Docket Nos. 108289, 108290 cons.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.

ZACHARY BOECKMANN, Appellee.–THE PEOPLE OF THE

STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. CHELSEY MASCHOFF,

Appellee.

Opinion filed June 24, 2010.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Garman specially concurred, with opinion, joined by

Justice Thomas.

Justice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Burke.

Justice Karmeier took no part in the decision.

OPINION

The circuit court of Clinton County declared unconstitutional

section 6–206(a)(43) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS

5/6–206(a)(43) (West 2008)) on due process grounds. As applied in

this case, section 6–206(a)(43) requires suspension of driving

privileges if a person receives court supervision for unlawful

consumption of alcohol under 21 years of age. Illinois Secretary of

State Jesse White (Secretary) appealed the circuit court’s judgment
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directly to this court under Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R.

603). For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s

judgment declaring section 6–206(a)(43) unconstitutional.

I. BACKGROUND

The defendants in this consolidated appeal, Zachary R.

Boeckmann and Chelsey M. Maschhoff, were each charged with

unlawful consumption of alcohol by a person under 21 years of age

(235 ILCS 5/6–20(e) (West 2008)). The defendants filed motions to

declare unconstitutional sections 6–206(a)(38) and (a)(43) of the

Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(38), (a)(43) (West 2008)).

Those sections generally authorize the Secretary of State to suspend

or revoke a defendant’s driving privileges upon conviction or

disposition of court supervision for the charged offenses.

Defendants alleged sections 6–206(a)(38) and (a)(43) violated

their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the

law. Defendants pled guilty to unlawful consumption of alcohol as

charged. The trial court placed them on court supervision for 90 days

and, the following day, declared sections 6–206(a)(38) and (a)(43)

unconstitutional.

After those orders were filed, the Secretary entered an appearance

and the trial court granted him leave to file petitions to vacate the

findings of unconstitutionality. In his petitions, the Secretary asserted

he did not receive notice of the defendants’ motions seeking a

declaration that the statute was unconstitutional. In response to the

petitions, the trial court vacated its orders declaring sections

6–206(a)(38) and (a)(43) unconstitutional and allowed the defendants

to file supplemental motions challenging the constitutionality of the

statute.

Defendants then filed motions alleging sections 6–206(a)(38) and

(a)(43), as applied, violate the due process and equal protection

clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions as well as the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The

Secretary stipulated that under section 6–206(a)(43) of the Vehicle

Code, he was required to suspend for three months the driving

privileges of any person receiving court supervision for a violation of
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section 6–20 of the Liquor Control Act (235 ILCS 5/6–20 (West

2008)).

The trial court subsequently found section 6–206(a)(43)

unconstitutional on due process grounds as applied to the defendants.

The trial court held this court’s decision in People v. Lindner, 127 Ill.

2d 124 (1989), controlled because a vehicle was not involved in the

commission of the offenses. The defendants’ other constitutional

challenges based on the equal protection and proportionate penalties

clauses were rejected by the trial court. The trial court made the

additional findings mandated by Supreme Court Rule 18 (210 Ill. 2d

R. 18), when a statute is declared unconstitutional.

The Secretary appealed the trial court’s orders declaring section

6–206(a)(43) unconstitutional directly to this court as permitted by

Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603).

II. ANALYSIS

The Secretary contends the trial court erred in finding section

6–206(a)(43) violates due process as applied to the defendants.

According to the Secretary, suspension of the defendants’ driving

privileges for unlawful consumption of alcohol bears a rational

relationship to the legitimate governmental interest in highway safety.

The Secretary maintains that preventing young people who consume

alcohol from driving is a reasonable means of furthering the interest

in highway safety. The Secretary also argues the suspension of

defendants’ driving privileges under section 6–206(a)(43) is a

reasonable means of promoting the legitimate public interest in

deterring underage consumption of alcohol.

Citing this court’s decision in Lindner, defendants contend that

suspending their driving privileges does not bear a rational relationship

to the public interest in the safe operation of motor vehicles because

no vehicle was involved in the commission of their offenses.

Defendants further argue suspension of driving privileges in all cases

of underage consumption of alcohol is not a reasonable means of

promoting the public interest in highway safety.

We begin by noting that statutes are presumed constitutional.

People v. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d 178, 199 (2009). To rebut the

presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish
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a constitutional violation. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill.

2d 185, 200 (2009). This court must construe a statute in a manner

upholding its constitutionality if reasonably possible. Cook County

Republican Party v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 232 Ill. 2d 231,

239 (2009). Accordingly, we will resolve any doubt on the

construction of a statute in favor of its validity. Napleton v. Village of

Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 307 (2008). The constitutionality of a

statute is reviewed de novo. In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 263

(2008).

This court has held a driver’s license is a nonfundamental property

interest. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 179. When a statute does not impact

a fundamental constitutional right, the applicable standard for

reviewing whether it conforms with substantive due process is the

rational basis test. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d at 205. Generally, a statute

violates the constitutional guarantee of due process under the rational

basis test if it does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate

legislative purpose, or is arbitrary or discriminatory. Napleton, 229 Ill.

2d at 307; Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 122

(2004); Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180. In applying the rational basis test,

we must identify the public interest the statute is intended to protect,

determine whether the statute bears a rational relationship to that

interest, and examine whether the method chosen to protect or further

that interest is reasonable. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180.

Rational basis review is highly deferential, but it is not “toothless.”

People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 596 (2006), quoting Mathews v. De

Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185, 50 L. Ed. 2d 389, 394, 97 S. Ct. 431, 434

(1976). Legislation must be upheld if there is a conceivable basis for

finding it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Stokovich,

211 Ill. 2d at 126. The legislature’s judgments in drafting a statute are

not subject to judicial fact finding and “may be based on rational

speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Arangold v.

Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003).

We must first determine the public interest section 6–206(a)(43)

is intended to protect. In examining the public interest of similar

Vehicle Code provisions in Lindner, this court considered the Vehicle

Code as a whole, the substantive provisions of the challenged sections,

and the Vehicle Code’s statement of purpose. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at

181-82. We observed that the stated purpose of the Vehicle Code
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contained in section 6–204(a) is preventing people from driving if they

demonstrate an unfitness to operate a motor vehicle safely. Lindner,

127 Ill. 2d at 182. Further, the challenged statute sections generally

enumerate offenses connected to operating or owning a vehicle safely

and legally. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. We concluded, therefore, that

the challenged provisions were intended to protect the public interest

in “the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles.”

Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182.

The statement of purpose in section 6–204 is still directed at

preventing people from driving after they have shown an unfitness to

operate a vehicle safely. 625 ILCS 5/6–204(a) (West 2008).

Additionally, the statute section challenged here describes offenses

and behavior largely connected to operating a motor vehicle safely and

legally. 625 ILCS 5/6–206 (West 2008). Accordingly, as in Lindner,

we conclude section 6–206 is intended to promote the safe and legal

operation and ownership of motor vehicles.

We must, therefore, determine whether section 6–206(a)(43) bears

a reasonable relationship to the public interest in the safe and legal

operation and ownership of motor vehicles. As applied in this case,

section 6–206(a)(43) provides for suspension of driving privileges

when a person has received court supervision for underage

consumption of alcohol. 625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(43) (West 2008). The

statute will be upheld if a conceivable basis exists for finding it

rationally related to the identified legitimate public interest. See

Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d at 126.

Here, the General Assembly may have believed that a young

person who has a driver’s license and consumes alcohol illegally may

take the additional step of driving after consuming alcohol. It is

reasonable to believe a young person disobeying the law against

underage consumption of alcohol may also lack the judgment to

decline to drive after drinking. Preventing young people from driving

after consuming alcohol unquestionably furthers the public interest in

the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles.

Defendants, nonetheless, contend this court’s decision in Lindner

compels a finding that section 6–206(a)(43) violates due process.

According to defendants, Lindner held that suspending driving

privileges violates the constitutional guarantee of due process if a

vehicle was not involved in the commission of the offense.
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In Lindner, the dispute focused on identifying the public interest

the challenged statute was intended to protect. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at

180. This court noted that the State apparently conceded the

unconstitutionality of the statute if the defendant’s argument on the

statute’s purpose were accepted. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180-81. We

agreed with the defendant’s argument that the statute served the

public interest in the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor

vehicles. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. Without any argument from the

State on the point, we then concluded revocation of the defendant’s

driver’s license did not bear a reasonable relationship to that public

interest because a vehicle was not involved in the commission of the

defendant’s sex offenses. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182-83.

Defendants assert this court should follow “[t]he principle in

Lindner that if no car is involved, like here, then to suspend driving

privileges would violate due process.” Defendants, however, rely on

a narrow reading of Lindner. We have subsequently explained the

rationale in Lindner, stating “[t]here was no rational relationship

between sex offenders and safe driving, and on that basis the statute

was found unconstitutional.” People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 391

(1991), citing Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 183. We have further explained

that in Lindner, the revocation of the defendant’s driver’s license did

not bear a rational relationship to the public interest to be served

because the defendant’s crimes “neither involved a motor vehicle nor

bore any rational relationship to his ability to drive a motor vehicle

safely.” Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 604, citing Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182-83.

Accordingly, the rationale in Lindner is broader than simply

determining whether a vehicle was involved in the offense. Rather, the

critical determination is whether the revocation of driving privileges

bears a rational relationship to the public interest in the safe operation

of motor vehicles.

In Lindner, there was no connection between the defendant’s sex

offenses and his ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. In contrast,

defendants’ underage consumption of alcohol would certainly impact

their ability to drive a motor vehicle safely. The legislature could have

rationally believed young people who have a driver’s license and

consume alcohol illegally may also drive after consuming alcohol,

regardless of whether a motor vehicle is involved in the charged

offense. On this point, we note that the appellate court has held
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suspension of driving privileges for the use of false identification in an

attempt to obtain alcohol is rationally related to the safe and legal

operation of a motor vehicle. Freed v. Ryan, 301 Ill. App. 3d 952, 957

(1998). The appellate court held the legislature could rationally

speculate that licensees under 21 years of age may use false

identification to obtain alcohol, leading on balance to an increase in

driving under the influence or driving after consuming alcohol. Freed,

301 Ill. App. 3d at 957. See also Horvath v. White, 358 Ill. App. 3d

844, 852-53 (2005) (distinguishing Lindner and holding suspension of

driver’s license for possession of another’s identification card is

rationally related to the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles,

particularly when the identification card reflected a legal drinking age).

We likewise conclude that suspension of defendants’ driving privileges

for underage consumption of alcohol bears a rational relationship to

the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles.

