UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

THOMAS C. GLASS,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

NY-0752-19-0200-I-1

DATE: August 16, 2023

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Christopher J. Keeven, Esquire, and Michael Joseph Sgarlat, II, Esquire, 

Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

Gabriel A. Hindin and Ashley W. Walker, Washington, D.C., for the 

agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

sustained his reduction in grade. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT 

the appellant’s petition for review and REVERSE the initial decision. The 

agency’s action is REVERSED. 

 

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contra st, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant served as a Supervisory National Bank Examiner, Level VII,

with the agency’s New York City office. On March 22, 2019, the Examiner-inCharge for Citibank proposed the appellant’s reduction in pay and grade to 

National Bank Examiner, Level VI, based on five specifications of conduct 

unbecoming a supervisor and three specifications of failure to follow established 

policies and procedures.2 Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 110. The conduct 

unbecoming specifications consisted of five instances wherein the agency alleged 

that the appellant engaged in inappropriate conduct with three of his direct reports 

and a subordinate regarding work-related matters. 

¶3 Following the appellant’s oral and written replies, IAF, Tab 6 at 41, 46, on 

May 24, 2019, the Deputy Comptroller for Large Banks issued a decision letter in 

which he found all five specifications of charge 1, and the charge itself, 

sustained. Id. at 35. He did not sustain charge 2. Nonetheless, he determined 

that the proposed penalty was appropriate, and the appellant was reduced to a 

lower grade, effective July 7, 2019. 3 IAF, Tab 6 at 27. The appellant filed an 

appeal with the Board. IAF, Tab 1.

¶4 Following the requested hearing, the administrative judge, in her initial 

decision, found all five specifications of the charge, and the charge itself, 

sustained. IAF, Tab 37, Initial Decision (ID) at 4-8. She considered, but found 

 

2

The agency had previously proposed the identical action against the appellant, with 

the same charges and specifications. The same deciding official sustained the proposal 

in its entirety and the appellant was reduced in grade, effective August 5, 2018. He 

filed a Board appeal, and during adjudication, the agency rescinded the action and 

moved for dismissal. With the appellant’s agreement, the administrative judge 

dismissed the appeal as moot. Glass v. Department of the Treasury, MSPB Docket No. 

NY-0752-18-0183-I-1, Initial Decision (Jan. 31, 2019). That decision became the 

Board’s final decision on March 7, 2019. The agency proposed the instant action two 

weeks later.

3

It is unclear whether the appellant suffered a reduction in pay. IAF, Tab 6 at 27. The 

agency states that he did not, Petition for Review File, Tab 3 at 6, and the appellant has 

not challenged that assertion.
3

unsupported, the appellant’s claim that the agency denied him due process when 

it posted a vacancy announcement for his former position after issuance of the 

first proposal notice. ID at 8-9. The administrative judge found that the agency’s 

action promotes the efficiency of the service, ID at 9, and that reduction in grade 

is a reasonable penalty for the sustained charge. ID at 9-11. Accordingly, she 

affirmed the action. ID at 1, 11.

¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review, Petition for Review (PFR)

File, Tab 1, the agency has responded, PFR File, Tab 3, and the appellant has 

replied. PFR File, Tab 4.

ANALYSIS

¶6 An agency may take an action under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 against an 

employee “only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.” 

5 U.S.C. § 7513(a). “Cause” generally connotes some specific act or omission on 

the part of the employee that warrants disciplinary action, and an agency action 

that does not set forth actionable misconduct cannot be sustained. Gonzalez v. 

Department of Homeland Security, 114 M.S.P.R. 318, ¶ 10 (2010); see Wilson v.

Department of Justice, 66 M.S.P.R. 287, 297 (1995) (“Regardless of whether the 

charged misconduct actually occurred, we agree with the administrative judge’s 

finding that the charged misconduct is not actionable.”); Ray v. Department of the 

Army, 97 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 54 (2004) (finding no basis to disturb the 

administrative judge’s conclusion that the charged conduct did not constitute 

actionable misconduct), aff’d, 176 F. App’x 110 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

¶7 The appellant in this case was a supervisor and the agency identifies the 

four employees mentioned in the specifications as either his direct reports or 

otherwise his subordinate. IAF, Tab 6 at 10-11. The specifications all relate to 

the manner in which the appellant dealt with these individuals regarding 

work-related matters.
4

¶8 In specification (1), the agency alleged that the appellant called one of his 

direct reports, P.B., a liar. IAF, Tab 9 at 110. In what is described as 

“Background” to this specification, the agency stated that, during a group meeting 

with visiting examiners in November 2016, the appellant asked P.B. about his 

reporting on information that he had reviewed related to a specific monthly 

report; that the appellant addressed P.B. in a scolding manner, questioning which 

of P.B.’s two statements, that he had been reviewing the reports or that he had not 

been reviewing the reports, was true; and that the appellant told P.B. that his 

explanation was not a good excuse and that he was ill-prepared for the meeting. 

The agency did not allege that the events at the November meeting constituted 

misconduct but alleged in the first specification that during a December meeting 

the appellant called P.B. a liar. The statement occurred during P.B.’s annual 

performance review. In sustaining this specification, the administrative judge

found that the appellant behaved in a manner unbecoming a supervisor. ID at 5. 

¶9 Even taking the agency’s version of this incident as accurate, 4the fact 

remains that the appellant was discussing his direct report’s performance with 

him, and, in that discussion, the appellant indicated that he believed that P.B. had 

not been truthful when, during the earlier meeting, he indicated both that he had, 

and had not, been reviewing the monthly reports. The appellant was correct that

it is impossible for both of P.B.’s statements to have been truthful. It is the job of 

a supervisor to address the performance of his subordinates and the making of 

inaccurate or false statements about a work-related matter is serious. Although 

the appellant’s language may have been direct or indelicate, that does not make 

his conduct actionable. See Ray, 97 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 54 (finding that, while 

statements the appellant made to a subordinate regarding matters within his area 

 

4 According to the appellant, during their discussion, P.B. first asked if the appellant 

was calling him a liar, to which the appellant replied “Yes, if you prefer that word.” 

IAF, Tab 7 at 87 (the appellant’s deposition). Regardless of who first used the word 

“liar,” the conduct does not equate to actionable misconduct. 
5

of responsibility may have been indelicately worded, there is no evidence that the 

appellant’s opinion was malicious or offered in bad faith). For these reasons, the 

conduct charged in specification (1) is not actionable.

¶10 In specification (2), the agency alleged that, on January 2, 2017, the 

appellant was having a discussion with another of his direct reports, Bank 

Examiner E.S., in which the appellant sought to clarify how many of a particular 

type of work item there were pending, and that when E.S. appeared not to 

understand his question, the appellant held up one finger from each hand in her 

face and said, loudly enough so that others could hear, words to the effect of 

“Here’s one finger and here’s one finger. How many fingers?” IAF, Tab 9 at 10. 

In E.S.’s written statement, she indicated that other staff members overheard the 

appellant. Id. at 31. In sustaining this specification, the administrative judge

found that the appellant behaved in a manner that was disrespectful and that 

caused E.S. to feel intimidated and embarrassed. ID at 5-6.

¶11 Again, even taking the agency’s version of the incident as accurate,

5

it 

remains true that the appellant was seeking information from a direct report about 

a work-related matter, as is within a supervisor’s responsibilities to do. That is so 

regardless of whether the appellant’s statement made E.S. feel uncomfortable.6

To the extent that the appellant’s reaction to E.S. may have been exaggerated, it 

still does not constitute actionable misconduct. See Ray, 97 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 54. 

 

5 According to the appellant, he was two to three feet away from E.S., he was not 

yelling, agitated, or angry, IAF, Tab 7 at 105, and, based on the setup of the work 

space, it was unlikely that anyone overheard the conversation. Id. at 105-06. He also 

stated that P.M.’s “cube” was next to the appellant’s. Id. at 106. The parties stipulated, 

however, that, although P.M. was sitting at his desk, adjacent to E.S.’s work station, at 

the time of the conversation, he had no recollection of it. IAF, Tab 30. 

6 A supervisor checking on the status of a work project, holding an employee 

accountable for timely completing work, reviewing the quality of an employee’s work, 

and generally exercising supervisory authority over an employee can sometimes make 

the employee angry, uncomfortable, frustrated, or embarrassed. The employee’s 

reaction to that sort of supervisory oversight does not make the supervisor’s conduct 

improper. 
6

¶12 In specification (3), the agency alleged that, on February 6, 2017, during 

another conversation, E.S. asked the appellant a question about a work project to 

which he responded, “We have talked about this five times!” IAF, Tab 9 at 111. 

Although the parties generally agree as to what the appellant said, they disagree 

about whether the question had previously been addressed. 7 In sustaining this 

specification, the AJ found that the appellant made it obvious to E.S. that he was 

annoyed and angry because of her question, and that he did not behave in a tactful 

manner but rather in a way that was unbecoming a supervisor. ID at 6.

¶13 Even taking the agency’s version of the incident as accurate, E.S.’s question 

to the appellant, to whom she reported, concerned a work-related matter and his 

response to her was in the context of his supervisory role. That is so even if the 

appellant’s response made E.S. feel afraid to ask further questions of him, as she 

claimed. IAF, Tab 9 at 132. To the extent that the appellant’s response reflected 

that he was frustrated by the question, it does not amount to actionable 

misconduct. See Ray, 97 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 54. 

¶14 In specification (4), the agency alleged that, between January and 

February 2017, the appellant asked R.T., a subordinate, to schedule a meeting to 

include him, the proposing official, and a member of bank management, and that, 

after R.T. made several attempts to confirm the appellant’s attendance, he 

responded to her to the effect that “I told you this three times. We have to go 

over this again?” IAF, Tab 9 at 111. Although the parties generally agree as to 

what the appellant said, they disagree about his tone. 8 In sustaining this 

specification, the administrative judge found that the appellant was annoyed and 

 

7

In her written statement, E.S. said that she did not recall having previously talked 

about the matter at issue. IAF, Tab 9 at 132. During his deposition, the appellant

stated that the question E.S. asked was a simple one that she had repeatedly asked over 

a period of days. IAF, Tab 7 at 108. 

8

In her written statement, R.T. stated that the appellant raised his voice. IAF, Tab 9 

at 134. In his deposition, the appellant stated that he was merely “questioning” 

inasmuch as the matter had already been addressed and resolved. IAF, Tab 7 at 126.
7

impatient and made his feelings known to R.T., and that he did not behave in a 

tactful manner but rather in a way that was unbecoming to a supervisor. ID at 7.

¶15 Even crediting the agency’s version of the incident as accurate, the 

discussion between the appellant and his subordinate concerned the scheduling of 

a meeting which is a work-related matter and, in addressing her, the appellant was 

acting within the scope of his responsibilities. That is so even though R.T. may 

have felt belittled as she claimed. IAF, Tab 7 at 134. To the extent the 

appellant’s response may have reflected that he was annoyed, it did not amount to 

actionable misconduct.

¶16 In specification (5), the agency alleged that, in an email exchange on 

May 5, 2016, to L.S., one of the appellant’s direct reports, he told her to 

henceforth submit her questions either to him or another named individual, and to 

“PLEASE stop emailing” C.L. IAF, Tab 9 at 111. The parties do not disagree as 

to the content of the email, a copy of which is in the record. Id. at 139. In 

sustaining this specification, the administrative judge found that the tone of the 

appellant’s email indicated that he was annoyed and that he should have 

understood that his email could have been construed that way. ID at 9. 

¶17 It is within a supervisor’s responsibility to direct who should be provided 

certain information and to whom questions should be addressed. Putting a written 

word in all capital letters is generally intended to draw the reader’s attention to it. 

To the extent that R.T. found the appellant’s email “belitting [sic]” and indicated 

that she felt that she had been “beaten up” by it, IAF, Tab 16 at 41, those feelings 

cannot serve to turn the appellant’s email into actionable misconduct.

¶18 In sum, none of the five specifications that make up the charge constitute 

actionable misconduct and, therefore, the sole charge supporting the agency’s 

action cannot be sustained.9 On this basis, the initial decision is reversed, and the 

 

9 We do not suggest that a supervisor’s conduct may never be actionable and therefore 

supportive of discipline, but only that the appellant’s conduct in this case does not rise 

to that level.
8

agency’s action is reversed as well. Because the agency has failed to allege or 

prove that there is “cause” for action, the Board’s inquiry stops and no other 

claims need be reached.10 Gonzalez, 114 M.S.P.R. 318, ¶ 25; Ray, 97 M.S.P.R. 

101, ¶ 54; Wilson, 66 M.S.P.R. at 297.

ORDER

¶19 We ORDER the agency to cancel the appellant’s reduction in grade and 

restore him to his supervisory position, effective July 7, 2019. See Kerr v. 

National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency 

must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision.

¶20 We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back 

pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel 

Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this 

decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s 

efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to 

provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the 

Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due, 

and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed 

amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. 

¶21 We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing 

when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has 

taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask 

the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b). 

¶22 No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully 

carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement 

with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant 

 

10 Based on this disposition, the Board need not consider the appellant’s claims that the 

administrative judge failed to make credibility findings or address his due process 

argument, and did not properly determine the reasonableness of the penalty. PFR File, 

Tab 1 at 11, 14-23, 23-25.
9

believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition 

should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not 

fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of 

any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

¶23 For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance 

Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation 

necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision 

are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all 

documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the 

Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be 

made within the 60-day period set forth above.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney 

fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of 

the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The 

regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If 

you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees 

and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. 

You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued 

the initial decision on your appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS11

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By 

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such 

 

11 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated 

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the 

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
10

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). 

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit 

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most 

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a 

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their 

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should 

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all 

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time 

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. 

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review 

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions 

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you 

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking 

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court 

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 
11

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of 

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you 

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action 

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain 

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination 

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you 

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on 

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be 

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any 

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective 

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding 

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the 
12

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the 

address of the EEOC is: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or 

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised 

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or 

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s 

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in 

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial 

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court 

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 12 The court of appeals must receive your 

 

12 The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain 

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on 

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on 
13

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B). 

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

 

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of 

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195, 

132 Stat. 1510. 
14

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their 

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

 /s/ for 

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board
DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE

Civilian Pay Operations

DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST

The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay 

pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following 

checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may 

substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at: 

https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx. 

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by 

vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay. 

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the 

specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments. 

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket 

comments as to why the documentation is not applicable: 

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order. 

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”. 

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s 

until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.*** 

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until 

notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.*** 

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.). 

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee 

in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment. 

Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also, 

include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation, 

CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums, 

or severance pay received by the employee upon separation. 

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority 

under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment 

they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The 

annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave 

ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES

Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process 

payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by the Merit 

Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts. 

1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information describing 

what to do in accordance with decision. 

2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration: 

a. Employee name and social security number. 

b. Detailed explanation of request. 

c. Valid agency accounting. 

d. Authorized signature (Table 63). 

e. If interest is to be included. 

f. Check mailing address. 

g. Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached. 

h. Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be collected 

(if applicable). 

Attachments to AD-343 

1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday Premium, 

etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable). 

2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts. 

3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency. 

4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to 

return monies. 

5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)

6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the type of 

leave to be charged and number of hours. 

7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave to 

be paid. 

NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and required 

data in 1-7 above. 

The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum Payment, 

Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.) 

a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above. 

b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided. 

c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable. 

If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s Payroll/Personnel 

Operations at 504-255-4630.