alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Ex parte LANE.

No. 15916.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 8, 1933.

Adams & McAlister, of Nacogdoches, for appellant.

H. L. Edwards, Sp. Prosecutor, and T. O. Lacey, Co. Atty., both of Nacogdoches, and Lloyd W- Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

LATTIMORE, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order fixing bail on a habeas corpus hearing.

The record in this case shows that it was heard in the lower court during vacation of said court, and an appeal taken from the order and judgment then entered. Article 857, C. C. P., requires in such case that the transcript be approved by the trial court, which was not done here. The state moves to dismiss this appeal. The motion must be sustained. Ex parte Turner, 107 Tex. Cr. R. 420, 296 S. W. 295; Ex parte Collins, 118 Tex. Cr. R. 146, 38 S.W.(2d) 789. We have no other option. The appeal is dismissed.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 235 (Wednesday, December 6, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 76329]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-31062]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Declaration of Disaster #3309]


State of Oklahoma

    As a result of the President's major disaster declaration on 
November 27, 2000, I find that Caddo and Grady Counties in the State of 
Oklahoma constitute a disaster area due to damages caused by severe 
storms and flooding beginning on October 21, 2000 and continuing 
through October 29, 2000. Applications for loans for physical damage as 
a result of this disaster may be filed until the close of business on 
January 26, 2001, and for loans for economic injury until the close of 
business on August 27, 2001 at the address listed below or other 
locally announced locations: U.S. Small Business Administration, 
Disaster Area 3 Office, 4400 Amon Carter Blvd., Suite 102, Fort Worth, 
TX 76155.
    In addition, applications for economic injury loans from small 
businesses located in the following contiguous counties may be filed 
until the specified date at the above location: Blaine, Canadian, 
Cleveland, Comanche, Custer, Garvin, Kiowa, McClain, Stephens, and 
Washita in the State of Oklahoma.
    The interest rates are:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Physical Damage:
  Homeowners with credit available elsewhere.................      7.375
  Homeowners without credit available elsewhere..............      3.687
  Businesses with credit available elsewhere.................      8.000
  Businesses and non-profit organizations without credit           4.000
   available elsewhere.......................................
  Others (including non-profit organizations) with credit          6.750
   available elsewhere.......................................
For Economic Injury: Businesses and small agricultural             4.000
 cooperatives without credit available elsewhere.............
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The number assigned to this disaster for physical damage is 330911 
and for economic injury the number is 9J7900.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 59002 and 
59008)

    Dated: November 29, 2000.
Herbert L. Mitchell,
Acting Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.
[FR Doc. 00-31062 Filed 12-5-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Farraro, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of both intentional murder and felony murder for the slaying of the manager of a gasoline station in the course of a robbery at the station. The proof of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. He had been employed at the gasoline station some weeks before the robbery and slaying and had knowledge of the procedures used in retrieving the money from the safe and, particularly, was aware of the fact that the manager arrived with the keys to the safe early in the morning, at least 15 minutes before the arrival of the other employees. He had access to the murder weapon, which was kept in a gun cabinet in his father’s home. He visited his father’s home shortly before and after the robbery and murder. On the day after the robbery, in which $3,225 was stolen, defendant deposited $1,000 in cash in a newly opened bank account and also spent approximately $1,300. Weeks before the robbery, his bank account had a zero balance and he had closed it. He lied to the police about his whereabouts on the day of the crime. He confessed to his girlfriend that he had committed the robbery, but denied that he did the shooting, and he told her that he had stayed at a motel near the airport after the crime so that he could fly out of town if "anything happened”. He also told her before he was arrested that he had gone to Batavia to arrange an alibi. Finally, his trial testimony, in which he attempted to establish an alibi and to explain his sudden acquisition of a large amount of cash, was inherently unbelievable.

