If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 21, 2023

v No. 359957

Jackson Circuit Court

SJIWANA LATRECE TAYLOR, LC No. 18-002411-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and REDFORD and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Sjiwana Latrece Taylor, appeals as of right her conviction by jury verdict on a 

charge of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317. The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourthoffense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 30 to 75 years’ imprisonment. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At approximately 3:30 a.m. on August 30, 2018, in the city of Jackson, Savanna Frinkle, 

Olivia Caston, and defendant walked to a party store. Douglas Goodwin, who was in the area, saw 

Frinkle engaged in a physical confrontation with 63-year-old Marvin Bearden (the victim) near the 

party store. Goodwin saw Frinkle repeatedly strike the victim while Caston and defendant were 

standing nearby, so Goodwin called 911. Frinkle, Caston, and defendant fled the scene, but not 

before Frinkle stabbed the victim several times and left a pocket knife with a three-inch blade and 

a black handle protruding from the side of the victim’s face. The victim suffered ten stab wounds 

to his lower back, buttocks, neck, and head, which led to his death. DNA evidence collected from 

the handle of the knife was determined to have come from Frinkle, but defendant’s DNA was not 

found on the knife.

Frinkle was charged with open murder and defendant was charged with aiding and abetting 

the murder. Defendant and Frinkle were tried together before separate juries. In exchange for her 

testimony, Caston was granted immunity from charges that could result from a marijuana sale that 

she conducted earlier on the night of the altercation. Caston testified in person at the preliminary 

examination, but she was not available to testify at the jury trial. On January 17, 2020, before the 

trial began, defense counsel stipulated that Caston was unavailable to testify at the trial despite the 
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prosecution’s due diligence and that Caston’s testimony from the preliminary examination should 

be admitted at the trial. The trial court ruled that Caston was an unavailable witness and allowed 

her preliminary examination testimony to be read into the record.

The jury learned through Caston’s preliminary examination testimony that she was present 

on the night of the murder. The jury further heard that Caston arrived to sell marijuana at a house

where defendant and Frinkle were present. During the marijuana transaction, Caston placed her

pocket knife on the counter. After the marijuana transaction, Caston noticed that the pocket knife 

was missing. Caston testified that defendant had the pocket knife and refused to give it back, so 

Caston followed defendant and Frinkle out of the house to get her pocket knife back. They walked 

past a party store and saw the victim. Frinkle got into an altercation with the victim while Caston 

and defendant were across the street. Frinkle pushed the victim, so the victim threw a punch back 

at her. Defendant and Caston then crossed the street and defendant joined the fray. When Caston

tried to intervene, the victim swung at her and missed. Then Caston hit the victim, knocking him 

to the ground.

According to Caston, the victim got up and started to run away, but Frinkle and defendant 

pursued him. The victim fell and defendant and Frinkle both continued to hit him. Caston stepped 

back into the fray to get Frinkle and defendant off the victim. The victim grabbed onto Frinkle’s 

ankle, and at that point Caston saw that defendant had the pocket knife in her hand. Caston also 

noticed a man in a truck on the phone watching the fight. The man told defendant and Frinkle to 

leave the victim alone, but Frinkle continued to hit the victim. After police sirens started blaring, 

Frinkle got off the victim and the three women walked away from the scene. Caston asked Frinkle 

and defendant where her pocket knife was, and Frinkle responded that she had “left that bitch in 

[the victim’s] face.” Caston testified that she did not realize the victim had been stabbed during 

the altercation. She further testified that she never saw defendant hand the knife to Frinkle during 

the altercation. During an interview with the police approximately two weeks after the altercation, 

Caston stated that it was Frinkle, not defendant, who had taken Caston’s pocket knife and punched 

the victim while the knife was in her hand. Other than Caston’s testimony, no evidence admitted 

at trial connected defendant to the knife.

