Filed 2/5/15 P. v. Medina CA2/5 Opinion following rehearing NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
ENRIQUE MEDINA et al.,
Defendants and Appellants. B249059
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. VA118471)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Los Ange les County, John A. Torribio, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Enrique Medina. Susan K. Shaler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Michael Anthony Barrios. J. Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defe ndant and Appellant
Thomas Arellanes. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorn ey General, Jonathan J. Kline and Taylor Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Appellants Enrique Medina, Michael Barrios, and Thomas Arellanes were convicted, following a jury tria l, of one count of first degree murder in violation of Penal
Code 1 section 187, subdivision (a), and one count of attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder in violation of secti ons 664 and 187, subdivision (a). The jury found true the allegations that all three appe llants committed the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22. The jury found not true the allegation that Medina personally used a fire arm in the commission of the offenses. The jury found true the allegations as to Barrios and Arellanes that a principal was armed in
the commission of the offenses within the meaning of section 12022.53. The court sentenced Medina to 40 years to life in state prison, consisting of 25 years to life in state prison for the murder conviction, plus 15 years to life for the attempted murder conviction pursuant to section 1 86.22. The court sentenced Barrios and Arellanes to total terms of 82 years to life in state prison, cons isting of 25 years to lif e for the murder plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement to the murder c onviction plus 7 years to life for the attempted murder convic tion plus 25 years to life fo r the firearm enhancement to the attempted murder convicti on. The court stayed senten ce on the gang enhancements
for Barrios and Arellanes. Appellants appeal from the judgment of conviction, claiming numerous errors by the trial court. Each appellant joins in the others’ contentions to the extent it accrues to
his benefit.
Medina contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder, the trial cour t erred in instructing the jury on the kill zone theory of liability, the prosecutor committed misconduct when arguing the kill zone theory, and the trial court’s instructions on aiding and abe tting contained multiple errors. Medina also contends the trial court incorrectly calculat ed his presentence custody credits and the abstract of judgment fails to show that his lia bility for direct victim restitution is joint and
several with Barrios and Arellanes.

1 Further statutory references are to th e Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.3 Barrios contends the trial court’s conduct was partisan and constituted misconduct, the court gave incorrect and in complete instructions on se cond degree murder, and the court imposed restitution a nd parole revocation fines in unauthorized amounts.
Arellanes contends there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions, the admission of text messages se nt by Barrios violated Arella nes’s Sixth Amendment rights, the trial court erred in failing to instruct th e jury that it could convict him of the lesser included offense of second degree murder, the trial court erred in in structing the jury on the kill zone theory of liability, the prosecutor committ ed misconduct when arguing the kill zone theory and the cumulative effect of the errors was prejudicial. Arellanes also contends his presentence custod y credits should be corrected. Respondent agrees Medina and Arellane s are entitled to additional presentence custody credits and the abstract of judgment should be correct ed to show joint and several liability for victim restitution. We agree as well, and order the credits and liability
corrected as set forth in more detail in th e disposition. We affirm the judgment of conviction in all other respects.

Facts On November 1, 2010, Barrios lived with Sabrina Ruelas and their young son in Pomona. Barrios’s half brother, Medina, also lived with them. Wh en Ruelas came home from work at 6:00 p.m. that da y, Medina and Arellanes were at the house with Barrios.
The three men were members of the Brown Assa ssin gang. The men left together when it began to get dark. Barrios drove a gold or light brown sp orts utility vehicle (“SUV”) during that period of time. At about 9:00 p.m. that night, Eric Cald era was in the front yard of a home on
Dork Street in Pico Rivera with some fri ends when a brown SUV, later identified as Barrios’s SUV, stopped in front of the house. There were four occupants in the SUV. One got out of the front passe nger door and approached Cald era. Caldera did not know the man, but described the man as being in his mid-twenties, Hispanic, 5’7” to 5’8” tall, and “husky” or muscularly built, wearing a ho odie or jacket and gloves. The man asked4 Caldera where he was from and about his “V alero” tattoo. Caldera responded that “Valero” meant “love for the valley.” The man said “he had love for the valley” and walked away. As he walked away , the man said, “Fuck Viejo.” Pico Viejo is a gang in Pico Rivera. It was a rival of Brown Assassins. Caldera initially identified Medina as the man who had approached him on November 1. However, at trial, Calder a identified Barrios as the man who had approached him. Sometime later that evening, Medina, Ba rrios, and Arellanes arrived at Daniel
Perez’s house in Pico Rivera. At around 9:45 p.m., Medina, Barrios, and Perez drove to a 7-Eleven store in Barrios’s SUV to buy beer. Medina entered the 7-Eleven to buy the b eer while Barrios and Perez waited in the SUV. While they were waiting, Barrios as ked a bald-headed man which gang he was
from. After Medina returned to the car with the beer, the three men returned to Perez’s house to drink. At some point, Barrios ste pped outside to speak to someone on his cell phone. Medina, Barrios, and Arella nes left Perez’s house so metime around 10:30 p.m. Perez saw Medina and Barrios gi ve each other a “high-five[]” as they left the house. About five to ten minutes later, Perez’s mo ther, Tina Perez, heard police sirens and helicopters nearby. Sometime after 10:00 p.m., Jacque Bu stamante and his brother-in-law were walking near the intersection of Rosemead Boulevard and Lindell Street in Pico Rivera when an armed man approach ed them. He was holding a black semiautomatic weapon
near his waist. Bustamante described the ma n as being 5’8” to 5’10” tall, medium build, and Latino. He was wearing a black beanie, black gloves, shorts and a pull-over hoodie with blue or white lettering on the front and on the sleeves. Bustamante identified
Medina as the armed man in an out-o f-court photo lineup and at trial. Medina “hit up” Bustamante, asking hi m what gang he was from, because Bustamante was wearing Pico Viejo gang colo rs (a Pittsburgh Steelers black and gold T-shirt). Bustamante replied that he did no t “gang bang.” Medina patted Bustamante’s5 pockets and said that he was lo oking for drugs. Medina left after Bustamante said he was not a gang member and did not have drugs, but returned less than a minute later. Medina pointed the gun at Bustam ante and accused Bustamante of ly ing to him. Medina said that Bustamante was a Pico Viejo gang member know as “Popeye.” Medina said, “Fuck Viejas” and eventually left the scene. Bu stamante heard gunshots five to ten minutes
after he encountered Medina. Bustamante said the gunshots “sounded pretty close” by. On November 1, Denise Elizalde was sitti ng outside her residence on Zola Avenue
in Pico Rivera with some frie nds. At about 10:30 p.m. that evening, she notic ed a gold or pewter SUV, later identified as Barrios’s S UV, drive up and down Zola Avenue slowly, passing her house several times. Elizalde testified that the SUV had a sticker at the
bottom of the back window. After the SUV drove by Elizalde’s house the fourth time, she noticed her neighbors, Ruth Rodriguez an d Robert Velasquez, walking south on Zola Avenue past her house. Elizal de went inside her house. Five to ten minutes later, she heard several gunshots. Rodriguez and Velasquez sat on a wall in fr ont of Rodriguez’s house. They were smoking marijuana when Rodriguez heard a gu nshot and saw a street light go out. After that, Rodriguez saw a brown or tan-colored S UV stop in front of her and Velasquez. Rodriguez testified that the SUV had a stic ker on the back window . Rodriguez also
noticed three men inside the car – the driver, front passenger, and rear passenger. The men were wearing black or blue ski masks. The front passenger pointed a gun out th e window and fired several shots. Rodriguez took cover behind the wall on whic h she was sitting, whil e Velasquez tried to run away. When the gunfire stopped, the SU V drove off and Velasquez lay motionless in Rodriguez’s front yard. Rodriguez believed the shooting occurred close to 11:00 p.m. Los Angeles Deputy Sheriff Timothy Rash ford received a “shots fired” call at approximately 10:50 p.m., and he and his partner arrived at th e crime scene within five to ten minutes. Deputy Rashford saw Velasquez lyi ng on his left side with what appeared to be a gunshot wound to the chest. Deputy Ra shford did not see any weapon on or around Velasquez. Velasquez died from th e gunshot wound to his chest.6 Sheriff’s deputies recovered several . 45-caliber bullets and nine expended “Federal” .45-caliber shell casings from the cr ime scene. The she ll casings extended for three to four feet in a southerly direction. Ballistics tests showed that the shell casings and bullets were fired from the same gun, likel y a Springfield .45-caliber automatic pistol
or a Colt. According to Ruelas, she woke up at about midnight and saw Barrios asleep in bed next to her. She testified that a couple of ho urs before that, she heard Barrios and Medina
come home. At about 4:00 a.m. on November 2, 2010 , Pomona Police Officer Paul Fernandez saw Barrios’s SUV parked in a driveway on Dian a Avenue in Pomona. He watched the SUV, saw headlights go on, and followed the SUV to a gas station, where the vehicle stopped. Barrios and two other men were in the SUV. 2 Barrios was arrested. Barrios was placed in the back of a patrol car where he remained for several hours. Deputy Kirk Halladay swabbed Barrios’s hands for gunshot residue (“GSR”) at
the time of his arrest. Later GSR testing showed that Barrios had particles characteristic of GSR on his hands, indicating that he ha d handled a weapon, disc harged a weapon, was near someone who had fired a weapon, or had touched a s ource of GSR. There were also particles consistent w ith GSR on the front passenger seat and front passenger interior door handle. In add ition, fingerprints belonging to Medina were discovered on the front passenge r exterior door handle. Inside Barrios’s SUV, Detective Ken Pe rry found one unfired bullet on the left rear passenger side floorboard. The bullet, a “Federal” .45-calib er, had been cycled through the gun which fired th e casings recovered at the mu rder scene. The bullet had jammed and been ejected from the gun without being fired. The front passenger area of Barrios’s S UV contained the DNA profile of at least
three different individuals. Arellanes was a possible contributor to the mixture of DNA with a profile match probability being 1 in 8,097 individuals. Medina, however, was

2 The other men were not Arellanes or Medina.7 excluded as a contributor to the mixture. As for a DNA mixture obtained from the right rear passenger area inside Barrios’s SUV, Ar ellanes and Medina we re both included as possible contributors to the mixture. The DNA profile match prob ability for Medina was 1 in 24 individuals, and 1 in 149 indivi duals for Arellanes. As for a DNA mixture
obtained from the left rear passenger area inside Ba rrios’s SUV (behind the driver),
Arellanes and Medina were both excluded as possible contributors to that mixture. Sheriff’s deputies searched Barrios’s and Medina’s home the day after the shooting. Inside Barrios’s bedroom, deputies found a black ski cap and a blue bandana. Both items contained particle s consistent with GSR. Inside Medina’s bedroom, deputies f ound a box containing various types of bullets, including .45-caliber bullets, pictures of people flashing gang signs with “Brown Authority” written on them, a da rk blue jacket, and a blac k bandana. The jacket and bandana tested positive fo r GSR particles. On November 3, 2010, sheriff’s deputies a rrested Medina in Ontario. The blackhooded sweatshirt that Medina was wear ing tested positive for GSR particles. That same day, deputies arrested Arellanes in El Monte. Arellanes tried to flee from the deputies prior to his arrest. Data downloaded from the cell phones belonging to Barrios, Medina, and
Arellanes showed several communications between the three men on November 2,
between 4:36 a.m. and 5:37 a.m. At 7:13 a.m ., Barrios sent Arellanes a text message that read, “Go buy [ sic ] bye. Call Devil.”
Cell tower data evidence showed that on No vember 1, at 10:35 p.m., Barrios’s cell phone was using a cell tower that was about one and one-half miles fro m the crime scene. Similarly, Arellanes’s cell pho ne was using a cell tower that was about two miles from the crime scene at 10:10 p.m. on November 1. According to Daniel and Tina Perez, seve ral days after the shooting, Barrios went
to their house with two Brown Assassins gang members – “Villain” and “Youngster.” Barrios told Daniel Perez, “[D]on’t talk to the cops,” and instructed Tina Perez to “keep [her] mouth shut.”8 Julio Lucas told detectives in an interview that Barrios called him on the night of the shooting and asked about police activities in the area of the shooting. Barrios instructed Lucas to “go in there and check what’s going on ‘cause I know for sure something happened in there. Go in there and see what’s going on. Are the cops there?” Lucas stated, “Basically he wants me to go co nfirm if someone is dead. That’s what it
was. That’s what it came down to. Because he didn’t tell me, oh go see – he told me, check it out, see what’s going on in there. And then I told him, well what’s up? What you guys do? What’s going on ? And he was like, well that’s why I want you to go check, to see what’s going on.” A week after the shooting, Barrios to ld Lucas that “Red” (Daniel Perez) was “snitching,” and that Luca s needed to “[f]ucking control him and tell him not to fucking open his mouth.” The Velasquez murder occu rred in Pico Viejo territo ry. In response to a hypothetical question that mi rrored the circumstances of th e shooting in this case, the gang expert opined the crimes were gang-rela ted, and were committed in association with
and benefited the Brow n Assassins gang. At trial, appellants called several witnesses for the defense. Medina called Deputy Leticia Reynoso, Deputy Stephanie Mandujano, and
Nicholas Cazares as witnesses on his behalf. Deputy Reynoso testified that when she interviewed Elizalde, Elizalde stated that she was inside her house at the time of the shooting. Elizalde did not mention that she saw an SUV with a sticker before the shooting. Deputy Mandujano testified that she inte rviewed Bustamante on November 1, and he stated that the gunman who approached him wore a white T-shirt and a black beanie, not a black hoodie. Bustamante did not say the gunman walked with a limp. Medina’s longtime friend Nicholas Cazares testified that Medina had sco liosis, and he walked with a crooked gait.
Cazares also testified that Medina came to his house in Ontario at around 11:00 p.m. on November 1, and they drank beer and played video games until 3:00 a.m.9 Cazares specifically recalled that Medina ca me to his house the ni ght before the police searched the house. However, evidence showed that the search occurred on November 3. Barrios called Eduardo Garcia, his employe r, to testify on his behalf. Garcia
confirmed Barrios worked for his construction company. Ba rrios used a powder-actuated nail gun daily. Garcia stated it was not un common for workers to w ear ski caps when the
weather was cold and band anas as a dust mask.

Discussion
1. Judicial misconduct Barrios contends the trial court repeatedly injected its own objec tions into the trial and made rulings in front of jurors that de monstrated the court’s disregard for Barrios’s
counsel. He contends that the trial court’ s lack of impartiality constituted misconduct. Barrios did not object to the co urt’s conduct during trial. “As a general rule, judicial misconduct claims are not preserved for appellate review if no objections were ma de on those grounds at trial.” ( People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237.) A defendant’s failure to object does not prevent review if an objection woul d have been futile. ( Ibid .) Barrios contends objecti ons would have been futile because the trial court was committed to an “aggressively activ e” role in the trial. He also points out that the trial court refused numerous requests by his counsel for sidebars. He contends that if the claim is forfeited, he received in effective assistance of counsel. We agree with Barrios in part. The court di d consistently take an active role in the questioning of witnesses, and did refuse ma ny of counsel’s requests for sidebars. An objection to the court’s active role in pro ceedings would no doubt have been futile. Accordingly, we will review Barrios’s claim.

a. Applicable law “‘The object of a trial is to ascertain the facts and a pply thereto the appropriate rules of law, in order that justice within th e law shall be truly administered.’ [Citation.]10 To this end, ‘the court has a duty to see that justice is done and to br ing out facts relevant to the jury’s determination.’ [Citation.] The trial court ha s a statutory duty to control trial proceedings, including the introduction a nd exclusion of evidence. [Citation.] As provided by section 1044, it is ‘the duty of the ju dge to control all proceedings during the trial, and to limit the introduc tion of evidence and the argument of counsel to relevant and material matters, with a view to the expeditio us and effective ascert ainment of the truth regarding the matters involved.’” ( People v. Sturm, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1237.) Concerning examination and cross-examination of witne sses, the trial court has a duty to “exercise reasonable control over the m ode of interrogation of a witness so as to make such interrogation as rapid, as distinct and as effective for the ascertainment of truth, as may be . . . .” (Evi d. Code, § 765, subd. (a); see People v. Carlucci (1979) 23 Cal.3d 249, 255 [the trial c ourt has a duty to ensure ambiguities and conflicts in the
record are resolved to the extent possible].) A tria l court has broad discretion in controlling the scope of cross-examination. ( People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 102.) “However, ‘a judge should be careful not to throw the weight of his judicial position into a case, either for or ag ainst the defendant.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Sturm,

supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1237.) “Trial judges ‘sho uld be exceedingly disc reet in what they say and do in the presence of a ju ry lest they seem to lean toward or lend their influence to one side or the other.’ [Citation.] A tria l court commits misconduct if it ‘“persists in making discourteous and disparag ing remarks to a defendant’s counsel and witnesses and utters frequent comment from which the jury may plainly perceive that the testimony of the witnesses is not believed by the judge.”’ [Citations.]” ( Id . at pp. 1237-1238.)

