6 R. R. 64. 1 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

N O . P D - 0265- 09

V I C K I E L A SH U N TO LB ER T , A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS ON S TATE ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW

FROM THE FI FTH CO URT O F AP PEALS

DALLAS CO UNTY J OHNS ON , J ., f

i l e d a di s s e nt i ng o pi ni on i n w hi c h H OL C OM B , J ., j oi ne d. D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N Th e state ind ic te d app ell ant fo r c a pit a l murd e r. At

the c los e of

the g uil t ph a se , th e state reque s t ed that instructions on “a lesser inc luded and pa

rties” be included in the jur y char g e. The 1 tr ia l c ourt de nie d th e state ’s re qu e st. Ap pe lla nt n e ith e r j oin e d the state ’s re qu e st no r o bje c te d to its denial. When quer ied as to whe ther the jury char g e wa s acc eptable to he r, appe llant said, “No objections.” On a

ppeal, she assert ed t h at the trial judg e should have , su a s po nte , included an2

T o lb e rt v . S ta te , N o . 0 5 -0 7 -0 0 9 2 0 -C R , 2 0 0 8 T e x . A p p . L E X IS 5 2 4 5 (T e x . A p p .– D a llas, d e live re d J u ly 2 1 6 , 20 0 8 )( no t de si gnat ed f o r pub l i cat i o n). A l t ho ugh t he l anguage o f t he st at e’ s ground f

o r r evi ew co m p l ai ns o f err o r i n ap p l y i ng A l m a n za , i ts b rie f’ s 3 ar g u men t i s h ea ded “ ( PR ESE RV AT I O N O F D EFE N SI V E JU RY I N ST RU CT I O N I SSU ES)

. ” St at e’ s Pet i t i on f or D i s cr et i onar y Revi ew a t 5. T he ar gu ment t hu s does not mat ch t he pl ai n l ang uag e of t he gr ound f

or r evi ew. ins tr uc tio n on the le sse r- inc lud e d of fe ns e of mur de r. Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls fo un d that, be c a

us e murder w as “la

w applica ble to the case ,” that instruction should have been g iven. I t f urther f ound that the err or resulted in e g reg ious ha rm, reve rsed the judgme nt of the trial court and rema nded “f or further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.” 2 In its petiti on to this C ourt, the state pr esente d a sing le ground for revie w. Criminal jury

char g es conta in “law applicable to the case ,” and of ten “de fensive issues.” To obtain re view on appea l , compl aints involving “la w applica ble to the c a se ” ne e d n ot b e pr e se rv e d at tr ia l but “ de fe ns ive iss ue s” mus t be pr e se rved. D id the Fif th Court of Appea ls wrong ly hold that where a defe ndant states “no objec tion” to the proposed c harg e and the n complains on appea l a bout the omission of a lesserincluded off

ense instruc tion, the Almanza sta nd ard a pp lie s? Almanza 3 Th e state ’s se c on d r e a so n for g ra nti ngre vie w o f i ts p e tit ion state s th at th e c ourt

of a pp e a ls incorre ctly interpre ted this Court’s unanimous decision in Bluit t v . S tate , 137 S.W. 3d

51 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ), “ wh ic h a dd

re sse d th e pr e se rv atio n o f co mpl a int s f or the law a pp lic a ble to t he c a se , to the pre servation of complaints for def ensive instructions.” Nowhere in Bluit t do Ifind s u ch a discussion. I n that case , the state raised three g rounds: (1) the cour t of appe als err oneously

require d prior convic tions to be proved beyond a re asonable doubt; (2) the cour t of appe als misapplied the Almanza s t an d ar d ; an d ( 3 ) th e c o urto f a p p e a l s e r r o n e o u s l y r

u l e d th ata p p e l l an tc o u l d

a p p e a l j urychar g e er ror, e ven afte r he aff

irmatively stated to the trial court that he had no objection to the jury char g e.3

