Filed 8/16/16 P. v. Ward CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RONALD WARD, 

Defendant and Appellant.

 B262842

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA420109)

 

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge. Affirmed. 

William J. Capriola, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, 

Assistant Attorneys General, Shawn McGahey Webb and Nima Razfar, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
2

Ronald Ward appeals from the judgment entered upon revocation of his probation. 

He contends he did not validly waive his right to a probation revocation hearing. We 

disagree and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

In February 2014, appellant was charged with transportation, sale, or offer to sell

cocaine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352.) Five prior prison terms were alleged, three of 

which were for drug convictions. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b); Health & Saf. Code, 

§ 11370.2, subd. (a).) Appellant had mental health issues, and a long history of 

homelessness and drug problems. Although he had told a mental health evaluator that he 

was not interested in rehabilitation, appellant asked to be sent to a dual diagnosis 

program. The court reluctantly agreed to consider that option. 

In March 2014, appellant pled no contest and admitted the prior prison term 

allegations. The court imposed and suspended a six-year prison term and placed 

appellant on three-year formal probation, on condition that he complete a one-year 

treatment program. Appellant was warned that leaving the program would result in 

execution of the six-year sentence. Probation was revoked in May 2014. After appellant 

stipulated to a probation violation, probation was reinstated on the same terms in 

September 2014. 

In March 2015, appellant appeared in court on a bench warrant pickup. The court 

explained that, on February 3, 2015, appellant had been ordered to enroll in a dualdiagnosis program for one year and to return to court within 48 hours of leaving or 

having been terminated from the program.1 Defense counsel related what appellant had 

told her: A few hours after checking into the program, appellant had asked permission to 

get something to eat. While he was out, he suffered a “psychotic episode,” during which 

he “experienced some auditory hallucinations directing him to engage in certain behavior 

 

1

The record does not include a reporter’s transcript or minute order from the 

February 3, 2015 hearing. 
3

and because of that, he did not return to the program,” and “that’s also why he never 

returned to court.” After consulting with appellant, counsel relayed that appellant was 

“asking the court for another opportunity.” The court stated that was the third time 

appellant had left the program without returning to court, terminated probation, and 

ordered execution of the previously imposed sentence. 

This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the trial court erred in revoking his probation without holding 

a formal probation revocation hearing or receiving a valid waiver of such a hearing.2

Probationers are entitled to due process protections prior to revocation, including a 

written notice of the claimed probation violation; disclosure of evidence against them;

opportunity to be heard in person, present evidence, and cross-examine adverse 

witnesses; as well as a neutral tribunal and a statement of reasons for revoking probation. 

(Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 489; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 

457–459.) However, probationers are not entitled to “all the procedural safeguards of a 

criminal trial,” and personal waivers of the procedural rights are not required. (People v. 

Abrams (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 396, 400; People v. Dale (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 191, 195

(Dale).) A probationer’s failure to object to the procedures used, and the conduct of his 

or her attorney, can indicate acquiescence sufficient to effectuate a waiver. (Ibid.; see 

also People v. Martin (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 482, 486 (Martin).)

The court in Dale concluded that the probationer had waived his right to a 

contested probation revocation hearing through the conduct of his counsel “in submitting 

an alleged violation of probation upon the probation report,” and appellant’s 

“acquiesc[ence] by his silence. . . .” (Dale, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d at p. 195.) In Martin, 

the court concluded that appellant had “waived his right to insist on a revocation hearing 

 

2

The March 9, 2015 minute order indicates appellant was advised and waived his 

right to a hearing, but the reporter’s transcript does not reflect a formal advisement and 

waiver. 
4

by filing a statement in mitigation which acknowledged that he would be sentenced . . .

and failing to object at the sentencing hearing either to the sentencing procedure or to the 

grounds for revocation.” (Martin, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 486.) 

Appellant seeks to distinguish these cases on the ground that, here, the matter was 

not submitted on a probation report, nor did appellant file anything acknowledging he 

would be sentenced. That is a distinction without a difference. For all intents and 

purposes, defense counsel conceded that appellant had violated probation by leaving the 

treatment program and not returning to court as ordered. While appellant claims to have

objected to the grounds for revocation, the record reveals no such objection. Rather, 

appellant, much like the probationer in Dale, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d. at page 193, asked 

the court to give him another opportunity. Yet, neither appellant nor defense counsel 

objected to termination of probation, and counsel orally provided the court with 

information relevant to sentencing. Appellant effected a waiver by acquiescing in his 

counsel’s conduct. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EPSTEIN, P. J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, J.

COLLINS, J.