IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Propel Charter Schools, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Department of Education :

(State Charter School Appeal Board), : No. 1209 C.D. 2020

Respondent : Argued: October 18, 2021

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge 

OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: November 19, 2021

Propel Charter Schools (Propel) petitions this Court for review of the 

State Charter School Appeal Board’s (CAB) December 22, 2020 order that denied 

Propel’s appeal from CAB’s Hearing Officer’s (Hearing Officer) order granting the 

Pennsylvania Department of Education’s (Department) motion to supplement the 

record with Propel’s 2017-18 school performance profile (SPP) scores (Motion to 

Supplement), and denied Propel’s appeal from the Department’s denial of Propel’s 

application (Application) to operate a Multiple Charter School Organization 

(MCSO). Propel presents three issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether Propel’s 

failure to adhere to the Department’s MCSO Application Guide (Application Guide) 

is a proper basis for denying Propel’s MCSO Application; (2) whether the 

Department’s Application Guide is an improper regulation; and (3) whether CAB 

erred when it interpreted the Charter School Law (CSL)1to allow the consideration 

1 Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, added by Section 1 of the Act of June 19, 

1997, P.L. 225, 24 P.S. §§ 17-1701-A - 17-1751-A. 
2

of SPP data that became available after Propel filed the MCSO Application.

2

 After 

review, this Court affirms.

3

In February 2018, the Department published an application form 

(Application Form) to be completed by charter schools seeking to establish an

MCSO, and published the Application Guide in conjunction with the Application 

Form.

On May 4, 2018, Propel submitted the Application to the Department,

wherein Propel sought to consolidate eight of its preexisting charter schools as a

single MCSO. The preexisting charter schools included: Propel Schools (operating 

as Propel Charter School-Homestead); Propel Charter School - East; Propel Charter 

School - McKeesport (Propel-McKeesport); Propel Charter School - Montour

(Propel-Montour); Propel Charter School - Northside; Propel Charter School -

Pitcairn; and Propel Charter School - Hazelwood. The Department received the 

Application on May 7, 2018. 

Propel also submitted its Application to the School District of 

Pittsburgh, Steel Valley School District, Woodland Hills School District, Penn Hills 

School District, McKeesport School District, Montour School District and Gateway 

School District. Pursuant to Section 1729.1-A(a) of the CSL,4 24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-

A(a), each school district and the Department had 45 days to render a decision on

the Application. On June 18, 2018, the School District of Pittsburgh voted to deny

the Application. No other school district responded to the Application within 45 

days and, therefore, the Application was deemed approved by those school districts. 

2 This Court has reordered Propel’s issues for ease of discussion.

3 This matter was argued seriately with Propel Charter Schools v. School District of 

Pittsburgh (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1210 C.D. 2020, filed Nov. 19, 2021).

4 Section 1729.1-A of the CSL was added by Section 10 of the Act of November 6, 2017, 

P.L. 1142.
3

On June 20, 2018, the Department denied the Application. The 

Department based its denial on deficiencies in the following areas:

• Demonstration of Proper Planning and Preparation for

Delivery of Educational Programs to Students

o Special Education

o Finance

• Governance

• General Application Requirements

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 5445a (emphasis added). With respect to the General 

Application Requirements,5the Department concluded:

5 The Department found Propel’s Application deficient, in part, based on Propel’s failure 

to comply with the sequential review instructions in the Department’s Application Guide. The 

Department’s Application Guide provides, in relevant part:

The General Assembly did not provide express direction concerning 

the sequence of submission and review of MCSO applications to the 

chartering school district(s) and the Department. Therefore, the 

Department has concluded that the most reasonable way to 

implement the requirements relating to submission and review is 

through a sequential review.

Under this sequential review process, the establishment of an MCSO 

begins with the submission of a complete and verified MCSO 

[a]pplication to the chartering school district(s) for each charter 

school under the proposed MCSO. In the case of a regional charter 

school, or when the charter schools seeking to form an MCSO have 

different chartering school districts, the MCSO [a]pplication must 

be submitted to all chartering school districts simultaneously. 

Chartering school district(s) have 45 days to review and act on an 

application for creation of an MCSO; if no action occurs within the 

45 days, the application is deemed approved. 24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-

A(a)(2). If a chartering school district disapproves an application 

and that disapproval is subsequently reversed by [] CAB[], see 24 

P.S. § 17-1729.1-A(f), the application will be considered approved 

as of the date of CAB’s written determination unless otherwise 

stayed by an appropriate order.

After approval by the chartering school district(s) (or CAB) or the 

passage of 45 days, the MCSO [a]pplication is submitted to the 

Department. The MCSO [a]pplication submitted to the Department 

must be identical to that approved by the chartering school

district(s). The Department has 45 days for review and action. 24 
4

Because the MCSO Application submitted by [Propel] did 

not contain a proper date for when the Application was 

submitted to the chartering school districts, and because 

the MCSO Compliance Certification had been altered, [the 

Department] requested that [Propel] specifically identify 

the dates on which the Application was submitted to the 

districts and the action taken by, the districts. In response, 

[Propel] identified that the MCSO Application was 

received by Woodland Hills School District on May 3, 

2018, and Gateway School District, McKeesport School 

District, Montour School District, Penn Hills School 

District, Pittsburgh School District, and Steel Valley 

School District on May 4, 2018; this information confirms 

that [Propel] did not comply with the application 

requirements. [The Department] also provided [Propel]

with a new, unaltered MCSO Compliance Certificate to be 

executed and attested to by the proposed members of the 

MCSO’s board of trustees. [Propel] did not resubmit the 

MCSO Compliance Certificate as requested.

Based on the above, [Propel] failed to submit its 

[A]pplication to form an MCSO to all its chartering school 

districts at least 45 days prior to submitting its 

[A]pplication to [the Department], and failed to properly 

complete the MCSO Compliance Certificate required as 

part of the MCSO [A]pplication, and the MCSO 

Application is, therefore, denied.

R.R. at 5453a.

