[Cite as State v. Baro, 2013-Ohio-5139.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 12AP-968 

 (C.P.C. No. 12CR-02-872)

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Siradjou Baro, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on November 21, 2013 

 

Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael P. Walton, 

for appellee. 

Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and David L. Strait, for 

appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

McCORMAC, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Siradjou Baro, appeals from the October 19, 2012 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas convicting him, pursuant to a 

no contest plea, of two counts of trademark counterfeiting and imposing a term of 

community control. Defendant assigns a single error: 

The trial court committed reversible error by overruling a 

defense motion to suppress the results of a search conducted 

in violation of the rights afforded by the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 

and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 

Because the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress, we affirm. 
No. 12AP-968 2 

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On September 9, 2011, Charles Disbennett, a counterfeit merchandise 

investigator for Hi-Hope Consulting, informed the Franklin County Sheriff's Office that 

counterfeit merchandise was being sold at Eastland Flea Market. (Joint Exhibit 1, 

Attachment 1.) On September 18, 2011, Detective Joe Schuler and Disbennett conducted 

a plain-clothes canvass of Eastland Flea Market for counterfeit merchandise. (Joint 

Exhibit 1, Attachment 1.) Disbennett noted counterfeit merchandise was being sold at all 

but two of the booths in operation on the day of the canvass. (Joint Exhibit 1, Attachment 

1.) 

{¶ 3} Following the canvass, Detective Schuler asked a Franklin County 

Municipal Court judge whether a separate warrant would be necessary for each booth 

within the flea market. Upon the opinion of the judge that a single warrant would validly 

authorize a search of the entire building, Detective Schuler filed an application for a single 

search warrant. 

{¶ 4} On October 6, 2011, another judge of the Franklin County Municipal Court 

issued a warrant authorizing a search of Eastland Flea Market for evidence of counterfeit 

merchandise. (Attached as an Appendix.) On October 7, 2011, detectives from the 

Franklin County Sheriff's Office executed the search warrant at the flea market. 

{¶ 5} At the time of the search, defendant was in control of four booths at the flea 

market, which was open for regular business at the time. Officers interviewed defendant, 

identified him, and allowed him to leave while they completed an inventory of the items 

found in his booths. Investigators seized items including merchandise offered for sale and 

merchandise tags containing company trademarks. 

{¶ 6} By indictment filed February 15, 2012, defendant was charged with seven 

counts of trademark counterfeiting in violation of R.C. 2913.34. On June 21, 2012, 

defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by officers from Eastland Flea 

Market, contending that the evidence was unconstitutionally obtained in violation of the 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Ohio Constitution, 

Article I, Section 14. On September 27, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on the motion 

to suppress and, after receiving testimony, denied the motion. On October 17, 2012, 
No. 12AP-968 3 

defendant entered a no contest plea to the indicted offenses and the trial court sentenced 

him accordingly. 

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 7} Appellate review of a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of law 

and fact. "In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in 

the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate witness credibility." State v. 

Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96 (8th Dist.1994). The reviewing court must accept the trial 

court's findings of fact in ruling on a motion to suppress if the findings are supported by 

competent, credible evidence. State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 627 (4th Dist.1993). 

Accepting the facts as true, the reviewing court must then independently determine as a 

matter of law, without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the 

appropriate legal standard. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. 

{¶ 8} Defendant asserts the trial court erred in overruling the motion to suppress 

evidence because the warrant to search and seize his property did not particularly 

describe the place to be searched. The state responds that (1) the issued warrant was 

valid, (2) the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, and (3) the plain view 

exception to the warrant requirement applies. 

A. Plain-View Exception 

{¶ 9} Defendant contends the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement 

does not apply because the seized evidence was not in plain view, the discovery of the 

evidence was not inadvertent, and the incriminating nature of the evidence was not 

readily apparent. Because the record is unclear as to whether some of the evidence seized 

from defendant's booths was in plain view, we examine whether the search warrant was 

valid or if another exception to the warrant requirement applies. 

B. The Warrant Was Validly Issued Under the Circumstances 

{¶ 10} The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as applied to the states 

through the Fourteenth Amendment, and Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14, protect 

"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

unreasonable searches and seizures." See State v. Ford, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-803, 2008-

Ohio-4373, ¶ 19 (noting the protections of Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14, and the 

Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are coextensive), citing State v. Robinette, 80 
No. 12AP-968 4 

Ohio St.3d 234, 238-39 (1997). " '[T]he Fourth Amendment "safeguard is designed to 

require a description which particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place so as to 

exclude all others." ' " United States v. Votteller, 544 F.2d 1355, 1357 (6th Cir.1976), 

quoting United States v. Lemmens, 527 F.2d 662, 666 (6th Cir.1976), quoting People v. 

Watson, 26 Ill.2d 203 (1962). "The Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity 

prevents 'a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.' " State v. Young, 

146 Ohio App.3d 245, 256, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 

(1971). 

{¶ 11} Defendant contends the particularity requirement was violated in this 

instance because the warrant described the entire building instead of the individual 

booths operated by defendant. In Votteller, a single warrant was issued to search a multifloor building containing a business on the first floor and separate apartments on the 

other floors. Id. at 1362. The court found the warrant was void because it authorized a 

search of the entire building without cause to search all of the units. Id. at 1364. 

{¶ 12} Unlike in Votteller, where the building was a multi-use structure subdivided 

by walls and floors into distinct, self-contained units, the Eastland Flea Market was a 

single-use structure consisting of open displays and booths. Under these circumstances, 

the Eastland Flea Market cannot be considered a multi-unit structure and, therefore, the 

warrant in this case complied with the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement. 

C. Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Applies 

{¶ 13} Although finding the warrant validly authorized the search ends the 

analysis, we nevertheless examine whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 

rule applies in the event the warrant was invalid. 

{¶ 14} "The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search or 

arrest was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies." 

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009). "The exclusionary rule should not be 

applied to suppress evidence obtained by police officers acting in objectively reasonable, 

good faith reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but 

ultimately found to be invalid." State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251 (1986), paragraph 

one of the syllabus, following United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). "To trigger the 

exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can 
No. 12AP-968 5 

meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price 

paid by the justice system." Herring at 144. 

{¶ 15} The deterrence rationale underlying the exclusionary rule " 'loses much of 

its force' * * * when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search 

warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope." Leon at 919-920, quoting 

Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). "In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be 

expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that 

the form of the warrant is technically sufficient." Id. at 921. See also Massachusetts v. 

Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990 (1984) (" '[T]he exclusionary rule was adopted to deter 

unlawful searches by police, not to punish the errors of magistrates and judges.' "), 

quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 263 (1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment); 

Herring at 142. Here, the officers properly requested a determination by a judge on the 

issue of whether multiple warrants were required to execute the search. Even if the single 

warrant for the entire structure was invalid, the error in issuing the warrant would be 

attributable to the judge, not the officers. 

{¶ 16} However, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply 

where the officer's reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable. "[S]uppression 

remains an appropriate remedy where: (1) '* * * the magistrate or judge * * * was misled 

by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was 

false except for his reckless disregard of the truth * * *'; (2) '* * * the issuing magistrate 

wholly abandoned his judicial role * * *'; (3) an officer purports to rely upon '* * * a 

warrant based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official 

belief in its existence entirely unreasonable" '; or (4) '* * * depending on the circumstances 

of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize 

the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot 

reasonably presume it to be valid.' " State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 331 (1989), 

quoting Leon at 923. 

{¶ 17} Defendant contends that because the warrant authorized a search of the 

entire structure, it was so facially deficient in particularizing the place to be searched that 

officers could not reasonably have presumed it to be valid. Defendant's argument is 

without merit since, as discussed above, the warrant complied with the particularity 
No. 12AP-968 6 

requirement. Thus, suppressing evidence obtained in this case through objectively 

reasonable reliance on the issued warrant would not serve the deterrence rationale of the 

exclusionary rule. See Leon at 922. 

{¶ 18} Because the warrant validly authorized the search and seizure of 

defendant's property or, in the alternative, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 

rule would apply if the warrant was invalid, we find there was no violation of the Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Ohio Constitution, Article I 

Section 14. Accordingly, defendant's assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Disposition 

{¶ 19} Having overruled defendant's assignment of error, we affirm the judgment 

of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT, P.J., and SADLER, J., concur. 

McCORMAC, J., retired, of the Tenth Appellate District, 

assigned to active duty under authority of the Ohio 

Constitution, Article IV, Section 6(C). 

 
No. 12AP-968 7 

APPENDIX
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