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P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al

D ocke t N o . 02-3278

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/6461 PRECE DENTI AL

UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF AP PEA LS F OR TH E TH IRD CIR CU IT

___________ No. 02-3278

___________

DEMETRIO REYNOSO -LOPEZ,

Petitioner
v. JOHN ASHC ROFT , Attor ney Generalof the Unite d States of America,
Respondent

____________ On Petiti on for Review of an Order of the Board of Imm igration Appeals (INS No. A73-115-357)

____________ Sub mi tt edUnd er

Thi rdCi rc ui t L AR 34.1(a) June 2, 2003

Before: BARRY , FUENTE S, and RO SE NN , Circuit

Judges

. (Fil ed: May 25, 2004)
Michael Morrone, Esq. 899 South College Mall Road Suite 252 Bloomington, IN 27201

Counsel for Pet iti oner John D. Willi ams, Esq. Michael P. Li ndemann, Esq. Jocely n L. Wright, Esq. Erica A. Franklin, Esq. United Stat es Department of Justi ce Office of Immigration Lit igati on P.O. Box 878 Ben Franklin St ation Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Respondent

___________ OPINI ON OF THE COURT

___________

FUENTES , Circ uit Judge. The princip al is sue prese nted by this ap pe al is wh etherthis Court has t he autho rityto rei nstat e a gr ant o f voluntary departure and exten d t he de partur e date prev iously ordered by an Immigrat ion Judge (“IJ” ) and affirmed by the Board of Immigrat ion Appeal s (“BI A” ). In this case, the pet iti oner, Demetr io Reynos oLopez (hereinafter “ Re ynoso” ), s eeks review of the BIA’s deci sion affirmi ng the IJ’s denial of his appl ic ation f or asy lum and withholding of removal under the Immigrat ion and N ationality Act (“INA ”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a ) and 1253(h) , and protection under the Convention A gainst Torture (“CAT”). In t he alt ernative, Rey noso asks us t o reins tate the now expired thirty-day

voluntary departure ordergranted t o him by t he IJ and reins tate d by

th e BI A unde r 8 U .S.C . § 122 9c( b)(1 ).2

According to Re ynoso, h e failed to depart voluntarily

because he wa nted to stay in this country to appea l the BIA ’ s decisi on o f h is re que st fo r a sy lum. He contends that, as a matter of due process,
we have jurisdicti o n to rei nstat e the exp i red voluntar

y depar ture dat e in the
eve nt that w e aff

irm the BIA ’s den ial o f his asy lum clai m. We disagree. Based on the plain la ng uage of the i mmigrati on stat utes a nd re gulatio ns, w hich c learly grantthe power to r einst ate or e xtend voluntary depa rture so lely to the Attorney General and h is delega tes at th e Immigrat ion and Na tural izat ion Servi ce (“I NS” ), we conclude that we lack the juri sdict ional authority to re ins tate or exte nd a vol unt ary de par ture ord er.

I. Reynoso is a t

wenty- seven y earold native of Gua te mal a. He cl ai ms that when he was ten y ears old, he wa s held in confinementby Guatem alan gue rr il la s. He clai ms t o have escaped to M exico, w here he lived f

or the next six y ears. In 1993, at the age of sixt een, Reynoso enter ed the Un it ed States without a vi sa. 1 On M ar c h 19, 199 4, he appl ie d fo r a sy lum, withholdi ng of rem oval, a nd p rotecti o n under th e CA T . In t he alt ernative, he request ed volunt ary de pa rt ur e. On October19, 1998, t

he INS charged him with being removabl e for ent ering t he UnitedStates without having been adm itted or p aro led.
In removal proc eedings on Janu ary 28, 1999, Reynoso conceded remo vability
an d request ed reconsi derati on of h i s p rev ious petition for asylum. O n Janua ry 20, 200 0, t he IJ deni ed all reli ef, but granted Reyno so vo luntary de partur e until March 6, 2000. O n July 23, 2002 , the BIA affirmedthe IJ withoutopinion. T he BIA also granted Rey

noso voluntary departure wit hin thirty d ays of

the d ate o f its o rde r. Reyno so no w a ppea ls the deci sion of the BIA. He raises tw o primary issues
on appe al : (1) w hethe r the B IA e rred in affirmi ng the IJ’s denia l of his petition for
as y lum; and (2) whether this Court has t

he juri sdict ional aut hor ity to rei nstat e an exp ired gra nt o f vo lun tary de par ture