Goodwin, who saw the altercation from this truck, testified that he was going to work early 

in the morning and drove up to the fight. He saw two women standing approximately 25 feet away 

from Frinkle. He saw Frinkle punch and kick the victim so hard that he fell to the ground. When 

the victim tried to stand up, Frinkle placed him in a headlock and hit him in the back of his neck. 

Frinkle plunged a knife two to three times into the back of the victim’s neck. Goodwin called the 

police and told the group of women to lay off the victim. Frinkle got off the victim, but the victim 

held onto the legs of her shorts. Frinkle stabbed the victim in the cheekbone area and left the knife 

in his face. Goodwin saw Frinkle join the other women and walk away from the scene. Goodwin 

testified that he arrived while the fight was in progress and that he only saw Frinkle fighting with 

the victim. He did not know how long the fight had been going on before he arrived. He testified 

that he only saw the knife in Frinkle’s hand and never saw defendant interact with the victim.

On February 14, 2020, the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree murder. The trial 

court sentenced defendant on May 13, 2020, to serve 30 to 75 years’ imprisonment on that charge. 

Defendant thereafter appealed, challenging her conviction, but not her sentence.
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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Defendant has identified three trial issues as potentially reversible error. First, she contends 

that the trial court should not have admitted at trial the testimony of Olivia Caston provided at the 

preliminary examination. Second, she argues that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

by failing to request a jury instruction on the right to defense of others. Third, she asserts that the 

evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a conviction for second-degree murder. We 

shall address these three issues in turn. 

A. UNAVAILABLE WITNESS

Defendant insists that the prosecution failed to establish due diligence in locating Caston 

before the trial court declared her unavailable and permitted her testimony from the preliminary 

examination to be read into the record at trial. This Court reviews a trial court’s determination that 

a witness is unavailable to testify at trial for an abuse of discretion. People v Bean, 457 Mich 677, 

684; 580 NW2d 390 (1998). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an outcome that 

was not in the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Roberts, 292 Mich App 

492, 503; 808 NW2d 290 (2011).

The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states 

that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 

witnesses against him[.]” US Const, Am VI. The Michigan Constitution of 1963 also includes a 

right of confrontation. Const 1963, art 1, § 20; see also People v Fackelman, 489 Mich 515, 525; 

802 NW2d 552 (2011). The confrontation clauses in the United States and Michigan constitutions 

preclude “the admission of testimonial statements by a witness who does not appear at trial unless 

the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.” 

People v Dendel (On Second Remand), 289 Mich App 445, 453; 797 NW2d 645 (2010). Because 

defendant was permitted to cross-examine Caston at the preliminary examination, the admissibility

at trial of Caston’s preliminary examination testimony turns upon whether Caston was unavailable 

to testify at defendant’s trial.

Under MRE 804(a)(5), a witness is “unavailable” when that individual “is absent from the 

hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance . . . 

by process or other reasonable means, and in a criminal case, due diligence is shown.” “The test 

for whether a witness is ‘unavailable’ as envisioned by MRE 804(a)(5) is that the prosecution must 

have made a diligent good-faith effort in its attempt to locate a witness for trial.” Bean, 457 Mich 

at 684. “The test is one of reasonableness and depends on the facts and circumstances of each 

case, i.e., whether diligent good-faith efforts were made to procure the testimony, not whether 

more stringent efforts would have produced it.” Id.

We have held that a defendant conceded the prosecution’s due diligence by stipulating to 

a res gestae witness’s unavailability at trial. People v Simon, 174 Mich App 649, 657; 436 NW2d 

695 (1989). Because the defendant stipulated to the res gestae witness’s unavailability at trial, this 

Court “decline[d] to allow defendant an appellate parachute fashioned from the fiber of his own 

agreement.” Id. Further, under well-established principles, “a stipulation constitutes a waiver of 

any alleged error[.]” People v Eisen, 296 Mich App 326, 328; 820 NW2d 229 (2012).
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Here, defense counsel not only stipulated that Caston was “unavailable,” but also stipulated 

that the prosecution had “been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance by process or other 

reasonable means, and . . . due diligence is shown.” By stipulating to Caston’s unavailability and 

to the prosecution’s due diligence in attempting to procure Caston’s attendance, defendant waived 

any alleged error concerning Caston’s testimony. Simon, 174 Mich App at 657; see also Eisen 296 

Mich App at 328. Therefore, Caston’s preliminary examination testimony was properly admitted 

at defendant’s trial pursuant to the written stipulation signed on January 17, 2020.

