alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
                                                                 EXHIBIT 10.16.2

                            EMERGENCE BONUS AGREEMENT

     This Emergence Bonus Agreement, effective as of February 17, 2005, is
entered into between David Davis ("Executive") and Cricket Communications, Inc.
("Cricket).

Recitals

     A. On April 13, 2003, Cricket, Leap Wireless International, Inc. ("Leap"),
and substantially all of their respective subsidiaries filed voluntary petitions
for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

     B. Cricket, Leap and their respective debtor subsidiaries emerged from
bankruptcy on August 16, 2004 when the Amended and Restated Joint Plan of
Reorganization of Leap, Cricket and other debtors party thereto became
effective.

     C. Executive served as an executive officer of Leap and Cricket for all or
substantially all of the time that these two corporations were in bankruptcy.

     D. To help assure its continued operations and the retention of its
employees during its financial restructuring, Cricket instituted various
retention and bonus compensation programs in 2003 and 2004, including a program
referred to as the Key Employee Retention Program ("KERP") which provided
employees who were selected to participate in the program with bonus payments in
October 2004 and February 2005. No executive officer of Leap or Cricket
participated in the KERP.

     E. In recognition of the services that Executive rendered to Leap and
Cricket, including the services that Executive rendered to Leap and Cricket
during the pendency of these corporations' bankruptcies, the Compensation
Committee of the Board of Directors of Leap authorized the payment of a cash
emergence bonus to Executive. For good and valuable consideration, the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, Cricket has agreed to pay to Executive the
portion of such bonus that remains to be paid as set forth below.

Agreement

     1. Cricket shall pay Executive a bonus in an amount equal to $87,500 on (or
promptly after) the earliest to occur of the following events:

          (a) September 30, 2005, provided Executive is still employed by
     Cricket on such date;

          (b) the date on which Executive ceases to be employed by Cricket,
     unless such cessation of employment occurs as a result of a termination for
     Cause.

<PAGE>

As used in this agreement, the terms "Cause" shall have the meaning ascribed to
such term in the standard form of Stock Option Grant Notice and Non-Qualified
Stock Option Agreement filed as Exhibit 10.2 to Leap's Current Report on From
8-K, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 5, 2005.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Agreement effective as of
the date first written above.

EXECUTIVE                               CRICKET COMMUNICATIONS, INC.


                                       By:
-------------------------------            -------------------------------------
                                        Name: S.D. Hutcheson
                                        Title: President, CFO
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Energy

###### Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

          - [Docket No. ER01-380-000]

Take notice that on November 6, 2000, American Transmission Company LLC (ATCLLC) tendered for filing a Generation-Tansmission Interconnection Agreement between ATCLLC and Madison Gas and Electric Company.

ATCLLC requests an effective date of January 1, 2001.

                    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest such filing should file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Comission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). All such motions and protests should be filed on or before December 8, 2000. Protests will be considered by the Commission to determine the appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the proceedings. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and are available for public inspection. This filing may also be viewed on the Internet at http://www.ferc.fed.us/​online/​rims.htm (call 202-208-2222 for assistance). Comments and protests may be filed electronically via the internet in lieu of paper. See, 18 CFR 385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions on the Commission's web site at                     *http://www.ferc.fed.us/​efi/​doorbell.htm.*

David P. Boergers,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 00-30730  Filed 12-1-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk April 23, 2012

d0416 

# Order

April 23, 2012

144203-4

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 144203-4 COA: 296509, 302136 Tuscola CC: 09-011135-FH PHILLIP WAYNE HARDY, 09-011136-FH Defendant-Appellant,

and

SHEILA KAY HARDY, Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 11, 2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented s hould be reviewed by this Court.
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed November 2, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D22-1024

Lower Tribunal Nos. 18-116-A-K & 20-732-A-K

________________

Robert Bursley,

Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida,

Appellee.

An appeal conducted pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Mark Wilson, Judge.

Robert Bursley, in proper person.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SCALES, LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert De Pillo, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant contends that his conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, a class A misdemeanor, should be reversed because the indictment was filed more than two years after commission of the crime *(see,*CPL 30.10 [2] [c]). By failing to submit a written motion to dismiss the indictment within 45 days after arraignment, defendant waived his right to a determination of that issue *(see,*CPL 210.20 [1] [fj; [2]; 210.45 [1]; 255.10 [1] [a]; 255.20 [1]; *contra, see, People v Perico,*143 Misc 2d 961) and has failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. There is no merit to defendant’s assertion that the People’s failure to commence the prosecution within the statutory time period constitutes a jurisdictional defect *(see, People v Kohut,*30 NY2d 183; *People v Dickson,*133 AD2d 492, 495).

*900Defendant also contends that, because his trial counsel failed to move timely to dismiss the indictment, he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. The failure to make a pretrial motion, even one that might be successful, does not, per se, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel *(see, People v Rivera,*71 NY2d 705, 709). In this case, trial counsel filed omnibus motions, made cogent opening and closing statements, adequately cross-examined prosecution witnesses, made appropriate objections, presented a reasonable defense, and significantly, was successful in obtaining the dismissal of the three other counts of the indictment, all of which were felony counts. Under the circumstances, counsel’s representation, viewed in its entirety, was meaningful *(see, People v Carter,*154 AD2d 883, *lv denied*74 NY2d 947). Moreover, defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel’s failure to move against the indictment *(see, People v Rivera, supra; People v Houston,*158 AD2d 971, *lv denied*75 NY2d 967). We note, in this respect, that trial counsel moved to dismiss the misdemeanor count of the indictment posttrial and after all of the felony charges had been dismissed. (Appeal from judgment of Ontario County Court, Henry, Jr., J.—criminal possession of controlled substance, seventh degree.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Denman, Green, Balio and Davis, JJ.
EXHIBIT 21
 SUBSIDIARIES OF WILMINGTON TRUST CORPORATION
 Jurisdiction ofSubsidiary
    
    IncorporationWilmington Trust Company
    
    DelawareBrandywine Finance Corporation
    
    DelawareBrandywine Insurance Agency, Inc.
    
    DelawareCompton Realty Corporation
    
    DelawareRodney Square Investors, L.P.
    
    DelawareSiobain VI, Ltd.
    
    DelawareWilmington Brokerage Services Company
    
    DelawareWilmington Trust (Cayman) Ltd.
    
    Cayman IslandsWilmington Trust SP Services (New York), Inc.
    
    Delaware100 West Tenth Street Corporation
    
    DelawareWilmington Trust SP Services, Inc.
    
    DelawareSpecial Services (Delaware), Inc.
    
    DelawareWilmington Trust SP Services (Delaware), Inc.
    
    DelawareWilmington Trust SP Services (Nevada), Inc.
    
    NevadaWilmington Trust SP Services (South Carolina), Inc.
    
    South CarolinaWilmington Trust SP Services (Vermont), Inc.
    
    VermontWilmington SP Services (California), Inc.
    
    CaliforniaWTC Community Investments, Inc.
    
    DelawareWTC Camden, Inc.
    
    DelawareWilmington Trust FSB
    
    United StatesWilmington
Trust Retirement and Institutional Services Company
    
    DelawareWilmington
Trust Fiduciary Services Company
    
    New JerseyWilmington Trust Investment Management, LLC
    
    GeorgiaWT Investments, Inc.
    
    DelawareWilmington Trust Conduit Services, LLC
    
    DelawareWilmington Trust Conduit Services Properties, LLC
    
    DelawareGTBA Holdings, Inc.
    
    DelawareGrant Tani Barash & Altman, LLC
    
    DelawareGrant, Tani, Barash & Altman Management, Inc.
    
    DelawareWilmington Family Office, Inc.
    
    DelawareRodney Square Management Corporation
    
    DelawareWilmington Trust (U.K.) Limited
    
    United KingdomSPV Advisors Limited
    
    United KingdomWilmington Trust (London) Limited
    
    United KingdomWilmington Trust SP Services (London) Limited
    
    United KingdomBedell SPV Management (Jersey) Limited
    
    JerseySPV Management Limited (Shell)
    
    United KingdomWilmington Trust SP Services (Cayman) Limited
    
    Cayman IslandsWilmington Trust SP Services (Channel Islands) Limited
    
    JerseyWilmington Trust SP Services (Dublin) Limited
    
    IrelandWilmington Trust SP Services (Frankfurt) GmbH
    
    GermanyWT (Luxembourg) SARL
    
    LuxembourgWilmington
Trust SP Services (Amsterdam) B.V.
    
    The NetherlandsWilmington Trust SP Services (Luxembourg) S.A.
    
    LuxembourgWilmington Trust CI Holdings Limited
    
    Cayman IslandsWilmington Trust Corporate Services (Cayman)Limited
    
    Cayman IslandsFlorence Limited
    
    Cayman IslandsKendall Corporation Ltd.
    
    Cayman IslandsSentinel Corporation
    
    Cayman IslandsWoodridge Corporation Ltd.
    
    Cayman IslandsRedmond Limited
    
    Cayman Islands
#### Ex parte C. C. KINCAID.

