### F OR P UBLICATION



## UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

M I C H E L L E 

### -L A E L 

### B

. N O R S W O R T H Y 

### , Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v

.

J E F F R E Y 

### B E A R

D 

### , CDCR Secretary ; M. E

. S P E A R

M A N 

### , CTF W arden; R A Y M O N D 

### J

. C O F F I

N 

### ; J A R E D 

### L O Z A N O 

### ; A. A D A M S 

### , Chief Medical Ex e cutive of CTF
, Soledad, CA; A. N E W T O N 

### ; D A

V I D 

### V A N 

### L E E R 

### ; L

. D. Z A M O R A 

### , CDCR Appeals Chief, Sacramento, CA,

Defendants-Appellants

. N o. 15-15712

D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00695- J ST

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California J on S. Tig ar, District J udg e, Presiding

Submitted Aug ust 13, 2015 * 

### San F rancisco, California

F iled October 5, 2015

* T h e p an el u n a n i m o u sl y co n clu d es th is case is su itab le f o r d ecisio n

w ith o u t o ral arg u

m en t. S ee Fed . R. A pp . P . 3 4 (a)(2 ).

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B efore: Stephen Reinhardt, A. W allace Tashima, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit J udg es.

Per Curiam Opinion; Partial Concu rrence and Partial Dissent by J udg e Callahan

SUMMARY * *



### P risoner Civil Rights

The p anel dismissed as moot a n a ppeal from the district court’s issuance o f a preliminary injunction ord e ring the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to provide p l a intiff, a transg endered woman, w ith sex reassig nment surg ery , and remanded with directions.

W h i l e t h e appeal was pending —one day prior to oral
arg ument—plaintiff was released on parole from the California prison sy stem. B ecause plaintiff d id n ot seriously dispute that the case became moot u pon her release, the panel d i s m issed the appeal. The panel remanded to the district
court so that it could determine whether the appe al became

mo ot throug h happenstance or the defendants’ o wn a ctions. The panel stated that if the latter was the case, the district
court should c onsider the factors under Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. W estern Conference of Teamsters , 686 F .2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1982)

, to determine whether to vacate its preliminary injunction order. The p anel al s o r e m anded for

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.

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the district c ourt to consider the qu e s t i o n of the award o f attorney s’ fees.

Concurring in the d ismissal and dissenting from the remand, J udg e Callahan stated that in addition to dismissing the appeal, the panel should v a c ate the mandatory preliminary injunction ordering the California D epartment of Corrections to provide plaintiff with sex reassig nment surg ery

.

COUNSEL

J ose A. Z elidon-Z e peda, Deputy Attorney General; T h omas S. Patterson; Supervising Deputy A ttorney General; J onathan L

. W olff, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kamala D

. Harris, A ttorney General o f California, San F rancisco, California, for Defendants-Appellants.

Herman J

. Hoy ing and Christopher J

. B a nks, Morg an L ewis & B ockius L L P, San F r ancisco, California; I lona M. Turner, J ennifer Orthwein, and Shawn T. Meerkamper, Transg ender L aw Center, Oakland, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Paul R.Q. W olfson and Thomas C. K ost, W ilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr L L P, W ashing ton, D

. C

. ; Alan E. Schoenfeld and Adriel I

. Cepeda Derieux
, W ilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr L L P, New York, New York; F elicia H. Ellsworth, W ilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr L L P, B oston, Massachusetts, for Amici Curiae American Civil L iberties Union et al.

Sanford J ay Rosen and Aaron J

. F ischer, Rosen B ien Galvan & Grunfeld L L P, San F rancisco, California, for Amici Curiae B ay Area L awy ers for I

ndividual F reedom.

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B arry L evenstam, J enner & B lock L L P, Chicag o, I llinois; L isa J

. Kohn, J enner & B lock L L P, L os Ang eles, California; Devi M. Rao, J enner & B lock L L P, W ashing ton , D

. C., for Amici Curiae Medical and M ental Health Professionals: W o rld Professional Association for Transg ender Health a nd GL MA: Health Professionals Advancing L GB T Equality

.

OP INION

PER CURI AM:

Plainti ff Michelle Norsworthy
, a transg endered woman, has b een incarcerated in the California prison sy stem since 1987. I n 2000, she was diag nosed with g ender dy sphoria and, several y ears thereafter, petitioned the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ( “CDCR”) for sex reassig nment surg ery , a procedure that w ould tr a nsform her

sex c haracteristics from male to female. After CDCR denied
t he petition, Norsworthy sued, alleg ing that the denia l amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eig hth Amendment. The di s t rict court issued a preliminary injunction o rdering the defendants to provide Norsworthy with sex reassig nment surg ery

. CDCR appeale d under 28 U.S.C. § 1 292(a)(1). This court stay e d the preliminary injunction pending appeal.

W h ile this appeal was pending —one day prior to oral
arg umen t

—

N orsworthy was released on parole from the California prison sy stem. The defe n d a n t s contend that the

case became moot once CDCR releas e d N o rsworthy

. W e ag ree. “An inmate’s r elease from prison while his claims a re pending g enerally will moot any claims for i n j u n c tive relief relating to the prison’s polici e s unless the suit has been

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c l assified as a class action.” Dilley v. Gunn
, 64 F .3d 13 6 5
, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995). Norsworthy does not seriously dispute that the case became moot upon her release.

Here, the d istrict court e n tered a mandatory injunction requiri n g C DCR to perform sex reassig nment surg ery

. Althoug h automatic vacatur is “the ‘established practice’

. . . whenever mootness prevents appellate review,” an ex c eption
to this practice ex ists when a case is mooted “not due to ‘happenstance’ but ‘when the appellant has by his own act caused the dismissal of the ap p e a l

. ’ ” Dilley
, 64 F .3d at 1369–70 (quoting Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v

. W e stern Conference of Teamsters
, 686 F .2d 720, 722 (9th Cir.1982)). Defendants arg ue that vacatur is appropriate as to the entirety of the district c ourt’s determination b ecause a n “ independent parole suitability r eview process” mooted t h e c a se. W here “the facts surrounding ” a prisoner’s r e lease “are not sufficiently developed in the r ecord

. . . to determine” whether the r elease occurred throug h ha ppenstance or the defendants’ actions, the appropriate course is to r emand to the district court to determine whether to vacate its order. Id. at 1371. W e therefore remand to the district court so that it can determine whether this a p p e a l became moot throug h happenstance or th e d efendants’ o wn actions. 1 

### I f the latter

1 T h e d issen t ch arg es th at o u r d ecisio n to rem an d b ecau se it is u n clear

w h eth er d ef en d an ts’ actio n s m o o ted th e case “ ap p ro ach es so p h i s try .” Ou r p reced en t, h o w ev er, req u ires t h at w e rem an d in su ch circu m stan ces. S ee Dilley
, 6 4 F.3 d at 1 3 7 1

. Mo reo v er, alth ou g h o u r d issen tin g co lleag u e m ay b e w illin g t o accep t th e d ef en d an ts’ assertio n s reg ard in g t h e i n d ep en d en ce

o f th e p aro le rev iew pro cess, w e are n o t so co n v in ced

. B ef o re No rsw o rth y f iled th is su it, a p an el o f

th e p aro le b o ard h ad o n

sev eral prio r o ccasio n s d e n i e d h er p aro le. It last d i d so in March 2 0 1 3 f o r a th ree- y ea r t e r m , m ean in g th at No rsw o rth y ’s n ex t paro le h earin g sh o u ld in th e o rd in ary

co u rse h av e co m e in March 2 0 1 6

. Fo u r m o n th s af ter No rsw o r t h y filed

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is the case, the district court should consider the factors under Ringsby to determine w hether to vaca t e i ts preliminary injunction order.

th is su it in Feb ru ary 2 0 1 4
, h o w ev er, th e paro le b o ard d ecid ed to ad v an ce th e d ate o f h er n ex t p aro le h earin g

. T ha t h earin g w as th en delay ed an d
, in th e m ean tim e, th e d i strict co u rt g ran ted th e m o tio n f

o r a p r e l i m in ary in j u n ctio n in A p ril 2 0 1 5 . A little o v er a m o n t h later, No rsw o rth y

f in ally h ad a p aro le h earin g , at w h ich p o in t a p aro le b o ard p an el ap p ro v ed h er ap p licatio n

.

B y statu te, b o th th e f

u ll p aro le rev iew b o ard an d g o v ern o r can rev iew

a p a n e l d e c isio n w ith in a certain tim e. S ee Cal. P en al Co d e § § 3 0 4 1
, 3 0 4 1 .2

. Here, i f b o th th e f u l l p aro le b oard a n d g o v e rn o r h ad let th ese statu to ry p erio d s lap se w ith o u t actio n , th e paro le d eterm in atio n w ou ld h av e b eco m e f

in al o n Octo ber 1 8
, 2 0 1 5

. A s it h ap p en ed
, th is co u rt ask ed th e p arties o n Ju ly 2 0 to p ro v id e an u p d ate reg ard in g No rsw o rth y ’ s paro le

an d ad dress w

h eth er th e paro le b oard p an el’ s d ec i s i o n m o o ted th e case. In t h eir resp o n s e, d ef

en d an t s in f

o r m e d u s f

o r th e f irst tim e th at th e f

u l l
p aro le b o a r d h ad at so m e p o in t ap p ro v ed th e pan el’ s d ecisio n an d th at d ef en d a n ts “ an ticip ate[d ]” a f in al decisio n f

ro m th e g o v ern o r b y A

u g u st 7 th at, if f

av o rab le to No rsw o rt h y , w o u l d in su re th at sh e w o u ld “ b e released f

ro m p riso n in A u g u st.” T h e g o v e rn o r d id in d eed ap p ro v e No rsw o rth y ’ s p aro le o n A u g u st 7

. Nev erth eless, No rsw o rth y arg u ed th at

o ral arg u m en t sh o u ld p ro ceed as sch ed u led o n A u g u st 1 3 b ecau s e CDCR p lan n ed to release h er o n A u g u s t 14
, m ean in g th at sh e w o u l d still b e in carcerated o n th e d ate o f o ral arg u m en t. D ef en d an ts re p l y

— f iled on A u gu s t 1 2
, th e ev e o f o ral arg u m en t—in f o rm ed u s th at No rsw o rth y h ad in f act b een released th at v ery m o rn in g

. T h e rep ly d id n o t div u lg e w h y No rsw o rth y ’ s release d ate h ad ch an g ed

.

Far f ro m “ so ph istry ,” th ese co in cid en ces in dicate th at th ere is at least

so m e ch an ce th at d ef

en d an ts in f

lu en ced th e p aro le p ro cess. A t th is p o in t, h o w ev er, all w e can say is t h at th e circu m stan ces o f No rsw o rth y ’ s release

are so m ew

h at u n u su al. B ecau se w e can say n o m o re, w e are u n w illin g to

ex p ress a v iew o f w h a t hap p en ed w ith o u t f u ll k n o w led g e o f all th e f

acts th at th e d istrict co u rt sh o u ld co n sid er in th e f irst in stan ce.

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According ly
, this appeal is dismissed as moot, and we remand this case to the district court so that it can determine whether to vacate its preliminary injunction order, as well a s to consider the question of the award of attorney s’ fees.

DISMISSED and REMANDED w ith directions.

CAL L A HAN, Circuit J udg e, concurring in the dismissal a nd dissenting from the remand:

Every one ag rees that this appeal is m o o t. Ms. Norsworthy has been released from custody by the California Department of Corrections and Reha b ilitation (“CDCR”). According ly
, in addition to dismissing this appeal we should
vacate the mandatory preliminary injunction ordering CDCR to provide Ms. Norsworthy with sex reassig nment surg ery

.

The majority ’s remand is based on leg al error a nd unnecessarily prolong s this litig ation. The majorit y a d mits that vacatur is appropriate unless “the appella nt has by his

own a ct caused the dismissal of the appeal.” Dilley v. G unn , 6 4 F. 3 d 1 365, 1369–70 (9th Cir. 1995). The majority does
not say that this has h a p p e ned; it o nly protests that the facts surrounding Ms. Norsworthy ’s release “are not sufficiently developed.”

This a pproaches sophistry

. The p r o c e ss by which the Parole B o ard determined that Ms. Norsworthy ’s confinement

was no long er required and the Gov e rnor’s review o f that d e c ision are set forth fully in the d ocuments that have b e e n submitted to the Court. There is no real doubt that the Parole

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B oard and the Governor are not subjec t to or responsible to the CDCR. 1



### Moreover, the remand simply encourag es unnecessary litig ation over a mandatory p reliminary injunction that
every one ag r ees is moot. I n contrast, the v acatur o f t he injunction would hav e n o effect on Ms. Norsworthy ’s assertion that she remains entitled to attorney ’s fees.

The mandatory preliminary injunction should be vacated.

1 A ccep tin g th e m aj o rity ’ s ch aracterizatio n o f th e f acts co n cern in g Ms. No rsw o rth y ’ s release, it o n l y sh o w s in f lu en ce an d n o t th at “ th e ap p ellan t h as b y h i s o w

n act cau sed th e d ism i ssal o f th e ap peal.” Dilley
, 6 4 F.3 d at 1 3 6 9

– 7 0 (q u o tin g Rin g

s by Tru ck Lin es v. W

ester n C on feren ce o

f Tea msters , 6 8 6 F.2 d 7 2 0 , 7 2 2 (9 th Cir. 1 9 8 2 )).