1 Ten n. R. Ct. App . 10 states:
Th is Co urt, with the c onc urren ce of a ll judge s partic ipating in the cas e, may affirm, rev erse o r mo dify the act ions of t

he t ria l cou rt bymemorandu m opini on when a formal opi nion woul d h ave no preceden tial

value. When a case is decided by memo randum opinion it shallbe design ate d “MEMORANDU M OPIN IO N,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason i n any un relat ed case. 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE Februar y 13, 2 003 Session STEPHEN MORGAN v. PAULA MORGAN Appeal from the Chancery Court for Robertson County No. 14647 Carol A. Catalano, Chancellor

No. M2002-00793-COA-R3-CV

H usband and Wife were declared divorced on the basis of stipulated grounds. Wife appeals th e classification and division of the property . We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed and Remanded
P AT RICIA J. C OTT RELL , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which B EN H. C ANT RELL , P.J., M.S., and M ARIE TTA M. S HIPLEY , S P
. J., joined. Thomas F. Bloom, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appe llant, Paula L. Morgan. Joe R. Johnson, II, Springfield, Tenne ssee, for the appellee, Stephen F. Morg an. MEMORAN

DUM OP

INION 1 Stephen F. Morgan

(“Husba nd”) and Paula L. Morgan (“

Wife”) were married on August 8, 1997. It was the fo urth m arriage for Hu sband and th e thir d for W ife. A t the t ime of the ma rriage Husbandwas 43 and Wife was 31. The marriage was rocky

fro m the beginning , and the parties separated twice beforedivorce proceedings were finally initiated. They

separa ted for th e first tim e in April of 1998 and reconciled sometime at the end of that year. T

he separated for the second and final time in March of 1999. They lived together as husband a nd wife for a total of seventeen months.2 W ife’s $15,667. 67 repre sent ed hershar e of the proceeds of a cl ass act ion la wsuit

agains t Circ le K Stores , Inc. The tri al c ourt

foun d tha t Wife had prov ided $15, 000 of this money to Husband and that neit her party knew where the mon ey wen t. The re was none left at the time of trial.

3 The bankruptcy plan provided for full payment of creditors throug h the sale of assets a nd with $100,00 0 M r. M orga n bo rrow ed fro m his fam ily trust. -2- When the couple got married, Husband was a farmer; he owned and worked his own dairy farm in Portland, Tennessee. Wife, on the other hand, entered the marriage with a N issan Sentra and separa te property of $15,666.67. 2 Wife also brought with her a daughter f rom a previous relationship. Wife did no t work dur ing the marria

ge, but befo re her marriage to Husband, Wife worked at various jobs that paid at or near minimum wage. Husbandtestifie d that his f arming operati on was fin ancially sound at the time the couple was married , but that he bega

n to experi ence financial

difficul ty in 1997 or 1998. Husband stated that his costs and expenses rose with the addition of Wife and her daughter to his household and tha t the increased expenses offset any g ains in gross profits. H e also fe lt that his new marriage distracted him s omewhat from his farming. His financial difficulties culminated in 1999 whe n he filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy. Wife, howe ver, alleges that Hu sb and only decla red bankruptcy

after she refused to renew their re lationship and disag rees tha t his financial situation was anything but sound. The trial court specifically found that Wife was aware at the time of the marriage that Husband was $4 00 ,0 00 in de bt an d t ha t e ve n a ft er th e b an kr up tc y Hu sb an d w ou ld ow e c on si de ra bl e m on ey. 3
Husband f

iled for d ivorce in May

of 1999 on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct andirreconcilable differences. Wife filed for temporary

support and Husbandwas ordered to pay support in the amount of $150 per week. The couple’s re lationship had deteriorated so much at this pointthat Husband was arrested for assault and Wife wa s arrested for vandalism; there were mutual restra ining orders to keep the two from being in contact with each other. Wife filed a countercomplaint for divorce in August of 1999, seeking a divorc e on the g

rounds of inapprop riate marital conduct, adultery , and irreconcilable difference s. She also sought spousal support. The bankruptcy c ourt entered an agreed or der gr anting r elief fr om the aut

omatic sta

y to permit Wife to proceed in the divorce proceeding s and also ordered thetrustee t o disburse

