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*********************************************** 
SERAMONTE ASSOCIATES, LLC v. TOWN

OF HAMDEN

(AC 42770)

Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Oliver, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 12-63c (a)), the owner of real property used primarily

for the purpose of producing rental income may be required to ‘‘annually

submit to the assessor not later than the first day of June’’ certain rental

income and expense information.

Pursuant further to statute (§ 12-63c (d)), an owner who fails to submit the

information required by § 12-63c (a), shall be subject to a penalty ‘‘equal

to a ten per cent increase in the assessed value of such property for

such assessment year.’’

The plaintiff, an owner of several rental properties in the defendant town

of Hamden, appealed from the judgment of the trial court, which upheld

the decision of the defendant’s Board of Assessment Appeals affirming

a 10 percent penalty imposed by the defendant’s assessor on the tax

assessments of the plaintiff’s properties pursuant to § 12-63c (d), as a

result of the plaintiff’s submission of required tax forms after June 1.

The plaintiff sent the tax forms by first class mail to the assessor on

May 31. It was undisputed that the assessor failed to receive the required

forms by the June 1 deadline set forth in § 12-63c (a). The plaintiff

claimed that the word ‘‘submit’’ as used in § 12-63c (a) was ambiguous

and that the trial court was required, as a matter of law, to rule in its

favor on the basis of the statute’s ambiguity and also claimed that the

imposition of the assessor’s penalty violated the excessive fines clauses

of both the federal and state constitutions. Held:

1. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the

defendant on the count of the complaint that alleged that the board

improperly upheld the 10 percent penalty: the plaintiff could not prevail

on its claim that the word ‘‘submit,’’ as used in § 12-63c (a), essentially

means ‘‘to mail,’’ as the word ‘‘submit,’’ when viewed in the context of

other tax statutes, was unambiguous and meant that the assessor must

receive the forms by June 1; the legislature’s decision not to include

the phrase ‘‘or postmarked’’ in § 12-63c (a) was dispositive, meaning

that those forms must be delivered to the assessor’s office by June 1

in order to comply with the statute..

2. The trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to strike the

plaintiff’s constitutional claims: the excessive fines clause of the eighth

amendment to the United States constitution did not apply to the 10

percent penalty in § 12-63c (d), as that penalty was not punitive within

the meaning of the eighth amendment, and, accordingly, the plaintiff’s

alleged violations of the eighth amendment necessarily failed; moreover,

under the state constitution, the 10 percent penalty in § 12-63c (d) was

not a fine that subjected it to the excessive fines clause and, even if

this court assumed that the clause applied, the court was not persuaded

that the 10 penalty was unconstitutionally excessive under the facts of

the case and controlling Connecticut precedent.

Argued October 15, 2020—officially released February 2, 2021

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the defendant’s Board

of Assessment Appeals denying the plaintiff’s appeal of

a penalty imposed by the defendant’s assessor and

added to tax assessments on certain of the plaintiff’s

real properties, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where

the court, S. Richards, J., granted the defendant’s

motions for summary judgment and to strike, and rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plain-
tiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Brenden P. Leydon, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Zachary J. Phillips, with whom was Adam J. Blank,

for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

OLIVER, J. The plaintiff, Seramonte Associates, LLC,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting

summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the town

of Hamden, as to count one of the plaintiff’s complaint

and granting the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s constitutional claims in count two. On appeal, the

plaintiff claims, with respect to count one, that the court

erred in holding that the word ‘‘submit’’ as used in

General Statutes § 12-63c requires that certain tax forms

have to be received by the defendant by June 1, and, with

respect to count two, that the court erred in granting

the defendant’s motion to strike, because the penalty

imposed for the plaintiff’s late submission of the tax

forms amounts to a fine that violates the excessive fines

clauses of the federal and the state constitutions. We

disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history, as set forth by the trial court in its memorandum

of decision and otherwise gleaned from the record, are

relevant to the plaintiff’s claims on appeal. The plaintiff

was the owner of certain parcels of rental property

located in Hamden known as 520 Mix Avenue, 609 Mix

Avenue, and 617 Mix Avenue (properties). On February

1, 2016, the assessor for the defendant assessed those

properties at $15,683,080 for 520 Mix Avenue, $2,927,890

for 609 Mix Avenue, and $10,521,560 for 617 Mix Avenue. Pursuant to § 12-63c (a), the plaintiff was required

to ‘‘submit to the assessor not later than the first day of

June’’ certain tax forms.1 The assessor sent the required

forms to the plaintiff, and the cover letter to those

forms stated: ‘‘It should be clearly understood that if

the attached report is not completed and submitted to

the [a]ssessor’s [o]ffice by June 1, 2016, it will result

in a 10 [percent] penalty being applied to your assessment per [§ 12-63c].’’ Additionally, the cover letter

stated that ‘‘[s]ubmission means this form is physically

in the [a]ssessor’s office by 4:30 on June 1, 2016, faxes,

e-mails and postmarks will not be accepted.’’ The plaintiff sent the required forms to the assessor by first class

mail on May 31, 2016, and it is undisputed that the

assessor received them on June 2, 2016. Because the

required forms were not received on or before June 1,

the assessor, pursuant to § 12-63c (d), imposed a 10

percent penalty, amounting to $132,145.16, that was

added to the assessments of the properties.

On September 28, 2016, pursuant to General Statutes

§ 12-119,2

the plaintiff commenced by service of process

an appeal in the Superior Court claiming that the valuation of the properties, which included the 10 percent

penalty, was excessive. Pursuant to General Statutes

§ 12-111,3

the plaintiff also timely appealed to the defendant’s Board of Assessment Appeals (board) the assessor’s imposition of the 10 percent penalty. The plaintiff
appeared before the board on March 2, 2017, and, on

March 21, 2017, the board issued its decision denying

the plaintiff’s appeal.

On February 27, 2017, the plaintiff filed a withdrawal

form in the Superior Court, stating that it was withdrawing its claim insofar as it alleged excessive assessments,

and that it was proceeding with its claim insofar as it

concerned the impropriety of the 10 percent penalty

added to the assessments. On March 27, 2017, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and, on

April 26, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment.

On May 1, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint (operative complaint) to clarify, in part, its February 27, 2017 withdrawal form. In the operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged, in count one, that the board

improperly had upheld the assessor’s imposition of the

10 percent penalty and, in count two, that the penalty

was unconstitutional under the excessive fines clauses

of both the federal and the state constitutions. See U.S.

Const., amend VIII; Conn. Const., art. I, § 8. On July 3,

2017, the defendant filed a motion to strike count two

of the plaintiff’s operative complaint on the ground that

it failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted,

arguing that the excessive fines clauses of both the

federal and the state constitutions do not apply to

tax penalties.

On December 21, 2017, the defendant filed a new

motion for summary judgment as to count one of the

plaintiff’s operative complaint. The defendant argued

that it properly had imposed the 10 percent penalty

pursuant to § 12-63c, because the plaintiff failed to submit its income and expense report to the defendant by

June 1, 2016. The plaintiff argued in its own motion for

summary judgment that the defendant’s interpretation

of § 12-63c was legally incorrect. On February 5, 2019,

the court denied the plaintiff’s April 26, 2017 motion

for summary judgment, and it granted the defendant’s

December 21, 2017 motion for summary judgment as

to count one of the plaintiff’s operative complaint. In its

memorandum of decision on the motions for summary

judgment, the court recognized that the word ‘‘submit’’

is not defined in § 12-63c, and it reasoned that, because

different dictionary definitions of ‘‘submit’’ could support either party’s interpretation, the term was ambiguous. The court also determined that the statute’s legislative history did not clarify the meaning of the word

‘‘submit.’’ The court, however, explained that in MSK

Properties, LLC v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial

district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-15-6029158-S

(July 3, 2017) (64 Conn. L. Rptr. 747, 753–54), the Superior Court interpreted the language of the statute to

mean that a town must receive the tax forms by June

1. Additionally, the court noted that, ‘‘in interpreting

another tax statute, General Statutes § 12-41 (e) (1),
[the] Superior Court [has] held that ‘file’ [by November

1] as used in that statute, meant that the tax information

had to be received by the town by November 1.’’ See

SBC Internet Services, Inc. v. Bridgeport, Superior

Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-06-

6000408-S (February 14, 2008) (44 Conn. L. Rptr. 870,

871). Accordingly, the court granted the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment, holding that the word

‘‘submit,’’ as used in § 12-63c, ‘‘means that the town

must receive the tax forms by June 1 of each year.’’

Also on February 5, 2019, in a separate memorandum

of decision, the court granted the defendant’s motion to

strike count two of the plaintiff’s operative complaint,

agreeing with the defendant that the excessive fines

clauses of both the federal and the state constitutions

do not apply to tax penalties. With respect to the federal

constitution, the court held that the tax penalty in § 12-

63c is remedial, rather than punitive, because ‘‘it is

imposed to ensure compliance with the timely payment

of taxes and to deter delinquent payment of taxes,

which could harm the government with additional

expenses of ensuring compliance in collecting those

taxes.’’ Accordingly, because the federal excessive fines

clause applies only to those forfeitures that may be

characterized as ‘‘punitive’’; see United States v.

Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied,

U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 1223, 197 L. Ed. 2d 462 (2017);

the court held that the federal excessive fines clause

did not apply.

With respect to the state constitution, the court held

that the 10 percent penalty in § 12-63c is not a ‘‘fine’’

within the meaning of the excessive fines clause. The

court relied on the definition of ‘‘fine’’ set forth in Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 96 Conn. 361, 368, 114 A. 104

(1921), aff’d, 260 U.S. 647, 43 S. Ct. 233, 67 L. Ed. 439

(1923), in which our Supreme Court stated that ‘‘[a]

fine is a pecuniary punishment imposed by a lawful

tribunal upon a person convicted of crime or misdemeanor.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court

explained that the tax penalty in § 12-63c ‘‘is not punishment imposed due to conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor. Rather, it is a tool to ensure payment of the

tax and punish evasion or neglect.’’ Accordingly, the

court concluded that the tax penalty is not a violation

of the excessive fines clause of the state constitution.4

The court rendered judgment on the second count of

the plaintiff’s operative complaint on March 18, 2019.

This appeal followed.

I

The plaintiff first challenges the summary judgment

rendered in favor of the defendant as to count one of

its operative complaint and claims that the trial court

erred when it held that the word ‘‘submit’’ as used in

§ 12-63c means that the defendant must receive the tax

forms by June 1 of each year. Specifically, the plaintiff
argues that (1) the ordinary meaning of ‘‘submit’’ is ‘‘to

send,’’ and that, in the tax context, ‘‘timely mailing is

timely filing,’’ (2) the rule of lenity applies to civil penalties for alleged lateness, and, therefore, the statute

should be strictly construed ‘‘and not extended by implication,’’ and (3) because the court found that the word

‘‘submit’’ was ambiguous, a decision in favor of the

taxpayer was compelled as a matter of law.

The defendant counters that ‘‘submit’’ means present,

file, or formally deliver, arguing that ‘‘[i]n some tax

settings the legislature has intended for the date of

sending to be considered the date of filing or submission. Crucially, however, when the legislature so

intends, it expresses that intent explicitly by adding

words such as ‘or postmarked’ to the statute.’’ With

respect to the rule of lenity, the defendant argues that

it applies ‘‘only if the statute remains ambiguous after

all sources of legislative intent have been explored . . .

[and that] [w]here, as here, after full resort to the process of statutory construction, there is no reasonable

doubt as to the meaning of the statute, [the court] need

not resort to the rule of lenity.’’ Finally, the defendant

argues that ‘‘strict construction neither requires nor

permits the contravention of the true intent and purpose

of the statute as expressed in the language used.’’ The

defendant claims that the statute is not ambiguous and,

therefore, strict construction is inapplicable, arguing

that the ‘‘plaintiff urges a construction that rewrites the

statute and eschews its plain language by adding the

words ‘or [postmarked]’ when the legislature intended

to leave those words out.’’ We agree with the defendant.

We begin with our standard of review. ‘‘The standard

of review of motions for summary judgment is well

settled. Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary

judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial

court must view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. . . . The party moving for

summary judgment has the burden of showing the

absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that

the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. . . .

‘‘On appeal, we must determine whether the legal

conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and

logically correct and whether they find support in the

facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the

trial court. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision

to grant [a moving party’s] motion for summary judgment is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Smigelski v. Dubois, 153 Conn. App. 186, 197, 100 A.3d

954, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 948, 103 A.3d 975 (2014).

Initially, we are called upon to determine the meaning
of the word ‘‘submit’’ in § 12-63c, which presents us

with a question of statutory interpretation. ‘‘[I]ssues of

statutory construction raise questions of law, over

which we exercise plenary review. . . . The process

of statutory interpretation involves the determination

of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to

the facts of the case, including the question of whether

the language does so apply. . . . When construing a

statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and

give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . .

In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned

manner, the meaning of the statutory language as

applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question

of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In

seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes

§ 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute

itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after

examining such text and considering such relationship,

the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and

does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not

be considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Ugrin v. Cheshire, 307 Conn. 364, 379–80, 54 A.3d

532 (2012).

The text of § 12-63c (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In

determining the present true and actual value in any

town of real property used primarily for purposes of

producing rental income, the assessor . . . may

require . . . that the owner of such property annually

submit to the assessor not later than the first day of

June, on a form provided by the assessor . . . the best

available information disclosing the actual rental and

rental-related income and operating expenses applicable to such property.’’

In the present case, the trial court concluded that,

because the statute does not define ‘‘submit’’ and

because dictionary definitions of ‘‘submit’’ could support either party’s position, the word ‘‘submit,’’ therefore, is ambiguous. In making that determination, the

court discussed the statute’s legislative history and certain Superior Court decisions. Pursuant to § 1-2z, however, we must consider both the text of a statute and

its relationship to other statutes to determine whether

it is ambiguous. See General Statutes § 1-2z (‘‘[t]he

meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes’’).

An examination of our tax statutes reveals that our

legislature frequently includes the phrase ‘‘or postmarked’’ when it intends for the date of mailing to be

considered the date of filing or submission. For example, General Statutes § 12-129 provides in relevant part

that ‘‘[a]ny person, firm or corporation who pays any

property tax in excess of the principal of such tax . . .

may make application in writing to the collector of
taxes for the refund of such amount. Such application

shall be delivered or postmarked by the later of [three

events] . . . .’’ (Emphasis added). Similarly, General

Statutes § 12-146 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[n]o

tax or installment thereof shall be construed to be delinquent under the provisions of this section if . . . (B)

the envelope containing the amount due as such tax

or installment, as received by the tax collector of the

municipality to which such tax is payable, bears a postmark showing a date within the time allowed by statute

for the payment of such tax or installment.’’ (Emphasis

added). General Statutes § 12-41 (e) provides in relevant

part: ‘‘(1) Any person who fails to file a declaration of

personal property on or before the first day of November . . . shall be subject to a penalty equal to twentyfive per cent of the assessment of such . . . property

. . . and (3) any declaration received by the municipality to which it is due that is in an envelope bearing a

postmark . . . showing a date within the allowed filing

period shall not be deemed to be delinquent.’’ (Emphasis added). Other tax statutes contain similar language.5

Those statutes guide our conclusion that when the

date of mailing is to be considered the date of filing or

submission, our legislature includes language to that

effect in the statute. At oral argument before this court,

however, the plaintiff argued that those statutes are

distinguishable because they use the word ‘‘file’’ as

opposed to ‘‘submit.’’ The plaintiff claims that the word

‘‘submit’’ essentially means ‘‘to mail,’’ and, therefore,

that the tax statutes that include the phrase ‘‘or postmarked’’ do not compel the conclusion that ‘‘submit,’’

as used in § 12-63c, means that the defendant must

receive the forms by June 1. We disagree.

Our legislature’s use of the word ‘‘file’’ or the word

‘‘submit’’ does not bear on whether the forms to be

filed or submitted must arrive at their destination, or

merely be postmarked, by any certain date. Rather,

the legislature’s decision not to include the phrase ‘‘or

postmarked’’, or other similar language that would

define submit to include mailing, is dispositive. ‘‘[I]t is

well settled that the legislature is always presumed to

have created a harmonious and consistent body of law

. . . . [T]his tenet of statutory construction . . .

requires [this court] to read statutes together when they

relate to the same subject matter . . . . Accordingly,

[i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look

not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader

statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Felician

Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut, Inc. v. Historic

District Commission, 284 Conn. 838, 850, 937 A.2d 39

(2008). Accordingly, we conclude that, when viewed in

the context of other tax statutes, all of which appear

in title 12 of the General Statutes, the word ‘‘submit’’

as used in § 12-63c is unambiguous.6 Section 12-63c

provides that the forms must be submitted by June 1,
which means that, in the absence of any language to

the contrary, those forms must be delivered to the assessor’s office by that date in order to comply with the

statute. There is no dispute in this case that the plaintiff’s tax forms were not delivered to the defendant’s

assessor by the June 1 deadline.

Therefore, the trial court properly rendered summary

judgment in favor of the defendant as to count one of

the plaintiff’s operative complaint.

II

Next, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendant’s motion to strike its constitutional claims in count two of the operative complaint

and rendered judgment thereon. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that, ‘‘[a]s a matter of proportionality and

fundamental fairness, a penalty of over $130,000 for at

worst being one day late with an ambiguous statutory

time is grossly excessive’’ and, thus, the imposition of

that penalty was a violation of both the federal and the

state constitutions. With respect to the federal constitution, the plaintiff argues that the penalty was imposed,

in part, to deter the delinquent payment of taxes. Citing

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610, 113 S. Ct.

2801, 125 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1993), the plaintiff claims that

‘‘United States Supreme Court precedent has been clear

that if civil sanctions are even in part serving a deterrent

purpose they are subject to excessive fine analysis.’’

With respect to the state constitution, the plaintiff characterizes the trial court’s decision as hinging on whether

the penalty was imposed due to conviction of a felony

or a misdemeanor. The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]his analysis is incorrect and the Connecticut Supreme Court

itself recognized in 1936 that an excessive ‘fine’ could

include civil penalties.’’ See Second National Bank of

New Haven v. Loftus, 121 Conn. 454, 459–60, 185 A.

423 (1936). We are not persuaded by either of the plaintiff’s arguments.

We begin with our standard of review. ‘‘The standard

of review in an appeal from the granting of a motion

to strike is well established. Because a motion to strike

challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court,

our review . . . is plenary. . . . We take the facts to

be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken

and we construe the complaint in the manner most

favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . . Thus,

[i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a

cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.

. . . [A] motion to strike is essentially a procedural

motion that focuses solely on the pleadings. . . . It is,

therefore, improper for the court to consider material

outside of the pleading that is being challenged by the

motion.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Dlugokecki v. Vieira, 98 Conn. App. 252, 256,

907 A.2d 1269, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 951, 912 A.2d
483 (2006). ‘‘For the purpose of ruling upon a motion

to strike, the facts alleged in a complaint, though not

the legal conclusions it may contain, are deemed to be

admitted. . . . A motion to strike is properly granted

if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that

are unsupported by the facts alleged.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Metcoff v. Lebovics,

123 Conn. App. 512, 516, 2 A.3d 942 (2010).

A

Federal Excessive Fines Clause

In order to determine whether a financial penalty is

unconstitutional under the excessive fines clause of the

eighth amendment to the federal constitution, courts

rely on the two step inquiry established in United States

v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 141

L. Ed. 2d 314 (1998). At the first step, a court must

determine whether the financial penalty constitutes a

punishment and is, thus, a ‘‘ ‘fine’ ’’ within the meaning

of the excessive fines clause. Id., 334. If it is determined

that the penalty constitutes a punishment, the court

then must proceed to the second step of the analysis

and determine whether the challenged forfeiture is

unconstitutionally excessive. Id.

With respect to the first step, the trial court, relying

on United States v. Viloski, supra, 814 F.3d 109, noted

that the excessive fines clause ‘‘applies only to those

forfeitures that may be characterized, at least in part,

as ‘punitive’—i.e., forfeitures for which a defendant is

personally liable.’’ ‘‘In contrast, purely ‘remedial’ forfeitures—i.e., those in rem forfeitures intended not to punish the defendant but to compensate the [g]overnment

for a loss or to restore property to its rightful owner—

fall outside the scope of the [e]xcessive [f]ines [c]lause.’’

United States v. Viloski, supra, 109. Additionally, the

trial court explained that ‘‘[a] forfeiture does not constitute ‘punishment’ to the extent that it is remedial, such

as where the amount of forfeiture is rationally related

to the costs of enforcing the law and societal costs of

the proscribed conduct . . . .’’

The plaintiff argues that the penalty in the present

case serves, in part, a deterrent purpose, and that under

Austin v. United States, supra, 509 U.S. 602, a civil

sanction is subject to the excessive fines clause if it is

retributive or has a deterrent purpose. As the defendant

correctly notes, however, that method of analysis was

drawn from United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448,

109 S. Ct. 1892, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1989), which was

abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118

S. Ct. 488, 139 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1997). Indeed, in Dept. of

Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114

S. Ct. 1937, 128 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1994), the United States

Supreme Court held that ‘‘Halper’s method of determining whether the exaction was remedial or punitive simply does not work in the case of a tax statute. . . .
Subjecting [the tax] to Halper’s test for civil penalties

is therefore inappropriate.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 784. The court noted that

‘‘neither a high rate of taxation nor an obvious deterrent

purpose automatically marks this tax as a form of punishment.’’ Id., 780. Nevertheless, it concluded that the

tax at issue in that case was punitive. That conclusion,

however, was compelled by the nature of the tax at

issue. Kurth Ranch concerned a Montana statute that

imposed a tax ‘‘on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs.’’ Mont. Code Ann. § 15-25-111 (1987). The

court explained that ‘‘this so-called tax is conditioned

on the commission of a crime. That condition is significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather than the

gathering of revenue . . . the tax assessment not only

hinges on the commission of a crime, it also is exacted

only after the taxpayer has been arrested for the precise

conduct that gives rise to the tax obligation in the first

place. Persons who have been arrested for possessing

marijuana constitute the entire class of taxpayers subject to the Montana tax.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,

supra, 781–82.

The 10 percent tax penalty in the present case lacks

the obvious punitive and penal nature of the tax at issue

in Kurth Ranch. It was not imposed during a criminal

proceeding, and it does not require any conviction for

imposition. Rather, as the trial court stated, ‘‘it is

imposed to ensure compliance with the timely payment

of taxes and to deter delinquent payment of taxes,

which could harm the government with additional

expenses of ensuring compliance in collecting those

taxes.’’ We conclude that the 10 percent penalty in § 12-

63c is not punitive within the meaning of the eighth

amendment to the federal constitution, and, therefore,

it is not subject to the second step of the excessive

fines clause analysis. The trial court properly did not

reach the second step of Bajakajian, and the plaintiff’s

arguments to the contrary fail. Therefore, because the

eighth amendment does not apply, the plaintiff’s alleged

violations of it in count two necessarily fail, and the

granting of the motion to strike those claims in count

two was proper.

B

Connecticut Excessive Fines Clause

Article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution provides that ‘‘[n]o person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or

property without due process of law, nor shall excessive

bail be required nor excessive fines imposed. . . .’’ Similar to its federal counterpart, Connecticut courts generally interpret the state constitution’s excessive fines

clause not to apply to tax penalties. See Bankers Trust

Co. v. Blodgett, supra, 96 Conn. 369.
In Bankers Trust Co., our Supreme Court held that

a succession tax was not a ‘‘fine’’ such that it would

be subject to the excessive fines clause. The court stated

that ‘‘[t]he necessities of government give the [s]tate

the right to tax property for such purposes and in such

amounts as it may determine, subject only to such

restrictions as may be imposed by the [c]onstitution,

and with the power to tax must go the power to enforce

collection of the tax by all summary means not contrary

to the [c]onstitution, and one of those means is the

right to impose penalties in order to compel payment

and as a punishment for evasion or neglect of this duty

owed the public.’’ Id., 366. The court then concluded

that the succession tax ‘‘does not impose an excessive

fine in violation of [the excessive fines clause]. The term

penalty in its broadest sense includes all punishment

of whatever kind. . . . A fine is always a penalty, but

a penalty may not always be a fine. . . . A fine is a

pecuniary punishment imposed by a lawful tribunal

upon a person convicted of crime or misdemeanor. . . .

The offense here punished is neither a crime nor a

misdemeanor, and the constitutional provision invoked

has no possible relation to it.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 368. Likewise, in the

present case, late submission of the tax forms required

under § 12-63c is not a crime. Timely and accurate compliance with our taxation statutes is, rather, a duty owed

the public, for which the legislature imposed a penalty

in order to compel compliance and as a punishment

for evasion or neglect of that duty. See PJM & Associates, LC v. Bridgeport, 292 Conn. 125, 145, 971 A.2d 24

(2009). Accordingly, the 10 percent penalty in § 12-63c

is best construed as a penalty and not as a fine.

The plaintiff relies on Second National Bank of New

Haven v. Loftus, supra, 121 Conn. 454, for the proposition that excessive fines can include civil penalties. In

that case, our Supreme Court quoted Bankers Trust

Co. v. Blodgett, supra, 96 Conn. 368, to define a fine as

a ‘‘pecuniary punishment imposed by a lawful tribunal

upon a person convicted of [a] crime or misdemeanor.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Second National

Bank of New Haven v. Loftus, supra, 459. It then stated

that ‘‘[t]he meaning of the term [‘fine’] in any connotation may not be extended, at most, further than to

include a pecuniary penalty or forfeiture recoverable

in a civil or criminal action.’’ Id. However, the court

explained that ‘‘the amount of the fine which the legislature may properly impose depends largely upon the

object designed to be accomplished by the imposition

of the fine, and the widest latitude is to be given to the

discretion and judgment of the legislature in determining the amount of the fine necessary to accomplish that

object.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 460 The

court concluded that ‘‘[w]e would be very reluctant to

say that the legislature had exceeded its powers in

imposing excessive penalties, and ought not to do so
except in a very clear case.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. This is not such a case.

The plaintiff argues that the tax penalty in the present

case is grossly excessive and disproportionate to any

harm the defendant suffered. Our Supreme Court, however, explicitly addressed that proportionality argument

in PJM & Associates, LC v. Bridgeport, supra, 292 Conn.

145. While interpreting the same statute at issue in the

present case, § 12-63c, our Supreme Court stated that

‘‘[t]he purpose of the penalty [in § 12-63c] is to compel

the submission of information to assist the assessor

in performing his duties. The fact that some property

owners are subjected to a higher penalty than others

is not unreasonable. . . . Finally, with respect to the

magnitude of the penalty, we have stated that penalty

provisions in taxing statutes are quite common and . . .

such provisions, though often attacked as confiscatory,

are almost always upheld by the courts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court noted that it previously had ‘‘upheld the validity of a statute [that]

resulted in a penalty of $320,000 for a tax payment that

was made one or two days late.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., quoting Brittany Farms Health

Center, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 177 Conn. 384, 387, 418 A.2d 52 (1979);

see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown, 164 Conn.

497, 501, 325 A.2d 228 (1973).

We conclude that, under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, the 10 percent penalty in § 12-63c

is not a ‘‘fine’’ that subjects it to our excessive fines

clause. Indeed, we are not persuaded that the 10 percent

penalty would be unconstitutionally excessive under

the facts of this case and controlling Connecticut precedent even if we assume that our excessive fines clause

applied. Accordingly, with respect to the allegations in

count two of the operative complaint that the penalty

was unconstitutional under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, the trial court’s granting of the

defendant’s motion to strike count two was proper.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 12-63c provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) In determining

the present true and actual value in any town of real property used primarily

for purposes of producing rental income, the assessor, which term whenever

used in this section shall include assessor or board of assessors, may require

in the conduct of any appraisal of such property pursuant to the capitalization

of net income method, as provided in section 12-63b, that the owner of such

property annually submit to the assessor not later than the first day of June,

on a form provided by the assessor not later than forty-five days before

said first day of June, the best available information disclosing the actual

rental and rental-related income and operating expenses applicable to such

property. Submission of such information may be required whether or not

the town is conducting a revaluation of all real property pursuant to section

12-62. Upon determination that there is good cause, the assessor may grant

an extension of not more than thirty days to submit such information, if

the owner of such property files a request for an extension with the assessor

not later than May first. . . .

‘‘(c) . . . Any person claiming to be aggrieved by the action of the asses-
sor hereunder may appeal the actions of the assessor to the board of assessment appeals and the Superior Court as otherwise provided in this chapter.

‘‘(d) Any owner of such real property required to submit information

to the assessor in accordance with subsection (a) of this section for any

assessment year, who fails to submit such information as required under

said subsection (a) or who submits information in incomplete or false form

with intent to defraud, shall be subject to a penalty equal to a ten per

cent increase in the assessed value of such property for such assessment

year. . . .’’

2 General Statutes § 12-119 provides in relevant part: ‘‘When it is claimed

that a tax has been laid on property . . . [that] was computed on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and

could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the

statutes for determining the valuation of such property, the owner thereof

. . . prior to the payment of such tax, may, in addition to the other remedies

provided by law, make application for relief to the superior court for the

judicial district in which such town or city is situated. Such application may

be made within one year from the date as of which the property was last

evaluated for purposes of taxation and shall be served and returned in the

same manner as is required in the case of a summons in a civil action, and

the pendency of such application shall not suspend action upon the tax

against the applicant. In all such actions, the Superior Court shall have

power to grant such relief upon such terms and in such manner and form

as to justice and equity appertains, and costs may be taxed at the discretion

of the court. If such assessment is reduced by said court, the applicant

shall be reimbursed by the town or city for any overpayment of taxes in

accordance with the judgment of said court.’’

3 General Statutes § 12-111 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any person . . .

claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of the assessors of such town may

appeal therefrom to the board of assessment appeals. Such appeal shall be

filed, in writing, on or before February twentieth. The written appeal shall

include, but is not limited to, the property owner’s name, name and position

of the signer, description of the property which is the subject of the appeal,

name and mailing address of the party to be sent all correspondence by the

board of assessment appeals, reason for the appeal, appellant’s estimate of

value, signature of property owner, or duly authorized agent of the property

owner, and date of signature. The board shall notify each aggrieved taxpayer

who filed a written appeal in the proper form and in a timely manner, no

later than March first immediately following the assessment date, of the

date, time and place of the appeal hearing. Such notice shall be sent no

later than seven calendar days preceding the hearing date except that the

board may elect not to conduct an appeal hearing for any commercial,

industrial, utility or apartment property with an assessed value greater than

one million dollars. The board shall, not later than March first, notify the

appellant that the board has elected not to conduct an appeal hearing. An

appellant whose appeal will not be heard by the board may appeal directly

to the Superior Court pursuant to section 12-117a. The board shall determine

all appeals for which the board conducts an appeal hearing and send written

notification of the final determination of such appeals to each such person

within one week after such determination has been made. Such written

notification shall include information describing the property owner’s right

to appeal the determination of such board. . . .’’

4

In its memorandum of decision on the defendant’s motion to strike, the

trial court stated: ‘‘Similar to the penalty in Bankers Trust Co., this tax,

although a penalty, is a ‘fine.’ ’’ It is clear, however, on review of the memorandum of decision and its reliance on Bankers Trust Co., that the trial court

intended to conclude that the tax penalty was not a fine within the meaning

of the Connecticut constitution, and that its omission of the word ‘‘not’’

was a scrivener’s error.

5 See, e.g., General Statutes § 12-39aa (a) (1) (‘‘If any return . . . required

to be filed with or any payment required to be made to the Department of

Revenue Services within a prescribed period on or before a prescribed date

under authority of any provision of the general statutes is, after such period

or such date, delivered by United States mail to the Department of Revenue

Services, the date of the United States postmark stamped on the cover in

which such return . . . is mailed shall be deemed to be the date of delivery

or the date of payment . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)); General Statutes § 12-

42 (a) (‘‘Any person required by law to file an annual declaration of personal

property may request a filing extension with the assessor of the municipality.

Such request shall be made on or before the first day of November in writing.
. . . When the first day of November is a Saturday or Sunday, the declaration

or extension request may be filed or postmarked the next business day

following.’’ (Emphasis added.)).

6 The plaintiff claims that, because the trial court held that the word

‘‘submit’’ was ambiguous, judgment for the taxpayer was compelled as a

matter of law. Because we conclude that ‘‘submit’’ as used in § 12-63c is

unambiguous, the plaintiff’s claim fails. Likewise, we agree with the defendant that the rule of lenity applies only if the statute remains ambiguous

after all sources of legislative intent have been explored. Here, because the

statute is unambiguous in the context of other tax statutes, the rule does

not apply.