alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 235 (Wednesday, December 6, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 76312-76313]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-30992]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION


Performance Review Board; Membership: Senior Executive Service

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the names of the members of the 
Performance Review Board.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ledia Esther Bernal, Director, Office 
of Financial and Administrative Services, Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission, 1120 20th Street, NW., 9th Floor, NW., 
Washington, DC 20036, (202) 606-5390.

[[Page 76313]]


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 4313(c)(1) through (5) of title 5 
U.S.C. requires each agency to establish in accordance with regulations 
prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management, one or more 
Performance Review Board(s).
    Members of the Performance Review Board are:

1. Elizabeth M. Thornton, Director, Office of Field Programs, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.
2. Richard L. Baker, Executive Director, Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Review Commission.
3. Earl R. Ohman, Jr., General Counsel, Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission.
4. Patricia A. Randle, Executive Director, Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission.

    Dated: November 30, 2000.
Thomasina V. Rogers,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. 00-30992 Filed 12-5-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7600-01-M
#### ALEXANDER W. HERMAN & CO., Appellant, v. LOFT, Incorporated, and Pepsi-Cola Company, Appellees.

No. 4617.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

March 12, 1940.

Allan D. Emil and Herman A. Benjamin, both of New York City, and Leon M. Bazile, of Richmond, Va., for appellant.

J. Randolph Tucker, of Richmond, Va., and Arthur T. Vanderbilt, of Newark, N. J., for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Cause docketed and dismissed on motion of appellees. Order filed.
Order entered May 30, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 12
- 00887
- CR MIQUEL ZUNIGA LOPEZ , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3

Dallas County, Texas Trial Cour t Cause No. F12
- 00559
- J



### O RDER In this case, appellant raises an issue related to the costs assessed against him. The record, however, does not contain a cost bill or other document with an itemized list of costs
assessed in this case. Accordingly, we ORDER the Dallas County District Clerk to file, within FIFTEEN DAYS of the date of this order, a supplemental clerk’s record containing a detailed itemization of the costs assessed in this case, including but not limited to, specific court costs, fees, and court appointed attorney fees. We further ORDER that the supplemental clerk’s record include a document explaining any and all abbreviations used to designate a particular fee, cost, or court appointed attorney fee.We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to Gary

Fitzsimmons, Dallas County District Clerk; the Dallas County District Clerk’s Office, Criminal Records Division; and to counsel for all parties.

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1820 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1820

To provide for the retention and service of transgender members of the 
                             Armed Forces.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 14, 2017

 Mrs. Gillibrand (for herself, Mr. McCain, Ms. Collins, and Mr. Reed) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
                      Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide for the retention and service of transgender members of the 
                             Armed Forces.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RETENTION AND SERVICE OF TRANSGENDER MEMBERS OF THE ARMED 
              FORCES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
individuals who are qualified and can meet the standards to serve in 
the military should be eligible to serve.
    (b) Certain Actions Relating to Currently Serving Members of the 
Armed Forces.--A currently serving member of the Armed Forces may not 
be involuntarily separated from the Armed Forces, or denied 
reenlistment or continuation in service in the Armed Forces, solely on 
the basis of the member's gender identity. Nothing in this subsection 
relieves a member from meeting applicable military and medical 
standards, including deployability, or requires retention of the member 
in service if the member fails to meet such standards.
    (c) Review of Accession of Transgender Individuals Into the Armed 
Forces.--
            (1) Deadline for completion of review.--The Secretary of 
        Defense shall complete the review of policy on the accession of 
        transgender individuals into the Armed Forces announced by the 
        Secretary on June 30, 2017, by not later than December 31, 
        2017.
            (2) Report.--Not later than February 21, 2018, the 
        Secretary shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report on 
        the results of the review of policy described in paragraph (1).
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER>  1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                           SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                               $   1,081,007
<SECURITIES>                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                         $  9,711,739
<ALLOWANCES>                                     0
<INVENTORY>                                      0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                       $12,042,579
<PP&E>                                 $   766,915
<DEPRECIATION>                                   0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                         $13,251,642
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                 $    765,652
<BONDS>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                                      0
<COMMON>                                    $1,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 $39,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>           $13,251,642
<SALES>                                 $1,152,685
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        $1,170,130
<CGS>                                     $  5,548
<TOTAL-COSTS>                             $970,319
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        $964,771
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           $199,811
<INCOME-TAX>                                     0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              0
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                             $(104,518)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 23.1


            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM


We have issued our report  dated  March 9, 2007  accompanying  the  consolidated
financial  statements of Synergy Brands, Inc. and subsidiaries  appearing in the
2006 Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended  December 31, 2006,  which is
incorporated by reference in the Registration  Statement No.  333-126539 on Form
S-3/A.  We  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in  the  Registration
Statement of the aforementioned  report and to the use of our name as it appears
under the caption "Experts".

/s/ Holtz Rubenstein Reminick LLP
Holtz Rubenstein Reminick LLP
Melville, New York
March 30, 2007
#### HICKS v. HIGHTOWER et al.

No. 3450.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

Dec. 6, 1938.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 7, 1938.

Howth, Adams & Hart, of Beaumont, for appellant.

J. E. Wheat and C. C. Hightower, both of Woodville, for appellees.

WALKER, Chief Justice.

On April 2, 1938, an election was held at Spurger, Texas, in Tyler County, to determine whether or not bonds should be issued by the Spurger Rural High School District for the purpose of remodeling a building used for school purposes at Spurger, Texas; the election resulted in favor of the bonds. This suit was filed by appellant as a contest against the result of the election. The appeal is before us' without a statement of facts, bills of exception, ás-signments of error, or propositions. Appellant makes this statement in his brief; “There was no evidence introduced on the trial of the case.” Appellee replied to that statement;- “It is not agreed that there was no evidence introduced on the trial of the case.” The judgment recites; “* * * the court after having heard the pleadings read, the evidence adduced and argument of counsel thereon is of the opinion that the law and facts are with the eontestees.” Appellant’s brief presents nothing for review.

On the allegations of appellant’s petition, the election was called and held as provided by Art. *29221,*as amended in 1937 by the 2nd called session of the 45th Legislature, House Bill No. 98 (Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. *29221).*Also, on the allegations of the petition, no specific rate of tax was embodied in the notice of the election. It was not necessary for the call of the election and the notice to stipulate a specific tax rate. Articles 2783-2788, R.C.S.; Common School District v. Farmers & Bankers Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 95 S.W.2d 502; Chambers v. Cook, Tex.Civ.App., 132 S.W. 865.

The judgment of the lower court is in all things affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 10(p)**

**AMENDMENT**

**TO**

**EXCESS BENEFIT PLAN**

 

THIS AMENDMENT is adopted this 19th day of July , 2005 by ESB FINANCIAL CORPORATION (formerly known as “PennFirst Bancorp, Inc.” and hereinafter simply referred to as “ESB”). 

 

RECITALS: 

 

WHEREAS, ESB is the sponsor of the ESB Financial Corporation Excess Benefit Plan(formerly known as the “PennFirst Bancorp, Inc. Excess Benefit Plan” and hereinafter simply referred to as the “Plan”); and 

 

WHEREAS, the Plan provides for the payment of certain deferred compensation to the participants in the Plan, subject to the terms and conditions setforth in the Plan; and 

 

WHEREAS, Section 409A of the InternalRevenue Code (added to the Code by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004) and IRS Notice 2005-1 contain new rules governing the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements, generally effective January 1, 2005; and 

 

WHEREAS, Q. & A. 19 in IRS Notice 2005-1 permits parties to amendexisting deferred compensation arrangements during 2005 in order to conform to the provisions of Section 409A; and 

 

WHEREAS, ESB now wishes to amend the Plan in order to achieve compliance with Section 409A, in accordance with Q. & A. 19 in IRS Notice2005-1. 

NOW, THEREFORE, ESB, intending to be legally bound, hereby amends the Plan, effective January 1,2005, as follows: 

 

FIRST: The following new language is hereby addedto Section 5.02 of the Plan: 

 

 

“Notwithstanding any other provision in this Plan, all amounts held in the Plan attributable to Supplemental Matching Contributions and SupplementalESOP Allocations credited to the account of a Participant after December 31, 2004 will be distributed to the Participant or the Participant’s beneficiary as soon as administratively feasible after the earlier of: 

 

(a) the date of the Participant’s death, or 

 

(b) the date which is six months after the date of the Participant’stermination of employment with the Company for any reason other the Participant’s death.” 