No. 7425.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 22, 1939.

Smith, Goldsmith & Bagby, of Austin, and Taylor & Storey and Hurst, Leak & Burke, all of Longview, for relator.

Oscar B. Jones, Dist. Atty., M. Neal Smith, Asst. Dist. Atty., Wynne & Wynne, Angus Wynne, William A. Wade and Henry H. Harbour, all of Longview, for the State.

F. B. Davenport, of Dallas, amicus curia.

CRITZ, Justice.

This is an original habeas corpus proceeding. It is a companion case to Ex parte Henry, 126 S.W.2d 1, this day decided by this Court. The facts involved in this case are, in law, the same as the facts involved in the Henry case. The law questions involved in the two cases are also the same. The relator here is enlarged for the reasons set forth in our opinion in the Henry case.
#### SHAW, Banking Com’r, v. McSHANE et al.

No. 1342-5886.

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.

June 1, 1932.

*279King, Mahaffey, Wheeler & Bryson, of-Texarkana, for plaintiff in error.

Rodgers & Rodgers and Keeney & Dalby, all of Texarkana, for defendants in error.

*283LEDDY, J.

The history of this case in the Court of Civil Appeals presents a rather unique situation. It is disclosed in the opening statement by Justice Hodges in his. opinion on rehearing, where this observation is made: “It seldom happens that the writer of an opinion disposing of a case on appeal is the only member of the court who, upon further consideration, questions the soundness of that opinion. But that has occurred in this case. The writer is now the only member of this court who thinks the conclusions stated in the original opinion are incorrect. Further consideration of the questions involved has convinced me that the controlling conclu- • *284sions of law stated in tlie original opinion are not warranted by tlie record.”

We have given a most thorough consideration to the two elaborate opinions delivered by Justice Hodges in this ease. In our judgment his opinion on rehearing (33 S.W.[2d] 282) thoroughly demonstrates the unsoundness of the legal conclusions reached in his former opinion on original hearing (33 S.W.[2d] 277). The controlling legal principles applicable to the facts of this case are correctly stated in the second opinion, 1 They meet with our distinct approval and furnish the basis for a proper disposition of this case.

The full and comprehensive manner in which the legal questions involved have been discussed by this eminent jurist in the opinion on rehearing renders it unnecessary for us to do more than render the judgment demanded by the conclusions therein stated.

We therefore recommend that the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals be reversed, and that judgment be here rendered in favor of plaintiff in error against defendants in error for the amount of the notes sued on, together with interest and attorneys’ fees, less a credit of $450 indorsed upon the smallest of said notes.

CURETON, C. J.

The judgments of the district court and Court of Civil Appeals are both reversed, and judgment rendered for plaintiff in error, as recommended by the Commission of Appeals.

1

 See page 279.
#### CARLTON v. STATE.

No. 16431.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 21, 1934.

Perkins & Perkins, of Rusk, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

*190MORROW, Presiding Judge.

The conviction is for unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor; penalty assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for two years.

The testimony adduced upon the trial is in substance as follows: Ered Moore, a deputy sheriff, testified that on the 12th day of April, 1933, he went from his home in Jacksonville, Tex., to the town of Alto. He further testified as follows: “Prior to that time I had received information as to the whereabouts of the defendant, Mack Carlton; a party told me that he was going south a short time before, and told me if I would follow him that X would probably catch him with a load of liquor. 7⁄8 * » party did not tell me in Jacksonville that this defendant had gone after whisky or had gone to any particular place, but told me that he had gone south out of Jacksonville, and that if I followed him I might find that he had whisky or would get whisky. * 5⁄8 ,5⁄8 He did not tell me that he knew that, but that he thought that. And X followed him in order to find out whether he had whisky or whether he was going to get whisky. I stopped him to see if he was going to get whisky. When I came to where I saw him, I walked up to the car because I thought that he might have whisky in it when I saw it. And when I came up there I saw this stuff in the car; that I did not know whether it was whisky or not, but that I thought it strong enough that I would not let him leave and told him to drive on ahead of me; and went on into Alto and turned him over to Mr. Belvin without any further investigation myself to determine what he had in there and bring him to Rusk. I never did know what was in the car and did not have any information that there would he anything in the car; hut that there might he something in the car.”

Bud Belvin, another deputy sheriff, testified that on the 12th day of April, 1933, the witness Ered Moore brought the appellant and his car to Alto and delivered the appellant and his car to Belvin ; that the witness'placed appellant in jail; that, while he did so, the sheriff searched the car and found therein twenty-three gallons of whisky.

By bills of exception Nos. 1 and 2 the appellant complains of the action of the trial court in permitting the introduction of the testimony of the deputy sheriffs, Moore and Belvin, because they .had no search warrant and because they searched the appellant’s car without probable cause. The objection to the proof of the search should have been sustained. See article 727a, C. C. P. 1925, as amended by Acts 1929, 2d Called Sess., c. 45, § 1 (Vernon’s Ann. C. C. P. art. 727a); also Ramirez v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 58 S.W.(2d) 829.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
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The Honorable Ray LaHood United States Department ofTransportation 1200 NewJersey Avenue, SE Washington, DC 20590 Dear Secretary LaHood:

....1 On behalfofNGK SPARK PLUGS (U.S.A.),INC, I am writing to express our strong support for the application ofDelta Air Lines for newnonstop service between**I-~~~~~~--~~** -- --oeu'UTraffd1'ian:ed-a.-**-.--~---~~~-" -~**  ..**-------~--** ..--­ Approval ofDelta's new service would be a major benefit for ourregion, where many corporations have strong trade and market presence with Japan. There are over 500 Japanese companies located in Michigan and hundreds more whose business models rely on access to Japan and it's market. The growth ofour business ties with Japan has created demand for increased capacity to Tokyo. Our business travelers look to the convenience offlying into Tokyo's downtown Haneda airport. Detroit is a proven and successful gateway to Asia, and as an airport that can support trans-pacific routes. This summer Delta is adding new service to Seoul and Hong Kong, fulfilling the commitment Deltamade to DTWto make it the airlines gateway to Asia. The addition ofHaneda as a destination is a natural fit that would clearly benefit our business travelers. Thank you for consideration ofthis request.
Record of Contacts

FDMSDocketNo.FAA~ I ~ ~ Of:)33 ------

With whom outside the FAA has this proposal been discussed (e.g., ATA, RAA, ALPA, etc.)?

Organization Person Contacted Date

Hoeing Bhupindcr Singh 4/27/09

ATA Joe White 4128109

,

,

UNCONTROLLEO COpy WHEN DOWNLOADED

Check the Master Lis! 10Verify That This is the Corred Revision Before Use
#### LUTTRELL v. STATE.

No. 14384.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 17, 1932.

Rehearing Denied April 13, 1932.

R. E. Eubank, H. B. Birmingham, and A. P. Dohoney, all of Paris, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, P. J.

Unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor is the offense; penalty assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for four years.

The conviction was had in the district court of Lamar county at a term ending on the 26th day of October, 1929. Judgment was entered December 16, 1930. The motion for new trial was overruled on the 19th day of December, 1930, at which time notice of appeal was given and the “statutory time” allowed within which to prepare and file the statement of facts and bills of exception. The bills of exception were filed on the 4th day of April, 1930, and the statement of facts was filed on the 8th day of the same month. The bills of exception were filed on the 106th day after notice of appeal, and the statement of facts was filed on the 110th day after notice of appeal. The utmost time allowed under the statute, article 760, C. O. P., was ninety days after final judgment and notice of appeal. The precedents are numerous and uniform to the effect mentioned. See collation of cases in Vernon’s Ann. Tex. C. C. P., vol. 3, p. 129; see, also, Supplement to the volume mentioned, page 23; Daniel v. State, 104 Tex. Cr. R. 604, 286 S. W. 221; Davis v. State, 105 Tex. Cr. R. 348, 287 S. W. 1100; Burleson v. State, 105 Tex. Cr. R. 347, 288 S. W. 198, and numerous others. Due to the fact that the bills of exception and statement of facts were filed more than ninety days after notice of appeal, this court is precluded from considering them. Under the circumstances mentioned, there is nothing before this court for review.

No matters appearing from the record authorizing a reversal, the judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

LATTIMORE, J.

Appellant has procured from the clerk of the trial court a statement as to the date of the filing of his bills of exception, which corresponds with the date mentioned in our opinion. We cannot consider said bills for the reasons advanced in our former opinion. The refused special charges, which appellant now insists should have been given, cannot be appraised, in the absence of a statement of facts. That part of the charge of the court to which objection is now pointed out presents no fundamental error, and is not believed by us to present any error at all. Same presented the doctrine of reasonable doubt in the beginning of the paragraph, which told the jury they must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did the things mentioned, and, unless they “so believed,” they should acquit. The case was correctly decided.

The motion for rehearing will be overruled.
(1)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Date:       May 13, 2011
    By:
    /s/ William C. StoneWilliam C. StoneChairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer) Date:       May 13, 2011
    By:
    /s/ Patrick J. PedontiPatrick J. PedontiSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)