J-S13040-22

2022 PA Super 79

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

JONATHAN ALAN CARL

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1486 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered October 25, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-67-CR-0003918-2020

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: MAY 4, 2022

The Commonwealth appeals the Order entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of York County granting a defense motion to dismiss the criminal 

complaint against Appellee, Jonathan Alan Carl, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. 

The Commonwealth maintains the trial court erred by including within

the Rule 600(C) computation of time a 60-day period that fell under a York 

County judicial emergency declaration. In response to the pandemic, 

statewide rules pertaining to criminal defendants’ rule-based rights to a 

prompt trial were suspended. After careful review, we vacate the order 

dismissing this matter and remand for further proceedings.

The relevant procedural history, which is not in dispute, is aptly 

summarized in the trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, as follows:

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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On June 29, 2020, Carl was charged with Simple Assault (M3), 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3), and [summary] Harassment, 18 Pa.C.S. § 

2709(a)(1). [His] preliminary hearing was scheduled for and held 

on August 6, 2020.

[On September 16, 2020,] Carl filed a waiver of arraignment, 

[which had been scheduled for September 20, 2020], and he was 

scheduled for a plea date on November 20, 2020. On November 

20, 2020, Carl indicated through counsel that his case was ready 

for trial for the next available trial date of January 4, 2021.

Later in November [of 2020], jury trials were suspended in York 

County by emergency order from November 30, 2020, to February 

28, 2021, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic []. 

Carl’s case was not called for trial until the Call of the List on 

October 21, 2021, for the trial week beginning October 25, 2021. 

On October 25, 2021, defense counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. A hearing on the motion was held 

on October 25, 2021.

As of October 25, 2021, 485 days had passed since the filing of 

the criminal complaint.

. . .

The evidence presented indicates that Carl indicated on November 

20, 2020, that his case would be ready for trial as of January 4, 

2021. At the time the request was made, jury trials were 

scheduled for the month of December 2020, and therefore the 

time from November 20, 2020, through January 3, 2021, was 

forty-six (46) days of excludable time, which Carl concedes.

We do note, however, that as a result of the judicial emergency 

order that was entered on November 24, 2020, and the 

subsequent extensions that followed, no jury trials occurred in 

York County from November 30, 2020, through February 28, 

2021, which [adds] excusable time [as calculated, infra], as the 

delay could not be attributed to either the Commonwealth or 

Defendant.

. . .
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The mechanical run date in the present case was June 28, 2021. 

If the [trial court] attributes the full delay from November 20, 

2020, to January 4, 2021, against Carl, then the adjusted run date 

was August 13, 2021.

Accounting for excusable delay from January 5, 2021 through 

February 28, 2021, an additional fifty-five (55) days, the case 

should have been called for trial by October 7, 2021. 

[As Carl’s case was not called for trial until the Call of the List on 

October 21, 2021, for the week of October 25, 2021, defense 

counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to [Rule] 600.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/21, at 2-5, 8.

At the Rule 600 hearing, the Commonwealth sought to exclude from the 

Rule 600 computation of time the period from June 29, 2020, to August 31, 

2020, during which the York County Court of Common Pleas was operating 

under a Covid-related judicial emergency declaration issued by Joseph C. 

Adams., President Judge of the 19th Judicial District. The May 27, 2020, 

“Declaration of Judicial Emergency” provided, in relevant part:

DECLARATION

Per the Supreme Court’s Order dated May 27, 2020, 

authorizing President Judges to declare judicial emergencies in 

their judicial districts, I declare a judicial emergency in the 19th

Judicial District through August 31, 2020. During the emergency, 

the following shall apply:

. . .

(3) Suspend statewide rules pertaining to the rulebased right of criminal defendants to a prompt 

trial.

Any postponement caused by the judicial emergency shall be 

considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable 
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time for purposes of the application of Rule 600. See 

Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693 (Pa. 2012) and 

Commonwealth v. Mills, 162 A.3d 323 (Pa. 2017).

Declaration of Judicial Emergency, 5/28/20.

At the Rule 600 hearing of October 25, 2021, both the defense and the 

Commonwealth agreed that the declared emergency created no delay in this 

matter, as Carl’s case proceeded from the filing of his criminal complaint to 

his arraignment, and then to his plea date, without interruption. 

It was the Commonwealth’s position, however, that the plain language 

of the Declaration called for the suspension of rule-based prompt trial time 

computations until the expiration of the declared judicial emergency and that 

it had relied on such language in scheduling the instant case for trial in 

compliance with Rule 600. Thus, it maintained that the 60 days from the June 

29, 2020, filing of the criminal complaint in this case to the August 31, 2020,

expiration of the declared emergency must be deemed excludable time. N.T., 

10/25/21, at 6.

