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Filed 1/25/22 P. v. Williams CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

C090766

(Super. Ct. No. 

STKCRFE20060008049, 

SF099265C )

In 2007, a jury found defendant Christopher Michael Williams guilty of multiple 

offenses, including the first degree murder of Conrad Celestine. We affirmed his 

convictions in People v. Miller et al. (Mar. 10, 2010, C056951) [nonpub. opn.] (Miller), 

but modified his sentence to 28 years eight months to life in state prison. Regarding his 

first degree murder conviction, we found substantial evidence showed he aided and 

abetted the actual killer with the intent to kill.

While he was serving his sentence, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 

(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 1-4), which 
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amended the law governing murder liability under felony-murder and natural and 

probable consequences theories and provided a new procedure under Penal Code section 

1170.951for eligible defendants to petition for recall and resentencing. Defendant filed a 

section 1170.95 petition, which the trial court denied after issuing an order to show cause, 

obtaining briefing, and holding a hearing.

Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred in determining he was ineligible 

for resentencing. He contends the trial court applied an incorrect burden of proof and an 

inapplicable felony-murder rule standard as well as improperly relied on our prior 

opinion in denying his petition. He also argues the trial court violated his constitutional 

rights to equal protection and due process by not providing him with a complete copy of 

the trial transcript.

On this record, we conclude the trial court was aware of and applied the correct 

beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof, that it did not consider the matter a felonymurder case, and that the trial court relied on more than this court’s prior opinion, 

including evidence from defendant’s original trial, in properly denying the petition. We 

also conclude any alleged error regarding the transcripts was invited. We therefore 

affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s section 1170.95 petition for resentencing as 

he was not eligible for relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

To facilitate our review of the court’s order denying defendant’s section 1170.95 

petition, we incorporate the facts and proceedings from our unpublished opinion 

affirming defendant’s convictions in Miller. (Miller, supra, C056951 [at pp. 2-14 ]).2

1

 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2

 The prosecution attached a copy of our unpublished decision in Miller to its informal 

response to defendant’s petition and asked the court to take judicial notice of the opinion.
3

According to our unpublished opinion, in February 20063 defendants Rosetta 

Jefferson, the actual killer, Lacy Miller, her brother, and defendant Williams, her 

boyfriend, all lived at Jefferson’s home in Stockton. On February 10, Jefferson asked the 

victims Conrad Celestine and Crystal Knowles to house sit for her while she and 

defendant were out of town. Jefferson’s brother Miller arrived at her home on 

February 12, and noticed things had been moved around and some items were missing. 

When he confronted Celestine and Knowles, each blamed the other and an argument 

ensued.

Jefferson and defendant returned to Jefferson’s home on February 14. Jefferson 

noticed rearranged furniture, soiled bedsheets, and missing personal items, including rare 

coins and her daughter’s Pokémon card collection. Both she and defendant were upset. 

Miller told Jefferson that Knowles and Celestine each blamed the other for what had 

transpired at Jefferson’s home in her absence.

Later that afternoon, Jefferson stopped by Knowles’s home and lured Knowles to 

her house under the guise of needing help. When they arrived at Jefferson’s home, Miller 

and defendant were there. As Knowles entered, Jefferson “stunned [her] to the ground” 

with a taser. Jefferson continued to stun her over 50 times while calling her names and 

accusing her of taking Jefferson’s property. At one point, Jefferson jabbed Knowles in 

the face with the taser and a metal prong broke off in her eye. Jefferson threatened 

Knowles with a knife and cut her on her chest, arm, and leg. Defendant threw water on 

Knowles and stunned her at least twice. When Knowles’s sister attempted to intervene, 

defendant told her to stop or “[b]oth of you bitches would be dead.”

