UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

ARMANDO ANGELES, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-3354 

(D.C. No. 6:15-CR-10154-JTM-4) 

(D. Kan.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

MATHESON, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

 Armando Angeles appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence found in 

his vehicle after a traffic stop. He argues the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude the stop was valid because it 

was based on reasonable suspicion of a traffic offense. We therefore affirm. 

 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 16, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual History 

 On July 27, 2014, Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper Sage Hill stopped Mr. Angeles, 

who was driving a green Ford Expedition with his children in the back seat. Trooper Hill 

told Mr. Angeles he pulled him over for twice crossing over the fog line while driving, a 

violation of a Kansas traffic statute. Mr. Angeles responded that he had turned around to 

speak with his children. Trooper Hill gave Mr. Angeles a written lane violation warning, 

told him he was free to go, but then inquired whether he could ask some further questions. 

Trooper Hill said there had been a lot of drug trafficking activity between Wichita 

and Topeka and asked Mr. Angeles if he had anything illegal with him in the car. Mr. 

Angeles responded that he did not. Trooper Hill then asked if he could search the car, 

and Mr. Angeles said that he could. In the console of the car, Trooper Hill found what 

was later determined to be 80 grams of cocaine. 

This traffic stop stemmed from a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) 

investigation of a drug trafficking operation centered in Wichita. The DEA had 

been monitoring the telephone calls of suspect Gilberto Sanchez. Matthew Lynch, a 

Sedgwick County, Kansas Sheriff’s Office detective, was temporarily assigned to the 

DEA investigation and testified at the district court suppression hearing about the 

monitoring activity leading up to Mr. Angeles’s arrest. 

Detective Lynch testified that, before the stop, agents had identified “suspect 

phone calls and text messages” containing possible coded language for drug deals 
3 

between Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Angeles. The wiretap revealed arrangements for 

them to meet so that Mr. Sanchez could provide drugs to Mr. Angeles. 

During later surveillance of Mr. Angeles, Detective Lynch followed him to the 

Kansas Turnpike. Based on information that “there was going to be a vehicle 

northbound in [his] area of responsibility that was possibly tied to illegal drug 

activity,” Trooper Hill received instructions to stop Mr. Angeles, preferably for a 

traffic violation, but to pull over the car even if he could not find an independent 

reason to do so. ROA, Vol. 3 at 48-49. 

Trooper Hill testified at the suppression hearing that he followed Mr. Angeles’s 

car after spotting it driving north on the Kansas Turnpike toward Topeka. He 

observed the car cross the white fog line of the highway twice by about a “tire width” 

each time. ROA, Vol. 1 at 56. Trooper Hill then pulled Mr. Angeles over. He 

arrested Mr. Angeles after finding the cocaine. 

B. Procedural History 

Mr. Angeles was indicted for (1) possessing with the intent to distribute 

cocaine (approximately 80 grams), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 

841(b)(1)(C); and (2) facilitating the commission of a violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) through use of a cell phone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). 

He moved to suppress the evidence under the Fourth Amendment, challenging 

the Government’s contentions “that the initial stop was justified, that the continued 

detention was consensual, that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to continue the 
4 

detention, and that the consent was voluntarily and knowingly given.” ROA, Vol. 1 

at 24. In response, the Government argued that the stop was valid based on (1) the 

wiretap and surveillance information, and (2) reasonable suspicion that Mr. Angeles 

had violated Kansas traffic law K.S.A. § 8-1522. It also argued the search was 

consensual. 

The district court denied the motion, upholding the stop on two grounds. 

United States v. Angeles, No. 15-10154-04-JTM, 2016 WL 4060293 (D. Kan. July 

29, 2016). First, invoking the “collective knowledge doctrine,” the court said “the 

officer directing the stop had probable cause to believe that Angeles’s vehicle” 

contained drugs based on “all of the intercepted communications,” and this 

knowledge could be imputed to Trooper Hill. Id. at *2. Second, “Trooper Hill 

validly stopped the vehicle for an observed traffic infraction.” Id. 

The district court found the testimony of the Government’s two witnesses, 

Detective Lynch and Trooper Hill, “generally credible.” Id. at *1. The court also 

relied on two dashboard video recordings of the stop (from different patrol cars) 

introduced by the Government for audio corroboration of Trooper Hill’s testimony 

and for evidence of the weather conditions when Mr. Angeles allegedly crossed the 

fog line.1

 1 Because “the camera overexposed the visual images due to sunlight during the 

relevant moments,” there is no clear footage of Mr. Angeles’s car going over the fog 

line. ROA, Vol. 1 at 41. 
5 

Mr. Angeles pled guilty as charged, “specifically reserv[ing] the right to 

appeal [the district court’s] denial of [his] Motion to Suppress” and “maintain[ing] 

that law enforcement officers unlawfully stopped, detained, and searched [his] 

vehicle and [him]self on July 27, 2014.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 49. At his sentencing, Mr. 

Angeles received time served and three years of supervised release. 

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mr. Angeles argues only that the district court erred in upholding 

the traffic stop, contending the collective knowledge doctrine does not apply and 

Trooper Hill lacked reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. He does not challenge 

the length of the detention or his consent to search. We affirm because the district 

court did not err in holding that reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation justified 

the stop. 

A. Scope and Standard of Review 

The Government argues that Mr. Angeles has waived any appellate challenge 

to the traffic stop because he did not argue that the traffic stop was invalid at the 

suppression hearing and has not argued plain error on appeal. Whether or not Mr. 

Angeles preserved his challenge to the traffic stop, and even under the most generous 

standard of review, we affirm because the district court did not err in upholding the 

traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion of the traffic infraction under K.S.A. 

§ 8-1522(a). 

“[W]e accept the district court’s factual findings and determinations of witness 

credibility unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 
6 

1135, 1139 (10th Cir. 2007). We view the evidence in “the light most favorable to the 

ruling.” United States v. Juszczyk, 844 F.3d 1213, 1214 (10th Cir. 2017); see also 

United States v. Mendoza, 817 F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir. 2016). “[W]e review de novo 

the ultimate determination of the reasonableness [of the stop].” United States v. 

Leyva-Serrano, 127 F.3d 1280, 1282 (10th Cir. 1997). 

B. Analysis

In United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en 

banc) (citations and quotations omitted), this court stated the standard for the 

constitutionality of a traffic stop: 

[A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based 

on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable 

articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred 

or is occurring. It is irrelevant, for purposes of Fourth Amendment 

review, whether the stop in question is sufficiently ordinary or routine 

according to the general practice of the police department or the 

particular officer making the stop. It is also irrelevant that the officer 

may have had other subjective motives for stopping the vehicle. Our 

sole inquiry is whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion 

that this particular motorist violated any one of the multitude of 

applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction. 

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Applying these standards here, we 

conclude the district court did not err in determining that Trooper Hill had reasonable 

suspicion that Mr. Angeles had committed a traffic violation. 

The district court held that Trooper Hill had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. 

Angeles based on his observing a violation of K.S.A. § 8-1522(a), which provides: 

Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked 

lanes for traffic, the following rules in addition to all others consistent 

herewith shall apply. 
7 

(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane 

and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained 

that such movement can be made with safety. 

The Kansas Supreme Court construed this statute in State v. Marx, 215 P.3d 601 

(Kan. 2009). It said that “K.S.A. 8-1522(a) is not a strict liability offense” and that 

“a violation of K.S.A. 8-1522(a) requires more than an incidental and minimal lane 

breach.” Id. at 612. See Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc., 621 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 

2010) (federal courts must be guided by “recent decisions of the state’s highest 

court” when interpreting state law). In Marx, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a 

vehicle’s crossing the fog line once, and then overcorrecting briefly across the 

centerline within a half-mile to one-mile observed span, was not in itself grounds 

for reasonable suspicion that K.S.A. 8-1522(a) had been violated. 215 P.3d at 612-

613. 

At the suppression hearing, Trooper Hill testified that, after spotting Mr. 

Angeles’s car driving north on the Kansas Turnpike from Wichita to Topeka, he 

observed the car cross the white fog line of the highway twice by about a “tire width” 

each time. ROA, Vol. 1 at 50, 56. The dashcam video showed no weather reason 

that would make staying in one’s lane impractical. As seen on video, Trooper Hill, 

upon pulling Mr. Angeles over, asked whether he had been drinking or was distracted, 

noting that he had swerved over the fog line twice. 

Unlike the stop in Marx, where the court said crossing the fog line and 

overcorrecting only once was not enough to justify the stop, Mr. Angeles’s two 
8 

forays fully over the line were enough for a reasonable officer to suspect that there 

was “more than an incidental and minimal lane breach” in this instance.2

 Also, 

here, unlike in Marx, there was (1) credible evidence that staying in one’s lane was 

practicable (given the weather and road conditions captured by the dashcam 

videos), and (2) testimony on how far the vehicle crossed over the fog line (about a 

“tire width.”)3

 

“[W]hether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective inquiry determined by 

the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Salas, 756 F.3d 1196, 1201 

(10th Cir. 2014). Under the circumstances here, we agree with the district court that 

Trooper Hill had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Angeles. 

III. CONCLUSION

 We affirm the district court’s judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

 2

 Although there is no post-Marx Kansas case on point, we have previously 

held that a vehicle’s drifting onto a shoulder twice in a quarter mile “without any 

adverse . . . weather conditions to excuse or explain the deviation” created reasonable 

suspicion that the driver could be a risk to others, under the principles articulated in 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 (1968). United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1199 

(10th Cir. 1999). 

3 See Marx, 215 P.3d at 613 (noting that “the deputy gave no testimony from 

which the court could even infer that it was practicable to maintain a single lane” and 

that the district court found that “no testimony was offered as to how far the motor 

home crossed . . . the fog line.”)