J-S46001-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

S.M.P. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

E.W.P., JR.

Appellant No. 2191 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order July 9, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County

Domestic Relations at No(s): 1828-2009

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2015

Appellant, E.W.P., Jr., (Father) appeals pro se from the July 9, 2014 

order denying his petition to compel information from Appellee, S.M.P. 

(Mother), where he also alleges Mother violated a May 17, 2010 custody 

order. After careful review, we dismiss this appeal.1

The certified record reveals the following factual and procedural 

history. Father and Mother, formerly married, are the parents of two 

children, K.P., born in June 2000, and E.P., born in April 2005. Mother 

initiated the underlying custody action on September 2, 2009, along with a 

divorce complaint, wherein she requested shared legal and primary physical 

custody of the children with “secondary physical custody” to Father. 

____________________________________________

1 We note that Mother did not file a brief in this matter. 
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Complaint in Divorce, 9/2/09, at ¶¶ 14-26. On January 19, 2010, Mother 

filed a petition for custody, wherein she asserted that Father is in Pike 

County Jail, and that she “intends to relocate on or about January 30, 2010 

with the aforementioned children outside the jurisdiction of this Court.” 

Petition for Custody, 1/19/10, at ¶¶ 9-10. As such, Mother requested the 

trial court grant her primary physical custody and “the ability to relocate to a 

location protected due to the events that have transpired.” Id. at 3 

(unpaginated). The certified record does not include any details of said 

events asserted by Mother.

A hearing was scheduled before a custody hearing officer on May 6, 

2010, at which time the parties entered into a stipulation that was placed on 

the record by the hearing officer. 2 The stipulation stated, in relevant part, 

as follows. 

Since the [M]other is in California with family, it is 

my understanding that the Agreement is on a 

temporary basis only, and that [Father] will have no 

objection to her relocating there and staying there.

That the Mother will have primary physical custody 

and that the Father will have no contact with the 

Children per an existing Protection from Abuse 

Order.

____________________________________________

2 Both parties were represented by counsel during the hearing. In addition, 

Father was transported from prison for the hearing. Mother appeared via 

telephone. N.T., 5/6/10, at 1 (unpaginated). 
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Stipulation, 5/17/10, at 2-3.3 With respect to legal custody, the hearing 

officer noted that, “[g]iven the situation that the Father is incarcerated and 

that there is a Protection from Abuse Order in effect and pending criminal 

charges (although there has been no disposition of those charges yet),” 

Mother would communicate regarding legal custody issues through counsel 

and not directly with Father. Id. at 3-4. Finally, the hearing officer noted 

that counsel for the parties agreed “Pennsylvania has jurisdiction,” but they 

disagreed on whether “jurisdiction would be in California after a period of six 

(6) months of the [c]hildren being there.”4 Id. at 3. 

On July 7, 2014, Father, who by then was incarcerated at State 

Correctional Institution - Graterford, filed pro se a petition to compel Mother 

“to follow the agreement that was made ... at a Master Hearing in 2010.” 

Petition, 7/7/14, at 1. The trial court described Father’s allegations as 

follows.

[Father] alleged various violations committed by 

[Mother] including: (1) failure to provide information 

regarding a vehicle; (2) failure to provide 

information about major issues in the children’s lives 

____________________________________________

3 The stipulation was made an order of the court on May 17, 2010, which the 

trial court stated was subsequently incorporated into the divorce decree

issued on June 4, 2010. See Order, 7/9/14. 

4 On May 10, 2010, the parties, through counsel, entered into a property 

settlement agreement in the divorce action, which was placed on the record 

the same date. 
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and (3) failure to comply with this [c]ourt’s [o]rder 

by moving to Maine.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/14, at 1.

By order dated and entered on July 9, 2014, the trial court denied 

Father’s petition. The order stated the following, in relevant part.

The Agreement between [Father] and [Mother] in 

the Divorce matter on May 6, 2010 which was 

incorporated into the Divorce Decree [by order of] 

May 17, 2010, was superseded by the Criminal 

Sentencing Order of July 7, 2011 in Criminal Case 

No. 425-CR-2009.[5] That Sentencing Order 

prohibited [Father] from having any contact with 

[Mother] or the children who are subject to the 

custody order.

Further, [Mother] and the children have not been 

residents of Pennsylvania now for over three years 

and therefore this [c]ourt does not have jurisdiction 

over this matter anymore. 

Trial Court Order, 7/9/14. 

On July 21, 2014, Father filed pro se a notice of appeal. By order 

dated July 24, 2014, the trial court directed Father to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) within twenty-one days, and Father timely 

____________________________________________

5 Neither the sentencing order nor the criminal docket is included in the 

certified record before this Court.
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complied.6 The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion on August 18, 

2014.

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review.

1). Was [ ] [Father] violated [sic] his right to be 

provided with the stipulations agreed by both 

parties, before [sic] [Father’s] criminal case? 

2). Did the [trial] court make a decision to deny [ ] 

[Father] his right to be provided these 

stipu[l]ations[] by not providing proof of record to 

where the children jurisdiction [sic]?

3). Was [the Honorable] Joseph F. Kameen, PJ, a 

conflict of interest in this case [sic]?

Father’s Brief at 4.7

However, we do not reach the merits of this appeal, as we conclude 

that Father has failed to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that 

____________________________________________

6

Father failed to file his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

along with his notice of appeal in accordance with Rule 1925(a)(2)(i). 

Nevertheless, because Father timely complied with the trial court’s order to 

file the concise statement, we do not deem his issues waived on this basis. 

See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. Super. 2009) (holding that an 

appellant’s failure to strictly comply with Rule 1925(a)(2) did not warrant an 

application of the waiver rule, as no court order had been violated, and there 

was no prejudice to any party). Cf. J.P. v. S.P., 991 A.2d 904, 908 (Pa. 

Super. 2010) (stating that, where the appellant/mother not only failed to 

simultaneously file a Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) statement with her notice of appeal 

but also failed to comply with the trial court’s order to file the Rule 1925(b) 

statement within 21 days, she waived her issues on appeal).

7

Father’s Brief does not contain pagination; therefore, we have assigned 

each page a corresponding page number.
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where the defects in a brief are substantial, the appeal may be dismissed. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2101. 

Father’s pro se brief in the instant matter is defective in substantial 

ways. Specifically, Father failed to comply with the following rules. First, 

Father’s brief does not have a proper statement of scope and standard of 

review in violation of Rule 2111(a)(3). Also, Father’s brief does not have a 

recital of the procedural history and factual background or a proper 

Statement of the Case, in violation of Rule 2117. In addition, Father’s brief 

does not have a proper argument in violation of Rule 2119. We note that 

Father’s argument, in its entirety, is as follows: “[t]he Appellant states, that 

[]his argument, please refer to the Concise Matters Complained of and the 

Divorce Decree and the Petitions entered in this case.” Father’s Brief at 7.

This Court has opined the following when faced with pro se litigants 

who do not comply with the procedural rules.

[A]lthough this Court is willing to construe liberally 

materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status 

generally confers no special benefits upon an 

appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply 

with the procedural rules set forth in the 

Pennsylvania Rules of the Court.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251-252 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted), appeal denied, 879 A.2d 782 (Pa. 2005). In addition, 

“[t]his Court will not consider the merits of an argument which fails to cite 

relevant case or statutory authority.” In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 
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203, 209 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), 

appeal denied, 69 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude Father’s defects in his appellate 

brief are substantial and preclude us from conducting meaningful appellate 

review. Accordingly, we elect to exercise our discretion under Rule 2101 and 

dismiss this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/15/2015