UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED TO PROTECT DEMOCRACY, et al. : : Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 17-2016 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 10, 22, 24 : PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSION : ON ELECTION INTEGRITY, et al. : : Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
G RANTING D EFENDANTS ’ M OTION TO D ISMISS ; D ENYING AS M OOT P LAINTIFFS ’ M OTION FOR

P RELIMINARY I NJUNCTION ; D ENYING AS M OOT P LAINTIFFS ’ M OTION FOR L EAVE TO F ILE D ECLARATION
I. INTRODUCTION In May 2017, the President of the United States signed Executiv e Order 13,799, which established the Presidential Advisory Commi ssion on Election In tegrity (the “Commission”). Approximately one month later, that Commission issued letters t o each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia requesti ng that they provide certain publi cally available voter roll information so that the Commission might “fully analyze vulnera bilities and issues related to voter registration and voting” in the United States. These req uests have been the subject of substantial public attention and ha ve generated several lawsuit s challenging their legality. This is but another one of those lawsui ts. In this case, Plaintiffs , United to Protect Democracy and The Protect Democracy Project, I nc., challenge the Commission’s failure to adhere to the notice and comment procedures specifie d by the Paperwork Reduction Act , 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq

. Now pending before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preli minary Injunction (ECF No. 10) and Defendants’ Motion to Dismi ss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) an d 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules2 of Civil Procedure (ECF No. 22) . For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and denies as moot Plaintiffs’ Motion for a P reliminary Injunction.
II. BACKGROUND A. The Paperwork Reduction Act The Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. § 3501, et seq . ) (“PRA”) sets standards for federal agencies when collecti ng information from the public. “The Paperwork Reduction Act was enacted in response to one of t he less auspicious aspects o f the enormous growth of our federal bureaucracy: its seemi ngly insatiable appetite for data .” Dole v. United Steelworkers of
Am. , 494 U.S. 26, 32 (1990). Thus, in 1980, Congress enacted the PRA to institute a comprehensive scheme for feder al information collection and “de signated [the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”)] t he overseer of other agencies w ith respect to paperwork.”
Id. Under the PRA, an agency is required to submit any proposed co llection of information to the OMB for review and approval. See 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(1)(C). In addition, the agency must publish notice of its proposed col lection in the Federal Regist er, stating that it is seeking approval from the Director of OMB and soliciting comments from the public. See id. at § 3507(a)–(b). In that notice, the agency must set forth (1) a title for the collection of information, (2) a summary of the collection of information, (3 ) a brief description of the need for the information and the proposed use of the information, (4 ) a description of the likely respondents and proposed frequency of response to the collectio n of information, and (5) an estimate of the burden that shall result from the collection of information. Id. at § 3507(a)(1)(D)(ii)(I)– (V). After providing the public an oppo rtunity to comment on the collection for at leas t 30 days, the Direct or may then decide w hether to approve the proposed collection. See id. at § 3507(b). If the Director appr oves, the agency may proceed with its3 collection and the Dir ector will issue a c ontrol number that mu st be displayed on the collection of information. See id. at § 3507(a)(2), (3). B. The Presidential Advisory Co mmission on Election Integrity On May 11, 2017, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 13,799, which established the Commission. See Exec. Order No. 13,799, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,389 (May 11, 2017). The Commission is chaired by the V ice President of the United S tates and may include an additional fifteen members appointed by the President. Id. at § 2. The President’s Executive Order charged the newly consti tuted Commission with “study[ing] the registration and voting processes used in Federal elec tions” and mandated that the Comm ission submit a report to the President on various topics, inc luding “vulnerabilities in voti ng systems and practices used for Federal elections that could lead to improper voter registratio ns and improper voting, including fraudulent voter registrations and fraudulent voting.” Id . at § 3(c). The Commission, however, is to be “solely advisory” and m ust dissolve within thirty days after it submits its report. Id. at §§ 3, 6. On June 28, 2017, in furtherance of its mandate, the Commission sent substantially similar letters to Secretaries of State and other election offi cials in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. These letters invited r ecipients to provide informat ion and opinions on seven broad policy questions relating to the administration of elections. Compl. ¶¶ 28–29. For example, the Commission sought opinions on potential changes to federal elec tion law related to election integrity, “evidence or informa tion” relating t o voter fraud, i nformation on “convictions for election-related crimes” since November 2000, and recommendatio ns for preventing voter intimidation or disenfranchisement. Compl. ¶ 29. In addition, the Commission requested that recipients voluntarily “provide to the Commission the publicly- available voter ro ll data for [their4 states].” Compl. ¶ 30. Specifica lly, the Commission requested“the full first and last names of all registrants, middle names or initials if available, address es, dates of birth, po litical party (if recorded in [that] state), last four digits of social security number if available, voter history (elections voted in) from 2006 onw ard, active/inactive status, cancelled status, information regarding any felony convictions , information regarding voter r egistration in a nother state, information regarding military status, and overseas citizen inf ormation.” Compl. ¶ 30; see also Decl. Kris W. Kobach, Ex. 3 (“June 28 Letter”), ECF No. 21-2. The Commission purportedly sought this data “in order for the Commission to fully analyze vulnerabilities and issues related to voter registration and voting.” See June 28 Letter. The Commission r equested that recipients respond to the letter by Jul y 14, 2017 and directed recipients to submit their responses either via email or through a secure electroni c file transfer protocol sit e that the federal government uses for transferring large d ata files. Compl. ¶ 31. The Commission’s request for vot er data has beco me a subject of significant public debate. For example, voting rights experts have articulated a broad set of concerns about how the requests might be used to s uppress voters and cybersecurity experts have identified risks inherent in consolidating sensit ive voter data without a clear security plan. See Compl. ¶¶ 37– 38. These requests have also beenthe topic of several legal c hallenges. See Compl. ¶ 40. And the recipients of the letters ha ve been far from unanimous in h ow they plan to respond. Indeed, as of September 27, 2017, seventeen states had indicated that they would provide the requested data while eight states had declined. Compl. ¶ 33. An additio nal eleven states had stated that they would only release data sub ject to certain restrictions. Compl. ¶ 33.5 C. The Present Suit On September 29, 2017, Plaintiffs, Un ited to Protect Democracy and The Protect Democracy Project, Inc., filed sui t in this Court asserting that the Commission’s request for voter data constituted a violation of the PRA. According to Plaintif fs’ Complaint, the Commission violated the PRA when it failed to undertake the appropriate no tice and comment procedures prior to issuing its re quest for voter data. See Compl. ¶¶ 60–76. As non-profit advocacy organizations engaged in public education and outreach, Plainti ffs claim that they have been injured by the Commission’s failing because they have been depr ived of certain information that they claim the Commission was req uired to disclose pursuant to the terms of the PRA. Compl. ¶ 73. Although Plaintiffs premise their claims on the text of the PRA, the PRA does not provide for a private right of action. T hus, Plaintiffs instead seek d eclaratory relie f under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02 and mandamus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. See Compl. ¶¶ 60–76, 84–87. Plaintiffs’ Complaint also cha llenges the inaction on the part of the OMB and the Director of OMB (collectivel y the “OMB Defendants”). See Compl. ¶¶ 77–83. Under 44 U.S.C. § 3517(b), “[a]ny person may request the Director [of OMB] to r eview any collection of information conducted by or for a n agency to determine, if, und er [the PRA], a person shall maintain, provide, or disclose th e information to or for the ag ency.” The statute further directs that, “[u]nless the request is fr ivolous, the Director shall, i n coordination with the agency responsible for the collecti on of information (1) respond to th e request within 60 days after receiving the request, unless su ch period is extended by the Di rector to a specified date and the person making the request is give n notice of such extension; an d (2) take appropriate remedial action, if necessary.” 44 U.S.C. § 3517(b). On July 3, 2017, Plaintiff United to Protect Democracy allegedly sent a letter to the Director of OMB explai ning the ways in which the6 Commission had allegedly violated t he PRA’s procedural requirem ents and, pursuant to § 3517, requested that the Director review the matter and take necessar y remedial action as soon as possible. Compl. ¶ 80. Because more than 60 days have elapsed since United to Protect Democracy sent its letter and the Director has neither responde d nor taken any other remedial action, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief again st the OMB and its Director under section 706(1) of the APA for unl awfully withholding or unreaso nably delaying action on its request. See Compl. ¶¶ 77–87. Two motions are now pending before the Court. First, on Octobe r 11, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Preliminar y Injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. Plainti ffs request that this Court iss ue a preliminary injunction requiring that (1) t he Commission cease its collecti on of data and delete and/or sequester any information collected unless and until it satisfi es the procedures prescribed by the PRA; and (2) the Director of OMB t o review the Commission’s all eged violation of the PRA and take appropriate remedial action to cure that violation. See Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. Defendants opposed the motion and simultaneous ly filed their own motion to dismiss the action on various grounds. See Defs.’ Mem. Opp’n Pls.’ Mot. Preli m. Inj. & Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.’ MTD”), ECF No. 21. Both motions have be en fully briefed by the partie s and are now ripe for decision.
III. ANALYSIS Before the Court can reach Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary I njunction, Plaintiffs must first overcome two fundamental obstacles presented by Defendant s’ Motion to Dismiss. First, Plaintiffs must demonstrate th at they have somehow been injured by Defendants’ actions and that they have standing to bring this suit at all. The Court i s satisfied that Plai ntiffs have met this burden, having alleged that they hav e been deprived of certain information that works a7 particularized and concrete ha rm upon them. Next, Plaintiffs m ust allege facts from which this Court can determine that the Com mission is actually subject to the PRA’s requirements, as the Plaintiffs claim. On this s econd obstacle, however, Plaintiffs stumble. The PRA applies only to “agencies,” as it defines that t erm. Based on the current stat e of the record, the Court cannot find that the Commission is an “agen cy” for purposes of the PRA because the pleadings and other evidence provided to the Court s upport the notion that the Comm ission works solely to advise and assist the President and the re has been no allegation or other showing that the Commission has any substantial authority inde pendent of the President. Ac cordingly, the Court cannot find that the Commission is subject to the terms of the PRA and thus Plaintiffs’ claims—all of which are based on this premise—must be dismissed. A. Standing The Court must first begin w ith the threshold question of wheth er Plaintiffs have constitutional standing to asserttheir claims at all. Article III of the United States Constitution grants the Judiciary authorityto adjudicate only “Cases” and “ Controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III. One of the hallmarks of the “ ‘Case[s]’” and ‘Controversie s’ that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Artic le III . . . is the doctrine of standing.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Indeed, “the requirementthat a claimant have ‘standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-c ontroversy requirement of Artic le III.’” Davis v. FEC , 554 U.S. 724, 733 (2008). This “irreducible constitutiona l minimum of standing contains three elements.” Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560. First, plaintiffs m ust demonstrate that they have suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning the “actual or imminent” invasion of a leg ally protecte d interest that is both “concrete and particularized.” Id. Second, they must show a causal connection between the injury a nd the8 challenged conduct such that the in jury is fairly connected to the challenged conduct. Id. Third, they must make a showing that it is “likely,” rather than “spec ulative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561. The “burden of establish ing these elements falls on the party invoking federal jur isdiction, and at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating each element.” Friends of Animals v. Jewell , 828 F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561) (hereinafter, “ Friends of Animals II”) . In this case, only the first element—injury in fact—is in doubt. Plaintiffs’ sole contention on the issue of injury in fact is p remised on a purported informational injury. Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 16–20. Informational injuries arise “only in very specific statutory contexts.” Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy , 23 F.3d 496, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In FEC v. Akins , the Supreme Court explained tha t a plaintiff “suffers an ‘inj ury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtai n information which must be pu blicly disclosed pursuant to a
statute.” FEC v. Akins , 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998). For exampl e, in that case, the Court held that plaintiffs had suffered an informational injury because they ha d been denied certain information that was subject to disclosure under their inte rpretation of th e Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”). See id . Likewise, in Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, the Supreme Court held that a purported advisory committee’s refusal to disclose certain records, reports, and meeting minutes, which plaintiffs claimed were subject to discl osure under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), “constitute[d] a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to
sue.” Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989). The courts in this Circuit ha ve found cognizable informational injuries in several additional statutory contexts . For example, courts have found such injuries based on provisions of the Emergency Planning and C ommunity Right-to-Know Act, see Waterkeeper All. v. Envtl.9 Prot. Agency , 853 F.3d 527, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2017), and the Endangered Specie s Act, see Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 824 F.3d 1033, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2016). No case, however, has fo und a plaintiff to have suffered an i nformational injury based on a c laim under the PRA. To assess whether such a claim might exist , the Circuit has advised that a “plaintiff suffers sufficiently concrete and particularized informational injury where the plai ntiff alleges that: (1) it has been deprived of information that, on i ts interpretation, a statute requires the government or a third party to disclose to it, and ( 2) it suffers by being denied acc ess to that information, the type of harm Congress sought to prevent by requiring disclosure.” Friends of Animals II, 828 F.3d at 992. In this case, Plaintiffs meet both elements necessary to show informational injury. First, under the Plaintiffs’ in terpretation of the PRA, the Commission was required to disclose certain information prio r to issuing its request for v oter data and materials, but it failed to do so. Section 3507(a)(1)(D)(ii) o f the PRA states, in uneq uivocal terms, that an agency “shall not conduct or sponsor the collection of information unl ess in advance . . . of the collection of information the agency has . . . published notice in the Fed eral Register . . . setting forth a title for the collection of information; a summary of the collection of information; a brief description of the need for the informati on and the proposed use of the inf ormation; a description of the likely respondents and proposed f requency of response to the co llection of information; an estimate of the burden that shall result from the collection of information . . . .” 1 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(1)(D). If, as Plainti ffs contend, the Commission con stitutes an “agency” and its requests for voter data constitute d a “collection of informatio n,” as those terms are defined under

1 Plaintiffs also argue that a di sclosure requirement can be inf erred from two provisions found in 44 U.S.C. § 3506. Neverthele ss, because the materials that Plaintiffs allege must be disclosed under that provision are substantially the same as wh at is explicitly required under § 3507(a), the Court finds it suffici ent to limit its discussio n to § 3507(a).10 the statute, then the Commissi on would have had a statutory obl igation to disclose this information prior to making its requests. It is undisputed, ho wever, that the Commission made no such disclosures. Thus, plain tiffs have made a sufficient s howing that they have been deprived of information that, unde r their interp retation of the law, they were entitled to obtain. This is sufficient to satisfy t he first prong of the informatio nal injury inquiry. 2
The Court thus turns to the s econd prong of the test—whether de nial of information caused Plaintiffs to suffer the type of harm that Congress soug ht to prevent by requiring disclosure. The D.C. Circuit ha s explained that “the second pa rt of the [informational injury] inquiry may depend on the nature of the statutory disclosure pr ovision at issue.” Friends of
Animals II, 828 F.3d at 992. “In some instan ces, a plaintiff suffers the type of harm Congress sought to remedy when it simply ‘ s[eeks] and [is] denied specif ic agency records.’” Id. (quoting Pub. Citizen , 491 U.S. at 449–50). This is the case when, for example, a g overnment agency

2 As the D.C. Circuit has rec ognized, a plaintiff need only “ espouse a view of the law under which the defendant (or an entity it regula tes) is obliga ted to disclose certain information that the plaintiff has a right to obtain.” Am. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entm’t, Inc. , 659 F.3d 13, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (empha sis added). That view , however, need not necessarily be the correct viewof the law in order to find the existence of standing under a theory of informational injury. For example, in Akins , the plaintiffs in that case challenged the Federal Election Commission’s determination that the American I srael Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”) was not a “political committee” for purposes of the F ECA and, consequently, that it did not have to disclose infor mation concerning its donors and contributions. See Akins , 524 U.S. at 13. Plaintiffs challenge d that legal determination and argued that AIPAC was both a political committee and subject to the law’s disclosure require ments concerning its donors and contributions. See id. at 21. The Supreme Court held that plaintiffs in that case had standing to challenge the agency’s interp retation, but did notactually res olve the predicate question of whether the AIPAC was, in f act, a political committee. See id . Rather, the Court was able to find an injury in fact consisti ng of plaintiffs’ inability to o btain information based purely on their “view of the law” which would re quire the disclos ure plaintiffs sought. See id . Thus, even though the Plaintiffs in this case have espoused a view suffici ent to find an informational injury, that view is not necessarily t he correct view of the law. And, in fact, as described in greater detail infra , the Court finds Plaintiffs’ vi ew is not correct because the C ommission does not constitute an “agency” for purposes of the PRA.11 denies a request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). See Pub. Citizen , 491 U.S. at 449–50. However, in other contexts, “a plaintiff may need to a llege that nondisclosure has caused it to suffer the kind of harm from which Congress, in ma ndating disclosure, sought to protect individuals or or ganizations like it.” Friends of Animals II, 828 F.3d at 992. For example, in Nader v. FEC , the D.C. Circuit noted that lit igants can have informational standing under the FECA “if the disclosure they seek is related to their informed participation in the political process.” Nader v. FEC , 725 F.3d 226, 230 (D.C. Cir. 2013). But in Nader , the plaintiff sought disclosure of information “in the hope of show ing that [certain lawyers and law firms] violated prohibitions on ‘c ontributions’ an d ‘expenditur es’ found in [the FECA].” Id. Because the plaintiff did “not seek information to facilitate h is informed participation in the political process,” but instead t o “force the FEC to get the ba d guys,” the Court found that he did not have standing to bring his clai m under a theory of informat ional injury. Id (internal quotations omitted). Under the facts alleged here, the Court is persuaded that Plain tiffs have suffered the type of harm that Congress sought t o prevent by requiring disclosure . In passing the PRA, Congress enumerated nearly a dozen purposes that it was meant to serve. Two are of particular relevance here. First, Congress sought to “improve the quality and use o f Federal information to strengthen . . . openness in Government and society .” 44 U.S.C. § 3501(4) (emphasis added). Second, Congress sought to “improve the responsibility and acco untability of the [OMB] and all other Federal agencies to Congress and to the public for implementing the information collection review process, information res ources management, and related p olicies and guidelines established under [the PRA].” 