2004 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-15-2004

Marran v. Marran

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 03-3018

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Recommended Citation

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-3018

 

RACHEL MARRAN;

CLAUDIA LIBRETT,

Appellants

v.

MICHAEL MARRAN;

MONTGOMERY COUNTY OFFICE

OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH;

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PA

 

On Appeal from the United States

District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-01709)

District Judge: Hon. Michael M. Baylson

 

Argued April 13, 2004

BEFORE: RENDELL, COWEN and

LAY*, Circuit Judges

(Filed July 15, 2004)

 

*Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior

United States Circuit Judge for the

Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

R. Nicholas Gimbel, Esq. (Argued)

McCarter & English

1735 Market Street, Suite 700

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellants

Gavin P. Lentz, Esq.

Stephen E. Skovron, Esq. (Argued)

Bochetto & Lentz

1524 Locust Street

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellee Michael Marran

Walter F. Kawalec, III, Esq. (Argued)

Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman

 & Goggin

200 Lake Drive East

Woodland Falls Corporate Park

Suite 300

Cherry Hill, NJ 08002

Counsel for Appellees Montgomery

County Office of Children and Youth;

and County of Montgomery

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

COWEN, Circuit Judge.

Claudia Librett (“Librett”) and

Michael Marran (“Marran”) were involved

in a protracted custody dispute over their

daughter, Rachel. After the state

proceedings had ended, Librett and Rachel

brought this action, based on the

allegations of child abuse that had been

made during the custody proceedings.
2

They appeal the order of the District Court

dismissing their complaint under RookerFeldman, Younger abstention, and Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. We will affirm the dismissal,

although on somewhat different grounds

than those given by the District Court.

I. 

Librett and Marran cohabited for a

time in New York, but were never married.

On May 21, 1999, while they were still

living together, Librett gave birth to

Rachel, the couple’s only child. Shortly

after Rachel’s birth, Marran and Librett

were involved in an altercation that

became physical. As a result of that

altercation, Marran pled guilty to a state

criminal charge of harassment in the

second degree, and the parties separated.

By consent as approved by the family

court in New York, Librett was granted

sole physical and legal custody of Rachel,

and Marran was allowed supervised

visitation with the child. Librett was also

granted permission to move with Rachel to

Pennsylvania. 

After Librett and Rachel moved to

Pennsylvania, Marran sought to modify his

visitations by filing a motion in the Court

of Common Pleas of Montgomery County.

Hearings in the matter began in October

2000 and continued through May 24, 2002.

During this time, Marran was permitted

seven unsupe rvised visits, which

culminated in an overnight visit from

December 11 to December 12, 2001.

Sometime after May 2002, Librett began

to suspect that Marran had sexually abused

Rachel. Librett filed several complaints of

abuse with the Montgomery County Office

of Children and Youth (“OCY”). She also

filed petitions to modify and suspend

Marran’s visitations. In response, the

Court of Common Pleas suspended

Marran’s visitation rights, and OCY

conducted an investigation into the

allegations. OCY ultimately determined

that the allegations of sexual abuse were

unfounded. Relying on these findings, the

Court of Common Pleas reinstated

Marran’s visitation rights. On January 9,

2003, the Court of Common Pleas issued a

custody order in which it found that there

was nothing to substantiate Librett's

allegations that Marran had sexually

abused Rachel, and found that Librett was

intent on excluding Marran from Rachel’s

life. The court then awarded joint legal

custody to Marran and Librett, primary

physical custody to Librett, and partial

physical custody to Marran. Librett

appealed the orders lifting suspension of

Marran’s visitation rights, denying a

subsequent emergency petition based on

the same events, and awarding custody.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed

the orders, including those dealing with the

abuse allegations. An appeal to the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court is now

pending.1

 

1

Since the custody order was issued,

Librett has continually failed to produce

Rachel for visitation with Marran,

arguing that she should not have to

because of the allegations of sexual

abuse. She has not alleged any
3

Rather than wait for the

Pennsylvania courts to rule on the appeal,

Librett filed this action in the District

Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania. Librett sought damages

from Marran on her own and Rachel’s

behalf, as well as an injunction prohibiting

Marran from abusing Rachel. The

complaint alleged claims for assault and

battery, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of

implied contract, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and loss of earnings

during minority. In addition, Librett and

Rachel brought a claim under the Civil

Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that

the Montgomery County defendants had

violated Libre tt’s and Rac hel’s

constitutional rights by failing to properly

investigate the allegations of abuse. The

complaint sought monetary damages and a

declaration that OCY’s findings regarding

the abuse allegations were null and void,

and could not be relied upon for any

purpose.

