RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 18a0037p.06 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

L ITTLE T RAVERSE L AKE P ROPERTY O WNERS A SSOCIATION ; D OUGLAS J ONES ; L. G ENE M ORSE ; L INDA M ORSE ; M ARY A NN S HUTZ ; M ARCIA S KJAERLUND , Plaintiffs-Appellants ,

v

.

N ATIONAL P ARK S ERVICE , Defendant-Appellee

. ┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┘ No. 17-1064

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids. No. 1:15-cv-00789—Gordon J. Quist, District Judge. Argued: October 13, 2017
Decided and Filed: February 23, 2018
Before: KEITH, ROGERS, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

_________________ COUNSEL

ARGUED: Graham K. Crabtree, FRASER TR EBILCOCK DAVIS & DUNLAP, P.C., Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Kevin W. Mc Ardle, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Graham K. Crabtree, Thaddeus E. Morgan, FRASER TREBILCOCK DAVIS & DUNLAP, P.C., Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Kevin W. McArdle, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. 

### >No. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 2

_________________ OPINION

_________________ ROGERS, Circuit Judge. This case presents th e question of what citi zens must do during the administrative planning stage of a federal agen cy action in order to preserve a later challenge to the agency’s final decision under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). In 2008, the National Park Service proposed a plan to bu ild a scenic trailway through the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore in Leelanau County, Mich igan. One of the alte rnative routes for the trailway ran along Traverse Lake Road, but residents along that road opposed sending Lakeshore visitors down their residential street, so they submitted objections to the proposed plan during the public comment period. The Park Service atte mpted to address the objections to the 2008 proposal, and in 2009, the Park Service issued a revised proposal that ma de significant changes to the portion of the trail along Traverse Lake Road. No one submitted objections to the revised plan, and the Park Service approved the route al ong Traverse Lake Road after it made a finding of no significant impact.
Almost six years later, the Li ttle Traverse Lake Property Owners Association, along with
individual residents on Traverse Lake Road (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed the current action, contending that the 2009 plan violates NEPA and its implemen ting regulations. In support of their claims, Plaintiffs sought to supplement the administrative record w ith additional pictures, maps, and other documents. However, the district court correctly dismisse d most of Plaintiffs’
claims as forfeited because Plaintiffs failed to participate in the Park Service’s planning process
in a manner that would alert the Park Service to their objections to the 2009 plan, and therefore,
Plaintiffs did not allow the Park Service th e opportunity to give the issues meaningful consideration before issuing its final decision. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen , 541 U.S. 752, 764–65 (2004). The district court also correctly he ld that Plaintiffs’ lone preserved claim is without merit, and that Plainti ffs have failed to show that th ere are exceptional circumstances requiring supplementation of th e administrative record.No. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 3

I.
The Sleeping Bear Heritage Tr ail is a hard-surfaced, non-moto rized, multi-use trail that will span twenty-seven miles from the northern end of the National Lake shore at County Road 651 to the Leelanau-Benzie county line south of Empire, Michiga n. The Trail currently runs almost twenty-two miles from Empire north to Bohemian Road (County Road 669), just west of Traverse Lake Road. The Trail is part of the Lakeshore General Management Plan, and was developed by the Leelanau Scenic Heritage Route Committee (the “Committee”), which was comprised of representatives from the Park Service, local municipalities, the Michigan Department of Transportation, the LeelanauConservancy, the Leelanau County Road Commission, and other interested organizations and citizens.
In January 2007, because the Trail project’ s development must comply with NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq ., the Committee solicited proposals for a pre-engineering study and
draft environmental assessment. NEPA “sets fort h essentially procedural requirements to assess environmental impacts of major federal actions.” Citizens Against Pellissippi Parkway Extension, Inc. v. Mineta , 375 F.3d 412, 414 (6th Cir. 2004) (Pellissippi Parkway ). In general, NEPA requires agencies to prepare an enviro nmental impact statement, which provides an explanation of the environmental impacts of, and possible alternativ es for, major federal actions that significantly affect the qual ity of the human environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). However, if an agency is uncertain whether a pr oject will significantly affect the quality of the human environment, it may first prepare an en vironmental assessment, which is a “concise public document” that briefly di scusses the environmental impact s of, and alternatives to, a proposed action. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9

. “[T]he environmental assessment functions as a screening device . . . [that] allows agencies with limited resources to focus on truly important federal actions,” and it “has been described as a rough-cu t, low-budget environmental impact statment.” Friends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Admin. , 61 F.3d 501, 504 (6th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

On October 1, 2008, the Park Service releas ed a proposed plan and environmental assessment (the “2008 Trail Plan”), which stated that the plan’s “pur pose and need” was toNo. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 4

“assist in the creation of a non-motorized trai lway that will provide a continuous scenic pathway” within Leelanau County, beginning at the intersection of M-22 and Manning Road and ending at Good Harbor Bay, Count y Road 651. The 2008 Trail Plan divided the twenty-seven mile path into nine distinct segments in order to analyze alternatives and environmental impacts with more specificity, and in each segment the pl an considered three alte rnatives—Alternative A, Alternative B, and No Action.
The easternmost segment, Segment 9, encompasses the Little Traverse Lake area at issue in this suit. Segment 9 runs from the intersec tion of Bohemian Road and Traverse Lake Road, east to the swimming beach and facilities located at the northern end of County Road 651, near the northern boundary of the Lakeshore, and prov ides access to historic Bufka Farm. The 2008
Trail Plan routed Alternative A for Segment 9 south of Little Traverse Lake along Highway M22, but for Alternative B, the “p referred alternative,” the 2008 Tra il Plan proposed a ten-foot offroad asphalt section on the north side of M-22 up to Traverse Lake Road that would then turn north, using Traverse Lake Roadfor approximately three miles before emerging back on the M22 right-of-way.

Both the east and west ends of Traverse Lake Road intersect with M-22, and the road extends approximately 2.7 miles between those intersections. Traverse Lake Road is approximately twenty-two feet wide, with unpave d shoulders, and mature trees are present on
both sides of the road. The south side of Trav erse Lake Road is bounded by more than seventy private parcels. Wetland areas are located near the east an d west ends of Little Traverse Lake, and sand dunes, some steep and more than fifty feet in height, are pres ent along the eastern end
of the road.
The 2008 Trail Plan was made available for pu blic review and comment for thirty days, and the Park Service held an open house meeting on October 16, 2008. The Park Service received approximately fifty comments dur ing the comment period. Among the comments, residents living along Traverse Lake Road objected to the expansion of the roadway to accommodate the Trail, asserting that it would “turn a quiet resident ial street into a highway with paved shoulders.” Opponents of Alternative B al so expressed concerns that the AlternativeNo. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 5

would present hazards for walkers, joggers, and bike rs due to increased tra ffic. Opponents also
voiced concerns about Alternativ e B’s potential impact on wetlands lo cated near both ends of
Little Traverse Lake and dunes at th e east end of Traverse Lake Road.
The president of the Little Traverse La ke Property Owners Association “strongly oppose[d] any modification of Traverse Lake Road to provide for bicycle lanes,” asserting that “[c]onstruction of a bicycl e lane on the north side of Traver se Lake Road” would interfere with “critical dunes and require th e removal of many, many mature trees” and it would be “both costly and environmentally dreadful!” The Property Owners Association also stated that a trail
on the south side of the road would cross more than seventy driveways and interfere with utilities, mailboxes, and landscap ing, contrary to the Park Serv ice’s assessment that the Trail would minimally impact adjacent landowners. Finally, the Property Owners Association suggested that the Trail be rerouted to terminat e at the north end of B ohemian Road at Lake Michigan.
After considering the public comments to the 2008 Trail Plan, the Park Service issued a revised plan and environmental assessment in March 2009 (the “2009 Trail Plan”). The revised plan maintained the initial proposal for Alternativ e A, but modified Alternative B for segments 1, 2, and 9. The revised Alternative B for Segment 9 is approximately 4.8 miles long, 2.3 miles of which runs along Traverse Lake Road. It is described as:
[A] 10 ′ off-road asphalt secti on on the north side of M-22 up to Traverse Lake Road. The Trailway turns north on the west side of Traverse Lake Road onto an off-road boardwalk within the county road right of way. It continues as a separate 10 ′ off road asphalt path on the north side of Traverse Lake Road either within the county road right-of-way or on Lakeshore property south of proposed wilderness. The Trailway would then follow an old two track road that runs from the northeast end of Little Traverse Lake be coming a crushed limestone path behind the Bufka Farmstead . [Emphasis added.]
Thus, while the 2009 Trail Plan retained a ro ute along Traverse Lake Road, it proposed three significant changes to address the concerns identified in the earlier comments. First, the Park Service sought to minimize the impacts to we tlands by using an off-road boardwalk to cross
the wetlands and Shalda Creek at the west end of Little Traverse Lake, rather than widening
Traverse Lake Road to accommodate the Trail. Second, after crossing the wetlands, the 2009No. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 6

Trail Plan proposed a separate asphalt path on the north side of Traver se Lake Road, either within the county road right-of-way or on Lake shore property rather th an using the roadway surface. This separate path was suggested to address safety concerns about bike and pedestrian traffic, and to minimize the impact on Traverse La ke Road residents, almost all of whom live on
the south side of the road. The separate path also allowed for greater flexibility in the Trail’s path, so that the Trail can avoid mature trees. Finally, rather than crossing most of the wetlands at the east end of the lake, the Park Service prop osed that the Trail follow “an old two track road that runs from the northeast end of Little Traverse Lake becoming a crushed limestone path
behind the Bufka Farmstead.”
The 2009 Trail Plan analyzed the impact of the trailway altern atives on topography, wetlands and water quality, vegetation and wildlif e, Michigan state-listed species, soils, socioeconomics, cultural resour ces, visitor opportunities an d use, and operations and
maintenance. The 2009 Trail Plan determined th at “four wetland areas . . . could be impacted,” and that “[t]hree surface waters could be affected,” including “Shalda Creek on Traverse Lake Road.” However, the environmental assessment explained that “boardwalks or hardened trail surfaces[] would be located to the extent feasible to avoid directly dredging or filling wetlands,” and the 2009 Trail Plan described best manage ment and monitoring practices for reducing construction impacts. Based on its analysis, th e Park Service concluded that Alternative B “would likely have short-term and long-term minor adverse impacts on the wetlands and water quality of the Lakeshore.”

The 2009 Trail Plan also determined that Alternative B for Segment 9 could impact vegetation and forest resources, including “direct removal or loss of vegetation that serves as wildlife habitat.” Indeed, the Trail Plan explai ned that because Segment 9 would be constructed in forested areas, “[trail] [p]l acement outside rights-of-way woul d be required in Segment[] . . . 9,” and that “development of a new trail through an area of relatively native forest where a swath of vegetation is removed to construct the trail w ould represent habitat loss. ” However, the Trail Plan concluded that “[m]inimal tree removal is expected due to the wi de spacing of existing mature trees in this area,” and that “virtually a ll trail locations out of the highway ri ghts-of-way are on previously disturbed areas, or areas with widely spaced trees.” Thus, the Park ServiceNo. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 7

concluded that Alternative B’s “impacts to vegetati on are likely, in the short-term to be moderate adverse and in the long-term, to be minor and adverse.”

The 2009 Trail Plan addresse d dune ecosystems in its assessment of impacts on topography and soils. The environmental asse ssment acknowledged that slopes in portions of Segment 9 range from 18% to 45%, and that “ret aining walls may have to be used when the slopeside exceeds 25%.” The Trail Plan also c onsidered the physical characteristics of the dunes, discussing the erodibi lity of the soil type in relation to Trailway development. While the environmental assessment recognized that some adverse impacts to top ography might occur in several segments, it explained that “[d]isturbance of areas with steep si de slopes and gradients would be avoided where possible.” The enviro nmental assessment described best management practices that would be employed to reduce impacts, including “silt fencing . . . in areas of steep topography” and “restoration to dist urbed areas in order to reduce de structive erosion.” The Park
Service concluded that revised Alternative B “w ould have short- and long-term minor adverse impacts on topography,” and short-term “moderat e” and long-term “minor” adverse impacts on
soils.
The Park Service made the 2009 Trail Plan available for public review and comment from March 5 to April 4, 2009, publicizing the revise d Trail Plan in the same manner as the 2008 Trail Plan. This time, the Park Service received only five co mments on the revised Trail Plan, none of which objected to the revised Segment 9 or raised concerns regarding Traverse Lake Road. None of the comments submitted during the 2009 comment period were submitted by
Traverse Lake Road residents.
In August 2009, the Park Service issued a finding of no significant impact (“FONSI”) and selected preferred Alternative B for Segmen t 9, concluding that an environmental impact statement was not required. “After analyzin g the [environmental assessment], the agency decides whether to prepare an [environmental impact statement] or issue a [FONSI],” which “briefly presents the reasons why an agency action will not create a significant environmental impact and why an [environmental impact statement] will not be issued.” Pellissippi Parkway , 375 F.3d at 414 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13) . The FONSI here stated that theNo. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 8

“[d]isturbance of interior vege tated areas, steep slopes, and di fficult soils would be minimized and sensitively planned,” and therefore, there were no major adverse or beneficial impacts that would require an environmental impact statement analysis. The Park Service also adopted the mitigation and best management analysis in the revised Trail Plan. Moreover, the Park Service found that “[t]here were no high ly uncertain, unique, or unknown risks identified during either the preparation of the environmental assessment or during the two public review periods.” Based on the analysis in the 2009 Trail Plan, the Park Service concluded that “[t]he selected alternative will not have a significant effect on the human environment.”
Nearly six years later, on Ju ly 31, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief, asserting that the Park Serivce had violated NEPA and its implementing regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500 et seq ., by: (1) issuing its FONSI base d upon an inadequate and faulty environmental assessment; (2) failing to prepare a full Environmental Impact Statement; (3) failing to analyze available alternatives; 1 and (4) relying upon inco mplete, misleading, and inaccurate data in formulating its environmental assessement and FONSI. On January 15, 2016, the Park Service filed the 3,005-page administrative record in accordance with the district court’s order, and on February 15, Plai ntiffs objected and moved for l eave to supplement the record. Plaintiffs sought to include photographs, maps, lay testimony, and other evidence.
On April 4, the district court mostly denied Plaintiffs’ request to supplement the record, although the Park Service agreed to supplement the record with“Director’s Order No. 12” (“DO12 Handbook”), which provides guidance to Park Se rvice employees for complying with NEPA.
The court held that the Park Service had neither negligently nor deliberately excluded any
materials from the record. The court indicated that the record appeared to provide an adequate
basis for it to determine whether the Park Servi ce considered all relevant factors, because the record contained materials addressing the issues that Plaintiffs claimed the additional evidence addressed. Thus, according to the court, Plain tiffs failed to meet their burden of showing “exceptional circumstances” requirin g supplementation of the record.

1 In particular, Plaintiffs claimed th at the Park Service failed to eval uate their suggestion during the 2008 comment period to terminate the Trail at the north end of Bohemian Road.No. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 9

The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On December 21, 2016, the district court issued an opinion granting the Park Service’s motion for summary judgment. Little Traverse Lake Prop. Owners Assoc. v. Nat’l Park Serv. , 223 F. Supp. 3d 691 (W.D. Mich. 2016). The district court held that Pl aintiffs had forfeited all of their claims, except
for their claim that the Park Service had failed to consider reasonable alternatives, because Plaintiffs did not adequately raise their obj ections during the administrative process. Id. at 694– 96. Moreover, the court held that, while Plain tiffs had preserved their claim that the Park
Service failed to consider reasonable alternatives , the Park Service was not required to consider the alternative route Plaintiffs proposed duri ng the 2008 public comment period because it did
not fulfill the Trail Plan’s reasonable statement of purpose and need. Id. at 696–97. Accordingly, the court granted the Park Service’ s motion for summary judgment as to all four
claims. Id. at 697.

II.
On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s conclusion that they failed to preserve most of their challenges to the 2009 Trail Plan. Plaintiffs also argue that the Park Service
violated NEPA when it failed to consider an a lternative route proposed by Plaintiffs during the 2008 public comment period. Finall y, Plaintiffs contend that the district court abused its discretion when it denied their motion to supplement the administrative record with additional photos, maps, and lay testimony. However, none of Plaintiffs’ arguments is persuasive.
Plaintiffs’ challenges to the adequacy and accuracy of the 2009 Trail Plan’s environmental analysis as well as their challeng e to the Park Service’s decision not to issue an environmental impact statement were forfeited. To preserve a challenge to an agency action under NEPA, parties must timely speak up during th e administrative planning process so as to “alert[] the agency to the [parties’] position and cont entions, in order to allow the agency to give the issue meaningful consideration.” Pub. Citizen , 541 U.S. at 764 (cit ation and internal quotation marks omitted, second alte ration in original). Plaintiffs did not preserve their challenges for two related reasons . First, Plaintiffs failed to raise any objections to the 2009 Trail Plan during the 2009 public comment period, even though they were required to make sureNo. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 10

that the Park Service was aware of their continued obj ections and concerns, so that the agency could give the issues meaningful consider ation before issuing its final decision. See id. Second, while Plaintiffs articulated objections and con cerns regarding the 2008 Trail Plan, the Park Service meaningfully addressed Plaintiffs’ specifi c complaints with significant changes in the revised 2009 Trail Plan, requiring Plai ntiffs either to renew their ob jections or otherwise to make clear to the Park Service that the revised proposa l did not sufficiently resolve their objections to
the 2008 Trail Plan.
It is true that many of Plaintiffs’ comme nts during the 2008 public comment period were
sufficient to alert the Park Service to deficiencies in the 2008 Trail Plan, 2 but those comments did not preserve Plantiffs’ ability to challenge the later 2009 Trail Plan. The Park Service specifically addressed Plaintiffs ’ material objections to the 2008 Trail Plan with significant changes in the revised proposal, such that it was r easonable for the Park Service to believe that it had sufficiently addressed Plaintiffs’ concerns when they did not renew their objections in 2009. When an agency significantly responds to co mments and objections to an environmental assessment, parties must renew their objections if they believe the agency failed to sufficiently address their concerns, so that th e agency is put on notice of the parties’ position and contentions with regard to the new proposal, in order to allow the agency to give the issues further

2 Some of the comments to the 2008 Trail Plan that Plaintiffs submitted were not sufficient to alert the Park Service to potential NEPA violations because they either were merely generalized objections to the trailway or addressed the substance of the trailw ay proposal. For example, several Traverse Lake Road residents were “opposed to the proposed trail being routed onto E/W Traverse Lake Road” beca use it would “turn a quiet residential street into a highway with paved shoulders,” and others complained that the trailway might interfere with area dunes or require the removal of “many, many trees. ” Still others raised speculative economic objections, claiming that routing the trail along Traverse Lake Road would increase the local tax burden by requiring additional upkeep of a park and outhouse, while also depriving a few businesses along M-22 of increased foot traffic. But such comments could not have alerted the Park Service to any inaccuracies or inadequacies in the proposal, and in order to preserve the ability to challenge an agency action, parties must present their claims during the administrative process with sufficient detail to allow the agency to rectify the alleged violation. See Karst Envtl. Educ. & Prot., Inc. v. Fed. Highway Admin. , 559 F. App’x 421, 424–27 (6th Cir. 2014)

. Moreover, objections to the Trail Plan’s substance, such as Plaintiffs’ complaints about removing trees, are generally insufficient to preserve a challenge to an agency action under NEPA, because NEPA does not dictate which substan tive choice an agency will make; it simply prescribes the necessary process. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council , 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); see also Friends of the Norbeck v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 661 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 2011). Thus, NEPA does not necessarily preclude agencies from taking actions that would affect area dunes and trees, because “[i]f the adverse environmental effects of the pr oposed action are adequately identifie d and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs.” Robertson , 490 U.S. at 350–51.No. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 11

meaningful consideration; otherwise the parties’ claims under NEPA are forfeited . See Pub.
Citizen , 541 U.S. at 764.
In response to the 2008 Trail Plan proposal, Plai ntiffs raised specific concerns that the Plan did not sufficiently consider safety problem s created by the proposed expansion of Traverse
Lake Road’s shoulders to acco mmodate the trailway, and there were objections that the 2008 Trail Plan inaccurately concluded that expandi ng the road shoulder would have a “minimal” impact on Traverse Lake Road residents. Plainti ffs also raised concerns that the 2008 Trail Plan did not sufficiently consider the impact the trailw ay would have on wetlands at the east and west
ends of Little Traverse Lake or on the Lakeshore w ilderness area that abuts Little Traverse Lake. While these comments sufficiently alerted the Park Service to deficiencies in the 2008 Trail Plan, the Park Service made meaningful substantive revisions to its proposal that were specifically aimed at addressing these concerns, so that the 2009 Trail Plan would not be similarly deficient. Had the Park Service ignored Plaintiffs’ objections when it issued the revised 2009 Trail Plan, Plaintiffs claims likely would have been preserve d because they would have timely “alert[ed] the agency to [their] position and contentions,” and the Park Service would have failed to “give the issue meaningful consideration.” Id. at 764.
But the Park Service took Plaintiffs’ objectio ns into consideration and attempted to modify the Trail Plan accordingly. For example, the Park Service addressed safety concerns by moving the trail onto “a separate 10 ′ off-road asphalt path” rather than expanding the shoulders of Traverse Lake Road, and this modification had the added benef it of allowing the Trail’s path
to avoid trees “due to the wide spacing of the existing mature trees in this area.” Also, the 2009 Trail Plan sought to minimize impacts on su rrounding residential property by moving the trailway onto the north side of Traverse Lake Road, avoiding the more than seventy driveways along the the road’s south side. The Park Service also made significant changes to address concerns about area wetlands, including off-road boardwalks to avoid wetlands on the west end of Little Traverse Lake, and rerouting the Trail along “an old two track road that runs from the northeast end of Little Traverse Lake becoming a crushed limestone path behind the Bufka Farmstead” to avoid wetlands on the eastern portion of Little Traverse La ke. Finally, the ParkNo. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 12

Service directly explained in the revised 2009 Trail Plan why it had chosen not to analyze impacts on the proposed Lakeshore wilderness area that abuts Traverse Lake Road.
After the Park Service made these significant ch anges to address the objections raised to the 2008 Trail Plan by Plaintiffs’ comments, it wa s reasonable for the Park Service to believe that its modifications sufficiently addressed Plai ntiffs’ concerns and thatthe 2009 Trail Plan was not similarly inadequate. Plaintiffs now cl aim that the revised 2009 Trail Plan did not sufficiently address their objections or that the revised plan is worse than the original 2008 Trail Plan, but “[t]he time to complain is at the comm ent stage, not after the agency has completed its decision making process.” Karst , 559 F. App’x. at 424 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978)). Again, the burden is on parties challenging an agency action under NEPA to alert the agency to potential violations during the administrative planning stage, so that the agency can give the issue meaningful consideration.
Pub. Citizen , 541 U.S. at 764. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ cl aims that the 2009 Trai l Plan inadequately assessed environmental impacts, relied on inaccurate data, and that the Park Service should have issued an environmental impact statement are fo rfeited, because Plaint iffs’ silence during the 2009 comment period did nothing to alert the Park Se rvice to these concerns with respect to the
2009 Trail Plan.

Plaintiffs’ claim that the 2009 Trail Plan faile d to consider reasonable alternatives was not forfeited, because the 2009 Trail Plan failed to consider or respond to an alternative route Plaintiffs proposed during the 2008 comment period. Plaintiffs’ claim is without merit, however,
because the alternative route th ey proposed did not accomplish the stated purpose and need of the proposed action, and therefore Plaintiffs’ pr oposal was not a reasonable alternative that would require a detailed study and response by the Park Service. See Webster v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. , 685 F.3d 411, 422 (4th Cir. 2012).
During the 2008 comment period, Pl aintiffs urged the Park Se rvice to cons ider stopping
the Trail at the end of Bohemian Road. But “[a]lternative actions . . . are measured against the Purpose and Need Statement, which explains w hy the agency is proposing to spend federal money on an action that potentially result s in significant environmental impact,” Coal. for theNo. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 13

Advancement of Reg’l Transp. v. Fed. Highway Admin. , 576 F. App’x 477, 481 (6th Cir. 2014), and Plaintiffs’ proposed alternative route does not fulfill the Trail Plan’s purpose to create “a continuous scenic pathway from . . . the so uth boundary of Leelanau County to the north boundary of the Lakeshore at Good Harbor Bay, County Road 651, all within Leelanau County.” 3 Indeed, Plaintiffs’ proposal would shorten the Trail by nearly te n percent, and would frustrate the Trail’s purpose of reaching the northeastern-most portions of the Lakeshore. Thus, while NEPA requires agencies to evaluate reasonable alternatives to the proposed action,

see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) and 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14( a), the Park Service was not required to assess Plaintiffs’ proposal because it would not have achieved the Trail’s stated purpose and need, and “[o]nly alternatives th at accomplish the purposes of th e proposed action are considered
reasonable.” Webster , 685 F.3d at 422; see also Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. , 661 F.3d 1209, 1244 (10th Cir. 2011); Akiak Native Cmty. v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 213 F.3d 1140, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiffs argue that, while an agency is not required to consider and eliminate every conceivable alternative, the Trail Plan’s stated purpose and need was un reasonably narrow. In particular, Plaintiffs contend that the Park Service imposed a rigi d and inflexible condition on the Trail Plan by requiring that it reach the norther n boundary of the Lakeshor e at Good Harbor Bay, County Road 651. But while agencies may not “define [a] project so narrowly that it foreclose[s] reasonable consid eration of alternatives,” Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184, 1195 (10th Cir. 2006), “[a]genc ies enjoy considerable discre tion in defining the purposes and needs for their proposed actions, provided that they are reasonable,” Webster , 685 F.3d at 422. While courts may reject an agency’s stat ement of purpose and need as “unreasonably narrow” if the statement “compels the se lection of a particular alternative,” Theodore Roosevelt

3 On appeal, Plaintiffs point to two other alternative routes proposed during the 2008 comment period, but Plaintiffs failed to raise these comments before the district court, and “[o]ur function is to review the case presented to the district court, rather than a better case fashioned after a district court’s unfavorable order.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden , 448 F.3d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 2008). Moreover, these additional alternatives were reasonably rejected by the Park Service because they would have required the Tr ail to go through the proposed wilderness, and the Park Service explained in the 2009 Trail Plan that such alternatives were impractical because “[n]o trailway deve lopments could occur on lands proposed for wilder ness . . . unless and until Congress acts upon a recommendation.” NEPA does not require an agency to “an alyze the environmental consequences of alternatives it has in good faith rejected as too remote, speculative, . . . impractical or ineffective.” Colorado Envtl. Coal. v. Dombeck , 185 F.3d 1162, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Webster , 685 F.3d at 427.No. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 14

Conservation P’ship v. Salazar , 661 F.3d 66, 73 (D.C. Ci r. 2011), the Trail Plan’s stated purpose of reaching the northeastern-most portion of the Lakeshore did not compel the selection of a particular alternative, and it was reasonably calcu lated to achieve the Committee’s stated goal of reaching the entire Lakeshore within Leelanau County.
While the Trail Plan does prescribe a defi nite terminus, that requirement was not unreasonably narrow because it allowed for sufficient flexibility in planning the trailway’s path. In fact, the Trail Plan demonstrat es considerable flexibility in ach ieving its purpose. In contested Segment 9 alone there were two options, Altern ative A and Alternative B, that would have
reached the Committee’s desired term inus. Each of the other eight segments of the Trail Plan also had two action alternatives, which were planne d to begin and end at th e same points in each segment. That means, for exam ple, that selecting preferred A lternative B in Segment 1 did not necessarily preclude the agency from selecting Alternative A in Segment 2. Thus, from the trailway’s starting point at th e Leelanau–Benzie County line to its desired terminus at County Road 651, there were more than 500 possible combin ations of routes that the Trail could have taken to achieve the Park Service’s goal of reaching the northeastern-most portion of the
Lakeshore.

Moreover, the Park Service’s desire to reach County Road 651 was calculated to ensure that the trailway achieved the Committee’s stated goals to reach the entire Lakeshore within Leelanau County, and to provide non-motorized access to “the beaches, trailheads, and other points of interest” in the north eastern-most portion of the La keshore, including the popular swimming beach at Good Harbor Bay and historic Bufka Farm. Thus, the Trail Plan’s purpose
and need were reasonable and well-considered. Because Plaintiffs’ proposed alternative would
not have achieved the Trail Plan ’s reasonable purpose, Plaintiffs’ claim that the Park Service
failed to consider reasonable alte rnatives because it i gnored their proposal for a truncated Trail is
without merit.

Plaintiffs also contend that the Park Serv ice’s failure to include an environmental screening form in the 2009 Trail Plan was a per se violation of NEPA because the agency’s DO12 Handbook requires a screening form for any proj ect that may have an impact on the humanNo. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 15

environment. The DO-12 Handbook includes an“Environmental Scr eening Form,” which contains a checklist for determining whether a pr oject may impact physical, natural, or cultural
resources or have other effects th at could require an environmenta l impact statement. According to the DO-12 Handbook, the Park Service must comple te a screening form for “any project that may have an impact on the human environment,” a nd the Park Service concedes that it did not include a screening form in the 2009 Trail Plan. But “[i]nternal operating manuals . . . do not carry the force of law, bind the agency, or confer rights upon the regulated entity[,]” Reich v. Manganas , 70 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1995), and the DO-12 Handbook was intended as a guide to assist Park Service employees, not as a binding legal mandate.
The DO-12 Handbook was never published in the Federal Register, and “[f]ailure to publish in the Federal Register is an indication that the statement in question was not meant to be a regulation.” Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton , 434 F.3d 584, 595–96 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphasis removed). Instead, the Department of the Interior has promulgated separate rules that “codify its procedures for implementing [NEPA],” 73 Fed. Reg. 61292 (Oct. 15, 2008), which do not require preparation of the screenin g form described in the DO-12 Handbook, see 43 C.F.R. pt. 46. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ assertion that the DO-12 Handbook, “accordi ng to its own terms, has ‘the force of law’” is misleading, because the Handbook actually states that “ most of its sections derive in whole or partfrom the CEQ regulation[s] or Interior NEPA guidelines, giving
them the force of law.” [Emphasis ad ded.] However, no NEPA provision, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–70, CEQ regulation, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–08, or Depart ment of the Interior supplemental NEPA regulation, see 43 C.F.R. pt. 46, mandates the completion of the screening form, and the Handbook does not independently create legally enforc eable obligations. Therefore, the screening form describe d in the DO-12 Handbook re presents a non-binding internal procedural requirement that does not carry the force of law, bind the agency, or confer rights, and the Park Service’s fa ilure to include an environmen tal screening form in the 2009 Trail Plan was not a per se violation of NEPA.
Finally, the district court’s orde r denying Plaintiffs’ request to supplement the administrative
record was not an abuse of discretion because Plaintiffs failed to show “exceptional circumstances” requiring supplementation. See Charter Twp. of Van Buren , 1999 WL 701924,No. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 16

at *4 (6th Cir., Aug. 30, 1999). When courts revi ew an agency decision, “[t]he APA requires
courts to review the whole record or those parts of it cite d by the party.” Sierra Club v. Slater , 120 F.3d 623, 638 (6th Cir. 1997) (int ernal quotation marks omitted). “The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706, to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court .” Fla. Power & Light Co. v.
Lorion , 470 U.S. 729, 743–44 (1985) (citation omitted) (em phasis added). “[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the ad ministrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.” Kroger Co. v. Reg’l Airport Auth. of Louisville & Jefferson Cty. , 286 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). Indeed, supplementation of the record before the reviewing court is rare and requires “exceptional circumstances.” See Charter Twp. of Van Buren , 1999 WL 701924, at
*4.
To be sure, “[s]upplementation of the administ rative record may be appropriate ‘when an agency has deliberately or negligently excluded certain documents from the record, or when a court needs ‘background’ information to determ ine whether the agency has considered all
relevant factors.’” S. Forest Watch, Inc. v. Jewell , 817 F.3d 965, 977 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Latin Ams. for Soc. & Econ. Dev. v. Adm’r of the Fed. Highway Admin. , 756 F.3d 447, 465 (6th Cir. 2014)). A “strong showing of bad faith” may also justify supplementation of the record. Charter Twp. of Van Buren , 1999 WL 701924, at *4; see also Commercial Drapery Contractors,
Inc. v. United States , 133 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1998). But Plai ntiffs have not shown that the Park Service deliberately or negligently excluded certai n documents, and Plaintiffs do not allege that
the Park Service acted in bad faith. As the district court observed, Plain tiffs do not allege that any of the materials that they pr opose be added to the record were presented to the Park Service prior to the time it issued the 2009 FONSI. It w ould be strange to say that the Park Service deliberately excluded certain documents that we re never presented to it for consideration.

The fact that the record cont ains evidence addressi ng the issues Plaintiffs sought to prove with their supplemental material further shows that the Park Serv ice was not negligent when it compiled the 3,005-page administrative record. I ndeed, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the additional photos, maps, and testimony would ha ve provided the court necessary “background”No. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 17

information to determine whether the Park Service had considered all releva nt factors. As the district court observed, the r ecord—consisting of 3,005 pages of materials—appears to contain materials addressing the issues Plaintiffs claim th e additional evidence addresses. For example, the record already contains evidence that Traver se Lake Road is a “quiet, residential, country road,” and cumulative information that “might have supplied a fuller r ecord, but otherwise does not address issues not already there,” is not ne cessary for the court to review the record. Friends of the Earth v. Hintz , 800 F.2d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 1986).

Still, Plaintiffs contend that while motions requesting supplementati on are rarely granted, “in NEPA cases, like the one at bar, a primary function of the court is to ensure that the information available to the agency includes an adequate discussion of environmental effects and alternatives.” True, but the idea that a special supplementation rule applies to NEPA cases is contrary to our precedent. See, e.g. , Slater , 120 F.3d at 638–39; Latin Ams. for Soc. & Econ.
Dev. , 756 F.3d at 464–65; Partners in Forestry Co-op., Northwood All., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 638 F. App’x 456, 468–69 (6th Cir. 2015). Even th e case upon which Plaintiffs rely for the proposition that NEPA cases are special acknowledges that “deviation from the record rule, even in NEPA decisions, is limited,” and “[c]ourts ma y . . . consider additional information . . . only when the administrative record is so inadequa te as to prevent the reviewing court from effectively determining whether the agency cons idered all environmental consequences of its proposed actions.” Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman , 132 F.3d at 7, 15 (2d Cir. 1997).
The 3,005-page record here is no t “so inadequate,” and, as disc ussed above, Plaintiffs had an opportunity to raise objections and subm it additional evidence during the 2009 public comment period. They did not, but “[i]f they had, their criticism would have been incorporated in the administrative record for future judicial review.” Davidson v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy , 838 F.2d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 1998). In this case, Pl aintiffs, not the Park Service, omitted the documents they now seek to add to the record. Moreover, the documents are cumulative and would not help demonstrate any facts not alr eady shown in the 3,005-page record submitted by the Park Service. Plaintiffs have not identified any Supreme Court or Circuit precedents that would allow them a do-over by way of introducing cu mulative evidence in the district court thatNo. 17-1064 Little Traverse Lake Property Owners Ass’n, et al. v. Nat’l Park Service Page 18

they did not present to the agency. See Camp v. Pitts , 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); Latin Ams. for
Soc. & Econ. Dev. , 756 F.3d at 465; Davidson , 838 F.2d at 854–56.

III.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.