alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# AGENCY:

Department of the Navy, DOD. 

# ACTION:

Notice of meeting. 

# SUMMARY:

The Board of Advisors to the Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, will meet to elicit the advice of the board on the Navy's Postgraduate Education Program. All sessions will be open to the public. 

# DATES:

The meeting will be held on Wednesday, February 16, and Thursday, February 17, 2000, from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. 

# ADDRESS:

The meeting will be held at the Sheraton Crystal City Hotel, Arlington, VA. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ms. Jaye Panza, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943-5000, telephone number (831) 656-2514. 

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The board examines the effectiveness with which the Navy's Postgraduate Education School is accomplishing its mission. To this end, the board will inquire into the curricula; instruction; physical equipment; administration; state of morale of the student body, faculty, and staff; fiscal affairs; and any other matters relating to the operation of the Naval Postgraduate School as the board considers pertinent. 

Dated: February 1, 2000. 

J.L. Roth, 

Lieutenant Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 00-3104 Filed 2-9-00; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3810-FF-U
NO. 07-15-00001-CV IN THE COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

AT AMARILLO, TEXAS BRENTLEY WAYNE HRNCIRIK 

### § § Appellant 

### § § v 

### § TRIAL COURT NO. 2013-509,724 

### § § § BOBBYE GAIL HRNCIRIK 

### § § Appellee 

### §

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OFTIME TO FILE APPELLANT’S BRIEF TO THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS: COMES NOW, BRENTLEYWAYNE HRNCII{IK, appellant, and files this Motion for Extension ofTime to file Appellant’s Brief, pursuant to TRAP 38.6(d) and would show the court as follows: I

The deadline forfiling Appellant’s Briefis March 9, 2015. II. No previous extension have been granted. Appellant’s attorney would request a 30 day extension to April 9, 2015. The reason Appellant needs an extension is due to the fact that on February 23, 2015, Appellant’s attorney was notified he was set numberone forjurytrial in Cause No. 2015-405,167, styled the State ofTexas v. Valentino Casares, in the ]40uhj District Court ofLubbock County, Texas, this is a re-indictment of Cause No. 2014-401,509, which had previously been set forjury trial November 3, 2014. Due to preparation forthisjury trial a necessity exists for an extension to file Appellant’s Brief. ifi. Appellant’s attorney is a sole- practitioner and has been diligent in his efforts to appropriately research and prepare Appellant’s Brief. ACCEPTED 2013-509,724 SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS

AMARILLO, TEXAS 3/5/2015 3:03:38 PM Vivian Long, ClerkIV. Appellant would show the Court that the actions taken by his attorney are taken in a good faith effort to promptly pursue appellant’s appeal and notforpurposes ofdelay, and the appelleewould not be harmed or prejudiced by the granting ofthis Motion for Extension ofTime to File Appellant’s Brief. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, appellant prays that the Court grant Appellant’s Motion for Extension ofTime to File Appellant’s Brief. Respectfully submitted, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID MARTINEZ 1663 Broadway Lubbock, TX 79401 Telephone (806) 744-1692 Telecopier (806) 744-5660 dmtzlaw@aol.com

By: 

### /WVcwtd’Mcurttne-3’ David Martinez State Bar No. 13141650 Attorney forAppellantCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certifythat atrue and correct copy ofthe above and foregoing Motion for Extension ofTime to file Appellant’s Briefwas emailed to Ms. Bobbye Gail Hrncirik at Bobbye.hrncirik@umchealthsystem.com 

### /s/Vwtd’Alailtnq’ David Martinez

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE This is to certifythat on this 5th day of March, 2015 I tried contacting Ms. Hrncirik and she was not available, a voice mail message was leftto Ms. Hrncirik regarding any objection to ourfiling ofour motion for extension.



### /s/DcwCdi Mcwttna David Martinez

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuantto TRAP 9.4 (i) (3), undersigned Counsel certifies thatthis Motion for Extension ofTime to File Motion Appellant’s Briefwas prepared with Microsoft Office 2010, and that according to the program’s word- count, the sections covered byTRAP 9.1 (i) (3) contains 468 words.