44 U.S.C. § 3501(11) (emphasis a dded). These statements evince12 Congress’s clear intent that information concerning the governm ent’s data collection efforts be shared with the public so that the public might hold the govern ment to account. Plaintiffs are non-profit organi zations that use advocacy, rese arch, and public education to confront perceived threats to democracy. Compl. ¶¶ 7–8. Th ese are activities in which Plaintiffs devote substantial re sources and have spent substant ial resources in connection with the work of the Commission. Compl. ¶ 73. Plaintiffs also alle ge that the information that the PRA supposedly required the Com mission to disclose “would have facilitated Plaintiffs’ mission.” Compl. ¶ 73. Indeed, they claim that “[h]ad [they] received the information to which they were entitled, they would ha ve sought to educate the publi c on the implications of that information, and would have organized their own advocacy strate gies to respond appropriately to those disclosures.” Compl ¶ 73. Accordingly, the Court is con vinced that Plaintiffs have suffered the same injury meant to be prevented under the statut e. 3 See Friends of Animals I, 824 F.3d 1033, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holdi ng that “there is no rea son to doubt [plaintiff’s] [informational] standing” when it claimed that “information pro vided by Section 10(c) [of the

3 In a related case, Electronic Privacy Information Center. v. Presidential Advisory Commission , the D.C. Circuit recently hel d that an advocacy organization did not have informational standing to challe nge the Commission’s purported violation of the E-Government Act because that statute was intended only to protect individua l privacy, which was not at issue for the organization. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Commission , No. 17- 5171, 2017 WL 6564621 at *4 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 26, 2017). In this case, the Court does not believe that the purpose of the PRA is limited in quite this same way. The text of the statute itself demonstrates that the PRA was not solely limited to protecting individuals. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (one of the purposes of the PRA includes “minimiz[ing] the paperwork burden of individuals, small businesses , educational and nonprofit instit utions, Federal Contractors, State, local and tribal governments, and other persons resulting from the collection of information by or for the Federal Government”) . Nor is there any reason to belie ve that only individuals may be harmed by a deprivation of information when the PRA speaks in t erms of “openness in Government and society ” and improving responsibil ity and accountability “ to the public .” See id. at §§ 3501(4), (11).13 Endangered Species Act] helps itmeaningfully participate in th e Act’s permitting process, as well as engage in related advo cacy efforts to protect [certain animals]”). Defendants argue, however, that Plaintiffs purported injury is not an informational injury, rather it is, if anything, an inf ringement of a bare procedural right, which is not sufficient to confer standing . See Defs.’ MTD at 13–14; Defs.’ Re ply at 6–8, ECF No. 28. The semi nal case on this issue is the Supr eme Court’s decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute , 555 U.S. 488 (2009). In that case, environmen tal organizations brought acti on seeking to enjoin the U.S. Forest Service from exempting certain agency decisions from the notice, comment, and appeals process used for significant land management decisions. See id. at 490. Plaintiffs argued that they had standing “because they ha [d] suffered procedural injury, namely, that they ha[d] been denied the ability to file comme nts on some Forest Service acti ons and will continue to be so denied.” Id . at 496. But the Court held tha t “deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is aff ected by the deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo —is insufficient to create Article III standing.” Id . That is, “[o]nly a ‘person who ha s been accorded a procedura l right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right with out meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. at 572, n.7). Plaintiffs in that suit, however, wer e not “claiming that but for the allegedly unlawful abridged pr ocedures they would have been able to oppose [a] project that threatened to impinge on their c oncrete plans to observe nature in [a] specific area.” Id. at 497. Because the plaintiffs had failed to connect any concrete injur y underlying a particular project for which they were unable to co mment, the Court held that plai ntiffs lacked standing. Id Here, Defendants focus on the f act that the particular disclo sures at issue are related to the PRA’s notice and comment procedures. See Defs.’ MTD at 13–14; Defs.’ Reply at 6–8. For14 this reason, Defendants contend tha t Plaintiffs’ injury is nece ssarily a procedural one like that in
Summers , rather than an informational injury. See Defs.’ MTD at 13–14; Defs.’ Reply at 6–8. While this argument certainly car ries some facial appeal, the C ourt is ultimately unpersuaded. Nothing in Summers prohibits a finding of informati onal injury merely because the statute conferring the right to infor mation also happens to be associat ed with the statute’s notice and comment procedures. In Summers , the sole injury alleged by plai ntiffs was the deprivation of a right to comment in a proceeding. See Summers , 555 U.S. at 456. While the Plaintiffs here might also share that pure pro cedural injury, they are also uni quely and concretely harmed by the deprivation of information to which they are allegedly e ntitled under the PRA. Such an i njury was not present in Summers. Furthermore, the case law of this Circuit simply does not suppo rt Defendants’ position. 4 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has held on multiple occasions that li tigants have adequately alleged informational injuries based s olely on notice statutes. For ex ample, in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA , the D.C. Circuit considered a chall enge to an EPA rule that allowed automobile manufacturers to establish their own emissions tes t procedures and methods, whic h the EPA would then evaluate

4 Defendants rely principall y on the Ninth Circuit opinion, Wilderness Society, Inc. v. Rey , 622 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2010). That case addressed whether aplaintiff could assert informational standing based on the notice provision of the App eals Reform Act (“ARA”)—the same statute that was at issue in Summers . The Ninth Circuit held tha t plaintiffs could not allege a cognizable informational injury under the ARA because “Congre ss’s purpose in mandating notice in the context of the ARA was not to disclose informati on, but rather to allow the publi c opportunity to comment on the proposals.” Id. at 1259 (emphasis added). Contrary to Defendant’s intimations, this c ase does not stand for the broad proposition that there can never exist a right to information if that right is conferred by a st atute setting forth notice and comment procedures. As its language s uggests, the case addressed only the particular circumstances underlying the ARA. The presen t suit, of course, does not conc ern the ARA and, as described above, the Court is satisfied t hat at least part of PRA’s purpo se was to disclose information to the public. Moreover, the case law in the D.C. Circuit has found i nformational injuries based on notice statutes on multiple occa sions, which critically undermi nes Defendants’ absolutist position.15 and approve in individual, closed proceedings. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA , 306 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The plaintiff argued that this was a violation of the C lean Air Act, which required the EPA to establish emissions tests by regulation pursuant to typi cal notice and comment procedures. Id. at 1146. The closed-door procedur e at issue allegedly harmed the plaintiff “because the mechanism adopted by t he EPA deprive[d] it of the opportunity to observe the rulemaking process and thus gaininformation useful in its effo rts both to develop and improve its products and to key them to the certification tests.” Id. Based on this informational deprivation, the D.C. Circuit found the plaintiff’s Article III standing to be “clear.” Id. at 1148. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has c ontinued to find informational standing predicated on notice statutes even after Summers was decided. Indeed, just la st year, the Circuit found informational standing under circ umstances very similar to thos e presented at bar. In Friends of
Animals I, the D.C. Circuit hel d that a non-profit or ganization had stan ding under § 10(c) of the Endangered Species Act. See Friends of Animals I , 824 F.3d at 1041. That provision provides, in relevant part: The Secretary shall publish notice in the Federal Register of e ach application for an exemption or permit which is made under this section. Each not ice shall invite the submission from interested partie s within thirty days after the date of the notice, of written data, views, or arguments with respect to the applicati on . . . . Information received by the Secretary as pa rt of any application shall be a vailable to the public as a matter of public record at ever y stage of the proceeding.”
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1539( c)) (emphasis omitted). While the st atute plainly requires the release of information as part of notice and comment procedures , the Court found that this provision “clearly creates a r ight to information upon which a claim of informational standing may be predicated.” Id. The Court observed that the pl aintiff in that case “regularly participate[d]” in the permitti ng process and had claimed that the “information provided by Section 10(c) helps it meaningfu lly participate in the Act’s pe rmitting process, as well as engage16 in related advocacy efforts to pr otect [certain] antelope speci es.” Id. Accordingly, the Court had “no reason to doubt” its info rmational standing. Here, like Ethyl Corp and Friends of Animals I, Plaintiffs’ right to i nformation may be based on a statute tied to notice and comment procedures, but they have sufficiently alleged that the deprivation of that partic ular information has caused them particularized and concrete injury in fact. Based on the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that, at this stage in the proceedings, Plaintiffs have adequately allege d a concrete and particularize d informational injury. Consequently, the Court finds tha t Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims.
B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Although the Court finds that Pla intiffs have demonstrated stan ding, their claims ultimately do not withstand scrutiny under a motion to dismiss. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a compla int contain “a sh ort and plain s tatement of the claim” in order to give the defendant fair noti ce of the claim and the grounds upo n which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiff’s ultimate likeli hood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800 (1982). A court considering such a motion presumes that the complaint’s factual allegations are true and construes them liberallyin the plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2000). Nevertheless, “[t]o su rvive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as t rue, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This means that a plaintiff’s fac tual allegations “must be17 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact ).” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. A court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal concl usions as true, see id. , nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that are co uched as factual allegations. See Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555. Under this standar d, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against either the Commission or the OMB Defendants. 1. Claims against the Commission The PRA does not provide for aprivate cause of action and, con sequently, Plaintiffs seek relief from the Commission’s actions under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. “[C]onsideration of any mandamus petition ‘starts from the prem ise that issuance of the writ is an extraordinary remedy, reserve d only for the most transparentviolations of aclear duty to
act.’” In re Core Commc’ns, Inc. , 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Bluewater
Network , 234 F.3d 1305, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); accord Power v. Barnhart , 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “To show entitlement to mandamus, plaintiffs must demonstrate (1) a clear and indisputable right to relief, (2) tha t the government agency or official is violati ng a clear duty to act, and (3) th at no adequate alternative remedy exists.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell , 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Monzel , 641 F.3d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). “These three threshold requirements are jurisdictional; unless all are met, a court must dismiss the ca se for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. (citing In re Medicare Reimbursement Litigation , 414 F.3d 7, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). But, “[e]ven18 when the legal requirements fo r mandamus jurisdiction have beensatisfied, however, a court may grant relief only when it finds compelling equitable ground s.” Id. “The party seeking mandamus has the burden of showi ng that its right to issuance o f the writ is clear and indisputable.” Power , 292 F.3d at 784 (internal quotation marks omitted). The critical question for Plain tiffs’ claims is whether, in fac t, the PRA applies to the Commission. If not, then the Com mission cannot be found to hav e violated a “clear duty to act” and Plaintiffs’ claim must necessarily be dismissed. By its terms, the PRA only applies when an “agency” conducts or sponsors the collection of information. See 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a). With the excep tion of certain enumerated exclusions not applicable here, the PRA defines the term “agency” to mean “any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government control led corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (includ ing the Executive Office of the President), or any independent r egulatory agency.” 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1). The Commission quite clearly does not fall into most of these categories. Indeed, i t is readily apparent that the Commission is not one of the fift een executive departments, see 5 U.S.C. § 101, any of the three military departments, see 5 U.S.C. § 102, does not fall withi n the definitions of “Govern ment corporation” or “Governmentcontrolled corporation” see 5 U.S.C. § 103, and is not one of several enumerated “independe nt regulatory agenc[ies],” see 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5). Accordingly, whether the Commission constitute s an “agency” for purposes of the PRA will necessarily turn on whether it falls within the PR A’s catchall category of “othe r establishment[s] in the executive branch of the Government (includi ng the Executive Office of the President).” The parties fundamentally disagr ee, however, about whether or n ot the Commission actually falls within that gr oup. Notably, the PRA does not sp ecify what that c ategory includes19 or excludes and no court has prev iously addressed whether the P RA may be interp reted to reach entities such as the Commission. N evertheless, Plaintiffs argu e that the text and purpose of the PRA suggest that the Commissi on should be considered an “agency ” under the PRA. See Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 21. Plainti ffs contend that the Commissio n is most certainly an establishment in the executive branch given that the Commissionwas established by Executive Order, is chaired by the Vice Pr esident, and is charged with pr oducing a report for the President himself. See Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 21. P laintiffs also contend that th e PRA’s definition of agency should be viewed broadly g iven that Congress’s overarchi ng purpose in enacting the PRA was to reign in government co llection activi ties, which the PRA sought to accomplish in part by extending its applicabilityto more agencies than its p redecessor statute, the Federal Reports Act of 1942. See Pls.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 21–22. D efendants, on the other han d, point out that the PRA’s definition of “agency” is nearly identical t o the definition of “agency” under FOIA. Defs.’ MTD at 17. For thi s reason, Defendants urge that the terms should be interpreted coextensively. Because FOIA has been interpreted not to includ e staff and units that serve solely to advise the President, Defenda nts argue that this limitation should apply equally to the PRA. The Court finds that Defendants have the better of the argument s. “There is a presumption that C ongress uses the same term consis tently in different
statutes.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Chertoff , 452 F.3d 839, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that when two statutes contain the s ame language, it is a “strong indication” that they “ should be interpreted pari passu ,” that is, on e qual footing. Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis City Sch. , 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam). Thus, under circumstances where statutes p arallel one another, ordinarily a“common term should be construed consistently under each statute.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union , 452 F.3d at 858; see20 also Kooritzky v. Herman , 178 F.3d 1315, 1319–20 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that simi lar language in different statutes is a strong indication that the language should be interpreted alike). In this case, the definitions of “agency” under the PRA paralle ls the definition of that term under FOIA. Indeed, under FOIA, the term “agency” “includes any exec utive department, military department, Government corporati on, Government controlled corpo ration, or other establishment in the executive branch of the G overnment (including the Execut ive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory a gency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(f). Given the parallel nature of the FOIA’s and the PRA’s definitions of “agen cy,” they are most naturally understood to be coextensive. Reading the PRA consistently w ith FOIA sheds light on the otherwise undefined contours of the term “other establishme nt in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President ).” Indeed, it is well settle d that, while the t ext itself does not admit of any limitations, it doe s not extend to “the President’ s immediate personal staff or units in the Executive Office [of the President] whose sole function it is to advise and assist the President.” Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press , 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980). Significantly, this “advise and ass ist” limitation was the sett led law at the time the PRA was enacted. The Supreme Court has advised that “when judicial int erpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the s ame language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpret ations as well.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit , 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006) (alteration in original, internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thu s, there is added force to the argument that Congress intended th e “advise and assist” limitat ion to apply equally to the PRA when it invoked the FOIA’s definition of “agency.”21 Plaintiffs attempt to resis t this conclusion by seizing on a si ngle distinction between the PRA’s definition of “agency” a nd FOIA’s definition of that term . Specifically, Plaintiffs point out that FOIA’s definition c ross-references 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), which is the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA’s”) definition of “agency.” See Pls.’ Opp’n at 19. According to Plaintiffs, this additional refe rence means that “agency” under the PRA should not be read coextensively with the definiti on under FOIA, despite all other language being e qual. To fully comprehend Plaintiffs’ argument, one must first understand the history and relation between FOIA and the APA. In 1966, Congress enacted FOIA as an amendment to the APA. See Pub. L. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). At that time, F OIA did not specify its own d efinition of “agency,” but instead relied upon the APA’s definition, w hich was codified at 5 U.S.C . § 551(1). Under the APA’s definition, which remains unchanged today, an “agency” is “each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or notit is within or subject to re view by another agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). In 1971, the D.C. Circu it issued an opinion in Soucie v. David , 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which held that this defi nition extended only to those a dministrative units “with substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific f unctions.” Id. at 1073. Thus, organizations whose “sole functi on[s] were to advise and assistthe President . . . [are] part of the President’s staff and not [] separate agenc[ies].” Id. at 1075. Then, in 1974, Congress amended FOIA to expand its definition of “ag ency” without expanding the overall definition of the term under the APA. See Pub. L. No. 93–502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974). That amendment clari fied that, for purposes of FOIA, an “‘agen cy’ as defined in section 551(1) ” of the APA “includes any executive department, military de partment, Government corporati on, Government controlled22 corporation, or other establishm ent in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President ), or any independent regulato ry agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(f). While Plaintiffs concede, as they must, that the definition of agency under the PRA is nearly identical to this amend ment, Plaintiffs focus on the fac t that the FOIA amendment, unlike the PRA, cross-references the A PA’s definition of “agency” unde r 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). This is critical, Plaintiffs contend, because FOIA’s “exemption for uni ts in the Executive Office that ‘advise and assist’ the President derives solely from” that pro vision. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 20, ECF No. 26. Unfortunately for Plain tiffs, this is simply not the c ase. While FOIA does reference the APA’s definition of agency under § 551(1) and the language of that provision is the source of the
APA’s limitation on staff and units that advise the President, § 551(1) is not the source of FOIA’s limited applicability. Indeed, the limitation on FOIA’s defini tion of “agency” comes from how Congress intended the term “Execu tive Office of the President” to be interpreted under § 552(f) of FOIA. The Conference Report for the 1974 FOIA amendments in dicates that “[w]ith respect to the meaning of the term ‘Execu tive Office of the President[, ]’ the conferees intend the result reached in Soucie v. David . . . .” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1380, at 15 (1974). Thus, itmade clear that “ [t]he term [was] not to be interpreted as in cluding the President’s immedi ate personal staff or units in the Executive Office whose sole function is t o advise and assistthe President.”
Id. (emphasis added). As this histo ry shows, FOIA’s limited appli cability comes—not from any interpretation of § 551(1)—but fro m how Congress intended the t erm “Executive Office of the President” to be interpreted unde r § 552(f)—FOIA’ s definition o f “agency.” 5 This is confirmed

5 Plaintiffs also argue that it would be “unnecessary and superf luous to understand the language of § 552(f) to incorporat e the ‘advise and assist’ lim itation, when the limitation was already present and operative fo r FOIA in § 551(1) at the time Congress passed § 552(f).” Pls.’ Opp’n at 21–22. The Plaintiffs a re wrong on this score. The F OIA Amendments expressly expanded the definition of “agen cy” so that it would extend beyond the constraints imposed by23 by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kissinger , which based its understanding of FOIA’s limited applicability on this very legislative history. See Kissinger , 445 U.S. at 156. Because the source of the “advise and assist” limita tion under FOIA is derived fro m the term “Executive Office of the President,” a term that is shared by the PRA, Plaintiffs ha ve failed to show why FOIA’s reference to § 551(1) r equires the Court to reject the normal p resumption that common terms in parallel provisions shoul d be construed consistently. 6 Based on the foregoing, the Court is

§ 551(1). See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1380, at 14–15 (1974) (“The conferees st ate that they intend to include within the defi nition of ‘agency’ those entit ies encompassed by 5 U.S.C. 551 and other entities, including [list of entities] . . . . Expansion of the definiti on of ‘agency’ in this subsection is intended to broade n applicability of the Freedom of Information Act . . . .”) (emphasis added). It woul d be illogical to understand § 552(f) as both broadening § 551(1)’s definition of “agency” while sim ultaneously being constrained b y its restrictions. Indeed, the only logical understanding of FOIA’ s “advise and assist” limitation is that it emanates from § 552(f) itself.
6 Plaintiffs other arguments are also unavailing. First, Plain tiffs argue that “Congress knew how to indicate that a subs equent statute should follow bo th parts of FOIA’s definition, bud did not include an indication of that sort here.” Pls.’ Op p’n at 23. As evidence of their claim, they point to the Privacy A ct, which incorporates FOIA’s definition of ‘agency’ by crossreference. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 23 (citing 5 U.S.C . § 552a). As an initial matt er, the Court finds the Privacy Act’s use of a cross -reference rather unsurprising given that the APA, FOIA, and the Privacy Act all reside within Ti tle 5 of the U.S. Code. The PR A, on the other hand, is found in Title 44. Nevertheless, there is no rule of construction sugge sting that, absent a cross-reference, statutes with similar language m ust be interpreted differently. And the mere fact that Congress did not include a cross-referen ce in this instance does not see m to otherwise suggest that Congress perceived a difference be tween agencies for purposes o f FOIA and the PRA when, in fact, Congress used the exact sam e words for both statutes. Pl aintiffs also contend that Congress “did not indicate in any way that it intended to minimize burde ns imposed on the public only by those segments of the federal gov ernment that wield substantial independent authority from the President.” Pls.’ Opp’n at 24. T his is plainly incorrect. As discussed above, Congress adopted the same language that it had c rafted for purposes of FOIA, whi ch it had enacted only a few years earlier, and did so only aft er its terms had been settled by the Supreme Court. So, while Congress may not have explicitly s tated its intentions as succi nctly as Plaintiffs might like, the import of Congress’s actions is undeniable. Finally, Plaintiff s argue that a finding that the PRA’s definition of “agency” does not extend to the President’s advisors would somehow undermine the purpose of the PRA. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 23–24. But , Plaintiffs do not point to anything indicating that Congre ss intended the PRA to apply to every establishment in the Executive Branch without exceptionor that Congress specificall y wanted the PRA to reach the President’s advisors. Thus, it is hard to understand how the C ourt’s finding in this regard necessarily does harm to the PRA ’s broader purpose. Congress i ntended FOIA to apply broadly24 convinced that the term “agency ” under the PRA should be constr ued conterminously with that term under FOIA and that FOIA’s “ advise and assist” limitation applies equally to the PRA. Having found that the definition of agency in the PRA is to be construed conterminously with the definition of “agency” found in FOIA, the Court must d etermine whether the Commission constitutes an agenc y under that definition. In the years since the Supreme Court’s decision in Kissinger , the D.C. Circuit has propounde d various tests designed to ans wer the question of whether a unit withi n the Executive Office of the P resident (“EOP”) is subject to
FOIA. See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Office of Administration , 566 F.3d 219, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2009). But, “[h]owever the test has b een stated, common to every case in which [the D.C. Circuit has] held that an EOP unit is subjec t to FOIA has been a finding that the entity in question ‘wielde d substantial authority independe ntly of the President.’” Id. (quoting Sweetland v. Walters , 60 F.3d 852, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). Likewise, the Court has “consistently refuse d to extend FOIA to an EOP unit that lacks substant ial independent authority.” Id. at 223. Consequently, the Court finds tha t this is the same inquiry tha t should control whether or not the Commi ssion constitutes an “agency” f or purposes of the PRA. Based on the present record and the relevant case law, the Court cannot conclude that the Commission constitutes an “agen cy” for purposes of the PRA. Th e Executive Order at issue indicates that the Commission is purely advisor y in nature and that it shall disband shortly after it delivers a report to the Preside nt. Moreover, the Order does n ot grant the Commission any authority independent of the Pr esident and there is no evidence that it has ever exercised any such authority. The Commission’s request for information from state officials is not a command

but, similarly, was not troubled tha t not applying it to the Pr esident’s advisors would undermine its purpose.25 for information that state o fficials must obey and there is no evidence that the Commission has sought to compel compliance by any means. This Court finds tha t these considerations lead to the inescapable conclusion that the Commission is not an “agenc y” for purposes of the PRA. 7 Plaintiffs allege no additional f acts in their complaint or pro vide any other information that would otherwise persuade this Court to reach a different r esult. Indeed, Plaintiffs all but concede this point, having made no argument that the Commissionin fact exercises any authority independent of the President. B ecause the Court cannot conclud e that the Commission is an “agency” for purposes of the PRA , it also cannot find that the Commission was under any “clear duty to act” in accordance with the PRA’s mandates. Without th e showing of such a duty, Plaintiffs’ claims for mandamu s relief must necessarily be dism issed. See, e.g., Baptist Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius , 603 F.3d 57, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (affi rming dismissal of mand amus action because, among other reasons, the statute at issue “cannot prov ide the ‘clear duty to act’ necessary to sustain the hospita ls’ requests for mandamus relie f.”). Likewise, Plaintiffs cannot sustain a claim for declarator y relief, so those claims must be dismissed as well.

7 This conclusion is in accord with how the Court of Appeals has addressed similar bodies that advise the Presi dent in the FOIA context. See Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisors , 762 F.2d 1038, 1042–43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that Council of Economic Advisors’ “sole function is to a dvise and assist the President” and “should not be considered an agency for purposes of the FOIA” because it “has no regulatory power,” “it cannot fund projects,” “nor can it issue regulations”); Meyer v. Bush , 981 F.2d 1288, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that President’s Task F orce on Regulatory Relief was n ot an agency under FOIA because it lacked substantial authority independent of the Pres ident to “direct executive branch officials”); Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President , 90 F.3d 553, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that National Securi ty Council “is not an agency subje ct to the FOIA” because it plays no “substantive role apart fro m that of the President, as oppos ed to a coordinating role on behalf of the President”).26 2. Claims against the OMB Defendants Plaintiffs’ claims against the OMB fare no better than their cl aims against the Commission. Indeed, the same fi nding that the Commission is no t an agency pursuant to the PRA necessarily dooms these claims too. Plaintiffs’ claims aga inst the OMB Defendants rely upon 44 U.S.C. § 3517(b), which states that “[a]ny person may r equest the Director to review any collection of informa tion conducted by or for an agency to determine if, under this subchapter, a person shall mainta in, provide, or disclose the i nformation to or for the agency .” (emphasis added). Unless the re quest is frivolous, the Directo r of OMB is typica lly required to respond to such a request withi n 60 days and to take any approp riate remedial actions if
necessary. See id. at § 3517(b). Plaintiffs allege that they submitted a request to the Director of OMB to review the Commission’s requests for voter data, but tha t the Director of OMB has, to this day, taken no action . Pls.’ Opp’n at 28–29. Plaintiffs bring suit against th e OMB Defendants pursuant to § 706(1) of the APA and also seek judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02 declaring that the OMB Defendants have violated the APA. See Compl. ¶¶ 77–83, 86–87. Under § 706(1) of the APA, courts can compel an agency “to take a discrete age ncy action that it is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004). This requir es, however, that “a federa l agency has a ‘ministerial or non-discretiona ry’ duty amounting to ‘a speci fic, unequivocal command.’” Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker , 809 F.3d 664, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Norton , 542 U.S. at 63–64). Plaintiffs’ claim against the OMB Defendan ts must fail because the PRA only requires the Director to t ake action when requested to rev iew a collection of information conducted “by or for [an] agency,” as defined under the PRA. B ecause the Court has already concluded that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show tha t the Commission satisfies that27 definition, they have also necessarily failed to show that the OMB Defendants were under any obligation to take any a ction under the statute. 8 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ APA and declaratory judgment claims against the OMB Defendants must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION Because the Court finds that it i s appropriate to grant Defenda nts’ motion to dismiss, there is therefore no need to rea ch Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prel iminary Injunction. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) and
DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Pre liminary Injunction (ECF No. 10). The Court also DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave t o File a Declaration in support o f its Motion for Preliminary Injuncti on (ECF No. 24). As discussed above, the basis for the Court’s decision is that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege or otherwise show that the Commission constitutes an “agency” subject to the PRA. Plaintiffs have re quested that, in the event that the Court makes just such a finding, that it be granted leave to fi le an amended complaint to demonstrate the reasons why the Commission meets the standard that the Court adopts today.
See Pls.’ Opp’n at 21, n.6. Plaintiffs also note that this very qu estion is pending in parallel litigation in th is Circuit. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 21, n.6. Based on the se representations, the Co urt is satisfied that leave should be gi ven. Accordingly, the Court w ill GRANT Plaintiffs request for leave to amend their Complaint or ders that they file their amen ded complaint within 30 days. An order consistent with this Memo randum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: December 29, 2017 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

8 Because the Court resolves the c laims against the OMB Defendan ts on the basis that Plaintiffs have not shown the Com mission to be an “agency,” the Court need not resolve Defendants’ additional grounds for dismissal.