$10,000 of the fu nds to the Ch ancery

Court. The

$10,000 r

eprese nts a portion of the money r eceived after an auction o f farm equipment. The bank ruptcy court or der specif ied t hat it did “not reflect any agreement

by the parties that the D ebtor’s wife has an interest in farm equipment sold at auction in this Chapter 1 2, and fu

rther do es not limit t

he wife t o a maximum of

$10,000 f or her ma rital inte rest in this farm equipment.” The trial court heard testimony on January 3, 2002. The par ties stipulated that grounds for divorce existed. Asa

result, the trial court declared the parties divorced, classified and divided the marital and separate prope rty, and handled all other matters then pending. The trial cour t made extensive factual findings and specifically held:4 Th is is a differen t settleme nt from that W ife rece ived in the Circ le K la wsuit. T he re cord i s devoi d of

testi mony regardi ng the a mount of t his s ettl ement. Wife was quest ioned about her recent involvemen t in a lawsuit against Roberts on County i n which she sough t $550,000 in damages . She was prohibited by the settlement agreemen t fro m discu ssing the te rms o f the settlem ent. -3- That Ms. Morg an be aw arded a judgmen t in the amo

unt o f $3, 662.44 from Mr. Morgan for which executio n may issue for unpaid me dical bill s incurr ed by Ms. Morgan. This amount sha ll be paid out of funds withhel d by the bankruptcy trustee. That Ms. Morgan

be awar ded a judg

ment from

Mr. Morg an in

the amount of $923 for past due spousal support. Further, that this amount shall be paid out of monies set aside by the bankr

uptcy trustee. That the following items of marital property be awarded to Ms. Morgan: the bedroom suite, computer, computer cha ir, dining room set, and household goods purchased by the parties during their marriag e. That the 1998 Isuzu be awarded to Ms. Morgan. That the John Deere Trac to r, an d a ny proceeds from the sale of said tractor, be awarded to Mr. Morgan.

. . . . That the following items be awarded to Ms. Morgan as her separate property : the gifts of Mr. Morgan, the sofa, the washer , the dryer , and the refrigerat or; her prema rital dinette set; and the settlement she received from Robertson Count y in her lawsuit a gainst Ro be rt so n C ou nt y. 4 That the Court awards Ms. Morgan the sum of $2,500 from

the $10,000 se

t side by the bankr uptcy court. That all of t

he real estate be awarded to Mr. Morgan. That Ms. Morg an’s request tha t Mr. Morgan provide health insurance be denied.
A subsequent agreed order wa s entered clarify ing the distribution of the $10,000 sent by the bankruptcy

trustee and held by

the clerk: Wife was to received a total of $7,085.44, representing the judgmen ts for unpaid medical bills and past due pendente lite spousal support as well as the $2,500 awarded Wife as her share of the marital property

. Husband w as to receive the balance of $2,914.56.
Wife appeals , arguing that the trial court: (1 ) did not a

ward he r an equi ta ble share of the marital property; (2) erred in finding that the John De ere Tra

ctor did not increase in value during the marriage; and(3) err

ed in dete rmining that she d

id not subst

antially contribute to the preservation and appreciation of the farming ope ration based solely on the shor t duration of the marriage. I. Cla ssificat

ion of Mar

ital and Se

parate Property Upon the dissolu

tion of a ma

rriag e, court s are ca

lled upon t

o divide the assetsth e parties accumulated

during the marriage. Such decisions are very fact-specific, and many

circumstances-4-

surrounding the prope

rty , the par

ties, and the marr iage it self play a role. T he task involves several steps, the first being to de

termine w

hether a n asset is s ubject to

division a

t all. Tennessee, bei ng a “ du al pr op er ty” st at e, re co gn iz es tw o d is ti nc t c la ss es of pr op er ty: “marital propert

y” and “sep arate

property.” Batson v. Batson , 769 S.W.2d 849, 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). Separate property

is not part of the marital estate subject to division. Cutsinger v. Cutsinger , 917 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly , when it comes to dividing a divorcing couple’s property, the

court should initially identify the separate property , if any, belong ing to each party. Anderton v. Anderton , 988 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). The gener al rules f or deter mining wh

ether pr operty is separate or maritalare found in statute. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-4-121(b)(1 ) & -121( b)(2). Prope rty owned by one spo use be fore m arriage is separate property . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A). Additionally, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( b) (2 )( C) ap pr ec ia ti on of pr op er ty a cq ui re d b efor e m ar ri ag e i s s ep ar at e p ro pe rt y, unless it is properly classified as marital property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1), which pr ovides in r

elevant part: (B) Marital property

includes income from, and any increase i n value du ring the marri age of, property de termined to be sepa

rate prop erty

in accor dance with subdivision (b)(2) if each party substantia

lly c ontribute d to it s p reservation and appreciation . . . . (C ) As used in this subsection “substantial contribution” may include, but not be limited to, the direct or ind irect contr ibut ions of a sp ouse a s a hom emaker , wage earner, parent, or family

financi al manag er, tog ether wi th suc h factors as the court having jurisdiction thereof may determine. Every increase in value during

the marriage does not constitute marital propert y. I t is only where the spouse has made substantial contributions toward the preservation or appreciation of the propert y that the statute operates. Harrison v. Harrison , 912 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tenn. 1 995). Cour ts require some link between the spouse’smarital e fforts a nd the app

reciati on of the s eparat

e propert y before that apprec ia tion is considered marital property

. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt , 81 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tenn. 2002). Where, for example, the appreciation is due solely to market factors and not to effortsof either spouse, the increase in value will not be considered marital property. Id. Indirect contributions by one party that allow the other party to pa y for the prope

r ty or asset constitute a substantial contribution to the preservationand appreciation of the property

. Brown v. B rown , 913 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). Where the non-owner spouse proves that he or she ha s contributedsubstantially to the appreciation or preservation of the ot he r s po us e’ s s ep ar at e p ro pe rt y, the entire a

mount of the appreciatio n in the s ep ar at e p ro pe rt y wi ll be tr ea te d a s m ar it al pr op er ty. Harrison , 912 S.W.2d at 127.-5- A. One-Half Inte

rest in the 118 Acre Farm Prior to the marriage, Husband own ed s everal pieces o f real e state, inc luding a one-half interest in the 118 acre tract wh ere Husband c arried on a dairy farming operation and where the parties lived. Du

ring the bankrup tcy

procee dings, the trustee sold at least one piece of property other than the 118 acre tract. Husband was allowed to keep the 118 acre tract at the conclusion of the ba nk ru pt cy. Additionally, in order to be dischar ged fr om bankrup tcy , Husband was req uired to borrow from his f

amily ’s limited p artner ship $103,000 against his real property . The record does not indica te how much of that w as attributable to the 118 ac

re tract. Husband’s interest in the 118 acre tract had a value of $88,500 in 1997, with a mortgage of approxima

tely $49,355. Its value at the time of trial was$103,250, witha mortgage encumbra nce of $46,000. On appeal, Wife asserts thefarm increased in value during the ma rriage in the amount of $18,605 and that this increase is marital property . However, at the end of the trial, the following exch ange took place regarding H usband’s real estate

and specifically

the 118 acre tract of farmland: Court: The

re is no evidence

of what th

e incre ase in va

lue is. Counsel for

Wife: There’s no - - we

are tak ing no po sition. I

f there ’s any

increa se in value on the property , it would only be because of the increase in real estate. And Ms. Morgan could not say that she substantially contributed to that, so that’s not been our position. It’s simply a

n indication of what

the separate property

of the husband is. Court: Well, and the Court acknowledges Ms. Morgan ’s acknowl edgmen t that all of that is separate property and awards it to him. This stated po si tio n is consis tent with Wif e’s Pret rial State ment listing

the part ies’ asse ts wh er ei n s he di d n ot cl ai m a ny i nc re as e i n t he va lu e o f t he re al pr op er ty a s m ar it al pr op er ty. Contrary to the posi

tion take n in the tri al court , on appe al, Wife in terpre ts the tr ial co urt’s ruling as holding that the increase in value of the far m was not ma rital pro perty because Wife did notsubstantially contribute to the preser vation and appreciation of the far m. Wife disputes that factual holding. In its final order, the trial court f ound: That the parties lived together as husband and wife a total of about a yea

r and a half. Further, that Ms. Mo

rgan d id little of the farm work, and that Mr. Morgan performed a majority of the work on the f arm land. Furthermore , that Ms. Morgan has continuo usly

resided in the home of the parties with her daughte r by a pre

viou s relation ship since August 1997 to present. And, during some period of that time, she hadher brother living with her. Ms. Morgan ha s therefore lived on this prope

rty 4 yearsand 4 month s, the re sult of a h usband a nd wife li ving tog ether le ss than 1 year-6-

anda half. All of the real estate is deemed by t he Court to

be Mr. Mor

gan’s s eparat

e property, a

nd is awarded to him as such.
We do not agree with Wife’s interpretation of this la nguage in view of the ea rlier quoted colloquy between the court and counsel for Wife. The

trial cou rt’s orde r did not a ddress the incr

ease in value of the property

as a separate issue it had to decide, presumably bec ause Wife had taken the position it was not. Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court ruled that Wife’s contributions we re no t s ub st an ti al an d, co ns eq ue nt ly, an y in cr ea se di d n ot qu al if y as ma ri ta l p ro pe rt y. Wife also arg

ues that th

e trial c ourt impro

perly consider ed the dur

ation of th

e marria ge in determining the proper classification of the incre ase in val ue. Again, we do not interpret the trial court’s statements regarding the time the couple spent together as relevant to any question of whether the increase in v alue was marital or separate proper ty. The court simply

did not address the classification of the increase in value because Wife had re presented that it was not an issue and co nc ed ed th at th e i nc re as e w as Hu sb an d’ s s ep ar at e p ro pe rt y. Ge ne ra ll y, this court will not entertain an issue on a ppeal th at was not raised in the court below. Simpson v. Frontier Cmty. Credit Union , 810 S.W.2d 147, 153 (T enn. 1 991) ( citi ng Lovell v. Metro. Gov’t , 696 S.W.2d 2 (Tenn. 1 985)); Davis v. Tennessean , 83 S.W.3d 125, 127 ( Tenn. Ct. App. 200 1); H

arlan v. Hardaway , 796 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Numerous Tennessee cases hold that an issue raised for the first time on appeal is waived. See, e.g., Norton v. McCaskill , 12 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tenn. 2000); Lawrence v. Stanfor

d , 655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 198 3) ( not in g, “ It

has long been the gener

al rule that questions not raised in the trial court will not be enterta ined on ap

peal . . .”). An issue not presented to, decided, or dealt with by the trial court will not be considered by appellate court s. In r e Adoption of a Femal

e Child , 42 S.W.3d 26, 32 (Tenn. 2 001); Reid v. S

tate , 9 S.W.3d 788, 796 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Wife didnot present to the trial court the issue of whether the increa se in value of the farm was marital o

r separ ateproperty a

nd did not give the trial court the opportunity to rule on tha t issue. Co ns eq ue nt ly, we will not consider this issue. Additiona lly, Tenn. R. A

pp. P. 36 provides “Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief

be granted to a party

responsible for an error or who failedto take wha

tever a ction wasreasona

bly availab le to prevent or nullify the ha rmful effect of an error.” To the extent the trial court’sgrant o f the land to Husba nd as his se

parate property c ould be construedas based on an incorrect implicit classification of the increa se in value, Wife caused that error, and is not entitled to the relief she r equests. Accord

ingly , we dec line to grant Ms. Morgan the relief she requests with regar d to being awarded a portion of the incre ase in value of the farm.5 The equi pment nett ed a total of $82,246.15, and the fun ds wer e dis tri buted to cr edit ors, wit h th e exce pti on of the $10,000 that was sent to the t rial court her ein for dist ribution. -7- B. The John Deere Tractor Prior to the marriage, Husband also owned a numbe r of pieces of farm equipment. The farm equipmen t, or some of it, was sold by the bankr uptcy trustee. 5 Included in that machinery was a John Deeretractor, which

sold fo r $38,750. Wife does not dispute that the tractor and other equipment were Husband’ s separa

te prope rty . Rather, she claims that the increa se in

the value of

the tractor was marital pr op er ty. The trial court found there was no increase in the value during the marriage, and in fact there was still existing a debt attributable to the tractor. Wife asserts that finding is in error. Wife’s position is based upon the argument that if married parties reduce the debt onone spouse’s separa te property throug

h their j oint efforts s o that the equity is increa sed, that equity is marital property, re

lying on Cohen v. Cohen , 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996). Husbandbough t the tractor in 1992 for $62,000, and paid $10,000 down at that time. He testified he made semiannual pay ments of $7,000, although other factors would indicate that $7,000 might be a y early total. He also made the final pay ment of approximately $10,000 from the proc eeds of loans he took out on his life insurance policies. Wife argues that, at the time of the ma rriag e Husbandowed a

pproximate

ly $30,000 which was paid off during the marriage through use of marital funds and the $1 0,000 loa ns, which arestill outstanding. Thus, Wife argues, when the tractor wa s sold at auctio n by

the bankr uptcy trustee f or $38,75 0, $28,750

repres ented eq

uity as marita l proper ty and should have been divided between the parties. Wife’s position tha

t approxima

te ly $30, 000 was owed on the tractor at the time of the marriage is based upon an entry in Husband’s 1997 financial statement for $30,000 to John Deere Credit. Husband testified this entry wa s not relatedto the tractor, but was a note for feed, fertilizer, andsupplies purchased at Rober tson County

