UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 96-4032

WILBERT DECOSTA GREAVES, a/k/a

Tony,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.

W. Earl Britt, District Judge.

(CR-95-38-BR)

Submitted: June 30, 1997

Decided: August 15, 1997

Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Gordon Widenhouse, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh,

North Carolina, for Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States

Attorney, John S. Bowler, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh,

North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Wilbert DeCosta Greaves appeals his conviction and sentence for

possession and distribution of crack cocaine and the related conspiracy charge. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994) & 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994).

Greaves claims on appeal that the district court erred in rejecting his

original plea agreement and ignoring the Government's claim that it

was concerned about potential problems of proof regarding the possession and distribution charges. Greaves also suggests that the district court erred in failing to redact references to"prior involvement

with police" from the transcript of a recorded conversation between

Greaves and his co-conspirator.

In attacking the district court's refusal to accept his guilty plea,

Greaves contends that when a prosecutor offers a legitimate, nonmanipulative reason for the plea agreement, the district court must

accept it so long as it is supported by the evidence. Although an

accused has the right to plead guilty to a charged offense, the Constitution does not require that the trial judge accept that plea. See

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); see also Godinez

v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1993). Moreover, the district court

was not bound to accept the plea simply because Greaves wanted to

plead. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.1 (1975).

Greaves relies extensively on the language of the United States

Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,§ 6B1.2 (Nov. 1995), to

support his contention that the district court has a duty to accept the

plea so long as the prosecutor offers a legitimate explanation for the

agreement. This argument ignores the permissive nature of the language of the guidelines. The district court "may" but is not required

to accept any given plea agreement. USSG § 6B1.2(a). With that

backdrop in mind, and the lack of any constitutional underpinning to

Greaves's claim, we cannot find that the district court abused its dis-

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cretion in rejecting the plea agreement.* See United States v. Crowell,

60 F.3d 199, 205 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, there is no merit to

Greaves's suggestion that the district court was required to compare

his culpability with that of his co-conspirators, or to his contention

that the district court should have inquired regarding the legitimacy

of the Government's proffered reason for the plea agreement.

Finally, Greaves challenges the district court's failure to redact a

recorded conversation that implied that Greaves had prior experience

with narcotics. The district court's evidentiary decisions are reviewed

for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726,

731 (4th Cir. 1993). The portion of the transcript at issue refers to

Greaves's explanation of the types of questions unidentified investigators asked him when he "got caught with the money" at some

unspecified time in the past. J.A. 153. Greaves contends that the district court erred by not excluding the evidence under Fed. R. Evid.

404(b). Evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b) is not admissible "to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

In this case, the evidence of Greaves's prior bad act was not admitted for the purpose of proving his character, but rather, was part and

parcel of the Government's evidence proving his awareness of the

presence of the drugs left at his co-conspirator's residence and his

awareness of his own wrongdoing. Id. Greaves has not shown that the

Government relied on the passing reference to his previous run-in

with the police to prove his character. Because the evidence tended

to prove Greaves's knowledge of the presence and source of the

drugs, it was relevant and probative to the issues at trial. See Fed. R.

Evid. 403. Greaves's suggestion to the contrary is without merit.

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*Greaves concedes that a district court may properly reject a plea

agreement based on undue leniency. Crowell, 60 F.3d at 205-06. There

is certainly evidence of undue leniency in this case, as the Government

was willing to allow Greaves to plead to a criminal information that

would have limited Greaves's exposure to imprisonment to five years. In

fact, the Government could have, and eventually did, charge Greaves

with the entire offense conduct in what amounted to a relatively straightforward possession and distribution case. That conduct ultimately subjected him to a guideline range of 360 months to life imprisonment.

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Finding Greaves's arguments unpersuasive, we affirm the conviction and sentence. We deny the motion for oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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