[Cite as State v. Guzman, 2018-Ohio-4470.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ALLEN COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-18-21 

 

 v. 

ROBERTO GUZMAN, 

 O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

[AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY - APPELLANT]. 

 

Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. CR2015 0010 

Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded 

Date of Decision: November 5, 2018 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Damion M. Clifford for Appellant 

 Randall L. Basinger for Appellee, State of Ohio 
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ZIMMERMAN, J. 

{¶1} Third-party appellant, American Surety Company (“Appellant”), 

appeals the nunc pro tunc judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court that 

added it as a party to a prior court judgment. On appeal, Appellant asserts that the 

trial court erred: 1) by adding it to a December 21, 2015 judgment via a nunc pro 

tunc entry; and 2) by entering judgment against it for $150,000. For the reasons that 

follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶2} On February 12, 2015, Roberto Guzman (“Guzman”) was indicted by 

the Allen County Common Pleas Grand Jury on one count of possession of cocaine, 

a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(e). 

(Doc. No. 5). Guzman’s bond in the trial court was set in the amount of $100,000 

cash or surety. (Doc. No. 7). Appellant appeared in the trial court for arraignment 

on February 27, 2015 and pled “not guilty” to the charge contained in the indictment. 

(Doc. No. 5). 

{¶3} On May 4, 2015, Guzman posted the $100,000 bond through a bail 

bonding company. (Doc. No. 63). Scott Hunter, (“Hunter”) on behalf of Erie Shore 

Bail Bonds, issued Guzman’s bond. (Id.). Appellant was a guarantor of the bond 

executed by Hunter. (Id.). 
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{¶4} On June 17, 2015, Guzman entered a negotiated plea of no contest to 

the possession of cocaine charge. (Doc. No. 70). The trial court journalized its 

judgment entry accepting Guzman’s plea on the same date, and continued Guzman’s 

$100,000 bond pending his sentencing. (Doc. No. 71). 

{¶5} On July 27, 2015, the trial court sentenced Guzman to prison, but stayed 

the prison sentence pending appeal. (Doc. No. 76). With respect to Guzman’s 

previously posted bond, the trial court, in its judgment entry, issued the following 

order: 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the bond as previously set is hereby 

revoked and an appellate bond of $150,000 cash or surety is set. 

(Emphasis sic). (Id.). Two days later, Guzman posted a $50,000 bond with the trial 

court. (Doc. No. 77). Hunter co-signed Guzman’s second bond on behalf of Erie 

Shore Bail Bonds, which Appellant guaranteed. (Id.). 

{¶6} On October 7, 2015, the trial court issued an order revoking Guzman’s 

appellate bond because Guzman never filed an appeal. (Doc. No. 80). The trial 

court further ordered that Guzman be taken into custody to serve the imposed prison 

sentence. (Id.). However, Guzman absconded and failed to appear at a show cause 

hearing held on October 15, 2015. (Doc. No. 84). 

{¶7} On October 16, 2015, the State filed a motion for forfeiture of bond 

pursuant to Crim.R. 46 and R.C. 2937.35. (Doc. No. 86). The State’s motion was 

scheduled for a show cause hearing on October 26, 2015. (Doc. No. 87). According 
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to the record, the State, Guzman’s attorney, Crime Victim Services, and American 

Surety Company/Erie Shore Bail were served with a copy of the notice pertaining 

to the bond forfeiture hearing. (Doc. No. 88). 

{¶8} Thereafter, on October 26, 2015, a bond forfeiture hearing was held in 

the trial court. (Doc. No. 90). The State, Guzman’s attorney, and Hunter, on behalf 

of Erie Shore Bail Bonds, appeared for the hearing. (Id.). After considering the 

record, the trial court found that Guzman failed to appear in accordance with the 

terms of bail and ordered that the bail posted ($150,000) be forfeited. (Id.). The 

trial court further ordered: 

As to recognizance given by any surety, the Clerk of Courts shall 

notify accused [sic] and each surety by ordinary mail at the address 

shown by them in their affidavits of qualification or on the record of 

the case, of the default of the accused and the adjudication of 

forfeiture and require each of them to show cause on or before 

MONDAY DECEMBER 21, 2015 @ 8:00 a.m. [* * *], why 

judgment should not be entered against each of them for the penalty 

stated in the recognizance. If good cause by production of the body 

of the accused or otherwise is not shown, the Court shall thereupon 

enter judgment against the sureties or either of them, so notified, in 

such amount, not exceeding the penalty of the bond, as has been set 

in the adjudication of forfeiture, and shall award execution therefor as 

in civil cases. The proceeds of sale shall be received by the clerk or 

magistrate and distributed as on forfeiture of cash bail. 

