NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A- 1280

- 22 RAYMOND G. MORISON, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. THE WILLINGBORO BOARD OF EDUCATION and NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION , STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS, Defendants-Respondents.

____________________________

Argued March 4, 2024

— Decided March 28, 2024 Before Judges Sabatino, Mawla, and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L- 0092

- 22. Eric J. Riso argued the cause for appellant (Zeller & Wieliczko, LLP, attorneys; Eric J. Riso, on the bri efs ). Lester Everett Taylor argued the cause for responde nt The Willingboro Board of Education (Florio Perrucci Steinhardt Cappelli Tipton & Taylor LLC, attorneys; Wade Lawrence Dickey, on the brief). Sadia Ahsanuddin, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent New Jersey Department of APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

March 28 , 2024 APPELLATE DIVISIONA- 1280

- 22 2 Education , State Board of Examiners (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenber g Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Sadi a Ahsanuddin, on the brief). The opinion of the court was delivered by SABATINO, P.J.A.D. In 2012, the Legislature overhauled the procedures through which tenured public school teachers and administrators i n New Jersey, who are charged with improper conduct or other just cause, may be removed or disciplined at the behest of their school district employers. The legislation replaced the elaborate and time-consuming system of administrative hearings for such contested tenure cases with proceedings be fore an arbitrator. The arbitrator is drawn from a panel of permanent labor arbitrators maintained by the State Commissioner of Education. The arbitrato r's decision is reviewable on narrow grounds in the trial court rather than, a s before, through the Commissioner's review of an administrative law judg e's findings. The novel issue presented to us is whether, under this revised system, a tenure arbitrator's determination of discipline thr ough the procedures set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1 prevents the State Board of Examiners and Commissioner from imposing a more severe sanction o f suspending or revoking the licensee's certificate to teach within this State, under the procedures set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-38 to -39.A- 1280

- 22 3 Appellant, a tenured teacher, was charged by the lo cal board of education with unbecoming conduct. The school boar d sought to terminate his employment in the district. The contested matter w as tried before an arbitrator. The arbitrator found appellant had eng aged in unbecoming conduct, but she imposed a milder sanction of a one-year sus pension. The arbitrator's decision was not challenged in court by either appe llant or the school board. The Board of Examiners then pursued the revocation of appellant's license based on his same improper conduct. Appellant contends the Board of Examiners and the C ommissioner

— even though they were not parties to the tenure arb itration

— have no authority to pursue the revocation of his license because the arbitrator only suspended his employment for one year. Among other things, a ppellant invokes a doctrine of "industrial double jeopardy" to support his preclusion argument. He also contends the revocation proceedings violate his constitutional and civil rights. The preclusion claims were presented to a Law Divis ion judge. 1 The judge ruled the State regulators are not precluded by the arbitrator's decision

1 Although some portions of the briefs and the record designate this as a Chancery Division case, the case has a Law Division docket number.A- 1280

- 22 4 from seeking to revoke or suspend appellant's teach ing certificate. This appeal ensued. We reject appellant's contentions and affirm. The statewide teacher certificate revocation process authorized in N.J.S. A. 18A:6-38 and - 39 operates separately from the teacher tenure arbitra tion process under N.J.S.A. 18A:6 -17.1. The manifest legislative intent is for the two statutes to be administered independently of one another. The pro ceedings involve nonidentical parties, and also different stakes, proce dures, and the avenues and standards of appellate review. The principles argued by appellant, including indus trial double jeopardy, cannot tie the hands of the Board of Examiners and Commissioner in ascertaining whether the license of a teacher to wo rk for any school in the State should be revoked or suspended

— regardless of whether a tenure arbitrator has imposed a lesser sanction at the dis trict level.A- 1280

- 22 5 I. Before we explore the details of this case, it is useful to discuss the respective frameworks of the two statutory schemes in question: (1) the issuance and revocation of certificates to teach; a nd (2) the discipline of tenured educators. 2
A. Teachers and other specified persons must have a St ate-issued certificate in order to instruct pupils in a New Jersey public school. The pertinent statute, N.J.S.A. 18A:6-38, prescribes that the Board of Exa miners within the State Department of Education "shall issue appropriate ce rtificates to teach or to administer . . . pupils in public schools operated by boards of education and such other certificates as it shall be authorized t o issue by law . . . and may revoke the same under rules and regulations prescri bed by the State board." This licensure system is implemented by a series of regulations administered by the Board of Examiners. N.J.A.C. 6 A:9B "sets forth the rules governing the licensure of educators or candidates required to be certified [and] also contains the rules delineating the organ ization of, powers of, duties

2 Throughout this opinion, we refer variously to "tea chers" and "educators," mindful the statutory provisions cover a host of ti tles of persons who work in schools, such as school nurses, principals, and oth er administrators and staff. See N.J.S.A. 18A:6 -38. To the extent pertinent, we include those add itional job categories in our discussion.A- 1280

- 22 6 of, and proceedings before the State Board of Exami ners." N.J.A.C. 6A:9B1.1. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-3.2(a), the Board of Examiners "shall: (1) Issue appropriate certificates to teach . . . stude nts in public schools and all other certificates as the Board of Examiners is aut horized to issue by law; [and] (2) Revoke or suspend certificates issued, pu rsuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:9B

– 4.4 ." The authority to revoke an educator's certificate is delegated by statute
to the Board of

Examiners in N.J.S.A. 18A:6 -38.1, subject to regulations promulgated by the Commissioner. Within those regulations, N.J.A.C. 6A:9B

4.4(a) provides that the Board of Examiners "may re voke or suspend the certificate(s) of any certificate holder on the bas is of demonstrated inefficiency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teac her, or other just cause." The regulations further specify in N.J.A.C. 6A:9B -4.4(c) that the Board of Examiners "shall not revoke or suspend a certifi cate without providing the certificate holder an opportunity to be heard, purs uant to N.J.A.C. 6A:9B -4.5." To launch the process, the Board of Examiners "may issue an order to show cause to a certificate holder if the Board of Exami ners determines the conduct of the holder warrants the revocation or suspension of the certificate(s) held," where one or more of ten enumerated circumstances i s present. N.J.A.C.
6A:9B -4.5(a)(1) to (10 

### ). Further, N.J.A.C. 6A:9B -4.5(b) provides thatA- 1280

- 22 7 "[n]othing in this section shall preclude the Board of Examiners from issuing an order to show cause on its own initiative when t he Board of Examiners determines grounds for revocation or suspension of a certificate may exist."
N.J.A.C. 6A:9B -4.6 outlines the procedures the Board of Examiners must follow in taking action against an educator. Upon receiving a referral, the Board of Examiners "shall determine by public v ote whether to initiate action against the certificate holder." N.J.A.C. 6 A:9B-4.6(a). The certificate holder has thirty days in which to file an answer t o the allegations. N.J.A.C. 6A:9B -4.6(c). If an answer is filed and material facts are in dis pute, "the Board of Examiners shall either hear the matter directly or transmit it to the Office of Administrative Law ["OAL"] for a hearing" before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-4.6(d). The OAL hearing s hall adhere to the procedures prescribed by the Administrative Procedu re Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B- 1

to -31, and the associated uniform rules, N.J.A.C. 1:1 . Alternatively, if an answer is filed and no material facts are in disput e, the certificate holder must be offered an opportunity to file briefs and other written submissions with the Board of Examiners. N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-4.6(e). After the OAL transmits a post-hearing decision or the matter is considered on the papers without a hearing, the Boa rd of Examiners issues aA- 1280

