alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
*

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstancesset forth in 5THCIR.R. 47.5.4.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-50611

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SANTOS ARNOLDO FERNANDEZ, also known as Sonny,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. A-00-CR-156-2-JN

--------------------

April 19, 2002

Before DeMoss, Parker, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Santos Arnoldo Fernandez appeals his sentence following

conviction for three counts of conspiracy and possession with

intent to distribute illegal narcotics. Fernandez argues that the

district court was clearly erroneous in determining his role in the

offense. We review a district court’s determination of, for

sentencing guidelines purposes, a defendant’s role in the offense

for clear error. United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 446 (5th
2

Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 823 (2002). 

Section 3B1.1(b) of the sentencing guidelines provides for a

three-level increase “[i]f the defendant was a manager or

supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal

activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise

extensive.” The district court’s finding is supported by the

testimony of the FBI agent Greg Smith that his surveillance showed

that Fernandez’s role was that of “chief lieutenant, most trusted

confidante, ... enforcer.” Fernandez has not shown that Smith’s

testimony was unreliable. See United States v. Patterson, 962 F.2d

409, 415 (5th Cir. 1992). The district court did not clearly err

by finding that Fernandez was a manager or supervisor of the

criminal activity not a minor participant and by adjusting the

offense level accordingly.

Fernandez argues that the district court erred by finding that

he obstructed justice and increasing his offense level under §

3C1.1 of the sentencing guidelines. This is a factual finding

reviewed for clear error. United States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 687

(5th Cir. 1996). A codefendant testified that Fernandez threatened

him about testifying by stating that anyone who “talked” would be

killed “along with their family.” The district court did not

clearly err by applying § 3C1.1 to Fernandez's sentence. 

AFFIRMED.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

 DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CHRISTOPHER LYNN KOPPE,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D22-3069

 LT Case No. 2008-CF-043786-A

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed March 3, 2023

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Brevard County,

Tesha Scolaro Ballou, Judge.

Christopher Lynn Koppe, Avon 

Park, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee. 

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See Wagner v. State, 177 So. 3d 695, 697 (Fla. 5th DCA 

2015) (recognizing that when a defendant enters an open plea, there is no 

plea agreement between the defendant and the State, and the trial court has 

the absolute discretion to determine the appropriate sentence); Jacoby v. 

State, 215 So. 3d 168, 171–72 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (recognizing that if a 
2

defendant is sentenced to a new prison sentence upon the revocation of the 

probationary term of a probationary split sentence, the defendant is not 

entitled to credit for the full amount of the original sentence if he obtained an 

early release due to gain time—he is entitled to credit for the time he actually 

served in prison); Brown v. State, 268 So. 3d 177, 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)

(“[F]orfeiture of gain time is a collateral consequence, and . . . neither the 

circuit court nor counsel was required to forewarn the defendant about that 

collateral consequence.” (citing Ortiz v. State, 227 So. 3d 682, 684 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2017))); State v. Rodriguez, 990 So. 2d 600, 606–07 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2008) (“[T]here is no requirement that a defendant be given a specifically 

quantified amount of time that he is expected to serve in prison.”).

LAMBERT, C.J., MAKAR and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur.
SFSB, Inc. and Slavie Federal Savings Bank Director Compensation Policy



 Exhibit 10.1 
  
 SFSB, INC. 
 SLAVIE FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK 
 Director Compensation Policy 
  
 This Director Compensation Policy (the “Director Compensation
Policy”) sets forth the policies of SFSB, Inc. (the “Company”) and Slavie Federal Savings Bank (the “Bank”), pertaining to the remuneration which the Company and the Bank shall pay to members (“Directors”) of their
respective Boards of Directors. 
  
 1. Remuneration for Officers and
Employees All Directors, including Directors who are officers or employees of the Company or the Bank are entitled to remuneration for serving as a Director. 
  
 2. Cash Compensation for Meetings. Slavie Federal Savings Bank shall pay each director, including the employee directors (Messrs.
Logan and Wagner), $700 for each regular meeting and the annual meeting, $75 for each quarterly meeting and an amount determined by the board of directors for special meetings. All directors are also eligible for an annual bonus, which shall be
awarded at the discretion of the board of directors. In addition, each non-employee director shall be paid $200 for the first hour of each committee meeting attended, and $50 for each additional half-hour with a $700 maximum fee per committee
meeting. Members of the loan committee shall also receive a monthly fee of $50. Directors shall be paid for two excused absences from board and committee meetings. Directors shall only paid for additional absences if the absence is for a medical
reason. 
  
 3. Special Cash Compensation. The Board of Directors or the
compensation committee of the Board of Directors of Slavie Federal Savings Bank may authorize discretionary payments to one or more Directors or the entire Board of Directors as a result of outstanding service. 
  
 4. Expense Reimbursements. All Directors of the Company and Slavie Federal Savings
Bank are entitled to reimbursement for reasonable expenses incurred on behalf of the Company and Slavie Federal Savings Bank. 
  
 5. Compensation to Secretary. The Secretary of Slavie Federal Savings Bank, in addition to any fees such person may receive as a director, shall be compensated
$150.00 for each regular, annual and special board meeting attended and $75.00 for each quarterly meeting. 
  
 6. Compensation to Directors of SFSB, Inc.. Unless and until the Company becomes actively involved in additional businesses other than owning all the capital stock of Slavie Federal Savings Bank, no separate
cash compensation will be paid to the directors of the Company in addition to that paid to them by Slavie Federal Savings Bank in their capacities as directors of Slavie Federal Savings Bank. The Company may determine in the future that such
separate cash compensation is appropriate. 
  
 7. Amendment or Termination.
This Director Compensation Policy may be amended, altered or terminated at the election of the Board of Directors of the Company in its absolute discretion. 
  
 8. Effective Date. This Director Compensation Policy was adopted by the Board of Directors of the Company and the Bank on February 7, 2005.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 236 (Thursday, December 7, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 76626-76627]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-31133]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RP01-116-000]


East Tennessee Natural Gas Company; Notice of Proposed Changes in 
FERC Gas Tariff

December 1, 2000.
    Take notice that on November 22, 2000, East Tennessee Natural Gas 
Company (East Tennessee) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas 
Tariff, Second Revised Volume No. 1, Fourth Revised Sheet No. 170, to 
be effective on January 1, 2001.
    East Tennessee states that the purpose of this filing is to revise 
the phone number of the person to whom complaints should be directed 
regarding East Tennessee's compliance with the Commission's gas 
marketing affiliate rules and to provide for the posting on East 
Tennessee's Internet Web site of information regarding shared operating 
employees and shared facilities, as well as any physical office space 
barriers and card key protections that may be necessitated by virtue of 
shared office space, consistent with Commission precedent.
    East Tennessee states that copies of its filing have been mailed to 
all affected customers and interested state commissions.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a motion to intervene or a protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in 
accordance with Sections 385.214 or 385.211 of the Commission's Rules 
and Regulations. All such motions or protests must be filed in 
accordance with Section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. 
Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the 
appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants 
parties to the proceedings. Any person wishing to become a party must 
file a motion to intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the 
Commission and are available for public inspection in the Public 
Reference Room. This filing may be viewed on the web at http://www.ferc.fed.us/online/rims.htm (call 202-208-2222 for assistance). 
Comments and protests may be filed electronically via the internet in 
lieu of paper. See, 18 CFR 385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions

[[Page 76627]]

on the Commission's web site at http://www.ferc.fed.us/efi/doorbell.htm.

David P. Boergers,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-31133 Filed 12-6-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1

                  CALCULATION OF PRO FORMA NET LOSS PER SHARE

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                  THREE MONTHS ENDED                    NINE MONTHS ENDED
                                                                      SEPTEMBER 30,                       SEPTEMBER 30, 
                                                              ------------------------------      ------------------------------
                                                                  1997              1996               1997              1996
                                                              ------------      ------------      ------------      ------------
<S>                                                         <C>                <C>               <C>               <C>
Weighted Average Common and Common Equivalent Shares:
  Series A Preferred Stock                                            --                --                --             994,677
  Series B Preferred Stock                                            --                --                --           1,614,046
  Common Stock                                                  10,175,426        10,008,542        10,121,499         5,720,538
  Common Stock Options                                                --                --                --             457,981
  Warrants                                                            --                --                --               2,142
                                                              ------------      ------------      ------------      ------------
                                                                10,175,426      $ 10,008,542      $ 10,121,499      $  8,789,384
                                                              ============      ============      ============      ============

Net Loss                                                      $   (763,000)     $   (246,000)     $ (3,052,000)     $ (5,085,000)
                                                              ============      ============      ============      ============

Pro Forma net loss per common and common equivalent share     $      (0.07)     $      (0.02)     $      (0.30)            (0.58)
                                                              ============      ============      ============      ============
</TABLE>



















                                       20
#### TURNER v. STATE.

No. 20716.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 10, 1940.

Rogers & Spurlock, of Fort Worth, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is possession of whisky in a dry area for the purpose of sale; the punishment, a fine of $100.

As' shown by bill of exception No. 5, appellant was the only witness who was in a position to deny the testimony of the arresting officers to the effect that the car in which she was riding was being driven at a rate of speed in excess of 45 miles an hour. Appellant did not testify in her own behalf. During the closing argument the county attorney indulged in the following language in the presence and hearing of the jury: “There has been no testimony from any witness denying that the car was being driven in excess of 45 miles per hour." When counsel for appellant objected to the foregoing remarks on the ground that they constituted a comment on appellant’s failure to testify the county attorney, in the presence and hearing of the jury, used the following language: “I was only discussing the evidence in the case. I didn’t mean to comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.” Counsel for appellant promptly objected to the argument last quoted on the ground that it constituted an allusion and comment on the failure of the appellant to take the witness stand and testify in her own behalf. We think the bill of exception presents a violation of the mandatory provisions of Art. 710, C.C. P., which prohibits allusion to or comment on the accused’s failure to testify.

In Smith v. State, 106 Tex.Cr.R. 586, 294 S.W. 221, 222, the following remarks of the district attorney were held by this court to constitute a direct allusion to the failure of the accused to testify: “This defendant not testifying this defendant, I do not mean to refer to this defendant not testifying.”

In Wilcek v. State, 64 Tex.Cr.R. 1, 141 S.W. 88, these remarks of one of the attorneys for the state were held to constitute a comment on the failure of the accused to testify: “The defendant’s defense in this case is — Although he has offered no testimony to that effect, I do not mean to refer to his failure to testify. * * * I have not referred to defendant’s failure to testify. On the contrary, I stated to the jury that I did not so mean to refer to that fact.” See, also, Brumbelow v. State, 122 Tex.Cr.R. 198, 54 S.W.2d 528.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
IA 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 91 

Providing for the approval of the Congress of the proposed agreement for 

cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 21, 2010 

Mr. BERMAN (for himself and Mr. ROHRABACHER) (both by request) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee 

on Foreign Affairs 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Providing for the approval of the Congress of the proposed 

agreement for cooperation between the United States 

and the Russian Federation pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 That the Congress does favor the proposed agreement for 

4 cooperation transmitted to the Congress by the President 

5 on May 10, 2010. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
#### COPELAND v. STANDARD INV. CO.

No. 3675.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

May 23, 1940.

James D. O’Connor, of Dallas, for appellant.

H. B. Houston, of Dallas, for appellee.

COMBS, Justice..

This appeal is from a judgment of the County Court at Law A, of Dallas County, in the amount of $150 and foreclosure of chattel mortgage lien on certain personal property. There is no statement of facts, but from recitals in the judgment appellant Copeland admitted the indebtedness in the-amount adjudged, and execution of the mortgage.

On the record the judgment is just. Appellant’s brief presents no reversible error, and we affirm the judgment without discussion of the several assignments. See Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Futch, Tex.Civ.App., 127 S.W.2d 1040.

Affirmed.
#### ALDRIDGE v. STATE.

No. 15015.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 13, 1932.

Tom E. Moberly, of Dallas, for appellant.

Dloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, P. J.

The offense is robbery; penalty assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for twenty-five years.

No ruling of the court is assailed by bills of exception or otherwise.

From the state’s evidence the following appears: F. A. De Roach, an operator of a street car in the city of Dallas, was assaulted and robbed between eleven o’clock and midnight of the first day of July, 1931. The appellant was not masked, and was identified upon the trial as the offender. Such was the testimony of De Loach. By circumstances detailed by other witnesses, the testimony touching the identity of the accused was supplemented. The appellant testified in his own behalf and said that on the night upon which. De Loach claims to have been robbed he spent the time from 9:30 q.t night until 1:00 o’clock the next morning at the home of Mrs. Pinson, situated in the city of Dallas. He specifically denied his identity as the offender.

In the motion for new trial there is complaint that the appellant’s application for a continuance was overruled. The record, however, reveals no application for a continuance, nor exception to the refusal to grant it. Such exception is essential. See Nelson v. State, 1 Tex. App. 44, and other cases cited in Branch’s Ann. Tex. P. C. § 304.

Attached to the motion for new trial is the affidavit of Mrs. Marguerite Pinson stating that, on the night of the alleged robbery, the appellant was at her home from 10 o’clock until 12 o’clock at night. There is nothing in the record to indicate whether there was an effort to secure the testimony of Mrs. Pinson at the trial. In the state of the record the judgment must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
#### Ex parte KING.

No. 7765.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Oct. 16, 1940.

*581Millard L. ..Threet and Garvey Melugin, both of Archer City, for relator.

CRITZ, Justice.

This is an original habeas corpus proceeding instituted directly in this Court by Wayne King, as relator, to secure his release from alleged illegal restraint of his liberty.

The District Court of Archer County, Texas, granted Bennie King, the then wife of relator, a divorce from relator. The divorce decree contained a child support order against relator. Later Bennie King, the divorced wife, made complaint against relator for disobedience of such child support order. This complaint was sworn to before Bennie King’s attorney acting as a notary public. The district court, on hearing, based on this complaint, adjudged relator in contempt, and committed him to jail. This Court ordered relator released on bail pending final determination of this cause. The decree of contempt entered in the district court was, and is, void because the complaint was sworn to before Mrs. King’s attorney as notary public. Ex parte Scott, 133 Tex. 1, 123 S.W.2d 306, 126 S.W.2d 626.

Relator is finally discharged.
July 31, 2013

Mr. Benjamin Magro

Coastal Helicopters, Inc.

141 Peabody Road

Appleton, ME 04862

Dear Mr. Magro

This is in response to your July 9, 2013 letter sent to the public docket (No. FAA-2011-1246) 

petitioning the Federal Aviation Administration on behalf of Coastal Helicopters, Inc.

(Coastal Helicopters) for an exemption from part 120 of Title 14, Code of Federal 

Regulations (14 CFR). That exemption, if granted, would allow Coastal Helicopters to cover 

its safety-sensitive employees under one testing program.

On July 15, 2013, the FAA published the Combined Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs 

final rule (78 FR 41999) relating to air carrier operators and commuter or on-demand 

operators that also conduct commercial air tour operations to combine the drug and alcohol 

testing required for each operation into one testing program. A copy of this rule change is 

enclosed for your information.

If you have any questions, please contact the FAAs Drug Abatement Division at (202) 267-

8442 or drugabatement@faa.gov. Because the relief you seek is now covered under the new 

rule, we will take no further action on your petition.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ida M. Klepper

Manager, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
April 4, 2014

Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OAR-2014-0020

Ms. Gina McCarthy

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

William Jefferson Clinton Building

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20460

Dear Administrator McCarthy:

The Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) submits these comments in response to EPA’s Questions for 

State Partners regarding “Considerations in the Design of a Program to Reduce Carbon Pollution from Existing Power 

Plants” under the Clean Air Act (CAA) section 111(d).1 KDHE hopes that this submittal helps inform the discussion and 

decision-making process in the development of EPA’s upcoming proposal to regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 

from existing electric generating units (EGUs). KDHE would like to emphasize that these comments are preliminary 

responses and not final opinions, as we do not have a proposed rule to evaluate. 

KDHE has multiple concerns, one being the perception that EPA lacks the appropriate authority to regulate CO2 emissions 

from existing power plants under CAA section 111(d) and that litigation will most certainly follow. KDHE recommends 

that EPA revisit the language of section 111(d)(1) as excerpted below from the Statutes at Large2:

(d) Standards of performance for existing sources; remaining useful life of source

(1) The Administrator shall prescribe regulations which shall establish a procedure 

similar to that provided by section 110 under which each State shall submit to the 

Administrator a plan which 

(A) establishes standards of performance for any existing source for any air 

pollutant 

(i) for which air quality criteria have not been issued or which is not included on 

a list published under section 108(a) [or emitted from a source category which is 

regulated under section 112] [or 112(b)] but

(ii) to which a standard of performance under this section would apply if such 

existing source were a new source, and

(B) provides for the implementation and enforcement of such standards of 

performance. Regulations of the Administrator under this paragraph shall permit the 

State in applying a standard of performance to any particular source under a plan 

submitted under this paragraph to take into consideration, among other factors, the 

remaining useful life of the existing source to which such standard applies.

A legal question has been raised as to whether CAA section 111(d)(1)(A)(i) disallows regulation of any air pollutant 

emitted from a source category that is already regulated under section 112. An affirmative answer to this question would 

 

1

http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/questions-state-partners

2

http://www.epw.senate.gov/envlaws/cleanair.pdf