(Emphasis sic). (Id.). 

{¶9} On December 21, 2015, the show cause hearing was held in the trial 

court on the bond forfeiture. (Doc. No. 97). Finding that good cause was not shown, 
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the trial court ordered judgment in the amount of $150,000 against Guzman’s 

“surety, Erie Shore Bail Bonds.” (Id.). 

{¶10} Guzman was apprehended on January 1, 2015. (Doc. No. 99). 

{¶11} On February 1, 2016, attorney Eric LaFayette (“LaFayette”) filed a 

motion in the trial court styled: “Surety, Scott Allen Hunter, Erie Shore Bail Bonds 

and American Surety Company [Appellant], motion for relief from bond forfeiture 

due to the surety apprehending the defendant and returning the defendant to the 

jurisdiction of this honorable court pursuant to R.C.§2937.39.” (Doc. No. 102). 

The motion averred that Hunter was the “surety agent for Erie Shore Surety [sic] 

and American Surety Company” (Appellant). (Emphasis added). (Id.). 

{¶12} On April 18, 2016, a remittance hearing was held in the trial court. 

(Doc. No. 120). On May 12, 2016, the trial court issued its judgment entry of 

remittance ordering that $5,000 of the $150,000 bond should be remitted to the 

surety due to their efforts in locating and apprehending Guzman. (Id.). However, 

the trial court also ordered that the remaining $145,000 not be remitted to the surety, 

Erie Shore Bail Bonds. (Id.). Appellant was not named as a surety in this trial court 

entry. (Id.). 

{¶13} Hunter and Erie Shore Bail Bonds appealed the trial court’s remittance 

order to this Court on June 7, 2016 (“Guzman I”). (Doc. No. 122). The appeal 
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designated only Hunter and Erie Shore Bail Bonds as the “sureties” of Guzman’s 

bonds. (Id.). 

{¶14} On July 11, 2016, while the appeal was pending, LaFayette filed in the 

trial court a “notice to clarify representation of attorney Eric L. LaFyette [sic] as the 

representative of Scott Allen Hunter and Erie Shore Bail Bonds.” (Doc. No. 130). 

In his notice LaFayette represented that he did not represent the Appellant. (Id.). 

{¶15} On February 27, 2017, this Court filed its judgment on Guzman I, 

affirming the trial court’s remittance order. (Doc. No. 135). 

{¶16} Nearly a year later, on February 26, 2018, the State filed a motion 

requesting that the trial court issue a “nunc pro tunc” order, correcting its original 

remittance order.1

 (Doc. No. 137). The State asserted that the May 12, 2016 

judgment entry was supposed to include Appellant. In support of its motion, the 

State attached the trial court’s bond entry and copies of the bonds that Hunter signed 

(one for $100,000 and another for $50,000) on behalf of Erie Shore Bail Bonds. 

(Id.). Each bond bore identical language that authorized Hunter as Appellant’s 

“power of attorney.” (Id.). 

{¶17} Appellant, appearing for the first time in the trial court on March 12, 

2018, filed a memorandum in opposition to the State’s motion for a nunc pro tunc

 

1

 Notably, the entry that the State requested the trial court to correct through the use of a nunc pro tunc entry 

was not the judgment entry that the trial court ultimately corrected. (See, Doc. No. 137, wherein the State 

requested a nunc pro tunc of the May 12, 2016 judgment entry on remittance of bond). 
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order. (Doc. No. 138). Appellant argued that the State was seeking to substantively 

change a prior order through the use of a nunc pro tunc entry, which was 

impermissible. (Id.). Appellant further argued that the underlying $145,000 

judgment was void, because the trial court had revoked the initial $100,000 bond 

posted by Guzman. (Id.). Appellant attached to its motion the trial court’s judgment 

entry of sentencing; the appeal bond order; a copy of Appellant’s OR bond 

paperwork; the judgment entry forfeiture of bond; and the judgment entry 

remittance of bond. (Id.). 

{¶18} On March 28, 2018, the trial court issued its judgment entry granting 

a nunc pro tunc entry of judgment on the bond forfeiture. (Doc. No. 139). The trial 

court found that Appellant, along with Hunter and Erie Shore Bail Bonds, had 

consistently been identified as the “surety” throughout the pendency of the case. 

