Opinion filed August 21, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-23-00126-CV

__________

JOHN DEATON AND DEATON LAW FIRM, LLC, Appellants

V.

LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN M. JOHNSON, P.C., Appellee

On Appeal from the 48th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 048-283747-16

O P I N I O N

At times, minor disagreements and contrasting views evolve into lingering

and contentious litigation. In the eyes of many, disputes of this nature are neverending and fade into an abyss. This case—as other courts have also noted—is no 

exception. 

The matter before us concerns the latest chapter in the parties’ ongoing feud, 

which has spanned decades, over the distribution of attorney’s fees. The parties have 

battled over this issue in numerous state and federal courts in Texas—at all levels of 

the judiciary—and in other venues beyond our state’s borders; however, none of 
2

these courts, or the arbitration tribunals to whom these courts have deferred, have

determined the merits of the parties’ core dispute. We do so today. 

Here,

1 Appellants, John Deaton and Deaton Law Firm, challenge the trial 

court’s grant of the motion to compel arbitration filed by Appellee, the Law Offices 

of Steven M. Johnson, P.C., and its order confirming the arbitrator’s final award. In 

three issues, Appellants contend that (1) the trial court erred when it compelled 

arbitration because no signed arbitration agreement existed between the parties, 

(2) vacatur of the arbitrator’s award is warranted because arbitration without an 

agreement to arbitrate is an abuse of authority, which is an express ground for 

vacatur under both the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the Texas General

Arbitration Act (TGAA), and (3) a mandatory forum selection clause and an alreadypending lawsuit in another jurisdiction prohibited the parties from arbitrating in this 

case. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.

1

Appellants originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals. This appeal was subsequently 

transferred to our court by order of the Texas Supreme Court after the seven justices of the Second Court 

of Appeals recused. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001(a) (West Supp. 2023); Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 

914 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. 1995); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 16.2 (grounds for recusal of an appellate court 

justice or judge); TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b) (grounds for recusal). As the transferee court, we must decide the 

issues raised in this appeal in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals if its precedent 

conflicts with ours. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
3

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal is the next edition2 to an already tortured procedural chronicle

“that exceeds all bounds of reasonable behavior.”3 At the bottom of this litigious 

bog lies an unpleasant truth. Working together in mass tort litigation that involved

hernia repair Kugel Mesh, from approximately 2008 to 2015, the parties agreed to 

share attorney’s fees that were generated from that litigation. Eventually, their 

relationship soured and, rather than resolving their disagreements in a civil manner, 

for years they have opted to engage in costly, prolonged, and largely ineffective 

litigation across the full gamut of available dispute resolution mediums—including 

filings in multiple state and federal trial and appellate courts, as well as engaging in, 

at times over objection, mediation and arbitration. Because the context of the 

parties’ unraveled relationship is important to our analysis, we review the 

background of their disputes and resulting battles in grave detail.4

2

See In re: All Individual Kugel Mesh Cases, No. PC-2008-9999, 2022 WL 19705089, at *1–9 (R.I. 

Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2022) (providing an exhaustive review of the relevant background and history of the

parties’ disputes); Deaton v. Johnson, C.A. No. 22-187WES, 2023 WL 3158933, at *1 n.1 (D. R.I. Apr. 26, 

2023) (recounting the abundant decisions, opinions, and orders pertaining to the parties’ disputes). 

Additionally, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division,

recently dismissed the claims that Appellants asserted against Appellee and others for breach of contract, 

fraud and fraud in the inducement, tortious interference, and conspiracy, because these claims had already 

been litigated and adjudicated or could have been litigated or adjudicated in the arbitration proceeding 

underlying this appeal. See Deaton v. Johnson, No. 4:23-CV-00415-O, 2024 WL 920082 (N.D. Tex. 

Mar. 4, 2024) (slip op.).

3

The Honorable Mark Whittington, the arbitrator in the underlying proceeding, who is also a former 

state district court judge and a former justice of the Fifth Court of Appeals sitting in Dallas, keenly described

this feud as an “extraordinary dispute” in which “[b]oth sides have engaged in unprofessional conduct and 

their actions have benefitted neither themselves nor their clients.” We agree.

4

Here, we focus primarily on Appellants’ conduct because it is their conduct that determines 

whether they “embraced” the ARAs under the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel. This focus does not 

imply that either party’s behavior was more or less unreasonable as their disputes percolated over time.
4

A. The Parties’ Original Agreements

The genesis of the parties’ relationship began in 2008, when Appellee began

filing lawsuits in Rhode Island and elsewhere on behalf of numerous clients5

alleging that the clients’ injuries and conditions were caused by defective Kugel 

Mesh implants that were manufactured by C.R. Bard, Inc., and its subsidiary Davol, 

Inc. (following the parties’ style in their briefs, we will refer to the manufacturerdefendants collectively as Bard/Davol). Appellee, a Texas law firm, executed an 

Attorney Representation Agreement (ARA) with each client, including Moreno. 

The ARAs specify that they (1) were executed in Tarrant County, (2) are to be 

construed pursuant to Texas law, (3) are performable in Texas, (4) permit Appellee 

to retain associate counsel to represent the clients, and (5) require the clients and 

Appellee to arbitrate “any dispute arising from the interpretation, performance, or 

breach” of the agreement in Fort Worth.

In connection with some of the ARAs, and through a general fee-sharing 

agreement, Appellee engaged Appellants to act as local counsel for Appellee by 

filing Kugel Mesh lawsuits in a Rhode Island superior court. Initially, the parties to 

this appeal agreed that Appellants would receive five percent of all attorney’s fees 

that were ultimately recovered in the lawsuits that they filed as local counsel for 

Appellee. This fee-sharing agreement, which is expressed in an e-mail from 

Appellee to Appellants, is reproduced below:

5

One such client is Margaret Moreno, the original plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit that generated 

this appeal. Moreno originally filed a legal malpractice action against both Appellee and Appellants and 

moved to compel arbitration. Appellee answered and filed cross-claims against Appellants. Moreno later 

nonsuited her claims. 
5

As further stated below, the parties later agreed to increase Appellants’ 

attorney’s fee recovery to ten percent:

Appellants filed 176 Kugel Mesh lawsuits in a Rhode Island superior court as local 

counsel for Appellee. Appellee prepared each individual client’s original complaint

and sent them to Appellants, who filed the complaints in the superior court. The 

parties also agreed that Appellants would file and argue any motions regarding the

reduction of certain fees related to the mass tort litigation and that Appellee would 

consider paying a bonus to Appellants based on the results of these additional efforts. 

B. The Patton Referral

Appellee also filed Kugel Mesh lawsuits in federal court, which were later 

consolidated with other pending lawsuits into a multi-district litigation (MDL) 
6

docket in the United States Court for the District of Rhode Island. After the federal 

district court there slated one of Appellee’s lawsuits, for a plaintiff named Rickie 

Patton, as a bellwether case in the MDL proceedings,6 Appellee and Appellants

executed a separate referral agreement, reproduced below, through which they 

agreed that Appellants would serve as Patton’s lead trial counsel, and Appellee 

would receive one-third of the recovered fees:

This agreement was executed in August 2012. At the outset, Appellants asserted 

that, by this agreement, Appellee relinquished settlement authority to them for the 

Patton lawsuit; however, Appellants later conceded that this was not so. Appellants 

“[f]ront[ed] tens of thousands of dollars” to develop Patton’s lawsuit for trial, 

including conducting nine depositions, propounding discovery, retaining and 

deposing experts, and engaging in motion practice. Appellee reimbursed Appellants 

for some of the costs associated with their efforts. In this regard, Appellant Deaton

stated that he essentially put his entire law practice on hold for approximately six 

months so that he could focus exclusively on the Patton lawsuit. 

6

See All Individual Kugel Mesh Cases, 2022 WL 19705089, at *1.
7

The Patton lawsuit morphed into a momentous point of contention between 

the parties, who, not surprisingly, contest the facts underlying that dispute. Patton’s 

lawsuit was selected as a bellwether case by Bard/Davol. “Bellwether” lawsuits help 

establish a “party liability” baseline for similar lawsuits. As such, rather than 

proceeding to trial in every individual lawsuit, the parties litigate a small number of 

bellwether lawsuits, the results of which serve as benchmarks that can extrapolate 

the “floor” and the “ceiling” of settlement values for all such lawsuits. Typically, 

the defendants and the plaintiffs in these cases are both permitted to select some of 

the lawsuits that will be tried as bellwether cases. Consequently, product liability 

defendants like Bard/Davol would select lawsuits that had very poor prospects of 

establishing liability for those defendants as bellwether cases, while plaintiffs would 

select focal cases that best presented their theory of product liability. 

Regarding Patton’s lawsuit, Appellee believed that “enormous problems” 

existed with it, namely that Patton had a preexisting medical history of developing 

hernias, which complicated proving a causal link between the alleged Kugel Mesh 

defects and Patton’s claimed injuries. Because of this, according to Appellee, some 

expert witnesses were not willing to testify that the Kugel Mesh specifically caused 

Patton’s injuries. In addition, the timeline of Patton’s lawsuit was compressed by 

an impending statute-of-limitations deadline and a constricted scheduling order 

imposed by the federal district court. Appellants were aware of the “issues” that 

existed in Patton’s lawsuit but agreed to accept a referral and to take the lead in 

preparing Patton’s lawsuit for trial. 

In November 2012, the Patton lawsuit was removed from the federal district 

court’s active docket, and it was never tried as a bellwether case. Appellee asserts 

that this was because Patton’slawsuit was weak from the beginning, had little chance 

of success, and Appellants had failed to work up the case adequately, which resulted 

in their causation expert witness being struck. Appellants, on the other hand, 
8

believed that they had diligently created enough uncertainty in the outcome of the 

Patton lawsuit, that they had clearly demonstrated their commitment to taking the 

case to trial, and that their preparation had influenced Bard/Davol’s decision to settle 

all of Appellee’s pending Kugel Mesh lawsuits. Appellants also believed that 

Patton’s lawsuit had a potentially high settlement value based on other settled cases 

that Appellants perceived to be factually similar to Patton’s. 

C. Appellee and Bard/Davol Settle

In June 2014, Appellee reached a global settlement with Bard/Davol for its

state and federal court Kugel Mesh clients, and a Master Settlement Agreement

(MSA) was executed, which provided a framework for individual settlements 

between Bard/Davol and Appellee’s clients. Although Appellants assert that the 

development of the Patton lawsuit was a significant factor in the negotiation and 

execution of the MSA, Appellee contends that unrelated developments in Kugel 

Mesh lawsuits that they filed in Illinois, for which Appellants did not serve as local 

counsel, were the moving force toward consummating the settlement. 

In any event, settlement negotiations had been ongoing for some time and 

Appellants and Appellee were both involved in those negotiations. At some point, 

Appellee and Bard/Davol agreed that the Honorable Alice Gibney of the Rhode 

Island superior court should preside over the mediation of all of Appellee’s pending 

lawsuits, including those filed in other state and federal courts. While mediation 

was ongoing, Justice Gibney appointed Appellants to take the lead in negotiating

with Bard/Davol because Appellee’s interactions with Bard/Davol had become 

contentious. 

The MSA provided that each claimant could choose to execute a release of all 

claims asserted, or to be asserted, against Bard/Davol. In consideration, Bard/Davol 

agreed to pay each claimant a confidential settlement amount, inclusive of attorney’s 

fees and costs. This settlement proposal was contingent on a certain threshold 
9

percentage of Appellee’s clients opting into the settlement framework. Once the 

requisite percentage of Appellee’s clients reached these thresholds, Bard/Davol 

agreed to fund a Qualified Settlement Fund (QSF), which would be established by 

the Rhode Island superior court pursuant to Section 468B of the Internal Revenue 

Code and be administered by an independent third-party administrator. 

The MSA contained a confidentiality provision that applied, among other 

things, to the disclosure of settlement amounts paid to settling claimants. The MSA 

provided that only counsel, co-counsel, and claimants, as defined in the MSA, are 

exempted from the confidentiality requirement and defined “Claimants’ Counsel” as 

“the Johnson Law Firm and the counsel, if any, listed on Exhibit 2.” No “Exhibit 2” 

is included in the record before us and it is undisputed that Appellants were neither 

listed nor identified in this exhibit. The MSA further provided that “Claimants’ 

Counsel represents and warrants that 100% of its known Claimants are participating 

in this Agreement.” 

The MSA also required that “[a]ny dispute arising under this Agreement or 

relating to the subject matter thereof, shall be filed only in the Superior Court of 

Rhode Island and Settling Claimants, Claimants’ Counsel and/or Co-Counsel hereby 

submit himself, herself, itself, or themselves to the personal jurisdiction of the 

Superior Court of Rhode Island.” 

D. The Parties’ Fee Dispute Erupts

Although Appellee claimed that it notified Appellants that they had negotiated 

a global settlement for the Kugel Mesh clients, Appellants asserted that they only

discovered the global settlement amount through Patton, who had received a 

settlement packet in the mail from Appellee that contained information about the 

global settlement. Appellants began inquiring about the global settlement’s terms 

and how the terms would pertain to Patton specifically; however, Appellee did not 

immediately discuss those particulars with Appellants. Appellants claimed that 
10

Patton had high expectations for the amount of monies that he would receive from

the settlement and that they had incurred significant expenses in preparing Patton’s 

case for trial. However, Appellants stated that, as long as Patton consented to and 

agreed with the settlement terms, Appellants would accept the settlement terms as 

well. 

Patton opted into the global settlement without Appellants’ immediate 

knowledge. Appellants speculated that Appellee avoided disclosing settlement 

information to them because the settlement amount allocated to Patton was lower 

than Appellants believed it should have been. Appellants suggested that Patton may 

not have opted into the global settlement if they had been able to advise him of its 

implications. 

Sometime after the execution of the MSA, Appellee sent Appellants a 

stipulation to sign; the executed stipulation was required to establish the QSF. In 

the letter that accompanied the stipulation, Appellee stressed the time sensitivity of 

the QSF stipulation, because it was a requisite part of moving forward with the QSF, 

and they requested that Appellants execute it immediately. Appellants also were 

contacted by Bard/Davol during this time and were asked to dismiss their clients’

lawsuits because a settlement had been reached. The QSF stipulation did not purport 

to dismiss any pending lawsuits nor did it refer to any specific claimant settlements, 

and Appellee did not ask Appellants to sign any client dismissals in connection with 

the QSF stipulation. 

Instead of executing the QSF stipulation, Appellants repeatedly asked

Appellee for information to evaluate the global settlement, explaining that they 

needed to ensure that the settlement was in the clients’ best interests and that it would 

be inappropriate for them to sign dismissals or to execute the QSF without reviewing 

the settlement information. Appellants also informed Bard/Davol that they would 
11

not sign the QSF stipulation, or dismiss any pending lawsuits, until they had received 

and reviewed this settlement information. 

Appellee was concerned that Appellants could not be exempted from the MSA 

confidentiality requirement because Appellants had worked with other law firms and 

clients in the Kugel Mesh litigation, and therefore could not meet the MSA provision 

that “Claimants’ Counsel represents and warrants” that 100% of its known claimants 

were participating in the MSA. Appellee also complained that Appellants never 

specified what information they wished to receive, although Appellants insisted that 

they had listed and identified such information in the letters they sent to Appellee. 

Appellants emphasized that they were the only counsel of record in the Rhode Island 

state court lawsuits, that they at times had spearheaded the settlement negotiations 

between Appellee and Bard/Davol, and that the confidentiality concerns cited by 

Appellee were absurd. 

Appellee asserted that, due to the contentious relationship with the attorneys 

representing Bard/Davol, Appellee was concerned that these attorneys would 

consider the disclosure of any MSA information to Appellants to be a breach of the 

MSA, and therefore void the settlement. However, in a letter to Appellee, 

Bard/Davol’s counsel authorized Appellee to “share any and all information with 

[Appellants] as if [they were] a claimant’s Counsel and/or co-Counsel, as those 

terms are defined and used in the MSA.” Even after this, Appellee did not provide 

settlement information to Appellants and continued to cite confidentiality concerns 

as the reason.

In connection with this dispute, Appellants eventually sent a letter to 

Bard/Davol that provided notice of their intent to file a $1 million attorney’s fee lien 

against the settlement funds. Appellants later expressed that the information they 

required included: (1) which clients had opted in or out of the global settlement, 

(2) which clients’ lawsuits would be dismissed with prejudice, (3) whether 
12

Appellant should take the lead for the clients who opted out of the settlement, and 

(4) the contingency fee percentages contained in each client’s ARA, so that

Appellants could determine their attorney’s fee recovery. 

Appellants’ refusal to execute the QSF stipulation delayed the funding of the 

QSF for months. Because Appellants refused to pursue any requested action to 

establish the QSF and thus facilitate the payment of the settlement funds to the 

clients, Appellee terminated Appellants as local counsel and engaged replacement 

local counsel who promptly executed the QSF stipulation. Appellants refused to 

accept this, even though they received multiple client affidavits confirming their

termination; they also refused to withdraw from the lawsuits filed in the Rhode 

Island superior court. 

E. $1 Million of QSF Funds are Segregated for Distribution

Despite their termination, Appellants filed a motion on behalf of all Kugel 

Mesh clients in the Rhode Island superior court for whom they had filed lawsuits, in 

which Appellants moved to compel Appellee to disclose the settlement allocations

and to enforce their attorney’s fee lien. In that motion, Appellants argued that they 

needed the settlement information, including each client’s retainer information, to 

determine the amount of attorney’s fees they were owed. On March 11, 2016, the 

Rhode Island superior court held a hearing on Appellants’ motion and ultimately 

signed an order directing (1) the third-party administrator of the QSF to segregate 

$1 million of the settlement funds, (2) Appellee to provide Appellants with client 

ARAs, and (3) Bard/Davol to provide Appellants with the requested settlement 

allocations. 

Over the next several months, Appellee, as directed, provided Appellants with 

client ARAs. Prior to these disclosures, Appellants executed a stipulation of nondisclosure of client information in which they stated that they had acted as counsel 
13

in the Kugel Mesh litigation pursuant to the authority granted in the client ARAs. 

This stipulation is reproduced below:

From the information contained in the ARAs, it became evident that Appellants’ 

maximum potential claim and recovery for the shared attorney’s fees was less than 

$400,000. Nevertheless, Appellants did not modify or limit their attorney’s fee lien 

or inform the Rhode Island superior court that the segregated amount far exceeded 

their maximum potential claim and recovery.

In addition to the excessive amount of the segregated funds, the superior 

court’s segregation order failed to limit the source of these funds to only attorney’s 

fees—which were also to be paid from the QSF—thus, the segregated funds include

funds that are due the clients. In fact, the segregated funds remain in the QSF today.

F. Patton Sues and Appellants Finance Patton’s Lawsuit

Soon afterwards, Patton sued Appellee and others for legal malpractice in

federal court in Rhode Island. See Patton v. Johnson, C.A. No. 17-259WES, 2018 

WL 3655785 (D. R.I. Aug. 2, 2018). The outcome of that lawsuit need not be fully

discussed here; however, it is significant that Patton’s protracted litigation against 
14

Appellee in that case was promoted and financed by Appellants (who did not 

represent Patton in that lawsuit). See Deaton v. Johnson, C.A. No. 20-78WES, 2020 

WL 4673834, at *2 n.5 (D. R.I. Aug. 12, 2020) (noting the “potentially troubling” 

fact that Appellants’ expenditures in financing Patton’s lawsuit substantially 

exceeded any possible amount that Patton could recover).

Following its own procedurally complex route, Patton’s lawsuit eventually 

wound up in arbitration in Texas. The arbitrator rejected all of the claims that Patton 

had asserted against Appellee, and the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, confirmed the arbitrator’s award and signed 

a final judgment, which neither party appealed. See Patton v. Johnson, No. 4:19-

CV-00698-O, 2022 WL 3012537 (N.D. Tex. June 23, 2022); see also All Individual 

Kugel Mesh Cases, 2022 WL 19705089, at *1–9, *15–16 (comprehensively 

reviewing the travels of Patton’s lawsuit and ultimately determining that the 

Northern District of Texas Court’s confirmation order and final judgment precluded

further litigation on the issue of arbitrability between Patton, Appellee, and 

Appellee’s attorneys). It is Appellants’ involvement in that litigation, rather than its 

substantive outcome, that is relevant to this appeal. As discussed below, Appellants 

not only financed Patton’s lawsuit against Appellee, but they also later sought to 

recover the amounts they expended in that case from the $1 million segregated QSF 

funds.

G. The Filing of Multiple Motions to Disburse the Segregated Funds

Since 2020, Appellants have filed two motions to disburse the segregated QSF

funds. First, in January 2020, Appellants filed a motion for attorney’s fees on their 

own behalf with the Rhode Island superior court, which requested that the entire

$1 million in segregated funds be disbursed to them from the QSF. See In re: All 

Individual Kugel Mesh Cases, No. PC-2008-9999, 2020 WL 6335955, at *2 (R. I. 

Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2020). In that motion, Appellants argued that the attorney’s fees 
15

they incurred for the lawsuits filed in the Rhode Island superior court were between 

$387,000 and $396,000. Appellants dedicated the majority of their motion to 

arguments concerning events that occurred in the Patton lawsuit, which included

allegations that an attorney who worked for Appellee met with Patton and 

misrepresented the amount of settlement funds that Patton would receive if he opted

into the global settlement. Appellants later conceded that these allegations, which 

were supplied by Patton’s affidavit, were false.

Appellants explained that, as a result of their representation of Patton, (1) they 

had incurred approximately $477,000 in attorney’s fees and (2) the superior court 

could, on its face, accept that they would incur additional, substantial attorney’s fees 

and costs that would likely exceed $130,000, thus incurring a combined attorney’s 

fee debt in excess of $1 million. Interestingly, Appellants attorney’s fees for

Patton’s Kugel Mesh settlement amounted only to approximately $37,000. The 

remainder of the attorney’s fee amount that Appellants quoted in their motion 

concerned the fees and costs that they incurred in Patton’s legal malpractice lawsuit 

against Appellee and its attorneys—an entirely separate affair that is not governed 

by the parties’ referral agreement, and which Appellants, among other things,

financed by retaining and compensating other attorneys and paying other litigation 

costs. 

Appellee intervened and removed this lawsuit to federal court, but it was later

remanded to the superior court. Deaton, 2020 WL 4673834, at *9. There, Appellee 

moved to stay Appellants disbursal motion, in part, on the basis that Appellants’ 

entitlement to the segregated funds should be determined in the then-pending 

arbitration that is the focus of the appeal before us, in accordance with the FAA’s 

mandatory stay provisions. All Individual Kugel Mesh Cases, 2020 WL 6335955, 

at *3. The superior court denied Appellee’s request for a stay and, in doing so, 

discussed whether the doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel should bind Appellants to 
16

the arbitration provision of the ARA. Id. at *4–5. The superior court found that it 

did not, because Appellants had not yet received any direct benefits, as, in its 

opinion, the application of the doctrine requires. It stated: 

To date, [Deaton] has received no benefits from the referral agreements 

that he signed, and which contained no arbitration clauses. It seems 

[the Johnson Law Firm] wants this Court to compel [Deaton] to 

arbitrate before he can receive the direct benefit of his agreement to 

serve as co-counsel based on the idea that [Deaton] has derived direct 

benefits from the [ARAs]. These two kinds of agreements are distinct 

and [the Johnson Law Firm’s] attempts to conflate them are unavailing.

Id. at *5 (internal citations omitted).

The superior court further reasoned that Appellants had properly brought the 

motion to disburse, as Appellee had agreed to do under the MSA, because the MSA 

stipulation and the superior court’s March 11, 2016 order segregating the $1 million 

of QSF funds and compelling Appellee to disclose settlement information to 

Appellants required it. Id. Finally, the superior court noted that, although the 

doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel applies in cases that involve non-signatories who 

embrace the contract but then attempt to repudiate its arbitration clause during the 

litigation process, Appellants had never attempted to repudiate the arbitration 

clause; rather, Appellants had simply pointed out that they were not a party to it. Id.

Accordingly, the superior court declined to exercise its discretion to impose an 

obligation to arbitrate on Appellants. Id.

Appellee has appealed the superior court’s ruling. Recently, on July 9, 2024, 

the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued an order regarding that appeal. In re Kugel 

Patch, 317 A.3d 781 (R.I. 2024). In its order, the court stated that “[i]t is clear to us 

that the circumstances of this case are far different now than . . . when the Superior 

Court issued its decision on Johnson’s motion to stay.” Id. at 783. Recognizing that 

the appeal of the superior court’s ruling would become moot once the appeal now 

pending before us is decided and any further appeals are exhausted, the court 
17

“deem[ed] it prudent to stay any further action on Deaton’s motion to disburse until 

the remaining arbitration in Texas is finally resolved.” Id. The court noted that, 

whatever the result of this or any subsequent appeal, it expressed no opinion 

regarding the “preclusive effect, if any, the arbitral proceedings may have on the 

issues that may later be raised in Superior Court.” Id. at 783 n.2.

Appellants’ second motion to disburse was filed in May 2022, when Patton

requested that the Rhode Island superior court, through his attorney of record, 

Deaton, disburse his allocation of the QSF funds to Deaton as his trustee. All 

Individual Kugel Mesh Cases, 2022 WL 19705089, at *8. This motion apparently 

also asserts that, pursuant to the referral agreement between Appellants and 

Appellee, Appellants must receive their attorney’s fees from Patton’s recovery and 

are solely responsible for asserting any claims for litigation expenses. Id. Once 

again, Appellee intervened and moved to stay Patton’s motion. Id. Based on the

preclusive effect of the many decisions issued by the state and federal courts in Texas 

that found Patton had agreed to arbitrate his disputes under the ARA, the Rhode 

Island superior court determined that the issues raised in Patton’s motion were 

referable to arbitration under his ARA; accordingly, it granted Appellee’s motion to 

stay Appellants’ motion to disburse. Id. at *11–16.

Significantly, the superior court also noted that its retention of continuing 

jurisdiction over the QSF “did not thereby bind all claimants and their attorneys . . . 

to resolve all disputes underlying the proper calculation of their ‘legal fees and costs’

through de novo hearings or mini-trials before this Court.” Id. at *15. The superior 

court further explained that “[g]iven the existence of a judicially confirmed—and 

evidently, an ongoing—arbitration proceeding between Patton and [Appellee], it is 

time to put the issue of arbitrability to bed so that the parties can resolve their 
18

remaining substantive disputes.” 7 Id. Finally, the superior court reaffirmed, albeit 

in a footnote, that although the MSA provides that venue for all disputes arising from 

the MSA rests with the superior court of Rhode Island, those provisions “do not 

change the outcome [of its decision to grant the stay], as the underlying proceedings 

before the Court involve a dispute between Patton and [Appellee] over attorneys’ 

fees and costs, rather than any dispute over the substance of the Settlement 

Agreement.” Id. at *16 n.11.

Thus, two stayed motions—one by Appellants and one by Patton, through his 

attorney, Appellant Deaton—to disburse the segregated funds from the QSF remain 

pending in the Rhode Island superior court. 

H. Special Appearance, Arbitration, and the Appeal in This Case

In February 2016, about a month before Appellants filed their motion to 

compel in the Rhode Island superior court, Moreno filed the underlying lawsuit 

against Appellants and Appellee in the 48th District Court of Tarrant County. She 

subsequently moved to compel arbitration based on her ARA. Appellee answered, 

filed cross-claims against Appellants, and eventually joined in Moreno’s motion to 

compel arbitration. 

Appellants filed a special appearance challenging the trial court’s personal 

jurisdiction over them. Appellants contended that they were not signatories to the 

Moreno ARA, which contained a forum-selection clause as well as an arbitration 

clause designating Fort Worth and Tarrant County as the proper forum for any 

dispute resolution proceeding. The trial court denied Appellants’ special 

7

Although a final award has been entered and confirmed in the Patton arbitration, the superior court 

characterized the arbitration as “ongoing.” All Individual Kugel Mesh Cases, 2022 WL 19705089, at *15. 

This is, in one court’s estimation, because Appellee’s fee entitlement has not yet been resolved and will not 

be until the QSF administrator issues its final determination of deductible court costs and expenses, and 

Patton receives the net disbursement from which he will owe Appellee its fee. See Deaton, 2023 

WL 3158933, at *4 n.6. 
19

appearance. On appeal from the trial court’s ruling, the Second Court of Appeals 

affirmed the denial and, in doing so, explicitly relied on the language in the 

stipulation of nondisclosure that Appellants had executed. See Deaton v. Moreno, 

No. 02-16-00188-CV, 2017 WL 4683940, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 19, 

2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The court held that, for jurisdictional purposes, as 

non-signatories, Appellants were subject to the forum-selection clause in the Moreno 

ARA under the doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel. Id.

The trial court subsequently ordered the parties to arbitration, over 

Appellants’ objection. With Moreno having nonsuited her claims, Appellants and 

Appellee proceeded to arbitration. Upon the conclusion of the arbitration, the 

arbitrator determined that the fee-sharing agreement between Appellants and 

Appellee was unenforceable as against public policy because they had failed to 

obtain client consents to enter into the agreement. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES

PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.04(f), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G 

app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9); Cokinos, Bosien & Young v. Moore, No. 05-

18-01340-CV, 2020 WL 549066, at *2–6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 4, 2020, no pet.) 

(mem. op.). The arbitrator then awarded Appellants $135,000 in quantum meruit 

damages for services rendered to Appellee. Appellee thereafter filed an application 

to confirm the arbitrator’s award. Appellants opposed Appellee’s motion and filed 

a separate motion that (1) challenged the trial court’s ruling that ordered the parties 

to arbitration, (2) challenged the resulting arbitration proceeding, and (3) sought to 

vacate the arbitrator’s award. The trial court confirmed the arbitrator’s award, 

Appellants appealed, and the appeal was later transferred to our court.

I. Appellants File Suit Against Appellee in Federal Court in Rhode Island

Around May 2022, Appellants filed suit against Steven Johnson, Blake 

Norvell, Jennifer Andrews, and Appellee in the Rhode Island superior court, and reurged the fraud and breach-of-contract claims they had asserted against Appellee in 
20

the appeal now before us. See Deaton v. Johnson, C.A. No. 22-187WES, 2023 WL 

3158933, at *7 (D. R.I. Apr. 26, 2023). In this lawsuit, Appellants added claims for 

tortious interference and conspiracy against Appellee and the attorney defendants, 

alleging that the named defendants strategically conspired to force Appellants to 

arbitrate in Texas and thus avoid Appellee’s obligation to share the disputed 

attorney’s fees. Id. This lawsuit was removed to federal court in Rhode Island but

was thereafter transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District 

of Texas, Fort Worth Division; that court has since determined that all of Appellants’ 

claims are precluded by the underlying lawsuit and arbitration proceedings that are

the basis of the appeal that is now before us. See id. at *9–11; see also Deaton v. 

Johnson, No. 4:23-CV-00415-O, 2024 WL 920082, at *2, *4–5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 

2024) (slip op.). As a result, the claims asserted by Appellants against each 

defendant were dismissed with prejudice. See Deaton, 2024 WL 920082, at *6. 

Notably, in its ruling, the federal district court also denied the defendants’ 

motion to declare Appellants as vexatious litigants, but issued a warning at the 

conclusion of its order that “any additional lawsuits [filed] in the Northern District 

of Texas, Fort Worth Division, which are of a similarly duplicative or antagonistic 

nature SHALL result in either a monetary sanction . . . or an injunction restraining 

[the attorney’s] capacity to file or otherwise appear . . . in the Fort Worth Division.” 

Id. at *6.

II. Standards of Review and Applicable Law

A. The Trial Court’s Order to Compel Arbitration

We may review a trial court’s order to compel arbitration as part of an appeal 

of a final judgment. See In re Gulf Expl., LLC, 289 S.W.3d 836, 842–43 (Tex. 2009);

Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 586–87 & n.9 (Tex. 2008); Chambers v. 

O’Quinn, 242 S.W.3d 30, 32 (Tex. 2007) (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 

531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000)). We review a trial court’s order granting a motion to compel 
21

arbitration for an abuse of discretion; in this regard, we defer to the trial court’s 

factual determinations if they are supported by the evidence, but we review its legal 

determinations de novo. In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 642–43 

(Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); see Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 585–87 & n.15. 

Where an abuse of discretion standard applies, and, as in this case, the trial court 

does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with its ruling, all facts 

necessary to support the trial court’s judgment and which are supported by the 

evidence are implied. See BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 

789, 795 (Tex. 2002); see also Labatt Food Serv., 279 S.W.3d at 643. We review 

de novo whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable. See Rachal v. Reitz, 403 

S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. 2013); Labatt Food Serv., 279 S.W.3d at 643.

Generally,

8 arbitration is required if (1) the parties agreed to arbitrate, and 

(2) the claims raised fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See 9 U.S.C.

§§ 2, 4 (FAA); CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 171.001, 171.002, 171.021 (West 2019) 

(TGAA); Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 843 (TGAA); In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 

(Tex. 2011) (FAA); In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. 

2005) (FAA). Whether parties have agreed to arbitrate is a gateway matter that is 

ordinarily committed to the trial court and controlled by state law that governs “the 

8

The arbitration clause at issue in this appeal does not specifically invoke either the FAA or the 

TGAA, and neither party addresses this point. The FAA governs a contract that involves interstate 

commerce if the contract contains a valid arbitration provision and does not specify that the FAA will not 

apply. Brand FX, LLC v. Rhine, 458 S.W.3d 195, 202 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.). When both 

state and federal law apply to an arbitration agreement, state law is preempted “to the extent that it actually 

conflicts with federal law—that is, to the extent that it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 

execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 

97–98 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 

468, 477 (1989)). The TGAA and the FAA may both be applicable to an agreement, absent the parties’ 

explicit selection of one or the other. Id. at 97 n.64 (citing In re L & L Kempwood Assocs., L.P., 9 S.W.3d 

125, 127–28 (Tex. 1999)). Here, the ground for which Appellants seek vacatur is substantially similar 

under either statute. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), with CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 171.088(a)(3)(A); see Gulf 

Expl., LLC, 289 S.W.3d at 842. Because the substantive principles that are applicable to our analysis in 

this appeal and the available grounds to review an arbitration award are the same under both statutes, we 

may find guidance in court decisions that arise under either. See Howerton v. Wood, No. 02-15-00327-CV, 

2017 WL 710631, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
22

validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.” Jody James Farms, 

JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Arthur Anderson 

LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009)); see In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 

S.W.3d 127, 130–31 (Tex. 2005). Thus, the ordinary principles of contract law of 

the forum state determine whether the parties have a valid agreement to arbitrate. 

Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d at 224.

Although state law determines the validity of an arbitration agreement, courts 

have applied both federal and state law to determine the related, but distinct, issue 

of whether non-signatories to the agreement should be compelled to arbitrate their 

claims. See Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 738 (collecting cases). The Texas Supreme 

Court has endeavored to resolve such questions through the application of state law 

“informed by persuasive and well-reasoned federal precedent,” and, in doing so, the 

court recognizes that it is “important for federal and state law to be as consistent as 

possible in this area.” Id. at 739. As such, consistent with federal precedent, the 

Texas Supreme Court has recognized six theories, that arise from common principles 

of contract and agency law, that may bind non-signatories to arbitration agreements: 

(1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) alter ego; 

(5) equitable estoppel; and (6) third-party beneficiary. See G. T. Leach Builders, 

LLC v. Sapphire V.P., L.P., 458 S.W.3d 502, 524 (Tex. 2015); Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d 

at 739 (citing Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkm., 345 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 

2003)). 

B. Confirmation of the Arbitrator’s Award

The Second Court of Appeals has set forth the following standard for 

reviewing arbitration awards, with which we agree:

An arbitration award is conclusive on the parties as to all matters 

of fact and law submitted to the arbitrator and has the effect of a 

judgment of a court of last resort. Accordingly, judicial review of an 
23

arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow, and we may vacate an 

arbitration award only in very unusual circumstances. 

To protect the strong deference accorded to arbitration awards, 

we review a trial court’s ruling to vacate or confirm an arbitration award 

de novo based on the entire record. All reasonable presumptions are 

indulged in favor of the award, and the challenging party bears the 

burden to establish an allowable ground for vacatur. We must focus on 

the integrity of the process, not the propriety of the result. 

Howerton v. Wood, No. 02-15-00327-CV, 2017 WL 710631, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal citations omitted).

 III. Analysis

In their first issue, Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it ordered

them to arbitration because no agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties. In 

support of this contention, Appellants argue that (1) the Second Court of Appeals’ 

decision affirming the denial of their special appearance, which specifically held that 

the doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel rendered the forum-selection clause in 

Moreno’s ARA enforceable as to Appellants, carries no preclusive effect in this 

appeal, and (2) direct-benefits estoppel does not apply to them based on this record. 

Although we agree with Appellants’ first point, contrary to Appellants’ second 

assertion, we conclude that direct-benefits estoppel applies here.

A. Law of the Case

The parties’ opening sallies concern the applicability of the doctrine of law of 

the case. Because the Second Court of Appeals’ decision, which affirmed the denial 

of Appellants’ special appearance, was based on many of the same facts as well as 

the same legal principles—that the parties assert are applicable and dispositive 

here—Appellee urges that we must apply the preclusive effect of the law of the case 

doctrine to the matter before us.

Under this doctrine, “a court of appeals is ordinarily bound by its initial 

decision if there is a subsequent appeal in the same case.” Briscoe v. Goodmark 
24

Corp., 102 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex. 2003) (citing Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 

628, 630 (Tex. 1986)). Law of the case applies when the appellate court is presented 

with facts that are “substantially the same” as those that existed when the matter was 

first decided. See Hudson, 711 S.W.2d at 630. “The doctrine . . . only applies to 

questions of law and does not apply to questions of fact.” Id. Functionally, the 

doctrine narrows the issues in subsequent stages of the litigation, thus achieving 

uniformity of decision and judicial economy and efficiency. Id. Suffice it to say, 

the parties to this appeal have yet to subscribe to the principles of judicial economy 

and efficiency. Nevertheless, a decision rendered on an issue by the appellate court 

does not absolutely bar the reconsideration of the same issue in a second appeal. 

Briscoe, 102 S.W.3d at 716. Instead, application of the doctrine lies within the 

discretion of the appellate court, depending on the particular circumstances that are 

presented in the case before it. Id.

The prior stage of litigation, to which the parties refer, only concerns the trial 

court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Appellants, which they challenged via 

special appearance. Deaton, 2017 WL 4683940, at *3–5. Rule 120a of the Texas 

Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the procedure for making and contesting a special 

appearance, and the rule makes clear that the parameters of inquiry—personal 

jurisdiction—at that stage are only preliminary. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a. For 

instance, among other things, the rule sets out what may be considered and form the 

basis of a trial court’s ruling on a special appearance: “[T]he pleadings, any 

stipulations made by and between parties, such affidavits and attachments as may be 

filed by the parties, the results of discovery processes, and any oral testimony.” 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a (3); see In re Christianson Air Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC, 

639 S.W.3d 671, 676–78 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (discovery under Rule 120a 

is limited to information “essential” to the plaintiff’s theory of personal jurisdiction). 

The rule also “recognizes that issues of fact determined in a special appearance may 
25

also be relevant to the merits, as it expressly leaves those issues open for 

redetermination at the merits stage.” Christianson Air Conditioning, 639 S.W.3d at

677; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(2) (“No determination of any issue of fact in 

connection with the objection to jurisdiction is a determination of the merits of the 

case or any aspect thereof.”).

Thus, Rule 120a specifically limits what the trial court may consider, as well 

as the extent of the resulting findings, in its jurisdictional inquiry. Although some 

courts have applied the law of the case doctrine to appeals that involve the 

reconsideration of a trial court’s finding(s) in a special appearance setting, we have 

not found an example, nor have the parties cited to or directed us to any, that parallels

the circumstances before us, in which a court has applied the doctrine in the manner

urged by Appellee—that is, to treat the finding(s) from a special appearance ruling, 

which is clearly a jurisdictional-only determination, as binding in a subsequent

determination on the merits. As such, we decline to do so here.

9

B. Direct-Benefits Estoppel

Despite the parties’ jurisdictional arguments, the primary thrust of Appellants’ 

complaints on appeal is that direct-benefits estoppel is inapplicable to the 

circumstances that we must confront in this appeal, and that they therefore cannot 

be bound by the arbitration clause in Appellee’s representation agreement with 

Moreno. We disagree.

Direct-benefits estoppel is a type of equitable estoppel under which a nonsignatory plaintiff who seeks the benefits under a contract is estopped from 

simultaneously attempting to avoid the contract’s burdens, such as the obligation to 

9

See also Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 585–86 (rejecting the argument that pre-arbitration 

mandamus proceedings—in which requests to stay the order compelling arbitration were denied without 

addressing or commenting on the merits—established the law of the case and precluded the defendants 

from raising the same arguments when challenging on direct appeal, post-arbitration, the trial court’s order 

to compel arbitration).
26

arbitrate disputes. See Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 739 (citing Bridas, 345 F.3d at 361–

62). Direct-benefits estoppel involves “non-signatories who, during the life of the 

contract, have embraced the contract despite their non-signatory status but then, 

during litigation, attempt to repudiate the arbitration clause in the contract.” Hellenic 

Inv. Fund, Inc. v. Det Norske Veritas, 464 F.3d 514, 517–18 (5th Cir. 2006) 

(emphasis added) (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc 

Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 200 (3rd Cir. 2001)).

There are two circumstances in which direct-benefits estoppel may apply: “A 

non-signatory can ‘embrace’ a contract containing an arbitration clause in two ways: 

(1) by knowingly seeking and obtaining ‘direct benefits’ from that contract; or (2) by 

seeking to enforce the terms of that contract or asserting claims that must be 

determined by reference to that contract.” Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, 

Inc., 620 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Hellenic Inv. 

Fund, 464 F.3d at 517–20)); see Taylor Morrison of Tex., Inc. v. Ha, 660 S.W.3d 

529, 533 (Tex. 2023) (holding that even though a home-construction contract that 

included an arbitration clause was signed by only one spouse, the non-signatory 

spouse and their children were nonetheless bound by the contract’s arbitration 

clause, and thus were required to arbitrate their construction defect claims, because 

they sought and obtained direct benefits and “embraced” the contract by residing in 

the home that the signatory spouse purchased);see also Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d 

at 131–33. Here, Appellants have not asserted any claims against Moreno or 

Appellee in this case,10 therefore they have neither sought to enforce the terms of the 

ARA nor have they asserted claims that must be determined by reference to it. 

10Although Appellants asserted counterclaims in the arbitration proceeding, our analysis only 

concerns the applicability of the arbitration clause as to Appellants. The claims that they did assert in the 

arbitration proceeding do not affect that analysis.
27

However, and based on our thorough review of the record and the 

circumstances before us, we conclude that Appellants have embraced the ARA by 

knowingly seeking and obtaining direct benefits from it. Appellants claim that 

(1) they had a fee-sharing contract with Appellee which did not contain an 

arbitration clause, (2) this contract defined the parties’ relationship, and (3) the ARA 

and its arbitration clause are entirely superfluous to that relationship. In light of 

Appellants’ arguments, we will first discuss how they sought and obtained direct 

benefits from the ARA. Next, we will explain how Appellants did so “consistently 

and knowingly.” Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 135; see Ha, 660 S.W.3d at 533.

1. Appellants “Sought and Obtained Direct Benefits”

A party can bind itself to an arbitration provision through its conduct during 

the life of the contract. See Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 132. For example, the 

use of a trade name that is pursuant to an agreement that includes an arbitration 

clause, or the receipt of lower insurance rates and the ability to sail under the French 

flag because a contract contains an arbitration clause have been found to bind nonsignatories to the arbitration provisions in those scenarios because these intangible

or abstract benefits were derived directly from agreements that included arbitration 

provisions. Deloitte Noraudit A/S v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, U.S., 9 F.3d 1060, 

1064 (2nd Cir. 1993) (holding that, under ordinary contract and agency principles, 

non-signatory Noraudit was estopped from denying its obligation to arbitrate 

because it knowingly accepted the benefits of the agreement through its continued 

use of the name “Deloitte”) (citing McCallister Bros. Inc. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 

F.2d 519, 524 (2nd Cir. 1980)); see Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard 

S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2nd Cir. 1999); see also Ha, 660 S.W.3d at 533 

(“[R]egardless of whether they asserted contract claims, Mrs. Ha and the children 

are nevertheless bound to the arbitration provision through direct-benefits estoppel 

[because] . . . [they] lived in the home at issue. [This] indicates that they accepted 
28

the benefits of Mr. Ha’s purchase agreement and therefore may be compelled to 

arbitrate.”).

A non-signatory’s conduct in seeking and obtaining direct benefits must be 

knowing and consistent in order to “embrace” the contract, as opposed to merely 

“shake[] hands with it.” Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 134–35. Because “the 

equitable nature of the doctrine may render firm standards inappropriate,” the 

doctrine requires “trial courts to exercise some discretion based on the facts of each 

case.” Id. at 135 (citing Bridas, 345 F.3d at 360). Nevertheless, “when a nonparty 

consistently and knowingly insists that others treat it as a party [to the contract], it 

cannot later ‘turn[] its back on the portions of the contract, such as an arbitration 

clause, that it finds distasteful.’” Id. (quoting DuPont, 269 F.3d at 200) (internal 

citations omitted). Simply put, the North Star and guiding principle for courts to 

follow in determining whether to apply the doctrine is this: “A nonparty cannot both 

have his contract and defeat it too.” Id.