- 22 8 decision about whether to revoke or suspend the edu cator's certificate. The Board of Examiners must "clearly articulate the fin dings of fact upon which its decision was based." N.J.A.C. 6A:9B-4.6(h). By statute, as revised in 2008, the decision of the Board of Examiners may be appealed administratively to the Commissione r of Education. 3 In turn, the Commissioner's ruling shall be deemed a "final agency action" and appealable "directly to the Appellate Division." N .J.S.A. 18A:6-38.4; see also
R. 2:2 -3(a)(2). In reviewing appeals from the Board of Examiners, t he Commissioner is guided by a standard of review comparable to the on e used by this court in reviewing agency decisions. The Commissioner must assess "whether the decision is supported by sufficient credible eviden ce in the record." N.J.A.C. 6A:4 -4.1(a). The Commissioner "shall not disturb the d ecision unless the appellant has demonstrated the State Board of Exami ners . . . acted in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law." Ibid. Except for the 2008 amendment omitting the step of review by the State Board of Education, these procedures for the revoca tion or suspension of an educator's certificate essentially have been in pla ce for decades. The Board of

3 The 2008 amendment removed the necessity to appeal the Commissioner's decision to the State Board of Education. L. 2008, c. 36, §2; see also N.J.A.C. 6A:4 -1.1 (explaining this change in procedures).A- 1280

- 22 9 Examiners, overseen by the Commissioner, has plenar y authority over such matters, including ascertaining whether the educato r has engaged in conduct that warrants such a regulatory sanction.
B. The procedures by which a local board of education may take disciplinary action against a tenured employee are quite different, particularly after the 2012 statutory overhaul. The history of the tenure statute recently was traced extensively by Justice Solomon in Sanjua n v. Sch. Dist. of W. N.Y., ___ N.J.___, ___ (2024) (slip op. at 19-20) ( holding that, under the current version of the statute, an arbitrator's aut hority to impose penalties is not limited to dismissal or a reduction in salary). In 1967, the Legislature enacted the Tenure Employe es Hearing Law ("TEHL"), N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -18.1, to replace th e previous Tenure Employees Hearing Act. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 10) (citing L. 1967, c. 271). "The TEHL originally provided that if the Commissio ner of Education determined that a tenure charge was 'sufficient to warrant dismissal or reduction in salary of the person charged,' then th e Commissioner would conduct a hearing." Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 18A:6- 16). "In 1998, the Legislature amended the statute to mandate a hearin g before an [ALJ] if the Commissioner deemed the charges sufficient. L. 1998, c. 42, § 2." Ibid.A- 1280

- 22 10 The ALJ's decision was then reviewable by the Commi ssioner. After that, the tenure case was reviewable by the State B oard of Education (until that last step was omitted by statute in 2008) and then directly appealable to the Appellate Division. See, e.g. , In re Young, 202 N.J. 50, 56-62 (2010) (illustratively involving a board of education's re moval case against a tenured teacher that was tried before an ALJ, and then revi ewed by the Commissioner, the Appellate Division, and ultimately the Supreme Court); Matter of Tenure Hearing of Cowan, 224 N.J. Super. 737, 740 (App. Di v. 1988) (similarly entailing a hearing before an ALJ, review of the AL J's decision by the Commissioner and (before 2008) the State Board of E ducation, and then direct review by the Appellate Division). The Legislature eventually recognized this sequence of proceedings for tenure cases was unduly protracted and inefficient. Consequently, in 2012, the Legislature substantially changed the process by su bstituting arbitration for OAL hearings, and through other major revisions. S ee L. 2012, c. 26, §22, known as the Teacher Effectiveness and Accountabili ty for Children of New Jersey Act ("TEACHNJ"). "Today, '[p]ursuant to TEACHNJ, the agency review p rocess no longer exists,' and instead, contested cases must be submi tted to arbitration." Sanjuan, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 11) (alterati on in original) (citationA- 1280