. We review the IJ’s d ecision to grant
or deny asy lum for abuse of discr etion. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (4)(D). Thus, our review of the IJ ’s fact

ual fi ndings, which
were adopt ed by the B IA, is d efere ntial. Factual findings, such as cre dibility determinations, are “conclusive unless any reaso nable adjudic ator would b e compelledto concl ude to the contrar y. ” 8 U.S .C. § 1 252 (b)(4)(B). We must est abl ish whether the BIA’s factual determi nation s are su pported b y substantial evid enc e. See Senathir ajah v. IN S , 157 F .3d 210, 21 6 (3d C ir. 1998). This stand a rd is “e ven m ore d efere ntial” than the “cl early

erroneous ” standard, and requir es us to sustain an adverse credib ility de termination“unless

. . . no reasonabl e person” would have found the app licant incredible. See Concrete Pi pe & Prod ucts 1 Although the briefs describe him as a twenty-thre e yea

r old (Pet. Br. at 2), if he was sixtee

n ye ars old in

1993, he i s approximately twenty

-seven ye ars old now.3

of CA v. C onst ructi on Laborers Pens ion Trust for Sou thern CA , 508 U.S. 602, 623 (199 3). “Ad verse credibility findings are affor d ed substantial de ference so l ong as the findings are supported b y s pecif ic coge nt reasons. ” Gao v. Ashcroft , 299 F.3d 266, 276 (3d Cir . 2002) ( citation
om itted ).

II.
In regard t o Reynoso’ s appeal f rom the de nial of h is app li catio n fo r a sy lum, the IJ, aft er as se ss in g Re ynoso’ s cr ed ib ilit y, det ermin ed t hat Re y noso “fail ed to establ ish awell-founde d fear of persecut ion as is n ec es sa ry i n order t o be statutorily eligible for a sylum

. ” Because Reynoso failed to estab lish eligib il ity for
as yl um, he necessarily

fail ed to meet t

he
more string ent standar d for showing a “clear probability

of perse cut ion” to be eligible for w ithhold ing o f dep orta t ion. INS v. Stev ic , 467 U.S . 4 07, 420 n.13 (1984). Si m ila rly, ba sed o n th e respond ent’s t es timony and the evi dence of the re c ord, he di d not offer s uffici ent
e vid ence for withhol ding of removalunder the CA T. W e hav e care fully reviewedthe entire r ecor d and find no basi s for dist urbing t he IJ’s thoro ugh and w ellreas oned o ral opi nion. We add only the following to unders core our agr eement wit h th at de cisio n. At the hearing b ef

ore the IJ, Reynoso test ifie d that, at the age of 10, he and his family were capt ured by a band

of g ueril las in Guatemala and taken fr o m their home town of

Quilco to the guerill as’ en camp men t. He t es ti fi edth at ab out two
we eks a fter his capture , the family , which appa rently include d b oth pare nt s and t wo sisters , escaped the encam pm ent. In the pro cess, Reynoso became separat ed from hi s f amily and managed to walk for three da ys to Chiapas, Mexico, where he st ayed and worked for thr e e years. Thereafter, Reynoso m ov ed to M ex ico C ity, where he lived for another three y ears, wo rking in a re st au rant . A t the age of 16, Reynoso left Mexico C ity a nd crossed into the Unit ed Sta tes. Reyno so’s par ent s, wit

h who m h e i s in regular

con t act, no w liv e in C um il, Guatemala, a town appr o ximatel y fi ve hours from Quilco on f

oot. None of them kno ws the whereabout s of h is younger sisters

. Although formal resi stance to the Guatemalan government has ended, Reynoso stat ed that

he belie ves former gueril las are still active in Gua te mal a. He test ifie d th at, if he re turned, he feared persecut ion bythese guer illas for failing to join their resi stance in 1987. The bas is for this assertion was a lis t that he clai med the gueril las have kept whichcontai ns names of peo ple whom they plan to target for retributi on. He believed t hat both he and his father

were on this list. He also st ated t hat he had acquaint ances who, aft e r retur ning to G uate m ala in 1997 , were kill ed by for

mer gueril las seeking r evenge. In addi ti on, R eynoso testified that his p arents’ cr op s h ad be en de str oye d , oste nsib ly by for me r gu erilla s. In arri ving at an adve rse cre dibility find i ng, the IJpointed to several defici encies in R eyn os o’ s te sti m on y.4