On appeal, defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed because the prosecutor improperly impeached his *997own witness and because the court’s charge on alibi was in error. In view of the overwhelming proof of guilt, the prosecutor’s improper impeachment of his own witness was harmless *(see, People v Saez,*69 NY2d 802, 804). The court’s charge on alibi, when viewed as a whole, conveyed to the jury the correct principle of law *(see, People v Victor,*62 NY2d 374). The court charged the jury that the burden of proof was upon the People to disprove the alibi. Although the court did not add at that point in the charge the words "beyond a reasonable doubt”, in other portions of its charge it fully and adequately defined the standard of the People’s burden of proof as "beyond a reasonable doubt”.

We have reviewed the issues raised in defendant’s *pro se*brief and find them to be without merit. (Appeal from judgment of Monroe County Court, Wisner, J.—murder, ? second degree.) Present—Denman, ? J. P., Boomer, Pine, Davis and Lowery, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1863 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1863

To clarify that noncommercial species found entirely within the borders 
    of a single State are not in interstate commerce or subject to 
   regulation under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 or any other 
  provision of law enacted as an exercise of the power of Congress to 
                     regulate interstate commerce.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 26, 2017

Mr. Lee (for himself, Mr. Hatch, and Mr. Paul) introduced the following 
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment 
                            and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To clarify that noncommercial species found entirely within the borders 
    of a single State are not in interstate commerce or subject to 
   regulation under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 or any other 
  provision of law enacted as an exercise of the power of Congress to 
                     regulate interstate commerce.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Native Species Protection Act''.

SEC. 2. TREATMENT OF INTRASTATE SPECIES.

    (a) Definition of Intrastate Species.--In this Act, the term 
``intrastate species'' means any species of plant or fish or wildlife 
(as those terms are defined in section 3 of the Endangered Species Act 
of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1532)) that is--
            (1) found entirely within the borders of a single State; 
        and
            (2) not part of a national market for any commodity.
    (b) Treatment.--An intrastate species shall not be--
            (1) considered to be in interstate commerce; and
            (2) subject to regulation under--
                    (A) the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 
                1531 et seq.); or
                    (B) any other provision of law under which 
                regulatory authority is based on the power of Congress 
                to regulate interstate commerce as enumerated in 
                article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution of 
                the United States.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>      5
<LEGEND>       THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION
               EXTRACTED FROM THE NUTRONICS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
               FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER
               30, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
               REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
<MULTIPLIER>   1
       
<S>                           <C>            
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 9-MOS          
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                      SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                      0
<SECURITIES>                                0
<RECEIVABLES>                               0
<ALLOWANCES>                                0                    
<INVENTORY>                                 0     
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            0     
<PP&E>                                      0     
<DEPRECIATION>                              0     
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              0     
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       0     
<BONDS>                                     0     
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       0     
<PREFERRED>                                 0     
<COMMON>                               86,292     
<OTHER-SE>                           (82,816)     
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                0     
<SALES>                                     0     
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            0     
<CGS>                                       0     
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               0     
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            0     
<LOSS-PROVISION>                            0     
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          0     
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             0    
<INCOME-TAX>                                0     
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         0     
<DISCONTINUED>                      (772)<F1>     
<EXTRAORDINARY>                             0               
<CHANGES>                                   0     
<NET-INCOME>                            (772)     
<EPS-PRIMARY>                           (.00)     
<EPS-DILUTED>                           (.00)
<FN>
<F1>           AT A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
               THE COMPANY ON MAY 22, 1995, IT WAS RESOLVED TO
               CONVERT 10,000 SHARES OF THE COMPANY'S ISSUED AND
               OUTSTANDING $100.00 PAR VALUE PREFERRED STOCK TO
               1,000,000 SHARES OF THE COMPANY'S $0.01 PAR VALUE
               COMMON STOCK.                 
</FN>          
        

</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

EX PARTE: JESUS AGUILAR. §

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 18

- 00064

- CR

Appeal from the

243rd District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 970D04229

- 243

- 2)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was error in the

order granting writ of habeas corpus. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order and render

judgment denying writ of habeas corpus, in accordance with the op inion of the Court. This

decision shall be certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 31ST DAY OF MAY, 2019.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
EXHIBIT 23.1
 
 
 CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
 
 
 
 We consent to the incorporation by
reference in the Registration Statements on Form SB-2 (File No. 333-113821), on
Form SB-2 (File No. 333-146779) and on Form S-8 (File No. 333-121399) of
Applied NeuroSolutions, Inc. of our report datedFebruary 21, 2008, which appears on
page 35 of this annual report on Form 10-K(SB) for the year ended December 31,
2007.
 
