IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 15, 2012

ALBERTO EDDIE DELEON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County

No. 281742 Don W. Poole, Judge

No. E2011-02645-CCA-R3-HC - Filed October 16, 2012

On appeal, the petitioner, Alberto Eddie Deleon, contests the Hamilton County Criminal

Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he was incarcerated

for an excessive time span prior to instigation of extradition proceedings. Upon review, we

affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOSEPH M. TIPTON,

P.J., and THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., joined.

Ardena J. Garth and Richard Kenneth Mabee (on appeal), and Erinn Rene O’Leary (at trial),

Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Alberto Eddie Deleon.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Nicholas W. Spangler, Assistant

Attorney General; William H. Cox, III, District Attorney General; and Cameron Williams,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

The record before us reveals that on April 5, 2011, a warrant was issued against the

petitioner in Gordon County, Georgia, charging him with aggravated assault. Thereafter, on

April 10, 2011, the petitioner was arrested in Chattanooga by the Tennessee Highway Patrol

(THP) for leaving the scene of an accident, and he was taken to the Hamilton County Jail.

The THP officer also issued the petitioner a citation, which provided that the petitioner “was

involved in a hit and run” and that he “was wanted in connection with a stabbing and

carjacking in [Georgia].” On May 26, 2011, the charge of leaving the scene of an accident
was dismissed. However, the petitioner remained incarcerated pursuant to a fugitive warrant

that was issued the same day; the fugitive warrant noted that “Georgia will extradite.”

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Subsequently, on September 15, 2011, the Tennessee Department of Correction

received a requisition letter from the Governor of Georgia asking for the petitioner’s

extradition based upon the April 5, 2011 aggravated assault arrest warrant. On September

29, 2011, the Governor of Tennessee issued a governor’s warrant allowing the extradition

of the petitioner to Georgia. The fugitive warrant was dismissed on October 10, 2011;

however, the petitioner remained in custody pursuant to the governor’s warrant.

On October 18, 2011, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which

was amended on October 31, 2011. The petitioner alleged that the State of Tennessee failed

to properly follow the procedures outlined in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. The

petitioner’s complaint centered on the length of his detention on the fugitive warrant prior

to the issuance of the governor’s warrant. Specifically, citing title 18, section 3182 of the

United States Code, the petitioner maintained that Georgia, as the demanding state, had thirty

days from the issuance of the fugitive warrant to secure a governor’s warrant from

Tennessee, the asylum state. The petitioner acknowledged that because of the difficulty of

complying with the thirty-day time frame, title 18, section 3188 of the United States Code

provides for the possibility of recommittment of the prisoner for up to sixty days. The

petitioner maintained that because the governor’s warrant was not sought and signed within

“the 90-day limit,” the petitioner was “illegally detained on this matter for an extended period

of time.”

At the hearing on the petition, the petitioner again maintained that he was entitled to

discharge and release because the governor’s warrant was not obtained within ninety days

of the issuance of the fugitive warrant. In response, the State argued that the thirty-day

period in title 18, section 3182 of the United States Code began to run from the date the

governor’s warrant was issued. The habeas corpus court found that “the scope of judicial

review of a governor’s grant of extradition is limited[,] and the timeliness of a rendition

warrant does not affect its validity.” The court held that the petitioner had failed to state a

claim upon which habeas corpus relief could be granted and denied the petition. The

petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal.

II. Analysis

Initially, we note that the determination of whether to grant habeas corpus relief is a

In his petition, the petitioner states that he “repeatedly refused to waive extradition under” the

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fugitive warrant. 

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question of law. Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007). As such, we will

review the trial court’sfindings de novo without a presumption of correctness. Id. Moreover,

it is the petitioner’s burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that the

sentence is void or that the confinement is illegal.” Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322

(Tenn. 2000).

Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees an accused the right to

seek habeas corpus relief. See Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). However,

“[s]uch relief is available only when it appears from the face of the judgment or the record

of the proceedings that a trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence a defendant or that

a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Wyatt, 24 S.W.3d

at 322; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101.

A. Procedural Compliance

The State argues that the petitioner failed to comply with the procedures mandated by

Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107 for filing a habeas corpus petition. Therefore,

the petition should be dismissed. Generally, “the procedural provisions of the habeas corpus

statutes are mandatory and must be followed scrupulously.” Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d

157, 165 (Tenn. 1993).

Despite the petitioner’s failure to comply with the mandatory requirements for a

habeas corpus petition, the habeas corpus court did not dismiss the petition for procedural

noncompliance; instead, the habeas corpus court addressed the petition on the merits. “A

habeas corpus court may properly choose to dismiss a petition for failing to comply with the

statutory procedural requirements; however, dismissal is not required. The habeas corpus

court may . . . choose to adjudicate the petition on its merits.” Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d

16, 21 (Tenn. 2004) (footnote omitted) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109). Therefore,

this court will address the merits of the petitioner’s complaints.

B. Constitutionality of Extradition Statute

The petitioner contends that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-9-105, a part of

Tennessee’s Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, is unconstitutional for vagueness.

Specifically, the petitioner questions the constitutionality of the statute because it fails to

provide a time limit for instituting extradition procedures. The statute in question provides:

If, from the examination before the judge or magistrate, it

appears that the person held is the person charged with having

committed the crime alleged and that the person probably

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committed the crime, and, except in cases arising under §

40-9-113, that the person has fled from justice, the judge or

magistrate must commit the person to jail by a warrant reciting

the accusation for a time specified in the warrant as will enable

the arrest of the accused to be made under a warrant of the

governor on a requisition of the executive authority of the state

having jurisdiction of the offense, unless the accused gives bail

as provided in § 40-9-106, or until the accused is legally

discharged.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-9-105; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (providing that a prisoner may be

discharged from custody in the asylum state if an agent of the demanding state does not

appear to claim the prisoner within thirty days of the prisoner’s arrest). However, the

petitioner did not raise this issue in his petition or at the hearing. We will not address issues

raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Alvarado, 961 S.W.2d 136, 153 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1996); State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 356-57 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

C. Extradition

The petitioner argues that he should have been discharged by this state, the asylum

state, because he was not granted bail while awaiting extradition and because he was not

extradited within thirty days of his arrest.

The Extradition Clause of the United States Constitution provides:

A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or

other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another

state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state

from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state

having jurisdiction of the crime.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; see also State ex rel. Wiley v. Waggoner, 508 S.W.2d 535, 536

(Tenn. 1973). “The Extradition Clause has been implemented by a federal statute, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3182, and by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.” Johns v. Bowlen, 942 S.W.2d 544,

547 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Where adopted, the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, along

with federal law, governs state extradition proceedings. Id. Tennessee has adopted the Act,

and it is codified in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-9-101 to -130. See id.

Title 18, section 3182 of the United States Code provides:

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Whenever the executive authority of any State or

Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the

executive authority of any State, District, or Territory to which

such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment

found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or

Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed

treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the

governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from

whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority

of the State, District, or Territory to which such person has fled

shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the

executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such

authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the

fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If

no such agent appears within thirty days from the time of the

arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.

(Emphasis added). This court has recognized that “[e]ven though no such [timing] provision

exists in the Tennessee statutes, we are bound by federal law regarding interstate

extradition.” Yates v. Gilless, 841 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

The purpose of extradition “is to allow the demanding state to retrieve violators of its

laws who are found in the asylum state.” State v. Paskowski, 647 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1983). To this end, courts have liberally construed extradition statutes, such as

title 18, section 3182 of the United States Code. Id. This court has recognized that “the

purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3182[] is to prevent indefinite incarceration of a prisoner in an

asylum state.” Id.; see also Yates, 841 S.W.2d at 336. Regardless, “the ‘arrest’ referred to

in the federal statute is one that arises pursuant to the governor’s warrant.” Yates, 841

S.W.2d at 335. In the instant case, the governor’s warrant was issued on September 29,

2011. On October 18, 2011, before extradition could be carried out, the petitioner filed for

habeas corpus relief, thereby tolling the thirty-day period for delivering the petitioner to the

demanding state. Id. at 336; see also Paskowski, 647 S.W.2d at 240. Accordingly, the

petitioner is not entitled to relief under title 18, section 3182 of the United States Code. Id.

at 336.

Turning to the petitioner’s claim that he was denied bail, we note that Tennessee Code

Annotated section 40-9-106 provides:

Unless the offense with which the prisoner is charged is

shown to be an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment

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under the laws of the state in which it was committed, the judge

or magistrate must admit the person arrested to bail by bond or

undertaking, with sufficient sureties, and in any sum that the

judge or magistrate deems proper, for the person’s appearance

before the judge or magistrate at a time specified in the bond or

undertaking, and for the person’s surrender, to be arrested upon

the warrant of the governor of this state.

Cf. de la Beckwith v. Evatt, 819 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (“Our statutes

authorize bail after the accused’s arrest on the fugitive warrant, but not after the issuance of

the governor’s warrant.”). Although the petitioner claimed in his “Addendum to Motion for

Writ of Habeas Corpus” that he was not granted bail, the petitioner did not argue this issue

before the habeas corpus court. Nevertheless, after the issuance of a governor’s warrant

habeas corpus review is generally limited to:

(a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order;

(b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the

demanding state;

(c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for

extradition; and

(d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive.

Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288 (1978); see also State ex rel. Sneed v. Long, 871

S.W.2d 148, 150-51 (Tenn. 1994). We conclude that the petition did not allege any of these

four factors. Therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this issue.

III. Conclusion

In sum, we conclude that the petitioner’s challenge to the constitutionality of the

extradition statute was waived by the petitioner’s failure to raise it in the lower court. Further,

we conclude that the petitioner is not entitled to relief based upon the State’s failure to grant

bail or the length of time transpiring between the issuance of the governor’s warrant and

delivery of the petitioner to the demanding state. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the

habeas corpus court.

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NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE

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