Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 

Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 

SHAKA AMIR FARRAKHAN 

v. Record No. 060252 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 January 12, 2007 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 Virginia Code § 18.2-308(A) provides in part that it is 

unlawful for "any person" to carry "about his person, hidden 

from common observation . . . any dirk, bowie knife, 

switchblade knife, ballistic knife, machete, razor" or "any 

weapon of like kind as those enumerated in this subsection." 

A first offense violation of this code provision is a Class 1 

misdemeanor. Further, Code § 18.2-308.2 provides that it is a 

Class 6 felony for a previously convicted felon "to knowingly 

and intentionally carry about his person, hidden from common 

observation, any weapon described in subsection A of § 18.2-

308." In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of 

Appeals erred in holding that the knife carried by the 

defendant was a "weapon of like kind" under Code § 18.2-

308(A). 

I. Facts and Proceedings Below 

 On the morning of January 8, 2004, Shaka Amir Farrakhan 

("Farrakhan") entered a women's furnishings store. While 

Farrakhan looked at women's boots, the store manager "walked 
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to the front door, turned [her] back to the front door and 

started facing inside of the store." Farrakhan selected two 

shoe boxes and began to walk towards the front door. Seeing 

the store manager standing at the front of the store, 

Farrakhan commented: "Oh, look. You're over here waiting for 

me." 

 Farrakhan started to leave the store, and the store 

manager asked: "Sir, can I get my boots back, please?" At 

some point either before or after the store manager's 

question, Farrakhan "pulled out a knife from inside of his 

jacket." The store manager testified that it looked like a 

kitchen knife. Farrakhan jabbed the knife toward the store 

manager stating: "[G]et the fuck out of my way." The store 

manager then backed away from Farrakhan. Farrakhan exited the 

store with the boots, and the store manager "ran to call 911." 

After leaving the store, Farrakhan was apprehended by police. 

A knife was recovered from the sidewalk where the police had 

pursued Farrakhan. 

 Farrakhan was charged with one count of robbery and one 

count of possession of a concealed weapon "described in 

Virginia Code § 18.2-308A" "having previously been convicted 

of a felony offense." In the bench trial, upon the conclusion 

of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief and again at the 

conclusion of the presentation of all the evidence, Farrakhan 
3

moved to strike the concealed weapon charge because he 

maintained that the knife was not enumerated in Code § 18.2-

308(A) or a "weapon of like kind." The trial court found 

Farrakhan guilty of robbery* and possession of a concealed 

weapon by a felon. The trial court observed that the knife 

used by Farrakhan was "not a pen knife or a pocket knife or 

something else," but was a "kitchen knife" with a "long, thin 

blade." 

 Farrakhan appealed to the Court of Appeals, where his 

conviction was affirmed. Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, Record 

No. 1804-04-4 (November 29, 2005). Farrakhan appeals to this 

Court upon one assignment of error: 

 The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the 

erroneous rulings of the trial court in not 

granting Defendant's motion to strike and in 

finding the evidence sufficient to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was 

guilty of possessing a concealed weapon by a 

convicted felon because the kitchen knife at 

issue is not a "weapon of like kind" for the 

purposes of VA CODE § 18.2-308(A). 

II. Analysis 

The construction of a statute is a question of law which 

we review de novo upon appeal. Dowling v. Rowan, 270 Va. 510, 

519, 621 S.E.2d 397, 401 (2005). Code § 18.2-308(A) is not a 

model of clarity. The interpretative history of the phrase 

 *

 Farrakhan's conviction upon the charge of robbery is not 

before us on appeal. 
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"weapon of like kind" in Code § 18.2-308(A) has proven to be 

problematic to trial and appellate courts of the Commonwealth. 

For example, in Ricks v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 442, 445, 

499 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1998), the Court of Appeals held that 

"the language of the statute does not provide that the purpose 

for carrying the knife is relevant. Rather, the physical 

characteristics of the knife determine whether the knife is a 

weapon contemplated by the statute." Two years later in 

Delcid v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 14, 18, 526 S.E.2d 273, 

275 (2000), the Court of Appeals held that a "determination 

whether a given bladed instrument is an implement or a weapon 

requires consideration not only of the physical character of 

the instrument itself, but also of the circumstances 

surrounding its possession and use." In 2005, the Court of 

Appeals in Ohin v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 194, 199, 622 

S.E.2d 784, 786 (2005), focused upon "a knife's weapon-like 

properties" and held that "[a] 'weapon of like kind' includes 

a knife that, while not possessing the exact physical 

properties of the enumerated knives, has the characteristics 

of a fighting knife just the same." The Court of Appeals 

added "[t]his focus on a knife's weapon-like properties 

'excludes from concealed weapons statutes innocuous household 

and industrial knives which may be carried for legitimate 
5

purposes.' " Id. Additionally, the Court of Appeals held in 

this case that: 

While nominally described as a "kitchen knife," 

the knife when viewed is more akin to a 

butcher's knife. It is 12 3/4 inches long with 

a sharp 7 3/4 inch blade that is finely honed 

and has a sharp point. It possesses, as 

discussed in Delcid, "unquestionable utility as 

a stabbing weapon." This was the threat posed 

by appellant. 

 In considering whether a knife is a 

"weapon of like kind" we look not only to the 

appearance of the instrument, but also to the 

purpose for which it was employed and the 

circumstances surrounding its use. 

Farrakhan v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1804-04-4, slip op. at 

7-8 (November 29, 2005) (internal citation omitted). 

In accordance with the principles of statutory 

construction of penal statutes, a court must not add to the 

words of the statute nor ignore the words of the statute and 

must strictly construe the statute and limit its application 

to cases falling clearly within the statute. Turner v. 

Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983). 

Additionally, it is a "settled principle of statutory 

construction that every part of a statute is presumed to have 

some effect and no part will be considered meaningless unless 

absolutely necessary." Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P'ship, 255 

Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998). The phrase "weapon 
6

of like kind" in Code § 18.2-308(A) must be interpreted 

consistent with these principles. 

Code § 18.2-308(A) includes numerous enumerated items, 

some of which are bladed, such as a dirk, bowie knife, 

switchblade knife, ballistic knife, machete, razor, and a 

"disc" or "throwing star" or "oriental dart" "having at least 

two points or pointed blades." Some enumerated items are 

without blades such as a slingshot, metal knucks, black jack, 

nun chuck, or fighting chain. Some enumerated items are 

designed for fighting purposes such as a dirk, bowie knife, or 

switchblade knife. Other enumerated items are not designed 

for fighting purposes, such as a machete or a razor, but 

unfortunately are now commonly understood to be "weapons." 

If the bladed item in question meets the definition of an 

enumerated item within Code § 18.2-308(A), the evidence is 

clearly sufficient for a conviction under the statute. 

Additionally, if the bladed item is not enumerated, 

concealment of the item may be proscribed by Code § 18.2-

308(A) if it is a "weapon of like kind." However, before 

examination of similar physical characteristics to enumerated 

items, the item in question must first be a "weapon." 

Clearly, the General Assembly did not intend all bladed 

items to fall within the proscription of Code § 18.2-308(A). 

The knife possessed by Farrakhan is an ordinary kitchen knife 
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with a blade sharpened on one side and a handle below. If a 

chef concealed the same ordinary kitchen knife and carried it 

to a restaurant, surely it was not the intention of the 

legislature to criminalize such conduct. The same difficulty 

occurs with other ordinary items as well. For example, does 

the office worker who purchases a letter opener and "conceals" 

it in the bag provided by the store violate the statute 

because of the item's resemblance to a "dirk?" 

Because an offense under Code § 18.2-308(A) is 

"possessory" in nature, it is committed upon concealment. 

Subsequent use or circumstances may not be considered in the 

definitional analysis of "weapon." Because we must strictly 

construe a penal statute, we hold that in order to be a 

"weapon" within the definition of "weapon of like kind," the 

item must be designed for fighting purposes or commonly 

understood to be a "weapon." Upon establishing that the item 

in question is a "weapon," the analysis continues to determine 

if the item possesses such similar characteristics to the 

enumerated items in the Code § 18.2-308(A) such that its 

concealment is prohibited. 

We hold that the kitchen knife possessed by Farrakhan is 

not a "weapon," because it is not designed for fighting 

purposes nor is it commonly understood to be a "weapon." 
8

Consequently, it is unnecessary in this case to compare its 

physical characteristics to the enumerated items. 

We are mindful that a kitchen knife is a potentially 

dangerous object, particularly in the hands of a person with 

criminal intent, but so also is an ordinary pocket knife or a 

letter opener. Here we are concerned with what is proscribed 

by statute as unlawful not simply what may be dangerous. We 

are compelled to interpret this statute in accordance with the 

principles of statutory construction recited herein. 

Conclusion

 We will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 

vacate the defendant's conviction for possession of a 

concealed weapon by a felon under Code § 18.2-308(A). 

Reversed and vacated.