IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs April 11, 2001

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JANICE FLOYD

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Chester County

No. 99-47 and 99-48 Donald H. Allen, Judge

No. W2000-02236-CCA-R3-CD - Filed July 20, 2001

The appellant was found not guilty by reason of insanity on two counts of second degree murder

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-210, and on one count of aggravated arson

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-302. After the court found the appellant not

guilty by reason of insanity, the appellant was committed to Western Mental Health Institute for

diagnosis and evaluation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303. At the

conclusion of the appellant’s diagnosis and evaluation, the doctors conducting the evaluation

determined that the appellant was not committable under the Tennessee Code Annotated and refused

to sign certificates of certification for the appellant to be involuntarily committed. At the end of the

initial sixty (60) day diagnosis and evaluation period, the doctors at Western Mental Health Institute

sought to have the appellant released into a mandatory outpatient treatment program. A hearing was

conducted after the ninety (90) day mandatory release date, and the trial court ordered that the

appellant be returned to Western Mental Health Institute. The appellant brought this appeal asserting

that the trial court erred in ordering her continued detention after the expiration of the maximum

ninety (90) day commitment period, and that such detention violates her rights. The state in its brief

concedes error. After a thorough review of the issue presented in this case, we agree with the

appellant and the state that the trial court erred. This case is remanded to the trial court for further

action consistent with the instruction set forth herein.

 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

 Reversed and Remanded

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOE G.RILEY and ROBERT

W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

George Morton Googe, District Public Defender, and Vanessa D. King, Assistant Public Defender,

for the appellant, Janice Floyd.
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Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Pamela A. Hayden-Wood, Assistant Attorney

General; James G. (Jerry) Woodall, District Attorney General; and Shaun Alan Brown, Assistant

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 

OPINION

In November 1999, the appellant was indicted on two counts of second degree murder and

on one count of aggravated arson. On January 3, 2000, counsel for the appellant filed a motion

seeking to have the appellant evaluated to determine her competency to stand trial and her mental

condition at the time of the alleged offenses. On February 2, 2000, Pathways Mental Health Facility

notified the trial court that a determination could not be made on an outpatient basis and that a more

extensive evaluation would have to be conducted. On February 15, 2000, the trial court ordered the

appellant to undergo an in-house evaluation at Western Mental Health Institute. On March 24, 2000,

the trial court was notified by Western Mental Health Institute that the appellant was competent to

stand trial and that the appellant’s mental state at the time of the alleged offense supported an

insanity defense. 

On April 27, 2000, the trial court entered an order finding the appellant not guilty by reason

of insanity. The appellant was committed to Western Mental Health Institute pursuant to Tennessee

Code Annotated section 33-7-303(a). On June 19, 2000, Western Mental Health Institute notified

the trial court that appellant did not meet the standards for commitment and recommended

mandatory outpatient treatment. On July 7, 2000, the District Attorney’s office filed a statement

opposing the release of the appellant. On August 17, 2000, a hearing was held and the trial court

denied the appellant’s release. 

Facts

The appellant, Janice Floyd, age thirty (30), was indicted on two counts of second degree

murder and on one count of aggravated arson in Chester County. On the evening of May 18, 1999,

a fire broke out at a home the appellant shared with her mother, father, and siblings. The appellant’s

mother and brother failed to leave the house when they were warned of the fire and were killed. 

In October 1999, the appellant confided in her sister that she was the one who started the fire.

At the urging of her sister, the appellant confessed the crimes to an investigator. The appellant was

subsequently arrested, indicted, and held in jail for trial. While the appellant was in jail awaiting

trial, arrangements were made for her to go to Pathway Mental Health Facility to be evaluated on an

outpatient basis to determine her competency to stand trial and her mental condition at the time of

the alleged offenses. Pathways Mental Health Facility determined that it could not properly evaluate

her and recommended that she be committed to Western Mental Health Institute on an inpatient basis

to have a proper evaluation conducted. 

During the appellant’s mental evaluation, the appellant explained to staff members at

Western Mental Health Institute that since the age of four (4) she had been sexually abused by her

father and had been hospitalized in a mental health facility on seven (7) prior occasions. The
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appellant was diagnosed with auditory command hallucinations that commanded her to kill herself.

 The appellant also stated that on the evening of the fire her father had sexually abused her, and after

the incident she went outside into the carport where she saw some of her father’s favorite clothes

drying on a rack. The appellant stated that she was hearing voices that were telling her to burn the

clothes. After setting the clothes on fire, the fire spread to the home and engulfed it, killing the

appellant’s mother and brother. 

