alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         328,822
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               328,822
<PP&E>                                         344,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                 13,403
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1,187,703
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          0
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       11,697
<OTHER-SE>                                     867,491
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1,187,703
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               150,870
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             11,263
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (158,285)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (158,285)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (158,285)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.02)
        


</TABLE>
7

Regulatory Evaluation

Docket No. FAA-2012-1313 Directorate Identifier: 2012-NM-080-AD

If you make changes to the values in the table below, you must ensure the totals update accordingly. If 

they do not, click (or Tab) into and then out of the changed cell.

Estimated Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection, 

replacement)

Do not include oncondition costs here

Costs per Product (e.g., aircraft, engine, 

propeller, appliance)

Work-hours 

(include 

access, testing, 

and close-up)

Labor 

cost 

(@$85/h

our)

Parts Cost Total Costs 

(labor + 

parts)

Number of

U.S. 

Registered 

Products

Total Cost 

for U.S. Fleet

same as original 

AD $ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

The known number of products in compliance:

Total Costs of compliance for U.S. fleet: $ 0

Costs covered under warranty (if known) $

On-Condition Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection, 

replacement)

Work-hours 

(include access, 

testing, and closeup)

Labor cost 

(@$85/hour)

Parts Cost Cost per Product

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

Special considerations for Economic Analysis (Use this field to explain anything in the Estimated Costs table 

that was assumed or might not be obvious. This field can also be used to explain warranty costs):
8

Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES* NO 

*Explanation: 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant? 

YES* NO 

*Explanation: 

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Explain for 

either a Yes or No answer.

YES NO 

Explanation: 

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific requirements for 

aircraft operated in Alaska where aviation might be the only mode of transportation?

YES* NO 

*Explanation:
Date: 5- 3% -oS 

The presentation will be given by h)d~ 

o(d9 

Please call Janet Travis at (520) 562-2234 ext. 286 to confirm 

placement on the agenda. 

Thank-you 

I I 
GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY 

EXTREME FIRE HAZARD PROCLAMATION 

WHEREAS, public s River Indian Community 

have reached ex@ 

e hazard includ
#### HENDERSON v. STATE.

No. 15002.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 13, 1932.

M. L. Arrington, of Mineral Wells, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, J.

Conviction is for transporting intoxicating liquor; punishment being one year in the penitentiary.

The record contains neither statement of facts nor bills of exception. In such condition, no question is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS OF CLINTRIALS RESEARCH INC. FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          10,867
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   30,179
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                47,090
<PP&E>                                          55,394
<DEPRECIATION>                                  15,620
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 123,096
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           29,864
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           182
<OTHER-SE>                                      89,374
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   123,096
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                89,691
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   62,936
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                50,925
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  29
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (23,358)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (1,226)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (22,132)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (22,132)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (1.22)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (1.22)
        

</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Domingo Nunez-Mezon, Respondent.

Order unanimously reversed on the law, motion denied, indictment reinstated and matter remitted to Onondaga County Court for further proceedings on the indictment. Memorandum: County Court erred in finding that the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally insufficient to establish the offenses of criminal possession of a controlled substance, second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance, third degree, and conspiracy, second degree. The Grand Jury may indict when the People present evidence establishing a prima facie case and that there is reasonable cause to believe that the accused committed the crime to be charged *(see,*CPL 190.65 [1]; *People v Jennings,*69 NY2d 103; *People v Dunleavy,*41 AD2d 717, *affd*33 NY2d 573; *see also, People v Forde,*153 AD2d 466). Furthermore, on a motion to dismiss an indictment under CPL 210.20 (1) (b), the reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to the legal sufficiency of the evidence; the court may not examine the adequacy of the proof to establish reasonable cause because that inquiry is solely within the province of the Grand Jury *(People v Jennings, supra).*The sufficiency of the People’s presentation is properly determined by inquiring whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant conviction by *992a petit jury *(see, People v Pelchat,*62 NY2d 97, 105). A defendant, having moved to dismiss the indictment, bears the burden of making a clear showing that the evidence is insufficient *(People v Howell,*3 NY2d 672) and, until that burden is met, there is a presumption that the indictment is valid *(People v Forde,*153 AD2d 466, *supra).*

In the instant case, the People presented evidence that the defendant and codefendant met at an airport in New York City; that codefendant assisted the defendant in the purchase of an airline ticket to Syracuse; that defendant and codefendant sat next to one another on the airplane; that defendant and codefendant exited the plane together at journey’s end and took separate cabs to the same address; that codefendant possessed an envelope on which defendant had written his home address; that defendant denied knowing the codefendant following his arrest; and that 2.6 ounces of cocaine were found upon the codefendant following her arrest. In our view, the evidence before the Grand Jury established a prima facie case that there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed the crimes charged. Further, it was error for County Court to weigh the evidence and to conclude that defendant’s conduct was subject to innocent interpretation *(see, People v Jennings,*69 NY2d 103, 115, *supra).*(Appeal from order of Onondaga County Court, Mulroy, J.—dismiss indictment.) Present—Denman, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Davis and Lowery, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN THIS QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10Q.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                          11,402
<SECURITIES>                                    35,649
<RECEIVABLES>                                   21,760
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,792
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                69,611
<PP&E>                                          11,869
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,412
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  93,980
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           17,585
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           145
<OTHER-SE>                                      76,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    93,980
<SALES>                                         29,728
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                29,728
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    7,485
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                26,221
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   375
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,867)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,045)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,822)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,822)
<EPS-BASIC>                                   (0.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.13)


</TABLE>
exv10w41



 






Exhibit 10.41




Amendment #1 to Employee Services Agreement




     THIS AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYEE SERVICES AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) by and between Global
eXchange Services, Inc. (“GXS”) and G International, Inc. (“G International”)



RECITALS



A. GXS and G International are parties to an Employee Services Agreement, effective as of November
1, 2004 (the “Agreement”) pursuant to which GXS provides certain managements and professional
services to G International. Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined in this Amendment
have the meanings assigned to them in the Agreement.



B. The parties desire to set forth their agreement with respect to the modification of the
Agreement to extend the term thereof as set forth in this Amendment.




AGREEMENTS




     NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the agreements contained herein, the
Employee Services Agreement is hereby amended as follows:


Section 1. Term. Section 6.08 of the Agreement is hereby modified to provide that, the
Agreement is hereby extended through the end of the Payroll Period ending June 30, 2005, unless
sooner terminated by either party upon thirty (30) days prior written notice to the other party or
by the mutual written consent of the parties.



Section 2. Miscellaneous.




     2.1 Integration. This Amendment embodies the entire understanding of the parties
hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and supercedes all prior negotiations,
understandings and agreements among them with respect thereto. The provisions of this Amendment
may be waived, supplemented or amended only by an instrument in writing signed by each of Licensor
and Licensee.



     2.2 Counterparts. This Amendment may be executed in counterparts, each of which when
so executed and delivered shall be deemed an original and all of which together shall constitute
one and the same instrument.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties hereto has caused this Amendment to be executed and
delivered on its behalf by its duly authorized representative effective as of the date set forth
below.



	 	 	 
	GLOBAL EXCHANGE SERVICES, INC.

	 	G INTERNATIONAL, INC.
	 
	 	 
	By: /s/ Ann Addison

	 	By: /s/ Tom Thomas
	Name: Ann Addison

	 	Name: Tom Thomas
	Title: VP, Human Resources

	 	Title: President, GM
	Date: May 3, 2005

	 	Date: May 2, 2005
#### ROTHCHILD v. TURNER et al.

No. 2261.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

March 14, 1940.

Rehearing Denied April 4, 1940.

Lynn B. Griffith and Forrester Hancock, both of Waxahachie, and Willard McLaughlin and Leonard Gorin, both of Waco, for plaintiff in error.

W. M. Tidwell, of'Ennis, for defendants in error.

ALEXANDER, Justice.

The defendants in error have filed a motion to strike plaintiff in error’s brief and to affirm the judgment of the lower court because the brief was not filed within the time required by law. The judgment was entered in favor of the defendants in error against plaintiff in error on June 2, 1939, for the sum of $196.35. The cause was removed to this court by writ of error, the transcript being filed herein on the 20th of September, 1939. On the 11th of January, 1940, this court set the cause for submission for the 7th of March, 1940. Although the plaintiff in error was duly advised of the setting, he did not file his brief herein until March 5, 1940, which was not within the time provided by the statutes. R.S. art. 1846, as amended, Vernon’s Ann. Civ.St. art. 1846. No excuse has been given for the failure to file the briefs within the time required by law.

It is a very well established rule that a plaintiff in error’s unexcused failure to file briefs until after the time provided by law has expired requires the sustaining of a motion to strike the briefs and to affirm the judgment of the lower court. McGraw v. Broach, Tex.Civ.App., 46 S.W.2d 1056; Duncan v. Scott, Tex.Civ.App., 128 S.W.2d 136.

But if we were to consider plaintiff in error’s brief, the result would be the same. The only assignments of error and' propositions contained therein relate to alleged improper argument of counsel and the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of the jury. There is no bill of exception in the record concerning the alleged improper argument of counsel, and consequently, that assignment cannot be considered. 3 Tex.Jur. 581; Chandler v. Weimers, Tex.Civ.App., 4 S.W.2d 569. There is no statement of the facts introduced in the lower court, and, therefore, under well established rules and for obvious reasons, we cannot determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict. 3 Tex.Jur. 540; Treadwell v. Borchers, Tex.Civ.App., 289 S.W. 75.

Plaintiff in error’s brief will be stricken from the record, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1344 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1344

  To amend title 39, United States Code, to prevent the United States 
  Postal Service from disclosing the names or addresses of any postal 
       patrons or other persons, except under certain conditions.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 16, 1993

  Mr. Condit introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
               Committee on Post Office and Civil Service

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title 39, United States Code, to prevent the United States 
  Postal Service from disclosing the names or addresses of any postal 
       patrons or other persons, except under certain conditions.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Postal Privacy Act of 1993''.

SEC. 2. CONDITIONS FOR DISCLOSURE OF NAMES OR ADDRESSES.

    (a) In General.--Section 412 of title 39, United States Code, is 
amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 412. Conditions for disclosure of names or addresses
    ``(a) No officer or employee of the Postal Service may make 
available to the public by any means or for any purpose any names or 
addresses (past or present) of postal patrons or other persons, except 
as provided under subsection (b) or as otherwise specifically provided 
by law.
    ``(b) The Postal Service shall prescribe such regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out this section. Under the regulations, no 
disclosure described in subsection (a) shall be allowable except if, or 
to the extent that--
            ``(1) the disclosure consists of information which--
                    ``(A) relates to a change of address; and
                    ``(B) was obtained from a person in accordance with 
                subsection (c);
            ``(2) permission to disclose has not been denied under 
        subsection (c)(2); and
            ``(3) the disclosure would contribute to the efficiency of 
        postal operations.
    ``(c) Any form used by the Postal Service to obtain information 
from a person relating to a change of address shall include--
            ``(1) notice of the Postal Service's information practices 
        under this section, including how, and to whom, any information 
        furnished on such form may be disclosed; and
            ``(2) a means for such person to deny permission for the 
        Postal Service to disclose any information furnished on such 
        form.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 4 of 
title 39, United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating 
to section 412 and inserting the following:

``412. Conditions for disclosure of names or addresses.''.

                                 <all>
```
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 6295

MICHAEL S. OWL FEATHER

- GORBEY , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; STATE OF MARYLAND , Respondents

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore

. Richard D. Bennett , District Judge. ( 1:19

- cv - 00360

- RDB )

Submitted : June 25, 2019 Decided: July 1, 2019

Before RICHARDSON and RUSHING , Circuit Judges , and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge

.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Michael S. Gorbey , Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Michael S. Owl Feather

- Gorbey , a District of Columbia Code offender incarcerated at FCI Cumberland in Maryland , seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) habeas petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a ce rtificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). ∗ A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satis fies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2 003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Owl Feather

Gorbey has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

∗ Because Owl Feather

- Gorbey was convicted in a District of Columbia court, he is required to obtain a certificate of appealability in order to appeal the denial of his habeas petition. See Madley v. United States Parole Comm’n , 278 F.3d 1306, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2002).3 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
#### BUTLER v. STATE.

No. 20257.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 15, 1939.

Burt Barr, of Dallas, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Upon appellant’s plea of guilty of the offense of theft of property over the value of fifty dollars, and the waiver of a trial by jury, the court assessed his penalty at two years’ confinement in the penitentiary.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception, hence ' no question is presented for review. All matters of procedure appearing regular, the judgment will be affirmed.