On July 17, 2018, Propel filed an appeal to CAB. Propel’s Application 

relied on Propel-McKeesport as its lone qualifying school to satisfy the CSL’s 

P.S. § 17-1729.1-A(a)(1). Disapproval by the Department is also 

subject to an appeal to CAB. See 24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-A(f).

This sequential review allows charter schools to address and resolve 

any concerns with the chartering school district(s), which have 

closer oversight of the charter schools, before seeking the 

Department’s approval. Also, the sequential review eliminates the

possibility of conflicting decisions on an MCSO [a]pplication being 

issued by the chartering school district(s) and the Department at the 

same time.

R.R. at 5869a-5870a.
5

MCSO approval requirement that at least one member school must have an SPP 

score that is among the top 25th percentile of Pennsylvania charter schools as 

measured by the SPP for the two most recent school years.

At the time Propel filed the Application with the Department, the two 

most recent school years for which SPP scores were available were the 2015-16 and 

2016-17 school years. On December 21, 2018, the Department published SPP scores 

for the 2017-18 school year. On January 9, 2019, based upon the SPP scores for the 

2017-18 school year, the Department updated its MCSO Eligibility List. 

On January 29, 2019, the Department filed the Motion to Supplement. 

The purpose of the Motion to Supplement was to provide CAB with evidence that 

Propel-McKeesport was no longer ranked in the top quartile as it had been for the 

2015-16 and 2016-17 school years. Because Propel-McKeesport had been the only 

school with an SPP score in the top quartile of charter schools in the Commonwealth, 

none of the eight schools in the proposed MCSO had an SPP score that would qualify 

Propel for MCSO eligibility. Along with its Motion to Supplement, the Department 

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support thereof.

On March 19, 2019, the Hearing Officer granted the Motion to Supplement (March 

19, 2019 Order). Propel appealed to CAB from the Hearing Officer’s March 19, 

2019 Order.

On May 21, 2019, the parties argued Propel’s direct appeal to CAB 

from the Hearing Officer’s March 19, 2019 Order and Propel’s appeal from the 

Department’s decision denying Propel’s Application. Prior to the hearing, CAB 

Member Lee Ann Munger (CAB Member Munger) and the Department Secretary 

recused themselves from participating in both appeals.6

6 CAB Member Munger explained that her children attend Propel.
6

At CAB’s June 18, 2019 meeting, CAB Member Munger and the 

Department Secretary recused themselves from the vote, leaving a quorum - four 

CAB members - who voted 4-0 to deny Propel’s appeal from the Hearing Officer’s

March 19, 2019 Order. Also, on June 18, 2019, CAB voted 3-1 to deny Propel’s 

appeal from the Department’s decision to deny Propel’s Application; however, CAB 

tabled the matter as a nonactionable vote because CAB determined, in accordance 

with its interpretation of the CSL, that the 3-1 vote did not constitute a valid CAB

action.7

On July 24, 2019, with the Department Secretary and CAB Member 

Munger again recusing, the same four CAB members voted on the substantive 

appeal from the Department’s denial, resulting in another 3-1 vote, which CAB did 

not recognize as a valid CAB action. Once more, CAB tabled the matter.

On September 6, 2019, Propel filed a Motion to Permit CAB Member 

Munger to Vote. CAB counsel held a conference call with all of the parties to discuss 

Propel’s Motion to Permit CAB Member Munger to Vote. On September 16, 2019, 

the Department filed its response in opposition thereto. On September 25, 2019, 

Propel withdrew its Motion to Permit CAB Member Munger to Vote, and filed a 

Motion to Allow Vote of 3-1 in this Matter as Proper (Vote Motion). On October 7, 

2019, the Department filed its response thereto. At CAB’s October 22, 2019 

meeting, the parties argued the Vote Motion and CAB voted to deny the Vote 

Motion, and again attempted to vote on the substantive appeal, that resulted in a 3-1 

vote to deny. CAB tabled the matter for a revote at its December 3, 2019 meeting. 

On November 27, 2019, CAB issued a written order denying the Vote Motion. On

December 26, 2019, Propel appealed to this Court. On that same date, Propel also 

filed a Petition for Review in the Nature of a Declaratory Judgment Complaint in 

7 Because a majority of the six CAB members did not vote unanimously, CAB determined 

that the 3-1 vote did not constitute a valid CAB action.
7

this Court’s original jurisdiction seeking a declaration that the CAB votes and 

revotes were proper, and an order for CAB to promptly issue a written decision.8

On November 20, 2020, this Court ruled that CAB’s 3-1 vote was 

proper, and reversed CAB’s November 27, 2019 order.9 This Court further directed 

that Propel had 30 days therefrom to appeal from CAB’s denial of Propel’s 

substantive appeal. On November 25, 2020, Propel filed the instant Petition for 

Review.10 On December 23, 2020, CAB issued its written decision in support of its 

June 18, 2019 vote of 3-1 denying Propel’s appeal and its denial of Propel’s appeal 

from the Hearing Officer’s March 19, 2019 Order.

11

Propel argues that CAB erred when it concluded that Propel’s failure to 

comply with the Department’s Application Guide, specifically its requirement that 

Propel first submit the MCSO Application to the school districts and, only after

approval by the school districts, to the Department, is a proper basis for denying 

Propel’s Application. Propel expressly asserts:

[The Department’s] invented “requirement” for sequential 

review and approval of the Application cannot be a reason 

8

In February 2020, both the Department and Propel filed motions to supplement the record 

with SPP scores issued by the Department for the 2018-19 school year. Propel-McKeesport was 

once again in the top 25% for 2018-19, based upon the updated MCSO Eligibility List. On 

February 20, 2020, the parties submitted Joint Stipulations seeking to admit evidence with respect 

to the most recent MCSO Eligibility List and Propel-McKeesport’s 2018-19 SPP score. The 

motions to supplement were deemed moot, and the Joint Stipulations were admitted into the record 

at CAB’s February 25, 2020 meeting.

9

See Propel Charter Sch. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 242 A.3d 985 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020); Propel 

Charter Sch. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 243 A.3d 322 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020); Propel Charter Sch. v. 

Charter Sch. Appeal Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1827 C.D. 2019, filed Nov. 20, 2020).

