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2017 S.D. 34 

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

JANNO KOLLAY TALLA, Defendant and Appellant.

* * * *

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

* * * *

THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS E. HOFFMAN

Judge

* * * *

MARTY J. JACKLEY

Attorney General

CULLEN P. MCNEECE

Assistant Attorney General

Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff

and appellee.

BEAU J. BLOUIN of

Minnehaha County Public

 Defenders Office

Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant

and appellant.

* * * *

CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS

MAY 30, 2017

OPINION FILED 06/07/17
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GILBERTSON, Chief Justice

[¶1.] Janno Kollay Talla appeals his sentence of life imprisonment for one 

count of first-degree manslaughter. Talla argues that in light of other sentences 

imposed for manslaughter in Minnehaha County, as well as his alleged lack of 

criminal history, the circuit court abused its discretion. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[¶2.] Talla was born in Barentu, Eritrea, in 1984 and immigrated to the 

United States as a refugee sometime around 2012. After living in Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for a short time, he moved to Sioux Falls, where he began a relationship 

with Ammuna Gayya. The two moved in together, and in late 2013, Gayya became 

pregnant with Talla’s child. In August 2014, prior to their child’s birth, Talla 

obtained new employment in Worthington, Minnesota, which required him to 

relocate. Gayya, who was in her late teens at the time, stayed in Sioux Falls to be 

close to her mother. Gayya gave birth to a boy in September 2014. 

[¶3.] For a time, Talla and Gayya continued their relationship, and Talla 

provided some financial support to Gayya and their son. When Talla would visit 

Sioux Falls on his days off, he would stay with Gayya and their son. However, 

Gayya eventually became romantically involved with another man, Danga Kotudi, 

and ended her relationship with Talla. According to Talla, Gayya denied having a 

relationship with Kotudi on several occasions when confronted by Talla. During 

this time, Gayya also formally sought child support from Talla.1

 

1. Talla actually quit his job to avoid paying child support.
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[¶4.] On October 29, 2015, while visiting Sioux Falls, Talla saw Gayya with 

Kotudi. Talla was jealous because he wished to continue his relationship with 

Gayya, so he drove to Kotudi’s apartment to confront them. Talla waited 30 to 40 

minutes for them to return. He placed a folding knife with a six-inch blade in his 

pocket, intending to kill Kotudi. After Kotudi and Gayya returned, Talla went 

inside and confronted them. After speaking with them for several minutes, Talla 

informed Kotudi that the two of them were going to fight to the death. Kotudi 

refused, and Talla drew his weapon and stabbed Kotudi in his left arm. Kotudi fled 

the apartment while his friend, Banana Tsegay, and Gayya attempted to restrain 

Talla. Talla stabbed Gayya, puncturing her left lung and heart. Gayya attempted 

to flee the apartment, but only made it a few feet before collapsing in the hallway. 

Talla did not attempt to render aid; instead, he fled. Gayya died from her wound 

about an hour later, but Kotudi survived.

[¶5.] Following the encounter, Talla drove back to Worthington. Local law 

enforcement was waiting and arrested him as he exited the interstate highway. 

Talla’s pants had Gayya’s blood on them. Law enforcement found the folding knife 

in the glove compartment of Talla’s car. The next day, Sioux Falls police searched 

Talla’s car and discovered a suitcase, which contained clothes, medications, a white 

envelope with $2,600 cash, a 0.25 caliber handgun, and a brown wallet containing 

identification cards and documents for one “Malik Mensur.”2 During a subsequent 

 

2. At the sentencing hearing, Talla’s attorney asserted that Mensur is Talla’s 

cousin and that Talla was in possession of Mensur’s documents because 

Mensur was incarcerated at the time. In contrast, the State asserted that it 

had been unable to establish any connection between Talla and Mensur. The 

(continued . . .)
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interview, Talla admitted that he intended to kill Kotudi and had been planning to 

do so for months.

[¶6.] Talla was indicted on 12 counts, including two counts of first-degree 

murder (premeditated and felony murder), one count of second-degree murder, one 

count of attempted first-degree murder, three counts of first-degree burglary, two 

counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of stalking. Eventually, Talla and 

the State entered into a plea agreement. Talla agreed to plead guilty to one count of 

first-degree manslaughter and one count of attempted first-degree murder. In 

exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and to recommend 

concurrent sentences. The agreement did not require the State to recommend a 

particular length of imprisonment for either count. At a change-of-plea hearing on 

June 17, 2016, Talla pleaded guilty, and the State produced a written factual 

statement signed by Talla. Three months later, after the completion of a 

presentence investigation, the circuit court sentenced Talla to concurrent terms of 

imprisonment: 25 years for attempted first-degree murder and life for first-degree 

manslaughter.

[¶7.] Talla appeals, raising one issue: Whether the circuit court abused its 

discretion in sentencing him to imprisonment for life for first-degree manslaughter.

Standard of Review 

[¶8.] “We generally review a circuit court’s decision regarding sentencing for 

abuse of discretion.” State v. Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 11, 877 N.W.2d 75, 79 (quoting 

________________________

(. . . continued)

State theorized that Talla intended to use the documents to establish a false 

identity.
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State v. Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 31, 874 N.W.2d 475, 486). “An abuse of discretion ‘is 

a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices.’” 

Id. ¶ 23, 877 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting MacKaben v. MacKaben, 2015 S.D. 86, ¶ 9, 

871 N.W.2d 617, 622). 

Analysis and Decision 

[¶9.] Talla argues the circuit court abused its discretion by sentencing him 

to imprisonment for life. Although Talla does not allege that his sentence is cruel 

and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment, he nevertheless contends that it 

is “grossly disproportionate to other sentences imposed in Minnehaha County on 

manslaughter in the first degree convictions in the ten years leading up to 

sentencing in this case.” Talla also contends that “[b]y imposing a life sentence, the 

court denied [him] the possibility of parole at any time in the future, and 

consequently failed to strike an appropriate balance between retribution, 

rehabilitation, and deterrence.”

[¶10.] We first address Talla’s proportionality argument. “[S]imilarly 

situated defendants should [generally] receive similar sentences. This principle 

naturally follows from the notion that ‘when statutory ranges are established, the 

legislative intent is that “the more serious commissions of the crime deserve 

sentences at the harsher end of the spectrum.”’” Id. ¶ 24, 877 N.W.2d at 83 (citation

omitted) (quoting State v. Bruce, 2011 S.D. 14, ¶ 32, 796 N.W.2d 397, 407). 

However, each “sentencing court has broad discretion in determining the sentence 

to be imposed.” State v. Anderson, 1996 S.D. 46, ¶ 30, 546 N.W.2d 395, 402. “[A] 

sentence within the statutory maximum generally will not be disturbed on appeal.” 
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Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 23, 877 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting Bruce, 2011 S.D. 14, ¶ 28, 

796 N.W.2d at 406). Thus, when a judge imposes the maximum sentence permitted 

by statute (as in the present case), it is sufficient that the judge could reasonably 

conclude the offense in question is among “the more serious commissions of the 

crime[.]” Id. ¶ 24, 877 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting Bruce, 2011 S.D. 14, ¶ 32, 796 N.W.2d 

at 407). 

[¶11.] We think the sentencing court’s implied conclusion that Talla’s crime is

among the more serious occurrences of first-degree manslaughter is reasonable, 

especially considering it occurred in the process of attempting to commit first-degree 

murder. Talla intended to kill Kotudi. He sat outside Kotudi’s apartment for 30 to 

40 minutes, waiting for him and Gayya to return. Talla armed himself and entered 

the apartment. He sat, talking to Kotudi and Gayya in relative calm, for several 

minutes. He then challenged Kotudi to mortal combat, and when Kotudi refused, 

Talla attempted to kill him anyway. When Gayya intervened, Talla stabbed her—

the 19-year-old mother of his infant son—in the heart. Even if doing so was 

reflexive and not intentional, Talla did not attempt to render aid to Gayya; instead, 

he fled. And even after learning that Gayya died as a result of her injuries, Talla 

did not express significant remorse. 

[¶12.] Even so, comparing his sentence to the one imposed in Rice, Talla 

concludes he should have been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of years. In 

Rice, the mastermind of a burglary plot that culminated in a homicide was 

sentenced to imprisonment for 80 years (with 20 years suspended) on conviction of 

one count of first-degree manslaughter. Id. ¶ 9, 877 N.W.2d at 79. Talla contends 
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that unlike Rice, Talla had no criminal history, had not previously exhibited violent 

behavior, had maintained legal employment while in the United States, and did not 

attempt to cover up his crime. The sentencing court noted these factors at 

sentencing. We also note that the presentence investigation report indicates there 

is only a moderate risk that Talla will reoffend. Even so, this case does not involve 

the type of unplanned-though-foreseeable violence that occurred in Rice. As noted 

above, Talla admittedly entered the apartment with the premeditated intent to kill 

Kotudi. In the course of his attempt, Talla instead killed Gayya, who as the circuit 

court noted, “was entirely innocent of any wrongdoing and was not complicit in any 

kind of illegal activity that spawned her resulting death.” Thus, it would not be 

unreasonable for a sentencing court to conclude Talla’s crime was more serious than 

the homicide that occurred in Rice despite Talla’s asserted mitigating factors.3 

Thus, Rice does not support the conclusion that the sentencing court abused its 

discretion by sentencing Talla to imprisonment for life in this case.

[¶13.] Next, Talla contends that the sentencing court failed to strike a 

balance between retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence. Talla essentially 

contends the sentencing court’s view that rehabilitation was problematic was 

erroneous. Whether a defendant “is capable of rehabilitation [is] a fact question to 

be decided by the [sentencing] court.” State v. Pulfrey, 1996 S.D. 54, ¶ 20, 

548 N.W.2d 34, 39. On the question of rehabilitation, the court said:

[I]n circumstances like this, where the individual’s character 

creates a propensity to commit domestic abuse to the level of 

 

3. Nor is it necessarily unreasonable for a different sentencing court to conclude 

the homicide that occurred in Rice was more serious.
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murder, the issue of rehabilitation is problematic. At the age of 

31, being a middle adult, when one’s mental processes are such 

that he concludes that he must kill his rival and put his former 

love interest at risk of a similar fatal result, the supposition that 

the individual could return to the community and engage in 

healthy relationships with other partners and that those 

partners would not be at risk of a similar fate is purely 

speculative in the [c]ourt’s view.

The court considered Talla’s mitigating factors prior to reaching this conclusion. 

Considering the evidence available to the sentencing court, we are not “satisfied 

that [the court’s findings] are contrary to a clear preponderance of the evidence.” 

Gartner v. Temple, 2014 S.D. 74, ¶ 8, 855 N.W.2d 846, 850 (quoting In re Estate of 

Olson, 2008 S.D. 97, ¶ 9, 757 N.W.2d 219, 222).

[¶14.] Moreover, “[r]ehabilitation ‘is not a bright-line rule that must be 

considered in every case.’” Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 26 n.6, 877 N.W.2d at 84 n.6 

(quoting State v. Milk, 2000 S.D. 28, ¶ 18, 607 N.W.2d 14, 20); see also Atiyeh v. 

Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1314, 101 S. Ct. 829, 830, 66 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1981) (“[T]here is 

nothing in the Constitution that says that ‘rehabilitation’ is the sole permissible 

goal of incarceration . . . .”). Retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 

rehabilitation are each legitimate penological goals. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 

501 U.S. 957, 999, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2704, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 26 n.6, 

877 N.W.2d at 84 n.6. None of these goals is “preeminent over any of the others.” 

Anderson, 1996 S.D. 46, ¶ 31, 546 N.W.2d at 402 (quoting State v. Ramos, 1996 S.D. 

37, ¶ 14, 545 N.W.2d 817, 821); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999, 111 S. Ct. 

at 2704. “[T]he sentencing court determines, on a case-by-case basis, which theory 

is accorded priority.” Anderson, 1996 S.D. 46, ¶ 31, 546 N.W.2d at 403. 
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[¶15.] As noted above, the sentencing court had serious concerns about 

Talla’s ability to “return to the community and engage in healthy relationships with 

other partners[.]” Notably, the court found that Talla was not significantly 

remorseful. The court was also convinced that the age disparity between Talla and 

Gayya, Talla’s response to Gayya’s formal request for child support (i.e., quitting his 

job to avoid garnishment), and ultimately, Talla’s fatal attempt to control Gayya’s 

relationships were evidence of domestic abuse. The court also noted that Talla has 

two other children by two other mothers, one of whom was—like Gayya—much 

younger than Talla. Thus, the court was concerned that Talla’s other partners (and 

prospective partners) would be at risk of a fate similar to Gayya’s. So even if we 

were convinced that the court clearly erred in determining Talla’s prospects for 

rehabilitation were purely speculative, the court’s concerns also support the 

sentence imposed under theories of deterrence and incapacitation. 

Conclusion 

[¶16.] A sentencing court could reasonably conclude that Talla’s offense is 

among the most serious commissions of first-degree manslaughter. Our opinion in 

Rice, even when considered in the context of Talla’s mitigating factors, does not 

suggest otherwise. The court’s finding that rehabilitation was speculative is not 

clearly erroneous. Therefore, we are not convinced the court abused its discretion 

by sentencing Talla to imprisonment for life for killing Gayya.

[¶17.] We affirm.

[¶18.] ZINTER, SEVERSON, WILBUR, and KERN, Justices, concur.