### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ugus t 20 06 S es sio n



### STA TE OF TENNESS EE v. MI CHAEL DALE RI MM ER

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty

No. 98-01033-34 W. F red Axley, Judge

No. W2004-02240-C CA-R 3-DD 

### - F iled Dece m ber 15, 2006

Capital Appellant Michae l Dale Rimmer appe als as of right his sentenc e of de ath re sulting from the 1997 murde r of Ricc i Ellsworth. I n November 1998, Appellant Rimmer was c onvicted of the ft of pr op e rt y , a g g ra vate d ro bb e ry a nd pr e me dit a te d fi rs t de g re e mur de r. He wa s sent enced to death f or the murde r convic tion. On direct a ppeal, a panel of t h i s C o u rt aff

irmed Appe llant Rimm er’ s convictions but, concluding that the sentenc ing ve rdict wa s “en i gm ati c and unc erta in,”

vacated the sentenc e of de ath and r emande d for a new se ntencing hearing. See State v . Michae l D. Rimmer, No. W1999-00637-CCA-R3-DD, 2001 WL 567960, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, May 25, 2001). Acc ording ly
, the case was rema nded to the Criminal Court for Shelby Countyfor

re- sentenc ing. A t the conclusion of the r e-se ntencing hearing in January 2004, th e j u ry found the prese nce of

one statutory

ag g ravating c ircumstance
, i.e ., that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more fe lonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person, T.C.A. § 39-13-204( i)(2) (1997). The jury further determined that the ag g ravating c ircumstance outweig hed the mitigating circ umstances be y ond a re asonable doubt and imposed a sentenc e of death. The trial court a pproved the sentenc ing ve rdict. Appe llant Rim mer timely appea ls presenting for our revie w the following issues: (1) whe ther the trial court erre d in deny ing the motion for r ecusa l; (2) whethe r the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in de nying the m oti on fo r a c on tin ua nc e ; ( 3) wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in excluding mitigation evidence ; (4) whe ther the pr osecutor e ng ag ed in m isconduct; (5) w hether the jury ins truc tio n o n r e a so na

ble do ub t wa s er

ro r; (6 ) wh e the r the Ap pe lla nt kno wi ng ly a ndvo lun tari ly waived his rig ht to testify ; (7) whether it was error for the jury to be informed that the Appellant had been on “ death r ow;” (8) whether the jury verdic t was c o m p l et e; (9 ) whe ther c umulative err or require s reve rsal; and ( 10) wh et h er t he Te nnessee death pe nalty statutes are constitutional. After revie w, we f

ind no err or of law requiring reve rsal. According ly
, we affirm the jury ’s impositi on of the sentenc e of de ath in this case.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J

. , d el i vere d the opinion of the court, in which, J OS EP H M. T I PTON , P.J ., and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., joined.-2-

B ro c k M e hle r, Na sh vil le , Te nn e sse e , an d J os e ph Ozm e nt, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla nt, Michae l D. Rimm er.

Paul G . Su mm ers , At torne y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Ma rk Da vid so n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Ge n eral, and Thomas D. H ender son, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

P roof at the Re -Sentencing Trial

I n 19 75
, Do na ld E ug e ne El lsw orth m arrie d Ri c c i E lls wo rth. Tw o c hil dr e n w e re bo rn of thi s marria g e. The couple divorced in 1977, then resumed an “off and on” relationship which persisted until 1984. Their separ ation was attributed to his drug pr oblem and her drinking problem. During their sepa ration, Ricci Ellsworth lived for a time with the Appellant, Michae l D ale Rimm er. I n 1994, Ricci and Dona ld Ellsworth remar ried.

I n Fe bruary1997, forty -four -y ear -old Ricci Ellsworth was e mploy ed as a n auditor at the Memphis I nn located on Ma con Cove. S h e worke d the nig ht shift, 11:00 p.m. t o 7:00 a.m. Her husband, Dona ld Ellsworth, who was in the construc tion business, worked during th e d ay

. I t was customary

for Ricc i Ellsworth to b e going to wor k when Dona ld Ellsworth was re turning home. This was the c ase on Fe bruary 7th. Ricci Ellsworth kissed her husba nd g oodnight a nd drove to wor k in her 1989 white D odg e Dynasty

.
On Fe bruary

7, 1997, a ra ilroad cr ew with CSX Transportation sta y ed at the Me mphis I nn. On Fe bruary

8th, the crew manag ement service attempted to contact the c lerk a t the Memphis I nn to notify the crew t h at a t ra i n was re ady . No one a nswere d at the motel. I n response , Ray mond Summers, an employ ee of CSX Transportation, we nt to the motel.
Up o n h i s arrival at the Memphis I nn, Mr. Summers observe d that the door g oing into the of fi c e wa s o pe n but that no per so n wa s visi ble

. He he ardwate r r un nin g a ndfo llo we d th e so un d to the bathroom. He started to turn the water off and rea liz ed that there was blood on the sink, on the wal l, on the toi le t bo wl a ndon tow e ls. Mr . Su mme rs le ft the bu ild ing a ndre po rt e d h is f ind ing to Shelby County deputies who had just finished eating brea kfast at a near

by restaur ant. The off

icer s returne d to the Memphis I nn with Mr. Summers and sec ured the scene

.
L inda Spence r, the g ener al manag er of the Memphis I nn, lived on the motel premises. She

was a wake ned by

the deputies who informed her that she neede d to go to the f ront offic e. Ar

riving at the o ff i ce , s h e noticed that the door wa s open, a c up of cof fee was sitting on the de sk, and

every thing wa s in order. Howeve r, as she walked back towards her office , she noticed tha t the are a “looked like somebody had been i n a fig ht.” She then we nt into the bathroom. “Ther e wa s blood

every wher e. On the w alls, on the floor . . . puddles of blood. We’re not talking just spots, there we re pu dd le s o f b loo d. ” She no tic e d th a t th e sin k w a s c ra c ke d. Ms. Spencer repo rt e d th a t $6 00 .0 0 in cash w a s mi s s in g f

r o m th e o f

f ic e

. Sh e a d d e d th a t s o me “ to w e ls
, b a thmats a n d [t h r e e s e ts o f]-3-

sheets” w ere missing from the stora g e room. Ms. Spence r obse rved that Ricci Ellsworth’s car , a white Dodg e Dynasty , was still at the hotel; however , Ricci Ell s wo rt h wa s not found on the pr e mis e s.

Ms. Spe nc e r e xpla ine d that Ric c i E lls wo rth’ s jo b d uti e s a s n ig ht a ud ito r a lso re qu ir e d h e r t o reg ister g uests while on duty . Ms. Spencer explained that Ricci Ellsworth should have be en behind a locke d, secur ed door w hile she wa s working

. At 2:30 a.m., Donald Ellsworth was awa kened by police office rs looking for Ricci Ellsworth. The police office rs took Donald Ell sworth t o the M emphis I nn and informe d him that “it was an ong oing c rime sce ne.” A t this poi nt, Mr. Ellsworth l ea rn ed that “the re ha d been a robbery and that there was b lo o d a t th e s c e n e

. . . a n d th a t th e y h a d n ’ t b e e n ab le to lo c a te [R ic c i E ll s w o r th .]” Mr. Ellsworth informed the office rs t hat, “if this wasn’t a random robbery . . . they neede d to be looking for Micha el Dale Rimm er.”
Memphis Police Offic er Robert G. M oore was called to the scene at the Memphis I nn. He observe d that some of the blood on the ba throom floor “looke d like people trie d to wipe the blood up.” Of fice r Moore added that there a ppear ed to be “ drag marks coming out of the bath room out int o th e of

fi c e are a .” Of

fi c e r M oo re a lso loc a te d a g re e n c ig are tte lig hte r b e ne a th a blo od y tow e l. Offic er Moor e identified a “g old colored ring w ith the black setting ” as be ing f ound in the are a betwee n the bathroom and the office

. A cigar ette butt was found g oing out of t he equipment room into the office are a.

Se rg e a nt Rob e rt She mw e ll, a ssi g ne d to the ho mic ide de pa rt me nt, wa s c a lle d to the Me mph is I nn. He late r plac ed the na mes of Ricci Ellsworth and the suspect, Appe llant R i m m er , in the National Crime I nformation Center

. Serg eant Shemwe ll also rece ived information that a vehicle was obser ved that nig ht backe d up to the night e ntranc e of the Memphis I nn with t h e d o or slightly opened. T he vehic le was described as a

Toy ota or other

small model car.

O n th e mo r n in g o f

M ar c h 5
, 1 9 9 7
, M ic h a e l D e w e y A d a ms , a

Jo h n s o n Co u n ty , I ndiana, Sheriff’ s Deputy , was on tra ffic patrol. During his shift, Deputy Adams stopped the driver of a 1988 maroon Honda Acc ord with light c olor interior, tra veling 72 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. Two people w ere in the vehicle. Deputy Adams obser ved the driver of the vehicle e x it the vehicle and beg an wa lking towa rds hi m. Deputy Adams, usi ng his vehicle’s P.A. unit, advised the driver to r eturn to the ve hicle. The driver r eturne d to his vehicle and place d both hands on the trunk of the c ar. Th e drive r p ro du c e d a Mis sis sip pi drive r’ s lic e ns e , wh ic h id e nti fi e d h im a s th e Ap pe lla nt, Michae l Dale Rimmer.
DeputyAd a ms a d v is e d A p p e ll a n t Ri mm e r to r e tu r n to th e s a f e ty o f h is v e h ic le
, w h ile he returne d to his patrol car and ran a check on the Appellant’s driver’ s license a nd vehicle ta g number.T h e H on da wa s r epor t ed s t ol en f r om a r es i den ce i n M emph i s i n e ar l y J an u ar y 1997. 1

-4- The c heck of

the license plate revea led t hat t he Honda Acc ord was stolen. A check of the Appellant 1

reve aled that he was wanted for que stioning in a homicide in Memphis, Tenne ssee. The information that Deputy

Adams had stopped A ppellant Rimmer was re lay ed to Memphis law enf orce ment and another office r wa s sent to the scene to assist Deputy Adams. Afte r a te st revea led that the Appe llant had a blood a lcohol content of .06, the office r pl ace d the Appellant under arre st for possession of a stolen vehicle a nd public intox ication.

