘rapidly’’ from the special

conditions.

The FAA does not agree with the

comment that ‘‘rapidly’’ should be

removed from the special conditions.

The wording in the special conditions is

consistent with the evacuation

requirements for other remote

compartments. The regulation for lower

deck service compartments, 14 CFR

25.819, has the same requirement that is

addressed in special condition no. 2,

including the requirement for rapid

evacuation from the compartment to the

main deck. The crew rest compartment

evacuation must be rapid to reduce the

amount of time between the detection of

smoke and initiation of fire fighting

procedures. Also, rapid evacuation

would reduce the amount of time that

smoke from the crew rest compartment

could enter the passenger cabin through

the open evacuation route.

Two comments address special

condition no. 2(a), concerning the

requirement that the two evacuation

routes be located on opposite sides of

the crew rest compartment, with

sufficient separation within the

compartment to minimize the

possibility of an event rendering both

routes inoperative. They note the words

‘‘opposite sides of the crew rest’’ do not

add to the level of safety for the

occupants of the crew rest over that

provided by the evacuation routes that

have ‘‘sufficient separation within the

compartment to minimize the

possibility of an event rendering both

routes inoperative.’’

Previous special conditions for

overhead crew rest compartments have

given the option for evacuation routes to

be located on opposite sides of the crew

rest, or to have sufficient separation

within the compartment to minimize

the possibility of an event rendering

both routes inoperative. The FAA agrees

with the comment that the words

‘‘opposite sides of the crew rest’’ do not

add to the level of safety for the

occupants of the crew rest when the

routes must have ‘‘sufficient separation

within the compartment to minimize

the possibility of an event rendering

both routes inoperative.’’ Evacuation

routes located on opposite sides of the

crew rest compartment may be located

in an area where both routes could be

rendered inoperative. The final special

conditions will be revised to remove the

words ‘‘opposite sides of the crew rest.’’

Five comments address special

condition no. 2(b), concerning the

location of crew rest compartment

evacuation paths entering the main

deck. One commenter proposes

clarification to the times that must be

considered for normal movement of

passengers that would affect the

evacuation from the crew rest

compartment by adding the following

words ‘‘during times in which

77254 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 238 / Monday, December 11, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

occupancy is allowed’’ in the crew rest

compartment. The commenter states

that since the crew rest compartment is

not occupied during taxi, takeoff and

landing, egress from the compartment

during an emergency evacuation of the

airplane is not relevant.

The FAA agrees with the comment

that passenger movement during inflight conditions needs to be considered

since the crew rest may only be

occupied during flight. The special

conditions will be revised to reflect this

clarification, that normal movement by

passengers when crew rest compartment

occupancy is allowed must be

considered.

A second commenter states that the

limitations for the location of one of the

two evacuation routes are too restrictive

and proposes some changes. The

commenter suggests that during flight

the normal passenger movement would

be greatest in the main aisle and galley

complex areas and the movement in a

cross aisle would be much less. The

commenter proposes allowing the

evacuation routes to open into cross

aisles provided there were procedures

that would require verification that area

below the emergency hatch is clear of

passengers before evacuating.

The FAA does not agree with the

concern that requiring one evacuation

route not to open into a cross aisle is

overly restrictive. The special

conditions require that one evacuation

route be located such that normal

passenger movement would not block

the route, but allows the other route(s)

to be located where they could be

blocked by normal passenger

movement. A compartment design that

would allow both evacuation routes to

be blocked by normal passenger

movement does not provide an

acceptable level of safety.

A third commenter notes that

passenger movement is low enough

when the crew rest compartment is

occupied that the cabin crew could clear

the area under or adjacent to an

emergency escape route quickly,

regardless of its location. The

commenter proposes a change to the

special conditions requiring procedures

for clearing the area of the evacuation

route in the event an evacuation is

necessary and there is passenger

movement in the evacuation route.

The FAA has considered the proposal

to have the main deck cabin crew clear

passengers out of the evacuation path

prior to evacuation from the crew rest

compartment. The reliance on the main

deck cabin crew to take some action

before the crew rest compartment can be

evacuated is not acceptable. In cases

when the main deck cabin crew is

involved with an emergency, they may

not be available to clear the passengers

out of the area of the evacuation path.

This includes evacuation paths into an

aisle, cross aisle, galley complex, or over

passenger seats.

A fourth commenter states that if the

evacuation path is over an area where

there are passenger seats, then several

items need to be considered including:

the number of passengers that would

need to be displaced, the relocation of

these displaced passengers, passenger

displacement during turbulence, the

possibility of the evacuees stepping on

the passenger seats, and addressing the

strength of these passengers seats. The

fifth commenter provides some

responses to the fourth commenter’s

concerns.

