COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Annunziata and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ANDRE TAYLOR 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0891-97-2 JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE 

 JUNE 9, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HOPEWELL 

James F. D'Alton, Jr., Judge 

 Homer C. Eliades (Adrienne George-Eliades; 

Eliades and Eliades, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Andre Taylor (appellant) appeals his conviction for 

possession of cocaine. On appeal, appellant contends that the 

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm 

the conviction. 

 Four police officers executed a search warrant on a 

residence in Hopewell, Virginia at about 10:00 p.m. on November 

15, 1996. Three persons were in the residence when the officers 

entered: Vernon Boone, Steven Wyche, and appellant. 

 Officer Hawkins testified that when the officers entered the 

apartment, all three men were seated in chairs around a kitchen 

table. They immediately stood and ran. Officer Hunter testified 

that he saw Boone "shove" something into his pants and turn his 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

back to the officers before running away. Hunter stated that 

appellant was about two to three feet from Boone when Hunter 

first entered the residence. Hunter recovered a bag containing 

.866 grams of crack cocaine which fell from the waistline of 

Boone's pants. Some of the cocaine was individually packaged in 

knotted plastic bag corners. Hunter, who testified that he was 

familiar with the packaging and distribution of cocaine, stated 

that the quantity and packaging of the recovered cocaine was 

inconsistent with personal use. 

 Appellant admitted to the officers that he was the lessee of 

the property and that Wyche also lived there. The officers 

recovered a shotgun from under a mattress in the only bedroom in 

the apartment, and they found a set of scales in the kitchen. 

Hawkins testified that, based on his experience with drug cases, 

the scales were similar to those used in the drug trade. 

Appellant admitted that the shotgun belonged to him. 

 The officers also seized $355 in cash from appellant's pants 

pocket. Appellant admitted that one of the two pagers found in 

the living room belonged to him. The officers recovered other 

personal items belonging to appellant from the apartment. 

 The trial court found appellant guilty of possession of 

cocaine, stating that "the scales, the pager, the gun and so 

forth in conjunction" with appellant's flight, his proximity to 

the drugs and "all the other aspects of it" pointed to his 

knowledge, dominion and control of the drugs. 
 3 

 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

 Possession of a controlled substance need 

not be exclusive, and may be shared. 

[P]ossession of a controlled substance may 

be actual or constructive. "To support a 

conviction based upon constructive 

possession, 'the Commonwealth must point to 

evidence of acts, statements, or conduct of 

the accused or other facts or circumstances 

which tend to show that the defendant was 

aware of both the presence and character of 

the substance and that it was subject to his 

dominion and control.'" 

McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 322, 357 S.E.2d 738, 740 

(1987) (citations omitted). Such "'possession may be proved by 

"evidence of acts, declarations or conduct of the accused from 

which an inference may be fairly drawn that he knew of the 

existence of narcotics at the place where they were found."'" 

Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 99-100, 390 S.E.2d 491, 

498 (1990) (citation omitted). 

 Circumstantial evidence of possession is 

sufficient to support a conviction provided 

it excludes every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence. 

 Although mere proximity to drugs is 

insufficient to establish possession, it is a 

circumstance which may be probative in 

determining whether an accused possessed such 

drugs. Ownership or occupancy of the 

premises is likewise a circumstance probative 

of possession. Thus, in resolving this 

issue, the Court must consider "the totality 

of the circumstances disclosed by the 

evidence." 
 4 

Spivey v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 715, 724-25, 479 S.E.2d 543, 

548 (1997) (citations omitted). "Flight itself from the scene 

[is] some evidence of guilty knowledge. Thus, the finder of fact 

could infer the appellant possessed the drugs at the time he 

began to run." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 150, 153, 

402 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1991). Possession of items associated with 

drug use and distribution is a factor to be considered by the 

trier of fact. See, e.g., White v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 

662, 668, 492 S.E.2d 451, 454 (1997) (en banc) (recognizing also 

that pagers are tools of the drug trade). 

 Here, appellant was seated at a table along with two other 

men, and all three men fled as the police entered the apartment. 

 One of the men, who was seated two to three feet away from 

appellant, stuffed a bag containing .866 grams of cocaine into 

his pants when the police arrived. Hunter testified that the 

amount of cocaine and the method of its packaging was 

inconsistent with personal use. Hunter stated that one of the 

pieces of cocaine was a "$50 rock," which "is a lot for one 

person to use." According to Hunter, the other pieces would sell 

for about $10 and $20. 

 Appellant admitted to the police that he leased the 

apartment, and the police recovered some of his personal 

belongings in the apartment. The police recovered indicia of the 

drug trade, such as cash, a shotgun, a pager, and a set of scales 

from the apartment. Thus, the only reasonable hypothesis arising 
 5 

from such evidence is that appellant was aware of the nature and 

character of the cocaine, that it was subject to his dominion and 

control, and that he jointly and constructively possessed the 

substance with the other men. Therefore, the evidence was 

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant 

possessed cocaine. 

 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

Affirmed.