Knowles eventually told Jefferson that Celestine had let people into Jefferson’s 

home while Jefferson was away. She said Celestine was in Jefferson’s bedroom with 

3

 All dates occurred in 2006 unless otherwise indicated.
4

some “bitch” and acknowledged smoking “dope” in Jefferson’s bedroom. Jefferson 

wanted to kill Knowles, but defendantsaid they should let her go. They ultimately 

agreed to let her leave if she promised not to talk and told her they would kill her family 

if she reported them to the police.

That evening, Jefferson telephoned Celestine’s home and asked to speak to 

Celestine. Upon being advised Celestine was unavailable, she told Celestine’s stepson 

that property was missing from her home and that “if it didn’t show up the niggers would 

be falling.” Later that same night, Jefferson again telephoned Celestine’s home and told 

his wife, Charolett, to “tell [Celestine] it’s on, it’s on.”

The following morning, on February 15, Miller telephoned Celestine’s home and 

told Celestine that he was coming over to get Jefferson’s keys. A short time later, Miller 

rang the doorbell, and Celestine let him in; Jefferson and defendant were hiding around 

the corner and followed Miller into the house.

Jefferson was holding a knife in her hand and demanded to know who had been in 

her house. Celestine denied knowing what she was talking about. Jefferson stabbed 

Celestine in his side and yelled, “You going to tell me who was in my house.” Charolett 

ran for the door, but defendant blocked the doorway and grabbed her by the arm. 

Charolett called out Jefferson’s name and pleaded with her not to “do this.” Defendant

responded, “Up, you said her name, now I got to kill him,” and held up a gun. By this 

time, Celestine was laying on the floor in the fetal position, attempting to block Jefferson 

and Miller’s blows with his legs and arms. Jefferson stabbed him again, while Miller 

urged him to tell Jefferson who had her things. Miller then began “slicing and poking” 

Celestine with “some ninja-like” three-bladed knife while Jefferson stabbed him 

“nonstop” as blood poured out of his side and mouth. When Charolett pleaded with 

Jefferson not to kill Celestine, Jefferson responded, “This motherfucker is going to die. 

You going to die.” Meanwhile, defendant kept saying, “I’m going to shoot him. Let me 

just kill him. Let’s just get it over with. Let me just kill him.”
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Once they finished stabbing and cutting Celestine, Miller and Jefferson took turns 

kicking him in the head. Defendant then kicked Celestine in the side, and his body went 

limp, and his eyes rolled back in his head. Celestine had been stabbed eight times, four 

of which were potentially fatal. Celestine also had 12 nonfatal “incised” wounds, which 

were caused by a cutting or slicing action, as opposed to a stabbing motion, and multiple 

blunt force injuries.

After Celestine’s body went limp, Miller said, “That’s enough,” and defendant 

walked out the door. Moments later, Miller and defendant returned, and Miller accused 

Charolett of calling for help because there was a truck with people outside. Defendant

told Charolett, “If I see any police or anything here, I’ll be back to finish the job to kill 

everybody in the house.” Charolett pleaded to call an ambulance, but defendant

responded, “No. Let that motherfucker die.”

Shortly after Jefferson, Miller, and defendant left, Charolett heard a series of 

gunshots, ran outside, and saw a truck take off and drive through two fences.4 

Meanwhile, she telephoned 9-1-1 and told them she needed an ambulance but not to send 

the police because she feared defendant would make good on his threat. After fleeing the 

scene, Miller and defendant were found hiding in the backyard of a nearby residence and 

were taken into custody.

Both Miller and defendant testified in their own defense. Jefferson did not.

According to Miller, on the morning of February 15, (the day of Celestine’s 

murder), Jefferson asked Miller if he had seen or heard from Celestine. Miller said, 

“No,” and immediately thereafter, telephoned Celestine and told him he was going to 

stop by and retrieve Jefferson’s key. The three defendants eventually walked to 

4

 Defendant was charged with attempted murder and shooting at an occupied vehicle for 

allegedly shooting at the truck. Because the jury found defendant not guilty of those 

charges, we do not further recount the underlying facts here.
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Celestine’s home; they did not discuss anything on the way and Miller did not see 

Jefferson or defendant with any weapons. As they neared Celestine’s house, they walked 

by a truck occupied by two people who gave them a threatening look. When they 

reached Celestine’s house, Miller rang the bell and told Jefferson and defendant to wait 

outside because he “didn’t want no fussing [or] arguing.” Celestine answered the door 

and Miller went inside. Miller saw Jefferson’s ninja-like knife on the entertainment 

center and confronted Celestine about taking things from Jefferson’s home. Celestine 

began screaming at Miller, and Jefferson went inside and began screaming at Celestine to 

“give me my keys.” Celestine grabbed a gun off the entertainment center and started to 

point it at Miller. Miller hit Celestine in the face, and Celestine dropped the gun and fell 

to his knees. As Celestine went to pick up the gun, Miller grabbed the ninja-like knife. 

When Miller turned back around, Celestine had the gun pointed at him. At that point, 

Jefferson stabbed Celestine in his side, and Miller began “swinging” the ninja-like knife. 

Miller could not recall anything after that point in time. The next thing he recalled was 

being ordered to “get down” by police.

Miller was aware of violent incidents in Celestine’s past and knew Celestine 

“could react in a violent fashion.” He had “heard about shootings and about [Celestine]

. . . hitting a certain woman and making her do stuff” at gunpoint. Miller had also 

observed Celestine push Knowles’s sister over a table.

In 1990, Celestine threatened a woman with a gun and thereafter was not “crime 

free.”

Defendant testified that he was present when Jefferson unexpectedly stunned 

Knowles. He urged Jefferson to take Knowles in the back bedroom so that they could 

talk calmly. While in the bedroom, Jefferson slapped Knowles, “but nobody else did 

anything . . . to her, no kicks, no broken noses.” During cross-examination, however, 

defendant acknowledged Jefferson punched Knowles in the face.
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Defendant denied stunning or striking Knowles or threatening her or her family. 

He threw water on Knowles because she said she was thirsty. When he did so, he 

believed Jefferson was done stunning her; he was not trying to electrocute her. At some 

point, Jefferson “poked” Knowles with a knife.5 Defendant did not attempt to stop 

Jefferson other than eventually telling her to “[c]ut it out, let her go.” After Knowles left, 

defendant went to a friend’s house.

Defendant returned to Jefferson’s home around 10:00 p.m. that night and learned 

Jefferson had been attempting to contact Celestine while he was gone. Jefferson was 

pretty upset.

The next morning, Jefferson was anxious to get her keys from Celestine, and 

defendant agreed to accompany her and Miller to Celestine’s home. He denied bringing 

any weapons with him or knowing that Miller and Jefferson were armed. He went to 

retrieve Jefferson’s keys but did not intend to assault anyone.

When they arrived, Jefferson and Miller went inside while defendant remained 

outside with Charolett. Defendant could hear people arguing but did not go inside 

because he “had no business in that conversation.” When the argument turned physical, 

he ran inside. He saw a gun on the floor and immediately picked it up. He also saw 

Celestine on his back attempting to fight off Miller and Jefferson as they stabbed and cut 

him. As soon as defendant picked up the gun, Charolett pulled him out of the house. 

Defendant told Jefferson and Miller to come out, and they did. Defendant denied striking 

Celestine, threatening anyone, or preventing Charolett from going anywhere.

Defendant told Charolett, “No, don’t call the police. It’s not going to do any good 

for anybody,” including Celestine. Although he believed Celestine had been beaten up, 

5

 Defendant initially testified that Jefferson waved a knife at Knowles, but it did not 

appear that she was poking her with it. On cross-examination, he admitted seeing 

Jefferson “poke [Knowles] in the skin.”
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he did not know he was mortally wounded. He did, however, tell Charolett she could call 

an ambulance.