On March 24, 2000, the trial court was notified by Western Mental Health Institute that the

appellant was competent to stand trial. The trial court was also notified in the same letter that the

appellant’s mental state at the time of the alleged offenses supported an insanity defense. Finally,

the letter from Western Mental Health Institute indicated that the defendant did not meet the

standards for judicial commitment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section§ 33-6-104 and

7-303. 

On April 27, 2000, the matter came before the trial court. The State and the appellant

stipulated that the appellant “did kill Mary Floyd and Billy Floyd during the perpetration of

aggravated arson.” It was further stipulated that the appellant “meets the criteria for the insanity

defense as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-11-501.” The State recommended that the

appellant should be declared not guilty by reason of insanity. Based upon the report submitted by

doctors at Western Mental Health Institute, the recommendation of the State, and the agreement of

the appellant, the trial court accepted the recommendation of the State and found the appellant “not

guilty by reason of insanity.” This triggered the appellant’s initial period of confinement at Western

Mental Health Institute for the purpose of diagnosis and evaluation pursuant to Tennessee Code

Annotated section 33-7-303.

On June 19, 2000, after the completion of the diagnosis and evaluation, the trial court was

notified by Western Mental Health Institute that the appellant did not meet the criteria set out by

Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-6-104 for involuntary commitment, and requested that the

trial court order mandatory outpatient treatment. A written, detailed Proposed Outpatient Treatment

Plan was included. The District Attorney’s office did not file any pleadings until July 7, 2000, when

it filed a statement in opposition to the appellant’s release. No certificates certifying the need for

commitment were filed. A hearing was scheduled for July 25, 2000; however, it was rescheduled

for August 17, 2000. 

On July 25, 2000, the trial court was notified by Western Mental Health Institute that the

appellant would be discharged on July 26, 2000, the ninetieth day of her commitment and the date

set for mandatory release by Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303(a). The court entered an

order the same day ordering that the appellant remain in the custody of Western Mental Health

Institute until the rescheduled hearing on August 17, 2000. The appellant remained in the custody

of Western Mental Health Institute until the August 17, 2000, release hearing as ordered. 

The appellant’s release hearing took place as re-scheduled on August 17, 2000. A treating

psychologist from Western Mental Health Institute testified that he did not believe that the appellant
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posed any danger to others, but that if the appellant failed to take her medication she might become

a danger to herself. A treating psychiatrist from Western Mental Health Institute also testified,

stating that the appellant was not committable. The psychiatrist testified that “with [the appellant’s]

current [clear] thinking, she could definitely follow [a mandatory outpatient treatment plan].” At

the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s release from Western Mental

Health Institute. The trial court stated as its reason for denial of the appellant’s release that it was

concerned: 1) that there would not be adequate supervision over the appellant; 2) with how the

appellant would get to and from treatment appointments at the outpatient program; 3) that the

appellant would not take her medication as directed; and 4) that the appellant would not be able to

purchase her medication. This appeal followed. The state now concedes that the statutory

requirements for continued commitment were not met. 

Analysis

The issue this court is called upon to address in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in

ordering the appellant’s continued detention after the expiration of the maximum ninety (90) day

commitment period. Jurisdiction to hear the issues brought by the appellant in the instant case is

conferred upon this court by Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303(d). Having jurisdiction

to review the issue presented in this appeal and render a decision in the matter, we must conclude

that the trial court’s continuing detainment of the appellant after the mandatory release date is in

error and is a violation of the appellant’s rights. 

A. Governing Law

We begin our analysis by examining Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303(a), which

states that when a person is charged with a criminal offense and subsequently “acquitted of the

charge on a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense,

the criminal court shall order the person detained for diagnosis and evaluation” in a hospital or

treatment center for a period of at least sixty (60) days, but not longer than ninety (90) days.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-6-104(c) continues by stating that “no respondent may be

judicially committed under this statute unless two (2) licensed physicians file in the commitment

proceeding certificates of need for care and treatment certifying that the respondent satisfies the

requirements of subdivisions 1-4 of subsection (b).” Thus, as is plainly clear from both of the above

statutes, the minimum period of time that a court may commit a person who has been acquitted of

a crime on grounds of insanity is sixty (60) days, and the maximum period of time such person may

be judicially committed is ninety (90) days - absent procedural certification of the acquitted by two

licensed physicians who have found that the acquitted falls within the parameters of Tennessee Code

Annotated section 33-6-104(b). 

This court has addressed the issues raised in the instant case in the past. In Brown v. State

C.C.A. No. 14, 1990 WL 40998 (Tenn. Crim. App., filed April 11, 1990, at Jackson), the appellant

was found not guilty by reason of insanity and was committed to a mental health institution for

diagnosis and evaluation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-7-303(a). As with the
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instant case, “the [institution] notified the trial court that the [appellant] did not meet the standards

forinvoluntary commitment and recommended mandatory outpatient treatment.” An outpatient plan

was submitted to the trial court. The trial court, however, rejected the outpatient plan and ordered

the appellant to be returned to the institution until a plan could be formulated that met with the trial

court’s approval. No certificates of commitment were filed by two licensed physicians as required

by statute. This court ultimately concluded that the detainment of Appellant Brown, when the

“substantive prerequisites [of the Tennessee Code Annotated] were not met,” violated her rights

under the Tennessee Code Annotated. Brown, 1990 WL 40998, at *4-5. 

B. Case Analysis

Turning to the facts in the instant case, testimony was given at the appellant’s release hearing

by treating doctors that the appellant did not meet the requirements under the Tennessee Code

Annotated for involuntary commitment. Further, it is undisputed that the state did not file

certificates by two licensed physicians for the involuntary commitment of the appellant. As in

Brown, it is apparent that the substantive prerequisites for involuntary commitment were not met in

the instant case. The appellant’s statutory rights were violated, as is conceded by the state. 

The trial court makes it manifestly clear that the reason for the continued commitment of the

appellant is due to its concern for the safety of the public and the appellant. The trial court found

such fear in the possibility that the appellant will fail to attend her outpatient treatment program and

fail to take her medication as directed, and thus, reasons that she could become a threat to herself and

society. Testimony, however, does not support this concern. In fact, the psychiatrist testifying on

behalf of the appellant stated that “with [the appellant’s] current [clear] thinking, she could definitely

follow [a mandatory outpatient treatment plan].” This is clear evidence that runs contrary to the trial

court’s concerns about the appellant not taking her medicine as required. We note that the state

offered no proof to rebut the expert medical testimony of the doctors working with the appellant at

Western Mental Health Institute, nor did the state offer any proof to show that the appellant posed

a substantial risk of serious harm to herself or others. In fact, in the record, the state admits that it

was unable to proffer any evidence to support its argument against the release of the appellant.

Indeed, the evidence set forth above, or the lack thereof, fails to support the trial court’s denial of

the appellant’s release into a court ordered outpatient treatment program. Upon this record the

evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. 

Prior to concluding this case, we pause to commend the trial court for its concern for the

welfare of society and the appellant. Indeed, we believe that the trial court attempted to act in the

best interest of all involved. However, concerns over the mere possibility of a breakdown in the

mandatory outpatient treatment plan do not topple statutory requirements for involuntary

commitment. Indeed, persons such as the case worker to be assigned to the appellant, the staff at the

appellant’s outpatient treatment program, and Mr. Maness-the individual with whom social services

made living arrangements for the appellant, all serve to ensure the appellant’s compliance with her

outpatient treatment plan. 
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With regards to the proposed living arrangements of the appellant upon release, this court

sees no valid reason to question the living arrangements of the appellant as made by the Department

of Social Services. The only accredited testimony that weighed against the proposed living

arrangement was testimony that Mr. Maness was working out of town. Mr. Maness, however, also

testified that he planned to quit his out of town work after January 2001. With regards to the claims

that there existed a hostile relationship between the appellant and Mr. Maness at one time, the trial

court obviously chose not to accredit such testimony, and this court sees no reason to disturb that

decision. 

CONCLUSION

 

We sympathize with the state’s and the trial court’s dilemma and concern over safety to the

public. However, Tennessee Code Annotated section§ 33-7-303 and 6-103 expressly set forth the

procedures that must be followed. When properly followed, the proper balance is struck in an

attempt to protect the public, while at the same time protect the ward from unjustified detention. 

Having concluded that the appellant’s statutory rights were violated, this court finds that the

trial court erred by ordering the continued detention of the appellant after the maximum ninety (90)

day period for diagnosis and evaluation. Thus, this matter is remanded to the trial court for an order

of release of the appellant to the outpatient treatment plan. If the state believes the appellant is

committable at some future time, it may file the appropriate documentation required by Tennessee

Code Annotated section 33-6-103. SeeBrown, 1990 WL 40998, at *4-5 (two judges recommending

any further proceedings must be pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 33-6-103). 

 

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE