IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Grady Walker III :

 :

 :

v. : No. 771 C.D. 2018

 : Argued: April 9, 2019

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Motor Vehicles, :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge (P)

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: April 30, 2019

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau 

of Motor Vehicles (Department) appeals from an Order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Dauphin County (trial court) sustaining Grady Walker III’s (Licensee) 

appeal and rescinding the two-year suspension on Licensee’s Official Emission 

Inspector License. The trial court sustained Licensee’s appeal on the basis that the 

Department’s Order of Suspension was insufficient and deprived Licensee of due 

process. The Department presents two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court 

erred as a matter of law in sustaining Licensee’s appeal on the basis that the Order 

of Suspension did not satisfy due process; and (2) whether the Department satisfied 
2

its prima facie burden of proof to support the violations forming the basis for the 

Order of Suspension.1 Upon review, we affirm.

I. Facts

a. Suspension

The Department notified Licensee in 2016 that a report from the Quality 

Assurance Officer showed violations in Licensee’s emission inspection of a Toyota 

Corolla. The notice explained that the violations in question related to Licensee’s 

record keeping, as well as his furnishing, lending, giving, selling, or receiving an 

emission inspection sticker for the vehicle without inspection.

2

 (Reproduced 

Record (R.R.) at 57a.) The Department also notified Licensee that an informal 

Department hearing was scheduled for December 20, 2016, before the 

Pennsylvania Safety and Emissions Team for Licensee to present testimony 

pertinent to these violations. (Id. at 58a.) Although Licensee’s counsel and the 

trial court briefly noted that the Department hearing was held, there is no record of 

it before this Court. (Id. at 68a, 110a.)

The Department issued its Order of Suspension on January 31, 2017. The 

Order of Suspension provided:

You are hereby notified that your certification as an Official Emission 

Inspector is suspended, pursuant to Section 4726 of the Vehicle 

Code[, 75 Pa. C.S. § 47263]. No vehicle emission inspections may be 

 

1 The Department’s arguments have been reordered for ease of discussion.

2 The language that appears in this notice is almost identical to that at issue in the Order 

of Suspension.

3 Section 4726 of the Vehicle Code provides in relevant part that:

[t]he [D]epartment shall supervise mechanics certified under this section and may 

suspend the certification issued to a mechanic . . . if it finds that the mechanic has 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
3

performed during the suspension. Pursuant to Departmental 

regulations, your certification as an Official Emissions Inspector is 

suspended for one (1) year for furnish[ing], lend[ing], giv[ing], 

sell[ing] or receiv[ing] a certificate of inspection without inspection, 

and one (1) year for fraudulent record keeping (2012 Toyota Corolla 

VIN: 2T1BU4EE0CC831095, sticker issued IM6-5355744, to the 

vehicle, by [Licensee], Operator #23-748-450).

(Id. at 55a.) Licensee appealed to the trial court, which issued a supersedeas order 

staying the suspension pending final disposition of the appeal. (Id. at 21a.)

b. Trial court hearing

After various continuances, the trial court held a hearing on Licensee’s 

appeal on September 21, 2017. Preliminarily, Licensee argued that the Order of 

Suspension did not provide adequate notice for due process purposes because it did 

not set forth “a factual summary of the basis for suspension.” (Hr’g Tr. at 10.) 

The trial court deferred ruling on the due process issue until after the hearing. The 

Department offered into evidence the certified record of the Department, to which 

Licensee objected on the basis that one of the documents in the record, an emission 

station audit report, contained hearsay. The trial court conditionally admitted the 

certified record subject to verification of the hearsay at issue, but because the 

testimony did not pertain to that document, the trial court never ruled upon the 

objection. 

_____________________________

(continued...)

improperly conducted inspections or has violated or failed to comply with any of 

the provisions of this chapter or regulations adopted by the [D]epartment.

75 Pa. C.S. § 4726.
4

The Department presented the testimony of William Moyer (Moyer), who is 

the regional manager for quality assurance officers with Parsons, a company

subcontracted by the Department for auditing emission and safety inspections. (Id.

at 13-14.) Moyer testified as follows about Licensee’s violations based upon a 

spreadsheet that Moyer provided to the Department with information about 

inspections conducted by Licensee for the vehicle in question. (Id. at 16-17; Ex. 

C-1(7), R.R. at 63a-65a.) Moyer explained that the inspections were linked to 

Licensee, as inspectors were required to input their license numbers and passwords 

into emission analyzers before beginning inspection. (Hr’g Tr. at 18-19, 21.) The 

information in the report was stored in the vehicle identification information 

database and reviewed monthly for irregularities. (Id. at 20.) The report showed 

that on May 23, 2016, the Toyota Corolla that Licensee inspected had a mileage of 

82,867,4 a figure which Licensee was required to manually enter. (Id. at 25-26; Ex. 

C-1(7), R.R. at 63a-64a.) The vehicle subsequently failed the emission test. (Hr’g 

Tr. at 25.) The report also showed an inspection for the same vehicle 10 days later, 

on June 3, 2016, and Licensee entered the mileage of 88,502 at that time. (Id. at 

26, 29, 31.) Licensee then gave the vehicle an emission inspection sticker on the 

basis that the vehicle fell within the 5000-mile exemption, which provides that a 

vehicle driven less than 5000 miles in 12 months and owned by the same 

individual for over a year may be provided an exemption emission inspection 

sticker. (Id. at 26-27.) Inspectors can verify that the vehicle has been driven less 

than 5000 miles by referencing the inspection sticker, the inspection report from 

 

4 The mileage reported in the May 2016 inspection was over 5000 miles from the last 

inspection on the Toyota Corolla in March 2015, at which time the vehicle’s mileage was

59,681. (R.R. at 64a.)
5

the previous year, or through the inspection station’s emission analyzer. (Id. at 27-

28.) However, the emission analyzer does not automatically recognize or alert the 

inspector if the current mileage the inspector enters is over 5000 miles from the 

last inspection. (Id. at 38-40.) While a typical emission inspection requires the 

inspector to perform tests on the vehicle with the emission analyzer to confirm that 

the vehicle passes, such tests are not required when a 5000-mile exemption is 

provided. (Id. at 32-34.) Instead, when the inspector enters the 5000-mile 

exemption menu on the emission analyzer, the inspector enters the vehicle 

information, including VIN number, sticker number, and mileage for the car, the 

inspection is finalized, and the sticker issuance report for the exemption is printed. 

(Id. at 35-36.) At the conclusion of Moyer’s testimony, Licensee did not present 

any evidence, and the trial court allowed submission of post-hearing 

memorandums, which both parties submitted.

c. Trial Court decision

The trial court issued its Order on May 7, 2018, sustaining the appeal and 

rescinding the license suspension on the basis that the Order of Suspension did not 

satisfy due process. The Department appealed and, upon order of the trial court, 

filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), arguing that it 

satisfied its prima facie burden of proof to support the suspension and the Order of 

Suspension complied with due process requirements.

In its opinion issued pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), (Rule 1925(a) Op.), the trial court relied

upon this Court’s decision in Dunn v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of 
6

Driver Licensing, 819 A.2d 189 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), and the trial court’s own 

decision in Santiago v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 

(Dauphin County, No. 2006 CV 713 LS, filed December 27, 2006),5in finding that 

the Order of Suspension provided inadequate notice to allow Licensee to prepare a 

defense; thus it violated due process. Although the Order of Suspension identified 

the vehicle and the relevant inspection sticker, the trial court found that this 

information informed Licensee only that his inspection of and recordkeeping for 

the Toyota Corolla was allegedly improper. Because the Order of Suspension did 

not further explain Licensee’s conduct, the trial court concluded Licensee “could 

only speculate as to how his inspection of the subject vehicle amounted to the 

alleged violations, and, therefore, he was presented with a virtually impossible 

burden of defense. . . .” (Rule 1925(a) Op. at 6-7.) While the hearing before the 

trial court made evident that the conduct in question was Licensee’s issuance of the 

5000-mile exemption sticker, the trial court reasoned that this did not cure any 

defect in notice from the Order of Suspension prior to the trial court hearing. 

Because the Order of Suspension, on its face, did not provide adequate notice of 

the charges against which Licensee must defend, the trial court concluded that its 

Order should be affirmed. 

 

5 A copy of Santiago is found in the reproduced record at pages 119a-27a. The licensee 

in Santiago was appealing a Department order suspending his license to perform emission 

testing. Relying upon this Court’s decision in Dunn, the trial court found that the suspension 

order did not satisfy due process because it did not provide information about the relevant dates, 

vehicles, or factual basis underlying the alleged violations, which would allow the licensee to 

prepare an adequate defense. 
7

II. Discussion

a. Due Process

On appeal,6the Department argues that the Order of Suspension provided 

sufficient information to pass constitutional muster, as it identified the vehicle’s 

make, model, and VIN number, and the emission inspection sticker issued. With 

this information, the Department contends, Licensee could have reviewed the 

emission inspection station records in order to prepare a defense against the alleged 

violations. The Department asserts that Licensee also had the opportunity for an 

informal Department hearing, which would have sufficed to provide Licensee 

information as to the specific nature of the violations. In any event, Department 

contends the de novo hearing before the trial court cured any deficiency in the 

Order of Suspension. Finally, citing to Phillips v. Department of Transportation, 

Bureau of Driver Licensing, 80 A.3d 561 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013), the Department 

argues that even if the notice in the Order of Suspension was insufficient, the trial 

court erred in sustaining the appeal on this basis because Licensee did not make a 

showing of prejudice suffered as a result of the insufficient notice in the Order of 

Suspension. The Department asserts that Licensee’s counsel was able to defend 

Licensee in the trial court hearing, as he objected to documents in the trial court 

record and made a due process argument regarding the Order of Suspension. 

Therefore, the Department contends, there is no indication that Licensee was 

prejudiced and unable to prepare a defense. 

 

6

In an inspection certificate suspension case, our review “is limited to determining 

whether the trial court committed an error of law or whether the trial court’s findings are 

supported by substantial evidence.” McCarthy v. Dep’t of Transp., 7 A.3d 346, 350 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2010).
8

Licensee argues that the Order of Suspension is “fatally defective” because it

does not comply with due process requirements. (Licensee’s Brief (Br.) at 2.) 

Licensee contends that Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 403, 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 403,7 governing the content of citations, provides a guideline for 

what would constitute sufficient notice in this case, including the date, time, and 

location of the conduct, the specific section and subsection of the regulation 

violated, and a summary of facts sufficient to inform the licensee of the nature of 

the conduct forming the basis for the violation. Licensee disagrees that it was his 

obligation to further investigate the conduct in question by searching the records at 

his place of employment using the sticker number provided in the Order of 

Suspension, particularly since he was no longer employed at the garage by the time 

the Department issued the Order of Suspension and he did not have access to the 

database. Relying upon the trial court’s decision in Santiago, Licensee asserts that 

the Order of Suspension lacked sufficient factual detail of the alleged violations. 

(Id. at 4.) Licensee contends that this Court’s decision in Phillips is 

distinguishable from the present case, as the notice provided in Phillips provided 

information as to the date and location of the conduct, as well as a statement of the 

conduct underlying the suspension. Licensee disagrees with the Department’s 

contention that the Order of Suspension was sufficient simply because Licensee 

presented a defense at the de novo hearing. Because the Order of Suspension did 

not provide more detail, Licensee argues that he had to speculate as to the basis for 

 

7 Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 403 sets forth what information must appear 

in a citation, which includes the date, time, and location of the alleged offense, a citation to the 

subsection allegedly violated, and “a summary of the facts sufficient to advise the defendant of 

the nature of the offense charged.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 403.
9

the suspension and “[w]hile a defense was presented, it was certainly compromised 

due to the lack of notice.” (Id. at 7.)

As this Court has acknowledged, while procedural due process requires 

adequate notice of any charges and an opportunity to be heard, due process has no 

“fixed meaning,” and can depend upon the circumstances of each individual case. 

Dunn, 819 A.2d at 192. There is “no particular form of notice or procedure”

required to satisfy due process; rather, the requirements are “flexible and nontechnical.” Harrington v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 763 A.2d 

386, 391-92 (Pa. 2000). In the context of a license suspension, “due process is 

afforded when the accused is informed with reasonable certainty of the charges . . . 

so that he or she may prepare an adequate defense.” Dunn, 819 A.2d at 192. 

Therefore, at the very least, the notice must have “a sufficient listing and 

explanation of the charges against an individual.” Id. at 193 (emphasis added). 

The list of these charges should be provided to the licensee with adequate time to 

allow the licensee “to prepare a defense as to all issues raised by the state.” Snyder 

v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 977 A.2d 55, 57 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2009). In addition, when a party asserts denial of due process, “demonstrable 

prejudice to the accused is a key factor.” State Dental Council & Examining Bd. 

v. Pollock, 318 A.2d 910, 916 (Pa. 1974) (emphasis added); see also Moore v. 

Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 19 A.3d 1200, 1204 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2011).

This Court reviewed a license suspension notice for compliance with 

procedural due process in Dunn, where the Department suspended a licensee’s 

operating privileges for multiple violations of The Controlled Substance, Drug, 
10

Device and Cosmetic Act (Drug Act).

8

 819 A.2d at 190. A court of common pleas

sustained the licensee’s appeal of the suspension, and this Court affirmed, holding 

that the Department violated the licensee’s due process rights with its notice. Id. at 

194. Specifically, the Department sent the licensee 11 different suspension notices 

in 2001, which cited the licensee’s Drug Act violations from 1993. In addition to 

being sent approximately eight years after the conviction, the notices also 

incorrectly reported the licensee’s dates of violations and convictions. Id. at 191. 

This Court concluded that the errors in the suspension notices rendered them 

“wholly inadequate to satisfy the foregoing due process requirements.” Id. at 193. 

The Court was not persuaded by the Department’s contention that the licensee 

could have undertaken the responsibility to discover the correct information

himself because “[t]he test for adequacy of notice . . . is not whether the licensee 

can correct the information contained in defective notices through diligent 

investigation, but rather whether the notices contain sufficient information and 

explanation to allow the licensee to defend against the charges contained therein.” 

Id. Accordingly, we agreed with the trial court that the licensee’s appeal should be 

sustained. Id. at 194.

In contrast, this Court determined that a Department notice did provide 

adequate notice to satisfy due process in Phillips. There, the Department 

suspended a licensee’s operating privileges following his conviction in New Jersey 

for driving while intoxicated. Phillips, 80 A.3d at 564. The notice of suspension 

the Department sent to the licensee indicated that the suspension was for the 

licensee’s conviction in New Jersey, which was considered similar to a violation of 

 

8 Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 780-101–780-144. 
11

Section 3802(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802(a)(2).9 In a de novo 

hearing before a common pleas court, the licensee challenged the suspension 

notice, arguing that it violated due process because it should have stated that his 

conviction was for a violation similar to Section 3802(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code, 

75 Pa. C.S. § 3802(a)(1).10 Phillips, 80 A.3d at 565. The common pleas court

disagreed and denied the appeal. This Court also determined that the notice 

adequately informed the licensee of the basis for his suspension by providing 

“sufficient information” to determine “what conduct instigated the proceeding and 

what statutory authority permitted the Department to take that action,” despite the 

citation to subsection (a)(2) instead of subsection (a)(1). Id. at 569. Moreover, we 

held the licensee was “fully aware of the factual and legal predicate for his 

suspension, including the supposed defect in the [n]otice, prior to the de novo 

hearing”; thus Licensee was not misled by the notice such that any prejudice 

resulted. Id. Because the “[l]icensee was fully informed of the facts and able to 

mount a vigorous defense” before the common pleas court, we held there was no 

due process violation. Id.

Thus, we must decide whether the Order of Suspension Licensee received 

included sufficient information and explanation to determine what conduct 

instigated the suspension process, and the statutory authority permitting the 

 

9 This determination was made based upon how the offense was defined in the American 

Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators Code Dictionary for purposes of interpreting and 

applying the interstate Driver’s License Compact, 75 Pa. C.S. §§ 1581-1586. Phillips, 80 A.3d 

at 564.

