alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### MAGEE v. STATE.

No. 19306.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 2, 1938.

Rehearing Denied June 15, 1938.

J. Mitch Johnson, of San Saba, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

Conviction is for possessing for the purpose of sale intoxicating liquor in dry territory, punishment being a fine of $100.

Under authority of a search warrant officers searched the private residence of appellant and found therein fifteen one-half pint bottles of whisky, six pint bottles of whisky, and two quarts and one pint bottle half full of whisky.

We discover no vice in the complaint or information and no variance between the avei-ments and the proof offered in support thereof by the state.

More than a quart of intoxicating liquor was found in appellant’s possession. We do not discuss the complaint that the court should have charged on circumstantial evidence. The point is decided against appellant in Terry v. State, 101 Tex.Cr.R. 267, 275 S.W. 837; Buchanan v. State, 107 Tex.Cr.R. 559, 298 S.W. 569; Fromm v. State, 118 Tex.Cr.R. 265, 39 S.W.2d 67; Miller v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 114 S.W.2d 244, decided on January 12, 1938, the state’s motion for rehearing denied March 9, 1938.

Appellant complains because the court did not define the word “possession.” The exact point under practically the same facts was decided against him in Miller v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 114 S.W.2d 244, decided January 12, 1938, the state’s motion for rehearing denied March 9, 1938, with citation of authorities.

When the state offered to prove by the officers what they found as the result of searching appellant’s residence, many objections were interposed, one being that the search warrant contained no description of the property to be. searched. The affidavit, or a copy thereof, and the warrant, were on the same sheet of paper, and the recitals in the warrant make the affidavit a part of the warrant, and the property is described in the affidavit. The precise contention was decided against appellant in the case of Miller v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 114 S.W.2d 244, decided January 12, 1938, the statels motion for rehearing denied March 9, 1938.

Another complaint brought forward is that the property to be searched is not described with sufficient certainty in the affidavit. The description follows: “ * * * a certain private dwelling, located in San Saba county, Texas, described as being on a 200-acre tract, a part of the J. Beard survey No. 40, Abstract No. 141, located about one *447and one-half miles west of San Saba town on highway No. 74, belonging to T. Y. Elton, where V. H. Magee with his family now reside and has resided successively for, the past few years, and known as the T. Y. Elton old home place, and being the premises of V. H. Magee. * ' * * ”

We regard the foregoing description not subject to the criticism leveled at it.

Finding no error demanding a reversal, 'the judgment is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS IN THE
ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2000 FOR SYMIX SYSTEMS,
INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                          11,868
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   39,031
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,075
<INVENTORY>                                        861
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                56,660
<PP&E>                                          23,513
<DEPRECIATION>                                  15,527
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  94,368
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           37,312
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     10,865
<COMMON>                                            78
<OTHER-SE>                                      36,631
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    94,368
<SALES>                                         57,858
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               128,908
<CGS>                                           19,636
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   59,988
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                79,716
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   575
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 781
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (11,762)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,557)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (10,205)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (10,205)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (1.38)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.38)


</TABLE>
#### James Woodrow WOODRUFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 21311.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 16, 1940.

Harvey W. Lindsay, of Dallas, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Conviction is for robbery, punishment assessed being six years in the penitentiary.

Since the jurisdiction of this court attached appellant has filed his affidavit advising that he does not desire to further prosecute his appeal, and at his request the appeal is dismissed.
#### SULLIVAN v. STATE.

No. 16527.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 7, 1934.

Vernon Goodall, of Waco, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is swindling; the punishment, a fine of $50 and confinement in jail for two days.

The complaint contains no jurat of the officer administering the oath. Notwithstanding appellant filed a motion to quash the complaint, the jurat was not amended. After verdict appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment. Upon this motion the county attorney testified that he in fact administered the oath to the party making the complaint, but failed to complete the jurat by signing his name thereto. At no time was the jurat amended, and the complaint appears in this record without the. jurat of the county attorney. It is well settled that the complaint is incomplete and insufficient to authorize the information unless it is accompanied by a jurat of the officer administering the oath. Stacy v. State, 96 Tex. Cr. R. 499, 258 S. W. 475. An amendment of the complaint is permissible; but where the fault consists in the absence of the officer’s jurat, to authorize the amendment there must be proof that the oath was administered. Stacy v. State, supra. In the present case, as already pointed out, the jurat was at no time amended. It follows that a reversal of the judgment must he ordered. The state’s attorney before this court confesses error.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM!

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
registrant's unaudited consolidated financial statements as of June 30, 2000,
and the six months then ended, and is qualified in its entirety by reference
to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001011991
<NAME> SUSA PARTNERSHIP, L.P.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                           2,453
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  207,221
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               209,674
<PP&E>                                       1,673,044
<DEPRECIATION>                                 112,993
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,769,725
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           90,646
<BONDS>                                        866,973
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     812,106
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,769,725
<SALES>                                        123,290
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               127,480
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   69,335
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,032<F1>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              22,525
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 33,588
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             33,588
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    33,588
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Included in other expenses are minority interest expense and gain/(loss) on
exchange of self-storage facilities.
</FN>


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1939 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1939

        To repeal the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 5, 2017

Mr. Blumenthal (for himself, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Markey, Mr. Menendez, Mr. 
 Sanders, Mrs. Gillibrand, Mr. Reed, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Van Hollen, Mr. 
 Carper, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Wyden, Ms. Duckworth, Ms. Warren, Mr. Kaine, 
Ms. Harris, Mr. Cardin, and Mr. Booker) introduced the following bill; 
  which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
        To repeal the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Equal Access to Justice for Victims 
of Gun Violence Act''.

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF THE PROTECTION OF LAWFUL COMMERCE IN ARMS ACT.

    Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms 
Act (15 U.S.C. 7901, 7902, and 7903) are repealed.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 23.1








Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm





The Board of Directors and Shareholders


RadiSys Corporation:





We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement No. 333-170148 on Form S-3 and registration statements Nos. 333-80577, 333-00514, 333-46473, 333-80087, 333-80089, 333-85093, 333-38966, 333-38988, 333-50582, 333-50584, 333-68362, 333-106670, 333-111520, 333-116570, 333-126189, 333-142968, 333-142969 and 333-169044 on Form S-8 of RadiSys Corporation of our reports dated March 15, 2011, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of RadiSys Corporation as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, and the related consolidated statements of operations, changes in shareholders' equity and comprehensive loss, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2010, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2010, which reports appear in the December 31, 2010 annual report on Form 10-K of RadiSys Corporation.





Our report dated March 15, 2011, contains an explanatory paragraph that states the Company adopted Financial Accounting Standards Board Staff Position No. APB 14-1, Accounting for Convertible Debt Instruments That May Be Settled in Cash upon Conversion (Including Partial Cash Settlement) (FSP APB 14-1)(codified in FASB ASC Topic 470, Debt with Conversion and Other Options) effective as of January 1, 2009 and retrospectively adjusted its accounting for its consolidated financial statements.





/s/ KPMG LLP





Portland, Oregon


March 15, 2011
May 24, 2012 

Aloha Ley 

Associate Director 

Small Community Air Service Development Program 

United States Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE 

Washington, DC 20590 

RE: SUPPORT OF MCCLELLAN-PALOMAR AIRPORT GRANT APPLICATION UNDER THE 

SMALL COMMUNITY AIR SERVICE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 

Dear Associate Director Ley: 

I am writing to express my full support as Mayor of the City of San Marcos for the County of San 

Diego's FY 2012 Small Community Air Service Development grant submission. I understand that 

the County is requesting federal funding to support the addition of California Pacific Airlines (CP 

Air) at McClellan-Palomar Airport in Carlsbad, California. 

Being a professional airline pilot myself, I have firsthand experience with many years of long and 

costly freeway trips to major airports in downtown San Diego (SAN), Orange County (SNA) and 

Los Angeles (LAX). This loss of valuable time, gasoline consumption and fighting major traffic are 

all strong reasons that we- should .implement a viable small airport alternative with McClellanPalomar Airport and CP Air. The Airport is extremely convenient for both residents and commerce 

in my city as well as the nearly 700,000 peop'e living in North County today. 

McClellan-Palomar Airport is a major untapped asset that, with your support, can inject economic 

vitality and smarter intermodal travel in our region. Unfortunately, McClellan-Palomar Airport is 

suffering significant long-term loss in airline seats and in the number of passengers using the 

facility. A study revealed that 98% of local passengers drive to other airports for air travel. I 

believe that CP Air will reverse this trend and help revitalize the regional air system along the 

west coast. 

The federal investment in the Airport will also improve North San Diego County's job outlook. It is 

estimated that CP Air will add over 1 00 new local jobs in its first year and grow to more than 500 

employees by year five. This long-term job creation comes at a time of great need for our region. 

I encourage the FAA's approval and implementation of the funding contained in the County's 

grant application. As a Mayor and a pilot, I know this airport has a unique chance to reinvigorate 

our region's economy and also our way of accessing air travel. Furthermore, I am confident that 

the benefits will pay dividends many times over this initial grant investment. 

( ·. Sincerely, 0, '--~J~/ Hon. Jim Desmond· 

Mayor
# Jf**ourtl) Court** **of limn** **Antonio, September** **30, 2014** **No. 04-14-00381-CV** **City of** **Del Rio,** **Appellant v.** **Daniel Jalomos,** **Appellee Trial** **Court Case** **No. 31037** 

### ORDER**The Court** **has reviewed** **the record** **and briefs** **in this** **appeal and** **has determined** **that oral argument** **will not** **significantly aid** **it in** **determining the** **legal and** **factual issues** **presented in** **the appeal.** **See Tex.** **R. App.** **P. 39.8.** **Therefore, all** **requests for** **oral argument** **are denied,** **and the** **cause is** **advanced for** **ON BRIEFS** **submission on** **November 13,** **2014, to** **the following** **panel: Justice** **Angelini, Justice** **Marion, and** **Justice Barnard.** **All parties** **will be** **notified of** **the Court's** **decision in** **this appeal** **in accordance** **with Tex.** **R. App.** **P. 48.** **Either party** **may file** **motion requesting** **the Court** **to reconsider** **its determination** **that**

### oral**argument will** **not significantly** **aid the** **Court in** **determining the** **legal and** **factual issues** **presented in** **the appeal.** **See Tex.** **R. App.** **P. 39.8.** **Such motion** **should be** **filed within** **ten (10)** **days from** **the date** **of this** **order. It** **is so** **ORDERED on** **September 30,** **2014. Karen** **Angelini/justice**

## IN**WITNESS WHEREOF,** **have hereunto** **set my** **hand and** **a/fixed the** **seal o/the** **said court** **on this** **September 30,** **2014.**
#### ODLOZELIK v. STATE.

No. 20454.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 23, 1939.

R. R. Smith and Frank W. Steinle, of Jourdanton, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is burglary; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for two years.

On the 10th of July, 1938, appellant forcibly entered a barn belonging to H. A. Traump and took therefrom some harness, bridles and other property. Shortly after the alleged burglary a depiity sheriff recovered the property from appellant’s field where it had been hidden under a shock of hay. Appellant made a. written statement in which he admitted entering the barn and taking the property in question.

Appellant introduced ' several witnesses who testified that in their opinion appellant was insane, some of them saying that he had temporary spells ■ of insanity.

Testifying in his own behalf, appellant made no denial of the fact that he entered the barn of Mr. Traump and took his property. However, he testified to the *292effect that he had no use for the property and that it was not his intention at the time to appropriate it to his own use or benefit. Again, it was his version that his recollection of the transaction was hazy. He said that it must have been a prank. Again, he declared that when he recalled some of the things that had happened on the night of the alleged burglary he started to return the property to Mr. Traump.

It is appellant’s contention that his testimony called for a charge to the effect that the jury should acquit him if they entertained a reasonable doubt as to whether he entertained the intent at the time he entered the barn to appropriate the property to his own use and benefit. He excepted to the charge for its failure to submit this issue to the jury, and submitted a requested instruction covering the subject. We think the issue was raised, and that in failing to respond to the exception the court fell into error. Unless appellant intended to appropriate the property to his own use or benefit, he would not be guilty of burglary with intent to commit theft. See Willis v. State, 24 Tex. App. 584, 6 S.W. 856.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 11

                              FINE HOST CORPORATION
                          COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE LOSS
                  (AMOUNTS IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE DATA)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                            THREE MONTHS ENDED
                                                     ------------------------------
                                                        MARCH 26,        MARCH 27,
                                                             1997          1996
                                                     ------------      ------------
                                                              (as restated)
<S>                                                   <C>                 <C>     

Loss applicable to Common Stock                       $(2,478)            $(1,001)
Stock warrant accretion                                     -              (1,040)
                                                     ----------          ----------
Net loss attributable to Common
      Stockholders                                    $(2,478)            $(2,041)
                                                     ----------          ----------
                                                     ----------          ----------

Weighted average number of common shares
      outstanding                                        7,669              2,048
Average convertible Preferred shares
      outstanding                                            -                -
Assumed conversion of:
      Warrants                                               -                -
      Options                                                -                -
      Subordinated Notes                                     -                -
                                                     ----------          ----------
Average number of shares of Common Stock
      outstanding                                        7,669              2,048
                                                     ----------          ----------
                                                     ----------          ----------

Net loss per share                                   $    (.32)           $(1.00)
                                                     ----------          ----------
                                                     ----------          ----------
</TABLE>
#### HANCOCK V. STATE.

No. 19855.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 26, 1938.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 23, 1938.

J. A. Johnson, of Stephenville, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

Conviction is for possession of liquor in dry area for purposes of sale; punishment, a fine of $150.

The record is before us without a statement of facts. The complaint and information are sufficient to charge the offense.

By a bill of exception, appellant complains of the introduction in evidence of the results of a search made by the officers in which 32 pints of whisky were found on his premises. His grounds of objection was that the search warrant was insufficient. The affirmance of the case, however, does not depend upon the sufficiency of the search warrant, because there is no statement of facts in the record. In its absence, we could not say that there was no evidence outside of the searching officers sufficient to make a case. It might be that appellant testified and admitted having the whisky, or such proof might have been produced from other sources.

The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM. '

The foregoing opinion of. the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

After re-examining the record in the light of appellant’s motion for rehearing we are constrained to adhere to the conclusion expressed in the original opinion.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.