AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed October 11, 2021 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-01160-CR 

PEDRO SANTIAGO MARIN, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F-1952413-Y 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Osborne, Reichek, and Smith 

Opinion by Justice Smith 

A jury convicted appellant Pedro Santiago Marin of intentionally and 

knowingly, during a period of thirty days or more in duration, committing two or 

more acts of sexual abuse against a child younger than fourteen years of age. The 

trial court sentenced Marin to thirty years’ confinement. Marin argues the evidence 

is legally insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove that 

he committed two sexual acts of abuse during a period that was thirty days or more 

in duration. Marin and the State ask the Court to reform the judgment to reflect that 

the trial court, instead of the jury, assessed punishment. As modified, we affirm the 

trial court’s judgment. 
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Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 To avoid unnecessary repetition of facts, we do not include a separate 

background section, but instead include only those facts necessary to dispose of 

Marin’s sufficiency challenge. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. 

On February 22, 2019, complainant’s mother walked into complainant’s room 

and saw Marin, who was in his boxer shorts, in bed with complainant with his hand 

under her shirt. Officer Mayra Balderas was dispatched to the home and after talking 

to complainant, Officer Balderas determined further investigation was necessary. 

 Officers took complainant, who was nine-years-old, to the Children’s 

Advocacy Center where Jessica Parada conducted a forensic interview. The 

interview lasted over an hour. 

 Complainant indicated during the interview that the first instance of abuse was 

around September 2018 and continued until around November 2018. The first time 

Marin abused her, he said he wanted to play a game, but instead, he held her hands 

down and put his mouth on her vagina. She described a second time in which Marin 

woke her up in the middle of the night, removed her underwear, and put his penis 

“on the top of her vagina.” He also put his mouth on her vagina. She told Parada 

the last time “something happened with her private parts” was right before her 

birthday, which was November 30. 

 Although complainant was unsure how many times Marin abused her, she 

testified during trial that he put his mouth on her vagina more than once. Parada also 
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testified during trial to the two incidents complainant described during her forensic 

interview. 

 Marin argues the evidence if legally insufficient because the State failed to 

prove he committed two or more acts of sexual abuse during a period of thirty days 

or more. The State responds the evidence is legally sufficient. 

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether “any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and defer to the trier of fact to 

resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic to ultimate facts. See Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see also Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010). The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a 

conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 

art. 38.07(a); Garner v. State, 523 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no 

pet.). 

A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the 

age of fourteen if, during a period that is thirty or more days in duration, he commits 

two or more acts of sexual abuse and, at the time of the commission of each act, he 

is seventeen years of age or older and the victim is a child younger than fourteen 

years of age. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b); Garner, 523 S.W.3d at 271. 
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Although the exact dates of the abuse need not be proven, the offense requires 

proof that two or more acts of sexual abuse occurred during a period of thirty days 

or more. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(d); Garner, 523 S.W.3d at 271. The 

statute does not require that the jury agree unanimously on the specific acts of sexual 

abuse the defendant committed or the exact dates when those acts were committed. 

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(d); see also Funes v. State, No. 05-18-01174-

CR, 2020 WL 5651659, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication). 

Here, a jury could reasonably infer that one of the described incidents of 

sexual abuse occurred in September while the second described incident occurred in 

late November. Making this determination was within the sole discretion of the 

factfinder. See, e.g., Trinidad v. State, No. 07-19-00034-CR, 2020 WL 4249745, at 

*5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (within factfinder’s role to resolve conflicts in evidence, weigh 

evidence, and draw reasonable inferences which included child’s testimony that was 

“very unsure, provided vague information and scant detail about specific instances 

of sexual abuse, and was unable to provide specific dates of alleged instances”). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense of 

continuous sexual assault of a child beyond a reasonable doubt. See TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. § 21.02(d); Garner, 523 S.W.3d at 271. 
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In reaching this conclusion, we need not consider Marin’s assertion that the 

February 22, 2019 breast-touching incident was not an act of sexual abuse because 

his conviction is supported by two other instances of abuse. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

47.1. We overrule Marin’s first issue. 

Modification of Judgment 

In his second issue, Marin argues the judgment should be reformed to reflect 

that the trial court, not the jury, assessed punishment. The State agrees. 

 We have the power to modify the trial court’s judgment when we have the 

necessary information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 

S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–

30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Here, the record reflects that Marin elected 

for the judge to assess punishment. The trial court conducted the punishment hearing 

and stated the punishment on the record at the conclusion of the hearing. 

Accordingly, we sustain Marin’s second issue and modify the judgment to reflect 

that the trial court, not the jury, assessed punishment. 

 
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Conclusion 

As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 

191160F.U05 

 

/Craig Smith/

CRAIG SMITH 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

PEDRO SANTIAGO MARIN, 

Appellant 

No. 05-19-01160-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the Criminal District 

Court No. 7, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F-1952413-Y. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. 

Justices Osborne and Reichek 

participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

MODIFIED to reflect “Punishment Assessed by: Trial Court.” 

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered October 11, 2021