alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### BALLEW v. STATE.

No. 19926.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 16, 1938.

Mahan & Broughton, of Childress, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, Presiding Judge.

The conviction is for the unlawful sale of whisky in a dry area; penalty assessed at a fine of $200.

Two young men testified for the State to the effect that on the night of February 20, 1937, they purchased from the appellant at his place of business a half-pint of whisky for which they paid him sixty-four cents; that shortly thereafter while riding in an automobile with some girls they were stopped by two officers. The witnesses were taken to the city hall where the County Attorney ascertained from them the name of the person from whom they purchased the whisky, after which they were released. However, the whisky was retained by the officers and introduced in evidence upon the trial.

The appellant did not testify upon the trial and introduced no defensive evidence.

The only bill of exception found in the record is that complaining of the court’s charge in -failing to define the meaning of the -term “sale”. However, the *347court gave a special charge requested by the appellant in which the term “sale” was defined as “the transfer of property from one person to another in exchange for money or some other valuable consideration.” Under the circumstances, we think no error is presented by the bill.

Deeming the evidence sufficient to ■support the conviction, the judgment is affirmed.

    
    My job title during the notice period will be Vice-President, Managing
Director, Atmel Rousset SAS.
    
    I will in particular be responsible for finishing the information and
consultation procedure (former Book III) and social plan with the works council, acting
as the legal representative for Atmel Rousset SAS in such process;
    
    I will also take on any special projects in relation to the Rousset site and
the ASIC Business Unit assigned to me by Jean Vaylet and generally support Jean Vaylet
in the handover period;
    
    As discussed and in order to support Jean Vaylet in a seamless transfer of my
present duties, I will be re-hired under a part time contract (1 day per week) up to
twelve (12) months. The first ninety (90) days will be a fixed term with the option
for either party to terminate the agreement with sixty (60) day notice (until end of
2009).
 
    
    Title: Director Special Projects
    
    Salary: 20% of my present total (France and US) gross salary
    
    Keep my PC and mobile phone.




---



##### 




    
    Effective 1 February 2009 and only for the time I am working for Atmel, Atmel
will pay 20% of the lease and maintenance cost of my present company car. I will
pay the remaining costs.
   Yours sincerely,/s/ BERNARD PRUNIAUXBernard Pruniaux cc.
    
    Jean-Pierre Sorange, Director of Human Resources, Atmel Rousset S.A.S
Jean Vaylet 
 Agreed and acknowledge/s/ STEVE LAUBSteve LaubPresident and CEO
Atmel Corporation Dated  10/17/08 -2-
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

March 6, 2015

N o. 04

- 14

- 00564

- CV

IN THE ESTATE OF WADE R. BEDELL, JR ., Deceased,

From the Probate Court No 2, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013

- PC

- 0636

Honorable Tom Rickhoff, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

The Appellant ’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief has this date been received

and filed in the above styled and numbered cause. Extension of time to file the Appellant’s brief

is this date GRANTED. Time is extended to April 13, 2015.



### PER CURIAM

A TTESTED TO:

____________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

CLERK OF COURT

cc: John Wennermark

1924 N Main Ave.

San Antonio, TX 78212

- 3942

James W. Carter, IV

Langley & Banack, Inc.

745 E. Mulberry, Suite 900

San Antonio, TX 78212 Robinson C. Ramsey

L angley & Banack, Inc.

Trinity Plaza II Suite 900

San Antonio, TX 78212

- 3141
CLD-214 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-1888

___________

IN RE: AKILAH SHABAZZ,

 Petitioner

____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(Related to Criminal No. 3-12-cr-00064-001)

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

April 25, 2013

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 21, 2013)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Pro se petitioner, Akilah Shabazz, seeks a writ of mandamus directing the United 

States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to impose a sentence in 

United States v. Shabazz, D.C. Criminal No. 3-12-cr-00064-001, in which he was found 

guilty of aggravated identity theft and related offenses on November 7, 2012, and to rule 

on his motion for release pending appeal, which was filed on January 28, 2013. By order 
2

entered May 3, 2013, the District Court scheduled sentencing for Shabazz on May 21, 

2013. Thus, Shabazz will obtain the remedy he seeks concerning sentencing. We are 

confident that the District Court will rule on his motion for release pending appeal in due 

course. Accordingly, we will deny the petition.

1

 

1

Even if sentencing were not scheduled, we would still deny the mandamus petition. 

Mandamus is a “drastic remedy” available in extraordinary circumstances only. In re: 

Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). Mandamus may be 

warranted when a district court’s delay in handling a case “is tantamount to a failure to 

exercise jurisdiction.” Madden, 102 F.3d at 79. However, the delay complained of by 

Shabazz is not tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction. Shabazz was found guilty 

on November 7, 2012. The presentence investigation report was filed on January 30, 

2013. On January 28, 2013, Shabazz filed a motion for release pending appeal and on 

February 20, 2013, he filed objections to the presentence report. Because only two 

months have passed since Shabazz filed his objections to the presentence report and three 

months since the filing of his motion for release pending appeal, the delay “does not yet 

rise to the level of a denial of due process.” Madden, 102 F.3d at 79 (denying a 

mandamus petition where the district court had not ruled on petitioner’s motion in four 

months). See also United States v. Campisi, 583 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1978) (five month 

delay between guilty plea and sentence was not “unreasonable” within the meaning of 

Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)).
Unassociated Document


    Exhibit
      10.1

    


    Water
      Science, LLC

    1800
      NW
      89th
      Place


    Miami,
      Florida 33172

    


    October
      30, 2008

    


     

    EAU
      Technologies, Inc.

