SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4959-16T2

THOMAS PALLOTTA,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

UNITED AIRLINES,

Respondent-Respondent.

____________________________

Submitted April 11, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Currier and Geiger.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of 

Labor and Workforce Development, Division of 

Workers' Compensation, Claim Petition No. 

2014-25491.

Martin Melody, LLC, attorneys for appellant 

(Eugene J. Melody and Nancy S. Martin, of 

counsel and on the briefs).

Braff Harris Sukoneck & Maloof, attorneys for 

respondent (Daniel A. Lynn, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this workers' compensation case, petitioner Thomas 

Pallotta appeals from the counsel fee award in the June 13, 2017 

order approving settlement. Because the workers' compensation 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

June 20, 2018
2 A-4959-16T2

judge refused to place her reasons on the record as required under 

Rule 1:7-4(a), we vacate the order and remand for further 

proceedings. 

Petitioner sustained injuries while at work and filed a claim

for workers compensation benefits. After three years of 

litigation, the parties reached a resolution and appeared in court 

on June 13, 2017 for judicial approval of the settlement. At the 

close of the proceeding, petitioner's counsel noted the counsel 

fee award was 15% and not the maximum 20% fee authorized under 

N.J.S.A. 34:15-64. The following colloquy ensued:

COUNSEL: Your Honor, is there a reduction in 

counsel fee in this case?

THE JUDGE: Yes.

COUNSEL: Why?

THE JUDGE: You can appeal me. 

COUNSEL: Can I be heard on that?

THE JUDGE: You can appeal me.

Thereafter, the judge left the bench.

On appeal, petitioner argues that the judge erred in reducing 

the counsel fee award without providing any reasons, findings, or 

justifications on the record or in a written opinion. 

"The factual findings of the compensation court are entitled 

to substantial deference." Ramos v. M & F Fashions, Inc., 154 
3 A-4959-16T2

N.J. 583, 594 (1998). In reviewing the decision of a workers' 

compensation judge, this court

must "limit[] its inquiry solely to whether 

the findings . . . could reasonably have been 

reached on sufficient credible evidence 

present in the record, considering the proofs 

as a whole, with due regard to the opportunity 

of one who heard the witnesses to judge of 

their credibility and with due regard to his 

expertise."

[Ibid. (quoting Bradley v. Henry Townsend 

Moving & Storage Co., 78 N.J. 532, 534 

(1979)).]

Rule 1:7-4(a) states that a trial judge "shall, by an opinion 

or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and 

state [his or her] conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried 

without a jury." "The rule requires specific findings of fact 

and conclusions of law." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court 

Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 1:7-4 (2018). As noted by our Supreme Court,

[b]ecause it is fundamental to the fairness 

of the proceedings and serves as a necessary 

predicate to meaningful review . . . "a trial 

court must analyze the [relevant] factors in 

determining an award of reasonable counsel 

fees and then must state its reasons on the 

record for awarding a particular fee."

[R.M. v. Supreme Court of N.J., 190 N.J. 1, 

12 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 

21 (2004)).]

Here, the compensation judge failed to explain her reasons 

for the attorney fee award and refused to do so even after 
4 A-4959-16T2

requested by counsel. Instead, she directed counsel to "appeal 

[her]." We discern no basis for the court's antagonistic reaction.

All parties are entitled to the reasons for a court's decision.

Therefore, we vacate the portion of the settlement regarding the

fee award and remand to the compensation court to make findings 

of fact and conclusions of law consistent with Rule 1:7-4(a).1

Reversed, vacated, and remanded. We do not retain 

jurisdiction. 

 

1 The judge presented a letter after appeal to this court pursuant 

to Rule 2:5-1(b), stating that the petitioner was awarded a 15% 

counsel fee, which was entirely within her discretion and 

reasonable under the circumstances. No reasons were given for the 

reduction of the commonly awarded 20% fee.