IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WICHITA FALLS DIVISION

CLIFFORD CLARK, §

TDCJ No. 2239054, §

 §

Plaintiff, §

 §

v. § Civil Action No. 7:22-cv-00059-M-BP

 § 

 §

MICHAEL WADDELL, et al., §

§ 

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Michael Feazell

(“Feazell”) and Andrea Lozada (“Lozada”) on January 27, 2023 (ECF No. 21), and the Motion to 

Dismiss Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss filed by Plaintiff Clifford Clark (“Clark”) on February 9, 

2023 (ECF No. 26), which the Court construes as a response to Defendants’ Motion. After 

considering the pleadings and applicable legal authorities, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that

United States District Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn GRANT the Motion and DISMISS Plaintiff’s 

claims against Defendants Feazell and Lozada in their official capacity and for return of property 

without prejudice and DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against them under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 for compensatory damages, for deprivation of his constitutional rights, and for conspiracy 

to violate those rights.

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Clark is an inmate in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal 

Justice (“TDCJ”) and brings this action pursuant to § 1983. ECF No. 1. Clark alleges that while 

he was incarcerated at the Allred Unit in Iowa Park, Texas, he was “racially profiled and 

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discriminated against due to ... growing [his] hair because of [his] religious beliefs.” ECF No. 1 

at 4. Clark alleges that Lozada and Feazell “knew about the issues [he] was having” but did nothing 

to stop the discrimination. ECF No. 8 at 5-6. Instead, Clark alleges that the Defendants “racially 

targeted [him],’ “protected each other” and “destroy[ed] [his] property.” ECF No. 1 at 3. Clark

seeks injunctive relief, compensatory damages of $300,000, and punitive damages of $777,000 

against the TDCJ officers. ECF No. 14 at 9. 

II. LEGAL AUTHORITIES

A. Pro Se Standard 

Courts are to liberally construe the pleadings of a pro se party, taking all well-pleaded 

allegations as true. Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993). “[A] pro se complaint, 

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted 

by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

106 (1976)). The Court must “look beyond” a prisoner’s “formal complaint and [] consider as 

amendments to the complaint those materials subsequently filed.” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 

220 (5th Cir. 1983). Those materials include any responses to a court-issued questionnaire, which 

“is a useful means by which the court can develop the factual basis for the prisoner’s complaint.” 

Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 602 & n.14 

(5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that questionnaire responses supplement the inmate’s complaint).

But “even a liberally-construed pro se . . . complaint must set forth facts giving rise to a 

claim on which relief may be granted.” Levitt v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 224 (5th 

Cir. 1988) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)). Thus, a court inquires “whether 

within the universe of theoretically provable facts there exists a set which can support a cause of 

action under [the] complaint.” Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1976).

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B. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes motions to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Rule 12(b)(1) motions 

present either “facial” or “factual” attacks. Brown v. Peterson, No. 7:03-cv-0205, 2006 WL 

349805, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2006). Where, as here, the motion is “based on the complaint 

alone,” the attack is facial, and the Court must “merely decide whether the allegations in the 

complaint, taken as true, sufficiently state a basis for subject matter jurisdiction.” Lowe v.

ViewPoint Bank, 972 F. Supp. 2d 947, 953 (N.D. Tex. 2013); see also Parks v. Hinojosa, No. 4:21-

cv-00111-O, 2021 WL 1720219, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2021) (explaining that Rule 12(b)(1) 

motions are presumptively facial attacks).

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” that “possess only that power authorized 

by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, “[a] case 

is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or 

constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 

Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Loc. 6 Pension Fund, 

81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). Any dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “should 

be made without prejudice.” Mitchell v. Bailey, 982 F.3d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 2020).

C. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to move for dismissal of a 

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

The Rules require that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of 

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the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A complaint must 

include sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts 

must “take all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 

. . . and ask whether the pleadings contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’” Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

557). 