10 “Our review of [CAB’s] decision is limited to determining whether constitutional rights 

were violated, whether errors of law were committed or whether the decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence.” New Hope Acad. Charter Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of the City of York, 89 A.3d 

731, 736 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

11 CAB did not file an opinion in support of its June 18, 2019 vote denying Propel’s 

substantive appeal before this Court issued its November 20, 2020 decision, due to its conclusion 

that the vote was not valid. 
8

for denial by CAB or [the Department]. The timing of the

Application submittal by Propel to [the Department]

(i.e.[,] simultaneous or later) is of no moment to [the 

Department] in its evaluation of Propel’s [A]pplication.

Whether or not Propel submitted its [A]pplication in a 

particular sequence does not bear on [the Department]’s 

analysis as to whether Propel is eligible to consolidate.

The MCSO [P]rovisions contained in the CSL do not 

require - or even provide for - a sequential review process.

Propel Br. at 28.

In its Decision, CAB explained:

[T]he Application Guide . . . explicitly states that “the most 

reasonable way to implement the [MCSO’s] requirements 

relating to submission and review is through a sequential 

review.” ([] Application Guide[ at] 2). The Application 

Guide goes on to state that “[a]fter approval by the 

chartering school district(s) (or CAB) or the passage of 45 

days, the MCSO [a]pplication is submitted to the

Department.” ([] Application Guide[ at] 2). While the 

Application Guide’s language is not expressed as a 

command or mandate (e.g., “the review shall be 

sequential”), no reasonable reading of that language would 

interpret it as providing an applicant with discretion in the 

timing of its filings, and an applicant choosing its own 

filing sequence would necessarily do so at its peril.

Therefore, Propel’s argument in this regard provides no 

grounds on which to reverse the denial of its Application.

CAB Dec. at 24, R.R. at 5833a.

Section 1729.1-A of the CSL, which provides for the establishment of 

MCSOs (MCSO Provisions), states, in relevant part:

(a) Establishment shall be as follows:

(1) Subject to the requirements of this section and [Part 

2, Subchapter C of the Associations Code, ]15 Pa.C.S. 

Pt. II Subpt. C[, 15 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6162] (relating to 
9

nonprofit corporations),[12]two (2) or more charter 

schools may consolidate into a[n] [MCSO] if both of 

the following apply:

(i) The [D]epartment approves the consolidation

as proposed in the application form submitted to the 

[D]epartment pursuant to subsection (c). If the 

[D]epartment does not approve or disapprove the 

proposed consolidation within forty-five (45) days 

after receipt of the application, the [D]epartment will 

be deemed to have approved the consolidation.

(ii) Each school district that granted the initial 

charter of any charter school included in the 

proposed consolidation approves, by a majority 

vote of the local board of school directors, a 

resolution approving the consolidation as proposed in 

the application submitted to the local board of school 

directors pursuant to subsection (c). If a local board 

of school directors does not adopt a resolution under 

this clause approving or rejecting the proposed 

consolidation within forty-five (45) days after receipt 

of the application, the school district will be deemed 

to have approved the consolidation.

. . . .

(b) (1) A charter school that, within either of the most 

recent two (2) school years, has failed to meet any of 

12 The Department contends that “[c]harter schools seeking to form an MCSO must 

maintain eligibility pursuant to [S]ection 1729.1-A(b) [of the CSL] until the merger has become 

effective.” Department Br. at 13. Further,

[c]harter schools seeking to merge as an MCSO are expressly 

subject to the requirements of . . . Pt. [II] Subpt. C [of the 

Associations Code]. 24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-A(a)(1). The Associations 

Code[, 15 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9507,] requires a regulated entity obtain 

the necessary approvals “before it may participate in any form of 

transaction under this chapter.” 15 Pa.C.S. §§ 103, 314(a). A 

merger under the Associations Code is not effective until the plan or 

statement has been filed with the Pennsylvania Department of State, 

which entities may not do until the necessary approvals have been 

obtained. 15 Pa.C.S. § 335(e)-(g).

Department Br. at 14.
10

the following shall not be eligible to consolidate with 

another charter school:

(i) Requirements for student performance set forth in 

[Chapter 4 of the State Board of Education’s 

Regulations,] 22 Pa. Code Ch. 4[, §§ 4.1-4.82]

(relating to academic standards and assessment).

(ii) Accepted standards of fiscal management or audit 

requirements.

(iii) A[n] [SPP] score that is among the top twentyfifth percentile of Pennsylvania charter schools as 

measured by the [SPP] for the most recent year for 

which a[n] [SPP] score is available.

(2) A charter school that has failed to meet any of the 

requirements of paragraph (1) may consolidate if 

the consolidation includes a charter school 

demonstrating that it has satisfied such 

requirements for the most recent two (2) school 

years.

(c) Within ninety (90) days of the effective date of this 

section, the [D]epartment shall develop and issue a 

standard application form that [MCSO] applicants 

must submit to the [D]epartment and to the local board 

of school directors of each school district that granted the 

initial charter of any charter school included in the 

proposed consolidation. . . . 

. . . .

(f) Appeals shall be as follows:

(1) [CAB] shall have the exclusive review of an appeal 

by an applicant for consolidation, with respect to the 

rejection of a proposed consolidation by either the 

[D]epartment or a school district.

(2) In considering an appeal under this section, [CAB] 

shall:

(i) Review the decision made by either the 

[D]epartment or the school district on the record as 

certified by the entity that made the decision being 

appealed, provided that [CAB] may allow the 
11

[D]epartment, a school district or the applicant 

for consolidation to supplement the record if the 

supplemental information was previously 

unavailable.

(ii) Meet to officially review the certified record no 

later than thirty (30) days after the date of filing the 

appeal.

(iii) Issue a written decision affirming or denying the 

appeal no later than sixty (60) days following its 

review of the certified record.

(iv) Make its decision based on whether the 

proposed consolidation satisfies the requirements 

of subsections (b) and (c).

. . . .