    1890
      Cobb
      International Blvd., Suite A

    Kennesaw,
      Georgia 30152

    


    
      	 	
              Re:

            	
              Limited
                Waiver of Section 2.4 of Warrant Agreement dated May 9, 2007, and
                Section
                9 of Second Amended and Restated Senior Secured Convertible Promissory
                Note dated October 6, 2008

            


    

    


    Gentlemen:

    


    Reference
      is made to (a) the Warrant Agreement dated May 9, 2007, by and between Water
      Science, LLC (the "Investor") and EAU Technologies, Inc. (the "Company"), and
      (b) the Second Amended and Restated Senior Secured Convertible Promissory Note,
      dated as of October 6, 2008 by and between the Investor and the Company (the
      "Second Amended Convertible Note").

    


    The
      Board
      of Directors of the Company, or the Compensation Committee thereof, has approved
      the issuance of 100,000
      of
      shares of its $0.0001 par value common stock at a sales price of $1.00
      per
      share to Theodore C. Jacoby, Jr., a director of the Company. Investor hereby
      agrees that the issuance of the shares of stock will not cause an adjustment
      in
      (a) the Conversion Price of $1.00 pursuant to Section 9 under the Second Amended
      Convertible Note, or (b) the Purchase Price pursuant to Section 2.4 of the
      Warrant Agreement.

     

    
      	 	 	 
	 	Very truly yours,
	 	 
	 	WATER
              SCIENCE,
              LLC
	 	 
	 	
              Peter F. Ullrich

              
                Manager
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    Exhibit 23.2


                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 Nos. 33-59918, 33-59916, 33-59920, 33-91900, 33-92684, 333-19487,
33-99976 and 333-26565) pertaining to the Davstar Industries Ltd. Stock Option
Plan, 1992 Employee Stock Option Plan, the Non- Employee Directors Stock Option
Plan, the Davstar Industries Ltd. 1994 Stock Incentive Plan, Dacomed 1989 Stock
Option Plan, 1996 Directors Non-Qualified Stock Incentive Plan, Employee Stock
Purchase Plan, Advanced Surgical 1992 Stock Plan and Employee Reserved Stock
Agreement, the X-Cardia 1996 Stock Option Plan and the Microsurge, Inc. Stock
Option Plan of Imagyn Medical Technologies, Inc. of our reports dated July 8,
1997, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of
UROHEALTH Systems, Inc. (before giving effect to the business combination with
Imagyn Medical, Inc. which occurred on September 29, 1997 and was accounted for
as a pooling of interest) included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year
ended March 31, 1998.



                                        /s/ Ernst & Young,  L.L.P.




Orange County, California
July 9, 1998
Second Amendment to Long-Term Incentive Plan



 Exhibit 10.05 
 SECOND AMENDMENT 
 TO THE 
 STATE AUTO FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
 LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN 
 Background Information 
  

	A.	 State Auto Financial Corporation (“STFC”) previously adopted and maintains the State Auto Financial Corporation Long-Term Incentive Plan (the
“Plan”) for the benefit of its executive officers and other key management employees, managers and professionals. 


  

	B.	 STFC desires to amend the Plan to comply with final regulations under Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”).



  

	C.	 Article 9 of the Plan permits the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of STFC to amend the Plan and the Board authorized such an amendment at a
meeting held on November 9, 2007. 


 Amendment of the Plan 
 The Plan is hereby amended effective January 1, 2009 as follows: 
  

	1.	 The last sentence of Section 5.1 of the Plan is hereby amended in its entirety to read as follows: 


 The Administrator may provide for deferred payment of any Final Award in accordance with the terms and conditions for making such a
deferred compensation election contained in the State Auto Property & Casualty Insurance Company Amended and Restated Incentive Deferred Compensation Plan, as the same may be amended from time to time. 
  

	2.	 All other provisions of the Plan shall remain in full force and effect. 


  

			
	STATE AUTO FINANCIAL CORPORATION
		
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Robert P. Restrepo, Jr.

		
	 Title:
	 	 President
#### W. A. HANNA v. STATE.

No. 20708.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 3, 1940.

J. V. Patterson, of Decatur, and Fred Minor, of Denton, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The appellant was convicted for the offense of converting funds belonging to Wise County alleged to be in his possession, and was given a penalty of two years in the penitentiary.