A sea rch of the Honda Acc ord reve aled numerous hotel re ceipts and pa wn tickets re flec ting the route tra veled by

the Appell an t af

ter the F ebrua

ry 7, homicide. Specific ally , the following

rec eipts were found. A rec eipt dated Fe bruary 8, 1997, from My rtle, Mississippi . A re ceipt date d Fe bruary 13, 1997, from Mi canopy , Florida . A re ceipt fr om Gree nvalley , Missouri, dated Fe bruary 15, 1997. A re ceipt fr om Casper, Wy oming, dated Fe bruary 17, 1997. Rece ipts dated Fe bruary 17 and 18, 1997, fr om Missoul a, Montana . The Appe llan t t h en trave led to Vac aville, California, a s evidenc ed by

a re ceipt date d Fe bruary

25, 1997. A receipt from San Fr ancisc o, California, wa s dated Fe bruary 26, 1997. The Appellant then trave led along the Mexican border to Blythe, California, on Fe bruary 28, 1997. He then he aded e ast, stopping in Casa G rande , Arizona, on Marc h 1, 1997, and Be rnado, Te x as, on Mar ch 3, 1997. On Ma rch 5, 1997, he was stopped in Franklin, I ndiana.
Memphis Poli ce Ser g eants Ashton, Shemwell, and Wilkinson traveled to Franklin, I ndiana, to i nte rv ie w A pp e llant R imm e r. Se rg e a nt A sh ton te sti fi e d th a t th e Ap pe lla nt a g reed to tal k with them. He a dded that the Appe llant a ppear ed relieve d when he was informed that the offic ers wa nted to talk to him about the stol en Honda Acc ord. The of

fice rs noticed a

chang e in the Appe llant’s demea nor, howe ver, w h en they advised him that they

also wante d to discuss Ricci Ellsworth. Serg eant Ashton re lated that “y ou could see this anx iety come ove r him . . . he g ot rea l excited and ag itated.”

The off icer s informed Appe llant Rim mer that Ricci Ellsworth wa s missi ng . Appellant Rimm e r r e sp on de d “ [o]h that c a n b e c le are d u p, sh e ’s pr ob ably g on e ho me to h e r m ot her in Alabama , she does it all the time.” The office rs then informe d Appellant that it appea red that Ricci Ellsworth was dea d. To this, the Appellant re sponded, “[s]he’s not dead, y ou don’t have the body .” Ap pe lla nt R imm e r d e nie d a ny kn ow le dg e of

a nythi ng abo ut the ho mic ide . H e a dd e d th a t it wa s “ his nature just to get up a nd leave [Memphis ] l ike that.”

Th e of fi c e rs int e rv ie we d Ri mme r the fo llo wi ng da y a ndob se rv e d that Rimme r w a s a g a in “very ag itated and hostile towar ds [t he off icer s]. . . .” S er gea n t As h ton expl ained that Appe llant Rimm er w ould “just have a n out-burst and start cussing us and scr eaming and hollering . . . .” During the interview , the Appellant informed the off icer s that his sist er w as being committed to L akeside Hospital as a r esult of the investig ation. Appellant R immer also “took issue” with the investig ators talking to his brother , Richard.-5-

Serg eant Ashton e x plained that Appe llant Rim mer ha d been rele ased from prison only a fe w months prior to his hastydeparture fr om Memphis. He furthe r testified that the A ppellant’s employ er informed him that Appellant Rimmer left in such a hur ry that he left all of his tools. The Appellant had only

been e mploy ed at his present job for a short time, and he lef t without picking up his pay chec k. Serg eant Ashton added that Appellant R immer had also left his clothing and “stuff” in a neat folded pile beside the bed in the room he occupie d at his sister’s house.
Appellant Rimm er was returne d from I ndiana back to Shelby County
, Tennes s ee , i n an extradition van. En route to Tenne ssee, Appe llant Rimm er “stole the van and kidnapped three other inmates and took the troopers and county deputies there on

. . . a four hour ru n , b ef o re h e w as appre hended.” Prior to this attempt, Appellant Rimm er had attempted to escape f rom the Johns on County , I ndiana jail. I nside his cell in J ohnson County
, two “shanks” wer e discove red by Serg eant She m w e l l

. M o r e o v e r , d u r i n g h i s o r i g i n a l tr i a l i n S h e l b y C o u n t y , t h e A p p e l l a n t h a d a B i b l e in h is possession which containe d the outline of a ha ndcuff key . The Appe llant also attempted to esca pe fr om the She lby

Cou nty Jail by kn oc kin g ou t se ve ra l w ind ow s.

F r a n k Sa mu e l B a e tc h e l, a f o r e n s ic e xa mi n e r e mp lo y e d b y th e F e d e r a l B urea u of I nvestig ation, rec eived a

seale d envelope containing “a c utting fr om a t o we l t h at came from the hotel, . . .[a] car

pet sample fr om the [Appellant’s] v eh i cl e.

. . , fabric from the ba ck seat of the vehicle, [and] some swabs fr om the seat be lt in the bac k seat of the car .” Mr. B aetc hel per formed DNA pr ofiling on thesamples ac cording to F.B .I . protocol. He determined that “the DNA t ypes at the v ario u s lo c a ti o n s w e r e th e s a me in a ll o f th o s e s a mp le s , c o n s is te n t w ith e a c h o f those having come f rom the same individual.” Mr. Baetc hel also rec eived a sample of blood from the victim’s mother, Mrs. F loy d, and a pa p smear pr eviously

obtained fr om the victim. The DNA pr ofiles of the

sa mpl e s ta

ke n f ro m th e Ap pe lla nt’ s v e hic le we re c on sis te nt w ith be ing a bio log ic a l of fs pring of Mr s. Floy d. The DN A profile taken from the pap smear wa s the same ty pe as in the blood stains in the Appellant’s automobile and was c onsistent with the DNA cutting from the towe l.

J ennife r Eakin, a

specia l ag ent with the F ed er al Bu reau of I nvestig ation, assisted the Memphis Police Depa

rtment with pr ocessing and org anizing the evidenc e. Ag ent Eakin c ollected the evidence g ather ed by

the Memphis Police Depa rtment, i.e. , pe rs on a l be lon g ing s of the vic tim ; evidenc e g athe red by

the Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation, i.e., evidenc e fr om the defe ndant’s

ve hic le a nde vid e nc e c oll e c te d at th e c ri me sc e ne; a ndthe vic tim ’s pa p s me ar o btaine d f

ro m a laboratory

in Southhaven, Mississ ippi. She then packa g ed the collected items and f orwa rded the evidenc e to the F .B.I . laboratory in Washington, D.C.

I n 1989, Appellant Rimmer was c onvicted of f irst deg ree burg lary
, ag g ravated assault and rape of R icci Ell sworth. I n 1990, Donald Ellsworth and Ricc i Ellsworth resumed their r elationship, and they rema rried in 1994, ha ving both ove rcome their individual problems. Whil e inca rce rate d fo r the c ri me s c omm itt e d a g a ins t Ric c i E lls wo rth, Ap pe lla nt R imm e r d isc us se d R i c c i E lls wo rth w ith two fellow inmates, Rog er L eScure and W illiam Conaley

. L eScure and Appe llant Rim mer wor ked toge th e r in th e main te n a n c e d e p ar tm e n t o f th e p r is o n

. A p p e ll a n t Ri mm e r in f o r me d L e Sc u r e that Ricci Ellsworth had stopped sending him money

. Appellant Rimm er also indicated that “when he-6-

g ot out he was g oing to kill the . . . ‘[f]ucking bitch.’ ” L eScure “under stood tha t she was the r eason [Ap pe lla nt R imm e r] wa s in the re fo r, a ny way , a t th e tim e .” Th e Ap pe lla nt a lso “ ta lke d q uit e a bit of wa y s to ge t rid of bodies

. . . .” Willi am Conaley knew Rhonda Panne ll, a relative of Ricci Ellsworth. Appellant Rimmer had commented on some photogr aphs of Conaley ’s which pictur ed Rhonda Parnell. The two men re alized t h at t hey had mutual ac quaintance s. Appellant Rimmer informed Conale y

about a lawsuit invol ving Ricc i Ellsworth’s son and how the two of them wer e g o i n g t o b e c o m i n g i n t o s o m e m o n e y. A p p e l l a n tR i m m e r p l a n n e d o n g e t t i n g s o m e o f t h e m o n e y. He informed Conaley that “if he didn’t g et that money he would kill her .” On one oc casion whe n Conaley was g ra n t ed a fur lough, A ppellant Rimmer asked that a messag e be r elay ed to Ricci Ellsworth about the money he wa s d u e an d t he death threat. The thirty -y ear -old Appellant wa s rele ased f rom Depa rtment of Corre ction custody in October

1996.

I nformation was available throug h prison rec ords that Ricci Ellsworth had visited Appe llant Rimm er at t h e No rt h west Corre ctional Center during the first sever al y ear s of his sentence

. Howeve r, Serg eant Shemwe ll related that Ricci Ellsworth stopped visiti ng the Appellant whe n she

rema rried D onald Ellsworth.

Ros s H e rrin, a n e mpl oy e e of the She lby Cou nty Cr imi na l Court Cler k’ s Of fi c e , te sti fi e d th a t,

on June 10 , 1 98 5, Ap pe lla nt R imm e r w a s c on vic te d u nd e r ind ic tme nt numbe r 85- 00 44 8 of a ssa ult with intent to commit robbery with a dea dly

wea pon. Mr. Her

rin furthe r re lated that, under indictment 85- 00449, Appellant Rimmer enter ed a g uiltyplea to ag g ravated assault. F or these two of fe ns e s, Ap pe lla nt R imm e r r e c e ive d c on c ur re nt s e nte nc e s o f f

ive y e ars c on fi ne me nt. Mr . H e rrin further related that, on J u n e 6 , 1989, Appellant Rimmer enter ed g uiltypleas to one c ount of ag g ravated assault, one c ount of first deg ree burg lary

and one c ount of rape under indictments, 89- 02746, 89-02737 and 89- 02738. The indictments in these off enses r elated that Ricci Ellsworth was the victim. Appellant Rimmer rec eived a n eff ective se ntence of ten y ear s for these crimes.

