Filed 5/23/23 P. v. Guzman CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GARDENIA GUZMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B323309

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. KA120225)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed.

Kevin D. Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No Appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________
2

INTRODUCTION

After initially being charged with murder, defendant 

Gardenia Guzman pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter 

pursuant to a plea agreement. After she was sentenced in accord 

with her plea agreement, she filed a petition for resentencing

under Penal Code1 section 1172.6 (former section 1170.952). The 

trial court denied her petition and she now appeals that decision. 

Her appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. 

Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), identifying no 

issues on appeal and requesting that we independently review 

the record for possible error.

Guzman filed a supplemental brief raising four arguments, 

none of which addresses the merits of her resentencing petition. 

Instead, her arguments all relate to the length of the sentence 

imposed pursuant to her plea agreement. The issues raised by 

Guzman are outside the scope of a section 1172.6 resentencing 

proceeding, and fail to demonstrate any error in the court’s denial 

of her petition. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On January 25, 2019, Guzman stabbed her father to death 

after the two had an argument in their apartment.

On December 2, 2019, the People charged Guzman with 

murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), alleging that she personally used a 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The Legislature renumbered the statute as section 

1172.6, with no change in text, effective June 30, 2022 (Stats. 

2022, ch. 58, § 10). For ease of reference, we use the current 

citation at section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.
3

knife in the crime (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Guzman was also 

charged with having suffered a prior conviction which was a 

“serious and/or violent felony” within the meaning of sections 

667, subdivision (d) and 1170.12, subdivision (b) and a “serious 

felony” within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

On September 30, 2020, as part of a plea deal, the People 

moved to amend the information to add a voluntary 

manslaughter count (§ 192, subd. (a)). The prosecutor informed 

the court that the People were moving to amend due to issues of 

proof related to the credibility of the only eyewitness, Guzman’s 

mother. The trial court granted the amendment and dismissed 

the murder charge. Guzman agreed to waive her trial rights and 

pleaded no contest to the voluntary manslaughter charge; she 

also admitted the prior conviction for a “serious or violent” felony 

(§§ 667, subd. (d) and 1170.12, subd. (b)) and a “serious felony” 

(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The court found a factual basis for the plea 

and accepted both the plea and Guzman’s waivers on the record, 

finding them to have been knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily made.

That same day, in accordance with the plea, the court 

imposed a prison sentence of 17 years, based on the middle term 

of six years for voluntary manslaughter (§§ 192, subd. (a), 193, 

subd. (a)), doubled to 12 years due to the prior “serious or violent”

felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), plus 

an additional five years due to the prior “serious felony” 

conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). Guzman was given credit for time 

served.

On May 26, 2022, Guzman filed a resentencing petition 

under section 1172.6. Guzman did not request the appointment 

of counsel.
4

On June 22, 2022, the trial court summarily denied the 

petition, stating in a memorandum of decision that Guzman was 

“not entitled to relief as a matter of law, for the following reason: 

[¶] The [c]ourt file reflects that [Guzman] was charged and 

prosecuted on a theory of [m]alice [m]urder as the sole 

perpetrator and actual killer. Through plea negotiations, she 

plead[ed] ‘No Contest’ to [v]oluntary [m]anslaughter.”

Guzman filed a timely notice of appeal on August 5, 2022.

DISCUSSION

We appointed counsel to represent Guzman in this appeal. 

Guzman’s attorney filed a brief raising no issues and requesting 

that we exercise our discretion to independently review the 

record for error pursuant to Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. In 

Delgadillo, our Supreme Court established procedures for cases 

in which counsel determines that an appeal from an order 

denying postconviction relief lacks merit. In such cases, 

“(1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that 

determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing 

on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send, with a 

copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the 

defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and 

that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may 

dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp. 231-232.) If the defendant does 

not file a supplemental brief, we “may dismiss the appeal as 

abandoned.” (Id. at p. 232.) In that instance, we do “not need to 

write an opinion but should notify the defendant when [we] 

dismiss[ ] the matter.” (Ibid.) Because a defendant who has been 

denied postconviction relief has no constitutional right to an 

appeal, we are not required to conduct an independent review of 
5

the record before dismissing the appeal, but we may conduct such 

a review at our discretion. (Id. at pp. 227-228, 232.)