Defendants also contend that suspending their driving privileges

is not a reasonable method of protecting the public interest because

they had no plans to drive after consuming alcohol. As we have found,

there is a rational relationship between suspending a person’s driver’s

license for underage consumption of alcohol and the safe and legal

operation of motor vehicles, regardless of whether a motor vehicle is

involved in the particular offense. The legislature may reasonably

determine a young person consuming alcohol under the legal age may

also drive after drinking. Preventing young people from driving after

consuming alcohol furthers the public interest in the safe and legal

operation of motor vehicles. We, therefore, conclude that suspension

of defendants’ driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol

is a reasonable method of promoting the public interest despite the

absence of a motor vehicle or plans to drive in these circumstances.

We further note that courts from other jurisdictions have upheld

similar statutes against substantive due process challenges. See State

v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 171-72, 125 P.3d 522, 527-28 (2005)

(rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute requiring

driver’s license suspension for underage purchase, possession, or

consumption of alcohol); State v. Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d 264, 268

(Alaska 2000) (rejecting substantive due process challenge to statute

requiring revocation of driving privileges for underage consumption

of alcohol); People v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6, 10, 5 Cal.
-8-

Rptr. 2d 492, 494 (1991) (rejecting substantive due process challenge

to statute requiring suspension of driving privileges for underage

possession of alcohol); Commonwealth v. Strunk, 400 Pa. Super. 25,

33-34, 582 A.2d 1326, 1330 (1990) (rejecting substantive due process

challenge to statute requiring driver’s license suspension for underage

possession or consumption of alcohol). Those courts have generally

recognized a rational relationship between suspending a person’s

driver’s license for underage possession or consumption of alcohol

and the governmental interest in highway safety. See Bennett, 142

Idaho at 172, 125 P.3d at 528; Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d at 267-68;

Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 9-10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 493-94.

While these decisions are not binding on this court, they may be

considered as persuasive authority. See People ex rel. O’Malley v.

6323 North LaCrosse Avenue, 158 Ill. 2d 453, 458-59 (1994); Cooper

v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 2d 269, 275 (1957).

The special concurrence asserts Lindner was wrongly decided and

should be overruled because it defined the public purpose of the

statute too narrowly. The parties do not ask this court to overrule

Lindner or present any argument on that issue, however. Under the

doctrine of stare decisis, this court’s prior decisions should not be

overturned absent “good cause” or “compelling reasons.” People v.

Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 146 (2007). Lindner engaged in a detailed

analysis of the statute’s purpose that has been accepted for more than

21 years. Lindner should not be overruled without the benefit of a

developed argument by the parties on the issue.

We need not overrule Lindner to conclude that the license

suspensions in this case do not offend due process. We need only

apply the highly deferential rational basis standard to decide that the

license suspensions do not violate defendants’ constitutional rights to

due process. The rational basis test is satisfied if there is a conceivable

basis for finding a statute rationally related to a legitimate state

interest. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d at 126. As discussed above, the weight

of authority from our appellate court and other jurisdictions supports

a finding that suspension of driving privileges for underage

consumption of alcohol bears a rational relationship to the legitimate

state interest in highway safety.

Accordingly, without any argument from the parties on the issue,

we should not reach Lindner. Moreover, overruling Lindner will not
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affect the result in this case. Of course, parties in a future case may

argue that Lindner should be overruled and this court may properly

consider the issue at that time. We only conclude that it is not

appropriate to address the issue in this case where the parties have not

raised or argued it.

In sum, we conclude that suspending defendants’ driving

privileges for underage consumption of alcohol is rationally related to

the legitimate public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor

vehicles. Section 6–206(a)(43), as applied in this case, provides a

reasonable method of furthering that interest. Accordingly, section

6–206(a)(43) does not violate defendants’ constitutional rights to

substantive due process.

Defendants also argue section 6–206(a)(43) is unconstitutionally

arbitrary as applied because the Secretary does not exercise the

discretion granted by the statute in determining whether to suspend a

person’s driving privileges for underage consumption of alcohol.

Rather, the Secretary issues a suspension in every case. Defendants

contend the Secretary’s failure to exercise discretion is arbitrary and

results in a due process violation.

In his reply to this argument, the Secretary contends he does not

have discretion in determining whether to suspend a person’s driving

privileges under section 6–206(a)(43). The Secretary maintains

section 6–206(a)(43) requires a three-month suspension when a

person receives court supervision for underage consumption of

alcohol.

Defendants’ argument is premised on the construction of section

6–206(a)(43) as granting the Secretary discretion in determining

whether to suspend a person’s driving privileges for underage

consumption of alcohol. Accordingly, this argument presents a

question of statutory construction subject to de novo review. See

People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 44 (2009). The fundamental objective

of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of

the legislature. People v. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d 30, 40 (2009). The best

indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its

plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Cardamone, 232 Ill. 2d 504,

512 (2009).
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Section 6–206 of the Vehicle Code is entitled, “Discretionary

authority to suspend or revoke license or permit; Right to a hearing.”

625 ILCS 5/6–206 (West 2008). Section 6–206 generally authorizes

the Secretary to issue a suspension or revocation of driving privileges

in 45 enumerated circumstances. In many of those circumstances, the

statutory language is purely discretionary. For instance, subsection

(a)(3) allows the Secretary to suspend or revoke driving privileges

upon a showing that a person has been repeatedly involved in

collisions or has repeated traffic offenses indicating an inability to

operate a motor vehicle safely or disrespect for traffic laws. See 625

ILCS 5/6–206(a)(3) (West 2008).