The FAA agrees that an evacuation

path over an area where the passengers

must be relocated is a concern. The FAA

has considered this type of evacuation

path and has determined that a

maximum of one row of seats may be

displaced.

The FAA agrees that if the evacuation

procedure includes having the evacuee

step on a seat, then it must be shown the

seat will not be damaged to the extent

that it is unsafe for the emergency

landing conditions.

Special Condition No. 3

Three commenters address special

condition no. 3 concerning the

evacuation of an incapacitated person

from the crew rest compartment. One

commenter raises a concern that

limiting the procedure to a single person

assisting the evacuation of an

incapacitated occupant was too

restrictive. The commenter suggests that

a procedure that requires more than one

person assisting should be acceptable.

The FAA does not agree with the

comment concerning the assistance of a

single person to demonstrate that they

can evacuate an incapacitated occupant

from the crew rest compartment is too

restrictive. In the event there are only

two occupants of the crew rest

compartment and one becomes

incapacitated, the other occupant must

be able to evacuate the incapacitated

occupant to the main deck of the

airplane.

The second commenter questions the

need to have the evacuation

demonstration conducted for each of the

evacuation paths and proposes that the

demonstration be limited to the most

critical evacuation path.

The FAA does not agree with the

comment that only the most critical

evacuation path for the incapacitated

occupant must be demonstrated, unless

the paths are identical to each other

including but not limited to size, assist

means, access, and available room

around the evacuation path. It is very

difficult to evaluate which evacuation

route would be the most critical path to

demonstrate the evacuation of an

incapacitated occupant. Therefore, the

FAA will require that all routes be

demonstrated.

The third commenter proposes that

the evacuation procedures should be

transmitted to the operator as part of the

training evacuation procedure.

The FAA concurs with the comment

that the procedures for the evacuation of

an incapacitated occupant should be

part of the training requirements for the

occupants of the crew rest compartment.

Special Condition No. 4

One comment addresses special

condition no. 4(a), concerning the

requirement for at least one exit sign to

be located near each exit. The

commenter proposes that only the

primary evacuation route be equipped

with an exit sign meeting the

requirements of § 25.812(b)(1)(i). The

commenter believes that having exit

signs at both primary and secondary

exits may cause confusion during an

evacuation.

The FAA disagrees with the comment

to have an exit sign only at the primary

exit path. The basic reason for the

requirement to have an exit sign

meeting the requirements of

§ 25.812(b)(1)(i) located near each exit is

to identify the emergency exits. When

there is an emergency that requires the

evacuation of the crew rest

compartment, the occupants must be

provided the greatest opportunity to

evacuate the compartment as quickly as

possible. Identifying all of the

evacuation routes with an exit sign

provides the evacuees with visible signs

that locate the available exits. With this

knowledge they can assess the

conditions and determine the best route

for evacuation based on the conditions

present in the compartment.

Three comments address special

condition no. 4(d) concerning the

illumination of the exit handles and

instruction placards. Two of the

commenters recommend that the special

conditions be revised to clarify what

instruction placards are being addressed

by the special conditions.

The FAA agrees that special condition

no. 4(d) should be revised to identify

what instruction placards must be

illuminated to at least 160

microlamberts under emergency lighting

conditions. The intent is to have the

instruction placards for the operation

and use of the escape paths be

addressed by the illumination

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 238 / Monday, December 11, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 77255

requirements of these special

conditions.

The third commenter proposes that

special condition no. 4(d) be deleted

and special condition no. 4(c) be revised

to read as follows: ‘‘Placards and exit

handles must be visible and readable

from a distance of 30 inches under

emergency lighting conditions.’’

The FAA disagrees with the proposal

to delete special condition no. 4(d) and

revise the requirements of special

condition no. 4(c) to address the

visibility of the instruction placards

under emergency lighting conditions.

The FAA requires a specific measurable

illumination level because it is the best

way to eliminate judgement calls that

would result from the proposal that

requires the placard be readable from a

distance of 30 inches under emergency

lighting conditions.

Special Condition No. 7

Two comments address special

condition no. 7 concerning the use of

the public address and crew interphone

as the means of alerting the occupants

of the crew rest compartment of an

emergency. The commenters state that

the current public address and crew

interphone designs do not differentiate

between normal and emergency

communications and that each airline

has a protocol and procedures for

emergency communications.

