Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 41A05-1708-SC-1766 | December 21, 2017 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Kevin Campbell

Marietta, Georgia

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kevin Campbell,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Irenea George,

Appellee-Defendant

December 21, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

41A05-1708-SC-1766

Appeal from the Johnson County 

Superior Court I

The Honorable 

Kevin M. Barton, Judge

Douglas Cummins, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No. 

41D01-1604-SC-1070 

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

[1] After Kevin Campbell and Irenea George ended their relationship and he 

moved out, Kevin brought a small-claims action against Irenea for the return of 
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a dog, Snickers, that was adopted during their relationship. The court allowed 

Irenea to keep the dog, and Kevin now appeals. We affirm the small-claims 

court. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Kevin and Irenea began dating in 2008; Kevin later moved into Irenea’s home 

along with her children and pets. On April 1, 2014, Irenea responded to a 

Facebook post by Kristina Strickland, who was trying to find a new home for 

her four-month-old chocolate Labrador Retriever puppy. That same day, 

Irenea and Kevin went to Kristina’s house and took possession of the puppy, 

who was given the name Snickers. Shannon Pepperack was at Kristina’s house

at the time of Kevin and Irenea’s visit. 

[3] On March 25, 2016—after Kevin and Irenea had ended their relationship and 

Kevin was in the process of moving to Georgia—an argument erupted over 

who got to keep Snickers, and police were called. Irenea kept Snickers, but on 

April 5, Kevin filed a notice of claim in Johnson County, seeking Snickers’s 

return from Irenea’s possession and $6000 in damages, the jurisdictional limit 

for small-claims actions. On June 9, Kevin and Irenea both appeared in person 

before a magistrate in Johnson Superior Court No. 1 and pled their cases. 

Among other things, Kevin presented a letter from Kristina, who was living in 

West Virginia at the time. The letter said that she gave the dog to Kevin. Ex. 

3. Irenea presented testimony from Shannon, who said that Kristina gave 

Snickers to Irenea “for [her] kids and the[ir] older dog to have companionship 
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until the dog passes and then [they] . . . would already [have] another dog 

[established] in the house to where it wouldn’t be as devastating . . . .” Tr. pp. 

38-40. The magistrate took the matter under advisement and, later the same 

day, issued an order finding Snickers belonged to Irenea and denying Kevin’s 

claim for monetary damages because “Snickers was given to the parties and no 

dollar amount was presented as to [the dog’s] value.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II 

p. 10. The magistrate specifically found:

The parties agree that Snickers was acquired while the parties 

resided together in an intimate relationship. The animal was 

acquired after [Irenea] made contact with Snickers’ previous 

owners following a Facebook post seeking to re-home Snickers. 

A letter presented by one of the animal’s previous owners, 

[Kristina], indicates she was contacted by [Irenea], the parties

arrived to meet and take possession of Snickers, she “decided to 

give the dog to [Kevin] . . . [Kevin and Irenea] took the dog 

home that same day.” All contact with [Kristina] prior to the 

day of the adoption was made by [Irenea]. Snickers’ other 

previous owner, [Shannon], testified in Court that she gave the 

dog to [Irenea] and [Irenea’s] children as a companion to an 

older dog already living at the residence in order to be a 

companion to the older pet and make the transition easier on 

[Irenea’s] children once the older dog passed.

Numerous exhibits and extensive testimony was presented by 

both parties as to who performed certain duties with the dog. 

[Kevin] had the dog micro-chipped, [Irenea] enrolled the dog in 

behavior training, etc., etc. Both paid for certain veterinarian 

visits and food for Snickers.

With conflicting testimony from the parties, the Court finds 

[Shannon’s] testimony credible in that she gave Snickers to 
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[Irenea] to assist in the transition period for [Irenea’s] children 

once her older dog passed and to be companion dog to [Irenea’s]

older animal.

Id. (emphases added). This order was never signed or otherwise adopted by the

judge of Johnson Superior Court No. 1. Kevin filed a Trial Rule 60(B) motion 

for relief from judgment “due to fraud upon the court,” id. at 19, which mainly

addressed whether Shannon was actually a previous owner of Snickers, and a 

motion to correct errors, both of which the magistrate denied in orders signed 

by him only.

[4] Kevin appealed to this Court raising numerous issues, but we found one 

dispositive. That is, we held that the magistrate’s order was not a final 

appealable order by statute. Campbell v. George, 77 N.E.3d 816, 818 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2017). We remanded “for adoption or rejection of the magistrate’s order 

by the court.” Id. 

[5] On remand, the judge of Johnson Superior Court No. 1 issued the following 

order dated June 15, 2017:

5. The Court accepts the findings and Order And Judgment 

entered by the Magistrate as a final appealable order. 

6. In addition, the Court has reviewed the evidence presented 

and finds that the Magistrate’s Order And Judgment is supported 

by evidence presented.
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7. By [Kevin’s] Verified Motion For The Court to Reject The 

Magistrate’s Order, [Kevin] raises issues in opposition to the 

Magistrate’s decision.

A. [Shannon’s] testimony.

The Magistrate entered a finding that [Shannon] was the prior 

owner and that she gave the dog to [Irenea]. [Kevin] asserts that 

the Magistrate incorrectly attributed ownership of “Snickers” to 

[Shannon]. 

[Shannon] did not testify that she was a prior owner of 

“Snickers”. However, [Irenea] testified that “Snickers” was a 

“community dog” in the household shared by [Shannon] and 

[Kristina]. There is evidence to support the Magistrate’s finding.

Moreover, the Magistrate’s Order is not dependent upon the 

finding. [Shannon] did testify that Snickers was given to 

[Irenea]. There is evidence to support the Magistrate’s finding. 

Appellant’s App. pp. 14-15. Kevin then filed a combined motion to correct 

errors and relief from judgment, id. at 97, and the small-claims court issued the 

following order dated July 27, 2017:

With regards to, [Kevin’s] individual claims of error, the court 

finds as follows: [Kevin] is correct that the Court incorrectly 

stated that the witness [Shannon] was the dog’s former owner. 

[Shannon] testified she was present on the day that [Kevin] and 

[Irenea] arrived to adopt Snickers, not that she was the dog’s 

owner. However, this does not change the Court’s ultimate 

determination in this case that [Irenea] be allowed to retain 

possession of Snickers. Consequently, [Kevin’s combined 

motion] is DENIED. 
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Id. at 17 (emphases added). This order was signed by both the magistrate and 

the judge. 

[6] Kevin, pro se, now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] We observe that Irenea has filed no brief. When the appellee has failed to 

submit an answer brief, we need not undertake the burden of developing an 

argument on the appellee’s behalf. Rather, we will reverse the trial court’s 

judgment if the appellant’s brief presents a case of prima facie error. Trinity 

Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). Prima facie error in 

this context is defined as, “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of 

it.” Id. Where an appellant is unable to meet this burden, we will affirm. Id.

[8] Kevin raises several issues on appeal, but his main challenge is to the evidence 

supporting the small-claims court’s judgment in favor of Irenea. Kevin argues, 

“Given that [Shannon’s] testimony [regarding dog ownership] as the magistrate 

[originally] cited never occurred, it is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances for the judge to affirm the [magistrate’s] decision” in 

favor of Irenea. Appellant’s Br. p. 17. 

[9] Small-claims-court judgments are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant 

Indiana rules and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). Pursuant to 

Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we review the facts determined in a bench trial under 

the clearly erroneous standard of review, with due regard given to the 
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opportunity of the court to assess witness credibility. Hamilton v. Schaefer Lake 

Lot Owners Ass’n, Inc., 59 N.E.3d 1051, 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This 

deferential standard of review is particularly important in small-claims actions,

where trials are informal and the sole objective is to dispense speedy justice 

between the parties according to the rules of substantive law. Morton v. Ivacic, 

898 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008); see also Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(A).

[10] It is true that the magistrate originally found that Shannon was a former owner 

of Snickers and that she testified that “she gave the dog [to Irenea].” However, 

on July 27, 2017, the magistrate, in an order signed by the judge, clarified that 

Shannon was not a former owner of Snickers and that she was merely present 

when Kevin and Irenea arrived at Kristina’s house to adopt Snickers. 

Importantly, the magistrate (and the judge) found that this mistake did not 

change “the Court’s ultimate determination in this case that [Irenea] be allowed 

to retain possession of Snickers.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 17. The record 

shows that Irenea, who knew Kristina, is the one who contacted Kristina about 

Snickers. Irenea testified that Kristina gave her Snickers. And Shannon, who 

was at Kristina’s house, testified that Kristina gave Snickers to Irenea and her 

children as a companion to their older dog. Given this evidence, we will not 

disturb the judgment in favor of Irenea. As for Kevin’s arguments concerning 

ownership, such as that he had Snickers microchipped, paid for certain

veterinarian bills, and registered Snickers with Johnson County Animal 
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Control,1 we find that they are requests to reweigh the competing ownership 

evidence presented by Irenea, which we will not do. 

[11] Kevin raises numerous other issues; however, we find all of them meritless.2 

For example, he argues that the court should have treated Kristina’s letter, 

Exhibit 3, not as testimony but rather as “a written instrument restating the . . . 

terms of the binding oral agreement reached on April 1, 2014” regarding the 

transfer of ownership of Snickers from Kristina to Kevin. Appellant’s Br. p. 18. 

We first note that Kevin presented Exhibit 3 to the court as simply a “letter” 

that Kristina “wr[ote]” “to the Court”—not as an oral agreement that was later 

reduced to rewriting. Tr. pp. 21-23. Treating the letter from Kristina, who 

lived in West Virginia at the time, as testimony comports with the informality 

of small-claims trials. See S.C.R. 8(A) (explaining that small-claims trials are 

not subject to “statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure, pleadings or 

evidence except provisions relating to privileged communications and offers of 

compromise”). Moreover, Kevin cites no authority to support this novel

 

1 Kevin points out that Johnson County Ordinance § 15-1-4-6 requires dangerous dogs to be registered with 

Johnson County Animal Control. He notes that he registered Snickers with Johnson County Animal 

Control, which conclusively establishes that he—and not Irenea—is the sole owner of Snickers. Aside from 

the fact that Kevin provides no citations to the record that Snickers is in fact dangerous, see Appellant’s Br. p. 

20, we agree with the small-claims court that the records of animal control “are only evidence and are not 

determinative” of ownership. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 16. 

2 Other issues Kevin raises include that the “magistrate has ignored local and state statues [sic],” the denial of 

his first motion to correct error, and the “authority and composition of . . . Johnson County’s courts.” 

Appellant’s Br. pp. 22, 25. We have reviewed these arguments and find that they either are waived or do not 

have merit. 
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contract theory and has therefore waived it. See Ind. Appellate Rule 

46(A)(8)(a). 

[12] Kevin also makes arguments concerning various Johnson County local rules. 

He first notes that LR41-SC16-011 requires hearings in possession-of-personalproperty cases to be “expedited.” He points out that he filed his notice of claim 

on April 5, 2016, the hearing was originally scheduled for May 11, but the court 

rescheduled it to June 9. We find, however, that the hearing in this case was 

sufficiently expedited under the local rule. Kevin also notes that LR41-SC01-

001 provides that “[t]hese rules shall govern the procedure and practice of the 

Small Claims Division, Johnson County Superior Court No. 2,” but his notice 

of claim was assigned to Superior Court 1, not 2. Kevin, however, does not 

explain how he was harmed by this or why this otherwise requires reversal of 

the small-claims court’s judgment. 

[13] Finally, Kevin argues that the court erred in not holding a hearing on his Trial 

Rule 60(B) motion for fraud upon the court. Trial Rule 60(D) generally 

requires trial courts to hold a hearing on any “pertinent” evidence before 

granting Trial Rule 60(B) relief. Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 904 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004). However, when there is no pertinent evidence to be 

heard, a hearing is unnecessary. Id. Here, because the court corrected itself and 

clarified that Shannon was not a former owner of Snickers but rather was 

merely present when Kevin and Irenea arrived at Kristina’s house to adopt 

Snickers, a hearing was unnecessary. We therefore affirm the small-claims 

court.
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[14] Affirmed. 

May, J., and Altice, J., concur.