“ C r i mi nal j ur y ch ar ges cont ai n ‘ l aw a pp l i cabl e t o t he cas e, ’ an d of t en ‘ def ens i ve i s s ues . ’ T o ob t ai n r evi ew 4 o n a p p ea l , co m p l aints i nv o l ving ‘l aw ap p l i ca b l e to t he ca se’ nee d no t b e p rese rve d at t rial b ut ‘ d efen si ve i ssue s’ m ust be pres er ved. ” As to the first g round, we held that the languag e of the statute is clear ; only unadjudicate d offe nses and ba d acts have an a rticulate d b u rd en of proof. F inal convictions have alre ady been pr o v e d b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b le d o u b t, an d p r o o f o f th e f

a c t o f c o n v ic ti o n is s u f

f ic ie n t for afinal conviction t o be su

b mi tt e d to th e ju r y . T h e tr ia l c o urt d id

n o t e r r in f a il in gto g iv e th e r e qu e s te d instruction. Be cause no err or occ urre d, no harm analy sis was nee ded, and w e ther efor e did not rea ch the state’s se cond g round. As to the thi rd g ro un d, the g ro un d o f i nte re st h e re , w e no te d th at Almanza a p p l i e s t o a l l j ur

ychar g e er ror a nd that it estab l i s h es o n l y two standards f or har m analy sis–eg reg ious harm for no ob je c tio n or som e ha

rm fo r a time ly ob

je c tio n. We he ld that, be c a us e “ no ob

je c tio n” is not

a “ tim e ly objection,” a

response of “no obje ction” must be equiva lent to a fa ilure to object a n d there fore subject to t h e “eg reg ious harm” a naly sis of Al

ma nz a . Under Bluit t , appellant is entitled to appe al purported jur

y -cha rg e er ror, with any

harm c onsidered unde r the “ eg reg ious” standar d. The a nswer to t he state ’s pe tit ion

fo r dis c re tio na

ry re vie w a s su

bmi tte d– “ Di d the F if

th Court of Ap pe a ls wro ng ly hold that . . . the Almanza standard applies? ”–is that the cour t of appe als did not err, a

nd this Court should theref

ore a ffirm the judg ment of the c ourt of appe als. P rese rvation The two stateme nts of law that beg in the state’s g round for revie w indicate that within the 4 state’s a rticulated Almanza complaint is the assumpti o n t h at any reque st for an instruc tion on a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e is a de fe ns ive iss ue , whic h le a ds to t he con c lus ion that a pp e lla nt f a ile d to pr e se rv e e rr or . T his is the iss ue that th e ma jor ity a dd res ses , a lth ou g h p re se rv atio n o f e rr or is a4

T EX . P E N A L C ODE , C h a p te r E igh t. 5
T EX . P E N A L C O D E § 8. 02. 6 differ ent issue than what standard to apply to jury -cha

rg e er ror. Some jury

instructions that may

be re quested, such as s el f- defe nse and ne cessity , are

cer tainly , and exclusively , defe nsive issues. The Pena l Code clea rly labels those issues and others as “de fense s.” I f an instruc tion on lesse r- i n cl uded off enses we re truly

“def ensive,” howeve r, the 5 state would be ba

rre d from re questing such an instruc tion. But the state can, a nd does, re quest the inclusion in the jury

char g e of instruc tions on applicable lesse r-include d offe nses. Our c ase la

w also supports t he position that lesser-inc luded offe nses ar e not “de fensive issues.” In De lga do v . S

tate , 235 S.W .3d 244, 249-50 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007), the sole issue before this Court was whether

the trial cour

t should have, su a s

po nte , inc lud e d an ins tr

uc tio n on re a so na ble doubt, truly

an issue for

the def ense. Delgado does not sa y that the submissi on to the jury of lesser

included off

enses is a “def

ensive” issue; it states only that the trial judge does not ha ve a su a s po nte duty to include instructions on “all potential defe nsive issues, lesser- included issues, or e videntiary issues.” By its very

words, Delgado remove s lesser- included off enses f rom the categ ory

of def ensive issues. Delgado al s o n o t es th atwh et h er t o re qu es t an i n s tru ct i o n i s o ft en a m at t er o f tri al s tra t egy and tac tics, an obser

vation that applies to both defe ndant and state

. The issue in Posey v . State, 966 S.W .2d 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), wa s the lack of a jury instruction on

mi s ta k e o f f a c t, a s tatuto r y d e f e n s e . T h e d e f

e n d an t h a d

n o t r e qu e s te d

th e mi s sing 6 instruction. This Court framed the issue a s a question of whe ther testimony that the def

endant thought that he had per

mission t o drive the stolen c ar “ imposes a duty on trial courts to su a s

po nte instruct the jury

on unreque sted defe nsive issues.” Id. at 62. The Court’s a nswer w as no.5

T EX . P E N A L C ODE § 9. 31. 7
T EX . P E N A L C ODE § 22. 06. 8

F o o tno te 1 0 o f B u

fk in , cite d b y the m a

jo rity, re fer s to two c a se s: F e rre l v. S ta te , 55 S.W

. 3 d 58 6 (T ex. 9 Cr i m. App. 2001) ( i n s t r u ct i on on s el f

- def en s e) ; a n d Cam pbel l v . St at e, i nf r a (d e fen d a n t re q u e ste d instr u c tio n ). Drue ry v . S tate , 2 25 S.W. 3d

49 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ), wa s a c a pit a l a pp e a l th at de a lt wi th a complaint that the tria l c ourt had not give n an instruction on the lesser -included c harg e of murde r. The opinion did not use the term “ defe nsive issue” a nd decide d the ca se on estoppel; the a ppellant had specific ally reque sted that the instruction not be g iven. Only the concur ringopinion raised the idea that an ins truction on a lesser-included offense is “a kind of de fensive issue.” Id . at 513 (Ke ller, P.J ., concur

ring .). The issue in Bu

fk in v . S tate , 2 07 S.W. 3d

77 9 ( Te x. Cr im. App

. 20 06 ), a do me sti c -a ssa

ult

case , was whe ther instructions on s elf-de fense and conse nt, both of which we re r equeste d by the defe ndant, should have be en submitte d to the jury . Self-def

ense and conse nt are statutory defe nsive 7 8 iss ue s and

so are unhe lpf

ul i n d isc us sin gle sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e s. 9 In Cam pb e ll v . S tate , 614 S.W .2d 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), the defe ndant had r equeste d an instruction on a lesse r-include d offe nse, but the trial judg e re fused to include it. The re quested instruction was a de fensive issue be cause it had been raised by the def ense. Cam

pb e ll , like Delgado , clea rly rec og nized that les s er- included-of fense instructions are not e x clusively a def ensive issue: “This Court has held that whe n evidenc e fr om any source raises a

defe nsive issue or ra ises an issue that a le sse r i nc lud e d off

e ns e may have be e n co mmi tte d an d a jur y c ha rg e on the iss ue is p ro pe rl y reque sted, the issue must be submitt ed t o t h e jury .” Id . at 445. Our c ase la w is clea r: reque sts for jur y ins tr uc tio ns on

le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e s a re no t per se “def

ensive” issues. Pr of e sso rs Di x a

nd Da ws on ’s tr e atis e on Cr imi na l Pr a c tic e and Pr oc e dure re fe rs to r e qu e sts6

43 G EOR GE E. D I X & R O BERT O. D A WS ON , C R I M I N A L P R A C T I C E A ND P RO CED U RE § 36. 50 a t 250 ( Su pp. 10 2 0 0 9 ). Id

. at 249.

11 for instructions on lesser -i n cl uded off enses a s part of the “the implied strateg ic dec isions of the pa rt ie s. ” “ Th e pa

rt ie s” in a c ri min a l c a se are the sta

te and the de fe nd ant. Th e pr of

e sso rs a lso no te 10 that [b] oth side s potentially may benef it from a lesser

included off

ense instruc tion. The defe nse intere st is in l imiti ngpunishment exposure by providing a lesser alternative to the c ha rg e d of fe ns e wh ile the pr os e c uti on c an ob ta in a g re ate r l ike lih oo d o f s ome ty pe of c onvic tio n b y

g ivi ngthe jur

y the op tio n o f c onvic tin g fo r an o ff e ns e wi th l e ss dif fi c ult pr oo f re qu ir e me nts , pa rt ic ula rl y if the pr os e c uti on fe ars that th e e vid e nc e is weak on the point that disti ng uishes the g reater off ense f rom the lesser

. 11 Their tre atise af

firms that an instruction on a le sser-inc luded offe nse is not exclusi vely a def ensive issue beca

use it is not ex clusively

within the domain of the def ense. Defensive Instruction or Law Appli cable to the C ase? An instruction on a lesser -included offe nse may be a de fense issue or a pr osecution issue, but it may also be l aw ap p l icable to the c ase, de pendingnot on who reque sted the instruction or eve n whether a par ty reque sted an instruction, but on the evide nce pr esente d at trial. By the expressions, "the la

w appl i ca b l e t o the ca se," and " the law of the ca se," as employ ed in the C ode, evidently is meant the law a pplicable to the c ase a s made by the proofs–the law applicable to the pleading s and the e vidence ; and this has been the uniform construc tion given to them by the Supreme Court and by this court. Da v is v . Th e Sta te , decide d at the pre sent term of this cour t, po st. The judge is said to have pe rf or me d th at duty wh e n he sh a ll h ave ins tr uc te d th e jur

y a s to the law a

pp lic a ble to ever y leg itimate deduction which the jur y may drawfrom the f

acts in evide nce. Liste r v . S

tate , Court of Appea ls of Texas, 3 Tex

. C t . App. 17; 1877 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 198 (1 87 7) . “ Ho we ve r, de fe ns ive iss ue s (e ve n if statut or ily -d e fi ne d) do no t c on sti tut e the ‘l aw a pp lic a ble to the case ’ unless the defenda nt makes them so by prese nting evidence to support their submission7

M a lik v . S ta te , 95 3 S.W

. 2 d 23 4 (T ex. C ri m . A p p . 19 9 7 ). 12

T hat dis cuss i o n m ay have b een recal l ed by t he jur o rs ; duri ng de l i b erat i o ns, t hey sent out a no t e aski ng 13 ab o ut l esse r- i nc l ud ed o f f en ses. in the char g e and by

reque sting their inc lusion in t he cha rg e.” Ro dge rs v . S

tate , 180 S.W .3d 716, 721 (Tex App.–Waco 2005). Our task on a pre servation c laim, the n, is to de termine what instructions would have been in the hy pothetically corr ect jury char g e. Whil e the jury char g e may be af fec ted 12 by the choices t h e p ar t i es make a s to requests for instructions, some instructions must be g iven beca use the issue ra ised is “law a pplicable to the c ase.” I f e v i d en ce fr o man y

s o urc e r ai s es th e i s s u e o f al es s er i n cl u d edo ff

en s e, th e c h ar ge must be g iven. Mo or e v . S tate , 5 7 4 S.W .2d 122 (Tx.C r.App. 1978). . . . A s noted in Tho mp so n v . S

tate , 521 S.W .2d 621 (Tx.C r.App. 1974), “it is . . . well rec og nized that a def endant is entitled to an instruction on eve ry issue raised by

the evidenc e, whether produce d by

the State or the de fenda nt, and whethe r it be strong , weak, unimpeache d, or contra dicted.” ( Citations om itted.) Be ll v . S tate , 693 S.W .2d 434, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Th e ind ic tme nt i n th is c a se a lle g e d c a pit a l murd e r a s murd e r i n th e c ours e of ro bb e ry . It is

rea sonable to deduc e that the state believed that the evidenc e mig ht raise lesse r-include d offe nses beca use, duringvoir dire, the state explained to the venire the lesse r- i n cl u ded off ense of murder, setting out the diff

ere nce be tween it and c apital murder and also the r ang e of punishment. 2 R.R. 41- 42. I t a ls o e xp la in e d r o b b e r y , it s r an g e o f p un is h me n t, an d th e p r o c e s s o f d e li b e r ati n g f ir st the of fe ns e c ha rg e d, the n a

