### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 311 -CV

RobertK. Tr ethewey and S hirley J. Trethewey , Appellan ts
v. Suzy Collin s, et al ., Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF COM AL COUNTY , 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. C2006 -06 13B , HO NORAB LE CHARLES A. STEP HENS II , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
I n this appeal, the pa

rties dispute the validity and applica

bility of ce rtain dee d restric tions adopted by

landowner s in a subdivision known as Pleasant Valley E s t ates in C omal County
. Appellants, Robert K. Trethe wey and Shirley J
. Trethe wey , challeng e the po rt i o n s of the district court’s judg ment (1) de clar ing the deed r estrictions to be valid an d ap p licable, a nd (2) perma nently enjoining the Tre thewey s from using their motor home as a temporar y or per manent residenc e on their lot. I n three points of err or, the Tr ethewe y s argue that the r estrictions on which the a pp e llee lan do wn e rs re ly

are un e nf

or c e a ble be c a us e the y we re re sc ind e d a

nd , a lte rn a tiv e ly , if the re strictions were not rescinde d, t h ey d o n ot apply in this case. F inding the de ed re strictions
e nf or c e a ble and a pp lic a ble to the Tr e the we y s’ mot or ho me , we a ff ir m the dis tr ic t court ’s jud g me nt.2

Bac kgr ound Ap pe lla

nts , Ro be rt

K. Tr e the we y

a nd Shi rl e y J. Tr e the we y , p ur c hased L ot 1 5 in the Ple a sant V a lle y

Es ta te s, Un it 1 , in

May 20 05 . T he y c ha lle ng e the e nf or c e a bil ity and a pp lic a bil ity of ce rtain re strictive cove nants prohibiting tra ilers, mobile homes, and trailer house s being used as
re sid e nc e s on Plea sant Va lle y Es ta te s lots
. Ap pe lle e s, wh o inc lud e e ig hte e n Pl e a sa nt V a lle y Es ta te landowner s, seek to enf

orce the re s t ri ct i v e covena nts to prevent the Tr ethewe y s from living in a mot or ho me on the ir lot
. On J une 30, 1978, Cree kdale, I nc., the origina l developer and owne r of the lots in the Pleasant Va lley Estates, recorde d deed r estrictions for the Pleasant Va lley Estates. The pr ovisions at i s s u e o nap p ea l ar e t h e f o l l o wi n g:
No tr a ile r, te nt, sh a c k, g ara g e , b arn , outb uil din g , mobi le ho me or tr a ile r h ou se sh a ll be at any time used as a r esidenc e, tempora rily or per manently . No exist ing struc ture sh a ll b e mov ed on said land and pr e mis e s f

or the purp os e of

oc c up anc y , a

nd a ll im p rovements erec ted there on, including f ence s, shall be of pe rmane nt ty pe, c ha ra c te r, and c on str

uc tio n, and may be bu ilt simult ane ou sly wi th o r s ub se qu e nt t o e r e c t i o no f

p e r m an e n tr e s i d e n c e o n l y.

. . . . Th e c ov e na

nts sh a ll r un wi th a nd burd e n th e land

un til De c e mbe r 3 1, 20 00 . T he se covena nts may be extended at that time for successive periods of t en (10) y ear s eac h, by written instrument executed by a majority

of the then proper

ty owner s and plac ed of re cord in the D eed Re cords of Comal County , Texas. Any of these c ovenants may be ame nded in whole or

in part at a

ny time by a majority

of the p roper

ty owner s executing a written instrument so amending and which instrument sha ll be rec orded in t he De e d Re c or ds of

Com a l Co un ty , T e xas.
On Se pte mbe r 2 0, 19 78 , Cr e e kd a le , Inc . r ecor ded a me ndme nts to t he se c ov e na

nts in its Amended Restrictions , Bu i l ding Re quirements and L andsca ping Re quirements for