 

 

 

SECOND: Inall other respects, the Plan is hereby ratified and confirmed. 

 

 

 

INTENDING TO BE LEGALLY BOUND HEREBY, ESB has signed below as of the day firstabove written. 

 

 
ATTEST: ESB FINANCIAL CORPORATION:  /s/  Frank D.Martz                             By   /s/  Charlotte A.Zuschlag                        Frank D. Martz, Secretary  Charlotte A. Zuschlag, President
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.3

SCHEDULE IDENTIFYING AGREEMENTS SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL TO THE FORM OF
INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT CONSTITUTING EXHIBIT 10.2 HERETO ENTERED INTO BY
MINDSPEED TECHNOLOGIES, INC. AND EACH OF THE FOLLOWING PERSONS:

Name

Donald R. Beall
Dwight W. Decker
Donald L. Gips
Raouf Y. Halim
Ming Louie
Thomas A. Madden
Jerre L. Stead
Simon Biddiscombe
#### James Rossi et al., Respondents, v Main-South Hotel Associates et al., Appellants.

Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs and motion denied. Memorandum: To be entitled to a judgment on liability for a violation of section 240 (1) of the Labor Law, plaintiff was required to prove, as a matter of law, not only a violation of the section, but also that the violation was a proximate cause of his injuries *(see, Bland v Manocherian,*66 NY2d 452, 459; *Avner v 93rd St. Assn.,*147 AD2d 414, 415; *Heath v Soloff Constr.,*107 AD2d 507, 510; *Mack v Altmans Stage Light. Co.,*98 AD2d 468, 470-471). Supreme Court erred in granting plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on liability under section 240 of the Labor Law because there is a question of fact whether the claimed violation of the statute occurring in December of 1986 was a proximate cause of his injuries. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Affronti, J.—summary judgment.) Present—Denman, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Balio and Davis, JJ.
Exhibit 32

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      This  Certification  is intended to accompany the Quarterly  Report of SVB
Financial Services, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March
31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange  Commission  (the  "Report"),
and is given solely for the purpose of satisfying the  requirements of 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002.  To the best of their  knowledge,  the  undersigned,  in their  respective
capacities as set forth below, hereby certify that:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
            material respects,  the financial condition and results of operation
            of the Company.

/s/ Robert P. Corcoran
-------------------------------------------
Robert P. Corcoran, Chief Executive Officer             Date: May 13, 2005

/s/ Keith B. McCarthy
-------------------------------------------
Keith B. McCarthy, Chief Financial Officer              Date: May 13, 2005

A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of this written  statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to SVB Financial  Services,  Inc. and
will be retained by SVB Financial Services, Inc. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Aaron Michael Marshall, Appellant

No. 06-23-00163-CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

Appeal from the 5th District Court of Cass

County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 2022F00025). 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Stevens and 

Justices van Cleef and Rambin. 

Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice 

Rambin. 

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant, Aaron Michael Marshall, has adequately indicated his 

inability to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED JULY 12, 2024

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

SCOTT E. STEVENS

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 9, 2020

No. 04

- 19

- 00889

- CR

Cameron An toine ROBY, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 226th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CR6809

The Honorable Velia J. Meza , Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Appellant’s brief was originally due to be filed on March 19, 2020. On July 31, 2020, we abated this case for an abandonment hearing. On August 27, 2020, we reinstated this case after

the trial court had appointed new appellate counsel. On October 5, 2020, we received notice that newly appointed counsel had died; consequently, the trial court appointed another counsel, Patrick Ballantyne, to represent appellant. On October 18, 2020, Mr. Ballantyne reques ted a sixty

- day extension of time to review the record and file a brief. We granted the request and ordered appellant’s brief due on December 4, 2020.

To date, appellant’s brief has not been filed. Therefore, a ppellant’s attorney , Mr. Ballantyne, is OR DERED to respond to this court in writing by December 14, 2020

. The response should state a reasonable explanation for failing to timely file the brief and demonstrate the steps being taken to remedy the deficiency. If Mr. Ballantyne fails to file an ade quate response within seven days, this appeal will be abated to the trial court for an abandonment hearing, and the trial court will be asked to consider whether sanctions are appropriate. T EX

. R.