- 22 11 omitted) (quoting Pugliese v. State-Operated Sch. D ist. of Newark, 440 N.J. Super. 501, 510 (App. Div. 2015)). As the Sponsors ' Statement to the bill described this procedural change, "[t]hese conteste d cases will no longer be referred to [ALJs], and the final determination on the case will no longer be made by the Commissioner of Education." Id. at __ (slip op. at 12) (second alteration in original) (quoting Sponsors' Statemen t to A. 3060 (June 14, 2012)). Under this post-2012 system, 4 an arbitrator is selected from a panel of fifty permanent labor arbitrators maintained by the State Commissioner of Education. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1(a). The arbitratio n must adhere to strict timelines. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1(b) and (f). In pre siding over the case, the arbitrator must apply the labor arbitration rules o f the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1(c). The arbitrator is required to render a decision within forty-five days of the sta rt of the hearing. N.J.S.A. 18A:6 -17.1(d). In contrast to the former tenure case process invol ving administrative agency review, the arbitrator's decision "shall be final and binding and may not be appealable to the [C]ommissioner or the State Bo ard of Education."

4 The statute was revised again in 2015, 2019, and 20 21 to address arbitrator training and other aspects not germane to the issue s before us. See L. 2015, c. 109, § 1; L. 2019, c. 45, §1; L. 2021, c. 51, § 1.A- 1280

- 22 12 N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1(e). Instead, the decision "sha ll be subject to judicial review and enforcement as provided pursuant to N.J. S.[A.] 2A:24-7 through N.J.S.[A.] 2A:24-10" (collectively, the New Jersey Arbitration Act (the "Arbitration Act")). Ibid. Such judicial review i s conducted in the first instance in a trial division of the Superior Court, not in the Appellate Division. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7. See, e.g. , Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11-12 (2017) (detailing the post-2012 procedures ); Luskey v. Carteret Bd. of Educ., 459 N.J. Super. 150, 154 (App. Div. 2019) (s imilarly illustrating the process). The trial court may confirm the arbitrat ion award, vacate, modify, or correct it. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7. The grounds for setting aside a tenure case arbitra tor's decision under the Arbitration Act are narrow. As the Supreme Court n oted in Bound Brook, the court can only vacate the decision if one of four s tatutory grounds is demonstrated:

a. Where the award was procured by corruption, frau d or undue means; b. Where there was either evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof; c. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient c ause being shown therefor, or in refusing to hear eviden ce, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of an y other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party;A- 1280

- 22 13 d. Where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and defi nite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. [228 N.J. at 12 (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:24

– 8) ; see also Sanjuan , ___ N.J at ___ (slip op. at 14).] The trial court's decision as to whether any of the se grounds pertain is then reviewable by this court. R. 2:2 -3(a)(1). Under these revised post-2012 procedures, the Comm issioner still performs a limited role in tenured teacher discipli ne cases. That role consists of a screening function when a board of education s eeks to initiate such disciplinary proceedings. Specifically, the process begins when a complainant charges a tenured employee with one of the grounds for dismissal or a reduction in compensation, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10, i. e., "inefficiency, incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other just cause." The char ges must be filed with the appropriate board of education and served by the bo ard on the employee. N.J.S.A. 18A:6-11. If the school board finds proba ble cause supporting the charges, and that the charges, if credited, are suf ficient to warrant a dismissal or a reduction in salary, then it must forward the charges to the Commissioner. Ibid. After reviewing the charges and any written respons es by the employee, the Commissioner must decide whether the charges ar e "sufficient to warrantA- 1280

- 22 14 dismissal or reduction in salary." N.J.S.A. 18A:6- 16. If they are, the Commissioner must refer the charges to an arbitrato r; if they are not, the Commissioner must dismiss the case. Ibid. From that point forward, the Commissioner is not involved, and the arbitration p rocess we have described above takes place. See also Sanjuan , ___ N.J at ___ (slip op. at 15-16).
II. Having outlined these two distinct statutory proce sses, we turn to the procedural setting of this case. Appellant Raymond G. Morison, Jr. is a tenured phys ical education teacher employed by respondent Willingboro Board of Education ("the School Board"). In November 2020, the School Board filed tenure charges against Morison, alleging "conduct unbecoming a teaching st aff member, . . . violation of Board policy and/or other just cause warranting dismissal and reduction in salary." 5 After the tenure charges were certified, the Commis sioner appointed an arbitrator. The arbitrator presided over a hearing in March 2021 and heard the testimony of several witnesses. On April 29, 2021, the arbitrator issued an arbitra tion award and

5 Because the specifics of the charges are irrelevant to our analysis of the legal issues, we need not detail them.A- 1280

- 22 15 decision. She found that Morison had "engage[d] in conduct unbecoming a tenured teacher." Nevertheless, the arbitrator con cluded that "while [Morison's] conduct was improper, removal from his position and loss of tenure [wa]s not the appropriate penalty." Instead , the arbitrator ordered Morison "suspended without pay for the entire 2020- 2021 school year," before being allowed to return to his position upon certai n conditions. Neither Morison nor the School Board challenged the arbitrator's findings, nor the sanction of a one-year suspension . The award is therefore now final as between those parties to the arbitrati on. Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, Local 292 v. Borough of North Haledon, 158 N .J. 392, 398-99, 401-02 (1999) (noting a party's right to seek judicial con firmation of the arbitration award within three months as specified by the Arbit ration Act, and thereafter via a common law plenary action). In November 2021, the Board of Examiners initiated the process to take its own measures against Morison. It issued an Ord er to Show Cause as to "why the teaching certificate(s) issued to [Morison ] should not be revoked or suspended." The Order to Show Cause was based on " the level and nature" of Morison's "unbecoming conduct" in the incidents tha t supported the tenure charges against Morison. The Order to Show Cause r eferred to and attached, by reference, the arbitrator's decision.A- 1280

- 22 16 In January 2022, Morison filed a complaint in the L aw Division against the Board of Examiners and School Board. The compl aint was styled as a summary action seeking several forms of relief. Fi rst, the complaint sought to confirm the arbitrator's award. Second, it sought a declaration that the Board of Examiners' certificate revocation proceedings vi olated Morison's substantive due process and civil rights, and his r ight to "be free from double jeopardy." The complaint demanded that the arbitra tor's decision be afforded "preclusive effect." As Morison later elaborated, he contended the one-year suspension from employment imposed by the arbitrato r demarcates the outer limit of any sanction he can receive for his proven unbecoming conduct. In response, the Board of Examiners and the School Board asserted that the arbitrator's decision does not legally preclude the Board of Examiners from seeking to revoke or suspend Morison's teaching cer tificates. Respondents have not opposed the court confirming the award, so long as the court does not restrict the Board of Examiners from pursuing its o wn regulatory measures against Morison. They asked the trial court to dis miss Morison's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. After considering these arguments, Judge Ronald E. Bookbinder agreed with respondents and rejected Morison's claims of p reclusion. In an orderA- 1280

- 22 17 dated November 18, 2022, the judge confirmed the ar bitration award but granted dismissal as to all other relief requested by Morison's complaint. In his related oral opinion, the judge concluded the c ourt lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Board of Examiners and its pr oceedings. Morison appeals. Again, he does not contest the a rbitrator's findings of unbecoming conduct. Rather, he argues the Board of Examiners must be barred from taking action to revoke or suspend his teaching certificates under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-38.1 and N.J.A.C. 6A:9B . He contends such proceedings, in the wake of the arbitrator's imposition of a one-ye ar suspension of his employment, violate his constitutional rights of su bstantive due process. He further asserts the revocation or suspension of his teaching license would violate principles of what has been described as in dustrial double jeopardy. Because appellant's arguments for preclusion fundam entally concern issues of law, we review them de novo. Dimitrakopo ulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019); Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 3 66, 378 (1995).
III. We begin our analysis with a recognition that gene ral principles of claim preclusion and issue preclusion do not prevent the Board of Examiners from pursuing regulatory action against Morison because of the earlier arbitrationA- 1280

- 22 18 proceeding. Obviously, the Board of Examiners was not a party to the arbitration. Appellant has not cited any rule or a uthority that would have enabled the Board of Examiners to intervene or part icipate in the arbitration, even if it wanted to do so. In addition, the Schoo l Board is not a party to the certificate proceedings being pursued by the Board of Examiners, nor is there any rule or authority allowing its participation. Because there is no identity of parties, the doctri nes of collateral estoppel and res judicata do not bind the Board of Examiners. See Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 505-06 (1991) (claim preclu sion under res judicata generally requires, among other things, identity of the parties or their privies in the earlier proceeding); Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67, 85 (2012) (issue preclusion under collateral es toppel generally requires, among other things, the party against whom the doct rine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding). The Board of Examiners, a state regulatory body, is neither the same entity, nor in privity with, the Willingboro Board of Education, an agency of local government. 6

6 Because Morison does not contest the use of the arb itrator's decision, we are not presented with the question of whether the conc ept of "offensive" or "nonmutual" collateral estoppel would prevent the previ ous non-party Board of Examiners from relying on an arbitrator's decision in taking action against a licensee who lost the arbitration. See Kortenhaus v. Eli Lilly & Co., 228 N.J. Super. 162, 165

- 66 (App. Div. 1988) (explaining the concept of offensiveA- 1280

- 22 19 As our foregoing comparative discussion in Part I s hows, the statutory processes to revoke or suspend an educator's certif icate under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-
38 , and to discipline a tenured educator under TEACHN J, N.J.S.A 18A:6-10 to -18.1, are distinct and dissimilar. Although the s ubject matters in both proceedings involve appellant's unbecoming conduct, the stakes are different. The tenure case encompassed only appellant's employ ment status in the school district, whereas the certificate proceedings conce rn appellant's ability to teach at any public school in the state. Further, as we have detailed, both processes have m ajor differences. The arbitration is conducted under the AAA rules; t he certificate proceedings are conducted under the OAL rules for administrativ e proceedings. The trier of fact in the arbitration is an individual drawn f rom a list of arbitrators; the trier of fact in the certificate case is an ALJ, a public official appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. As we have noted, the arbitration award can only be reviewed by the trial court, whereas the ALJ's decision is reviewab le by the Board of Examiners and the Commissioner. The standards of r eview under the Arbitration Act differ from those applicable to fin al decisions of state

______________ __________ collateral estoppel); Restatement (Second) of Judgments §29 (Am. Law Inst. 1982).A- 1280

- 22 20 administrative agencies. The trial court has no ju risdiction to review the agency's decision, which instead must be filed dire ctly in the Appellate Division. The initial screening of the proposed tenure charge s by the Commissioner does not alter the preclusion analysis or intermingle the statutory schemes. As we have explained, the Commi ssioner simply assesses, before any hearings are held, whether charges appea r to be sufficient on their face to be tried before an arbitrator and are of po tential severity to warrant removal, a pay reduction, or other employer sanctio ns. Sanjuan, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 15-16). The Commissioner has no s ay in the degree of discipline the arbitrator chooses to mete out if th e charges are proven in that forum. We reject appellant's contention that these separat e processes violate constitutional principles of due process. He argue s the Board of Examiners' attempt to revoke or suspend his certificate, after the tenure case has been arbitrated, unconstitutionally transgresses his fun damental interest in his continued employment as a teacher. He demonstrates no such constitutional violation. Appellant has clarified that he is not alleging a v iolation of principles of procedural due process. Nor could he. The concept of procedural due processA- 1280

- 22 21 assures that the government will not deprive citize ns of certain rights without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 56 8 (1985). Here, the Board of Examiners has duly provided appellant with formal written notice of the charges against him. He will have "an opportun ity to be heard" at an administrative hearing as prescribed by the procedu res in N.J.A.C. 6A:9B, followed by several levels of available appellate r eview. See Hosp. Ctr. at Orange v. Guhl, 331 N.J. Super. 322, 340-41 (App. D iv. 2000) (explaining that "[w]hen a state affords a full judicial mechanism w ith which to challenge the administrative decision in question, the state prov ides adequate procedural due process, . . . whether or not the plaintiff avails [themselves] of the provided appeal mechanism") (quoting DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of

