alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SERVED: APRIL 10,2013 

·---·--

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

IN THE MATTER OF · 

MAGORIEN HONING & HYDRAULICS 

FAA DOCKET NO. [TO BE ASSIGNED] 

(Civil Penalty Case) 

FDMS No. FAA-2012-0908. 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

. ;-~(1:-.1 . ' t F > ._i: 

-· ~-<-~--~·.-:·\_~~; 

On October 4, 2012, the Federal Aviation Administration ("Complainant") filed a 

Complaint. On September 25, 2012, Magorien Honing & Hydraulics ("Respondent") had filed a 

Request for Hearing. 

Complainant, on AprilS, 2013, withdrew its Complaint, citing settlement. 

14 C.F.R. § 13.215 states: "At any time before or during a hearing, an agency attorney 

may withdraw a complaint or party may withdraw a request for a hearing without the 

consent of the administrative law judge. If an agency attorney withdraws the complaint or 

a party withdraws the request for a hearing and the answer, the administrative law judge 

shall dismiss the proceedings under this subpart with prejudice." 

WHEREFORE, the within filed Withdrawal of Complaint having been read and 

considered, it is ORDERED as follows: 

1. Complainant's Withdrawal of Complaint be and is hereby granted; and 
"'I 2 

2. This proceeding be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 

~e.~~ Richard C. Goodwin 

U.S. Administrative Law Judge 

Attachment- Service List 
3 

SERVICE LIST 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W10001 

Neel Viradia, General Manager 

Magorien Honing & Hydraulics, Respondent 

1212 South Vail A venue 

Montebello, CA 90640 

TEL: 323-723-1151 

FAX: 323-888-1154 

Email: www.magorien.com 

Doug Griffith, Respondent's Counsel 

Law Office of Doug Griffith 

633 W. 5111 St., SE 2800 

Los Angeles, CA 90071 

TEL: 213-223-2092 

FAX: 213-814-4530 

ONE COPY 

Email: doug@douggriffithlaw.com 

Michael F. McKinley, Complainant's Counsel 

Senior Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel 

Enforcement Division, AGC-300 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

TEL: 202-267-7100 

FAX: 202-267-5106 

The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin, Administrative Law Judge 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (E 11-31 0) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: Attorney~ Advisor 202-366-2139 

Staff Assistant 202-366-5121 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

FDMS No. FAA-2012-0908 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

1 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2WIOOO, Washington, 

DC 20591, Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.
### § 152 .15 Pesticide products required to be registered.
top No person may distribute or sell any pesticide product that is not registered under the Act, except as provided in §§ 152 .20, 152 .25, and 152 .30. A pesticide is any substance (or mixture of substances) intended for a pesticidal purpose, i.e. , use for the purpose of preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest or use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant. A substance is considered to be intended for a pesticidal purpose, and thus to be a pesticide requiring registration, if: (a) The person who distributes or sells the substance claims, states, or implies (by labeling or otherwise): (1) That the substance (either by itself or in combination with any other substance) can or should be used as a pesticide; or (2) That the substance consists of or contains an active ingredient and that it can be used to manufacture a pesticide; or (b) The substance consists of or contains one or more active ingredients and has no significant commercially valuable use as distributed or sold other than (1) use for pesticidal purpose (by itself or in combination with any other substance), (2) use for manufacture of a pesticide; or (c) The person who distributes or sells the substance has actual or constructive knowledge that the substance will be used, or is intended to be used, for a pesticidal purpose. 

## Page 1 of 1 Electronic Code of Federal Regulations:

11/17/2011 http ://ecfr. gp oaccess. g ov/c g i/t/text/text-idx?t yp e=simp le;c=ecfr;cc=ecfr;idno=40;re g ion=

...
#### CLARK v. STATE.

No. 15347.

Court , of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 18, 1932.

Jno. R. Francis and Pliney Y. Myers, both of Houston, for appellant.

O’Brien Stevens, Cr. Dist. Atty., and E. T. Branch, both of Houston, and Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, J.

Conviction is for assault with intent to murder; punishment being five years in the penitentiary.

The record is here without statement of facts or bills of exception. In this condition nothing is presented for review.

. The judgment is affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-50858 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee v. ANDRE GIBSON Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 1:02-CR-238-1 Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Andre Gibson, federal prisoner # 28834-180, appeals, pro se, the district c ourt’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of its order granting the Government’s motion to reduce Gibson’s sentence from 108 to 96 months pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). Gibson asserts the Government breached its agreement to recommend a greater reduction. A motion for reconsideration in a criminal proceeding is timely if filed within the period allotted for noticing an appeal; in this instance, with in ten United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D June 25, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk2

days of the order granting the Rule 35(b) motion. S ee United States v. Brewer, 60 F.3d 1142, 1143-44 (5th Cir. 1995); F ED . R. A PP. P. 4(b). Gibson’s motion, however, was filed more than fifteen months after the order. Accordingly, it was untimely. See United States v. Cook, 670 F.2d 46, 48-49 (5th Cir. 1982). AFFIRMED.
FILED U.S. COURT OF AP P EALS E LEVEN T HC IRC UIT NOVEMB ER 26, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CLERK [ DO NO T P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 07- 12571 N on -A rgum entC al endar

________________________ D . C. D o c k e tN o . 0 5 - 0 0 0 3 9 - CR- O C- 1 0 - G RJ U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , P la in tif f - A p p e lle e , v ersu s A M I L C A R B A R R O S - G O M E Z , a .k .a . T o ty , a .k .a . E l N e g r ito , a .k .a . C a r lo s P a lm a r , a .k .a . R o b e rt H ig iu s , D e f e n d an t- A p p e llan t.

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f orthe M i ddl e D i s tr i c tof F l or i da

_________________________ ( N ove m b e r 26, 2007) B efo re B IR C H , D U B IN A an dB L A C K , C i rcu i tJu d g es.2

P E R C U R I A M: D a vi d M e nge r s , appoi nt e d c ouns e l f orA m i l c arB arr os - G om e z , ha s f i l e d a m ot i on t o w i thdr a w on appe a l , s upport e d byabr i e f pr e par e d pur s uantt o A nde r s v. C a l i f orni a , 386 U . S . 738, 87 S . C t . 1396, 18 L . E d. 2d 493 ( 1967) . O uri nde pe nde nt r e vi e w of

the r e c or d c onf

i rm s c ouns e l ’ s a s s e s s m e ntof the r e l a t i ve m e r i t s of

a ny p o te n tia l is s u e s f

o rap p e a l. B e c au s e th e r e c o r dr e v e a ls n o is s u e s o f a r g u ab le m e r it, w e GR AN T c ouns e l ’ s m ot i on t o w i thdr aw a nd AF F I RM B arro s- G o m ez ’s conv i ct i on and sent ence .
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001011449
<NAME> SUBURBAN LODGES OF AMERICA, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          15,273
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      685
<ALLOWANCES>                                       151
<INVENTORY>                                      1,891
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                21,828
<PP&E>                                         279,144
<DEPRECIATION>                                  12,330
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 308,571
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            9,223
<BONDS>                                         84,529
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           154
<OTHER-SE>                                     213,528
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   308,571
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                13,939
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   10,801
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,265
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,323
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,226
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,097
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,097
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.14
        

</TABLE>
#### LEWIS v. UNITED STATES.

No. 7160.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

June 24, 1940.

*490Arthur Roe, U. S. Atty., of Danville, 111., Carl W. Feickert, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Belle-ville, 111., Julius C. Martin, Director, Bureau of War Risk Litigation, Wilbur C. Pickett, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen., and Young M. Smith, Atty., Department of Justice, all of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Philip H. Lewis, of Lawrenceville, 111., and Samuel V. Jinkins, of Danville, 111., for appellee.

Before SPARKS, MAJOR and TREANOR, Circuit Judges.

SPARKS, Circuit Judge.

This appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in a suit on a war risk insurance policy presents the single question whether there was any substantial evidence to support it. The case was presented to the court for determination, upon waiver of jury.

The veteran was discharged from the service in April, 1919, and, unless his policy was matured by the occurrence of total and permanent disability prior to May 31, 1919, it expired as of that date. In entering *judgment in his*favor, the District Court stated: “After a thorough analysis of the evidence I find that plaintiff was at the time of his discharge, and has been at all times since, totally and permanently disabled, that whatever . the disease of the lungs from which he has been and is suffering may be, it is totally and permanently disabling, making it impossible for him to carry on with reasonable continuity any sustained physical or mental effort; that when he worked he should not have done so ; that the labor done by him was dangerous to his health and that his condition at all times has been such that only rest and desisting from exertion were compatible with proper protection of his health.”

We also have carefully analyzed the evidence, and, while we might have been more impressed by that presented by the Government and somewhat less impressed by that of the veteran, had we been triers of the facts, we certainly cannot say that there is no substantial evidence to support the judgment. Since it is not the province of an appellate court to weigh the evidence in the case on appeal, upon finding such substantial support, we must, and we do hereby affirm the judgment of the District Court.
#### Norman J. PFAFF and Frank B. Wallace, Executors of Estate of William L. Wallace, Deceased, Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Appellee.

No. 337.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

July 8, 1940.

Laurence Sovik, of Syracuse, N. Y. (Costello, Cooney & Fearon, of Syracuse, N. Y., of counsel), for appellants.

Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key and Morton K. Rothschild, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before SWAN, AUGUSTUS N. HAND, and PATTERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Decision affirmed.
(logo) Deutsche Bank

 

1761 East St. Andrew Place

Santa Ana, CA 92705-4934

 

Tel 714 247 6000

Fax 714 247 6009 

 

 

ANNUAL STATEMENT AS TOCOMPLIANCE

 

COMM 2015-CCRE25

 

The undersigned, David Co, aDirector of Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, as the CertificateAdministrator (a "Certifying Servicer") under the Pooling andServicing Agreement, dated as of August 1, 2015 (the "Agreement"), byand among, Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation, as Depositor,Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer, CWCapital AssetManagement LLC, as Special Servicer, Wilmington Trust, National Association, asTrustee, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, as Certificate Administrator,Paying Agent and Custodian, and Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as OperatingAdvisor, here by certifies in accordance with Section 10.11 of the Agreement:

 

A) A review of such CertifyingServicer's activities from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016 (the"reporting period") and of such Certifying Servicer's performanceunder the Agreement has been made under such officer's supervision and

B) That, as to the best ofsuch officer's knowledge, based on such review, such Certifying Servicer hasfulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement, in all material respectsthroughout the reporting period.

 

DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANYAMERICAS

as Certificate Administrator

 

/s/ David Co

BY: David Co 

Title:  Director

Date: March 1, 2017
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 62 Engrossed in House (EH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 62

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
 Appointing the day for the convening of the second session of the One 
                       Hundred Eleventh Congress.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the second regular 
session of the One Hundred

              

 Eleventh Congress shall begin at noon on Tuesday, January 5, 2010.

            Passed the House of Representatives December 11, 2009.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
111th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                             H. J. RES. 62

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 Appointing the day for the convening of the second session of the One 
                       Hundred Eleventh Congress.
```
#### LETCHER v. STATE.

No. 2030.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Eastland.

Nov. 10, 1939.

R. Temple Dickson, of Sweetwater, for appellant.

Gerald C. Mann, Atty. Gen., Geo. W. Barcus, M. C. Martin, and Fred Chandler, Assts. Atty. Gen., and Truett Barber, Dist. Atty., of Colorado City, for defendant in-error.

GRISSOM, justice.

This suit was instituted by the State of Texas, under Art. 666 — 29, Vernon’s Tex. Pen.Code 1936, to enjoin Harold Letcher from selling,' etc., intoxicating liquor in a building owned by him in Mitchell County; to declare the building a common nuisance, and for an order closing the place for a period of one year, or until the owner should execute a bond as required by law.

Upon a trial on the merits, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff as prayed for and in accordance with the aforesaid statute. Defendant has appealed and by super-sedeas bond has suspended enforcement of the judgment pending appeal.

Appellant has filed no brief. Appellee has filed a brief and appeared by counsel. We have examined appellee’s brief and the judgment of the court. We find the judgment is such as can be affirmed under the view presented by appellee, and that the record as presented shows no reversible error. Without examining the record further, in accordance with the Courts of Civil Appeals Rule No. 39, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Guaranty Old Line Life Ins. Co. v. Leonard, Tex.Civ.App., 109 S.W.2d 1091.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>
 
EXHIBIT 21



                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
                       ----------------------------------
                                        

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements of
Value Health, Inc. and Subsidiaries on Form S-8 (File Nos. 33-74002, 33-42969
and 33-310695) and on Form S-3 (File Nos. 33-85568, 33-89248 and 33-30082) of
our report dated February 19, 1997 on our audits of the consolidated financial
statements and financial statement schedule of Value Health, Inc. and
Subsidiaries as of December 31, 1996 and 1995 and for each of the three years in
the period ended December 31, 1996, which reports are included in this Annual
Report on Form 10-K.



Coopers & Lybrand
Hartford, Connecticut
March 20, 1997

                                      95
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 188 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 188

    To prohibit the use of Federal funds for the costs of painting 
     portraits of officers and employees of the Federal Government.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 23, 2017

    Mr. Cassidy (for himself, Mr. Johnson, Mrs. McCaskill, and Mrs. 
   Fischer) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To prohibit the use of Federal funds for the costs of painting 
     portraits of officers and employees of the Federal Government.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Eliminating Government-funded Oil-
painting Act'' or the ``EGO Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR PORTRAITS.

    (a) Prohibition.--No funds appropriated or otherwise made available 
to the Federal Government may be used to pay for the painting of a 
portrait of an officer or employee of the Federal Government, including 
the President, the Vice President, a Member of Congress, the head of an 
executive agency, or the head of an office of the legislative branch.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section--
            (1) the term ``executive agency'' has the meaning given the 
        term in section 133 of title 41, United States Code; and
            (2) the term ``Member of Congress'' includes a Delegate or 
        Resident Commissioner to Congress.
                                 <all>
```
#### WARREN v. STATE.

No. 19987.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 7, 1938.

Ray G. Cowsert, of Dimmitt, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s. Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of a violation of the State liquor laws in a dry area, and fined $50.

Appellant complains of the court’s charge in that the trial judge failed and refused to charge the jury the law on circumstantial evidence. It appears from the record that the appellant admitted to some of the witnesses that the beer in his possession belonged to appellant, and thus took the case out of the realm of circumstances. Where there is direct evidence trom any source as to the main fact charged, a charge on circumstantial evidence is not required. A case must rest wholly *302on circumstantial evidence before such charge is required. See Branch’s Penal Code, p. 1039, Sec. 1874.

-The appellant objects to paragraph 1-B of the court’s charge relative to the possession of more than 24 twelve ounce bottles of beer in a dry area being prima facie evidence of such possession for the purpose of sale. The charge is substantially as requested by appellant in his special requested instruction No. 4, and seems-to be a proper instruction as to such law.

There does not appear to us to be any error reflected in the récord,,, and the judgment is affirmed.
**MEMORANDUM**

DATE: November 24, 2014 TO: Carbon Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Docket Id: OAR

–2013
- 0602 FROM: Region 7 , EPA SUBJECT: September 17 2014 , Meeting Regarding Proposed Carbon Power Plan for

Existing Power Plants
**SUMMARY** Josh Tapp and Amy

Bhesania of EPA gave a thorough presentation on September 17 , 2014 , to the members of the Midwest Section of the Air and Waste Management Association. The majority

of the presentation centered on highlighting the four major building blocks in the Carbon Power Plan for Existing Power Plants
. The Carbon Power Plan for Existing Power Plants was proposed on June 2 , 2014
. **ATTENDEES** EPA Region 7: Josh Tapp Amy Bhesania Other Attendees included members of Midwest Section of the Air and Waste Management Association

- attendee list not available.