PleasantI n their Statement of Fa cts, appellee s asser t that “[t] he only

substantive chang e made to the 1 restric tions was to exclude from trac t 1 the single family residenc e restriction.” W e note, howe ver, that th e e xpir a tio n d a te fo r t he re str ic tio ns wa s e ff

e c tiv e ly c ha ng e d f ro m D e c e mbe r 3 1, 20 00 , to Se pte mbe r 2 0, 20 08 . T he Tr e the we y s ma ke no me nti on of the e xiste nc e of the a me nd e d r e str ic tio ns . Although w e make note of the amended restrictions in our di scussion for purpose s of bac kg round information and r ely

on the amende d restric tions as having been va lidly enac ted, none of

the su bs tanti ve dif

fe re nc e s bet

we e n the or ig ina l re str ic tio ns and a me nd e d re str ic tio ns a ff e c t th e ana ly sis in this case. Eve n if we w ere relying on the orig inal restric tions rather tha n the amende d restric tions as the immediate prede cessor to the second set of amende d restric tions, our analy sis would be unchang ed. The fir st set of amende d restric tions modi fied the or igina l restrictions by resc inding them 2 in t he ir e nti re ty and

re pla c ingthe m. T his wa s a lso the pr oc e ss w iththe se c on d s e t of a me ndme nts to the deed restric tions. Although the Trethe wey s contest the validity of the second set of ame nded re str ic tio ns , th e y

do no t c on te st the va lid ity of the fi rs t se t of

a me nd e d r e str ic tio ns . 3 Valley Estates, Unit 1, to the County of Comal, Te x as. The r estriction prohibiting tra ilers and other mobile struc tures as residenc es rema ined intact, but the orig inal restric tion relating to the term of the
covena nts was re scinded, a

nd the following provision was adde d: 1
These c ovenants shall be bindingfor a period of thirty (30) y ear s from the date they are filed for

rec ord in the De ed Rec ords of Comal County , Texas, unless chang ed or amende d as provided he rein. Said cove nants shall be automatica lly extended, upon the expiration of said term, for succe ssive periods of ten (10) y ear s eac h. The re cord owner s of leg al title of fifty -one ( 51%) pe rcen t o f t h e l o ts as shown by the dee d rec ords of Comal County , Texas, may amend or chang e said c ovenants in whole or p a r t a t an y t i m e . A n y c h an g e o r a m e n d m e n t s h a l l b e s e t f o rt h an d e v i d e n c e d b y a succe ssor instrument bear ing the signatures of the requisite number of re cord ow ners and the re c or din g of

same in the of

fi c e of the Cou nty Cle rk of Com a l Co un ty , T e xas. 2 (F ootnote added.)

On November 7, 2000, a majority of the Pleasa

nt Valley Estate landowne rs re corde d
a dd iti on a l ame ndme nts to t he re str ic tiv e c ov e na

nts in t he ir Se c on d A me nd e d Re str ictio ns ,4

Building Requirements a

nd L andsca

pi n g R equire ments for Pleasa nt Valley Estates, Unit 1, to the County of Com a l, T e xas. Ac c or din g to t his do c ume nt, the ow ne rs :
desire to c hang e the r estrictions having been filed perta ining to said subdivisi n [si c] which ar e re corde d in Vol. 272, pag es 313-315, or the Dee d Records of

Comal County , Texas, which said re strictions shall have no for ce a nd eff ect a nd are here by resc inded, and the ow ners of PL EASANT VAL L EY ESTATES, U NI T Idoes [sic] here by restric t said proper

ty as her einaf

ter set out, which r estrictions shall be binding upon the owner s of said lots, or any purcha sers ther eof, the ir heirs, adminis trators or assig ns, and said re strictions shall be covena nts running w ith the land, to wit: . . . .
The re striction releva

nt to this case relating to the use of mobile structures a s residenc es re mained the same thr ou g h e a c h r e vis ion of the re str ic tiv e c ov e na

nts
. Although the Trethe wey s own L ot 15, their childre n, Mark a nd J oanie Koe nig, live in the house located t h er e. The Tr ethewe y s planned to spend the ma jority of their time traveling and living in their

motor home on the roa d. Sometime after Ma y 2005, the Tre thewey s had a
concr ete slab built on L ot 15. They obtained re sidential utili t y service throug h a sepa

rate meter and beg an to intermittently park the ir motor home o n t h is slab. When the Trethew ey s were not trave ling but we re living in Comal Count y , they parke d their motor home on the concr ete slab a nd lived in the motor home.

