IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

El Mariachi Mexican Restaurant, LLC :

 :

 v. : No. 837 C.D. 2023

: Submitted: May 7, 2024

Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, :

 Appellant : 

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: June 4, 2024

The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) appeals an order of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Cumberland County (trial court) that reversed the PLCB’s 

decision to deny El Mariachi Mexican Restaurant, LLC’s (Applicant) application for 

an Economic Development Restaurant Liquor License (EDR License).1 The PLCB 

argues the trial court erred by holding that Applicant satisfied the requirements for 

an EDR License as set forth in the Liquor Code2 and the PLCB’s regulations. After 

review, we affirm. 

1 The PLCB may issue an EDR License notwithstanding quota restrictions, explained infra, for the 

purpose of economic development. See Section 461(b.1) of the Liquor Code, Act of April 12, 

1951, P.L. 90, as amended, 47 P.S. § 4-461(b.1). 

2 Act of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, as amended, 47 P.S. §§ 1-101 - 10-1001. 
2

BACKGROUND 

In June 2021, Applicant applied for an EDR License for its restaurant located 

at 40 Shippensburg Shopping Center, Suite 21, in Shippensburg, Pennsylvania. 

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 52a. By letter dated October 5, 2021, the PLCB’s 

Bureau of Licensing (Bureau) notified Applicant it would hold a hearing to address 

the PLCB’s objections to its application, specifically indicating: 

1. The [PLCB] shall take evidence to determine whether [Applicant] 

exhausted reasonable means in an effort to find a suitable license within 

the current county quota scheme, in accordance with Section 3.105 of 

the [PLCB’s] Regulations.

2. The [PLCB] shall take evidence to determine that the approval of 

this application will not adversely affect the health, welfare, peace and 

morals of the neighborhood within a radius of 500 feet of the proposed 

licensed premises. 

R.R. at 55a-57a.

The PLCB hearing examiner conducted two hearings in this matter, one on 

December 21, 2021, and one on February 25, 2022.3 Jose Luis Olvera Hernandez 

(Mr. Olvera), one of Applicant’s owners, testified at both hearings. At the second 

hearing, Applicant’s counsel, Jan Sulcove, Esquire (Counsel), who served as 

Applicant’s agent in attempting to procure a license, testified. After the hearings, 

the hearing examiner recommended denying the EDR License. Id. at 215a. By order 

dated September 21, 2022, the PLCB refused Applicant’s EDR License application. 

Id. at 229a. The PLCB concluded that although approval of Applicant’s application 

3 During the first hearing, Applicant’s counsel, Jan Sulcove, Esquire (Counsel), attempted to testify 

regarding his efforts to procure a license for Applicant as Applicant’s agent. R.R. at 33a-48a. 

Because Counsel represented Applicant at the hearing, the hearing examiner did not permit 

Counsel to testify as a fact witness. Id. The PLCB hearing examiner held a second hearing during 

which substitute counsel took over representation and Counsel testified. Id. at 102a-31a.
3

would not adversely affect the health, welfare, peace, and morals of the 

neighborhood within a 500-foot radius of the premises, Applicant failed to exhaust 

reasonable means to find a restaurant liquor license within the current county quota 

scheme. PLCB’s Op. at 22. Applicant appealed to the trial court. 

The trial court conducted a de novo trial. R.R. at 232a-308a. The trial court 

accepted the record of the administrative proceedings, and the following individuals 

testified on behalf of Applicant: Counsel; Stephen Dopson, Applicant’s accountant

(Accountant); Mr. Olvera; and Heather Olvera, Mr. Olvera’s wife, and Applicant’s 

co-owner (Ms. Olvera) (collectively, the Olveras). 

During his testimony, Accountant explained he was familiar with Applicant’s 

business organization as he assisted in setting up the company. Id. at 244a. At the 

end of 2021, Applicant had approximately $28,328 in capital, and did not have any 

assets to serve as collateral for a business loan. Id. at 247a. Accountant prepared 

balance sheets reflecting Applicant’s bank statements, invoices, and check register 

at the end of every month, and presented an income statement reflecting a net income 

of approximately $190,000 for the year 2021. Id. at 248a. Accountant testified that 

based on his review of Applicant’s financial records, Applicant could not afford to 

pay $600,000 for a liquor license out of its assets. Id. at 250a. 

In his testimony, Counsel described his efforts to secure a license for 

Applicant. Counsel explained the Olveras contacted him in April 2021, for help 

obtaining a liquor license. Id. at 259a-60a. After obtaining approval from the Board 

of Supervisors of Shippensburg Township, Counsel began the process of contacting 

active license holders and holders of licenses in safekeeping4 with the PLCB by 

sending letters requesting the recipients contact him if they had any interest in selling 

4 Where a licensee’s operations cease for 15 consecutive days or more, its license may be held in 

safekeeping and become available when its operations resume. See 40 Pa. Code § 7.31.
4

their licenses. Id. at 261a. Counsel contacted “substantially over 50%” of the 

entities listed on the PLCB’s records as being owners of the licenses, but received 

only one response, which was from Todd Meals (Meals), an officer and director of 

Scalles, Inc. (Scalles). Id.

As a result of that contact, Counsel researched the average price paid for a 

license through the PLCB’s auction process, as well as information available on the 

internet from brokers who sold licenses. Id. at 263a-64a. Based on his research, 

Counsel calculated an average purchase price to be approximately $67,209. Id. at 

263a. Counsel met with the Olveras, and they permitted him to send Meals an offer 

of $67,209 for Scalles’ liquor license, expecting to begin negotiations. Id. at 265a. 

However, Meals responded that Scalles was not interested and did not begin 

negotiations. Id. Counsel researched the average cost of purchasing a liquor license 

on the marketplace, which he found to be between $550,000 and $650,000. Id. 

Mr. Olvera testified the Olveras went to F&M Bank to obtain a $600,000 

business loan, but the bank denied the loan because Applicant did not have enough 

cash flow. Id. at 288a. Applicant admitted the denial letter from F&M Bank. Id. 

Similarly, Ms. Olvera testified F&M Bank expressed there was no way it would offer 

a loan, and explained it is very difficult to get a bank to approve the amount the 

PLCB requires for licenses. Id. at 293a-94a. Additionally, the Olveras went to M&T 

Bank, the holder of Applicant’s business bank accounts, but the bank would not offer 

a business loan for a liquor license. Id. During Ms. Olvera’s testimony, she 

explained the M&T Bank loan officer indicated Applicant did not yet have sufficient 

cash flow to support a $600,000 loan having just opened in 2020. Id. at 293a. Mr. 

Olvera testified Applicant could not have purchased a liquor license for $600,000. 

Id. 
5

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sustained Applicant’s appeal, 

directing the PLCB to issue the EDR License to Applicant. Based on the evidence 

presented, the trial court found Applicant provided sufficient evidence to 

demonstrate that Counsel made contact with over 50% of the relevant liquor license 

holders in the county, and that only one responded. Id. at 306a. Applicant made an 

offer of $67,209, which while well below market price, was a price Applicant could 

afford. Id. The trial court noted Applicant provided an accounting of its 2021 capital 

financial resources, as well as current and projected revenue and expenses, and the 

trial court found Applicant attempted to get a loan but was rejected. Id. The trial 

court concluded: 

The only question for [the trial court] is whether [Applicant] exhausted 

reasonable means to obtain a license from the [marketplace] in that its 

offer was well below the open [marketplace] price. 

The [trial court] finds that [Applicant] has exhausted reasonable means 

because [Applicant] offered on the open market[place] what the 

[Applicant] could afford and in keeping with the purpose of the [EDR 

License], the [PLCB] is overruled and shall grant [Applicant] a[n] 

[EDR License].

Id. at 306a-07a. 

The PLCB filed its notice of appeal on July 26, 2023. The trial court 

subsequently issued an opinion under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

(Rule) 1925(a), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) (1925(a) Opinion). In its 1925(a) Opinion, the 

trial court explained it found Applicant exhausted reasonable means of purchasing a 

regular restaurant liquor license because Applicant offered on the open marketplace 

what it could afford. Id. at 7. Relying on this Court’s decision in Myles Development 

Company, LLC v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 224 A.3d 1119, 1127 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2020), the trial court explained: 
6

[W]e cannot expect an applicant to engage in an exercise in futility in 

order to obtain a license. It seems contradictory to require an applicant 

to offer an asking price of which it [cannot] afford. Applicant’s owner, 

former attorney, and accountant all credibly testified that purchasing a 

regular restaurant license on the marketplace was not financially 

feasible for Applicant. Additionally, Applicant was turned down twice 

for loans. To demand more seems an exercise in futility. Therefore, 

there was sufficient evidence to find in favor of Applicant and order the 

issuance of an [EDR] License.

1925(a) Op. at 15. Additionally, the trial court asserted this Court should quash the 

PLCB’s appeal as it was untimely filed. Id. at 8 

On appeal, the PLCB argues (1) it timely appealed the trial court’s order; (2) 

the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law by interpreting the 

statutorily imposed condition, “exhausted reasonable means to find a suitable 

license,” to require only a single offer for an amount an applicant can afford, rather 

than requiring a good faith offer; and (3) the trial court committed an error of law or 

abused its discretion by failing to base its decision on substantial evidence by finding 

Applicant was unable to obtain financing to make a market-rate offer for an available 

license. PLCB’s Br. at 4. 

In response, Applicant argues this Court should quash the PLCB’s appeal 

because the PLCB failed to timely file its notice of appeal and, thus this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to address this matter. Applicant’s Br. at 1-4. As to the merits, Applicant 

asserts the trial court’s order directing the PLCB to issue it an EDR License should 

be affirmed because the trial court’s conclusion that Applicant exhausted reasonable 

means to find a suitable license within the existing county quota scheme is supported 

by substantial evidence. Id. at 6. Additionally, Applicant contends the trial court’s 

order should be affirmed because the trial court’s conclusion that Applicant was 

unable to secure a loan or other financing to enable it to afford a liquor license is 
7

supported by substantial evidence and the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion 

in making this determination. Id.

DISCUSSION 

Timeliness 

Because a timely appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to this Court’s exercise 

of jurisdiction, we must first address the timeliness of the PLCB’s appeal. Monroe 

Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Miller, 570 A.2d 1386, 1388 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). 

Rule 903(a) provides a notice of appeal “shall be filed within 30 days after the entry 

of the order from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Under Rule 108, an 

order is “entered” the day “on which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that 

notice of entry of the order has been given as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b).”5 

Pa.R.A.P. 108. This Court has previously held the 30-day appeal period does not 

begin until an order is entered by the trial court, and the trial court’s order is not 

“entered” until that order has been entered by the prothonotary on the docket and 

notice of the order’s entry has been given to the parties by the prothonotary. Gomory

v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 704 A.2d 202, 204 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1998). Here, the trial court contends it “entered” its order on June 21, 2023, because 

it dictated the order in open court with all parties present. 1925(a) Op. at 8. 

However, the order was not filed on the docket until June 30, 2023, due to a clerical 

error. Id. Moreover, the prothonotary did not provide notice to the parties under 

Civil Rule 236 until July 6, 2023. R.R. at 312a. Therefore, the trial court’s order 

was entered on July 6, 2023. As such, the PLCB had until August 7, 2023, to file its 

5 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 236(b) provides: “The prothonotary shall note in the docket 

the giving of the notice and, when a judgment by confession is entered, the mailing of the required 

notice and documents.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b). 
8

notice of appeal.6 The PLCB filed its notice of appeal on July 26, 2023, which was 

before its deadline. Accordingly, the PLCB timely filed its notice of appeal.

Merits

We turn to the merits of the PLCB’s appeal. Under Section 464 of the Liquor 

Code, a trial court conducts de novo review of the PLCB’s grant or denial of a 

license. 47 P.S. § 4-464.7 A de novo review “contemplates an independent 

evaluation of the evidence.” Domusimplicis, LLC v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 202 

A.3d 836, 841 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quotation omitted). The trial court “is not 

restricted to reviewing the established record and may hear new evidence and make 

independent findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Id. So long as the trial court’s 

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, it may 

reverse the PLCB’s decision to deny a license. Id. We review the trial court’s 

decision to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support its findings or 

whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. K&K 

Enters., Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 602 A.2d 476, 478 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). 