Defendant eventually threw the gun into a garbage can and returned to Jefferson’s 

house. Soon thereafter, he heard the police arrive, and he and Miller climbed out a back 

window and hopped the fence.

The jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Celestine, false 

imprisonment by violence of Charolett, dissuading a witness (Charolett) by force or 

threat, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury upon Knowles, and 

possession of a firearm by a felon. It also found true allegations that he used a handgun 

in the commission of the murder, and a knife and a taser in the commission of the assault. 

He was initially sentenced to an aggregate term of 31 years to life in state prison, which 

this court subsequently reduced on appeal to 28 years eight months to life. On appeal, 

this court found sufficient evidence supported defendant’s first degree murder conviction 

because the evidence at trial showed Jefferson intended to kill Celestine, that she 

premeditated and deliberated the murder, and that defendant knew of and shared 

Jefferson’s murderous intent.

In January 2019, defendant filed a form petition for resentencing pursuant to 

section 1170.95. On the form, he checked various boxes stating that a complaint was 

filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder 

or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, that at trial he was 

convicted of first or second degree murder pursuant to the felony-murder rule or the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine, and that he could not now be convicted of 

first or second degree murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective 

January 1, 2019. He requested the appointment of counsel.

The trial court issued an order to show cause and appointed defendant counsel. 

The prosecution filed a written response arguing Senate Bill 1437 was unconstitutional 

and that defendant was not entitled to relief because, as we found in Miller and as the 
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evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly showed, he shared Jefferson’s murderous 

intent and he directly aided and abetted Celestine’s murder. The prosecution requested 

that the trial court judicially notice this court’s opinion in Miller and attached a copy to 

its response.

In June 2019, defense counsel filed a response asserting Senate Bill 1437 was 

constitutional. While counsel acknowledged that the prosecution presented two theories 

at trial for defendant’s murder liability—that defendant was either an aider and abettor of 

the actual killer, or that he was an aider and abettor of an assault with a deadly weapon, 

the natural and probable consequences being premeditated, willful, and deliberate 

murder—defense counsel claimed, given defendant’s own testimony and additional trial 

evidence referenced in a prior habeas corpus petition, that the jury could only have relied 

on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to find defendant guilty. According to 

him, the prosecution and the trial court could not now substitute their own theory of 

liability for that of the previous jury. Defendant’s response twice referenced the 

applicable burden of proof under section 1170.95—that the prosecutor had to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant could still be convicted of murder despite 

Senate Bill 1437’s changes.

In September 2019, defendant filed a supplemental response. Defendant attached 

as exhibits the transcripts of the parties’ closing arguments and the jury instructions given 

by the trial court as well as a jury question and the trial court’s response during 

deliberations; he requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the attached 

materials. Summarizing the transcripts, counsel argued that defendant was prosecuted for 

Celestine’s murder based solely on the legal theory of aider and abettor liability, and that 

the prosecutor specifically argued defendant aided and abetted Jefferson and Miller in an 

assault with a deadly weapon, the natural and probable consequences of which were the 

first degree murder of Celestine. According to defendant, the prosecutor did not allege or 
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argue to the jury that defendant had the specific intent to kill, or that he directly aided and 

abetted either Jefferson or Miller with the specific intent to kill Celestine.

Defendant’s supplemental reply again highlighted the prosecution’s burden under 

section 1170.95 to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was ineligible for 

resentencing. The supplemental response emphasized that the trial court was required “to 

resentence him on his murder conviction, unless the prosecution can prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he does not qualify for resentencing.”

At the hearing on the petition on November 4, 2019, defense counsel requested 

that the trial court strike all of the references in the prosecutor’s brief to the actual trial 

transcripts because he had not been provided a free copy of the transcripts. The trial 

court refused counsel’s request. The trial court explained that defendant had already been 

provided with a free copy of the complete trial transcripts for his direct appeal, and that 

the court did not have a budget to pay for a second copy for defendant. The trial court, 

however, offered to continue the hearing to allow defense counsel an opportunity to 

review the transcripts. After conferring with defendant, defense counsel indicated that 

they wished to proceed with the hearing despite not having reviewed a complete copy of 

the transcripts.6

Defense counsel argued that the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that defendant was not eligible for resentencing, and that the trial court 

could not find defendant ineligible for relief based on a theory that was never presented 

to his jury. The prosecutor agreed with defense counsel that because the court had issued 

an order to show cause, her burden was to show beyond a reasonable doubt that 

defendant could still be convicted of murder following Senate Bill 1437’s changes. She 

argued that “[t]he analysis is for this Court to consider, could he be convicted of first—or 

6

 Defendant attached copies of the transcripts of the closing arguments and the trial 

court’s instructions to his supplemental response.
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second degree murder today, and the answer has to be yes, not just based on the Third 

DCA’s opinion, but the facts that I put forth in my brief.” Based on the jury instructions 

given (CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401), the prosecutor also argued that defendant was tried 

under both a direct aiding and abetting theory as well as aiding and abetting a target 

offense, the natural and probable consequences of which was a murder. Because the 

verdict did not specify which theory the jury relied upon, there was no way to know 

whether defendant was convicted as a direct aider and abettor or based on the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine. Nevertheless, the evidence showed that defendant could 

still be convicted as a direct aider and abettor with the intent to kill.

After reviewing the parties’ written submissions and considering their arguments 

at the hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding defendant ineligible for relief. 

The trial court ruled that it had initially issued the order to show cause because the jury 

had been instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. However, the 

court found that “the evidence was overwhelming in many different ways that 

[defendant] [was] not eligible for relief.” The trial court noted this court’s decision in 

Miller, which found that defendant’s conduct and statements before, during, and after the 

attack provided overwhelming evidence that he shared Jefferson’s murderous intent and 

aided and facilitated Celestine’s murder. In addition, the trial court found that defendant 

“was a major participant by any measure,” and that “he shared the intent to kill by the 

bulk of the evidence . . . .” The trial court did not consider defendant’s case particularly 

close.

Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I

Overview of Senate Bill 1437

Senate Bill 1437 was enacted to “amend the felony murder rule and the natural 

and probable consequences doctrine, . . . to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on 
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a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major 

participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” 

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill 1437 achieves these goals by amending 

section 188 to require that a principal act with express or implied malice (§ 188, as 

amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2), and by amending section 189 to state that a 

person can be liable for felony murder only if (1) the “person was the actual killer”; 

(2) the person, with an intent to kill, was an aider or abettor in the commission of murder 

in the first degree; or (3) the “person was a major participant in the underlying felony and 

acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 189, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 

2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)

Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95 to provide the resentencing petition 

process for a “person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable 

consequences theory.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) After a defendant submits a petition and 

the court performs an initial review for missing information, subdivision (c) of section 

1170.95 provides: “The court shall review the petition and determine if the petitioner has 

made a prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions of this section. 

If the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent the 

petitioner. The prosecutor shall file and serve a response within 60 days of service of the 

petition and the petitioner may file and serve a reply within 30 days after the prosecutor’s

response is served. These deadlines shall be extended for good cause. If the petitioner 

makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an 

order to show cause.”

Following an order to show cause, the court must hold a hearing “to determine 

whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence . . . .” (§ 1170.95, 

subds. (c), (d)(1).) At that hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant is not eligible for resentencing. (§ 1170.95, subd. 

(d)(3).) “The prosecutor and the petitioner may rely on the record of conviction or offer 
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new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (Ibid.) The parties also 

may waive a resentencing hearing and stipulate that a defendant “is eligible to have his or 

her murder conviction vacated and for resentencing.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(2).)

II

Denial of Section 1170.95 Petition

Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his resentencing petition 

based on an incorrect burden of proof and an inapplicable felony-murder theory; he also 

argues the court inappropriately relied on this court’s prior opinion to deny the petition. 

These alleged errors, he argues, were structural, requiring automatic reversal, or, at the 

very least, they were not harmless. We are not persuaded.

It is “presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.” (Evid. Code, 

§ 664; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Trial courts, moreover, are 

presumed to know and apply the correct statutory and case law. (People v. Coddington

(2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644, disapproved on another ground in Price v. Superior Court 

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13. Nothing defendant cites overcomes this 

presumption.

He argues, based on the trial court’s comments during the hearing, that the trial 

court applied an incorrect burden of proof in finding he had an intent to kill by the “bulk 

of the evidence” rather than by the statutorily required beyond a reasonable doubt 

standard. The trial court’s comment, however, cannot be viewed in isolation. When 

properly viewed in context, the record affirmatively shows that the trial court was well 

aware that the prosecutor bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 

defendant was ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.95. (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3) 

[at a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and recall the 

sentence, the prosecutor bears the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 

petitioner is ineligible for resentencing].)
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Counsel for both parties agreed that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard found 

in section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3) applied, and that it was the prosecutor’s burden to 

meet it. The parties noted the standard in the written briefs and during oral argument at 

the evidentiary hearing after the trial court issued the order to show cause. And the trial 

court expressly stated that it had “read all the moving papers.”

With the applicable beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof highlighted by 

the parties, the trial court ruled that it “[did not] think this is a particularly close case.” 

While it is true the court never used the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” during the 

hearing, defendant concedes such exact “magic words” were not necessarily required. 

Furthermore, the court’s comment referencing our decision in Miller where we found that 

defendant’s conduct and statements before, during, and after the attack provided 

“overwhelming evidence” that he shared Jefferson’s murderous intent and aided and 

facilitated Celestine’s murder does not mean the court held the prosecutor to some sort of 

“overwhelming evidence” standard of proof rather than the beyond the reasonable doubt 

standard called for in section 1170.95. The same applies to the trial court’s “bulk of the 

evidence” comment regarding defendant’s intent to kill. We interpret the trial court’s 

statements to mean simply that, in the trial court’s view, the case for relief was not even 

close because the evidence overwhelmingly showed defendant directly aided and abetted 

Jefferson with the intent to kill Celestine. Thus, the trial court was implicitly convinced 

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not eligible for resentencing.

Similarly, the trial court’s comment that the evidence showed defendant was “a 

major participant by any measure” does not mean, as defendant contends, that the trial 

court was laboring under the misapprehension that the felony-murder rule applied. 

Neither party, we note, ever argued that the felony-murder rule applied to defendant’s 

case since the assault on Celestine merged with the homicide, making the felony-murder 

rule inapplicable. (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1200 [“[w]hen the underlying 

felony is assaultive in nature . . . the felony merges with the homicide and cannot be the 
15

basis of a felony-murder instruction[;] [a]n ‘assaultive’ felony is one that involves a 

threat of immediate violent injury”].) The court, moreover, did not find that defendant 

was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life as required by 

the amended felony-murder rule in section 189, subdivision (e). (§ 1170.95, subd. 

(e)(3).) The comment, when considered against the backdrop of all the evidence 

presented on the petition, shows that the trial court believed defendant’s participation in 

the murder was not merely as a passive participant as his counsel argued, but rather that 

he directly aided and abetted the murder.

We are also not persuaded that the trial court was misguided by defense counsel’s 

reference to the trial court as a reviewing court that could not substitute its own feelings 

about the credibility and strength of the evidence. As the People point out, the prosecutor 

emphasized that ruling on the petition was a postconviction proceeding where, as when 

applying Propositions 36, 47, and 64, courts could consider the strength and credibility of 

the evidence. And the trial court expressly found that “[it did not think it] was a 

particularly close case” as opposed to finding that some hypothetical jury could still have 

found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in relying on this court’s prior 

opinion to deny relief is likewise without merit. An appellate opinion is part of the 

record of conviction that the trial court may consider under section 1170.95. (See, e.g.,

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971-972 (Lewis) [after appointment of requested 

counsel and consideration of briefs, a trial court may consider the record of conviction, 

including a prior appellate court opinion, in determining whether a petitioner has made 

the single prima facie showing required under section 1170.95, subdivision (c)];

People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 456 [an appellate opinion is a part of the record 

of conviction]; see also, § 1170.95, subd. (d)(3) [the parties may rely on the record of 

conviction to meet their respective burdens during evidentiary hearing].) In any event, 

while it is true the trial court cited our prior opinion in denying the petition, the 
16

prosecutor specifically referenced evidence admitted at trial in her responsive brief and 

the trial court refused to strike the evidence when defense counsel requested that it do so 

at the hearing because it believed considering all the available evidence was appropriate. 

Defendant’s supplemental response also included the transcript of closing arguments and 

the jury instructions for the court’s consideration. The trial court recited that it had read 

and considered all of the moving papers, which included the evidence presented in the 

written submissions. Because the trial court did not solely rely on this court’s Miller 

opinion to deny the petition, the fact that we applied a substantial evidence standard of 

review on appeal is irrelevant.

To the extent defendant argues that it is unclear whether the jury convicted 

defendant on a direct aiding and abetting theory or a natural and probable consequences 

theory, the controlling question for eligibility under section 1170.95 was whether 

defendant could still be convicted of murder under a theory permitted by section 188 or 

189, not whether a jury relied on that same theory at trial. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) 

Likewise, the proper inquiry on the petition was not whether the jury instructions given 

during his trial are still valid in light of subsequent changes in the law, but whether the 

prosecutor proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant could still be convicted of 

murder under the newly revised statutes. (§ 1170.95, subds. (a)(3), (d)(3).)

Senate Bill 1437 did not “alter the law regarding the criminal liability of direct 

aiders and abettors of murder because such persons necessarily ‘know and share the 

murderous intent of the actual perpetrator.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 

1128, 1135, abrogated on other grounds in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952.) “One who 

directly aids and abets another who commits murder is thus liable for murder under the 

new law just as he or she was liable under the old law.” (People v. Lewis, supra, 

43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1135.) The trial court implicitly found that defendant aided and 

abetted Celestine’s killing with a murderous intent. Substantial evidence amply supports 

the trial court’s conclusion. (People v. Lopez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 936, 953 
17

[sufficiency of the evidence standard applies when reviewing postjudgment denial of a 

petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 following issuance of an order to show 

cause and evidentiary hearing], review granted February 10, 2021, S265974.)

The evidence at trial showed defendant was present when Jefferson first attacked 

Knowles, stunning her over 50 times with a taser, cutting her multiple times with a knife, 

and physically assaulting her because she was so outraged that Knowles had allowed 

people into her home while housesitting for her. Defendant threw water on Knowles and 

stunned her at least twice; he also drop-kicked her in the face with his boot. During the 

attack defendant threatened Knowles’s sister not to intervene or else both she and 

Knowles “would be dead.” Defendant later threatened Knowles that if she told anyone of 

the attack, they would come back and kill her family.

Having witnessed and participated in the attack on Knowles, the next day 

defendant accompanied Jefferson and Miller to Celestine’s house. Each was armed with 

a weapon, defendant with a gun and Jefferson and Miller with knives. Defendant 

brandished his gun and prevented Charolett from escaping the apartment to get help 

while Jefferson and Miller continuously stabbed Celestine as he lay defenseless on the 

floor. During the stabbing defendant threatened to shoot Celestine if Charlotte tried to 

help him, and also stated, “Let me shoot him. Let me shoot him.” He told Charlotte he 

was “going to shoot him,” and repeatedly told Jefferson, “Let me just kill him. Let’s just 

get it over with. Let me just kill him.” Defendant said he had to kill Celestine after 

Charlotte said Jefferson’s name when begging her to stop, and later kicked him in the 

side causing Celestine’s body to jump and go limp. He threatened to finish the job and 

kill everyone in the house if he saw any police, and when Charlotte asked if she could 

call an ambulance defendant responded, “No. Let that mother fucker die.”

