IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2016-CP-00664-COA ELLE A. ADAMS APPELLANT

v. JOHN LEON RICE APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/06/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DOROTHY W INSTON COLOM COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ELLE A. ADAMS (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: MARK G. W ILLIAMSON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/12/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., BARNES AND WILSON, JJ. BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. E l l e A d a ms (a.k.a. Elle Aquilera, Ellie A dam s , Elle A gundis), appe a r i n g p r o s e , appeals the judg me n t o f t he Oktibbeha County Chancery Court, which f ound that she was in contem pt f or not allowing John Rice visitation with their m inor child. Additionally , the chancery court declined to m odif y cust o d y . E l l e appeals, raising issues of j udicial bias, jurisdiction, child custody , and i nef f ective assistance of counsel. F inding n o er r o r , w e a f f irm

. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. This appeal stem s f rom John’s petition f

or contem pt and m odif

i cation of ch i l d

c u s t o dy
f iled in Novem

ber 2015. He alleged that Elle ref u sed to a llow him visitation o r contact withtheir two-y ear old child, A aron. 1 John requested that Elle b e held in contem pt f or her f ailure

to f ollow the court’s order and be required to pay his attorney ’s f e es and other c o s t s . Additionally , J ohn requested that the court m odif y its prior order and award him phy sical custody of Aaron subject to Elle’s restricted and supervised visitation. ¶3. The initial action of this case w a s f iled in Decem

ber 2013. John f

i led a petition to establish paternity , custody , and support of A aron. He initially requested custody of Aaron. Elle f iled a c ounterclaim f

or custody , child support, and m edical expenses i ncurred f rom the b i r t h o f t h e child. A f

ter a Septem

ber 2 014 hearing, t he issues were narrowed to visitation privileges, health insurance, and child support, a s John’s paternity had b een established, and he no longer desired phy s i cal custody

. ¶4. In i ts opinion and f inal judgm e nt of Decem

ber 2 014, the chancery court granted Elle phy sical custody of Aaron, with both parties having joint l egal c ustody

. John was awarded visitation consisting of

alternating weekends and specif ic holiday s. At the tim e , Elle lived
in Gulf S hores, Alabam a, and John lived i n S t a r kville, Mississippi; so the parties were to exchange the ch i l d a t the Meridian Police Departm ent. John was ordered to pay child support. Elle appealed the judgm ent, arguing the chancellor erred in granting u nsupervised visitation to John and joint legal custody

. Adams v. Rice , 196 So. 3d 1 086, 1089 (¶9) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2016). She a lso claim ed the chancellor should have declined jurisdiction based on

1 A p seu d o n y

m h as b een u sed to p ro tect th e id e n tity o f th e m in o r ch ild

. T h e p arties w e re n ev er m arried , an d th e y d isp u te th e n atu re o f t h eir relatio n sh ip

. Jo h n claim s th ey d ated an d h e liv ed w ith E lle an d h er tw o o th er ch ild ren f o r tw o an d o n e-h alf y ears. E lle, h o w e v er, claim s t h ey n ev e r d ated o r liv e d t o g eth er, an d th at A aro n is th e p ro d u ct o f rap e, af ter w h ich Jo h n co n tin u ed to h arass h er. Jo h n d en ies th ese alleg atio n s an d claim s E lle b ecam e h o stile af ter h e ref u sed to m arry

h er w h en sh e b e c am e p reg n an t.

2the doctrine of f orum non conveniens. Id. at 1090 (¶14). This Court af f irm e d the chancery

court. Id. at (¶16). ¶5. In February 2015, a f am ily court i n J e f

f e r s o n County , A labam a, granted E lle an ex parte t em porary protection order due to alleged dom estic abuse by John. She claim ed she
f led to Alabam a to escape John’s a b u s e . On August 17, 2015, the Alabam a f a m ily court

m ade the order perm anent, “suspended” John’s visitation, and closed the m atter. ¶6. On Novem

ber 12, 2015, John f

i l e d h i s p e t i t i o n f

o r c i t a t i o n o f c ontem

pt and

m odif ication of custody

. In F ebruary 2 016, Elle f iled m o tions to appoint a court interpreter and to c o ntest the chancery court’s jurisdiction under the Unif orm Chil d Custody Jurisdictional E nf