If the defendant does file a supplemental brief or letter, we 

are “required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in 

that brief and to issue a written opinion. The filing of a 

supplemental brief or letter does not compel an independent 

review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” 

(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)

On March 22, 2023, we sent Guzman a letter notifying her 

of the no-merits brief and informing her that she had 30 days to 

file a supplemental brief.3 On April 13, 2023, we received a 

supplemental letter brief from Guzman.

Section 1172.6 was enacted by the Legislature in 2018 as 

part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). The overall 

purpose of the legislation was “to amend the felony murder rule 

and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates 

to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a 

person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to 

kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who 

acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, 

ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) To accomplish this, the bill added section 

189, subdivision (e) “to amend the felony-murder rule,” and added 

section 188, subdivision (a)(3) “to amend the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 

Cal.5th 830, 842-843.)

3 In a declaration submitted with the brief he filed, 

Guzman’s counsel averred that on March 21, 2023, he sent 

Guzman a copy of the brief along with a copy of the entire record 

on appeal.
6

As relevant here, section 1172.6 provides a mechanism for 

a defendant to seek resentencing where they plead guilty to 

manslaughter after being charged with murder under a theory 

that is no longer tenable after the amendments to sections 188 

and 189 and they could not be convicted of murder under the 

present law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Guzman, however, pleaded 

guilty to manslaughter in a situation where she was the actual 

killer; she was not convicted under any theory in which malice 

was imputed to her. Section 1172.6 thus has no application to 

her case, and the trial court did not err in summarily denying her

resentencing petition.

Guzman raises four arguments in her supplemental brief, 

but none relate to the denial of her petition for resentencing. 

Instead, they all relate to alleged improprieties in her original 

sentencing. Guzman first argues that the court failed to consider 

several factors listed in Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)

when sentencing her; Senate Bill No. 81 concerns a trial court’s 

authority to dismiss enhancements. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1; see 

§ 1385, subd. (c) [amended by Senate Bill No. 81].) Guzman next 

contends the court should not have applied the enhancements to 

her sentence. In her third argument, she complains that her 

sentence was “[e]xcessive” and violated “double jeopardy,” and 

she contends that her counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 

Guzman’s fourth argument is premised on section 1025, which

concerns allegations that a defendant has suffered a prior 

conviction.

Guzman did not appeal her conviction or sentence. Even if 

she had, the issues she could have raised in such an appeal were 

limited given that she pleaded guilty. Without a certificate of 

probable cause, which Guzman has never obtained, a defendant 
7

who appeals following a no contest plea pursuant to a plea 

agreement may only challenge the denial of a motion to suppress 

evidence (which did not occur in this case) or raise grounds 

arising after the entry of the plea that do not affect the validity of 

the plea. (§ 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b); People v. 

Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668, 676-677 & fn. 3.) Notably, “a 

certificate of probable cause is required if the challenge goes to an 

aspect of the sentence to which the defendant agreed as an 

integral part of a plea agreement.” (Johnson, supra, at p. 678; 

see People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 382 [concluding the 

defendant could not appeal his sentence without a certificate of 

probable cause because by “challenging the very sentence he 

negotiated as part of the plea bargain” he was, “in substance, . . . 

attacking the validity of his plea”].) Here Guzman agreed to 

plead no contest to voluntary manslaughter and be sentenced to 

17 years, based on the midterm of six years for voluntary 

manslaughter and two separate enhancements for her prior 

felony conviction. Thus, Guzman cannot challenge the length of 

her sentence (including the sentencing enhancements that make 

up part of that sentence) without a certificate of probable cause.4

Nor are any of Guzman’s arguments cognizable in a 

proceeding for postconviction relief under section 1172.6. In her 

supplemental brief, Guzman does not argue she was charged 

with murder under a theory that is now invalid as a result of the 

amendments to sections 188 and 189, nor does she dispute the 

4 We decline to address Guzman’s claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel regarding her underlying conviction and 

sentence. Such claims of ineffective assistance are “more 

appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. 

Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)
8

trial court’s finding that she was ineligible for relief under section 

1172.6 because she “was charged and prosecuted on a theory of 

[m]alice [m]urder as the sole perpetrator and actual killer.” (See 

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710 [“Senate Bill [No.] 

1437 relief is unavailable if the defendant was . . . the actual 

killer”].) Thus, Guzman’s challenge to the trial court’s order 

necessarily fails. Finally, we decline counsel’s request that we 

independently review the record, as nothing before us suggests 

such an exercise is necessary. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

p. 232.)

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying Guzman’s petition for 

resentencing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.