Given the above, more than sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding 

that defendant shared Jefferson’s murderous intent and aided and abetted Jefferson in 
18

killing Celestine. The trial court applied the correct standard of proof and did not err in 

denying defendant’s petition.

III

Equal Protection and Due Process Rights to Access to Complete Trial Transcript

Defendant contends the trial court’s refusal to provide a second copy of the 

complete trial transcript, free of charge, before ruling on the petition violated his rights to 

equal protection and due process. The People argue defendant had adequate alternatives 

to review the transcript, and also invited the alleged error. We agree that any alleged 

error was invited.

We need not decide whether the parameters of the equal protection or due process 

clauses mandate that the State provide a second free copy of the transcript of an indigent 

defendant’s prior trial for purposes of a postconviction hearing under section 1170.95. 

(See e.g., Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 [100 L.Ed. 891] [under equal 

protection, an indigent defendant is entitled to free transcript of prior proceedings if 

necessary for proper appellate review or an effective defense]; People v. Hosner (1975) 

15 Cal.3d 60, 65-66 [extending holding in Griffin to require that an indigent defendant be 

provided the transcript from a mistrial caused by a hung jury, upon request, where the 

defendant seeks the transcript to aid in his defense at a retrial].) This is because the 

invited error doctrine bars defendant from raising the issue.

“The doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent an accused from gaining a 

reversal on appeal because of an error made by the trial court at his behest.” (People v. 

Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 330, disapproved on other grounds by People v. 

Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186.) A party who, by his conduct induces the commission of 

an error, is estopped from asserting it as a ground for reversal on appeal. (Geffcken v. 

D’Andrea (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1312.) The doctrine requires affirmative 

conduct demonstrating a deliberate tactical choice on the part of the challenging party. 

(Huffman v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 679, 706.)
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In this case, the trial court repeatedly offered to continue the hearing to give 

defense counsel an adequate opportunity to review the full trial transcript. After the trial 

court said it would not strike the People’s references to the trial transcript citations in its 

response, but offered to give defendant more time to review the trial transcript, defense 

counsel conferred with defendant and agreed that they wanted to proceed with the 

hearing. This appears to have been a tactical decision because counsel had a “pretty good 

understanding” of the facts of defendant’s case since he had reviewed this court’s prior 

opinion, which set forth in detail the evidence presented at trial, and had also reviewed a 

habeas corpus petition defendant previously filed, which also included a summary of the 

evidence presented at trial. Defendant had also obtained at least a portion of the trial 

transcript because he attached over 200 pages of the transcript to his supplemental 

response, including the closing arguments and jury instructions. After further discussion 

about how the trial court did not have budgetary means to supply defendant with a second 

copy of the full trial transcript since he had already been provided with a free copy on his 

direct appeal, counsel again indicated that he wanted to have the hearing despite not 

having reviewed the entire transcript. The parties and the trial court then proceeded with 

the hearing.

Based on counsel’s comments of the materials he had reviewed and his discussion 

with defendant before informing the trial court that they wanted to proceed even without 

having reviewed the entire trial transcript, defendant invited any alleged error by the 

court in electing to proceed with the hearing. He cannot now complain on appeal that he 

was not provided with a second free copy of the entire trial transcript before the trial 

court ruled on the petition.

DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 is 

affirmed.
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 \s\ , 

BLEASE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

 \s\ ,

DUARTE, J.

 \s\ ,

RENNER, J.