orcem ent Act (UCCJEA). I n response to the m otion f or a n interpreter, John revealed that Elle actually worked as a Spanish interpreter. He r easoned that she was

m erely try ing to delay the proceedings. As f or the jurisdictional m otion, John argued that the initial custody

determ ination was m a de in Oktibbeha County , where he still lived, but Elle unilaterally m oved t o Alabam a with neither a j ob nor f riends with the intent to separate h im
f rom his son. ¶7. On March 14, 2016, Elle obtained another e x parte tem p orary protection order, this tim e in Baldwin County , Alabam a. 2 On March 15, 2016, J ohn f i led a m otion f

or Elle to bring

2 B o th t h e B ald w in C o u n t

y a nd J e ffe r so n C o u n ty p ro tectio n o rd ers w ere ad m itted in to ev id e n c e at th e f

in al h earin g ; h o w ev er, th e B ald w i n C o u n t y o rd er is n o t in clu d ed in th e reco rd

. T h e tran scrip t s tated th ey co u l d b e “f o u n d sep arate an d ap art f

ro m th is reco rd in th e O f f ice o f th e C h a n cery C o u rt o f O k tib b eh a C o u n ty , M i ssissip p i.” T h e B ald w in C o u n ty o rd er, h o w ev er, w as attach ed to an em erg en cy m o tio n to r ecu s e th e c h a n cello r, f iled in th e M ississip p i S u p rem e C o u rt th e d ay b ef o re th e f in al h earin g o n th is actio n . E l le’s m o tio n w as d ism issed w ith o u t p rej u d ice b ecau se sh e h ad n o t g iv en t h e ch an cello r a n o p p o rtu n ity to ru le o n th e r eq u est to recu se. 3their child to the f i nal hearing scheduled f

o r March 3 1, 2016, because John had not seen h im since the Septem

ber 2014 hearing. Elle f

ailed to appear at the March 22, 2016 hearing on these m otions, but she was r epresented by counsel. T he chancellor denied Elle’s two m otions and granted John’s m o tion. The chancellor ruled that Elle’s f a ilure to a ppear was f

atal to both

m otions, as no testim ony

or evidence was presented in their support. ¶8. On March 30, 2016, one day prior to the f inal h earing, E l l e f

i l e d a n answer and counterclaim

. She deni e d t h a t she was in contem pt. E l le alleged that she w as u nder the protection of the Baldwin County order and f orm erly under the protection of t he Jef f erson County order. Additionally , Elle requested that the court hold John i n contem pt f or f ailure

to pay child support. 3 Elle also f iled the af orem entioned m otion f

or the chancellor’s recusal with the Mississippi Suprem e Court. ¶9. At the f

inal hearing on M arch 31, 2016, E l le again did not appear or produce the child

as ordered. She told h er a ttorney the reason f or her absence was because Aaron was sick and had a doctor’s appointm ent. E lle’s counsel appeared and r epresented her c l i ent in her absence; however, counsel was f orced to rest without presenting any testim ony o r e vidence. ¶10. The c hancery court i ssu e d a d e t a i l e d opinion and f inal judgm ent. T he chancellor
f ound she had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The chancellor w as not convinced that there

was a legitim ate threat of dom estic violence aga i n s t E l l e , f inding her claim s of rape and abuse were not c redible. It was the chancellor’s opinion that Elle was using the benef its of dom estic protection orders “as a m e ans to circum vent t he orders of t his court.” The

3 Jo h n t e stif

ied th a t h e p aid th ree m o n th s o f ch ild su p p o rt b u t q u it p ay i n g it w h en E lle d isco n n ected h er telep h o n e an d m o v ed w ith o u t tellin g h im w h e re sh e w en t. 4chancellor f urther d eterm ined t hat the prot e c t i o n orders d id not t hwart jurisdiction: the Jef f erson County o rder had been dism issed; and the Baldwin County protection order, if still
in e f f ect, had no authority to interf ere with the c hancery court’s d e cision. The chancellor noted that John had no notice of the Baldwin C ounty order, nor had the Baldwin county court contacted the M ississippi chancery court to discuss custody o r visitation. The chancellor also noted the f

act that Elle f

ailed to a ppear at the March 31 hearing to address t he i ssues she raised by m otion. ¶11. The c hancellor also f ound Elle in contem

pt f or f ailure to com

ply with the visitation schedule of the Decem

ber 2014 o rder. John had a b solutely no visitation with his son since Septem b e r 2014, and the chancellor f ound E lle had “a pattern [ of ] m isuse [ of

] the judicial

s y s t e m to thwart John’s legal right to visit and bond w ith his son.” Elle was also f ound i n
contem pt f or f ailing to p r o d u c e t h e child at the March 31 h earing. W hile Elle’s attorney inf orm ed the chancellor that Elle had texted her num erous tim es to explain that Aaron had been sick and had a d o c t or’s appointm ent, no d ocum entation was presented to justif y the
f ailure. B ecause Elle f

ail e d to appear and of

f er proof , J ohn w as not held in contem pt f or f ailure to pay c hild support; however, h e was ordered to p ay the arrearage to Elle. Regarding

m odi f i c a t i o n of custody , Elle was denied sole custody of Aaron, and J ohn was denied phy sical cust ody of Aaron “at this tim e.” The chancellor f ound that while Elle’s denial of visitation caused a m aterial change o f circum stances that adversely af f ected Aaron, af

ter evaluating the Albright 4 f actors, she f

ound t hat a change of custody t o John w a s not in

4 A lb rig h t v. A lb rig h t , 4 3 7 S o . 2 d 1 0 0 3 (M iss. 1 9 8 3 )

. 5Aaron’s best interest, as Aaron h ad y et to develop a bond with John. The visitation schedule

of the original custody

order was to rem ain in ef f ect. ¶12. Elle appeals p r o se, raising f our issues: (1) the chancellor should have recused as she harbored bias against Elle; (2) the chancery c ourt lacked jurisdiction to hear the case due to the Alabam a protective orders; (3) the chancellor erred by m odif y ing custody ; and (4) Elle received inef

f ective assistance of

counsel.
ANALYSIS ¶13. None of Elle’s argum ents on appeal involve the substantive c laim s that John raised
in his petition f

or c ontem pt, child support, or m odif i cation of phy sical c ustody

. John argues that E lle is im

properly attem

pting to def

end her case f

or t he f irst tim e o n appeal b ecause of
h e r f ailure to a

ppear and d ef

end a t the March 22 and 31 hearings. He conclud e s t h a t h e r issues are procedurally barred because t hey were not raised bef ore the chancery court. See Henrichs v. Henrichs , 32 So. 3d 1202, 1205-06 (¶¶11-12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). 5 ¶14. W e disagree. U nlike the def endant in Henrichs , while Elle f ailed to a ppear at the two hearings, she was represented by counsel, and ultim ately f iled an answer and counterclaim the day bef

ore the f inal hearing. Additionally , the argum ents Elle raises b ef ore this Court do

not relate to insuf

f icient f i n d i n g s o f f

act by the c hancellor as in Henrichs

. Here, the chancellor issued a detailed opinion and f inal judgm ent e x plaining her ru l i n g , w h i ch included

5 In H e n rich s , th e d e f

e n d a n t d id n o t resp o n d to th e d iv o rce p etitio n in an y w ay o r ap p ear in o p en co u rt. H

en rich s , 3 2 S o . 3 d at 1 2 0 3 -0 4 (¶¶3 -4 ). T h e p lain tif f w as g ran ted a d iv o r ce an d related req u ests, a s th e d ef en d an t p resen t e d n o t e s tim o n y o r ev id en ce. Id

. at 1 2 0 4 (¶5 ). T h e d ef

en d a n t co m

p lain e d o n ap p eal th at th e ch an cello r f ailed to m ak e sp ecif

ic f i n d i n g s o f f

act, b u t th is C o u rt f

o u n d th e arg u m en t lack ed m erit d u e to th e d ef en d a n t ’ s f ailu re to ap p ear an d d ef

e n d

. Id

. at 1 2 0 5 -0 6 (¶¶9 -1 2 ).

6over f

our pages o n the jurisdictional i ssue. Both j udicial recusal and jurisdiction were raised bef ore the chancery court; theref ore, they are not procedurally barred. However, as will be detailed below, E l l e ’s j oint-custody and inef f ective-assistance-of

- counsel c laim s were not raised bef ore the chancery

court; accordingly , those issues are barred f rom our review.
1. Judicial Recusal ¶15. Elle a rgues that the chancellor should h ave recused herself b ecause Elle h ad f iled a
f ederal lawsuit a nd j udicial comp l a i n t a gainst her alleging bias, discrim ination, and

m isconduct. 6 E l l e r e a s o ned that her legal a ctions against the chancellor w ould m ake her
“even m o re biased” and “incapable of m aking appropriate decisions”; thus, recusal was
necessary . ¶16. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 48B explains the proceedings on a m otion

to disqualif

y the trial judge. If a trial judge denies a m otion seeking his or h er recusal, the

m ovant m ay

seek review of

the judge’s action by

the Mississippi Suprem e Court. Id. ¶17. The day bef

ore the hearing, Elle f

iled a pro s e e me r g e ncy m otion to recuse the chancellor b ef

ore the suprem e court, m aking m any of the sam e allegati o n s a s on appeal. Additionally , she argued that the chancellor’s “hostile acts” inf ringed upon her civil rights because she was denied a Spanish interpreter at t he March 31, 2016 hearing. Further, she claim ed t he chancellor and her attorney h ad “ex p arte c o m m unication” which was “disparaging a nd i nappropriate,” questioning her ability t o understand English, am ong other

6 N eith e r o f th e s e d o cu m en ts is in th e ap p ellate reco r d

. It is w e l l estab lish ed t h at

“ M ississip p i ap p ellate co u rts m ay n o t co n sid er i n f o rm atio n th at is o u tsid e t h e re c o r d

. ” H a rd y v. B ro ck , 8 2 6 S o . 2 d 7 1 , 7 6 (¶2 6 ) (M iss. 2 0 0 2 ). 7m atters. The Mississippi S uprem e Court dism issed the m otion the s am e d ay , without

prejudice, b e cause Elle h ad f ailed to f irst seek recusal f

rom the chancellor herself bef ore asking f or the suprem e court’s review and f ailed to serve the chancellor with the m otion. 7 ¶18. T h e r u le concerning disqualif ication of a j udge is contained in C anon 3(E)(1)(a ) o f the Mississippi Code of Judicial C onduct. It states that “[ j]udges should disqualif y them selves in proceedings in which their im partiality m ight be questioned b y a reasonable
person knowing all the circum stances

. . . including but not lim ited to i nstances where

. . . the j u d g e h a s a p e rsonal bias o r prejudice concerning a party

. . . .” The Mississippi Suprem e Court has held “that the o bjective reasonable person knowing all of the circum stances is the
proper standard” to determ ine i f a judge should have recused herself

. Dodson v. Singin g River Hosp. Sys. , 839 So. 2 d 530, 5 32-33 (¶9) (Miss. 2003). “[ R]ecusal is required when the evidence produces a reasonable d oubt as to the judge’s i m partiality

. ” I

d

. a t 5 3 3 (¶13). However, it is presum ed that judges are qualif ied and unbiased. Id. at (¶10). The appellate

court applies a m anif

est-error standard when reviewing a judge’s r ef usal to recuse. Sullivan

v. Maddox , 122 So. 3d 75, 81 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Bredemeier v. Jackson , 689 So. 2d 770, 774 (Miss. 1997)). ¶19. Elle claim ed the chancellor m ade disparaging com m ents about her and her f am ily in
open court and “ ex p arte com m unication” with o ne of Elle’s num erous attorney s bef ore the chancery court. Also, apparently because of the chancellor’s unf avorable ruling, Elle claim s

7 E lle co m

p lain s in h e r ap p ellate b rief th at h er m o tio n f o r recu sal w as n ev er h eard o r r u l e d u p o n , b u t th is i s i n co rrect. O b v io u sly , th e m o tio n f i led w ith th e su p rem e co u rt w as ru led u p o n . F u rth er, th e ch a n cery co u rt d o ck et d o e s n o t in d icate th at E lle ev er f iled a m o tio n f o r recu sal in th at co u rt, as d irected

. 8that the c h an c e l l o r h a d an “unconscious b ias” against her a s exhibited at the March 31

hearing (whi c h E l l e did not attend). Further, E lle argues that the chancellor could not be
im p artial knowing that Elle had f iled a f ederal lawsuit and state bar com plaint against her. Elle requests the judgm ent against her be reversed due to the alleged evidence of bias. ¶20. At the March 31, 2016 hearing, the chancellor acknowledged f or the record that while she had not been served with a f ederal lawsuit, she was aware that Elle had f i led one in Alabam a against her, John, and the cities of Starkville a n d Colum bus, Mississippi. The chancellor stat e d f

o r t h e record that she read the com plaint b ut f

ound it proper to m ove f orward with the hearing. ¶21. Af ter reviewing the transcripts, we d o n o t f i n d t h a t t h e c h a n c e l l o r m ade any disparaging personal com m e nts about Elle. N or did the transcript i ndicate any evidence of bias t owards Elle, who f

ailed to attend two h earings; one on m otions that s he f i led o n March 22, and the f

inal hearing on March 31. However, the chancellor did f ind E lle’s “ a ttem

pts to

m anipulate the judicial sy stem

. . . appa l l i n g.” W e cannot say t hat it was disparaging or prejudicial tha t t h e c h a n cellor r eprim anded Elle on t he record f or not pursuing her own def ense. Moreover, Elle did not f ile a m otion to recuse t he chancellor i n the c h ancery court

even af ter the Mississippi S uprem e Court entered its o rder. Accordingly , the issue is barred. Further, there is no e viden c e t h a t the chancellor’s im partiality m ight be reasonably questioned; theref

ore, the issue is also without m erit.
2. Jurisdiction ¶22. Next, Elle argues that the chancellor l a c k e d j u r i sdiction to d ecide both t he initial

9custody of Aaron and John’s subsequent petition to m odif y c u stody

. “W hether the chancery

court had jurisdiction to hear a particular m atter is a question of law” that this Court reviews de novo. In re Guardianship of Z.J. , 804 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (¶9) (Miss. 2002). ¶23. E l le m akes several argum ents regarding the cha n c e r y c o u r t ’ s a l l e g e d l a c k o f jurisdiction to determ ine the initial petition f iled by John on Decem

ber 20, 2013. Elle has, however, already challenged this initial jurisdiction, and this Court f ound that her claim s to be without m erit. 8 It is well established that af t er a ma t t e r i s a d

judicated, the petitioner is barred f rom relitigating the c laim u n d e r t he doctrine of res judicata, w hich “ref lects the ref usal of the law to tolerate a m ultiplicity of l itigation.” Little v
. V & G W elding Supply Inc. , 704 So. 2d 1336, 1 337 (¶8) (Miss. 1997). “Res j udicata bars all i ssues that m i ght have been (or could have been) raised and decided in the initial suit, plus all issues that were actually decided in the f

irst cause of action.” I

d. Accordingly , Elle’s jurisdictional a rgum ents related

to the i nitial case are barred. H owever, Elle is not barred f rom challenging t he chancellor’s jurisdiction of

the instant case’s petition f or contem pt and to m odif

y custody

. ¶24. In this m atter, E l l e , r e p r e s e n ted by counsel, f iled a m otion contesting jurisdiction under the UCCJEA on February 24, 2016. She s u b m itted “that Mississippi no longer has

8 D u rin g th e in itial actio n , E lle also m ad e sev e ral j u risd i ctio n al c h a llen g es. A d a m s , 1 9 6 S o . 3 d at 1 0 9 0 (¶¶1 4 -1 6 ). E lle f iled a m o t io n to d ism iss, arg u in g th e ch an cello r lack ed j u risd ictio n b ecau se E lle an d h er so n w ere resid en ts o f L o w n d es C o u n ty , w h ich w as d en ied

. T h en , th e d ay o f t rial, E lle m ad e a m o tio n to d ism i ss f o r f o ru m n o n co n v en ien s, w h ich w as also d en ied , an d w h ich th is C o u rt af f irm ed

. Id

. A s A d

a m s ex p lain s, w h en t h e in itial actio n b eg an , E l le, Jo h n , an d A d am s all resid ed in M ississip p i; th u s M ississip p i w as c o n sid ered th e “h o m e state” u n d er M ississip p i C o d e A n n o tated sectio n 9 3 -2 7 -2 0 1 (1 )(a) (R ev . 2 0 1 3 ), ev en th o u g h E lle m o v ed to A lab am a so m etim e af ter sh e w a s serv e d i n Jan u a r y 2 0 1 4

. Id

. at (¶1 5 ). 1 0exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the child” b ecause o f her m o ve to Alabam a; 9

theref ore, she argued that the chancery c o u r t “ i s precluded f

r om m odif

y ing its original [ o]rder

as it no longer has jurisdiction to m ake an initial child custody determ ination u nder [ section]
93-27-201.” 10 She a rgued Alabam a is now A aron’s “hom e state” as d ef ined by Mississippi Code A n n o t a ted section 93-27-102(g) (Rev. 2013). As proof , E lle claim ed she lives and

wor ks in A labam a, Aaron is b eing reared in Alabam a, a ll of Aaron’s m edical and day care records are in Alabam a, and Aaron has been a perm anent resident there since J anuary 2014. Moreover, she noted that in August 2015, the Jef f erson County p r o t e ction o rder was converted f

rom tem porary to perm anen t

. She c laim ed the above evidence and protection order show n either she nor Aaron had the statutorily required “signif icant connections” with Mississippi to establish jurisdiction. ¶25. On appeal, Elle claim s t hat she i s s till under the protection of the Jef f erson County and Baldwin County orders. However, the record indicates that the Jef f erson County order was dism issed in Decem

ber 2015, and the status of t he Baldwin C ounty o rder is unknown. 11 Elle

9 Wh en E lle w a s serv ed w i th Jo h n ’ s in itial p etitio n , sh e an d A a r o n w ere still resid en ts o f M ississip p i. S h o rtly th ereaf ter, E lle an d A aro n m o v e d t o A lab am a, b eco m in g p erm an en t resid en ts aro u n d th e en d o f Jan u ary 2 0 1 4

. 10 S ectio n 9 3 -2 7 -2 0 1 (1 ) ( R ev . 2 0 1 3 ) g o v ern s j u risd ictio n to m ak e an in itial cu sto d y d eterm in atio n .

11 E lle o b tain ed th e B ald w in C o u n ty p ro tectio n o r d e r o n M a r ch 1 4 , 2 0 1 6 , af ter h er m o tio n c o n testin g j u risd ictio n w as f iled

. A t t h e M arch 3 1 , 2 0 1 6 h earin g , E l le’s atto rn ey stated th e B ald w in C o u n ty p ro t e c t i o n o rd er w as still i n ef f ect “as f ar a s [ s h e] k n ew .” H o w ev er, Jo h n w as n ev er serv ed w ith th e o rd er a n d h a d n o k n o w l ed g e o f i t. F u r th er, th ere is n o p r o o f in th e reco rd reg ard in g w h eth er it is still in ef f ect. T h e c h an cello r f

o u n d t h at ev en if th at o rd er w as s till in ef f ect, it w o u ld n o t in terf

e r e w ith j u risd ictio n o f th e O k tib b eh a C h an cery C o u rt. 1 1argues that b ecause the chancellor “disregarded” these Alabam a orders, she was deprived of

v a r i o u s c o n s t itutional rights, i ncluding due process, equal protection, and f u ll f aith an d c r e d i t

. ¶26. “Under the U C C J E A , o nly one court m ay assert jurisdiction a f t er an i nitial custody order has been entered.” D eborah H. Bell, B ell on Mississippi Family Law § 18.10 at 459 (1st e d

. 2 0 0 4 )

. The “court issuing [ the] initial decree has continuing subject m atter jurisdiction over the action and continuing personal jurisdiction over the parties. No other

court m ay m odif

y the d ecree.” Id. (citing Miss. Code A n n . § 93-27-202(1) (Rev. 2013)). Section 93-27-202(1)(a) provides that a Mississippi court that has m a d e a n initial childcustody determ ination s hall have “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determ ination until:” (a) A court of this state determ ines that neither the child, nor the c hild and one parent, nor the child and a person acting a s a parent have a signif icant connection with t his s tate a nd that substantial evidence is no longer available in t h i s s t a t e concerning the child’s care, protection, training, a nd personal relationships . . . . Elle a r gues that there is no longer a “signif i cant connection” am ong her, Aaron, and Mississippi, and “all pertinent e vidence” relating t o the child is in Alabam a. She claim s under s ection 93-27-202(1)(a) that the c h i l d ’ s “care, protection, training, and personal relationships” are now in Alabam a rather than Mississippi. ¶27. W e disagree. The chancery court had exclusive, continu i n g j u r i s d iction over the action under section 93-27-202(1)(a). Further, there was no order f rom a Mississippi court det e r m ining a lack of signif

icant connections w ith this state. A dditionally , section 93-27- 202(1)(b), which allows a court of this s tate or a not h e r s t a te to d eterm ine j urisdiction if

1 2neither parent resides within the state, is inapplicable, as John s till resides in Mississippi. It

was within the chancellor’s discretion t o determ ine that Mississippi s hould retain jurisdiction

even though Elle and the child had m oved to Alabam a . Accordingly , the chancery court properly retained jurisdiction. ¶28. Elle also argues t hat certain “required disclosures” pertaining t o jurisdiction were not f iled; theref

ore, the chancellor should have dism issed the acti o n . Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-27-209(1) (Rev. 2013) provides tha t , in child-custody proceedings, each party in its f

irst pl e a d i n g o r in an attached af f idavit m u st provide certain inf

orm ation under oath as to the child’s present address and other m atters. Elle cites W hite v. W hite , 26
So. 3d 342 (Miss. 2010), a child-custody mo d i f i cation case, a s support. I n W hite , even though the petitioner f

ailed to p rovide this inf

orm ation, the M ississippi Suprem e Court f ound it was not f

atal to jurisdiction f

or two r easons: the chancery court’s jurisdiction is set by the Mississippi Constitution and cannot b e dim inished by statute; a nd under t he plain language of s ection 93-27-209(2), the court is not required t o stay t he proceedings. 12 Id. at 347 (¶13). ¶29. John provided this inf orm ation i n h is initial petition. In his petition to m odif y custody , he c ould not provide t he i nf orm ation because, as he e xplained, he was unaware of where Elle and A aron were residing at that tim e. Elle, in response, claim ed that she did not reveal her address and other inf

or ma t i o n i n h e r initial answer o r in this action due to t he Alabam a protection orders. S i n c e a n y f ailure to provide this inf

orm a tion is not f

atal to j urisdiction,

12 T h e s tatu te states: “If th e in f o rm a tio n req u i red b y su b sectio n (1 ) is n o t f u rn ish ed , th e c o u rt, u p o n m o tio n o f a p arty o r its o w n m o tio n , m a y stay th e p ro c e e d i n g u n t i l th e in f o rm atio n is f

u r n ish ed

. ” M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 3 -2 7 -2 0 9 (2 ) (em p h asis ad d ed ). 1 3and it i s within the discretion of the chancellor to go f o r w a r d w i t h t he proceeding, this
argum ent is without m erit. ¶30. We c o n c lude that t he chancery court pro p e r l y r e t a i n e d c o n t i n u o u s e x c l u s i v e jurisdiction over this m atter. 3. Custody ¶31. Elle a rgues that the chancellor erred in granting John joint legal custody of t he m inor child, c laim i ng that she should have sole legal and phy sical c u stody

. However, neither party raised the issue of legal custody in this case. In her f inal judgm ent, t he chancellor stated that b oth parties h ad requested custody m odif ication: John requested phy sical custody w i t h supervised visitation by Elle, and Elle r equested sole custody , thereby elim inating joint legal custody as previously ordered. B oth requests were denied. However, we c annot f ind in the record where Elle requested m o dif ication of custody

. 13 I t appears that only John requested

m odif ication of phy sical custody to him . Elle m erely reasserts her argum ent f

rom her f irst appeal related to John’s initial petition, which i s im proper. As stated earlier, “ [ r]es judicata bars all i ssues . . . that were actually decided in the f irst cause o f action.” Little , 704 So. 2d at 1337 (¶8). ¶32. The cha n c e l l o r , h o w e v e r , t h o roughly a naly zed m odif

ication of custody f

or both parties, f inding Elle f

ai l e d to a

ppear and provide a ny proof of a m aterial c hange of circum stance that was a dverse to the child. The chancellor stated the prim ary reason John

was now seeking a custody change was Elle’s continued r ef us a l t o a l l o w h im to exercise

13 E lle’s co u n terclaim

req u ested p ay

m en t o f b ack ch ild s u p p o r

t an d atto rn ey ’s f

ees, an d to h av e Jo h n in carcerated f o r co n tem

p t f o r f ailu re to p ay

ch ild su p p o rt. 1 4court-ordered visitation. The chancellor f ound that E lle’s denial of John’s visitation caused

a ma t e r i a l change i n circum stances that a d versely af f ected Aaron because the child “irretrievably l ost” the f

ather/son bond that he was entitled to have. T he chancellor m ade a detailed a naly sis of the Albright f actors. Even t hough m ost f actors f avored John or neither party , and none f

avored Elle, the chancellor opined that rem oving Aaron f rom the custody of his m other w hen he was so y o un g a n d w i thout any r elationship and/or bond with John would not be i n the child’s best interest. Accor d i n g l y , s h e declined to m odif y c ustody to John “at this t i me ,” w arning that any interf erence by Elle of J ohn’s visitation would be viewed unf

avorably

. The chancellor also denied Elle’s all e g e d r e q u e st f or term i nation or lim itation of

John’s visitation privileges—a request we also cannot f ind in the record. ¶33. Elle com

plains here as she did in her f irst appeal that the chancellor f ailed to address the Albright f

actors. However, E lle appears t o be ref e r encing the f

i r s t a c t i o n, where the chancellor did not analy

ze t he Albright f

actors. 14 Here, the chancellor’s April 2016 j udgm ent analy zed the Albright

f actors in great detail. Accordingly , this issue is without m erit.
4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ¶34. Finally , Elle argues that her counsel was i n e f f e c t i v e . In January 2016, the attorney

at issue 15 entered an appearance. She l ater represented E l l e a t t h e hearing on March 31, 2016, w here Elle f

ailed to appear. Elle com

plains that her c ounsel “belittled” and “m ocked”

14 In A d a m s , th is C o u rt f

o u n d n o erro r b ecau se o n l y leg al cu sto d y

w as a t issu e, an d th u s an A lb rig h t

an a ly sis w a s n o t

n eed ed

. A d

a m s , 1 9 6 S o . 3 d at 1 0 8 9 (¶1 1 )

. 15 T h e reco rd i n clu d es p l ead in g s f ro m t h e in itial actio n , w h ich sh o w s E lle h ired an d f ired sev eral atto rn e y s o r

rep resen ted h erself

. 1 5her at the beginning of the hearing by explaining to the chancellor t hat Elle had c o ntacted her

several t im es about b eing unable to travel to t h e h e a ring due to a sick child. Elle also criticized her counsel f

o r advising her that she w ould “lose the case” if she was a bsent f rom the hearing. ¶35. El l e ’ s a r g u me n t i s p r o c e d u r a l l y a n d s u b s tantively without m erit. The Sixth
Am endm ent right to ef

f ective assistance of counsel is triggered i n crim inal proceedings, not f am ily -law m atters. S

ee Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 ( 1984) (discussing the standard of inef

f ective-assistance-of

-counsel c laim s i n t he context of crim inal proceedings). Notwith s t a n d i ng the im

propriety of t he claim , this Court h as r eviewed the t ranscript and
f ound, as the chancellor noted at the hearing, t hat E lle’s attorney “did a good j o b” representing Elle’s interests in her absence. Counsel apparently tried to im

press upon Elle the im portance of her appearance and the im pact h er absence could have on the o utcom e of the case. Elle’s accusations about her counsel a re unf ounded, and her argum ent is without

m erit. ¶36. AFFIRMED. LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., CARLT O N , F AIR, WILSON, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR.

1 6