T. J . Helldorfe r, a M em p h is Pol ice Of fice r, testified that in the c ourse of investigating the disappea ranc e of Ricc i Ellsworth, he contac ted the Appe llant’s brother, Richa rd Rimmer. During

a c on ve rs a tio n, Ric ha

rdRimm e r a dmi tte d th a t th e Ap pe lla nt h a d b e e n to his ho us e a t app ro xima te ly 9:00 a.m. on Fe bruary 8, 1997. Furthermore , Richard Rimmer ac knowledg ed that the Appe llant had been to his house in the Honda Acc ord and that there w as a shove l in the back se at. Appellant Rimm er pla ced the shovel ag ainst the house and the n inquired as to how to g et blood out of the bac k seat of a car . Appellant Rimmer went inside the house and cle aned up be cau s e h e h ad “mud a nd stuff” on his shoes.” Appellant Rimmer then lef t. At some point after the disappea ranc e of Ricc i Ellsworth was broadc ast on television, Richard Rimm er and a friend g ot rid of the shovel by placing it i n a du mps te r at a n a

pa rt me nt co mpl e x. Of

fi c e r He lld or fe r se arc he d Ric ha rdRimm e r’ s p ro pe rt y located in Ne sbitt, Mississ ippi, fiftee n miles from Memphis. A sear ch of this prope rty with cada ver dog s and a helicopter with the Flora sy stem (an infra- red heat detec tion sy stem) failed to r evea l the body of Ricci Ellsworth.

Dar lene Sills, the Appellant’s g irlfriend until the ni g ht prior to t he murde r, informe d office rs that A pp e llan t Ri mm er had take n h e r t o Pl a ntatio n Po int on Ar ka bu tla L ake . Sh e state d th a t th is-7-

“wa s a plac e that [the Appellant] liked to go to get ri gh t with the world and smoke his dope.” Offic er H elldorfe r stated that they sear ched this a rea on Arka

butla L ake, but this sear ch also fa iled to reve al the victim’s body

.
Samera Z avar o, a for ensic scie ntist i n the serolog y DNA d e p a

r tment of the Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation, examined the maroon Honda Acc ord automobi le. Ms. Z avar o determined that the blood stains found in the Appellant’s Honda Acc ord we re huma n blood.

Donald Ellsworth desc ribed Ri cci Ellsworth as a “very g ood person.” She had chang ed her

way s. She ha d fou nd a c hu rc h tha t she ha d att e nd e d for se ve n or ei g ht y e ars . She wa s in vo lve d in priso n mini stry a nd wa s a g oo d, kin d a ndc ari ng pe rs on . M r. El lsw orth e xpla ine d th a t he los t hi s wife a nd their childre n had lost their mother. He stated that Ricci’s murder was e specia lly hard on their daug hter Tr acy , who was f ourtee n at the time.

Reca lling his wife’ s relationship with Appellant Rimmer, Mr. Ellsworth stated that he w as not happy with the rela tionship and he was “worrie d about i t.” He ex plained that “there ha d been fig hts and there had bee n trouble and the police had be en involved and Ricc i had b ee n hurt in the past by Michae l.” Mr. Ellsworth ac knowledg ed that during this ti me Ricci wa s drinking.

On cr oss-ex am i n at i on, Mr. Ellsworth admitted that he ha d found some photog raphs of Appellant Rimmer locate d in a box i n his home. He maintaine d that the phot og raphs did not make h i m j ea l o u s as the photog raphs we re taken bef ore he and Ricci ha d g otten back tog ether . Mr. Ellsworth additionally

stated that Ricci had visited A ppellant Rimm er while he wa s in prison in the

early 1990’s. Mr. El lsworth admitted that he was familiar with his wife’ s work ar ea, but maintaine d that he seldom visited her at her plac e of e mploy ment.

Whil e Mr. Ellsworth stated that the last time he saw Appellant Rimm er was be fore he had g ott e n b a c k to g e the r w ith his wi fe , h e c ou ld not state the la st time that Ricc i had se e n th e Ap pe lla nt. He a lso stated that, during the t ime that Ricci was living with Appellant Rimmer, Mr. Ellsworth was g iven “e merg ency , temporary custody of the c hildren.” Mr. Ellsworth denied a ny alleg ation that he was involved in the murde r of Ricc i Ellsworth.

The victim’s mother, Ma rjorie Fl o y d
, a resident of Flore nce, A labama, te stified that Ricci

wa s o ne of fo ur sis te rs

. Mr s. F loy d la st sa w Ric c i on Janu ary 28 , 1 99 7 at a n a nn ive rs ary din ne r h e ld in Corinth, Mississ ippi. Mrs. Floy d rec alled having long telephone conversations with Ricci on a

re g ula r b a sis

.
Mrs. Floy d stated t hat R icci will never be replace d and that she wil l never stop grieving for her. She e x plained that ther e could be no closure be cause Ricci’s body was ne v er fo u n d and the family could not bury

her. Mr s. Floy d stated that her daug hter ha d become a Christian and wa s active in the prison minist ry . She described her daug hter a s a trusting person. She a dded that the murder ha d a sig nificant impac t on Ricci’s children.-8-

On cr oss-examination, Mrs. Floy d stated that she c ould not part i cularly rec all Appellant Rimm e r. She a lso state d th a t he r d a ug hte r h a d b e e n ma rrie d to th ree di ffe re nt m e n, Do na ld Ellsworth, Paul Vickey

and Tommy

West. Mrs. Floy d also related that she wa s awa re tha t Ricci had visited Appellant Rimmer when he was in prison.

L inda Sp e n c e r , th e g e n e r a l m a n a g e r o f th e M e mp h is I n n , d e s c r ib e d Ri c c i a s b e in g an “excellent” e mploy ee, “ [h] onest,” a nd “[d] ependa ble.”

Willi a m Co na le y

state d th a t he te sti fi e d ag a ins t App e lla nt Rimm e r at his orig ina l tria l. B oth Con a le y a ndAp pe lla nt R imm e r w e re be ing he ld in the She lby Cou nty Jail . Wh ile Con a le y

wa s in the shower

are a, Appe llant Rim mer attacked him.

I n mitigation, t he Appellant prese nted t he testi mony of Dr. A nn Marie Cha

rvat, a mitigation sp e c ia lis t. Dr

. Cha

rv a t te sti fi e d th a t sh e int e rv ie we d A pp e lla nt R imm e r, du ri ng wh ic h s he wa s a ble to o btain a c hr on olo g y

of his lif e . Sh e a lso int e rv ie we d th e Ap pe lla nt’ s mo the r andfathe r. As a result o f h er inve stigation, Dr. Charvat made numer ous findings a nd provided the f ollowing sy no ps is:
Mr. and Mrs. Rimmer, they met eac h o t h er when she wa s fiftee n and he w as eig hteen. And her fathe r opened restaur ants and had g one to Milan, Tenne ssee a nd opened up a

restaur ant wher e she me t Mr. Rimm er. A nd h er fathe r tried to kee p them apart and moved her back to Memphis, but he followed. And the[y ] m arried. She wa s qu ite y ou ng a nd sh e ha d thr e e c hil dr e n, in qu ic k su cces si on . [ Ap pe lla nt] Rimm er w as the middle child. He has an olde r sister and a y oung er br other.

And he wor

ked in the field of paint and body . . . . He f ix ed the outside of c ars. And

ear l y o n , t houg h, he tra veled with his family from Memphis to Houston for wor k. A n d w h i l e t h e y w e r e t h e r e , t h e r e w a s d i f f i c u l t y.

He e nded up being arr ested. It was re latively minor.

. . . .
I t r e su lte d in pr ob a tio n, wh ic h h e su c c e ssf ull y c omp leted

. An d th e n th e famil y moved to I ndianapolis. That’s wher e Mrs. Rimm er’ s mother wa s. And they ended up g etting a

divorce there

.
I n fac t, I think that they wer e there t wo t o three y ear s. Michae l and his sister started

sc ho ol i n Ind ia na

po lis . A ndthe n th e famil y re c on ne c te d, the y re marrie d andthe y

a ll move bac k to H orn L ake, actua lly the first place that they lived is the Southaven are a, next door to i t. They

moved bac k to Mississ ippi and Mr. Rimmer g ot a job working wi th the City

of Me mph is a ndke pt that jo b f or tw e nty -s ix y e ars

.-9-

Mr s. Rimm e r w a s a

ho me -m ake r, up un til , I be lie ve Mic ha e l Rimme r w a s p ro ba bly

abo ut e le ve n y e ars old . Sh e stay e d h ome wi th h e r c hil dr e n p ri or to that.

Dr . Ch arv a t te sti fi e d th a t th e Ap pe lla nt b e g a n h a vin g dif fi c ult ie s in sch oo l aro un d th e fi fth g rade . This is the same time that Mrs. Rimmer went bac k to work. Most o f t h e p roblems wer e be ha vio ra l; h e be c a me dif fi c ult to m a na g e in the c la ssr oo m a nde xclu de d h ims e lf fr om c la ss
a c tiv iti e s. Dr . Ch arv a t de sc ri be d th e Ap pe lla nt a s a “ C” stu de nt; ho we ve r, sh e op ine d th a t he wo uld ha ve be ne fi tte d f

ro m sp e c ia l e du c a tio n c la sse s. Th e Ap pe lla nt d ro pp e d o ut o f s c ho ol in th e nin th g rade

. P ri o r to this, however , the Appellant wa s hospitaliz ed during a time when his father wa s being t re ated f

or a me ntal illness. The Appellant wa s hospitaliz ed at lea st three times as a n
a do le sc e nt. On e of

the se ho sp ita lizatio ns wa s th e dir e c t re su lt of the Ap pe llant’ s in vo lve me nt w ith an older woman, possibly

a tea cher . Once he lef

t schoo l
, t h e Ap p ell ant beg an wor king at a g as station and worke d at his father ’s shop.

At ag e eightee n, the Appellant was arre sted for a g g ravated assault. This ar rest ar ose whe n he and his friends attempted to purc hase some ma rijuana a nd became involved in a fig ht. The Ap pe lla nt w a s th e on ly

on e inv olv e d in the inc ide nt t o b e se nt t o p ri so n. Th e oth e rs we re g ive n ti me in the county

jail or rec eived pr obation. The Appellant reported that, while he was in prison, he met

a n o l d e r m a n , J i m m y W a t s o n

. W a t s o n i n tr o d u c e d t h e A p p e l l a n tt o R i c c i E l l s w o r t h

. A p p ar e n t l y, Ricci Ellsworth wa s s eeing J immyWatson at the time, but decided that she w ould prefe r a relationship wit h the Appellant. The Appe llant and his family members r eporte d that the Appellant’ s time with Ri cci Ellsworth wa s the happiest time in his life. The Appe llant lived with Ri cci a nd her children.

Whil e Dr . Charvat state d that the Appellant ha d enter ed a g uiltyplea to ra ping Ricc i El lsw orth, sh e un de rs too d tha t the re la tio ns hip be tw e e n th e tw o c on tin ue d e ve n a ft e r this inc ide nt. The re lationship resumed eve n while the Appe l l an t wa s serving his sentence for the c rime. Ricci Ellsworth visited the Appellant while he w as in prison and wa s even ide ntified on the appr oved visitor lis t as the Appe llant’s common law wife. Christopher and Tra cy

Ellsworth, Ricci Ellsworth’s

c hil dr e n, we re a lso na me d o n th e lis t.

Ba rbar a Dy cus ministered to the Appe llant at W est Tenne ssee St ate Penitentiary . Ms. Dy cus
a lso kn e w R ic c i El lsw orth thr ou g h h e r r e la tio ns hip a t B olt on F ull Go sp e l Ch ur c h. Ric c i E lls wo rth ha d in fo rm e d M s. Dy c us that sh e wa s e ng a g e d to Ap pe lla nt R imm e r w hil e he wa s c on fi ne d at We st Tenne ssee State Penitentiary in 1993. Ms. Dy cus further re lated that the Appe llant attended e very service that she administere d on Saturday evening s. Appellant Rimm er play ed music, wrote g ospel song s and sang during the servic es.

Thomas Mac h visited t h e Appe llant while he wa s on death row at Riverbend Ma x imum Security I nstitut ion throug h his involveme nt in the prison minist ry

. Mach state d that the Appellant has done a mazing thing s once he was re m o v ed fr om death row . The Appe llant got e ighte en other men intere sted in the Bible. Ma ch stated that he believe d that the Appellant ha d chang ed.T h e re c o rd su g g e sts tha t T o m m y W e st a n d T o m m y V o yle s a re the sa m e p e rs o n

. 2

-10- Nathanie l Hatche r met the Appe llant while he wa s serving as the p rison minist er in 1998. Hatche r desc ribed t h e Ap p el l ant as “a fa ntastic g uy .” He added that the Appellant had a g ood positive attitude a nd he and the Appellant became frie nds. Hatche r also desc ribed how the Appellant had impacte d the other me n in his unit . Hatche r maintained his assert i o n t h at h e admired the Appellant eve n considering the Appellant’s convictions for a g g ravated assault, ra pe, burg lary

and murder.

Th e Ap pe lla nt’ s mo the r, Sa nd r a Rimm e r, state d th a t th e Ap pe lla nt w a s th irty -s e ve n y e ars old at the time of the r e-se ntencing hearing. Mr s. Rimm er e x plained that the Appe llant and Ricci El lsw orth b e g a n a

ro ma nti c re la tio ns hip in 1 98 6 o r 1 98 7. Th e Ap pe lla nt the n b e g a n li vin g wi th Ricci Ellsworth and her

children. Mr s. Rimm er e x plained that, at one point, the Appellant moved out of Ricci’s home and J immy Watson, Ricci’ s former boy friend, moved back in with Ri cci. The n, afte r a w hile, J immywould move out and the Appe llant w ould move back in with Ricci. Sandra Rimm er r elated that, during this ti me, b o t h t h e Appellant and Ricc i were drinking , smoking marijuana and “I don’t know what else.”

Sandra Rimmer re ported that in 1989 or 1990, the Appe llant was ar rested f or assaulting and

r ap i n g R i c c i E l l s w o r t h

. M r s

. R i m m e r e xp l a i n e d t h a t , w h e n t h e A p p e l l a n t w a s i n j a il f orthe se offe nses, Ricci Ellsworth married Tommy Voy les. Sh e al s o s t ated that, although a ccuse d of

2 brea king into Ricc i E llsworth’s home, the Appellant had a key to the house and his belong ings w ere inside.

Mrs. Rimmer also stated that she took Ricci Ellsworth to visit t h e Ap pellant in prison. Du ri ng the drive to the priso n, Ric c i El lsw orth c on fi de d to S a ndra Rimm e r that th e Ap pe lla nt r e a lly did not rape he r. Ricci Ell sworth ex plained that she, Tomm y Voy les and the Appellant had g otten into a fig ht. Mrs. Rimm er related that Ricci Ellsworth stated that Tommy Voy les had “ pushed her ” int o f ili ng the c ha

rg e s a g a ins t th e Ap pel lan t. Mrs. Rim me r f urthe r d e sc ri be d th e re la tio ns hip betwee n the Appellant and Ricci Ellsworth as boy friend and g irlfriend, e ven af ter he was c onvicted of ra ping he r. Mrs. Rimmer testified that the Appellant was rele ased from prison in October 1996.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

ins truc te d the jury re g ard ing the statut ory a g g ra vatin g a ndmit ig a tin g fa c tor s:

Tenne ssee law provides that no sente nce of death or sentenc e of imprisonment for life without the possibil ity of par ole shall be imposed by a jury , but upon unanimous finding that the state ha s proven be y ond a reasonable doubt the exist ence of one or more of the statutory

ag g rav at ing c ircumstance s which shall be limited to the fo l l o wi n g:
(1) The defe ndant was previously convicted of

one, or more felonies other than the prese nt char g e. The statutory elements of w hich involve the use of violenc e to the per son.-11-

The state is re ly ing upon c rimes of a ssault to rob . . . ag g ravat ed assault . . ., ag g ravated assault . . ., and ra pe . . ., which is, or a

re, a felony involving the use of violence to the pe rson.
(2) T h e murde r wa s knowing ly committed, solicited, directed, or

a ide d b y the de fe nd a nt, wh ile the de fe nd a nt ha d a subs ta nti a l r ole in

co m m i t t i n g, o r a t t em p t i n g t o c o m m i t , o r w as fl ee i n g af t erh av i n g a
s u b s t a n t i a l r o l e i n c o m m i t t i n g , o r a t t e m p t i n g t o c o m m i ta n y r o b b e r y.

Members of

the jury
, the Court ha s rea d to y ou the ag g ravated circ umstances whic h the la w r e qu ir e s y ou to c on sid e r i f y ou fi ndpr oo f b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t.

You shall not consider a ny other fa cts or cir cum s t an ce s as an a g g ravated circ umstance in de ciding whether the death penalty
, or imprisonment for life w ithout possibili ty

of par ole, would be a

ppropriate punishment in thi s case

. Mitigating circ umstances. Tennessee law provide s that in arriving at the punishment the jury shall consider as pre viouslyindicated, a ny mitigating circ umstances r aised b y t h e e v i d en ce , wh i ch s h al l i n cl u d e, b u tar e n o tl i m i t ed t o t h e f o l l o wi n g:
(1) Any

attempts by

the def endant to pa

rticipate in e fforts at reha

bilitation while incar cer ated. (2 ) An y

e vid e nc e wh ic h te nd s to c a st d ou bt o n th e de fe nd a nt’ s g uil t. (3) Any

other mitigating f

actor which is raise d by the evidenc e produc ed b y ei t h ert h e p ro s ec u t i o n o r d ef en s e a t ei t h er t h e gui l t , o r s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g. That is, y ou shall consider a ny aspec t of t he def endant’ s char acte r, or r ecor d or any aspec t of he c ircumstance s of the offe nse favor able to the defe ndant, which is supported by

the evidenc e.

The trial c ourt furthe r instructed the jury that should they find that at least one statutory ag g ravating circ umstance ha d been pr oven bey ond a re asonable do u b t an d that circ umstance ha d been pr oven by the Sta te to out we ig h an y mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s bey on d a re a so na ble do ub t th e se nte nc e sh a ll be de a th. Th e tr ia l c ou rt pr ov ide d in str

uc tio ns a s to ho w the jury wa s to redu ce th eir ve rd ic t to

wr i t i n g.

T h e j u ryre t i re d t o d el i b er at e a t1 : 1 0 p

. m

. De l i b er at i o n s ad j o u rn ed at 6 : 0 5 p

. m

. t h at ev en i n g, and re sumed the next day at 8:48 a.m. At 11:40 a.m, the jury returne d with its verdict, finding that the State had pr oven bey ond a rea sonable doubt the pre sence of the (i) (2) a g g ravating c ircumstance

. Th e ju r y f

u r th e r d e te r mi n e d th a t th is f a c to r o u tw e ig h e d a n y mi ti g a ti n g c ir c u ms tan c es and,

acc ording ly , imposed a sentenc e of de ath.

I. Rec usal of

Trial Court-12-

Appellant Rimmer contends that the t rial j udg e “exhi bited actua l bias ag ainst the defe ndant.” Additionally , he asse rts that “the judg e’s impartialitymight reasonably be questioned.” I n support of these c laims, Rimm er contends t hat t he “re-se ntencing hearing was nec essitated by a combination of er rors c ommitt ed by

[t he trial judg e] in the first trial.” He further alleg es t hat, during a hearing

on the mot ion to r e c us e , th e tr ia l ju dg e de nie d r e vis ing the jury ve rd ic t a s f

ou ndbythe app e llate

c ou rt , s ta tin g that “[t]he y sa id that the se c on d sta g e pr oc e e din g jury ins truc tio ns we re c on fu sin g to the jury

. ” Ap p el l an t Rim mer raised numerous other fac tors in support of the trial judg e’s bias including: ( 1) the trial judg e’s r efusa l t o re ap point the lawy ers who ha d secur ed the r ever sal from the Court of Criminal Appea ls, (2) the trial judge adopted ex traordina ry security measure s, (3) the trial judg e fa iled to conduct hea ring s at Riverbend Ma x imum S ecurity I nstitut i o n as re q u ired by section 16-1- 105, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated, (4) the trial judg e made misstatements of fac t in the Rule 12 r e p o r t, ( 5 ) th e tria l ju d g e e xh ib it e d a n a d v e r s ar ia l p o s it io n to w ar d th e A p p e ll a n t a fter the g uilt phase of the tria l, (6) the tria l judg e excluded proff ere d evidenc e in mitigation, and ( 7) the trial judge ’s numerous de cisions wh ic he f f e c tive ly denied the A ppellant time to properly prepa re the case

.
A fa i r t rial in a fair tribunal is a basic r equire ment of due pr ocess. The “princ iples of im p a r ti a li ty , d is in ter e s tedness and f airne ss” ar e funda mental conc epts in our jurisprudenc e. Se e Sta te v. Bondurant
, 4 S

. W

. 3 d 6 6 2
, 6 6 8 (T en n

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( q u o t i n g State v. Lynn , 924 S.W .2d 892, 898 (Tenn. 1996)). Ar

ticle I , Section 17 of t he Tennessee Constit ution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti tution guar antee all litigants a he aring befor e an impartial decision-make r. In re Cameron , 1 26 Te nn . 6 14 , 6 58 , 1 51 S.W. 64 , 7 6 ( 19 12 ); se e als o Tu mey v . O hio , 273 U.S. 510, 5 3 2
, 4 7 S

. C t

. 4 3 7 (1 9 2 7 ) ( “e v er y p ro ce d u re wh i ch wo u l d o ff era p o s s i b l e t em p t at i o n t o t h e a v er age
man as a judge [t o forg et the burden of proof require d to c onvict the defe ndant, or which might lea d him] not to hold the balance nice, c lear and true betwee n the State and the acc used, denie s the latter due proc ess of law ”). A rticle VI , Section 11 of t he Tennessee Constit ution states t hat judg es ca nnot participate in case s in which they might have e v en the slighte st interest. Ne e ly v . S tat e , 63 Tenn. 174, 182 (1874). A simi lar restriction appea rs in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 17-2-101(1). Th e pu rp os e of

the se pr ov isi on s is to g ua

rd a g a ins t the pr e

jud g me nt o f a

lit ig a nt’ s r ig hts a ndto a vo id situatio ns in wh ic h the lit ig a nts mig ht be lie ve that th e c ou rt re a c he d a pr e jud ic e d c on c lus ion be c a us e of intere st, partiality

or fa vor. Chumbley v . Peoples Bank & Trust C o., 165 Tenn. 655, 659, 57 S.W .2d 787, 788 (1922).
Society demands a

judge who is “indepe ndent of g overnme ntal, political, social, ec onomic, or ot h er p re d isposing influenc es.” State v. Alley , 882 S.W .2d 810, 819 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

. A j ud g e po sse ssi ng the se qu a lit ie s c a n “ app ro a c h th e de c isi on of a ny qu e sti on in a

c a se g uid e d s ole ly by leg al knowledg e and judicia l ex p er ience and temper ament.” Id. (c iti ng Cha rl e s W. Wo lf

ra m, M o de r n Le g a l E thics 98 0 (19 86 )) . A lth ou g h th is i de a l is on e that is dif fi c ult to a c hie ve , it

is a fundame ntal principle of due proce ss that a judge presiding at trial “must be suff iciently neutra l and fre e of pr econc eptions about the fa ctual issues to be a b l e t o re n d er a

fair de cision.” Alley , 882 S.W .2d at 820 (c itation omit ted). A tria l before a biase d or pre judiced judge i s a d en ial of due proce ss. W

ilson v. W

ilson
, 987 S.W .2d 555, 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Manyy ea rs ago , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court observe d: “[I ]t is of immense importance , not only that justice shall be administered . . ., but that [the public] s h all have no sound r eason f or supposing that it is not-13-

administered.” In re Came ron, 12 6 T e nn . a t 61 4, 15 1 S. W. a t 76

. “I f th e pu bli c is t o ma int a in confide nce in the judiciary
, it is require d that case s be tried by unprejudice d and unbiased judg es.” Alley , 882 S.W .2d at 820 (c itations omi tted).

Th e wo rd s “ bia s” a nd“ pr e jud ic e ” are c e ntr a l to the de te rm i n atio n o f w he the r a re c us a l sh ou ld be g rante d. See Alley , 882 S.W .2d at 820. Gene rally , the terms re fer to a state of mind or attitude that works to pre dispose a judg e for or ag ainst a party

. Id. (c i t i n g 4 6 Am.J ur.2d “Judge s” § 167 ( 1 9 6 9 ) )

. N o t e v e r y b ia s , p ar ti a li ty , o r p r e ju d ic e me r it s r e cusal. Alley , 882 S.W .2d at 820. To disqualify , prejudice must be of a pe rsonal cha rac ter, dire cte d at t he litiga nt, “must stem from an

ex tra j u d i ci al s o u rc e a n d re s u l t i n an o p i n i o n o n t h e m er i t s o n s o m e b as i s o t h ert h an wh at t h e j u d ge learned fr om . . . participation in the ca se.” Id. (citations omitted). Personal bias involves a n antag onism toward t he movi ng party , but does not ref er to a ny views that a judg e may

have r eg arding the subject matter

at issue. Id. (citations omitted). I f the bias is base d upon actua l o b s er v an ce of witnesses and e vidence g iven during the trial, the judg e’s p rejudice does not disqualify the judg e. Id . (ci t at ion omitt ed). H oweve r, if the bias is so per vasive that it is sufficient to deny the litigant a fa ir trial, it need not be e x trajudicial. Id. (citations omitted).
A trial judg e should r ecuse himself or herse lf whene ver the judge has any doubt a s to his or her ability to preside impartially or whe never

his or her impartialitycan r easona bly be questioned. Sta te v . P an ne ll, 71 S.W .3d 720, 725 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). This is an objective sta ndard. Alley, 882 S.W .2d at 820. The appea ranc e of impropriety is c onceptua lly distinct fr om the s u b j ec t i ve approa ch of a judge fac ing a pos sible disqualification cha lleng e and doe s not depend on the judg e’s belief that he or she is a cting proper ly

. See Lit ekyv. United States , 5 10 U. S. 5 40 , 5 53 , n .2 , 1 14 S. Ct. 1147 (1994) (“T he judg e does not ha ve to be subjec tively biased or prej u d i ced, so long a s he appea rs to be so.”)

. “Thus, while a trial judge should g rant a rec usal whene ver the judge has any doubts about his or her a bility t o p reside impartially , rec usal is also warr anted whe n a per son of ordinary prudenc e in the judg e’s position, knowing all of t he facts known to the judg e, would find

a re asonable basis for que stioning the judg e’s impartiality .” Id. The trial judg e re tains dis cr et ion over his or he r re cusal. S ta te v

. Sm ith, 9 0 6 S .W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Unless the

e vid e nc e in the re c or d in dic a te s th a t th e failu re to re c us e wa s a n abu se of dis c re tio n, thi s Co urt w ill not interfer e with that dec ision. Sta te v . H ine s, 919 S.W .2d 573, 578 (Tenn.1995)

. Appellant Rimmer alleg es that the trial court abused its discre tion when it denied his rec usal motion specifically

beca use this same jud ge comm itted error in the initial trial reg arding the jury

v er d i ct , m ad e a l l ege d m i s s t at em en t s i n t h e R u l e 1 2 re p o rt , m ad e c ri t i ca l d ec i s i o n s d en y i n g a
co n t i n u an ce t o t h e d ef

en s e t ea m an d ex cl u d i n g ev i d en ce i n m i t i gat i o n , an d fa i l ed t o co n d u ct h ea ri n gs at Riverbend Max imum Security I nstitut ion as required by Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 16-1- 105. Adver se ruling s by a trial court are not usually sufficie nt gr ounds to establish bias. Alley , 882 S.W .2d at 820 (c itations omitted). Moreove r, ruling s of a trial judge
, even if err oneous, numerous and continuous, do not, without more, justify disqualification. Id. (citations omitted).
Appellant Rimm er alleg es that the trial court adopted extraordinary security measure s. The

rec ord re veals that Appe llant Rim mer made numerous esc ape attempts after be ing ta ken into custody-14-

and that two we apons w er e re m o v ed from the Appellant’s pe rson in the courtroom prior to the orig inal trial. Appellant Rimm er has not e stablished that the sec urity measure s employ ed by

the trial court we re not wa

rra nted under

the circ umstances. Ac cording ly , the trial court’ s implementation of

security measure s cannot support a motion for rec usal. The Appe llant also contend s t h at t h e trial court de monstrated bias whe n it refuse d to re-a ppo int c o u n s e l w ho wer e succ essful in obtaining relief on direc t appea l. Nothing in the record demonstrates t hat t he trial court e rre d in this respect nor doe s the Appellant establish how appointment of differ ent counsel established bias by the trial judg e or
r a i s e d a q u e s t i o n o f

i m p ar t i a l i t y.
The Appe llant focuses the majority of his r ecusa l a rg ument toward acc usations that the trial judge made numer ous misst atements of f acts, made numerous questionable statements during the fi rs t tria l a ndre fu se d to app ly a n o bje c tiv e st and ard reg ard ing his imp art ia lit y . Wh ile c omm e nts

ma de by a jud g e ma y

be de mon str a tiv e of

bia s o r p re

jud ic e , th e Appel la nt h a s f a ile d to dir e c t th is Court’s attention to any such comments. Moreove r, misstatements of fac t a re insuff icient to support a showing of bi as. L ikewise, comments made by a judg e in a se parate and unr elated c ase c annot be imputed to the case now bef ore us. How ever , in so far a s t h e re m arks indicate a judg e’s pe rsonal moral convic tion or which “r efle ct pre vailing soc ietal attitudes,” such r emar ks are insufficient a lone to mandate disqualification. Alley
, 8 8 2 S

. W

. 2 d at 8 2 0 (c i t i n g United States v. Norton, 700 F.2d 10 72 , 1 07 6 ( 6thCir .1 98 3) ; State v. Hawk, 68 8 S. W.2 d 4 67 , 4 72 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 85 ); State v. B o b by A n d r e w H

ig don, No. 89-41-II I , 1990 WL 26772 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na shville, Mar. 15, 1990)). The re is no indication in the re cord be fore us that the trial j udg e prejudg ed any fac tual issues that arose related to the re -sentenc ing he aring

.
After revie w of the rec ord befor e this Court and the alleg ations raised by the Appellant, we

are unable to conc lude that the trial c ourt abused its discre tion in deny ing the motion fo r re cusal.

