Filed 3/26/13 P. v. Glasgow CA2/4 

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

CHRISTOPHER NATHANIEL 

GLASGOW et al., 

 Defendants and Appellants. 

 B237077 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. TA115998) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with 

directions. 

 Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant Christopher Glasgow. 

 Linn Davis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant Annetta Alvarez. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer 

and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

 Appellant Christopher Nathaniel Glasgow challenges his convictions for 

possession of cocaine base and marijuana for sale, possession of firearms and body 

armor by a felon, and unlawful possession of ammunition. He maintains that his 

judgment of conviction must be reversed due to insufficiency of the evidence and 

sentencing error. Respondent acknowledges certain errors in Glasgow’s sentence, 

and also contends that it contains other defects requiring resentencing. Although 

we reject Glasgow’s contentions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

conclude that his sentence is incorrect, and thus reverse the judgment against him 

for resentencing. 

 Appellant Annetta Marie Alvarez, Glasgow’s codefendant, was convicted of 

possession of cocaine base and marijuana for sale, storing a controlled substance, 

and unlawful firearm activity. Her court-appointed counsel has filed an opening 

brief raising no issues. Following our independent examination of the entire record 

pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we conclude that no 

arguable issues exist, and affirm the judgment against her. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 22, 2011, an information was filed, charging Glasgow and 

Alvarez in counts 1 and 2 with possession of cocaine base and marijuana for sale 

(Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351.5, 11359). The information further charged 

Glasgow in counts 3, 5, and 6 with possession of a firearm as a felon (former Pen. 

Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)), in count 4 with unlawful possession of ammunition 

(former Pen. Code, § 12316, subd. (b)(1)), in count 7 with possession of body 

armor as a violent felon (former Pen. Code, § 12370, subd. (a)), and in counts 8 

and 9 with the transportation of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. 
3

Code, § 11352, subd. (a)).1 The information also charged Alvarez in count 10 with 

providing storage for a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.5, subd. 

(a), and in counts 11 and 12 with unlawful firearm activity (former Pen. Code, 

§ 12021, subd. (d)(1)). 

 The information asserted a gang allegation against appellants with respect to 

each count (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). The information further 

alleged, under count 1, that Glasgow was personally armed during the offense 

(Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (c)), and under count 2, that a principal was armed 

during the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In addition, accompanying 

all the counts against Glasgow were allegations that he had suffered prior 

convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 667.5, subd. (b)), including two 

“strikes,” for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b) - 

(i), 1170.12, subds. (a) - (d)). The information also alleged a prior conviction 

enhancement against Glasgow under counts 1, 8, and 9 (Health & Saf. Code, 

11370.2, subd. (a)). 

 Appellants pleaded not guilty and denied the special allegations. The trial 

was bifurcated regarding Glasgow’s prior convictions. On October 5, 2011, a jury 

found appellants guilty as charged and found the gang and gun use allegations to 

be true.2 Later, an amended information was filed against Glasgow, alleging 

additional prior convictions. On November 2, 2011, after finding the prior 

conviction allegations to be true, the trial court denied Glasgow’s motion to strike 

1 The Legislature has repealed several provisions of the Penal Code under which 

appellants were convicted and replaced them with new statutes carrying over the repealed 

provisions without substantive change. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 51D pt. 1 West’s 

Ann. Pen. Code (2011 supp.) foll. § 12000, p. 32.) For simplicity, we refer to the 

provisions under their former numbers.

2 During the jury trial, Glasgow stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction.
4

his prior convictions, and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 213 years to life. 

The court also sentenced Alvarez to an aggregate term of five years. 

FACTS 

 A. Prosecution Evidence

 1. Background

 Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Detective Erik Shear, a gang 

expert, testified that Bounty Hunter Bloods are a gang whose territory lies 

primarily in Watts. He opined that Glasgow belongs to the Bounty Hunter Bloods, 

and that Alvarez and Glasgow’s sister Liza are “associates” of the gang who 

support its activities.3 

In March 2008, Alvarez leased a residence on 108th Street in Los Angeles. 

She received assistance from the Los Angeles housing authority in order to pay her 

rent. On March 3, 2010, the management company responsible for the residence 

informed Alvarez that her rent was to be increased, and that the housing authority 

intended to decrease her subsidy. The management company also told her that she 

could remain in the residence if she paid a portion of the rent. On March 23, 2010, 

Alvarez notified the management company that she intended to remain in the 

residence for another year. 

 2. February 11, 2010 Cocaine Sale (Count 8)

 In early 2010, Rock Holcomb, a special agent with the United States 

Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), oversaw 

“controlled buys” of narcotics by a confidential informant, Deshun Jones. Jones 

3 Because Glasgow and his sister share a surname, we refer to her by her first name. 
5

was a member of the Bounty Hunter Bloods. On February 11, 2010, Holcomb, 

together with Detective Shear, arranged for Jones to meet Glasgow in a parking lot, 

where Glasgow sold Jones 44.9 grams of cocaine base for $1,600. 

 3. March 4, 2010 Cocaine Sale (Count 9)

 On March 4, 2010, Holcomb arranged another meeting between Jones and 

Glasgow during which Jones paid Glasgow $1,600 for 49.2 grams of cocaine base. 