In our view, and based on the record before us, Appellants sought and 

obtained a direct benefit from the ARAs by actively and continuously expanding

their role in the Kugel Mesh litigation beyond that which they and Appellee had 

contemplated in their fee-sharing agreement. This expansion was not sufficiently

accounted for by the revised fee-sharing agreement. Key developments in the 

litigation and the global settlement that were spurred by Appellants’ conduct indicate

that—both before and after they became aware of the arbitration provisions 

contained in the client ARAs—Appellants purposefully sought and occupied a role

that exceeded the scope of what their fee-sharing agreement specified. Together, 

these key developments establish that Appellants sought and obtained direct benefits 

from the client ARAs by purporting to wield authority on behalf of the clients that 

their fee-sharing agreement with Appellee did not grant them.
29

The “key” developments referenced above are: Appellants’ (1) belief that, 

through their ongoing efforts, they had so rehabilitated Patton’s lawsuit as to have

created a high value for that individual case, which in turn influenced the settlement 

value of all of Appellee’s cases; (2) role as lead negotiator during the unsuccessful 

mediation in the Rhode Island superior court; (3) refusal to cooperate in the 

establishment of the QSF, which was necessary to consummate any individual client 

settlements, until Appellants’ demands were met; (4) refusal to accept Appellee’s 

decision to terminate them, levying of an attorney’s fee lien, and filing motions to 

segregate $1 million of the QSF funds; (5) execution of the stipulation for 

nondisclosure of client information, confirming that the ARAs were the source of 

their authority, and (6) filing motions to disburse the entire $1 million years later, 

despite their possession of the client ARAs and knowledge that their maximum claim 

and recovery for attorney’s fees as it related to the Kugel Mesh litigation amounted

to approximately $400,000.

The first two developments essentially acted to change Appellants’ 

expectations of the case and their perception of their role in it. Whether this change 

was justified or correct is not relevant to our analysis. It is sufficient to conclude 

that Appellants expended significant time, effort, and monies into developing the 

Patton lawsuit and leading the negotiations during the mediation in the Rhode Island 

superior court. And, to Appellants’ understanding, these efforts collectively 

contributed in a significant way to the overall team effort of reaching a global 

settlement of Appellee’s lawsuits.

Next, Appellants claim that as settlement negotiations neared their successful 

conclusion, Appellee did not communicate with them in a manner that Appellants

considered to be to their satisfaction. Again, the reasonableness of Appellants’ 

perception of these events is not relevant here. Appellants repeatedly requested 

updates about the status of settlement negotiations and received little or no response.
30

Then, after the global settlement was reached in principle, Appellants believed 

that they were not appropriately informed of this development and its implications. 

Ultimately, Appellants’ response to this uncertainty was to advance their position 

that the settlement could not proceed until their demands and concerns were 

addressed and met. They refused to sign the QSF stipulation and thus delayed, and 

potentially jeopardized, the entire global settlement. During this time, Appellants 

asserted their authority to delay the settlement proceedings because they were the 

only counsel of record in the Rhode Island state court lawsuits. They also claimed 

that Appellee’s alleged confidentiality concerns were absurd because Appellants had 

been the lead negotiators during the superior court mediation and were a fee-sharing 

counsel to those state court lawsuits. They did not address Appellee’s expressed 

concern that they could not meet the confidentiality requirements and definitions in 

the MSA because they separately represented other Kugel Mesh clients as local 

counsel in other lawsuits.

When, because of their refusal to facilitate the global settlement, Appellants 

were terminated as local counsel for nearly all the lawsuits pending in the Rhode 

Island superior court, Appellants refused to either accept that they had been

terminated or were required to withdraw from the lawsuits, despite having received

client affidavits confirming their termination in most of the cases. Then Appellants 

filed a motion, purportedly on behalf of all the same clients, to compel the disclosure 

of settlement information from Appellee and Bard/Davol, and to segregate an 

exorbitant amount of the settlement funds for the sole and exclusive purpose of

funding, and allowing them to address, their decades-long dispute with Appellee. 

Though Appellants argue that they intended their “informal” attorney’s fee lien to 

apply only to attorney’s fee funds, the actual and unfortunate result of the 

segregation order affected the distribution of client funds as well.
31

After they received the client ARAs, the global settlement MSA, and 

information regarding the QSF funds, Appellants still did not alter their position or 

seek to reduce the amount of funds in the QSF that were segregated at their request, 

although it was apparent that the maximum amount of attorney’s fees to which they 

were entitled amounted only to approximately $400,000. Appellants did not 

disavow the stipulation they signed before receiving the ARAs, which explicitly 

confirmed that they acted pursuant to the authority granted to them in the ARAs. In 

fact, in 2020, years after receiving the first ARAs in the summer of 2016 pursuant 

to the superior court’s order, Appellants took affirmative action to obtain the entire

$1 million of the segregated funds from the QSF. Their motion to disburse primarily 

focused on the legal malpractice lawsuit that Patton filed against Appellee, which 

Appellants had funded to the tune of almost $500,000—funds which Appellants now 

request be reimbursed to them through the segregated $1 million.

Whether Appellants’ actions in all of this were justified, reasonable, or 

otherwise, does not factor into our analysis of this quagmire. Rather, the question 

that we must address is whether Appellants knowingly sought and obtained direct 

benefits from the ARAs. Based on the record before us, we conclude that they did. 

Like sailing under the French flag, see Am. Bureau of Shipping, 170 F.3d at 353,

using the well-known tradename “Deloitte,” see Deloitte, 9 F.3d 1064, or residing 

in a home that the signatory spouse purchased when the construction contract 

included an arbitration clause as one of its terms, see Ha, 660 S.W.3d at 533,

Appellants exercised their authority as counsel for the Kugel Mesh clients to 

interfere with and affect the entire global settlement in several respects—authority 

Appellants’ sparse fee-sharing agreement could not reasonably confer upon them 

and ways in which it did not contemplate. Disregarding any confidentiality 

concerns, whether those were ultimately reasonable or not, Appellants blocked the 
32

global settlement for an extended period of time by refusing to sign the QSF 

stipulation until their concerns and demands were addressed to their satisfaction.

In this instance, Appellants persistent conduct constitutes “embracing” the 

authority granted to them by the ARAs, beyond any level that the fee-sharing 

agreement could purport to grant. Appellants’ concerns about their attorney’s fee

recovery did not necessitate or authorize them to take the fate of the entire global 

settlement into their hands—their proffered justifications for doing so, such as 

concerns about the values of client settlements, had nothing to do with their 

attorney’s fee recovery. Despite this, we note that Appellants later conceded that 

signing the requested QSF documents would not have resulted in the dismissal of 

any client lawsuits or affected the individual settlements that had yet to be allocated. 

The context of their relationship with Appellee, especially concerning Appellants’

efforts in the Patton lawsuit, implies that Appellants believed they were unfairly 

excluded from a process to which they had significantly contributed and developed. 

This reading of the parties’ history is especially vindicated by Appellants protracted 

and disproportional financial support of Patton’s subsequent legal malpractice 

lawsuit against Appellee and its attorneys. To be sure, we do not necessarily give 

credence to Appellee’s touted confidentiality concerns with respect to its refusal to 

tender basic settlement information to an attorney and firm with which they had 

litigated and settled cases for the past six years. However, in seeking to assert their 

interests, Appellants purposely chose to take actions in their capacity as counsel for 

the Kugel Mesh clients. Such actions could only have been authorized by the client 

ARAs, not the fee-sharing agreement.

But Appellants did not stop at thwarting the purpose of the QSF. They refused 

to either accept their termination as local counsel or withdraw from the pending 

Kugel Mesh lawsuits. Appellants then filed a motion on behalf of the very clients 

who had terminated them, without the clients’ consent, the result of which was to 
33

segregate a large sum from the general settlement fund for their own, exclusive 

interests. Finally, years later, when they unquestionably knew that their claim for 

attorney’s fees did not, and could not, approach anything close to $1 million, 

Appellants still sought to extract the entire amount.

Based on this record, we conclude that the facts before us constitute a 

conscious insistence by Appellants that they be treated as a party to the client ARAs. 

In this regard, the insistence was knowing and consistent, and it sought and obtained 

a direct benefit for Appellants from the ARAs—the authority to act on behalf of all 

the Kugel Mesh clients, independently and even in opposition to Appellee, the 

clients’ primary counsel, in ways that affected all of the clients’ settlements, which 

authority was far beyond and exceeded their designated duties as local counsel.

2. Appellants “Knowingly” Embraced the ARAs

Importantly, although many of the actions taken by Appellants in seeking and 

obtaining a direct benefit from the ARAs occurred before Appellants became aware 

of the arbitration provision in the client ARAs, Appellants consistently maintained 

and reaffirmed their position asthe parties’ disputes unfolded even afterthey became 

aware of the arbitration provision and have continued to take affirmative action in 

furtherance of their positions since that time.

The knowledge element of direct-benefits estoppel has been held by the 

Second Court of Appeals to require “actual knowledge” or something closely akin 

to it. See Telsmith, Inc. v. 37 Building Products, Ltd., No. 02-19-00220-CV, 2020 

WL 719445, at *4–5 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 13, 2020, no pet.) (mem. 

op.) (Holding that direct-benefits estoppel would likely be satisfied if the nonsignatory had (1) access to a copy of the arbitration agreement, (2) a summary of its 

essential terms, or (3) a “similar indicia of knowledge.”).

Here, the record shows that Appellants first came into possession of the client 

ARAs during the summer of 2016, after the issuance of the Rhode Island superior 
34

court’s March 11 order that directed Appellee to provide them to Appellants. Prior 

to this, it is largely undisputed—and the record shows no indication to the contrary—

that Appellants had neither seen any client ARAs nor were they otherwise aware of 

the attendant arbitration provision.

Throughout the Kugel Mesh litigation, the resulting client settlements, and the 

subsequent attorney’s fee dispute, Appellants have asserted a clear position based 

on authority that emanated exclusively from the client ARAs. When Appellants 

became aware of the arbitration provision in the ARAs, they did not alter or disclaim 

any aspect of their position; instead, they continued to pursue aggressive, affirmative 

action in furtherance of that position, all the while knowing that the basis of their 

position flowed directly from the ARA’s grant of authority, rather than their feesharing agreement with Appellee.

Appellants consistently insisted by their conduct that they be treated as a party 

to the ARAs, even after they came into possession of the ARAs, and therefore knew

at that time, if not sooner, that the ARAs contained an arbitration clause. With 

respect to the Rhode Island superior court’s rulings, we view Appellants’ efforts to 

avoid arbitration under the ARAs necessarily as attempts by them to repudiate a 

contract which they knowingly “embraced.” As such, we conclude that Appellants

are bound by the ARA’s terms under the doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel.

Because Appellants knowingly embraced the terms of the client ARAs, the 

trial court, in its discretion, correctly (1) applied the equitable doctrine of directbenefits estoppel to bind Appellants to the terms of the ARAs and (2) ordered them 

to arbitration pursuant to the ARAs arbitration provision. Therefore, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion as Appellants suggest. Accordingly, we overrule 

Appellants’ first issue.

Moreover, because a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties, 

the arbitrator did not abuse its powers by conducting the arbitration and issuing an 
35

award, and the trial court did not err when it confirmed the arbitrator’s award. 

Accordingly, we also overrule Appellants’ second issue.

C. The Forum Selection Clause of the MSA

Finally, in their third issue, Appellants contend that “[c]ompelling and 

conducting arbitration were also error because of a mandatory forum selection clause 

and an already-pending suit” in the Rhode Island superior court. We disagree. The 

MSA provides:

Any dispute arising under this agreement or relating to the subject 

matter thereof, shall be filed only in the Superior Court of Rhode Island 

and Settling Claimants, Claimants’ Counsel and/or Co-Counsel hereby 

submit himself, herself, itself, or themselves to the personal jurisdiction 

of the Superior Court of Rhode Island.

In its October 2020 order denying Appellee’s motion to stay Appellants’ 

motion to disburse the QSF funds, the Rhode Island superior court addressed the 

question of whether direct-benefits estoppel should bind Appellants to the client 

ARAs and its arbitration provisions. See All Individual Kugel Mesh Cases, 2020 

WL 6335955, at *4–5. The superior court declined to exercise its discretion to 

impose this equitable estoppel theory on Appellants and further noted that 

Appellants had “properly brought [their] motion to disburse here, to this Court, as 

[Appellee] agreed to do under the master settlement agreement, the stipulation filed 

as to the master settlement agreement, and the March 11, 2016 order of this Court.” 

Id. at *5.

However, the superior court later granted Appellee’s motion to stay, stating 

that retaining continuing jurisdiction over the QSF “did not thereby bind all 

claimants and their attorneys . . . to resolve all disputes underlying the proper 

calculation of their ‘legal fees and costs’ through de novo hearings or mini-trials 

before this Court.” All Individual Kugel Mesh Cases, 2022 WL 19705089, at *15. 

The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island described this ruling 
36

to mean that the “litigation of disputes (including those impacting the allocation of 

attorney’s fees and expenses from the QSF) that are governed by the ARA clauses 

requiring binding arbitration in Texas” are not governed by the forum selection 

clause in the MSA, which “does not apply to such disputes because [the effect of 

this clause] is limited ‘to any dispute over the substance of the Settlement

Agreement.’” Deaton, 2023 WL 3158933, at *4 (quoting All Individual Kugel Mesh 

Cases, 2022 WL 19705089, at *15–16 n.11).

Moreover, as previously mentioned, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 

issued a stay in the parties’ appeal of the superior court’s October 2020 denial of 

Appellee’s motion to stay. Kugel Patch, 317 A.3d at 783. Noting that a disposition 

of the matter before us was likely imminent, and that Appellee’s prayed-for relief—

to stay all proceedings pending the resolution of the Texas arbitrations—in the 

Rhode Island appeal would thus be rendered moot, the court deemed it prudent to 

stay its proceedings until the pair of arbitrations conducted in Texas have reached 

final resolution and all appellate review has been exhausted. Id.

It is significant that the dispute before us is not brought under the MSA. 

Rather, this appeal concerns only whether Appellants are obligated to arbitrate under 

the terms of the client ARAs. Although the parties’ attorney’s fee dispute will 

undoubtedly return to the Rhode Island superior court as they seek the allocation and 

disbursement of QSF funds, we have no jurisdiction over the resolution of that 

distinct question. Instead, our opinion today affirms the trial court’s order to compel 

arbitration and its judgment confirming the arbitrator’s award of $135,000 to 

Appellants in quantum meruit damages because Appellants agreed to arbitrate any 

dispute arising under the client ARAs when they embraced the terms of those 

agreements. Accordingly, we overrule Appellants’ third issue.
37

 IV. This Court’s Ruling

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

W. STACY TROTTER

JUSTICE

August 21, 2024

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.