 Both Marran and the Montgomery

County defendants filed motions to

dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the

District Court lacked jurisdiction over the

claims under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, that the District Court should

abstain from exercising its jurisdiction,

and that the complaint had failed to state a

claim upon which relief could be granted.

On June 12, 2003, the District Court

dismissed the complaint, holding that it

lacked jurisdiction over all of the claims

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Alternatively, the District Court held that

Younger abstention was proper. Finally,

the District Court held that the complaint

had failed to state a claim against the

Montgomery County defendants. This

appeal followed.

II.

As a preliminary matter, the

Montgomery County defendants have filed

a motion to dismiss this appeal. They

argue that Librett is a fugitive from justice

and should not be entitled to use this

Court’s resources to promote her own

ends, when she is unwilling to follow the

Pennsylvania court’s custody orders.

Although it is troubling that Librett would

blatantly ignore another court’s orders

while seeking relief before this Court, we

are not convinced that dismissal is

warranted, and will deny the motion.

The Supreme Court has recognized

that courts have the power to dismiss a

fugitive’s criminal appeal. See Molinaro

v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970)

(a fugitive’s escape “disentitles the

defendant to call upon the resources of the

Court for determination of his claims”).

The Supreme Court later held, however,

that a claimant’s failure to appear in a

criminal case does not permit a district

court to grant summary judgment to the

additional instances of abuse other than

the ones deemed unfounded by OCY,

and has produced no further evidence of

abuse. The Court of Common Pleas held

Librett in contempt for violating two

separate orders in the custody case and

fined Librett $500 for each day she failed

to produce Rachel for visitation. 
4

government in a related civil forfeiture

case. Degan v. United States, 517 U.S.

820, 829 (1996). In addition, it has held

that an appellate court does not have the

power to dismiss an appeal when a

convicted felon who fled after conviction

but before sentencing was recaptured

before the appeal. Ortega-Rodriguez v.

United States, 507 U.S. 234, 246 (1993).

The Supreme Court reasoned that,

although the fugitive’s flight acted as an

affront to the district court’s authority,

permitting “an appellate court to sanction

by dismissal any conduct that exhibited

disrespect for any aspect of the judicial

system, even where such conduct has no

connection to the course of the appellate

proceedings,” would sweep to broadly. Id.

The Court did, however, recognize that

dismissal would be appropriate if the

fugitive’s status in some way prejudiced

the government’s status as a litigant, but

found that the Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit had not articulated such

prejudice in dismissing the case. 

In the state court proceedings,

Librett has failed to produce Rachel for the

visitations required by the custody order.

As a result, Librett has been held in

contempt by the Court of Common Pleas

of Montgomery County. Criminal charges

have also been filed against her in

Montgomery County for interfering with

child custody and concealment of the

whereabouts of a child, in connection with

her refusal to produce Rachel under the

custody order. Although the finding of

contempt and the criminal charges are very

troubling and relate in part to the events

underlying this case, they have no direct

effect on the processing of this appeal.

Even assuming that Librett is a fugitive

from justice, the Montgomery County

defendants have not shown that her status

as a fugitive would prejudice them in this

appeal. We also observe that the affront

was to the dignity of the Pennsylvania

courts, not to this Court. Dismissing this

appeal under the fugitive disentitlement

doctrine would expand that doctrine even

beyond the scope rejected by the Supreme

Court in Ortega-Rodriguez. Moreover, the

fact that Librett is not acting solely in her

own capacity, but is also representing

Rachel’s interests, complicates the

prospect of dismissal on this basis, as it

would not be fair to penalize Rachel based

on her mother’s fugitive status. We will

deny the Montgomery County defendants’

motion to dismiss the appeal.

III.

A. 

The District Court held that it

lacked jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine. We exercise plenary

review over the decision to grant the

motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. FOCUS v. Allegheny

County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d

834, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1996). 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars

lower federal courts from exercising

jurisdiction over a case that is the

functional equivalent of an appeal from a

state court judgment. Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
5

U.S. 462 (1983). A cas e is th e

functional equivalent of an appeal from a

state court judgment in two instances: (1)

when the claim was actually litigated

before the state court; or (2) when the

claim is inextricably intertwined with the

state adjudication. ITT Corporation v.

Intelnet International Corporation, 366

F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2004). As we

recently noted, almost any claim that is

actually litigated will also meet the

inextricably intertwined test. Id. Unless

the federal claims are identical to the state

court claims, determining whether the

claims have been actually litigated is more

difficult than determining whether the

claims are inextricably intertwined with

the state judgment. Id. at 211 n.8. Thus,

we will begin by determining whether the

current claims are inextricably intertwined

with the custody determination.

A claim is inextricably intertwined

with the state court adjudication when

“federal relief can only be predicated upon

a conviction that the state court was

wrong.” Parkview Assoc. v. City of

Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir.

2000). “Rooker-Feldman applies only

when in order to grant the federal plaintiff

the relief sought, the federal court must

determine that the state court judgment

was erroneously entered, or must take

action that would render the state

judgment ineffectual.” FOCUS, 75 F.3d at

840.

To determine whether a particular

claim for federal relief is inextricably

intertwined with a prior state court

decision, this Court looks at “the questions

of state law that the state court was

required to reach in order to render its

decision.” Desi’s Pizza v. City of

Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 421 (3d Cir.

2003). Pennsylvania law requires that

courts consider “the preference of the child

as well as any other factor which

legitimately impacts the child's physical,

intellectual and emotional well-being” in

determining custody. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §

5303(a). Ongoing sexual abuse, as well as

continued association with a past abuser,

would unquestionably impact a child’s

well-being. In addition, the state court is

required to consider “each parent and adult

household member’s present and past

violent or abusive conduct” in determining

custody. Id. at § 5303(c). In other words,

the Court of Common Pleas had to

consider and adjudicate the allegations of

sexual abuse in reaching its determination

that Marran was entitled to joint legal

custody and partial physical custody of

Rachel. 

Librett argues that the Court of

Common Pleas refused to adjudicate the

issue of whether Rachel had been sexually

abused, because the judge in the custody

matter deferred to the findings of the

investigation conducted by OCY, rather

than conduct a separate hearing on the

matter. In the custody order, however, the

judge explicitly discounted the opinions of

Librett’s experts regarding the alleged

abuse, determined that reports of Rachel’s

behavioral problems after the overnight

visit were a result of Librett’s reaction to

the visit rather than to any abuse, and

discounted the idea that an incident of
6

abuse took place during supervised visit.

In making these determinations, the judge

considered the reports of a neutral third

party, the therapist chosen by Librett to

supervise the visits between Marran and

Rachel. In those reports, the therapist

noted that Rachel responded well to

Marran and gave no indication that

anything was wrong. The judge further

found that, although Marran may have

made mistakes as a new father, the

program of supervised visitation and

therapy had made him a better father, and

a strong bond existed between him and

Rachel. In addition, the judge referred to

the findings of OCY that the allegations of

abuse were unfounded, and noted that no

new allegations of abuse had been made.

The fact that no additional hearings were

held does not mean that the issue was not

adjudicated. Indeed, under Pennsylvania

law the judge was required to adjudicate

the issue of whether the abuse had

occurred, because he was required to

consider a parent’s abusive conduct in

making the custody determination. See 23

Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5303(a). Whether the

judge erred in not holding a hearing,

accepting other evidence, or allowing

additional testimony after May 2002 is an

issue that must be decided by the

Pennsylvania courts through the appeals

process.

The claims in this case fall into

three categories: (1) Librett’s claims

against Marran; (2) Rachel’s claims

against Marran; and (3) the claims against

the Montgomery County defendants.

Librett’s claims against Marran present the

most straightforward application of

Rooker-Feldman. Librett seeks damages

for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of

implied contract, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and “loss of earnings

during minority.” All of these claims are

based on the alleged abuse of Rachel. In

order for Librett to succeed on these

claims, the District Court would have to

find that the Court of Common Pleas erred

in deciding that the allegations of abuse

were unfounded. As such, the claims are

inextricably intertwined with the state

court adjudication and the District Court

was correct in finding it lacked jurisdiction

over these claims.

Libre tt also argues that

Rooker-Feldman does not bar the claims

against Marran, because she and Rachel

are seeking an injunction against further

abuse and damages for past abuse, not

modification of the custody order. Even

assuming that it is true that no

modification of the custody order would

occur because of an injunction or an award

of damages, granting an injunction or

award of damages against Marran would

require this Court to find that the Court of

Common Pleas erred in finding that the

abuse allegations were unfounded.

Rooker-Feldman bars all of Librett’s

claims against Marran.

Rachel’s claims against Marran

present a slightly more complicated issue.

Generally, Rooker-Feldman does not bar

claims by persons who were not parties to

the underlying state action. Valenti v.

Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 297-98 (3d Cir.

1992). As we have noted, “[t]his limiting
7

principle of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

‘has a close affinity to the principles

embodied in the legal concepts of claim

and issue preclusion.’” Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industry Corp., 364

F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting

Valenti, 962 F.3d at 297). For example, as

with claim preclusion and issue preclusion,

Rooker-Feldman bars actions brought by

parties in privity with the parties in the

state action. Id. 

Privity “is merely a word used to

say that the relationship between one who

is a party on the record and another is

close enough to include that other within

the res judicata.” EEOC v. United States

Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 493 (3d Cir.

1990) (quoting Bruszewski v. United

States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir.)). “One

relationship long held to fall within the

concept of privity is that between a

nonparty and party who acts as the

nonparty’s representative.” Id. Even if a

child is not a party to a custody action her

federal claims will be barred if the child is

in privity with the named parties (her

parents).

Rachel was not a named party in the

underlying custody proceeding. The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never

ruled that a child is a party to her own

custody hearing, and it is unclear whether

a child who is the subject of a custody

hearing is in privity to her parents. A

recent Superior Court decision has held,

however, that three boys could not

intervene in their own custody action in

order to assert their own interests. Frank

v. Frank, 833 A.2d 194, 197 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 2003). In Frank, the Superior Court

reasoned that “there is no need for a child

to intervene in his or her own custody

proceeding” because the child’s interests

are the subject of the hearing, and allowing

such an intervention would be “ineffectual

as being redundant.” Id. It then held that

the boys’ claims were barred by collateral

estoppel, as they had already been

addressed and decided in the custody

hearing. Id. 

Other states have similarly held that

there is no need to make children parties to

the custody litigation, either through

intervention or other means. See, e.g.,

Auclair v. Auclair, 730 A.2d 1260, 1270

(Md. App. 1999); Miller v. Miller, 677

A.2d 64, 66-67 (Me. 1996); Hartley v.

Hartley, 886 P.2d 665, 673-74 (Colo.

1994); Leigh v. Aiken, 311 So. 2d 444

(Ala. 1975). In some of those cases, the

court relied on the availability of a

guardian ad litem to represent the

children’s interests. See e.g., Auclair, 730

A.2d at 1270; Miller, 677 A.2d at 66-67;

Hartley, 886 P.2d at 673-74. In other

cases, no guardian ad litem was involved,

and only the parents were parties to the

action. Leigh, 311 So.2d at 446-48 (court

did not err in not appointing guardian ad

litem, when none was requested and the

nature of custody proceedings is already

protective of the child’s interests). 

In all of the cases, the courts

recognized that the child’s best interests

were the guiding force in the custody

determination and reasoned those interests

were already adequately represented,

whether by an appointed guardian ad litem
8

or by the parents and court. Courts have

generally recognized that a child’s

interests in a custody dispute are

represented by the parents, even when the

child makes no motion to intervene. See

generally, Smith v. Organization of Foster

Families for Equality and Reform, 431

U.S. 816, 842 n. 44 (1977) (in litigation, a

child’s rights are generally represented by

a parent or guardian, because the child

herself lacks the capacity to represent her

own interests); In re Tamara R., 764 A.2d

844, 849 (Md. App. 2000) (“Unless a

guardian ad litem is appointed, the

children's interests are presumed to be

represented by their respective parents.”).

In Frank, the Superior Court did not

explain whether the boys’ claims were

estopped because they were deemed

parties to the action or because they were

in privity to one or both of their parents,

who were parties to the action. The

precise distinction is unnecessary to our

analysis, however, as Rooker-Feldman

bars both the parties to the state action and

persons in privity with those parties from

relitigating in federal court the issues

decided in a state court. We therefore hold

that Rooker-Feldman bars a minor child

from relitigating in federal court the issues

concerning the child that were adjudicated

in a state custody determination. Rachel’s

claims against Marran are barred, for the

same reasons that Librett’s claims against

Marran are barred. 

The claims against the Montgomery

County defendants are even more

involved. Librett alleges that the

Montgomery County defendants violated

her constitutiona l rights to th e

companionship, care, custody, and

management of Rachel by failing to

conduct an adequate investigation into the

allegations of sexual abuse. She also

alleges that this failure to investigate the

allegations adequately caused emotional

distress to both Librett and Rachel. She

seeks damages under § 1983, as well as a

declaration that the investigation was

inadequate and a declaration that the

findings “are null and void and may not be

relied upon for any purpose.” (App. at

19). 

The District Court reasoned that the

Montgomery County defendants were in

privity with Marran, and as such, the

claims against them were barred by

Rooker-Feldman. Although it is not

entirely clear how the District Court found

a privity relationship between Marran and

the Montgomery County defendants,

privity is not required. As we recently

noted, “we have never deemed RookerFeldman inapplicable based on the nonparticipation in state court of a party

asserting the jurisdictional bar.” ITT

Corporation, 366 F.3d at 216 n.19.

Instead, the question must be whether the

issues underlying the claims against the

Montgomery County defendants were

actually litigated in or are inextricably

i n tertwined with the custod y

determination.

We have held that Rooker-Feldman

deprived a district court of jurisdiction

over an attorney’s challenge to the

decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court disbarring him. Stern v. Nix, 840
9

F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1988). The attorney in

Stern framed the claim as a constitutional

challenge to certain rules governing

attorney discipline, and sought an

injunction barring the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court from disbarring himself

and other similarly situated attorneys if

those rules were applied. Id. at 212. We

recognized that, at first glance, the

challenge appeared to be a general

constitutional challenge to the rules and

not barred by Rooker-Feldman, but then

went on to reason that the nature of the

injunction sought indicated that “Stern’s

complaint is simply a skillful attempt to

mask the true purpose of the action, which

essentially is to reverse the judicial

decision of the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, in contravention of

Rooker-Feldman.” Id.

In a later case, we held that a

similar challenge to the Pennsylvania rules

governing attorney discipline was not

barred by Rooker-Feldman. Centifanti v.

Nix, 865 F.2d 1422 (3d Cir. 1989).

Centifanti alleged that certain rules were

unconstitutional on their face, and sought

an injunction barring the prospective

application of those rules. Id. at 1426.

The district court, citing Stern, dismissed

Cen tif ani’s com plaint unde r

Rooker-Feldman. Id. We reversed,

however, stating that the prospective

nature of the injunction meant that it was

not barred by Rooker-Feldman. Id. at

1429-30. We also found that the federal

claim was not inextricably intertwined

with the state claim, because a federal

court could find that the rules were

unconstitutional without attacking the

judgment of the state court that Centifanti

had violated those rules. Id. at 1430.

The declaratory judgment that

Librett seeks against the Montgomery

County defendants is akin to the injunction

sought in Stern. She seeks a ruling that the

findings are null and void and may not be

relied upon for any purpose. This relief is

barred under Rooker-Feldman, because it

is an indirect attack on the custody

determination already adjudicated in state

court. The Court of Common Pleas

deferred to OCY’s findings that the abuse

allegations were unfounded, and based its

custody determination on those findings.

A declaration by this Court that those

findings may not be relied on necessarily

implies a finding that the Court of

Common Pleas was in error. This is the

type of indirect appeal of a state court

dete rminatio n is prohibited by

Rooker-Feldman.

Despite the fact that Librett and

Rachel attempted to seek relief prohibited

by Rooker-Feldman, the § 1983 claim

itself is not barred by Rooker-Feldman. In

Ernst v. Child & Youth Services of

Chester County, which also involved child

custody matters, a custodial grandmother

alleged that Child and Youth Services

(“CYS”) had improperly formulated and

made recommendations to the state court

in a dependency proceeding regarding her

granddaughter. Ernst v. Child and Youth

Services of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486

(3d Cir. 1996). We held that 

[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine did
10

not preclude the district court from

deciding those claims, because a

ruling that the defendants violated

Ernst's rights to substantive due

proces s by mak i n g

recommendations to the state court

out of malice or personal bias

would not have required the court

to find that the state court

judgments made on the basis of

those recommendations were

erroneous.

Id. at 491-92. Likewise, in this case, a

finding that the Montgomery County

defendants violated Librett’s or Rachel’s

substantive due process rights in

investigating the allegations of abuse

would not require a finding that the Court

of Common Pleas erred in relying on the

report stemming from the investigation.

This is not to say that such a determination

would not have an effect on the custody

determination. Armed with such a

judgment, Librett may be in a position to

seek reconsideration of the custody order.

Nevertheless, Rooker-Feldman is not

implicated, and the District Court erred in

dismissing this claim for lack of

jurisdiction.2

B.

The District Court went on to find

that abstention was proper with respect to

the § 1983 claims under the principles

enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37 (1971). We exercise plenary review

over the question of whether the elements

required for abstention exist. FOCUS, 75

F.3d at 834. If all of the elements are

present, we review the District Court’s

 

2The Montgomery County defendants

also argue that the § 1983 claims are

barred, because Rooker-Feldman bars

constitutional claims that could have

been but were not raised during the state

court proceedings. This is not exactly

the case. We have held that

Rooker-Feldman barred the plaintiffs

from raising a First Amendment

challenge in federal court, even though it

had never actually been litigated at the

state court level. Valenti, 962 F.2d at

296. In Valenti, the plaintiffs had

challenged an election law on equal

protection grounds, but did not raise a

First Amendment challenge. Id. We

held that the claim was barred, because it

could have been raised in the state

matter. We later explained, however,

that such claims were barred only if they

were inextricably intertwined in the state

court proceedings. Parkview Assoc., 225

F.3d at 326-29. Thus, a constitutional

claim is only barred if finding merit in

the claim would require a finding that the

state court was wrong. Id. at 326. In this

case, a finding that the underlying

investigation conducted by OCY was

constitutionally insufficient would not

indicate that the state court wrongly

relied upon OCY’s recommendations. It

would merely mean that OCY did not

properly perform its job. As such, the

challenge is not inextricably intertwined

with the custody proceedings. 
11

decision to abstain for abuse of discretion.

Younger established that federal

courts should abstain from enjoining state

criminal prosecutions, because of

principles of comity and federalism, unless

certain extraordinary circumstances exist.

Younger, 401 U.S at 49-54. This holding

has been expanded over time to apply to

noncriminal judicial proceedings that

implicate important state interests.

Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.

Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432

(1982). “A federal court will only

consider Younger abstention when the

requested equitable relief would constitute

federal interference in state judicial or

quasi-judicial proceedings.” Marks v.

Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1994)

(emphasis added). The proponent of

abstention must show that “(1) there are

ongoing state proceedings that are judicial

in nature; (2) the state proceedings

implicate important state interests; and (3)

the state proceedings afford an adequate

opportunity to raise federal claims.”

Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir.

1989).

The Supreme Court has never

explicitly decided whether Younger

abstention covers actions for damages as

well as equitable relief. See Deakins v.

Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988); see

also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517

U.S. 706, 719 (1996). In Deakins, the

Court reserved the question of whether a

federal court could decline to exercise

jurisdiction over a claim for damages

under the principles in Younger, but

approved of this Circuit’s rule requiring

courts to stay, rather than dismiss, actions

for damages that were not cognizable in

ongoing state proceedings. Deakins, 484

U.S. at 202. In Quackenbush, the Supreme

Court held that, in cases removed from

state court, remand under abstention

principles was proper only when

discretionary relief, such as an injunction

or declaratory judgment, was sought.

Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 730. These

cases seem to indicate that abstention

under Younger principles is not proper

when damages are sought.

Even if Younger abstention is

proper in suits for damages, it was not

appropriate for the District Court to

abstain from the § 1983 claims in this case.

While it is true that litigation regarding

custody is still ongoing in the state court,

there are no ongoing state proceedings

regarding the adequacy of OCY’s

investigation. When there are no pending

state proceedings, Younger abstention is

inappropriate. FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 843.3 

 

3Librett argues that Ankenbrandt v.

Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992),

precludes a federal court from ever

declining jurisdiction under Younger

principles when the case involves

domestic relations, unless the plaintiff

directly asks for a divorce, custody, or

alimony decree. This is simply not true. 

In Ankenbrandt, a mother sued a father

on behalf of their children, seeking

damages for abuse. Id. at 691. The

district court found that it lacked

jurisdiction over the action because of

the “domestic relations” exception to
12

C.

Although the District Court erred in

dismissing the § 1983 claims under both

Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention,

dismissal was still proper under Rule

12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim may be granted only if,

accepting all well-pleaded allegations in

the complaint as true and viewing them in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the

plaintiff is still not entitled to relief. Bd.

of Trustees of Teamsters Local 863

Pension Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d

164, 168 (3d Cir. 2003). To make out a

prima facie case under § 1983, the plaintiff

must demonstrate that a person, acting

under color of law, deprived him of a

federal right. Berg v. County of

Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir.

2000). “Section 1983 is not a source of

substantive rights and does not provide

redress for common law torts–the plaintiff

must allege a violation of a federal right.”

Id. 

“Local governing bodies . . . may be

sued directly under § 1983 for monetary,

declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . .

the action that is alleged to be

unconstitutional implements or executes a

policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or

decision offic ially adopted and

promulgated by that body's officers.”

Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S.

658, 690 (1978). In addition, local

gov ernm ents can be sued for

“constitutional deprivations visited

pursuant to governmental ‘custom.’” Id. at

690-91. Local governments are not liable

“unless action pursuant to official policy

of some nature caused a constitutional

tort.” Id. at 691. In other words, a county

(or its agencies) may not be sued under a

respondeat superior theory. Therefore, a

prima facie case against a county must

involve an allegation of a policy or custom

that directed or caused the constitutional

deprivation.

Librett alleges that OCY’s failure

diversity jurisdiction. Id. In the

alternative, the district court found that it

would abstain from exercising

jurisdiction under the principles of

Younger. Id. 

The Supreme Court confirmed

that a “domestic relations” exception to

diversity jurisdiction did exist, but that it

was only applicable in a narrow set of

circumstances not present in that case. 

Id. at 703. The Court then examined the

alternative holding under Younger and

found that abstention was inappropriate

in that case, because the father’s rights

had already been severed and there were

no ongoing proceedings in state court. 

Id. at 705. Ankenbrandt does not stand

for the proposition that Younger

abstention is never appropriate in cases

involving domestic relations. It held that

Younger abstention is inappropriate in

domestic relations cases when there are

no ongoing proceedings. Id. at 705. In

this case, the District Court relied on

Rooker-Feldman in finding that it lacked

jurisdiction over Librett’s and Rachel’s

claims. The “domestic relations”

exception to diversity jurisdiction was

not relied on. 
13

“to consult even one of the mental health

professionals to whom Rachel Marran

described the sexual abuse she had

experienced at the hands of her father . . .

denied Ms. Librett her constitutionally

protected rights in the companionship,

care, custody, and management of her

daughter Rachel” and caused severe

emotional distress to both Rachel and

Librett. (App. at 46.) Assuming,

arguendo, that Librett properly alleged a

constitutional violation, Librett did not

allege that a policy or custom of OCY or

Montgomery County led to the violation.

This is an essential part of a § 1983 claim

against a county. Without an allegation of

a policy or custom, Librett has not stated a

prima facie case, and the District Court

properly dismissed the claim without

permitting discovery. 

IV.

The claims against Marran and the

attempt to seek declaratory judgment that

OCY’s findings are null and void and may

not be relied upon for any purpose are an

attempt by Librett and Rachel to relitigate

an issue already decided by the

Montgomery County Court of Common

Pleas. The District Court properly

dismissed them under Rooker-Feldman. In

addition, the remaining claims against the

Montgomery County defendants were

properly dismissed for failure to state a

claim, and Librett has conceded that she is

unable to properly state a claim.4 

The District Court’s order of June

12, 2003, dismissing the complaint will be

affirmed.

 

4Librett asserts that, in the § 1983

claim, she would claim that Montgomery

County lacked a policy requiring

reasonable investigations, or that it had

such a policy, but that the policy was

breached in this case. Even if she were

allowed to amend her complaint to

include such allegations, she would still

fail to properly state a claim against the

Montgomery County defendants under §

1983.