(4) All decisions of [CAB] shall be subject to appellate 

review by the Commonwealth Court. In the event of an 

appeal of a decision by [CAB] to the Commonwealth 

Court, the decision of [CAB] shall be stayed only upon 

order of [CAB], the Commonwealth Court or the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-A (emphasis added). 

Propel argues that its failure to comply with the Department’s 

sequential review process set forth in the Application Guide is not a valid basis for 

the Department or CAB to deny the Application. The Department’s Application 

Guide provides that only after obtaining the approval from the applicable school 

districts, as required in Section 1729.1-A(a)(1)(ii) of the CSL, may the applicant 

submit an application to the Department under Section 1729.1-A(a)(1)(i) of the CSL. 

Propel correctly observes that there is no such requirement in the CSL’s 

MCSO Provisions, as Section 1729.1-A(a)(1) of the CSL simply provides that 

applications are to be submitted to the applicable school districts and to the 

Department, and that the school districts and the Department must render their 
12

decisions within 45 days of their receipt of the respective application or the 

respective application will be deemed approved. See 24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-A(a)(1).13

In response, the Department argues that, pursuant to Section 1729.1-

A(c) of the CSL, it was required to develop a standard MCSO application. Although 

Section 1729.1-A of the CSL does not mandate sequential review, the Department 

concluded that sequential review was “the most reasonable way to implement the 

requirements relating to submission and review[.]” Department Br. at 17. It 

contends that its interpretation of the MCSO Provisions of the CSL is entitled to 

deference since it is the agency charged with the CSL’s implementation and, as an 

interpretive rule, the Department’s interpretation of Section 1729.1-A of the CSL

providing for sequential review is not clearly erroneous, unwise, or violative of 

legislative intent.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

This Court has held “[a]n interpretation by the agency 

charged with the administration of a particular law is 

normally accorded deference, unless clearly erroneous.” 

Harkness v. [Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.], . . . 920 

A.2d 162, 171 ([Pa.] 2007). Moreover, since Harkness, 

we have described two types of agency interpretations 

which are accorded different levels of deference. Agency 

interpretations that are promulgated in published rules and 

regulations have been referred to as “legislative rules” and 

“are accorded a particularly high measure of deference[,]”

also known as Chevron[14] deference, and “enjoy a 

presumption of reasonableness[.]” N[w.] Youth Serv[s., 

Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare,] 66 A.3d [301,] 310-11 [(Pa. 

2013)]. Non-legislative rules, also known as “interpretive 

rules” or “guidance documents,” such as “manuals, 

interpretive memoranda, staff instructions, policy 

statements, circulars, bulletins, advisories, [and] press 

13 Section 1729.1-A(a)(1) of the CSL merely lists approval by both the Department and the 

applicable school districts as requirements for an MCSO. Notably, Section 1729.1-A(a)(1) of the 

CSL lists the Department’s approval first. See 24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-A(a)(1)(i), (ii).

14 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13

releases” are accorded “a lesser quantum of deference[,]”

also known as Skidmore[15] deference, which allows an 

agency’s interpretation to be disregarded when a court is 

“‘convinced that the interpretative regulation adopted by 

an administrative agency is unwise or violative of 

legislative intent.’” Id. at 310-12, quoting Pa. Hum[.]

Rel[.] Comm’n v. Uniontown Area Sch[.] Dist[.], . . . 313 

A.2d 156, 169 ([Pa.] 1973).

Harmon v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 207 A.3d 292, 299-300 (Pa. 2019)

(footnotes omitted). The Department asserts that the Application Guide is an 

interpretive rule, which should be afforded Skidmore deference. 

With respect to an initial application for a charter under Section 1717-

A of the CSL, this Court has explained:

[T]he legislature apparently appreciated that timeliness 

was an important element in assuring the fairness of the 

charter school application and review process. This is 

evident from the legislature’s inclusion of time limitations 

at every stage of these proceedings under the CSL. Thus, 

the essence of the thing to be accomplished by the CSL 

is the prompt adjudication of charter school 

applications. It is with this in mind that we recently 

considered a time limitation imposed under the CSL and 

held:

The [CSL] emphasizes that time is of the essence 

and directs the local school boards and [CAB] to 

quickly resolve the issue of whether to grant or deny 

an institution[’]s charter school application. Thus, 

we conclude that the legislature’s use of the word 

“shall” in Section 1717-A(i)(8) [of the CSL] . . . is 

mandatory, requiring [CAB] to issue its written 

decision and order within 60 days of its final hearing 

on an application.

Shenango Valley Reg[’l] Charter Sch[.] v. Hermitage 

Sch[.] Dist[.], 756 A.2d 1191, 1194 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). 

15 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
14

Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Indep. Charter Sch., 774 A.2d 798, 802-03 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)

(emphasis added; footnotes omitted).

Similarly, here, the General Assembly imposed a strict 45-day MCSO 

application review time limit for both the Department and the school districts,

providing that if a decision was not rendered on the application within the allotted 

time, the application would be deemed approved. See 24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-

A(a)(1)(i),(ii). It also imposed strict time requirements on CAB’s disposition of 

appeals therefrom. See 24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-A(f)(2)(ii), (iii). 

In its Application Guide, the Department requires, without explicit 

statutory authority, an applicant to obtain the applicable school districts’ approval 

before submitting an application to the Department. In doing so, the Department

extended a process, the timeframe for which the General Assembly explicitly 

dictated. Because an applicant that might otherwise submit applications to the 

school districts and the Department on the same day, in accordance with the 

Application Guide, must wait up to 45 days for the school districts’ decision before 

filing the application with the Department, the application process time period 

envisioned by the General Assembly is effectively doubled. Such an interpretation 

of the CSL is clearly inconsistent with the aforementioned legislative intent. See 

Harmon. Because CAB’s interpretation is inconsistent with the CSL, it does not 

merit Skidmore deference.

16 Accordingly, CAB erred when it concluded that 

Propel’s failure to comply with the Department’s requirement that Propel first 

submit the MCSO Application to the school districts and, only upon approval by the 

16 Propel also contends that CAB erred when it relied on the Application Guide because 

the Application Guide is an improper regulation. The Department denies that it attempted to create 

binding regulations through the use of the Application Guide. See Department Br. at 20. Rather, 

the Department claims the Application Guide is an interpretive rule. Based on this Court’s ruling

that the Department’s interpretive rule with respect to sequential review is violative of legislative 

intent, the Department’s interpretation is to be disregarded.
15

school districts, to the Department, was a proper basis for denying Propel’s 

Application. 

Propel next argues that CAB erred when it denied Propel’s appeal from 

the Hearing Officer’s decision granting the Motion to Supplement by interpreting 

the CSL to allow CAB to consider SPP data that became available after Propel filed 

the Application.17

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “CAB must apply a de 

novo standard of review when entertaining appeals from a [school d]istrict [b]oard’s

denial of a charter school application.” W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Collegium 

Charter Sch., 812 A.2d 1172, 1180 (Pa. 2002).

18 Pursuant to Section 1729.1-

17 According to Propel, its lack of eligibility under the MCSO Provisions pertaining to SPP 

scores resulted from CAB’s lengthy delay in rendering a decision on its Application.

18 West Chester involved Section 1717-A of the CSL, added by the Act of June 19, 1997, 

P.L. 225, 24 P.S. § 17-1717-A, rather than Section 1729.1-A of the CSL. The West Chester Court 

explained:

Section []1717-A(i)(6) [of the CSL, 24 P.S. § 17-1717-A(i)(6)] 

grants [] CAB discretion to permit the parties to supplement the 

record with previously unavailable information. Such directive is 

inconsistent with traditional appellate review. Moreover, [Section 

1717-A(i)(10) of] the CSL specifically articulates that “all decisions 

of the appeal board shall be subject to appellate review by the 

Commonwealth Court.” 24 P.S. § 17-1717-A(i)(10) (emphasis 

added). Had the Legislature intended [] CAB to also utilize an 

appellate standard of review, it could have similarly provided.

Finally, we note that the composition of [] CAB supports a finding 

of de novo review. [] CAB is not comprised of attorneys capable of 

conducting a legal examination of the evidence, but rather consists 

of persons who have a perspective on public education. See [Section 

1721-A of the CSL,] 24 P.S. § 17-1721-A(a) (stating composition 

of CAB as: a parent, a school board member, a certified teacher, a 

faculty or administrative employee, a business person, and a 

member of [the] State Board of Education).

W. Chester, 812 A.2d at 1180. Similarly, Section 1729.1-A of the CSL grants CAB discretion to

supplement the record and provides that all CAB decisions shall be subject to appellate review by 

this Court. Thus, this Court concludes that Section 1729.1-A of the CSL similarly contemplates 

that CAB will conduct a de novo review.
16

A(f)(2)(i) of the CSL, CAB’s review of the decision below may allow 

supplementation of the record, and, pursuant to Section 1729.1-A(f)(2)(iv) of the 

CSL, CAB must make an independent determination of whether the charter 

school has satisfied the requirements of Subsection 1729.1-A(b) of the CSL

(disqualifying MCSO applicants that, within either of the most recent two school 

years have failed to meet student performance requirements, failed to maintain fiscal 

management standards, or failed to achieve SPP scores in the top 25 percentile) 

and Subsection 1729.1-A(c) of the CSL.

In approving the Hearing Officer’s record supplementation with the 

2017-18 school year SPP data, CAB noted that Section 1729.1-A(f)(2)(i) of the CSL 

authorized it to supplement the record and further reasoned:

It is without question that the information related to SPP 

scores issued by the Department for the 2017-18 school 

year was previously unavailable and could not have been 

obtained or submitted for inclusion in the record prior to 

the Department’s decision to deny Propel’s [] Application. 

As such, the evidence related to the Charter Schools 

Meeting [MCSO] Eligibility Criteria - 24 P.S. § 17-

1729.1-A, containing 2016-17 and 2017-18 data, 

appended to the Department’s Motion to Supplement, 

clearly constitutes admissible supplementary evidence. 

Thus, the Hearing Officer properly granted the 

Department’s Motion to Supplement, and the updated 

MCSO Eligibility List, containing the 2017-18 school year 

SPP scores, shall be admitted into the record. 

CAB Dec. at 18-19, R.R. at 5827a-5828a. CAB concluded that the most recently 

available SPP data was relevant information given its duty to ensure compliance 

with the CSL’s requirement that at least one charter school had met the required SPP 

threshold for the two most recent school years for which scores were available. See

CAB Dec. at 20, R.R. at 5829a; see also 24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-A(b). 
17

CAB rejected Propel’s argument19 that it should only consider the SPP 

scores that were available at the time of its Application, explaining:

These arguments were well made but ultimately 

unpersuasive in light of the more overarching intent of the 

General Assembly in enacting the CSL, which provides in 

relevant part:

It is the intent of the General Assembly, in enacting 

this article, to provide opportunities for teachers, 

parents, pupils and community members to establish 

and maintain schools that operate independently 

from the existing school district structure as a method 

to accomplish all of the following:

(1) Improve pupil learning.

(2) Increase learning opportunities for all pupils.

. . . .

(5) Provide parents and pupils with expanded choices 

in the types of educational opportunities that are 

available within the public school system.

(6) Hold the schools established under this [A]ct 

accountable for meeting measurable academic 

standards . . . .

[Section 1702-A(1), (2), (5) and (6) of the CSL,] 24 P.S. §

17-1702-A(1), (2), (5) and (6).

In support of the CSL’s intent to hold charter schools 

accountable for meeting measurable academic standards, 

it appears that the General Assembly enacted the SPP 

score criteria in MCSO Section []1729.1-A(b)(1) and (2)

19 According to CAB, Propel essentially claimed that “the qualifier []as of the date of the 

Application[] must be read into the ‘most recent two (2) school years’” language in Section 1729.1-

A(b)(1) of the CSL, CAB Dec. at 28, R.R. at 5837a (italics added), and that “the ‘mandatory 

timelines for action on both charter school applications and MCSO applications’ [were] statutory 

illustrations of legislative intent not to allow for repeatedly reevaluating an MCSO’s eligibility 

based on updated information, including previously unavailable SPP scores.” CAB Dec. at 29, 

R.R. at 5838a.
18

[of the CSL] as quality-control measures for schools

seeking to consolidate. If an applicant school cannot 

demonstrate its success as measured by its ranking, then it 

cannot be qualified to expand itself through the MCSO 

process. To hold that [] CAB may only consider the SPP 

score rankings from the two years immediately prior to the 

application date would be inconsistent with the legislative 

intent to improve learning and learning opportunities, and 

to hold charter schools to measured standards. As the 

intent expressed in [S]ection []1702-A(1) and (2) [of the 

CSL] for increased learning and learning opportunities is 

a continuing goal not limited to a single point in time, the 

issue of the quality of learning being provided by schools 

proposing to consolidate is always relevant. Therefore, 

SPP rankings are also always relevant.

CAB Dec. at 29-30, R.R. at 5838a-5839a. Notably, the express prohibition on 

merging in Section 1729.1-A(b) of the CSL, where, inter alia, the proposed MCSO 

fails to include a charter school that meets the 25th percentile SPP requirement, is a 

separate threshold from the school district’s and the Department’s approval 

requirement contained in Section 1729.1-A(a) of the CSL. 

Propel cites Souderton Area School District v. Souderton Charter 

School Collaborative, 764 A.2d 688 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000), and Brackbill v. Ron 

Brown Charter School, 777 A.2d 131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001), to support its contention 

that CAB erred when it supplemented the record in this matter with the SPP data 

released after Propel filed the Application, because “CAB and [the] Commonwealth 

Court have interpreted . . . the [CSL] to provide for eligibility at the time the 

application was submitted.” Propel Br. at 21. Both Souderton and Brackbill

involved the loss or the potential loss of a facility location identified in a charter 

school application. 

In Souderton, CAB disagreed with a school board’s finding that the 

proposed short-term facility location was inappropriate and was a substantial safety 

and welfare risk to students. Given that the charter school’s plan was more than two 
19

years out of date, CAB questioned whether the proposed facility was still available 

for the charter school’s use. Nonetheless, CAB noted its responsibility to review the 

application on the record certified by the school board as submitted, and concluded 

that since the application was acceptable at the time it was submitted, it did not

constitute a basis for denial. 

On review, this Court explained:

[I]n its opinion, [] CAB simply points out the very real 

possibility that, because [the applicant’s] [a]pplication is 

more than two years old, the [s]trip [m]all [f]acility that 

was to house the charter school may no longer be 

available. Despite this realization, [] CAB recognized 

that, in ruling on [the applicant’s] appeal, [] CAB only 

could review the suitability of the [s]trip [m]all [f]acility 

presented in the [a]pplication. Having determined that this 

[s]trip [m]all [f]acility was available and acceptable at the 

time the [a]pplication was submitted, [] CAB could not 

deny [the applicant’s] appeal based on the possibility that 

this particular facility might not be available currently.

Viewing [] CAB’s order in light of the reasoning set forth 

in its opinion, it becomes apparent that, in directing the 

[d]istrict [b]oard to sign [the applicant’s] charter school 

[a]pplication, [] CAB refers only to the [a]pplication 

including the [s]trip [m]all [f]acility. The final sentence 

of [] CAB’s order merely reflects [] CAB’s recognition of 

a possible problem with the [a]pplication’s listed facility. 

Thus, [] CAB directs [the applicant] to inform the 

[s]chool [d]istrict and [] CAB in the event that [the 

applicant] would need to use a different facility. In this 

way, the [s]chool [d]istrict and [] CAB would be aware 

that [the applicant] would have to submit a new 

application to the [d]istrict [b]oard and afford the 

[d]istrict [b]oard an opportunity to consider whether 

the facility is appropriate under the CSL.

Souderton, 764 A.2d at 697-98 (footnote omitted; bold emphasis added).

In Brackbill, a school district challenging CAB’s grant of a charter 

claimed that CAB erred because the proposed location listed in the charter 
20

application was no longer available. This Court rejected the school district’s 

argument, reasoning:

The [c]harter [s]chool properly listed two facilities in its 

application in compliance with the statutory requirement.

The [s]chool [d]istrict, through the delay caused by its 

inaction, appears to have caused the [c]harter [s]chool’s 

loss of rights in these proposed facilities. It would be 

unreasonable to expect an applicant to maintain rights in 

the precise vacant property listed in an application for the 

period which it has taken for the revised application to 

wend its way from the [d]istrict [b]oard to [] CAB to this 

[C]ourt. Moreover, by failing to act on the revised 

application, the [s]chool [d]istrict abdicated to [] CAB the 

authority to review all of the relevant criteria. We believe 

that [] CAB appropriately weighed this factor in its 

determination to grant the charter. Although an applicant 

must include a proposed facility in its application, there is 

no requirement that the facility be under a contractual 

obligation before the charter is granted. On the contrary, 

[] Section 1717-A(e)(2) [of the] CSL simply provides 

that[]

[a] charter school application submitted under this 

article shall be evaluated . . . based on criteria 

including, but not limited to, the following:

* * *

(iii) The extent to which the application considers the 

information requested in [S]ection 1719-A [of the 

CSL]. . . . 

24 P.S. § 17-1717-A(e)(2). [] CAB found that the [c]harter 

[s]chool had met the statutory requirements and thus had 

appropriately considered the facility necessary for 

operation of its school. Therefore, we believe [] CAB 

acted within its discretion in granting the charter subject 

to the requirement that the [c]harter [s]chool present 

information regarding its facility prior to the opening 

of the school.
21

Brackbill, 777 A.2d at 139 (footnote omitted; bold emphasis added).20 

Notably, in both of these cases involving the review of an initial charter 

application, this Court affirmed CAB’s decision where that decision conditioned 

the charter grant on the applicant providing updated facility information to 

determine compliance with the CSL. Thus, although the applications were 

approved based on the information submitted, the ultimate charter grant was 

conditioned on CSL compliance involving circumstances occurring after the 

application submission date. Accordingly, neither Souderton nor Brackbill stand for 

20 Apart from its reliance on Souderton and Brackbill, Propel contends that “[a] second, 

but equally important aspect of the CSL that provides evidence of the General Assembly’s 

legislative intent are the mandatory timelines for action on both charter school applications and 

MCSO applications.” Propel Br. at 21. Propel further urges:

As noted by the Commonwealth Court in Independence Charter 

School, “the legislature apparently appreciated that timeliness was 

an important element in assuring the fairness of the charter school 

application and review process.” [Id.] at 803. These provisions 

apply equally to the MCSO [P]rovisions as they do to establishing 

the charter school . . . . 