ny le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e s ra ise d b y

the e vid e nc e . 2 R.R . 4 2- 43 . T he state also reque sted instructions on “a lesser included and par ties.” 6 R.R. 64. W ithout inqui ringwhat le sse r o ff e ns e wa s w ante d, the tr ia l ju dg e de nie d th e re qu e st. As the state e x plained in voir dire, unle ss the killing was in t h e co u rs e of the robber y , the offe nse wa s murder, not capital murder. Monica S heff ield, the onl y state’s witness who asserted 138

T esti m o ny ab o ut t he jew el b o x d i d no t rev ea l i t s ap p ea ran ce , i t s p ro ve na nc e, o r i t s co nten t s. 14

T he st at e argues i n i t s b ri ef t hat an i nst ruct i o n on t he l ess er- i ncl ud ed off ense of m urder i s an i ss ue f

o r t he 15 def ens e, but i t s ac t i ons at t r i al bel i e t hat as s er t i on: “ T he onl y t hi ng , Y our H onor, we wer e a s ki ng f or i s a l es s er i ncl uded an d part i es . ” 6 R. R

. 64. T he s t at e’ s r eques t was i mm edi at el y deni ed by t he t r i al cour t , s o t he r ecor d do es no t reveal what l ess er- i ncl ud ed

- o f f ense i nst ruct i o n (or i nst ruct i o ns) i t want ed

. I n s p i t e o f t hat l ack o f

s p eci f i ci t y , t he s t at e f au l t s a ppel l an t f

or f ai l i n g t o j oi n i n i t s r equ es t

. St at e’ s br i ef a t 11 a n d f

oot n ot e 4. direc t knowledg e of a

ny aspec t of appellant’s g uilt, testified t o a confession by appellant to murde r, but sh e ha d n o d ir e c t kn ow le dg e of a pp e lla nt takin g any of

the c omp la ina

nt’ s p os se ssi on s at th e tim e of the murde r. She could testify only that ap p el l ant ca

me to her home car

rying a jewel box and

14 that, afte r the murder, she and a friend drove appellant to the complainant’s home, where appellant

remove d four longg uns from the c omplainant’s pickup. As we stated in Be ll , “ it i s . . . we ll

rec og nized that a defe ndant is entitled to an instruction on ever y issue raised by

the evidenc e, whether produce d by

the State or the de fenda

nt, and whethe r it be strong , weak, u n i m p ea ch ed, or contra dicted.” Sheffield’ s testimony may have be en we ak and c ontradicte d, but it raised the issue of the lesse r-include d offe nse of murde r. The state was e ntitled to an instruction on that lesser of fe ns e , a nd the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in de nyingthe state ’s re qu e st. Gi ve n the c ourt ’s re sp on se , a re qu e st from appe llant for instructions on lesser- included off enses c ould rea sonably be seen a s futile. Given the evidenc e, the tria l court should have included an instruction on a lesser-included offense as law applicable to the case

. Sheffield de nied any

part in the off

ense, but other

state’s witnesse s impli cate d her in the attempted sale of the stolen longg uns and, by infere nce, in the mur der. Eve n if wea k and contra dicted, the e vidence raised a n issue of appe llant as a p ar t y t o the murder , and g iven that evidenc e, the tria l court should have inc luded an instruction on parties as law a pplicable to the c ase. 159 Conclusion The c ourt of appe als corr ectly analy zed the evidenc e pre sented a nd found that an instruc tion

on the l esser -included offense of m urder was not a defensive issue and should have be en g iven as law applica

ble to the ca se. It followed our r uling in Bluit t, held that appe llant could complain of that omission on appeal and, usingthe prope r Almanza sta nd ard of e g re g iou s h arm , f

ound su c h h arm . I ts j ud g me nt s ho uld

be a ff ir me d. Ire sp e c tf

ull y dis se nt.

Filed: Mar ch 17, 2010 Pub lis h