The FAA is concerned that during

normal operation the public address

system would not be active in the crew

rest compartment. In an emergency, the

system would need to be active in the

crew rest compartment. Therefore,

means need to be provided for

differentiating between normal and

emergency communications. The FAA

also has a similar concern that the

chime system on the crew interphone

system does not provide an adequate

means of differentiating between normal

and emergency communications.

Special Condition No. 9

Two comments address special

condition no. 9 concerning providing

protective clothing for a person fighting

a fire in the crew rest compartment. One

commenter proposes that protective

clothing be provided for the designated

fire fighter. The other commenter argues

against that type of requirement.

The FAA has determined that the

minimum equipment required to fight a

fire in the crew rest compartment is a

fire extinguisher and protective

breathing equipment.

Special Condition No. 10

One comment addresses special

condition no. 10(c) concerning the

smoke detection warning provided in

the main passenger cabin. The

commenter suggests that the special

condition be changed from ‘‘A warning

in the main passenger cabin * * *’’ to

‘‘A visual and/or aural warning in the

main passenger cabin. * * *’’ It is the

commenter’s contention that both

means would provide an acceptable

warning.

The FAA agrees that either a visual or

aural warning could be found

acceptable, however, the current

wording does allow both types of

warnings or combinations of the

warnings. Therefore, no change to the

special conditions wording is required.

Special Condition No. 11

Five comments address special

condition no. 11 concerning fire control

in the overhead crew rest. One

commenter disagrees with handling fire

control without entering the overhead

crew rest area. The commenter states

that this does not provide an acceptable

level of safety and that manual fire

fighting does provide an acceptable

level of safety. The commenter states

that Halon stratification from a built-in

system would settle in the vestibule area

of the overhead crew rest and prevent

proper concentration in the entire area

that would be needed to control the fire.

The FAA disagrees with the comment

that a built-in fire extinguishing system

does not provide an acceptable level of

safety. The FAA would require a test to

show that for any built-in fire

extinguishing system, the concentration

during the initial introduction of Halon

1301 or equivalent is a minimum of five

percent by volume and that it is

sustained at a minimum level of three

percent for the maximum diversion in

still air (including an allowance for 15-

minute holding and/or approach and

land) for the airplane. The applicant’s

design must ensure that in the event the

vestibule door is damaged, the

extinguishing agent concentration of

Halon 1301 is not compromised. The

door would be placarded for crew

access only and access will be limited

by a mechanism to prevent ‘‘accidental

opening.’’

One comment mentions a concern

about products of thermal

decomposition of Halon when exposed

to a fire, and the impact of this on

passengers.

The FAA agrees that the built-in fire

extinguishing system must not

introduce a hazard to the occupants or

airplane structure. Section 25.851(b)

would apply to any built-in fire

extinguishing system. The issue of

toxicity of fire extinguishing agents has

been previously explored as in

Amendment 25–74, Airplane Cabin Fire

Protection, adopted: April 4, 1991,

effective May 16, 1991, as published in

the Federal Register 56 FR 15450, April

16, 1991.

One comment expresses concern over

the operation of the vent system used to

evacuate smoke when smoke is present

in the overhead crew rest. A system that

evacuates smoke during a fire would

also evacuate the fire suppression agents

used to control the fire in the

compartment.

The FAA agrees with the comment

that a ventilation system within a

compartment that has a fire suppression

system can have a negative affect on the

fire suppression system. The design of

the ventilation system would need to

ensure that the ventilation flow can be

controlled in such a way during a fire

that the fire suppression agent used

remains in the compartment. There is

no requirement to clear smoke from the

crew rest area, however, there is a

requirement to clear the smoke that has

entered the main passenger

compartment during the evacuation of

the crew rest compartment and/or

during the process of fighting the fire.

One commenter addresses concerns

regarding the access provisions required

for the crew rest compartment and

timely access of the crew member with

the fire fighting equipment and

proposes changes to the special

condition. The commenter believes that

‘‘unrestricted access’’ is too restrictive a

requirement and the ‘‘sufficient access’’

provides an acceptable level of safety.

The FAA disagrees with the comment

that the current language is

inappropriate. The use of ‘‘unrestricted

access’’ related to ‘‘crewmembers

equipped for fire fighting’’. The intent of

this requirement is to ensure that the

aircraft design will accommodate the

entrance to enable ‘‘crewmembers

equipped for fire fighting’’ to gain

entrance to the crew rest area in a

minimum amount of time.

One comment suggests that a built-in

fire extinguishing system is not

warranted.