A PP

. P. 38.8(b)(2).

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 9th day of December, 2020

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, Clerk of Court
#### WOOD et al. v. BANKERS LIFE & LOAN ASS’N OF DALLAS.

No. 24028.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 1, 1939.

Geo. M. Hopkins, of Denton, for plaintiffs in error.

J. Frank Wilson, of Dallas, and Fred H. Minor, of Denton, for defendant in eri-or.

PER CURIAM.

The application for writ of error in this case is.stamped “Dismissed W. O. J.,” by virtue of a rule adopted by this Court effective March 1, 1939, which rule reads as follows:

> “5a. Under Article 1821, of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, and Article 1728, of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as amended [Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. arts. 1821 and 1728], certain cases are placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court qn writ of error. Such cases must be dismissed by the Supreme Court for want of jurisdiction on the applications for writs of error.

> “Under Subdivision 6 of Article 1728, as amended it is directed that ‘in all cases where the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is a correct one but the Supreme Court is not satisfied that the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals in all respects has correctly declared the law, it shall dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.’

> “In order that parties, attorneys, and the courts may be advised of the classification made by the Supreme Court in dismissing each application for writ of error, effective from this date, each application dismissed because the "case is adjudged beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on writ of error will be stamped ‘Dismissed W. O. J.’, while each case dismissed under the above quoted portion of Subdivision 6 of Article 1728, as amended, will be stamped ‘Dismissed, W. O. J. — Correct judgment.’ ”

 This is a suit for $250. It originated in the county court. We hold that the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in this case is final, and that we have no jurisdiction to grant a writ of error. Section 1, Article 1821, R.C.S.1925, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 1821, subd. 1. In our opinion, this case presents no question which under the exceptions contained in the above statute, would confer jurisdiction on this Court. This Court is therefore without actual jurisdiction. This application is therefore “Dismissed W. O. J.,’’ which means that it is dismissed because we are without jurisdiction. As shown by the above rule, hereafter when a case is “Dismissed W. O. J.,” and nothing more, it is meant that this Court is without jurisdiction.
Abatement Order filed November 3, 2014

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 14

- 00600

- CV

____________ IN RE LARRY TAYLOR, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPA CITY AS STATE

SENATOR FOR DISTRICT 11 , Relator

O RIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS 21 2th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 14CV0395



### ABATEMENT ORDER

On July 24, 2014, relator Larry Taylor, in his official capacity as State Senator for District 11, filed a petition for writ of mandamus, asking this court to

compe l the Honorable Bret Griffin, presiding j udge of the 212th District Court of Galveston County, to vacate an order that denied relator’s motion to quash a2

deposition subpoena and subpoena duces tecum or for a protective order, and that granted a motion to c ompel the deposition of relator.
On October 29, 2014, relator filed a letter informing this court that the parties in the underlying litigation have reached a settlement agreement in principle, but that the settlement has not yet been finalized. Relator fu rther writes that the real party in interest has represented that in the event settlement of the underlying litigation is finalized, the real party in interest no longer will pursue the challenged discovery.
Based on the foregoing representations, we orde r this original proceeding abated pending the outcome of the efforts by the parties to the underlying litigation
to finalize the settlement. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of relator’s petition, we abate this original proceeding, t reat it as a closed case, and remove it from the court’s active docket. This court will consider an appropriate motion filed by either party to dismiss or reinstate this original proceeding, including a motion for temporary relief, as appropriate.

We fur ther direct relator to advise this court of the status of the settlement
discussions in the underlying litigation every thirty (30) days from the date of this order until this original proceeding is reinstated or dismissed.

It is so ORDERED

.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Donovan and Brown

.
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 12

- 00353

- CV

IN RE GEORGE DE LOS SANTOS RELATOR

------------

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

------------



### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

------------

The court has considered relator’s petition for writ of mandamus and is of

the opinion that relief should be denied. Accordingly, relator’s petition for writ of

mandamus is denied.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: GABRIEL, GARDNER, and MCCOY, JJ.

DELIVERED: October 8 , 2012

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4, 52.8 (d).