J-S37022-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOSHUA J. YELVERTON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2030 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 6, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0002143-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 16, 2022

Joshua J. Yelverton appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, following his convictions 

of third-degree murder,1 conspiracy – third-degree murder,2 possessing 

instruments of crime (PIC),3firearms not to be carried without a license,4 and 

carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia.

5

 After 

review, we affirm.

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).

2 Id. at § 903.

3 Id. at § 907(a).

4 Id. at § 6106(a)(1).

5 Id. at § 6108.
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On October 31, 2019, at approximately 4:45 p.m., Yelverton and 

Marquis Mathis arrived at the Regency Apartments Complex at 5600 Ogontz 

Avenue in Philadelphia. For forty-five minutes, Yelverton and Marquis walked 

around the complex, entered and exited several apartment buildings, and 

ultimately stopped in the large courtyard.6 

At 5:30 p.m., while Yelverton and Mathis stood in the large courtyard, 

a man wearing a clown mask, Carter, approached Mathis. Yelverton was 

hidden behind a wall. Carter had a brief exchange with Mathis, after which 

Yelverton pulled out his gun, a .45 caliber firearm with an extended 

magazine.7 At the same time, Mathis also pulled out his firearm. Carter pulled 

out his own firearm and, within seconds, all three men began shooting.

Yelverton remained hidden behind the wall while he shot at Carter. 

Mathis, likewise, shot at Carter. Carter’s gun, after firing a single bullet, was 

struck in the baseplate, which broke the gun into multiple pieces and caused 

all the bullets, except for one, to fall out of the damaged gun. Carter 

attempted to run, but was struck by multiple bullets. Carter collapsed almost 

immediately, facing away from Mathis and Yelverton. As Carter fell, his 

damaged firearm fell from his hand and landed several feet away from him.

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6 Yelverton and Mathis’s arrival at the apartment complex, their walk through 

the complex, and the subsequent murder of Craig Carter Jr. was captured on 

surveillance video and presented at trial.

7 Yelverton did not have a license to carry a firearm.
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After Carter collapsed, the shooting momentarily paused and Mathis put 

his firearm away. Yelverton walked out from behind the wall and continued 

to fire at Carter, who was unarmed and lying on the ground. Yelverton and 

Mathis began to run away, but Yelverton stopped and fired at Carter again. 

Yelverton and Mathis fled the scene together and disposed of their firearms 

under the same car.

Police from the 35th Philadelphia Police District heard gunshots and 

responded to the scene. Police recovered twenty-one .45 caliber fired 

cartridge casings (FCCs), four .357 caliber FCCs,

8 one 9mm FCC, eight 9mm 

live cartridges, one 9mm handgun with the magazine missing the bottom 

plate, a clown mask, and one pair of earbuds. Police transported Carter to 

Albert Einstein Hospital, where he was pronounced dead. 

Doctor Albert Chu, Deputy Medical Examiner, recovered eleven 

projectiles from Carter’s body. Ten projectiles were .45 caliber rounds fired 

from Yelverton’s gun. One projectile was inconclusive. Carter was shot 

fourteen times in total.

Yelverton was identified from the apartment complex surveillance video. 

However, after the shooting, Yelverton cut off his dreadlocks, avoided 

returning to his home, and evaded arrest for several months. Ultimately, 

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8 Mathis’s firearm was a .357 caliber handgun.
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Yelverton was located, arrested, and interviewed. Yelverton was Mirandized9

and confessed to killing Carter.

Yelverton was charged and, on May 18, 2021, he proceeded to a nonjury trial, after which he was convicted of the above-mentioned offenses. The 

trial court deferred sentencing for the preparation of a pre-sentence 

investigation and mental health reports. On August 6, 2021, the trial court 

sentenced Yelverton to an aggregate term of 20 to 44 years in prison. 

Yelverton filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied. Yelverton 

filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Yelverton now raises the following questions for our review:

[1.] Was the evidence sufficient to convict [] Yelverton of thirddegree murder, conspiracy to commit third-degree murder, and 

PIC, where the Commonwealth failed to disprove he acted in selfdefense?

[2.] Did the trial court commit reversible error when the court 

rejected [] Yelverton’s imperfect self-defense theory and 

convicted him of third-degree murder, not voluntary 

manslaughter?

[3.] Was the evidence sufficient to convict [] Yelverton of 

conspiracy, where the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that he agreed with another person to engage in criminal 

conduct?

Brief for Appellant, at 7.

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9 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

adhere to the following standard of review:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not [re-

]weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that[,] as a matter of law[,] no probability of fact 

may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, 

the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact[,] while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the 

evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the 

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

For ease of disposition, we address Yelverton’s first two claims together. 

In his first claim, Yelverton argues that he raised a claim of self-defense at 

trial, which the Commonwealth failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. 

See Brief for Appellant, at 15-21. In his second claim, Yelverton argues that 

even if he did not act in self-defense, he acted in imperfect self-defense and 

the trial court erred by not finding him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Id.

at 21-23. We disagree.
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The Crimes Code defines third-degree murder as “[a]ll other kinds of 

murder” other than first and second-degree murder and classifies it as “a 

felony of the first degree.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c). To sustain a conviction 

of third-degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant 

killed another person with malice. Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 

774 (Pa. Super. 2007). Malice is defined as “exhibiting an ‘extreme 

indifference to human life.’” Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623, 632 

(Pa. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 431 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. 

1981)) (emphasis omitted). A fact-finder may find malice not only in an 

intentional killing, “but also in an unintentional homicide where the perpetrator 

consciously disregarded an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions 

might cause death or serious bodily injury.” Ludwig, 874 A.2d at 632

(quotation and citation omitted). A fact-finder may also infer malice “from 

the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s body.” 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 54 A.3d 332, 335-36 (Pa. 2012). 

For the following reasons, we conclude that the Commonwealth 

presented sufficient evidence that disproved Yelverton’s self-defense and 

imperfect self-defense claims. In particular, Yelverton provoked the incident 

by drawing his firearm first, and he escalated the use of force by firing 21 

bullets at Carter, striking him at least 10 times, and continuing to fire after 

Carter had crumpled to the ground. 
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The use of force against a person is justified “when the actor believes

that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself 

against the use of unlawful force” by another person. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a). 

There is no burden on the defendant to prove a claim of self-defense, but 

there must be some evidence, from any source, to justify a finding of selfdefense. See Commonwealth v. Black, 376 A.2d 627, 630 (Pa. 1977). If 

there is any evidence that will support the claim, then the issue is properly 

before the fact finder. See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 585 A.2d 1069, 

1071 (Pa. Super. 1991). “If a defendant introduces evidence of self-defense, 

the Commonwealth bears the burden of disproving the self-defense claim 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 

1135 (Pa. 2011). 

The Commonwealth can disprove a claim of self-defense by establishing 

that “[1] the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in danger of 

death or serious bodily injury; or [2] the accused provoked or continued the 

use of force; or [3] the accused had a duty to retreat[,] and the retreat was 

possible with complete safety.” Smith, 97 A.3d at 787. The Commonwealth 

must establish only one of these three elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Burns, 765 A.2d 1144, 1149 (Pa. Super. 2000). 

The finder of fact is not required to believe the defendant’s testimony 

that he thought that he was in imminent danger and acted in self-defense. 

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa. 2011). Disbelief of the 
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defendant’s testimony, however, is not sufficient to satisfy the 

Commonwealth’s burden to disprove self-defense absent some evidence 

negating self-defense. Commonwealth v. Ward, 188 A.3d 1301, 1304 (Pa. 

Super. 2018).

In his second claim, Yelverton argues that even if he was not acting in 

self-defense, he was acting in imperfect self-defense and that the trial court 

erred in not finding him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. See Brief for 

Appellant, at 21-23.

The Crimes Code defines voluntary manslaughter as follows:

(b) Unreasonable belief killing justifiable.--A person who 

intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary 

manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the 

circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the 

killing under Chapter 5 of this title, but his belief is unreasonable.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b).

The defense of “imperfect self-defense,” which reduces the crime of 

murder to voluntary manslaughter, exists where the defendant actually, but 

unreasonably, believed that deadly force was necessary to protect himself or 

another against the use of unlawful force. See Commonwealth v. Truong, 

36 A.3d 592, 599 (Pa. Super. 2012). This defense applies only in limited 

circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Green, 273 A.3d 1080, 1087-88 

(Pa. Super. 2022). This Court has recently stated:

If the Commonwealth proves that the defendant’s belief that 

deadly force was necessary was unreasonable but does not 

disprove that [] the defendant genuinely believed that he was in 

imminent danger that required deadly force and does not disprove 
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either of the other elements of self-defense, the defendant may 

be found guilty only of voluntary manslaughter under the defense 

of imperfect self-defense.

See Commonwealth v. Jones, 271 A.3d 452, 459 (Pa. Super. 2021).

Instantly, the record reveals that Carter, wearing a clown mask, 

approached Mathis. N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 5/18/21, at 75, 77-81, 90-96; id., 

5/19/21, at 15-28. Yelverton was hidden behind a wall and drew his firearm 

as Carter approached. Id. 5/18/21, at 89-93, 113-16; id., 5/19/21, at 39, 

58. Carter, Yelverton, and Mathis all had firearms. Id., 5/18/21, at 93-94, 

113-16; id., 5/19/21, at 39, 53. While the record is unclear as to who fired 

first, it is clear that Carter fired one bullet, but Yelverton fired 21 bullets. See 

id., 5/18/21, at 24-25, 37-38, 169-73, 204-05. Even though Carter had been 

struck, disarmed, and collapsed to the ground, Yelverton continued to fire at 

Carter. Id., 5/18/21, at 55, 64, 95-96, 121-22; id., 5/19/21, at 26-28, 75-

82, 85-91. 

Based upon the above facts, the Commonwealth disproved Yelverton’s 

claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. 

Harvey, 812 A.2d 1190, 1196 (Pa. 2002) (even assuming victim threatened 

defendant with deadly force before defendant shot him, “the autopsy report 

revealed that [the victim] had been shot a total of six times, which was simply 

more force than would have been necessary for the [the defendant] to use in 

order to protect himself”); see also Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 

1211, 1222 n.10 (Pa. 2009) (“even if [a]ppellant believed that [the victim] 
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was pursuing him with a deadly weapon, the use of force employed by 

[a]ppellant was excessive in that he shot [the victim] a second time at close 

range after already having shot him in the chest, causing the victim to fall 

forward”). It is clear that Yelverton provoked the use of force by drawing his 

firearm first. Similarly, it is apparent that Yelverton escalated that force when 

he shot Carter, continued to shoot at him 21 times even after Carter had 

collapsed and been disarmed, and struck Carter with at least 10 of those shots. 

Meanwhile, Carter discharged a single round, which did not strike Yelverton. 

Therefore, we conclude the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to 

disprove Yelverton’s self-defense claim. See Smith, supra; see also 

Harvey, supra. Accordingly, we grant him no relief.10

Yelverton’s claim of imperfect self-defense fails for the same reasons as 

his claim of self-defense. Namely, Yelverton provoked the altercation by 

drawing his firearm first, and escalated the use of force by repeatedly firing 

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10 Moreover, we observe that after shooting Carter, Yelverton fled the scene 

with Mathis and both of them hid their firearms under the same vehicle. See

N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 5/18/21, at 90-96; id., 5/19/21, at 15-28, 39.

Additionally, after fleeing the scene, Yelverton changed his appearance and 

evaded arrest for several months. See N.T. 5/18/21, at 16-18, 230-33; id., 

5/19/21, at 54, 91-96; see also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 

792 (Pa. 2004) (conduct of defendant after crime may be admitted showing 

guilt); Commonwealth v. Bradley, 69 A.3d 253, 258-59 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(“[D]efendant’s attempts to cover up after a crime can be inferred to 

demonstrate consciousness of guilt.”). Thus, Yelverton’s flight and 

subsequent attempted concealment of his firearm undermine his claim of selfdefense.
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his weapon even after Carter had already been disarmed and collapsed on 

the ground. See Jones, supra. Accordingly, we grant Yelverton no relief. 

In his third claim, Yelverton argues that the Commonwealth presented 

insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of conspiracy. See Brief for 

Appellant, at 23-25. Yelverton contends that he was unaware that Mathis 

followed him away from the scene. Id. Additionally, Yelverton asserts that 

he did not intend to enter into a criminal conspiracy because the killing of 

Carter arose from “unexpected events.” Id. at 23. Yelverton posits that he 

did not agree to commit a crime with Mathis, because Yelverton’s intention 

was to defend himself from Carter. Id. at 23-24.

The Crimes Code defines conspiracy as follows:

(a) Definition of conspiracy.--A person is guilty of conspiracy with 

another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of 

promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or 

one of more of them will engage in conduct which 

constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to 

commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the 

planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a).

Simplified, the offense of conspiracy requires proof of three elements: 

(1) an agreement, (2) shared criminal intent, and (3) an overt act. See 

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 795 A.2d 1025, 1037-38 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

The “overt act need not be committed by the defendant; it need only be 
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committed by a co-conspirator.” Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 

245, 253 (Pa. Super. 2000). 

“Mere association with the perpetrators, mere presence at the scene, or 

mere knowledge of the crime is insufficient to establish that a defendant was 

part of a conspiratorial agreement to commit the crime.” Commonwealth v. 

Dunkins, 229 A.3d 622, 633 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Generally, 

there must be some additional proof that a defendant intended to commit the 

crime along with the co-conspirator. Id. 

Instantly, the trial court addressed Yelverton’s claim as follows:

[Yelverton] and Mathis arrived at the apartment complex 

together, spent approximately forty-five minutes in the apartment 

complex together, and waited in the courtyard together before the 

shooting. [Yelverton and Mathis] raised [their] weapon[s at 

Carter together.] [Yelverton] and Mathis began firing at [Carter] 

at the same time. They ran away from the scene of the murder 

together. As they fled, [Yelverton] and Mathis disposed of their 

weapons by tossing them under the same car. [Thus,] the 

Commonwealth presented ample evidence of an agreement to 

commit a crime between [Yelverton] and Mathis.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/21, at 5.

Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s 

determination and affirm on this basis. See id. We emphasize that Yelverton 

was not “merely” associating with Mathis, or merely present at the scene. See 

Dunkins, supra. Rather, Yelverton and Mathis arrived together, spent time 

together, aimed their firearms at Carter together, shot Carter together, fled 

the scene together, and hid their firearms under the same car. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 11/5/21, at 5. Thus, the Commonwealth presented sufficient 
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evidence to sustain Yelverton’s conviction of conspiracy and we afford him no 

relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/16/2022