The FAA does not concur with the

comment. The special condition as

written allows either a built-in system

or crew entry and extinguishing of fire

directly. This is left to the applicant to

propose and demonstrate a suitable

solution. The overhead crew rest area

poses some challenges but a successful

applicant should be able to design the

crew rest area and associated ventilation

system and smoke/detection and fire

suppression system architecture to

ensure that FAA requirements are met.

Therefore, the FAA believes that the

77256 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 238 / Monday, December 11, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

current language in the special

condition is appropriate.

One commenter suggests the special

condition should be revised to reflect

the type of fire most likely to occur

within the crew rest compartment and

associated detection times.

The FAA disagrees that the special

conditions should be revised to reflect

the type of fires most likely to occur

within the crew rest compartment. The

special conditions must reflect all

expected fire threat scenarios. It should

be noted that the crew rest area will not

be carrying flammable fluids,

explosives, or other dangerous cargo.

The requirements to enable

crewmember(s) quick entry to the crew

rest compartment and to locate a fire

source inherently places limits on the

amount of baggage that may be carried

and the size of the crew rest area. The

applicant must accommodate these

requirements and the appropriate

Aircraft Certification Office must

require suitable means of compliance

and may elect to limit an investigation

to a ‘‘worse case fire threat’’ scenario.

One commenter suggests having a

trained crewmember for manual fire

fighting as the most effective means for

controlling a fire in an overhead crew

rest compartment. The commenter

recommends that only the manual fire

fighting be accepted for the crew rest

compartment.

The special condition allows the

applicant to select an appropriate means

to meet the requirement. While the

presence of a ‘‘trained crewmember’’

may be very effective, the FAA position

is that a properly designed smoke

detection and fire suppression system

with sufficient quantity of smoke

detectors, smoke detector placement,

quantity and placement of fire

extinguishing nozzles, control of

ventilation, etc; can provide an effective

means to control and suppress a fire

threat in any crew rest area.

One commenter suggests that the

critical design issue for effective manual

fire fighting is unrestricted access to the

compartment.

The FAA concurs that the time

element is a critical issue for effective

control and suppression of any fire

threat for both a built-in smoke

detection and fire suppression system

and a manual fire fighting system.

One comment states that ‘‘the time for

the compartment to become smokefilled, * * *’’ is vague and open to

numerous interpretations.

The FAA disagrees. Performance

based wording is deliberately used to

convey to the applicant a broad

spectrum of requirements that the

regulation intends. The FAA does agree

that there needs to be a common

understanding of the requirements and

that they need to be consistently applied

to each applicant that has a similar

installation.

One comment states that it is not clear

if a flight test is required for the crew

intervention option in special condition

no. 11. The commenter believes that it

is possible this may be the more limiting

test condition and should therefore be

required.

The FAA concurs, and an aircraft

certification office may require flight

testing to demonstrate an acceptable

means of compliance.

One comment states that there is no

evaluation of the effectiveness of fire

fighting procedures. The commenter

questions whether it is sufficient to

determine that the option of crew

intervention provides an equivalent

level of safety to the installation of a fire

suppression system.

The FAA concurs that the special

conditions as written focus on the

requirement that a crewmember be able

to quickly enter the crew rest

compartment prepared to locate the

smoke source. Inherent in the action of

locating the smoke source is the action

of suppression/extinguishment of the

smoke source that should be no

different than utilizing a fire

extinguisher in the cabin. The key issue

is the response time. As previously

mentioned, the time required to gain

access and determine the smoke source

must be short enough to prevent the fire

from propagating and threatening

continued safe flight and landing. The

applicant must evaluate the kinds of

fires likely to occur and ensure that the

appropriate fire extinguishers are

provided per the requirements given in

§ 25.851. In addition, FAA has begun

internal discussions to develop

guidance on acceptable means of

compliance. These discussions have

included issues such as the required

level of smoke concentration, the

possible use of a low light level source

to simulate a visual cue from a

‘‘smoldering source,’’ placement of the

smoke source, and test conditions. The

FAA will issue applicable guidance

material when it becomes available or is

required.

Special Condition No. 14

Five comments address special

condition no. 14(a) concerning the

manual release of the oxygen system in

the crew rest compartment. Several of

the comments state that the design in

previous remote crew rest

compartments has been an extension of

the system provided in the passenger

compartment. The oxygen system has an

automatic and a manual release method.

With the automatic release method,

whenever the altitude in the cabin goes

higher than a preset amount, the oxygen

masks are automatically deployed. With

the manual method, the flight crew can

deploy the oxygen masks. The

commenters question the need to have

a method for the crew rest occupants to

manually deploy the oxygen masks.

The FAA agrees with the commenters

that the system should be similar to the

main deck passenger oxygen system and

there must be a means for the oxygen

masks to be manually deployed from the

flight deck.

One comment addresses special

condition no. 14(c)(5) and (f)(7). The

commenter interprets a section as a

common area in the crew rest area that

contains seats and/or bunks that can be

closed off for privacy * * * and a

smoke detection system in that section

that ties into the entire crew rest smoke

detection system. The commenter

suggests changing the wording in the

special conditions to read ‘‘Testing of

the smoke detection system will

demonstrate that a fire can be detected

in each individual bunk.’’

The FAA agrees with the

interpretation but disagrees with the

need to adopt the suggested language.

The FAA interpretation of the

requirements for built-in smoke

detection and fire suppression/

extinguishing systems inherently

includes the need for detection and for

suppression/extinguishment to

encompass the entire area in question.

One comment recommends a general

change to the special conditions

concerning the approval of all normal,

abnormal and emergency procedures

and their training be approved by the

Authority under which the airplane is

operated. The commenter proposes that

a statement to that effect be included in

the special conditions.

The FAA agrees with the comment

that the Authority under which the

airplane is operated approves all

normal, abnormal and emergency

procedures and their training. However,

the FAA disagrees that the special

conditions must include that

requirement. The modification to install

the overhead crew rest area would be

considered a major modification that

would require the approval of the

Authority under which the airplane is

operated to return the airplane to

service after the modification. This

approval to return the airplane to

service would include review and

approval of all normal, abnormal and

emergency procedures and their training

changes made as a result of the

modification.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 238 / Monday, December 11, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 77257

Discussion of the Special Conditions

In general, the requirements listed in

these special conditions are similar to

those previously approved in earlier

certification programs, such as the

Boeing Model 747 overhead crew rest

compartment. These special conditions

establish seating, communication,

lighting, personal safety, and evacuation

requirements for the overhead crew rest

compartment. When applicable, the

requirements parallel the existing

requirements for a lower deck service

compartment and provide an equivalent

level of safety to that provided for main

deck occupants.

Seats and berths must be certified to

the maximum flight loads. Due to the

location and configuration of the crew

rest compartment, occupancy during

taxi, takeoff, and landing would be

prohibited, and occupancy limited to

crewmembers during flight. Occupancy

would be limited to either ten persons,

or the combined total of approved seats

and berths, whichever is less.

To preclude occupants from being

trapped in the crew rest compartment in

the event the main entryway is blocked,

two evacuation routes, including the

entryway, would be required. Each

evacuation route must be designed to

allow for removal of an incapacitated

person from the crew rest compartment

to the main deck.

In addition, passenger information

signs, supplemental oxygen, and a seat

or berth for each occupant of the crew

rest compartment would be required.

These items are necessary because of

turbulence and/or decompression.

To prevent the occupants from being

isolated in a dark area due to loss of the

crew rest compartment lighting, either a

second independent source of normal

lighting or emergency lighting would be

required. An emergency lighting system,

which is activated under the same

conditions as the main deck emergency

lighting system, would also be required.

Two-way voice communications and

public address speaker(s) would be

required to alert the occupants to an

inflight emergency. Also, a system to

alert the occupants of the crew rest

compartment in the event of

decompression and to don oxygen

masks would be required.

Special condition No. 8 requires a

means, readily detectable by seated or

standing occupants of the crew rest

compartment, which indicates when

seat belts should be fastened. The

requirement for visibility of the sign by

standing occupants may be met by a

general area sign that is visible to

occupants standing in the main floor

area or corridor of the crew rest area. It

will not be essential to be visible from

every possible location in the crew rest

area; however, the location should not

be easily obscured or remotely located.

Since the overhead crew rest

compartment is remotely located from

the main passenger cabin and will not

always be occupied, a smoke detection

system and fire-fighting equipment will

be required to minimize the hazards

associated with a fire in the crew rest

compartment. The smoke detection

system must be capable of detecting a

fire in each area of the compartment

created by the installation of a curtain

or partition. The materials in the crew

rest compartment must meet the

flammability requirements of

§ 25.853(a), and the mattresses must

meet the fire blocking requirements of

§ 25.853(c).

The crew rest compartment must be

designed such that fires within the

compartment can be controlled without

having to enter the compartment; or, the

design of the access provisions must

allow crew equipped for fire fighting to

have unrestricted access to the

compartment. The time for a

crewmember on the main deck to react

to the fire alarm, to don the fire fighting

equipment, and to gain access must not

exceed the time for the crew rest

compartment to become smoke filled,

making it difficult to locate the fire

source. If the means of controlling the

fire within the compartment is a Halon

1301 or equivalent fire suppression

system, the system should be designed

similar to a cargo compartment fire

suppression system. Advisory Circular

120–42, titled ‘‘Extended Range

Operation With Two-Engine Airplanes

(ETOPS)’’ provides guidance on fire

suppression systems in cargo

compartments.

This special condition requirement

concerning fires within the

compartment was developed for, and

applied to, Boeing Model 777–200 and

Model 777–300 series airplanes lower

lobe crew rest compartment; it was not

applied to the overhead crew rest

compartment in earlier certification

programs such as the Boeing Model 747.

The Model 747 special conditions were

issued before the new flammability

requirements were developed. This

requirement originated from a concern

that a fire in an unoccupied crew rest

compartment could spread into the

passenger compartment, or affect other

vital systems, before it could be

extinguished. The special condition

would require either the installation of

a manually activated fire containment

system that is accessible from outside

the crew rest compartment, or a

demonstration that the crew could

satisfactorily perform the function of

extinguishing a fire under the

prescribed conditions. The manually

activated fire containment system

would be required only if it could not

be demonstrated that a crewmember

responding to the alarm could not locate

the fire source and successfully

extinguish the fire.

These special conditions provide the

regulatory requirements necessary for

certification of this modification. Other

special conditions may be developed, as

needed, based on further FAA review

and discussions with the applicant,

manufacturer, and civil aviation

authorities.

Applicability

As discussed above, these special

conditions are applicable to Boeing

Model 777–200 series airplanes. Should

Flight Structures, Inc., apply at a later

date for a supplemental type certificate

to modify any other model included on

Type Certificate No. T00001SE to

incorporate the same novel or unusual

design feature, the special conditions

would apply to that model as well

under the provisions of § 21.101(a)(1).

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel

or unusual design features on Boeing

Model 777–200 series airplanes. It is not

a rule of general applicability, and it

affects only the applicant who applied

to the FAA for approval of these features

on the airplane.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting

and recordkeeping requirements.

The authority citation for these

special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,

44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by

Administrator, the following special

conditions are issued as part of the type

certification basis for Boeing Model

777–200 series airplanes, as modified by

Flight Structures, Inc., with overhead

crew rest compartments.

1. Occupancy of the overhead crew

rest compartment is limited to a

maximum of ten occupants. There must

be an approved seat or berth able to

withstand the maximum flight loads

when occupied for each occupant

permitted in the crew rest compartment.

(a) There must be appropriate

placards, inside and outside to indicate:

(1) The maximum number of

occupants allowed,

77258 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 238 / Monday, December 11, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

(2) That occupancy is restricted to

crewmembers that are trained in the

evacuation procedures for the overhead

crew rest compartment,

(3) That occupancy is prohibited

during taxi, take-off and landing, and

(4) That smoking is prohibited in the

crew rest compartment.

(b) There must be at least one ashtray

on the inside and outside of any

entrance to the crew rest compartment.

(c) There must be a means to prevent

passengers from entering the

compartment in the event of an

emergency or when no flight attendant

is present.

(d) There must be a means for any

door installed between the crew rest

compartment and passenger cabin to be

capable of being quickly opened from

inside the compartment, even when

crowding occurs at each side of the

door.

(e) For all doors installed, there must

be a means to preclude anyone from

being trapped inside the compartment.

If a locking mechanism is installed, it

must be capable of being unlocked from

the outside without the aid of special

tools. The lock must not prevent

opening from the inside of the

compartment at any time.

2. There must be at least two

emergency evacuation routes that could

be used by each occupant of the crew

rest compartment to rapidly evacuate to

the main cabin. In addition—

(a) The routes must be located with

sufficient separation within the

compartment, and between the

evacuation routes, to minimize the

possibility of an event rendering both

routes inoperative.

(b) The routes must be designed to

minimize the possibility of blockage,

which might result from fire,

mechanical or structural failure, or

persons standing below or against the

escape route. One of two evacuation

routes may not be located where, during

times in which occupancy is allowed,

normal movement by passengers occurs

(i.e., main aisle, cross aisle, or galley

complex) that would impede egress of

the crew rest compartment. If there is

low headroom at or near the evacuation

route, provisions must be made to

prevent or to protect occupants from

head injury. The use of evacuation

routes must not be dependent on any

powered device. If the evacuation

procedure involves the evacuee

stepping on seats, the seats must not be

damaged to the extent that they would

not be acceptable for occupancy during

an emergency landing.

(c) Emergency evacuation procedures

and the evacuation of incapacitated

occupants must be established and

transmitted to the operators for

incorporation into their training

programs and appropriate operational

manuals.

