United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

 June 5, 2019 

Before 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge 

No. 19-1728 

RUBEN LOPEZ RAMOS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General 

of the United States, 

 Respondent.

 Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals. 

No. A039-091-760 

O R D E R 

 IT IS ORDERED that the motion for stay of removal is DENIED. The temporary 

stay of removal entered on April 18, 2019, is VACATED. Petitioner has demonstrated 

neither the irreparable harm nor substantial likelihood of success on the merits required 

for a stay under Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009). While we are cognizant that removal 

imposes a serious burden on petitioner, the Supreme Court has made clear that “the 

burden of removal alone cannot constitute the requisite irreparable injury.” Id. at 434. 

And petitioner’s argument that the statutory scheme is irrational has little chance of 

succeeding. 
No. 19-1728 Page 2 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Ramos faces removal 

from the nation where he has been a lawful permanent resident for thirty years, since he 

was just ten years old. He is removable, rather than a United States citizen who has 

served his time, because of an odd, arguably irrational, conundrum. The conundrum 

arose under statutes that have been repealed but still apply to him. If Ramos had been 

born abroad to two non-citizens, he would have become a United States citizen 

automatically when his mother would have become a naturalized citizen. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1432 (1988) (repealed). His mother was born a citizen of the United States, though, so 

she was never naturalized. Because she had not resided in the United States before 

Ramos’s birth, a different rule applied. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1970). He did not become a 

United States citizen automatically upon his birth or as a minor, but he would have if 

only his mother had not been a citizen herself. 

Ramos argues that this odd differential treatment in favor of children of 

naturalized mothers as compared to mothers who are citizens by birth is irrational and 

violates the equal protection dimension of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause. 

He might be right. Neither the immigration judge nor the Board of Immigration 

Appeals had the authority to consider that constitutional claim. This court is not aware 

of any controlling or even persuasive authority from any court that would resolve this 

claim. While it may be difficult to win an equal protection case under the applicable 

rational-relation test, it is not impossible. Also, the 2001 repeal of the statutes posing 

this odd conundrum raises questions about the government’s interests here. 

In deciding Ramos’s motion for a stay of removal, under Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 

418 (2009), and Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 777–78 (1987), we should exercise 

equitable discretion by weighing the risk of irreparable harm posed by an incorrect 

decision (in either direction) and Ramos’s prospects for success on the merits. 

Removal of a long-term legal permanent resident who has a family and a life in this 

country will cause grave irreparable harm, not only to Ramos but also to his family of 

United States citizens. A delay of months to give our court time to consider his 

arguments carefully through the ordinary course of briefing and argument will, on the 

other hand, cause the government and the public no comparable or even appreciable 

harm. In the absence of controlling law that would show Ramos’s case is futile, we 

should leave the stay of removal in place while we consider this case in the ordinary 

course.