### ,YVcwCd’Ma-rttnez David Martinez
Form of Amendment to Nonqualified Stock Option Agreement -1997 Stock Option Plan



 EXHIBIT 10.6 
 CHENIERE ENERGY, INC. 
 AMENDMENT TO NONQUALIFIED STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT 
 This Amendment is made and entered into effective as of
                    , 2008, by and between Cheniere Energy, Inc. (the “Company”) and
                                        
(the “Optionee”). 
 WHEREAS, the Optionee was previously granted a stock option by the Company under the Cheniere
Energy, Inc. Amended and Restated 1997 Stock Option Plan (the “Plan”) pursuant to the Nonqualified Stock Option Agreement dated
                    , 200     (the “Agreement”), by and between the Company and the Optionee;

 WHEREAS, the Company and the Optionee desire to amend the Agreement to extend the Option Period for an additional five
(5) years as permitted by the Plan; 
 WHEREAS, Section 1.409A-1(b)(5)(v)(C) of the Final Section 409A Regulations
permit the extension of the exercise period of an option where, at the time of the extension, the fair market value of the underlying stock is less than or equal to the exercise price; 
 WHEREAS, Section 6.6 of the Plan provides that the Committee (as defined in the Plan) has the authority to amend the terms of any and all
outstanding options; and 
 WHEREAS, pursuant to the Plan, any amendment of an outstanding option requires the consent of the
optionee. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed by and between the Company and the Optionee that the Agreement is hereby amended as follows
: 
 1. Section II.E. of the Agreement is hereby amended, in its entirety, to read as follows: 
 “E. Option Period:
                    , 200     through
                    , 20     (until 12:00 p.m. central).” 
 2. Section III. of the Agreement is hereby amended, in its entirety, to read as follows: 
 “III. Option Period. The Option Period shall begin on the Grant Date and terminate on the
         day of                     , 20    . This period during
which the Option is in effect and may be exercised is referred to herein as the “Option Period.”” 
 3. Unless
otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms used in this Amendment shall have the same meanings as set forth in the Agreement and the Plan. 
 4. Except as modified and amended in this Amendment, the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 
 5. This Amendment may
be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument. 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment is executed this
         day of                     , 2008. 
  

			
	CHENIERE ENERGY, INC.
		
	By:	 	 
	Name:	 	 
	Title:	 	 
		
	Address:	 	 700 Milam Street, Suite 800
 Houston, Texas
77002



 Accepted and agreed this          day of
                    , 2008. 
  

			
	OPTIONEE
	
	 
	Name:	 	 
		
	Address:	 	 
		 	 
		 	 


  

 2
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1405 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1405

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow Head Start teachers 
    the same above-the-line deduction for supplies as is allowed to 
               elementary and secondary school teachers.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 10, 2009

Mr. Wilson of Ohio introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                    the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow Head Start teachers 
    the same above-the-line deduction for supplies as is allowed to 
               elementary and secondary school teachers.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. HEAD START TEACHERS ALLOWED ABOVE-THE-LINE DEDUCTION FOR 
              SUPPLIES.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (1) of section 62(d) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (defining eligible educator) is amended by adding 
at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(C) Head start teachers.--The term `eligible 
                education' includes, with respect to any taxable year, 
                an individual who is a teacher or aide under a Head 
                Start program operating under the Head Start Act (42 
                U.S.C. 9831 et seq.) for at least 700 hours during a 
                school year.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to taxable years ending after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
                                 <all>
```
Docket Number FAA-2014-0655

 Contacts. With whom outside the FAA has this proposal been discussed? 

Organization Person Contacted Date Response 

National Business Aircraft Association Eli Cotti 3/20/13

Regional Airline Association 3/20/13

Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association Robert Hackman 3/20/13

ATA M Lopez 3/20/13
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-2255
LOUIS J. DE MAIO, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus LLOYD BENTSEN, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at B altimore. M. J. Garbis, District Judge. (CA-94- 3474-MJG) Submitted: February 7, 1996 Decided: February 14, 1996 Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis J. De Maio, Appellant Pro Se. Charles Joseph Peters, Sr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltim ore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his Title VII action. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. De Maio v. Bentsen , No. CA-94-3474-MJG (D. Md. June 6, 1995). We dispense withoral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1
 
                      ROSS SYSTEMS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
 
              STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE LOSSES
 
                     (IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE DATA)
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                            YEAR ENDED JUNE 30,
                                                                                      -------------------------------
<S>                                                                                   <C>        <C>        <C>
                                                                                        1997       1996       1995
                                                                                      ---------  ---------  ---------
Net loss............................................................................  $   2,353  $   1,541  $  15,528
                                                                                      ---------  ---------  ---------
                                                                                      ---------  ---------  ---------
Weighted average shares outstanding during the period...............................     18,515     15,089     12,105
Common and common stock equivalent shares using the treasury stock method (1).......     --         --         --
                                                                                      ---------  ---------  ---------
Common and common stock equivalent shares outstanding for purposes of calculating
  primary and fully diluted losses per share........................................     18,515     15,089     12,105
                                                                                      ---------  ---------  ---------
                                                                                      ---------  ---------  ---------
Primary loss per common and common equivalent share (2).............................  $    0.13  $    0.10  $    1.28
                                                                                      ---------  ---------  ---------
                                                                                      ---------  ---------  ---------
</TABLE>
 
------------------------
 
(1) Due to the net loss for the periods, only the weighted average shares
    outstanding during the period were used in calculating the losses per share.
 
(2) There is no significant difference between the primary and fully diluted
    loss per share computations.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Appellant**

**v.**

**ALEJANDRO GUZMAN,**

**Appellee :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 48 MAP 2014** 

**Appeal from the Order of the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal**  **Division, dated May 7, 2014 at No.**

**CP-15-CR-0001051-2013**

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, **this 31 st**  **day of August, 2015, the Order of the Court of Comm on** 

**Pleas is hereby** AFFIRMED **. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 20 15).**
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                         154,988
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  207,843
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               365,938
<PP&E>                                         496,783
<DEPRECIATION>                                 18,728
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 478,055
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          235,304
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          108,000
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       10,890
<OTHER-SE>                                     509,281
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   863,475
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               402,812
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             38,606
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (420,561)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (420,561)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (420,561)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.04)
        

</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Hector Pichardo, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aiello, J.), rendered October 19, 1988, convicting him of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

After witnessing his nephew’s involvement in a heated argument, the defendant departed the scene of the dispute, but then returned with a weapon and shot two of the men with whom his nephew had argued. One of the men subsequently died. Although at trial the defendant took the stand and denied involvement in the shootings, the jury convicted him, among other things, of murder in the second degree.

On appeal, the defendant contends, *inter alia,*that the trial court "conducted material portions of [his] trial in his absence”. We disagree. A presumption of regularity attaches to official court proceedings, which imposes upon a defendant the burden of coming forward with substantial evidence to rebut that presumption *(see, e.g., People v Richetti,*302 NY 290; *People v Davis,*151 AD2d 596, 597; *People v Marchese,*140 AD2d 547). Although during trial, the court clerk did not, on certain occasions, ministerially record that the defendant was present in the courtroom, the defendant offers no additional evidence supporting his conclusory assertion that he was absent on the days in question and has thereby failed to rebut the presumption of regularity which attached to the proceedings *(see, e.g., People v Butchino,*152 AD2d 854, 856; *People v Davis, supra).*

The record belies the defendant’s contention that he was entitled to a justification charge. It is well settled that a court need not charge the defense of justification if no reasonable view of the evidence establishes the elements of the defense *(see, People v Reynoso,*73 NY2d 816, 818; *People v Watts,*57 NY2d 299; *People v Stamen,*163 AD2d 499; *People v Russell,*161 AD2d 815; *People v Douglas,*160 AD2d 1015). Examining the record in a light most favorable to the defendant, we conclude that there was no evidence which would support a *578finding that the defendant was faced with the imminent use of deadly physical force *(see,*Penal Law § 35.15 [2] [a]). Indeed, it was the defendant’s position at trial that he was not involved in the shootings at all, and there was no additional evidence adduced which might otherwise support the submission of a justification charge to the jury *(see, People v Reynoso, supra; People v Pizarro,*154 AD2d 409, 410).

We have reviewed the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Lawrence, J. P., Kooper, Sullivan and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1943 

To amend the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act to extend the transition period for preferential treatment of certain textile and apparel articles. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 5, 2017 

Mr. NELSON (for himself and Mr. RUBIO) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act to 

extend the transition period for preferential treatment 

of certain textile and apparel articles. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Caribbean Trade Ex5 tension Act of 2017’’. 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1943 IS

1 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF TRANSITION PERIOD FOR PREF2 ERENTIAL TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TEXTILE 

3 AND APPAREL ARTICLES. 

4 Section 213(b) of the Caribbean Basin Economic Re5 covery Act (19 U.S.C. 2703(b)) is amended— 

6 (1) in paragraph (2)(A)— 

7 (A) in clause (iii)— 

8 (i) in subclause (II)(cc), by striking 

9 ‘‘2020’’ and inserting ‘‘2030’’; and 

10 (ii) in subclause (IV)(dd), by striking 

11 ‘‘2020’’ and inserting ‘‘2030’’; and 

12 (B) in clause (iv)(II), by striking ‘‘18’’ and 

13 inserting ‘‘28’’; and 

14 (2) in paragraph (5)(D)(i), by striking ‘‘2020’’ 

15 and inserting ‘‘2030’’. 

Æ 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1916 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1916

To prohibit the possession or transfer of certain firearm accessories, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 4, 2017

   Mrs. Feinstein (for herself, Mr. Van Hollen, Mrs. Gillibrand, Ms. 
  Klobuchar, Mr. Markey, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Durbin, Mr. 
 Casey, Mr. Reed, Ms. Hassan, Mr. Merkley, Mr. Carper, Mr. Cardin, Mr. 
Coons, Mr. Franken, Mr. Booker, Ms. Harris, Mr. Whitehouse, Ms. Hirono, 
  Mr. Sanders, Mr. Leahy, Ms. Warren, Mr. Schumer, Ms. Cantwell, Mrs. 
     McCaskill, Mr. Nelson, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Udall, and Mr. Kaine) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To prohibit the possession or transfer of certain firearm accessories, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Automatic Gunfire Prevention Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON POSSESSION OF CERTAIN FIREARM ACCESSORIES.

    Chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) in section 922, by inserting after subsection (u) the 
        following:
    ``(v)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), on and after the date 
that is 180 days after the date of enactment of this subsection, it 
shall be unlawful for any person to import, sell, manufacture, 
transfer, or possess, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, a 
trigger crank, a bump-fire device, or any part, combination of parts, 
component, device, attachment, or accessory that is designed or 
functions to accelerate the rate of fire of a semiautomatic rifle but 
not convert the semiautomatic rifle into a machinegun.
    ``(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to the 
importation for, manufacture for, sale to, transfer to, or possession 
by or under the authority of, the United States or any department or 
agency thereof or a State, or a department, agency, or political 
subdivision thereof.''; and
            (2) in section 924(a)(2), by striking ``, or (o)'' and 
        inserting ``(o), or (v)''.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED September 23, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-41332 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff - Appellee

v. ALBERT SMITH, III Defendant - Appellant

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 1:03-CR-41-1

-------------------- Before KING, Chief Judge, and SMITH and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Counsel appointed to represent Albert Smith, III, has requested leave to withdraw from this appeal and has filed a brief as required by Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Smith has filed a response and a supplemental response. Our independent review of counsel’s brief, Smith’s response and supplemental response, and the record discloses no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from furtherNo. 03-41332 -2- responsibilities, and the appeal is DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2.
APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED.