J-S45002-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JESSE R. HILES, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

BOROUGH OF LANSFORD,

Appellee No. 250 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 21, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County

Civil Division at No(s): 16-2229

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 07, 2019

Appellant, Jesse R. Hiles, appeals from the judgment entered in favor of 

Appellee, Borough of Lansford (“Lansford”), following a non-jury trial. We 

affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

On September 14, 2016, [Appellant] filed a Complaint against 

[Lansford] asserting that water run-off caused by [Lansford’s] 

construction is damaging his triangularly[-]shaped property 

located at the intersection of Cortright Street and West Ridge 

Street in Lansford. On February 3, 2017, [Lansford] filed an 

Answer and New Matter averring that storm water is a common 

enemy that enters [Appellant’s] property as a natural effect of the 

elevation.

Following a non-jury trial held before this [c]ourt on July 25, 2017, 

and September 22, 2017, proposed Findings of Fact and 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Conclusions of Law were submitted by counsel for both parties on 

November 3, 2017. On June 1, 2018, upon review of counsels’ 

submissions and careful consideration of the evidence presented 

at trial, this [c]ourt entered a decision and verdict finding that 

[Appellant] had failed to establish by a preponderance of the 

evidence that [Lansford] caused an increase in the amount of 

water that runs from West Ridge Street and Cortright Street onto 

[Appellant’s] property during rain storms. Accordingly, this 

[c]ourt found in favor of [Lansford] on all claims set forth in 

[Appellant’s] Complaint.[1] 

On June 11, 2018, [Appellant] filed a post-verdict motion. On July 

25, 2018, [Lansford] filed a brief in opposition to that motion. The 

parties agreed to waive oral argument on [Appellant’s] motion, 

which was scheduled for August 24, 2018, and rely upon their 

filings. On December 20, 2018, this [c]ourt entered an order 

denying [Appellant’s] motion. 

On January 18, 2019, [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal to the 

Superior Court. On January 28, 2019, this [c]ourt entered an 

order directing [Appellant] to file of record, within twenty-one (21) 

days, a concise statement of the matters complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). 

On February 14, 2019, as a final judgment had not been entered 

in this matter, the Superior Court entered an order directing 

[Appellant] to praecipe the Carbon County Prothonotary to enter 

judgment on [the trial court’s] decision. On February 15, 2019, 

[Appellant] submitted a concise statement in compliance with [the 

court’s] order. On February 19, 2019, [Appellant] filed a praecipe 

for judgment and, on February 21, 2019, judgment was entered 

in favor of [Lansford] and against [Appellant].1

1 As provided in the Superior Court’s order of February 14, 

2019, [Appellant’s] notice of appeal will be treated as having 

been filed on February 21, 2019, after the entry of judgment 

in this matter. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5).

Trial Court Opinion, 4/15/2019, at 1-3. 

Presently, Appellant raises five issues for our review:

____________________________________________

1 Specifically, Appellant’s complaint included counts for trespass, injunctive 

relief, and de facto taking. 
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1. Whether the [v]erdict was supported by the evidence 

presented?

2. Where the Pennsylvania Storm[ W]ater Management Act, 32 

P.S. [§] 680[.]13[,] requires a landowner and any person engaged 

in the alteration or development of land which may affect storm 

water run-off characteristics to implement such measures as are 

consistent with the provision of the applicable storm[]water 

management plan and as are reasonably necessary to prevent 

injury to health, safety or property with the purpose being to 

assure that the maximum rate of storm[]water run-off is no 

greater after development tha[n] prior to development and to 

manage the quality, velocity and direction of the resulting 

storm[]water run[-]off in such a manner as to adequately protect 

health and property from possible injury[,] did the court correctly 

apply this Act to the facts presented?

3. Whether the [c]ourt erred in not allowing [Appellant] to present 

testimony from David Hiles, who has a degree in engineering as 

to the cause of the increased water run-off onto the property of 

his brother, [Appellant] herein?

4. Whether [the trial c]ourt misapplied the [l]aw to the facts 

presented and is contrary to law [sic] in that it applied the 

“[c]ommon [e]nemy” rule to the facts of this case because the 

“[c]ommon [e]nemy” [r]ule does not apply where the owner of 

the higher ground diverts the water from a natural channel[,]

LaFoam v. Bethlehem Twp., ... 499 A.2d 1372 ([Pa. Super.] 

1985)[,] which the testimony showed was done as a result of the 

work done in approximately 1996 when [Lansford] re-graded the 

entire roadway to change the roadway from a swale[-]type 

roadway to a crowned roadway. This provision only applies to 

protect an owner of higher ground from liability due to damage 

caused by water naturally flowing from one level to another 

which is not the case at [b]ar? [sic]

5. Whether [Lansford] assumed the responsibility for the water 

run-off to the roadway based upon [its] making various attempts 

to address the water run-off including[,] but not limited to[,]

installing a swale with blacktop, placing a bituminous curb along 

the roadway, laying stone, placing fill into the gullies and trenches 

created by the water run[-]off, and installing curbing and 

handicapped ramps in the area?

Appellant’s Brief at iv-v (emphasis in original). 
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Although Appellant raises five issues in his statement of questions 

involved, he does not divide the argument section of his brief “into as many 

parts as there are questions to be argued....” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Furthermore, 

despite raising multiple issues, the entire argument section of Appellant’s brief 

consists of a mere three pages. See Appellant’s Brief at 6-8. Therein, 

Appellant provides only two case citations — with no meaningful analysis

accompanying them — to support his five claims. See id. It is wellestablished that “[t]his Court will not act as counsel and will not develop 

arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 

1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) 

(requiring that the argument section have “such discussion and citation of 

authorities as are deemed pertinent”). “The Rules of Appellate Procedure 

state unequivocally that each question an appellant raises is to be supported 

by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority. Appellate arguments which 

fail to adhere to these rules may be considered waived, and arguments which 

are not appropriately developed are waived.” Coulter, 94 A.3d at 1088

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Appellant 

completely fails to cite to the record in his argument section, even though he 

devotes most of his three-page argument to discussing and challenging certain 

testimony given at trial. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (“If reference is made to the 

... evidence ... or any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must 

set forth, in immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a 

reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears....”); 
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Appellant’s Brief at 7-8 (arguing which witnesses’ testimony should be found

credible). In addition, Appellant neglects to include a table of citations and a 

statement of both the scope of review and standard of review in his brief. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 2174(b); Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(3). These multiple deficiencies hinder 

our review. Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s issues are waived, and 

therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Judgment affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/7/19