Other subsections require specific action by the Secretary,

however. In particular, several subsections call for suspension of

driving privileges for a certain length of time. See 625 ILCS

5/6–206(a)(15) (West 2008) (“the suspension shall be for one year”

upon conviction of criminal trespass to a vehicle); 625 ILCS

5/6–206(a)(21) (West 2008) (“the suspension shall be for one year”

upon conviction of leaving the scene of an accident involving vehicle

damage over $1,000); 625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(29) (West 2008)

(“driving privileges shall be suspended for one year” upon conviction

of certain listed offenses committed while operating a vehicle); 625

ILCS 5/6–206(a)(30) (West 2008) (“driving privileges shall be

suspended for 5 years” upon second or subsequent conviction of

offenses listed in paragraph 29); 625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(32) (West

2008) (“the suspension shall be for 3 years” upon conviction of

aggravated discharge of a firearm while inside a motor vehicle).

The provision involved in this case, section 6–206(a)(43), states:

“The Secretary of State is authorized to suspend or revoke

the driving privileges of any person without preliminary

hearing upon a showing of the person’s records or other

sufficient evidence that the person:

* * *

[h]as received a disposition of court supervision for a

violation of subsection (a), (d), or (e) of Section 6–20 of

the Liquor Control Act of 1934 or a similar provision of

a local ordinance, in which case the suspension shall be for
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a period of 3 months[.]” 625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(43) (West

2008).

Similar to the other subsections described above, subsection

(a)(43) requires specific action when a person receives court

supervision for the underage consumption of alcohol offenses involved

here. The statute provides “in which case the suspension shall be for

a period of 3 months.” 625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(43) (West 2008).

Subsection (a)(43) provides for suspension as the only possible action

as shown by the phrase “the suspension shall be.” The legislature used

“the suspension” rather than a less specific reference such as “any

suspension.” Moreover, the use of “shall be” indicates suspension is

the mandatory action. See People v. Ousley, 235 Ill. 2d 299, 311

(2009) (when the issue is whether the statutory language has the force

of a command, the word “shall” generally indicates the legislature

intended to impose a mandatory obligation). The mandatory nature of

the suspension is also shown by the provision of a specific period of

three months. The statutory language, therefore, provides for a

mandatory consequence of a three-month suspension in these

circumstances.

Thus, we conclude the Secretary does not have discretion in

determining whether to issue a suspension of defendants’ driving

privileges under section 6–206(a)(43). Rather, section 6–206(a)(43)

provides for mandatory suspension. We note that our interpretation

of section 6–206(a)(43) is consistent with our duty to construe

statutes in a manner upholding their constitutionality when reasonably

possible. See Cook County Republican Party, 232 Ill. 2d at 239.

Given our conclusion that section 6–206(a)(43) does not allow for

exercise of discretion by the Secretary, we must reject defendants’

claim that the statute is arbitrary as applied and, therefore, results in

a due process violation.

Finally, defendants renew their argument that suspension of their

driving privileges under section 6–206(a)(43) violates the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.

1970, art. I, §11). Defendants argue that suspension of their driver’s

licenses, in addition to the criminal penalties imposed for underage

consumption of alcohol, results in cruel and degrading punishment.

The proportionate penalties clause in the Illinois Constitution is

coextensive with the federal constitution’s prohibition of cruel and
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unusual punishment. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d at 206-07. Both provisions

apply only to the criminal process involving a direct action by the

government to inflict punishment. In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 510,

518 (2006). The critical determination, therefore, is whether

suspension of the defendants’ driving privileges is a direct action by

the government to inflict punishment.

We have determined that section 6–206(a)(43)’s purpose is to

promote the safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles.

Section 6–206(a)(43) is, therefore, intended to provide for safe

highways, not to punish licensees for underage consumption of

alcohol. Indeed, we have previously stated statutory summary

suspension of a driver’s license is not penal in nature because it is

intended to protect the public rather than punish a licensee. People v.

Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491, 501 (1988). Accordingly, we conclude the

proportionate penalties clause does not apply here because suspension

of defendants’ driving privileges under section 6–206(a)(43) is not a

direct action by the government to inflict punishment.

In sum, we conclude that suspension of defendants’ driving

privileges under section 6–206(a)(43) does not violate their

constitutional rights to due process or the proportionate penalties

clause. The trial court’s orders declaring section 6–206(a)(43)

unconstitutional must, therefore, be reversed.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit

court declaring section 6–206(a)(43) of the Vehicle Code

unconstitutional and remand this matter to the circuit court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Circuit court judgment reversed;

cause remanded.

JUSTICE KARMEIER took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.
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JUSTICE GARMAN, specially concurring:

Although I agree with the lead opinion that section 6–206(a)(43)

of the Vehicle Code is constitutional, I believe that People v. Lindner,

127 Ill. 2d 174 (1989), was wrongly decided to the extent that it

requires any statutory provision that mandates or permits the

revocation or suspension of a driver’s license to directly serve the

public interest in ensuring that “drivers who have demonstrated they

are unfit to safely operate vehicles are not allowed to drive” (Lindner,

127 Ill. 2d at 182) by tying revocation or suspension “to offenses

involving the use of a motor vehicle” (Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82).

In Lindner, this court found the public purpose of section 6–205

of the Vehicle Code by examining “the statement of purpose in section

6–204(a)” and “the substantive provisions of section 6–205.” Lindner,

127 Ill. 2d at 181. In my opinion, Lindner defined the public purpose

of section 6–205 of the Vehicle Code too narrowly and failed to

recognize that different public purposes might be served by different

statutory provisions that mandate or permit the revocation or

suspension of a driver’s license, whether those provisions are

contained in section 6–205, section 6–206, or elsewhere in the Vehicle

Code.

Chapter 6 of the Vehicle Code is the Driver Licensing Law.