 4. April 14, 2010 Offenses (Counts 1-7, 10-12) 

During Detective Shear’s investigation into Glasgow’s cocaine sales, he 

obtained information that Glasgow stored narcotics at Alvarez’s 108th Street 

residence. At 11:30 a.m. on April 14, 2010, Shear and other LAPD officers arrived 

at the residence to execute a search warrant. They waited for Glasgow to leave the 

residence, as Shear wanted to detain him outside the residence while it was 

searched. 

 Shortly before 3:00 p.m., an SUV arrived at the residence containing 

Glasgow, his sister Liza, and Bobby Irvin, a Bounty Hunter Bloods gang member. 

After Glasgow unlocked the residence’s front door, he and the other occupants of 

the SUV entered the residence for ten minutes and then returned to the SUV. In an 

unmarked patrol car, LAPD Officer Manuel Moreno followed the SUV, which 

Liza drove. When Moreno saw Liza disregard a red light, he radioed marked 

patrol cars to intercept the SUV. After five or six patrol cars initiated a traffic stop, 

Liz halted the SUV, but she and the other occupants refused to leave the SUV 

when the police officers ordered them to do so. Instead, she drove away. Moreno 

and the other officers followed her. 

After the SUV drove a distance, Glasgow got out and ran through a housing 

project. LAPD Officer Hamilton Alvarenga, who chased Glasgow on foot, saw 
6

him handle a gun and then throw it onto the roof of a project building. Moreno 

remained in his vehicle, but also saw Glasgow throw a gun onto a rooftop as he ran 

from pursing officers. When arrested, Glasgow had $1,845 in cash. Following the 

arrest, a loaded gun was recovered from the rooftop. 

Moreno obtained Glasgow’s keys to the 108th Street residence and gave 

them to Detective Shear. During the search of the residence, officers found 

Glasgow’s driver’s license in the living room. They also saw adult male and 

female clothing in the laundry room and a bedroom.4 Within that bedroom’s 

closet, they discovered a purse containing approximately six ounces of rock 

cocaine, a laptop bag containing approximately three ounces of marijuana, a 

partially loaded assault rifle, an LAPD armored vest, a weight scale and plastic 

sandwich bags, as well as a man’s shirt, a woman’s shoes, and a receipt for car 

repairs bearing Glasgow’s name. The bedroom’s dresser disclosed a photograph of 

Glasgow and Alvarez, a loaded handgun, and ammunition. A man’s motorcycle 

jacket and hats were also discovered in the bedroom, and two toothbrushes were 

found in the adjoining bathroom. 

 Detective Shear opined that the cocaine and marijuana found in the 

residence were possessed for the purposes of sale. He noted that the quantities of 

cocaine and marijuana were too large for personal use, that no signs of drug use 

were found in the residence, and that there was evidence of sales, namely, the 

weight scale and sandwich bags. 

4 In addition, the officers saw children’s clothing inside the residence. 
7

 5. Subsequent Events 

 Alvarez was not immediately arrested after the search of the 108th Street 

residence. According to the records of the management company responsible for 

the residence, on April 16, 2010, she moved without providing the required 30 

days notice or paying her final month’s rent. Later, on April 22, 2010, Alvarez 

spoke by phone with Glasgow, who was incarcerated. An audio recording of the 

call was played for the jury. During the call, after Alvarez said that she had 

developed a “funny feeling,” Glasgow said that Alvarez “could have moved the 

groceries and the furniture on [her] own” and that “the place was burnt” because 

too many people visited it. Detective Shear opined that Glasgow and Alvarez were 

speaking in code, and that Glasgow was telling Alvarez that she should have 

moved the drugs and guns from the 108th Street residence when she suspected that 

too many people were aware of it. 

 6. Gang Evidence

Detective Shear testified that the Bounty Hunter Bloods engage in many 

crimes, ranging in seriousness from vandalism and street drug sales to shootings, 

assaults with deadly weapons, and murders. He opined that the crimes charged 

against appellants had been committed for the benefit of that criminal street gang. 

(Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A).) 

B. Glasgow’s Defense Evidence 

Bettye McCall testified that on April 13, 2010, she met with Glasgow and 

Liza to discuss his application to rent an apartment she owned on South 

Normandie. The application identified his residence as an address on West 27th 

Street. McCall asked Glasgow to pay the deposit and first month’s rent the 

following day. 
8

 According to Glasgow’s mother Joyce, in April 2010, Glasgow lived with 

her on West 27th Street, worked at a motorcycle shop called the “Hog Pit,” and 

had several girlfriends, including Alvarez. Joyce did not believe that the men’s 

clothing found in the 108th Street residence belonged to Glasgow because they 

were the wrong size. She also testified that Liza owned a gun. On April 11 or 12, 

2010, Joyce lent Glasgow approximately $30,000, including $2,000 to pay McCall. 

 Glasgow testified that between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m. on April 14, 2010, 

Alvarez asked him by phone to transport a vacuum cleaner from the 108th Street 

residence to a Maie Avenue apartment she had rented. Glasgow picked up 

Alvarez’s keys from her son and went to the 108th Street residence in an SUV with 

Liza and Bobby Irvin. Upon entering the residence, he discovered that the vacuum 

cleaner had to be assembled before it could be moved, so he decided not to 

transport it. 

 After Glasgow, Liza, and Irvin left the residence, police cars forced Liza to 

stop their SUV. Glasgow denied that Liza ran a red light. He further maintained 

that when she offered her driver’s license and registration to the officers, they 

refused to accept them, and instead ordered the SUV’s occupants to leave it. 

Instead of complying, Liza told Glasgow, “I got my gun,” and sped away. Liza 

soon stopped the vehicle, tossed her gun onto Glasgow’s lap, and told him to run. 

He left the SUV, immediately threw the gun on the ground, and tried to flee, but 

was arrested. 

 According to Glasgow, he met with Jones to “hook him up” with someone 

who sold fake insurance cards. He further testified that the assault rifle in the 

108th Street residence was the property of Alvarez’s “baby daddy,” and that the 

drugs in the residence belonged to Alvarez’s son, who sold drugs. He also stated 

that as a parolee with two strikes, he tried to avoid visiting the residence due to the 

potential criminal activity in it. 
9

 C. Alvarez’s Defense Evidence 

Alvarez testified that after she began dating Glasgow in 2009, he frequently 

visited the 108th Street residence and stayed overnight. In February 2010, she 

sought approval from the housing authority to rent a new residence. On April 1, 

2010, she signed a lease for an apartment on Maie Avenue, obtained a key for it, 

and began moving in. The last date she entered the 108th Street residence was 

April 9, 2010, when she gave Glasgow her only key to it. She testified that she did 

not permit Glasgow to store the drugs and guns found in the residence, and that she 

never saw them while she lived there. She also denied that her son had a key to the 

108th Street residence. 

Tanisha Bailey, Alvarez’s friend, testified that on April 9, 2010, she visited 

the 108th Street residence, and encountered Alvarez and Glasgow. After Alvarez 

gathered up some clothes, Bailey and Alvarez walked to an apartment on Maie 

Avenue. Alvarez had a key to the apartment, which contained furniture and 

Alvarez’s children. According to Bailey, some of the furniture shown in the 

photographs of the LAPD search of the 108th Street residence differed from the 

furniture she saw there on April 9, 2010. 

 

 D. Rebuttal and Surrebuttal 

 In rebuttal, the prosecution presented an audio recording of Officer 

Moreno’s April 14, 2010 radio transmissions, which disclosed that after he 

reported that the SUV had run a red light, he requested a ladder to retrieve a gun. 

In addition, the prosecution offered field identification cards for Glasgow 

indicating that he was a member of the Bounty Hunter Bloods, and evidence that 

no motorcycle shop called the “Hog Pit” was located at the address Glasgow had 

provided for it. 
10

 In surrebuttal, Joyce Glasgow testified that she had recently visited the Hog 

Pit. 

DISCUSSION 

I Glasgow

Glasgow contends (1) that his convictions for possession of controlled 

substances for sale and possession of firearms and body armor as a felon fail for 

want of substantial evidence, and (2) that there was sentencing error. As explained 

below, although we reject his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

conclude that his sentence discloses errors requiring a reversal for resentencing. 

A. Substantial Evidence 

 We begin with Glasgow’s contentions regarding the adequacy of the 

evidence, which target his convictions for the offenses on April 14, 2010. 

1. Standard of Review 

 Our inquiry follows established principles. “In determining whether the 

evidence is sufficient to support a conviction . . . , ‘the relevant question is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] Under this standard, ‘an appellate court 

in a criminal case . . . does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the 

trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] Rather, the 

reviewing court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the 

judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, 

evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable 
11

trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Vy (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1224.) 

2. Possession of Contraband in the 108th Street Residence (Counts 

1, 2, 5-7) 

Glasgow challenges his convictions for possession of the firearms, body 

armor, and drugs found in the 108th Street residence. Generally, the offenses of 

possession of drugs for sale and possession of a firearm as a felon include as 

elements possession and knowledge of the contraband. (People v. Meza (1995) 38 

Cal.App.4th 1741, 1745-1746 [possession of drugs for sale]; People v. Jeffers

(1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 [possession of a firearm by a felon].)5 Glasgow 

contends there is insufficient evidence that he had the knowledge required for 

possession of the contraband. 

 To establish the element of possession, the prosecution must demonstrate 

that the defendant had actual or constructive possession. (People v. Cordova

(1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 665, 670.) “Actual possession occurs when the defendant 

exercises direct physical dominion and control over the item . . . . [Citation.] 

Constructive possession does not require direct physical control over the item ‘but 

does require that a person knowingly exercise control or right to control a thing, 

either directly or through another person or persons.’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Austin (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1608-1609 (Austin), disapproved on another 

ground in People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 867.) Exclusive possession and 

control is not required (People v. Rushing (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 618, 622 

5 Although our research has disclosed no case holding that possession of body 

armor by a violent felon is also subject to these requirements, the offense’s close 

similarity to possession of a firearm by a felon supports that conclusion. The parties 

agree. 
12

(Rushing); People v. Patino (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 986, 996 (Patino)), as a 

showing of joint and constructive possession is sufficient (People v. Haynes (1967) 

253 Cal.App.2d 1060, 1064 [possession of drugs] (Haynes); People v. Nieto (1966) 

247 Cal.App.2d 364, 368 [possession of firearm by a felon]). Possession and 

knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Cordova, supra, 

97 Cal.App.3d at pp. 669-670.) 

 As instructive application of these principles is found in Haynes. There, a 

man and woman were charged with possession of marijuana for sale. (Haynes, 

supra, 253 Cal.App.2d at p. 1061.) At trial, evidence was presented that police 

officers, upon executing a search warrant for the woman’s residence, found both 

defendants there, as well as a large amount of marijuana and materials for 

packaging it. (Id. at p. 1063.) The man also had traces of marijuana in his pocket. 

(Id. at pp. 1063-1064.) Inside a bedroom closet were the man’s shoes, a suit, and a 

laundry receipt for the suit bearing the man’s name and the residence’s address. 

(Ibid.) The appellate court concluded that this evidence was sufficient to show that 

the defendants “jointly occupied the premises where the marijuana was found; had 

knowledge of the presence of that marijuana and its narcotic character; had access 

thereto; and had joint control thereof.” (Id. at pp. 1064-1065; see also Patino, 

supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at pp. 995-996 [there was sufficient evidence that defendant 

possessed vials of drugs in mother’s home, as officers found document identifying 

the home as defendant’s residence, and one vial was found in sweater fitting 

defendant]; Rushing, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 620-621 [there was sufficient 

evidence that defendant possessed cocaine found in apartment he shared with three 

other persons, in view of ledger of drug sales bearing defendant’s first name found 

near cocaine].) 

 Here, there is ample evidence that Glasgow “‘knowingly exercise[d] 

control’” over the contraband in the 108th Street residence (Austin, supra, 23 
13

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1608-1609). Aside from disclosing that Glasgow sold cocaine 

and marijuana, the record shows that he conducted his sales operation out of the 

residence, with Alvarez’s cooperation. Alvarez testified that Glasgow frequently 

stayed overnight in the residence, and Detective Shear testified that he saw 

Glasgow enter it with a key. All the contraband was found in a bedroom 

containing men’s and women’s clothing. Inside the bedroom closet were large 

quantities of cocaine and marijuana, as well as material for packaging drugs, an 

assault rifle, body armor, a receipt bearing Glasgow’s name, and a man’s shirt. 

The remaining items of contraband -- a handgun and ammunition -- were in the 

bedroom’s dresser, which also displayed a photo of appellants. In addition, 

Glasgow’s secretive jailhouse phone conversation with Alvarez indicated their 

joint awareness of the contraband and its unlawful character. In view of this 

evidence, the jury reasonably found that Glasgow knew of the contraband and had 

constructive possession of it. 

3. Possession of Loaded Gun In Housing Project (Counts 3 & 4) 

 Glasgow contends there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions 

for the offenses involving the loaded gun found in the housing project, namely, 

possession of a gun as a felon and possession of ammunition. At trial, the jury was 

instructed with CALCRIM No. 2511, which stated in pertinent part: “If you 

conclude that the defendant possessed a firearm, that possession was not unlawful 

if the defendant can prove the defense of momentary possession. In order to 

establish this defense, the defendant must prove that: [¶] 1. He possessed the 

firearm only for a momentary or transitory period; [¶] 2. He possessed the 

firearm in order to abandon, or dispose of, or destroy it; [¶] and [¶] 3. He did not 

intend to prevent law enforcement officials from seizing the firearm.” Glasgow 

argues that the record conclusively establishes this defense, pointing to his own 
14

testimony that he threw the gun away immediately after Liza tossed it to him. We 

disagree. 

 The “momentary possession” defense is traceable to People v. Mijares

(1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 420, in which our Supreme Court determined that defendants 

charged with possession of illegal drugs may assert as a defense that they held the 

drugs only to dispose of them in a safe manner. In so concluding, the court 

explained that its decision “in no way insulates from prosecution . . . those 

individuals who, fearing they are about to be apprehended, remove contraband 

from their immediate possession.” (Id. at p. 422.) This qualification of the 

defense’s application is reflected in the elements of CALCRIM No. 2511. (See 

People v. Hurtado (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 805, 810-811 (Hurtado).)6 

 Here, there is sufficient evidence that Glasgow curtailed his possession of 

the handgun only because he realized that he would soon be apprehended. 

According to Officers Moreno and Alvarenga, Glasgow held the gun while he ran 

from pursuing officers, and threw it onto a building rooftop only moments before 

he was captured. Because this testimony supports the reasonable inference that 

6 As respondent notes, there is a division of opinion regarding the extent to which 

this defense is available to a defendant charged with possession of a firearm as a felon. 

In People v. Pepper (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1037-1038 (Pepper), the appellate 

court concluded that convicted felons may not assert the defense, and that they are 

permitted momentary possession of a handgun only in situations satisfying the elements 

of other defenses, namely, self-defense, defense of others, and legal necessity. In 

contrast, in Hurtado, the appellate court rejected Pepper and reached the contrary 

conclusion. (Hurtado, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 813.) Later , in People v. Martin

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180, 1191, our Supreme Court discussed Hurtado with approval, and 

remarked in dictum that the recognition of the defense “serves the salutary purpose and 

sound public policy of encouraging disposal . . . of dangerous items such as controlled 

substances and firearms.” (Ibid.) It is unnecessary for us to examine this division of 

opinion because there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s rejection of the 

defense. 
15

Glasgow disposed of the gun to prevent it from being found in his possession when 

arrested, the jury reasonably rejected his “momentary possession” defense. 

 

B. Sentencing 

 Glasgow raises several challenges to his sentence. In addition, respondent 

maintains that Glasgow’s sentence contains other defects that render it 

unauthorized. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the matter must 

be remanded for resentencing. 

Upon finding that Glasgow had two prior strikes under the Three Strikes 

law, the trial court sentenced him to a total term of 213 years to life, determined as 

follows: consecutive terms of 25 years to life on counts 1 through 3 and 5 through 

9; two five-year enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision 

(a)(1); and a three-year enhancement pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 

11370.2, subdivision (a). In addition, on count 1, the trial court imposed a 

concurrent one-year enhancement under former Penal Code section 12022, 

subdivision (c), and on count 2, a concurrent one-year enhancement under former 

Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). Punishment was stayed with respect 

to count 4 (§ 654) and the gang enhancements (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. 

(b)(4)(A))7. 

 1. Refusal to Strike Prior Convictions 

 Glasgow contends the trial court erroneously declined to dismiss one or 

more of his serious or violent convictions. Under the Three Strikes law, the 

7 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated. 
16

decision to dismiss or “strike” a prior felony conviction is consigned to the trial 

court’s discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 

504.) The trial court must consider whether, “in light of the nature and 

circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony 

convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the 

defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part.” 

(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) 

 Under these standards, the trial court did not err in denying Glasgow’s 

motion to dismiss the strikes, in view of his lengthy criminal record and the 

circumstances of his present crimes. Generally, abuse of discretion in sentencing 

“is found only where [the trial court’s] choice is ‘arbitrary or capricious or 

“‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.”’ 

[Citations.]’” (People v. Trausch (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1247, quoting 

People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234.) We see no abuse of discretion here. 

 When sentenced, Glasgow was 38 years old. As a juvenile, petitions were 

sustained against him for taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, burglary, 

robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon. After turning 18, Glasgow was 

convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and a firearm (1990), possession of 

contraband in prison (1992), receiving stolen property (1992), possession of a 

firearm as a felon (1992, 1995), robbery (1995), possession of a controlled 

substance for sale (2003), and murder (2011).8 Furthermore, he committed the 

offenses at issue here while on parole. 

 Glasgow maintains that he falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law 

because none of his current offenses resulted in physical injury and four were 

8 In an unrelated criminal proceeding, Glasgow was convicted of murder after his 

arrest for the offenses charged in the underlying action, but before sentencing occurred.
17

related to drug sales. However, that law “does not require multiple violent felony 

offenses to come within the statutory scheme.” (People v. Strong (2001) 87 

Cal.App.4th 328, 340, italics omitted.) Notwithstanding the absence of resulting 

injury from his current offenses, his long record of criminal conduct -- including 

violent felonies -- establishes that he is “‘the kind of revolving-door career 

criminal for whom the Three Strikes law was devised.’” (Ibid., quoting People v. 

Gaston (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310, 320.) 

 2. Section 654

Glasgow challenges the sentences imposed on counts 5 through 7, charging 

him with possession as felon of the two firearms and the body armor found in the 

108th Street residence. Pointing to subdivision (a) of section 654, which prohibits 

multiple punishment for “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways 

by different provisions of law,” Glasgow argues that the trial court erred in 

imposing punishment for each offense because they arose from a single act or 

course of conduct. As explained below, we disagree. 

 Generally, multiple punishments are proper under the statute if the defendant 

pursues suitably independent criminal objectives. (People v. Williams (1992) 9 

Cal.App.4th 1465, 1473-1474.) Our Supreme Court has explained: “Whether a 

course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act 

within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. 

If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished 

for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.” (Neal v. State of 

California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19, disapproved on another ground in People v. 

Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331 (Correa).) 
18

 a. Multiple Punishments for Possession of Firearms as a 

 Felon 

 Glasgow contends that multiple punishments were improper for the two 

counts of possession of a firearm as a felon, that is, count 5, which concerned the 

gun found in the bedroom dresser, and count 6, which concerned the assault rifle 

found in the bedroom closet. We conclude that this contention fails in light of our 

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Correa, which involved a defendant who, 

when arrested, was hiding in a closet containing a cache of guns. (Correa, supra, 

54 Cal.4th. at p. 334.) After he was convicted of seven counts of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm, the trial court imposed multiple punishments on the 

offenses. (Ibid.) In examining the sentence, the Supreme Court concluded that 

section 654 does not prohibit multiple punishment for multiple violations of a 

single law. (Id. at pp. 335-343.) However, because this determination constituted 

a new rule regarding section 654, the court declined to apply it retroactively to the 

defendant’s sentence. (Id. at p. 344.) 

 The court nonetheless affirmed the sentence on an alternative basis, namely, 

former section 12001, subdivision (k), which provided that “‘each firearm . . . shall 

constitute a distinct and separate offense,’” for purposes of enumerated crimes, 

including possession of a firearm by a felon.9 (Correa, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 

pp. 342, 345.) On this matter, the court determined that the Legislature enacted 

that statute in 1994 to authorize multiple punishment for the enumerated crimes, 

notwithstanding section 654. (Correa, supra, at pp. 345-346.) The court thus held 

that such punishment was properly imposed for the defendant’s simultaneous 

possession of firearms. (Ibid.) 