The trial court disagreed, ruling that the Declaration had no bearing on 

the instant case where it caused neither delay nor a postponement of any of 

its proceedings. Thus, the court refused to extend Carl’s adjusted run date

by the requested 60 days and proceeded to conduct its examination of the 

Commonwealth’s due diligence in bringing the present case to trial. 

Critical to the trial court’s due diligence inquiry was its observation that 

no discernable backlog of pending criminal trials had occurred in York County

during the relevant time here, and it produced a list of 15 criminal cases with 
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less Rule 600 urgency that the Commonwealth had elected to bring to trial 

before the present case. It concluded, therefore, that the Commonwealth had 

not demonstrated appropriate time management here.

Accordingly, having determined that Carl’s adjusted run date had passed 

without a trial and the Commonwealth had failed to prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that it acted with due diligence throughout the proceedings to 

bring the case to trial in compliance with Rule 600, the trial court granted 

Carl’s motion to dismiss his criminal complaint with prejudice. This timely 

appeal followed.

The Commonwealth presents the following issue for our consideration:

[Did] the trial court err[] in granting Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600? Specifically, [did] the trial 

court err[] in not including in its excludable delay calculations the 

time period from June 29, 2020 through August 31, 2020, wherein 

there was a local order signed by then-President Judge Adams 

suspending the statewide rules pertaining to the rule-based right 

of criminal defendants to a prompt trial[, and in] factoring in this 

time, the Commonwealth was within its adjusted mechanical date 

for Rule 600 . . . ?

Commonwealth’s Brief of Appellant, at 5.

When presented with a speedy trial claim arising under Pennsylvania 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 600, our standard of review is well settled.

In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of a trial 

court's decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 

Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon 

facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing 

and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an 

error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly 
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unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, 

as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the record 

of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the 

[trial] court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party.

Additionally, when considering the trial court's ruling, this Court is 

not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule [600]. Rule 

[600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection 

of the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of 

society. In determining whether an accused's right to a speedy 

trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society's 

right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain 

those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. 

However, the administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not 

designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith 

prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the 

Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial 

rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a manner 

consistent with society's right to punish and deter crime. In 

considering [these] matters ..., courts must carefully factor into 

the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual 

accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law 

enforcement as well.

Commonwealth v. Bethea, 185 A.3d 364, 370 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

and emphases omitted), appeal denied, 219 A.3d 597 (Pa. 2019). The 

Commonwealth bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, 

that it acted with due diligence throughout the proceedings. See 

Commonwealth v. Kearse, 890 A.2d 388, 393 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 provides that “[t]rial in a 

court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall 

commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.” 
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). In computing the Rule 600 deadline, however, we 

do not necessarily count all time following the filing of the complaint. Rather, 

“periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the 

Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence 

shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must 

commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the 

computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).

The Rule 600 analysis thus entails three steps:

First, Rule 600(A) provides the mechanical run date. Second, we 

determine whether any excludable time exists pursuant to Rule 

600(C). We add the amount of excludable time, if any, to the 

mechanical run date to arrive at an adjusted run date.

If the trial takes place after the adjusted run date, we apply the 

due diligence analysis set forth in Rule 600([D]). As we have 

explained, Rule 600[ ] encompasses a wide variety of 

circumstances under which a period of delay was outside the 

control of the Commonwealth and not the result of the 

Commonwealth's lack of diligence. Any such period of delay 

results in an extension of the run date. Addition of any Rule 600[ 

] extensions to the adjusted run date produces the final Rule 600 

run date. If the Commonwealth does not bring the defendant to 

trial on or before the final run date, the trial court must dismiss 

the charges.

Commonwealth v. Wendel, 165 A.3d 952, 956–57 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citation omitted).

In the instant case, the Commonwealth urges this Court to conclude that 

the plain language of the Judicial Emergency Declaration’s Subsection (3) 

mandated the suspension of time computations taken under statewide rules 

governing a criminal defendant’s rights to a prompt trial. As discussed, the
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trial court rejected this position, refused to count the implicated 60 days as

excludable time and extend Carl’s adjusted run date accordingly, and 

commenced its due diligence inquiry. Guided by well-settled rules of statutory 

interpretation, we find the court’s ruling in this regard to have been in error.

As the present dispute centers on the proper interpretation of the 

criminal procedures set forth in the Judicial Emergency Declaration at issue, 

we take guidance from our standards and scope of review governing statutory 

construction of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. Issues of 

statutory construction involving the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure

present a pure question of law and, thus, our standard of review is de novo

and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Rushing, 99 A.3d 

416, 420 (Pa. 2014). 

We begin by observing that we apply the Statutory Construction 

Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991, when interpreting the Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. ...

[T]he principal objective of statutory interpretation and 

construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the 

rule-making body. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The plain language of a 

statute or rule is the best indication of this intent. The basic tenet 

of statutory construction requires a court to construe words of the 

statute according to their plain meaning. “When the words of a 

statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not 

to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Furthermore, the Statutory Construction Act 

requires penal provisions of statutes to be strictly construed, 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1); thus, where an ambiguity is found in the 

language of a penal statute, such language should be interpreted 

in the light most favorable to the accused. Finally, courts must 

give effect to every provision of the statute, as the legislature is 

presumed not to intend any statutory language to exist as mere 

surplusage.
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Commonwealth v. Santiago, 270 A.3d 512, 516 (Pa. Super. 2022).

As reproduced, supra, Subsection (3) of President Judge Adams’ May 

27, 2021, Declaration of Judicial Emergency for the 19th Judicial District 

provides, in relevant part, that “[d]uring the emergency, the following shall 

apply: . . . (3) Suspend statewide rules pertaining to the rule-based right of 

criminal defendants to a prompt trial.” 

Construing Subsection (3) in accordance with the plain meaning of its 

words, we find that it clearly and simply directs that rule-based, “prompt trial” 

time computations are suspended for the duration of the judicial emergency

at hand. The intended effect on Rule 600 computations in criminal cases 

existing at that time is thus evident: such computations are to be held in

abeyance and shall not include days transpiring during the effective time of 

the Declaration until the expiration of the declared emergency, at which time 

resumption or commencement of such computations may proceed. 

As for the separate and final paragraph of the Declaration, we do not 

agree with Mr. Carl’s position that it limits Subsection (3)’s suspension of 

prompt trial rules to only those instances where postponements occurred. 

Rather, the final paragraph states, “Any postponement caused by the judicial 

emergency shall be considered a court postponement and shall constitute 

excludable time for purposes of the application of Rule 600.”

Reading the Declaration as a whole leads to the conclusion that the final 

paragraph serves as a supplement to Subsection (3) that extends the Rule 

600 exception therein to postponements “caused by” the judicial emergency,
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which would thus include even those consequential postponements occurring 

after the expiration of the emergency. 

Given the uncertainties of the covid pandemic’s course, it was 

reasonable to anticipate that the judicial emergency would have downstream 

effects, such as the possible creation of a protracted criminal case backlog. 

Upon the eventual expiration of the declared emergency, however, Subsection 

(3)’s time computation suspension would expire with it. 

The prospective posture of the Declaration’s final paragraph, however, 

addresses this potential void by providing an ongoing, explicit, local policy in 

those cases that continue to experience postponements stemming from the 

judicial emergency even after the emergency state, itself, has been lifted.

The final paragraph, therefore, functions as a judicial response to the 

anticipated need for fair time computation and case management demands in 

the wake of any emergency-caused postponement, occurring either during or 

after the emergency. It does not, however, in any discernable way limit the 

immediate, preemptive, and plain mandate in Subsection (3) to suspend 

statewide rules pertaining to the rights of criminal defendants to a prompt trial 

“during the emergency.” 

As such, we find that the 60-day time period in question should have 

been excluded from the Rule 600 time computation in Mr. Carl’s case. The 

proper consequence of this exclusion would have been the extension of his

adjusted run date to December 6, 2021, and thus would have obviated the 
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need for an inquiry into the Commonwealth’s due diligence in bringing him to 

trial in compliance with Rule 600(C). 

It was error for the trial court to reach the due diligence inquiry where 

the adjusted run date had not yet lapsed. Indeed, for the trial court to 

conclude that due diligence required the Commonwealth to take upon itself 

the task of adding back time to Mr. Carl’s time computation that the Judicial 

Emergency Declaration so plainly excluded by virtue of Subsection (3) was 

error.

As outlined above, our relevant jurisprudence counsels against Rule 600 

dismissals absent dilatory or bad faith prosecutorial efforts in bringing

defendants to trial in a timely fashion. Here, we find the Commonwealth acted 

both reasonably and in good faith in relying upon Subsection (3) of the 

Declaration of Judicial Emergency to exclude from its internal Rule 600 

timekeeping the 60 days from the time the criminal complaint was filed to the 

date of the Declaration’s expiration. 

The plainly-worded Subsection (3) unambiguously suspended in

criminal cases all rule-based, “prompt trial” time computations for the duration 

of the Declaration’s effective period, and nothing in the subsequent paragraph 

of the Declaration placed qualifications or limitations on this absolute, 

temporary suspension. Accordingly, we vacate the order to dismiss and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Order vacated. Remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/04/2022