FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT MAY 31, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1422 2 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 02-01608 -CV -RW S-1 IRENE L. ST EP HENS , P la int if f- Appe llant, ve rs us GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, D efendant-Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ Appe al f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ ( May 31, 200 5) Be fo re T JO FL A T , A

N D E RS O N and D U BIN A , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: Ir en e L . S te phe ns, pr oc ee din g pr o se , appe al s se ve ra l de ci sio ns b y the dis tr ic t c ourt i n he r ci vil a ct ionf ile d a ga ins t the G eo rg iaD ep ar tm ent of Tr ansportation (“ DO T” ). She c laim ed, inter alia, that the DO T denied her a2

tr an sf er and t er m inate d he r ba se d onil le ga l, dis cr im inator y m oti ve s. S te phe ns ap pe al s th e fo llo w ing pr oc ed ur al de ci sio ns: ( 1) the de nia l of he r m oti on f

or sanc tio ns; ( 2) the de nia l of he r m oti on t o am en d he r co m pla int ; ( 3) the gr an t of

the D O T ’ s m oti on t o stri ke portio ns o f the r ec or d; and ( 4) the de nia l of he r m oti on t o d i s m i s s h erco m

p l ai n twi t h o u tp re

ju d i ce . S t ep h en s al s o ap p ea l s th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of the D O T . W e af

fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt i n al l r es pe ct s. S te phe ns’ arg um en ts are a ddr es se d intur n. I. STEPHENS’ PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS A. De nial of Ste phen s’ Motion f or Sanct ions St ep he ns arg ue s th at

he r due pr oc es s r igh ts w er e vio la te d by vir tue of the DO T’ s alleged destruction o f a 1994 em ploy ee handbookand its alleged obstru ct ionof

j ust ic e. Appl y ing ali be ra l r ea din g of S te phe ns’ s a

ppe llate br ie f, it ap pe ar s th at

she is as se rt ing that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by de ny ing he r m oti on f

or sanc tio ns unde r Fe d. R. Ci v. P. 11 b ec au se the D O T w as a ct ing in ba d f ai th thr ough out

the li tig at ion . S ee H ai ne s v. K er ne r, 404 U . S. 519 , 520 , 92 S . Ct . 594 , 596 (197 2) (holding that pro se pleadings are held to less strin gent standards th an co un se le d p le ad in gs ). W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rm inatio ns r eg ar din g sanc tio ns f or abuse of di sc ret io n. So ur an v. Trav el ers Ins . Co., 9 82 F.2d14 97 , 15 06 (11 th Cir . 19 93 ).3

Federa l Rule of Cr im inal Procedure 11(c) provides for sanctions when parties m ak e ce rt ai n r ep re se ntatio ns t o th e co urt. D istri ct c ourts m ay

im pose sanc tio ns pur suant t o F ed . R. Ci v. P. 11( c) “ (1 ) w he n aparty f ile s aple ad ing that ha s no reasonable fac tual basis; (2) when the party files a pleading that is based on a legal the or y that ha s no r ea sona

ble c hanc e of

suc ce ss and tha t c an not

be a dvanc ed

a s a re as ona ble arg um en t t o c hange e xis tin g law ; and ( 3) w he n th e party f ile s a pleading in bad faith for an im proper purpose.” S ouran, 982 F.2d at 1506 (internal quot at ionom itt ed ). S te phe ns’ c la im that the D O T a ct ed

in ba d f ai th b y c onc ea lin g the 199 4 e m

plo y ee handbo ok i s w ith out m er it. S te phe ns a dm itt ed ly pos se sse d a co py of the handbo ok. S te phe ns d id n ot p ro duc e any e vid en ce of

ba d f ai th o n th e part of the D O T . A cc or din gly , the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s di sc re tio n by de nyin g S te ph en s’s m ot io n fo r sa nc ti on s. (B) De nial of Ste phen s’s Motion t o Am end her Com plaint St ep he ns arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt “ er

re d and/ or

abuse d [ its ] dis cr et ion ” by de ny ing he r m oti on f

or le av e to am en d he r al re ady a m en de d c om

pla int . A lth oughle av e to am en d sh oul d be li be ra lly gr an te d w he n ne ce ssary

in the int er es t of

j ust ic e, the de ci sio n is c om m itt ed to the dis tr ic t c ourt' s di sc re tio n and gr an t or de nia l of le av e to am en d is r ev ie w ed f or abuse of dis cr et ion . Je nni ngs v. BIC C orp., 181 F.3d 1250 , 1258 (11th Cir. 1999); Fed.R .Civ. P. 15(a).Ha vin gfo un d th at the dis tr ic t court did no t abu se its dis c re tio n in denyingSte ph e ns ’ 1 motion to amend, we do not re ach the question of whethe r the e mploy ee ha ndboo k const ituted a unilatera l contrac t beca

use that issue wa s only

raised in the motion to amend. 4 St ep he ns f

ile d th e m oti on t o am en d ov er six m onths a ft er

the de ad lin e se t by the S ch ed uli ng O rd er . S te phe ns’ m oti on w as thu s un tim el y , and F ed er al Ru le of Ci vil P ro ce dur e 16( b) r equir es he r to s howgoo d c au se in or de r fo r the c ourt t o gr an t he r m oti on. F ed . R. Ci v. P ro . 16( b) . T he onl y r ea son St ep he n of

fe re d f or the de lay is that sh e dis co ve re d ane wle ga l the or y thr ougha ddi tio na l r es earc h. W e do not find th at the district court abused its d iscretion in ho lding that this proffered re as on w as ins uf

fi ci ent t o sh owgoo d c au se . S ee Je nni ngs, 181 F . 3d at 12 58 ( 11th Ci r. 199 9) ( statin g th at

und ue de lay is ana de quate ba sis f

or de ny ing le av e to am end). 1 ( C ) G r a n t o f

t h e D O T ’ s M o t i o n t o S t r i ke Stephens argues that the district court erred by striking portions of her sum m ar y j udgm en t m oti on, inc lud ing portio ns c onc er nin g th e bankr

upt cy f ili ng o f another DO T e m

ploy ee who was a w itness. She specif ically argues that inf orm at ionc onc er

nin g th e bankr

upt cy f ili ng i s r el ev an t t o th e ins tant c as e be ca use that e m

plo y ee ’ s st at em en ts w er e use d to sup port S te phe ns’ s te rm inatio n, an d t he ba nk rupt cy

in fo rm at io n a dd res se d t he em pl oyee’s cred ib il it y .5

W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e vid en tiary r uli ngs fo r anabuse of

dis cr et ion , reversing only

when there is subs tantial prej udice. B rochu v. City of Riviera Be ac h, 304 F . 3d 1 144, 115 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) . T he F ed er al Ru le s of Ci vil Pr oc ed ur e pr ovi de that “ the c ourt m ay or de r str ic ke n f

ro m any ple ad ing any ins uf fi ci en t de fe nse or

any r ed undant, im

m at er ia l, im

pe rt ine nt, or

sc an da lou s m atte r. ” F ed . R. Ci v. P. 12( f) . W e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s dis cr et ionin str iki ng p ortio ns o f St ep he ns’ s m oti on f or sum m ar y j udgm en t because it contained “ im

m aterial, im

pertinent, or scandalou s m atter. ” Se e Fed. R.C iv.P. 12(f). (D ) De nial of Ste phen s’s Volun tary Dism issal of her Com plaint Without Pr ejud ice St ep he ns arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

by de ny ing he r m oti on t o dis m iss he r co m

pla int vol unt ar ily

w ith out pr ej udi ce , a sse rt ing that the D O T w oul d no t l os e an y

su bs ta nt ia l ri gh ts as a res ul t o f th e d is m is sa l. W e re vie wf

or abuse of dis cr et ionthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio ns r eg ar din g th e dis m iss al of

ac om pla int w ith out pr ej udi ce . P ont enbe rg v. Bo sto n S ci en tif ic Co rp . , 252 F . 3d 1 253, 125 6 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) . T he F ed er al Ru le s of Ci vil Pr oc ed ur e pe rm it a pla int if

f to d ism iss an a ct ionvol unt ar ily onl y “ uponor de r of the c ourt and u

pon suc h te rm s and c ondi tio ns a s th e co urt de em s pr ope r” a ft er the6

defendant has filed an answer to the com

plaint, unless th ere is a stipul ation sig ned by all parties to the action. F ed.R. Civ.P. 41(a). W e have held that “ [a] volun tary di sm is sa l wi th ou t p reju di ce i s n ot a m at te r of rig ht .” Fis he r v. P.R . Mari ne Mg m t., In c., 94 0 F .2d15 02 (11 th Cir . 19 91 ). [I ] n m ost c as es , avol unt ar

y dis m iss al sho uld

be gr an te d un le ss the defendant will suffer

clear legal prej udice, other than the m ere pr ospe ct of asub se que nt l aw sui t, a s ar es ult . T he c ru ci al que sti on t o be de te rm ine d is , W oul d th e de fe ndant l ose any sub stanti al r igh t by the dis m iss al . I n e xe rc isi ng i ts b ro ad e qui ta ble dis cr et ionund er

Ru le 41( a) (2 ), the dis tr ic t c ourt m ust w ei gh the r el ev an t e qui tie s and d o j ust ic e be tw ee n th e part ie s ine ac h c as e, im posi ng s uc h c ost s and attaching such con ditio ns to th e dism issal as are dee m ed appropriate. Pontenberg, 252 F.3d at 1255-56 (citations , quotations, and em phasis o m itted). In Stephens’ s case, the DO T obj ected to a dism issal without p rej udice, ar gui ng tha t su chadis m iss al w oul d be pr ej udi ci al due to its pe ndi ng m oti on f or summ ary j udgm ent. Stephens filed her com plaint in June 200 2. S he filed her m ot io n t o v ol un ta ril y

di sm is s wi th ou t p reju di ce i n M ay 20 04 . Duri ng th attwo y ear period, num erous m otion s had been filed, e xtensiv e discovery had been produced, and m otion s for sum m ary j udgem ent wer e pending. The district court ag re ed w iththe D O T ’ s a sse rt ionthat on ly adis m iss al w ithpr ej udi ce w oul d be appropriate. Stephens was not entitled to a volu ntary dism issal without p rej udice as a m atter of r ight, and the DO T dem onstrated that it would b e prej udiced by suchOn appe al, Stephens also ar gues that a psycholog ist who was supposed to examine 2 her on Dec ember

8, 2000, improperly

rele ased he r medica l rec ords to the DOT. Stephe ns did not raise this issue in the district court. We g ener ally will not consider issues raise d for the f irst time on a pp e a l, wit h s e ve ra l e xce pti on s, inc lud ingwh e n th e iss ue " inv olv e s a pure qu e sti on

of law, and if ref usal to consider it would re sult in a miscarriag e of justice." Nar ey v. Dea n, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526- 27 (11th Cir. 1994). S ince St ephens raised her claim reg arding "pa tient/client confide ntiality " f or the first time on appea l, and our re fusal to c o nsider it will not result in a miscarria g e of justice, w e c on c lud e that Ste ph e ns wa ive d th is c la im. 7 a dis m iss al . A cc or din gly , the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s di sc re tio n by

de ny ing St ep he ns ’s m ot io n t o d is m is s h er co m pl ai nt vo lu nt ari ly w it ho ut pre jud ic e. II. STEPHENS’ SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS Inhe r co m

pla int , S te phe ns a lle ge d: ( 1) vio la tio ns o f he r due pr oc es s and equa l pr ote ct ionr igh ts; ( 2) e m plo ym en t di sc ri m inatio n; and ( 3) r et al ia tio n f or exercising a legal right. The district court r ead the com plaint broadlyin defere nce to S te phe ns’ pr o se status , and c onsi de re d he r to h av e al le ge d: ( 1) avio la tio n of due process and equal protection rights pu rsuant to 42 U. S. C. § 198 3; (2) a vio la tio n of

T itl e V II of

the Ci vil Ri ght s A ct ; ( 3) avio la tio n of the A m er ic an s w ith D isa bil iti es A ct

( “ A D A ”) ; and ( 4) avio la tio n of the A ge D isc ri m inatio n E m plo ym en t A ct

( “ A D E A ”) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d sum m ar y j udgm en t t o th e D O T on a ll cl ai m s. 2 W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of am oti on f

or sum m ar y j udgm en t de novo , “ ap ply ing the sam e le ga l st an dard s th at bound the dis tr ic t c ourt. ” Ja ck son v. Be llS outh T el ec om

m . , 372 F . 3d 1 250, 127 9 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) . S um m ar y j udgm en t8

is a ppr opr ia te w he n “ the ple ad ing s, de posi tio ns, answ er s to int er ro ga tor ie s, and adm iss ion s onf

ile , tog ethe r w iththe a ff

idavit s, if any , sho wthat the re is no ge nui ne iss ue a s to any

m at er ia l f

ac t and tha t the m ovi ng p ar ty is en tit le d to a j udgm en t a s am atte r of

law . ” F ed . R. Ci v. P. 56( c) . Am at er ia l f ac t i s ge nui ne onl y

“ if the e vid en ce is suc h th at ar ea sona

ble j ur y c oul d r et ur n ave rd ic t f

or the nonm ovi ng p ar

ty . ” A nde rs on, 477 U . S. a t 24 8, 106 S . Ct . a t 25 10. A . S ove re ignI m

m uni ty Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt g ra n t eds u m m ary ju d g m en tt o th e D OT o n St ep h en s ’ § 19 83, A D A , and A D E Ac la im s a ft er f ind ing that the D O T ha d im m uni ty pur suant t o th e E le ve nthA m en dm en t. S te phe ns b ro ught he r cl ai m

sol el y a ga ins t the G eo rg iaD ep ar

tm en t of T ranspo rt at ion . A s an arm of the state , the D O T is en t i t l ed t o th e s ame s o v er ei g n i m m u n i t y o f t h e s t at e i t s el f. Ro b i n s o n v . Ga . De p ’t of T ransp., 966 F.2d 637, 640 (11t h Cir. 1992 ). Congress has not abrogated im m uni ty f or c la im s br ough t purs uant t o § 1 983, the A D E A , or the A D A . S ee id. (h old ing that the E le ve nthA m en dm en t barr ed pla int if f’ s § 1 983 ag ai nst

G eo rg ia DOT ) ; K im el v. F la . Bd . of Re ge nts , 528 U . S. 62, 120 S . Ct . 631 ( 2000 ) (h old ing that the A D E Adid

not va lid ly abr ogate E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty ); Bd . of T rs . of the U niv . of

A la . v. G ar

re tt, 531 U . S. 356 , 121 S . Ct . 955 ( 2001 ) (h old ing that st at e ag en ci es w er e en tit le d to E le ve nthA m en dm en t i m m uni ty f ro mStephens argues that the district court err ed by conductinga de novo inquiry of her 3 claims bec ause, dur ing he r ac tion to obtain st ate une mploy ment benef

its, a state administrative hear ing of

fice r alleg edly

had alr eady

ruled on the me rits of her c laims by deter mining that the DO T had fa iled to meet its burden of pr oof to est ablish Stephens' s ineligibility for be nefits. B y

finding that the DOT ha d failed to mee t its burden of p ro o f t o es t ablish Stephens' s disqualification from unemploy ment benef

its, the state administrative hea ringoffice r did n o t address the merits of any potential ADEA, A DA, or Title VI Iclaims. Fur thermore , the state a dminist rative r uling doe s not have a prec lusive eff

ect ove r Stephens' s Title VI Iclaims. See B ishop, 361 F.3d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 2004). Acc ording ly , the di strict court did not err by conducting a de novo reviewof the c ase be fore g rantingsummary

judgme nt in favor of

the DOT. 9 emp l o yees ’ cl ai m s b ro u g h tp u rs u an tt o th e A DA) . Th er ef o re , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s gr an t o f su m

m ary jud gm en t o n t he se cla im s was pro pe r. B. Title V II The district court, rea ding Stephens’ claim liberally , stated that she alleged se ve ra l c ogni za

ble the or ie s un de r a T itl e V II c la im : ( 1) that S te phe ns w as de nie d a tr an sf er and u lti m at el y

te rm inate d be ca

use of he r se x; ( 2) that sh e w as avic tim of dis parate tr eatm en t; an d ( 3) that sh e w as r et al ia te d a ga ins t be ca use of he r se x. T he dis tr ic t c ourt f

ound that S te phe ns f

ai le d to e sta

bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se und er

T itl e VI I and that even if she had established a prim a fa cie ca se, the D OT cam e forw ard w ithale git im at e, non -d isc ri m inator y r ea son fo r te rm inatin g he r that S te phe ns co ul d n ot sh ow was pre te xt ua l. 3 Apla int if f m ay e sta bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se of

dis cr im inatio n by

vir tue of the denial of a j ob transfer or ter m ination by

showing that (1) she is a m em ber of a pr ote ct ed c la ss; ( 2) she is qua lif

ie d f or the pos iti on; ( 3) she w as sub j ec te d to10

adve rs e em

plo ym en t a ct ion ; and ( 4) she w as r ep la ce d by ape rs on o uts ide the pr ote ct ed c la ss. K el lih er

v. V en em an , 313 F . 3d 1 270, 127 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) . T he pla int if f ge ne ra lly

ha s th e bur de n of

e sta bli shi ng a pr im a fa ci e ca se of dis cr im inatio n. Mc D onne ll D ougl as Co rp . v. G re en , 411 U . S. 792 , 802 , 93 S . Ct . 1817 , 182 4, 36 L . E d. 2d 6 68 ( 1973 ) E sta bli shi ng a pr im a fa ci e ca se of discrim ination cre ates a pre sum ption of unlawful discrim ination , and the em ploy er m ust c om e fo rw ar d w ithe vid en ce of ale git im at e non- dis cr im inator y r ea son fo r its de ci sio n. I d. a t 80 2, 93 S . Ct . a t 18 24. T his bur de n is “ ex ce ed ing ly li ght , ” an d th e em pl oyer m us t m erel y

pro fferno n- di sc riminat ory reas on s, n ot pro ve th em . Pe rr ym anv. Joh nsonP ro ds. Co . , 698 F . 2d 1 138, 114 2 ( 11th C ir . 198 3) . Whe n th e em plo y er e xpr es se s on e or

m or e le git im at e re as ons fo r its a ct ion s, the pr es um pti on of dis cr im inatio n e va

por at es , and the pla int if

f m ust r ai se age nui ne iss ue of m at eri al factas t o wh et he r th e rea so ns off eredby the de fen da nt are p ret ex tu al . McDo nn el l Do ug la s, 4 11 U.S. at 8 04 , 93 S.Ct . at 1 82 5. A ssum ing arg ue ndo that S te phe ns e sta bli she d apr im a fa ci e ca se w ith respect to one or m ore of her claim s, sum

m ary j udgm ent for the D OT wa s ne ve rthe le ss a

ppr opr ia te be ca

use it of fe re d le git im at e, non -d isc ri m inator y r ea sons fo r he r te rm inatio n, and S te phe ns d id n ot p ro duc e ev ide nc e cr eatin g age nui ne issue of m aterial f

act that the proffe red re asons were pretextual. Stephens refusedOther arguments asser ted on appe al ar e re

jected w ithout need for f

urther disc ussion. 4 11 to follow her supervisors’ directions on sev eral occ asions, tookfre quent sick leave, and tooka state vehicle a nd drove dang erously

on pub lic roads. Even af ter thi s, the D O T a tte m

pte d to m ee t w ithhe r an d w ork w ithhe r, but she r ef use d to co ope rate . A ny

of the se r ea sons are suf

fi ci en t l eg iti m at e re as ons fo r te rm inatio n, an d n ot hi ng in th e rec or d i nd ic at es th atth ey are p ret ex tu al . III. CONCLUSI ON Upon care fu l r ev ie wof

the r ec or d and the part ie s’ br ie fs , w e fi nd n o reversible er

ror. 4 AFFIRMED.