10 Section 3802(a)(2) prohibits an individual from operating a vehicle when the 

individual’s blood alcohol concentration is between 0.08% and 0.10%, whereas Section 

3801(a)(1) prohibits an individual from operating a vehicle after consuming a sufficient amount 

of alcohol to render the individual incapable of safely driving. 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802(a)(1), (2).
12

Department to take the action, to allow Licensee to defend against the charges 

without having to diligently investigate. Phillips, 80 A.3d at 569, Dunn, 819 A.2d 

at 193. In this case, the Order of Suspension, on its face, does not satisfy due 

process requirements. The Order of Suspension reads:

You are hereby notified that your certification as an Official Emission 

Inspector is suspended, pursuant to Section 4726 of the Vehicle Code. 

No vehicle emission inspections may be performed during the 

suspension. Pursuant to Departmental regulations, your certification 

as an Official Emissions Inspector is suspended for one (1) year for 

furnish[ing], lend[ing], giv[ing], sell[ing] or receiv[ing] a certificate of 

inspection without inspection, and one (1) year for fraudulent record 

keeping (2012 Toyota Corolla VIN: 2T1BU4EE0CC831095, sticker 

issued IM6-5355744, to the vehicle, by [Licensee], Operator #23-748-

450).

(R.R. at 55a.) From this alone, Licensee was on notice that his actions in question 

related to a certificate of inspection he issued and fraudulent record keeping for the 

vehicle in question. The Order of Suspension does not provide a date or place 

where these purported actions occurred; nor does it include a citation to a specific 

statutory or regulatory provision prohibiting the conduct in question. It remains 

unclear whether the first charge for the certificate of inspection is in connection 

with the same vehicle listed in the second charge related to the fraudulent record 

keeping. Importantly, there is no notice that Licensee’s conduct relates to 

providing a 5000-mile exemption sticker where it was not warranted. Unlike the 

notice provided in Phillips, the Order of Suspension does not indicate “what 

conduct instigated the proceeding and what statutory authority permitted the 

Department to take that action.” 80 A.3d at 569. Further, as this Court noted in 

Dunn, it is insufficient for the Department to assert that Licensee could have 

assumed the responsibility of discovering these details by independent 
13

investigation into his records, particularly where Licensee no longer had access to 

those records. Rather, the Order of Suspension itself must “contain sufficient 

information and explanation to allow the licensee to defend against the charges 

contained therein.” Dunn, 819 A.2d at 193. On the whole, the Order of 

Suspension does not do so and, therefore, does not comply with due process 

requirements. 

b. Prejudice 

Our inquiry does not end here. Licensee was also required to show that the 

lack of proper notice in the Order of Suspension prejudiced him. Pollock, 318 

A.2d at 916; see also Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Fisher, 423 

A.2d 1093, 1094 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). The Department argues that Licensee 

cannot show prejudice because the de novo hearing by the trial court cured any 

defect in the Order of Suspension and, further, Licensee presented a defense at the 

hearing, including argument and cross-examination. Licensee disagrees, arguing 

that he had to speculate as to the factual basis for the suspension and his defense 

was compromised due to the lack of notice, as his preparation for the trial court 

hearing was merely an educated guess as to what conduct he would have to defend 

against. 

The Department cites to various cases from this Court for the proposition 

that a de novo hearing can cure a notice defect. (Department’s Br. at 21 (citing

O’Donnell v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 781 A.2d 1287 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2001); Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Tutt, 576 A.2d 1186 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1990); Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Quinlan, 408 

A.2d 173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979)).) However, these cases are inapposite and stand for 
14

the proposition that a de novo hearing before a trial court can cure administrative 

hearing deficiencies, not notice deficiencies. In Quinlan, this Court stated that a 

“[d]e novo hearing . . . cures any procedural due process defect resulting from the 

lack of an administrative hearing.” 408 A.2d at 175. Again, in O’Donnell, this 

Court reiterated that point and remanded for the trial court to conduct a de novo 

hearing. 781 A.2d at 1289. In Tutt, this Court acknowledged that a de novo 

hearing may have cured any due process violation from an administrative hearing, 

but only after concluding that the licensee was adequately informed of the 

Department’s charges against him and there was no due process violation. 576 

A.2d at 1189. The issue before us is not one arising from an alleged procedural 

due process violation in an administrative hearing. Instead, we must determine 

whether the notice provided to Licensee in the Order of Suspension violated his 

due process. Because notice is intended to provide a licensee with adequate 

information in order to prepare a defense before the hearing at which he must 

defend against the charges, see Snyder, 977 A.2d at 57, a subsequent de novo 

hearing does not cure a notice, such as this, which is defective on its face.

As for the Department’s contention that Licensee’s participation in the de 

novo hearing indicates that he was able to prepare a defense and, therefore, he was 

not prejudiced, we also disagree. We find Licensee’s case to be distinguishable 

from those where licensees who were clearly aware of the basis for the 

Department’s action nonetheless argued insufficient notice. For example, in 

Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Sutton, the licensee 

appealed to a common pleas court from a suspension of operating privileges for 

refusing to submit to a chemical test. 660 A.2d 46, 46 (Pa. 1995). The licensee 

argued to common pleas that the notice of suspension deprived him of due process 
15

because it listed the date of the violation as February 4, 1993, rather than February 

3, 1993. The court of common pleas sustained the appeal, finding that the 

Department did not seek to amend the notice or provide testimony that the notice 

was in error and did not prove that a violation occurred on the date set forth in the 

notice. Id. at 47. This Court affirmed, concluding that the Department did not 

prove that licensee committed a violation on the date in the notice, reasoning that 

the notice of suspension serves the function of a pleading and puts at issue the date 

of the alleged violation. Id. at 48. The Department appealed, arguing that the 

notice of suspension provided sufficient information to allow the licensee to 

prepare a defense, even if the date provided was incorrect. The Supreme Court 

agreed, finding that the notice did not mislead the licensee or prevent the licensee 

from preparing a proper defense. Id. at 48-49. Because the licensee was “well 

aware and prepared to defend against the test refusal on which the suspension was 

based,” the Supreme Court determined there was no due process violation. Id. at 

49. The Supreme Court reasoned this way again in Harrington, when a licensee 

contended that the Department’s notice of suspension violated due process because 

it did not comply with technicalities of the Interstate License Compact. 763 A.2d 

at 391. The licensee argued that because some information relating to his 

conviction in another state was omitted on the notice he received from the 

Department, he was unable to prepare an adequate defense. Id. The Supreme 

Court disagreed. After explaining that the notice of suspension detailed the action 

being taken, the date of the conviction, the date of the offense, the equivalent 

statutory section for the offense under Pennsylvania law, and the statutory 

authority for the Department’s action, the Court determined that this information 

“was clearly sufficient” for the licensee to prepare a defense. Id. at 392. Further, 
16

the Court reasoned that “[o]ther than by overt generalization, [the licensee] fails to 

indicate why formal notice of the details with which he was already intimately 

familiar was essential to the understanding and preparation of his defense.” Id. 

Unlike the licensees in Sutton and Harrington, there is no indication from 

the record here that Licensee was familiar with the basis for the suspension such 

that his challenge of the Order of Suspension can be construed as an attempt to be 

“deliberately obtuse as to the nature of a proceeding.” Harrington, 763 A.2d at 

393 (quoting Dep’t of Transp. v. McCafferty, 758 A.2d 1150, 1163 (Pa. 2000)). In 

the absence of any admissible evidence before the trial court that Licensee was 

familiar with the factual circumstances underlying his suspension, all that remains 

is an Order of Suspension that alone is insufficient to satisfy due process. 

Furthermore, to the extent that the Department contends there was no prejudice 

because Licensee presented a defense at the trial, we note that Licensee did not 

present any witnesses and asked only six questions of the Department’s witness on 

cross-examination which is not the “spirited defense” and “extensive[] crossexam[ination],” the Department contends. (Department’s Br. at 23.) Therefore,

the trial court did not err in finding the Order of Suspension violated Licensee’s 

procedural due process rights.11

 

11 Because we conclude that the Order of Suspension provided by the Department was 

constitutionally invalid and prejudiced Licensee, we need not determine whether the Department 

satisfied its prima facie burden of proof to show Licensee’s violations. 
17

III. Conclusion 

The Order of Suspension did not provide Licensee with adequate notice to 

satisfy due process, which prejudiced Licensee in the proceedings. Accordingly, 

we affirm.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Grady Walker III :

 :

 :

v. : No. 771 C.D. 2018

 : 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Motor Vehicles, :

Appellant :

O R D E R

NOW, April 30, 2019, the May 7, 2018 Order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Dauphin County, entered in the above-captioned matter, is AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge