Filed 5/23/18 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
FORREST HUFF,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES USA, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant

. H042852 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 1

- 10

- CV

- 172614)

This case presents the question of whether a plaintiff who brings a representative action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ( PAGA; Lab. Code, § 2698,

et seq.) may seek penalties not only for the Labor Code violation that affected him or her,
but also for different violations that affected other employees. The trial court granted
p la intiff Forrest Huff a new trial, reasonin g that Huff ’s failure to prove he was personall y affected by one of the multiple Labor Code viol ations alleged in his complaint did not preclude his action under PAGA

. As we will explain , we conclude that PAGA allows an “aggrieved employee”

–– a person affected by at least one Labor Code violation committed by an employer

–– to pursue penalties for all the Labor Code violations committed by that employer. We will therefore affirm the order granting a new trial.
I. BACKGROUND Huff worked as a security guard for defendant Securitas Security Services USA,
Inc. (Securitas). Securitas provides businesses with on

- site security . It hires employees to work as security guards, and then contracts with its clients to provide guards for a particular location. Securi tas occasionally places guards in temporary ass ignments, but it2

more typically provides clients with long term placements. ( A standard contract duration , though terminable on 30 days’ notice , is three years. )
Huff was employed by Securitas for a bout a year , during which time he worked at
three different client sites. After he was removed from an assignment at the request of the client, Huff resigned his employment. Two months later, he sued Securitas for Labor
Code violations. The operative second amended complaint contains a representative
cause of action under PAGA , seeking penalties for Labor Code violations committed against Huff and other employees

. According to t he complaint, the basis for the PAGA
claim i s that Securitas i s subject to penalties for violations of “num erous Labor Code provisions.” T he Labor Code provisions alleged to have been violated include section s 201 [requiring immediate payment of wages upon termination of employment]; 201.3 , subdivision (b) [ requiring temporary services employer s to pay wages weekly ]; 202 [requiring payment of wages within 72 hours of resignation]; and 204 [failure to pay all wages due for work performed in a pay period] (unspecified statutory references are to the Labor Code)

. B ecause of the representative nature of the acti on, the case was designated complex and the court ordered that the trial would proceed in phases. The parties agreed the first phase of the trial would involve a sample of 20 Securitas employees (10 selected by Huff and 10 by Securitas), and would determi ne only certain disputed issues as to
those employees . Among the issues the parties agreed to have determined in the first phase were whether the sample employees had been p aid on a weekly basis as required by Labor Code section 201.3, subdivision (b)(1); whether they were assigned to wor k for a client for over 90 days ( and were therefore exempt from the weekly pay requirement under the exemption provided for by section 201.3, subdivision (b)(6) ) ; and the amount
of any penalties to be imposed against Secur itas

. The first phase was tried to the court. After Huff presented his case, Securitas moved for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The trial court granted3

the motion, finding that the evidence established Huff was not a temporary services employee as defined by section 201.3, subdivision (b)(1), a nd as a result could not show he was affected by a violation of that section . The court further decided that Huff had no standing to pursue penaltie s under PAGA on behalf of others who were affected by that
violation. J udgment was entered in favor of Securitas.
H uff moved for a new trial under Code of Civil Procedure section 657 , and t he trial court granted that motion. The court found that it made an error in law when it entered judgment in favor of Securitas based on Huff’s inability to prove a violation of the section 201.3, subdivision (b)(1) weekly pay requirement. Under PAGA an “aggrieved employee” can pursue penalties for L abor Code violations on behalf of other current and former employees, and the statute defines an aggrieved employee as someone who suffered “one or more of the alleged violations” of the Labor Code for which penalties are sought. Relying on that statutory definition, the court conclude d that so long as Huff could prove he was affected by at least one Labor Code violation , he could pursue penalties on behalf of other employees for additional violations. Since Huff’s complaint alleged that another violation of the Labor Code ( separate from the weekly pay requirement ) affected him personally , the court de cide d that the failure to establish a violation of the weekly pay requirement did not preclude his entire PAGA cause of
action

