# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 26 , 2017 *

Decided October 6, 2017

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK

, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE

, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON

, Circuit Judge

No. 16

- 3 190

ALVIN T. PERKINS , JR.

, Plaintiff

- Appellant

,

v

.

RANDY PFISTER and

SHERWIN MILES, Defendants

- Appellees

. Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern District

of Illinois, Eastern Division

.

No. 16

- C V

- 3563

Gary Feinerman

, Judge

.

O R D E R

Alvin Perkins, an Illinois inmate , is currently housed at Menard Correctional

Center . In 2016, while incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center, he brought t his

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the warden and an assistant warden at

* The defendants were not served with process in the dis trict court and are not participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide th is case without oral argument

because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C)

. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 16

- 3190 Page 2

Stateville enforce an unsafe policy requiring prisoners to wear wrist restraints behind

the ir back s during security lockdowns, even when using prison stairways. At screening

the district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and Perkins appeals. We affirm the judgment

. When Perkins first filed suit, he asked only for an injunction preventing him from being handcuff ed behind the back while using stairways. The defendants, he said, were continuing to apply a long

- standing policy of handcuffing inmates behind the back when moving the inmates

— even on stairs

— despi te a clear risk of injury. Perkins did not allege

that he had actually fallen or been physically injured . H e a lleg ed instead that the practice was leaving him mentally scarred because he could not use the handrails for support and feared falling. He identified four occasions over ten month s when he was forced to go down stai rs while cuffed behind the back and said that he nearly fell twice

. In dismissing Perkins’s complai nt

, the district court recognized that Pyles v. Fahim

, 771 F.3d 403, 410

– 11 (7th Cir. 2014), concluded that the risk of falling on slippery stairs is

not , by itself, serious enough to support a claim of deliberate indifference to inmate safety. The plaintiff in Pyles had not been restrained when he fell on the stairs, but the

district judge a lso pointed to a decision from the Northern District of Illinois

— a decision

that we later vacated on appeal

— in which the district court had concluded that “the risk of falling down slippery stairs, even while handcuffed, is not sufficiently serious to state an Eighth Amendment claim.” Anderson v. Morrison , No. 13 CV 8622, 2014 WL 6542760, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2014), vacated and remanded , 835 F.3d 681 (7th Ci r. 2016) (forcing prisoner to walk handcuffed and unaided down dangerously slick stairs posed unreasonable danger). On the basis of these decisions, the district court reasoned that even if Perkins had been physically injured, he could not plausibly claim that the defendants’ alleged policy violates the Eighth Amendment.

While Perkins was still at Stateville, he amended his complaint to demand, in

addition to an injunction, $1.8 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. To his prev ious allegations he added that on at least some occasions

, he wore a “ black box ” over his handcuffs

, his legs were shackled

, other inmates were in
line behind him, or his vision was blurred because of medication he takes. And one time,

Perkins said, the gu ards who were escorting him left the handcuffs on too long , causing needless pain.

The district court still found Perkins’s allegations lacking

. The judge repeated that handcuffing inmates behind the back during security lockdowns does not itself create a substantial risk of harm

. And, the judge explained, Perkins does not allege that the

warden or assistant warden knew about his blurred vision or w ere personally involvedNo. 16

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in the ir subordinates’ prolonged use of handcuffs on the one occasion Perkins complai ned about

.
Perkins’s initial objective in filing this lawsuit

— to prevent Stateville guards from cuffing him behind the back while using stairs

— is now beyond reach in this lawsuit

. Perkins has been transferred to a different Illinois prison, so his request for injunctive

relief is moot

. See Maddox v. Love , 655 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2011). Moreover, Perkins

could not be entitled to compensatory damages . He has not alleged any physical injury

, and he cannot recover solely for mental or emotional injury under th e Prison Litigation

Reform Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e ); Smith v. Peters , 631 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2011). So

all that remains of Perkins’s requested relief is hi s demand for $5 millio n in punitive damages.

We do no t agree with Perkins that , as a matter of law, the Eighth Amendment would be violated by a policy requiring inmates during periods of heightened security to navigate stairs while handcuff ed behind the back

. Even without the b enefit of this court’s opinion in Anderson , the district court correctly concluded that Perkins ha s not alleged a sufficiently serious risk of harm

. Our decision in Anderson

— which Perkins does not
address

— highlight s the much greater risk faced by that prisoner as compared to Perkins

. The plaintiff in Anderson , who also was at Stateville, allegedly fell and was knocked

unconscious while the defendant guards forced him to walk unassisted, w ith his hands

c uffed behind his back , down stairs that w ere slick with milk and for several days had

b een strewn with trash. 835 F.3d at 683. Perkins , on the other hand, simply alleges in this suit against prison administrators that the alleged handcuffing policy creates in all

circumstances an unwarranted risk s ufficien t to violate the E ighth Amendment.

Perkins’s allegations are less compelling than those we found lacking in Pyles

. As Perkins points out, handcuffs

— which were missing from Pyles

— did make his trips down

the stairs riskier. But the p laintiff in Pyles was navigating stairs that he used every time

he showered . B ecause they were so close to the showers, those stairs were always wet and slippery

. 7 71 F.3d at 405

. In c ontrast, Perkins allege s only that on the rare occasion s of security lockdown s

— four times in t en months

— he was at risk of falling because of a policy of handcuffing inmates behind the back before moving them through dry,

uncluttered stairwells.

Finally, the district court properly disregarded Perkins’s new a llegations concerning his blurry vision a nd the one instance of prolonged use of restraints. As to these allegations, Perkins does not allege personal involvement by either defendant, so they c ould not be held liable for those events even if Perkins might have had a claimNo. 16

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against guards who carri ed out the alleged handcuffing policy. See Gill v. City of

Milwaukee , 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017).

The judgment is AFFIRMED. Perkins has incurred two strikes for this litigation, one for filing a complaint that fails to state a claim and a second one for this appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).