[Cite as In re H.W. , 2016-Ohio-7794.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY IN THE MATTER OF: : H.W., : Case No. 16CA3565 : : Adjudicated Dependent Child. : : DECISION AND : JUDGMENT ENTRY : : RELEASED 11/16/2016

APPEARANCES : Aaron M. McHenry, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellant. Matthew S. Schmidt, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jennifer L. Ater, Ross County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.

Hoover, J. {¶1} Appellant, C.P., appeals from the judgment of the Ross County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, awarding appellee, South Central Ohio Job and Family Services, Children’s Division (“SCOJFS”), permanent custod y of her minor child, H.W. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Facts {¶2} H.W. was born on April 9, 2014. The father of the child is not known. A short time after H.W.’s birth, it was alleged that C.P. left the infant child in the familial residence without adult supervision, when she fled from la w enforcement who had arrived at the house to serve a warrant on her. As a result of this incident , as well as a previous history between C.P. and the children services agency, SCOJFS filed a complaint alleging that H.W. was a dependentRoss App. No. 16CA3565 2 child. SCOJFS was granted temporary custod y of H.W. on June 23, 2014. The trial court subsequently adjudicated H.W. dependent on Oc tober 23, 2014, and ordered the child to remain in SCOJFS’s temporary custody. The order of temporary custody was extended on several occasions. {¶3} A case plan was filed with the trial court on September 24, 2014. The case plan was amended several times after its initial filing. Throughout the duration of the case C.P. was offered services to complete her goals toward reunification with the child. {¶4} On November 30, 2015, SCOJFS filed a mo tion requesting permanent custody of H.W. SCOJFS asserted that H.W. had been in its temporary custody for more than twelve of the past twenty-two months and that awarding it permanent custody would serve the child’s best interest. {¶5} The trial court held a hearing to consider SCOJFS’s permanent custody motion on June 21, 2016. At the time of the hearing, C.P. wa s incarcerated and serving a two-year sentence imposed in May 2016 for felony counts of receivi ng stolen property and drug possession. She was conveyed to the hearing and participated in the hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order granting SCOJFS’s motion and awarding it permanent custody of H.W. The trial court found that the child had been in SCOJFS’s temporary custod y for at least twelve out of the past twenty-two months. The trial court also determined that awarding SCOJFS permanent custody of H.W. would se rve the child’s best interest. {¶6} This appeal followed. II. Assignment of Error {¶7} C.P. raises one assignment of error.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PERMANENT CUSTODY WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE MINOR CHILD.Ross App. No. 16CA3565 3

III. Law and Analysis {¶8} In her sole assignment of error, C.P. contends that the tr ial court erred by determining that awarding SCOJFS permanent cust ody was in the child’s best interest. C.P. does not dispute that H.W. had been in SCOJFS’s cust ody for at least twelve of the past twenty-two months. Instead, C.P. argues that “the eviden ce showed that [she] had made significant improvements since SCOJFS filed its initial complaint” and that she should have been given “more time to complete her case plan.” Specifically, she claims that while her “efforts were not always perfect”, she had “attended parenting clas ses, started a drug treatment program, and attempted to stay in contact with SCOJFS throughout the proceedings.” A. Standard of Review {¶9} A reviewing court generally will not disturb a trial court’s permanent custody decision unless the decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re R.M., 2013– Ohio–3588, 997 N.E.2d 169, ¶ 53 (4th Dist.). “ ‘Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to s upport one side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible eviden ce sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathema tics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.” ’ ” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012–Ohio–2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990).Ross App. No. 16CA3565 4
{¶10} When an appellate court reviews whether a trial court’s permanent custody decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court “ ‘ “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” ’ ” Eastley at ¶ 20, quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115, 750 N.E.2d 176 (9th Dist.2001), quoting Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). Accord In re Pittman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20894, 2002–Ohio–2208, ¶¶ 23–24. {¶11} In a permanent custody case, the ultimate question for a reviewing court is “whether the juvenile court’s findings * * * we re supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008–Ohio–4825, 895 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 43. “Clear and convincing evidence” is: “[T]he measure or degree of proof th at will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations s ought to be established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to th e extent of such certainty as required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean clear and unequivocal.” In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 104, 495 N.E.2d 23 (1986). In determining whether a trial court based its decision upon clear and convincing ev idence, “a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990). Accord In re Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985), citing Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954) (“Once the clear and convincing standard has been met to the satisfaction of the [trial] court, the reviewing court must examine the record and determine if the trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this burden of proof.”). “Thus, if theRoss App. No. 16CA3565 5 children services agency presented competent a nd credible evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could have formed a firm belief that permanent custody is warranted, then the court’s decision is not against the manife st weight of the evidence.” R.M. at ¶ 55. {¶12} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, the court may reverse the judgment only if it appears that the fact-finder, when resolving the conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Martin at 175. A reviewing court should find a tr ial court’s permanent custody decision against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the [decision].’ ” Id., quoting Martin at 175; accord State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 483, 721 N.E.2d 995 (2000). {¶13} Furthermore, when reviewing evidence under the manifest weight of the evidence standard, an appellate court generally must defer to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations. As the Eastley court explained: “[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgme nt and the finding of facts. * * * If the evidence is susceptible of more th an one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.” Eastley , 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, at ¶ 21, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Re view, Section 60, at 191–192 (1978).Ross App. No. 16CA3565 6

B. Permanent Cust ody Principles {¶14} A parent has a “fundamental liberty interest” in the care, custody, and management of his or her child and an “essential” and “basic ci vil right” to raise his or her children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990); accord In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007–Ohio–1105, 862 N.E.2d 829. A parent’s rights, however, are not absolute. In re D.A. at ¶ 11. Rather, “ ‘it is plain that the natural rights of a parent * * * are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’ ” In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979), quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla.App.1974). Thus, the State may terminate pa rental rights when a child’s best interest demands such termination. In re D.A. at ¶ 11. {¶15} Before a court may award a children services agency permanent custody of a child, R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) requires the court to ho ld a hearing. The primary purpose of the hearing is to allow the court to determine whether the child’s best interests would be served by permanently terminating the parental relationshi p and by awarding permanent custody to the
agency. Id. Additionally, when considering whether to grant a children services agency permanent custody, a trial court should consid er the underlying purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151, as set forth in R.C. 2151.01: (A) To provide for the care, protection, a nd mental and physical development of children * * * whenever possible, in a family environment, separating the child from the child’s parents only when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interests of public safety;Ross App. No. 16CA3565 7 (B) To provide judicial procedures th rough which Chapters 2151. and 2152. of the Revised Code are executed and enforced, a nd in which the parties are assured of a fair hearing, and their constitutional and other legal rights are recognized and enforced. C. Permanent Custody Framework {¶16} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) permits a trial court to grant permanent custody of a child to a children services agency if the court determin es, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child’s best interest would be served by the award of permanent custody and that any of the following apply: (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services ag encies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consec utive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies orprivate child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twentytwo-month period if, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents. (b) The child is abandoned. (c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody. (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of aRoss App. No. 16CA3565 8 consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children se rvices agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary cust ody of an equivalent agency in another

state. (e) The child or another child in the cust ody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has b een adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separa te occasions by any court in this state or another

state. {¶17} R.C. 2151.414(D) requires a tria l court to consider specific factors to determine whether a child’s best interest will be served by granting a children services agency permanent custody. The factors include: (1) the child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents a nd out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the child’s wishes, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child's maturity; (3) the child’s custodial history; (4) the child’s need for a le gally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a gran t of permanent custody to the agency; and (5) whether any factors listed under R. C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply. {¶18} Thus, before a trial court may award a children services agency permanent custody, it must find (1) that one of the circ umstances described in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) applies, and (2) that awarding the children services agen cy permanent custody would further the child’s best interests.Ross App. No. 16CA3565 9
{¶19} In the case at bar, C.P. does not challenge the trial court’s R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) finding. Therefore, we do not address it. Instea d, C.P. focuses her argume nt on the trial court’s best interest determination.
D. Best Interest {¶20} Here, C.P. does not expressly challenge an y of the best interest factors listed above; however, her argument coul d be interpreted as a challeng e to the trial court’s finding regarding the child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without granting perman ent custody to SCOJFS. C.P. contends that the evidence shows that she has made “sig nificant improvements” since the dependency complaint was filed in this case and that she could eventually provide a legally secure permanent placement for the child. C.P. thus contends that the trial court s hould have denied the permanent custody motion and given her more time to complete her case plan. {¶21} We do not agree with C.P. that she has made “significant improvements” during the pendency of the case or that the trial court should have given her more time to complete the case plan. Rather, the evidence adduced at the pe rmanent custody hearing clearly demonstrates that C.P. has failed to make imp rovements or work towards the co mpletion of her case plan. For instance, the evidence shows that during the pendency of this case C.P. has been incarcerated six times for various offenses. C.P. was convicted of felony counts of receiving stolen property and drug possession, resulting in a two-year prison se ntence in May 2016. C.P. failed to inform her caseworker of her whereabouts and failed to mainta in regular contact with SCOJFS. She failed to maintain appropriate and stab le housing, having a house foreclosed on despite monetary assistance from the agency, having been evicted from an apartment, and having failed to follow through with the agency’s referral to Metropolitan Housing. C.P. also failed to completeRoss App. No. 16CA3565 10 parenting classes through Elizab eth’s Hope, and failed to comple te alcohol and drug counseling through Prism Behavioral Health Care and Recovery Council, having been terminated from both programs for noncompliance. C.P. also tested positive for drugs, refused to take drug screens, and had invalid drug screens durin g the pendency of the case. Finally, the evidence indicates that C.P. only visited H.W. sporadically, w ith the last visit being on June 18, 2015. {¶22} In addition to the above evidence, the casew orker from SCOJFS testified that they investigated several relative placement options for the child but that no suitable options were available. Moreover, the attorney and guardian ad litem for the child agreed, through two reports filed with the trial court, that it was in the child’s best interest for SCOJFS to be awarded permanent custody. {¶23} The foster mother also testified at the hearing, indicating that the child has thrived under her care, and that she is willing to adopt the child. The foster mother also expressed concern that C.P. showed up to at least one sche duled visitation under the influence; and that she regularly missed or showed up late to scheduled visitations with H.W. {¶24} Here, SCOJFS presented competent and credible evidence at the permanent custody hearing indicating that C.P. failed to co mplete her case plan or to otherwise work towards reunification with H.W. While C.P. contends that given more time she could complete her case plan, her past behaviors indicate otherwise. Moreover, we have continuously recognized that a trial court is not required to experiment with a child’s welfare in order to permit a parent an opportunity to prove his or her suitability: “ ‘ * * * [A] child should not have to e ndure the inevitable to its great detriment and harm in order to give the * * * [paren t] an opportunity to prove her suitability. To anticipate the future, however, is at most, a difficult basis for a judicialRoss App. No. 16CA3565 11 determination. The child’s present conditi on and environment is the subject for decision not the expected or anticipated behavior of unsuitability or unfitness of the * * * [parent]. * * * The law does not re quire the court to experiment with the child’s welfare to see if he will suffer great detriment or harm.’ ”
In re A.C.H. , 4th Dist. Gallia No. 11CA2, 2011-Ohio-5595, ¶ 42, quoting In re Bishop , 36 Ohio App.3d 123, 126, 521 N.E.2d 838 (5th Dist.1987); see also In re C.B.C. , 4th Dist. Lawrence Nos. 15CA18 & 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 61. Thus, we disa gree with the suggestion that the trial court should have given C. P. one more chance to prove her suitability. {¶25} We therefore conclude that clear a nd convincing evidence supports the trial court’s determination that awardi ng SCOJFS permanent custody is in H.W.’s best interest. H.W. needs a legally secure permanent placement. While C.P. says she would like to provide it, her past behaviors suggest an inability to do so. Furthermore, the record does not indicate any other viable options for a legally secure permanent placement. IV. Conclusion {¶26} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule C.P.’s sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.Ross App. No. 16CA3565 12

JUDGMENT ENTRY It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFI RMED. Appellant shall pay the costs herein taxed. The Court finds there were reas onable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appella te Procedure

. Harsha, J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. For the Court By: Marie Hoover, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this documen t constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.