. Securitas appeals from the order granting Huff a new trial.
II. DISCUSSION
A. T HE P RIVATE A TTORNEYS G ENERAL M ODEL OF L ABOR L AW E NFORCEMENT California law closely regulates the working conditions of employee s and the payment of their wages . (See, e.g., §§ 201 [ requiring immediate payment of all wages due upon discharge of an employee]; 202 [requiring payment of wages within 72 hours of an employee’s resignation]; 201.3 [requiring weekly payment of wages for temporary employees]; 204 [requiring semi

- monthly payme nt of wages during regular employment].) Tho se labor laws are enforceable in sever al ways: An employee can file4

suit to recover wages ow ed and any statutory damages provided for by the Labor Code (s ee , e.g., § 203 )

. A n employee can file an administrative complaint with the Labor Commissioner, who is authorized to investigate complaints and order employer s to pay wages owed (§ 98 )

. V iolations of certain provisions are punishable by a monetary penalty, which the Labor Commissioner ca n recover in an administrative proceeding or in

court ( § § 210 , 225.5 ) ; a nd some violations may be prosecuted as cri minal offenses (§ § 215 , 216, 218 )

. Despite those statutes and remedies , the Legislature found state labor law s were not being effectively enfo rced. ( Iskanian v. CLS Transp ortation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 379 ( Iskanian ).) D eclining funding and staffing levels had left

state agencies unable to produce widespread compliance. ( Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980

– 981.) The solution the Legislature devised is the statute at
issue in this case

. PAGA was enacted in 2003 to allow private parties to sue for the civil penalties previously only recoverable by a state agency . ( Iskanian , supra , 59 Cal.4th at
p. 379.) A s the California Supreme Court recognized in Iskanian , PAGA created a type
of qui tam action , au thorizing a private party to bring an action to recover a penalty on behalf of the government and receive part of the recovery as compensation . ( Id. at
p. 382). W hen an employee brings a representative action under PAGA, he or she does
so “ as the proxy or agent of the state's labor law enforcement agencies, not other employees .” ( Esparza v. KS Industries, L.P. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1241.) “The purpose of the PAGA is not to recover damages or restitution, but to create a means of ‘deputizing’ citizens as private attorneys general to enforce the Labor Code. [Citation.] ” ( Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 489, 501 .) T he relief provided by the statute is designed to benefit the general public, not the party bringing the action. ( Ibid .) Since PAGA is fundamentally a law enforcement action, a plaintiff must first allow the appropriate state authorities to investigate the alleged Labor Code violations, by providing the Labor and Workforce Development Agency with written5

notice of the violations. ( Montano v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc. (2015) 7 Cal.App.5th 1248, 1256, citing § 2699, subd. (a).) Only if the agency elects not to pursue the violation s may an employee file a PAGA action. (§ 2699.3, subd. (a)(2).) The penalties that can be
recovered in the action are those that can be recovered by state enforcement agencies under the Labor Code; they are separate from the statutory damages that can be recovered by an employee pursuing an individual claim for a Labor Code violation. ( Iskanian , supra , 59 Cal.4th 348, 381.) P enalties recovered by a plaintiff in a PAGA case are paid mostly to the state. (See § 2699, subd. (i) [75 percent distributed to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency, and the remaining 25 percent to aggrieved employees].)
B. A N E MPLOYEE A FFECTED B Y AT L EAST O NE L ABOR C ODE V IOLATION M AY P URSUE P ENALTIES ON B EHALF OF THE S TATE FOR U NRELATED V IOLATIONS B Y THE S AME E MPLOYER Securitas contends the trial court erred in concluding that so long as Huff was affected by at least one Labor Code violation, he can sue under PAGA to reco ver penalties for any alleged violation by Securitas , even those that did not affect him.
Securitas does not dispute that PAGA authorizes a plaintiff to recover penalties for Labor
Code violations suffered by other employees. But it argues the statute allows for that only when the violations against the other employees involve the same provision of the
Labor Code as the violation suffered by the plaintiff . Resolving th e issue raised by
Securitas requires us to interpret PAGA, a pure question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review. ( Haniff v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 191, 198. )
W hen we interpret a statute our primary task is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent and effectuate the purpose of the law . We look first to the words of the statute itself as the most direct indicator of what the Legislature intended. ( Hsu v. A bbara (1995)
9 Cal.4th 863, 871.) PAGA provides in section 2699, subdivision (a) that “a ny provision of this code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the Labor and6