 
 /s/
VIRCHOW, KRAUSE & COMPANY, LLP
 
 
 Chicago,
Illinois
 March 20,
2008
CLD

- 214 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13

- 1 888

___________

IN RE: AKILAH SHABAZZ,

Petitioner

____________________________________
On a Petition for W rit of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(Related to Criminal No. 3

- 12

- cr

- 00064

- 001 )

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

April 25, 2013

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN

, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 21, 2013 )

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Pro se petitioner, Akilah Shabazz

, seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Unite d

States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to impose a sentence in

United States v. Shabazz

, D.C. Criminal No. 3

- 12

- cr

- 00064

- 001 , in which he was found

guilty of aggravated identity theft and related offenses on November 7, 2012 , and to rule

on his motion for release pending appeal, which was filed on January 28 , 2013. By order2

entered May 3, 2013, the District Court schedule d sentencing for Shabazz on May 21,

2013. Thus, Shabazz will obtain the remedy he seeks concerning sentencing

. We are

confident that the District Court will rule on his motion for relea se pending appeal in due

course. Accordingly, we will deny the petition

. 1

1 Even if sentencing were not scheduled, we would still deny the mandamus petition. Mandamus is a “drastic remedy” available in extraordinary circumstances only. In re: Diet Dr ugs Prods. Liab. Litig. , 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). M andamus may be warranted when a district court’s delay in handling a case “is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.” Madden , 102 F.3d at 79 . However, t he delay complained of by Shab azz is not tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction. Shabazz was fo und guilty on November 7, 2012. The presentence investigation report was filed on January 30, 2013. On January 28, 2013, Shabazz filed a motion for release pending appeal and on February 20, 2013, he filed objections to the presentence report. Because only two months have passed since Shabazz filed his objections to the presentence report and three months since the filing of his motion for release pending appeal, the delay “does not yet rise to the level of a denial of due process.” Madden , 102 F.3d at 79 (denying a mandamus petition where the district court had not ruled on petitioner’s motion in four months). See also United States v. Campisi , 583 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1978) (five month delay between guilty plea and sentence was not “unreasonable” within the meaning of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)).
*OPINION ISSUED OCTOBER 6, 2008*

#### LYNN LEVINSON VS. DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS

(CC-06-0254)

Claimant appeared *pro se.*

Jason C. Workman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Claimant brought this action for vehicle damage which occurred when her 2001 Ford Focus struck a hole while her son, Aaron Levinson, was driving on Fifth Avenue in Huntington, Cabell County. Fifth Avenue is a road maintained by respondent. The Court is of the opinion to make an award in this claim for the reasons more fully stated below.

The incident giving rise to this claim occurred between 11:30 p.m. and 1:00 a.m on September 5,2005. Fifth Avenue is a paved, four-lane road with a posted speed limit of thirty-five miles per hour. Mr. Levinson and the three passengers in his vehicle were *136returning from picking up a friend at a bar on Fourth Avenue. He was driving at the speed limit when his vehicle struck a hole that was five feet long, two feet wide, and six to eight inches deep. Mr. Levinson, a student at Marshall University who resided in the State of Washington at that time, explained that he had driven on this road almost every day during the prior school year. Since claimant had just returned to campus for the start of a new school year, he was not aware of the hole on Fifth Avenue before his vehicle struck it. Aaron Jamieson, a passenger in the vehicle, recalled that he heard a loud “pop,” and Mr. Levinson pulled the vehicle over into a parking lot to see what had happened. Then, they saw the hole in the road. As a result of this incident, claimant’s vehicle sustained damage to its alignment, right passenger wheel, rim, frame, and steering. The total amount of claimant’s damages amounts to $1,100.00, and claimant’s insurance deductible at the' time of the incident was $500.00.

The position of the respondent is that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition on Fifth Avenue. The respondent did not present any witnesses at the hearing.

The well-established principle of law in West Virginia is that the State is neither an insurer nor a guarantor of the safety of travelers upon its roads. *Adkins v. Sims,*130 W.Va. 645, 46 S.E.2d 81 (1947). In order to hold respondent liable for road defects of this type, a claimant must prove that respondent had actual or constructive notice of the defect and a reasonable time to take corrective action. *Chapman v. Dep't of Highways,*16 Ct. Cl. 103 (1986).

In the instant case, the Court is of the opinion that respondent had, at the least, constructive notice of the hole which claimant’s vehicle struck and that the hole presented a hazard to the traveling public. The size of the hole and the time of year in which this incident occurred leads the Court to conclude that respondent had notice of this hazardous condition. Thus, the Court finds respondent negligent and claimant may make a recovery for the damage to her vehicle.

In accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated herein above, the Court is of the opinion to and does make an award to the claimant in the amount of $500.00.

Award of $500.00.
Joint Forces Staff College

AJPME/HLSPC/JAWS/JCWS/JC2IOS/JIMPC

Course Replacement Certificate Request

Fax: (757) 443-6026 * Phone: (757) 443-6124 * DSN: 646-6124

Email: Registrar2@ndu.edu * https://jfsc.dod.afpims.mil/Registrar/RegistrarDivision.aspx

FIRST NAME MIDDLE

INITIAL

LAST NAME YEAR COURSE

COMPLETED

EMAIL ADDRESS

DAYTIME PHONE 

SSN (last 4 digits) DOB

mm/dd/yyyy

SERVICE U.S. Air Force U.S. Army

U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Marine Corps

U.S. Navy DoD Civilian

International Student Non-DoD Civilian

Other

RANK (while attending) PAY GRADE (while attending)

STUDENT SIGNATURE DATE

Your request cannot be processed without a handwritten signature. Digital signatures are NOT accepted.

EMAIL ADDRESS YOU WISH TO 

RECEIVE THE CERTIFICATE 

Due to Federal privacy laws, a form request with the student's signature is required. We cannot fulfill telephone

requests for duplicate certificates. Fill form out completely with typed information only. Return to our office via FAX or 

EMAIL.

This document is subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 and should be treated as FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). Contents shall not be disclosed,

discussed, or shared with individuals unless they have a direct need-to-know in the performance of their official duties. Unauthorized disclosure of this

information may result in CIVIL and CRIMINAL penalties. If you are not the intended recipient or believe that you have received this document(s) in error, DO

NOT copy, disseminate or otherwise use the information and contact the owner/creator or your Privacy Act officer immediately.

Submit Completed form to (757) 443-6026 or Registrar2@ndu.edu. Please allow 10-15 business days for processing. 

For Office Use Only Received Date: Accepted: No Signature: Incomplete Form: Other:

Date Processed: By:
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14(a) OR 15D-14(a) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Michael W. Trudnak, certify that:

1.

I have reviewed this report on Form 10-KSB of Guardian Technologies International, Inc.;



2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.

The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:

(a)

designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



(b)

evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



(c)

disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to affect, the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting; and



5.

The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuers auditors and the audit committee of small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)

all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



(b)

any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting.





Date: May 13, 2005

Signed:

/s/Michael W. Trudnak

Name: Michael W. Trudnak

Title: Chief Executive Officer
#### Mrs. Eula MARKWARD, Independent Executrix, Appellant, v. Mrs. Fannie MURRAH et al., Appellees.

No. 10652.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Jan. 17, 1940.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 14, 1940.

John L. Dodson, of Del Rio, for appellant.

Wallace & Thurmond, of Del Rio, for ap-pellees.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

This is a companion case to cause No. 10651, L. H. Clark et al. v. Mrs. Fannie Murrah et al., this day decided by this Court 136 S.W.2d 652, the facts and questions of law in both cases being identical. Therefore, for the reasons stated in the opinion in the cited case, the judgment in this cause will be affirmed.