alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1416 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1416

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to include liability to pay 
    compensation under workmen's compensation acts within the rules 
          relating to certain personal liability assignments.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 18, 1993

  Mr. Jacobs introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to include liability to pay 
    compensation under workmen's compensation acts within the rules 
          relating to certain personal liability assignments.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ASSIGNMENT OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LIABILITY ELIGIBLE FOR 
              EXCLUSION RELATING TO PERSONAL INJURY LIABILITY 
              ASSIGNMENTS.

    (a) In General.--Subsection (c) of section 130 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to certain personal injury liability 
assignments) is amended--
            (1) by inserting ``, or as compensation under any workmen's 
        compensation act,'' after ``(whether by suit or agreement)'' in 
        the material preceding paragraph (1),
            (2) by inserting ``or the workmen's compensation claim,'' 
        after ``agreement,'' in paragraph (1), and
            (3) by striking ``section 104(a)(2)'' in paragraph (2)(D) 
        and inserting ``paragraph (1) or (2) of section 104(a)''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to claims under workmen's compensation acts filed after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.

                                 <all>
```
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22

- 6557

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. BENNY LYNN ISOM , Defendant

- Appellant

.

No. 23

- 6112

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. BENNY LYNN ISOM , Defendant

- Appellant.

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro

. Thomas D. Schroeder , Chief District Judge. ( 1:03

- cr - 00241

- TDS

- 1; 1:03

- cr 00242

- TDS

- 1 )

Submitted : June 26, 2023 Decided: July 5, 2023 USCA4 Appeal: 23-6112 Doc: 9 Filed: 07/05/2023 Pg: 1 of 42 Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and QUATTLEBAUM , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Benny Lynn Isom, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-6112 Doc: 9 Filed: 07/05/2023 Pg: 2 of 43 PER CURIAM : Benny Lynn Isom appeals from the district court’s order s denying his motion s for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and reconsideration. We affirm.
District courts may reduce a term of imprisonment if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction,” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and we review a court’s ruling on the motion for abuse of discretion, United States v. Kibble , 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2021). When deciding whether to reduce a defendant ’s sentence based on “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances , a court generally proceeds in three steps. United States v. High , 997 F.3d 181, 185

- 86 (4th Cir. 2021)

. First, the court decides
whether “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances in fact support a sentence
reduction. Id . at 186. Second, the court considers whether granting a sentence reduction is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing
Commi ssion.” Id . (quoting 1 8 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) )

. B ut there is as of now no applicable policy statement governing compassionate release motions filed by defendants.
Courts are thus “empowered to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for
releas e that a defendant might raise.” United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). If the defendant passes the first two steps, the court then considers at the third step whether the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, “to the extent that they are applicable,” favor early release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)

. Courts have “broad discretion” in analyzing those factors

. United States v. Bethea , 54 F.4th 826, 834 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. USCA4 Appeal: 23-6112 Doc: 9 Filed: 07/05/2023 Pg: 3 of 44 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that , even if Isom showed extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release, the § 3553(a) sentencing factors did not warrant a ny reduction

. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s order s. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED USCA4 Appeal: 23-6112 Doc: 9 Filed: 07/05/2023 Pg: 4 of 4
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 148

To amend title 28, United States Code, to clarify the remedial jurisdiction

relating to taxes of inferior Federal courts.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 5, 1993

Mr. CRANE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on the Judiciary

A BILL

To amend title 28, United States Code, to clarify the remedial jurisdiction relating to taxes of inferior Federal

courts.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Judicial Taxation Pro5 hibition Act of 1993’’.

6 SEC. 2. TITLE 28 AMENDMENT.

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 85 of title 28, United

8 States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1341

9 the following new section:
2

•HR 148 IH

1 ‘‘§ 1341A. Prohibition of judicial imposition or in2 crease of taxes.

3 ‘‘(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no

4 inferior court established by Congress shall have jurisdic5 tion to issue any remedy, order, injunction, writ, judg6 ment, or other judicial decree requiring the Federal Gov7 ernment or any State or local government body to impose

8 any new tax or to increase any existing tax or tax rate.

9 ‘‘(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a court

10 from ordering duly authorized remedies, otherwise within

11 their jurisdiction, which may require expenditures by Fed12 eral, State, or local government where such expenditures

13 are necessary to effectuate such remedies.

14 ‘‘(c) For purposes of this section, the term ‘‘tax’’ in15 cludes—

16 ‘‘(1) personal income taxes;

17 ‘‘(2) real and personal property taxes;

18 ‘‘(3) sales and transfer taxes;

19 ‘‘(4) estate and gift taxes;

20 ‘‘(5) excise taxes;

21 ‘‘(6) user taxes;

22 ‘‘(7) corporate and business income taxes; and

23 ‘‘(8) licensing fees or taxes.’’.

24 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

25 at the beginning of chapter 85 of title 28, United States
3

•HR 148 IH

1 Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to

2 section 1341 the following new item:

‘‘1341A. Prohibition of judicial imposition or increase of taxes.’’.

Æ
#### LOWE et al. v. CITY OF DEL RIO.

No. 7378.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Dec. 7, 1938.

*192John L. Dodson, of Del Rio, for plaintiffs in error.

Wallace & Thurmond, of Del Rio, and Conger, Lowe & Spears and Lester Whip'ple, all of San Antonio, for defendant in error.

Julian LaCrosse, of Del Rio, amicus curiae.

SHARP, Justice.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory order granting a temporary injunction against the City of Del Rio, Texas, its officers and agents, restraining the payment of certain bonds and warrants issued by such city. It was contended by the plaintiffs in the district court that such bonds and warrants are void and do not constitute valid obligations of the City. The trial' court granted a temporary injunction, restraining the payment of such bonds and warrants until the matters in controversy should be finally determined. The City appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, and that court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court. Ill S.W.2d 1208. A writ of error was granted.

The record before us discloses that many of the holders of the bonds and warrants involved have not been made parties to this suit. We also find that such holders who were made parties have not been served with citation and have not answered. This suit being for the cancellation of the bonds and warrants issued by the City, the owners and holders of such bonds and warrants are necessary parties to a suit to cancel same. Board v. Texas & P. Railway Co., 46 Tex. 316; Dwyer v. Hackworth, 57 Tex. 245, 251; Buie v. Cunningham, Tex.Civ.App., 29 S.W. 801; Taxpayers’ Ass’n v. Houston Independent School District, Tex.Civ.App., 81 S.W.2d 815; Adams v. Bankers’ Life Co., Tex.Com.App., 36 S.W.2d 182; Camp v. Thomas, Tex.Civ.App., 26 S.W.2d 470, writ of error refused; Texas Jurisprudence, Vol. 34, p. 692, Vol. 32, p. 128.

In view of the state of this record, we deem it advisable not to pass on the validity of the bonds and warrants, the owners of which have been given no opportunity to be heard in court. Therefore we express no opinion as to the merits of the case or any part thereof.

The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings, with instructions that the temporary writ of injunction issued by the trial court shall continue in force, subject to the orders of the trial court, until there is a final judgment upon the merits of the case.
In-Person Attendees: TV NOPR Test Procedures MeetingMeeting Date: Thursday, March 22, 2012Name Title Organization Street CityStateZip Phone Fax EmailBelt, Bill Senior Director,Technology & StandardsConsumer Electronics Association(CEA)1919 S. Eads Street Arlington VA 22202 703-907-5249 703-907-7675 bbelt@ce.orgCalwell, Chris Senior Research Fellow ECOVA 1199 Main Ave, # 242 Durango CO 81301 970-259-6801x 301910-259-8585 ccalwell@ecova.comChristensen, Adam Staff Engineer Appliance Standards AwarenessProject (ASAP)529 14th Street NW, Suite600Washington DC 20045 202-507-4002 202-429-2248 achristensen@standardsasap.orgDesroches, Louis-Benoit Program Manager Lawrence Berkeley NationalLaboratory (LBNL)1 Cyclotron Road, Mailstop90R4000Berkeley CA 94720 510-486-5833 N/A LDesroches@lbl.govEdwards, Brenda J. Program SupportSpecialistU.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 1000 IndependenceAvenue SWWashington DC 20585 202-596-2945 202-586-4617 brenda.edwards@ee.doe.govFarber, Julia Senior Specialist, GlobalGovernment AffairsUnderwriters Laboratories 1850 M St, NWSuite 1000Washington DC 20036 202-530-6162 N/A julia.farber@ul.comGoldberg, Adam Principal AGP, LLC 3003 Barkley Gate Ln Fairfax VA 22031 703-539-5081 N/A adam@agp-llc.comJohnson, Douglas K. Vice President,Technology PolicyConsumer Electronics Association(CEA)1919 S. Eads Street Arlington VA 22202 703-907-7686 703-907-7675 djohnson@ce.orgMalinowski, Mateusz(Matt)Senior Associate ICF International 1725 Eye Street, NWSuite 1000Washington DC 20006 202-862-2693 202-862-1144 mmalinowski@icfi.comPetrolati, Victor P Retired U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 1000 IndependenceAvenue, SWWashington DC 20585 202-586-4549 202-586-4617 victor.petrolati@ee.doe.govRadulovic, Verena N/A Environmental Protection Agency N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/ARotolo, Anthony Consultant Navigant Consulting, Inc., Suite 500 1200 19th St. NW Washington DC 20036 202-973-2434 202-973-2401 anthony.rotolo@navigant.comSchindler, Bill Display IndustryConsultantVerizon N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A bschindlerny@verizon.netSharp, Mark J. Group ManagerCorporate EnvironmentalDepartmentPanasonic Corporation of NorthAmerica1130 Connecticut Avenue,NW,Suite 1100Washington DC 20036 202-912-3800x 116202-912-3810 mark.sharp@us.panasonic.comSher, Celia M General Counsel Office of General Counsel - DOE 1000 IndependenceAvenue, SWWashington DC 20585 202-287-6122 N/A Celia.Sher@hq.doe.govStephens, Charlie Senior Energy Codes &Standards EngineerNorthwest Energy Efficiency Alliance(NEEA)421 SW Sixth Avenue,Suite 600Portland OR 97204 503-688-5457 503-688-5447 cstephens@neea.orgIn-Person Attendees: TV NOPR Test Procedures MeetingMeeting Date: Thursday, March 22, 2012Name Title Organization Street CityStateZip Phone Fax EmailTsao, Allen Managing Consultant Navigant Consulting, Inc. 1200 19th Street, NW Washington DC 20036 202-481-8357 N/A allen.tsao@navigant.comYoder, Christopher Senior Consultant Navigant Consulting, Inc. 575 South Negley Ave Pittsburgh PA 15232 717-487-1610 N/A chris.yoder@navigant.comZhumagali, Bizhan N/A ICF International 1725 1st Street, NW Washington DC 20850 202-862-1994 N/A bzhumagali@icfi.com
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the audited
financial statements contained in the Company's annual report on Form 10-K for
the year ended December 31, 1996 and is qualified in its entirety by reference
to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       2,202,596
<SECURITIES>                                 7,947,207
<RECEIVABLES>                                  511,710
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    251,979
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            11,455,188
<PP&E>                                       2,976,019
<DEPRECIATION>                             (1,234,631)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              15,424,902
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,203,125
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       12,343,001
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     3,532,071
<OTHER-SE>                                 (2,970,036)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   562,035
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            18,237,528
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               13,684,870
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              4,552,658
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,838,163
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          2,714,495
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,714,495
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7340

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PAULETTE JACKSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:19-cr-00020-JAG-1)

Submitted: February 28, 2022 Decided: March 17, 2022

Before DIAZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Paulette Jackson, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Paulette Jackson appeals the district court’s order denying her motion for 

compassionate release. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. United States v. 

Jackson, No. 3:19-cr-00020-JAG-1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2021). We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

RANDY HEIMLER,

Appellant,

v.

LEONARD KRENEK and DELAYNE KRENEK,

Appellees.

No. 4D16-2184

[October 19, 2017]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, 

Indian River County; Cynthia L. Cox, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

312010CA010969.

Neil B. Solomon of McLaughlin & Stern, LLP, West Palm Beach, for 

appellant.

Lyman H. Reynolds, Jr., and George P. Roberts, Jr., of Roberts 

Reynolds Bedard & Tuzzio, PLLC, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GERBER, C.J., MAY and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1333 

AN ACT 

To amend chapter 40 of title 18, United States Code, to 

exempt the transportation, shipment, receipt, or importation of explosive materials for delivery to a federally 

recognized Indian tribe or an agency of such a tribe 

from various Federal criminal prohibitions relating to 

explosives. 
2 

•HR 1333 EH

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. EXEMPTION OF THE TRANSPORTATION, SHIP4 MENT, RECEIPT, OR IMPORTATION OF EX5 PLOSIVE MATERIALS FOR DELIVERY TO A 

6 FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBE OR 

7 AN AGENCY OF SUCH A TRIBE FROM VAR8 IOUS FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS RE9 LATING TO EXPLOSIVES. 

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 845(a)(3) of title 18, 

11 United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘to any agen12 cy of the United States or to any State or any political 

13 subdivision thereof’’ and inserting ‘‘to any agency of the 

14 United States, to any State or any political subdivision 

15 thereof, or to any federally recognized Indian tribe or 

16 agency thereof’’. 

17 (b) INDIAN TRIBE DEFINED.—Section 841 of such 

18 title is amended by adding at the end the following: 
3 

•HR 1333 EH

1 ‘‘(t) ‘Indian tribe’ has the meaning given the 

2 term in section 102 of the Federally Recognized In3 dian Tribe List Act of 1994 (25 U.S.C. 479a).’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 30, 

2009. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1333 

AN ACT 

To amend chapter 40 of title 18, United States 

criminal prohibitions relating to explosives. an agency of such a tribe from various Federal delivery to a federally recognized Indian tribe or ceipt, or importation of explosive materials for Code, to exempt the transportation, shipment, re-
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT UNITED STATES OF AM ER IC A, Plaintiff - Appe lle e , v. LAR R Y LORENZO DOW

NING, De fe nda

nt - Appe lla

nt. No. 12-10041

D.C . No. 2:09-c r-00709-M HM M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of Ariz o na M ary H. M urguia , Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d

June 18, 2013 ** B e fore : TALLM AN, M . SM ITH, a nd HUR W ITZ, C irc uit Judge s. Larry Lore nz o Downing a

ppe a ls from

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt a nd c ha lle nge s his guilty -ple a c onvic tion a

nd 66-m onth se nte nc e for c o nspira c y to posse s s with intent to distribute 500 gra m s or m ore of c oc a ine , in viola tion of 21 U.S.C . §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B ), and 846. Pursua nt to A nde rs v . C

alifornia , 386 

# FIL ED JUN 21 2013 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S
. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).U.S. 738 (1967), Downing’ s c o unse l ha s file d a brie f stat ing tha

t the re are no grounds for re lie f, a long with a m otion to withdra

w a s c o unse l of re c ord. W e have provide d Downing the

opportunity

to file a pro se supple m e nta l brie f. No pro se supple m e nta l brie f or answe ring brie f ha s be e n file d . Downing ha s wa ive d his right to a ppe a l his c onvic tion a

nd se nte nc e . Our inde pe nde nt re vie w of the re c ord pursua nt to P e n son v . Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), disc lose s no a

rgua ble issue a s to the va lidity of the wa ive r. Se eUnite d State s v . W atson , 582 F.3d 974, 986-88 (9th C ir. 2009). W e a c c ordingly dism iss the a ppe a l. Se eid. at 988. C ounse l’ s m otion to withdra w is G RANT E D. DISM I SSE D.

1 2 - 1 0 0 4 1 2
*OPINION ISSUED JULY 3, 2007*

#### MAE W. CUSACK VS. DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS

(CC-05-012)

Claimant appeared *pro se.*

Jason C. Workman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Claimant brought this action for damage to her 1998 Ford Windstar which occurred when a tree limb fell onto her vehicle while she was traveling on Mill Creek Road in Beckley, Raleigh County. Mill Creek Road is a road maintained by respondent. The Court is of the opinion to deny the claim for the reasons more fully stated below.

*16The incident giving rise to this claim occurred between 6:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. on November 28, 2004. Mill Creek Road is a two-lane highway at the area of the incident involved in this claim. Claimant testified that she was traveling on Mill Creek Road when her vehicle struck what she thought was a tree limb. She stated that the tree limb pushed the antenna back into the windshield of the vehicle, damaging the windshield. Claimant’s vehicle sustained damages totaling $259.70.

The position of the respondent is that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition on Mill Creek Road at the site of the claimant’s accident for the date in question. Joe Donnally, Transportation Crew Chief for respondent in Fayette County, testified that there were no records of any complaints regarding a tree or tree limb prior to claimant’s incident.

The well-established principle of law in West Virginia is that the State is neither an insurer nor a guarantor of the safety of travelers upon its roads. *Adkins*vs. *Sims,*130 W.Va. 645; 46 S.E.2d 81 (1947). The general rule of this Court with regard to tree fall claims is that if a tree is dead and poses an apparent risk, then the respondent may be held liable. However, when an apparently healthy tree falls and causes property damage as a result of a storm, the Court has held that there is insufficient evidence of negligence upon which to justify an award. *Gerritsen*v. *Dept. of Highways,*16 Ct. Cl. 85 (1986); *Wiles v. Division of Highways,*22 Ct. Cl. 170 (1998);

In the instant case, the Court is of the opinion that respondent had no notice that a tree limb at issue posed an apparent risk to the public. The evidence adduced at the hearing established that the claimant was not sure what struck and damaged her vehicle. The Court will not speculate as to the nature of the object that claimant’s vehicle struck, and thus, the claimant may not make a recovery for her loss in this claim.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion to and does deny this claim.

Claim disallowed.
#### HOPE v. STATE.

No. 20077.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 15, 1939.

Lee Wallace, W. C. Baker, and Dent Taylor, all of Kerrville, and J. Franklin Spears, of San Antonio, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of murder, and given a term of ten years in the penitentiary.

It has been made known to this court, by proper affidavit, that the appellant died on or about the 5th day of November, 1938, after having perfected his appeal. The death of the appellant deprives this court of jurisdiction of the appeal. It is therefore abated.