Propel Br. at 23. According to Propel, 

good sense and practicality demand that the relevant time period to 

consider the SPP data in the instant appeal is at the time the 

Application was filed with [the Department]. Any other possible 

result would allow for the charter schools that have filed a 

consolidation application to potentially be subject to a rollercoaster 

of eligibility determinations based upon updated data while the

application sits in litigation limbo.

Propel Br. at 26-27 (footnote omitted). This Court disagrees.

When considering an MCSO appeal, CAB is specifically charged with a duty to ensure that 

the applicant is not ineligible due to the applicant’s failure to maintain student performance 

requirements, lack of accepted standards of fiscal management or audit requirements and that the 

applicant has an SPP profile among the top 25th percentile. See 24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-A(f)(2)(iv)

(referencing Section 1729.1-A(b) and (c) of the CSL). Unlike both Souderton and Brackbill, where 

the charter school applicants were unable to prevent a private landlord from leasing to another 

their intended future location, an applicant’s adherence to the standards in Section 1729.1-A(b) of 

the CSL, is within the applicant’s control. It is not unreasonable to expect an MCSO applicant to 

maintain the required standards at least until CAB has rendered a decision on its MCSO application 

appeal.
22

the proposition that CAB must ignore changes in circumstances occurring after the 

application date which render applicants statutorily ineligible to effect a merger 

under the CSL.

Interestingly, in Montour School District v. Propel Charter SchoolMontour, 889 A.2d 682 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), a case involving one of the same 

schools included in Propel’s Application, the Montour School District (MSD) sought 

review of CAB’s order reversing MSD’s denial of a charter application for PropelMontour. At argument before CAB, Propel-Montour notified MSD and CAB that it

recently learned that its proposed facility was no longer available. Propel-Montour 

represented that it was pursuing a lease for another facility, but that such lease would 

require zoning changes for charter school use. MSD objected to the submission of 

any evidence with respect to the new facility and CAB barred the submission of such 

evidence. Nonetheless, CAB reversed MSD’s denial of Propel-Montour’s 

application. On appeal to this Court, MSD argued, inter alia, that CAB erred by 

ordering MSD to issue a charter without an identified location, and requiring PropelMontour to merely inform MSD and CAB of the new location without requiring 

submission of the proposed site for MSD’s approval. In response, Propel-Montour 

argued that “it was prepared and willing to present evidence of the new proposed 

facility at oral argument before CAB, but was not allowed to do so because of 

[MSD’s] vigorous objections.” Montour, 889 A.2d at 688. 

The Montour Court explained:

We have previously held that CAB has the authority to 

conduct a de novo review of a school district’s denial of a 

charter application. Here, however, given its authority to 

conduct a de novo review, CAB erroneously failed to hear 

[Propel-Montour’s] evidence concerning the new 

proposed site when it sustained the [school d]istrict’s 

objections. Under Souderton, CAB could not then order 

the [d]istrict to grant the charter in the absence of any 

evidence of a proposed site for the school. Accordingly, 
23

because CAB failed to hear and consider [PropelMontour’s] evidence with regard to the new proposed 

facility, we must vacate CAB’s order and remand to CAB 

for the purpose of hearing this evidence to determine 

whether the new proposed site is suitable under the CSL 

before CAB can order the charter to be granted.

Montour, 889 A.2d at 690 (italics added).

This Court addressed the propriety of supplementing a record with 

recently released SPP scores in Reading School District v. I-Lead Charter School, 

206 A.3d 27 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019), a charter school revocation case where evidence 

of the school’s performance was relevant to CAB’s decision. In I-Lead, this 

Court considered whether CAB properly reversed a school district’s charter 

revocation. In conducting its review, CAB granted the school district’s motion to 

supplement the record to include significantly lower SPP scores released after the 

school district rendered its decision, but did not consider the supplemented SPP 

scores when it reversed the school district’s revocation. Section 1729-A(d) of the 

CSL governed CAB’s exercise of its independent judgment and provided, in relevant 

part: 

[CAB] shall have the exclusive review of a decision not to 

renew or revoke a charter. [CAB] shall review the record 

and shall have the discretion to supplement the record if 

the supplemental information was previously unavailable. 

[CAB] may consider the charter school plan, annual 

reports, student performance and employe and community 

support for the charter school in addition to the record. 

[CAB] shall give due consideration to the findings of the 

local board of directors and specifically articulate its 

reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with those findings in 

its written decision[.]

24 P.S. § 17-1729-A(d).
24

In holding that CAB deliberately disregarded the supplemented 

evidence, this Court recognized with respect to the similar statutory language in 

Section 1729-A of the CSL permitting supplementation of the record,

[b]ased on its clear language, Section 1729-A(d) of the 

CSL specifically contemplates that, on appeal, CAB may 

consider information that did not inform a school district’s 

decision. This statement is consistent with CAB’s de novo

review function, “making an independent determination as 

to the merits . . . .” W. Chester, 812 A.2d at 1180.

I-Lead, 206 A.3d at 36 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the I-Lead Court 

recognized that

prior CAB decisions have relied upon student performance 

data occurring after a school district resolved to revoke a 

charter. See, e.g., Imani Educ. Circle Charter Sch. [v. Sch. 

Dist. of Phila., (Dkt. No. CAB 2014-08, filed May 11, 

2016)]; Cmty. Acad. of Phila. Charter Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of 

Phila., Sch. Reform Comm’n, (Dkt. No. CAB 2013-12, 

filed September 8, 2014). 

I-Lead, 206 A.3d at 36 n.19.

The statutory language at issue in Section 1729.1-A of the CSL 

pertaining to MCSO approval is similar to that in Section 1729-A of the CSL at issue 

in I-Lead. Like Section 1729-A(d) of the CSL, Section 1729.1-A(f) of the CSL 

(pertaining to MCSO appeals) provides that it is CAB’s duty to “[r]eview the 

decision made by either the [D]epartment or school district on the record as certified

. . . [and in its discretion, permit parties to] supplement the record if the supplemental 

information was previously unavailable.” 24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-A(f)(2)(i). 

Although, unlike Section 1729-A(d) of the CSL, Section 1729.1-A(f) 

of the CSL does not explicitly authorize CAB to consider evidence “in addition to 

the record[,]” 24 P.S. § 17-1729-A(d), it allows CAB to supplement the record, 

which CAB did. See 24 P.S. § 17-1729.1-A(f)(2)(i). Propel argues that this Court 
25

should limit CAB’s ability to supplement the record only to evidence existing at the 

time it filed its Application. There is no language in Section 1729.1-A(f)(2)(i) of the 

CSL limiting relevant evidence only to evidence available at the time the MCSO 

Application was filed. It is beyond cavil that “courts ‘have no authority to add or 

insert language into a statute’ and should not, through interpretation, add a 

requirement that the General Assembly did not include.” Twp. of Wash. v. Twp. of 

Upper Burrell, 184 A.3d 1083, 1089 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (quoting Summit Sch., Inc. 

v. Dep’t of Educ., 108 A.3d 192, 199 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)).

Like Section 1729-A(d) of the CSL, Section 1729.1-A(f)(2)(i) of the 

CSL, “specifically contemplates that, on appeal, CAB[, through supplementation 

of the record with relevant evidence,] may consider information that did not inform 

a school district’s [or the Department’s] decision.” I-Lead, 206 A.3d at 36. 

Subsection 1729.1-A(f)(2)(iv) of the CSL, imposes a duty on CAB to “[m]ake its

decision based on whether the proposed consolidation satisfies the requirements of 

subsections (b) [(disqualifying from mergers those charter schools that fail to meet 

the top twenty-fifth percentile SPP threshold for the two most recent school years 

for which scores are available),] and (c) [(governing application submission)].”21 24 

P.S. § 17-1729.1-A(f)(2)(iv). Where, as here, such relevant evidence pertains to 

21 Propel strongly asserts that its inability to meet the SPP threshold is a direct consequence 

of CAB’s delay in rendering a valid vote on its Application. It insists that, because it satisfied the 

SPP threshold at the time of its Application and during the period that CAB was statutorily required 

to issue a decision on its appeal, CAB’s delay in rendering a decision (during which time new SPP 

scores were released) caused Propel’s SPP threshold deficiency. Notably, Propel did not challenge 

the validity of CAB’s decision based on CAB’s delay. This Court acknowledges that CAB’s 

inability to render a decision on the Application lengthened the review process beyond that 

permitted in the MCSO Provisions. Notwithstanding, of the eight charter schools included in the 

Application, only Propel-McKeesport satisfied the SPP threshold at the time of filing, and even

that school subsequently fell below the SPP threshold. Thus, at the time that CAB rendered its 

decision on the Application, not a single school out of the eight satisfied the threshold requirement. 

Despite the delay which exceeded CAB’s statutorily-mandated review window, neither CAB, nor 

this Court may ignore other mandates in the MCSO Provisions. 
26

CAB’s explicitly imposed statutory duty to ensure that at least one of the schools in 

the proposed MCSO meets the SPP threshold requirements, requiring CAB to ignore 

evidence that the applicants no longer meet the requirements would impede CAB’s 

ability to perform its duties. The approval of a noncompliant applicant’s MCSO 

application would undermine “[t]he core purpose of the [CSL, which] is to improve 

students’ education.” New Hope Acad. Charter Sch. v. Sch. Dist. of the City of York, 

89 A.3d 731, 739 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). 

The New Hope Court further explained:

T]he General Assembly expressly set forth its intention in 

enacting the [CSL] to “[i]mprove pupil learning,”

“[i]ncrease learning opportunities for all pupils,” and 

“[h]old the schools established under [the CSL] 

accountable for meeting measurable academic 

standards and provide the school with a method to 

establish accountability systems.” [Section 1702-A (1), 

(2), (6) of the CSL,] 24 P.S. § 17-1702-A(1), (2), (6)[.]

New Hope, 89 A.3d at 739 (emphasis added; citation omitted). Therefore, 

considering an applicants’ most recent SPP scores in reviewing a charter school 

merger decision furthers these expressed intentions by permitting CAB to more 

accurately consider the potential merger’s impact on the affected students. 

Accordingly, this Court concludes that CAB properly denied Propel’s appeal from 

the Hearing Officer’s decision granting the Motion to Supplement. Further, because 

Propel failed to meet Section 1729.1-A(b)(1) of the CSL’s threshold requirements 

pertaining to SPP data, it did not qualify for MCSO approval.22

22 CAB correctly concluded:

For purposes of the Application, the “most recent two (2) school 

years” were 2017-18 and 2018-19; and, given as much, Propel does 

not meet the application requirements for an MCSO under [Section] 

[]1729.1-A(b)(1) [of the CSL] because its [A]pplication lacks a 

school within the [top 25th percentile] of Pennsylvania [c]harter 
27

For the foregoing reasons, CAB’s order is affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

[s]chools for the two most recent school years for which scores are 

available, as evidenced by the updated MCSO Eligibility List.

. . . .

Accordingly, . . . while the Department’s denial of the Application 

was not independently supported by each and every reason stated in 

its denial letter, the Application as a whole failed to support Propel’s 

entitlement to MCSO status, especially in light of its current 

inability to meet the express requirements of [Section] 1729.1-A 

(b)(1)(iii) or (2) [of the CSL].

CAB Dec. at 31, R.R. at 5840a. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Propel Charter Schools, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Department of Education :

(State Charter School Appeal Board), : No. 1209 C.D. 2020

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 19th day of November, 2021, the State Charter School 

Appeal Board’s December 22, 2020 order is affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge