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PHILIP FILIPPELLI III ET AL. v. SAINT

MARY’S HOSPITAL ET AL.

(SC 19148)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Robinson and

Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued December 2, 2014—officially released October 13, 2015

Stephanie Z. Roberge, for the appellant (named

plaintiff).

Ellen M. Costello, for the appellees (defendant Waterbury Orthopaedic Associates, P.C., et al.).
Opinion

PALMER, J. The plaintiff, Philip Filippelli III,1 brought

this medical malpractice action against the defendants,

Dennis M. Rodin and Waterbury Orthopaedic Associates, P.C.,2 claiming that Rodin negligently failed to

timely diagnose and treat the plaintiff’s compartment

syndrome,3

resulting in severe and permanent injuries

to the plaintiff’s lower left leg. Following a trial, the

jury found that the defendants had not breached the

standard of care and returned a verdict in favor of

the defendants. The trial court rendered judgment in

accordance with the jury verdict, and the plaintiff

appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the

trial court’s judgment. Filippelli v. Saint Mary’s Hospital, 141 Conn. App. 594, 597, 61 A.3d 1198 (2013). On

appeal to this court following our grant of certification;

Filippelli v. Saint Mary’s Hospital, 308 Conn. 947, 67

A.3d 289 (2013); the plaintiff claims that he is entitled

to a new trial because the Appellate Court improperly

concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1)restricting his use of an article from a medical

journal to impeach certain witnesses, and (2) precluding him from (a) questioning the defendants’ expert

witness about his previous work as an expert on behalf

of Rodin, and (b) making an offer of proof and marking

a document for identification in connection with that

proffered questioning. We disagree with the plaintiff’s

claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the

Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the

relevant facts and procedural history in detail. See Filippelli v. Saint Mary’s Hospital, supra, 141 Conn. App.

597–600. To briefly summarize, the plaintiff sustained

a comminuted tibial plateau fracture4 while playing basketball on March 4, 2005. At approximately 10 p.m. that

evening, he was taken to the emergency department

of Saint Mary’s Hospital, where he was treated and

released. The plaintiff returned at approximately 7:30

a.m. the following morning complaining of severe pain

in his left leg, and Rodin admitted the plaintiff for observation. At approximately 6:45 p.m. that evening, Rodin

diagnosed the plaintiff with compartment syndrome

and treated it by performing a four compartment fasciectomy.5 Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this

action alleging that Rodin was negligent in failing to

diagnose and treat his compartment syndrome on the

morning of March 5, 2005, and that the delay in treatment caused, among other things, severe and permanent injuries. Following a trial, in response to an

interrogatory, the jury found that the defendants had

not breached the standard of care. The jury returned a

verdict for the defendants and the trial court rendered

judgment in accordance with that verdict.

On appealto theAppellate Court, the plaintiff claimed

that the trial court abused its discretion in barring him
from using an article from a medical journal for the

purpose of impeaching Rodin’s credibility, and in limiting his use of the same article in his cross-examination

of Andrew Bazos, the defendants’ expert witness. Id.,

605–607. In addition, the plaintiff claimed that the trial

courtimproperly precluded him from questioningBazos

about his previous work as an expert on behalf of Rodin

in other malpractice actions. Id., 623. With respect to

the plaintiff’s attempt to ask Bazos about his prior work

on behalf of Rodin, the plaintiff also contended that

the trial court precluded him from creating an adequate

record of that claim for appellate review by denying

him the opportunity to make an offer of proof and

to mark a particular document for identification. The

Appellate Court concluded that none of the challenged

evidentiary rulings constituted an abuse of the trial

court’s discretion. Id., 600–601. The Appellate Court

further concluded that, although the trial court should

not have barred the plaintiff from making a record as

requested, that impropriety was harmless.6

Id., 623–26.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment

of the trial court. Id., 626. On appeal to this court, the

plaintiff challenges the Appellate Court’s conclusions

with respect to each of these issues. Additional facts

and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

Before turning to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims,

we briefly set forth the standard of review applicable

to those claims. It is well settled that ‘‘[w]e review the

trial court’s decision to admit [or exclude] evidence, if

premised on a correct view of the law . . . for an abuse

of discretion.’’ State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 218, 926

A.2d 633 (2007). Underthe abuse of discretion standard,

‘‘[w]e [must] make every reasonable presumption in

favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset

it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus, our]

review of such rulings is limited to the questions of

whether the trial court correctly applied the law and

reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it

did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hurley v.

Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371, 402, 3 A.3d 892

(2010). Moreover, ‘‘[b]efore a party is entitled to a new

trial because of an erroneous evidentiary ruling, he or

she has the burden of demonstrating that the error was

harmful. . . . [A]n evidentiary impropriety in a civil

case is harmless only if we have a fair assurance that

it did not affect the jury’s verdict. . . . A determination

of harm requires us to evaluate the effect of the evidentiary impropriety in the context of the totality of the

evidence adduced at trial. . . . [Finally, our] review of

the Appellate Court’s conclusions of law, including the

determination that any evidential improprieties were

harmless, is plenary.’’(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Klein v. Norwalk Hospital, 299 Conn. 241, 254–55, 9 A.3d 364 (2010).

I
The plaintiff first claims that the Appellate Court

improperly determined that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in (1) prohibiting him from using the journal article to impeach Rodin, who had read the article

prior to his deposition, and (2) limiting his use of the

article during his cross-examination of Bazos. We reject

both of these contentions.

A

We first address the plaintiff’s claim concerning the

trial court’s ruling precluding him from using the article

to impeach Rodin’s credibility. Specifically, the plaintiff

maintains that, although Rodin suggested during his

deposition that the article in question supported his

testimony concerning the diagnosis and treatment of

compartment syndrome, the article actually contradicts

his deposition testimony in several respects. According

to the plaintiff, he was entitled to use the article to

establish that Rodin did not testify truthfully during

his deposition.

The following facts and procedural history, some of

which is set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court,

are relevant to this claim. ‘‘Counsel for the plaintiff

deposed Rodin in March, 2009. At that time, Rodin testified that, in preparation for his deposition, he had

reviewed an article in the Journal of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, but that he had not

brought the journal article to the deposition.7 Later, the

plaintiff’s counsel undertook a literature search and

found an article published in the subject journal that

she believed to be the one Rodin reviewed. On March

6, 2011, as trial was about to begin, the plaintiff filed

a supplemental list of exhibits that included, among

other things, ‘[S. Olson & R. Glasgow, ‘‘Acute Compartment Syndrome in Lower Extremity Musculoskeletal

Trauma,’’ 13 J. Am. Acad. Orthopaedic Surgeons, No.

7 (November, 2005)].’

‘‘The defendants filed an objection to the plaintiff’s

supplemental list of exhibits, including the journal article. The defendants claimed prejudice due to the plaintiff’s late disclosure of the journal article and sought

to preclude its use at trial. . . . On May 10, 2011, the

court held a hearing regarding the defendants’ objection

to putting the journal article into evidence at trial. The

plaintiff’s counsel argued that Rodin had referred to

the journal article during his deposition . . . . [The

defendants] . . . contended that Rodin had referred in

general to a journal article, not to a specific journal

article, and that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate

that the article found by the plaintiff’s counsel was,

in fact, the one Rodin had reviewed. Moreover, [the

defendants argued that the article was not admissible

pursuant to the learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule; see Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (8);8 because] Rodin

was a fact witness, not an expert witness, and no expert
had testified that the journal article was a standard

authority in accordance with § 8-3 [8] ofthe Connecticut

Code of Evidence. . . . The court . . . conditionally

overruled the defendants’ objection with respect to

Rodin.’’ (Footnotes added.) Filippelli v. Saint Mary’s

Hospital, supra, 141 Conn. App. 602–603.

At trial, the court instructed plaintiff’s counsel that,

before questioning Rodin about the article in the presence of the jury, she would be required to make an

offer of proof. Outside the presence of the jury,9

‘‘Rodin

testified that he did not recall reading a journal article

before his deposition. . . . [He] acknowledged [however] that, during his deposition, he testified that he

had reviewed a journal article. [The] [p]laintiff’s counsel

presented Rodin with a copy of the journal article that

she had located and asked him if it was the article he

had reviewed. Rodin did not recognize the journal article nor did he remember reading it. [The] [p]laintiff’s

counsel then presented Rodin with copies of what she

represented were the tables of contents of the Journal

of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons for

[2004 through 2009]. The table[s] of contents disclosed

only one article concerning compartment syndrome,

which was published in November, 2005.

‘‘Following the plaintiff’s offer of proof with respect

to the tables of contents, the courtfound thatthe journal

article discovered by the plaintiff’s counsel published

in the Journal of the American Academy of Orthopaedic

Surgeons in November, 2005, entitled ‘Acute Compartment Syndrome in Lower Extremity Musculoskeletal

Trauma,’ was the article reviewed by Rodin prior to his

deposition. The court [initially indicated that it would

admit] into evidence a copy of the journal article

because Rodin testified that ‘he relied on this journal

article in preparation for his deposition . . . .’ ’’ Id.,

608–609. After additional argument on the issue, however, the court indicated that it would reconsider its

ruling based on arguments provided by the parties prior

to the next trial day.

‘‘Prior to the next trial day, the defendants submitted

a memorandum of law in opposition to the admission

of the journal article through a nonexpert witness to

impeach the credibility of that witness. Rodin had not

been disclosed as an expert witness. The defendants

argued that the journal article was hearsay and the

learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule did not

apply because the article had not been identified as

authoritative nor was it relied upon by an expert witness. The defendants further argued that the plaintiff

intended to use the journal article for substantive purposes. Counsel for the plaintiff [argued] that Rodin’s

deposition testimony was untruthful as it was at odds

with the substance of the journal article, although Rodin

had testified that his testimony was consistent with the

journal article.’’ Id., 609. The plaintiff made clear that
he was not offering the article underthe learned treatise

exception or for the truth of the matter asserted in the

article. Rather, the plaintiff explained that he intended

to use the article for the nonhearsay purpose of

impeaching Rodin’s credibility by establishing that

Rodin had been untruthful in his deposition testimony.

Specifically, the plaintiff pointed to the following

exchange between the plaintiff’s counsel and Rodin

during Rodin’s deposition:

‘‘Q. Did you review any literature in preparation for

your deposition today?

‘‘A. I did look at one . . . article.

‘‘Q. What did you look at?

‘‘A. Journal of American Academy of Orthopaedic

Surgery.

‘‘Q. What article did you review?

‘‘A. An article on compartment syndrome.

‘‘Q. When was that article published?

‘‘A. I believe 2005; I’m not sure exactly.

‘‘Q. What did the article say?

‘‘A. Just a review about what compartment syndrome

is, and diagnosis and treatment.

‘‘Q. What did it list in there about diagnosis and

treatment?

‘‘A. Similar to things I’ve already mentioned in terms

of specific things to look at on clinical examination.’’

The plaintiff claimed that this portion of Rodin’s

deposition testimony suggested that the article was consistent with his opinion concerning the diagnosis and

treatment of compartment syndrome when, in fact, the

article was inconsistent with his testimony in several

respects.10 To demonstrate that Rodin’s deposition testimony was false in that regard, the plaintiff’s counsel

sought to question Rodin about his deposition testimony describing the diagnosis and treatment of compartment syndrome, to confront Rodin with portions

of the article that contradicted his testimony on certain

points, and to introduce those excerpts from the article

into evidence.11 The trial court vacated its order from

the previous day and ruled that the article was inadmissible. The court did allow the plaintiff’s counsel to supplement her offer of proof on this issue and, for that

purpose, she confronted Rodin with the contradictions

between his deposition testimony and the article.12

On appealto theAppellate Court, the plaintiff claimed

that the trial court improperly precluded him from using

the journal article to impeach Rodin’s credibility. The

plaintiff maintained that Rodin had not been truthful in

testifying that his deposition testimony was consistent

with the journal article, and that he ‘‘was entitled to
bring . . . Rodin’s lack of candor to the attention of

the jury.’’ Filippelli v. Saint Mary’s Hospital, supra,

141 Conn. App. 607. The plaintiff further maintained

that the learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule

was inapplicable to his claim because he had not sought

admission of the article as substantive evidence but,

rather, merely to impeach Rodin’s credibility by demonstrating that he was untruthful when he suggested in

his deposition testimony that the article supported his

opinion. The Appellate Court rejected the plaintiff’s

claim, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in precluding him from using the article to

cross-examine Rodin because ‘‘[t]he trial court has discretion to limit the admissibility of a learned treatise

when used to undermine or bolster credibility dependent on the facts of a particular case.’’ Id., 611. In support of its conclusion, the Appellate Court further

observed that Rodin had not been disclosed as an expert

witness and that ‘‘no expert in this case had identified

the article as standard authority . . . .’’ Id. The Appellate Court, believing that the plaintiff had questioned

Rodin in front of the jury about his failure to recall at

trial that he had reviewed an article in preparation for

his deposition; see footnote 9 of this opinion; also concluded that, even if the trial court had abused its discretion in precluding the plaintiff from introducing the

article to impeach Rodin’s credibility, any such impropriety was harmless. Filippelli v. Saint Mary’s Hospital, supra, 611–12.

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff challenges the

Appellate Court’s conclusion that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to admit the

article pursuant to the learned treatise exception

because that was not the theory on which he relied in

seeking to introduce the article at trial. The plaintiff

also contends that the Appellate Court’s conclusion was

predicated on the mistaken belief that the plaintiff had

questioned Rodin in the presence of the jury with

respect to his failure to recall that he had reviewed the

article in preparation for his deposition. We agree with

the plaintiff both that the learned treatise exception

has no bearing on whether the article was admissible

for the purpose of impeaching Rodin’s credibility and

that the record indicates that the questioning at issue

took place outside the presence of the jury. We nevertheless conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in precluding the plaintiff from using the

article to impeach Rodin’s credibility. Even if Rodin did

suggest during his deposition that the article supported

his testimony; but see footnote 10 of this opinion; the

article was inadmissible for that purpose because

extrinsic evidence generally is not admissible to

impeach a witness by proving that he or she engaged

in an act of misconduct.13

Although our rules of evidence generally prohibit evidence of misconduct to prove the character of a wit-
ness; see Conn. Code Evid. § 4-5; one exception to that

rule allows a party to impeach the credibility of a witness by asking about particular acts of misconduct that

tend to demonstrate the witness’ lack of veracity. Conn.

Code Evid. § 6-6 (b) (1).14 As we previously have recognized, ‘‘[a] claim that [a] witness gave false testimony

[under oath] in a prior [proceeding] is directly relevant

to a witness’ credibility.’’ Weaver v. McKnight, 313

Conn. 393, 427, 97 A.3d 920 (2014). Our evidentiary rules

also provide, however, that extrinsic evidence generally

may not be used to establish that a witness engaged

in such misconduct.15 Conn. Code Evid. § 6-6 (b) (2).

Rather, ‘‘the only way to prove misconduct of a witness

for impeachment purposes is through examination of

the witness. See, e.g., Martyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn.

402, 408, 198 A.2d 700 (1964). The party examining

the witness must accept the witness’ answers about a

particular act of misconduct and may not use extrinsic

evidence to contradict the witness’ answers. State v.

Chance, [236 Conn. 31, 60, 671 A.2d 323 (1996)].’’16

Weaver v. McKnight, supra, 427. This limitation on the

use of extrinsic evidence to prove specific acts of misconduct ‘‘prevents a trial within a trial on the collateral

question of whether the witness did, in fact, commit

the alleged misconduct.’’ Id., 430; see also C. Tait & E.

Prescott, Connecticut Evidence (5th Ed. 2014) § 6.32.5,

pp. 400–401.

In the present case, the plaintiff sought to introduce

the article for the improper purpose of proving through

extrinsic evidence that Rodin testified falsely in

response to questioning at his deposition. A review of

the transcript from the plaintiff’s offer of proof demonstrates that allowing the plaintiff to use the article for

this purpose would have created a ‘‘trial within a trial’’

on the collateral issue of whether Rodin had, in fact,

testified falsely at his deposition. See Weaver v.