D. Qualified Immunity 

“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from 

liability unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 

a reasonable person would have known.” Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing 

Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)). “[T]he immunity issue must be resolved at 

the earliest possible stage of the litigation since it entails an entitlement to immunity from suit and 

not merely a defense to liability.” Id. (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226 (1991)). Qualified 

immunity can be decided at the motion to dismiss stage as it is the earliest possible stage in 

litigation. Carswell v. Camp, 37 F.4th 1062, 1068 (5th Cir. 2022).

To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the official 

violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the 

time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citations omitted). 

A good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual burden of proof, shifting it to the 

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plaintiff to show that the defense is not available. Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., 948 F.3d 281, 287 (5th 

Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 376 (2020). 

E. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice

There exists a “well-established policy that the plaintiff be given every opportunity to state 

a claim.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). As a result, courts generally 

allow plaintiffs at least one opportunity to amend. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean 

Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (2002). Nonetheless, a court may appropriately dismiss an action 

with prejudice if it finds that the plaintiff has alleged his best case. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 

322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999). Likewise, a court may dismiss a complaint with prejudice, thus 

foreclosing the plaintiff’s opportunity to amend, whenever amendment of the pleadings would be 

futile. Stem v. Gomez, 813 F.3d 205, 215-16 (5th Cir. 2016).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Eleventh Amendment bars Clark’s claims for damages against Feazell 

and Lozada in their official capacity. 

Clark seeks $1,077,000 in damages and injunctive relief from this action. ECF Nos. 1 at 4, 

14 at 9. However, Clark has only named individual officers as parties to this suit. ECF Nos 1, 14 

at 9. To the extent that Clark sues Feazell and Lozada in their official capacity for damages, he 

cannot proceed because the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution prevents such a claim. 

The Eleventh Amendment “bars suits against a state unless the state has waived its 

immunity or Congress has abrogated immunity.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 

U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state agencies and to state 

officials if the relief sought would operate against the state. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 

491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). However, the Supreme Court has carved out an exception to state 

sovereign immunity in Ex parte Young, permitting suits for injunctive relief against state actors 

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whose conduct violates federal law. 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908); Haverkamp v. Linthicum, 6 

F.4th 662, 669 (5th Cir. 2021). “The rule is based on the legal fiction that a sovereign state cannot 

act unconstitutionally,” and therefore, when “a state actor enforces an unconstitutional law, he is 

stripped of his official clothing and becomes a private person subject to suit.” K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 

F.3d 115, 124 (5th Cir. 2010).

The TDCJ is a Texas state agency, and Feazell and Lozada were TDCJ employees at the 

Allred Unit during all relevant times. Harris v. Angelina County, Tex., 31 F.3d 331, 338 n. 7 (5th 

Cir. 1994) (“Under the current state of the law, the TDCJ is deemed an instrumentality of the state 

operating as its alter ego in carrying out a public function of the state, and is immune from suit 

under the Eleventh Amendment.”); see generally ECF Nos. 1, 8, 14, 15. The State of Texas has 

not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cox v. Texas, 354 F. 

App'x 901, 903 (5th Cir. 2009). Moreover, it is also settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars a 

recovery of money damages under § 1983 from state employees in their official capacity. See 

Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, Clark cannot sue Feazell and Lozada in 

their official capacity for money damages.

Whether he can proceed against them for injunctive relief depends on whether the Ex parte 

Young exception applies to the facts of this case. Under Ex parte Young, a court need not “require 

an analysis of the merits of the claim. Rather, a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry 

into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly 

characterized as prospective.’” City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting 

Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (alteration in original)). 

Liberally construing Clark’s pro se complaint and his answers to the Court’s questionnaire, it 

appears that he alleges ongoing violations of the First and Eighth Amendment and seeks injunctive 

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relief in addition to monetary relief. ECF Nos. 1 at 4, 14 at 9; Delaughter v. Woodall, 909 F.3d 

130, 137 (5th Cir. 2018); Mayfield v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 

2008). 

However, Clark has no viable claim for prospective injunctive relief against Feazell and 

Lozada since they are employees at the Allred Unit, and the Court notes that Clark is now 

incarcerated at the William P. Clements Unit in Amarillo. ECF No. 14 at 1. Therefore, his claims 

against Feazell and Lozada for injunctive relief are moot, and he cannot proceed against them 

under Ex parte Young. See Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th 

Cir.1991) (holding that an inmate's transfer from county jail to state prison rendered moot his 

claims for injunctive relief); Thompson v. Eason, 258 F. Supp. 2d 508, 522 (N.D. Tex. 2003)

(holding that transfer to another prison facility moots inmate’s request for injunctive relief); see 

also Hoyt v. Big Spring State Hosp., No. 6:15-cv-0003-BL, 2016 WL 7189844, at *10 (N.D. Tex. 

Dec. 8, 2016) (holding that because plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was moot, he had no 

viable claim for prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young). Because the Eleventh 

Amendment bars Clark’s claims against Feazell and Lozada in their official capacity, and Ex parte 

Young does not apply to Clark’s claims against them for injunctive relief, Judge Lynn should 

dismiss those claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The Court construes the remaining claims against Feazell and Lozada 

as claims against them in their individual capacity for which there is no Eleventh Amendment 

immunity. Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 850 (5th Cir. 

1991).

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B. Clark cannot recover compensatory damages from Feazell and Lozada 

because he does not allege that they physically injured him.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), no prisoner can may bring a civil action 

in federal court “for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing 

of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (West 2023). As a 

result, a prisoner such as Clark cannot recover compensatory damages “for violations of federal 

law where no physical injury is alleged.” Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 529 F.3d 599, 605 

(5th Cir. 2008). There is no physical injury when prison employees allegedly failed to protect a 

prisoner from other inmates. Jones, 188 F.3d at 326. However, a prisoner can recover nominal and 

punitive damages if he asserts a violation of a constitutional right, even without alleging that he 

sustained a physical injury. Mayfield, 529 F.3d at 605-06. Clark alleges numerous violations of his 

property and other rights, but he asserts no physical injury caused by Feazell and Lozada. As a 

result, the PLRA bars Clark’s claim for compensatory damages from them, and Judge Lynn should 

dismiss such claims with prejudice.

C. Clark has not sufficiently pleaded a failure to protect claim. 

Liberally construed, Clark’s complaint alleges that Feazell and Lozada failed to protect 

him from harm by putting him “in cells with people who have severe mental issues . . . who I don’t 

get alon[g] with and I don’t feel safe with.” ECF No. 1 at 4. Prison officials have a duty under the 

Eighth Amendment to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). “It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at 

the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for 

the victim's safety.” Id. at 834; Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 1995). Rather, a 

prisoner-plaintiff must demonstrate both that “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a 

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substantial risk of serious harm” and that the defendant prison official's state of mind is one of 

“deliberate indifference” to the prisoner's safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, Horton, 70 F.3d at 401. 

Knowledge about a particular inmate’s violent tendencies, without more specific 

information about the risk, does not rise to the requisite level of awareness necessary for a finding 

of deliberate indifference. Van Williams v. Samaniego, No. EP-05-CA-491, 2007 WL 9701460 

(W.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2007); Lopez v. Davis, No. 6:19CV593, 2020 WL 6935560, at *4 (E.D. Tex. 

Oct. 7, 2020), rec. adopted, 2020 WL 6888993 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2020). Clark has not pleaded 

in his complaint or provided in his questionnaire answers any facts to show that he sustained any 

physical injury or that Feazell or Lozada was aware of any violence directed at him by a fellow 

inmate. ECF Nos. 1 at 4, 8 at 5-6. Thus, the Court looks to the grievances Clark attached to his 

answers to the Court’s questionnaire to determine if they state any factsthat would have put Feazell 

or Lozada on notice of the physical altercations that Clark alleges. 

After reviewing the approximately eighty pages of grievance reports that Clark submitted

(ECF Nos. 14, 15), the Court found only one mention of Lozada. Clark wrote that “[i]n the past, I 

have problems with the following people about me growing my hair due to religious beliefs and 

in different ways have prosecuted me . . . A. Lozada.” ECF No. 15 at 47. The grievance reports 

mention Feazell several times. In the first report, Clark complained about his recreation restriction

and blamed the restriction on Feazell, along with other officials, who racially discriminated against 

him and attacked him by taking his I.D. ECF No. 14 at 25. In another report, Clark stated that he 

talked to Feazell about receiving his “Line 1.” ECF No. 15 at 31-32. Finally, in a Step One 

grievance report, Clark stated that Feazell racially profiled him and “targeted [him], harassed [him]

about [his] hair, got mad at [him] because [he] didn’t address him by Sir, threatened [him], saying 

he was going to take away my G4.” Id. at 47. However, none of the grievances that mentioned 

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Feazell or Lozada mention any physical injury that Clark sustained. To the extent that Clark pleads

that Feazell and Lozada failed to protect him from other inmates, his statements are vague and 

conclusory, and do not show that Feazell or Lozada was deliberately indifferent toward him. Nor 

do Clark’s allegations explain how he was injured as a result of any alleged deliberate indifference. 

Feazell and Lozada have pleaded qualified immunity as a defense to Clark’s complaint and 

seek dismissal on this basis. ECF No. 26 at 1-2. Because Clark has not adequately pleaded a 

violation of his constitutional rights or that the law establishing such rights was clearly established,

Clark has not met his burden of addressing Feazell and Lozada’s qualified immunity defense, and 

dismissal is proper. 

Although he has not amended his complaint or sought leave to do so, Clark has had an 

opportunity to supplement his complaint in answers to the Court’s questionnaire. Clark did so by 

filing over 100 pages of answers and supplemental materials. See ECF Nos. 13, 14, 15. If the 

prisoner has filed his complaint and submitted questionnaire responses, then the Court may 

conclude that he has pleaded his best case such that granting him further leave to amend would be 

futile or cause unnecessary delay. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Waybourn, No. 4:20-cv-1150-P, 2021 

WL 2635917, at *10 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2021); McLean v. King, No. 3:20-cv-1244-C-BK, 2020 

WL 6049297, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2020), rec. adopted, 2020 WL 6048202 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 

13, 2020).

Under these circumstances, the undersigned concludes that Clark has pleaded his best case 

of a constitutional violation against Feazell and Lozada in their individual capacities, and any 

further amendment would be futile and would only cause unnecessary further delay. Judge Lynn 

therefore should dismiss with prejudice Clark’s claims against Feazell and Lozada in their 

individual capacity for violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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D. Clark has not sufficiently pleaded a conspiracy among Feazell, Lozada, and 

other persons. 

In his complaint, Clark argues that Feazell and Lozada “protected each other,” and 

repeatedly mentions how they failed to hold other officers accountable, even alleging that Feazell 

“was behind and orchestrated some of the issues [he] was facing.” ECF Nos. 1 at 3, 8 at 5-6. To 

the extent that Clark alleges that Feazell and Lozada conspired in some way against him, he does 

not adequately allege facts to plead an actionable conspiracy.

To sufficiently plead a civil conspiracy under § 1983, Clark must show that there was “an 

actual violation of a right protected under § 1983” and that “[the] action [was] taken in concert by 

the defendants with the specific intent to violate the aforementioned right.” Brown v. Tull, 218 

F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2000). “[A] conspiracy claim is not actionable without an actual violation of 

section 1983.” Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1995). Clark has not pleaded that there 

was an actual violation of a right protected under § 1983 as he has not stated enough facts to 

demonstrate that Feazell or Lozada failed to protect him in violation of the Eighth Amendment or 

otherwise violated his constitutional rights. Moreover, even if he had sufficiently pleaded that 

element, he has not pleaded facts to show how Feazell and Lozada acted in concert to violate any 

of his constitutional rights. Merely making a conclusory statement that Feazell and Lozada

“protected each other,” or that Feazell was responsible for some of the unconstitutional acts is not,

without more, enough to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Thus, Clark has not 

pleaded a civil conspiracy claim under § 1983 against Feazell and Lozada, and Judge Lynn should 

dismiss this claim with prejudice as any further amendment would be futile for the reasons 

previously stated. 

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E. Clark’s claim for deprivation of property should be dismissed. 

“[T]he deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest caused by a state actor's 

random, unauthorized conduct does not give rise to a § 1983 procedural due process claim unless 

the state fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy.” Meeks v. Nash, No. 20-40252, 2021 

WL 4515396, at *1 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 115 (1990)). 

“Postdeprivation remedies, such as state tort suits, ‘do not satisfy due process where a deprivation 

of property is caused by conduct pursuant to established state procedure, rather than random and 

unauthorized action.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984)). 

Clark alleges that Feazell “took [his] I.D. which is state property.” ECF No. 15 at 47. He 

also alleges that before taking his I.D., Feazell pulled him out of line to harass him and threaten 

him out of retaliation for not cutting his hair. Id. After threatening him, Feazell then, allegedly, 

took his I.D. Id. Clark has not pleaded that Feazell took his I.D. pursuant to any established state 

procedure. See generally ECF Nos. 1, 8, 14, 15. Clark states that Feazell took his I.D. as a result 

of “racial profil[ing] and target[ing],” and asks the TDCJ to get his I.D. back from Feazell. Id. at 

47-48. These facts describe a random and unauthorized deprivation of property, not a deprivation 

under an established state procedure. Thus, Clark’s claim for the deprivation of his property “does 

not give rise to a § 1983 procedural due process claim unless the state fails to provide an adequate 

postdeprivation remedy.” Meeks, 2021 WL 4515396 at *1. 

Clark claims that the post-deprivation remedies were inadequate because the state did 

“absolutely nothing to remedy my lost, destroyed property.” ECF No. 26 at 4. However, the Texas 

administrative and judicial systems do provide an adequate state postdeprivation remedy. Tex. 

Gov. Code § 501.007 (West 2023); see also Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543-44 (5th Cir. 

1994). Clark’s remedy is to file a tort suit in state court, and lack of understanding of this right 

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does not indicate that the remedy is inadequate. Washington v. Garcia, No. 2:19-CV-131-Z-BR, 

2022 WL 3702011, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 2022). Consequently, the appropriate forum for Clark’s 

claims for return of his property is in a Texas state court, not here. Judge Lynn should dismiss this 

claim without prejudice so that Clark can pursue such a remedy if he chooses to do so. Simmons 

v. Poppell, 837 F.2d 1243, 1244 (5th Cir. 1987).

IV. CONCLUSION 

The Eleventh Amendment bars Clark’s claims against Feazell and Lozada in their 

individual capacity for monetary damages, and Clark has no claim against them for prospective 

injunctive relief since he no longer is incarcerated in the Allred Unit. Clark has not stated a claim 

against Feazell or Lozado upon which relief could be granted for compensatory damages, for 

failure to protect him in violation of the Eighth Amendment, for conspiracy, and for deprivation 

of property. 

Therefore, after considering the pleadings and applicable legal authorities, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS that United States District Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn GRANT the Motion to 

Dismiss and DISMISS Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Feazell and Lozada in their official 

capacity and for return of property without prejudice and DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s 

claims against them under § 1983 for compensatory damages, for deprivation of his constitutional 

rights, and for conspiracy to violate those rights.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties 

in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, 

and recommendation must file specific written objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). To be specific, an objection must 

identify the particular finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

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the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except 

upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th 

Cir. 1996) (en banc).

SIGNED on March 30, 2023.

 ______________________________________

Hal R. Ray, Jr.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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