JOURNAL OF THE

JOINT AND COMBINED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

Summer 2008

CAMPAIGNING
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History 

 In the 1930s, few officers were qualified, either by training or experience, to 

engage in joint operations. The demands of World War II brought out the urgent need for 

joint action by ground, sea, and air forces. To alleviate the friction and misunderstanding 

resulting from lack of joint experience, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established an Army and 

Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) in 1943. ANSCOL conducted a four-month course that 

was successful in training officers for joint command and staff duties. 

 After the war, educational requirements for the armed forces were fully examined. 

Although thorough contingency planning was recognized as essential for waging war on 

a joint and combined scale, ANSCOL, which had been established to meet the immediate 

needs of war, was discontinued. A joint committee was appointed to prepare a directive 

for a new school. This directive, which was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 

June 1946, established the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC). 

 Responsibility for the operation and maintenance of its facilities was charged to 

the Chief of Naval Operations. Following a temporary residence in Washington, D.C., 

AFSC was established in Norfolk, Virginia, on 13 August 1946. The site, formerly a 

U.S. Naval Receiving Station, was selected by the Secretaries of War and Navy because 

of its immediate availability and its proximity to varied high-level military activities. 

 There were 150 students from all Services in the first class. They assembled in 

converted administration buildings on 3 February 1947 to be greeted by the first 

commandant, Air Force Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons. The faculty officers 

came from joint assignments in all theaters of World War II. 

 With the construction of Normandy Hall in 1962, AFSC completed its transition 

from a temporary to a permanent institution. AFSC was assigned to the National Defense 

University on 12 August 1981. In the summer of 1990, AFSC changed from an 

intermediate joint professional military education school to an institution where Phase II 

of the Chairman’s Program for Joint Education is taught. 

 In 2000, the AFSC was renamed the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). The Joint 

and Combined Warfighting School proudly traces its origin back to the Army Navy Staff 

College. Today’s JCWS educates over one thousand senior military officers from the 

United States and International countries as well as civilians from the interagency. We 

are proud of our heritage and anticipate a bright future for this great institution. 
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JCWS Mission 

The Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) 

produces graduates capable of creatively and effectively 

planning operational level warfighting for joint and 

combined military forces while integrating the effects 

of the United States Government, non-governmental 

organizations, and international organizations to ensure the 

success of Combatant and Joint Task Force Commanders 

operating within an uncertain operating environment. 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent

the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the Department of

Defense.
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Welcome to the Joint and Combined Warfighting School’s quarterly journal, Campaigning. 

This quarter’s Campaigning features an article on “Military Objectives and the Levels of War” 

written by our dear friend and staunch supporter Dr. Milan Vego. Dr. Vego has provided a very 

thoughtful article focusing on an important aspect of campaign planning. Robert Kemp’s 

contribution to this edition is an extremely interesting and timely piece which discusses a variety 

of issues associated with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Eastern Afghanistan. Robert uses a 

very worthwhile case study method which emphasizes key aspects of planning that make the 

implementation of a coherent policy on reconstruction so complex and challenging. Dr. Alex 

Crowther addresses the inter workings of an embassy at war. He provides superb insight into the 

difficulties associated with implementing our nation’s policies at the cutting edge of the Global 

War on Terror. Each of these submissions should substantially contribute to the ongoing 

dialogue and debate surrounding our profession. I hope you find each of these articles 

interesting. 

In addition to our main featured articles, this issue of Campaigning contains an update on the 

Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information System, (JDEIS) provided by 

Dave Spangler from the Joint Forces Command, as well as updates on the activities of your Joint 

Combined and Warfighting School (JCWS). Based on the outstanding reputation of our faculty 

and alumni, JCWS has been asked to participate in the development and execution of a number 

of education endeavors throughout the world. We have included an update of just two of our 

undertakings in Brazil and Saudi Arabia. 

We are always searching for contributors to keep the quality of our journal as high as it has been 

to date – please consider sending us your article for review and publishing. 

Finally, I would like to thank Seaman Jania Battles and Ms Monica Clancy. Both of these ladies 

spend a great deal of time into making Campaigning a truly worthwhile endeavor. 

Craig L. Bollenberg 

Colonel, USA 

Dean, Joint and Combined Warfighting School 
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Index

 1 Military Objectives and the Levels of War 

Dr. Milan Vego 

32 Civil-Military Cooperation as a Function of Security, Eastern 

Afghanistan, 2004 – 2005 

Robert Kemp 

43 The Embassy at War 

Alex Crowthers 

51 One Stop Electronic Shopping for Joint Doctrine and More 

 David Spangler 

52 Brazilian Joint Force Operations Conference 

54 Support to the Saudi Arabian Staff College 

56 JCWS Award Winning Papers
 

Summer 2008 

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MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND THE LEVELS OF 

WAR 

By 

Dr. Milan Vego 

Copyright© 2008 

Pursue one great decisive aim with force and 

determination—a maxim which should take 

first place among all causes of victory. 

Carl von Clausewitz, Principles of War 1812 

 The objective to be accomplished comprises the very heart of both the theory and the 

practice of war. Without a clearly stated and attainable objective, the entire military effort 

becomes essentially pointless.1 This is particularly true at the operational and strategic levels of 

war because the stakes are so much higher than at the tactical level. Almost all aspects of 

operational warfare are related, either directly or indirectly, to the objective to be accomplished. 

Among other things, the objective determines the method of one’s combat force employment, the 

size of the physical space for accomplishing it, the level of war, and also the level of command, 

type of planning, and major phases and elements of one’s combat force employment. 

Aims/Goals vs. Objectives 

All too often, the terms aims, goals, and objectives are used interchangeably, as if they 

mean the same thing; they do not. Aim refers to a general statement of intent or direction for an 

action. A goal is a statement of one’s intent. However, it is more specific than an aim. Aims and 

goals are, by their very nature, ambiguous, vague, open-ended, and difficult, if not impossible, to 

quantify. They are usually expressed in very broad terms. Military planning and execution 

cannot be based on aims or goals because they lack sufficient specificity. They also do not 

contain elements that can be used to measure progress toward their ultimate accomplishment. 

This is the reason that aims/goals were replaced with something much more specific: objectives 

(or objects). 

In generic terms, the objective can also be understood as the “purpose” of the actions one 

carries out within a specific space and time. Military objectives are those that, by their nature, 

location, purpose, or potential use, would make an effective contribution to military action, or 

whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would offer a definitive military 

advantage. Some theoreticians contend that the term objective has physical and geographical 

 

1

 C. R. Brown, “The Principles of War,” Proceedings 6 (June 1949), p. 624. 
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meaning and thus tends to be confusing. The famous British theoretician B. H. Liddell Hart 

observed that better terms would be “object” when dealing with the purpose of policy, and 

“military aim” when dealing with the way forces are directed in the service of policy.2

Scale 

Tactical, operational, and strategic objectives are differentiated according to their scale. It 

is the scale of the objective that determines the method of one’s combat force employment and 

the size of the physical space (and hence, levels of command to be established) in which one’s 

forces are to be employed—not vice versa. The accomplishment of any military objective 

requires a drastic or radical change to the military situation (see Figure 1). Therefore, the 

solution to any military problem concerns an evaluation of the factors that would create a new 

and favorable military situation. 3 The accomplishment of a military objective is intended to 

cause a drastic or radical change in the situation. It also creates some desired or undesired effects 

on the mind of the enemy commander or leadership.

 

MilitaryStrategic

Objectives

Tactical

Objective

Political Strategic

Objectives

Theater-Strategic

Objective

Theater-Strategic

Objective

Operational 

Objective

Operational 

Objective

Tactical

Objective

Tactical

Objective

Tactical

Objective

Operational 

Objective

Theater-Strategic

Objective

Operational 

Objective

 

Figure 1: Hierarchy of Objectives 

 In general, the political objective should dominate the strategic objective, and the 

strategic objective should drive the determination of the operational and tactical objectives.4

 In 

 

2

 B. H. Liddell Hart, “The Objective in War: National Object and Military Aim, A Lecture Delivered at the Naval 

War College on 24 September 1952,” Naval War College Review, 1952, p. 1. 

3

 Department of Operations, Sound Military Decision (including the Estimate of the Situation and the Formulation 

of Directives) (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1938), p. 30. 
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generic terms, a strategic objective can be described as the one whose destruction, annihilation, 

neutralization, or control will have a drastic (or radical) effect on the course and outcome of a 

war as a whole. Correspondingly, the accomplishment of a strategic objective should have a 

drastic or radical effect on the situation in a part of or the entire theater (of war). In general, 

strategic objectives range from neutralizing or reducing military and nonmilitary strategic threats 

to one’s national or alliance/coalition interests in time of peace, to partially or completely 

eliminating these threats in time of war. 

 A distinction is made between the national (or alliance/coalition) strategic objective and 

the military strategic objective. In the case of a country potentially waging war in two or more 

theaters, there will also be a need to accomplish the theater-strategic objective in each theater. In 

war, the accomplishment of a national or alliance/coalition strategic objective should end the 

enemy’s organized resistance and the hostilities in a given theater of war.5

 

 

 Normally, a national or alliance/coalition strategic objective cannot be accomplished with 

a single step but requires the achievement of two or more intermediate steps or military strategic

or theater-strategic objectives. The accomplishment of each of these subordinate strategic 

objectives should lead to a drastic change in the military situation in a given theater of war and 

would also represent a distinctive phase in a war as a whole. 

 

 The intermediate strategic objectives can be accomplished sequentially and/or 

simultaneously. The number of theater-strategic objectives principally depends on whether a war 

is global or regional in scale. In a global war, in each theater of war, there might be several 

theater-strategic objectives, some offensive and some defensive, to be accomplished in sequence 

or simultaneously; this was the case in the Pacific in 1941–1945. The larger the theater, the more 

likely each theater-strategic objective would be separated by long distances from each other. For 

example, in the spring of 1942, there were four theater-strategic objectives in the Pacific: defense 

of Alaska and the Aleutians; defense of the U.S. West Coast, Hawaii, and Midway; defense of 

island positions and shipping routes from the U.S. West Coast and Hawaii to Australia and New 

Zealand via the southern Pacific; and defense of Australia/New Zealand. In the offensive phase 

of the war in the Pacific after August 1942, the Allies had four offensive theater-strategic 

objectives to accomplish: seizing control of the Solomons archipelago, the central Pacific, New 

 4

 William D. Ivey, Objectives and Success—Linking National Policy Objectives and Military Strategic Objectives to 

Achieve Success (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), p. 1. 

5 In the nineteenth century, the term operations-object was used in referring to the objective of an operation. The 

most important operations-object was the enemy army. Strategic points could serve as the operations-object only if 

they were to create favorable conditions for the next operations or if their seizure, because of their political 

significance, would result in peace; the seizure or occupation of the enemy capital was considered the main 

operation-object to which all operations were directed; J. Neumann, Grundzuege der Strategie. Ein Leitfaden fuer 

das Studium der Kriegsgeschichte (Vienna, 1870), p. 11. 
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Guinea, and the Philippines. Defense of Alaska and the Aleutians remained a defensive theaterstrategic objective until the end of the war. The final offensive theater-strategic objective was the 

planned invasion of the home islands and the capture or neutralization of the key island positions 

guarding the southern approaches to Japan (i.e., Formosa, Iwo Jima, and Ryukyus). 

 In a regional war—such as were the Korean War, 1950–1953; the Iraqi-Iranian War, 

1980–1988; the Gulf War of 1990–1991; Afghanistan 2001–2002 (Operation Enduring 

Freedom); and Iraq in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom)—there is a single military or theaterstrategic objective to be accomplished. 

 Because of its scale and complexity, a military strategic or theater-strategic objective 

cannot be accomplished by a single act; several intermediate steps—operational objectives—

have to be accomplished to achieve the entire military or theater-strategic objective. Depending 

on the respective strength of the friendly and enemy forces, the characteristics of the physical 

environment, and other aspects of the situation, the intermediate objectives can be accomplished 

in succession and/or simultaneously. The accomplishment of each operational objective should 

lead to drastic or radical change in the situation in a given declared (or undeclared) theater of 

operations. 

 In land warfare, an operational objective might be a large city or industrial basin, an oilproducing area, an oil refinery complex, the country’s capital, a major part of the enemy forces, 

or a certain phase line (PL) to be reached. For example, in the German invasion of Soviet Russia 

in 1941, Leningrad, Kiev, and Moscow were operational objectives in the purely military sense, 

as was the Donbas Basin, the Crimea Peninsula, and the Caucasian oil fields. 

 In war at sea, the operational objective is usually accomplished by obtaining control of a 

certain sea or ocean area, destroying or neutralizing a major part of the enemy fleet, or cutting 

off or defending the flow of maritime trade. In a maritime theater, obtaining sea control in a 

major part of the theater or seizing or defending a large island or archipelago or strait/narrows 

can be an operational objective. Sometimes even a large naval or air base, such as Singapore in 

1942, can be an operational objective to be defended or captured. Also, the destruction or 

successful defense of a large convoy or a convoy carrying sorely needed reinforcements and 

supplies can be an operational objective. In the Allied Solomons Campaign of 1942–1943, the 

ultimate theater-strategic objective was accomplished through the successive accomplishment of 

three operational objectives—the islands of Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and New Georgia—and 

the neutralization of the Japanese naval and air complex at Rabaul, New Britain. 

 In air warfare, an operational objective would be to obtain or maintain superiority or 

supremacy in the air in a given area or joint area of operations; to destroy a major part of the 

enemy air force; or to prevent enemy strikes from the air or through airspace in a given area of 

operations. For example, in the Allied bombing offensive against Germany in World War II, the 
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destruction of the industrial Ruhr area—especially of the Schweinfurt ball-bearing plants—and 

of the Ploesti oil-producing area in Romania were operational objectives. 

 An operational objective also has to be divided into several intermediate—or tactical—

objectives. These, in turn, can be major or minor in scale. The accomplishment of a major 

tactical objective should represent a major step toward accomplishing the respective operational 

objective and should also lead to a drastic change in the situation in a given area of operations. 

Examples of major tactical objectives would be the destruction of a carrier group, amphibious 

task force, or large convoy, and seizing or holding a large naval base, port, or airfield complex. 

In war on land, a major tactical objective might be destroying or neutralizing a major element of 

the enemy division or seizing or successfully defending a large city, a critical major road 

junction or mountain pass, or some controlling heights. In an amphibious operation, major 

tactical objectives could include capturing a beachhead or some important island facing the main 

landing beach, or seizing control of an important inland airfield. 

 The accomplishment of a minor tactical objective should directly contribute to achieving 

the respective major tactical objective and also result in a drastic change in the situation in a 

given combat zone or sector. Examples of minor tactical objectives are the seizure or defense of 

some key natural or human-made feature, such as a hill, valley, river crossing, port/anchorage, 

village/town, or road junction. The destruction or neutralization of force elements, such as an 

army company or battalion, and one or a group of ships or aircraft, also constitutes a minor 

tactical objective. In practice, it is often difficult to precisely differentiate between major and 

minor tactical objectives. It is often a matter for the commander’s judgment and experience. 

Tasks vs. Objectives 

 A military objective is normally divided into a number of constituent parts—called 

tasks—that, when carried out, will collectively lead to the objective’s accomplishment. Tasks are 

those measurable entities that allow the commander to properly determine the rate of progress 

toward the accomplishment of a given military objective. A task answers the question of what 

needs to be done, while the objective or the purpose answers the question of why it needs to be 

done. The linkage between the objective and its constituent tasks cannot be arbitrarily broken up 

without serious consequences for one’s ability to accomplish that objective. 

 The larger the objective, the more tasks it encompasses; thus, the larger and more diverse 

the forces and the more time required to accomplish the given objective. A large military 

objective is usually divided into several related, arbitrarily named, main (or principal) tasks; each 

of these is, in turn, composed of a number of component (or partial) tasks (see Figure 2). 
6 

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Main Task

Main Task

Main

Task

Main Task

 Figure 2: Objective vs. Tasks 

 

 The process of deriving tasks is an art rather than a science. Determining too few tasks is 

bound to lead to partial or even complete failure to accomplish the stated objective. Adding new 

tasks without changing or modifying the objective or having larger resources leads to so-called 

mission creep. This, in turn, would lead to a disconnect between one’s ends and means; hence, in 

most cases it has fatal consequences. 

Types

In general, a military objective can be offensive, defensive, or a combination of the two. 

An offensive objective is aimed to seize, capture, or destroy a territory, position, or some source 

of military or nonmilitary power. A defensive objective, in contrast, is aimed to defend, hold, or 

control these. A side that possesses overwhelming military strength usually determines a series 

of offensive, military objectives to be accomplished. A side inferior to its opponent in the key 

elements of strength is usually forced to take a defensive posture until the correlation of forces 

shifts in its favor. 