For the reasons stated in Hanna v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 135 S.W.2d 105, this case is reversed and remanded.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>               5
<MULTIPLIER>            1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                    SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                            8,790
<SECURITIES>                     62,512
<RECEIVABLES>                    24,308
<ALLOWANCES>                        240
<INVENTORY>                           0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                 97,168
<PP&E>                          199,007
<DEPRECIATION>                   33,942
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  264,300
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>            50,649
<BONDS>                          28,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0
<PREFERRED>                           0
<COMMON>                          4,012
<OTHER-SE>                      179,440
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    264,300
<SALES>                          98,355
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                147,351
<CGS>                                 0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                    86,595
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  2,100
<LOSS-PROVISION>                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                1,563
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  65,010
<INCOME-TAX>                     26,464
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              38,546
<DISCONTINUED>                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0
<CHANGES>                             0
<NET-INCOME>                     38,546
<EPS-PRIMARY>                      2.41
<EPS-DILUTED>                      2.41
        

</TABLE>
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JULY 15, 2016

NO. 03-16-00097-CV

J. L. S., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 22ND DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, GOODWIN, AND FIELD

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION -- OPINION BY JUSTICE FIELD

This is an appeal from the trial court’s judgment in a suit affecting a parent and child relationship 

signed July 7, 2015 and an order denying a request for de novo review signed by the trial court

on January 25, 2016. Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments it appears that the 

Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. Therefore, the Court dismisses the appeal for want of 

jurisdiction. Appellant shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court 

below.
EXHIBIT 31.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(a) OR RULE 15d-14(a)

I, C. Patrick Machado, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Medivation, Inc. (the Company);

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my
knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented
in this report;

4. The Companys other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures
(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures,
or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Companys most recent
fiscal quarter (the Companys fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Companys internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The Companys other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
Companys auditors and the audit committee of the Companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Companys ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant
role in the Companys internal control over financial reporting.

Dated: August 13, 2007



|       |  |                                                  
|------ |  | -------------------------------------------------
|       |  | /s/ C. Patrick Machado                           
|Name:  |  | C. Patrick Machado                               
|Title: |  | Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jerry Armstrong, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Goldstein, J.), rendered March 8, 1988, convicting him of burglary in the second degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant’s contention that the People’s witnesses were not credible because of claimed inconsistencies between their respective evidence as well as inconsistencies between their trial testimony and prior statements is without merit. Resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact which saw and heard the witnesses *(see, People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see, People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]). Eiber, J. P., Sullivan, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1515

To authorize the exchange of certain public lands in Nevada.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 29, 1993

Mrs. VUCANOVICH (for herself and Mr. BILBRAY) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources

A BILL

To authorize the exchange of certain public lands in Nevada.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION OF EXCHANGE.

4 (a) AUTHORIZATION AND WITHDRAWAL.—(1) If no

5 later than one year after the date of enactment of this

6 Act, the owner of the Primadonna lands (as defined in

7 subsection (c)) offers to convey such lands to the United

8 States in exchange for the exchangeable public lands (as

9 such term is defined in subsection (c)), the Secretary of

10 the Interior is authorized to carry out such exchange, pur11 suant to the requirements of subsection (b).
2

HR 1515 IH

1 (2) Subject to valid existing rights, the exchangeable

2 lands are hereby withdrawn from all forms of entry, ap3 propriation, and patent under the public land laws and

4 the mining and mineral and geothermal leasing laws. This

5 withdrawal shall terminate one year after the date of en6 actment of this Act, unless the Secretary acts to continue

7 it in effect thereafter.

8 (b) REQUIREMENTS.—(1) Any exchange of lands

9 pursuant to this section shall be on the basis of equal

10 value, except that the United States shall not be liable

11 for any cash payment to the owner of the Primadonna

12 lands, while such owner shall pay to the United States

13 the difference, if any, between the fair market value of

14 the Primadonna lands and the exchangeable public lands,

15 without regard to any limitations on such payments to the

16 United States under section 206(b) of the Federal Land

17 Policy and Management Act of 1976 or other applicable

18 law.

19 (2) The Secretary of the Interior shall not be required

20 to review or revise any land use plans prepared pursuant

21 to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976

22 in order to carry out an exchange under this section, but

23 nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the

24 Secretary to carry out such an exchange or except as spec25 ified in paragraph (1) of this subsection with regard to
3

HR 1515 IH

1 equalization payments as relieving the Secretary from

2 compliance with any other provision of that Act or other

3 law applicable to any proposal for disposal of public lands

4 through exchange.

5 (c) LANDS.—(1) The term ‘‘Primadonna lands’’

6 means that parcel, amounting to approximately one hun7 dred and sixty-six acres, designated as ‘‘Parcel 2’’ on the

8 map entitled ‘‘Primm South Real Estate Company—Bu9 reau of Land Management Land Exchange’’ numbered

10 and dated .

11 (2) The term ‘‘exchangeable public lands’’ means the

12 tract of public lands, amounting to approximately two

13 hundred and fourteen acres, designated as ‘‘Parcel 1’’ on

14 the map referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection.

Æ