[Cite as Tallmadge v. Johnson, 2016-Ohio-5214.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

CITY OF TALLMADGE 

 Appellee 

 v. 

TENEIKA Y. JOHNSON 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 27936 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

STOW MUNICIPAL COURT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. 2014CRB03932 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: August 3, 2016 

 

MOORE, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Teneika Johnson, appeals her conviction by the Stow Municipal Court. 

This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} On December 6, 2014, a loss prevention employee of Kmart in Tallmadge saw 

two women enter the store with large purses. They gathered some children’s merchandise and 

walked to the cashiers’ area, where one of the women made a payment toward a layaway 

account. When the Kmart employee approached the women, they ran from the store and drove 

away in a white Ford Edge. The employee provided police with the license plate number and 

identified the owner of the layaway account as Teneika Johnson. 

{¶3} When Ms. Johnson returned to the store to return an item from layaway, store 

employees called the police. They arrested Ms. Johnson outside the store near a vehicle that 

matched the earlier description. Ms. Johnson was charged with petty theft in violation of 
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Codified Ordinances of the City of Tallmadge 545.05, a first-degree misdemeanor. The trial 

court found Ms. Johnson guilty and sentenced her to a fine of $1000, with $800 suspended, and 

180 days in jail, suspended on the condition that she complete community control. The trial 

court also ordered Ms. Johnson to pay $70 restitution to Kmart. Ms. Johnson filed this appeal. 

Some of her assignments of error have been rearranged for ease of discussion. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONFRONTATION 

CLAUSE OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE 

U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION WHEN IT RELIED ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE FROM A 

DECLARANT OF UNKNOWN AVAILABILITY IN ITS FINDING OF FACT 

AND THEN FOUND MS. JOHNSON GUILTY. 

{¶4} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Johnson argues that the trial court erred by 

permitting hearsay testimony that violated the Confrontation Clause. This Court does not agree. 

{¶5} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused 

the right to confront witnesses against him. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004). As 

a general rule, the Confrontation Clause is implicated by the admission of out-of-court 

statements that are testimonial in nature when the declarant does not testify in the proceeding. 

See Melandez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309-310 (2009). When no such statements 

are admitted, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated. In this case, the Kmart employee 

testified about his own observations on the evening in question. When he started to relate 

statements made by his supervisor on several occasions, defense counsel objected. The trial 

court sustained the objection, and the trial court’s written findings of fact relied solely on the 

employee’s testimony regarding his own observations. In other words, the trial court did not 

admit any of the statements at issue, so there was no error with respect to the Confrontation 
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Clause. Because we need go no further than this in our analysis of this issue, we make no 

determination with respect to whether the statements at issue were testimonial in nature. 

{¶6} Ms. Johnson’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING MS. JOHNSON’S CONVICTION FOR 

PETTY THEFT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE GUILT BEYOND A 

REASONABLE DOUBT IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 

OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE U.S. 

CONSTITUTION AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION. 

{¶7} Ms. Johnson’s third assignment of error is that her conviction for petty theft is not 

supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, she has argued that there is insufficient evidence 

that she is the person who stole merchandise from the Tallmadge Kmart. We disagree. 

{¶8} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law 

that this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 2009-Ohio6955, at ¶ 18, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is 

whether the prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to 

sustain a conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). In reviewing the evidence, we do 

not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State v. 

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The State’s evidence is sufficient if it allows the trier of 

fact to reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id. 

{¶9} Codified Ordinances of the City of Tallmadge 545.05(a)(1), which is analogous to 

R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), provides that “No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or 

services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services * * * 

[w]ithout the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent[.]” The identity of a 
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perpetrator must also be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Flynn, 9th Dist. 

Medina No. 06CA0096-M, 2007-Ohio-6210, ¶ 12. 

{¶10} In this case, the Kmart security employee testified that between 6:00 and 7:00 

p.m., he saw two women with large purses enter the store, proceed to the children’s clothing 

department, and gather several items of clothing. He recalled that the women then went to the 

infants’ department and put the merchandise into their purses. He also testified that when he 

approached the women after they completed a transaction at the cash registers, they ran. The 

employee identified Ms. Johnson as one of the two women, and records from the layaway 

transaction also identified her as the owner of the layaway account. Ms. Johnson was arrested 

when she returned to the store in late December in the same vehicle that had been used the night 

of the theft. 

{¶11} Based on this testimony, a jury could reasonably conclude that Ms. Johnson 

committed petty theft by stealing the items at issue. Her third assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

MS. JOHNSON’S CONVICTION FOR THEFT WAS AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE IV, 

SECTION 3, OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION. 

{¶12} Ms. Johnson’s second assignment of error is that her conviction for petty theft is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence because some of the witnesses at trial testified that 

she was at another location during the theft. We disagree that her conviction is against the 

weight of the evidence. 

{¶13} When considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, this Court must: 

review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts 
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in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered. 

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). A reversal on this basis is reserved for 

the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id., citing 

State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 172 (1st Dist.1983). 

{¶14} Ms. Johnson has argued that the weight of the evidence at trial established that 

she was not at the Tallmadge Kmart on the evening of the theft. Ms. Johnson, who testified in 

her own defense, testified that she cleaned a daycare center on Ardella Avenue in Akron on the 

day in question from around 4:40 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. She admitted that the car identified at the 

Kmart was hers, but testified that she loaned it to a friend the day of the theft and gave the same 

friend her driver’s license so that the friend could make a payment on her layaway account in her 

absence. A second friend testified that she helped Ms. Johnson with her cleaning responsibilities 

on the night of the theft, but she also admitted that she could not remember what Ms. Johnson 

was wearing that day, that she did not know whether Ms. Johnson drove there or was dropped 

off, and that she did not pay attention to what time Ms. Johnson left the daycare center. 

{¶15} Notably, there are gaps in both women’s testimony. In addition, Ms. Johnson’s 

testimony that she gave her vehicle and driver’s license to an acquaintance who was not licensed 

to drive is of questionable veracity. Ms. Johnson’s testimony and the testimony of her cleaning 

companion were also at odds with the testimony of the Kmart employee, who witnessed the theft 

and identified Ms. Johnson as the woman who committed the theft and returned to the store in 

late December. Having reviewed all of the testimony at trial and considered the credibility of all 

of the witnesses, however, we cannot conclude that this is the exceptional case in which the 

evidence at trial weighs heavily against the conviction. 
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{¶16} Ms. Johnson’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶17} Ms. Johnson’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Stow 

Municipal Court is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Stow Municipal 

Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 CARLA MOORE 

 FOR THE COURT 

WHITMORE, J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR. 
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APPEARANCES: 

REBECCA M. BLACK, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

MEGAN E. RABER, Director of Law, and JOHN A. SCAVELLI, JR., Assistant Director of 

Law, for Appellee.