Sometimes the term “positive” objective is used for an offensive objective, and the term 

“negative” for a defensive objective.6

 For example, in the American Civil War (1861–1865), the 

northern states had a positive strategic objective—to defeat the southern states and thereby force 

them to remain in the union. This objective could be accomplished only by going on a strategic 

offensive. For the southern states, the strategic objective was negative—forcing the North to 

 

6

 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green, 1918), p. 24. 
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recognize their independence. However, for the confederate states, the accomplishment of that 

strategic objective required going on the offensive.7 

 A military objective can be exclusively or predominantly physical or tangible. This is 

usually the case with tactical and operational objectives in a high-intensity conflict. a military 

objectvie can be exclusively unquantifiable or intangible. This is often the case with the For 

example, udermining the enemy’s morale and will to fight is an essentially intangible military 

objectives. However, in most cases a military objective is composed of both tangible and 

intangible elements. In a low-intensity conflict, tangible elements of a military objective are 

preseent at all levels of war. 

 It is at the strategic level that political and military objectives start to diverge in terms of 

their ultimate purpose. At the strategic level, objectives can range from the threat of the use of 

force to a change in the enemy’s behavior or policy on a certain issue. If the political objectives 

are unlimited, then so are the military objectives; the opposite is not necessarily always true. An 

unlimited political objective is usually directed at eliminating the enemy’s leadership from power 

or even radically changing the enemy’s social order. A regime can be removed but afterward 

given back to the people, or a new constitution can be imposed, as the Western Allies did in the 

aftermath of World War II in Japan and their zone of occupation in Germany. In contrast, in the 

aftermath of the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Soviets imposed the Stalinist communist 

government and social system on Eastern Europe where their troops were deployed. Unlimited 

objectives can also include the conquest of the entire country or groups of countries, or even the 

extermination of the entire population of the hostile state.8

 

For example, the real U.S. strategic objective in the war in Afghanistan in 2001–2002 

(Operation Enduring Freedom) was the end of the Taliban regime in Kabul, the defeat of the 

Taliban’s armed forces, and the establishment of a new central democratic government. Another 

major part of that objective was eliminating Afghanistan as a base for al-Qa‘ida’s leadership and 

and its base of operations. 

 In a war fought for limited strategic objectives, the intent is not regime change and 

occupation of the enemy’s entire territory. One normally does not risk all for limited political 

objectives, nor does one commit all his sources of power in such a war.9

 For example, the Gulf 

 

7

 Guenther Korten, Erfahrungen ueber Wehrmachtsfuehrung aus dem amerikanischen Sezessionkrieg, lecture at the 

Kriegsakademie, March 1936, RW 13/v. 34, Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv (BA-MA), Freiburg, i. Br., p. 13. 

8

 Neumann, Grundzuege der Strategie. Ein Leitfaden fuer das Studium der Kriegsgeschichte, pp. 44–45. 

9

 Bruce B. G. Clarke, Conflict Termination: A Rational Model (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, 1 May 1992), p. 11. 
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War of 1990–1991 was a limited war, because the U.S.-led coalition never intended to defeat the 

Iraqi armed forces as a whole and seize the entire Iraqi territory. The coalition objectives were 

immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, restoration 

of the legitimate Kuwaiti government, the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian 

Gulf, and the safety and protection of American citizens abroad.10 The United States aimed to 

remove Saddam Hussein by his domestic opposition, but without endangering Iraqi territorial 

integrity. The coalition did not aim to defeat Iraq so completely that the ensuing vacuum would 

be exploited by Iran and spark further turmoil in Iraq.11 However, the United States was 

unwilling to pursue its objective directly and did not intend to be involved in the nation-building 

and humanitarian relief that would surely accompany the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. A 

serious disconnect existed between the more ambitious ends and modest means to be used by the 

United States and its coalition partners. Hence, it was not surprising that the termination of the 

Gulf War not only was confused and ambiguous but had unintended and adverse consequences 

for U.S. national interests.12

 Optimally, the commander should determine a single main objective and one or more 

alternate objectives. The situation that exists during one’s planning and preparation might 

significantly change during the actual execution of a major operation (or even a campaign). By 

having an alternative objective, the commander on the scene can act quickly instead of waiting 

on orders from the higher commander. For example, one of the major flaws of the naval 

component of the Japanese Sho-1 Plan for the defense of the Philippines was that Vice Admiral 

Takeo Kurita’s First Diversionary Attack Force was assigned a single main objective—to break 

into the Leyte Gulf and destroy the U.S. forces defending the area and their transports.13 He 

never received an alternative objective in the event that for some reason the main objective could 

not be accomplished. As it turned out, by the morning of 25 October 1944, when Kurita’s force 

exited the San Bernardino Strait and sailed southward, most U.S. transports had left the Tacloban 

anchorage. By then only one attack cargo vessel; 23 landing ships, tank (LSTs); two landing 

craft, medium (LCMs); and 28 Liberty ships remained there. However, even these ships were 

 

10 Cited in Jerome V. Martin, Victory From Above: Air Power Theory and the Conduct of Operations Desert Shield 

and Desert Storm (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Research Report No. AU-ARI-92-8, June 1994), p. 24. 

11. Mark Garrard, “War Termination in the Persian Gulf,” http://www.airpower.maxwell.af/mil/ 

airchronicles/apj01/fal01/garrard.html, p. 5. 

12 Stanley T. Kresge, Gulf War Termination Revisited (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, Air University, April 

1999), pp. 22–23. 

13 “Excerpts from Battle Summary of First Diversion Attack Force in Operation ‘Sho,’ ” The Campaigns of the 

Pacific War (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 297–98; Adrian Stewart, The Battle of 

Leyte Gulf (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1980), p. 29; James A. Field, The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Sho 

Operation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 31. 
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worth attacking. In addition, the landing beaches were piled high with food, ammunition, and 

other supplies, and much equipment was stored at the Tacloban airfield.14 

 There is probably no greater mistake than to formulate and simultaneously try to 

accomplish multiple operational, or even worse, strategic, objectives. Such a course of action 

could only be taken if one’s forces possess overwhelming strength against any conceivable 

combination of the enemy’s forces. For example, Hitler’s Germany in World War II pursued 

several strategic objectives, some of them simultaneously, although it did not possess sufficient 

military or economic strength to achieve them against the overwhelming combined strength of its 

enemies. Hitler also had the bad habit of trying to almost simultaneously accomplish several 

operational objectives by conducting eccentric operations. In the initial phase of the invasion of 

Soviet Russia in 1941, the Germans tried to achieve several initial operational objectives at the 

same time by defeating the Soviet forces in the areas close to the borders in the northern, central, 

and southern parts of the front. Afterward, the Germans tried to accomplish three operational 

objectives, also almost simultaneously: the capture of Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev. They 

succeeded in seizing only Kiev (on 19 September 1941). 

 Perhaps the most fatal error was Hitler’s decision, during the German summer offensive 

of 1942 (Operation Blau), to seize almost simultaneously both Stalingrad and the oil fields in the 

Caucasus in two separate and eccentric major operations.15 This decision was aimed at bringing 

the war in the east to at least a temporary halt before the onset of winter. General Franz Halder, 

chief of the army’s general staff, tried unsuccessfully to persuade Hitler to change this decision. 

Halder’s thinking was based solely on the operational realities, while Hitler was entirely focused 

on so-called “strategic necessities.” Halder was well aware of the fatal consequences of any 

reduction of the German forces advancing toward Stalingrad, especially as that city had by then 

been turned into a fortress.16 The lack of focus on a single main objective and failure to employ 

the German forces within mutually supporting distance was one, though not the only, reason for 

 

14 Tomijii Koyonagi, “With Kurita in the Battle for Leyte Gulf,” Proceedings 2 (February 1953), p. 361; “Excerpts From 

First Mobile Fleet—Report of Sho Operations Air Strength of CarDiv 3 at Time of Sortie (for Sho Operation),” The 

Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 309; Stewart, The Battle of Leyte Gulf, pp. 31–32. 

15 Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, DC: Center of Military 

History, United States Army, 1987), p. 39. 

16 Bernd Wegner, “The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia 1941–43,” in John Gooch, ed., Decisive 

Campaigns of the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1990), p. 120. 
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Germany’s first major military defeat of the war—the encirclement and destruction of the Sixth 

Army at Stalingrad in November 1942–January 1943.17 

 The establishment of the initial lodgment in a maritime campaign often requires the 

accomplishment of the principal operational objective and several supporting operational 

objectives by a single or several services of the armed forces. Supporting objectives—for 

example, obtaining and maintaining sea control or air superiority—are prerequisites for the 

accomplishment of the main or principal objective on land or ashore. They differ from other 

types of military objectives, because they are usually the first necessary step for the respective 

combat forces to carry out other tasks. For example, a certain degree of air superiority must be 

achieved before an air force can successfully carry out close air support, interdiction, and other 

tasks. 

Several supporting objectives must usually be accomplished in the case of an offensive 

campaign. For example, in the Allied Normandy invasion (Operation Neptune), the principal 

operational objective was the establishment of the lodgment on the continent from which to carry 

out successive operations. Obtaining and maintaining air superiority and sea control in the 

amphibious objective area were each supporting operational objectives. In the Philippines 

Campaign, October 1944–August 1945, the capture of Leyte in October 1944, by which the 

Allies hoped to secure the initial lodgment in the Philippine archipelago, was both the initial and 

the principal operational objective of the Leyte operation. To accomplish that objective, it was 

necessary to plan and execute a major amphibious landing operation. To consolidate initial 

operational success, a successive major land operation was planned and executed as well. 

However, the main amphibious landing could not have been successful without accomplishing 

two supporting and related operational objectives: obtaining and maintaining sea control and 

control of the air, respectively, in the Leyte area and its approaches. These, in turn, required 

planning and executing a major naval and air operation, respectively. 

Determination of the Objective 

 The selection of an objective is the first and most critical step in undertaking any military 

enterprise. Once the objective is determined, the entire problem becomes greatly simplified (but 

not necessarily easy to resolve). However, it is usually the determination of the objective that is 

the most difficult part of any military planning.18 

 

17 This figure included 147,200 killed and wounded and 91,000 captured; in Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The 

German Defeat in the East, p. 79. 

18 The objective, as a principle of war, should not be confused with the term “physical objective,” as it often is. The 

physical objective is the point upon which the aim or goal is directed; Richard L. Connolly, “The Principles of 

War,” Proceedings 1 (January 1953), p. 3; the objective can also be defined as that “concrete thing in possession of 

the enemy against which our effort is to be directed”; “Principles of War and Their Application to Naval Warfare,” 
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 The process of determining one’s military objective requires a careful analysis of the 

enemy’s factors of space, time, and force. In general, the larger the scale of the objective, the 

larger the factors of space, time, and force to be considered. Among other things, one should 

focus primarily on the size and physical characteristics of the land, air, and sea in the objective 

area and its approaches; the distances from the objective to one’s staging and deployment area 

and other key positions from which one’s combat forces can be effectively employed; the time 

required for the enemy’s forces to be deployed, concentrated, and reinforced; the time required to 

commit reserves; and the time required for regenerating combat power or reconstituting friendly 

forces. 

 

 The next step in the process is the evaluation of the enemy’s factor of force. Optimally, 

this analysis should include all the tangible and intangible elements of the enemy’s source of 

power available or deployed in the objective area. This step also encompasses the examination of 

the part of the theater where enemy forces can prevent friendly forces from accomplishing the 

selected operational or strategic objective. 

In determining strategic and operational objectives, operational planners should also fully 

consider political, diplomatic, economic, financial, information, legal, environmental, ethnic, 

religious, and other nonmilitary aspects of the situation. Normally, these considerations, with the 

exception of legal aspects, do not play a major role in determining operational objectives in war 

at sea and in the air. 

Very often foreign policy or domestic political considerations might dictate whether a 

certain objective should be selected or not for a military action. This is especially the case in the 

first phase of an invasion. Similarly, the economic or financial aspect of the situation might force 

the commander to capture a certain area first before trying to destroy or neutralize the enemy 

forces. For example, prior to the outbreak of World War I, the German chief of the general staff, 

Helmuth von Moltke, Jr., was concerned with the prospect of violating Belgian neutrality; he 

wanted to keep England out of the war. In one memorandum in 1913, he wrote that the violation 

of Belgian neutrality would make England Germany’s enemy. In his view, it was vitally 

important for England to prevent Germany from having a foothold on the opposite shore. He 

considered it inconvenient to start a war with a violation of the territory of a neighboring state. In 

short, the German general staff was fully aware of the negative implications of a violation of 

Belgian neutrality. However, for Moltke, Jr., the main conclusion was not that England might 

enter the war on the side of Germany’s enemies, but that the Germans must fight not only the 

Belgian army but also English troops in Belgium. His solution for that problem was purely 

military: the German flank in Belgium must be made as strong as possible. In drafting his plans 

for the possible war with France and Russia, Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen (chief of the 

Great General Staff, 1891–1905) believed that in the coming war Germany must unconditionally 

 July 1925, Record Group 4, Box 23, Folder 1018A, Naval War College Archives, Newport RI; U.S. Naval War 

College, p. 5. 
12 

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CAMPAIGNING

go on the offensive and, therefore, must invade France. The possibility of going on the offensive 

against Russia in case of some Balkan conflict and remaining on the defensive against France 

and not violating Belgian neutrality—thereby possibly keeping Britain out of the war—was not 

considered at all. Just the opposite: Moltke, Jr., directed in 1913 that all planning for a great 

offensive against Russia be stopped, because he was concerned that, in case of war, the existence 

of such a deployment plan could lead to confusion for subordinate commands. The German 

government was also fully informed that the general staff had stopped all planning against 

Russia.19

A strategic objective normally comprises a mix of both military and nonmilitary 

elements. In a major combat phase of a campaign, it is the military aspect of the strategic 

objective that needs to be accomplished first. For example, Hitler’s strategic decision of 31 July 

1940 to invade Soviet Russia was based on a combination of political, military, economic, 

ideological, and racial factors. Perhaps the single most important factor in making the decision to 

invade Soviet Russia was Hitler’s determination to create “living space” (Lebensraum) for the 

Germans in the east. It was also Hitler’s aim that through the annihilation of what he called 

“Jewish bolshevism” any opposition to German hegemony in the east would be eliminated and 

the development of the “pure” German race would thus be allowed to proceed.20 

 

 In the Philippine campaign of 1944–1945, the military aspect of the strategic objective 

for the Allies was to obtain control of the Philippine archipelago and its approaches through the 

destruction of enemy ground, sea, and air forces defending the archipelago, and to cut off lines of 

supplies between the vital Southern Resources Area and the home islands. The political strategic 

objective was to liberate the Filipino population from Japanese rule, restore U.S. political control 

of the Philippines, and enhance American influence and prestige among the peoples of the Far 

East and Southeast Asia. 

Normally, in determining operational objectives in a conventional war, military, not 

nonmilitary, considerations should predominate (this is not necessarily the case in a low-intensity 

conflict); otherwise there is a great danger that such objectives will not contribute to the 

accomplishment of the ultimate objective of a campaign. In practice, one’s efforts should be 

directed against those sources of the enemy’s critical strengths that can endanger the 

 

19 Peter Wenning, Aufmarschplanung als strategische Fuehrungsproblem. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung am 

Beispiel des Schlieffenplans 1914, der NATO Aufmarschplanung im Rahmen der “Flexible Response” un dem neuen 

strategischen Konzept der NATO (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 30 December 1997), p. 11. 

20 Juergen Foerster, “Hitlers Entscheidung fuer den Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion,” in Horst Boog et al., eds., Der 

Deutsche Reich Und Der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 4, Der Angriff Auf Die Sowjetunion, (Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1983), p. 16. 
13 

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CAMPAIGNING

accomplishment of one’s objectives. For instance, in 1941, Hitler’s decision to advance to 

Rostov (southern Russia) and Leningrad was based primarily on economic and political 

considerations. Actually, the advance to Moscow was the proper first operational objective for 

the Germans in the first phase of the Barbarossa campaign, because it would have led to the 

destruction of the major part of the Soviet forces defending the capital.21

 Sometimes geography or location may play the main or sole role in determining the 

operational objective. For example, the primary reason for selecting Leyte as the initial main 

operational objective in the Philippines Campaign was the belief that the island, with its large 

and fertile Leyte Valley, offered a favorable place for the construction of airfields from which 

large-scale attacks could be launched against Luzon and the rest of the Philippines and China. 

Subsequent events proved that Leyte was unsuitable for the construction of large numbers of 

airfields and air facilities. The Allied planners correctly believed, however, that Leyte would 

provide an excellent anchorage, as well as sites for supply bases.22 By selecting Leyte as the next 

major landing objective, the Allies accepted certain penalties. The most serious problem was that 

Leyte was beyond the effective range of Allied land-based fighters. The distance to the nearest 

Allied airfields exceeded 500 miles.23 Leyte was also located in the center of an extensive 

network of enemy airfields. The enemy aircraft based on Luzon and Mindanao and on the other 

Visayan Islands could easily support enemy forces on Leyte. Because of the short distances and 

the presence of numerous islands and islets, the Japanese could covertly bring troop 

reinforcements to Leyte from the Visayas, Luzon, and Mindanao by using barges and smaller 

vessels, under cover of darkness and in bad weather. In the initial phase of the landing, the Allies 

had to rely primarily on carrier aircraft for close air support and to prevent the enemy from 

reinforcing his troops on Leyte. In MacArthur’s view, the success of the entire operation hinged 

on the ability of Allied naval forces to keep the enemy from building up his strength on Leyte 

and adjoining Samar, and to prevent enemy naval forces from attacking friendly shipping in the 

beachhead area.24

 

21 Adolf Heusinger, Der Ostfeldzug 1941–1942. Ein operativer Ueberblick, T-6, ZA/1 2325, Studien der Historical 

Division Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Foreign Military Branch, Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv (BAMA), p. 12. 

22 M. Hamlin Cannon, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Leyte: The Return to the 

Philippines (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1954, reprinted 1987), pp. 3, 1, 15. 

23 Ministry of Defence (Navy), War with Japan, Vol. 6, Advance to Japan (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 

Office, 1995), p. 51. 

24 Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army in World War II (Washington, DC: 

Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 145; Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

(New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 212. 
14 

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CAMPAIGNING

Forces’ Requirements 

 Clearly, any military objective should be determined with due consideration of what 

forces (one’s own and friendly) are available or becoming available.25 The larger the objective, 

the more “massed” combat potential (not necessarily a numerically larger force) should be 

available or become available to accomplish it.26 Force requirements also depend on the scale of 

the military objective—whether the objective is offensive or defensive, and limited or unlimited. 

This part of the planning process is more of an art than a science. It is s critical that there 

be no disconnect or mismatch between the ends and the means; otherwise, the ultimate or 

intermediate objectives of a campaign or major operation might not be attained. For example, the 

Israeli top political and military leadership committed such a blunder in going to war against the 

Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah in July 2006 (Operation Change of Direction). The Israelis did not 

realize that the means they wanted to use—massive use of airpower alone, without ground 

attack—against Hezbollah, and Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure, was in mismatch with their 

declared ultimate objective, total disarmament of Hezbollah. Reportedly, there was no serious 

discussion among the highest leaders on the relationship between the ends and ways to achieve 

these ends. The Israeli prime minister’s stated objectives of the operation were over-ambitious 

and unfeasible.27

One’s assumptions on anticipated enemy resistance are one of the major factors in 

determining the requirements for employing one’s sources of power to accomplish strategic 

objectives. Other factors include the available combat potential of the enemy forces, 

characteristics of the physical environment, and weather/climate. 

Force requirements differ considerably in the post-hostilities phase from those in the 

major combat phase of a campaign. Also, a different size and composition of one’s forces are 

required when engaged in a counterinsurgency than when fighting a conventional high-intensity 

war. Force requirements are also dependent on one’s forces’ degree of combat readiness and 

such intangible factors as quality of leadership, quality and reliability of weapons and equipment, 

soundness of doctrine, quality of training, morale and discipline, and unit cohesion. 

 

25 Gustav Daeniker, Raum, Kraft und Zeit in der Militaerischen Kriegsfuehrung (Frauenfeld: Verlag von Huber, 

1944), p. 2. 

26Center for Military History, U.S. Army, CMH Pub 104-5, Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign (Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 6. 

27 “Summary of the Winograd Committee Interim Report,” Jerusalem Post Online Edition, 30 April 2007, pp. 3–4. 
15 

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CAMPAIGNING

For example, the Allied objective for the landing at Anzio on 22 January 1944 was 

selected without due regard for the factors of space and, particularly, force. The objective of the 

amphibious landing required the Allied force to be large enough to cause the Germans to react 

operationally, and also to be able to sustain itself until the expected linkup with the U.S. Fifth 

Army troops, advancing northward after the German withdrawal from the Gustav Line. The 

Allied VI Corps initial force comprised three ranger battalions, two commando battalions, a 

parachute regiment, and an additional parachute battalion, plus some supporting units. The size 

and composition of the landing force were determined, not by the objective to be accomplished, 

but by the availability of troops and landing craft. Afterward, one armored division (minus an 

infantry regimental combat team) was added.28 British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and 

his advisers mistakenly believed that a two-division landing force plus some paratroops would, 

by cutting off the German X Army’s lines of communications, force the Germans to withdraw 

their troops from the front or to immediately retreat.29 However, the landing force of only two 

divisions was clearly inadequate to achieve that effect, regardless of how aggressive the local 

commander was. 

Articulating the Objective

 In the process of determining a military objective, it is not sufficient to specify only the 

objective; one must also clearly spell out what type of action one must carry out to accomplish 

the specific objective. Otherwise, the planners will be unable to properly plan the pending 

operation. Clearly, actions intended to accomplish an offensive objective differ significantly 

from those aimed at achieving a defensive objective. An offensive objective is accomplished by 

its destruction, annihilation, or neutralization. The enemy is destroyed when he suffers such 

losses that he cannot continue the fight.30 Destruction means making the core of the enemy 

forces incapable of operating.31 It also means that a target is so damaged that it can neither 

 

28 Martin Blumenson, “General Lucas at Anzio,” in Kent Roberts Greenfield et al., Command Decisions 

(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1990), pp. 328–29. 

29 Carlo D'Este, Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1st ed., 1992), p. 

77. 

30 Norbert Hanisch, Untersuchen Sie die operativen Ideen Manstein hinsdichtlich Schwerpunkt-bildung, 

Ueberraschung, Initiative und Handlungsfreiheit an den Beispielen Westfeldzug 1940 (Sichelschnitt-Plan) und 

Operation Zitadelle (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundewehr, 15 January 1988), p. 33. 

31 Die Operative Kunst der Luftstreitkraefte, Part 1 (Dresden; “Friedrich Engels” Military Academy, 1976); 

translated from the Russian by F. Beer et al., p. 119. 
16 

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CAMPAIGNING

function as intended nor be restored to a usable condition.32 The enemy is annihilated when he is 

left with no sources of power to offer any serious resistance. Neutralization means that the 

enemy is rendered ineffective and cannot prevent one’s forces from accomplishing their assigned 

objective.33 In defense, one has to hold, control, or retain a certain territory or position or delay 

withdrawal. 

A properly articulated objective should be expressed clearly, concisely, and 

unambiguously. A lack of clarity could lead to waste of one’s time and sorely needed resources. 

It will also unnecessarily dilute one’s focus of effort, prevent the development of a coherent 

strategy, and make success difficult to obtain. Without clear political objectives, operational 

commanders cannot determine strategic and operational objectives or define what constitutes 

success. Failing to define clear objectives or changing objectives during a war or campaign 

causes confusion, lack of focus, and, often, lack of success.34 For example, the objective given to 

General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, prior to 

the landing at Normandy was clearly and concisely stated: “You will enter the Continent of 

Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the 

heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.”35 Compare this with the highly 

ambiguous and open-ended objective in the Kosovo conflict of 1999: In March 1999, the United 

States publicly stated that the objectives of NATO’s action against Serbia were to demonstrate 

the “seriousness” of NATO’s opposition to Belgrade’s policies in the Balkans; to deter Slobodan 

Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on civilians and to create conditions to 

reverse his ethnic cleansing; and, by diminishing or degrading Serbia’s ability to wage military 

operations, to damage the country’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or to 

spread the war to neighbors.36 Likewise, the Israeli leadership provided ambiguous and unclear 

objectives to the military for the operation against Lebanon in July 2006.37

 

32 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (12 April 2001; As 

Amended through 14 April 2006), p. 370. 

33 Department of Operations, Sound Military Decision (including the Estimate of the Situation and the Formulation 

of Directives), p. 158. 

34 Ivey, Objectives and Success—Linking National Policy Objectives and Military Strategic Objectives to Achieve 

Success, pp. 3, 1. 

35 Frank H. Skelly, “The Principles of War,” Military Review 8 (August 1949), p. 16. 

36 President Clinton’s press statement, 24 March 1999; “Cohen, Shelton Joint Statement on Kosovo After Action 

Review,” NATO Security Digest, no. 198 (14 October 1999), p. 6. 

37 “Summary of the Winograd Committee Interim Report,” p. 3. 
17 

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CAMPAIGNING

 In articulating the objectives for a campaign, the focus should be clearly on the ultimate 

strategic objective. The highest politico-military leadership should not group strategic and 

operational objectives together, thereby confusing the distinction between these two. The list of 

the objectives at the strategic level should not include purely routine military activities. For 

example, the basic rules of clearly and succinctly stating the proper objectives for a campaign 

were grossly violated by former U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld in his public 

statements both at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in March 2003.38

Objectives and Effects

 The operational commander and the planners must also give a great deal of thought to 

anticipating the possible effects (also called consequences or results) of the accomplishment of 

the military objective. This is not a science, as many information warfare proponents seem to 

believe, but rather an art. Much depends on the commander’s knowledge and understanding of 

the enemy and all aspects of both the military and nonmilitary situation. There are also many 

pitfalls in the process, which, in turn, make any prediction on the possible effects tenuous at best. 

In contrast to the so-called effects-based approach to planning, the effects of one’s 

actions cannot be determined prior to the accomplishment of a given military objective. 

 

38 Rumsfield publicly stated on 7 October 2001 that the U.S. objectives were “to make clear to the Taliban leaders 

and their supporters that harboring terrorists is unacceptable and carries a price; to acquire intelligence to facilitate 

future operations against al-Qa‘ida and the Taliban regime that harbors the terrorists; to develop relationships with 

groups in Afghanistan that oppose the Taliban regime and the foreign terrorists that they support; to make it 

increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operation; and to alter the military 

balance over time by denying to the Taliban the offensive system that hampers the progress of the various 

opposition forces; and to provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions under 

the Taliban regime;” cited in Philipp Eder and Bruno Guenter Hofbauer, “Operation Enduring Freedom,” 

Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift 1 (January–February 2002), p. 58; the U.S. objectives for the war in Iraq 

as stated by Rumsfeld on 21 March 2003 were as follows: “Our goal is to defend the American people, and to 

eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and to liberate the Iraqi people. Coalition military operations are 

focused on achieving several specific objectives: to end the regime of Saddam Hussein by striking with force on a 

scope and scale that makes clear to Iraqis that he and his regime are finished. Next, to identify, isolate and 

eventually eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, production capabilities, and 

distribution networks. Third, to search for, capture, drive out terrorists who have found safe harbor in Iraq. Fourth, 

to collect such intelligence as we can find related to terrorist networks in Iraq and beyond. Fifth, to collect such 

intelligence as we can find related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction activity. Sixth, to end 

sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian relief, food and medicine to the displaced and to the many needy 

Iraqi citizens. Seventh, to secure Iraq’s oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people, and which they 

will need to develop their country after decades of neglect by the Iraqi regime. And last, to help the Iraqi people 

create the conditions for a rapid transition to a representative self-government that is not a threat to its neighbors and 

is committed to ensuring the territorial integrity of that country.” Jim Garamone, “Rumsfeld Lists Operation Iraqi 

Freedom Aims, Objectives,” Defenselink, 21 March 2003, 

www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003.n212003_200303219.html. 
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CAMPAIGNING

However, it is incumbent on the operational commander and his staff to try to realistically 

anticipate the possible effects of the accomplishment of a given objective. They should also 

contemplate the possible effects of partially accomplishing the objective, as well as the effects of 

failing to accomplish the objective of a campaign or major operation (see Figure 3). 

 

ACCOMPLISHING

THE MILITARY

OBJECTIVE

•FRIENDLY

•ENEMY

•NEUTRAL

FACTOR OF FORCE

•SHORT TERM

•MEDIUM TERM

•LONG TERM

FACTOR OF TIME

• WITHIN A GIVEN

THEATER

• ADJACENT

THEATER(S)

• REMOTE THEATER(S)

FACTOR OF SPACE

CONSOLIDATION

OF THE MILITARY

OBJECTIVE

TYPE OF EFFECTS

• MILITARY

• POLITICAL

• DIPLOMATIC

• PSYCHOLOGICAL

• FINANCIAL

• RELIGIOUS

• LEGAL

• ENVIRONMENTAL

• OTHER

STRATEGIC

OPERATIONAL

TACTICAL

DESIRED EFFECTS

UNDESIRED EFFECTS

DETERMINING

THE MILITARY

OBJECTIVE

Figure 3: ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A MILITARY OBJECTIVE AND ITS EFFECTS

Figure 3: Accomplishment of a Military Objective and its Effects 

In general, the effects of accomplishing a military objective can be positive (desired or 

intended) or negative (undesired or unintended). Effects are not limited to the enemy and 

friendly sides but are also felt by neutrals. They can be military or nonmilitary in their nature. 

They can be tangible or intangible (or both). One should bear in mind that in most cases the type 

of effects and their strength and duration cannot be accurately predicted, much less expressed in 

quantifiable terms. 

Effects can be felt at a specific level of war or across several levels of war. In terms of the 

factor of space, effects can be limited to a given part of the theater where the military action took 

place, or they can be felt far beyond the confines of that theater. The duration of effects can vary 

greatly. The effect of accomplishing or failing to achieve the objective might not be immediately 

recognized by the enemy and friendly or neutral sides; it might be some time before the effect of 

one’s action is fully understood. The effects of success or failure in accomplishing the objective 

can reinforce or neutralize each other. 
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CAMPAIGNING

In general, the larger the scale of the objective, the more likely the effects will be felt in a 

much larger area and over a longer time. These effects often lead to changes in the political, 

diplomatic, economic, informational, psychological, and other aspects of the situation in a 

theater, or even beyond the theater where the military action took place. 

 

The accomplishment of an operational objective can sometimes have highly negative 

effects at the strategic level, as the Japanese surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl 

Harbor on 7 December 1941 illustrates. In the planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor, the 

Japanese operational objective was to neutralize the U.S. Pacific fleet long enough for the 

Japanese forces to complete their planned conquest of the Philippines, Malaya, and the 

Netherlands East Indies (NEI). At the strategic level, the Japanese hoped that by the time they 

had consolidated their position in Southeast Asia, the United States would accept the Japanese 

conquests as a fait accompli. However, the strategic effect of their action was just the opposite. 

The attack brought together divisive elements of the U.S. government and galvanized political 

and public support for declaring war on Japan. In other words, the action had strategic effects 

that were unintended and undesirable for Japanese interests.39

A decisive victory over a numerically much larger force can have profound effects at 

both operational and strategic levels, as the U.S. Navy’s victory in the battle of Midway on 4–6 

June 1942 illustrates. The U.S. Navy’s force, composed of two carrier groups (three carriers, 

eight cruisers, and 14 destroyers), sank four fast Japanese carriers. The Japanese suffered their 

first defeat at sea since the sixteenth century; four carriers, with 253 aircraft, and one cruiser 

were sunk, and 3,500 men were killed, including 100 pilots. 40 Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto 

(1884-1943), CINC of the Combined Fleet, still had huge superiority in surface forces, but 

immediately (and properly) realized that without carriers any attempt to sustain Japanese forces 

on Midway would eventually end in disaster, and made a sound decision to withdraw from the 

scene of action. 

 The U.S. Navy’s victory at Midway was due to almost perfect intelligence, which 

allowed its small force to concentrate at the right place and time; Admiral Raymond Spruance’s 

skillful handling of the carrier task force; aggressiveness of U.S. naval pilots; and, not least, a 

good deal of luck. The Japanese underestimated their opponent. They also tried to accomplish 

several objectives almost simultaneously and in the process did not achieve their main objective 

 

39 Donna Lucchese, The Relationship of Center of Gravity Analysis, Targeting for Effect, and Measuring Success

(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1998), p. 7. 

40 Juergen Rohwer, “Die See-Luftschlacht bei Midway 1942,” in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Juergen Rohwer, eds., 

Entscheidigungsschlachten des zweiten Weltkrieges (Frankfurt, a.M: Verlag fuer Wehrwesen Bernard & Graefe, 

1960), p. 226. 
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CAMPAIGNING

at Midway. The Japanese prepared plans based on wishful thinking, envisaging that the enemy 

would react exactly as the planners wanted him to.41 

 

 In retrospect, the Battle of Midway was clearly the turning point of the entire war in the 

Pacific. Its effects were also felt in the European theater, by both the Allies and Germany and 

Italy. The Japanese were unable to quickly replace their losses of four fast carriers. In the 

aftermath of the battle, the quality of the training of Japanese naval pilots declined drastically. 

The effect of this failure was not recognized by Japanese naval and military leaders and planners 

for several months. For example, the Japanese army took the lead in preparing a number of 

offensive plans. The Japanese army general staff made a decision to seize Port Moresby, New 

Guinea (Papua) but overland. The news of Field Marshal Rommel’s advance in North Africa 

emboldened the Japanese to revive their plans to capture Ceylon (Sri Lanka today) and carry the 

offensive further into the Indian Ocean. On 29 June 1942, the army general staff issued orders to 

carry out that operation. It was the Japanese navy that was unwilling to support the action. 

Instead, Yamamoto planned a new raid in the Bay of Bengal for August 1942. However, that 

operation was canceled because of the Allied landing at Guadalcanal, Lower Solomons, on 7 

August 1942. Afterward, the Japanese faced progressively larger requirements for defense of 

their outposts in the Pacific but had steadily weakened forces.42

Perhaps no operational failure had so many diverse and enduring effects as the German 

defeat in the battle of Stalingrad, November 1942–January 1943. The Soviets encircled the 

German Sixth Army (including some forces of German allies) at Stalingrad in November 1942. 

By the end of the battle, in late January 1943, the Axis losses were 225,000 killed, including 

170,000 Germans. About 25,000 German soldiers were flown out to safety. About 110,000 

Germans and 3,000 Romanians went into Soviet captivity; most of them never returned home. 

The Luftwaffe lost 500 transport aircraft in its resupply efforts.43 The Soviets claimed that the 

German losses were 147,000 killed and 91,000 captured (including 24 generals and 2,500 other 

officers). The Soviets never released information on their losses, but they are believed to have 

been substantial.44 In fact, they most likely exceeded those of the Germans and their allies. 

 

 

41 Ibid., pp. 224–25. 

42 Ibid., pp. 226-27. 

43 Heinz Magenheimer, Kriegswenden in Europa 1939–1945: Fuehrungsentschluesse, Hintergruende, Alternativen

(Munich and Landsberg am Lech: Guenter Olzog Verlag, 1995), p. 124. 

44 Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East (Washington, DC: Center of 

Military History, United States Army, 1987), p. 501. 
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 The loss of the Sixth Army, with 21 divisions, plus the destruction of the four armies of 

their allies was a huge defeat for the Germans.45 For the Soviets the battle of Stalingrad was an 

operational victory that had significant effects at both operational and strategic levels. After 

Stalingrad, the strategic initiative began to shift to the Soviets, and in that sense Stalingrad 

represented a point of no return for the Germans. It marked the culmination of the process of 

shrinking German options for achieving victory in the east.46 Yet the defeat at Stalingrad was not 

as decisive as some claimed, because the combat strength of the German army was not yet 

broken, as the German counteroffensive in southern Russia and in February–March 1943 and at 

Kursk in July 1943 showed. It was only after the battle of Kursk that the strategic initiative 

finally went over to the Soviets. 

Stalingrad was much more than a military defeat. It had a huge political and 

psychological effect on both the victors and the losers. Soviet morale rose tremendously. At the 

same time, the defeat at Stalingrad had enormous consequences for the Germans. It caused 

feelings of despair among the German population. There was also a widespread impression that 

the defeat represented a turning point in the war. Even Hitler became the target of discontent 

among the Germans.47 Despite Nazi minister of propaganda Joseph Goebbels’ call for total war, 

the German people lost confidence in Hitler’s “genius.” Some young staff officers posted on the 

eastern front began to organize resistance to Hitler, which eventually led to the failed 

assassination attempt in July 1944. Hitler’s basic mistake in planning the summer offensive in 

Russia was that he confused policy, strategy, and propaganda. The consequences were bad not 

only for Hitler’s standing among the Germans but for the German people as well.48

The foreign policy effects of the German defeat at Stalingrad were extraordinarily large.49

Stalingrad had a major effect on the attitudes and policies of Germany’s closest allies and of 

neutrals as well. Finland, Hungary, and Romania almost immediately sensed that the war against 

Soviet Russia had been lost and started to look for ways to ensure their own salvation. Mussolini 

also became concerned about the war’s outcome and proposed making a separate peace with the 

 

45 Magenheimer, Kriegswenden in Europa 1939–1945: Fuehrughnsentschluesse, Hintergruende, Alternativen, p. 

125. 

46 Wegner, “The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia 1941–43,” p. 123. 

47 Ibid., p. 121. 

48 Walter Goerlitz, “Die Schlacht um Stalingrad 1942–1943,” in Jacobsen and Rohwer, eds., 

Entscheidigungsschlachten des zweiten Weltkrieges, p. 311. 

49 Ibid. 
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Soviet Union. Romanian dictator Marshal Ion Antonescu also proposed a separate peace, but 

with the Western Allies. In early 1943, the Finns, Romanians, and Hungarians all started to have 

some contact with the Western Allies in order to mitigate the consequences of a Soviet victory in 

the war.50

 

Sometimes a tactical action such as a raid may have not only psychological but also 

operational and even strategic effects. For example, the so-called “Doolittle Raid” (named after 

General James H. Doolittle) conducted on 18 April 1942 was planned as an action to boost U.S. 

and Allied morale after a string of defeats in December 1941–April 1942. The raid was carried 

out by Task Force 16 (the carriers Hornet and Enterprise, three heavy and one light cruiser, and 

eight destroyers, supported by two submarines and two tankers). On board the U.S. carriers were 

embarked 16 B-25 land-based bombers. The plan was that both carriers, accompanied by four 

cruisers, would make a dash west and launch 16 B-25 bombers from a position some 500 miles 

from Tokyo, so that the bombers could reach the Chinese airfield at Chuchow (Zhuzhou) (some 

1,100 miles away from Tokyo). The success of the raid depended on TF-16’s concealed 

approach to the assigned launching position. As it turned out, the B-25s were launched some 670 

miles away from Tokyo.51 The bombers successfully reached Tokyo and dropped their bombs 

but caused only slight damage. Not a single B-25 was lost over Japan.52

The military and psychological effects of the Doolittle Raid were far greater than U.S. 

decision makers and planners had envisaged. The raid gave American morale a huge lift, which 

was then badly needed. The Japanese military leaders lost face because they had promised that 

the home islands would never be bombed. One of the first operational effects of the raid was that 

the Japanese directed four army fighter groups to be deployed to defend Tokyo.53 As it 

happened, the raid came at a propitious time, when the Japanese navy and army were involved in 

an often-bitter debate over what course of action to take in the Pacific in the future. The naval 

officials argued for cutting off the United States from Australia and New Zealand by occupying 

the Fiji Islands, New Caledonia, and Samoa. The precondition for that action was the 

neutralization of the U.S. carrier forces. This, in turn, in the view of Admiral Yamamoto, 

 

50Cited in Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East, p. 505. 

51 Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific 1931–April 1942

(Boston, MA: Little Brown and Company, 1948, reprint 1984), p. 394. 

52 One bomber had to fly to Vladivostok, where it was interned; and 15 bombers made for Chuchow; Morison, 

History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific 1931–April 1942, 

p. 396. 

53 Ibid., p. 398. 
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required the capture of the bases in the Aleutians and the western tip of the Hawaiian Islands 

chain. The Japanese army was opposed to any further offensive in the Pacific. The raid ended the 

discussion and provided a powerful argument for accepting the Japanese navy’s view. 

Yamamoto was directed to execute a major operation that also included luring U.S. carriers into 

the waters around Midway Island.54 The subsequent defeat of the Combined Fleet in the battle of 

Midway on 3-6 June 1942 was the turning point of the war in the Pacific. 

 

 For example, in the Battle for Britain in the summer of 1940, the German Luftwaffe was 

engaged in the increasingly bitter struggle for control of the air over the southern part of 

England. The Germans prepared plans based on a certain sequence of tasks to be carried out. 

This sound timetable was derailed by a rather inconsequential Royal Air Force (RAF) raid on 

Berlin on 25–26 August 1940 that caused only slight damage to the residential area. However, 

the RAF’s raid enraged Hitler, who directed Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering, CINC of the 

Luftwaffe, to shift air attacks from the British Fighter Command to London and other cities. As a 

result, the Luftwaffe diverted scarce forces and resources to strengthening the defense of Berlin 

and escorting bombers attacking London—a new and irrelevant operational objective.55 This 

decision ended all German hopes, if there were any, of obtaining air superiority over the English 

Channel as a prelude to the planned invasion of England (Operation Sea Lion). 

A tactical action should be decisive in its ultimate results; otherwise, it might lead to an 

operational failure. Very often, losses in men and materiel are not the only or even the most 

important factor in determining which side won or lost in some tactical action or a major 

operation. For example, in the battle of Jutland in June 1916, the numerically much smaller 

German High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte) inflicted heavier losses on the British Grand Fleet than 

they received.56 The Germans could plausibly claim that they had won a great tactical victory 

 

54 Cited in Lucchese, The Relationship of Center of Gravity Analysis, Targeting for Effect, and Measuring Success, 

p. 6. 

55 Klaus A. Maier and Hans Umbreit, “Direkte Strategie gegen England,” in Klaus A. Maier et al., Das Deutsche 

Reich in der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 2, Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem Europaeischen Kontinent, (Stuttgart: 

Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979), p. 386; Werner Fritsch, War Unternehmen Seeloewe Erfolgsversprechend (Hamburg: 

Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1961), p. 35; the Luftwaffe’s full-scale attacks against London started on 5 

September; Richard Hough and Denis Richards, The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Air Battle of World War II 

(New York/London: W. W. Norton, 1989), p. 242; W. H. Tantum IV and E. J. Hoffschmidt, eds., The Rise and Fall 

of the German Air Force: History of the Luftwaffe in WW2 (Old Greenwich, CT: WE, 1969), p. 91. 

56 The Germans sank 14 British ships with 115,025 tons and lost 11 of their ships with 61,180 tons. About 6,100 

British officers and sailors were killed, 510 wounded, and 177 taken prisoner by the Germans. The Germans had 

2,550 men killed and about 510 men wounded; V. E. Tarrant, Jutland: The German Perspective (A New View of the 

Great Battle, 31 May 1916) (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), pp. 247–48; Keith Yates, Flawed 

Victory: Jutland, 1916 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 216. 
24 

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despite their large inferiority in numbers and materiel. However, in operational terms, the British 

Grand Fleet was the clear victor, because the operational situation in the North Sea remained as 

it was prior to the battle. The High Seas Fleet remained unable to operate beyond the narrow 

confines of the North Sea. Another effect of the Battle of Jutland was that the German admiralty 

and the army’s high command persuaded Emperor Wilhelm II and his chancellor, Theobald von 

Bethmann Hollweg that the only way for Germany to break out of the enemy blockade was to 

launch unrestricted U-boat warfare.57 This decision, in turn, had extremely bad consequences for 

Germany, because it eventually led to America’s entry into the war on the side of Germany’s 

enemies and ultimately to Germany’s defeat. 

In other cases, a tactical defeat might actually result in an operational victory for the 

defeated side if the enemy cannot complete the main part of his mission. For example, the Battle 

of the Coral Sea in 28 April–8 May 1942 was a tactical victory for the Japanese but an 

operational victory for the Allies. The Japanese planned to invade Port Moresby, New Guinea, 

by landing troops there. The Japanese fast carrier force would provide distant cover and support 

to the amphibious force. In the carrier engagement fought in the Coral Sea, the Japanese lost one 

light carrier (Shoho), and one fast carrier (Shokaku) suffered heavy damages so that it was unable 

to launch or receive any aircraft. The Japanese were left with only 39 aircraft. The U.S. losses 

were one fast carrier (Lexington), one fleet oiler (Neosho), and one destroyer (Sims). 

Coincidentally, the U.S. carriers were also left with only 39 aircraft. The biggest consequences 

for the Japanese were that both carriers were put temporarily out of service. One carrier was so 

heavily damaged that it was not ready for action by the time of the Midway operation; the other 

carrier (Zuikaku), although undamaged, was left with only nine planes. The reserve aircraft at 

that time were insufficient to cover these losses. This left the Japanese with only four front-line 

carriers available for the Midway operation.58 One might speculate that if these two carriers had 

been present in the subsequent battle of Midway, they might have provided the necessary margin 

for the Japanese victory.59 Another effect of the operational failure in the battle of the Coral Sea 

was that the Japanese decided to seize Port Moresby by advancing across the Owen Stanley 

mountain range, rising in height up to 13,000 feet. This attempt ultimately failed in late 1942, but 

only after the Allies suffered relatively high losses. 

 A major operation aimed at defending or resupplying a certain position or place might be 

only partially successful and end in larger losses in personnel and materiel, but might ultimately 

 

57 Tarrant, Jutland: The German Perspective, p. 251. 

58 Rohwer, “Die See-Luftschlacht bei Midway 1942,” p. 204. 

59 Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations, Vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine 

Actions, May 1942–August 1942 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), p. 63. 
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represent an operational success. For example, the strategic situation in the Mediterranean in the 

spring and early summer of 1942 was very difficult for the Allies. In the summer of 1942, the 

British Eighth Army in North Africa was on the defensive. The Axis’s Afrika Corps threatened 

the Nile Valley. The island of Malta was under almost constant air attack by the Axis aircraft 

based on Sicily and North Africa. By April 1942 the chances of Malta’s survival were low. The 

island’s reserves of wheat and flour, fodder, benzene, and kerosene fuel would not last beyond 

mid- or late June, while stocks of white oil and aviation fuel were sufficient only until midAugust. Specifically, there were only 920 tons of diesel oil and about 2,000 tons of furnace oil, 

needed for refueling Allied warships in the docks. The Welsh coal would last until the end of 

May and other grades until mid-June 1942. Stocks of AA ammunition were sufficient for only 

about six weeks of fighting. The Allied dual-convoy operation (Harpoon/Vigorous) to resupply 

Malta in June 1942 was a major defeat for the Allies. Out of six merchant ships in the convoy 

from Gibraltar (Operation Harpoon), only two ships, with about 15,000 tons of supplies, reached 

Malta. This convoy also lost two destroyers, while three more destroyers and a cruiser were 

seriously damaged. The convoy from Haifa and Port Said to Malta (Operation Vigorous) had 11 

merchant ships, but none of them reached their destination. Two merchant ships were sunk, 

along with one cruiser and destroyer, before the rest of the convoy was ordered to turn back and 

sail for Alexandria. The supplies that reached Malta were to last only until early September 

1942.60 

 

 The failure of the convoy operations in June 1942 dramatically worsened Malta’s 

situation. Hence, on 10–15 August 1942 the Allies mounted another major effort to resupply the 

island (Operation Pedestal). A convoy of 14 merchant ships, plus a very large force of distant 

and direct support, sailed out from Gibraltar toward Malta. The convoy was subjected to almost 

continuous attacks by the Luftwaffe, U-boats, and motor torpedo boats (MTBs) and in the 

process suffered very heavy losses. Eventually, only five merchant ships reached Malta; two of 

them were so damaged that they almost sank. The naval losses were also heavy: one Allied 

aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and one destroyer were sunk, while another carrier and two cruisers 

were damaged.61 Yet despite all these losses the operation proved to be an operational success. 

About 47,000 tons of cargo reached Malta (including 15,000 tons of black and white oil and 

32,000 tons of general supplies), sufficient to keep Malta alive until December 1942.62 By then 

the second battle of El Alamein in November 1942 had completely changed the situation in 

North Africa and the central Mediterranean in the Allies’ favor. 

 

60 Peter C. Smith, Pedestal: The Malta Convoy of August 1942 (London: William Kimber, 1970), pp. 21, 32–33. 

61 Stephen W. Roskill, The War at Sea, Vol. 2, The Period of Balance (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 

1956), p. 307. 

62 I. S. O Playfair, F. C. Flynn, C. J. C. Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East (September 1941 to September 

1942): British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1960), p. 325. 
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In some cases, a series of large tactical or even operational defeats can still be 

transformed to positive strategic effects, as the Vietcong Tet offensive in Vietnam in January 

1968 showed. Some 70,000 Vietcong guerrillas launched the offensive. It failed to inflict large 

losses on the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. About 40,000 Vietcong fighters and the core of 

its leadership were killed.63 Yet the psychological effects of the offensive were enormous. It 

convinced the majority of the U.S. public that the war in Vietnam was essentially unwinnable. 

From then on, public support for the war went down dramatically in the United States. This, in 

turn, led to the election of Richard Nixon as president, who initiated the policy of 

“Vietnamization”—of progressively turning over the conduct of the war to the South Vietnamese 

government in Saigon—and eventually to the fall of South Vietnam under communist control in 

1975. 

Level of War

 The scale and complexity of the military objective to be accomplished determine the 

level of war to be conducted. The larger the military objective, the higher the level of war. Thus, 

three basic levels of war exist: strategic, operational, and tactical (see Figure 4). The Soviets 

were stricter in their interpretation of what constitutes a level of war. Because of their focus on 

quantitative aspects of warfare, the levels of war were essentially tied to specific force size. 

Hence, the Soviets differentiated among tactical, operational-tactical, operational, operationalstrategic, and strategic forces and formations. In contrast, the principal differences among the 

levels of war for the Germans were the objective to be accomplished and the purpose of 

command and other elements of any given force.64

 

63 Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (Lincoln: University of 

Nebraska Press, 2006), p. 139. 

64 Gary P. Petrole, Understanding the Operational Effect (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military 

Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 8 May 1991), p. 11. 
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PPT-97VEG024A (PFR) REV. 1/25/2007

LEVEL OF WAR

NATIONAL-STRATEGIC LEVEL

MILITARY-STRATEGIC

THEATER-STRATEGIC

TACTICAL LEVEL

OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL LEVEL 

OPERATIONAL

COMMAND ECHELON

NATIONAL-STRATEGIC

MILITARY-STRATEGIC

OR

THEATER-STRATEGIC

TACTICAL LEVEL

OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL

OPERATIONAL

OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC 

MILITARY OBJECTIVE

MULTIPLE NATIONAL OR

ALLIANCE/COALITION

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

MULTIPLE MILITARY-STRATEGIC

OR THEATER-STRATEGIC

OBJECTIVES

SINGLE MILITARY-STRATEGIC OR

THEATER-STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

SINGLE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE 

SINGLE OR MULTIPLE

TACTICAL OBJECTIVES

Figure 4: Military Objective-Levels of War-Levels of Command 

 

 The strategic level of war can be divided into two sublevels: national-strategic and 

theater-strategic. The national-strategic level of war is conducted in all three mediums for a 

country, or for groups of countries of both sides in a war. In World War II, U.S. president 

Franklin D. Roosevelt, his closest advisers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were chiefly 

responsible for determining strategy, providing strategic direction and sufficient personnel and 

materiel, and coordinating strategic actions in multiple theaters of war. Their counterparts in 

Great Britain were Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, the War Council, and the British Chiefs 

of Staff. The U.S. and British Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) operated at the coalition’s 

strategic level. Adolf Hitler and his Supreme Command of Wehrmacht (OKW) and Josef Stalin 

and the High Command (Stavka) operated at the national-strategic level. In the Gulf War of 

1990–1991, the U.S. president, his national security advisers, and the JCS operated at the 

national-strategic level. 

The theater-strategic level of war is conducted in a specific theater (of war). In the case 

of a global conflict such as World War II, several campaigns can be conducted sequentially 

and/or simultaneously in a given theater of war. Normally, the highest politico-military 

leadership would assign to each theater-strategic commander a single national or 

alliance/coalition strategic objective. The theater-strategic commander would then translate that 

objective into several theater-strategic objectives and take appropriate actions and measures to 

accomplish them. In World War II, the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, the Pacific Ocean 
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Area (POA), and the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) represented theater-strategic levels of war, 

in today’s understanding of the term. 

The operational level of war takes place in a formally (or informally) declared theater of 

operations. Then a single campaign is normally conducted to accomplish a single theater or 

military strategic objective. Normally, the accomplishment of a theater-strategic objective would 

require the sequenced and synchronized employment of military (land, sea, and air/space) and 

nonmilitary sources of national power in a given theater of operations. The operational level of 

war was conducted in the northern, central, and southern Pacific Ocean Areas in World War II. 

Similarly, the operational level of war took place in New Guinea (Papua) and adjacent areas in 

1942–1944 and in the Philippines in 1944–1945. The operational level of war was conducted by 

both sides in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982; in the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO) 

in the Gulf War of 1990–1991; in Afghanistan in 2001–2002 (Operation Enduring Freedom); 

and in the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 

(Operation Iraqi Freedom). An example of the operational level of war, in which a limited 

strategic objective was accomplished through the planning and execution of a major 

joint/combined air offensive operation, was the Kosovo conflict of 1999 (Operation Allied 

Force). This operation was conducted largely in NATO’s Allied Force South (AFSOUTH) area 

of responsibility. 

 The tactical level of war is conducted in a small part of the theater, ranging from a 

combat zone or sector to an area of operations. This is the level of war at which one’s and enemy 

forces are engaged to accomplish their respective major or minor tactical objectives through the 

conduct of battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, and other tactical actions. These actions take 

place in all three physical mediums. 

Although related, levels of war and levels of command are not identical. The first 

nominally exist only in time of war and deal exclusively with the employment of one’s sources 

of military and nonmilitary power to accomplish specific military objectives. Normally, levels of 

command exist in time of peace and in war. They are only prerequisites for conducting war at a 

given level in the course of accomplishing assigned military objectives. Yet if the respective 

theater commander does not apply the tenets of operational art in the employment of his sources 

of power and instead focuses on tactics or, even worse, pure targeteering, he does not conduct 

war at the operational or theater-strategic level. Normally, levels of command are clearly 

differentiated from each other, while levels of war are not. The reason is that the outcome of 

combat actions often has effects beyond the boundaries of a particular level of war. A major 

tactical defeat can result in the failure of a major operation and thereby adversely affect the 

situation at the operational level, and in some cases even at the strategic level. The boundaries 

between individual levels of war are often not constant, but they may overlap, sometimes 

considerably. 
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The relationship between the levels of war may differ depending upon the unique 

circumstances of a particular war. Levels of war are not clearly delineated from each other. 

Distinctions among the levels are greatest in a high-intensity conflict. It is there that the 

stratification of levels tends to be most complete and the levels’ individual characteristics most 

evident. The more the nonmilitary aspects of the strategic objective predominate, as in the case 

of an insurgency or counterinsurgency or so-called counterterrorism, the less need there is for the 

use of one’s sources of military power; the opposite is equally true. Hence, the scope of the 

operational level of war in a low-intensity conflict is comparatively much smaller than the scope 

of the strategic and tactical levels. In low-intensity conflict each level exists, but it is more 

difficult to isolate key events and decisions associated with each level.65

In a physical sense, there are, of course, no “levels,” but only different sizes of physical 

space and mediums (land, sea, air/space) in which friendly and enemy forces operate. The levels 

of war refer to the actual employment of military and nonmilitary sources of power to 

accomplish assigned military objectives in a specific part of a theater or in the theater as a whole. 

They provide a framework for command and control; they are very useful tools for analysis of 

politico-military activity before, during, and in the aftermath of combat. They provide a means of 

achieving a coherent picture of force in different ways, at different levels, in pursuit of strategic 

objectives. Force can be applied offensively at one level and defensively at another level.66 A full 

understanding and knowledge of the levels of war and their mutual relationships are the key 

prerequisites for operational commanders and their staffs in sequencing and synchronizing the 

use of military and nonmilitary sources of power in accomplishing strategic or operational 

objectives. 

A thorough knowledge and sound understanding of the levels of war are a critical for 

selecting the proper methods of combat employment of one’s forces. The levels of war determine 

the nature of the decisions to be made, the type of planning process (i.e., progressive vs. 

regressive), and the plans’ execution. Without the understanding and knowledge of what 

constitutes a given level of war, it is hard to understand the true differences in the concepts of 

critical factors and centers of gravity, culmination point, and maneuver, to name just a few 

elements of operational warfare. The higher the level of war, the more important the role each of 

these elements plays in the planning and execution of a given military action. The higher the 

level of war, the more complex the situation that the military commanders and their staffs must 

understand, evaluate, and synthesize. Both military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation are 

critical for success at the operational and strategic levels across the spectrum of conflict. This is 

 

65 Ibid., pp. 6–8. 

66 Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare Publication 0-01: British Defence Doctrine (Shrivenham, Swindon, UK: Joint 

Doctrine & Concepts Center, Ministry of Defence, 2nd ed., October 2001), p. 1-3. 
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not necessarily the case at the tactical level, except in the post-hostilities phase of a campaign or 

operations other than war. Errors made at the operational and strategic levels of war can be 

overcome only with great difficulty, if at all. 

Levels of war are not, as is often erroneously believed, identical to the respective 

components of military art. Each component of military art encompasses the fields of study and 

practice-art, while the levels of war encompass only the field of practice. To complicate the 

matter, strategy and operational art spans several levels of war. For example, operational art is 

mainly applied from the operational-tactical to the theater-strategic levels of war. Likewise, 

strategy is applied at the operational, theater, and national-strategic levels. 

All the levels of war are interrelated; actions and activities at each level affect the other 

levels. In a low-intensity conflict, the levels of war are often hard to distinguish from each other 

because of the inherent complexity of the objectives to be accomplished. Then, decisions made at 

the tactical level have a considerable and sometimes significant impact on events at the 

operational and even strategic levels of war. Sometimes tactical events cause a significant ripple 

effect at the operational and strategic levels of war. In low-intensity conflict, it is more difficult 

to isolate the key events and decisions associated with each perspective.67 For instance, in a 

peace operation, a tactical action should not lead to undermining the ultimate strategic purpose. 

A single tactical action that results in a large loss of civilian life or other collateral damage can 

have significant adverse political and psychological effects. Several such actions can even have 

profound negative long-term strategic consequences. 

Conclusion

The military objective is the single most important part of operational warfare. Almost all 

its aspects are related in one way or another to, or dependent on, the military objective to be 

accomplished. Among other things, the objective determines the levels of war to be conducted, 

methods of employment of one’s combat forces, and establishment of the corresponding levels of 

command. The objective also greatly affects the content of and mutual relationships among 

individual elements of operational warfare, such as concentration, critical factors and centers of 

gravity, maneuver, fires, point of culmination, deception, sequencing, synchronization, branches 

and sequels, and reserves, to mention the most important. 

Properly determining the objective is the first and perhaps the most important step in 

planning and executing military action at any level. This is not an easy task for commanders and 

their staffs. Afterward, the problem is to properly match ends with means and then select proper 

ways. The importance of the military objective in planning and executing a military action 

cannot be overstated. The larger the scale of the objective, the more critical that all steps in 

 

67 Petrole, Understanding the Operational Effect, p. 8. 
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harmonizing one’s ends, means, and ways are done properly; otherwise, it is hard to see how the 

military action can be successful. Almost all aspects of operational warfare are in one way or 

another linked to the objective. 

Once the objective is determined, one of the key issues is to divide it into a number of 

main and partial (component) tasks that will collectively ensure its accomplishment. The linkage 

between the objective and its constituent tasks cannot be arbitrarily severed without seriously 

endangering the accomplishment of the objectives as a whole. The accomplishment of any 

objective will invariably have positive or negative effects on one’s own situation and future 

operations. Operational commanders and planners should always try to think ahead and to 

anticipate what effects the accomplishment of a given objective will have on not only military 

but also nonmilitary aspects of the situation in a theater. Many of these effects are hard or 

impossible to quantify. Hence, the operational commander should avoid the temptation to 

embark on the time-consuming and labor-intensive but ultimately futile effort of trying to 

accurately predict what these effects might be. 

Comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the activities and actions at each 

command echelon and level of war are prerequisite to understanding the full complexity of 

relationships among strategy, tactics, and operational art. No mastery of operational art is 

possible without understanding each level of war and the mutual relationships among the levels. 

Because of the difference in the scope of the military objectives to be accomplished, each level 

of command and level of war require commanders and their staff to have a different perspective. 

The higher the level of command, the broader that perspective. The narrowest perspective, in 

terms of both physical space and the elements of the situation, is at the tactical level. This 

determines that, normally, only military sources of power are used to accomplish a tactical 

objective. At each level above the tactical level, the perspective becomes progressively larger 

and more complex. At the national- and theater-strategic levels, the accomplishment of military 

strategic objectives requires the employment of all available military and nonmilitary sources of 

power over time. 

 Dr. Milan Vego serves as a professor with the Naval War College Joint Military 

Operations faculty which he joined in August 1991. He is the author of Operational 

Warfare as well as numerous books and articles published in professional journals and 

magazines. 
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Civil-Military Cooperation as a Function of Security, 

Eastern Afghanistan, 2004 – 2005 

By 

Robert Kemp 

Introduction: Regional Command – East 2004 - 2005 

U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in eastern Afghanistan in 2004 and 2005 were 

predominantly focused on provinces bordering Pakistan, where the majority of combat 

operations took place. The provinces with the most active insurgencies were Khost, Paktika and 

Konar Provinces, with security generally improving away from the border and in non-Pashtun 

areas, such as Bamian and Panshir Provinces. 

The main counterinsurgency tools were the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and 

maneuver battalions, integrated into a brigade command. US Special Forces were also present, 

and, by 2005, significant numbers of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police 

(ANP) units were deployed. 

The PRTs were composed of soldiers working in civil-military units, augmented by 

officers from the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), and the 

US Department of Agriculture (USDA). The PRTs were not assigned combat roles (except to 

react when attacked), but instead carried out small-scale reconstruction and development 

projects, supported elections, and bolstered the provincial and district-level government. In 

contrast, the maneuver battalions were tasked with combat operations, as well as normal 

patrolling and joint operations with the ANA. The Regional Command - East (RC-East) brigade 

command in 2004 was under the 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 25th Infantry Division, 

followed in 2005 by the 1st BCT, 82nd Airborne. The coordination of the PRTs, maneuver units 

and air assets was done at the brigade level; coordination with Special Forces was done both at 

the brigade level, and on the ground between field-grade officers. 

The situation in many provinces, particularly those near the border with Pakistan, was 

often unstable and rapidly changing. Provincial governance was weak, with limited reach into 

the districts, and tribal leaders and local strongmen often filled power vacuums. Cross-border 

attacks were common in some areas, particularly Khost and Paktika, and by the summer of 2005 

the insurgents had increased their numbers, command and control, and armaments. Suicide 

bombings, previously a rare occurrence, happened more frequently beginning in the spring of 

2005. The ANA, though lacking anywhere near the required number of kandaks (battalions), 

gradually increased its presence in several provinces. The ANP continued to struggle, hampered 

by insufficient equipment, poor pay, high levels of corruption, and in many cases poor 

leadership. 
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This paper looks at how the USG carried out counterinsurgency efforts in Regional 

Command East, using three case studies to examine how the level of security determined what 

combination of Afghan Government, PRTs, maneuver units, international organizations and 

Special Forces were used in different areas for different goals. 

Case Study 1: Bermal Valley: Maneuver Battalion leads 

The Bermal valley, in the far eastern reaches of Paktika province, is a rocky desert, with 

low mountain ranges to the east and west. Across the border is Pakistan’s Federally 

Administered Tribal Area’s (FATA) South Waziristan agency, a hotbed of insurgent activity, 

apparently based in the town of Wana. Several mountain valleys have streams that support 

limited agriculture, but otherwise the economy is based on trade, particularly cross-border 

commerce. 

The predominant tribe is the Waziris, who extend into Pakistan. The Durand line has 

split this tribe, and in some sense Bermal district is an extension of Waziristan. Historically, the 

government of Afghanistan has never had strong control of this district. Twice during the period 

2002 – 2004 the Afghan National Police had been driven off by insurgents, in one case with 

several officers killed. Complicating the picture, only a poor road connected Bermal with the rest 

of Afghanistan, stretches of which were the sites of ambushes by insurgents. In 2004, a PRT 

convoy was ambushed on this road, taking several casualties in a firefight that lasted more than 

an hour. 

 In 2003, the U.S. 2-27 maneuver battalion maintained a company in the area, a period 

during which there was minimal combat activity, later handing the area of operations (AO) to a 

Special Forces unit. The porous border with Pakistan, frequent cross-border insurgent attacks, 

and rocket barrages made the Bermal district difficult to secure. Added to the mix were intertribal rivalries between the Kharoti and Waziri tribes, and the tendency of people on the border 

to be “fence sitters”, reluctant to trust their future to either the Coalition or the Afghan 

government, for fear of an insurgent return. 

In early 2005 Paktika Governor Mangal decided to reestablish a district government in 

Bermal, and requested assistance from the US military. A decision was made at the brigade level 

to support this request, and the 1-508 battalion (which had taken over Paktika from the 2-27) was 

tasked with the operation, in coordination with Special Forces. The provincial government, the 

commander of the 1-508, and tribal elders first hammered out a political agreement, guaranteeing 

the support of the tribes, providing a parcel of land for a government center, and agreeing that 

each tribe provide men for a security force. 

By late spring, elements of a company arrived in Bermal Bazaar, roughly 15 km. north of 

the town of Shkin, and began setting up a perimeter in a patch of desert outside of town. Over the 

next weeks, a district sub-government was established (headed by a bold ex-police officer from 
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Paktia province), and provincial ANP and ABP units arrived. This was followed by the 

construction of barracks, a government center, a medical post, and a mosque. 

This operation was important for several reasons. It directly extended the reach of the 

provincial government into an area where its writ had not only been contested, but effectively 

removed by insurgents. It also took the fight directly to the South Waziristan based insurgents, 

putting Afghan and Coalition forces close to their sanctuaries, and providing a buffer for the 

remainder of Paktika province. 

Analysis 

Bermal was a case where a very tenuous security situation required that the maneuver 

battalion, supported by Special Forces take the lead instead of the PRT. Although the goal of 

“extending the reach of the Government of Afghanistan” fell within the PRTs responsibilities, 

the PRT lacked the firepower and resources to take on the job. The State Department’s role was 

limited, with the officer assigned to the brigade command involved in the initial planning, and 

making several trips to Bermal to assess the situation. At this time, there was no State political 

officer assigned to either the PRT in Sharan, or the maneuver battalion in Orgun – E. Either or 

both would have put an extra “tool in the toolbox”, particularly during the negotiations with 

tribal leaders prior to the operation, and in helping establish the district government. The AID 

officer in Sharan contributed by working to arrange funding for the district government center. 

By late 2007 the Bermal firebase had grown to include a U.S. battalion HQ, as well as the 

district government center, a mosque, and an ANA base. This was a successful operation that 

provided security and governance to a tough district, while also interdicting the cross – border 

flow of insurgents. 

Case Study: United Nations Leads 

The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) maintained two 

regional offices in the RC – East, in Gardez and Jalalabad. These offices kept good contacts with 

the governors and tribes, as well as the USG. The Gardez office worked closely with U.S. 

military and civilian officers to plan and execute the so-called “Zadran Arc Initiative”, targeted 

at the districts where the Zadran tribe has influence, where Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces 

come together. The UNAMA officer responsible for the project saw the need to reduce tension 

between the various tribes, while expanding the influence of the governors and engaging U.S. 

development funds. To that end, he worked closely with tribal leaders and the three provincial 

governors to broker a peace deal between the tribes (in part by delineating boundaries of tribal 

lands), with the governors and tribal leaders signing a formal agreement. The U.S. military 

provided additional support, hosting several regional governors’ conferences, and providing 

funding for projects in the area under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. The 

Zadran Arc Initiative helped secure the pass between Khost and Gardez, keeping an important 
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logistical route open and improving security along the route of a planned 100 million dollar 

USAID road-building project. 

The UNHCR led in Khost in the spring and summer of 2005, when several Afghan 

Refugee camps located across the border in Pakistan were closed on short notice. UNHCR took 

the lead on coordinating efforts with the Afghan Government and U.S. forces, including the 

Khost PRT, while also providing some logistical support for the returnees. Interestingly, tribal 

and village ties played a major role in absorbing the returnees back into society. 

Elections: Afghan Government Leads, with Considerable 

International Support 

The Presidential elections, held in October 2004, and the Parliamentary and Provincial 

Council elections, held in September 2005, were complex operations, requiring considerable 

planning and logistical efforts over periods of several months. At the same time the very nature 

of the event required complete Afghan participation, and the lead of the Afghan government. In 

support of the elections were a wide range of participants – UNAMA, including the 

establishment of a welcome center the Joint Electoral Management Board, the PRTs, maneuver 

battalions and Task Force commands, Afghan security forces, and international contractors, 

along with considerable community involvement. 

Analysis 

UNAMA political officers brought considerable background and skill to their work; 

however, their offices often lacked adequate staff to fully carry out the responsibilities assigned 

to them by their Kabul office, and in a larger sense, by the Bonn Agreement. In the end the 

resources brought to bear by the brigade commands both overshadowed the UNAMA efforts, 

and also drew the UNAMA officers to try and co-opt the U.S. military into funding projects they 

deemed necessary. UNAMA did carry influence as a perceived neutral player in the complicated 

political playing field of the border provinces. 

The successful elections of 2004 and 2005 probably have not received as much 

recognition as they deserve. Carrying out elections in Afghanistan in the best of times would be 

difficult, but doing in the midst of an ongoing insurgency, in a country battered by more than 25 

years of war, was exceptional. Much of the credit goes to the ability of the various organizations 

involved to coordinate and integrate their efforts. 

 

Case Study 3: Position of PRTs on the Civil-Military Spectrum, 

2004 - 2005 

Each PRT in RC – East, despite similarities in overall organization and strategic goals, 

was unique in its specific objectives and methods. Each had to adjust to the local conditions – 

security, economic, geographic, cultural, and political – and adopt its own model, while staying 
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within guidance from higher commands, including the Division command, Brigade command 

and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul (and, in the case of the New Zealand –led PRT in Bamian, from 

Wellington). 

 The security situation in each province was the determining factor for each PRT. Where 

on the “civil” to “military” spectrum each province was – if kinetic operations predominated, or 

if reconstruction was the main effort of Coalition forces in the province - determined how the 

PRT functioned (keeping in mind that no PRT had a combat role to play, other than selfdefense). Some provinces, such as Konar, had high threat levels in many areas. This resulted in 

more emphasis on combat operations, carried out be maneuver units and Special Forces, with the 

development projects often done in support of these operations. On the other end of the 

spectrum, PRTs in Bamian and Parwan, operated in a much more permissive security 

environment, and were able to emphasize economic and political development, and reduce (or 

eliminate) combat operations and patrols. 

In very general terms, the security situation improved away from the border with 

Pakistan; in areas where Hazaras or Tajiks were the predominant ethnic group, or where 

abundant coalition firepower was available, as in Khost or near Bagram Air Base. Of course, 

economic and security considerations were closely related, so that in areas with economic 

growth, including the towns of Jalalabad and Ghazni, the security situation improved as a result. 

Following is a description of the resulting PRT “continuum” as it stood in the fall of 

2005, from the most challenging security situation (Asadabad, Konar Province and Sharan, 

Paktika Province) to the most favorable (Bamian, Parwan and Panshir). 

Asadabad 

The PRT at Asadabad, in Konar Province across from the FATA’s Bajaur Agency, was a 

case where significant security threats resulted in an emphasis on military operations over 

development efforts during 2004 - 2005. Threats were due to cross-border attacks, indigenous 

insurgent forces as well as those infiltrated from Nuristan Province and Pakistan, as well as 

criminal groups involved in smuggling opium, lumber and jewels. The geographic layout of the 

province, with the roads often following linear valleys, or with only one route in or out (for 

example the Pesh valley road, leading to Camp Blessing north of Asadabad) resulted in 

predictable and unavoidable travel routes, and significant casualties due to IEDs. 

Beginning in 2005 the Marines were the main maneuver force, operating out of Camp 

Blessing, backed by Special Forces at other bases. By early 2005 smaller ANA units were 

actively patrolling. The Korangal valley, a very rugged area west of Asadabad, was the site of 

many contacts, as the insurgents were using it as a staging and supply area (in 2006 a major 

operation, dubbed “Mountain Lion”, was mounted to stabilize the area). By late 2005 the 
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provincial government, with financial support from Kabul, was standing up militias at the district 

levels with the aim of fielding a 2,000 man force to counter instability in the province. Because 

of repeated attacks, some ANP stations were de-facto fire bases, protected with sandbagged 

towers and heavy machine guns. 

The security situation slowed development projects; construction of the Jalalabad to 

Asadabad road was repeatedly postponed due to threats, and in at least one case, the death of 

construction engineers at the hands of insurgents. Movements of the AID representative posted 

to the PRT were restricted, and most projects were limited to Asadabad and its surroundings, and 

to support of counter-insurgency operations the Pesh valley. PRT Asadabad was also responsible 

for the eastern half of Nuristan (with PRT Methar Lam responsible for western Nuristan). The 

focus of efforts there was building rudimentary roads, to open access for future development as 

well as open military lines of communications. 

The role of the political officer in Asadabad was particularly important during 2004 – 

2005, due to a weak and corrupt provincial government. This led to an eventual housecleaning in 

early 2005, with the replacement of the governor, NDS chief and police chief. 

Sharan 

As described in the previous section on Bermal, the security situation in Paktika province 

made the maneuver battalion predominant relative to the PRT. This was in part due to sheer 

numbers – the maneuver battalion counted on roughly 700 soldiers, versus 100 soldiers manning 

the PRT. CERP funding levels were roughly equivalent between the maneuver unit and the PRT. 

AID had signed several million dollars worth of contracts with the International Organization of 

Migration (IOM) as an implementing partner, but due to security concerns, these projects were 

on hold, making the CERP funds particularly important. 

The first maneuver battalion in Paktika, the 2-27, was on the ground prior to the 

establishment of the PRT, and built up strong relations with Governor Mangal and other 

provincial officials and tribes. These strong ties were carried on by the 1-508 maneuver battalion. 

Both battalions pushed units out to the districts, often for extended periods, which the PRT was 

rarely able to do due to security and manpower restraints. The 1-508 established several patrol 

bases, as well as a permanent base in the south of the province at Waza Khwa. This established a 

reach the PRT was never able to match. In addition, helicopters were at times made available for 

operations by the 1-508, an enabler the Sharan PRT – or most other PRTs – did not have access 

to, a critical difference given the poor road network. 

Other factors reduced the effectiveness of the PRT relative to the maneuver battalion. The 

State Department was not able to place an officer at Sharan until late 2005 – prior to this, the 

province was covered by the political officer based in Khost. AID was also slow in placing an 

officer in Sharan. When an AID officer did arrive, an IED attack on a convoy – resulting in the 

deaths of several Afghan police officers – led to the officer being relocated to Khost. Making 

matters worse for the PRT, Orgun –E was the previous capital of Paktika, and much political and 
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economic weight remained there. The Special Forces ODB responsible for Paktika was also 

located in Orgun-E, reducing the chances for synergy with the PRT. 

In order to improve coordination with the PRT, the maneuver battalion had assigned a 

captain as liaison officer. This was an easy arrangement to make, as a small force was assigned 

to Sharan to help guard the governor’s compound. This improved relations, and was also a link 

for State and AID officers to the commander of the maneuver battalion. 

Jalalabad 

 Given the relatively large population and economic output of Nangarhar Province, its 

proximity to Pakistan and Peshawar, as well as the considerable poppy cultivation and opium 

production, Jalalabad was the most important PRT in RC – East. Operations in this province 

were the most complex, involving the PRT, a substantial USAID effort, SF, Marines, military 

trainers, and State. 

 Two AID officers were assigned to the PRT, in part to handle the heavy workload 

generated by alternative livelihood programs, and the need to manage sub-contractors such as 

Development Associates International. A USDA officer was assigned to the PRT, advising on 

agriculture and micro credit (although USDA was hobbled by not having its own funding for 

projects). 

The PRT’s presence benefited from a Marine battalion headquartered at the Jalalabad 

airfield, Special Forces, as well as an increasingly strong ANA presence. This helped open 

access to some of the more difficult districts, particularly in the Spin Ghar range south of 

Jalalabad, bordering Pakistan, and the heavily tribal districts near the Khyber Pass. 

The PRT commander, an efficient regular Army lieutenant colonel, was heavily involved 

in the complex politics of the province. Several families had traditionally run the province, but 

there were other poles of power, including the provincial chief of police and the chief of the 

Afghan Border Police. The PRT was a moderating influence between the power brokers, 

extending the influence of the Embassy and, more than other PRTs, acting as a de-facto 

consulate. This influence took several forms – pressing the provincial government to crack down 

on drug production and corruption; settling disputes between the ANA and the ANP; and 

reacting to riots magazine that erupted in the spring of 2005, precipitated by an article in 

Newsweek magazine. While this incident damaged security for the short term, overall security 

was sufficient for development to take precedence over combat operations by the summer of 

2005. 

Ghazni 

During 2004 Ghazni province was relatively peaceful, allowing for freedom of movement 

by the PRT in most of the province. By the summer of 2005, however, the Taliban was 
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resurgent, making operations more difficult, particularly in the districts bordering Paktika 

(particularly Andar district) and Zabol provinces. The Ghazni PRT also covered Wardak 

province, a difficult assignment given the distances and poor roads in that province. 

The PRT benefited from sharing its base with an army maneuver battalion, easing its 

access to less secure parts of the province. Interestingly, the Afghan Highway Police was a 

significant factor in provincial security, by not only keeping the Kabul to Kandahar ring road 

open, but by also serving as the governor’s private militia. 

The political and AID officers shared strong working relations with Gov. Assadullah 

Khalid, a young and vigorous official with strong ties to both the Northern Alliance and 

President Karzai. This relationship was in some ways the textbook of what a PRT political 

officer can do – improving the efficiency of the provincial government, shaming the governor 

into doing the right thing, acting as an honest broker (with a mixed Tajik, Hazara and Pashtun 

population, politicians from these various groups at times caused problems for their own ends); 

and explaining USG programs and policies. 

An additional U.S. maneuver battalion was assigned to Ghazni and Wardak provinces for 

the September 2005 provincial elections. This brought a significant increase in security to areas 

that had previously had only occasional Coalition presence. An opportunity was missed, 

however, by not assigning a State officer to this temporary deployment. 

Methar Lam 

Laghman Province had been fairly quiet for the years after the 2001 overthrow of the 

Taliban, with insurgent activity mostly in two northern districts. The Methar Lam PRT also 

covered western Nuristan province. The PRT initially shared a base with a Marine company, 

which aggressively patrolled in the province. In part due to the Marine’s presence, the PRT was 

able to make rapid progress in several areas. In coordination with the provincial government, the 

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program was effective, defanging 

several militia groups and bringing in Taliban members. The 2005 parliamentary elections were 

used as leverage against several warlords, who were forced to at least partially disarm before 

being eligible as candidates. 

 In general, the combined PRT/Marine presence seemed to give confidence to the local 

government, headed by the reasonably competent Governor Safi, and several development 

projects – including roads in the Alishang valley – were begun. The civilian presence at Methar 

Lam was limited at first, with Jalalabad-based State and AID officers providing coverage when 

possible. The AID presence was primarily a counter-narcotics effort to promote alternative 

livelihoods, and construct the road linking Methar Lam with Route 1. By late 2005, a State 

officer had been permanently assigned. 
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Bamian 

Within RC- East, the Bamian PRT was unique for several reasons. Although it was an 

OEF PRT, it was commanded and staffed by New Zealand soldiers. They brought their own 

doctrine to the field, including a “softer” approach emphasizing reconstruction and community 

relations over combat operations. The population in Bamian Province is predominantly of the 

Hazara ethnic group, who are mostly Shiite Muslims. As a result, the Taliban and other 

insurgents groups had difficulties operating in Bamian, and the security situation was permissive. 

This allowed the PRT to operate without the support of a maneuver battalion, relying instead on 

their limited combat capabilities (rarely, if ever used) and the presence of Afghan security forces. 

The Hazara have historically been an underclass in Afghanistan, and have received 

limited development assistance over the years. The PRT’s development projects therefore made 

a disproportionately large impact. The PRT worked closely with Gov. Sarobi, Afghanistan’s only 

woman governor, supporting her in struggles against corrupt government and police officials. 

This PRT had an unusually large proportion of medics, and made good use of “medcaps” 

throughout the province. Officers from USAID, State and USDA were posted to the PRT, 

making their agencies resources available in support of the NZ effort. 

In contrast to the situation in Bermal, Bamian was a case where the PRT was able to lead, 

without any maneuver battalion support to speak of. The security situation was good enough that 

the focus was almost entirely on reconstruction work and development of the provincial 

government. 

Panshir 

The Panshir PRT was also unique among OEF PRTs, with a State Department officer 

designated at the commander instead of a military officer. Only a minimal number of soldiers 

were assigned to the PRT, and its focus was on political and economic development. This 

arrangement was made possible by the special conditions in the Panshir valley – a receptive 

Tajik population, a provincial government willing to assure the PRT’s security, and the difficulty 

the Taliban or other insurgent groups have operating in the Panshir. The Panshir model had 

significant benefits – a smaller footprint, cheaper costs, and reliance on local capabilities. 

However, this model may be difficult to replicate in areas where the security situation is more 

fluid. 

Analysis 

In 2004 – 2005 Regional Command East dealt with a wide variety of conditions in terms 

of security, economic development, Afghan government capacity, ethnic groups, insurgent 

capabilities, border conditions, and terrain. As a result, each PRT was considerably different than 

other PRTs, and was specifically adapted to the conditions and development needs of its 

province. The most important variable, as illustrated by the examples above, was the level of 
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security. This determined not only how much access the PRTs had to their districts (some were 

no-go areas), but also what type and how many development projects were undertaken. 

One measure of the long-term success of the PRT concept in Afghanistan will be the rate 

at which PRTs are able to shift from a focus on security efforts – as was the case in Asadabad, 

and in the Bermal valley – to a reconstruction and political focus, as in Bamian and the Panshir. 

This depends on a multitude of factors – how strong and effective the Afghan security forces 

eventually become, whether the Taliban and other insurgent groups are able to continue their 

activities, overall economic development, the maturation of the district, provincial and national 

government, the future level of NGO and international organization involvement, the rejection of 

the insurgents by the populace, and events in the FATA. Ultimately, the PRTs should completely 

hand the “humanitarian space” off to the NGOs, IOs, and the efforts of the GoA. At that point, 

the PRTs will have worked themselves out of a job. 

Conclusions and Recommendations 

By 2008 the situation in RC – East had significantly changed from the fall of 2005. 

Afghan institutions were making their presence felt, particularly the ANA, which had more 

troops, an increasing ability to carry out operations, and the support of the Afghan population. 

After considerable investment by the U.S. in training and equipping the ANP, the police were 

gradually improving. The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), established in 

August 2007, was working to improve policy, infrastructure, capacity, and the overall 

functioning of government at the provincial, district and municipal levels. The IDLG had also 

brought in several new governors, both improving the administration of the provinces, but also 

improving the outlook of citizens towards their government. At the same time, economic growth 

in several provinces – notably Nangarhar – was cause for optimism. The trend of increasing 

Afghan government capacity has changed the dynamics of cooperation outlined in this paper – 

increasingly, U.S. military and civilian officers follow the Afghan lead. 

In 2007 the U.S. military added a second brigade combat team to the border areas, with a 

second task force headquarters established in Jalalabad. This considerably increased the ability to 

carry out combat operations in areas that were previously “economy of force” operations, as well 

as increase partnering with ANA, ABP and ANP units. This had the added advantage of 

increasing the level of security enough that the PRTs could operate in districts where their 

movements had previously been restricted. At the same time, the levels of CERP funding were 

significantly increased. For example, Task Force Bayonet, the brigade command based in 

Jalalabad, funded roughly 100 million dollars of projects with CERP in 2007, most of which 

went through the four PRTs in its AO (Jalalabad, Asadabad, Methar Lam and Nuristan). 

The establishment since 2005 of three new PRTs in RC – East – in Wardak, under 

Turkish leadership, in Logar under the Czechs, and in Nuristan, under U.S. leadership has 

allowed for a more “tailored” approach to each of these provinces. Previously, each of these 

provinces was covered by U.S. PRTs located in adjacent provinces, and was often a secondary 
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effort. The Nuristan PRT in particular has improved the ability to provide development 

assistance to one of the least developed and most remote Provinces in Afghanistan. 

Maneuver battalions still play a major role in RC – East. Some areas in Konar province, 

particularly the Watapor and Korangal valleys, still have troops in contact on a regular basis, 

while sectors of Khost and Paktika provinces, particularly the border districts, have significant 

insurgent influence. Some provinces that had only low levels of insurgency in 2004 – including 

parts of Ghazni, Logar, Wardak and Kapisa – now see increased insurgent activity. The 

maneuver units are needed not only to directly counter the insurgents, but also to support the 

ANA and ANP, and to allow the Afghan government and the PRTs to operate freely in contested 

districts. The duties of maneuver units and the PRTs sometimes overlap, particularly in less 

secure areas, with officers from both involved in CERP projects and support of the government. 

Some provinces appear to be shifting towards the positive end of the security spectrum, 

so that PRTs (and Afghan government ministries) play an increasing role relative to security 

forces. An example is Nangarhar province, where in 2004 there were only minimal U.S. and 

Afghan security forces, and a considerable insurgent presence. By 2008, the ANP and to a lesser 

extent the ANA had the lead on security, and insurgent activity was mostly limited to a few 

border districts. This allowed the PRT to concentrate on development, spending almost 25 

million dollars of CERP funds for projects in 2007, and to focus on working with the governor, 

the Provincial Council, and tribal leaders. The improved security situation helped a U.S. “special 

troops battalion”, composed of soldiers whose specialties were not combat arms, to succeed as a 

hybrid combat and development unit. 

The need for increased civilian staff at the PRTs and at brigade commands, apparent in 

2004 – 2005, remains a problem in 2008. The military has shifted officers to fill these gaps, 

assigning officers to work on political, development, agricultural, and rule-of-law issues, but the 

counterinsurgency effort would benefit from more civilian officers with training and experience 

in these areas. At the same time, UNAMA suffers from being both understaffed and 

underfunded at both the provincial and regional levels. 

On the negative side, various insurgent groups have survived to 2008, including the 

Taliban, the Haqqani network, Al Qaeda, Hezb-i- Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), and foreign jihadist 

groups. In some cases, their capabilities have increased (particularly in “asymmetric” warfare 

such as IEDs and suicide bombings). The resulting low-intensity conflict has had a 

disproportionate negative impact on development efforts, by keeping NGOs out of many areas, 

diverting money that might be spent on development projects into security, and 

keeping the U.S. PRTs with a preponderance of military, rather than civilian officers. 

 Robert Kemp is a State Department Foreign Service officer currently assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. 

He has previously been political advisor to brigade commanders of the 25th ID, the 82nd Airborne and the 173rd

Airborne Brigade Combat Team during their deployments to Afghanistan. This paper reflects the personal 

views of the author, and does not represent official State Department or U.S. Government policy or views. 
 

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The Embassy at War 

By 

Alexander Crowther 

Introduction 

 As a result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States has adopted a more forward 

security stance. Because of this, US embassies throughout the world are required to spearhead 

interagency, intergovernmental and sometimes multinational security efforts in support of the US 

National Security Strategy and the strategies of our international partners. This requires a US 

country team that is able to focus the efforts of all US government organizations to achieve the 

synergies needed to defeat our enemies. As such, we need to ensure that the US Embassy is 

organized appropriately and capable of running operations along a spectrum of conflict from 

‘normal’ or peaceful circumstances to all-out conflict like Iraq. The embassy must be able to 

organize for war. 

Modern Challenges 

The modern global milieu is fraught with challenges. In the post-Cold War era, 

opponents of globalization and the perceived hegemony of the developed countries have attacked 

not only developed countries but also our partners throughout the world. 

Our opponents seek to use asymmetric means to attack us. Asymmetric approaches are 

the only way that our opponents can attack us and survive due to the overwhelming conventional 

capability present in the modern developed state. They seek to undermine our credibility and our 

political will. Rather than overthrowing governments and replacing them, modern opposition 

groups use terrorist techniques to gain their political goals, which usually center on gaining the 

space to do what they will, whether making money like the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 

Colombianas (FARC) in Colombia or seeking room to organize and build weapons like alQuaeda. 

Modern Approaches 

 Modern challenges require modern approaches. It is no longer sufficient to unleash the 

might of the US armed forces on the opposition. In modern warfare, use of military force is often 

counterproductive.1

 Even when the military is used, it is used as a part of a 

Joint/Interagency/Intergovernmental/Multinational (JIIM) team. The US part of the JIIM team is 

known as the interagency. 

The interagency is a colloquial term for the collection of US government agencies. With 

the burgeoning challenges of the 21st century, an approach that only uses one or two agencies 

 

1 See Rupert Smith “The Utility of Force” for a more detailed analysis. 
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will be overwhelmed by the opposition. Therefore, the USG seeks synergies by mobilizing the 

resources of the entire government. This team can be very flexible and bring a wide variety of 

resources and capabilities to the table. On the other hand, it can be hidebound, hierarchical and 

shot through with rivalries. The first team described is the one that everyone wants to work with. 

The second is the team that we usually end up in. 

Department of Defense 

 The Department of Defense is organized with a series of headquarters in the Pentagon 

and forces in the field. In the Pentagon is the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff 

which serves the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and four service staffs – the Army Staff, 

the Marine Staff, the Navy Staff and the Air Staff, who serve the Secretaries of the Army, Navy 

and Air Force as well as the four service Chiefs in their missions to train and equip the forces. 

Ten Combatant Commanders are responsible for regional and functional areas around the world. 

The “Geographic Combatant Commanders” are responsible for forces deployed into their “Areas 

of Responsibility.” These are Northern Command (North America), Southern Command (Latin 

America and the Caribbean), European Command (Europe, Russia and Israel), Africa Command, 

Central Command (the Near East and Central Asia) and Pacific Command (as far west as 

Pakistan and the Indian Ocean). These commands are not aligned along the same lines as the 

Regional Bureaus within the State Department. Each of these commands has their own Army, 

Marine Corps, Navy, Air and Special Operations component commands. The functional 

Combatant Commanders who have global responsibilities are Strategic Command, Joint Forces 

Command, Transportation Command and Special Operations Command.2

 

 Combatant Commanders have recently added an interagency capability within the 

command. Each of them has formed a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), which 

provides an interagency coordination capability. Although this does not give the interagency an 

operational-level capability, it is an admission that the interagency needs to have capabilities that 

parallel those of the Department of Defense. 

Department of State 

 The Department of State is organized with a headquarters at “Main State” in Washington 

DC with embassies and consulates throughout the world. Main State is organized along both 

regional and functional lines. There are six Under Secretaries of State who are in charge of 

Political Affairs, Economic Business and Agricultural Affairs, Arms Control and International 

Security Affairs, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Management, and Democracy and Global 

Affairs. 

 

2 http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dod101/ 
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The Under Secretary for Political Affairs has eight Assistant Secretaries: six have 

“Regional Bureaus” that manage affairs in the different parts of the world. The other two include 

International Organizations and International narcotics and Law Enforcement.3

The United States has 260 diplomatic and consular posts in 163 countries.4

 The mission 

of the Department of State is to “Advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and 

the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and 

prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, 

reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.”5

 In order to 

perform this mission, the State Department will “strengthen the capability of the U.S. 

Government and of international partners to prevent or mitigate conflate, stabilize countries in 

crisis, promote regional stability, protect civilians, and promote just application of government 

and law.”6 

 The State Department does not have an operational-level capability that would match the 

capability of the Combatant Commanders. Each regional bureau executes these functions. The 

regional bureaus have to perform the functions that are performed by the regional offices in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the regional Deputy Directorates within the Joint Staff J5, 

and the Combatant Commanders. This imbalance of capabilities puts the State Department at a 

significant disadvantage at the policy, strategic and operational levels where DOD has quite 

robust capabilities. 

 The head of each embassy is called the Chief of Mission (COM). Usually the COM is the 

Ambassador, in the absence of the Ambassador the Chief of Mission is a designated Chargé 

d’Affaires. Although there are several other titles, this person is the senior US government 

official in the country and is the personal representative of the President of the United States. 

The various agencies within an embassy are called the “Country Team.” The head of the country 

team is the Chief of Mission. 

Strategic Guidance

 Given the importance of this issue, there is a surprising lack of guidance on this subject. An 

examination of strategic level policy documents shows that many people do not conceptualize 

the importance of our overseas operations. 

 

3 Department of State Home Page: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/99494.htm 

4 US Department of State “Strategic Plan – Fiscal Years 2007-2012” http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf p 4 

5 Ibid p 9 

6 Ibid p 12 
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The National Security Strategy 2006 has an entire chapter on the interagency. In it, it 

addresses the need to continue “to reorient the Department of State towards transformational 

diplomacy”7

 but does not talk about country teams. It does address the need for “improving our 

capability to plan for and respond to post-conflict and failed-state situations.”8 

 The National Defense Strategy 2005 talks about partnerships, both international and 

domestic. Again, it does not address the country team, but does state that “The (State) 

Department is cooperating with this new office to increase the capacity of interagency and 

international partners to perform non-military stabilization and reconstruction tasks that might 

otherwise often become military responsibilities by default...to that end, the (Defense) 

Department will work with interagency and international partners to improve our ability to 

transition from military- to civilian-led stability operations.”9

 

 The National Military Strategy 2004 addresses the formation of the JIACGs mentioned 

above, but does not address the Department of State.10

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003 provides some guidance on what 

the President has three goals that call for effort by the US Embassy. They are “Deny sponsorship, 

support, and sanctuary to terrorists”11, “Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to 

exploit”12 and “Defend US citizens and interests at home and abroad.”13 The description of these 

goals does not identify what US agencies have responsibility for them, however upon close 

reading it is obvious that the State Department has the lead for many of the objectives. 

The Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006 dedicates an entire chapter to “Achieving 

Unity of Effort”14 which emphasizes both domestic and international operations. It does 

recommend “the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of 

both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities.”15 It also discusses the country 

 

7 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. March 2006. p 44 

8 Ibid 

9 The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005. p 15 

10 The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow, 2004. p. 24. Lack of 

addressing the State Department is appropriate in a military strategy. 

11 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003. p 17 

12 Ibid, p 22 

13 Ibid, p 24 

14 QDR pp 83-92 

15 Ibid, p 85 
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team, saying that “for most other (i.e. non-DOD) agencies, the U.S. Chief of Mission in a 

specific country, leading an interagency Country Team, has an important field leadership role. 

 

Creating opportunities to help enable Combatant Commanders to work more 

collaboratively with Chiefs of Mission is one objective.”16 It also says that the Department of 

Defense will “Support broader Presidential authorities to redirect resources and task the bestsituated agencies to respond, recognizing that other government agencies may be best suited to 

provide necessary support in overseas emergencies. This new authority would enable the U.S. 

Government to capitalize on inherent competencies of individual agencies to tailor a more 

effective immediate response.”17 These two statements contain a paradox that bedevils 

interagency planning and operations. Although the second statement seems to state that the State 

Department and other agencies might be better suited to lead certain types of operations, the first 

statement clearly indicates that the Department of Defense considers that DOD assets are not 

subordinate to the Chief of Mission. This bifurcated attitude has caused significant problems 

with a lack of unity of effort in both Vietnam and Iraq. 

As one could expect, the Department of State Strategic Plan 2007-201218 addresses many 

aspects that refer to the country team. It addresses the need for Transformational Diplomacy and 

addresses cooperation with other agencies. It identifies the Departments of Homeland Security 

and the Defense as “key U.S. Government partners with whom we will coordinate.”19 Unlike 

Defense products that obliquely refer to the other Departments, this plan overtly articulates the 

need for cooperation with other departments by name, stating that “(The Department of) Defense 

coordinates closely on counterterrorism and counter-narcotics programs, and provides the 

military-to-military contacts, assistance, and training that strengthen military and alliance 

relationships, play an important role in the management of arms transfers and the Excess 

Defense Articles program, and support the evacuation of non-combatants from crisis or disaster 

sites. Defense sponsors significant cooperative threat reduction programs and supports the 

Proliferation Security Initiative. Defense leads in providing security support, when needed, for 

stabilization and reconstruction activities and participates in government-wide stabilization and 

reconstruction planning and operations with other agencies.”20 

State also acknowledges that the country team needs to be reorganized. Indeed one 

of their seven Strategic Goals is “Strengthening Consular and Management Capabilities.”21

 

16 Ibid 

17 Ibid, p 86 

18 Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2007-2012 US Department of State US Agency for International Development. 2007. 

19 Ibid, 16 

20 Ibid 

21 Ibid, p 38 
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Unfortunately, their strategic plan addresses consular and management functions and does not 

speak to the need to strengthen the country team, as exemplified by their strategic priorities in 

this chapter: Visa services, Passport/American citizen services, Human Resources, Information 

Technology, Security, Facilities, Planning and accountability, Administrative services, 

Rightsizing/regionalization, and the Office of Inspector General.22 

We can see, therefore, that the policy-level documentation talks about the interagency, 

but actually provides very little guidance. This makes it very difficult for people seeking to 

improve the situation in what is one of the most important manifestations of US forward 

presence. 

Strategic & Operational Challenges 

In the 21st Century, there are a series of specific challenges that an embassy faces. During 

large-scale operations, these are particularly important. These challenges include the size of 

operations of different departments, an imbalance in the elements of national power, cultural and 

size issues between departments, personalities, the need for additional capabilities during 

contingency operations, the span of control, unity of effort, a lack of doctrine, lack of guidance, 

and the ability to assess operations. 

The sheer size of operations in the modern world can be difficult to handle. Although 

some military operations in countries in Latin America and Africa can consist of only a few 

military people working with the host nation, in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq the size of 

deployments can overwhelm embassies. There are currently 160,000 US troops on the ground in 

Iraq. The US Embassy in Iraq has over 1,000 people in it. These types of operations require a 

robust capability that many agencies, including the State Department, have trouble handling. 

This is reflected in the imbalance in the elements of national power. Regardless of 

whichever conceptual construct for elements of national power one uses, it is obvious that the 

military is only one of many aspects in any given operation. Other agencies must be able to 

address the other requirements of current operations. Currently operations tend to be quite 

imbalanced towards the military. It must become balanced out by strengthening the other 

elements before we can return to normal operations there. 

Cultural and size issues are very important as well. The entire State Department is 

smaller than a US Army mechanized division. There is no State Department planning 

community. They do not have a think tank to perform their policy-level deep thought. There is 

very little reach-back capability. What does exist is in the regional bureaus. But the State 

Department is not the only agency with cultural foibles. The Defense Department is a huge, 

unwieldy organization that lacks flexibility. Because Defense has so many assets, it tends to 

 

22 Ibid, pp 38-42 
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throw more at problems rather than seeking different routes or non-traditional approaches. 

Although some would say that State lacks doctrine, they would also say that Defense is hobbled 

by excessive dependence on doctrine. Seeking to impose a conventional solution on Iraq in the 

early 2000s is a very good example of this. Another example of cultural problems is the attitude 

that Defense personnel tend to have towards others, mainly due to a lack of understanding 

cultural differences. In the US Embassy in Baghdad, many field grade officers treat interagency 

and coalition partners with contempt bordering on disdain. 

Personalities have a huge impact on operations forward. There is a spectrum from bad 

relations between Lieutenant General Sanchez and Ambassador Bremer to a better relationship 

between General Casey and Ambassador Kalilizhad to the other end of the spectrum with the 

current relationship between General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. 

During a contingency operation, there is a need for additional capability within an 

embassy. The non-military aspects of these US efforts must be handled by someone. In Vietnam 

the US Government created the Civil Operations and Rural (or Revolutionary) Development 

Support (CORDS), in Afghanistan, both the US and international efforts have created Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which assist the Afghan government in development efforts. In 

Iraq, the US Government developed the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to 

provide oversight on the $20 billion provided by Congress in support of Iraq reconstruction. As 

this money was expended, IRMO changed to the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) 

which concentrates on capacity-building at the national level in Iraq. Another organization 

created in Iraq is the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) which supervises the efforts of PRTs as 

well as capacity building in at the provincial and municipal levels in Iraq. 

Unity of effort is another aspect that must be addressed during these operations. As 

previously mentioned the Chief of Mission is the senior US Government official in a country and 

is the personal representative of the President of the United States. There can be three types of 

relations in a country. The COM can be in charge, the military can be in charge, or they can each 

be in charge of their own areas. The first example is the most ubiquitous. It is the international 

norm. It is also how we have executed operations in countries like El Salvador in the 1980s and 

Colombia today. The second example is quite rare. It applies in places where the military 

obviously needs to be in charge, such as German and Japan at the end of WWII. The third 

example is fairly rare but has been used twice recently: Vietnam and Iraq. Each provides a lesson 

in what happens when we have a lack of unity of effort. 

This is a short list of the challenges that the US Government has faced over the years in 

trying to plan and execute interagency operations overseas. Although it is impossible to develop 

a comprehensive list of difficulties as each agency, each country and each situation present their 

own challenges; this list can illustrate the difficulties faced by US officials on the ground. 
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Recommendations

In order to address these issues, the government must address a wide variety of issues: 

embassy structure; education; selection of leaders; cultural issues; reach-back of strategic 

planning capability; and the need to achieve legitimacy for both US presence and local 

government. 

Changes to address these issues will require two major shifts in the way that the State 

Department does things. First, State needs to establish a personnel account that allows for a 

‘float’ capability, similar to the US Army “Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student (TTHS) 

account. That would allow the State Department to function at full potential while 

simultaneously training and educating their personnel. 

The second major shift will have to be the relationship between State and Congress. 

These changes will require significant resources, all of which will have to come from Congress. 

State should revamp their ability to communicate their agenda to Congress. The premier 

government organization that generally has the greatest success in communicating with Congress 

is the United States Marine Corps. State should examine how the Marine Corps plans and 

executes this plan and adopt the best practices that can apply. 

Conclusion 

 The United States are challenged at the beginning of the 21st century. Our opponents are 

ruthless, flexible groups who seek to use asymmetric means to delegitimize US efforts around 

the world. Only by creating synergies through the focused use of the interagency can the United 

States hope to prevail. This will require providing policy-level guidance, resources to improving 

interagency capabilities, and a flexible, rational approach to designing country teams. 

Colonel Glenn Alexander Crowther recently served as the Principal Advisor for Hostage 

Affairs for U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker. COL Crowther is currently 

assigned as a Research Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies 

Institute at the Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA.
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“One Stop Electronic Shopping for Joint Doctrine and 

More...” 

By 

David Spangler 

 If you have a need to research joint doctrine, get information on Joint Staff directives, 

instructions or access joint training or education information, all this information is at your finger 

tips. All you need is access to the internet and a CAC card and reader. This wealth of joint 

information is contained on the Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information 

System (JDEIS). The JDEIS Web Portal is managed for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (CJCS) by Joint Staff J-7 (Operational Plans & Joint Force Development). JDEIS replaces 

the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) as the primary authoritative source of joint doctrine, 

education, training and related information supporting Department of Defense and interagency 

planning and operations, and is not accessible by the general public. The JEL remains 

operational as a publicly-accessible source of information. 

 JDEIS provides portal capabilities for the Joint Staff J-7 and gives the Joint Community a 

responsive user-friendly tool for rapid access to current U.S. joint doctrine, training and 

education information, related materials and research tools. JDEIS makes it possible to rapidly 

find key joint doctrine, UJTL tasks, educational and training materials, joint publications and 

other references, and provides links to other websites and data collection venues. JDEIS has fast 

and easy search tools that bring up a vast amount of information including definitions, related 

topics, related Universal Joint Tasks, and related joint publications. 

 In addition to all that JDEIS offers, U. S Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting 

Center, Doctrine and Education Group has added three training portals currently available on 

JDEIS under the Joint Exercise and Training Section. The Combatant Command Headquarters 

Training Guide (CCHQTG) is a searchable database that describes the tasks that are performed 

by Combatant Command staffs, boards, centers, and cells. The Joint Task Force Headquarters 

Training Guide (JTFHQTG) is a searchable tool that lists the steps, practices, and procedures that 

aid Joint Task Force staff members. The Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing 

Operating Procedure (CJTFHQSOP) is a base-line SOP for establishing and operating a Joint 

Task Force headquarters and staff. All three of these products are based on current policies, joint 

doctrine, and UJTL tasks. 

 This great “One Stop” electronic tool is available to all that have .mil access, CAC reader 

access and have a strong desire to gain more joint knowledge. The Joint Warfighting Center’s 

Point of Contact is LTC Andy Creel at (757) 203-6132 or andrew.creel@jfcom.mil. 
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Update: Brazilian Joint Force Operations Conference 

By 

Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Evancho 

 Three Faculty Members from JCWS participated in a Brazilian Joint Force Operations 

Conference June 2-6, 2008. 

 Four Brazilian officers graduated the JCWS during the last five years and brought the 

lessons and concepts back home. The Brazilian Ministry of Defense (MOD) organized a Joint 

Force Operations Conference to expose a wide array of their officers to their emerging Joint 

Concepts and their view for the way ahead. To facilitate this, the MOD arranged for US 

participation to foster both learning and enduring partnership between Brazil and the USA. 

 The Joint Force Operations Conference, designed by the Brazilian MOD included 

participants from the Brazilian MOD, instructors from their Naval War College, Army 

Command and Staff College, Air Force Command and Staff College, and representatives from 

their service staffs and operational commands as well as the invited US participants from the US 

Military Liaison Group (Mil Group), US Defense Attaché Office and the three instructors from 

the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) from the US Joint Forces Staff 

College(JFSC). 

 The Brazilian MOD requested, through the US Mil Group, three JCWS instructors to 

present four lectures on Joint Operations presented iteratively next to Brazilian lectures on the 

same topics to compare and contrast methods and terminology. After each pair of lectures, a 

substantive debate via tandem question and answer session followed. The four topics were” 

Joint Operations Planning, Military Direction of Civil-Military Operations, Logistics in Joint 

Operations and Joint Planning during Execution. 

 The event was held at Brazil’s National War College, the Escola Superior de Guerra 

(ESG) in Rio de Janeiro. Several Brazilian Flag Officers attended the conference and made 

presentations to express to the participants the importance of Joint Force Planning and Execution 

to the participants. Each, to a man, expressed personally to the US participants, their 

appreciation for US involvement and specifically the growing partnership and sharing of useful 

lessons learned and participation with the Brazilian officers in the conference. 

 After three days of lecture and debate on the topics, the participants broke into working 

groups to further explore questions of deficiencies and possibilities of doctrinal improvements in 

Brazilian Joint Operations planning and execution methods based on the US model and lessons 

learned. The group was then convened again to present the specific findings of the working 

groups. 
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 The Brazilians held the lessons and the available references from the US in high regard. 

They appreciated the US willingness to assist and foster increasing partnership in their perceived 

need to move their military planning into an era of greater Joint focus. The success of this first 

US-Brazilian Joint Force Operations Conference bodes well for requests for increased future 

participation by the US in Brazilian plans to develop their Joint Force Operations planning and 

execution. 

 

The US participants from JCWS were LTC M. Ivan Evancho, USA, LtCol Ted Rubsamen, 

USMC, and LtCol Marc Cwiklik, USAF. LTC Evancho is an Asst Professor assigned to 

JCWS since 2005, a Portuguese speaker and Foreign Area Officer. LtCol Rubsamen is a 

JCWS instructor since 2007, an Artillery Officer and experienced in International 

Relations through his many deployments and work in the NATO Counter-IED field. 

LtCol Cwiklic is a JCWS instructor since 2006 and SME in Logistics, with International 

experience through his many deployments and assignments in the UK.
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JCWS Support to the Saudi Arabian Staff College 

By 

Lieutenant Colonel Jon McDonough 

 The Joint Forces Staff College continues to strive to be at the leading edge of Security 

Cooperation with our international partners and allies. The International Military Education and 

Training (IMET) program has been an integral part of the Joint Forces Staff College educational 

experience for decades. This Security Cooperation program has clearly provided a benefit to all 

the US and international officers at the college, but additionally it has also provided some great 

opportunities to enhance the Joint Forces Staff College’s role in our Defense Secretary’s security 

cooperation vision. Several of the senior leaders from our friends and allies Ministries of 

Defense have expressed interest in developing a similar joint staff education program in their 

own nations. 

 In late 2006 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia expressed an interest in establishing a JCWSstyle program at the Saudi Staff College. Responding to this interest, the JFSC conducted a 

Mobile Training Team (MTT) visit to Saudi Arabia which was coordinated by the US Military 

Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia. In January of 2007, at the invitation of the Saudi 

Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA), JFSC sent two senior military instructors to Saudi 

Arabia to conduct an advisory visit to the Saudi Arabian Staff College. In consultation with the 

leadership of the Saudi Staff College and members of the Saudi MODA, the Joint Forces Staff 

College advisors proposed the introduction of the JCWS curriculum with US instructors as the 

lead, and subsequently spiraling into a Saudi lead program within a year of initial 

implementation. 

 In order to implement the JCWS curriculum and assist in the transition of the JCWS 

curriculum into Saudi national strategies and capabilities, four senior field grade Saudi officers, 

from all of the Saudi military services attended the 10 week JCWS program. After the IMET 

sponsored course, the Saudi officers participated in the JFSC instructor development program 

which included classes on teaching techniques, curriculum development and practice teaching in 

the JCWS seminars. These four Saudi officers are the seeds of the program in Riyadh and have 

been working along side experienced US instructors hired by the Saudi Government through a 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract in the fall of 2007. 

 As of June 2008, within the parameters of the Foreign Military Sales USMTM 

established contract, two former JFCS instructors have co-taught four 12-week sessions with 

their Saudi counterparts at the Saudi Staff College. In addition to the USMTM established 
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contract the Joint Forces Staff College continues to provide updates on emerging US planning 

doctrine and policies. The Joint Forces Staff College has also sent five of its active duty military 

instructors on three week staff assistance visits over a six month time period to advise our Saudi 

counterparts on curriculum development, seminar teaching philosophies and other areas of 

military professional education that the Saudi Staff College professionals would like to explore. 

Lieutenant Colonel McDonough is a Military Intelligence Officer and a Eurasian Foreign 

Area Officer in the US Army. He has served as the Chief of the Office of Defense 

Cooperation in Vilnius, Lithuania and is currently serving as a member of the military 

faculty at the Joint Forces Staff College.
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JCWS Award Winning Papers 

 JCWS recognized five papers for awards during the Graduation Ceremony for Class 08-03. 

General Cartwright, VCJCS assisted in the presentation of the awards. The awards are: 

MacArthur Foundation Award – recognizes the student collaborative writing team with 

the best paper addressing joint leadership, joint warfighting or other topics demonstrating the 

ideals of General Douglas MacArthur. The winning paper was titled: Synchronizing DOD’s 

Global Strike Mission and was written by LTC Phillip J. Deppert, USA, Lt Col Jeffery N. 

Aldridge, USAF and Maj Jeffery W. Garza, USMC. These students are from Seminar 2 and 

their faculty advisor was Lt Col Kristopher J. Alden, USAF 

National Defense University Foundation Award – recognizes the student collaborative 

writing team with the paper that best displays excellence in research, analysis and writing. The 

winning paper was titled: Linking Combatant Command Plans to Service Resources and was 

written by CDR Mark S. VanYe, USN, Maj Jerry L. Norwood, USAF and MAJ James A. 

Fosbrink, USA. These students are from Seminar 10 and their faculty advisor was CDR 

Elizabeth A. Yeomans, USN 

JFSC Commandant’s Award – recognizes the student collaborative writing team with the 

best paper that clearly demonstrates on of our primary goals – development of joint attitudes and 

perspectives concerning critical issues of the day. The winning paper was titled: A Proposal for 

the Realignment of the Department of State and Department of Defense Areas of Responsibility

and was written by CDR Thomas A. Zwolfer, USN, LTC James Januszka, USA, Maj Dennis S. 

Rand, USAF and Mr. James S. Engler, DAF. These students are from Seminar 9 and their 

faculty advisor was LTC Mark J. Hovatter, USA 

JFSC Transformation Award – recognizes the student collaborative writing team with the 

best paper on the subject of Transformation. The award winning paper was titled: Interagency 

Leadership: Improving Joint Tactical Level Predeployment Training: Utilizing the Joint 

National Training Capability and the Joint Live Virtual Constructive Federation and was written 

by CDR Robert W. Patrick, USN, Maj Olgun Deyeci, Turkish Air Force and Major Richard T. 

Whitlock, USAF. These students are from Seminar 8 and their faculty advisor was LtCol Lance 

K. Landeche, USMC 

 Association of the United States (AUSA) Award – recognizes the student collaborative 

writing team with the best paper on land warfare in a joint environment. The award winning 

paper was titled: Keeping the Fire Lit: Democracy and the Long War and was written by LCDR 

Lance J. Luksik, USN, Maj Eric B. Moses, USAF and MAJ John R. Woodward, USA. These 

students are from Seminar 5 and their faculty advisor was CDR Christopher T. Kirkbride, USN 
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The Joint and Combined Warfighting School Crest 

The Mermaid holds multiple symbolic references to the Joint and Combined Warfighting 

School. The mermaid symbolizes eloquence in speech, applicable to the graduates of the school, 

but in more familiar terms, the Mermaid signifies the school’s strong bond and heartfelt 

association with Norfolk, Virginia. 

The Mermaid is colored purple to represent the combination of all colors of the Military 

Forces of the United States. Green for the Army, Navy Blue for the Navy, Ultra-Marine Blue for 

the Air Force and Cardinal and Gold for the Marine Corps. 

The Torch she carries symbolizes liberty, truth and intelligence, the keystones of genuine 

Education. 

Her flowing hair, the hallmark of the Mermaid’s vanity, reflects the Service colors of the 

Joint and Combined military services that attend the school. 

Her scales represent the armor protection provided by the synergistic combination of the 

joint forces working together. 

The shaft of the Spear she brandishes represents the supreme force of National Power. 

The mantle that connects the shaft to the four tines represents the inter-agency coordination that 

bolsters the strength of those four tines. Each of the tines represents the four Branches of the 

Military Arm of national Power. 
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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent

the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the Department of

Defense.