Article II of chapter 6 governs the “Cancellation, Suspension, or

Revocation of Licenses and Permits.” This article does not contain a

provision expressly stating an overarching purpose. Rather, it

enumerates the circumstances in which the Secretary of State is

required to cancel a driver’s license (625 ILCS 5/6–201 (West 2008)),

required to impose a mandatory revocation (625 ILCS 5/6–205 (West

2008)), and permitted to suspend or revoke a driver’s license as a

matter of discretion (625 ILCS 5/6–206 (West 2008)).

In addition, article II contains procedural provisions, including

section 6–204, which is entitled “When Court to forward License and

Reports.” Section 6–204 directs that when a person is convicted of

one of the offenses enumerated elsewhere in article II, the judge shall

require the person to surrender his driver’s license or permit to the

clerk of the court, who shall forward the license or permit and a report

of conviction to the Secretary of State. 625 ILCS 5/6–204(a)(1)

(West 2008). 
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In Lindner, this court first considered “the statement of purpose

in section 6–204(a).” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181. Yet this section does

not contain language that can be identified as an express statement of

the purpose of article II as a whole. Rather, section 6–204 sets out

procedures “[f]or the purpose of providing to the Secretary of State

the records essential to the performance of the Secretary’s duties”

under article II. 625 ILCS 5/6–204(a) (West 2008). This section

further provides that the Vehicle Code recognizes that convictions of

certain offenses or traffic violations and adjudications of delinquency

are “evidence relating to unfitness to safely operate motor vehicles.”

625 ILCS 5/6–204(a) (West 2008). This is the language that Lindner

found to be a “statement of purpose.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181. 

In my opinion, this court in Lindner gave entirely too much weight

to this single phrase in section 6–204(a). While a conviction of a

certain offense or traffic violation or an adjudication of delinquency

may be evidence revealing unfitness to safely operate a motor vehicle,

a conviction or adjudication having nothing to do with the individual’s

operation of a vehicle may also be a reasonable basis for the

revocation or suspension of the individual’s driver’s license. Thus,

one’s license may be revoked or suspended for permitting “an

unlawful or fraudulent use of a driver’s license” (625 ILCS

5/6–206(a)(5) (West 2008)); for making a false statement or

knowingly concealing a material fact in an application for a driver’s

license (625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(9) (West 2008)); for possessing,

displaying or attempting to fraudulently use the license of another

person (625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(10) (West 2008)); or for altering or

attempting to alter a license or possessing an altered license (625

ILCS 5/6–206(a)(26) (West 2008)). None of these offenses relate to

the individual’s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. In each

instance, however, the legislature has determined that the individual

who commits such an offense may forfeit his right to drive, at least

temporarily.

Section 6–204’s mention of “unfitness to safely operate motor

vehicles,” therefore, cannot be viewed as the legislature’s expression

of a single overarching purpose for all of the provisions of article II,

chapter 6, of the Vehicle Code. It is entirely possible that sections

6–201, 6–205, and 6–206 are intended to serve different purposes, or

that some of the 43 subsections of section 6–206 are intended to serve
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different or multiple purposes. Lindner should be overruled to the

extent that it so narrowly defines the public purpose of this article and,

thereby, limits consideration of other public purposes that may be

served by a challenged provision. 

In addition to relying on section 6–204, Lindner inferred the

public purpose of section 6–205 as a whole from the fact that with the

exception of the challenged section, “every subsection of sections

6–205(a) and (b) has some affinity with a motor vehicle–either the

operation or ownership of the vehicle, or the paperwork connected to

such operation or ownership.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181. Thus, even

whileacknowledging that section 6–205(b)(2) provided for revocation

of a driver’s license “regardless of whether a vehicle was used in their

commission” of the crime, the court nevertheless concluded that

“section 6–205(a)(3) clearly reflects the legislature’s intent that

revocation be tied to offenses involving the use of a motor vehicle.”

Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82. That is, this court determined that

when two sections of the same statute reflected different legislative

intents, one section was a true expression of purpose and the other

section was not a true expression of purpose.

As the dissenting justice pointed out, this conclusion defies logic.

Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 190-91 (Miller, J., dissenting) (the presence in

section 6–205 of subsection (b)(2), which requires revocation for

offenses not related to the operation of a motor vehicle, demonstrates

that “the statutory scheme must actually serve at least one additional

purpose not specified in the general statement of intent” that the

majority found in section 6–204). Thus, by including a provision

within section 6–205 that required license revocation on some basis

other than an offense involving the use of a motor vehicle, the

legislature clearly had another purpose in mind. 

In my opinion, the Lindner court’s “unnecessarily crimped view

of the purpose of the legislation and the interests served by it”

(Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 188 (Miller, J., dissenting)) led directly and

inevitably to its finding the challenged provision unconstitutional. Had

the legislative purpose been viewed more broadly, as the plain

language of the statute required, the court could then have determined

whether that purpose was a legitimate legislative purpose and whether

the challenged provision was rationally related to that purpose.
-16-

Instead, that analysis was short circuited by the court’s answer to the

threshold question. 

I have no opinion on whether the Lindner court reached the

correct result in that case. It is possible that section 6–205(b)(2) may

have been found unconstitutional even if the legislative purpose had

been properly defined. This court might have found that the legislative

purpose was not legitimate or that the provision was not rationally

related to that purpose. 

In keeping with the doctrine of stare decisis, this court does not

overrule a prior decision absent good cause or a compelling reason.

Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 505 (2006). We do not depart from

established precedent, such as our decision in Lindner, merely because

we might have decided otherwise if we were writing on a blank slate.

However, good cause to depart from stare decisis exists when

“serious detriment prejudicial to public interests is likely to result” and

when a governing decision is “unworkable or [is] badly reasoned.”

Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 505-06. 

This court is now faced with the precise situation envisioned by

the dissenting justice in that case. By continuing to adhere to

Lindner’s “unnecessarily crimped view” of the purpose of section

6–205, we find ourselves constrained in our consideration of the

constitutionality of a provision in section 6–206. We must either

acknowledge that Lindner was badly reasoned on this point,

producing a result that is detrimental to the public interest, or affirm

the trial court, which found section 6–206(a)(43) unconstitutional. 

Rather than expressly overrulingLindner, the lead opinion applies

its rule in such a way as to render it almost meaningless. 

Lindner contains four statements in which this court identified the

purpose of the statute. First,

“We think section 6–205(a)(3) clearly reflects the legislature’s

intent that revocation be tied to offenses involving the use of

a motor vehicle.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82.

Second,

“The stated purpose is to ensure that drivers who have

demonstrated they are unfit to safely operate vehicles are not

allowed to drive.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182.
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Third,

“[W]e conclude that the public interest the statute was

intended to protect is the interest in keeping the roads free of

two kinds of drivers: those who threaten the safety of others,

and those who have abused the privilege to drive by doing so

illegally *** .” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182.

And fourth,

“In short, the public interest is the safe and legal operation of

motor vehicles.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182.

The lead opinion finds that section 206(a)(43) “unquestionably

furthers the public interest in the safe and legal operation and

ownership of motor vehicles” (slip op. at 5), but does not

acknowledge that the offense of possession of alcohol by a person

under the age of 21 (235 ILCS 6/6–20 (West 2008)) is not tied to an

offense involving the use of a vehicle, or that individuals who commit

this offense have not demonstrated that they are unfit to safely operate

a vehicle, or that such persons have not threatened the safety of others

or abused the privilege of driving by doing so illegally. In effect, the

lead opinion chooses the broadest and most expansive statement of

purpose from Lindner, while ignoring the substance of Lindner. The

trial court, however, properly applied Lindner and found that the very

narrow purpose expressed in the first three of the four passages

quoted above was not met. 

The lead opinion then finds this broader public purpose served

based on the legislature’s possible belief “that a young person who has

a driver’s license and consumes alcohol illegally may take the

additional step of driving after consuming alcohol. It is reasonable to

believe a young person disobeying the law against underage

consumption of alcohol may also lack the judgment to decline to drive

after drinking.” Slip op. at 5.

This conclusion may reflect the lead opinion’s effort to resolve all

doubts in favor of finding the provision constitutional and to give

effect to the strong presumption of constitutionality. In re Marriage

of Miller, 227 Ill. 2d 185, 195 (2007). However, by reaching so far to

find a rational relationship between the now more broadly defined

legislative purpose and the challenged statute, the lead opinion has

saved Lindner by rendering it meaningless. In essence, the lead
-18-

opinion concludes that because an individual may commit one crime,

he may lack the judgment to decline to commit another crime. Under

this reasoning, the legislature could provide that a conviction of

domestic battery is grounds for the suspension of the offender’s

driver’s license because his anger issues make him likely to succumb

to road rage; or that a person who has been found liable in a civil

action for negligence causing the death or injury of another person,

even if no motor vehicle was involved, should have his license

suspended or revoked because he has demonstrated that he cannot be

counted upon to exercise ordinary care. Indeed, the statute at issue in

Lindner would likely survive this analysis because an individual who

would commit acts of sexual assault against his minor stepdaughters

cannot be trusted to resist the temptation to lure a child into his car.

In addition, if this court were to overrule Lindner to the extent I

suggest, it could also correct an imprecise statement in that case. In

defining the rational basis test, this court stated that the legislative

enactment must bear a “ ‘ “reasonable relationship to the public

interest intended to be protected.” ’ ” (Emphasis added.) Lindner, 127

Ill. 2d at 180, quoting People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 65-66 (1985),

quoting Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Ass’n v. Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443,

453 (1979). Immediately thereafter, this court cited Harris v. Manor

Healthcare Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368 (1986), for the proposition

that a “statute will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a

legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor

discriminatory.” (Emphasis added.)

The Lindner court improperly shifted its focus from discerning

whether there might have been a legitimate legislative purpose for the

challenged provision to the question of whether the provision served

the public interest the statute as a whole was intended to protect and

then set about finding that purpose. The difference is subtle, but

significant. In People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 203-04 (2004), we

stated that the “rational basis test is satisfied where the challenged

statute bears a rational relationship to the purpose the legislature

intended to achieve in enacting the statute.” Thus, if the legislature has

identified a purpose for its enactment of a statute, and if that purpose

is legitimate, the rational basis test is satisfied if the statute bears a

rational relationship to that purpose. 
-19-

However a challenged statute will still satisfy the rational basis test

if it bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose.

