FOR BU PUBLICATIONLBLICA

ATTORNEYS  FOR APPELLANT:	ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

KEVIN P. MCGOFF			JEFFREY A. MODISETT

ALICIA A. GOODENK   iefer & McGoff			Attorney General of Indiana

indianapoliKiefer & McGoff. 

Indianapolis, Indiana			ANDREW L. HEDGES

			Deputy Attorney General

			Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

DIANA JAUNESE,			)

			)

	Appellant-Defendant,	)

			)

		vs.	)	No.  48A02-9711-CR-790

			)

STATE OF INDIANA,	)

			)

	Appellee-Plaintiff.	)

APPEAL FROM THE MADISON SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Thomas Newman, Jr., Judge

Cause No.  48D03-9607-CF-247

NovemberNovember 30, 1998(Handdown Date)

MEMORANDUM DECISIONOPINION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RUCKER, Judge

************************************************************************

MEMORANDUM

TO:		Judge Robert D. Rucker

FROM:	Kirstie D. Andersen

RE:		Jaunese v. State

		Court of Appeals Cause No.  48A03-9711-CR-790

		Lower Court Cause No.  48D03-9607-CF-247

Date Assigned:  10-02-98

First Draft Submitted: 

First DraftMemo sSubmitted:  10-22-98

WordPerfect ID:  O:JAUNESE.DOC

File System Headings:  CRIMINAL

				Evidence

					Inferences

					Sufficiencty

						Assisting a Criminal

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	Appellant-Defendant Diana Jaunese appeals her conviction for assisting a criminal, as a Class C felony.1  Jaunese raises several issues for our review, one of which is dispositive:  whether the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction.

	We reverse.

	On the night of June 23, 1995, John Golden, Deron Sparks, and Jaunese went to a bar

in Anderson, Indiana.  While at the bar, Golden began to fight with Jack Tomlinson.  During

the course of the fight, Golden stabbed Tomlinson causing Tomlinson's death.    Golden,

Sparks, and Jaunese then fled the scene arriving at Sparks' apartment shortly thereafter. 

Sparks instructed Golden and Jaunese to tell police they saw a woman in the crowd who had

a knife and that she may have stabbed Tomlinson.

	Police arrested Jaunese the next morningat approximately 3:00 a.m. and held her for questioning.  After

informing her that she was not a  suspect, Jaunese gave police a statement.   Jaunese stated that

Golden fought with Tomlinson but did not stab him.  She also told police that she observed

a woman in the crowd carrying a knife.  Despite Jaunese's statement, the State charged

Golden with murder.  Jaunese and Sparks continued to encourage Golden to claim a woman

stabbed Tomlinson.  They further advised him not to claim he stabbed Tomlinson in self-

defense.  During Golden's trial, Jaunese assertedcontinued to assert that Golden did not stab Tomlinson and

repeated the story about the woman in the crowd.  A jury found Golden guilty of murder. 

Following Golden's conviction, the State charged Jaunese with assisting a criminal, as a Class

C felony.  A jury found her guilty.  This appeal ensued in due course. 

	Jaunese contends the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for assisting

a criminal.  Indiana Code § 35-44-3-2 states in pertinent part:

		A person not standing in the relation of parent, child, or spouse

to another person who has committed a crime or is a fugitive

from justice who, with intent to hinder the apprehension or

punishment of the other person, harbors, conceals, or otherwise

assists the person commits assisting a criminal . . . .

The burden of proving all elements of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt rests

with the State.  Geljack v. State, 671 N.E.2d 163, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).  Thus, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:  "to convict Diana Jaunese, the State must have proved

each of the following elements; Diana Jaunese (1) was not the parent, child or spouse of John

W. Golden . . . ."  R. at 65.  Jaunese argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that  she did not stand in one of the relationships enumerated in the statute.

	Jaunese maintains that there were no facts from which the jury could deduce her

relationship with Golden was not one of spouse, parent, or child.  The State counters it

presented sufficient evidence that Golden and Jaunese did not stand in a privileged

relationship.  The evidence upon whichith the State relies consists of  the following:  (1)

Golden's references to his fiLori, his finaancee at the time ofat the time he of the crimetestimony referring to histestifying that he had a fiancee named Lori when the crime was committed; (2) a letter written by Golden

referring to both Jaunese and Golden's mother; and (3) testimony from which the jury could

estimateinfer Jaunese's age.  The State asserts that the foregoing evidence was  such that the jury

could infer Jaunese was not Golden's wife, mother, or child.  Thus, the State claims it carried

its burden of proof in this regard.  We disagree.

	When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, we will neither reweigh

the evidence nor judge witness credibility.  Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509, 516 (Ind. 1997), reh'g denied.  We examine only the evidence most favorable to the State together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and if there is substantial evidence to

support the conviction, it will not be set aside.  Sears v. State, 668 N.E.2d 662, 670 (Ind. 1996).

	In this case, we must determine whether the jury could reasonably infer that Jaunese

was not Golden's spouse, parent, or child.  We agree with Jaunese that the inference that she

was not Golden's spouse was unreasonable.2

	"An inference is a process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be

established is deducted as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts already

proved or admitted."  Lewis v. State, 535 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).  An inference which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence constitutes relevant evidence to

be considered by the fact-finder.  Id.  However, a fact-finder's determination cannot stand if it is based upon mere speculation or conjecture.  Darlage v. Drummond, 576 N.E.2d 1303, 131108 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).

	The State argues that because Golden testified to having a girlfriend when Jaunese

allegedly assisted him, the jury could infer Golden was not married to JaunseseJaunese was not his wife.  We first note

that it is curious that the State relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element which is easily proven through direct evidence.  the The StateSecond, we find it unreasonable to conclude tjathat

a personbecause a person has a significant other, he or she is not married for the sole reason that he or she ahas ashappens to have significannt other. 

ExtUnfortunately, extramarital affairs are all too common in today's society.3  Given the Without any other evidence to the contrary, the wexistence of a girlfriena significant other is too premote to prove a person

is not married

 to someone else.td o that a person

does not have a spouse because he because

a person has a girlfsignificant other, he  he or she does not have  aspo   Therefore, we find the evidenc epe presented insufficient to congvict Jaunese of

assisting a criminilaal.

	Judgment rReversed.

 and remanded with instructions to enter judgment considstent with

this opinion.GARRARD, J., and RILEY, J., concur.