9 Former section 12001, subdivision (k), is carried over in new section 23510 

without substantive change. (Correa, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 334, fn. 2.) 
19

 In view of Correa, appellant’s contention fails. As former section 12001, 

subdivision (k) also governed Glasgow’s sentence, the trial court properly imposed 

multiple punishments on counts 5 and 6.10 

 

 b. Possession of Firearms and Body Armor as Felon

 Glasgow also contends that section 654 bars additional punishment for 

possession of body armor by a violent felon (count 7) due to the punishments 

imposed on counts 5 and 6. For the reasons discussed below, we reject this 

contention because the items served different objectives. 

Our research has disclosed no decision addressing whether section 654 bars 

multiple punishments for simultaneous possession of firearms and body armor by a 

felon. However, we find guidance on the issue before us from People v. Winchell

(1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 580. There, a police officer noticed signs that someone had 

attempted to break into a building, and found the defendant in a nearby car. (Id. at 

pp. 581-583.) After a search disclosed a gun under the driver’s seat and burglary 

tools on the rear seat floor, the defendant was charged with attempted burglary, 

possession of a firearm as a felon, and possession of burglary tools. (Ibid.) 

However, the charge of attempted burglary was dismissed, and the defendant 

suffered convictions only for the possession-related offenses, upon which the trial 

court imposed multiple punishments. (Id. at pp. 581-585.) In rejecting the 

defendant’s challenge to the sentence under section 654, the appellate court held 

that in the absence of the attempted burglary charge, the record showed the 

defendant’s commission of “two independent acts,” viz., his possession of the 

10 People v. Spirlin (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 119, upon which Glasgow relies, is 

distinguishable, as it stands for the proposition that section 654 bars multiple 

punishments for a felon’s possession of the same firearm on different dates (see id. at 

pp. 128-129). That is not the situation we confront here. 
20

burglary tools and the gun, albeit simultaneously. (People v. Winchell, supra, at 

p. 597.) Accordingly, multiple punishments could be imposed. 

 We reach the same conclusion here. Generally, guns and body armor serve 

different functions: whereas guns are offensive weapons, body armor is intended 

to protect its wearer. Although they can be used together in criminal activities, the 

record discloses no evidence that Glasgow, in fact, intended to do so. Accordingly, 

section 654 did not prohibit multiple punishments on counts 5 through 7. 

3. Enhancements Under Section 667, Subdivision (a)(1) 

 Glasgow maintains that the trial court improperly imposed two five-year 

enhancements pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1), arguing that the two 

prior convictions underlying the enhancements were not the product of separate 

proceedings. Respondent agrees, but argues that the court also erred in failing to 

impose a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), on each of 

counts 1 through 3 and 5 through 9. We conclude that both contentions are correct. 

 We begin with Glasgow’s contention. Subdivision (a)(1) of section 667 

provides: “[A]ny person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been 

convicted of a serious felony . . . shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed 

by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for each such prior 

conviction on charges brought and tried separately. . . .” (Italics added.) In order 

for the “‘brought and tried separately’” requirement to be satisfied, “the underlying 

proceedings must have been formally distinct, from filing to adjudication of guilt.” 

(In re Harris (1989) 49 Cal.3d 131, 136; accord, People v. Frausto (2009) 180 

Cal.App.4th 890, 903.) Here, the two prior convictions for robbery occurred in a 

single proceeding, case No. TA028842. For this reason, it was error to impose two 

five-year enhancements pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1) for the two 

prior convictions. (People v. Frausto, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 903.) 
21

Regarding respondent’s contention, our Supreme Court has held that under 

the Three Strikes law, section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancements “are to be 

applied individually to each count of a third strike sentence.” (People v. 

Williams (2004) 34 Cal.4th 397, 405.) Furthermore, the trial court must impose the 

enhancements, as they may not be stricken under any provision of law, including 

section 1385 (see pt.I.B.4., post). (People v. Garcia (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1550, 

1561 (Garcia).) For this reason, “[t]he trial court has no discretion and the 

sentence is mandatory.” (People v. Purata (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 489, 498.) 

Accordingly, the trial court was required to apply a five-year enhancement under 

section 667, subdivision (a)(1), to each count on which it imposed a third strike 

sentence (counts 1 through 3 and 5 through 9). 

 The result of the two errors was a legally unauthorized sentence that must be 

corrected. (People v. Purata, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 498; see People v. 

Frausto, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 903.) As we conclude below that the matter 

must be remanded for resentencing (see pts. B.4. & B.5., post), we shall direct the 

trial court to remedy the errors. 

4. Gun Enhancements 

 Glasgow contends the trial court erred in imposing concurrent gun use 

enhancements on counts 1 and 2, which concerned his possession of cocaine base 

and marijuana for sale on April 14, 2010. He argues that the trial court was 

obliged to strike the enhancements, rather than order them to run concurrently with 

the terms for the underlying offenses. As explained below, the matter must be 

remanded to the court with directions regarding each enhancement to (1) impose it 

as a consecutive term or (2) strike it. 

 Counts 1 and 2 charged Glasgow with violations of Health and Safety Code 

sections 11351.5 and 11359. Under count 1, the information also alleged a gun use 
22

enhancement pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 12022, which provides that 

“any person who is personally armed with a firearm in the commission of a 

violation or attempted violation of [s]ection . . . 11351.5 . . . of the Health and 

Safety Code, shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of 

imprisonment . . . for three, four, or five years.” (Italics added.) In addition, under 

count 2, the information alleged a gun use enhancement pursuant to subdivision 

(a)(1) of section 12022, which provides that “any person who is armed with a 

firearm in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an 

additional and consecutive term of imprisonment . . . for one year . . . .” (Italics 

added.) 

 Unlike enhancements under subdivision (a)(1) of section 667 (see pt.I.B.3., 

ante), these gun use enhancements are subject to the trial court’s discretionary 

authority under section 1385 to strike enhancements. (See People v. Jones (2007) 

157 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1380-1383.) “It is well established that, as a general 

matter, a court has discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c), to dismiss or 

strike an enhancement, or to ‘strike the additional punishment for that 

enhancement in the furtherance of justice.’” (People v. Meloney (2003) 30 Cal.4th 

1145, 1155.) Absent a clear statutory directive to the contrary, the court retains its 

discretion under section 1385 to strike an enhancement when imposing a sentence 

under the Three Strikes law. (People v. Bradley (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 386, 394-

395 (Bradley).) When a court exercises its power to strike an enhancement, it must 

set forth its reasons in writing in the minutes. (Id. at p. 391.) 

 Here, in sentencing Glasgow on counts 1 and 2, the trial court imposed 

consecutive terms of 25 years to life on the underlying offenses. However, the 

court ordered the gun use enhancements to run concurrently (without stating its 

reasons). 
23

We conclude that the imposition of concurrent enhancements resulted in a 

legally unauthorized sentence. Generally, the trial court has “a duty to impose 

sentence in accord with the law.” (Bradley, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) 

Under section 1385, the court has the discretion only to impose an enhancement or 

strike it. (People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 364.) Thus, for example, a 

court “has no authority to stay an enhancement, rather than strike it -- not, at least, 

when the only basis for doing either is its own discretionary sense of justice.” 

(Ibid.; People v. Jones (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 756, 757-758.) Because subdivisions 

(a)(1) and (c) of section 12022 specify that each enhancement shall be “an 

additional and consecutive term of imprisonment,” the trial court had discretion 

only to impose them consecutively or strike them. 

 Respondent contends that because Glasgow was subject to indeterminate 

sentencing under the Three Strikes law, the trial court properly imposed concurrent 

gun enhancements. As respondent notes, under that law (§§ 667, subd. (c)(6), 

1170.12, subdivision (a)(6)), a court has the discretion to select concurrent or 

consecutive sentencing for offenses committed on the same occasion or arising 

from the same set of facts. Because the offenses charged in counts 1 and 2 

occurred at the same time and place, respondent argues that the trial court properly 

ordered the enhancements to run concurrently. We disagree. 

 Because the gun enhancements are not offenses, the court’s discretion under 

the Three Strikes law to impose concurrent terms on the offenses underlying 

counts 1 and 2 did not encompass the enhancements. As our Supreme Court has 

explained, the provisions of the Three Strikes law upon which respondent relies 

mandate consecutive sentencing only for offenses not committed on the same 
24

occasion and not arising from the same set of operative facts.11 (People v. Hendrix

(1997) 16 Cal.4th 508, 512-513; see People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 

226; People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 590-591.) However, under the Three 

Strikes law, the court’s discretion to select consecutive or concurrent sentencing 

for “felony counts” -- that is, offenses -- is distinct from its discretion to strike or 

impose enhancements, when determining the sentence for each offense. 

 Generally, in sentencing a three-striker convicted of multiple offenses, the 

trial court is required to calculate the minimum determinate term of each offense’s 

indeterminate sentence. (People v. Williams, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 403-404; 

People v. Cartwright (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1141-1143; People v. Ayon

(1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 385, 392, disapproved on another ground in People v. 

Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 600, fn. 10; §§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. 

(c)(2)(A); see People v. Nguyen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 197, 205-206.) Once the 

minimum determinate term of the sentence for an offense has been identified, 

applicable enhancements are added to the minimum determinate term for that 

offense. (People v. Williams, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 403-404.) Absent a statutory 

directive to the contrary, the court has the discretion under section 1385 to strike or 

impose the enhancements with respect to each offense. (Bradley, supra, 64 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 394-395.) Upon determining the sentence for each offense 

(including the imposition or striking of enhancements), the court has the discretion 

to select concurrent or consecutive sentences for offenses committed on the same 

occasion or arising from the same set of facts. (People v. Hendrix, supra, 16 

11 Section 667, subdivision (c)(6), and section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6), state: “If 

there is a current conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same 

occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the 

defendant consecutively on each count . . . . ” 
25

Cal.4th at pp. 512-513; see People v. Lawrence, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 226; People 

v. Deloza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 590-591.) 

 Nothing in the Three Strikes law suggests that the trial court’s discretion to 

select concurrent sentencing for offenses also encompasses the prior stage of the 

sentencing determination, that is, the application of enhancements to the terms for 

individual offenses. Nor does the Three Strikes law contain any provision 

authorizing the court to impose concurrent terms for enhancements established as 

“additional and consecutive term[s] of imprisonment” (§ 12022, subds. (a)(1), (c)). 

Accordingly, the court erred in ordering the gun use enhancements to run 

concurrently. In sum, the matter must be remanded so that the court may exercise 

its discretion to impose the gun use enhancements as consecutive terms or strike 

them.12 

12 Although respondent claims to find support from People v. Oates (2004) 32 

Cal.4th 1048 (Oates), that decision comports with our analysis. Oates involved 

sentencing under the so-called “10-20-life law” found in section 12022.53, rather than 

under the Three Strikes law. (Oates, supra, at p. 1052.) As explained below, Oates

stands for the proposition that the trial court’s discretion to impose consecutive or 

concurrent indeterminate sentences does not modify its duty to impose enhancements in 

accordance with the statutes that create them. 

 In Oates, the defendant fired a gun at several people socializing in front of a 

house, injuring one of them. (Oates, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) The jury found the 

defendant guilty of five counts of attempted murder, and also found true gun use 

allegations under subdivision 12022.53, subdivision (d), which provides for an 

“additional and consecutive” 25-years-to-life enhancement when the defendant’s personal 

use of a gun causes great bodily injury “to any person other than an accomplice.” (Oates, 

supra, at p. 1053.) In the defendant’s subsequent appeal, the court held that section 654 

barred the imposition of such enhancements on two separate counts of attempted murder. 

Our Supreme Court reversed this determination, reasoning that the mandatory 

language of section 12022.53 required the imposition of multiple enhancements. (Oates, 

supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1055-1062.) In so concluding, the court stated: “[T]here is 

nothing anomalous about applying section 12022.53 in accordance with its language, 

such that the number of subdivision (d) enhancements imposed turns on the number of 

people defendant attempted to murder. Moreover, . . . a trial court can mitigate concerns 

(Fn. continued on next page.) 
26

5. Enhancements Under Section 667.5, Subdivision (b) 

Respondent contends the trial court erred in failing to impose or strike the 

enhancements pleaded and proved against Glasgow under section 667.5, 

subdivision (b). We agree. 

Subdivision (b) of section 667.5 provides: “[W]here the new offense is any 

felony for which a prison sentence . . . is imposed . . . , in addition and consecutive 

to any other sentence therefor, the court shall impose a one-year term for each prior 

separate prison term . . . for any felony . . . .” As explained in Garcia, when a 

defendant is subject to sentencing as a three striker, “the trial court [is] required to 

impose the section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancements or strike 

them in whole or in part pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a). Section 667.5, 

subdivision[] (a) . . . [,] contain[s] mandatory language, which requires the 

additional terms be imposed on every count. The enhancement language in section 

667.5 is mandatory unless the additional term is stricken.” (Garcia, supra, 167 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1561, fn. omitted.) 

Here, the information alleged such an enhancement under each count 

charged against Glasgow, and the trial court found that he had served a prior prison 

term, for purposes of the enhancement.13 However, in sentencing him, the court 

did not refer to the enhancements, and neither imposed nor struck them. In view of 

Garcia, the trial court’s failure to exercise its discretion with respect to each 

 

about sentencing inequities by imposing concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences 

where multiple subdivision (d) enhancements are found true. Thus, defendant’s assertion 

regarding possible sentencing anomalies does not justify departing from the statutory 

language.” (Id. at p. 1060, italics added.)

13 We recognize that the same conviction underlies the enhancements alleged under 

section 667.5, subdivision (b), and the three-year enhancement that the trial court 

imposed under Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (a). The court may 

properly impose both enhancements on the basis of a single prior conviction. (People v. 

Gokey (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 932, 935-937.)
27

enhancement resulted in an authorized sentence. (Garcia, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1561.) Accordingly, the matter must be remanded to permit the court to 

exercise its discretion regarding the prior prison term enhancements. (Id. at 

pp. 1561-1563; see also Bradley, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 391-392 [trial 

court’s failure to impose or strike section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement in 

sentencing three striker required remand for exercise of discretion].) 

 6. Custody Credits 

 Glasgow contends the trial court miscalculated his presentence custody 

credits. The trial court awarded Glasgow credit for 567 days of actual custody. He 

argues that he is entitled to credit for an additional day of actual custody . 

Respondent agrees. We conclude that Glasgow’s custody credits must be 

corrected to reflect a total of 568 days of actual custody. 

II Alvarez

 After an examination of the record, Alvarez’s court-appointed counsel filed 

an opening brief raising no issues and requesting this court to review the record 

independently pursuant to Wende. In addition, counsel advised Alvarez of her 

right to submit by supplemental brief any contentions or argument she wished the 

court to consider. Alvarez has neither presented a brief nor identified any potential 

issues. Our examination of the entire record establishes that Alvarez’s counsel has 

fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (Wende, 

supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.) 
28

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment against Glasgow is reversed solely with respect to his 

sentence, and the matter is remanded for resentencing for limited purposes, with 

directions to the trial court to impose a single five-year enhancement under section 

667, subdivision (a)(1), on each of counts 1 through 3 and 5 through 9; to exercise 

its discretion with respect to the enhancements under section 12022, subdivisions 

(a)(1) and (c), and section 667.5, subdivision (b); and to correct Glasgow’s custody 

credits. Upon resentencing, the court is directed to prepare a corrected abstract of 

judgment and forward a copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 

The judgment against Glasgow is affirmed in all other respects. 

 The judgment against Alvarez is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 MANELLA, J. 

We concur: 

WILLHITE, Acting P. J. 

SUZUKAWA, J.