alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                       2,129,877
<SECURITIES>                                22,806,526
<RECEIVABLES>                                  139,245
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,269,122
<PP&E>                                      59,238,068
<DEPRECIATION>                               8,490,405
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              76,763,103
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       14,116,337
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  56,526,766
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                76,763,103
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             5,397,492
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,701,874
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,695,618
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,695,618
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,695,618
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### WYATT C. HEDRICK, Inc., v. RATCLIFF.

No. 1649—6092.

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.

March 22, 1933.

Charles Kassell, of Fort Worth, for appellant.

E. H. Ratcliff and Hampden Spiller, both of Fort Worth, for appellee.

HARVEY, Presiding Judge.

The Court of Civil Appeals for the Second district has submitted a certificate, in the above case, which, in effect, submits the whole case, involving the consideration of the whole record, to the Supreme Court for decision. It. is the settled rule that the Supreme Court will refuse to take jurisdiction in instances of that sort. We recommend that the certificate be dismissed.

CURETON, Chief Justice.

The certificate is dismissed, as recommended by the Commission of Appeals.
<PAGE>
                                                                   Exhibit 10.38

                                 AMENDMENT NO. 2
                                     TO THE
                            LODGIAN, INC. 401(K) PLAN
           (AS AMENDED AND RESTATED EFFECTIVE AS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 2003)


      Pursuant to the power to amend reserved in Section 12.1 of the Plan in
order to comply with law, Lodgian, Inc. (the "Plan Sponsor") hereby amends the
Plan, effective as of the dates herein indicated as follows:

                                       1.

      Section 8.1(b)(2) is hereby amended effective as of March 28, 2005 by
adding the following at the end of the present provision:

      "Effective as of March 28, 2005, the maximum value of the Vested Benefit
      for automatic cash out purposes shall be reduced from $5,000 to $999."

                                       2.

      Section 8.2(a) is hereby amended effective as of March 28, 2005 by adding
the following to the end of the present provision:

      "Notwithstanding the foregoing, effective as of March 28, 2005, "$1,000"
      shall be substituted for "$5,000" in (1) and (2) above, so that automatic
      cash outs shall only be made if the Vested Benefit is less than $1,000."

                                       3.

      Except as herein amended, the provisions of the Plan shall remain in full
force and effect.

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Plan Sponsor, on behalf of itself and the
Participating Employers has caused this Amendment No. 2 to be executed by its
duly authorized officer, as of the 24 day of March, 2005.


                               LODGIAN, INC.

                               By: s/ Daniel E. Ellis
                               Title:  Senior Vice President & General Counsel

                                       1
Exhibit No. 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report of Advanced Photonix, Inc. (theCompany) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2009 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (theReport), I, Richard D. Kurtz, Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: June 29, 2009

/s/ Richard KurtzRichard KurtzChief Executive
      Officer


---
Exhibit 21.1  Subsidiaries of PetroQuest Energy, Inc.
 Name
    
    JurisdictionPetroQuest Energy, L.L.C.1
    
    LouisianaPetroQuest Oil and Gas, L.L.C.1
    
    LouisianaTDC Energy LLC1
    
    LouisianaPittrans, Inc.2
    
    OklahomaSea Harvester Energy Development Company, L.L.C.3
    
    Louisiana
 
 1
    
    100% owned by PetroQuest Energy, Inc.2
    
    100% owned by PetroQuest Energy, L.L.C.3
    
    92% owned by TDC Energy LLC
#### CITY GROCERY CO. v. MOORE GROCERY CO.

No. 3563.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

Dec. 7, 1939.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 20, 1939.

Adams & McAlister, of Nacogdoches, for appellant.

Ramsey & Ramsey, of San Augustine, and Butler & Price, of Tyler, for appellee.

WALKER, Chief Justice.

The controlling facts in this case are decided in our opinion, Parker et al. v. Moore Grocery Company, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 1083, 1084, reversing the judgment of the lower court entered on an instructed verdict, on the ground that F. K. Parker’s authority to execute the note “was a question of fact for the jury.” On return of the mandate, appellee dismissed its cause of action on the docket of the district court, and filed this suit in the ■county court of San Augustine county upon the note and letter set out in our opinion cited above. On trial to a jury, judgment was again entered in favor of appel-lee on an instructed verdict. Again we must say that the authority of F. K. Parker to execute the note and letter was a fact Issue for the jury.

By a plea in abatement, appellants allege that at 'the time appellee dismissed its suit on the docket of the district court there was pending in answer to appellee’s ■cause of action appellants’ cross action, -putting in issue the facts in controversy in this case, and their liability to appellee. .Appellants’ proof did not sustain their plea in abatement. That issue can be developed further on another trial.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and remanded.
EXHIBIT 10.1
 
 AUXILIO, INC.
 AMENDMENT TO 2011 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN
  This Amendment to the 2011 Stock Incentive Plan (the “Plan”) of Auxilio, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the “Company”), is made effective as of August 4, 2011.
  WHEREAS, the Plan was established and adopted by the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”) on March 17, 2011 and approved by the shareholders of the Company on May 19, 2011;
  WHEREAS, the Company has previous established and adopted a 2001 Stock Option Plan, 2003 Stock Plan, 2004 Stock Option Plan and 2007 Stock Option Plan, as amended (collectively, the “Predecessor Plans”);
  WHEREAS, an aggregate of 5,182,402 shares are, as of the date of this Amendment, subject to outstanding stock options under the Predecessor Plans (the “Outstanding Predecessor Plan Options”); and
  WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 10.1 of the Plan, on August 4, 2011, the Board of Directors approved an amendment to the Plan to provide that the Outstanding Predecessor Plan Options shall be rolled into the Plan in connection with the termination of the Predecessor Plans.
  NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows:
  1.
Section 2.25 of the Plan is amended to read in full as follows:
  “2.25           Option.  “Option” means any option to purchase Common Stock granted pursuant to Article 5 hereof or “rolled into” the Plan pursuant to Section 12.6 of the Plan.”
  2.           A new Section 2.31 of the Plan shall be added and shall read as follows:
  “2.31           Predecessor Plans. “Predecessor Plans” means, collectively, the Company’s 2001 Stock Option Plan, 2003 Stock Plan, 2004 Stock Option Plan and 2007 Stock Option Plan, as amended.”
 
 3.           Previous Sections 2.31 through 2.41 of the Plan shall be renumbered accordingly to reflect the insertion of new Section 2.31.
  4.           Section 4.1 of the Plan is hereby amended and restated to read in its entirety as follows:
  Shares Subject to the Plan
  5.
A new Section 12.6 of the Plan shall be added and shall read as follows:
  Predecessor Plan Option Agreements
  Unless otherwise amended as set forth herein, the terms and provisions of the Plan remain in full force and effect.
Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

Docket Number: FAA- 2014-0139

Directorate Identifier: 2012NM133AD

A320-53-1195, R04 --- 8/22/12

A320-53-1195, R03 --- 11/8/11

A320-53-1196, R03 --- 8/22/12

A320-53-1196, R02 --- 11/8/11

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the 

Supplemental AD Docket
MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW.,

Renton, WA 98057

425.227.1221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

Form Date: 03/05/2008
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-40864 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus EUGENIO FALCON, JR., also known as Gene Falcon, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. M-98-CR-24-01

-------------------- August 24, 1999 Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Eugenio Falcon, Jr., a/k/a Gene Falcon, appeals his sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States arising out of a bail bond bribery scheme. Falcon argues that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, the guideline for bribery with a base offense level of 10. He contends that the applicable guideline was § 2C1.2, for accepting a gratuity, with a base offense level of 7. He also argues that the district court erred in applying § 2C1.1(b)(2)(B) becauseNo. 98-40864 -2- there was only one bribe which was paid in installments. The Government argues that Falcon waived his right to appeal his sentence in his plea agreement. Falcon was sentenced exactly according to the guideline range agreed upon in the plea agreement. Falcon does not arguethat he was not aware of or did not understand the waiver-ofappeal provision in his plea agreement. Falcon’s argument in his reply brief about statements made by the district court at sentencing are irrelevant to whether Falcon knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence when he pleaded guilty. We hold that Falcon waived his right to appeal his sentence, which was imposed within the guideline range agreed upon in his plea agreement, and we DISMISS THIS APPEAL AS
FRIVOLOUS. See United States v. Portillo , 18 F.3d 290, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1994).
The State o

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 9, 2014

No. 04-14-00383-CR

Sean LEBO,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 14, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 413956

Honorable Bill C. White, Judge Presiding

ORDER

Appointed counsel for appellant Sean Lebo has filed a motion to abate this appeal and 

remand the case to the trial court. We grant the motion. The appeal is abated and the case is 

remanded to the trial court. We order the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether 

there is a potential conflict of interest that disqualifies counsel from continuing to represent 

appellant in this matter and to appoint new appellate counsel if necessary. 

We further order the trial court to cause a record of its findings and orders in this matter 

to be filed in this court by January 8, 2015.

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 9th day of December, 2014.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### Ex parte NEWSOM.

No. 21366.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 16, 1940.

Wm. E. Davenport and Clyde Vinson, both of San Angelo, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

It appears from the record that relator was charged by complaint, in Reagan County, Texas, with the offense of burglary, and at a hearing thereon on July 19, 1940, he was held in bond in the stun of $1,500. That thereafterwards a bond in said sum was presented to the sheriff of Reagan County, who refused to accept said bond, and this writ of habeas corpus is brought for the purpose of releasing relator from his confinement in said jail of Reagan County, at Big Lake, and is based upon the proposition that a good and sufficient bond has been presented to the sheriff of Reagan County, and he has arbitrarily refused to approve such bond.

Under Art. 53a, Vernon’s Ann. C. C.P., it appears that we have the power,, if we so desire, to grant the writ of mandamus in certain cases whenever necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of this court, but only to that extent. It seems to us-that this hearing is an effort to obtain from this court a writ of mandamus directing the sheriff of Reagan County to approve this proffered bond, of which action we have no jurisdiction.

It further appears that the undertaking of the bond was to bind the relator to await the action of the grand jury on the matters set. forth in the complaint,, which grand jury was to meet in Big Lake' on October 7, 1940, which date has already passed, and doubtless the bond, should same be approved, would now be functus officio^ at this time.

The appeal is dismissed.
IA

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 286

Designating June 7, 1994, through June 14, 1994, as ‘‘National Flag

Celebration Week’’.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 3, 1993

Mr. MCCLOSKEY (for himself, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. APPLEGATE, Mr. ARCHER,

Mr. BARLOW, Mr. BATEMAN, Mr. BEVILL, Mr. BILBRAY, Mr. BILIRAKIS,

Mr. BLILEY, Mr. BONIOR, Mr. BREWSTER, Mr. CALLAHAN, Mr. CARDIN,

Mr. CLEMENT, Mr. COLEMAN, Miss COLLINS of Michigan, Mr. CRAMER,

Ms. DANNER, Mr. DE LA GARZA, Mr. DICKEY, Mr. DINGELL, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr. EDWARDS of Texas, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. EVERETT, Mr.

FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. FROST, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. PETE GEREN of

Texas, Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. HALL of

Texas, Mr. HAMILTON, Mr. HILLIARD, Mr. HOAGLAND, Mr. HOYER, Mr.

HUGHES, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. JEFFERSON, Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota, Mr. KASICH, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. KLEIN, Mr.

KLUG, Mr. KOPETSKI, Mr. KREIDLER, Ms. LAMBERT, Mr. LANCASTER,

Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. MCNULTY, Mr. MANTON, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr.

MEEHAN, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, Mrs. MINK, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr.

MONTGOMERY, Mr. MORAN, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. NEAL of

Massachusetts, Mr. NEAL of North Carolina, Mr. OLVER, Mr. OWENS,

Mr. PARKER, Mr. PASTOR, Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota, Mr. PETERSON

of Florida, Mr. PETRI, Mr. PICKLE, Mr. QUILLEN, Mr. RAHALL, Mr.

RAMSTAD, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. RAVENEL, Mr. ROTH, Mr. ROWLAND, Ms.

ROYBAL-ALLARD, Mr. SAWYER, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. SHARP, Mr. SHAYS,

Mr. SLATTERY, Ms. SLAUGHTER, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Ms. SNOWE,

Mr. SPENCE, Mr. STUMP, Mr. THOMAS of Wyoming, Mr. VALENTINE,

Mr. VOLKMER, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. WHITTEN, Mr. WILSON, and Mr.

YOUNG of Alaska) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
2

•HJ 286 IH

JOINT RESOLUTION

Designating June 7, 1994, through June 14, 1994, as

‘‘National Flag Celebration Week’’.

Whereas it is the obligation of each generation of Americans

to instruct the next in the significance of our history and

of the meaning of and the ideals embodied in our Nation’s patriotic symbols;

Whereas the flag of the United States is the principal patriotic symbol of our Nation;

Whereas the citizens of the United States already celebrate

the observance of Flag Day on June the fourteenth of

each year; and

Whereas Public Law 89–443 did establish on June 9, 1966,

that ‘‘the President is authorized and requested to issue

annually a proclamation designating the week in which

June 14 occurs as National Flag Week, and calling upon

all citizens to display the flag of the United States on

those days’’: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That the President revive this custom by declaring the

4 week beginning June 7, 1994, which culminates with the

5 observance of Flag Day, on June 14, 1994, to be ‘‘Na6 tional Flag Celebration Week’’, during which citizens, es7 pecially children, be encouraged to both display the flag

8 and study its history and the ideals it represents.

Æ
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1854 

To amend chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, to enhance penalties 

for theft of a firearm from a Federal firearms licensee. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 25, 2017 

Mr. GRAHAM (for himself, Mr. CASSIDY, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. RISCH, Mr. BOOZMAN, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. STRANGE, Mr. CRAPO, and Ms. HEITKAMP) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, to 

enhance penalties for theft of a firearm from a Federal 

firearms licensee. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Federal Firearms Li5 censee Protection Act of 2017’’. 

6 SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO ENHANCE CERTAIN PENALTIES. 

7 Section 924 of title 18, United States Code, is 

8 amended— 


ethrower on DSK3G9T082PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1854 IS

1 (1) by striking subsection (i) and inserting the 

2 following: 

3 ‘‘(i)(1)(A) A person who knowingly violates section 

4 922(u), or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this 

5 title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 

6 ‘‘(B) In the case of a violation described in subpara7 graph (A) that occurs during the commission of— 

8 ‘‘(i) a burglary, the term of imprisonment shall 

9 be not less than 3 years; or 

10 ‘‘(ii) a robbery, the term of imprisonment shall 

11 be not less than 5 years. 

12 ‘‘(2) In this subsection— 

13 ‘‘(A) the term ‘burglary’ means the unlawful 

14 entry into, or remaining in, the business premises of 

15 a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or li16 censed dealer with the intent to commit a crime; and 

17 ‘‘(B) the term ‘robbery’ has the meaning given 

18 the term in section 1951(b).’’; and 

19 (2) in subsection (m), by inserting ‘‘or attempts 

20 to do so,’’ after ‘‘or licensed collector,’’. 

Æ 


ethrower on DSK3G9T082PROD with BILLS
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-13-00736-CR

IN RE Ruben NERIO, Jr.

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 30, 2013

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

Relator Ruben Nerio Jr. filed this pro se petition for writ of mandamus on October 23, 

2013, complaining the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation in two underlying

criminal cases. In April 2013, Scott McCrum was appointed to represent relator in connection with 

the underlying criminal cases. We conclude that any original proceeding on the issues presented 

should be presented by relator’s counsel. Relator is not entitled to hybrid representation. See 

Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The absence of a right to hybrid 

representation means relator’s pro se mandamus petition will be treated as presenting nothing for 

this court’s review. See id.; see also Gray v. Shipley, 877 S.W.2d 806, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston 

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause Nos. 2005CR1231 and 2005CR1529, both styled The State of Texas v. Ruben 

Nerio Jr., pending in the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Angus K. McGinty 

presiding.

 
04-13-00736-CR

[1st Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding). Accordingly, relator’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a).

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH

- 2 -
#### PARKER v. STATE.

No. 15665.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 9, 1932.

Thos. C. Turnley, of Houston, for appellant.

O’Brien Stevens, Dist. Atty., and E. T. Branch, both of Houston, and Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

LATTIMORE, J.

Conviction for robbery; punishment, life imprisonment in the penitentiary.

It is alleged in the indictment that, on a day named, appellant by an assault and by violence robbed a certain person. It is further alleged in said indictment that at a time and place prior to the date of the robbery alleged herein appellant was indicted, tried and finally convicted for a similar offense, that is, for the offense of robbery. We held in Gerard v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 374, 238 S. W. 924, that for a second conviction of a felony of the same character the punishment is fixed by statute and need not be set out in the verdict of the jury (Pen. Code 1925, art. 62). This was the practice in the case before us. There is no statement of facts, nor are there any bills of exception.

The judgment will be affirmed.

HAWKINS, J., not sitting.