Thus, we said in People v. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573, 584 (2007), that

“[u]nder the rational basis test, our inquiry is twofold: we must

determine whether there is a legitimate state interest behind the

legislation, and if so, whether there is a reasonable relationship

between that interest and the means the legislature has chosen to

pursue it.” Further, “[t]he rational basis test is highly deferential; its

focus is not on the wisdom of the statute. [Citation.] If there is any

conceivable set of facts to show a rational basis for the statute, it will

be upheld.” Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d at 585. See also Napleton v. Village

of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 307 (2008) (“a legitimate legislative

purpose”); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 450 (2006) (“a legitimate

state interest”); In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289, 310 (2005) (“a legitimate

state interest”); People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000) (“a public

interest to be served”); People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991)

(“a public interest to be served”). Taking a broader view of the

legislative purpose portion of the inquiry is consistent with due

process decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 

Defendants’ constitutional challenge to section 6–206(a)(43)

invoked the due process clauses of both the United States and the

Illinois Constitutions. The lead opinion does not distinguish between

the two, treating the due process protections of the state and federal

constitutions as coextensive. This is consistent with our past practice

when the language of the two constitutions is identical or nearly

identical. People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 335 (2006). Thus, in

Miller, we discerned “no reason to construe our due process clause

differently than the federal due process clause on the specific issue

before us,” and therefore treated the two clauses and coextensive and

were guided by federal precedent. Miller, 227 Ill. 2d at 196. 

Under federal precedent, a court will not strike down a statute

under the rational basis test even if the reasonable relationship

between the statute and a legitimate legislative purpose is

hypothetical. It is entirely appropriate for the court to consider what

purpose the legislature might have intended to serve or what the

legislature “might have concluded” (Williamson v. Lee Optical of

Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464

(1955)) about the relationship between its intent and the method
-20-

chosen to effectuate it. “[T]he law need not be in every respect

logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that

there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that

the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”

Williamson, 358 U.S. at 487-88, 99 L. Ed. at 572, 75 S. Ct. at 464.

A court will not strike down a law on due process grounds merely

because the law may be “unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with

a particular school of thought.” Williamson, 358 U.S. at 488, 99 L.

Ed at 572, 75 S. Ct. at 464. In such instances, if the people seek

change in the law, they “ ‘must resort to the polls, not to the courts.’ ”

Williamson, 358 U.S. at 48, 99 L. Ed. at 572, 75 S. Ct. at 464-65,

quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L. Ed. 77, 87 (1876).

I note that section 6–206(a)(43) was enacted in 2007 and took

effect on January 2, 2008, decades after the enactment of the

provision that is now codified at section 2–206. Later additions to

section 2–206 do not necessarily share the same legislative purpose as

earlier enactments or, if they share the same general purpose, they

may be intended to serve an additional purpose as well. See Lindner,

127 Ill. 2d at 190 (Miller, J., dissenting). The decision to codify this

provision in section 6–206(a) may be a result of the organizational

scheme of chapter 6 rather than an expression of identical purpose.

With this in mind, and guided by the principles set out by the Supreme

Court in Williamson, I would look beyond sections 6–204 and 6–205

of the Vehicle Code to discern the evil that the legislature might have

intended to address by enacting section 6–206(a)(43).

In 2002, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 92–804, which

amended section 4–4 of the Liquor Control Act and added subsection

(a)(38) to section 6–206 of the Vehicle Code. The effect of these

amendments was to provide discretionary authority to the Secretary

of State for the suspension or revocation of the driver’s license of a

person “convicted of a violation of Section 6–20 of the Liquor

Control Act of 1934 or a similar provision of a local ordinance.”

(Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/6–206(a)(38) (West 2008). Section

6–20 defines the offenses of illegal transfer, possession and

consumption of alcoholic liquor by an underage person. 235 ILCS

5/6–20 (West 2008).

In 2007, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 95–66, entitled

“AN ACT concerning transportation.” Pub. Act 95–166, eff. January
-21-

1, 2008. Again, the Act amended the Liquor Control Act and the

Vehicle Code. The effect of these amendments was to provide

discretionary authority to the Secretary of State for the suspension or

revocation of the driver’s license of a person who received a

disposition of court supervision for a violation of section 6–20. 625

ILCS 5/6–206(a)(43) (West 2008). 

During the third reading of the bill in the House of

Representatives, its chief sponsor, Representative Tom Cross, spoke:

“This is a Bill that deals with drinking by teenagers,

specifically minors. As we all know, the law says if you’re

under 21, you cannot drink in the State of Illinois. This Bill

provides that in the event of a court supervision, which I think

is a good concept *** that you would lose your driver’s

license for a period of three (3) months. That has not been the

case when someone receives court supervision. We had a

rather tragic incident in Oswego, a couple of months ago,

where five (5) young children lost their lives. Alcohol was

involved. This is an attempt to address that issue and it has

unfortunately been a problem around the state.” 95th Ill. Gen.

Assem., House Proceedings, April 27, 2007, at 22 (statements

of Representative Cross).

Representative Cross did not specifically state that the driver who

caused this accident was a teenager who was then under court

supervision for a violation of section 6–20 of the Liquor Control Act,

although this fact seems to be implied by his remarks. 

Nevertheless, we are not constrained by the language of the

statute or by the legislative history (of which there is very little) when

discerning what “evil” the legislature might have been addressing. We

may ask ourselves, in light of the overall legislative scheme and

common sense, what the legislative purpose might have been for the

enactment.

One purpose of adding subsections (a)(38) and (a)(43) to section

6–206 may have been to encourage compliance with section 6–20 of

Liquor Control Act, which is specifically referenced in the both

provisions. The purpose of the Liquor Control Act is that “the health,

safety and welfare of the People of the State of Illinois shall be

protected and temperance in the consumption of alcoholic liquors shall
-22-

be fostered and promoted by sound and careful control and regulation

of the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors.” 235

ILCS 5/1–2 (West 2008). 

Sections 6–206(a)(38) and (a)(43) may be intended to effectuate

this legitimate legislative purpose by giving persons under the age of

21 an incentive to resist the peer pressure to drink by conditioning

their continued ability to drive on compliance with section 6–20 of the

Liquor Code.

