United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-11140 

____________

N. Sugumaran Narayanan, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Midwestern State University, 

Defendant—Appellee. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:21-CV-46

______________________________

Before King, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Appellant N. Sugumaran Narayanan appeals the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment in favor of Appellee Midwestern State University

under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII. Finding that the 

district court did not err and properly granted summary judgment, we 

AFFIRM the district court’s ruling on all ADA claims. Finding that the 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 11, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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district court erred, we VACATE and REMAND on the Title VII claims, 

as described in detail herein. 

I. Background

N. Sugumaran Narayanan began teaching at Midwestern State 

University (“MSU”) on September 1, 2007, as an Assistant Professor. In 

2013, he was granted tenure and in 2015 he was promoted to Associate 

Professor. In 2016, Narayanan sued MSU “for denial of a promotion based 

on retaliation as well as race, color, and national origin” which was settled

out of court.

1

Beginning in 2017, Narayanan began experiencing stress-related 

health issues including anxiety and hypertension. Narayanan requested and 

was granted leave to tend to these health-related issues. Once he recovered, 

Narayanan requested to teach summer classes for the summer 2018 session 

but was denied the opportunity.

On September 6, 2018, Narayanan requested a two-year leave of 

absence, to begin in Spring of 2019 “for good cause.” In his request, 

Narayanan states, “I am seeking to apply for a two-year leave of absence 

(without compensation), for good cause, beginning the Spring semester of 

2019.” MSU denied the request due to the hardship it would impose on the 

Political Science Department, which was short-staffed at the time.

Narayanan took extended leave despite the denial.

On November 28, 2018, two months after the previous request, 

Narayanan requested expedited advanced funding for travel to Kuala 

Lampur, Malaysia, to present a paper at a conference in December of that 

_____________________

1 In his original complaint, Narayanan asserted that his, “race, Asian, National 

Origin (Malaysian) and color (brown),” was a “motivating factor” for the actions of the 

Appellee.

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year. It was on this trip that Narayanan was diagnosed with cervical 

spondylotic myelopathy. On January 8, 2019, just before the start of the 

spring semester Narayanan submitted a two-page “Documentation of 

Disability” form from his doctor in Malaysia saying that he “cannot fly,” and 

giving a time frame of “at least six months,” before he could resume his job 

functions due to a new diagnosis of cervical spondylotic myelopathy. This 

was the first time this condition was mentioned to MSU. The leave was 

granted, and Narayanan subsequently exhausted all paid and unpaid leave 

related to this claim.

In January 2019, Narayanan filed another complaint with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) based on retaliation for 

filing his 2016 suit and continued discrimination based on race, color, and 

national origin.2 On January 16, 2019, MSU informed Narayanan that he 

would receive teaching assignments for Fall 2019. On May 13, 2019, MSU 

emailed Narayanan to notify him of his fall 2019 teaching assignments. Over 

the next few months, MSU emailed Narayanan three separate times 

requesting that he sign his Annual Employment Contract (“Contract”). On 

August 12, 2019, Narayanan emailed MSU’s disability office requesting

additional leave related to his cervical spondylotic myelopathy diagnosis, 

which he said rendered him unable to fly to MSU from Malaysia for “at least 

another 6 months” extending to “possibly 12 months.”

On August 20, 2019, MSU responded with an Employee Individual 

Accommodation Plan (“Plan”) that acknowledged Narayanan’s disability 

and offered accommodations of a chair available in the teaching classroom, 

ergonomic office furniture, and limits on extended travel. Narayanan 

responded the following day, August 21, 2019, that the offered 

_____________________

2 The record is unclear on the exact date this EEOC complaint was filed.

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accommodations were not sufficient. The same day, Narayanan responded 

to MSU’s third email about signing his Contract stating he would sign once 

his Plan was finalized. MSU viewed Narayanan’s failure to return this 

Contract, and his failure to report to campus to teach classes on August 26, 

2019, as breaches of duties justifying termination. Narayanan argues that a 

reasonable accommodation would have allowed him to teach his classes 

online, while MSU believes his physical presence on campus was necessary 

to perform his duties. Narayanan also states that online classes were common 

at MSU; however, there is no record of online classes being discussed 

between the parties as an accommodation.

On August 28, 2019, MSU emailed Narayanan with an updated Plan,

which recommended “[l]eave time unless such accommodation would have 

undue hardship on the functioning of the department or university.”