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Defendant next asserts that her trial attorney was ineffective in stipulating that Caston was 

unavailable and in failing to request a jury instruction on defense of others. We disagree with both 

arguments. A defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim “is a mixed question of fact and 

constitutional law.” People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). We review 

the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, while we review questions of law de novo. People 

v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 48; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). “When a defendant did not move in the 

trial court for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing” on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

though, “this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent from the record.” People v Heft, 299 

Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). If the record does not contain adequate detail to support 

a defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim, the defendant has effectively waived the issue. People 

v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649 NW2d 94 (2002).

The United States and Michigan constitutions guarantee the defendant the right to effective 

assistance of counsel. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. In order to obtain a new trial, a 

defendant must show (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 

and (2) “but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 

would have been different.” Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 51. The defendant has to “overcome the 

strong presumption that counsel’s performance was born from a sound trial strategy.” Id. at 52. 

But we “cannot insulate the review of counsel’s performance by calling it trial strategy.” Id.

First, defendant argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating that Caston was 

unavailable at trial. Defense counsel was not ineffective for agreeing to that stipulation. The most 

likely explanation for defense counsel’s willingness to sign the stipulation is defense strategy. See 

Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 52. Caston’s presence would have been beneficial to the prosecution 

and harmful to defendant’s theory of the case. Caston was the only witness who testified defendant 

had the pocket knife and struck the victim. Defense counsel was able to impeach Caston based on 

her inconsistent statements about whether Frinkle or defendant took her pocket knife. In addition, 

defense counsel was able to question the reliability of Caston’s testimony without Caston present 

to elaborate upon her testimony or explain inconsistencies in her stories. Under the circumstances, 

this Court will not second-guess defense counsel’s trial strategy that led to the stipulation.

1

 

1 At a pretrial conference held on January 17, 2020, when the prosecution explained the stipulation 

about Caston’s testimony to the trial court, the prosecutor made clear that the prosecution was still 

trying to locate Caston because the prosecution “would obviously prefer her to testify in person if 
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Second, defendant argues that her counsel was ineffective because he did not request a jury 

instruction explaining that defendant had a right to defend others. A defense attorney’s failure “to 

request a particular jury instruction can be a matter of trial strategy.” People v Dunigan, 299 Mich 

App 579, 584; 831 NW2d 243 (2013). Furthermore, a trial strategy does not constitute ineffective 

assistance just because it ultimately failed. People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 414-415; 639 

NW2d 291 (2001). A criminal defendant has “the right to have a properly instructed jury consider 

the evidence against [her].” People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 80-81; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), modified 

450 Mich 1212; 539 NW2d 504 (1995). An instructional error that directly affects a defendant’s 

theory of defense can infringe a defendant’s due-process right to present a defense. People v Kurr, 

253 Mich App 317, 326-327; 654 NW2d 651 (2002). Instructions must include all elements of the

offense charged and must not exclude consideration of material issues, defenses, and theories for 

which there is supporting evidence. Id. at 327. A person may use self-defense without having the 

duty to retreat when “[t]he individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force 

is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself or herself 

or to another individual.” MCL 780.972(1)(a).

During the jury instruction conference on February 14, 2020, the trial judge discussed jury

instructions on self-defense and defense of others. The trial court suggested including instructions 

on those subjects, and defense counsel for Frinkle chose to have her jury instructed on self-defense. 

In contrast, counsel for defendant explained that “there is no evidence that my client did anything 

so it’s very difficult for me to argue for self-defense,” so “I’m just going to leave it[.]” Similarly, 

when the trial court offered to give an instruction on defense of others, counsel for defendant noted 

that, “without self-defense” an instruction for defense of others was unnecessary. Given the theory 

of the case that defendant did nothing to the victim, defense counsel’s strategic decision to decline 

an instruction on defense of others made good sense. A jury instruction suggesting that defendant 

was defending Frinkle by getting involved in the fight would have undermined defense counsel’s 

entire theory of the case. Accordingly, this Court has no basis to second-guess the strategic choice 

to decline the trial court’s offer of a jury instruction on defense of others. See Dunigan, 299 Mich 

App at 584.

C. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

Finally, defendant argues that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to support 

the conviction for second-degree murder on an aiding-and-abetting theory. This Court reviews de 

novo “whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513-514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992) (quotation 

marks omitted). “ ‘Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence 

can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime.’ ” People v Carines, 460 Mich

750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). This Court “must view the evidence in a light most favorable to 

the prosecution[,]” Wolfe, 440 Mich at 515, and “we must defer to the fact-finder by drawing all 

 

she is made available to us[.]” Thus, the record reflects the understanding that Caston’s testimony 

at trial would be better for the prosecution than the admission of her testimony from the preliminary 

examination. 
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reasonable inferences and resolving credibility conflicts in support of the jury verdict.” People v 

Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 167; 740 NW2d 535 (2007).

To obtain a conviction on the charge of second-degree murder, the prosecution must prove 

four elements: “(1) a death, (2) the death was caused by an act of the defendant, (3) the defendant 

acted with malice, and (4) the defendant did not have lawful justification or excuse for causing the 

death.” People v Smith, 478 Mich 64, 70; 731 NW2d 411 (2007). “[T]o convict a defendant of 

aiding and abetting a crime, a prosecutor must establish that ‘(1) the crime charged was committed 

by the defendant or some other person; (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement 

that assisted the commission of the crime; and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the 

crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that [the defendant]

gave aid and encouragement.’ ” People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 67-68; 679 NW2d 41 (2004). As 

a result, “the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant aided or abetted 

the commission of an offense and that the defendant intended to aid the charged offense, knew the 

principal intended to commit the charged offense, or, alternatively, that the charged offense was a 

natural and probable consequence of the commission of the intended offense.” People v Robinson, 

475 Mich 1, 15; 715 NW2d 44 (2006).

Defendant contends that there was not sufficient evidence that she performed acts or gave 

encouragement that assisted Frinkle. She asserts that there was no evidence other than Caston’s 

testimony that enabled the jury to find that defendant did anything more than stand off to the side 

and watch the fight. In addition, she argues that no witness testified that defendant gave the pocket

knife to Frinkle. Thus, defendant’s argument requires this Court to disregard Caston’s testimony. 

The determination of Caston’s credibility was a matter for the jury. Schumacher, 276 Mich App 

at 167. Defendant presented to the jury the same arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence 

that she now presses on appeal, but the jury found Caston credible enough to accept her testimony 

despite hearing that Caston was selling marijuana on the night of the murder, that she was high at 

the time of the altercation, and that she offered her testimony in exchange for immunity. The jury 

also heard that Caston changed her story about whether Frinkle or defendant took her pocket knife. 

Knowing all of that, the jury still accepted Caston’s testimony about the role that defendant played 

in the altercation. Accordingly, the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, 

established that defendant aided Frinkle in the attack. Caston testified that she saw defendant hit 

the victim while holding the pocket knife in her hand. Goodwin testified that he saw Frinkle stab 

the victim with the pocket knife. Thus, the record contains sufficient evidence to link defendant 

as an aider and abettor to the murder of the victim that was committed with the pocket knife.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ James Robert Redford

/s/ Christopher P. Yates