(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, 

INC. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

No. 12–1184. Argued February 26, 2014—Decided April 29, 2014 

The Patent Act’s fee-shifting provision authorizes district courts to

award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in “exceptional cases.” 35 

U. S. C. §285. In Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 

393 F. 3d 1378, 1381, the Federal Circuit defined an “exceptional

case” as one which either involves “material inappropriate conduct” 

or is both “objectively baseless” and “brought in subjective bad faith.” 

Brooks Furniture also requires that parties establish the “exceptional” nature of a case by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id., at 1382. 

Respondent ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., sued petitioner Octane 

Fitness, LLC, for patent infringement. The District Court granted 

summary judgment to Octane. Octane then moved for attorney’s fees 

under §285. The District Court denied the motion under the Brooks 

Furniture framework, finding ICON’s claim to be neither objectively

baseless nor brought in subjective bad faith. The Federal Circuit affirmed. 

Held: The Brooks Furniture framework is unduly rigid and impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts.

Pp. 7–12.

(a) Section 285 imposes one and only one constraint on district 

courts’ discretion to award attorney’s fees: The power is reserved for

“exceptional” cases. Because the Patent Act does not define “exceptional,” the term is construed “in accordance with [its] ordinary 

meaning.” Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U. S. ___, ___. In 1952, when Congress used the word in §285 (and today, for that matter),

“[e]xceptional” meant “uncommon,” “rare,” or “not ordinary.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 889 (2d ed. 1934). An “exceptional” case, then, is simply one that stands out from others with re-
 

2 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC. 

Syllabus 

spect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated. District courts 

may determine whether a case is “exceptional” in the case-by-case

exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances. Cf. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U. S. 517. Pp. 7–8.

(b) The Brooks Furniture framework superimposes an inflexible 

framework onto statutory text that is inherently flexible. Pp. 8–11.

(1) Brooks Furniture is too restrictive in defining the two categories of cases in which fee awards are allowed. The first category—

cases involving litigation or certain other misconduct—appears to extend largely to independently sanctionable conduct. But that is not 

the appropriate benchmark. A district court may award fees in the 

rare case in which a party’s unreasonable, though not independently

sanctionable, conduct is so “exceptional” as to justify an award. For 

litigation to fall within the second category, a district court must determine that the litigation is both objectively baseless and brought in

subjective bad faith. But a case presenting either subjective bad 

faith or exceptionally meritless claims may sufficiently set itself

apart from mine-run cases to be “exceptional.” The Federal Circuit 

imported this second category from Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 49, but that 

case’s standard finds no roots in §285’s text and makes little sense in 

the context of the exceptional-case determination. Pp. 8–10.

(2) Brooks Furniture is so demanding that it would appear to

render §285 largely superfluous. Because courts already possess the

inherent power to award fees in cases involving misconduct or bad

faith, see Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 

240, 258–259, this Court has declined to construe fee-shifting provisions narrowly so as to avoid rendering them superfluous. See, e.g., 

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 419. Pp. 10–11.

(3) Brooks Furniture’s requirement that proof of entitlement to

fees be made by clear and convincing evidence is not justified by

§285, which imposes no specific evidentiary burden. Nor has this 

Court interpreted comparable fee-shifting statutes to require such a 

burden of proof. See, e.g., Fogerty, 510 U. S, at 519. P. 11. 

496 Fed. Appx. 57, reversed and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAGAN, 

JJ., joined, and in which SCALIA, J., joined except as to footnotes 1–3. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–1184 

OCTANE FITNESS, LLC, PETITIONER v. ICON 

 HEALTH & FITNESS, INC.
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 

[April 29, 2014] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.* 

Section 285 of the Patent Act authorizes a district court 

to award attorney’s fees in patent litigation. It provides, 

in its entirety, that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may

award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 

35 U. S. C. §285. In Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F. 3d 1378 (2005), the United States

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that “[a] case

may be deemed exceptional” under §285 only in two limited circumstances: “when there has been some material 

inappropriate conduct,” or when the litigation is both

“brought in subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.” Id., at 1381. The question before us is whether the 

Brooks Furniture framework is consistent with the statutory text. We hold that it is not. 

I 

A 

Prior to 1946, the Patent Act did not authorize the 

awarding of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in 

—————— 

* JUSTICE SCALIA joins this opinion except as to footnotes 1–3. 
 

 

2 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

patent litigation. Rather, the “American Rule” governed: 

“‘[E]ach litigant pa[id] his own attorney’s fees, win or 

lose . . . .’” Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. ___, 

___ (2013) (slip op., at 9). In 1946, Congress amended the 

Patent Act to add a discretionary fee-shifting provision,

then codified in §70, which stated that a court “may in its 

discretion award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment in any patent case.” 

35 U. S. C. §70 (1946 ed.).1 

Courts did not award fees under §70 as a matter of 

course. They viewed the award of fees not “as a penalty

for failure to win a patent infringement suit,” but as appropriate “only in extraordinary circumstances.” Park-InTheatres, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F. 2d 137, 142 (CA9 1951).

The provision enabled them to address “unfairness or bad 

faith in the conduct of the losing party, or some other 

equitable consideration of similar force,” which made a

case so unusual as to warrant fee-shifting. Ibid.; see also 

Pennsylvania Crusher Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 193 F. 

2d 445, 451 (CA3 1951) (listing as “adequate justification[s]” for fee awards “fraud practiced on the Patent

Office or vexatious or unjustified litigation”).

Six years later, Congress amended the fee-shifting 

provision and recodified it as §285. Whereas §70 had

specified that a district court could “in its discretion award 

reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party,” the 

revised language of §285 (which remains in force today) 

provides that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award

reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” We have 

observed, in interpreting the damages provision of the

Patent Act, that the addition of the phrase “exceptional 

—————— 

1This provision did “not contemplat[e] that the recovery of attorney’s

fees [would] become an ordinary thing in patent suits . . . .” S. Rep. No. 

79–1503, p. 2 (1946). 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

cases” to §285 was “for purposes of clarification only.”2 

General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U. S. 648, 653, 

n. 8 (1983); see also id., at 652, n. 6. And the parties agree

that the recodification did not substantively alter the 

meaning of the statute.3 

For three decades after the enactment of §285, courts

applied it—as they had applied §70—in a discretionary 

manner, assessing various factors to determine whether a

given case was sufficiently “exceptional” to warrant a fee 

award. See, e.g., True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 

601 F. 2d 495, 508–509 (CA10 1979); Kearney & Trecker 

Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F. 2d 579, 597 (CA7 

1971); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F. 2d 474, 480–481 (CA8 

1965).

In 1982, Congress created the Federal Circuit and vested

it with exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases. 

28 U. S. C. §1295. In the two decades that followed, the 

Federal Circuit, like the regional circuits before it, instructed district courts to consider the totality of the circumstances when making fee determinations under §285. 

See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chemical Co., 736 

F. 2d 688, 691 (1984) (“Cases decided under §285 have

noted that ‘the substitution of the phrase “in exceptional

cases” has not done away with the discretionary feature’”); 

—————— 

2The Senate Report similarly explained that the new provision was

“substantially the same as” §70, and that the “ ‘exceptional cases’ ” 

language was added simply to “expres[s] the intention of the [1946]

statute as shown by its legislative history and as interpreted by the 

courts.” S. Rep. No. 82–1979, p. 30 (1952). 3See Brief for Petitioner 35 (“[T]his amendment was not intended to

create a stricter standard for fee awards, but instead was intended to 

clarify and endorse the already-existing statutory standard”); Brief for

Respondent 17 (“When it enacted §285, as the historical notes to this

provision make clear, Congress adopted the standards applied by courts 

interpreting that statute’s predecessor, §70 of the 1946 statute. Congress explained that §285 ‘is substantially the same as the corresponding provision in’ §70”). 
 

 

4 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F. 3d 1339, 1347 (2000) (“In assessing 

whether a case qualifies as exceptional, the district court

must look at the totality of the circumstances”). 

In 2005, however, the Federal Circuit abandoned that 

holistic, equitable approach in favor of a more rigid and

mechanical formulation. In Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. 

Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F. 3d 1378 (2005), the court held 

that a case is “exceptional” under §285 only “when there 

has been some material inappropriate conduct related to

the matter in litigation, such as willful infringement, 

fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent,

misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified

litigation, conduct that violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, or like 

infractions.” Id., at 1381. “Absent misconduct in conduct 

of the litigation or in securing the patent,” the Federal

Circuit continued, fees “may be imposed against the patentee only if both (1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.” Ibid. The Federal Circuit subsequently clarified 

that litigation is objectively baseless only if it is “so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could believe it would 

succeed,” iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F. 3d 1372, 1378 

(2011), and that litigation is brought in subjective bad

faith only if the plaintiff “actually know[s]” that it is objectively baseless, id., at 1377.4 

—————— 

4 In Kilopass Technology, Inc. v. Sidense Corp., 738 F. 3d 1302 (CA 

Fed 2013)—decided after our grant of certiorari but before we heard

oral argument in this case—the Federal Circuit appeared to cut back on

the “subjective bad faith” inquiry, holding that the language in iLOR 

was dictum and that “actual knowledge of baselessness is not required.”

738 F. 3d, at 1310. Rather, the court held, “a defendant need only 

prove reckless conduct to satisfy the subjective component of the §285

analysis,” ibid., and courts may “dra[w] an inference of bad faith from

circumstantial evidence thereof when a patentee pursues claims that

are devoid of merit,” id., at 1311. Most importantly, the Federal Circuit 

stated that “[o]bjective baselessness alone can create a sufficient 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

Finally, Brooks Furniture held that because “[t]here is a 

presumption that the assertion of infringement of a duly 

granted patent is made in good faith[,] . . . the underlying 

improper conduct and the characterization of the case as

exceptional must be established by clear and convincing

evidence.” 393 F. 3d, at 1382. 

B 

The parties to this litigation are manufacturers of exercise equipment. The respondent, ICON Health & Fitness, 

Inc., owns U. S. Patent No. 6,019,710 (’710 patent), which 

discloses an elliptical exercise machine that allows for 

adjustments to fit the individual stride paths of users. 

ICON is a major manufacturer of exercise equipment, but 

it has never commercially sold the machine disclosed in

the ’710 patent. The petitioner, Octane Fitness, LLC, also

manufactures exercise equipment, including elliptical 

machines known as the Q45 and Q47. 

ICON sued Octane, alleging that the Q45 and Q47

infringed several claims of the ’710 patent. The District 

Court granted Octane’s motion for summary judgment, 

concluding that Octane’s machines did not infringe ICON’s 

patent. 2011 WL 2457914 (D Minn., June 17, 2011). 

Octane then moved for attorney’s fees under §285. Applying the Brooks Furniture standard, the District Court 

denied Octane’s motion. 2011 WL 3900975 (D Minn., 

Sept. 6, 2011). It determined that Octane could show 

neither that ICON’s claim was objectively baseless nor 

that ICON had brought it in subjective bad faith. As to 

objective baselessness, the District Court rejected Octane’s 

—————— 

inference of bad faith to establish exceptionality under §285, unless the 

circumstances as a whole show a lack of recklessness on the patentee’s 

part.” Id., at 1314. Chief Judge Rader wrote a concurring opinion that
 

sharply criticized Brooks Furniture, 738 F. 3d, at 1318–1320; the court, 

he said, “should have remained true to its original reading of” §285, id.,
 

at 1320.
 
 

 

6 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

argument that the judgment of noninfringement “should 

have been a foregone conclusion to anyone who visually 

inspected” Octane’s machines. Id., *2. The court explained that although it had rejected ICON’s infringement 

arguments, they were neither “frivolous” nor “objectively

baseless.” Id., *2–*3. The court also found no subjective 

bad faith on ICON’s part, dismissing as insufficient both

“the fact that [ICON] is a bigger company which never 

commercialized the ’710 patent” and an e-mail exchange 

between two ICON sales executives, which Octane had 

offered as evidence that ICON had brought the infringement action “as a matter of commercial strategy.”5 Id., *4. 

ICON appealed the judgment of noninfringement, and 

Octane cross-appealed the denial of attorney’s fees. The 

Federal Circuit affirmed both orders. 496 Fed. Appx. 57 

(2012). In upholding the denial of attorney’s fees, it rejected Octane’s argument that the District Court had 

“applied an overly restrictive standard in refusing to find

the case exceptional under §285.” Id., at 65. The Federal 

Circuit declined to “revisit the settled standard for exceptionality.” Ibid. 

We granted certiorari, 570 U. S. __ (2013), and now 

reverse. 

—————— 

5One e-mail, sent from ICON’s Vice President of Global Sales to two 

employees, read: “ ‘We are suing Octane. Not only are we coming out

with a greater product to go after them, but throwing a lawsuit on top

of that.’ ” 2011 WL 3900975, *4. One of the recipients then forwarded 

that e-mail to a third party, along with the accompanying message: 

“ ‘Just clearing the way and making sure you guys have all your guns 

loaded!’ ” Ibid. More than a year later, that same employee sent an

e-mail to the Vice President of Global Sales with the subject, “‘I heard we 

are suing Octane!’ ” Ibid. The executive responded as follows: “ ‘Yes—

old patent we had for a long time that was sitting on the shelf. They 

are just looking for royalties.’ ” Ibid. The District Court wrote that “in 

the light most favorable to Octane, these remarks are stray comments 

by employees with no demonstrated connection to the lawsuit.” Ibid. 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

II 

The framework established by the Federal Circuit in 

Brooks Furniture is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly 

encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district 

courts. 

A 

Our analysis begins and ends with the text of §285: “The

court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney 

fees to the prevailing party.” This text is patently clear. 

It imposes one and only one constraint on district courts’ 

discretion to award attorney’s fees in patent litigation: The 

power is reserved for “exceptional” cases. 

The Patent Act does not define “exceptional,” so we 

construe it “‘in accordance with [its] ordinary meaning.’” 

Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 6); 

see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U. S. 593, ___ (2010) (slip

op., at 6) (“In patent law, as in all statutory construction, 

‘[u]nless otherwise defined, “words will be interpreted as

taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning”’”). In 1952, when Congress used the word in §285 

(and today, for that matter), “[e]xceptional” meant “uncommon,” “rare,” or “not ordinary.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 889 (2d ed. 1934); see also 3 Oxford 

English Dictionary 374 (1933) (defining “exceptional” as 

“out of the ordinary course,” “unusual,” or “special”); 

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 435 (11th ed. 

2008) (defining “exceptional” as “rare”); Noxell Corp. v. 

Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant, 771 F. 2d 521, 526 

(CADC 1985) (R. B. Ginsburg, J., joined by Scalia, J.) 

(interpreting the term “exceptional” in the Lanham Act’s 

identical fee-shifting provision, 15 U. S. C. §1117(a), to

mean “uncommon” or “not run-of-the-mill”).

We hold, then, that an “exceptional” case is simply one 

that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering 
 

 

8 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the 

unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.

District courts may determine whether a case is “exceptional” in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, 

considering the totality of the circumstances.6 As in the 

comparable context of the Copyright Act, “‘[t]here is no

precise rule or formula for making these determinations,’ 

but instead equitable discretion should be exercised ‘in

light of the considerations we have identified.’” Fogerty v. 

Fantasy, Inc., 510 U. S. 517, 534 (1994). 

B 

1 

The Federal Circuit’s formulation is overly rigid. Under 

the standard crafted in Brooks Furniture, a case is “exceptional” only if a district court either finds litigation-related 

misconduct of an independently sanctionable magnitude 

or determines that the litigation was both “brought in

subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.” 393 F. 3d, 

at 1381. This formulation superimposes an inflexible 

framework onto statutory text that is inherently flexible.

For one thing, the first category of cases in which the

Federal Circuit allows fee awards—those involving litigation misconduct or certain other misconduct—appears to

extend largely to independently sanctionable conduct. See 

ibid. (defining litigation-related misconduct to include 

“willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in 

procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation, vexa-

—————— 

6 In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U. S. 517 (1994), for example, we 

explained that in determining whether to award fees under a similar

provision in the Copyright Act, district courts could consider a “nonexclusive” list of “factors,” including “frivolousness, motivation, objective 

unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case)

and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of 

compensation and deterrence.” Id., at 534, n. 19 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

tious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11, or like infractions”). But sanctionable conduct 

is not the appropriate benchmark. Under the standard 

announced today, a district court may award fees in the 

rare case in which a party’s unreasonable conduct—while

not necessarily independently sanctionable—is nonetheless so “exceptional” as to justify an award of fees.

The second category of cases in which the Federal Circuit allows fee awards is also too restrictive. In order for a 

case to fall within this second category, a district court 

must determine both that the litigation is objectively 

baseless and that the plaintiff brought it in subjective bad 

faith. But a case presenting either subjective bad faith or

exceptionally meritless claims may sufficiently set itself 

apart from mine-run cases to warrant a fee award. Cf. 

Noxell, 771 F. 2d, at 526 (“[W]e think it fair to assume 

that Congress did not intend rigidly to limit recovery of

fees by a [Lanham Act] defendant to the rare case in 

which a court finds that the plaintiff ‘acted in bad faith,

vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons’ . . . . 

Something less than ‘bad faith,’ we believe, suffices to

mark a case as ‘exceptional’”).

ICON argues that the dual requirement of “subjective

bad faith” and “objective baselessness” follows from this

Court’s decision in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. 

v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 49 (1993) 

(PRE), which involved an exception to the NoerrPennington doctrine of antitrust law. It does not. Under 

the Noerr-Pennington doctrine—established by Eastern 

Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 

Inc., 365 U. S. 127 (1961), and Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657 (1965)—defendants are immune from

antitrust liability for engaging in conduct (including litigation) aimed at influencing decisionmaking by the government. PRE, 508 U. S., at 56. But under a “sham exception” to this doctrine, “activity ‘ostensibly directed toward 
 

10 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

influencing governmental action’ does not qualify for 

Noerr immunity if it ‘is a mere sham to cover . . . an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships

of a competitor.’” Id., at 51. In PRE, we held that to 

qualify as a “sham,” a “lawsuit must be objectively baseless” and must “concea[l] ‘an attempt to interfere directly

with the business relationships of a competitor . . . .’” Id., 

at 60–61 (emphasis deleted). In other words, the plaintiff 

must have brought baseless claims in an attempt to

thwart competition (i.e., in bad faith).

In Brooks Furniture, the Federal Circuit imported the 

PRE standard into §285. See 393 F. 3d, at 1381. But the 

PRE standard finds no roots in the text of §285, and it 

makes little sense in the context of determining whether a

case is so “exceptional” as to justify an award of attorney’s

fees in patent litigation. We crafted the Noerr-Pennington

doctrine—and carved out only a narrow exception for

“sham” litigation—to avoid chilling the exercise of the

First Amendment right to petition the government for the

redress of grievances. See PRE, 508 U. S., at 56 (“Those

who petition government for redress are generally immune from antitrust liability”). But to the extent that 

patent suits are similarly protected as acts of petitioning,

it is not clear why the shifting of fees in an “exceptional” 

case would diminish that right. The threat of antitrust 

liability (and the attendant treble damages, 15 U. S. C. 

§15) far more significantly chills the exercise of the right

to petition than does the mere shifting of attorney’s fees. 

In the Noerr-Pennington context, defendants seek immunity from a judicial declaration that their filing of a lawsuit 

was actually unlawful; here, they seek immunity from a

far less onerous declaration that they should bear the 

costs of that lawsuit in exceptional cases. 

2 

 We reject Brooks Furniture for another reason: It is so 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

demanding that it would appear to render §285 largely

superfluous. We have long recognized a common-law 

exception to the general “American rule” against feeshifting—an exception, “inherent” in the “power [of] the 

courts” that applies for “‘willful disobedience of a court 

order’” or “when the losing party has ‘acted in bad faith, 

vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . . .’” 

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 

U. S. 240, 258–259 (1975). We have twice declined to 

construe fee-shifting provisions narrowly on the basis that

doing so would render them superfluous, given the background exception to the American rule, see Christiansburg 

Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 419 (1978); Newman 

v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402, n. 4 

(1968) (per curiam), and we again decline to do so here. 

3 

Finally, we reject the Federal Circuit’s requirement that

patent litigants establish their entitlement to fees under

§285 by “clear and convincing evidence,” Brooks Furniture, 

393 F. 3d, at 1382. We have not interpreted comparable 

fee-shifting statutes to require proof of entitlement to fees 

by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Fogerty, 510 

U. S., at 519; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 

384 (1990); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558 

(1988). And nothing in §285 justifies such a high standard 

of proof. Section 285 demands a simple discretionary 

inquiry; it imposes no specific evidentiary burden, much 

less such a high one. Indeed, patent-infringement litigation has always been governed by a preponderance of the

evidence standard, see, e.g., Béné v. Jeantet, 129 U. S. 683, 

688 (1889), and that is the “standard generally applicable

in civil actions,” because it “allows both parties to ‘share

the risk of error in roughly equal fashion,’” Herman & 

MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 390 (1983). 
 

 

12 OCTANE FITNESS, LLC v. ICON HEALTH & FITNESS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

* * * 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is reversed,

and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.