b. Elizalde Barrios contends the trial judge twice improperly curtailed his cross-examination of prosecution witness Elizalde and thereb y improperly interfered with his ability to present a defense. We do not agree.11 Barrios contends the trial court firs t interfered when defense counsel was attempting to demonstrate on cross-examinati on that Elizalde was being untruthful about her relationship with the victim and his father. The trial court interrupted counsel as he began to ask Elizalde if she knew that the vic tim’s father was a member of the Pico Viejo gang. The court stopped counsel before he could make the gang reference. If anything, the court was trying to help defense counsel, not hinder him. Outside the presence of the jury, the court pointed out that counsel and his cocounsel had moved to restrict the amount of gang activity that w ould come out during tria l, but that counsel’s question would open the door to more gang evidence. The court stated: “I’m just advising you that you are opening a door. If you want to open it, that is your call.” The court added: “I’m not here to stop you fro m examining. You are misunderstanding.” Once the jury returned, defense counsel asked Elizalde; “But you know that his father
was involved with Pico Viejo?” The witness rep lied that she did not.
Defense counsel then be gan to impeach Elizalde on this topic, using her preliminary hearing testimony. After counsel read a series of eight questions and answers, the trial court stated; “At th is time I’m going to sustain my won [ sic ] objection under section 352 , and I’ll as k you to terminate now. Your record is made.” There was no improper interference from the court. As the subsequent discussion outside the presence of the jury made clea r, the court mistakenly believed that the
evidence about Pico Viejo was in the reco rd. When the trial court learned from defense counsel that the Pico Viejo evidence was not yet part of the record, the court permitted defense counsel to proceed. Defense counsel then read the preliminary hearing testimony
in which Elizalde testified that she called a relative to get in touc h with the victim’s family because that person “hangs out or knows people” from the Pico Viejo gang.12 c. Ruth Rodriguez
Barrios contends the trial court abandoned its neutral position by reviewing key testimony with Rodriguez before she testified and later improperly curtailed crossexamination of Rodriquez about her marijuana use. We do not agree. Taken in context, the trial court’s br ief summary of Rodriguez’s expected testimony cannot be reasonably understood as improperly “reviewing” her testimony with her. The court was questioning Rodriquez because she did not wa nt to testify at trial. The court’s brief summary of Rodriguez’s tes timony was part of an effort by the court to convince Rodriguez that she would not be a “sn itch” if she testified, because she did not see the shooter and was not naming anyone. The judge told Rodriguez several times that he just wanted her to “say what you saw th at night” and “say wh at happened out there” and “tell us what happened that night.” There is nothing improper in that. Further, it seems very unlikely that the witness mis understood the court as suggesting that she testify in a certain way or was somehow unc onsciously influenced to testify in the manner summarized by the court, since she did not testify that the shooter was in a gold
SUV. She testified that the shooter was in a little car and she did not remember the
color. 3 The trial court did not improperly curt ail counsel’s cross-examination of Rodriguez. There was no dispute that Rodr iguez had smoked marijuana earlier in the evening. The line of questioni ng which the court interrupted involved Rodriguez’s intent to smoke marijuana again that night. Couns el addressed the issue slowly and obliquely, eventually asking the somewhat argum entative question: “If had you [ sic ] already smoked it, why did you need to smoke it agai n?” Counsel’s reason for inquiring about this planned activity is not clear, and he did no t attempt to clarify it for the trial court. If Rodriguez was planning to smoke marijuana agai n, it would be reasonable to infer that it
was because she was not under the influence of the earlier marijuana at the time of the shooting, an inference which would not be favorable to the defense since it would

3 She was impeached with he r preliminary hearing testim ony that the vehicle was a light tan SUV.13 increase the likelihood that her description of the SUV was accurate. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in curtailing the cross-examination.

d. Reynoso Barrios contends the trial court improper ly curtailed his cross-examination of Deputy Reynoso, a witness calle d by Medina. We do not agree. Deputy Reynoso had intervie wed Elizalde shortly after the shooting, and Elizalde
did not mention that she had seen an SUV with a sticker before the shooting. Barrios’s counsel asked the deputy: “[W]hen you go to do a canvass--” The court interrupted and
told counsel that he could not question the deputy about “her standards and procedures.” The court nevertheless permitted Barrios’s counsel to ask the deputy about her training in conducting interviews as part of a canvass, and whether she followed those procedures in interviewing Elizalde. Thus, Barrios has not shown how the trial co urt’s ruling curtailed his cross-examination in any meaningful way.

e. Daniel Perez Barrios contends the trial court improper ly curtailed his cross-examination of prosecution witness Daniel Pe rez. We do not agree.
Defense counsel asked Perez if he had “an exact memory of thes e events?” Perez replied, in part, “I don’t remember what time it was or like none of that . . . .” Defense counsel then asked, “Do you have a memo ry about the time things happened and the dates that they happened?” Pe rez replied, “No.” Counsel then asked if he had “an exact memory about the order that things happened ?” The court asked what things counsel was referring to, and counsel replied, “Any events that he has testified to.” The court then sustained its own objection th at the question was vague and ambiguous. The court asked, “Are you talking about from the beginning of the his testimony to the then end?” Counsel replied that he was ta lking about “a one- to three-day period.” The court then sustained its own objection that the question was overbroad.14 The trial court’s objections were accurate. The trial court has a duty to “exercise reasonable control over the mode of interroga tion of a witness so as to make such interrogation as rapid, as distinct and as effe ctive for the ascertainm ent of truth, as may be . . . .” (Evid. Code , § 765, subd. (a); see People v. Carlucci, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 255 [the trial court has a duty to ensure ambiguitie s and conflicts in the re cord are resolved to the extent possible].) Perez readily admitted that he did not have a good memo ry of the dates and times
of events. The dates and times of the ke y events in Perez’s testimony were shown through other evidence. The 7-11 incident wa s captured by a security video with a date and time stamp. The time appellants left Perez’s house was show n by the testimony of Perez’s mother. Nothing in the court’s objec tions precluded defense counsel from asking more specific questions, such as did event X happen before or after event Y. Barrios has not shown that the court’s objections curtaile d his cross-examination in any meaningful

way.

f. Lucas Barrios contends the trial court improper ly curtailed cross-ex amination of Julio Lucas, called by the prosecu tor but hostile to both si des. We do not agree. During the early part of the prosecutor’s examination of Lucas, defense counsel requested a sidebar and stated that the witness was clearly lying. The prosecutor agreed. The court agreed that the parties could im peach Lucas. The pr osecutor sought and received permission to play a ta ped interview of Lucas to impe ach him. Barrios contends that “equal-handed treatment” required that he be permitted to impeach Lucas with his prior convictions for unlawfully possessing a handgun and selling drugs. Barrios never expressly sought permission for such impeachment. Counsel did ask Lucas about his prior co nviction for possessing a handgun. Lucas acknowledged the conviction. If counsel wished to next impeach Lucas with a prior conviction for selling drugs, he could have as ked him about such a conviction. He did not. Instead, counsel asked Lucas about drug sales, which Lucas denied. After Lucas’s15 second denial, the trial court sa id, “Counsel, under 352, I w ill ask you to move on.” The court acted properly in terminating a lin e of repetitive questioning which was time consuming and unproductive. The taped interview played by the prosec ution demonstrated that Lucas was not truthful. The jury was aware that Luca s had a criminal conv iction for possessing a handgun. Lucas was thoroughly impeached even wi thout evidence of a conviction for drug sales, assuming such a conviction occurred.

g. Tina Perez Barrios contends the trial court improper ly foreclosed him from impeaching Tina. We do not agree.
Barrios first contends that the trial c ourt improperly curtailed his attempts to impeach Tina with her prior convictions. Barrios’s counse l was able to impeach Tina with a prior conviction for ch ild abuse, and a prior conviction for petty theft. The court only intervened when counsel attempted to question Tina about two convictions for violating se ction 148, but counsel’s que stion showed that he was
unfamiliar with the nature of th e conviction. He asked, “y ou have two convictions of California P.C. 148. Is that resisting arre st or giving false information to a police officer?” The court found this was improper impeachment. Resisting arrest is a viola tion of section 148, but whet her it is a crime of moral turpitude would depend on the underlying fa cts of Tina’s offense. Counsel’s question
indicates he was not aware of those facts. Giving false informati on to a police officer would be a crime of moral turpitude, but not a violation of section 148. (See §§148.3, [false report of emergency]; 148.5 [false report of criminal offense]; 148.9 [giving false identification to police].) Counsel made no attempt to explain how the underlying facts of the offense(s) qualified as crimes of mo ral turpitude, and give n his question it seems unlikely he could ha ve done so. Barrios next contends the court improperly curtailed his attempts to impeach Tina with prior inconsistent statem ents and testimony. Here, too, Barrios’s counsel was able16 to impeach Tina with prior testimony. Th e court only interven ed when counsel’s questions became confus ing and possibly repetitive and counsel was unable to articulate the relevancy of the questions. Counsel asked Tina numerous questions ab out previous statements and testimony. She generally replied that she did not rememb er. Counsel then asked Tina if she had testified at the preliminary hearing that he r son was a gang member. When she denied this, counsel read her testimony from the pre liminary hearing transcript, in which she admitted her son was a gang member. Counse l then started to ask another, somewhat convoluted question about Tina’s preliminary hearing testimony, and it was at this point
the court intervened. Counsel was unable to address the court’s concerns about the questions, and the court instru cted counsel to move on. Following a series of questions about ch ildren in the neighborhood who were in tagging crews and gangs, the court told counsel to come to a sidebar. The court opined that counsel’s questions were “meandering w ith no focus” and asked what the relevance of the questions were, given that “we know sh e lives in a gang neighborhood.” Counsel did not make a relevancy argument. The court then told counsel, “I just want to make sure you have a record. I’m not trying to cu t you off.” Counsel re plied, “I don’t think you are cutting me off. I th ink you have good points.”

h. Paul Fernandez Barrios contends the trial court improper ly curtailed his cross-examination of Officer Paul Fernandez. We do not agree. Barrios contends the court prevented him from questioning Fe rnandez about how he held/used his flashlight, whether Fernan dez searched Barrios’s SUV and who relieved Barrios at the gas station. Barrios contends these questions were relevant to the delay in the discovery of a .45-caliber round in the SUV. It was undisputed that Fernandez did not search the SUV. Counsel was permitted
to ask Fernandez if he ever “ev en peer[ed]” into the SUV. Fernandez replied that he did not. Fernandez agreed that visibility was not difficult at the ga s station and he was17 carrying a flashlight. The court found the ma nner in which Fernandez carried a flashlight
was not relevant. The court was correct. Barri os established that the gas station was well
lit and Fernandez had a flashli ght, but did not search the SU V. There is no apparent
relevance to how Fernandez carried the flashlight. Counsel was permitted to ask Fernandez if he was relieved by Sergeant Perry at 8:30 a.m. Fernandez replied that he did not remember. Fernandez did agree that he was relieved after sunrise. Counsel was not pe rmitted to attempt to refresh Fernandez’s
recollection as to the name of the offi cer who relieved him. Whether Fernandez remembered Perry’s name or not, there was no dispute that Sergeant Perry came to the gas station the next morning and stated that he discovered the round at that time. There is no apparent relevance to the fact that Perry relieved Fernandez.

i. Eric Caldera Barrios contends the court improperly limited his cross-examination of Caldera concerning Caldera’s convic tions. We do not agree. At some point, the prosecutor provided de fense counsel with a list of convictions
for Eric Caldera. When counsel asked Calder a about the first conviction on the list, for mail fraud, Caldera denied that he had suffe red such a conviction. The prosecutor asked for a sidebar, and explained that he did not kno w if all the convictions on the list were for the witness Eric Caldera. The prosecutor re presented that he was certain the witness had been convicted of felony vandalism, burglar y and petty theft. The court ruled that defense counsel could ask about the burglary and petty theft convictions, which were “clean,” and showed dishonesty, and would ma ke it clear that Caldera was a convicted
felon.
It was clear that defense counsel had not verified that the listed convictions were suffered by the witness Caldera. Thus, any questions about other convictions would have been a fishing expedition. The trial court acted reasonably in limiting the questioning to verified convictions, particularly since t hose convictions showed dishonesty. Even assuming the trial court should have granted co unsel a little more leew ay, there is nothing18 in the record to show that the fishing expedition would ha ve been successful and thus nothing to show prejudice.

j. Wayne Holston Barrios contends the trial court improp erly curtailed his cross-examination of Detective Wayne Holston concerning Caldera’s failure to select Barrios from a six-pack photographic line-up. We do not agree.
Barrios identifies three areas where his cr oss-examination was curtailed: (1) the basics of eyewitness identification; (2) Ho lston’s opinion about Caldera’s suggestibility; and (3) whether Holston got the impression that Caldera thought the vehicle he saw was a
clunker. When defense counsel sought to qu estion Holston about the “basics” of eyewitness identification, the court ruled the questioning was beyond the scope of direct and that Holston was not an identification expe rt. The court was correct. Simply being a police officer does not make one an expe rt in eyewitness id entification.
The court found that Hols ton’s opinion about Calder a’s suggestibility would be “speculation.” Defense counsel did not lay a ny foundation to show that Holston had any expertise in evaluating the personalities of witn esses. Holston’s personal opinion, if he had one, was not relevant. The court also fo und that Holston’s “impression” that Caldera
believed the vehicle he saw was a “clunker” wo uld be speculation. Barrios offers no explanation of how it could be otherwise. Holston had no special ability to read Caldera’s mind. Further, whether Caldera t hought the vehicle was a clunker or not was simply irrelevant.

k. GSR expert Barrios contends the trial court improperly curtailed his cross-examination of GSR expert Katrina Fritz on the topics of cartri dge based nail guns and GSR transference. We do not agree.19 Before Barrios’s cross-examination began, Fritz testified that “consistent with GSR” particles containing one or two elemen ts could come from firearms but could also come from many sources other than firearms . One source of “consistent with GSR” particles is cartridge based nail guns. Barrios contends he presented evidence that he and his coworkers used cartridge based nail guns and so the trial court acted improperly in preventing him from asking the GSR expert if sh e was aware of what he did for a living. He contends that his next question woul d have been whether the expert’s opinion changed in any way knowing th at Barrios worked with a na il gun. The court found the question lacked foundation. Technically , the question was attempting to lay a foundation. However, Fritz was a prosecutio n witness and Barrios had not yet presented his defense evidence. Thus, it appears Ba rrios would have been unable to lay a
foundation. Counsel was able to ask a hy pothetical question on this subject, as follows: “If you are doing construction work and you are around a lot of di fferent chemicals, a lot of different types of metals, could that be cons istent with GSR also rubbing against it while working?” Fritz replied: “T here are consistent particles that are produced by certain construction materials, such as cartridge base d nail guns. [¶] The consistent particles lead and barium are produced in certain nail gun based cartridges. Those are also produced in GSR.” Thus, if counsel later in troduced evidence that cartridge based nail guns were used at Barrios’s job, there woul d be an explanation for the “consistent” two particle GSR found on Barrios and his belongings. We note that “characteristic GSR” partic les containing three elements were also
found on Barrios’s hands. This was the more incriminating GSR evidence, since “characteristic GSR” particles only come from guns. Showing that Barrios worked with cartridge based nail guns would not explain the presence of the “characteristic GSR” particles.20 l. Opening statement
Barrios contends the trial court acted im properly in calling for a sidebar during counsel’s opening statement and then ruling th at counsel could not mention the contents of rumors in the community following the shooting. There was no impropriety. The court was co rrect that the contents of the rumors would be hearsay. Defense counsel did not identify any exception to the hearsay rule. There is nothing to suggest a ny disrespect by the court to Ba rrios’s counsel. Moreover, counsel for codefendant Arellanes objected th at the contents of the rumors would be prejudicial to his client, so the court was not alone in believing it inappropriate to delve
into the contents of the rumors.

2. Murder instructions
Barrios contends the trial court erred in modifying CALCRIM Nos. 520 and 521 by deleting certain references to second degree murder, and by failing to instruct the jury that second degree murder included an unpre meditated murder with express malice. Arellanes separately contends the trial court e rred in failing to fully instruct the jury on second degree murder. There was no error.

a. Forfeiture Respondent contends appellants have forfeite d these claims by failing to object to the trial court’s instructions or to request clarification or amplification of those instructions. We do not agree. The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence , whether or not the defendant makes a formal request.” ( People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 744.) This duty includes a requirement
to instruct on “lesser included o ffenses is there is evidence that , if accepted by the trier of fact, would absolve the defendant of guilt of the greater offense but not the lesser.” ( Id

. at p. 745.) Appellants’ claims are essentia lly that the trial cour t failed to fulfill this obligation.21 b. CALCRIM Nos. 520 and 521
Barrios is mistaken in his claim that th e trial court modified CALCRIM Nos. 520
and 521. Trial in this matter took place in November 2012. The trial court used the then
current versions of CALCRIM No s. 520 and 521. The court di d not delete any references to second degree murder. The versions of CALCRIM Nos. 520 and 521 quoted by
Barrios in his brief are the 2013 versions of the instructions. They did not exist at the
time of trial.
We will treat Barrios’s claim as a claim that the previous version of CALCRIM Nos. 520 and 521 used by the trial court were not accurate statements of the law because they did not tell the jury that murder is “presumptively” in th e second degree and that if the prosecutor fails to prove the murder is in the first degree, it is “by default” the lesser offense of second degree murder. “When considering a claim of instru ctional error, we view the challenged
instruction in the context of th e instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine
whether there is a reasonabl e likelihood the jury applie d the instruction in an impermissible manner. [Citation.]” ( People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4t h 1186, 1229.)
We see no such likelihood.
The version of CALCRIM No . 520 used by the trial c ourt was titled, “First or Second Degree Murder with Mali ce Aforethought” and stated that if a defendant killed another person with malice aforet hought, he was guilty of murde r. It then stated that if the jury decided that the de fendant committed murd er, it “must then decide whether is it murder of the first or second degree.” Th e version of CALCRIM No. 521 used by the trial court told the jury there we re two theories of first degree murder in the case, and “the People have the burden of pr oving beyond a reasonable doub t that the killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder.” It necessarily follows that, if22 the People proved the defendan t was guilty of murd er but failed to prove either of the first degree murder theories, the defenda nt was guilty of second degree murder. 4
The 2013 versions of CALCRIM Nos. 5 20 and 521 referenced by Barrios make explicit what was implicit in the earlier ve rsions. The 2103 ve rsion of CALCRIM No. 520 ends by telling the jury that if they “d ecide that the defendan t committed murder, it is murder of the second degree unless the Peopl e have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that it is murder of the first degree . . . .” The 2013 version of CALCRIM No. 521 ends by telling the jury, “The People have the bu rden of proving beyo nd a reasonable doubt that the killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser cr ime. If the People have not met this burden, you must fi nd the defendant not guilty of first degree murder and the murder is second degree.” While these changes are undoubtedly improvements, the changes do not mean that the previous ve rsions were inaccurate or incomplete.

c. Second degree murder Barrios contends the evidence supported a theory of an unpremeditated murder with express malice, which is second degree mu rder, and the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on express malice second degree murder as a lesser included offense. 5 We do not agree.

4 Arellanes contends that because the inst ruction used the term “lesser crime” but failed to explicitly tell the jury that second degree murder wa s the “lesser crime,” the jury would have had no means of finding the defe ndants guilty of second degree murder. That is a not a reasonable reading of the instructions . In context, “lesser crime” clearly refers to second degree murder. Furthe r, even if the instructions we re ambiguous on this issue, CALCRIM No. 640, which explained the verdict forms in this case, expressly told the jury that “if all of you agree th at the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder but also agree the defendant is guilty of second degree murder, comple te and sign the form for . . . guilty of second degree murder.” 5 To the extent Arellanes contends the instructions fail to define implied malice second degree murder, he is mi staken. The jury was instru cted on the definition of implied malice and that a killing with implie d malice was murder. The jury was further instructed that additional facts such as pr emeditation and delibera tion were required to make the murder in the first degree. These in structions together adequately described the offense of second degree implied malice murder.23 It was undisputed that the shots were fire d from a motor vehicle. The jury was correctly instructed that if those shots were fired with an intent to kill, the shooter was guilty of first degree murder. (§ 189 [“an y murder which is perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict death, is mu rder of the first degree.”].) Since there was
no evidence that the shots we re fired from a location other than a motor vehicle, there was no evidence to support a theory of second degree express malice murder. Even assuming the jury specu lated that the shots were fired from another location, CALCRIM No. 520 told the jury that second degree murder could be committed with express malice. The instruction was titled, “F irst or Second Degree Murder with Malice Aforethought.” The instruction first told the ju ry that in order to fi nd the defendant guilty of the crime of murder, the ju ry must find that he acted with malice aforethought. The instruction also explained that there were two kinds of malice: express or implied. The
instruction concluded by telling the jury that if it d ecided that a defendant committed murder, then the jury had to decide if the murd er was first degree or second degree murder. Thus, the instruction clearly told th e jury that second degree murder could be committed with express malice. It is unreas onable to read the instruction otherwise. Appellants’ reliance on People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 82 6 to show error is misplaced. In that case, the trial court gave two general in structions on murder plus a specific instruction on willful, deliberate and premeditated first degree murder and CALJIC No. 8.31, which instructed the jury on second degree implied malice murder. The court did not give CALJIC No. 8.30 on second degree express malice murder. ( Id. at p. 866.) Thus, the trial court’s instructi ons inadvertently emphasized the implied malice form of second degree murder. The instructions in this cas e gave no such emphasis to one form of second degree murder. Further, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claim that the instructions might have caused the jury to convict him of first degree
murder if it found that th e killing was intentional but not premeditated because the instructions gave no viable option to conv ict him of second degree murder for such a killing. The court held that nothing in the instructions “precluded the logical conclusion24 that if defendant intended to kill, he acted with ‘wanton disregard for life’ or knew that ‘his conduct endangered the life of anothe r’ and acted ‘with conscious disregard for human life.’ Thus, the instructions, reasonabl y understood, did not preclude a finding of second degree murder if the jury belie ved the killing was intentional.” ( People v. Rogers,

supra , 39 Cal.4th at pp. 868-869.) The same is true here.

3. Attempted murder – kill zone
Medina and Arellanes contend there is insu fficient evidence that they intended to kill Rodriguez and so insuffici ent evidence to support thei r conviction for her attempted murder. They contend the ev idence shows only that they in tended to kill Velasquez. They further contend that since there was no ev idence to support the kill zone theory of liability, the trial court erred in instructing th e jury on that theory , and their attempted
murder conviction cannot be upheld under that theory.

a. Applicable law “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we examine the wh ole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it disclo ses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reas onable doubt. [Citations.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of ever y fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] The same standard of revi ew applies to cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence a nd to special circumstance allegations. [Citation.] [I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circum stances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility. [Citations.]” ( People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 210 [internal quotation marks omitted].)25 A trial court has a “’duty “to refrain from instructing on principles of law which not only are irrelevant to the issues raised by the evidence but also had the effect of confusing the jury or relieving it from making fi ndings on relevant issues.” [Citation.] “It is an elementary principle of law that befo re a jury can be instru cted that it may draw a particular inference, evidence must appear in the record wh ich, if believed by the jury, will support the suggested inferenc e [citation].” [Citation.]’ ( People v. Sadler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671, 682.)” ( People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 920-921.)

b. Intent required fo r attempted murder
In order for a defendant to be convicted of attempted murder, there must be evidence the defendant had the specif ic intent to kill the victim. ( People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 136.) If there are multiple victims, the prosecution must prove the
defendant intended to kill each victim. ( People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739.) The doctrine of transferred intent does not ap ply to the offense of attempted murder. ( People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 317.) Howe ver, “a shooter may be convicted of multiple counts of attempted murder on a “kill zone” theory where the evidence
establishes that the shooter used lethal force designed and inte nded to kill everyone in an area around the targeted victim (i.e., the ‘kill zone’) as a means of accomplishing the killing of that victim.” ( People v. Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 745-746; People v. Bland, supra , 28 Cal.4th at pp. 329-330.) The kill zone theory is “’ simply a reasonable inferen ce the jury may draw in a given case.’” ( People v. Smith, supra , 37 Cal.4th at p. 746.) When “a defendant who intends to kill A, and in order to ensure A’s death, drives by a group consisting of A, B, and C, and attacks the group with automatic weapon fire or an explosive device devastating enough to kill everyone in the group . . . [t]he defendant has intentionally
created a kill zone to ensure the deat h of his primary victim. . . .” ( People v. Bland,

supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 330.) A jury may “rea sonably infer from the method employed an
intent to kill others concurrent with an intent to kill the primary victim.” ( Ibid .) When, for example, a defendant uses “a hail of bulle ts” aimed at a group containing the target26 rather than “a single bullet aimed at” the ta rget’s head, the jury can infer that the
defendant “intended to kill ever yone in A’s immediate vicinity to ensure A’s death.” ( Id

. at p. 330.) Here, the shooter fired at least nine shot s at Velasquez and Rodriguez, who were sitting directly next to each other on a wall in front of Rodriguez’s house. A tree and three cars near their location were hit by gunf ire. Thus, the evidence shows a “hail of bullets” aimed at both Velasqu ez and Rodriguez, not a “singl e bullet” aimed at Velasquez alone. The jury could reasonabl y have inferred that appella nts intended to kill Rodriguez concurrently with Velasquez. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support appellants’ convictions for the attempte d murder of Rodriguez. Appellants contend the evidence shows the shooter “took aim” at Velasquez and continued shooting at him alone as he ran up the street a nd thus did not create a kill

zone. 6 There is no direct evidence that Velas quez ran up and down th e street. Rodriguez saw Velasquez get off the wall when the shooti ng started, but did not see where he went. The shooting lasted only a few seconds and when it stopped, Rodriguez saw Velasquez in her front yard, lying on the ground. Thus, it doe s not seem reasonable to infer that he ran up and down the street while the shots were be ing fired. However, ev en if the jury could have reasonably inferred that Velasquez ra n up and down the street and the line of cartridges showed that the car was following him and so shoo ting only at him, that would not require not require reversal of the judgment. ( People v. Nelson, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 210 [“if the circumstances reasonably justif y the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because th e circumstances might also reas onably be reconciled with a contrary finding”].)

6 Appellants also contend that since Ro driguez dropped behind the wall once the shooting started, she was not in any kill zone. We see no sign ificance to the fact that Rodriguez took shelter behind the wall after th e shooting started. The precise timing of Rodriguez’s movement from the top of the wall to the rear of the wall is not certain, although given the rapid succession of the shots fired, it is doubtful she actually made it behind the wall before the shooting ended. Ev en assuming that she did, she was still in the area where the shots were being fired, and thus still in the kill zone.27 We note that appellants’ attack on the suffi ciency of the evidence relies in part on statements by the prosecutor, in which appellants contend the prosecutor effectively
conceded there was insufficient evidence to support the kill zone theory. They point to statements such as “the target in this case is Robert,” “the evidence doesn’t show they are trying to kill Ruth” “the shooter is unloading, and if Ruth gets in the way, that’s just collateral damage,” “this isn’t shooting in th e air . . . [t]his is, I’ve acquired a target [Velasquez], the target is running and so I’m going to keep shooting at the target because I want to put the target down,” and “[t]hey are trying to kill the en emy, and if somebody else gets in the way, oh well.” Appellants also contend these remarks are misstatements
of the law. We discuss the challenged remarks in more detail in subsection d below, in which we consider appellants’ claim of prosecutor ial misconduct. As relevant to appellants’ sufficiency of the ev idence argument, we do not view the prosecutor’s remarks as concessions. Appellants have taken most of the remarks out of context. The prosecutor’s
statement that the evidence did not show appellants were tryi ng to kill Ruth, for example, was part of the prosecutor’s argument that Velasquez was the primary target, and was selected because he looked like a gang membe r. Ruth, in contrast, was not the primary target. More importantly, the prosecutor was at most arguing his view of the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom, and the jury was not bound by that argument.
Neither are we.

c. Court’s instruction
Since there was sufficient evidence to show that a ppellants intended to kill Rodriguez in order to kill Velasquez, the cour t did not err in instru cting the jury on the kill zone theory of liability for attempted murder. The c ourt used CALCRIM No. 600 to instruct the jury on th is theory, and appellants do not cl aim there is any flaw in that
instruction.28 d. Prosecutorial misconduct Appellants contend the prosecutor co mmitted misconduct by misstating the law concerning the kill zone theory of liability. Respondent c ontends that appellants have forfeited this claim by failing to object to th e prosecutor’s statements and request an admonition. We agree that th e claim has been forfeited. Appellants contend that if their claims ar e forfeited, they r eceived ineffective assistance of counsel. An appellant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425.) In or der to establish such a claim, an appellant must show that his counsel's pe rformance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that, but for counsel's error, a different resu lt would have been reasonably probable. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) A prosecutor is given wide latitude during closing argument. ( People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 244.) However, it is misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate the applicable law. ( People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 435.) When a statement by the prosecutor is ch allenged as misconduct, the reviewing court examines the prosecutor’s statement in the context of the whole argument and all
the instructions in order to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed or applied the statemen t in an objectionable way. ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 832.) The prosecutor argued the k ill zone theory as follows:

Now, you also have the crime of attempted murder, which is sort of an interesting law here. I would submit to you that
how this unfolded is like this: th e target in this case is Robert [Velasquez]. Robert is a 17-y ear-old Hispanic male wearing baggy clothes and a L.A. Dodgers ha t. He’s standing in front of a house on a high gang street. This is heart of Pico Viejo. And he’s dressed in the -- I don’t know if you call it right or wrong,29 but he is dressed in the appr opriate manner to be a target.

They have acquired their target now. It’s not a bunch people like Elizalde and her family who are celebrating the day
of the dead. This is now a bona fide target. A young Hispanic male dressed in baggy clothes with a baseball hat in enemy territory.

I submit to you that what happened here is, as they see the target, what they think is I’m going to kill Robert [Velasquez], I’m going to shoot at that guy. And if that girl gets in the way, we’ll just take her ou t, too. I’m just going to kill everybody over there to get to him, to get to Robert. This is called the kill zone theory. If you look down here, the last paragraph, it explains what kill zone is.

Basically what all that says is if you want to kill person X and to get to person X, you don ’t mind killing person Y, too, then you are guilty of the attempted murder of person Y as well. Even if that wasn’t your intende d target, even if who you want to get is Robert, you are guilty of the attempted murder of Ruth [Rodriguez], too, because you did everything you could to just blanket that area with gunfire.

If you look at the different pict ures that we have, you can see this is -- this is not, like, ju st a couple of shots. This is People’s 10. Okay. Ruth and Robert are sitting by that tree on the left of the picture. You all saw [ sic ] see that? That’s where they are sitting when this begi ns. The car pulls up and stops30 right in front of them a nd then the shooting begins.

If you look at this, this is going to be People’s 14, which is
the sketch. You see 4123 at the top of the screen, here. So that’s where they are sitting in front of this tree.

These three cars are all struck with gunfire. This tree is struck with gunfire. The light down by Denise’s house is shot
out. You see the total of the ni ne casings which are these little yellow dots going all the way up the street until you get to the point right here at the blue truck.

They are doing everything they can to get Robert. Because if you remember, Robert is runni ng. Robert doesn’t drop behind the wall. Robert takes off running. So the shooter is unloading, and if Ruth gets in the way, th en that’s just collateral damage and that’s okay. But because th e shooter is creating a kill zone or a zone of danger where thos e bullets are going, then that
means that the shooter and th e people who are aiding and abetting him in killing Robert are also guilty of trying to kill Ruth. Do you all understand that ? That’s called the kill zone theory.

I, don’t think that the -- or I submit to you that the
evidence doesn’t show that they are trying to kill Ruth. What gain is there in killing a girl. Th ey are trying to kill the enemy, and if somebody else gets in the way, oh, well.31 The prosecutor did use some what imprecise language in discussing the kill zone theory, but overall, in context, conveyed the e ssence of that theory. Taken as a whole, the prosecutor’s argument told the jury that even though appellants’ intended target was Velasquez, the jury could find that appellant s thought, “I’m just going to kill everybody over there to get to him, to get to Robert.” That is a correct statement of the kill zone theory. The prosecutor’s remarks ab out the girl getting in the way, collateral damage and not minding killing another person are most reasonably un derstood as emphasizing that Velasquez was the primary target. As th e prosecutor also pointed out, Velasquez appeared to be a gang member and was in te rritory claimed by a gang which was a rival of appellants’ gang. Thus, appellants had a motive to kill Velasquez. The prosecutor’s references to Rodriguez mainly indicated th at there was nothing about Rodriguez as an individual which provided a mo tive for appellants to try to kill Rodriguez. Appellants, the prosecutor, argued, wanted to kill Rodriguez solely as a means of ensuring they killed Velasquez. These remarks are si mply an application of the kill zone theory to the facts of
the case. As a whole, the prosecutor’s argument pr operly explained the kill zone theory to the jury, and the application of that theory to the facts of this case. There was no
misconduct. Since there was no misconduct by the prosec utor, trial counsels’ failure to object did not fall below an objective standard of re asonableness. “[A] defense counsel is not required to advance unmeritorious argumen ts on [a] defendant's behalf.” ( People v.
McPeters (1993) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1173.) Appellants’ ineffective assistance claim fails. Even if the prosecutor’s some what imprecise language ha d the potential to confuse the jury, there was no prejudice to appellants. The prosecutor clearly to ld the jury that his
remarks referred to the kill zone theory. The prosecutor dire ctly referred the jury to the court’s instructions on the theory, saying, “If you look down here, the last paragraph, it explains what the kill zone is.” The cour t’s instruction on this topic was clear and correct. Absent any contrary indications, we presume the jury followed the court’s32 instructions. ( People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 179 [“We presume that jurors
treat the court’s instructions as a statemen t of the law by a judge and the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an advocate in an attemp t to persuade”].) That presumption is particularly str ong in this case, given that th e prosecutor referred the jury to the court’s instruction as part of the pros ecutor’s explanation of the kill zone theory. There is no reasonable possib ility or probability th at appellants would have received a
more favorable verdict absent the prosecutor’s remarks. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 81, 24; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Their ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fa ils for this reason as well.

4. Aiding and Ab etting Instruction
Medina contends the trial court erred in faili ng to instruct the jury that an aider and abettor could be found guilty of a lesser included offense ev en if the jury found the perpetrator guilty of the greater offense. He further contends the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that in order to find a defendant gu ilty of willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder as an aide r and abettor, the defendant must have personally premeditated and deliberated the murder. We do not agree. Viewing the instructions as a whole, there is no reasonabl e likelihood the jury wo uld have understood
the instruction as Medina contends.

a. Murder Medina contends that the aiding and abetting instruction under CALCRIM No. 400 failed to adequately inform the jury that he could be found guilty of a lesser crime
than the actual killer. He asserts the trial c ourt should have instructed the jury that “an aider and abettor’s culpability is not necessarily coex tensive with that of the perpetrator, and that a person who aided and abetted a crime could also be found culpable for a lesser crime than the perpetrator.” Absent such an instruction, he believes the jury had no
choice but to convict him of the same crime as the actual perpetrator.33 The trial court instructed th e jury on the general principl es of aiding and abetting pursuant to CALCRIM No. 400 as follows:

A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she may have directly co mmitted the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a perpetrator, who directly committed the crime.

A person is guilty of a crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator.

The court also instruct ed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 401 as
follows:

To prove that a defendant is gu ilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must prove that:

1. The perpetrator committed the crime;

2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime;

3. Before or during the co mmission of the crime,
the defendant intend ed to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime;

AND

4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and34 abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.

Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.

If all of these requirements ar e proved, the defendant does not need to actually have been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an aider and abettor.

If you conclude that defendant was present at the scene of the crime or failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining whether the defendant was an aider and abettor. However, the fact that a person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to prevent the crime does not, by itself, make
him or her an aider and abettor.

A person who aids and abets a crime is not guilty of that
crime if he or she withdraws be fore the crime is committed.

In assessing whether jury instructions correctly convey the law, the reviewing
court must look to th e instructions as a whole to se e whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” the jury underst ood the instructions as the defendant contends. ( Estelle v.
McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [116 L.Ed.2d 385]; Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380 [108 L.Ed.2d 316]; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 899; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525-526.) “[I]nstructions are not consid ered in isolation. Whether instructions are correct and adequate is dete rmined by consideration of the entire charge to the jury. [Citation.]” ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 677; accord, Boyde v.35 California, supra , 494 U.S. at p. 378.) In evaluating jury instructions, courts should “not engage in a technical parsing of this language of the instructions, but instead approach the instructions in the same way that the jury would -- with a ‘comm onsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial.’ [Citation.]” ( Johnson v. Texas (1993) 509 U.S. 350, 368 [125 L.Ed.2d 290], quoting Boyde v. California, supra , 494 U.S. at p. 381.) One who aids and abets an offense is guilty as a principal. (§ 31.) To be guilty as an aider and abettor, a person must “act with knowledge of the crim inal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of comm itting, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense. [Citations.]” ( People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560, italics omitted.) “The liability of an aide r and abettor extends also to the natural and probable consequence of the act s he knowingly and intentionally aids and encourages. [Citation.]” ( Id . at p. 560.) An aider and abettor may be found guilty of a greater homicide-related offense than the actual perpetrator: “[W]hen a pers on, with the mental st ate necessary for an aider and abettor, helps or induces another to kill, that person’s guilt is determined by the combined acts of all the particip ants as well as that person’s own mens rea. If [the aider and abettor’s] mens rea is mo re culpable than another’s, that person’s guilt may be greater even if the other might be deemed the actual perpetrator.” ( People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111 , 1122.) Likewise, an aider and abettor can be convicted of a
lesser homicide-related offense than the actual perpetrator. (See People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4t h 1148, 1164-1165.) Generally, “the extent of an aider and abettor’s liability is dependent upon his particular mental state, which may, under the specific facts of any given case, be the same as, or greater or lesser than, that of the direct perpetrator.” ( People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 624.) Courts found a previous version of CALCRIM No. 4 00 concerning aiding and abetting to be potentially mislead ing. That instruction read in pertinent part, “A person is equally guilty of the crime whether he or she committed it pers onally or aided and36 abetted the perpetrator who committed it.” The Samaniego court found the use of the phrase “equally guilty” to be misleading un der the circumstances (but ultimately harmless). ( People v. Samaniego, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164; see also People v.
Nero (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 504, 518-519 [reaching same conclusion for similar CALJIC No. 3.00, but findi ng error prejudicial].)
CALCRIM No. 400 was revised in 2010 to eliminate the word “equally.” ( People v. Lopez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1119, fn. 5 .) The jury in this case was instructed
with the revised version of the instruction. This version correctly states the general legal requirements for aiding and abetting liability, in cluding that a “person is guilty of a crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator.” (See § 31.) It is an introductory in struction which sets out the ba sic principle that both direct perpetrators and those who merely aid and ab et the commission of a crime are deemed to share criminal liability. (See People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1122 [holding that “an aider and abettor ‘shares the guilt of the actual perpetrator.’ [Citation.]”].) Nothing in CALCRIM No. 400 st ates that the requirements for being a perpetrator and for being an aider and abettor are identical, nor would a reasonable juror have interpreted that language in such a manner. The requirements for aiding and abetti ng are set forth in CALCRIM No. 401. That instruction states that the jury may find aider and abettor liability only when the aider and abettor “knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.” In light of CAL CRIM No. 401, the jury could not have reasonably disregarde d Medina’s mens rea in conv icting him. Thus, the jury could only have convicted Medina of firs t degree murder under an aiding and abetting theory if it found that he specifically intended to aid Barrios in the murder and knew of Barrios’s unlawful purpose. If the jury fou nd Medina did not inte nd to aid Barrios’s crime, or aided some lesser crime than Ba rrios committed, then it would have had to acquit him under an aiding and abetting theory.37 b. Attempted murder Medina contends the aiding and abetting instructions we re erroneous because they did not require a finding that Medina pe rsonally acted with deliberation and premeditation in the attempted murder, and did not require a finding that a premeditated and deliberated attempted murder, as opposed to simply an atte mpted murder, was the natural and probable consequence of the targ et offense of murder. We do not agree. The prosecution was not required to pr ove Medina’s personal premeditation and deliberation. The crime of attempted murder requires “ only that the murder attempted must have been willful, deliberate, and premeditated, not that the attempted murderer personally must have acted willfully and with deliberation an d premeditation.” ( People
v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 622, italics in original ( Lee ).) Thus, one who aids and abets another in committing attempted murder can be subject to the greater punishment for willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempte d murder even though he or she did not personally act with the requisite willfulne ss, deliberation, and premeditation. ( Id . at pp. 616, 627.) This is true even when liability for the attempted murder is based on the natural and probable conseq uences doctrine. (See People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 879-880 ( Favor ); People v. Cummins (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 667, 680; People v. Curry (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 766, 791-792.) Under the natural and probable consequenc es doctrine as applied to attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder, the jury must find the attempted murder was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime, here murder. ( People v. Favor,

supra , 54 Cal.4th at p. 872. ) The jury need not find that premeditation was a natural and probable consequence of the target offense. ( Ibid .) In other words, “[u]nder the natural and probable consequences doctrine, there is no requirement that an aider and abettor reasonably foresee an attempted premeditate d murder as the natural and probable consequence of the target offense. It is su fficient that attempted murder is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the crime aided a nd abetted, and the attempted murder itself was committed willfully, deliberatel y and with premeditation.” ( Id . at p. 880.)38 Medina contends that the holdings of People v. Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th 613 and People v. Favor, supra, 54 Cal.4th 868 are based on th e premise that a finding of personal willfulness, premeditation and delib eration is not requi red for aiding and abetting liability because secti on 664, subdivision (a) is a penalty provision and so not subject to the requirements of a jury findi ng and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues that the cases are incorrect as a matter of federal constitutional law in light of the United States Supreme Court’ s subsequent decision in Alleyne v. United States (2013) ___ U.S. __ [133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314] ( Alleyne ).) We do not agree.
The court in Alleyne v. U.S., supra, ___ U.S
. ___ [133 S.Ct. 2151] held that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is an element of the offense that must be found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id . at p. __ [133 S.Ct. at p. 2158 ].) This holding is based on the court’s earlier decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, in which the c ourt held that any fact which increases
the maximum penalty for a crime is an element of th e offense that must be found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id . at p. __ [133 S.Ct. at pp. 2155-2158].) Section 664, subdivision (a), increases th e maximum penalty for attempted murder and so has long been subject to the federal constitutional requi rement that it must be found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the court in People v. Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th 613
and People v. Favor, supra, 54 Cal.4th 868 refers to section 664, subdivision (a), as a penalty provision, nothing in t hose decisions suggests that th e court based its holdings on an incorrect understanding of established fe deral constitutional law concerning penalty provisions. To the contrary, the court in Lee recognized that if section 664, subdivision (a), contained a requirement that an aider and abettor personally act with premeditation and deliberation, the jury woul d have to be instructed to determine whether such an attempted murderer so acted. ( Lee, supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 616 [potential second issue for review was “what is the standard of prejudice fo r a trial court’s failure to instruct the jury
to determine whether such an attempted murderer so acted ?”].) Thus, the court was clearly aware of the requirement of a jury de termination before the penalty provision of section 664, subdivision (a) could be imposed.39 The holdings of People v. Lee, supra , 31 Cal.4th 613 and People v. Favor, supra
, 54 Cal.4th 868, are dispositive of the issue here. Accordi ngly, Medina’s argument must be rejected. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) In sum, when the aiding and abetting inst ruction is considered together with the instructions on murder, attemp ted murder, and the natural and probable consequences doctrine (CALCRIM Nos. 402, 520, 521, 600, 6 01), it is clear the ju ry was adequately instructed as to the requisite intent for both aiders and abettors and direct perpetrators,
and thus there was no reasona ble likelihood that the jury understood the aiding and abetting instructions as Medina argues.

5. Arellanes – Suffici ency of th e evidence
Arellanes contends there is no solid evid ence to show that he was in the SUV when the shooting occurred or to show that he aided and abetted the shooting and so there
is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. He fu rther contends such convictions violate his federal constitutional right to due process.

a. Presence in the SUV Tina Perez testified that Arellanes, Ba rrios and Medina left her house around 10:25 to 10:30 p.m. on the night of the shooting. Tina testified that David did not leave the house when the three men did or at any la ter time that night. Tina heard sirens and helicopters five to ten minutes later. Elizalde testified that she saw a gold or pewter SUV drive up and down Zola Avenue at about 10:30 p.m. that night. She went inside and five to ten minutes later heard gunshots. Th ese facts support a reasonable inference that Arellanes was in the car with Barrios and Medina when the shooting occurred. Appellant contends it is more reasonable to infer that David Perez was in the SUV
with Barrios and Medina because David wa s with the two men earlier when they “banged” a man at a 7-11 store. The jury was free to disbelieve Tina’s testimony and
infer that David returned to the SUV with the Barrios and Medina on the basis of his
involvement in the earlier enco unter. However, the inference that David was in the40 SUV is, at most, as reasonable as the inferen ce that Arellanes was in the SUV, not more reasonable. It does not require reversal of the judgment. ( People v. Nelson, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 210 [“if the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply beca use the circumstances might also reasonably
be reconciled with a contrary finding”].)

b. Aiding and abetting
As we discuss in more detail in section 4 above, a defendant is liable as aider and abettor if he acts “with knowledge of the crim inal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose of either committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.” ( People v. McCoy, supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118.) Mere presence at the scene of a crime and mere knowledge of criminal conduct are
not alone sufficient to show culpability as an aider and abettor. ( People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 181.) However, presence at the scene of the crime is a factor which may be considered in deciding whether a defendant aided and abetted a crime, as may companionship with the actual perpetrato r, conduct before and after the crime, and flight from the scene. ( In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) Here, Arellanes was with fellow Brow n Assassin gang members Medina and
Barrios at the Perez residence. He went w ith them to Zola Street, which was in the territory of a rival gang. That street is “not off a main boulevard. So you would have to kind of make your way into that neighborhood.” According to gang expert Ortega, the “area is deep in a dense populated gang terri tory of Pico Viejo ga ng members. And the only reason why Brown Authority persons would be there, in my opinion, would be to be looking for trouble.” Arellanes covered his face with a ski mask, as did Medina and Barrios, suggesting that Arellanes was aware th at that criminal activity was planned. These facts support an inference that Arella no knew of the others’ criminal purpose and intended to encourage or fac ilitate that purpose theory of aiding and abetting. (See People v. Jones (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 966, 970 [def endants’ acts of wearing masks and entering and leaving the crime together suppor ted the theory of aiding and abetting].)41 This inference is strengthen ed by Arellanes’s attempt to flee from police when they came to arrest him, which can show consciousness of guilt. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that Arellanes aided and abetted the murder and attempted murder in
this case.

c. Due process
Since we have determined that “a rati onal trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the due process clause
of the United States Constitution is satisfied [citation] as is the due process clause of article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.” ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 690.)

6. Text messages
Arellanes contends evidence that Barrios sent a text to Arellanes which read, “Go buy [ sic ] bye. Tell devil.” was inadmissible under the Aranda-Bruton rule and the trial court erred prejudicially in admitting it. 7 He further contends the admission violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
The Aranda-Bruton rule addresses a specific issue th at arises at joint trials when the prosecution seeks to admit the out-of-court statement of a nontes tifying defendant that
incriminates a codefendant. “‘ Aranda and Bruton stand for the proposition that a “nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial self -incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-ex amination, even if a limiting instruction is given.” [Citation].’” [Citation.] ( People v. Hajek (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1176.)
Since the Aranda-Bruton decisions, however, the United States Supreme Court has
clarified that the confrontation clause of th e Sixth Amendment is concerned solely with out-of-court statements that are “testimonial.” ( Crawford v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S.

7 This rule derives from People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Ca l.2d 518 and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123.42 813, 821-825.) Thus, the confrontation clau se does not apply to nontestimonial out-ofcourt statements ( Whorton v. Bockting (2007) 549 U.S. 406, 420), including such statements by codefendants. ( People v. Arceo (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 556, 571.) Given this clarification in the law, it is questionable whether the Aranda/Bruton rule applies to nontestimonial out-of-court statements by a codefendant, since “[i]f none of the codefendants has a constitutional right to conf ront the declarant, none can complain that his right has been denied.” ( United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena (1st Cir. 2010) 612 F.3d 69, 85.) The text message to Arellano was not “testimonial.”
Even if the Aranda-Bruton rule still applied to non-t estimonial statements, it would have no application in th is case. The rule applies only to statements which are facially incriminating. ( Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200, 207-208.) As the
court in Richardson explained, the Aranda-Bruton rule is a “narrow exception [that] should not apply to confessions that are not incriminating on their face, but become so only when linked with other evidence intr oduced at trial. [Citation.]” ( People v. Hajek,

supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1176-1177.) The text message in this case is not faci ally incriminating. It contains no references to any crime. The message is not even clear about who is going “buy [ sic ] bye.” It could be a sugge stion to the recipient that he should go “buy [ sic ] bye” or a statement by the sender that he is going “buy [ sic ] bye” or possibly a directive to the recipient to tell “devil” to go “buy [ sic ] bye.” The reason for leav ing is not given. (See People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 874-875 [codefendant Woodman’s post-arrest call to coworker asking him to destroy busine ss cards was not facially incriminating as to defendant Homick; it became in criminating only when consid ered with other evidence showing two of the business cards were Homick’s].) Appellant contends that the text message is incriminating through inference, and
that the Aranda-Burton rule applies to inferentially incr iminating statements. We do not agree. The class of inferentially in criminating statements to which the Aranda-Bruton rule applies are “obvious” ones, “inferen ces that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial.” ( Gray v.43 Maryland (1998) 523 U.S. 185, 196.) The content of the text message does not pass this test. Leaving or telling someone else to leave is not incriminatory by itself. Further, even when considered with other evidence, the message has little, if any, additional incriminating effect. The evidence showed that Barrios, Medina and Arellanes were not communicating with each other on their cell phones between 7:19 p.m. and
about 4:00 a.m. when Barrios was arrested. Then, about 4:30 a.m., while Barrios was apparently alone in the back of a police car, he contacted Medina and Arellanes. Arellanes’s cell phone record shows that he began moving around 5:00 a.m., toward Ontario. Thus, Arellanes was already on the move when he received the “buy [ sic ] bye” text message at 7:13 a.m., indicating that the message may not have been intended to be a catalyst for Arellanes’s flight. Further, given that Barrios’s time alone in the patrol car ended around 7:00 a.m., the most reasonable understanding of the me ssage may be that Ba rrios himself was going “buy [ sic ] bye” after several hours of sitting around in the patrol car, or was ending
communications because law enforcement offici als had come to the patrol car and he could no longer communicate freely. Since the text message was not facially incriminating, its admission was not barred by the Aranda-Bruton rule. Arellanes’s Sixth Amendmen t right to confrontation was not
violated.

7. Constitutionally fair trial Arellanes contends cumulative error require s reversal of their convictions. We have found few, if any, errors . Considered together, any mi nor errors were harmless and did not result in an unfair trial. (See People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 861, fn. 14.)

8. Restitution fines
Barrios claims the trial court erroneous ly relied on the amended versions of
sections 1202.4 and 12 02.45 to impose a $280 restituti on fine and a corresponding $28044 parole revocation fine. He contends these fi nes violated the prohibition against ex post
facto laws because the amended versions went into effect on January 1, 2013, after the
commission of the crim es in this matter. “[T]he imposition of res titution fines constitutes punishment, and therefore is subject to the proscriptions of the ex post facto clause and other constitutional provisions.” ( People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 14 3.) Thus, a defendant may challenge the imposition of a rest itution fine under section 1202.4 as violating the ex post
facto clauses of the California and federal Constitutions, if the fine is greater that authorized by section 1202.4 at th e time he committed his crimes. ( Ibid .)
The amended version of section 1202.4 sets the minimum restitution fine at $280. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b )(1).) The version of se ction 1202.4 in effect at the time of appellants’ crimes set the minimum fine at $200. Both versions set the maximu m fine at $10,000. (See People v. Souza, supra , 54 Cal.4th at p. 143 [explain ing former section 1202.4].) The same is true for the corresponding parole revocation fine. (§ 1202.45.) Respondent is correct that th e $280 fine imposed by the trial is within the range authorized by the version of sec tion 1202.4 in effect at the time of the crimes in this case. However, the minimum fine was $200, and in se tting the amount of the fine in excess of the minimum, the trial court is directed to consider any relevant factors, which include
but are not limited to the defendant’s inab ility to pay and the circumstances of the offense. Thus, a trial court must have some reason for departing from the statutory
minimum. “Express findings by the court as to the factors bearing on the amount of the fine shall not be required.” (§ 1202 .4, subd. (d).) Here, the trial court gave no explanation for
the amount of the fine.
Barrios contends that the fact that the tr ial court imposed the fines in the minimum amount required by the amended versions of the sections ($280) shows that the court intended to impose the minimum fine but erro neously relied on the amended versions to
do so. Such an inference is a reasonable one. It also reasonable to infer that the trial court was aware that the applicable minimum fine was $200 but prop erly considered the45 fact that the Legislature had increased the minimum fine to $280, and decided that the higher amount was appropriate. (See Peugh v. United States (2013) __ U.S. __ [186 L.Ed.2d 84] [“notwithstanding a rule that retr ospective application of a higher Guidelines range violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, sentencing courts will be free to give careful
consideration to the current version of the Guidelines as representing the most recent views of the agency charged by Congress with developing se ntencing policy . . . . The newer Guidelines, meanwhile, will have the stat us of one of many reasons a district court might give for deviating from the older Guidelines, a status that is simply not equivalent
for ex post facto purposes”].) We presume that the trial court “knows an d applies the correct statutory and case law [citation] and is able to . . . recogniz e those facts which properly may be considered in the judicial decision making process. [Citations.]” ( People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644.) Barrios has not overc ome that presumption. His claim fails.

9. Presentence custody Medina and Arellanes contend they are entitled to a total of 934 days of presentence custody credit. Respon dent agrees. We agree as well. Both appellants were arrested on Novemb er 3, 2010 and sentenced on May 24, 2013. The total number of actual days in cust ody, including the day of arrest and the day of sentencing, is 934. (See People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729, 735.)

10. Restitution liability Medina contends the abstract of judgment must be corrected to show that he is jointly and severally liable w ith Barrios and Arellanes for vi ctim restitution. Respondent agrees, and points out that this notation is mi ssing from all three appellants’ abstracts and so all should be corrected. We agree.
The court stated that “each defendant is or dered to pay restituti on” and it would be “joint and several.” This is not reflected in the abstracts of judgme nt. The abstracts are ordered corrected. (See People v. Arnold (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1098-1100 [joint46 and several restitution proper; defendant is re sponsible for full amount of victim’s losses but payments by other respons ible parties are deducted from the amount owed].)

Disposition The presentence custody credits awarded to appellants Medina and Arellanes are ordered corrected to 934 days. The abstract of judgment is ordered corrected to reflect this amount. The abstract of judgment fo r Medina, Arellanes and Barrios is ordered corrected to reflect the trial court’s ruling that each is jointly and severally liable for the
direct victim restitution award. The clerk of the superior court is instructed to prepare amended abstracts of judgment reflecting th ese changes and to deliver copies to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment of conviction is affirmed in all other respects.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MINK, J. 

We concur:

MOSK, ACTING P.J.

KRIEGLER, J.

 Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superi or Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.