[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 21-10483

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

WILLIAM MARION PATTERSON, III, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:16-cr-00097-TJC-JBT-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10483

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

William Patterson III appeals the district court’s denial of his 

motion for early release or a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), better known as the “compassionate release” 

provision, which permits courts to reduce the sentences of defendants when warranted by “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” 

After careful review, we affirm. 

In June 2018, Patterson was sentenced to 84 months in 

prison after pleading guilty to child pornography offenses. The district court varied downward from the guideline range of 151 to 188 

months. Then, in September 2020, Patterson requested early release or a sentence reduction, claiming that he suffered from a combination of medical conditions—including high blood pressure, 

high cholesterol, type 2 diabetes, asthma, and untreated nerve 

damage—that increased his risk of severe illness from COVID-19. 

He also contended that the Bureau of Prison’s virus mitigation 

measures had increased the severity of his sentence, and that a reduction was warranted based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing 

factors, including his low risk of recidivism. 

The district court denied Patterson’s motion. Based on the 

government’s concession, the court appears to have found that Patterson’s type 2 diabetes qualified as an “extraordinary and compelling” ground for relief. Nevertheless, the court stated that 

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21-10483 Opinion of the Court 3

Patterson “does not appear to be at imminent risk of severe illness” 

and that his conditions were being managed well in prison. It further concluded that the § 3553(a) sentencing factors did not support 

a sentence reduction. The court noted that Patterson’s offense 

conduct involved the receipt of 4,465 images and 687 videos of 

child sexual abuse, including the rape and abuse of prepubescent 

and toddler-aged children, that his original sentence was well below the guideline range, and that, at the time the court denied the 

motion in November 2020, Patterson had served just 35% of the 

total sentence. The court then denied Patterson’s motion for reconsideration, and this appeal followed.

We review de novo a determination about a defendant’s eligibility for a § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant, 

996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). We review the denial of an 

eligible prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion. 

Id.; United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). 

Section 3582(c) grants the district courts limited authority to 

reduce the sentences of defendants for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting a reduction under this provision, the court must find three things: (1) an 

extraordinary and compelling reason exists under U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.13’s policy statement; (2) the reduction is supported by the 

§ 3553(a) factors; and (3) granting a reduction would not endanger 

others. United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345–46 (11th Cir. 

2021); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). 

“Because all three conditions . . . are necessary, the absence of even 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10483

one would foreclose a sentence reduction.” Tinker, 14 F.4th at 

1238. Thus, a court may exercise its discretion to deny a sentence 

reduction based on the § 3553(a) factors even if the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling ground for relief. Id. at 

1239.

The weight to give any particular § 3553(a) factor, whether 

great or slight, is committed to the district court’s sound discretion. 

Id. at 1241. “Even so, [a] district court abuses its discretion when it 

(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due 

significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or 

irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

An order granting or denying compassionate release under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) generally must indicate that the district court has 

considered “all applicable § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Cook, 

998 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (11th Cir. 2021). But “a district court need 

not exhaustively analyze each § 3553(a) factor or articulate its findings in great detail,” and an acknowledgement by the court that it 

has considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments is 

ordinarily sufficient. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241 (quotation marks 

omitted). Nevertheless, the court “must provide enough analysis 

that meaningful appellate review of the factors’ application can 

take place.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Patterson contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to adequately explain any of the § 3553(a) factors it 

relied on or “to link any particular fact with any of the § 3553(a) 

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21-10483 Opinion of the Court 5

factors at all.” He asserts that the court’s “boilerplate language” is 

insufficient to permit meaningful review. 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that a sentence reduction was not supported by the 

§ 3553(a) factors. The court was not required to expressly discuss 

all of Patterson’s mitigating evidence or every § 3553(a) factor. See 

Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241. And it expressly referenced several 

§ 3553(a) factors. It discussed the nature of the offense and the serious nature of Patterson’s conduct. It considered Patterson’s history and characteristics, including his medical conditions, their 

treatment, and effective measures to mitigate Covid-19 at Patterson’s facility. It also referenced the original guideline range and the 

portion of the sentence he had served before seeking a sentence 

reduction. Considered as a whole, the court’s explanation was far 

from “boilerplate” and is sufficient to show that it properly considered the § 3553(a) factors and had a reasoned basis for exercising its 

discretion to deny Patterson the extraordinary remedy of a sentence reduction. And we cannot say the court abused its discretion 

by concluding that a sentence reduction was not warranted on the 

facts of this case. 

For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Patterson’s 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for a sentence reduction.

AFFIRMED.

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