Narayanan responded to MSU the next day, August 29, 2019, asking for the 

“undue hardship” phrase to be removed, but he never signed the Plan. MSU 

emailed Narayanan later again on August 29, 2019, denying his request for 

up to two additional semesters of leave citing “undue hardship” and offering 

the same accommodations from the August 20th email. Narayanan did not 

offer any accommodation alternatives, and he did not report to teach his 

assigned fall classes.

On September 18, 2019, MSU staff informed Narayanan that it was

“recommending that [his] tenure be revoked for (1) ‘failure to submit a 

completed Disclosure of Outside Employment form as required by MSU 

policy 3.325 for Academic Year 2019 (even after multiple reminders) and for 

Academic Year 2020,’3 and (2) ‘Neglect of professional duties for failing to 

_____________________

3 MSU requested Narayanan return his completed disclosures for 2019 and 2020 

nine times between September 2018 and January 2020. Most of that time, he was on leave.

Narayanan returned the forms in January 2020. 

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meet your assigned classes for the 2019 Fall Semester.’” MSU’s President 

informed Narayanan on December 9, 2019, that there was good cause to 

revoke his tenure and terminate employment for neglecting his professional 

duties. Narayanan then exercised his right to a due process hearing.

On April 6, 2020, the Due Process Committee held a virtual due 

process hearing and unanimously decided there was good cause to revoke 

Narayanan’s tenure and terminate his employment.

4 Narayanan’s 

termination became effective in May 2020 when MSU’s Board of Regents 

(“Board”) voted 8-0 to revoke his tenure and terminate employment.5

Following his termination, Narayanan filed a charge for retaliation and 

continued discrimination based on race, color, and national origin against 

MSU with the EEOC and Texas Workforce Commission (“TWC”). He 

later filed a charge with the same entities based on disability discrimination 

and failure to accommodate. Narayanan filed his initial complaint under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.) (“Title VII”) with the United 

_____________________

4 The Due Process Committee recommended revoking Narayanan’s tenure based 

on these reasons: (1) “[Plaintiff’s] failure to return a signed contract accepting the 

University’s offer for employment for the 2019–2020 academic year by the time of the first 

faculty reporting day (August 19, 2019);” (2) “[Plaintiff’s] failure to report for the first day 

of the 2019–2020 academic year meetings (August 19, 2019) without prior notification that 

he would not be present;” (3) “[Plaintiff’s] failure to be present on the first day of class 

(August 26, 2019) and failure to teach his Fall 2019 teaching assignment, in spite of being 

notified of his Fall 2019 teaching assignments by the Provost (January 16, 2019 and May 13, 

2019);” and (4) “[Plaintiff’s] failure to submit a properly completed Disclosure of Outside 

Employment form for Academic Years 2019 and 2020 at the time of request.”

5 Of note, Narayanan’sinitial suit named the Board as an additional defendant. The 

Board was subsequently dismissed without prejudice. MSU argues that because the Board 

was dismissed, the ADA claims are moot. Narayanan briefs the ADA issue without 

addressing the mootness claim.

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States District Court for the Northern District of Texas on June 22, 2021. On 

June 20, 2022, MSU filed a motion for summary judgment which was 

subsequently granted on October 24, 2022. Narayanan timely filed his Notice 

of Appeal on November 18, 2022. 

II. Standard of Review

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo and draw every 

reasonable inference in Narayanan’s favor. Newbold v. Operator, L.L.C., 65 

F.4th 175, 178 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted); Hudson v. Lincare, Inc., 58 

F.4th 222, 228 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is 

appropriate if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A 

genuine [dispute] of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Austin v. 

Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

However, “[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely 

disputed must support the assertion” by “citing to particular parts of 

materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish 

the absence or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A party 

opposing summary judgment “must go beyond the pleadings and designate 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid 

Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). “[C]onclusory 

allegations” and “unsubstantiated assertions” will not suffice. Id. (citations 

omitted). “We resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, 

but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have 

submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Id.

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III. Discussion

We address three points regarding the district court’s opinion below: 

1) the ADA claims, 2) the Title VII Discrimination claim, and 3) the Title VII 

Retaliation claim.

A. The Americans with Disabilities Act Claims

The district court properly granted summary judgment regarding the

ADA claims for failure to accommodate, discrimination, and retaliation.