(Id.). And, because the Appellant had always been listed as a surety of Guzman’s 

bonds, the trial court corrected its judgment, nunc pro tunc, to reflect such in its 

December 21, 2015 judgment entry on bond forfeiture. (Id.). Further, the trial 

court’s nunc pro tunc entry ordered judgment in the amount of $150,000 (as 

opposed to $145,000) against the Appellant. 

{¶19} From this judgment Appellant appeals, and presents the following 

assignments of error for our review: 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADDING AMERICAN 

SURETY COMPANY TO A DECEMBER 21, 2015 JUDGMENT 

THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF A NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRY. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT ON 

MARCH 28, 2018 IN THE AMOUNT OF $150,000 AGAINST 

AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY. 

Appellant’s First Assignment of Error 

{¶20} Appellant argues that the trial court erred by issuing a nunc pro tunc 

judgment entry adding it as a party to a prior judgment. We agree. 

Standard of Review 

{¶21} We review a trial court’s Civ.R. 60 ruling under an abuse of discretion 

standard. Business Data Systems, Inc. v. Gourmet Café Corp., 9th Dist. Summit 

No. 22096, 2005-Ohio-4, ¶ 23 citing Hall v. Paragon Steakhouse, 9th Dist. Lorain 

No. 99CA007443, 2000 WL 1026695, *1. “Under an abuse of discretion standard, 

a lower court’s decision will [* * *] be reversed [* * *] only when the court’s 

decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Morrow v. Becker, 138 

Ohio St.3d 11, 2013-Ohio-4542, 3 N.E.3d 144, ¶ 9. 

Analysis

{¶22} Under Civ.R. 60(A), a trial court may correct clerical mistakes in 

judgments, orders, or other parts of the record. See generally, Business Data 
Case No. 1-18-21 

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Systems, Inc., 9th Dist. Summit No. 22096, 2005-Ohio-4, ¶ 24. Specifically, Civ.R. 

60(A) states, in relevant part: 

(A) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or 

other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or 

omission may be corrected by the court at any time on its on initiative 

or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court 

orders. 

Civ.R. 60(A). Furthermore, “[i]t is within the trial court’s discretion to correct 

clerical mistakes that are apparent on the record, but not those mistakes that require 

the court to make substantive changes in judgments.” (Emphasis added). Allied 

Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Uneco Realty Co., 146 Ohio App.3d 136, 146, 2001-

Ohio-3387, 765 N.E.2d 420 

{¶23} In distinguishing a clerical error from a substantive error, a “clerical 

error,” has been defined as “a mistake that is mechanical in nature and apparent on 

the record, which does not involve a legal decision or judgment.” Id. See also, 

Londrico v. Delores C. Knowlton, Inc., 88 Ohio App.3d 282, 285, 623 N.E.2d 723 

(9th Dist.1993) (Civ.R. 60(A) allows the court, in its discretion, to correct clerical 

mistakes which are apparent on the record, but does not permit a court to make 

substantive changes in judgments); Dentsply Intern., Inc. v. Kostas, 26 Ohio App.3d 

116, 118, 498 N.E.2d 1079 (8th Dist.1985) (clerical mistake is the type of mistake 

or omission mechanical in nature which is apparent on the record and which does 

not involve a legal decision or judgment by an attorney). 
Case No. 1-18-21 

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{¶24} In its nunc pro tunc judgment entry, the trial court found that the 

“surety” had been consistently identified as Hunter, Erie Shore Bail Bonds, and

American Surety Company throughout the pendency of the case. (03/28/2018 J. 

Entry at 4). In support of its findings, the trial court referred to the bail bonds 

guaranteed by Appellant that appointed Hunter/Erie Shore Bail Bonds as its power 

of attorney to execute such bonds. (Id.; see also Doc. Nos. 63; 77). The trial court’s 

analysis also referred to the show cause hearing held on October 26, 2015, which 

provided that the “defendant and/or surety” (i.e. Appellant) had an opportunity to 

show cause why the bail bond should not be adjudged forfeited, for which Appellant 

received notice but failed to appear. (Id. at 3; Doc. Nos. 87; 88; 92). 