McKnight, supra, 313 Conn. 430. First, because the

plaintiff did not request the article at the time of the

deposition, and because Rodin testified in connection

with the offer of proof that he could not recall reading

the article, the plaintiff would have had to present

extensive evidence merely to establish that the article

in question was the article that Rodin had read prior

to the deposition. In attempting to do so in his first

offer of proof, the plaintiff confronted Rodin with his

deposition testimony in which he indicated that he had

read an article from the Journal of American Academy

of Orthopaedic Surgery about the diagnosis and treatment of compartment syndrome that he believed was

published in 2005. The plaintiff then asked Rodin

whether the article in question was the article that he

had reviewed. Because Rodin could not recall reading

the article prior to his deposition, the plaintiff then

introduced the tables of contents from all of the issues

of that journal that had been published between 2004

and 2009 for the purpose of establishing that the 2005
article was the only one dealing with compartment syndrome. All of this evidence was offered to establish that

the article in question was the article that Rodin had

reviewed prior to his deposition. In support of the plaintiff’s supplemental offer of proof, he adduced additional

evidence to demonstrate that the information contained

in the article was inconsistent with Rodin’s deposition

testimony. To that end, the plaintiff’s counsel asked

Rodin several questions about the contents of the article, and Rodin responded to each one that he could

not answer without first reading the article. Finally,

counsel confronted Rodin with several portions of his

deposition testimony wherein he had provided information concerning the diagnosis and treatment of compartment syndrome that differed from the information

contained in the article.

The plaintiff sought to introduce all of this evidence

solely for the purpose of establishing that, despite

Rodin’s alleged suggestion to the contrary, the article

on which he relied to prepare for his deposition was

inconsistent with his deposition testimony. Because

Rodin was a fact witness and not an expert witness,

however, he testified only about his own treatment of

the plaintiff, and did not offer an expert opinion on the

standard of care for the diagnosis and treatment of

compartment syndrome.17 Thus, whetherthe article and

Rodin’s deposition testimony were consistent was collateral to the substantive issue of whether he was negligent in his diagnosis and treatment of the plaintiff. See

Martyn v. Donlin, supra, 151 Conn. 407–408 (in wrongful death action, trial court properly excluded documents offered for collateral issue of whether defendant

police officer lied on job application). We have long

recognized that ‘‘[s]uch a minitrial about a collateral

issue distracts from the main issues at trial, wastes the

court’s and the jury’s time, and is frequently based on

hearsay evidence of questionable value.’’ Weaver v.

McKnight, supra, 313 Conn. 430; see also State v.

O’Neill, 200 Conn. 268, 277, 511 A.2d 321 (1986); State

v. Horton, 8 Conn. App. 376, 380–81, 513 A.2d 168, cert.

denied, 201 Conn. 813, 517 A.2d 631 (1986). As the

plaintiff’s offers of proof demonstrate, allowing the

plaintiff to introduce the article to impeach Rodin’s

credibility would have resulted in extended, potentially

confusing testimony about an issue that was not relevant to any substantive issue to be decided by the jury.

Under § 6-6 (b)(2) ofthe Connecticut Code of Evidence,

extrinsic evidence was inadmissible for that purpose.18

Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court

properly concluded that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in precluding the plaintiff from introducing the journal article to impeach Rodin’s credibility.

B

The plaintiff next claims that the Appellate Court

incorrectly concluded that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in limiting his use of the same journal

article in connection with his cross-examination of the

defendants’ expert, Bazos. We reject this contention

as well.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to this claim. At trial, Ronald M. Krasnick,

an orthopedic surgeon, testified as an expert witness

on behalf of the plaintiff. Krasnick testified that the

Journal of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgery is ‘‘a standard authority in the field of orthopedic

surgery.’’19 When Bazos later testified as an expert on

behalf of the defendants, the plaintiff sought, during

cross-examination, to introduce portions of the article

that contradicted Bazos’ testimony regarding the standard of care forthe diagnosis and treatment of compartment syndrome. The plaintiff argued that the article

was admissible under the learned treatise exception to

the hearsay rule because Krasnick had identified the

Journal of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgery, in which the article was published, as a standard

authority in the field of orthopedic surgery. See Conn.

Code Evid. § 8-3 (8). The defendants objected, arguing

that the article was inadmissible because, although

Krasnick had testified that the Journal of the American

Academy of Orthopaedic Surgery was a standard

authority, he did not identify the specific article in question as a standard authority. The defendants further

argued that, if the article was admitted under the

learned treatise exception, only the portions of the article that the plaintiff used to impeach Bazos’ testimony

should be admitted as a full exhibit. The trial court

concluded that the plaintiff would be allowed to crossexamine Bazos about the article, but that only those

portions that the plaintiff used during his cross-examination would be admitted as a full exhibit and published

to the jury.

After the trial court’s ruling, the plaintiff initially

attempted to read certain statements directly from the

article during his questioning of Bazos. The defendants

objected to the plaintiff reading from the article, however, and the trial court sustained the objection and

directed the plaintiff to ask questions without reading

from the article. Thereafter, without reading from the

article, the plaintiff incorporated portions of the article

into his questions by asking Bazos whether he agreed

with certain statements. The plaintiff also twice

approached Bazos and directed him to certain statements in the article on which the plaintiff’s questions

were based. After questioning Bazos and directing him

to the statements in the article, the plaintiff sought

permission to read those statements into the record,

but the trial court denied the plaintiff’s request. After

the completion of the plaintiff’s cross-examination, the

trial court ruled that the portions of the article on which

the plaintiff had not questioned Bazos would be

redacted, with the redacted version being admitted as
a full exhibit.

On appealto theAppellate Court, the plaintiff claimed

that the trial court had improperly limited his use of

the article in connection with his cross-examination

of Bazos. The plaintiff argued that the trial court had

admitted the entire article as a full exhibit, and that it

was improperfor the court to prohibit him from reading

directly from the article and directing Bazos’ attention

to certain portions of the article during his cross-examination. The plaintiff also claimed that the trial court

improperly permitted only a redacted version of the

article to be published to the jury after admitting the

entire article as a full exhibit. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in limiting the plaintiff’s cross-examination of Bazos

because the plaintiff had failed to meet the requirements

of § 8-3 (8) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence regarding the admission of a learned treatise. Specifically, the

Appellate Court explained that ‘‘[b]oth Krasnick and

Bazos testified that there is no standard authority

regarding the diagnosis of compartment syndrome and

that their knowledge of the care and treatment of such

a condition is based on their reading of the whole of

orthopedic literature and their education, training and

experience as orthopedic surgeons.’’ Filippelli v. Saint

Mary’s Hospital, supra, 141 Conn. App. 613. The Appellate Court also concluded that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting only those portions of

the article on which Bazos was questioned. Id., 613 n.18.

The plaintiff now claims that the Appellate Court

improperly determined that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion by limiting his use of the journal article

during his cross-examination of Bazos because, contrary to the conclusion of the Appellate Court, the plaintiff had met the foundational requirements of the

learned treatise exception. The plaintiff maintains that,

because the trial court found that the article was admissible as a learned treatise under § 8-3 (8) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, it was improper for the trial

court to limit his use of the article. The defendants

contend to the contrary that the article should not have

been admitted into evidence for any purpose because

the plaintiff failed to meet the foundational requirements of the learned treatise exception and, in the alternative, that the trial court had the discretion to limit

the plaintiff’s use of the article on cross-examination.

We reject the plaintiff’s claim because, even if the plaintiff did meet the requirements for the admission of the

article as a learned treatise, the trial court properly

exercised its discretion in limiting the plaintiff’s use of

the article during cross-examination.

Under § 8-3 (8) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence,

‘‘a statement contained in a published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, medicine, or

other science or art’’ may be admitted into evidence as
an exception to the hearsay rule if two foundational

requirements are satisfied. ‘‘First, the work must be

recognized as a standard authority in the field by the

witness, other expert witness or judicial notice, and,

second, the work must either be brought to the attention

of the witness on cross-examination or have been relied

on by that expert during direct examination.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Pestey v. Cushman, 259

Conn. 345, 367, 788 A.2d 496 (2002). Connecticut’s

learned treatise rule ‘‘differs from that of most other

jurisdictions, including the federal rule, in that we allow

the material to be taken into the jury room as a full

exhibit. . . . Most other jurisdictions bar such material

from the jury room, limiting their use to an oral reading

in connection with an expert witness’ testimony. . . .

This limitation seeks to avoid the danger of misunderstanding or misapplication by the jury and ensures that

the jurors will not be unduly impressed by the text

or use it as a starting point for reaching conclusions

untested by expert testimony. . . . The Connecticut

rule, on the other hand, has the advantage of allowing

the jurors to examine more fully the text of what frequently is a technical and complicated discussion that

may be unfathomable to a nonexpert juror who merely

heard a single oral recitation. Although the concerns

which underlie the federal rule cannot be completely

obviated when the materials are allowed in the jury

room, the dangers can be minimized by the judicious

exercise of discretion by the trial court in deciding

which items ought to be admitted as full exhibits.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gupta, 297

Conn. 211, 239, 998 A.2d 1085 (2010); see also C. Tait &

E. Prescott, supra, § 7.11.3, pp. 478–79.

As stated previously, for a writing to be admissible

under the learned treatise exception, it must be identified as a ‘‘standard authority in the field,’’ either by an

expert witness or by judicial notice. Conn. Code Evid.

§ 8-3 (8). The question arises, however, whether admissibility under the learned treatise exception requires

testimony by the expert witness that the particular article is a standard authority, or whether it is sufficient,

as occurred in the present case, that the expert merely

identify the journal as such authority.

Although we have not had occasion to do so, the

Appellate Court previously addressed this issue in

Musorofiti v. Vlcek, 65 Conn. App. 365, 382–85, 783 A.2d

36, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 938, 786 A.2d 426 (2001). In

that case, after the plaintiff’s treating physician identified the Journal of the American Dental Association as

a standard authority in the dental profession, the trial

court allowed the defendants to introduce an article

from that journal pursuant to the learned treatise exception. Id., 382–83. On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that

‘‘acceptance of the journal that contained the article

[as a standard authority in the field] was insufficient

to qualify the article contained therein as a learned
treatise.’’ Id., 384. In support of this claim, the plaintiffs

relied on Meschino v. North American Drager, Inc.,

841 F.2d 429, 434 (1st Cir. 1988), in which the United

States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, addressing

a similar claim, stated that it ‘‘would not accept [the]

plaintiff’s argument that the contents of all issues of a

periodical may be qualified wholesale under [r]ule 803

(18) [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] by testimony

that the magazine was highly regarded. In these days of

quantified research, and pressure to publish, an article

does notreach the dignity of a ‘reliable authority’ merely

because some editor, even a most reputable one, sees

fit to circulate it. Physicians engaged in research may

write dozens of papers during a lifetime. Mere publication cannot make them automatically reliable

authority.’’

TheAppellateCourt generally agreed with the reasoning of the court in Meschino, stating that it ‘‘would not

accept that all articles in a periodical may be qualified

as learned through the mere demonstration that the

periodical itself is highly regarded.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Musorofiti v. Vlcek, supra, 65 Conn. App. 384.

The Appellate Court further observed, however, that

Meschino should not be read as creating a per se rule,

and that there may be circumstances in which a particular periodical is so highly regarded within a field that

all articles published therein would be admissible as a

learned treatise. Thus, the Appellate Court endorsed

the approach taken by the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit in Costantino v. Herzog,

203 F.3d 164, 172 (2d Cir. 2000), wherein the court

stated that ‘‘[p]ublication practices vary widely, and an

article’s publication by an esteemed periodical which

subjects its contents to close scrutiny and peer review,

obviously reflects well on the authority of the article

itself. Indeed, because the authoritativeness inquiry is

governed by a ‘liberal’ standard, good sense would seem

to compel recognizing some periodicals—provided

there is a basis for doing so—as sufficiently esteemed

to justify a presumption in favor of admitting the articles

accepted for publication therein.’’ The Appellate Court

concluded in Musorofiti that, under the circumstances

of that case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in admitting the article based on testimony that the

journal ‘‘was widely read, recognized and accepted in

the dental profession as authoritative.’’ Musorofiti v.

Vlcek, supra, 382–83; see id., 385. We agree generally

with the approach adopted by the Appellate Court in

Musorofiti.

In the present case, it is questionable whether Krasnick’s testimony provided an adequate foundation for

establishing the admissibility of the article under § 8-3

(8) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Although we

agree, as the Appellate Court recognized in Musorofiti

v. Vlcek, supra, 65 Conn. App. 385, that evidence that

a journal is particularly esteemed within a field may
‘‘justify a presumption in favor of admitting the [article]

accepted for publication therein,’’ it is by no means

clear that Krasnick’s testimony met that standard with

respect to the Journal of the American Academy of

Orthopaedic Surgery. Indeed, Krasnick testified that

‘‘[a]ll journals are used as reference tools by orthopedic

surgeons.’’ Krasnick’s testimony that the Journal of the

AmericanAcademy of Orthopaedic Surgery is one publication among many relied on by orthopedic surgeons

as a general reference tool does not provide a particularly firm basis for concluding that that publication is

regarded as so authoritative and respected within the

field of orthopedic surgery that all articles published

therein merit learned treatise status.

Even assuming that the plaintiff satisfied the requirements of § 8-3 (8) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence

for admission of the article as a learned treatise, however, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the plaintiff’s use of the article on crossexamination. The essence of the plaintiff’s claim is that

the trial court unduly limited his use of the article by

requiring him to incorporate portions of it into his questions, rather than allowing him to read directly from

the article, because it had been marked as a full exhibit.

Significantly, however, the plaintiff’s assertion that the

trial court had marked the entire article as a full exhibit

is belied by the record. Although the trial court initially

indicated that the entire article would be admitted as

a full exhibit, after hearing further argument from the

defendants, the court indicated that only the portions

of the article on which the plaintiff questioned Bazos

would be marked as a full exhibit and published to the

jury.20 Moreover, the mere fact that the trial court found

that the article met the requirements for admissibility

under the learned treatise exception does not mean

that the court was required to allow the plaintiff unfettered use of the article. Section 8-3 (8) merely provides

that materials which meet the foundational requirements of the learned treatise exception are ‘‘not

excluded by the hearsay rule,’’ and does not mandate

the admission of such materials or otherwise ‘‘purport

to circumscribe the discretion generally afforded to a

trial court to determine the admissibility of evidence

in light of the facts of record.’’ Harlan v. Norwalk Anesthesiology, P.C., 75 Conn. App. 600, 607, 816 A.2d 719,

cert. denied, 264 Conn. 911, 826 A.2d 1155 (2003). As

discussed previously, we have long recognized that this

state’s approach to the learned treatise exception,

which allows materials admitted under the rule to be

treated as full exhibits and taken into the jury room

during deliberations, carries ‘‘the danger of misunderstanding or misapplication by the jury’’ that other jurisdictions seek to avoid by precluding the admission of

such materials as full exhibits. Cross v. Huttenlocher,

185 Conn. 390, 396, 440 A.2d 952 (1981). We therefore

have explained that trial courts may minimize the risks
posed by the rule by use of ‘‘the judicious exercise of

discretion . . . in deciding which items ought to be

admitted as full exhibits.’’ Id., 396–97; see also id.,

397–98 (trial court properly exercised discretion in

excluding portions of medical texts recognized as standard authority in field that were likely to confuse or

mislead jury).

In the present case, it was well within the trial court’s

discretion to preclude the plaintiff from reading directly

from the article during his cross-examination of Bazos,

and to admit as a full exhibit only the portions of the

article about which Bazos was questioned. The trial

court did not, as the plaintiff argues, preclude him from

‘‘engaging in any cross-examination of [Bazos] with the

article . . . .’’ Rather, the record reveals that the plaintiff’s counsel questioned Bazos extensively as to

whether he agreed with the information contained in

the article and, in many instances, counsel quoted the

article verbatim in connection with his questioning.21

On at least two occasions, counsel approached Bazos,

directed him to the portion of the article on which the

question was based, and asked whether he agreed with

a particular statement. Finally, the redacted version of

the article that the trial court admitted as a full exhibit

contained all of the sections of the article that the plaintiff’s counsel had incorporated into her questions. Thus,

although the trial court did not allow the plaintiff to

read the article into the record, the jury was able to read

the article for itself and compare it to Bazos’ testimony.

Additionally, it bears emphasis that, contrary to the

plaintiff’s claim, the article was not a full exhibit until

after he completed his cross-examination and the trial

court was able to redact the portions of the article on

which the plaintiff did not rely. It was not an abuse of

discretion for the trial court to preclude the plaintiff

from reading from a document that was not yet a full

exhibit; see Kaplan v. Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc., 146

Conn. 327, 334–35, 150 A.2d 602 (1959); and to postpone

admitting the article as a full exhibit until after the

plaintiff had finished his cross-examination, when the

court could determine which portions of the article

were relevant to Bazos’ testimony. See State v. Wade,

96 Conn. 238, 251, 113 A. 458 (1921) (‘‘The question

of the cross-examiner [confronting a witness with a

learned treatise] must be confined to such parts of the

authority as tend to contradict the opinion as expressed

by the witness. It cannot be based upon some illustration or isolated case used by the authority to explain

or illustrate his opinion.’’). Accordingly, the Appellate

Court properly concluded that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in limiting the plaintiff’s use of the

article while cross-examining Bazos.

II

The plaintiff also claims that the Appellate Court

improperly concluded that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in precluding him from questioning Bazos

about his previous experience as an expert on behalf

of Rodin. The plaintiff maintains that this evidence was

relevant because Bazos falsely testified at his deposition

that he had never worked with Rodin and that the only

other case in which he remembered giving deposition

testimony was one in which Rodin was not a party.

According to the plaintiff, he should have been allowed

to ask Bazos about this prior experience with Rodin

for the purpose of impeaching Bazos’ credibility.

Finally, the plaintiff asserts that, contrary to the determination of the Appellate Court, the trial court’s failure

to permit him to make an offer of proof and to mark

an exhibit for identification prevented him from making

an adequate record of this claim. We reject each of

these contentions.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to this claim. On April 4, 2011, approximately one month prior to the commencement of trial,

counsel for the plaintiff deposed Bazos. During the

deposition, the plaintiff’s counsel briefly questioned

Bazos about his prior experience serving as an expert

witness, and whether he had ever heard of or worked

for Rodin. When asked whether he remembered the

names of any physicians for whom he previously had

provided expert deposition testimony, Bazos stated,

‘‘[t]he only one I remember, because it was relatively

recent, was [a physician named] Geiger.’’ When asked

whether he had ever heard of Rodin before his involvement in this case, Bazos testified, ‘‘I’ve seen his name;

I’ve not worked with him, but Waterbury is not that far

away, and we’ll occasionally see patients that live there

and may have been treated out there in the past.’’

Prior to trial, the defendants filed a motion in limine

to preclude evidence relating to other malpractice

actions against Rodin. At a pretrial hearing on the

motion, the plaintiff indicated that, although he did not

intend to question Rodin with respect to other malpractice claims, he did intend to ask Bazos whether he had

served as an expert witness on behalf of Rodin in any

other cases. The plaintiff claimed that Bazos had testified falsely during his deposition when asked about

his relationship with Rodin, and that he intended to

impeach Bazos’ credibility by bringing that false testimony to the jury’s attention. Specifically, the plaintiff

indicated that, priorto the present case, Bazos had been

disclosed as an expert witness on behalf of Rodin in

two other medical malpractice cases. The plaintiff

argued that Bazos intentionally concealed his relationship with Rodin when he stated that he only remembered testifying as an expert witness on behalf of Geiger

and suggested that he had no knowledge or familiarity

with Rodin other than having come across his name in

the course of his practice. The plaintiff maintained that

he should be allowed to question Bazos regarding his

previous work as an expert on behalf of Rodin to show
that Bazos lied during his deposition. The defendants

argued that Bazos did not testify falsely at his deposition, but simply had misunderstood the questions asked

by the plaintiff’s counsel,22 and that Bazos intended

to submit an errata sheet to clarify his answers. The

defendants further argued that allowing the plaintiff to

present evidence that Bazos had served as an expert

on behalf of Rodin in other malpractice cases would be

unfairly prejudicial because it would reveal that Rodin

previously had been sued by other patients. The trial

court agreed with the defendants that evidence of other

malpractice claims against Rodin would be unduly prejudicial, but also concluded that the plaintiff should be

allowed to ask Rodin whether he lied under oath at his

deposition. The trial court therefore granted in part the

defendants’ motion in limine, ruling that the plaintiff

could ask Bazos whether he had a prior ‘‘working relationship’’ with Rodin, but not whether he had previously

served as an expert witness on Rodin’s behalf.

At trial, the plaintiff renewed his request to question

Bazos about his prior work for Rodin. As an additional

basis for the plaintiff’s belief that Bazos had testified

falsely at his deposition when he claimed only to

remember testifying as an expert on behalf of Geiger,

the plaintiff indicated that Bazos gave deposition testimony on behalf of Rodin in another case just two

months prior to his deposition in the present case,

whereas his deposition testimony on behalf of Geiger

was given approximately one year earlier. The plaintiff

also claimed that, just five days before his deposition

in this case, Bazos signed an errata sheet for a deposition he had given on behalf of Rodin in another case.

The plaintiff then requested the opportunity to make

an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury. The

trial court reaffirmed its original ruling and denied the

plaintiff’s request to make an offer of proof.

Following Bazos’ testimony, the plaintiff asked to

mark for identification the certification page of a deposition Bazos had given on behalf of Rodin in another

case. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request, but

allowed the plaintiff to read the certification page into

the record.

On appealto theAppellate Court, the plaintiff claimed

that the trial court had abused its discretion both by

precluding him from questioning Bazos about his work

as an expert on behalf of Rodin and by denying his

request to make an offer of proof and mark the certification page as an exhibit for identification. With respect

to the first claim, the Appellate Court concluded that

the trial court reasonably precluded the plaintiff from

introducing evidence of other medical malpractice

actions in which Bazos had testified on behalf of Rodin

on the ground that such evidence was more prejudicial

than probative. Filippelli v. Saint Mary’s Hospital,

supra, 141 Conn. App. 622. With respect to the plaintiff’s
second contention, the Appellate Court concluded that,

although the trial court improperly denied the plaintiff’s

request to make an offer of proof and mark an exhibit

for identification, both errors were harmless. Id.,

623–26.

As discussed in part I of this opinion, our evidentiary

rules allow a party to impeach a witness by asking

about specific acts of misconduct that are probative of

the witness’ lack of veracity; Conn. Code Evid. § 6-6

(b) (1); and false testimony given under oath is a classic

example of misconduct that may be used for such purposes. See Weaver v. McKnight, supra, 313 Conn. 427.

We have long recognized, however, that the right to

cross-examine a witness with respect to such acts is not

unlimited. ‘‘First, cross-examination may only extend to

specific acts of misconduct other than a felony conviction if those acts bear a special significance upon the

issue of veracity . . . . Second, extrinsic evidence of

such acts is generally inadmissible [unless the prior acts

of misconduct are relevant to a material or substantive

issue in the case]. Conn. Code Evid. § 6-6 (b) (2).’’ (Citation omitted;footnote omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Annulli, 309 Conn. 482, 492, 71 A.3d

530 (2013). Finally, consistent with the broad leeway

that trial courts have in regard to rulings pertaining to

the admissibility of evidence, ‘‘[w]hether to permit

cross-examination as to particular acts of misconduct

. . . lies largely within the discretion of the trial court.’’

Id., 492–93; see also C. Tait & E. Prescott, supra, § 6.32.4,

p 399 (‘‘[c]ross-examination into the misconduct of a

witness forimpeachment purposes is discretionary with

the trial judge, as to both allowance and extent’’).

In the present case, it is apparent that the trial court

properly exercised its discretion in precluding the plaintiff from questioning Bazos as to whether he previously

had testified as an expert on behalf of Rodin. First,

whether Bazos previously served as an expert on behalf

of Rodin was a collateral matter because it was relevant

only to Bazos’ credibility and not to any substantive

issue in the case. See State v. Annulli, supra, 309 Conn.

494–95 (‘‘[a]n issue is collateral if it is not relevant to

a material issue in the case apart from its tendency to

contradict the witness’’ [emphasis in original; internal

quotation marks omitted]). In other words, although

Bazos’ alleged false deposition testimony bore on his

veracity, his relationship with Rodin was not relevant

to the plaintiff’s claim that Rodin was negligent in failing

to timely diagnose and treat the plaintiff’s compartment

syndrome.23 Furthermore, for obvious reasons, evidence of prior claims of professional negligence against

Rodin, which were not otherwise admissible, would

have been highly prejudicial to the defendants. Thus,

as the trial court concluded, allowing the plaintiff

unrestricted inquiry into Bazos’ work as an expert for

Rodin would have injected a collateral issue into the

case that was extremely prejudicial to the defendants.
More importantly, the trial court did not bar the plaintiff from questioning Bazos whether he had testified

falsely during his deposition, but simply precluded the

plaintiff from asking Bazos about the nature of his relationship with Rodin, because allowing the plaintiff to

do so would have revealed to the jury that other patients

had filed malpractice actions against Rodin. As the trial

court recognized, allowing the plaintiff to conduct this

line of inquiry would have created a substantial risk

that the jury might infer that Rodin was negligent in

the present case because he had been a defendant in

other medical malpractice actions. See Lai v. Sagle, 373

Md. 306, 323, 818 A.2d 237 (2003) (‘‘similar acts of prior

malpractice litigation should be excluded to prevent a

jury from concluding that a doctor has a propensity to

commit medical malpractice’’); cf. Conn. Code Evid.

§ 4-5 (a) (‘‘[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts

of a person is inadmissible to prove the bad character

or criminal tendencies of that person’’); 1 K. Broun,

McCormick on Evidence (7th Ed. 2013) § 189, pp. 1025–

26. The court also recognized, however, thatthe plaintiff

had a legitimate interest in impeaching Bazos’ credibility by questioning him about his allegedly false or misleading deposition testimony. The court sought to

balance these concerns by allowing the plaintiff to confront Bazos with the portion of his deposition testimony

in which he stated that he was only familiar with Rodin’s

name because he had seen it in his patients’ medical

records and to ask whether Bazos had a ‘‘working relationship’’ with Rodin, but precluded the plaintiff from

inquiring more specifically about other malpractice

cases against Rodin.

Thus, on cross-examination, the plaintiff asked Bazos

whether he had ‘‘an ongoing working relationship with

[Rodin] since about 2008,’’ which was three years before

his deposition testimony, and Bazos responded in the

affirmative. The plaintiff then confronted Bazos with

the portion of his deposition testimony in which, when

counsel for the plaintiff asked whether he had ever

‘‘heard of [Rodin] before being involved in this case,’’

Bazos stated that he had ‘‘seen [Rodin’s] name’’ but had

‘‘not worked with him . . . .’’ Bazos testified that he

did, in fact, have a working relationship with Rodin,

but that he had met Rodin for the first time the day

before the trial. At that time, the plaintiff expressly

underscored the contradiction between Bazos’ deposition testimony and his admission that he had an ongoing

relationship with Rodin for about three years, and suggested that Bazos’ deposition testimony ‘‘made it appear

as though [Bazos] may have come across [Rodin’s]

name . . . in one of [his] patient’s records.’’

Although this cross-examination likely would have

been more damaging to Bazos’ credibility had the plaintiff been permitted to ask about his prior work as an

expert on behalf of Rodin, the trial court properly
weighed the plaintiff’s interest in impeaching Bazos

against the substantial likelihood of prejudice to the

defendants had such questioning been permitted. The

record reveals that the trial court carefully considered

the arguments of the parties24 in the interest of fashioning a solution that gave the plaintiff an opportunity to

bring the alleged false testimony to the jury’s attention

without the high risk of unfairness to the defendants

that have would resulted from evidence revealing other

malpractice actions against Rodin. The decision on how

best to preserve the fairness and integrity of the trial

in this situation is precisely the kind of determination

best left to the discretion of the trial court, and that

decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was

arbitrary or unreasonable.25 State v. Annulli, supra, 309

Conn. 495. Because the trial court carefully weighed

the competing interests and afforded the plaintiff the

opportunity to impeach Bazos’ credibility by asking him

about his allegedly false deposition testimony, the trial

court’s handling of the issue was fair and reasonable.

Accordingly, we agree with the Appellate Court that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding

the plaintiff from questioning Bazos about his work on

behalf of Rodin in other cases.

Finally, we also agree with the Appellate Court that,

although the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff

both to make an offer of proofregarding Bazos’ previous

work as an expert on behalf of Rodin and to mark for

identification the certification page from Bazos’ deposition in one of those previous cases, neither such impropriety was harmful to the plaintiff. See Filippelli v.

Saint Mary’s Hospital, supra, 141 Conn. App. 623–26.

As a general matter, a trial court should always allow

a party to make an offer of proof and mark an item as

an exhibit foridentification, for both practices generally

are necessary to preserving the trialrecord for appellate

review. See State v. Silva, 201 Conn. 244, 253, 513 A.2d

1202 (1986) (‘‘the general rule has evolved that the trial

court must mark as an exhibit for identification anything offered by counsel’’ [emphasis in original]); State

v. Zoravali, 34 Conn. App. 428, 433, 641 A.2d 796 (‘‘The

appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate

appellate record through the offer of proof, among other

vehicles. . . . A trial court cannot prevent a defendant

from doing so.’’ [Citation omitted.]), cert. denied, 230

Conn. 906, 644 A.2d 921 (1994); C. Tait & E. Prescott,

Connecticut Appellate Practice and Procedure (4th Ed.

2014) § 8-2:1.1, p. 437 (‘‘[i]f necessary [to properly preserve a claim for appellate review], the appellant also

must make an offer of proof or offer an exhibit for

identification’’). In the present case, however, the

record is adequate for review of the plaintiff’s claims

despite the trial court’s denial of his request to make

an offer of proof and to mark the document for identification. As the Appellate Court observed, ‘‘although the

court improperly failed to permit the plaintiff’s counsel
to make an offer of proof, the court permitted the plaintiff’s counsel to argue extensively, on more than one

occasion, the legal basis on which she wanted to present

evidence of other medical malpractice actions in which

Bazos testified as an expert witness . . . .’’ Filippelli

v. Saint Mary’s Hospital, supra, 624. In addition, ‘‘[t]he

[trial] court permitted the plaintiff’s counsel to read the

document [she had sought to mark for identification]

into the record, which is available for our review.’’ Id.,

626. Accordingly, neither of the improper rulings prejudiced the plaintiff in any way.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and ZARELLA and

ROBINSON, Js., concurred.

1 Philip Filippelli’s wife, Linda Filippelli, initially alleged claims for loss

of consortium, but withdrew those claims prior to trial. All references to

the plaintiff in this opinion are to Philip Filippelli III.

2 The plaintiff withdrew his claims against Saint Mary’s Hospital prior to

trial. We therefore refer to Rodin and Waterbury Orthopaedic Associates,

P.C., as the defendants.

3 Compartment syndrome is ‘‘a condition in which increased pressure in

a confined anatomic space adversely affects the circulation and threatens

the function and viability of the structures therein.’’ Stedman’s Medical

Dictionary (28th Ed. 2006) pp. 1894–95.

4 A comminuted fracture occurs when ‘‘the bone is broken into more than

two fragments.’’ Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (28th Ed. 2006) p. 769. ‘‘A

tibial plateau fracture occurs at the top of the shin bone, and involves the

cartilage surface of the knee joint.’’ J. Cluett, ‘‘Tibial Plateau Fractures,’’

(last modified May 16, 2014), available at http://orthopedics.about.com/od/

brokenbones/a/tibia_2.htm (last visited September 22, 2015).

5 A fasciectomy is the ‘‘[e]xcision of strips of fascia.’’ Stedman’s Medical

Dictionary (28th Ed. 2006) p. 706. The fascia is ‘‘[a] sheet of fibrous tissue

that envelops the body beneath the skin; it also encloses muscles and groups

of muscles and separates their several layers or groups.’’ Id., p. 700

6 The plaintiff also claimed on appeal to the Appellate Court that the trial

court improperly precluded him from using the article to confirm the opinion

of Ronald M. Krasnick, the plaintiff’s expert witness. See Filippelli v. Saint

Mary’s Hospital, supra, 141 Conn. App. 605–607. The Appellate Court

rejected that claim, and it is not before us in the present appeal.

7 At that time, plaintiff’s counsel did not ask Rodin or Rodin’s counsel to

produce the article.

8 Section 8-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant

part: ‘‘The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the

declarant is available as a witness . . .

‘‘(8) Statement in learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention

of an expert witness on cross-examination or relied on by the expert witness

in direct examination, a statement contained in a published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art,

recognized as a standard authority in the field by the witness, other expert

witness or judicial notice.’’

9 The opinion of the Appellate Court indicates that the plaintiff questioned

Rodin in the presence of the jury as to whether he remembered reading the

article. See Filippelli v. Saint Mary’s Hospital, supra, 141 Conn. App. 608.

Our review of the record, however, indicates that the plaintiff questioned

Rodin about the article only in connection with the offer of proof, which

was conducted outside the presence of the jury. As we explain hereinafter,

this discrepancy does not alter our conclusion that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in precluding the plaintiff from introducing the article

to impeach Rodin’s credibility.

10 We note that it is questionable whether the portion of Rodin’s deposition

testimony on which the plaintiff relies would have been construed by the

jury to suggest that the article supported his testimony regarding the diagnosis and treatment of compartment syndrome. Rather, it seems much more

likely that, when Rodin testified that the information in the article was

‘‘[s]imilar to things I’ve already mentioned in terms of specific things to

look at on clinical examination,’’ he meant only that the article covered
similar subject matter, not that it necessarily was consistent with his testimony. The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, reasonably could

have excluded the evidence on that ground. Cf. State v. Annulli, 309 Conn.

482, 496, 71 A.3d 530 (2013) (fact that testimony was unclear as to whether

witness gave false statement weighed against its admission). As discussed

hereinafter, however, it is clearthat the article also was inadmissible because

it constituted extrinsic evidence offered to prove an act of misconduct.

11 Specifically, the plaintiff’s counsel underscored the following discrepancies between Rodin’s testimony and the journal article: Rodin testified that

compartment pressures are used only to confirm a diagnosis of compartment

syndrome and are not taken to make a diagnosis in questionable cases,

whereas the article recommends that compartment pressures be taken in

order to make a diagnosis under such circumstances; Rodin testified that

a patient with compartment syndrome will experience extreme pain upon

passive range of motion of the big toe, whereas the article indicates that

pain is merely aggravated in such circumstances; and Rodin testified that

irreversible tissue damage can occur in two hours, whereas the article

indicates that such damage takes eight hours.

12 In ruling that the article was inadmissible to impeach Rodin, the trial

court explained: ‘‘The grounds on which the court is not allowing the [article]

in is based on the fact that the court finds the journal article to be hearsay.

And I’ve had no satisfactory exception provided to the court for that hearsay.’’ The court further explained that the article ‘‘is a learned treatise,’’

that, under our Code of Evidence, ‘‘the witness to which this article would

be presented would have to be an expert witness,’’ and that the plaintiff

could not attack Rodin’s credibility because ‘‘Rodin has not been designated

as an expert witness . . . .’’ Finally, the court noted that ‘‘the article is

dated eight months after the care and treatment of [the plaintiff]’’ and that

‘‘Rodin testified he did not review . . . this article in preparation for the

care and treatment of [the plaintiff].’’ The plaintiff, however, did not offer

the article pursuant to the learned treatise exception or for the truth of its

contents but, rather, to impeach Rodin’s credibility by demonstrating that

his alleged statement that the article supported his deposition testimony

was false. As explained hereinafter, despite the trial court’s failure to

squarely address the plaintiff’s arguments, it is clear that the article was

not admissible for the purpose for which the plaintiff offered it.

13 As noted previously; see footnote 12 of this opinion; the trial court did

not rely on this reasoning in ruling that the article was inadmissible to

impeach Rodin. The court concluded, rather, that the article was hearsay,

that the plaintiff had offered ‘‘no satisfactory [hearsay] exception’’ pursuant

to which the article was admissible, and the article was not otherwise

admissible under the learned treatise exception. Although at trial the defendants principally argued that the article was inadmissible because it did not

meet the requirements of the learned treatise exception, the defendants also

asserted that, to the extent it was offered for impeachment purposes, the

article related to ‘‘a collateral issue.’’ Similarly, in their brief to this court,

the defendants argue primarily that the article was inadmissible under the

learned treatise exception, but also claim that ‘‘there was no other way for

the [journal] article to be used against the defendant, a fact witness . . . .’’

To the extent the defendants have not expressly renewed their contention

that the article was inadmissible as extrinsic evidence offered to impeach

Rodin on a collateral matter, we note that ‘‘[w]here the trial court reaches

a correct decision but on mistaken grounds, this court has repeatedly sustained the trial court’s action if proper grounds exist to support it.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruffin, 206 Conn. 678, 683, 539 A.2d 144

(1988); see also State v. Henry, 253 Conn. 354, 363–66, 752 A.2d 40 (2000)

(although trial court admitted testimony under coconspirator exception to

hearsay rule, this court affirmed on ground that testimony was not hearsay);

State v. John, 210 Conn. 652, 679–80, 557 A.2d 93 (affirming trial court’s

ruling admitting out-of-court statement on different grounds than articulated

by trial court, noting that ‘‘this court is free to sustain a ruling on a different

basis from that relied upon by the trial court’’), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824,

110 S. Ct. 84, 107 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1989); State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 433,

512 A.2d 160 (‘‘this court may . . . consider grounds for affirming a judgment that may have been overlooked by counsel in an appeal to this court’’),

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1986). Because

it is clear from the record that the plaintiff sought to use the article for the

improper purpose of demonstrating by use of extrinsic evidence that Rodin

had engaged in an act of misconduct, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate

Court on that basis.
14 Section 6-6 (b) (1) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: ‘‘A

witness may be asked, in good faith, about specific instances of conduct

of the witness, if probative of the witness’ character for untruthfulness.’’

15 Extrinsic evidence may be used for such purposes, however, ‘‘[w]here

. . . prior acts of misconduct are relevant to a substantive or material issue

in the case . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Annulli, 309

Conn. 482, 492 n.7, 71 A.3d 530 (2013).

16 We note that the plaintiff does not claim that the trial court improperly

precluded him from asking Rodin whether he testified falsely at his deposition. He claims, rather, that the trial court improperly precluded him from

using the article only to demonstrate that Rodin did, in fact, testify falsely.

17 The parties agree that Rodin did not testify as an expert witness.

18 The plaintiff makes two additional arguments to support his claim that

the trial court abused its discretion in precluding him from introducing the

article to impeach Rodin’s credibility. Neither of these claims has merit.

First, the plaintiff argues that, because Rodin would have testified at trial that

he did not recall reviewing the article prior to his deposition, his deposition

testimony that he had reviewed the article was a priorinconsistent statement,

and the article and the tables of contents therefore were admissible to

demonstrate that Rodin was lying when he testified that he did notremember

reading the article. This claim fails because whether Rodin reviewed the

article prior to his deposition was a collateral issue, and extrinsic evidence

is not admissible to impeach a witness regarding an inconsistent statement

on a collateral matter. See State v. Diaz, 237 Conn. 518, 548, 679 A.2d

902 (1996).

Second, the plaintiff argues that the article was relevant to demonstrate

that Rodin was untruthful when he sought to explain the meaning of certain

statements contained in his medical records. Specifically, on the morning

of March 5, 2005, after Rodin first examined the plaintiff upon his return

to the emergency department, Rodin documented that there was a ‘‘question

of compartment syndrome’’ and that ‘‘[t]his may very well be an impending

compartment syndrome . . . .’’ According to the article, ‘‘[o]n diagnosis of

impending . . . compartment syndrome, immediate measures must be

taken,’’ and ‘‘measuring compartment pressures is recommended’’ in questionable cases. Rodin testified at trial that he was certain that the plaintiff

did not have compartment syndrome when he examined him that morning,

and that his notation in the medical records merely reflected his concern

that the plaintiff ‘‘was at risk for the development of compartment syndrome.’’ The plaintiff claims that Rodin came up with this explanation about

the meaning of his medical records only after reading the article, and that

he should have been allowed to introduce the article and ask Rodin whether

he reviewed it prior to his deposition to impeach his credibility on that

issue. The plaintiff never argued at trial that the article was admissible for

that purpose and we, therefore, will not consider it on appeal. Travelers

Ins. Co. v. Namerow, 257 Conn. 812, 831, 778 A.2d 168 (2001) (‘‘[o]ur review

of evidentiary rulings made by the trial court is limited to the specific legal

ground raised [at trial]’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

19 In response to questioning from counsel for the plaintiff, Krasnick testified as follows:

‘‘Q. . . . [D]o you subscribe to any medical journals or any other medical literature?

‘‘A. Primarily two . . . the Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery and the

Journal of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgery. . . .

‘‘Q. And is the Journal [of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgery]

generally used as a reference tool by orthopedic surgeons?

‘‘A. All journals are used as reference tools by orthopedic surgeons.

‘‘Q. Is the Journal of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgery used

in that capacity as well?

‘‘A. Absolutely.

‘‘Q. And is that publication a standard authority in the field of orthopedic surgery?

‘‘A. Yes.’’

20 Before the plaintiff questioned Bazos on the article, the trial court

initially indicated that the entire article would be admitted as a full exhibit.

The defendants argued, however, that only the portions used for impeachment should be admitted, and the trial court responded, ‘‘[w]ell, I’m going

to wait and see what [plaintiff’s counsel] brings up on cross, it’ll be marked

in full and will not be published to the jury and then we’ll . . . see what

she brings out.’’ At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s cross-examination of

Bazos, the defendants again inquired as to which portions of the article

would be admitted as a full exhibit, and the trial court stated, ‘‘my ruling

on what should and shouldn’t come in is everything that [Bazos] was ques-
tioned on. . . . And I want you to work with [the plaintiff’s] counsel on

that, everything else is redacted.’’ Consistent with the transcript, a review

of the exhibits reveals that only the redacted version of the article was

marked as a full exhibit. Thus, although the trial court’s initial ruling may

have suggested that the entire article would be admitted in full, the court

ultimately admitted only the redacted version, and did so only after the

plaintiff had completed his cross-examination of Bazos.

21 For example, the plaintiff asked Bazos whether he agreed that ‘‘pain

out of proportion to the injury aggravated by passive stretching of muscle

groups in the corresponding compartment is one of the earliest and most

sensitive clinical signs of compartment syndrome,’’ and that ‘‘[p]eripheral

pulses are palpable and, unless a major arterial injury is present, capillary

refill is routinely present.’’ This and other language used by the plaintiff in

his questioning of Bazos is identical to that appearing in the article. See S.

Olson & R. Glasgow, supra, 13 J. Am. Acad. Orthopaedic Surgeons 436.

22 Specifically, although acknowledging that the plaintiff’s counsel had

asked Bazos at his deposition whether he ‘‘remember[ed] the names of any

of the physicians for which [he had] given deposition testimony’’; (emphasis

added); the defendants explained that Bazos had responded that he only

recalled testifying on behalf of Geiger because he mistakenly thought that

the plaintiff’s counsel was merely seeking to ascertain whether he had

previously testified as an expert at trial, and Bazos had not previously

testified at trial on behalf of Rodin. Counsel for the defendants also argued

that Bazos’ deposition testimony that he had not previously worked with

or met Rodin was not false because, although he had served as an expert

on Rodin’s behalf, his relationship was with Rodin’s counsel and her firm,

rather than with Rodin himself.

23 The dissent maintains that Bazos’ previous relationship with Rodin was

not collateral because it ‘‘was relevant to the issue of his potential bias or

interest in the outcome of the case’’ and that ‘‘evidence tending to show a

witness’ bias, prejudice or interest is never collateral.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) To the extent the plaintiff preserved this claim at trial and

has raised it on appeal, we disagree that the mere fact that an expert witness

previously served as an expert on behalf of the same party in an unrelated

matter is admissible to demonstrate bias. It is well established that, although

a trial court may not unduly restrict a party from impeaching a witness with

evidence of bias, the court maintains the discretion to limit the scope of

such evidence when it is of limited probative value; see State v. Lee, 229

Conn. 60, 69–70, 640 A.2d 553 (1994); C. Tait & E. Prescott, supra, § 6.30.6 (b),

p. 393; and to exclude relevant evidence that will result in unfair prejudice to

the opposing party. Conn. Code Evid. § 4-3 (‘‘[r]elevant evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice’’); see also Cousins v. Nelson, 87 Conn. App. 611, 622–24, 866 A.2d 620

(2005). Thus, in addressing the identical issue in Cousins, the Appellate

Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding

the plaintiff from questioning the defendant’s expert about other cases in

which he had served as an expert on the defendant’s behalf and, instead,

limiting the plaintiff to asking whether the expert had a ‘‘personal relationship’’ with the defendant. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cousins v.

Nelson, supra, 623–24. As the Appellate Court observed in that case, evidence

that an expert witness previously served as an expert on behalf of the same

party in an unrelated case ‘‘could not [reveal] any potential personal stake

on the part of [the expert] in the outcome of the trial.’’ Id., 623.

As in Cousins, the trial court in the present case did not completely bar

the plaintiff from asking Bazos about his previous relationship with Rodin,

but merely precluded him from asking Bazos whether he had worked as an

expert for Rodin in other cases. It bears noting, moreover, that although

the trial court indicated that the plaintiff could ask Bazos whether he had

a ‘‘working relationship’’ with Rodin, the court also expressly informed the

plaintiff’s counsel that it was willing to consider other suggestions as to

how the relationship could be described without alerting the jury to the

other cases in which Rodin was named as a defendant. Of course, the

plaintiff also was free to explore Bazos’ potential bias in favor of Rodin by

asking whether he was being compensated for his work in the present case.

Testimony about previous cases, however, would have had little or no

probative value and would have been extremely prejudicial to the defense

because it would have revealed that Rodin had been a defendant in other

medical malpractice actions. Thus, the trial court properly exercised its

discretion in precluding this evidence to forestall the serious risk that the

jury would conclude that Rodin likely was negligent in the present case
merely because he had been a defendant in other malpractice actions.

24 For example, at the pretrial hearing on the defendants’ motion in limine,

in response to the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff should not be

permitted to question Bazos about his prior relationship with Rodin, the

court explained: ‘‘It’s not as if he’s walking into this not knowing anything

about [Rodin], he’s had prior experience with [Rodin] on two previous

occasions. And what I’m trying to get from you is a way counsel can bring

out that there is this preexisting relationship between the parties . . . without going into what it was.’’ The court further explained that ‘‘[t]he fact

that there has been previous malpractice claims against [Rodin] is highly

prejudicial and its prejudicial value outweighs is probative value. However,

the plaintiff is entitled to bring out the fact that . . . there’s some sort of

relationship here between these parties, this is not someone who is blindly

looking at [Rodin] for the first time.’’ At trial, following the plaintiff’s contention that asking Bazos about his work as an expert for Rodin in other

cases was necessary to put the alleged false testimony in its proper context,

the court responded, ‘‘you’re going to be given an opportunity to attack his

credibility on that issue, just not in the direction you want to take it on the

other issues.’’

25 The plaintiff’s reliance on Hayes v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 38

Conn. App. 471, 661 A.2d 123, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 922, 666 A.2d 1185

(1995), is misplaced. In Hayes, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial

court had abused its discretion by precluding the plaintiff in a medical

malpractice action from cross-examining the defendant’s expert witness

concerning an action pending against the expert himself that included claims

of medical negligence similar to those at issue in Hayes. Id., 473–76. The

Appellate Court reasoned that, because the allegations against the expert

resembled the allegations against the defendant, the expert had a motive

to testify that the defendant’s actions conformed to the standard of care.

Id., 473. Hayes is readily distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case

sought to introduce evidence of other malpractice claims that had been

filed against the defendant’s expert, not against the defendant himself, and,

therefore, there was no risk that the jury would presume that the defendant

was negligent merely because he was a defendant in separate medical malpractice action.