Sp ec ifi ca lly, t he IJ fou nd q uestion able Reynoso’s test imonyrelating to (1) a “list” that the g ue rillas crea ted in 1 987 ; (2) his belie f tha t guerilla s are still ac tive in Guatemala; (3) the gueril las’ capture of the entire family , inc ludi n g his two younger sisters ; and (4) his esc ape at t he age of 10 and subs eque nt jou rney through Mexico and into the U nited Sta tes. The IJ fou nd this test imony incre dible for sever al rea sons. Fi rst, he doubtedthat Rey

noso could have escaped the gu er illa ca m p b y h imself on foot and then supporte d himself in Mexico from ages ten to s ixtee n. Second, he did not find that Rey

noso’ s account pr ovided a plaus ible basis for f

e aring a t

hreat by formergueril las. Third, he took judi cial noti ce o f cha nged coun try conditio ns in Guatemala, findin g that th e gueril las had disbanded. Therefore, the IJ h eld that Reynoso had fail ed to show e ither past p er secuti on or a well- founded fear of future perse cution , as is req uired to establishst atut ory el ig ib il it y for as y lum. Mo reover, the IJ foun d that any harm Reynoso suffered was not “on account of” anyof the fi ve grounds enumerat ed bythe INA ( i.e

. , race, relig ion, na tionali t y, mem bersh ip in a parti cular socialgroup, or political opinion) . Ins tead, the gueri llas mistr eatedhis fami ly in an attem pt to recruit the family t o join t heir r ebell ion. The IJ anal yzed e ach of these areas of Rey

noso ’s te sti mony and suppli ed specific reasons for his adverse credib ilityfindings . In par ticul ar , the IJ found that Rey

no so ’s te sti mony was exaggerat ed, em belli she d, and no t particu larly belie vable. The IJ acco rding ly
c oncludedthat Rey

noso had not met

hi s burden to establ ish a well -founded fear of persecut ion if r eturned to Guatemala.
We find no abuse o f dis cretion in anyof the IJ ’s cre di bili ty det erminations. We accordingly conclude that subst an tial
ev ide nce supports the IJ ’s det erminat ion that Reynoso fai ledto sup port h is as y lu m, withholding of deportation and CAT claim s w ith cr edib le ev iden ce.

III.
A.
We now turn to t

he questi on of whether we ca n reinstate Reynos o’s voluntary depa rture d ate. U nder certain circumstances, the A tto rne y Gen eral w ill grantan alien vo luntary depart ure as an alte rnati ve to depo rtation. T his allows t he alie n to dep art the U nit ed States at his or her ow n exp ense with out b eing s ubjec t to the pena lties and restrictio ns tha t d eportation im pos es . A n a li en wh o i s deported may not reent er the Unit ed States for ten year s unless the Attor ney General perm its it. However, an ali en who depa rts volu ntarily is not

bound by t

his re stri ction and may ree nter

the Unite d States once he
or she has obt ained prope r documentat ion. Se e Rams ay

v. INS , 14 F.3d 206, 211 n. 7 (4 th Cir. 1994) . As a n altern ative to granti ng hi s p eti tio n f

or as ylu m , R eyn os o re ques ts that we ext end the thirt y- da y
v oluntary dep arture or der gr ant ed h im b y the IJ and r einst ated by the BIA . Before his volu ntary dep artur e period ha d expired, Reynoso timel y ap p ealed to this C ourt. How ever, his depar

ture peri od ended5

before appe llat e revie w of his asy lum app licatio n w as c om plete d. Reynoso’s request

rais es an is sue of first im pr es si on in our Circ ui t: whe th er we have the authority to extend a v oluntary departure order p endin g our revi ew of a denial of a re quest for asy lum. Sever al ot her courts of appeals have conside red this question an d are divide d as to whether this autho rityexist s under the cu rr en t INS regulations. These regul ations stat e that th e “ [a]uth ority to exte nd th e time with in which to depart

voluntarily

specifi ed initially by an im migra tion ju dg e or the Board is only w ithin the jurisdi ction of the district d ir ector, the Deputy Executive Ass ociate Comm issi oner for Detenti on a nd Rem oval, or the Dir ector of the Office of Juveni le Affa ir s.

. . .” 8 C. F. R. § 1240.26 (f). The Government argues that
we do not have j urisdi ction to exte nd the voluntary departur e period be cause the language of the re gulati on makes clear that the pow er to gra nt, ext end o r reinstate voluntary departur e is wit hin th e sole autho rityof th e A tt orne y Gen eral an d his delegat es at the INS and Executive Offi ce fo r Immi gration Rev iew, w hic h
e ncompasses th e I Js andth e BI A. Re sp

. Br. at 28-3 0. Re ynoso c oun ters that d u e process requir es that

this Court have the power to exte nd voluntar y depart ure, or else his decisi on to appealthe BIA’s deni al of his asylum a pplica tion w ill have caused him to lose “ the priv ile ge of volun tary dep artu re.” Pet. Br. at 16 ( quoting Matter of Villeagas-A guirre , 13 I. & N. Dec. 139 (BIA 19 69 ) )

. We hol d that because C ongress has not pro vided statutory authority for appel late courts to rei nstat e o r extendthe vo lu n tary

departur e period pres crib ed by an IJ or the B IA, this Co urt lacks jurisdic tio n to reinstate Re ynoso’s vol unt ary de par ture per iod

.

B.
In 1996, Congr ess passed th e Ill egal Immigr a tionReform and Immigrant Res pon sibility Act (“II RIRA”). Under the plain language of t

he INA, as amended by II RIRA, the authorit

y t o reins tate or extend voluntary depa rture fa lls solely w ithin the discr etionof the Atto rney G enera l and h is delegat es at the INS. These delegates, including the IJ and BIA, granted Reynoso
a thirty-day

voluntary d epartur e period. Any exten sion o f th is time p eriod w ould clearly confli ct with t

he expli cit l anguage of II RI RA, which provides t hat only the district direc tormay

det ermin e the t ime per iod for vol unt ary de par ture

. The I m migrati on Regulati ons, as amended by I IRIRA, stat e: Au thority to exte nd th e t ime within which to depa rt volun tarily specifie d initially by
an immigrat ion judge or the Board is only with in the jurisdi ctiono f the di stri ct director , the D eputy E xecu tive A ssocia te Co mm is sioner for De tentio n and Rem oval,
or the D irector o f the O ffice of Ju venile Affairs

. An i mmi gra tion j udge or the Board may rein state vo luntary de partur e in
a removal proc ee ding that ha s been reopenedfor a p urpo se oth er than solely
ma k ing an app lication for volun tary departure if reope ning was gran ted prio r to6

the expiration of the orig inal pe riod of vol unt ary de par ture

.

8 C .F.R . § 12 40.2 6(f

) (em pha sis ad ded ).

Therefore, und er IIRIRA, the executi ve bran ch, no t the jud iciary, is given the so le authori ty

to dete rmine when
a n alien mu st de par t. Furth er , I IRI RA spec ifically limi ts the role of the court s as to when an alien, under an order of voluntary departur e, must l eav e the
co un try. Id. For example, under 8 U. S. C. § 122 9c(f) , “[n]o cour t shall ha ve juri sdict ion over an appealfrom denialof
a r eq ue st for an or de r o f v ol un tar y departure . . . , nor sha ll a ny co urt order a stay of an alien’s re mo val p en ding consider ationof an y claim with respe ct to voluntary departur e.” Addit ionally, “no court s hall have juri sdict ion to r eview

. . . anyjudgment re gardi ng the granting of
re l ief” und er se ction 122 9c. 8 U.S .C. § 125 2(a)(2 )(B)(i)

. Reynoso i s no t appe alin g a denial of a request for voluntary departur e or a claim with res pect to voluntary depart

ure. Thus, these provisi ons do not dives t thi s Cou rt of juri sdict ion in this case. However, they do undersco re t he fact t hat, in enact ing II RIRA, Congress int ended to vest the right to set d eadlines for a n alien’s voluntary departure s olely with the executi ve branch, and not the c our ts. See Zaz ueta-C arril lo v. Ashcroft , 322 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Neithe r the stat ute nor t he regu lations g ive co urts any desig natedrole i n this process of sett ing the deadl ine for de partur e.”). In grant ing the authori ty

to s et voluntary departure da tes to the e xecu tive bra nch, it is fair to saythat C ong ress inte nded the au thority to be e xclu sive

. Our inabil ity

to gran t Reynoso t

he reli ef he seeks does not leave him without
a re m ed y. U nd er IIR IR A , R eyn oso m ay apply for rei nstat ement or ext ension of voluntary depa rture d irectly to the district di re ctor. See 8 C.F.R . § 1244.2(f )(2); Castaneda , 23 F .3d a t 15 82. Seeking rel ief from the distric t director is, in fact , the procedu re th atCo ng ress intended for a petitioner

such as Reyno so t o f ol lo w. Indeed, in thi s case, the BIA informed Re yno so that any ext ension of t he
v ol untary departur e time period “maybe granted by t he district

director,” t

hus putting him on noti ce t hat a ny r elie f from the voluntary departure s et by the BIA
wo uld have to be gr antedad m in ist ra tiv ely, not judicially. BIA Ord er at 2. Further, this stat ement bythe BIA s hows that t he BIA has int erpret ed the INA as giving t he dis tri ct director sole authori ty to set and extendvol unt ary de par ture per iod s. Even if one w ere to a rgue that the sta tut ory language were unclear , w e would sti ll be requir ed to give defe rence to the B IA’s int erpretationof I IRI RA

. Che vr on U .S .A

. , Inc. v. Nat ural Resources Defense Co uncil, I nc. , 467 U .S. 837 (198 4); see also Zaz ueta-C arrillo , 32 2 F.3d at 1173 (same); see also Fad dou l v. I NS , 37 F.3d 185 , 192, 191-93 ( 5th Cir. 1995) (stating that there was “[n]o reas on to augmentthe administ rati ve remedy whic h the alie n had7

neg lecte d,” and d enyin g reins tate ment of voluntary departure because the pet iti oner did not apply

to the BIA or

district direct or for an e xtension and waited until the l ast dayof his depar

ture period before filing his appeal ( citing Farzad v. INS , 808 F.2d 1071, 1072 (5th Cir. 198 7))); Alsheweikh
v. INS 990 F.2d 1025, 1028 ( 8th Cir. 1993) (declining consi derati on o f the petitioner’s applic ation f or rei nstat ement of voluntarily

depar tu re, and s tating that the petitioner

“ma y reques t this reli ef from the I NS ”). Further, und er IIR IRA , appe llate
co urts re ta injuri sd ic ti on to r ev ie w a n alien’s appeal after

he voluntarily

departs. 8 U.C.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B). This re me dy
was not ava il abl e i n the p re -I IRI RA
re gi me because, under the formerINA, an ap pellate court l ost j urisdi ction onc e a petitioner

left th e co unt ry. See 8 U .S.C . § 1105a(c) (19 94)

. Thus, be fore IIRIRA, an
a lienwas forced to choos e between exerci sing his ri ght to appe al and t aking adva ntage of voluntarydepar ture. Becaus e IIR IRA eliminates t

his concern, Reynoso
was free t o vo lu ntarily dep art and still pursue a peti tionfo r r ev ie w, prese rving his appe llate righ ts. See Za zueta -Car rillo , 322 F.3d at 117 1; Mo ore v. Ashcroft , 251 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 20 01); Tap iaGar ci a v . I NS , 237 F.3d 1216 (10t

h Cir . 200 1).

C.
A number of cir cuits addressing the voluntary de p arture iss ue ha ve sim ilarly found that t

heylack j urisdi ctionto exte nd
a voluntar

y depar ture or der. I n Nkacoang v. INS , the Eleventh Circuit s tres sed the factthat Congre ss has not empowered the
cour ts of app eals to reinstate voluntary dep art ure orders t

hat have expi red. 83 F.3d 353, 357 (11t

h Cir. 1996 ). The C ourt held that ab sent ex plicit C ongressi onal empowerment to act , an appel lat e court lacks the jurisdictio nal au thority to exte nd
or reins tate vol untary d ep ar tu re . S im ila rly, in Cas tane da v. INS , the Ten th Circ uit held th a t it la ck edth e authorit

yto re vi ew a request for reinstateme nt of a vo luntary departure order, stat ing t hat “none of t he perti nent statu tes . . . p rovi de an y basis whatsoeverfor t hi s c ourt t o as sum e autho rityfor affording the di sc re tio na ry, administ rati ve relie f so ugh t by pe tition er.” 23 F.3d 1576, 158 0 (10 th Cir. 1994) . The Ten th Circu it went on to rei terat e that “[i]f
an act can be pe rform ed by a [ fede ral]
cour t, it i s because i t was permit ted and not be cau se it

was not prohi bited by Congress. Fed eral co urts op erate o nly in the presence r ather t

han the abse nce of statutoryauthori ty .” Id. at 1580 (i nternal citationand quo ta tion s om itted ). In Kac zmarc zyk v. INS , t he Sev enth Circuit

af fir med an order of deportation and held that the Court lac ked juri sdiction to r einstate or extend voluntary departur e, thus re quiri ng the al ien to fil e a motion w ith t

he INS district director request ing reinstatement o f voluntary departur e. 933 F.2d 588 , 598 (7t h Cir. 1991), cert. denied , 502 U .S. 981 (199 1). The Seven th Circuit did no te its concern that the I NS m ight use its discretionary autho rityto dis co ura ge peti tioner s from seeking judici al review. The Court st ated that “[d] e portabl e ali ens should not be8

face d with the c hoice bet ween enjoy ing the voluntary departur e privi lege and securi ng judicia l review of B oard determ ination s;” thus “[s ]h oul d i t c ome to our at tenti on that the INS is wie lding its d iscretion to with hold voluntary departure [in order] to det e r applic ants fr om seeking revi ew of BIA de cis io ns , ou r sc ru tin y of that discretionary exerci se might expand.” Id. (cit ationomitted). Ho wev er, as discuss ed above, the pass age of II RIRA has elimi natedthis concern as a liens may now pursue their ap peals from abroad, avoiding their having to c hoose between exer cisi ng their right to a ppea l and ta kin g volun tary dep artu re. The Ninth Circuit also a ddressed this issue in Za zue ta-Carrill o v. Ashcroft , in which it ove rrul ed its previous decisi on in Con tr er as -Ar ag on v . I NS and h eld tha t, in light of IIRIRA, appel late c ou rts l ack autho rityto reins tate voluntar y depar ture. 322 F.3d at 1172

. In Contreras -Aragon v. INS , the Ninth Ci rcuit

had held that when
an appeals co urt otherwise has jur isdi ction
over a finalorder of depor tati on it may reinstate a gr ant of volun tary departure origina llyentere d by

th e I J and B IA. 852 F.2d 1088, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1988) . After II RIRA, how e ve r, the N inth C ircuit reconsi deredits de ci sion i n ContrerasAragon and con clud ed that a petitioner’s voluntary departur e period begins when an IJ or the BIA e nters its order gr anting volunt ary dep artu re. See Zaz ueta-C arrillo , 322 F.3d at 1168. The Zaz ueta-C arrillo Cou rt ex a mined the r ationa les on which Contreras -Aragon reli ed, and concluded that these r ationa les w ere no long er valid in th e co ntex t of I IRI RA

. Examining the releva nt imm igratio n stat utes an d regulations pos t- II RIRA, the Nin th Circ uit held that ap pellate c ourts lack th e auth ority to extend the tim e period fo r voluntary dep artur e, and that aliens g ra nte d voluntary depa rture m ust co ntinue th ei r app eals fro m a bro ad. Id. Wh ile other circuit s have taken the opp osite stance, ho lding t hat the y have autho rityto rei n stat e voluntarydepartur e, these hol d ings pre date II RIRA. For
ex amp le , the Fourt

h Circuit in Ramsay v. INS held th at an a ppella te cou rt shou ld extendvolu nta ry depa rture w hen ( 1) it finds that the INS has u sed its d iscretion to with hold voluntar

y depar ture i n or d er to deter applicants f

ro m seeking judi cial review of BIA de ci si ons ; and ( 2) th e INS does not indi cate t hat it will pr esent t

he distri ct director with any other r eason for refusi ng reins tate ment. 14 F. 3d at 213 (in t ernal quotati on marks and cit ations omitted). Sim ilarly , in Umanzor-Alvarado
v. INS , the F irst Circu it held that it had the autho rityto extend v oluntary depart ur e when the I NS o ffered no evi dence suggesting th atth e al ie n ha d be come ineligib le for d epartu re in the interim between the BIA ’s opinion and t he appe llate court’ s opini on. 896 F.2d14, 16 (1st Cir. 19 90); see also Aiyadur ai v. INS , 68 3 F .2d 1195, 1201 ( 8th Cir. 1982) (restoring voluntar

y depar ture s tatus desp ite the fa ct t ha t thi s iss ue was not rais ed on appeal, and noting th at the petitioner

“qualified fo r voluntary stat us at the

. . . deportation hearing and there is no indicationin the record t hat she does not9

con tinu e to q ualif

y”). The arguments pr esented by the Fou rth and First

Circu i ts , i n pr e- II RIRA decisions, are un persu asive in l ight of t he plain language of t

he INA, as amended by II RIRA. As d iscusse d abo ve, the Fou rth Circuit’s co nc ern tha t t

he INS may use its discr etionover volu nta ry departu re in orderto dete r judicia l rev iew of BIA d ecisi ons was e li min at ed b y II RIRA ’ s provisi on that ap pellate c ourts re tain juri sdict ion over an alien’s appeal aft er he has dep arted the c oun try.

In additi on, both t

he F ourth and FirstCircuit s conclude t hat the re is no reasonfor an appe llate cour t not to tollthe initial departure period gr anted by an IJ or the BIA when the INS has offe red no evidence to suggest

that t he ali en had bec ome ineligib le for voluntary departure during the cou rse o f the app eal. See Ramsay v. INS , 14 F.3dat 213 ; Um anzorAlva ra do v. INS , 896 F .2d at 1 6. Th is approach, how ever, c onf li c ts wit h the spec ific procedures providedf or in t he stat ute. Whether the r elie f sought by Reyno so in th is appeal i s charact erize d as a “reins tate ment and extens ion” of th e voluntar y departure period or as a “toll i ng,” the e ffe ct is th e sa me

. See Zaz ueta-C arrillo , 322 F.3d at 1176 (Berzon, J., co ncu rring ). The INA is cl ear that this ty pe of reli ef may onl y be s ought from the dis tri ct di rect or. Further, as the Ten th Ci rc uit poi nts out , the approach of the Ramsay and Uman zo r- Al varado Cour t s misplace s the burden of persuasi on in a petition for exte nsion of volun tary departur e, as the INS does not bear t he burden of showing an alie n to be ine ligible for volun tar y de pa rtu re . O n t he co nt ra ry, “it is the alien wh o bears the burden of p rovi ng statutory eligibili ty for this form of reli ef and demon strating th at it is
w arra nted .” Castaneda , 23 F .3d at 1 58 2 ( citing Ri ve ra -Z ur it a v . I NS , 946 F.2d 118, 1 20 (10th Cir. 19 91) (in ternal q uotatio n s om itted )).
Fi na lly, the policy

co nsider ation s surroundi ng voluntary departure s upport
our conclusi on that Congre ss did not intend for appel late c o urts to have autho rityto exte nd voluntar y depart ure orders. These co nsid erati ons were stated by the N inth C ircuit as follow s: Th e purpos e of a utho rizin g voluntary departur e in li eu of depo rtation is to effect the alien’s prompt departur e without f urther troub le to the Serv ice . Both the alie ns and the Servic e ben efit th er eb y. But if the alie n does not depart promptly, so that t he Service becomes involved in furthe r and
m ore co stl y pr oc ed ur es by hi s attem pts to contin ue his ill egal st ay here, the ori ginal be nef it to the Service is lost. And if, after years of delay, he is again rewarded with the opportuni ty

for volunt ar y departur e wh ich he has p reviou sly spurned, what incent ive is there f or anyalien si milarly ci rc ums tance d to depart prom ptly wh en fir s t given the oppor

tun it y?10

See Zazuet a- Carr illo , 322 F.3d at 1173 ( quoting Balleni lla- Gonzalez v

. INS , 546 F.2d 515, 521 (2d Cir. 197 6)). If voluntary depar ture period s cou ld be e xtend ed un til after the completi on of

an ap peal, it w ould discour age prompt depart ure and ev e n encourage frivolo us ap peals in an att empt to continue e xtending a n alien’s depa rture date. Id. at 1173-74. This r esult wo uld confli ct wit h th e INS’ goal of having expedit ious remo val pro ceed ings. T his goal und erlies vo lunta ry d epartu re, and is refle ctedin the clear pro cedu res for extend in g voluntar

y depar ture s et out by Co ngr ess in IIR IRA

.

IV. Th e BIA’s order affirming the IJ’ s denial of Reynoso’s a p plication for
as y lu m, withholdi ng of removal, and protection under the Convention A gainst Torture is affirmed. Und er th e INA, we lackjuri sdict ion to r einst ate the IJ’s grant of voluntar

y de pa rtur e and to ext end Re ynoso ’s da te fo r de par ture

.