6

1. ADA - Failure to Accommodate Claim

We have frequently recognized that a claimant must prove that “he is 

a person who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 

essential functions of his employment position.” Turco v. Hoechst Celanese 

Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1093 (5th Cir. 1996). See also E.E.O.C. v. LHC Grp.,

Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 697 (5th Cir. 2014). For a failure to accommodate claim to 

be successful, Narayanan must prove: “(1) the plaintiff is a ‘qualified 

individual with a disability;’ (2) the disability and its consequential 

limitations were ‘known’ by the covered employer; and (3) the employer 

failed to make ‘reasonable accommodations’ for such known limitations.”

Feist v. La., Dep’t of Justice, Off. of the Att’y Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (2013).

_____________________

6 In addition to the ADA claim, Narayanan brings failure to accommodate claims 

under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. We have 

consistently found that the only difference in these claims is causation which can be found 

to be immaterial. Bennett-Nelson v. Louisiana Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454-55 (5th Cir. 

2005) (“The question is whether the failure to accommodate the disability violates the 

ADA; and the existence of a violation depends on whether under both the Rehabilitation 

Act and the ADA, the demanded accommodation is in fact reasonable and therefore 

required.”); Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 287-88 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen 

ADA claims are directed at architectural barriers[] the rights and remedies are exactly the 

same as those provided under the Rehabilitation Act. This circuit, as well as others, has 

noted that, because the rights and remedies under both statutes are the same, case law 

interpreting one statute can be applied to the other.”).

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“The ADA prohibits covered employers from ‘discriminat[ing] against a 

qualified individual on the basis of disability.’ Discrimination includes failure 

to make ‘reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless 

such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose 

an undue hardship.’” Id. (citations omitted). The district court assumed for 

its analysis that Narayanan was a qualified individual, and the parties do not 

dispute that Narayanan had a disability that was known to the university. The 

only question is whether MSU failed to make reasonable accommodations.

In the instant case, MSU offered accommodations of a chair available 

in the teaching classroom, ergonomic office furniture, and limits on extended 

travel. While Narayanan initially told MSU the accommodations were 

insufficient and requested an additional leave of six to twelve months, he did 

not respond to the second offer of the same accommodations. Narayanan also 

failed to show that the offered accommodations were insufficient, and he did 

not offer any reasonable alternative. An exception to the ADA requirement 

of providing a qualified individual with reasonable accommodations exists if 

the requested accommodations would cause an undue hardship. Groff v. 

DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 453-73 (2023). Specifically, as cited by the district 

court, “[u]ndue hardship exists when an employer is required to bear more

than a de minimis cost.” Antoine v. First Student, Inc., 713 F.3d 824, 839 (5th 

Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). MSU argues that the indefinite leave request is 

an undue hardship, and it was thus exempt from providing Narayanan with 

more leave. We have frequently recognized that indefinite leave requests 

lacking a return date, like Narayanan requested, qualifies as an undue 

hardship and does not violate ADA standards. Rogers v. Int’l Marine 

Terminals, 87 F.3d 755, 759–60 (5th Cir. 1996); Delaval v. PTech Drilling 

Tubulars, L.L.C., 824 F.3d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 2016); Reed v. Petroleum 

Helicopters, Inc., 218 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2000). In addition, MSU was

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forced to cancel classes last minute and “scramble” to find additional staff.

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s opinion on the ADA failure to 

accommodate claims.

2. ADA – Discrimination and Retaliation Claims

A prima face case for discrimination can be established by direct or 

indirect evidence. Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 162 (5th Cir. 

1996). If indirect evidence is used, the Court applies the McDonnell Douglas 

framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).

A plaintiff must show that: “1) he or she suffers from a disability; 2) he or she 

is qualified for the job; 3) he or she was subject to an adverse employment 

action; and 4) he or she was replaced by a non-disabled person or was treated 

less favorably than non-disabled employees.” Cortez v. Raytheon Co., 663 F. 

Supp. 2d 514, 525 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (citations omitted). The parties agree 

that Narayanan suffers from a disability. As discussed above, the district 

court assumed Narayanan was qualified for the job. His termination was an 

adverse employment action. As the district court noted, Narayanan presents 

no evidence that he was either replaced by a non-disabled person or was 

treated less favorably than a non-disabled person. Since there was a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to terminate Narayanan, his ADA 

discrimination and retaliation claims have no merit. Therefore, we affirm the 

district court’s opinion on the ADA discrimination and retaliation claims.

B. Title VII Discrimination Claim

With regard to Narayanan’s Title VII discrimination claim, the 

district court held that he did not show he suffered an adverse employment 

action because “failure to grant [his] desired summer teaching assignments 

does not rise to level of an ‘ultimate employment decision.’” In Hamilton v. 

Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc), we ruled that the

“ultimate employment decision” language had no basis in Title VII: 

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Today we hold that a plaintiff plausibly alleges a disparatetreatment claim under Title VII if she pleads discrimination in 

hiring, firing, compensation, or the “terms, conditions, or 

privileges” of her employment. She need not also show an 

“ultimate employment decision,” a phrase that appears 

nowhere in the statute and that thwarts legitimate claims of 

workplace bias.

Id. at 497.

Our decision “made clear that Title VII requires a broader reading 

than our ‘ultimate employment decision’ line of cases permitted and thus 

‘end[ed] that interpretative incongruity’ by removing the requirement.” 

Harrison v. Brookhaven Sch. Dist., No. 21-60771, 2023 WL 6158232, at *1 (5th 

Cir. Sept. 21, 2023) (citing Hamilton, 79 F.4th at 497). Additionally, here, the 

district court did not consider the lost income Narayanan experienced from 

MSU denying him the opportunity to teach summer classes. Lost income can 

qualify as compensation under both the pre- and post-Hamilton 

interpretation of “ultimate employment decision” and “terms, conditions, 

or privileges of employment” if that lost income can be shown to be a 

significant source of income. Hamilton, 79 F.4th at 497, 501-04; Burlington 

N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 72-73 (2006) (holding that an 

employee being forced to go 37 days without pay was materially adverse);

Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 523 (5th Cir. 2001)

(holding that a $2500 discontinued stipend qualifies as a compensation 

decision); Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 284 (5th Cir. 2004)

(reasoning that the appellant’s lost compensation from incentives should 

have been considered and summary judgment was thus inappropriate) 

(abrogated by Hamilton, 79 F.4th 494). Hence, the district court should also 

consider the income Narayanan lost from his denial of summer teaching 

assignments. Accordingly, we remand this issue to the district court to

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reconsider Narayanan’s Title VII discrimination claims in light of our recent 

en banc decision in Hamilton. 

C. Title VII Retaliation Claim

With regard to Narayanan’s Title VII retaliation claim, the district 

court erroneously applied the “ultimate employment decision” standard 

which was mandated only for discrimination claimsratherthan the materially 

adverse standard as required under Burlington. 548 U.S. at 72-73. The court 

held that “failure to grant Plaintiff desired summer teaching assignments 

does not rise to [] level of an ‘ultimate employment decision.’” 

Applicable to the instant case, however, Burlington holds that “a 

plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the 

challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well 

might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 

charge of discrimination.’” Id.; see also Hudson, 58 F.4th at 231 (applying the 

materially adverse standard and finding that appellant did not suffer an 

adverse employment action sufficient to create a Title VII retaliation claim); 

Mota, 261 F.3d at 521-23 (reasoning that the denial of both paid leave and a 

one-year unpaid leave was a violation of the Title VII antiretaliation provision 

and amounted to an adverse employment action); McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 

492 F.3d 551, 556-61 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying the materially adverse 

standard and finding that the appellant did not prove that a reasonable person

might be dissuaded from making or supporting a discrimination charged); 

Wheat v. Florida, 811 F.3d 702, 708-09 (5th Cir. 2016) (denying employee a 

planned pay raise did not rise to a materially adverse action); Holloway v. 

Dep't of Veterans Affs., 244 F. App'x 566, 567 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Instead of the 

‘ultimate employment decision’ standard, the Supreme Court held that an 

employee suffers an adverse employment action if ‘a reasonable employee 

would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this 

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context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making 

or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” (quoting Burlington, 548 U.S. at 

68)). 

In addition, the district court should consider the lost income 

Narayanan incurred when MSU denied his request to teach summer classes. 

Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292, (1960) (“[I]t 

needs no argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often 

operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard 

conditions.”). 

IV. Conclusion 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court 

regarding the ADA claims. We VACATE the judgment of the district court 

and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

regarding the Title VII claims. 

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