{¶25} The trial court then went on to find that the docket activity occurring 

after the December 21, 2015 hearing was determinative that Appellant was a 

“surety” of Guzman’s bond. Specifically, the trial court found that the motion filed 

by LaFayette on behalf of Hunter, Erie Shore Bail Bonds, and Appellant requesting 

relief from the bond forfeiture was proof of Appellant’s consistent involvement in 

the case at each stage of the forfeiture proceedings. (Id. at 4; Doc. No. 102). And 

lastly, the trial court determined that in the first appeal of this case, Guzman I, the 

“surety” never raised the issue of the validity December 21, 2015 judgment on 

appeal. (Id.). See, State v. Guzman, 3rd Dist. Allen No. 1-16-27, 2017-Ohio-682. 
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{¶26} In our review of the record to determine whether the omission of 

Appellant from the December 21, 2015 judgment entry was a clerical error or a 

substantive error, we find the record to be ambiguous as to whether Appellant was 

a “surety,” throughout the course of the proceedings. Specifically, on December 

21, 2015, at the bond forfeiture hearing, the trial court introduced the case as 

follows: 

Trial Court: The matter is before the Court pursuant to the 

Judgment Entry on the Forfeiture of Bond that was filed on the 

26th of October of this year. At that time the Court ordered that 

the bond posted, a total of a hundred and fifty thousand dollars, 

was forfeited because the defendant failed to appear and fled the 

jurisdiction of the Court. The Court gave notice to the surety of 

record, which is the Erie Shores (sic) Bail Bonds, to determine this 

morning at the hearing whether there’s reason why judgment 

should not be entered against the surety on the amount of the 

recognizance, or the hundred and fifty thousand. 

(Emphasis added). (Bond Forfeiture Hrg., 12/21/2015 Tr. at 1). The trial court went 

on to reaffirm that Erie Shore Bail Bonds was the surety, discussing the purpose of 

the hearing as: 

Trial Court: Again, the purpose of the hearing this morning is 

for Erie Shore Bail Bonds to show cause why judgment should not 

be entered against them. 

(Id. at 2). Finally, the trial court, after hearing the testimony, found the following: 

Trial Court: Upon consideration of all the facts in this case the 

Court’s going to find that good cause has not been shown by the 

production of the body of the accused, or otherwise, and so I’m 

going to order that judgment be entered against Erie Shore Bail 

Bonds in the amount of a hundred and fifty thousand dollars and 
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execution of that shall be awarded as in a civil case and was 

represented here, Mr. Guzman (sic), Ohio Revised Code 2937.37, 

I believe, would allow for if you produce Mr. Guzman’s body to 

the Court after the judgment, which I’m entering today, you can 

apply for remitter. Okay? 

(Emphasis added). (Id. at 5). At no point during the hearing did the trial court, the 

State, or Hunter mention Appellant as a surety of Guzman’s bonds. 

{¶27} After the hearing, the trial court journalized its ruling with the 

following language: 

Therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that 

Judgment shall be and hereby is entered, pursuant to R.C. 2937.36, 

against the surety, Erie Shore Bail Bonds in the amount of 

$150,000.00, which amount does not exceed the penalty of the bonds 

as were posted on May 4, 2015 and July 29, 2015, as had been set in 

the adjudication of forfeiture filed on October 26, 2015. 

(Emphasis added). (Emphasis sic). (Id.). 

{¶28} Furthermore, we do not find that LaFayette’s (one time) filing on 

behalf of Appellant to be conclusive of Appellant’s “consistent” involvement as a 

surety in this matter. Even though LaFayette filed a motion on behalf of Hunter, 

Erie Shore Bail Bonds, and Appellant, he subsequently filed a motion to “clarify 

representation,” wherein he represented (to the trial court) that he was not retained 

by and did not represent Appellant. 2 (See, Doc. No. 130). Lastly, with regards to 

the first appeal to this Court, we note that the identified parties were: “Appellant, 

 

2

 The trial court also acknowledged this filing in its judgment entry granting the nunc pro tunc order. (See 

Doc. No. 139). 
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Scott Allen Hunter (“Hunter”), d.b.a. Erie Shore Bail Bonds (“Erie Shore”) (as, 

“Surety”) ***. Guzman, 3rd Dist. Allen No. 1-16-27, 2017-Ohio-682, at ¶ 1. As a 

matter of fact, the Appellant herein, (American Surety Company) was never referred 

to as an interested party by anyone in our first decision. Id. 

{¶29} Accordingly, since the “surety” was “inconsistently” identified 

throughout the course of the proceedings hereunder, we cannot say that it is “clear 

from the record” that Appellant’s omission from the judgment entry was just a 

“clerical error.” 

{¶30} In State v. Senz, a case factually similar to the case at hand, the trial 

court ordered forfeiture of bond and entered judgment against the corporate entity 

that posted the defendant’s bond. State v. Senz, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 02CA0016, 

2002-Ohio-6464, ¶ 3. In Senz, the bondsman and the corporate entity filed a motion 

to vacate and set aside a judgment against the corporate entity. Id. Thereafter, the 

trial court entered a judgment entry nunc pro tunc, stating that the earlier judgment 

against the corporate entity would include the issuer of the bond as part of the surety. 

Id. at ¶ 4. The appellate court reversed, holding that: 

[T]he trial court’s nunc pro tunc (sic) entry entered judgment against 

another party. This is a substantive change and not an entry that 

merely reflects what had previously occurred in the court. 

Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to enter judgment against 

Bankers Insurance Co. (the issuer of the bond) through a nunc pro 

tunc (sic) entry. 

Id. at ¶ 13. 
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{¶31} Here, even though the trial court cited numerous cases to support its 

conclusion that the Appellant was bound by its December 21, 2015 judgment entry, 

none of the cases cited by the trial court utilized a nunc pro tunc to do so. See, State 

v. Slider, et al., 184 Ohio App.3d 68, 2009-Ohio-4179, 919 N.E.2d 775. ¶ 14 

(decision of the trial court was reversed and remanded for additional findings of fact

as to the intent of the parties); State v. Slider, 9th Dist. Washington No. 09CA41, 

2010-Ohio-5952, ¶ 7 (remand hearing was held for the limited purpose of resolving 

the ambiguity that existed with respect to the capacity in which the Appellant signed 

the recognizance bond); State v. Sexton, 132 Ohio App.3d 791, 792, 726 N.E.2d 554 

(4th Dist.1999) (bonding company appealed the judgment entry arising from the 

bond forfeiture hearing); and State v. Scherer, 108 Ohio App.3d 586, 589-90, 671 

N.E.2d 545 (2nd Dist.1995) (trial court ordered bond forfeited after a bond 

forfeiture hearing because defendant failed to appear). 

{¶32} Moreover, none of the cited cases stand for the proposition of law that 

a trial court may add a party to a prior judgment through the use of a nunc pro tunc. 

To the contrary, Ohio case law has consistently held that a nunc pro tunc may not 

be used to add a party to a judgment. As we have previously held, “[a] nunc pro 

tunc order may not render a judgment or modify a judgment never made in the first 

instance.” Lowery v. Estate of White, 3rd Dist. Allen No. 1-200-15, 2000-Ohio1906, *1, citing McKay v. McKay, 24 Ohio App.3d 74, 75, 493 N.E.2d 317 (11th 
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Dist.1985). The Ninth District Court of Appeals, in Business Data Systems, Inc., 

expounded upon this principle and held that “[c]hanging a party’s liability on a 

judgment is clearly a substantive change in the parties’ rights and not merely a 

correction of a clerical error.” Business Data Systems, Inc., 9th Dist. Summit No. 

22096, 2005-Ohio-4, ¶ 37. The Second District Court of Appeals, in Nemcic v. 

Phelps, followed Business Data Systems, Inc.’s holding that changing a party’s 

liability on a judgment is clearly a substantive change and the trial court could not 

have modified its prior order under Civ.R. 60(A). Nemcic v. Phelps, 2nd Dist. 

Montgomery No. 26066, 2014-Ohio-3952, 19 N.E.3d 554, ¶ 21. 

{¶33} Lastly, even if this was a proper nunc pro tunc order, we would not 

have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, “[b]ecause * * * a proper nunc pro tunc entry 

does not give rise to a new final order for purposes of appeal.” Matter of H.S., 9th 

Dist. Ross No. 16CA3569, 2017-Ohio-457, 84 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 49 citing State v. 

Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, paragraph two of the 

syllabus (“a nunc pro tunc judgment entry issued for the sole purpose of * * * 

correct[ing] a clerical omission in a final judgment entry is not a new final order 

from which a new appeal may be taken.”) 

{¶34} For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court abused its 

discretion in amending a final judgment to include a new party nunc pro tunc. Thus, 
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we sustain Appellant’s first assignment of error and reverse the nunc pro tunc order 

of the trial court. 

Appellant’s Second Assignment of Error 

{¶35} Having found the underlying nunc pro tunc invalid in Appellant’s first 

assignment of error, Appellant’s second assignment of error is rendered moot. 

Conclusion 

{¶36} Having found error prejudicial to Appellant herein in the particulars 

assigned and argued, we sustain Appellant’s first assignment of error, which renders 

the second assignment of error moot. This matter is remanded back to the Allen 

County Common Pleas Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Judgment Reversed and 

Cause Remanded 

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur. 

/jlr