(d) There must be a limitation in the

Airplane Flight Manual or other suitable

means requiring that crewmembers be

trained in the use of evacuation routes.

3. There must be a means for the

evacuation of an incapacitated person

(representative of a ninety-fifth

percentile male) from the crew rest

compartment to the passenger cabin

floor. The evacuation must be

demonstrated for all evacuation routes.

A flight attendant or other crewmember

(a total of one assistant) may provide

assistance in the evacuation. Procedures

for the evacuation of an incapacitated

person from the crew rest compartment

must be established.

4. The following signs and placards

must be provided in the crew rest

compartment:

(a) At least one exit sign, located near

each exit, meeting the requirements of

§ 25.812(b)(1)(i).

(b) An appropriate placard defining

the location and the operating

instructions for each evacuation route.

(c) Placards must be readable from a

distance of 30 inches under emergency

lighting conditions.

(d) The exit handles and evacuation

path operating instruction placards

must be illuminated to at least 160

microlamberts under emergency lighting

conditions.

5. There must be a means in the event

of failure of the airplane’s main power

system, or of the normal crew rest

compartment lighting system, for

emergency illumination to be

automatically provided for the crew rest

compartment.

(a) This emergency illumination must

be independent of the main lighting

system.

(b) The sources of general cabin

illumination may be common to both

the emergency and the main lighting

systems if the power supply to the

emergency lighting system is

independent of the power supply to the

main lighting system.

(c) The illumination level must be

sufficient for the occupants of the crew

rest compartment to locate and transfer

to the main passenger cabin floor by

means of each evacuation route.

6. There must be means for two-way

voice communications between the

crewmembers on the flight deck and the

occupants of the crew rest compartment.

There must also be two-way

communications between the occupants

of the crew rest compartment and each

flight attendant station required to have

a public address system microphone per

§ 25.1423(g) in the passenger cabin.

7. There must be a means for manual

activation of an aural emergency alarm

system, audible during normal and

emergency conditions, to enable

crewmembers on the flight deck and at

each pair of required floor level

emergency exits to alert occupants of

the crew rest compartment of an

emergency situation. Use of a public

address or crew interphone system will

be acceptable, providing an adequate

means of differentiating between normal

and emergency communications is

incorporated. The system must be

powered in flight, after the shutdown or

failure of all engines and auxiliary

power units, or the disconnection or

failure of all power sources dependent

on their continued operation, for a

period of at least ten minutes.

8. There must be a means, readily

detectable by seated or standing

occupants of the crew rest compartment,

which indicates when seat belts should

be fastened. Seat belt type restraints

must be provided for berths and must be

compatible for the sleeping attitude

during cruise conditions. There must be

a placard on each berth requiring that

seat belts must be fastened when

occupied. If compliance with any of the

other requirements of these special

conditions is predicated on specific

head location, there must be a placard

identifying the head position. In the

event there are no seats, at least one sign

must be provided to cover anticipated

turbulence.

9. The following equipment must be

provided in the crew rest compartment:

(a) At least one approved hand-held

fire extinguisher appropriate for the

kinds of fires likely to occur;

(b) One protective breathing

equipment device approved to

Technical Standard Order (TSO)–C116

or equivalent, suitable for fire fighting;

and

(c) One flashlight.

10. A smoke detection system (or

systems) must be provided that

monitors each area within the crew rest

compartment, including those areas

partitioned by curtains. Flight tests must

be conducted to show compliance with

this requirement. Each system (or

systems) must provide:

(a) A visual indication to the flight

deck within one minute after the start of

a fire;

(b) An aural warning in the crew rest

compartment; and

(c) A warning in the main passenger

cabin. This warning must be readily

detectable by a flight attendant, taking

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 238 / Monday, December 11, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 77259

into consideration the positioning of

flight attendants throughout the main

passenger compartment during various

phases of flight.

11. The crew rest compartment must

be designed such that fires within the

compartment can be controlled without

a crewmember having to enter the

compartment, or the design of the access

provisions must allow crewmembers

equipped for firefighting to have

unrestricted access to the compartment.

The time for a crewmember on the main

deck to react to the fire alarm, to don the

fire fighting equipment, and to gain

access must not exceed the time for the

compartment to become smoke-filled,

making it difficult to locate the fire

source.

12. There must be a means provided

to exclude hazardous quantities of

smoke or extinguishing agent

originating in the crew rest

compartment from entering any other

compartment occupied by crewmembers

or passengers. The means must include

the time periods during the evacuation

of the crew rest compartment and, if

applicable, when accessing the crew rest

compartment to manually fight a fire.

