In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 08-2236

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TERRI SAWYER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. IP-06-126-CR-04-M/F—Larry J. McKinney, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 12, 2009—DECIDED MARCH 12, 2009

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and

MANION, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Terri Sawyer was convicted for

participating in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Her appeal primarily rests on the district court’s

refusal to instruct the jury on the elements of a duress

defense, although she also raises questions about her

sentence and certain evidentiary rulings as well.

For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment and

sentence of the district court.
2 No. 08-2236

I. Background

In February 2008, at the conclusion of a two-day trial,

a federal jury convicted Terri Sawyer of conspiracy to

deliver 500 or more grams of a mixture or substance

containing methamphetamine. Sawyer presented a very

different account of the events leading to that conviction

than the government. She claims she was relentlessly

threatened by Seferino Rodriguez, one of the government’s witnesses at trial, because of a previous drug

debt owed by her ex-boyfriend. To pay off this debt, she

claims that Rodriguez forced her to find meth buyers.

The government’s evidence at trial indicated that Sawyer

was a willing participant in a meth-dealing operation,

and that she purchased meth from Rodriguez and was

responsible for introducing various buyers and suppliers.

Seferino Rodriguez offered testimony in support of the

government’s case. Rodriguez testified that he began

dealing meth in January 2005, when Sawyer asked him to

sell it to her. He had met Sawyer a few months before,

because Rodriguez had sold marijuana to Sawyer’s boyfriend Ryan Beauchamp. After Sawyer asked him for

meth, Rodriguez met with a man known as Gavacho at

a nightclub, and Gavacho agreed to sell him meth. Rodriguez testified that he set up his first sale to Sawyer about

a week after this. Continuing for the next six months,

Rodriguez sold meth to Sawyer, usually once or twice

per week. In late June or early July 2005, Sawyer introduced Rodriguez to a customer of hers, Donald Pruett.

Rodriguez testified that when he met “Donnie” (as Rodriguez knew him) they made a deal to buy meth. Shortly
No. 08-2236 3

after this sale, Rodriguez went to Texas for his sister’s

birthday. In his absence, Gavacho sold meth directly to

Sawyer. Rodriguez went back to selling meth to Sawyer

when he returned to Indiana in September 2005.

Some time after Rodriguez returned to Indiana, Sawyer

introduced him to Gregory Vanes. According to his trial

testimony, Sawyer introduced Vanes as her partner in

meth dealing. For the next few months, until police

officers arrested him in February 2006, Rodriguez sold

meth to both Sawyer and Vanes. Rodriguez delivered

the drugs once or twice per week, in pound quantities.

During this time, Sawyer introduced Rodriguez to two

other customers, Jason Swearingen and Heather

Crowder; as a result of these introductions, Rodriguez

sold meth to both of them.

In January 2006, Sawyer and Vanes told Rodriguez that

their partnership had ended over a financial dispute.

Rodriguez continued selling meth to Sawyer for the

next month or so. He was arrested on February 13, 2006,

by Indianapolis police officers while in possession of

nine ounces of meth. At the time of his arrest, he was on

his way to complete a deal with Sawyer.

The government’s case included several additional

witnesses. Vanes testified that Sawyer introduced him

to Rodriguez as a supplier of methamphetamine and

that he and Sawyer bought meth from Rodriguez

regularly after that meeting; Vanes admitted to

personally receiving five or six one-pound shipments. At

the same time, Vanes was also buying meth from another source in five or ten pound shipments; he
4 No. 08-2236

testified that he would deliver two to five pounds to

Sawyer after each delivery from this other source.

Donald Pruett testified that he began buying meth from

Sawyer in February 2005, and bought meth from her

about once a month for the next six months. Eventually,

Pruett learned of Sawyer’s suppliers, including

“Seferino” (presumably Rodriguez), “Gordo,” “Joker,” and

“Gavacho.” Pruett stopped buying from Sawyer when

she arranged a drug transaction with her suppliers that

she did not show up for; after that, Pruett bought

directly from Sawyer’s suppliers. Jason Swearingen

testified that he met Sawyer in August 2004, and began

buying meth from her about a month later. He and his

girlfriend, Heather Crowder, bought about one pound of

meth per week from Sawyer. Crowder testified that she

met Sawyer around the same time as Swearingen, and that

Sawyer and Swearingen arranged a meth deal at that

first meeting. After that, she and Swearingen regularly

bought one-pound quantities of meth; many of these

deals took place in Indianapolis, where Crowder was

introduced to some of Sawyer’s suppliers. The government’s case also included a recorded phone call between

Sawyer and Crowder that took place after Swearingen

had been arrested on drug charges; in that call, Crowder

asked “when do we go back to work,” meaning, she

testified, when they could go back to selling meth.

The government also presented the testimony of Special

Agent Michael Davis of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Davis testified that he executed the search warrant on

Sawyer’s home in Richmond, Indiana in November 2006.
No. 08-2236 5

In that search, law enforcement officers recovered a small

amount of meth, approximately $11,746 in currency, and

weights for a scale.

Sawyer presented a very different version of events.

She testified that she began dating Ryan Beauchamp in

2004; eventually, both of them began to use methamphetamine. Sawyer testified that Beauchamp was friends

with Rodriguez, and that the two of them dealt marijuana and cocaine together. This business relationship

soured when Beauchamp ripped Rodriguez off in a

drug deal, however. (Rodriguez, when asked about this

deal during his testimony at trial, said that Beauchamp

had been assaulted and robbed after Rodriguez fronted

him fifteen pounds of marijuana; he testified that he did

not try to collect on this debt.) Sawyer testified, however,

that Rodriguez began threatening Beauchamp after that

deal. First, Rodriguez showed up at Sawyer and Beauchamp’s house with several other men and threatened

Beauchamp. After that night, Sawyer threw Beauchamp

out of their shared house.

After that confrontation, Rodriguez evidently lost contact with Beauchamp and instead began harassing

Sawyer about the debt. At one point he and several

other men showed up at Sawyer’s house and demanded

that she go with them to Hoosier Marine to get

Beauchamp’s boat released as payment. Rodriguez acknowledged that he made this trip, and the manager of

Hoosier Marine testified that he remembered Sawyer

looking scared during their conversation.

Looking for other ways to pay off the debt, Sawyer

testified that she then began introducing Rodriguez
6 No. 08-2236

to potential customers. She claims to have acted as a

middleman in transactions between Rodriguez and the

government’s other witnesses at trial. She testified that

she was present when others bought meth from

Rodriguez, but never participated in re-selling.

Sawyer never contacted the police because, she

claimed, Rodriguez was a member of the Mexican

Mafia and she was afraid he would find out if she did.

She testified that the debt that Beauchamp owed

Rodriguez (and that as a result she owed Rodriguez) was

between $25,000 and $30,000. Rodriguez would call

her, she claimed at trial, “daily,” by “coming down constantly, saying they would be—he would tell me they

would circle the house the night before and just—I was an

emotional wreck.” With respect to the nature of the

contact, Sawyer testified that, “he would be on to me,

like, tell them to move the dope faster and get people

up there; and, you know, ‘These guys are, you know,

getting mad,’ just same stuff every day.”

On cross-examination she admitted that she did not

have any conversations about the running balance of that

debt or how much it diminished based on the number of

introductions that she made, until October 2005 when

Rodriguez had reduced the debt by $10,000. She also

testified that she moved from Cloverdale, Indiana, to

Richmond, Indiana in December 2005, in order to get

away from Rodriguez. The threatening encounters with

Rodriguez ended after she moved, although Sawyer

testified that he would still contact her by phone.

During an instruction conference at the trial, Sawyer

tendered an instruction on the affirmative defense of
No. 08-2236 7

duress. The government objected on the grounds that

Sawyer had not met the burden of production for that

defense because she had not established that she faced

an immediate threat of death or bodily injury and did not

have a reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened

harm. The district court agreed with the government

and declined to issue the instruction.

The jury convicted Sawyer of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine at the close of the trial. On May 9,

2008, Sawyer was sentenced to 260 months in prison. This

appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Sawyer raises three issues in this appeal. First, she

argues that the district court erred by not tendering her

proffered instruction on duress to the jury; second, she

argues that the district court erred by excluding certain

evidence from her trial; third, she argues that the

district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. We

take each claim in turn.

A. Duress instruction

This court reviews de novo a district court’s decision

not to give a defense instruction. United States v. Brack,

188 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Prude,

489 F.3d 873, 882 (7th Cir. 2007) (“We review a district

court’s refusal to give a theory of defense instruction

de novo.”). A defendant is entitled to offer an
8 No. 08-2236

instruction on an affirmative defense or a theory of

defense if: (1) the defendant’s proffered instruction is a

correct statement of the law; (2) the theory of defense

is supported by the evidence; (3) the theory of defense

is not part of the charge; and (4) the failure to include

the instruction would deny the defendant a fair trial.

United States v. Jenkins, 419 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005). A

defendant is entitled to have a jury consider a proffered

defense so long as that defense has a foundation in the

evidence, “however tenuous” that foundation may be.

United States v. Given, 164 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1999).

Sawyer’s claim centers around the affirmative defense

of duress. The duress defense has its roots in common

law, and excuses criminal conduct, even though the

defendant engages in it with the requisite mens rea,

because the defendant nevertheless acted under a threat

of a greater immediate harm that could only be avoided

by committing the crime charged. Under the law of this

circuit, a defendant attempting to present a defense of

duress or coercion must show: (1) she reasonably feared

immediate death or serious bodily harm unless she committed the offense; and (2) there was no reasonable opportunity to refuse to commit the offense and avoid the

threatened injury. United States v. Jocic, 207 F.3d 889, 892

(7th Cir. 2000). If the defendant had a reasonable alternative to violating the law, then the defense of duress will

not lie. Id. A defendant’s fear of death or serious bodily

injury is generally insufficient. Rather, “[t]here must be

evidence that the threatened harm was present, immediate,

or impending.” United States v. Tanner, 941 F.2d 574, 587

(7th Cir. 1991). Further, Supreme Court precedent also
No. 08-2236 9

suggests that when a defendant presenting a duress

defense committed an ongoing crime (such as, in this

case, conspiracy) that defendant must have ceased committing the crime as soon as the claimed duress lost its

coercive force. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 412-

13 (1980) (holding that an escapee from custody must

present evidence that he surrendered to authorities as

soon as the coercive force ceased when he claimed his

escape occurred under duress).

The district court declined to issue the jury instruction

in this case because it did not find a sufficient

evidentiary basis for it. The court first noted that, “I don’t

think there’s evidence that the threat was immediate. . . .

The cases that give these instructions are cases in

which there’s someone right there on the spot enforcing

the person’s activities. This isn’t—we don’t have that.”

With respect to the second portion of the defense, the

district court found that she had a reasonable opportunity to refuse to commit the offense, noting that

“there was so much time available for her to have

reached out to law enforcement and she chose not to.”

One sentence of the district court’s opinion complicates

our review, however. The district court, when discussing

the evidence presented, found that “[t]here’s just not

enough evidence here to meet the burden—preponderance

on her burden to show that she engaged in conduct

because she reasonably feared that immediate serious

bodily harm or death would be inflicted upon her and

that she had no reasonable opportunity to avoid injury.” Sawyer argues on appeal that the district court’s
10 No. 08-2236

reference to “preponderance” was erroneous and applied the wrong evidentiary standard to the instruction.

Sawyer suggests that the district court was improperly

applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Dixon v.

United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006). That case held that the

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the elements of a duress defense by a preponderance of the

evidence. The holding of Dixon pertains to the ultimate

burden of proof on the issue at trial and not the initial

showing that a defendant must make before the court

will instruct the jury on the defense, however. On an

initial showing, a defendant need show only a foundation for the elements of the defense in the evidence, not

a preponderance of the evidence supporting the defense.

Sawyer argues that this legal error merits reversal, as

the district court used the wrong legal standard when

rejecting the jury instruction. The government argues that

Sawyer’s claim is insufficient as a matter of law. Her

presentation did not include any evidence of an “immediate” threat. Instead, her duress case relies on unspecific threats of violence at a future time. The government

also argues that this extended time frame prohibits

Sawyer from producing evidence that she had no reasonable opportunity to refuse to commit the offense.

Over the course of a year, the government argues, Sawyer

would have had ample opportunity to report Rodriguez

to the police, and could have done so anonymously if

she feared for her safety.

With respect to Sawyer’s argument on appeal, the

district court’s use of the word “preponderance” in its
No. 08-2236 11

ruling on the jury instruction does raise some question

about what evidentiary standard the court applied. The

remainder of the ruling, however, indicates that the

court simply found no evidentiary basis for the proposed

instruction under the correct standard. The scenario

that Sawyer presented at trial was a far cry from the

kind to which the duress defense applies. The court

noted that she had not alleged that she ever acted under

an immediate threat (such as someone monitoring or

enforcing her behavior) nor that, during the course of a

year, she did not have a reasonable opportunity to

escape the threatening conduct.

As the remainder of our discussion indicates, the

district court committed harmless error even if it applied the wrong evidentiary standard, as Sawyer

simply did not establish a foundation for the defense.

This circuit has long held that the threat giving rise to a

duress defense must have been “present, immediate, or

impending.” Tanner, 941 F.2d at 587. Sawyer does not

allege an immediate threat; her brief alleges that

Rodriguez was affiliated with the Mexican Mafia and

was capable of harming Sawyer and her son, but in her

testimony she did not claim that Seferino Rodriguez or

anyone else was present at all times when Sawyer was

involved with the meth ring, forcing her to act under

constant compulsion. Even taking her testimony at face

value, it recounts Rodriguez’s allusions to future violence if Sawyer refused to pay off Beauchamp’s drug

debt. We have previously noted in this context that,

“ ‘future’ or ‘later’ and ‘imminent’ are opposites.” United

States v. Tokash, 282 F.3d 962, 970 (7th Cir. 2002). Whether
12 No. 08-2236

or not it was reasonable, Sawyer’s fear of future violence

if she did not cooperate with Rodriguez does not entitle

her to a duress defense. See United States v. Sahakian,

453 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that “Sahakian’s

fear that he might be assaulted at some future point by

some unidentified inmate” was insufficient for a duress

defense).

Additionally, Sawyer did not present evidence that

she could have avoided this threat only by agreeing to

help sell drugs, with no reasonable opportunity to seek

protection from law enforcement. Her case is actually

very similar to the circumstances in Tanner. In that case, a

prison inmate was charged with possession of cocaine

with intent to distribute after a package he attempted

to smuggle into the prison was intercepted. Tanner,

941 F.2d at 576. A witness at trial testified that the defendant only smuggled the package in because another

inmate had threatened his life if he did not help. Id. at 587.

We held that the defendant had not demonstrated that

no other reasonable alternative was available, since the

defendant could have sought protective custody or

notified prison guards. Id. In this case, Sawyer did not

present evidence that she never had the chance to contact the police in order to report Rodriguez’s threats.

Since she is alleging ongoing threats over the course of a

year, it would be virtually impossible for her to present

such evidence. She does allege that she was afraid of

Rodriguez’s Mexican Mafia connections and believed he

would find out if she reported him to the police. Outside

of this assertion, however, she presented no evidence

that Rodriguez is actually a member of the Mexican
No. 08-2236 13

Mafia, or that the group has moles inside the various

police forces in Indiana such that it would have been

unreasonable for her to seek their protection. Finally,

Sawyer failed to meet Bailey’s requirement that she

cease committing the crime as soon as the threats against

her lost their coercive force. Sawyer testified that her

threatening run-ins with Rodriguez ended when she

moved to Richmond, but she continued to sell drugs

after the threat had passed, and continued to sell during

the months that Rodriguez was in Texas in the summer

of 2005.

We also note that the threat of future violence, often

implied and sometimes express, is frequently the currency of drug trafficking operations, and allowing a

duress defense in circumstances such as this where the

defendant has not shown the requisite elements would

flood drug prosecutions with jury instructions in cases

where they are unwarranted. We thus affirm the

district court’s decision not to offer the instruction in

this case. 

B. Exclusion of evidence

Sawyer next argues that the district court erred by

excluding testimony from two witnesses. We review

those evidentiary rulings only for an abuse of discretion.

United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 830 (7th Cir. 2008).

Moreover, harmless error analysis also applies to a

district court’s evidentiary rulings. United States v. Zapata,

871 F.2d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 1989).
14 No. 08-2236

Sawyer first challenges the district court’s decision not

to admit the testimony of Shaun Clark, who was in

prison for various drug trafficking offenses. Clark’s

testimony would have been hearsay offered through

Michael Davis, the DEA agent who testified during

the government’s case. Davis would have testified that

Clark purchased methamphetamine from various drug

dealers (including Vanes) but when offering testimony

to government agents about whom he had purchased

from, did not name Sawyer as one of them. The government objected to the evidence on relevance grounds

and hearsay. Sawyer contends that the evidence would be

relevant to a line from the government’s opening statement, claiming that Sawyer was a “principal” distributor

of methamphetamine in her part of Indiana. Sawyer

contends that the absence of her name from Clark’s

hearsay statement makes it more likely that she was just

a middleman or a broker rather than a drug distributor,

and is relevant for that reason. Sawyer also contends

that the evidence was not hearsay because it was not

offered for the truth of the matter asserted (to show that

Clark could have bought meth from the various sources

he named) but to show that people investigated the

meth market and discovered that Sawyer was not

named as someone from whom meth could be purchased.

Sawyer attempts to rely on United States v. Blandina, 895

F.2d 293, 299 (7th Cir. 1989), in support of the statement’s

admissibility. In Blandina, a defendant charged with tax

evasion claimed that he was not understating his income

because much of his accumulated wealth resulted from

selling rare coins left to him by his grandfather. The
No. 08-2236 15

government presented rebuttal testimony from an IRS

agent who refuted this defense. He claimed to have

interviewed sixty-one rare coin dealers in two states,

none of whom had ever transacted with the defendant.

When the defendant challenged that testimony as

hearsay on appeal, this court held that the testimony

was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but

merely to show that the agent’s testimony was the result

of a thorough investigation. Id. at 300.

Sawyer is attempting to make such an indirect evidentiary point that it is extremely difficult to conclude

whether or not she is really offering the statement for the

truth of the matter asserted. However, it appears that

Clark’s testimony was either hearsay or it was

irrelevant, and it was probably both. As it is presented to

this court, the testimony is that Clark purchased from

the major drug distributors in Indiana, and did not

name Sawyer as one of them. If that is the evidence that

Sawyer wanted to present, then the testimony is hearsay

because it depends on the truth of the matter asserted,

namely Clark’s knowledge of the drug market. If it is not

the testimony of someone who knows all the drug distributors, but merely the testimony of someone who

bought meth but did not buy it from Sawyer, then it

is irrelevant. It does not contradict any of the trial testimony and makes it no less likely that Sawyer sold or

bought meth from the government’s witnesses. Apparently

Sawyer wanted to use the testimony to rebut the government’s charge in its opening statement that she was

a “principal” distributor. That Clark’s testimony may

have showed that Sawyer was not a “principal” does not
16 No. 08-2236

make the evidence relevant. The indictment in this case

did not charge her with being a “principal” anything, only

being a participant in a conspiracy. The government

bore no burden of proof on her status in the conspiracy

at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

action more probable or less probable than it would be

without the evidence.”). At any rate, we are satisfied

that the inference Sawyer was asking the jury to draw

from this hearsay testimony was so indirect and insubstantial, especially compared to the testimony of her coconspirators at trial, that the district court’s decision

to exclude it passes harmless error review as well.

The second piece of testimony that Sawyer wanted to

offer was testimony from witnesses to an altercation

between Ryan Beauchamp and Seferino Rodriguez and

another group of people at a strip club in Indianapolis. The

witnesses would have testified that when friction developed between the two groups Rodriguez placed a phone

call and several other friends of Rodriguez arrived at the

bar. Sawyer argued that this evidence was relevant to

establish the credibility of the threat she faced from

Rodriguez, as she heard about the incident and claims

it contributed to her fear.

The government argues that the evidence is irrelevant.

Relevance, of course, is determined by whether the evidence makes any fact relevant to a determination of

the action more or less likely. We agree with the district

court that whether or not Rodriguez was able to get on
No. 08-2236 17

the phone and call for help in intimidating other strip

club patrons does not make it any more or less likely

that he threatened Sawyer. At best, this evidence shows

that Rodriguez was capable of summoning people if he

wanted to make a threat; it does not show that he ever

threatened Sawyer nor that he ever threatened her in

the same way that he threatened this anonymous group

of people in the nightclub. It certainly does not show an

immediate threat supporting Sawyer’s duress defense. 

C. Reasonableness of Sawyer’s sentence

Sawyer’s final argument is that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence of 260 months. We

review a district court’s application of the sentencing

guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.

United States v. Hollins, 498 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2006).

Ultimately, our review is concerned with the reasonableness of the defendant’s sentence, based on the calculation of the guidelines and the discretionary factors

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A properly calculated

within-guidelines sentence is entitled to a non-binding

presumption of reasonableness on appeal. Rita v.

United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007).

Sawyer concedes that her 260-month sentence was

properly calculated and was within the range specified by

the relevant sentencing guideline. She argues, however,

that the sentence was “likely enhanced from a sentence

at or near the bottom of the guidelines of 235 months due

to the court’s finding that Sawyer did not tell the truth

during her testimony.” The supposedly untruthful testi-
18 No. 08-2236

mony related to the source of money found in her home

(Sawyer claimed it was from a deceased relative), her

reasons for joining the conspiracy (she claimed she was

under duress) and her overall role (she claims she

only made introductions). Sawyer argues that this was

improper because the district court did not find at the

jury instructions conference that Sawyer’s testimony on

the duress defense was false, and declined to impose a

two-level enhancement to her offense level based on

obstruction of justice. Her argument is that if the

district court did not bar her proffered jury instruction

because of false testimony or impose an enhancement

for obstruction of justice, it is not entitled to find that

Sawyer was untruthful in her testimony.

The government argues that the district court’s determination that Sawyer did not tell the truth in her testimony simply represented the district court’s decision to

credit the testimony of Sawyer’s accomplices—who

presented her as a central figure in the conspiracy—rather

than Sawyer’s testimony. Such a decision is within the

district court’s discretion and does not make the sentence unreasonable.

Sawyer’s sentence is harsh, considering that she has

no previous criminal record: 260 months works out to

nearly twenty-two years in prison. That the law imposes

such a severe sentence on a first-time offender whose

circumstances present a case for leniency is a reflection

of the severe penalties that Congress has legislated for

drug crimes, and a sentencing regime that uses the

weight of drugs in the entire conspiracy as a baseline for

the sentencing of each member of that conspiracy. The
No. 08-2236 19

sentence was within the relevant guideline range of 235

to 293 months, however. In deciding not to depart from

the guidelines range, the district court cited, among other

§ 3553(a) factors, the need to deter methamphetamine

dealers and the serious nature of trafficking meth. The

district court also found that a sentence in the middle

of the applicable guideline range was warranted because

of Sawyer’s “failure to accept responsibility, and go[ing]

so far as to tell the jury things that weren’t true . . . .”

While it is true that the district court did not find that

Sawyer obstructed justice through her testimony, the

district court was entitled to find that she had misled

the jury, minimized her own role in the conspiracy, or

otherwise failed to accept responsibility. Our review of

this factual predicate is limited to clear error, and we

find none in this case. The district court’s findings are

consistent with the jury verdict—they found Sawyer

guilty, and their verdict is incompatible with Sawyer’s

testimony that she was a marginal player in the

overall conspiracy. The district court was thus entitled to

find that Sawyer had failed to accept responsibility for

her crimes, and that this in tandem with other factors

required a sentence of 260 months.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment

and sentence of the district court.

3-12-09