Workforce Development Agency or any of its departments, divis ions, commissions, boards, agencies, or employees, for a violation of this code, may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees pursuant to the procedures specified in
Section 2699.3. ” T he statute then specifically defines “aggrieved employee” in
section 2699, subdivision (c) : “ ‘ a ggrieved employee ’ means any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations
was committed. ”
A s the trial court did, we interpret those provisions to mean that any Labor Code penalties recoverable by state auth orities may be recovered in a PAGA action by a person who was employed by the alleged violator and aff ected by at least one of the violations alleged in the complaint. Indeed, we cannot readily derive any meaning other than that
from the plain statutory language, a nd Securitas does not offer a reasonable alternative
for what those provisions mean when rea d together. Instead, Securitas relies heavily on legislative history, which it views as reveal ing the Legislature’s intent to allow a PAGA plaintiff to pursue penalties only for the same type of Labor Code violat ion alleged as to him or her

. 1 Securitas points to a statement attributed to the sponsors of the PAGA bill that “unlike the UCL [Unfair Competition
L aw; Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.] this bill would not open private actions up to persons who suffered no harm from the alleged wrongful act

... private suits for Labor Code violations could be brought only by an ‘ aggrieved employee ’

–– an employee of the alleged violator against whom the alleg ed violation was committed.” ( Assem. Com. on

1 Both parties have asked us to take judicial notice of documents reflecting the legislative history for S.B. 796, the bi ll that enacted PAGA in 2003; and S.B. 940 , a bill that amended PAGA in 2008. We grant th os e request s . Huff also requested that we judicially notice documents reflecting the legislative history for A.B. 281 , a bill proposed in 2017 that would amend PAGA . That request relates to documents not rel evant to the determination of the issues in this appeal, and is therefore denied.7

Labor and Employment, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 796 (2003

– 2004 Reg. Sess.) July 9, 2003, p. 7.) Securitas cites other statements from the legislative history indicating employees would be permitted to act in the capacity of a private attorney general to recover penalties for a Labor Code violation “solely because th ey have been aggrieved by that violation.” (Sen Comm. on Labor and Industrial Relations, Analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 796 (2003

– 2004 Reg. Sess.) April 9, 2003, p. 3 .; see also, Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 796 (2003

- 2004 Reg. Sess.) June 26, 2003, p. 6 [“... this bill would not permit private actions by persons who suffered no harm from the alleged wrongful act.”].)
It is an established principle that where statutory language is unambiguous, a court is precluded from considering legislative history. (See, e.g., People v. Robles (2000)
23 Cal.4th 1106, 1112 [“ If the language contains no ambiguity, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs. [ ] If, however, the statutory language is susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, we can look to legislative history in aid of ascertaining legislative intent. ”].) But a s Securitas points out, the plain mean ing rule does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose. ( Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) Courts have therefore consider ed legislative history even in cases where th e text o f a statute is clear; but only to confirm the interpretation already apparent from the plain language , not to advance an alternative meaning

. (See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America , NT & SA (2009) 46 Cal.4th 630, 642 [examination of legislative history to support conclusion regarding proper interpretation]; Haniff v. Superior Court , supra , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 202 [legislative history may provide additional authority confirming the court’ s interpreta tion of a statute].)
Even assuming it is appropriate to consider legislative history here , that would not change our conclusion because none of the purported expressions of intent relied on by
Securitas made its way into the statute. T he proposition th at PAGA allows an employee8

to pursue penalties only for the type of violation he or she has suffered is directly at odds
with the provision that an action may be brought by an employee against whom “ one or

more ” of the alleged violations was committed

. Legislative history, even when appropriately considered, cannot be used to contradict language that the Legislature decided to include in the statute. ( An Independent Home Support Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1418 , 1437.) Had t he Legislature intended to
limit the recovery of a PAGA plaintiff suing in a representative capacity to only the penalties for employees affected by the same Labor Code violation as the plaintiff , it
would have said so in the statute. Indeed , the Legislat ure did make such a distinction in
section 2699, subdivision (h), which prohibits an employee from bringing a PAGA claim
when state authorities have already taken action against an employer for the same
violation : “ No action may be brought under this section by an aggrieved employee if the agency or any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies, or employees, on the same facts and theories, cites a person within the timeframes set forth
in Section 2699.3 for a violation of the same s ection or sections of the Labor Code under which the aggrieved employee is attempting to recover a civil penalty on behalf of
himself or herself

... . ” We find it significant that t he Legislature did not use similar limiting language regarding what violatio ns can be pursued by an aggrieved employee
when , as in this case, state authorities do not take enforcement action

. Securitas makes much of the fact that a previous version of the bill stated aggrieved employees could recover penalties “on behalf of the mselves or other current and former employees,” and the language was cha nged to the conjunctive in the enacted
version

–– allowing aggrieved employee s to bring an action “on behalf of himself or
herself a nd other current or former employees.” (§ 2699, subd. (a) ( italics added) .) But the effect of that change i s simply to require that a PAGA claim be representative. That is, an employee seeking to recover Labor Code penalties that would otherwise be
recoverable only by state authorities cannot do so in a pur ely individual capacity ; the9

employee must bring the action on behalf of himself or herself and others

. ( Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123

– 1124 [“ ‘ [ T ] he PAGA statute does not enable a single aggrieved employee to litigate his or her claims, but requires an aggrieved employee “ on behalf of herself or himself and other current or former employees ” to enforce violations of the Labor Code by their employers

. ’ [Citation.]” ) The use of conjunctive phrasing to p reclude an employee from usi ng PAGA to litigate as an individual h as no bearing on whether a PAGA plaintiff may pursue penalties for all the
Labor Code violations committed by an employer.
We also observe that PAGA ’s legislative history as a whole actually undermines Securitas’ position

. The Legislature clearly stated that its intention in enacting PAGA was to solve the problem of inadequate state enforcement resources by deputizing private citizens to pursue violators. ( Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Ca l.4th 969, 980

– 981.)
Given the goal of ac hieving maximum compliance with state labor laws, it would make
little sense to prevent a PAGA plaintiff (who is simply a proxy for state enforcement
authorities ) from seeking penalties for all the violations an employer committed. Securitas’ argument that in order to have standing to pursue statutory violations, a plaintiff must be aggrieved by those particular violations would have more tractio n if a
PAGA claim were not a qui tam proceeding . As observed by the California Supreme
Court in Iskanian ( citing the Federal False Claims Act as an example ) , traditional standing requirements do not necessarily apply to qui tam actions since the plaintiff is acting on behalf of the government: “T he q ui tam plaintiff under the f ederal False Claims Act has standing in federal court under article III of the United States Constitution, even though the plaintiff has suffered no injury in fact, because that statute

‘ can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim. [Citation.] ’ ” ( Iskanian , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 382. ) So in this context,

not being injured by a particular statutory violation presents no bar to a plaintiff pursui ng penalties for that violation

. Although a PAGA suit differs from a pure qui tam action10

(such as under the Federal False Claims Act ) in that PAGA’s standing requirement prevents the general public from bringing an action, the even more stringent standing requirement urged by Securitas is not found in the statute. For PAGA standing a plaintiff need only have been employed by the violator and affected by “one or more” of the alleged violatio ns. (§ 2699, subds. (a), (c).) That requirement strikes a reasonable
balance , requiring a plaintiff to have some connection to th e employer’s unlawful practices, while also advancing the state’s interest in vigorous enforcement

. Securitas’ interpretation of PAGA standing

–– that a plaintiff must have personally experienced the s ame violation s pursued in the action

–– is similar to the requirements for
class certification . (See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012)
53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 [requirements for maintaining a class action include predominant questions of law an d fact among the class, and a plaintiff with claims that are typical of the class].) But a representative action under PAGA is not a class action. ( Franco v. Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 947, 962.) It is a law enforcement
action wh ere the plainti ff acts on behalf of the state, not on behalf of other employees. ( Ibid .) The idea that a plaintiff must be aggrieved of all the violations alleged in a PAGA

c ase doe s not flow logically from the fact that a plaintiff is standing in for government authorities to collect penalties paid (i n large part ) to the state. The plaintiff is not even the real party in interest in the action

–– the government is. ( Iskanian , supra , 59 Cal.4th at
p. 382.) I n that sense , it would be arbitrary to limit the plaintiff’s pursuit of penalties to only those Labor Code violations that affected him or her personally