Smoke entering any other compartment

occupied by crewmembers or

passengers must dissipate within 5

minutes after closing the access to the

crew rest compartment. Flight tests

must be conducted to show compliance

with this requirement.

13. There must be a supplemental

oxygen system equivalent to that

provided for main deck passengers for

each seat and berth in the crew rest

compartment. The system must provide:

(a) An aural and visual warning to the

occupants of the crew rest compartment

to don oxygen masks in the event of

decompression; and

(b) A decompression warning that

activates before the cabin pressure

altitude exceeds 15,000 feet. The

warning must sound continuously until

a reset pushbutton in the crew rest

compartment is depressed.

14. The following requirements apply

to a crew rest compartment that is

divided into several sections by the

installation of curtains or partitions:

(a) To compensate for sleeping

occupants, there must be an aural alert

that can be heard in each section of the

crew rest compartment that

accompanies automatic presentation of

supplemental oxygen masks. Two

supplemental oxygen masks are

required in each section whether or not

seats or berths are installed in each

section. There must also be a means by

which the oxygen masks can be

manually deployed from the flight deck.

(b) A placard is required adjacent to

each curtain that visually divides or

separates, for privacy purposes, the

overhead crew rest compartment into

small sections. The placard must require

that the curtain(s) remain open when

the private section it creates is

unoccupied. The vestibule section

adjacent to the stairway is not

considered a private area and, therefore,

does not require a placard.

(c) For each crew rest section created

by the installation of a curtain, the

following requirements of these special

conditions must be met with the curtain

open or closed:

(1) No smoking placard (special

condition no. 1),

(2) Emergency illumination (special

condition no. 5),

(3) Emergency alarm system (special

condition no. 7),

(4) Seat belt fasten signal (special

condition no. 8), and

(5) The smoke or fire detection system

(special conditions no.’s 10, 11, and 12).

(d) Overhead crew rest compartments

visually divided to the extent that

evacuation could be affected must have

exit signs that direct occupants to the

primary stairway exit. The exit signs

must be provided in each separate

section of the crew rest compartment,

and must meet the requirements of

§ 25.812(b)(1)(i).

(e) For sections within an overhead

crew rest compartment that are created

by the installation of a rigid partition

with a door physically separating the

sections, the following requirements of

these special conditions must be met

with the door open or closed:

(1) There must be a secondary

evacuation route from each section to

the main deck, or alternatively, it must

be shown that any door between the

sections has been designed to preclude

anyone from being trapped inside the

compartment.

(2) Any door between the sections

must be shown to be openable when

crowded against, even when crowding

occurs at each side of the door.

(3) There may be no more than one

door between any seat or berth and the

primary stairway exit.

(4) There must be exit signs in each

section meeting the requirements of

§ 25.812(b)(1)(i) that direct occupants to

the primary stairway exit.

(f) For each smaller section within the

main crew rest compartment created by

the installation of a partition with a

door, the following requirements of

these special conditions must be met

with the door open or closed:

(1) No smoking placards (special

condition no. 1),

(2) Emergency illumination (special

condition no. 5),

(3) Two-way voice communication

(special condition no. 6),

(4) Emergency alarm system (special

condition no. 7),

(5) Seat belt fasten signal (special

condition no. 8),

(6) Emergency fire fighting and

protective equipment (special condition

no. 9), and

(7) Smoke or fire detection system

(special conditions no.’s 10, 11, and 12).

15. The requirements of two-way

voice communication with the flight

deck and provisions for emergency

firefighting and protective equipment

are not applicable to lavatories or other

small areas that are not intended to be

occupied for extended periods of time.

16. Where a waste disposal receptacle

is fitted, it must be equipped with an

automatic fire extinguisher that meets

the performance requirements of

§ 25.854(b).

17. Materials (including finishes or

decorative surfaces applied to the

materials) must comply with the

flammability requirements of

§ 25.853(a), as amended by Amendment

25–83. Mattresses must comply with the

flammability requirements of

§ 25.853(c), as amended by Amendment

25–83.

Issued in Renton, Washington on

December 1, 2000.

Donald L. Riggin,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service,

ANM–100.

[FR Doc. 00–31478 Filed 12–8–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2000–NM–03–AD; Amendment

39–12032; AD 2000–24–25]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Raytheon

Model Hawker 800A (U–125A) and

Hawker 800XP Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD),

applicable to certain Raytheon Model

Hawker 800A (U–125A) and Hawker

800XP series airplanes, that requires

inspecting the roller clearance in the

nose landing gear drag stay and making