Co-op which was fina

nced thr ough John D eere Cr

edit. Contrary to assertions made in his brief, Husband did not testify that he paid off

the tractor before the marriage. Rather, he testified he paid it off prior to the bankr uptcy, but could not remember

exactly when the loan wa s paid i n full. H owever, in identify ing an insurance policy statement showing the cash value and other information re garding the policy as of February , 1999, Husbandtestified that the statement predated the loan he ma

de to pay off the

tractor. Thus, we can conclude that the tractor was paid off after F ebruar y 1 999 and be

fore he filed ba nkruptcy later in 1999. Thus, at most, Husband made three or four semiannual pay ments during the marriage using farming operation money that Wife a sserts weremarital funds. Because noevidence was introduced of the terms of the loan, such as the interest rate, and no more speci fic evidenc e of the actual pay ments, it is impossible to calculate what percentage of the ove rall inc re ase in equity may have6 The $62, 0 00 purchase price was reduced by two $1 0,000 payments from Husb and’s separate property; t he parti es were m arried for 2 o f the 7 yea rs of the lo an; and 2/7 o f the $4 2,00 0 of p rincipa l paid oth e r than by the two $10,000 payments i s $12,000. That amount is 19. 4% of the tot al purch ase pri ce. 7 20% of $38,750 i s $7, 750. -8- occurred during the marriage. Our be st estimate is approximately 20%. 6 Thus, eve n if we we

re to agree that the $38,750 the tractor bought at auction was equity, the maximum portion of that amount that could logically

be characterized as an increa se attributable to marital efforts is $7,750. 7
In any eve nt, the proceeds from the tractor were combinedwith the proceeds from other farm equipment

to pay credito rs. Thus, to the exten

t pay ments on the tractor were made, as Wife as serts, from proceeds of the farming oper ation, the recov ered equity in the tractor w as used to repay expenses of that

operation. Consequently, viewing the entire operation as a whole, it is clear there was no surplusand no va lue to the overall operati on. Thus, th e trial court’s conclusion there was no value to the tractor, but instead an outstandingdebt on it because of the insurance loan, is easily understood.
For purposes of our examination of the equity of the division of marital property , Wife’s final issue, we will consider the $7,750 as includable in the marital estate.
II . Equitabl e Division

of the Ma

rital Esta te Fi na ll y, Wife argues that the trial court erred by failing to award

her an equitable share of the marital property. After classification of the parties’ property as either marital or separate, the trial court is charged with equitably dividing , distribu ting, or assigning the ma

rital pro perty in “proportions as the court deems just.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1). The court is to consider several factors in its distribution. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) (listing the factor s to be considered). The court may conside r any other

factors necessary

in determining the equities between the parties, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(11), except that division of the marital prope rty is to be made without regard to marital fault. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121(a)(1).
A t rial cou

rt’s division of marital property is not rende red inequitable simply bec ause it i s notprecisely equal. Cohen , 937 S.W.2d at 832; Kinard v. Ki nard , 986 S.W.2d 220, 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Similarly, equity does not req uire that each party receive a share of every piece of marital property. King v. King , 986 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Brown , 913 S.W.2d at 168. The overall equity

in the division of

marital p roperty is dependent on the facts of each ca se. The fairness of a particular division of property betwee n two divorcing par ties is judg ed upon its final results, Watte rs v. W atters , 959 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), and the trial court has a great deal of discretion

concerning the manner

in which it

divides ma

rital pro perty

. Smith v. S

mith , 984 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Ten n. Ct. App. 1997); Wallace v. W allace , 733 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. Ct

. App. 1987). Ap

pellate courts ordinar

ily d efer to the trial judge’ s decisio n unless it is inconsistent withth e f ac to rs in Te nn . C od e A nn . § 36 -4 -1 21 (c ), or is no t s up po rt ed by a preponderance of the evidence. Wilson v. Moore , 929 S.W.2d 3 67, 372 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 1996); Brown , 913 S.W.2d at 168.-9-

Among the fac tors to b e considered in distributing marital property are the duration of the marriage, the contribution of each party to marital and se

parate property , and the estate of each party at the time of the marriage. These fa ctors are considered in the rule often applied to mar riages of short duration that

division of

the prope rty should be made in

such a way

that “as nearly

as possible, places the part

ies in the s ame positi on they would hav e been in

had the marriage never

taken place.” Batson , 769 S.W.2d at 859. Relying on that princ iple, Wife asks that the cour t put her in

the same po si ti on as wh en sh e e nt er ed th e m ar ri ag e w it h a n a wa rd of at le as t $ 20 ,0 00 in ma ri ta l p ro pe rt y. The “marri age of short d

uration”principle

cannot be

interpre ted as en titling a party to leave a marri age in t

he same economic p osition he or she en tered it. Where fin ancial d ifficult ies arise during the marr

iage, t he marita l estate may

become s o depleted that it sim ply is not po ssible to restore a party’ s finances to its premarital level through distribution of that marital estate. Neither party in this marriag e can be restored exactly to their premarital financial position. The parties submitted pretrial statements listing marital and separate property . They ag reed that th e m ar it al pr op er ty inclu ded some o f the con tents of th

e home, sp ecifica

lly t he bedro om set, computer, computer

chair and desk , and hous ehold g oods. The trial cou rt awar ded all th is pr op er ty, plus dining room

furnitur e claime d by

Wife to be marital, t

o Wife. This property was not a ssigned a value by either party or the t rial cou rt, even though it repres ents the bulk of the marital a ssets remaining by

the time of

the trial

. Several other assets Wife claimed to be marital property were determined by

the court to have no value, and Wife has not appealed those rulings, with the exception of the incre ase in equity in the John Deere

tractor . Even wh

en the $7, 750 estima

ted incr ease in the equit y in the tractor is included in the marital estate, we find the tr ial court’s award to Husband of the proceeds of the sale of the tractor to be equitable in view of the relative contributions of each party to the fa

rming operation and the fact Husband still owes money he used to pay of

f the tractor. The trial court divi ded th e $10, 000 fu nd fro m the b ankru ptcy by awardi ng $ 2,5 00 to Wife and$7,500 to Husband. The $10,000 cam e from the proceeds from the sale of fa rm equipment Husbandhad acquired over the y ear s in his farming operation. I t is here that the trial court’s conclusi ons reg arding

the contr ibutions of

each to t he marita l estate i s releva

nt. A notherfactor

to be cons idered i s the valu e of the s eparat e proper ty o f each p arty . While Wife asserts Husband was able to retain at least his one-half inter est in the 118 acre tr

act, and also claims a value of $300,000 for all Husband’s separate property, she ove

rlooks the de bt or encumbrances associated wi th that property. I n addition, Wife failed to prove or even estimate a value for her separate property . That property inc luded items thatboth parties agreed were g ifts to Wife from Husband: a sectional sofa, a washer and dry er, and a refriger

ator. Her separa te prope rty also included some furnishings and other items she ownedbefore the marriage. I n addition, she had the procee ds from the

recent settleme nt of a lawsuit, and the amount of that settlement was not proved.-10-

The trial court made extensive findings of fact in this case and conside red all of the statutory factors in determining the distribution of marital property. The parties both entered the marriag e of short duration with financial shortcomings. The trial court found that Wife had the ability to seek employ ment, yet she chose

not to work and received

pendente lite support from Husband. Husband works and has a significant child supp ort oblig ation. The parties b othclaimed to make contributions towardthe marr

iage, y et their t estimony as to who w as respo nsible for the most amount

of work was co nt ra di ct or y. The trial court also found that Wife hadbeen allowed to live on and enjoy the marital residencefor over four years during the pendency of the divorce, while the couple only lived there as husband and wife for approximately seventeen months.
We do not find

th e d istribution of marital property to be e ither inequitable or unsupported by a preponderance of the evidenc e. Conseque ntly , we aff

irm the decision of

the trial court. We

also decline to awa rd Wi fe’s at torne y’s fees on appeal . We re mand t he caus e for an y further p roceed ings which may be necessary . Costs of the appeal are taxed to the appellant, Paula L . Morgan.

___________________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTREL L, JUDGE