alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

ZACHARY SHIELDS,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 477 EAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 2nd day of April, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
#### Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Appellant, v F & F Maintenance, Inc., et al., Defendants, and James E. Bradley et al., Respondents.

Yesawich, Jr., J.

Appeal from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Prior, Jr., J.), entered October 6, 1989 in Albany County, which directed an inquest on the issue of liability.

Plaintiff instituted this action to recover money paid pursuant to a performance bond. Defendants had agreed to indemnify plaintiff for any loss it sustained in furnishing the bond. Thereafter, an action was commenced seeking recovery under the performance bond, for which plaintiff issued a settlement check in the amount of $43,500. Additionally, plaintiff incurred $2,965 in legal fees.

When plaintiff’s demands for reimbursement were ignored, it instituted this action. Two of the indemnitors, defendants James E. Bradley and Blanche M. Bradley (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants), failed to answer and plaintiff *877moved for a default judgment against them. Defendants successfully opposed the motion and submitted a proposed order to that effect, which Supreme Court signed on June 2, 1988. That order, however, was never entered. Inasmuch as defendants did not enter an order reflecting the relief obtained by them, namely, permission to serve an answer to the complaint, on January 30, 1989 plaintiff moved again for a default judgment. Defendants, even on appeal, failed to oppose that motion. Supreme Court thereupon granted plaintiff’s motion to the extent of declaring defendants in default but referred both the issues of liability and damages for an inquest. Plaintiff urges on appeal that only the issue of damages should have been referred for a hearing. We agree.

Defendants’ failure to explain their neglect in not entering the order denying plaintiff’s first motion for a default judgment and to interpose any opposition to the instant motion makes it apparent that defendants have abandoned the relief that was granted them (22 NYCRR 202.48; *see,*CPLR 2220 [a]; Siegel, 1988 Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C2220:l [1990 Pocket Part], at 37; *compare, Nolan v Nolan,*137 AD2d 799). Plaintiff is accordingly entitled to a default judgment.

Because plaintiff’s verified complaint sets forth a valid indemnity cause of action for which relief may be granted and defendants by their default admit liability *(see, Muhlhahn v Triple Cee Bar & Rest. Supply Co.,*133 AD2d 996, 997), a hearing on the issue of liability is unnecessary.

Order modified, on the law, with costs to plaintiff against counsel for defendants James E. Bradley and Blanche M. Bradley, by reversing so much thereof as directed the issue of liability be referred for an inquest, and, as so modified, affirmed. Kane, J. P., Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.
*OPINION ISSUED FEBRUARY 4, 2008*

#### CONNIE BUCKBEE, individually and as Administratix of the Estate of JULIA CAROLYN STRICKLAND, deceased VS. DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS

(CC-05-208)

J. Timothy DiPiero, Attorney at Law, for respondent.

Andrew F. Tarr, Attorney at Law, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This claim was submitted to the Court for decision based upon a Mutual Settlement Agreement which provides as follows:

1. On or about July 7,2001, West Virginia Paving Inc., began paving and berm work on a portion of W.Va. Route 39, near the Gauley Bridge. The work was performed pursuant to a contract issued by respondent.

2. The paving job left holes along the edge of the road where the grates were located. The grate in question was approximately three inches deep and extended eighteen inches into the paved highway.

3. On July 24,2000, Julia Carolyn Strickland was traveling east on W.Va. Route 39 near Gauley Bridge when her vehicle struck the drainage grate which is partially located on the roadway. Julia Carolyn Strickland lost control of her vehicle and it crashed into a truck traveling in the opposite direction. She was killed as a result of this collision.

*954. Claimant alleges that respondent’s inspector, who was present when the paving took place, should have been aware that the paving created a problem with respect to the grate, but failed to take steps to have the grate raised or to pave over the grate.

5. Claimant further contends that respondent, having inspected and approved the work performed, having released the road to the traveling public without warning signs and having failed to paint the white edge lines along the side of the highway, was negligent in its actions.

6. As a result, the parties have agreed that claimant is entitled to recover damages in the amount of $500,000.00.

The Court has reviewed the facts of the claim and finds that respondent was negligent in its maintenance of W.Va. Route 39 on the date of this incident; that the negligence of respondent was the proximate cause of the death of Julia Carolyn Strickland; and that the amount of damages agreed to by the parties is fair and reasonable. Thus, claimant may make a recovery for this loss.

Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion to and does make an award in the amount of $500,000.00.

Award of $500,000.00.
#### Ex parte WALTRIP.

No. 20791.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 18, 1939.

W. ,E. Martin, of Abilene, for appellant.

*276Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was charged in the County Court of Taylor County by complaint and information alleging in the first count that he was in possession' for the purpose of sale of malt liquor, to-wit: beer, in dry area, and in the second count that he sold malt liquor, to-wit: beer, in dry territory to a named party. By proper averments the fact of Taylor County being “dry area” was alleged.

Appellant entered his plea of guilty before the County Judge, waiving a jury. The following judgment was entered in the minutes of the County Court.

> “The State of Texas vs. J. M. Waltrip.

> “Charge: Liquor Law Violation

> “No. 10,208

> “Date: Mar. 10, 1938.

> “This day this cause was called for trial, and both parties appeared and announced ready for trial, and the defendant, J. M. Waltrip after being duly admonished of the consequences thereof by the Court, pleaded guilty to the charge herein, and waived a trial by jury and submitted his cause to the Court.

> “Wherefore it is considered by the Court, that the defendant is guilty as charged, and his punishment is assessed at a fine of One Hundred & No/100 Dollars and * * days’ imprisonment in the county jail.

> “It is therefore considered and adjudged by the Court, that the State of Texas do have and recover of the defendant J. M. Waltrip the said fine of One Hundred and No/100 Dollars and all costs of this prosecution and that he be imprisoned in the County jail of Taylor County, Texas, for -days, and the defendant being present in Court is placed in the custody of the sheriff — who will commit him forthwith to the jail of said county — until said period of imprisonment has expired, and thereafter — until said fine and costs are fully paid.

> “It is further ordered by the Court that execution may issue against the property of said defendant for the amount of said fine and costs.

> “Defendant appeared in person and by attorney and entered a plea of guilty and fined $100.00 and costs.”

Appellant failed to pay his fine and costs. A capias, pro fine was issued under which he was taken into custody. He sought release by a writ of habeas corpus before Hon. M. S. Long, District Judge. Upon a hearing he was remanded to custody and from said order this appeal is prosecuted.

As we understand it appellant sought relief through habeas corpus proceeding on the theory that the judgment of conviction was a void judgment and thus subject to attack in the manner indicated.

While the judgment in question may be subject to some criticism we do not discover any defect therein which could not have been corrected by direct proceeding in the trial court, or by this court if appeal had been prosecuted. We do not believe the judgment is void.1 See Terry v. State, 30 Tex.App. 408, 17 S.W. 1075; Ex parte Dickerson, 30 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 17 S.W. 1076; Caples v. State, 91 Tex.Cr.R. 111, 237 S.W. 923; Ex parte Cross, 105 Tex.Cr.R. 52, 284 S.W. 584.

The judgment remanding appellant is affirmed.
Exhibit 14.1

Worldwide Restaurant Concepts, Inc.  Code of Ethics for Chief Executive Officer  and Senior Financial Officers

The Company has a Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, which includes provisions for honest and ethical conduct. That Code applies to all of the Company's
officers and employees. As a supplement to that Code, the Company's Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Chief Accounting Officer/Controller (Controller) and persons
performing similar functions (Financial Executives), are subject to the following additional specific responsibilities:

No
code can anticipate every situation that may arise. Accordingly, this Code of Ethics is intended to serve as a source of principles for the guidance of conduct. Financial Executives
are encouraged to bring questions about particular circumstances that may implicate one or more of the provisions of this Code to the attention of the General Counsel and/or the Audit Committee.

Any
Financial Executive who has reasonable cause to believe that 1) a violation of this Code has occurred or may occur, or 2) a transaction or relationship reasonably could
be expected to give rise to a violation of this Code, must promptly report it to the General Counsel and/or the Audit Committee. No one will be subject to retaliation because of a good faith report of
suspected misconduct. Persons may choose to remain anonymous in reporting any possible violation of this Code. On an annual basis, Financial Executives shall complete and execute an acknowledgment of
their compliance with this Code and file the acknowledgement with the Audit Committee and the Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee.

1

---



The
Company expects all Financial Executives to honor and abide by this Code in all respects. Anyone who violates its provisions will be subject to discipline up to and including
termination of employment. The Audit Committee, upon the recommendation of the CEO, shall monitor and recommend action to the Board of Directors with respect to any violations of the Code.

This
Code may be amended or waived only by the Board of Directors, upon the recommendation of the Audit Committee, subject to the provisions of applicable laws and regulations. Waivers
of the Code shall only be granted in exigent circumstances, and may have to be disclosed to the stockholders under applicable law or regulatory requirements as determined by legal counsel.

Effective:

2

---



QuickLinks
June 20, 2014

**MEMORANDUM From:**  Mary Johnson EPA/SPPD/ESG (D243

- 01) **To:** Docket Number EPA
- HQ
- OAR
- 2013
- 0495 **Subject:** Meeting with Golden Spread Electric Cooperative on June 17, 2014 Rulemaking for GHG Emissions from New EGUs **Participants** Golden Spread : Michael Wise George Hess Thomas Burke Ruth Valle S outhwest Power Pool (SPP) : Lanny Nickell NRECA : Rae Cronmiller EPA : Kevin Culligan, OAR Bob Wayland, OAR Nick Hutson , OAR Mary Johnson, OAR **Discussion** Representatives of Golden Spread Electric Cooperative presented a summary of their comments regarding the impacts of EPA’s Proposed Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources on n atural g as - fired c ombustion t urbines . Golden Spread provided the attached materials. Attachment
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Georges Kleefeld, Deceased. Cameron K. Wehringer, Appellant; Denise Stork, Respondent.

Order and judgment (one paper), Surrogate’s Court, New York County (Marie Lambert, S.), entered September 6, 1989, which, *inter alia,*granted summary judgment to respondent dismissing petitioner’s claims for attorney’s fees allegedly due from respondent, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, to grant summary judgment to petitioner on liability and to remand the matter for an assessment of damages.

Although we agree that petitioner cannot recover on his claim of breach of express contract since the written contingency retainer agreement is not broad enough to include his services in the Court of Appeals, we believe he is entitled to recover on a theory of quantum meruit, which he also urged as a basis of liability before the Surrogate. "[W]hen a person has knowledge that legal services were performed for him, a promise to pay their reasonable value may be implied”. *(Paulsen v Halpin,*74 AD2d 990, 991.) Since it is undisputed that petitioner performed legal services for respondent in connection with pursuing, to its successful conclusion in the Court of Appeals (55 NY2d 253), an appeal from the Surrogate’s determination that decedent’s last will should be admitted to probate, petitioner is entitled to recover in quantum meruit for these services. Accordingly, we remand for a hearing to determine the reasonable value of the services petitioner performed for respondent. While fees petitioner received from other sources for the same services may be relevant to the amount of his award, the receipt of such fees, ipso facto, does not defeat his basic right to recovery. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Ross, Rosenberger, Kassal and Wallach, JJ.
Order entered June 10, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-00453-CV

HICKORY TRAIL HOSPITAL, L.P., Appellant

V.

MARVELLA LOYA, Appellee

On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-02031

ORDER

Before the Court is appellee’s June 7, 2016 motion to file corrected brief. Appellee’s 

motion is GRANTED. Appellee’s corrected brief shall be filed within TEN DAYS of the date 

of this order. 

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 237 (Friday, December 8, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 77045]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-31266]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION


Special Emphasis Panel in Civil and Mechanical Systems; Notice of 
Meeting

    In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-
463, as amended), the National Science Foundation announces the 
following meeting:

    Name: Special Emphasis Panel in Civil and Mechanical Systems 
(1205).
    Date and Time: January 29 and 30, 2001, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
    Place: NSF, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Room 530, Arlington, VA.
    Type of Meeting: Closed.
    Contact Person: Dr. Alison Flatau, Program Director, Dynamic 
Systems and Control, Sensor Technologies for Civil and Mechanical 
Systems, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Blvd, Room 545, 
Arlington, VA 22230. Telephone: (703) 292-8360.
    Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and recommendations 
concerning proposals submitted to NSF for financial support.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate nominations for the FY'01 Dynamic 
Systems and Control Individual Investigator Award (IIA) Review Panel 
proposals as part of the selection process for awards.
    Reason for Closing: The proposals being reviewed include 
information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including 
technical information; financial data, such as salaries and personal 
information concerning individuals associated with the proposals. 
These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c), (4) and (6) of the 
Government in the Sunshine Act.

    Dated: December 1, 2000.
Karen J. York,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 00-31266 Filed 12-7-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555-01-M
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1860 

To amend section 203 of the Federal Power Act. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 26, 2017 

Mr. INHOFE (for himself and Mr. HEINRICH) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To amend section 203 of the Federal Power Act. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Parity Across Reviews 

5 Act’’ or the ‘‘PARs Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF FACILITY MERGER AUTHORIZA7 TION. 

8 Section 203(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Power Act (16 

9 U.S.C. 824b(a)(1)(B)) is amended by striking ‘‘such facili10 ties or any part thereof’’ and inserting ‘‘such facilities, or 

11 any part thereof, of a value in excess of $10,000,000’’. 


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2 

•S 1860 IS

1 SEC. 3. NOTIFICATION FOR CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS. 

2 Section 203(a) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 

3 824b(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following 

4 new paragraph: 

5 ‘‘(7)(A) Not later than 180 days after the date 

6 of enactment of this paragraph, the Commission 

7 shall promulgate a rule requiring any public utility 

8 that is seeking to merge or consolidate, directly or 

9 indirectly, its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of 

10 the Commission, or any part thereof, with those of 

11 any other person, to notify the Commission of such 

12 transaction not later than 30 days after the date on 

13 which the transaction is consummated if— 

14 ‘‘(i) such facilities, or any part thereof, are 

15 of a value in excess of $1,000,000; and 

16 ‘‘(ii) such public utility is not required to 

17 secure an order of the Commission under para18 graph (1)(B). 

19 ‘‘(B) In establishing any notification require20 ment under subparagraph (A), the Commission 

21 shall, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize 

22 the paperwork burden resulting from the collection 

23 of information.’’. 


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3 

•S 1860 IS

1 SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

2 The amendment made by section 2 shall take effect 

3 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


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##### 



EXHIBIT 32
 Certification pursuant to
Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
 Date: February 2, 2007/s/ Daryl J. FaulknerDaryl J. FaulknerChief Executive Officer/s/ Joseph P. SlatteryJoseph P. SlatteryChief Financial Officer
#### R. L. WHITE CO. v. STATE et al.

No. 10353.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Dec. *14,*1938.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1939.

*327Dodson & Ezell and L. D. Hill, all of San Antonio, for appellant.

John R. Shook, L. J. Gittinger, and John A. James, all of San Antonio, for appellee.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

This proceeding was brought at the instance of the State Highway Department to condemn, for highway purposes, strips . of 11.3 feet of land off the east side of city blocks owned by appellant, R. L. White, and situated on existing State Highway 66, lying just north of the City limits of the City of San Antonio.

The expropriated strips were taken from the east edge of the full length of Blocks 20 and 21, and a part of Block 28, Holly-crest Addition to the City of San Antonio.

The jury found, separately, the values, per square foot, of the land taken from each block. They arrived, separately, at the damage to the land remaining in each block, by finding the respective values thereof per square foot before and after the taking of the condemned strips. They found that the values of the strips taken were less per square foot than the values, per square foot, of the land remaining at the time of the taking. White has appealed from the award made upon those findings, upon the contention that they were arbitrary, conflicting and without support in the evidence.

The expropriated land adjoined an existing federal-state highway, which was also San Pedro Avenue, and was necessary to the location and construction of an underpass in the highway at its intersection with the Missouri Pacific Railroad at that point. The highway lay along the east front of appellant’s property. The width of the projected underpass in the street was forty feet, and when completed it would cut off all of appellant’s Block 21 and a part of Block 28, from the street, leaving Block 20, however, in the clear. According to the pleadings of both parties, confirmed, at least inferentially, by the evidence, a strip of approximately ten feet of the 11.3 feet here expropriated was already burdened with some sort of restriction upon its use, which served, as a practical matter, to reduce .the depth of appellant’s blocks from 100 feet to 90 feet.

The jury had all these facts and circumstances before them in their deliberations, and upon those considerations arrived at their findings, of which appellant complains upon the grounds stated abové. Appellant’s complaint is not that the award, or any particular element of it, was inadequate. His complaint is, rather, of the processes, or of the claimed lack of any orderly or rational processes, by which the jury traversed the sinuous course to their ultimate conclusion. We do not feel at liberty, even if given the perspicacity, to undertake to follow or analyze those processes. We think the evidence was of such nature, quantity and quality as to support the jury findings, and since the trial judge did not disturb them, we cannot.

The judgment is affirmed.