W. Amwell, 53 F. 3d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 2000) (alterations in original )). Nor does the Board of Examiners' case violate princ iples of substantive due process, as appellant contends. "Substantive d ue process doctrine does not protect an individual from all government action th at might infringe [that person's] liberty in violation of a law." In re At t'y Gen. L. Enf't Directive Nos.
2020 -5 & 2020-6, 465 N.J. Super. 111, 155 (App. Div. 20 20). "Instead, it 'is reserved for the most egregious governmental abuses against liberty or property rights, abuses that "shock the conscience or otherwise offend . . .A- 1280

- 22 22 judicial notions of fairness . . . [and that are] o ffensive to human dignity."'" Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Rivkin v. Dover Twp. Rent Leveling Bd., 143 N.J. 352, 366 (1996)). The separate regulatory action of the Board of Exam iners with respect to appellant's continued ability to serve as a teacher within this state does not amount to "an egregious governmental abuse" nor doe s it "shock the conscience." Nor does it offend "judicial notions of fairness" or "human dignity." The Board is lawfully acting to carry out its responsibility to protect schoolchildren from improper teacher conduct, and t hereby promote their own ability to receive a public education under our law s. See, e.g. , N.J. Const. art. VIII, § IV, ¶ 1. The statutory licensure system fo r teachers embodied in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-38 and 38.1 has a clearly rational foundation, and its coexistence with the teacher tenure laws is complemen tary, not deleterious. We also reject appellant's invocation of what has b een termed in a few cases from other jurisdictions and labor law public ations as a principle of industrial double jeopardy. Appellant does not cit e to or rest upon the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and New Jerse y Constitutions, see U.S. Const. amend. V; and N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 11, whic h generally focus upon punishments that follow the conviction of a crimina l offense. Instead, appellant relies upon a civil analogy, characterizi ng the possible re voc ation orA- 1280

- 22 23 suspension of his license as an unfair additional p unishment for his proven unbecoming behavior. He asserts the State cannot a s such engage in industrial double jeopardy "by essentially seeking to punish h im twice for the same conduct." The doctrine of industrial double jeopardy has not been adopted in New Jersey case law. We discern no reason to endorse o r apply it here. 7 Morison relies on opinions from the United States C ourt of Appeals for the First Circuit, the Massachusetts Appeals Court, and an unpublished Delaware state court case, 8 which have referred to the concept of industrial double jeopardy. Those citations are unpersuasive and inapposite. In Zayas v. Bacardi Corporation, the First Circuit noted that "[t]he phrase 'industrial double jeopardy' refers to one o f a family of concepts that fall under the rubric of industrial due process." 524 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing 1 Tim Bornstein et al., Lab. & Emp. Arb. § 15.01 (2d ed.1997); Ray J. Schoonhoven, Fairweather's Prac. & Proc. in Lab. Arb. § 13, at 374 (4th

7 We previously noted an assertion of industrial doub le jeopardy in Yarborough v. State Operated Sch ool Dist rict of City of Newark, 455 N.J. Super. 136, 144 (App. Div. 2018), but declined to a ddress it because the plaintiff had failed to raise the argument before f iling his appeal.

8 In compliance with Rule 1:36 -3, we decline to cite or discuss the unpublished Delaware opinion.A- 1280

- 22 24 ed.1999)). "In the arbitral context, these protect ions are not normally of constitutional dimension. Rather, when an arbitrat or refers to double jeopardy or some similar due process concept, [the arbitrato r] generally has imported that concept into a [Collective Bargaining Agreemen t]." Ibid. "The impetus is that such an importation is intrinsic to the notion of just cause or otherwise implicit in the labor contract." Id. at 68-69 (cit ing 1 Bornstein, § 15.03; Schoonhoven, § 13, at 373). "This borrowing does n ot mean, however, that the borrowed concepts play out identically in the c onstitutional and industrial spheres. The concept of industrial double jeopardy , for example, is usually considered weaker and narrower than its constitutio nal counterpart." Id. at 69 (citing Schoonhoven, § 13.VIII, at 417-18). In Zayas, the federal court observed that "[t]he d octrine of industrial double jeopardy enshrines the idea that an employee should not be penalized twice for the same infraction." Ibid. This principle was unavailing to the employee in Zayas, however. The employee was a labor union mem ber who had been temporarily suspended without pay by his e mployer while it investigated charges that he had falsified records. Id. at 66-67. After he served that temporary suspension, an arbitrator sub stantiated the charges and authorized the employer to terminate him. Id. at 6 7. The employee challenged the termination, arguing that the employer could no t impose a greater sanctionA- 1280

- 22 25 upon him than the earlier temporary suspension. Ib id. The First Circuit rejected that argument, noting that "[t]he authorit ies are consistent that when employers suspend employees pending investigation o f alleged misconduct, the doctrine of industrial double jeopardy does not bar subsequent discipline." Id . at 69 (emphasis added). The other published judicial opinion cited by appe llant likewise involved an employer imposing additional discipline upon an employee. In City of Springfield v. United Public Service Employees Unio n, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals principally addressed "whether an arbitrator exceeded her authority when she ordered a terminated employee re instated without loss of pay or other rights, even though she found that he had engaged in conduct amounting to sexual harassment." 47 N.E.3d 447, 44 9 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016). As a subsidiary question, the court considered whet her the employer could nonetheless require the reinstated employee to rece ive sexual harassment training. Id. at 451. Citing Zayas, the court sta ted that the employer's authority to impose an additional suspension, loss of pay, or loss of other employment rights would violate "industrial double jeopardy" provisions, but that the employer was not precluded by the arbitrat ion award from requiring other remedial measures such as training and counse ling. Id . at 453 (citingA- 1280

- 22 26 524 F.3d at 69 ). But here again, the factual context was whether the worker's employer could impose additional sanctions upon its employee. Not so here. Even if the doctrine of industrial d ouble jeopardy were adopted as the law of this state, it would not aid Morison in this particular setting. That is because the Board of Examiners is not his employer. His employer, the School Board, obtained through the ar bitration process a oneyear suspension of his employment in the school dis trict. The Board of Education has not brought any other litigation or i mposed any other sanctions upon him. In a similar vein, Morison cites to Township of Moorestown v. Armstrong, an employment case that recognized the e mployee in question "cannot be punished twice for the same offense." 8 9 N.J. Super. 560, 567 (App. Div. 1965). That case involved an employer t hat removed an employee based on ten separate instances of improper conduct . Id. at 562-64. The Civil Service Commission upheld nine of the charges, but it reduced the sanction to a six-month suspension without pay. Id. at 564. O n appeal, we concluded the Commission misapplied its discretion and reversed, reinstating the dismissal. Id. at 566-67. We noted that one of the ten charge s had already been punished by the employer with a five-day suspension, which t he employer was notA- 1280

- 22 27 entitled to increase but which could be considered as a past record of misconduct in sanctioning the rest of the offenses. Id. at 567. The situation here plainly differs from Moorestown because the regulatory action of the Board of Examiners is not a second sanction being imposed by the same employer. Instead, it is a lic ensure matter being pursued by a regulatory agency. By analogy, the Supreme Co urt is not precluded from suspending or disbarring an attorney from the pract ice of law after a tribunal finds the lawyer was appropriately fired or discipl ined by the attorney's employer concerning the same improper conduct. In sum, Morison presents no valid constitutional or other legal grounds to enjoin the Board of Examiners' proceedings to re voke or suspend his certificate. Lacking such support, he has no viabl e claims under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. Se e Desanctis v. Borough of Belmar, 455 N.J. Super. 316, 333 (App. Div. 2018) ( citing Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake, 234 N.J. 317, 331 (2018)). To the extent we have not discussed them, all remai ning points raised by appellant lack sufficient merit to discuss in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The action by the Board of Examiners may proceed. Affirmed.