United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued October 2, 2007

Decided October 18, 2007

Before

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 07-1197

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DONNELLA ANDERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division 

No. 06-CR-291-1

Ronald A. Guzman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Donnella Anderson pleaded guilty to causing false claims for income-tax

refunds to be submitted to the Internal Revenue Service. See 18 U.S.C. § 287. The

district court sentenced her to 18 months’ imprisonment, at the low end of the

guidelines range. On appeal, Anderson argues that the district court erroneously

presumed that a prison term within the guidelines range was the appropriate

sentence. She also argues that the court did not sufficiently explain its choice of

sentence. Both contentions are without merit.

Anderson operated Bestway Tax Services out of her home in Chicago, Illinois. 

She prepared federal income-tax returns for clients, and offered refund-anticipation

loans through an arrangement with a bank. Bestway would make the loan to the

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07-1197 Page 2

client through the bank, taking a portion as a preparation fee. The IRS would then

deposit the refund directly into Bestway’s account. 

Between January and May 2003, Anderson knowingly filed 25 fraudulent

income-tax returns on behalf of her clients. Anderson altered or created false W-2s

to increase the amount of income her clients earned, and listed fraudulent

deductions and credits, all with an eye toward increasing the refund she would

receive. There is no evidence that Anderson’s clients were aware of the false filings. 

In total Anderson claimed more than $114,375 in false refunds. Anderson pleaded

guilty to four counts, each arising from a different return.

The probation officer calculated a guidelines imprisonment range of 27 to 33

months. Before sentencing, however, Anderson filed a memorandum contending

that she should not be imprisoned at all. Anderson argued that if she was

imprisoned there would be no one who could “truly” care for her three minor boys

(at that time, ages 12, 14, and 15), despite the fact that she is married and her

husband lives with her and her sons. Anderson asserted that the boys could not

afford to lose their primary caretaker, and that the family could not continue

sending them to private school with her in prison. Her husband submitted a letter

asserting that he would have a difficult time raising the boys without Anderson and

that it would be a significant hardship if she was incarcerated.

At sentencing, in November 2006, the district court acknowledged receiving

Anderson’s memorandum. Counsel for both sides addressed the court about the

sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court stated that it had

reviewed the presentence report and the written submissions of both attorneys, that

it was familiar with the facts of the case from the written plea agreement, and that

it took these matters into consideration. The district court rejected the probation

officer’s proposed finding that Anderson had not accepted responsibility,

recalculated the guidelines range as 18 to 24 months, and explained that it settled

on a sentence of 18 months “[b]ased on all of the information, the totality of the

circumstances.” 

Months later, before she began serving her sentence, Anderson moved to stay

her surrender date pending the resolution of this appeal. On March 1, 2007, the

district court conducted a hearing on Anderson’s motion. At that time, the Supreme

Court had not announced its decision in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456

(2007), and Anderson argued that the outcome could affect this appeal. The district

court denied the motion, stating:

I remember this case and I think the sentence was extremely

fair. This is not a harsh sentence. It’s not beyond—I mean, I have

difficulty believing that the end result for your client is going to be any
No. 07-1197 Page 3

different than it is now and, if so, all we’re doing is wasting time, hers

and ours.

. . . . 

If I thought you had an appeal in which there was a substantial

issue as to guilt or innocence, it would be a different story, but that

doesn’t exist here and I don’t think, in the grand scheme of things,

this motion is gaining anything of substantial value for your client

even if we assume all the most favorable outcome to your client.

. . . . 

I guess what I’m telling you is that I don’t see the sentence

being any different. Even if I do not indulge in the presumption of

reasonableness to the Guideline range and even if I do not consider it

necessary to prove an extraordinary circumstance to move outside the

Guideline range, it’s not going to change.

. . . . 

And if I look at the Guidelines just as a factor to consider,

which the Supreme Court says is what we have to do, the sentence

would still be the same. . . . 

Anderson makes two arguments. First, she contends that the district court

erroneously presumed that it should impose a sentence within the guidelines

imprisonment range. Second, Anderson argues that the district court failed to

articulate sufficient reasons for the sentence imposed. Whether a district court

followed the correct procedures for imposing sentence under the advisory guidelines

regime is a question of law we review de novo. United States v. Tyra, 454 F.3d 686,

687 (7th Cir. 2006).

Anderson’s first contention is not supported by the record. At no point at

sentencing did the district court state that it was imposing a prison term within the

guidelines because it believed such a sentence to be presumptively reasonable. 

Anderson attempts to side-step this fact by first suggesting that the court’s failure

to elaborate on its choice of sentence, coupled with the selection of a term within the

guidelines range, must mean that the court presumed that a within-range sentence

should be imposed. But Anderson offers no authority for this inference. To the

contrary, little explanation is required for a sentence within the range, Rita, 127

S. Ct. at 2468; United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2005), so the

inference Anderson proposes would be nonsensical. More likely, the district judge
No. 07-1197 Page 4

reasoned that little explanation was required because he found this case to be

typical and, in light of the statutory factors, rested his reasoning upon that of the

Sentencing Commission. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468.

Anderson’s fallback position is that statements made by the district court

during the hearing on her motion to stay the surrender date necessitate a finding

that the court had engaged in a presumption of reasonableness at sentencing. But

rather than evidencing that the court indulged in an impermissible presumption at

sentencing, the judge’s comments reflect his effort to cast himself in the role of

appellate judge to assess whether Rita, which was still pending in the Supreme

Court, might affect our review of Anderson’s sentence. The district court simply

was evaluating whether Anderson had an appellate argument worthy of delaying

her surrender date even further. Indeed, the district judge stated that the Supreme

Court had mandated that the guidelines be viewed “just as a factor to consider,”

which undercuts Anderson’s argument that the court at sentencing had presumed

that a sentence within the range should be imposed. At any rate, statements made

by the district court in March 2007 shed very little light on whether the district

court applied a presumption of reasonableness at Anderson’s sentencing in

November 2006.

 Also without merit is Anderson’s contention that the district court did not

sufficiently explain its sentence. In Rita, the Supreme Court noted that lengthy

explanation usually will be unnecessary where the judge decides to impose a

sentence within the guidelines. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468. Often the record will

evidence that the district court saw nothing atypical about the defendant’s situation

and relied on “the Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a

proper sentence (in terms of § 3553(a) and other congressional mandates) in the

typical case.” Id. That is what happened here.

 Anderson’s sole argument for a sentence below the guidelines range was that

her family will suffer from her absence. But there is nothing unusual about familial

relationships suffering as the result of criminal activity and subsequent

incarceration. See United States v. DeVegter, 439 F.3d 1299, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006);

United States v. Jaderany, 221 F.3d 989, 996 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Wright, 218 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Carter, 122 F.3d 469, 474

(7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 907 (7th Cir. 1994). That is

the norm, and it is why the Sentencing Commission concluded that family

circumstances ordinarily are not relevant to the choice of sentence. See U.S.S.G.

§ 5H1.6. As the Commission has explained, “the fact that the defendant’s family

might incur some degree of financial hardship or suffer to some extent from the

absence of a parent through incarceration is not in itself sufficient as a basis for

departure because such hardship or suffering is of a sort ordinarily incident to

incarceration.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 cmt. 1(B)(ii). And though after United States v.
No. 07-1197 Page 5

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a district court has greater discretion in fashioning an

appropriate sentence, a reason for sentencing outside the range that was

questionable before Booker is still suspect after Booker. United States v. Boscarino,

437 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2006). 

The level of detail required to explain a particular sentence is proportional to

the gravity of the arguments raised by the party requesting a different sentence. 

United States v. Spano, 447 F.3d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 2006). Anderson did not

identify anything unusual about her family situation, and because she presented no

serious argument for a lower sentence, the district judge was not required to say

more than he did. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468; United States v. Gama-Gonzalez, 469

F.3d 1109, 1111 (7th Cir. 2006). The district court did exactly what the Supreme

Court in Rita said would be sufficient in the typical case. Anderson’s case is typical. 

Her sentence is therefore

AFFIRMED.