On J une 16, 2006, appe llees filed thei r P etition for Dec laratory J udg ment and for Te mpo ra ry and Pe rm ane nt R e str a ini ngOr de r i n th e Com a l Co un ty dis tr ic t c ourt , se e kin g to p ro hib it the Tre thewey s from par

king the ir motor home on L ot 15 and living in it. Following a benc h trial on April 3, 2007, the district court g rante d appel l ee s ’ p et i t i on. The district cour t declar ed the deed r estrictions to be valid and a pplicable, and permanently enjoined the Tr ethewe y s fromAp pe lle e s a lso argue that the Tr e the we y s wa ive d the ir c omp la int s on a pp e a l by fa ili ngto 3 a d e qu a te ly b r ie f th e ir ar g u me n ts an d b y f a il in g to s p e c if

ic a ll y c h a ll e n g e c e rta in f

in d in g s o f f a c t. We find the Tre thewey s’ brief ing to be adequate and, ther efor e, will addre ss their points of err or.

5 using the ir motor home as a temporar y or perma

nent residenc e on L ot 15. I n three points of error , t h e T r e t h e w e y s a r gu e t h a tt h e r e s t r i c t i o n s o nw h i c h a p p e l l e e l an d o w n e r s r e l y

ar e u ne nf

or c e a ble beca use they wer e re scinded a

nd, alt er n at i vely , if the re strictions were not rescinde d, they do not apply in this case.
Enfor c e abi lit y o f re st r ic ti ons

I n t h ei r first point of er

ror, the T rethe wey s argue that the de ed re strictions upon which appe llees re ly

are unenfor ceabl e bec ause the y wer e re scinded a

nd, there fore , could not be subsequently

modified or ame nded. Ac cordingto the Trethe wey s, any subsequent modificat ions
or ame ndments were void and unenf orce able. Appellee s respond that the prope rty code ma ndates
a lib e ra l c on str

uc tio n o f r e str ic tiv e c ov e na nts to g ive e ff

e c t to the pa

rt ie s’ int e nt. Acco rd ingto appellee s, the last set of amende d restric tions (the Second Amended Restrictions) are in effe ct and should be enfor ced. 3

Construction of a re stricti v e co v en ant is a question of law , and we revie w the district court’s c onstruction de novo. Owens v. Ouse y , 2 41 S.W. 3d

12 4, 12 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 07 , p e t. d e nied). Re str ic tiv e c ov e na nts are to b e c on str

ue d li be ra lly

to e ff e c tuate the pa

rt ie s’ int e nt. Te x. Pr op . Co de Ann. § 2 02 .0 03 (We st 2 00 7) ; Owens , 241 S.W .3d at 129. Ge n er al rules of co n t ra ct construction apply to the construction of r estrictive c ovenants. Pilarcik v. Em mons , 966 S.W .2d 474, 478 (Tex. 199 8 ). W e co n s true re strictive cove nants as a w hole in light of the6

circ umstances at the time the parties e ntere d into the ag ree ment, g iving effe ct to ever y sentenc e, clause , and word of a cove nant, and a voiding c onstructions that would rende r par ts of the cove nant
s u p e r f lu o u s o r inope rative. Owens , 241 S.W .3d at 129-30. Our primary obligation in construing restric tive covena

nts is to give ef

fec t t o t h e t ru e i ntention of the par ties as expressed in the instrument. Id. We focus not on their subjec tive intent but on their objective intent, a s it is re flec ted in the written contra ct. Lo p e z v . M u n o z , H ocke ma & Ree d , 22 S.W .3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2000); Tien Tao Ass’n v. Kings b r i d g e P ark Cmty. Ass’n , 953 S.W .2d 525, 528 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.).

The Pleasa

nt Valley Estates re strictive cove nants could have been a mended at any time prior to their expiration on S ep t em b er 2 0 , 2008. On Novembe r 7, 2000, a ma jority of the land ow ne rs e xec ute d a

do cum ent e nti tle d Se c on d A me nd e d Re str ic tio ns , B uil din g Re qu ir e me nts
and L and sc a pin g Re qu ir e me nts fo r P le a sa nt V a lle y Es ta te s, Un it 1 , to the County of Com a l, T e xas. Th a t d o c u me n t p u r

p o rte d to “ c h an g e th e r e s tr ic ti o n s ” b y r e s c in d in g th e p r io r

r e s tr ic ti o n s a nd
enac ting ne w re strictions. The re strictive cove nant at issue re lating to mobile structur es as
re sid e nc e s w a s unc ha

ng e d in the a me nd e d r e str ic tio ns . Const ru i n g t h e lang uag e of the restric tive covena nt liberally

to give eff

ect to the parties’ intent, we find the l andowne rs’ S econd Amended Restric tions to be valid and enfor cea ble. The la n d o wner s’ intent that the new r estrictions amend a nd modify

exis ting r estrictions is evidence d, f ir s t, b y th e ti tl e o f th e d o c u me n t: Se c o n d A me n d e d Re s tr ic ti o n s , B u il d in g Re qu irements and Lan d s c a p i n g R e qu i r e m e n t s f

o r P l e a s an t V a l l e y E s t a t e s , U n i t 1 , t o t h e C o u n t y o f C o m a l , T e x a s . In
a dd iti on , th e int

ro du c tor y langua g e pr ov ide s th a t th e land ow ne rs se e k to “ c ha ng e the re str ic tio ns ”7

alre ady in effe ct. Except for the extension of the expi ration date , the Second Ame nded Restrictions
are virtually

identical to the fir s t s et of ame nded re strictions, which wer e virtually identical to the orig inal restric tions. Fin a ll y , a lt h o u gh th e a me n d e d restric tions rescinded a nd repla ced the restric tive
covena nts they wer e modifying, this two-step process was acc omplished in a sing le ac t of adopting the modified re strictive cove nants. Readingthe re levant docume nts as a whole, w e fin d t h at the intent of the landowne rs was to “ amend or modify ” orig inal restric tive covena nts and the first set of ame nded re strictive cove nants, as expressly permitted by

the documents memo ri al i z ing tho se re str ic tio ns .

The Tr ethewe y s rely

chief ly on Owens v. Ouse

y to supp o rt t h eir a

rg ument that the Second Amende d Restrictions are invalid. I n Owens , we a ddresse d the enf orce ability

of a simi lar restric tive covena

nt. 241 S.W .3d at 127. I n that case , the Ousey s sought enfor ceme nt of a re strictive
covena nt prohibiting the plac ement of a mobile home on adjac ent lots owned by the Owe nses. Id. Th e pr ov isi on

in q ue sti on pr ov ide d th a t th e re str ic tiv e c ov e na nts :
shall be in full forc e and e ffe ct for a p er i o d o f t wenty -five y ear s. Howeve r, any restric tive covena

nt or covenants m ay be renewe d at t he end of said 25 y ear

period, or may , at any

time, be altered amended or canc elled by a majority vote of the owners of the prope rty , eac h lot, whether owned by one or more persons, having a nd being entitled to one vot e, on any question of alteration, amendment of [si c] canc ellation of any restric tion.
Id. The deed containing these covena nts w as executed October 22, 1976. Id. a t1 3 0
. T h u s , t w e n t yfive y ear s from its date of e x ecution wa s October 2 2 , 2001. Two y ear s after its ex piration, the Ou s ey s s o u gh t t o amend the r estriction so that it would continue in eff ect. Id. a t 1 2 7
- 2 8
. T he tr ia l c ourt