. In Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL

- CIO v. Superior Court (2009)
46 Cal.4th 993 , 999 (

Amalgamated Transit ) , the California Supreme Cou rt held that a union had no standing to bring a PAGA claim because it had never been employed by the alleged violator and therefore was not an “aggrieved employee.” ( Id. at p. 1003 .) That case interpreted a p art of the “aggrieved employee” definition not at issue here

–– no one disputes Huff was employed by Securitas

–– but the Supreme C ourt’s description of11

PAGA is consistent with our construction : “The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 permits an ‘aggrieved employee’

–– that is, an employee against whom a violation of a provision of the Labor Code was committed [citation]

–– to bring an action ‘on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees’ to recover civil penalties for violations of other provisions of the Labor Code. [Citation.]” ( Amalgamated
Transit , supra , at p. 1003.) The construction urged by Securitas is contrary to the view expressed by the Supreme Court that the statute allows an employee against whom a
Labor Code violation was committed to recover penalties “ for violations of other provisions of the Labor Code. ” ( Ibid .) We also note, as did the trial court, that PAGA has been interpreted in two federal
district court cases as allowing an employee who has suffered a Labor Code violation to pursue penalties fo r all the violations committed by the employer. ( Jeske v. Maxim
Healthcare Servs

. , Inc. ( E.D. Cal. 2012) 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2963 , at p. 37 [Plaintiff

“ need not have suffered all PAGA violations for which she seeks to pursue civil penalties .” ]; Holak v. K M art Corp. (E.D. Cal. 2015) 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65439 , at
p p. 12

– 13 [“ By the plain language of the statute, an aggrieved employee need only suffer one of the Labor Code violations alleged against his or her employer to be able to bring a
PAGA claim on behalf of himself or herself and current or former employees who suffered any Labor Code violation at the hands of the employer. Plaintiff need not have actually suffered all of the Labor Code violations that she alleges to have taken place for
purposes o f seeking PAGA penalties. ”].) Of course, those decisions are not binding on this court, and Securitas correctly points out that the standing issue was not necessary to the resolution of either case, so the observations regarding st anding requirements are12

d icta. N onetheless , we find it persuasi ve that two federal courts have construed the statute the same way we do here. 2 Securitas argues tha t the “operative provision” of PAGA i s section 2699, subdivision (a). Securitas att empts to avoid the implicatio ns of section 2699,
subdivision (c) , which defines “aggrieved employee , ” by characterizing it a s merely a
definition that “was never intended to overwhelm all other provisions of the PAGA.” But
in constru ing a statute, we will not focus on one provision w hile ignoring another, as
Securitas would have us do. “ Fundamental rules of statutory interpretation require that a statute be read as a whole, and that the parts of a statute be read together and harmonized, when possible, in order to give effect to the intent of the Legislature .” ( County of Orange
v. Flourn o y (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 908, 914.) We must accord significance to every word, phrase, and sentence in discerning the legislative purpose. ( People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 35 7 .) Our interpr etation of the statute harmonizes section 2699 , subdivision (a) with the definition of “aggrieve d employees” in section 2699,
subdivision (c) and is therefore preferable to Securitas’ proposed interpretation, which
focuses on the former in isolation

. Securitas further asserts that the definition of “aggrieved employee” in section 2699, subdivision (c) cannot be harmonized with other provisions of the statute , specifically, subdivision s (f) and (i) of that section. Section 2699, subdivision (f) create s a civil penalty for any Labor Code violation for which a penalty is not provided elsewhere in the law . The penalties under section 2699, subdivision (f) are “one hundred dollars ($100) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred dollars ($200) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation.” Securitas posits that using the

2 Securitas has asked us to take judicial notice of a decision regarding PAGA from the Alameda County Superior Court , and urges us to adopt the reasoning in that decision The rules of court do not permit citation to Superior Court decisions as authority (Cal. Rul es of Court, rule 8.1115 (a) ) , and the decision is not otherwise relevant here. We therefore deny the request for judicial notice.13

def inition of aggrieved employees in section 2699, subdivision (c) to calculate those penalties w ould allow over

- cou nting in some cases to include weeks worked by employees affected by just one of the Labor Code violations alleged in the complaint, even if it is not the one giving rise to the penalties imposed by section 2699,
subdivision (f). To the contrary, it is en tirely possible to harmonize the two provisions

. The method of calculation under section 2699, s ubdivision (f) imposes penalties based on
the total number of employees t hat have been affected by an employer’s Labor Code
violations. Though S ecuritas calls that “over

- counting,” it i s not impermissible for the Legislature to impose penalties measured in that way

. E ven if the method of calculation provided for by section 2699, subdivision (f) is something of a blunt instrument , it is not
our role to rew rite the statute. ( People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1 , 14.) Separation of powers principles require us to interpret the law as written , “ and leave for the People and the Legislature the task of revising it as they deem wise. ” ( I d. at p. 15

. ) W e also note that PAGA gives a court broad discretion to “award a lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty amount

... if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressi ve, or confiscatory.” (§ 2699, subd. (e)(2).) So the statute incorporate s a remedy if the penalty
calculation is unfair or arbitrary as applied to a particular employer

. S ection 2699, subdivision (i) provides for the distribution of the monetary penalt ies recovered in a PAGA action: 75 percent to the state Labor and Workforce Development Agency, and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees. Securitas maintains
that a pplying the statutory definition of “aggrieved employee” to that provision cannot be

corr ect because t hat would allow a plaintiff to share in penalties imposed for violations he or she never suffered. But Securitas again ignores the distinction bet ween an individual
lawsuit and the qui tam action a uthorized by PAGA. As previously discussed, a PAGA plaintiff does not pursue an individual claim but rather is deputized to bring a suit to collect penalties on behalf of the government

. I f all p enalties were paid to the state, an14

individual would have little incentive to pursue a PAGA action. Sin ce the Legislat ure sought to give individual employees an incentive to enforce labor laws in place of understaffed state agencies, it provided for some of the penalties to be paid to the plaintiff employees

. 3 Applying the statutory de finition of “aggrieve d employee ” to the p art of the

statute governing distribution of the penalties yields a result consistent with the overall purpose of the legislation.
Se curitas asserts that allowing PAGA plaintiff s to recover penalties for violations
that did not affec t them would grant them powers beyond those of the Labor Commissioner. But it cites no authority for the proposition that the Labor Commissioner is precluded from seeking penalties for all Labor Code violations an employer has
committed. An action brought by the Labor Commissioner to recover penalties “ shall be brought in the name of the people of the State of California and the Labor
Commissioner .” (§ 210, subd. (b).) The state’s interest in such an action is to enforce its laws, not to r ecover damages on behalf of a particular individual. The Labor Commissioner therefore has the authority to seek penalties for all known violations

c ommitted by an employer

–– just as a PAGA plaintiff has t hat authority when standing in
the shoes of the Labo r Commissioner.
Securitas relies on Starbucks Corp. v. Superior Court (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1451 ( Starbucks ) , which found that the plaintiffs could not bring an action for violation of a law prohibiting employers from inquiring about marijuana

rela ted convictions on job applic ations because they had not suffered any injury from the inquiry

–– they had no such convictions to disclose . The court held that a plaintiff could

not sue for a statutory penalty unless he or she was within the class of persons the statute was designed to protect. Starbucks is distinguishable for two reasons. First, it involved
individual c laims brought on behalf of other individuals , not a qui tam claim brought on

3 T he statute does not furt her explain the method to be used for dividing the 25 percent of the total penalties among the aggrieved employees. (See § 2699, subd. (i).)15

behalf of the government. T he traditional standing analysis u ndertaken by the court in
Starbucks does not apply in a qui tam action. And second, PAGA states that an action may be brought by an employee “against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed,” a clear expression that the Legislature intended that a PAGA plaintiff be affected by at least one, but not necessarily all, of the violations alleged in the action.
The Starbucks court , by contrast, found no such expression of legislative intent in the
statute at issue in that case, and relied on that silence to conclude that only those injured by a particular violation of the statute could bring suit. ( Id. at p. 1451.) Securitas asserts that applying the statutory definition of “aggrieved employee” as
we do here leads t o absurd consequences. It worries that the penalties collectable by PAGA plaintiffs will be “bounded solely by [their] pleading imagination.” But a PAGA plaintiff does not collect penalties merely by alleging a Labor Code violation in the complaint. The plaintiff still must prove a t trial that a violation in fact occurred.
P rocedural mechanisms such as summary adjudication remain available to weed out meritless claims before trial. (Code of Civ. Proc. §437c, subd. (f)(1).) Perhaps Securitas’
concern i s more about plaintiffs who bring PAGA claims solely as a fishing expedition to attempt to uncover other violations committed by the employer. Though that concern is better directed to the Legislature, w e note that the trial courts are also equipped to

ma nage cases in a way that avoi ds unreasonable consumption of time or reso urces. Where appropriate, c ases brought under PAGA can be designated complex under the
Rul es of Court (as in this case), with rules designed to manage the expenditure of resources. ( See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.750(c) [providing for an initial case management conference in cases designated complex , the principal objects of which are

“ to expose at an early date the essential issues in the litigation and to avoid unnecessary

a nd burdensome discovery procedures in the course of preparing for trial of those
issues. ”].)16

The other consequences Securitas characterizes as absurd are that plaintiffs will be incentivized to pursue penalties for Labor Code violations that affected other employees,
and will be able to collect a portion of the penalties imposed for those violations. Far from absurd, those consequences are precisely what the Legislature intended when it
enacted P AGA as a way to encourag e private parties to pu r sue Labor Code violations,

r elieving pressure on overburdened state agencies and achieving maximum compliance with labor laws. The trial court correctly found that so long as Huff was affected by at
least one of the Labor Code violations alleged in the c omplaint, he can recover penalties for all the violations he proves.
C. T HE R EMAINING L ABOR C ODE V IOLATIONS A LLEGED B Y H UFF A RE S UFFICIENT TO S UPPORT THE PAGA C AUSE OF A CTION When the court granted the defense motion for judgment after Huff presented his

ca se at the first phase of trial, it found that Huff had failed to prove a violation of the
section 201.3 weekly pay requirement because his assignments exceeded 90 days and he

was therefore not a temporary employee. In its later order granting a new trial ( from which Securitas now appeals ) , the court determined that regardless of whether Huff proved a violation of the weekly pay requirement, he could maintain a PAGA action because he alleged another Labor Code violation that did affect him : the failure to timely
pay employees after they quit or were removed from a site, in violation of sections 201
and 202.
Securitas contends that even if PAGA permits a plaintiff to seek penalties for
Labor Code violations that d id not affect him or her, Huff still c annot proceed because
the untimely payment of wages on termination is a new theory raised after trial

. We agree that had Huff not alleged that claim as part of the lawsuit, he could not be granted a new trial to litigate it. But as noted by the trial cou rt in its order granting a new trial, t he second amended complaint states : “When a security officer quits or is removed from a site, Securitas typically does not immediately pay the officer. Instead, it waits until the17

officer’s next scheduled payday. Th is could be as much as 20 days, generally no less than 7 days, and averages at least 13 days. [¶] Securitas’ actions violate the rights of Securitas’ security officer employees to have their final wages paid on a timely basis as mandated by law. This is a violation of California Labor Code §§ 201, 202

... .” T he
claim that Securitas failed to promptly pay wages on termination was not raised for the first time after trial, but was specifically alleged in the operative complaint.
Securitas also contends that Huff’s claim for failure to pay wages on termination cannot support his PAGA cause of action because the claim is without legal merit . It argues that Huff’s removal from an assignment does not constitute a termination of his

e mployment as a matter of law and therefore it was not required to issue him a final paycheck at the time of removal . But the trial court never ruled on the merits of the claim
fo r prompt payment of final wages, and as a reviewing court, we cannot do so in the first instance. (Code Civ. Proc. § 906.) T he trial was divided into phases. T he first phase
determined only certain issues, and the issue of whe ther Securitas violated section 201 or
202 by not timely paying wages on termination was not among th em

. The trial court accordingly made no findings regarding the merits of Huff’s claim for violation of sections 201 and 202, so ther e is nothing for us to review. Securitas similarly asserts that Huff’s claim for failure to pay wages on termination fails be cause he did not notify the
Labor an d Workforce Development Agency of the facts and circumstances relating to
that violation. Again, that issue h as not yet been decided by the trial court and is
therefore not ripe for review.
A court has discretion to order separate trials of issues and determine the order in which those issues are to be decided. ( Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co

. v. Ranger Ins. Co

. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 193, 205 .) The trial court properly rejected Secur itas ’ argu ment that Huff waived his claim for failure to pay wages on termination , finding that the claim

was not waived because it was not among the issues to be tried at the first phase of the
trial and the second phase of the trial was to “ include any remaining issues that have not18

yet b een determined .” We would reverse a decision regarding the management of a case
for trial and the order in which issues are to be tried only for a manifest abuse of discretion. ( Downey Sav ings & Loan Ass’n v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1072, 1086 .) Securitas argues that the pretrial scheduling orders contemplated only a trial of the claim for violation of the section 201.3 weekly pay requirement, and that the trial was divided into phases merel y to allow that issue to be
tried as to the chosen 20 employees first and any remaining employees in a lat er phase.
But the trial court disagreed , and, interpreting its own orders, found the language broad enough to all ow for the trial of the failure to pay on term ination claim at a later phase of the proceedings

. We find no abuse of discretion in that decision.
Securitas also contends that Huff forfeited the argument that other alleged violations could support the PAGA cause of action by not raising it in opposition to the
defense motion fo r judgment during trial . But Huff did make the argument when he moved for a new trial, and the court properly considered it at that time in deciding to grant the motion. Securitas cites no authority for the proposition that the court w as prohibited from correcting a legal error it made in its previous decision. A s long as the trial court still has jurisdiction over a case , it has inherent authority to c orrect a prior ruling. ( LeFrancois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108 [procedural rules limit a part y’s ability to bring a motion for reconsideration but do not prevent a court from correcting a prior erroneous order, no matter how the error came to its attention].) Securitas’ arguments regarding Huff’s p urported failure to preserve certain claims are rooted in the idea that it did not have adequate notice of the claims and therefore
could not properly defend against them. But this is not a case where a plaintiff was granted relief at trial on claims about which the defendant was previously unaware. The court’s ruling here is simply that plaintiff should be allowed to pursue certain claims at a later phase of trial

–– at which point Securitas will have the oppor tunity to defend against
them. The only prejudice identified by Securitas is that it did not conduct discovery19

regarding the prompt payment on termination claims because it believed those claims were no longer at issue. But nothing prevents Securitas from conducting that discovery
before the new trial. ( Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 2 4 7.)
D. H UFF ’ S C ROSS - A PPEAL IS M OOT Huff filed a protective cross

- appeal from the order granting Securitas’ motion for judgment and the resulting judgment in Securitas’ favor. The trial cour t’s order granting
a new trial vaca ted the order and judgment from which Huff cross

- appeals. Since we affirm the order granting a new trial, Huff’s cross

- appeal is moot.
E. H UFF ’ S M OTION TO I NTERPRET S ECTION 201.3 IS D ENIED Recognizing that affirmance of the order granting a new trial mean s that we w ill
not reach the issues he raises in his cross

- appeal, Huff filed a motion requesting that we interpret section 201.3, subdivision (b)(6)

. H e asks that we provide direction to the trial court on how to apply these statutory exemption s for the temporary employee weekly pay requirement on retrial in order to avoid additional proceedings there and in this court

. But the order granting a new trial does not limit retrial to a particular issue. ( Barmas, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 372, 376 [court may either grant a new trial on all issues, or limit retrial to certain issues if that would not make the trial unfair].) As a result, all issues now remain to be tried, and on retrial (as Huff’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument) the trial court will not be bound by the previous ruling on th e issue. We therefore deny Huff’s request that we interpret section 201.3 , subdivision (b)(6) because that would constitute an advisory opinion , which is prohibited under established principles of appellate review . ( Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 998.)
III. DISPOSITION The order granting a new trial is affirmed. Huff shall be awarded costs on appeal.
The cross

- appeal is moot and dismissed. No costs are awarded as to the cross

- appeal

.____________________________________ Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________ Premo, Acting P. J.

____________________________ Mihara , J

.

H042852

– Huff v Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.Trial Court: Santa Clara County Superior Court Superior Court No. 1

- 10

- CV

- 172614
Trial Judge: Hon. Peter H. Kirwin

Counsel for Plaintiff/ Respondent Forrest Huff Michael Millen

Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. James E. Hart John Kevin Lilly Littler Mendelson Sherry Beth Shavit Tharpe & Howell, LLP

H042852

– Huff v Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.