J-S17017-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

DILPREET BAJWA

v.

IBRAHIM I. MAHMOUD AND AMIRA 

TIBIN 

Appellants

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2584 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered July 19, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 00831 February Term, 2018

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 07, 2019

Appellants, Ibrahim I. Mahmoud and Amira Tibin, appeal pro se from 

the order entered on July 19, 2018, which denied their petition to open default 

judgment. We affirm.

The trial court explained:

The underlying matter in this case is a dispute over damages 

to a home that [Plaintiff, Dilpreet Bajwa (hereinafter 

“Plaintiff”)] leased to [Appellants]. Plaintiff brought suit in 

Municipal Court. On January 16, 2018, the Municipal Court 

entered judgment for [Appellants]. Plaintiff appealed to the 

Court of Common Pleas on February 12, 2018. Plaintiff filed 

an affidavit averring that [Appellants] were personally served 

with [the] notice of appeal and [the] case management order 

on February 18, 2018. Plaintiff filed a complaint on March 6, 

2018 and certified that a copy of the complaint was served 

on [Appellants’] by first class mail. [Appellants] failed to file 

an answer within [20] days of receiving the complaint.

[The] parties attended a settlement conference on April 3, 

2018. The parties did not reach a resolution at the settlement 
J-S17017-19

- 2 -

conference. Plaintiff sent [Appellants] a notice of intent to 

enter default judgment on April 3, 2018. Plaintiff filed a 

praecipe to enter default judgment on April 17, 2018. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/18, at 1-2 (some capitalization omitted).

On April 23, 2018, Appellants filed a petition to open the default 

judgment. However, Appellants did not attach a responsive pleading to their

petition to open. See Pa.R.C.P. 237.3(a) (“A petition for relief from a 

judgment . . . of default . . . shall have attached thereto a copy of the . . . 

preliminary objections[] or answer which the petitioner seeks leave to file.”). 

On July 19, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Appellants’ petition and, at 

the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Appellants’ petition. 

Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.

1

 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court ordered Appellants to file and serve a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(b). Appellants listed the following claims in their Rule 

1925(b) statement: 

[1.] We acknowledge notice of appeal was received but the 

complaint was not, so we had no knowledge of it nor 

opportunity to respond to the complaint such that default 

should not have been entered. Especially in light of the fact 

we prevailed in the Municipal Court. [Plaintiff] has not 

presented evidence to the contrary that he properly served 

the complaint.

. . .

[2.] The judge did not make the decision based on law and 

evidence.

[3.] The judge argued that Amira Tibin and her petition to 

open default judgment was denied because she is not a 
J-S17017-19

- 3 -

Among other procedural violations in Appellants’ brief is the absence of 

a Rule 2116(a) statement. Normally, this would result in the automatic waiver 

____________________________________________

lawyer. [Appellants’] words should be taken into 

consideration equally as much as the Plaintiff’s lawyer.

[4.] The judge should ask both [Appellants] questions not 

just Amira, the judge did not ask Ibrahim any questions and 

immediately denied the petition to open default judgment 

before Ibrahim could defend himself against the Plaintiff’s 

lawyer’s claim that Ibrahim was given a copy of the complaint 

during the April 3rd conference.

[5.] The judge did not listen to [Appellants] when the 

Plaintiff’s lawyer said the supplement was added to the 

petition to open default judgment by Amira Tibin in May 

claiming that time was a factor, the judge should look at the 

evidence and know that time wasn’t a factor because 

[Appellants] filed a petition to open default judgment on April 

23rd, while the default judgment was entered on April 17th.

[6.] The judge asked Amira why she didn’t pay the Plaintiff 

the judgment money. The judge did not take Amira’s words 

that Amira doesn’t owe the landlord any [(illegible)] paid rent 

every month, moved on time, left the house in good 

condition, and paid the water bill. The Plaintiff removed parts 

of the original lease and submitted the edited version to the 

court.

. . .

[7.] The Plaintiff did not serve [Appellants] with any default 

judgment notice. The Plaintiff instead sent a letter stating 

that the Plaintiff served [Appellants] with the ten day notice 

of intent to enter default judgment on April 2nd, 2018 via first 

class mail.

Appellants’ Rule 1925(b) Statement, 9/12/18, at 1-7 (some capitalization 

omitted).
J-S17017-19

- 4 -

of Appellants’ claims on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“The statement of 

the questions involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved, 

expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary 

detail. The statement will be deemed to include every subsidiary question 

fairly comprised therein. No question will be considered unless it is 

stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested 

thereby.”) (emphasis added). However, as we are able to ascertain from 

Appellants’ brief that the crux of their argument is that the trial court erred in 

denying their petition to open the default judgment, we will address that 

issue.2

As our Supreme Court held in Schultz v. Erie Insurance Exchange: 

“A petition to open a judgment is addressed to the equitable powers of the 

court and is a matter of judicial discretion. The court will only exercise this 

discretion when (1) the petition has been promptly filed; (2) a meritorious 

defense can be shown; and (3) the failure to appear can be excused.” Schultz 

v. Erie Ins. Exch., 477 A.2d 471, 472 (Pa. 1984).

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.3, entitled “Relief from 

Judgment of Non Pros or by Default,” was adopted after our Supreme Court's 

opinion in Schultz. Rule 237.3 provides:

____________________________________________

2 See Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159, 1160 (Pa. Super. 1996) 

(noting that “this court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro 

se litigant,” but warning that an “appellant is not entitled to any particular 

advantage because she lacks legal training”) (quotations and citations 

omitted).
J-S17017-19

- 5 -

(a) A petition for relief from a judgment of non pros or of 

default entered pursuant to Rule 237.1 shall have attached 

thereto a copy of the complaint, preliminary objections, or 

answer which the petitioner seeks leave to file.

. . .

(b)(2) If the petition is filed within ten days after the entry of 

a default judgment on the docket, the court shall open the 

judgment if one or more of the proposed preliminary 

objections has merit or the proposed answer states a 

meritorious defense.

Pa.R.C.P. 237.3.

However, as the note to Rule 237.3 makes clear, “Rule 237.3 does not 

change the law of opening judgments;” rather, the three required elements, 

as specified by our Supreme Court in Schultz, are applicable to every petition 

to open a default judgment. Pa.R.C.P. 237.3 note. The effect of Rule 237.3 is 

simply that, when a party attaches a proposed answer or proposed preliminary 

objections to a petition to open, the rule “supplies two of the three requisites 

for opening such judgments by presupposing that a petition filed as provided 

by the rule is timely and with reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse for 

the inactivity or delay resulting in the entry of the judgment.” Pa.R.C.P. 237.3 

note.

In this case, Appellants did not attach a proposed responsive pleading 

to their petition to open. As such, Appellants’ “petition to open is not within 

the scope of Rule 237.3(b);” and, for Appellants to be entitled to relief, 

Appellants must “proceed pursuant to case law and meet the standards of 

Schultz.” Id. However, as the trial court explained, Appellants failed to meet 
J-S17017-19

- 6 -

the standards of Shultz because Appellants did not show that they have a 

meritorious defense to Plaintiff’s claims and Appellants did not demonstrate

that their “failure to appear can be excused.” See Schultz, 477 A.2d at 472. 

The trial court stated:

Here, [Appellants] have not submitted any evidence of a 

meritorious defense. [Appellants] claimed at the July 19, 

2018 hearing that they do not owe Plaintiff any money, but 

did not substantiate these claims.

Further, [Appellants] did not present an excuse for their 

failure to appear. [Appellants] claim they failed to appear 

because they were not served with Plaintiff’s complaint. 

However, an affidavit of service was filed on March 14, 2018, 

evidencing proper service. Moreover, [Appellant] Mahmoud 

attended the April 3, 2018 settlement conference. 

[Appellant] Mahmoud would only have known to attend the 

settlement conference because this information was served 

on him. [Appellant] Tibin even acknowledged that 

[Appellants] received something in the mail but stated “this 

does not apply to us.” 

Based on the above, [Appellants did not establish] . . . a 

meritorious defense[] or show[] that the [trial] court should 

excuse their failure to appear. Therefore, [Appellants did] 

not meet the requirements for the [trial] court to open the 

default judgment.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/18, at 3-4 (citations and some capitalization 

omitted).

We agree and conclude that the trial court did not err when it refused 

to open the default judgment against Appellants. 

Next, Appellants claim that the trial court erred in denying their petition 

to open because Plaintiff “did not serve [Appellants] with any default judgment 
J-S17017-19

- 7 -

notice.” Appellants’ Brief at 3-4. The record belies Appellants’ claim. 

Certainly, the docket entry for April 17, 2018 declares:

Praecipe for entry of default judgment filed. Judgment in 

favor of [Plaintiff] and against [Appellants] for failure to file 

answer within required time. Pro-prothonotary. Notice 

under Rule 236 given. Notice under 237.1 given. 

Affidavit of non-military service filed. Damages assessed: 

$9,141.95.

Docket Entry, at 4/17/18 (emphasis added); see also Praecipe to Enter 

Judgment by Default, 4/17/18, at Certificate of Service.

The record clearly reflects that Appellants were given notice that default 

judgment was entered against them. Appellants’ claim to the contrary fails.

Appellants also claim that the trial court erred in denying the petition to 

open default judgment since “[t]he trial court did not properly consider the 

evidence Appellants presented” and “[t]he trial court was biased against 

Appellants because they were pro se.” Appellants’ Brief at 7-11. The former 

claim fails because Appellants did not present any evidence during the July 

19, 2018 hearing that would have enabled the trial court to open the default

judgment. See N.T. Hearing, 7/19/18, at 1-13. The latter claim fails because 

the trial court actually provided Appellants with greater protection due to their 

pro se status. To be sure, Appellants failed to attach a responsive pleading to 

their petition to open and Appellants’ petition did not allege a meritorious 

defense. See Appellants’ Petition to Open Default Judgment, 4/23/18, at 1-

5; Appellants’ Supplement to Petition to Open, 5/2/18, at, 1-3. The trial court 

could have thus simply denied Appellants’ petition outright. Rather than doing 
J-S17017-19

- 8 -

so, the trial court held a hearing on the petition, to see whether Appellants 

could supplement their petition with testimony or evidence to demonstrate

that they were entitled to open the default judgment. See N.T. Hearing, 

7/19/18, at 11-12 (the trial court explained to Appellant Tibin: “Ma’am, I 

know you’re not a lawyer, but there are some things that have to be met 

before I open a default judgment. Based upon your testimony today, that has 

not been satisfied. So unfortunately, by law I cannot open this judgment 

against you because the certain elements that need to be met have not been 

met today. That’s why I asked you a series of questions to try to see if I can 

get some information to see if I could open it”). 

Appellants simply failed to produce any evidence that would have 

enabled the trial court to open the default judgment; and, as a result, 

Appellants are not entitled to any relief on appeal.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/7/19