In the absence of an express statement of the intent of our own

legislature, we can also look to similar enactments in other states, for

our own legislators may have had a similar purpose. The California

legislature made specific findings when it enacted a statute that

suspended the driving privileges of persons under the age of 21 who

committed offenses involving controlled substances.

“(a) The Legislature finds and declares as follows:

* * *

‘(3) Individuals who abuse drugs or alcohol demonstrate a

dangerous disregard for the safe legal operation of motor vehicles.

The risk is particularly acute for individuals under the age of 21.

‘(4) The increased potential for teenage death in vehicle

collisions and other nondriving accidents, homicides, and suicides,

while being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, requires

special attention in order to reduce the statewide youth fatality

rate and to control unlawful and unsafe driving practices.

‘(b) It is, therefore, the intent of the Legislature to enact this

measure in an attempt to reduce the incidence of young drivers on

the highways and roads of this state who, because of their use of

alcohol or other illegal drugs, pose a danger to the health and

safety of other drivers by all or a combination of the following

methods:

‘(1) To prevent use of motor vehicles by drivers under the age

of 21 years by suspending their driving privileges for one year

from the date of conviction, because a one year suspension of

these drivers’ privileges may provide a means of deterring use of

alcohol, and other illegal drugs by these young persons.” People

v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6, 9-10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492,

493 (1991), quoting Stats. 1988, ch. 1254, §1, at 4175-76. 
-23-

These legislative findings are entirely consistent with the concerns

expressed by the sponsor of the bill that resulted in the enactment of

section 6–206(a)(43). I would find that the legitimate legislative

purposes of the enactment were to encourage compliance with section

6–20 of the Liquor Control Act and to protect the individual young

person and the public by suspending the driving privileges of those

young persons who, by violating section 6–20, have demonstrated that

they should not be entrusted with the operation of a motor vehicle.

If the means chosen–suspension of the driver’s license–bears a

reasonable relationship to this purpose, the statute may not be struck

down. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d at 585. The lead opinion acknowledges

that the statute “must be upheld if there is a conceivable basis for

finding it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest” and that the

legislature’s judgment is “not subject to judicial fact finding and ‘may

be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical

data.’ ” Slip op. at 4, quoting Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d

142, 147 (2003). 

It is entirely rational for the legislature to conclude that the

possible suspension of one’s driver’s license may serve as an incentive

to comply with a law or court order. For example, section

6–201(a)(3) of the Vehicle Code provides that the Secretary of State

may cancel a license or permit for failure to pay fees or civil penalties

owed to the Illinois Commerce Commission. 625 ILCS 5/6–201(a)(3)

(West 2008). Section 6–201(a)(9) provides that the Secretary may

cancel the license of any person who “has been convicted of a sex

offense as defined in the Sex Offender Registration Act,” and that the

license shall remain cancelled until the person registers as required and

has otherwise complied with the requirements of the Registration Act.

625 ILCS 5/6–201(a)(9) (West 2008). Section 6–103(14) provides

that the Secretary “shall not issue, renew, or allow the retention of any

driver’s license nor issue any permit under this Code *** [t]o any

person who is 90 days or more delinquent in court ordered child

support payments or has been adjudicated in arrears in an amount

equal to 90 days’ obligation or more and who has been found in

contempt of court for failure to pay the support.” 625 ILCS

5/6–103(14) (West 2008).

Under the reasoning of Lindner, these provisions would be

unconstitutional because they do not relate directly to the narrowly
-24-

defined public interest in ensuring that “drivers who have

demonstrated they are unfit to safely operate vehicles are not allowed

to drive.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. However, it is clear that the

legislature, on occasion, uses the provisions of the Vehicle Code to

advance broader public purposes. 

I would find that section 6–206(a)(43) bears a rational relationship

to the legitimate public purposes of encouraging compliance with

section 6–20 of the Liquor Control Act and of protecting young

drivers and the public from the potentially fatal consequences that may

follow when a young person whose judgment is impaired by alcohol

gets behind the wheel of a car.

JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this special concurrence.

JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:

I dissent from today’s resolution of this case because, under the

principles set forth in People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174 (1989), the

circuit court correctly ruled section 6–206(a)(43) of the Vehicle Code

to be unconstitutional. 

Justice Garman’s assessment of Justice Kilbride’s opinion is welltaken, and I agree with her that his analysis renders Lindner

meaningless. Slip op. at 16-18 (Garman, J., specially concurring,

joined by Thomas, J.). Justice Garman also accurately identifies our

options in this case: either we overrule Lindner’s view of the purpose

of section 6–205 or we apply the case and affirm the trial court’s

ruling. Slip op. at 16 (Garman, J., specially concurring, joined by

Thomas, J.).

Rather than ask that Lindner be overruled, the State believes it can

be distinguished from this case. Lindner cannot be distinguished in any

meaningful way, Justice Kilbride’s suggestion notwithstanding, as

Justice Garman correctly recognizes. I might also note that in the 21

years since Lindner was announced, there has been no indication from

this court that Lindner was either wrongly decided or too narrowly

defined the purpose of section 6–205. 

Stare decisis means, of course, that prior decisions, Lindner

included, should be overturned only on a showing of good cause.

People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 146 (2007). Because no one is
-25-

asking for Lindner to be overruled, the court does not have the benefit

of any developed argument as to good cause. I therefore express no

opinion on whether Lindner should be overruled.

JUSTICE BURKE joins in this dissent.