6

 Thirty days from July 6, 2023, would set the filing deadline at August 5, 2023. However, because 

August 5, 2023, was a Saturday, the PLCB had until Monday, August 7, 2023, to file its notice of 

appeal. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908. 

7 Section 464 of the Liquor Code provides:

The court shall hear the application de novo on questions of fact, administrative 

discretion and such other matters as are involved, at such time as it shall fix, of 

which notice shall be given to the [PLCB]. The court shall either sustain or overrule the action of the [PLCB] and either order or deny the issuance of a 

new license or the renewal or transfer of the license or the renewal of an amusement 

permit to the applicant.

47 P.S. § 4-464. 
9

Section 461(a) of the Liquor Code8imposes a quota system restricting the 

number of permitted liquor licenses based on a municipality’s population. Because 

Cumberland County has exceeded its quota,9the PLCB is generally prohibited from 

8 Section 461(a) of the Liquor Code provides: 

No additional restaurant, eating place retail dispenser or club licenses shall be 

issued within a county if the total number of restaurant and eating place retail 

dispenser licenses is greater than one license for each three thousand inhabitants in 

the county, except the board may issue licenses to public venues, performing arts 

facilities, continuing care retirement communities, airport restaurants, municipal 

golf courses, hotels, privately-owned private golf courses, privately-owned public 

golf courses, racetracks, automobile racetracks, nonprimary pari-mutuel wagering 

locations, privately-owned ski resorts and to any other entity which this act 

specifically exempts from the limitations provided in this section, and the board 

may issue a license to a club situated in a borough having a population less than 

eight thousand inhabitants which is located in a county of the second class A whose 

application is filed on or before February 28, 2001. In addition, the board may issue 

an eating place retail dispenser license for on-premises sales only to the owner or 

operator of a facility having a minimum of a one-half mile asphalt track and having 

a permanent seating capacity of at least six thousand people used principally for 

holding automobile races, regardless of the number of restaurant and eating place 

retail dispenser licenses already issued in that county. When determining the 

number of restaurant and eating place retail dispenser licenses issued in a county 

for the purposes of this section, licenses exempted from this limitation, licenses 

subject to the mixed-use town development project provisions of this act, licenses 

subject to the commercial and mixed-use overlay project provisions of this act, 

licenses subject to the tourist development project provisions of this act and club 

licenses shall not be considered. Inhabitants of dry municipalities shall be 

considered when determining the population in a county. Licenses shall not be 

issued or transferred into municipalities where such licenses are prohibited pursuant 

to local referendum in accordance with section 472. Licenses approved for 

intermunicipal transfer may not be transferred from the receiving municipality for 

a period of five years after the date that the licensed premises are operational in the 

receiving municipality.

47 P.S. § 4-461(a).

9 Cumberland County’s retail liquor license quota is 78 licenses. R.R. at 58a. At the time of the 

hearing, the PLCB’s records showed Cumberland County had 88 restaurant liquor licenses and 

one eating place malt beverage liquor license in effect which also counted against its quota. Id.
10

issuing new liquor licenses in the county. Id. However, Section 461(b.1) of the 

Liquor Code allows an exception to the quota for restaurants, in the interest of 

economic development, which is the EDR License. Under Section 461(b.1) of the 

Liquor Code, the PLCB can issue an EDR License where specific conditions are 

met: 

(b.1) The board may issue restaurant and eating place retail dispenser 

licenses and renew licenses issued under this subsection without regard 

to the quota restrictions set forth in subsection (a) for the purpose of 

economic development in a municipality under the following 

conditions:

(1) A license may only be issued under this subsection if 

the applicant has exhausted reasonable means for 

obtaining a suitable license within the county.

(2) The proposed licensed premises must be located 

within . . . :

. . . . 

(ii) A municipality in which the issuance of a 

restaurant or eating place retail dispenser license 

has been approved by the governing body of the 

municipality for the purpose of local economic 

development . . . . 

(3) The board may issue no more than two licenses total in 

each county of the first through fourth class and no more 

than one license total in each county of the fifth through 

eighth class per calendar year.

47 P.S. § 4-461(b.1)(1-3).10 

Section 3.105 of the PLCB’s regulations provides the mandatory criteria an 

applicant must provide to establish that it has met the Liquor Code’s exhaustion of 

10 The parties do not dispute Applicant satisfied Section 461(b.1)(2)(ii) of the Liquor Code by 

obtaining approval from the Board of Supervisors of Shippensburg Township.
11

reasonable means requirement. 40 Pa. Code § 3.105. Specifically, Section 3.105(e)

of the PLCB’s regulations provides an applicant’s evidence shall include the 

following: 

(1) Evidence that the applicant, or the applicant’s agent, made contact 

with existing restaurant liquor licensees, if a restaurant liquor economic 

development license is sought, or existing eating place retail dispenser 

licensees, if an eating place retail dispenser economic development 

license is sought, in the county.

(i) The purpose of the contact is to inquire as to the 

availability of the licensee’s license for purchase.

(ii) In counties of the first through fourth class, the number 

of licensees contacted by the applicant, or the applicant’s 

agent, must be equal to or greater than 50% of the existing 

restaurant liquor or eating place retail dispenser licensees 

in the county.

. . . .

(2) Evidence that the applicant, or the applicant’s agent, has offered to 

purchase a restaurant liquor or eating place retail dispenser licenses in 

the county that are in safekeeping at the time the application is filed 

with the Board, including the offered and requested amounts.

(3) An explanation as to why it is not economically feasible for the 

applicant business to pay the amount requested for an existing 

restaurant liquor or eating place retail dispenser license. The applicant 

shall provide evidence of the following factors:

(i) The applicant’s capital and financial resources.

(ii) The applicant’s projected revenue and expenses for its 

business, as well as actual revenue and expenses if the 

business is currently in operation.

(iii) Other factors the applicant considered when deciding 

that obtaining a liquor license in the marketplace was not 

economically feasible.
12

(4) A written estimation, with supporting documentation, of the 

expected economic benefits to the municipality if the application is 

granted.

40 Pa. Code § 3.105(e). 

The PLCB asserts the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error 

of law by interpreting Section 461(b.1) of the Liquor Code and Section 3.105(e) of 

the PLCB’s regulations regarding the exhaustion of reasonable means requirement

“so that it only requires a single offer for an amount an applicant claims it can afford, 

even if that amount is well below the open market price, rather than a reasonable, 

good faith offer.” PLCB’s Br. at 22. We disagree.

In Domusimplicis, 202 A.3d at 843, 845, this Court affirmed a trial court’s 

grant of an EDR License after the trial court credited the testimony of the applicant’s 

agent that he had called and sent letters to existing licensees inquiring about the 

availability of their licenses for sale. Additionally, the agent testified he personally 

knew that the licenses in safekeeping were not available for sale. Id. at 843. Under

these circumstances, we concluded it was unnecessary for the applicant to make an 

offer or to specify the price the applicant was willing to offer for the licenses because 

there were no licenses for sale. Id. An applicant need not make futile offers to 

purchase unavailable licenses. Id. Based on the trial court’s findings, which were 

supported by substantial evidence, we upheld the trial court’s determination that the 

applicant’s efforts met the exhaustion of reasonable means criterion. Id. 

Similarly, in Myles Development Company, the trial court found that none of 

the licensees the applicant reached out to were willing to sell their liquor license 

without also selling their business. 224 A.3d at 1127. In that case, we agreed with 

the trial court’s conclusion that Section 3.105(e) of the PLCB’s regulations did not 

require the applicant to purchase a separate business and additional real estate in 
13

order to acquire a liquor license. Id. Again, we concluded that a “licensee cannot 

be expected to engage in an exercise in futility.” Id. 

Here, the trial court credited Counsel’s testimony regarding the form letters 

he sent to existing licensees inquiring about the availability of their licenses for sale. 

Despite Counsel’s numerous inquiries, Counsel received only one response. Based 

on Counsel’s research and Applicant’s financial status, Applicant made an offer 

expecting to initiate negotiations, but Meals immediately indicated Scalles was not 

interested, and gave no indication he wanted to pursue further negotiations. The 

PLCB’s regulations require evidence that Applicant offered to purchase an available 

restaurant liquor license, including the offered and requested amount, as well as an 

explanation as to why it is not economically feasible for the applicant to pay the 

requested amount. See 40 Pa. Code § 3.105(e). Applicant complied with the 

PLCB’s regulations by offering to purchase the license from the only party 

indicating an interest in selling, along with the amount offered. The other party did 

not respond with a requested amount, simply indicating it was not interested. 

Despite the lack of a requested amount, Applicant provided an explanation why it 

was not economically feasible for it to offer an amount closer to market price. It 

provided evidence of its capital and financial resources, its projected revenue and 

expenses, and its attempt to obtain a business loan. The trial court deemed

Applicant’s evidence credible, and found it offered what it could afford. We agree 

with the trial court that to expect Applicant to have offered more than it could afford 

would have been “an exercise in futility.” See 1925(a) Op. at 15. Substantial 

evidence exists that Applicant could not afford the marketplace price. 

Moreover, we reject the PLCB’s assertion that because Applicant’s offer was 

below the market price for a liquor license, it was unreasonable or offered in bad 
14

faith. Neither the statute nor the regulation requires an applicant to offer the market 

price for a liquor license to demonstrate it “exhausted reasonable means” to secure 

a license. The PLCB’s suggestion this is a requirement is not supported by the plain 

language of the Liquor Code or the PLCB’s regulations. Here, the trial court 

concluded, based on its findings, which are supported by the record, Applicant’s 

offer, while below market price, was based on Counsel’s research and an amount 

Applicant could afford. The Liquor Code requires an applicant to exhaust 

“reasonable” means, and requiring an applicant to offer an amount beyond what it 

could afford to pay would be unreasonable. Additionally, the trial court did not find 

Applicant’s offer was in “bad faith” and the record does not support such a 

conclusion. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law 

committed by the trial court. 

Finally, the PLCB challenges the trial court’s factual finding that Applicant 

was unable to secure a loan or other financing to enable it to make a “legitimate 

offer” to purchase a license. We disagree.

 The trial court may reverse a PLCB decision to deny a liquor license where 

the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

I.B.P.O.E. of W. Mount Vernon Lodge 151 v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 969 A.2d 642, 

648 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is such relevant 

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 

Pa. State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control Enf’t v. Boots & Bonnet, Inc., 630 A.2d 

541, 543 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). 

Here, Accountant testified about Applicant’s capital and financial resources,

its past revenue and expenses, and its projected revenue and expenses. Accountant’s 

testimony was supported by his prepared financial statements. Additionally, the 
15

Olveras testified about Applicant’s finances and that it could not afford to offer 

market price for a liquor license. The Olveras both testified about their attempts to 

secure a business loan through two separate banks, and their denials from both 

banks. The Olveras’ testimony was supported by financial statements from 

Applicant’s bank accounts and a letter from F&M Bank denying Applicant’s loan 

request. The PLCB alleges Applicant did not “use the services of an accountant, 

attorney or other professional in seeking a loan,” but that is of no consequence as 

our review is simply whether substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s 

findings. Additionally, neither the Liquor Code nor the PLCB’s regulations require 

an applicant to provide evidence it used specific professional services when 

attempting to obtain a liquor license. Accountant’s testimony, supported by 

Applicant’s financial statements, and the Olveras’ testimony, supported by 

Applicant’s bank statements and F&M’s loan denial letter, constitute substantial 

evidence upon which the trial court could find Applicant was unable to secure a loan 

or other financing to enable it to make a higher offer to purchase a license. Because 

the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion or commit an error of law. 

For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order. 

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

El Mariachi Mexican Restaurant, LLC :

 :

 v. : No. 837 C.D. 2023

: 

Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, :

 Appellant :

O R D E R 

 AND NOW, this 4th day of June 2024, the order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Cumberland County entered on July 6, 2023, is AFFIRMED. 

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge