alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1979 

To block the implementation of certain presidential actions that restrict 

individuals from certain countries from entering the United States. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 18, 2017 

Mr. MURPHY (for himself, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. LEAHY, Mrs. MURRAY, Mr. 

BLUMENTHAL, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Mr. MERKLEY, Mr. FRANKEN, Ms. 

BALDWIN, Mr. SCHATZ, Mr. BOOKER, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, 

Ms. HARRIS, Mr. SCHUMER, Ms. WARREN, Ms. DUCKWORTH, Mr. 

WHITEHOUSE, Mr. REED, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. SANDERS, Mr. CARPER, 

Mrs. SHAHEEN, Mr. COONS, Ms. KLOBUCHAR, Ms. HIRONO, Ms. HASSAN, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. BENNET, Mr. BROWN, and Mr. DURBIN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To block the implementation of certain presidential actions 

that restrict individuals from certain countries from entering the United States. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. FINDINGS. 

4 Congress finds that Executive Order 13780 and the 

5 presidential proclamation issued on September 24, 2017— 


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•S 1979 IS

1 (1) violate the Immigration and Nationality Act 

2 (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.), which states that no person 

3 can be discriminated against in the issuance of an 

4 immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, na5 tionality, place of birth, or place of residence; and 

6 (2) violate the Establishment Clause of the 

7 First Amendment to the United States Constitution 

8 and the equal protection component of the Due 

9 Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 

10 United States Constitution. 

11 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF FUNDS. 

12 No funds, resources, or fees made available to the 

13 Secretary of Homeland Security, or to any other official 

14 of a Federal agency, by this Act or any other Act for any 

15 fiscal year, may be used to implement or enforce Executive 

16 Order 13780, signed on March 6, 2017, or the presidential 

17 proclamation issued on September 24, 2017. 

Æ 


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#### CULLUM et al. v. CULLUM.

No. 5173.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Amarillo.

June 10, 1940.

Sturgeon & Sturgeon, of Pampa, for appellants.

*735A. A. Lumpkin, of Amarillo, for- appel-lee.

FOLLEY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment in the sum of $589.54 in favor of the appellee and against the appellants.

The appellants have perfected an appeal but have failed to file briefs. The appellee has filed his brief asking for an affirmance of the judgment.

Finding no fundamental error in the record the judgment is affirmed. National Indemnity Underwriters of America v. Shelton, Tex.Civ.App., 115 S.W.2d 1140; McCulley v. Foster et al., Tex.Civ.App., 123 S.W.2d 705, and authorities cited.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 June 28, 2016

a0620

Order 

Clerk

June 28, 2016

151112(98)

BLACKWARD PROPERTIES, LLC, Plaintiff/Counter Defendant- Appellant,

v SC: 151112

COA: 313282

Oakland CC: 2010-112094-CZ

CHARLES D. SOWER, REAL ESTATE 

ONE, INC., d/b/a MAX BROOCK REALTORS, 

RONALD L. HUGHES, and HUGHES 

ACQUISITION,

Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs/ThirdParty Plaintiffs-Appellees,

and

HARRY BLACKWARD and D’ANNE

KLEINSMITH,

Third-Party Defendants-Appellants,

and 

PRIVATE BANK & TRUST COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s March 8, 

2016 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
#### BULLOCK v. STATE.

No. 15351.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 2, 1932.

C. E. Florence and Edwin M. Fulton, both of Gilmer, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, J.

Conviction is for assault with intent to rape; punishment being two years in the penitentiary.

The main insistence before this court is that the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction for assault with intent to rape. We find it unnecessary to consider that question.

Our attention has been called to the form of the indictment. That part of the statutory definition of rape (article 1183, P. O.) applicable to the present ease provides that rape is: “* 3⁄8 * The carnal knowledge .of a female under the age of eighteen years other than the wife of the person with or without her consent and with or without the use of force, threats or fraud.” The language “other than the wife of the person” accused being a part of the very definition of one character of rape denounced by the statute, it follows that, where the state relies *92upon that phase of the rape statute, which it does in this case, it is necessary to allege in the indictment charging that character of rape or assault with intent to rape that the female was not the wife of accused. The charging part of the present indictment alleges only that appellant “in and upon Jewell Rumsey, a female uhder the age of eighteen years, did make an assault with the intent then and there to commit the offense 'of rape upon the said Jewell Rumsey, hy then and there attempting to have carnal knowledge of her.” There is no averment that prose-cutrix was not the wife of accused. The indictment is exactly like that found in Dudley v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 543, 40 S. W. 269, which was held fatally defective. To the same effect is Edwards v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 242, 38 S. W. 996, 39 S. W. 368; Rice v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 36, 38 S. W. 801; Sproulen v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 561, 262 S. W. 757. Under the defective indictment, only one order can follow.

The judgment is reversed, and the prosecution ordered dismissed.
II 

Calendar No. 95 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 190 

[Report No. 115–76] 

To provide for consideration of the extension under the Energy Policy and 

Conservation Act of nonapplication of No-Load Mode energy efficiency 

standards to certain security or life safety alarms or surveillance systems, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 23, 2017 

Mr. GARDNER (for himself and Ms. CANTWELL) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

MAY 24, 2017 

Reported by Ms. MURKOWSKI, without amendment 

A BILL 

To provide for consideration of the extension under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of nonapplication of 

No-Load Mode energy efficiency standards to certain 

security or life safety alarms or surveillance systems, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


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2 

•S 190 RS

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Power And Security 

3 Systems (PASS) Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF NONAPPLICATION OF NO-LOAD 

5 MODE ENERGY EFFICIENCY STANDARD TO 

6 CERTAIN SECURITY OR LIFE SAFETY ALARM 

7 OR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS. 

8 (a) Section 325(u)(3)(D)(ii) of the Energy Policy and 

9 Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 6295(u)(3)(D)(ii)) is amend10 ed— 

11 (1) by striking ‘‘2015’’ each place it appears 

12 and inserting ‘‘2021’’; and 

13 (2) by striking ‘‘2017’’ and inserting ‘‘2023’’. 

14 (b) Section 325(u)(3)(E) of the Energy Policy and 

15 Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 6295(u)(3)(E)) is amend16 ed— 

17 (1) in clause (ii), by striking ‘‘July 1, 2017,’’ 

18 and inserting ‘‘the effective date of the amendment 

19 under subparagraph (D)(ii)’’; and 

20 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

21 ‘‘(iv) TREATMENT IN RULE.—In the 

22 rule under subparagraph (D)(ii) and sub23 sequent amendments the Secretary may 

24 treat some or all external power supplies 

25 designed to be connected to a security or 

26 life safety alarm or surveillance system as 


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3 

•S 190 RS

1 a separate product class or may extend the 

2 nonapplication under clause (ii).’’. 


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Calendar No. 95 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 190 

[Report No. 115–76] 

A BILL 

To provide for consideration of the extension under 

or surveillance systems, and for other purposes. standards to certain security or life safety alarms application of No-Load Mode energy efficiency the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of nonMAY 24, 2017 

Reported without amendment 


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#### VAUGHN v. STATE.

No. 15905.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 8, 1933.

Alex F. Cox, of Beeville, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, Presiding Judge.

Aggravated assault is the offense; penalty assessed at a fine of $200 and confinement in the county jail for a period of thirty days.

The indictment is regular and regularly presented.

We find nothing in the record requiring discussion.

The complaint of the charge of the court and of the introduction of evidence cannot be reviewed, in the absence of the statement of facts.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### James Nicolosi, Appellant, v Brookhaven Memorial Hospital, Defendant, and Abraham Cohen et al., Respondents.

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gerard, J.), entered December 14, 1988, which, upon an order granting the respondents’ motion to *489dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them, made at the close of the plaintiffs case, is in favor of the respondents and against him.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The day after injuring his leg in a basketball game, the plaintiff sought treatment at the emergency room of Brookhaven Memorial Hospital. The attending physician misdiagnosed his injury as a fractured ankle and sent him home with an ace bandage and the phone number of an orthopedist. The following day the plaintiff contacted the orthopedist’s office and made an appointment for that afternoon. The defendant Leon Finkelstein examined the plaintiff at his office and found that he had compartment syndrome, a condition requiring immediate surgery. The plaintiff was operated on that evening by the defendant Dr. Abraham Cohen, who was affiliated with Dr. Finkelstein. A second and third operation were later performed and the plaintiff left the hospital with "foot drop”, a permanent disability.

During the trial, the plaintiff settled with the defendant hospital. At the close of the plaintiffs case the remaining defendants, Drs. Cohen and Finkelstein, moved to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them for failure to prove a prima facie case. The motion was granted. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly dismissed the action against Drs. Finkelstein and Cohen individually. We conclude that it did.

In order to present a prima facie case of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate, *inter alia,*that his or her injuries were proximately caused by the defendant’s departure from the required standard of performance *(see, Tonetti v Peekskill Community Hosp.,*148 AD2d 525). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolving all questions of credibility in his favor as we must *(see, Gruntz v Deepdale Gen. Hosp.,*163 AD2d 564), we find that there was insufficient evidence adduced at the close of plaintiffs case upon which a reasonable person might conclude that the departures from acceptable practice attested to by the plaintiffs expert, proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries.

Our review of the record indicates that any finding in the plaintiff’s favor would be based upon sheer speculation *(cf., Schneider v Kings Highway Hosp. Center,*67 NY2d 743). The logical inferences to be drawn from the testimony presented demonstrate that the plaintiffs injuries were the result of the *490compartment syndrome, his failure to seek medical attention initially and the hospital’s misdiagnosis of his condition. As such, the expert testimony did not aid in the presentation of a prima facie case against the respondents. Bracken, J. P., Kooper, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.
#### JOHNSON v. STATE.

No. 16433.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 21, 1934.

Rehearing Denied April 11, 1934.

H. T. Brown, of Jacksonville, and Perkins & Perkins, of Rusk, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

• LATTIMORE, Judge.

Conviction for transporting intoxicating liquor; punishment, two years in the penitentiary.

 The proof in this case shows without dispute that appellant was arrested by officers a little while before day on Sunday morning .driving along the road in Cherokee county, and that a search of his car revealed the presence of five gallons of whisky] The officers testified, without contradiction, that they had information which they regarded as reliable that appellant transported whisky along that way every Saturday night. We regard the showing of probable cause sufficient, and that 'the facts demonstrate appellant’s guilt. We have examined each of the bills of exception found in the- record, and see no necessity for discussing any of them.

The judgment will be affirmed.
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</TABLE>
Opinion issued October 23, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-12-00998-CR

———————————

JOAQUIN CARLON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 338th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1294334

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant, Joaquin Carlon, guilty of the offense of aggravated 

robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(2) (West 2011). The trial court 

then found the allegations in an enhancement paragraph true and sentenced him to 
2

30 years in prison. See id. § 12.42(c)(1) (West Supp. 2014). Appellant timely 

filed a notice of appeal.

Appellant’s appointed counsel on appeal has filed a motion to withdraw, 

along with a brief stating that the record presents no reversible error and the appeal 

is without merit and is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 

1396 (1967). 

Counsel’s brief meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional 

evaluation of the record and supplying us with references to the record and legal 

authority. 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; see also High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 

807, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel indicates that he has thoroughly 

reviewed the record and is unable to advance any grounds of error that warrant 

reversal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; Mitchell v. State, 193 

S.W.3d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

We have independently reviewed the entire record in this appeal, and we 

conclude that no reversible error exists in the record, there are no arguable grounds 

for review, and the appeal is frivolous. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 

1400 (emphasizing that reviewing court—and not counsel—determines, after full 

examination of proceedings, whether appeal is wholly frivolous); Garner v. State, 

300 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (reviewing court must determine 

whether arguable grounds for review exist); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 
3

826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (same); Mitchell, 193 S.W.3d at 155 (reviewing 

court determines whether arguable grounds exist by reviewing entire record). We 

note that an appellant may challenge a holding that there are no arguable grounds 

for appeal by filing a petition for discretionary review in the Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827 & n.6.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court and grant counsel’s motion to 

withdraw.1 Attorney Jerome Godinich, Jr. must immediately send appellant the 

required notice and file a copy of the notice with the Clerk of this Court. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 6.5(c).

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Keyes.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

 

1 Appointed counsel still has a duty to inform appellant of the result of this appeal 

and that he may, on his own, pursue discretionary review in the Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals. See Ex Parte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997).
#### GREEN v. STATE.

No. 19520.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 9, 1938.

State’s Rehearing Granted April 20, 1938.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1938.

*81Eugene F. Mathis, of San Angelo, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

Opinion.

GRAVES, Judge.

The offense charged is for violating the local option liquor laws, Vernon’s Ann.P.C. art. 666 — 1 et seq., the punishment assessed being a fine of $250.

The record is before us without a complaint being incorporated therein. We have heretofore held that a complaint is necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the county court. See article 415, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.; McQueen v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 117 S.W.2d 79, opinion this day handed down; and Olivares v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 316, 76 S.W.2d 140.

The judgment is reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

This cause has been heretofore reversed and ordered dismissed on account of a failure to find embodied in the record the complaint upon which such prosecution should have been predicated.

It is now made to appear that a proper complaint was filed in said cause at the proper time, and the failure to have same present here in the transcript was an inadvertence and mistake upon the part of the county clerk, and, a certified copy thereof being now filed herein, the order dismissing this cause is set aside, and we proceed to- consider the same upon its merits.

It seems from the statement of facts that the officers searched appellant’s premises on July 10, 1937, and found thereon 120 twelve-ounce cans of beer, which beer was intoxicating, in Runnels county, Tex., which county was a “dry area.”

The complaint and information seem, to charge a violation of the law. There are no bills of exception in the record. The facts seem to be sufficient, and this judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

KRUEGER, Judge.

Appellant insists that the court erred in holding the complaint and information sufficient to charge the offense. An examination thereof convinces us that the cause was properly disposed of in our original opinion. The statement of facts is adequate to support the conviction.

The motion for rehearing will be overruled.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
COURT OF APPEALS FOURTEENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Houston, Texas GREGORY CHARLES HURST, § APPELLANT § § NUMBERS VS. § 14-15-00539-CR § § THE STATE OF TEXAS, § APPELLEE

SECOND MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPELLANT BRIEF

Winifred Weber 2525 Bay Area Blvd. Suite 310 Houston, Texas 77058 SBN 01672500 Telephone: (281)488-9040 Facsimile: (281)488-9009 Electronic mail: winifredweber@gmail

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ACCEPTED 14-15-00539-CR FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS 10/22/2015 8:19:23 AM CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERKTO THE HONORABLE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:

Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 10.1 and 38.6(d), Appellant, GREGORY CHARLES HURST, files this Second Motion to Extend Time to F ile Appellant Brief. Appellant’s opening brief is currently due October 21, 2015. Counsel for Appellant requests a 7-day extensi on of time to file his brief, making the brief due October 28, 2015. This is the second request for extension of time to file the opening brief.

In addition to the routine matters that counse l must attend to in daily practice, such as a full criminal caseload requiring docket appear ances, filings, and jail visits, counsel for Appellant relies on the following reaso n, to explain the need for the requested extension: On this date, Appellant has brought a potenti al issue to the attention of Appellant’s counsel and requested counsel to resear ch said issue for Appellant’s brief. Counsel believes one week is adequate time to research the issue and include it in the brief, depending on the result of the resear ch. Counsel for Appellant seeks this extension of time to be able to adequately prepare Appellant’s brief. This request is not sought for delay but so that justice may be don e.

All facts recited in this motion are within th e personal knowledge of the counsel signing this motion; therefore no verification is n ecessary under Rule of Appellate

Procedure 10.2.PRAYER FOR RELIEF

For the reasons set forth above, Appellant req uests that this Court grant this Second Motion to Extend Time to File Appellant Brie f and extend the Deadline for Filing the Appellant’s Brief up to and including Oc tober 28, 2015. Appellant requests all other relief to which he may be entitl ed. Respectfully submitted, /s/______________________ Winifred Bandy Weber

2525 Bay Area Blvd. Suite 310 Houston, Texas 77058 SBN 01672500 Telephone: (281)488-9040 Facsimile: (281)488-9009 Electronic mail: winifredweber@gmail

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of t he above and foregoing Motion has been delivered by electronic email to th e Galveston County District Attorney’s Office, Galveston, Texas on this the 21s t day of October, 2015.

/s/_______________________ WINIFRED WEBER