g ra nte d a mand a tor

y inj un c tio n c omp e lli ng the Ow e ns e s to mov e the mob ile ho meEven if we assume that the or igina l restrictions rather than the first set of amended 4 restric tions were still in effe ct on November 7, 2000, the l andowne rs adopted the Second Amende d Restrictions before the expiration of the orig inal Restrictions, Dece mber 31, 2000. 8 off their prope rty
. Id. at 128. On appe al, this Court rever sed, holding that to “g ive ef fec t to every sentenc e, cla

use, and w ord of a

covena nt” and to “ av o i d constructions that would re nder pa rts of the c ov e na

nt s up e rf luo us or ino pe rativ e ,” the pr ov isi on s w e re re qu ir e d to be a me nd e d whi le the y sti ll
rema ined in eff

ect; otherwise, t he twenty -five- y ear provision would be “supe rfluous or inoper ative.” Id. at 1 3 0 (c i t i n g City of San Antonio v. Ci ty of Boerne , 1 1 1 S.W.3d 2 2 , 2 9 ( T e x. 2 0 0 3 ) )
. We
rea soned that, eve n const ru i n g the re strictive cove nant libera lly , as re quired by the prope rty

code, amendments e nacte d two y ear s after the pro v i s i o n s expi red w ere void and ineff ective. Id. ; see Tex. P rop. Code Ann. § 202.003( a).

The ke y dist i n ct i o n betwee n Owens and this case is that the restrictions in Owens had expired two y ear s befor e the landow ners soug ht to amend them. See O wens , 241 S.W .3d at 127- 28. The provision allowing amendments e x pressly allowed the restric tions to be “ altere d amende d
or ca ncelled” either “ at the end of said 25 y ear period” or “at any time” during the 25-y ear period. Id. at 127. The la

ndowner s in Owens did not attempt to enact new amendments or modific ations withi n t h e s p ecified time period. Rather , they waited until two y ear s after the expiration of the restric tions and, with them, the t ime period for amendingor modifying the m. Id. at 127-28. Unde r such circ umstances, attempts to amend expi red de ed re strictions are inva lid. Id. at 130. He re, howeve r, th e r e s tr ic ti o n s w e r e s ti ll e f f e c ti v e a t th e ti me th e la

n d o w n e r s s o u g h t to “ c h an g e the restric tions.” Although the landowner s made these modifications by resc inding the old r estrictions 4 and re placingthem with new, modified re strictions, t h ei r ex p ress intent wa s to “cha ng e theI n a subpar t to their second point of e rror , the Tre thewey s argue that the dist rict cour t erre d 5 in holding that the restric tions c ould not be enfor ced wher e the Trethe wey s had not consente d to the restric tions. As noted, t he re strictions require d only that a majority

of landowne rs conse nt to the re str ic tio ns that w ou ld t

he n a pp ly to a ll l and ow ne rs in t

he Ple a sa nt V a lle y Es ta te s: The re cord ow ners of

leg al title of fifty -one ( 51%) pe rce nt of the lots as shown by the de e d r e c or ds of

Com a l Co un ty , T e xas, may a me nd or c ha ng e sa id c ov e na

nts in w ho le or part at any

time. Any

chang e or a

mendment shall be set f

orth and e vidence d by a succ essor instrument bea ring the sig nature s of the re quisite num b er of rec ord o w n e r s a n d

t h e r e c o r d i n g o f

s a m e i n t h e o f

f i c e o f t h e C o u n t y C l e r

k o f C o m a l C o u n t y, Te xas. There is no dispute that a majority of the Pleasant Valley Estate landowner s signe d t h e S econd Amended Re strictions. Having found the Sec ond Amended Re strictions to be valid and enf orce able, we ho ld the m to be va lid and e nf or c e a ble a g a ins t th e Tr e the we y s e ve n th ou g h th e Tr e the we y s d id not consent to their adoption. 9 restric tions” curr ently in effe ct. Construing the restric tions li bera lly as the leg islature has ma

ndated, we hold that the r estriction modifications or amendments wer e prope rl y en acted. See Tex. P rop. Code Ann. § 202.003(a ). Ac cording ly , we hold that the Sec ond Amended Re strictions are va lid and enfor cea ble, and ove rrule the Trethe wey s’ first point of er ror. 5 App lic abi lit y o f re st r ic ti ons

I n th e ir se c on d p oin t of

e rr or , th e Tr e the we y s ar g ue that the re str ic tio ns do no t a pp ly to their motor home. Acc ording to the Trethe wey s, the restric tion pr ohibiting a “ trailer, te nt, shack, g ara g e , b ar

n , o u tb u il d in g , mo b il e h o me o r tr a il e r h o u s e ” f r o m b e in g u s e d a s a r e s id e n c e does not apply to their motor home. They argue that their motor home is not desc ribed by any of the
e nume rate d te rm s.

The a pplicabil i t y o f a re strictive cove nant is a question of c ontrac t construction, a question of law whic h we r eview de novo. See O wens , 241 S.W. 3d a t 129. Wor ds and ph ra se s in10

a re strictive cove nant must be g iven their commonly acc epted meaning as of the date the restric tion
was wr itten and must not be enlarg ed, extended, stretc hed, or c hange d by construction. W

ilm oth v. W ilcox , 734 S.W .2d 656, 657-58 (Te x . 1987). The T rethe wey s argue that a “motor” home is not included in the list of structure s or items prohibite d b y t h e d ee d restric tion, and they cite Hidden Va lle y Civ ic Clu b v. Br own , 70 2 S.W. 2d 66 5 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14t h Di st. ] 198 5, no wr it) , in support of their position. Hidden Valley Civic Club involved the applicability of a deed r estriction simil ar, but not identica l, to the restriction at issue he re:
RESTRI CTI ON 6. No trailer, base ment, tent, shack, g ara g e apa rtment or bar , or other ou t b u i l ding sha ll at any time be used a s a re sidence , temporar ily or perma nently , nor shall any

residenc e of a t em p o rar y char acte r be pe rmitted. No building shall be mo ved upon any lot, but mus t be er ecte d to conform with the require ments set out in parag raph one here of.
I n Hidden Valley

Civic Club , th e a

pp e lla nt ch a lle ng e d the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing s th a t th e a pp e lle e s’ motoriz ed ca

mper was not a st ructure , building, trailer t ruck, tandem truck, or mobile home. The
c ourt of a pp e a ls o ve rr

ule d th e a

pp e lla nt’ s c ha lle ng e , s ta ti ng : “ Ap pe lla nt f a ile d to e sta

bli sha s a matter of la

w that appe llees’ ve hicle constituted a violation of any of the pe rtinent dee d restric tions.” 702 S.W .2d at 668. Thus, the cour t found the restric tion pr ohibiting a “tra iler, baseme nt, tent, shack, g ara g e apa

rtment or bar, or ot her outbuil ding” from being used as a r esidenc e did not apply to the appellant’ s motoriz ed tra iler. Id.

Appellee s resp o n d t h at “ther e is much authority for the pr oposition t hat a motor home violates a r estriction ag ainst a mobile home or a trailer house” and cite seve ral c ases in support of this proposition. Each of the c ases c ited by appellee s, howeve r, involves the applicability of11

restric tive covena

nts to non-motoriz ed vehic les and , more spec ifically , to mobile homes. See Las sit e r v . B lis s , 5 5 9 S
. W
. 2 d 3 5 3 ( T e x. 1 9 77 ); Dempse y v. A pache Shore

s Prop. Owners Ass’n , 73 7 S. W.2 d 5 89 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 87 , n o w ri t) ; Bullock v . Kattener , 502 S.W .2d 828 (Tex. Civ. Ap p. —A us t i n 1 9 7 3 , w r i t r e f ’ d n . r . e . )
. F u rt h e r , o u r s e ar c h o f t h e c a s e l aw h a s r e v e a l e d n o c a s e in which a mo to r

h o me o r mo to r iz e d

r e c r e a ti o n a l v e h ic le h a s b e e nf o u n d to v io late a

r e s tr ic tive covenant aga i n s t a mobile home or a trailer house . We ag ree with the Trethe wey s that the list of structure s and it ems in the first portion of t he restriction does not include motorized vehicles suc h as a motor home.

Howeve r, thoug h the re striction at issue does not include motor homes or any other ty pe of motorized vehicle s, it does include the following lang uag e:
No exist ing struc ture shall be moved o n s ai d land and pr emises for the purpose of occupa ncy , and all im p ro v em ents ere cted ther eon, including fenc es, shall be of a pe rmane nt t

y pe , c ha ra c te r, and

c on str uc tio n, and

may be bu ilt sim ult ane ou sly

wi th o r s u b s e qu e n tt o e r e c t i o no f

p e r m an e n tr e s i d e n c e o n l y.
I t is not di sputed that the Tre thewey s park their motor home on a c oncre te slab on the lot, hook it up to utili ty service , and live it in from time to time. This is more than parking the motor home on the lot as a motorized vehicle. I t is using the mot or home “ for oc cupanc y ” and r uns afoul of the portion
o f t h e r e s t r i c t i o nr e l a t i n g t o m o v i n g ane x i s t i n g s t r u c tu r e o n t o t h e l an d f

o r t h e p u r p o s e o f o c c u p a n c y. The undisputed fa ct that the Tre thewey s use their motor home for occupanc y and move it onto the lotThe Trethewe y s also argue that the f act that they

do not occupy

their motor home on the 6 lot at all times, or permane ntly , chang es the a naly sis. However , the lang uag e of the restric tion pr oh ibi ts m ov ingan e xistin g str uc tur e on to the land fo r the purp os e of oc c up anc y . Th e re is n o ti me para meter or exception for tempora

ry structure s used for the purpose of occupa ncy . Thus, the intermittent nature of

their use of

the motor home for o cc u p an cy o n t he lot does not aff ect the ana ly sis
. We also note that the di strict court’s order declar ed that the Trethewe y s violated restric tion numbe r 1 0, wh ic h p ro vid e s: Trailer s such as c amper

trailers ( uninhabited), horse trailers, stock tr ai l er s , boat trailers, etc., [si c] w ill be permitted on the premises so long a s they are parke d on the back side of the pe rmane nt dwelling and only afte r the per manent dwe lling is ere cted. Withre g ard

to t his pa rt ic ula r r e str ic tiv e c ov e na

nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt

fo un d tha t: (1 ) the De fe nd a nts ma y n o t p ar k a r e c r e a ti o n a l v e h ic le in f r o n t o f th e ir h o me o r to th e s id e s o f th e ir h o me located on L ot 15, and (2) the Defendants viol ated r estriction number 10 of the “SECOND AMEN DED RESTRI CTI ONS, BU I L DI NG REQUIREMENTS A ND L AN DS C AP I

NG R E QU I REMENTS FOR PL EASANT VAL L EY ESTATES, UNI T 1, TO THE COMAL COUNTY, TEX AS.” Although the Trethe wey s challeng ed the e nforc eability and validity

of all provisions, they did not challeng e the district court’s a pplication of this provision to their motor home. There fore , we de cline to deter

mine whether

this provision i s applicable to the Trethe wey s’ motor home.

12 wh e n th e y

do so , b ri ng s the ir mot or ho me in thi s ca se wi thi n the te rm s of the re str ic tiv e c ov e na nts
. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule the ir second point of e rror . 6
Attor neys’ fees

I n t hei r th ir d p oin t of

e rr or , th e Tr e the we y s argue that th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in denying the ir motion for summary judgme nt that the y are entitled to a dec laration that the restrictions
are unenfor cea

ble as a matter of la

w, and in fa iling to awa rd them attorne y s’ fe es under sect i o n 3 7
. 0 0 9 of the Te x as Civil P rac tice and Re medies Code. This point of err or is predic ated13

on our finding err or in the district c ourt’s g rant of summary judgme nt. We ha ve not f o u n d er ror. Consequently , we ove rrule the Trethe wey s’ third point of err or.
Conclusion Havi n g o v erruled the appe llants’ points of error , the judg ment of the district cour t is affirme d.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pemberton a nd Waldrop Affir med Filed: Mar ch 27, 2009