II. Denial of

Continu ance

On Dec embe r 19, 2003, Appe llant Rim mer filed a motion requesting a continuanc e of the

re- sentenc ing t ri al sche duled for January 5, 2004. Trial counse l was appointed to re prese nt the Ap pe lla nt i n F e br

ua ry 20 03 , a ft e r the Ap pel lant ’s ini tia l a tto rn e y s w e re g rante d p e rm iss ion to withdraw. A s g rounds for thecontinuance
, the Appellant asserted that counsel we re not pre pare d to pr ocee d due to lead c ounsel’s position as lead c ounsel in another c apital murder trial schedule d fo r Ja nu ary

26 , 2 00 4. Th e Ap pe lla nt fu rthe r ma int a ine d that a dd iti on a l tim e wa s r e qu ir e d a s ( 1) it

was ne cessa

ry to secure and re view “boxes and boxes of rec ords,” ( 2) he w as housed 200 miles from his attorney s, (3) ther e had be en pr o b l em s in obtaining f unding f or experts and (4) the mitigation specia list had not completed her inve stigation and prepa ration. The trial court denied the motion for a continuanc e. I n its order de ny ing the motion for a new sentenc ing trial, the trial court noted that no prejudice had re sulted from the de nial of the c ontinuance. In rende ring thi s decision, the trial court c onsidered the mitigating evidenc e pre sented a t trial.

A p p e ll a n t Ri mm e r c h a ll e n g e s th e tria l c o u rt’ s d e n ia l o f th e c o n ti n u a n c e , a s s e r ti n g th a t “ [i ]t is unreasona

ble to demand a

showing of ac tual prejudice from the denial of a c ontinuance to a llowD r

. Char vat t es t i f i ed t hat t he not eboo k i n t he po s s es s i on of defens e c ouns el was “ prepar ed .

. . i n t he i ni t i al 3

st ag es [o f

he r i nv esti ga t i o n].” In t his reg ard
, she ex p l aine d t ha t “wh en yo u crea t e t he se t hings and w he n y o u s t art t he se

s t u di es , s ome of

t h e i n for mat i on c h anges a s y o u secure m or e dat a. So t h at on e dat ed s i x or s ev en mon t h s a g o, i s n ot p art i cul arl y germane t o what’ s go i ng o n t o d ay and what we know at t hi s p o i nt i n t i m e. ” T hese s t at em ent s m ad e b y D r. Cha r v at c an n ot be c on s t r u ed as a n a s s er t i on t h at she needed a ddi t i on al t i me t o c ompl et e a s u f f i ci en t mi t i g at i on i nvest i gat i o n.
-15- time for completing a mi tigation investigation; one cannot know what mig ht have be en discove red had more time be en allotted; the basic task rema ins unf inished, and there is no way to measure what impact the unpre sented mitiga tion might have had on a ca pital sentencing jury .” Appe llant Rim mer adds that his trial attorney s had “j u s t a littl e over 10 months to do a complete investig ation of not

o n l y th ed e f

e n d an t ’ s s o c i a l
, e d u c at i o n a l
, v o c a t i o n a l
, m e d i c a l
, i n s t i t u t i o n a l
, a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l h i s t o r y, bu t a lso of the c ri me , h is p a st c ri me s, a ndthe lit ig a tio n th a t he ha d b e e n e ng a g e d in by 3 p ri or se ts of a tto rney s. ” Ap pe lla nt R imm e r f urthe r s ug g e sts that th e “ tr ia l ju dg e wa s mo re c on c e rn e d w ith expediency

than fa irness.” The State responds that the Appellant c annot show that the lowe r court’s decision wa s an abuse of discre tion.
The g ranting of a c ontinuance r ests within the s ound discretion of the trial court. See Sta te v. Odom, 137 S.W .3d 572, 589 (Tenn. 2004) ; Sta te v . R us se ll , 1 0 S. W.3 d 2 70 , 2 75 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 99 ). Th is C ou rt

wi ll r e ve rs e th e de nia l of a c on tin ua nc e on ly

if the tr ia l c ou rt

abu se d it s discretion and the defe ndant was pr ejudiced by the denial. Odom , 1 37 S.W. 3da t 58 9. “ An abu se of dis c re tio n is de mon str a te d b y sh ow ing that the failu re to g rant a c on tin ua nc e de nie d d e fe nd a nt a fair trial or that it could be r easona bly conclude d that a diffe rent re sult would have followed ha d the continuance been g rante d.” Hines , 919 S.W .2d at 579. The defe ndant who asserts that the denial of a c ontinuance c onstitut es a de nial of due pr ocess or the rig ht t o co u n s el must establish actual prejudice

. Odom , 137 S.W .3d at 589.

Althou gh t h e Appellant aver s that a continuanc e wa s nece ssary in order f

or the mitigation specia list t o complete he r investig ation, the re cord ref lects that Dr. Charvat never indicated that her investigation was not complete. Rather , Dr. Char vat ex p l ained that the “notebook” in possession of def ense counsel had not been updated. Notwithstanding, D r. Charvat also testified that “[i] f y ou 3 thi nk abo ut it, the re is n o e ndto h ow muc h in fo rm a tio n o ne c ou ld c oll e c t on a n in div idu a l.” She a lso described the “inf

ormation” c ollected a s being capa ble of c onstant chang e. The recor d reve als that Dr. Char vat provided a mple testimonyreg arding the Appellant’ s backg round.
Nothing in the r ecor d sug g ests that the t rial court abused its discre tion, thereby prejudicing the Appellant. The matter wa s remande d for re- sentenc ing by this Court on May

25, 2001. Counsel for the re- sentenc ing were appointed on Mar ch 20, 2002. The se attorne y s were g rante d permission to withdraw in F ebrua

ry 2003, at which time substitut e counsel wer e appointed. T he re -sentenc ing hearing be g an on January 5, 2004, nearly

three y ear s from the da te of re versa l an d n ea rl yeleve n months after trial counsel’s appointment. Trial counsel wa s privy to information in the possession of counse l orig inally

appointed for

the re -sentenc ing. S ee , e.g. , State v. Jimm y D. Dillingham, 03C01-9110-CR-319, 1993 WL 22155 at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Fe b. 13, 1993), perm. t o a ppeal denied, ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( h o ld in g th a t tria l c o u r t d id n o t ab u s e d is c r e ti o n in de ny ing continuance wher e pu b l i c defende r wa s aff orded one month to prepare for c ase w here previous-16-

attorney had bee n involved as public def ender and had benef

it of prior counsel’s prepar ations and eff orts).
Although a

capital c ase w ill clea

rly require more prepar ation by defe nse counse l than a noncapital c ase, w e conclude that counsel was aff orded adequate time to familiarize themselves with the fac ts and prese nt eviden ce i n m i t i g ation on the Appellant’ s behalf. T here is no indication in the

rec ord that ele ven months was insuffic ient t i m e fo r the attorne y s to prepar e for the re -sentenc ing tr ia l. T he Ap pe lla nt h a d th e be ne fi t of a mit ig a tio n s pe c ia lis t. T he mit ig a tio n sp eci ali st faile d to state that her

investigation was complete, but noted that any investigation of this ty pe would be constantly

chang ing. A review of the r ecor d fails to demonstrate that Dr. Charvat’s investigation

wa s impe de d b y

the de nia l of

the c on tin ua nc e

. Mo re ov e r, the re c or d f a ils to d e mon str a te wh a t, i f

a n y , mi ti g a ti o n p r o o f w o u ld h a v e b e e n u n c o v e r e d h a d D r

. Ch ar v a t b e e n p r o v id e d mo r e ti me

. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion nor was t h e Appellant prejudice d by the de nia l of the c on tin ua nc e . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

III. Exclus ion of

Mitigation Evid ence
Appellant Rimmer contends that th e t ri al court committed rever sible err or by excluding evidenc e offere d to support the m itigating circ umstance of residual doubt and by excluding evide nce to rebut the (i) (2) a g g ravating c ircumstance relied on by the prosec ution.

The a dmissibi lity of evidenc e at ca pital sentencing hearings is g overne d by section 39-13- 20 4( c ), Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d, wh ic h p ro vid e s:

I n the se n te n c in g p r o c e e d in g , e v id e n c e may b e p r e s e n te d a s to a n y matt e r th a t the court de ems rele vant to punishment and may include, but not be limit ed to, the nature and cir cumstance s of the c rime; the def endant’ s char acte r, bac kg round history , and phy sical condition; any ev idence tending to establish or rebut the a g g ravating circ umstances e numerated in subsection (i); and any evidenc e tending to establish or rebut a ny mitigating fac t o rs

. Anysuch evide nce w hich the court deems to have pr ob a tiv e va lue on the iss ue of pu nis hme nt m a y

be re c e ive d r e g ard le ss o f i ts admissibili ty

under the rules of e vidence ; provided, that the defe ndant is acc orded a fair op po rtun ity

to r e bu t a ny

he ars a y state me nts so a dmi tte d. Ho we ve r, thi s subsection ( c) s hall not be construe d to authorize the introduction of any evidenc e
secur ed in violation of the constitution of the United States or t he constitution of Tenne ssee.

Our s u p r e me c o u r t h a s r e c o g n iz e d th a t, u n d e r th is s tatu te , a n y e v id e n c e w h ic h is r e le v a n t to the circ umstances of

the murder , the ag g ravating circumstance s of the murde r, or the mitig ating

c ir c ums ta nc e s o f the mur de r, a nd wh ic h ha s pr ob a tiv e va lue in the de te rm inatio n o f p un ish me nt i s ad m i s s i b l e at a capital sentenc ing he aring

. See Sta te v . A us tin , 87 S.W .3d 447, 459 (Tenn. 2002) (c i t i n g State v. Teague , 897 S.W .2d 248, 250 (Tenn. 1995)). Additionally
, “a de fenda nt [ is] allowed to present e vidence at a[ ]s entenc ing he aring to e stablish r esidual doubt a s a non-statutory mitigating-17-

circ ums t an ce .” State v. Hartman, 4 2 S

. W

. 3 d 4 4
, 5 5 (T en n

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Teague, 897 S.W .2d at 256). Residual doubt evidenc e is typically established by

proof whic h casts d o u b t u p o n a defe ndant’s g uilt, which proof is not limited to e vidence mitigating a def endant’ s culpability

for the offe nse. See H

artman, 42 S.W. 3da t 57 . A s th e e xclu sio n o f m iti g a tin g e vid e nc e po tent ia lly undermines the re li a

b il it y of the sente ncing determination, any err or in failing to admit such evidenc e is reviewe d by

this Court under a constitutional harmless er ror standa rd. Au sti n , 87 S.W .3d at 459 (c i t i n g Sta te v . Ca uth e rn , 9 67 S.W. 2d72 6, 73 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ). Th e bu rd e n th us fa lls on the Sta te to prove that a ny

err or in excluding the e vidence did not affe ct the verdic t and was ha rmless bey ond

a re asonable doubt. Id. (c i t i n g Sa tte rwh ite v . Te x as , 4 8 6 U. S

. 249, 258, 108 S. Ct . 1792, 1798 (1 98 8) ; Chapman v. Californi a, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. C t. 824, 828 (1967)).

A. Residual Doub t Evidence
Appellant Rimmer asserts that the trial court ex cluded mit igation evidenc e of residual doubt by sustaining hearsay and relevanc e objections to testimony that two individuals were obse rved at the sce ne of the crime w ith b l o o d on their hands a nd that a ca r wa s backe d up to the night of fice

. Specifica lly , the Appellant ar g ues that the trial c ourt err oneously prohibited the victim’s husband from answe ring a question reg arding whether law enf orce ment office rs had informed him that they had rea son to be lieve that more than one person wa s involved in the commission of the crime. The Appellant also a

rg ues that the re- sentenc ing jury was not inf ormed that the jury that convicted the Appellant never considered any evidenc e that more than one person may have be en involved in the crime. The trial court sustained objections raised by the State on numerous g rounds, including that

s u c h t e s t i m o n y o n t h e s e m a t t e r s w e r e h e ar s a y.
The Appe llant is corre ct in that he arsa y is admissibl e in a c apital sentenc ing he aring

. Au sti n , 87 S.W. 3da t 45 9; S ta te v. Odom
, 92 8 S.W.2 d 1 8, 28 (T e nn . 1 99 6) . T he Sta te a sse rt s th a t, notwithstanding the f

act that se veral objections were made a nd sustained, the jury hear d testimony indicating that two men wer e obser ved at the sc ene of the crime with blood on their hands and that

a c ar wa s ba c ke d up to the nig ht of fi c e wi th its trun k o pe n a t th a t ti me . A c c or din g ly , th e Sta te a sse rt s that no err or wa s committed reg arding residual doubt evide nce.

At the re -sentenc ing hearing, Serg eant Robert Shemwell testified he had talked with J ames Darnell who had attempted to chec k into the Memphis I nn that morning . J ames Da rnell re ported that he an d Di x i e Roberts we nt to the Memphis I nn betwee n 1:45 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on F ebrua ry 8, 1997. Darnell observe d throug h the chec k-out window a white male bleeding from his hands and

a no the r w hit e ma le on the oth e r s ide of the c he c k- ou t w ind ow . H e fu rthe r d e sc ri be d th e fi rs t ma le

a s b e ing in h is earl y tw ent ies , lo ng re d h a ir , w e ari ng a n o rang e ba ll c ap a ndwe ari ng blu e je a ns

. Darnell stated that the man appea red ve ry drunk. Da

rnell believe d the other ma n to have be en the cler k. He de scribed the second ma le as be ing thirty y ear s of ag e, long brown ha ir, moustache a nd

wea ring blue jeans. D arne ll observed the man believe d to be the cle rk hand mone y throug h the ch ec k o u twi n d o w t o t h e o t h erm al e. Da rn el l wa s u n co m fo rt ab l e w i t h t h e s i t u at i o n an d l ef tt o go somewher e else . Photogra phs of suspects we re s en t t o Darnell via the F eder al B urea u of I nvestig ation. Darnell could not positivelyidentify either man from the photospre ad. A photog raph-18-

of Appe llant Rim mer wa s included in the photosprea d. Serg eant Shemwe ll additionallytestified th a t h e h a d r e c e iv e d in f

o r mati o n th a t a v e h ic le
, d e s c r ib e d a s a T o y o ta , w a s b a c k e d to the night entra nce of

the Memphis I nn.

The re co rd re veals that the sa me information that the Appe llant now asserts was excluded

wa s a c tua lly pr e se nte d to the jury

. Whil e the Ap pe lla nt c la ims that the tr ia l cou rt im pro pe rl y
e xclu de d re sid ua l do ub t e vid e nc e fr om the jury ’s c on sid e ratio n, the re c or d r e ve a ls that th e jury did h av e s u ch i n fo rm at i o n

. T h u s , an y erro r i n ex cl u d i n g t h e i n tro d u ct i o n o f t h e s am e e v i d en ce t h ro u gh

a no the r f orm w a s h arm le ss b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t.
B. Rebuttal of Aggravating Circum stance
Appellant Rimmer also conte nds that the trial court excluded evidence that woul d have

re bu tte d th e (i )( 2) a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e . Sp e c if ic a ll y , App ell a nt a sse rt s th a t he a tte mpt e d to elicit testimonyfrom Sandra Rimm er reg arding the details of his assault and rape convictions. The prosec ution objected, alleg ing that such testimony was hear s ay

. T he trial c ourt sustained the objections.
Notwithstanding the Appellant’s a rg ument, the re cord r evea ls that the ju r y d id h e a r te s timony that the Appellant, the vic tim, and a man name d “Tommy ” g ot i nto a fig ht. The jury also hea rd testimo ny that the victim told S andra Rimm er tha t the Appellant did not rea lly rape her a nd that “Tommy ” had ta lked her

into filing the ra

pe cha rg es. F urthermor e, the jury hear d testimonythat the victim continued to visit the Appellant while inc arc erated on the rape char g es. Moreove r, Sandra Rimm er de scribed the Appellant and the vi ctim as “girlf riend and boy friend.” As the jury had bef ore it i nf orma tio n th a t w a s a lle g e dly “ e xclu de d, ” we c on c lud e a ny e rr or in i ts e xclu sio n is ha

rm le ss.

I n the pre sent ca se, the jury actua lly heard t h e ev i dence that the Appellant now c omplains was improper ly

excluded. The e vidence supported the jury ’s findi n g of the statutory ag g ravating circ umstanc e

. T h e ju r y

a ls o h a d s u f

f ic ie n t e v id e n c e u p o n w h ic h to w e ig h th e a g g r a v a ti n g a nd mitigating circ umstances. Ac cording ly , we c annot conclude t hat t he Appellant is entitled to relief on this iss ue.

IV. P rosec utorial Misconduct
Appellant Rimmer contends tha t, at the re -sentenc ing he aring , the prosec utor, Thomas D. Hende rson, made “ more than 20 ba seless objec tions to hearsay evidenc e.” T he Ap p e ll an t a sserts that these “ repe ated, ba seless objec tions to [ his] evidenc e as ‘hearsay ’ constituted prosec utorial misconduct, and violat ed [ h i s ] rig hts under the Six th, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendme nts to the U. S. Co ns titut io n, and Art. I , § 8 a nd16 of the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion .” I n s up po rt of his alleg ation, Appellant R immer relies upon the fact that Mr. Hende rson is an experienc ed prose cutor and is c h ar g e d w ith c o n s tr u c ti v e k n o w le d g e o f

th e la w th a t “ h e ar s a y

is a d mi s s ib le in a

c ap it al sentenc ing he aring .” Au sti n , 87 S.W .3d at 447. He further contends t hat “Thoma s D. Hende rson, by his own admission, was ‘nea r apople ctic in obje cting
, almost e very opportunity .” The Appe llant-19-

c on c lud e s th a t th e nu me ro us ob je c tio ns we re “ a blata nt e ff ort to un de rm ine de fe ns e c ou ns e l’ s a bil ity to p re s ent his case .” The State responds that the obje ctions made by the State wer e to either inadmissible hearsay

or matters of

non-re lev an ce

. T h e S tate further a sserts that some of the ob je c tio ns we re su staine d a nd , in ma ny ins ta nc e s, de fe ns e c ou ns e l with dr e w the qu e sti on . T he Sta te

c on te nd s th a t the ob

je c tio ns do no t ri se to the le ve l of pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t, a ve rring that th is

was a case wher e the “ prosec utors struck har d blows as they wer e entitled to do.”

I n g e ne ra l, a

pr os e c ut or

c omm its mis c on du c t by the us e of

de c e pti ve or

re pr e he ns ibl e methods to persuade either the court or the jury

. People v . Strickland , 1 1 Ca l.3 d 94 6, 95 5, 11 4 Ca l. Rptr. 632, 523 P.2d 672 (1974). But the de fenda nt need not show that the prosecutor acted in bad faith or with appre ciation for the wrong fulness of the c onduct, nor is a c laim of prosec utorial misconduct defe ated by

a showing of the prose cutor’s subjec tive g ood faith. People v . Bolton , 23 Cal.3d 208, 214, 152 Cal.Rptr.141, 589 P.2d 396 (1979).

O u r r e v ie w o f th e r e c o r d r e v e a ls ap p r o xim a te ly tw e n ty

- e ig h t o b je c ti o n s ma d e bythe prosec utor during the cour se of the r e-se ntencing hearing. G rounds for the objections included but

wer e not limited to r eleva nce and hear say

. Many of the objections resulted in defe n s e counsel withdrawing t h e q u es tion. Som e objec tions were sustaine d, while others we re ove rruled. B ench confe renc es re veal that the pr osecut o r, T h o m as Henderson, wa s well awa re of the applica

ble law

re g ard ing a dmi ssi ble he ars a y a ndpr ov ide d ra tio na l ar g ume nt in sup po rt of his ob je c tio ns . T he Sta te has a leg itimate inter est in the outcome of a pr ocee ding and, as such, the State ha s a leg itimate rig ht in a dv oc a tin g its int e rp re ta tio n o f a pp lic able law re g ard ing the a dmi ssi bil ity of e vid e nc e . Wh ile some serie s of objections we re inc essant, ther e is no indication in the rec ord that the objec tions were without lega l basis or wer e made mere ly as an attempt t o co m m en t upon the cr edibilityof the testimony

. We conclude that the obj ections, viewe d either sing ly or collec tively , did not deny the Appellant a f

air trial or result in any

prejud i ce

. T h i s Court remains convinc ed that the objec tions complained of

by the Appellant we re not the sour ce of any prejudicia l error

.
V. Ins tr uc ti on o n Re as ona ble Do ubt
Appellant Rimmer next contends t h at the trial court’s instruction on rea sonable doubt impermissiblylowere d the prosecution’s burden of proof. Specifica lly , Rimm er c ontests that part of the instruction providing “[ r] ea s o n ab l e doubt does not mea n a doubt that may arise f rom possibili ty ,” see T.P.I . – Crim. §2.03 (West 2000), “sugg ests an im proper ly high deg ree of doubt for acquittal and lowe rs the prose cution’s burde n of proof in viola t i o n o f t he state a nd fede ral constitutions.”

Th e ins truc tio n p ro vid e d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

is a s f oll ow s:

Reasonable doubt is that doubt e ng ender ed by an investig ation of all the proof in the

case and an inabilityafte r such investig ation to let the mind rest easily upon the

certainty of g uilt.-20-

Re a so na ble do ub t do e s n ot m e a n a do ub t that may

ari se fr om p os sib ili ty . A bs olu te

certainty of g uilt is not demanded by the law.
The Appe llant conced es t h at t h is instruction conforms larg ely to that provided in the Tenne ssee Pattern JuryI nstructions Criminal, Fifth Edition, § 2.03.

“The bey ond a re asonable d oubt standard is a r equire ment of due pr ocess, but the Con sti tut ion ne ith e r p ro hib its tr ia l c ou rt s f ro m de fi nin g re a so na

ble do ub t no r r e qu ir e s th e m to do so
as a matter of c ourse.” Victor v. Nebraska , 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S. C t. 1239, 1243 (1994). As long as the “ court instructs the jury on the nec essity

that the def

endant’ s g uilt b e p ro v ed bey ond a

re a so na ble do ub t, . . . the Con sti tut ion do e s not r e qu ir e that a ny pa rt ic ula r f orm of wo rd s b e us e d in advising the j ury of t he government’s burden of proof.” Id. (citations omitted). Rather, “ taken a s a whole, the instructions [ must] corr ectly conve[y ] t he conc ept of re asonable doubt to the j ury .” Ho lla nd v . U nit e d S tat e s, 3 4 8 U

. S. 1 2 1
, 1 4 0
, 7 5 S. Ct

. 1 2 7
, 1 3 8 ( 1 9 5 4 )

. Co n s id e r in g th e f u ll c o n te xt of the trial c ourt ’s instruction, we c onclude that the trial court’s instruc tion on the definition of

rea sonable doubt “suf

ficiently described the deg ree of doubt nec essary for acquittal and the de g ree of proof nece ssary for c onviction.” See Pe tty joh n v . S tat e , 885 S.W .2d 364, 365 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Numerous c ase law decisions have conclude d that the ex act inst ruction as submitt ed to t he jury in this case is not err or. Sta te v . H all
, 976 S.W .2d 121, 159 (Tenn. 1998)
, cert. de nied, 52 6 U .S. 10 89 , 1 19 S. Ct . 1 50 1 ( 19 99 ); State v. Bush, 942 S.W .2d 489, 520-521 ( Tenn.), cert. de nied, 522 U. S. 95 3, 11 8 S. Ct. 37 6 ( 19 97 ); Scott v. State, No. 01C01-9709-CR-00400, 1999 WL 233643, at

** 9- 10 (Te nn . Crim. Ap p. a t N a sh vil le , A pril 2 0, 19 99 ); Sta te v . Co war t, No . 0 3C0 1- 95 12 -C R00402, 1999 WL

5174, at *23 (Te n n

. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle), perm. to appeal de nied, (Tenn. 19 99 ); Lane v. State, No. 02C01- 9604-CC-00133, 1998 WL 756746, *7 (Te n n

. Crim. App. at J ackson, O ctober

30, 1998), perm. to appeal de nied
, (T enn. 1999). Te nnessee courts have consistently approve d jury instructions patterned a fter T .P.I . (Crim.) 2.03. E. g. , S tat e v . Ni c ho ls, 877 S.W. 2d72 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) ; State v. Sex ton, 91 7 S. W.2 d 26 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 95 ); Pettyjohn, 885 S.W .2d at 364. I n fac t, this Court ha s encour ag ed the use of T.P.I

. (Crim.) 2.03 over the use of the alternate pattern instruction on “re asonable doubt” found in T.P.I . (Crim.) 2.03(a ). E. g. , S tat e v . J os e Holmes , N o. 02 C01 -9 50 5- CR- 00 15 4 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. a t Jac ks on , D e c . 1 0, 19 97 ); State v. De rek Denton, C.C.A. No. 02C01-9409-C R -0 0 186 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, A ug . 2, 1996). Moreove r, the Six th Circuit has confirme d the constitutionalityof the e x act lang uag e used in the jury instruction in the instant case. Au sti n v . B e ll, 126 F.3d 843 (6t h Cir.1997). We continue to adhe re to the long tr adition of authority that has found jury

i n s t ru ct i o n s l ike the one g iven her e
c on sti tut ion a lly

so un d. Th e Ap pe lla nt’ s a rg ume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.

V I

. W a iv e ro f R ig ht

t o Te s t if y

Ne xt, A pp e lla nt R imm e r c on te nd s tha t “[n]e ith e r the c oll oq uy wi th h is o wn c ou ns e l no r w ith the court established that the waive r of the de fenda nt’s rig ht to testify in the sentenc ing he aring was kn ow ing , in te lli g e nt andvo lun tary a s r e qu ire d b y

the F if th, Sixth, Ei g hth , a ndF ou rt e e nth-21-

Amendments to the U.S. Constit ution, and Art. I
, § § 8
, 9
, an d 16 of the Te nnessee Constit ution.” Specifica lly , Appellant Rimm e r ma in ta in s th at “ [t ]h ec o ll o q u y

with the court c oncerned only whether the def endant c hose not to testify of hi s own free will.” He maintains that the rig ht to testify in the

c apit a l se nte nc ing c on te xt inc lud e s a lim ite d privi le g e a g a ins t se lf -i nc ri min a tio n, that is , a n a bil ity to testify about mitigating cir cumstance s and not be c ross-examined about the f acts a nd circ umstances of the murder unless he opens the door. State v. Cazes
, 875 S.W .2d 253, 266 (Tenn. 1994). The c olloquy

reg arding his waiver f

ails to indicate that Appe llant Rim mer was advised of t h i s a s p e c to f

h i s r i g h tt o t e s t i f

y.
The rig ht of a c riminal defe ndant to te stify in his or her own be half at trial is a fundame ntal constitutional right. Mo mo n v . S ta te , 18 S.W .3d 152, 157 (Tenn. 1999) . The rig ht may only be waived pe rsonally

by the def endant. Id. A rig ht that is fundame ntal and per sonal to the defe ndant may only be waived i f t here is evidenc e in t he re cord de monstrating “ an intentional re linquishm ent or aba ndonment o f a k n o wn rig ht or privileg e.” Id. at 161-62. A w aiver of this rig ht may

not be presumed by

a silent rec ord. Id. at 162.

I n o rd ert o en s u re t h at d ef en s e a t t o rn ey s d o n o t m ak e u n i l at er al d ec i s i o n s re gar d i n g a de fe nd a nt’ s rig ht to tes tif y , the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt imp le me nte d th e fo llo wi ng pr oc e du re s:

At an y t i m e b ef o re co n cl u s i o n o f t h e p ro o f, d ef en s e co u n s el s h al l re q u es t a h ea ri n g, out of the pre sence of the jury
, to inquire of the defe ndant whethe r the de fenda nt has made a knowing
, voluntary
, and int ellige nt waiver of t he right t o testify

. This hearing sh a ll b e pla c e d o n th e re c or d a ndsh a ll b e in the pr e se nc e of the tr ia l ju dg e . D e fe ns e counsel is not require d to eng ag e in any particula r litany , but c ounsel must show at

a min imu m th a t th e de fe nd a nt kno ws a ndun de rs ta nd s th a t:
(1) the de fenda nt has the rig ht not to testi fy , and if the de fenda nt does not testify , then t h e j u r y ( o r

c o u r t ) m a y n o t d r a w a n y i n f e r e n c e s f r o mt h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s f a i l u r e t o t e s t i f

y;
(2 ) the de fe nd a nt h a s th e ri g ht t o te sti fy a nd that if the de fe nd a nt w ish e s to e xer c ise that r ig ht, no on e c a n p re ve nt the de fe nd a nt f ro m te sti fying ;
(3) the de fend an t has consulted with his or her counsel in making the dec ision whether or not to testify ; that the defe ndant has be en advise d of the a dvantag es and dis a dv a nta g e s o f t e sti fying ; a nd that th e de fe nd a nt h a s v olu nta ri ly a ndpe rs on a lly waived the rig ht to testify

.
Momon , 18 S.W .3d at 162. The Momon court recog nized that “[d] efe nse counsel is ge nera lly in the be st p os iti on to v oir

dir e the de fe nd a nt. ” 18 S.W. 3da t 16 2. Th us , “ [u]nd e r n orma l c ir c ums ta nc e s, the t rial j udg e shoul d play no role in this proce dure.” Id. The court further noted that this approac h, which minimiz es judicial interf er en ce , strikes the prope r bala nce be tween the prese rvation of a confide ntial rig ht and the nee d to protect the r elatio nship and confide nces be tween c ounsel and client. Id

. Def

ense counsel and trial courts “should adher e to t hese pr ocedur al g uidelines in all case sIn C aze s , ou r s u pr eme cou r t r ec og n i ze d t h at du e t o t h e g r av i t y of a ca pi t al s en t en ci n g h ea r i n g and t he 4

cons t i t ut i onal mandat e t o e ns ur e t hat al l r el eva nt mi t i gat i ng ci r cums t anc es be pres ent ed t o t he s ent enc i ng bod y “ a c api t al defendan t ’ s t es t i mo ny reg ar di ng m i t i gat i ng f act ors t hat are whol l y co l l at er al t o t he meri t s o f t he ch ar ges agai ns t hi m d oes

n o t o p e ra te a s a c o m p le te w a ive r o f the p riv ileg e a g a ins t se lf- inc rim ina tio n

. C aze s , 8 7 5 S .W .2d at 2 6 6

. In o t he r wo rd s, a def endan t ha s a ri gh t t o l i mi t ed cr oss

- exa mi nat i on i f he wi s hes t o t es t i f

y about onl y col l at er al mi t i gat i ng ci r cums t anc es

a t t h e p e n a lty p h a se o f a c a p ital tria l. Id.

-22- tried or re t ri ed af

ter the da te of this decision.” Id. at 163. The c ourt noted, howe ver, tha t the “proc edure s are prophy lactic mea sures which are not themselves constit utionally require d.” Id. at 163. And, the fa ilure to follow the Momon g uidelines will not alone support a c laim for deprivation of the constitutional rig ht to testify if there is e vidence in the rec ord to establish that the rig ht was otherwise pe rsonally

waived by

the def endant. Id.
Appellant Ri m m er’ s arg ument contesting the validity of the wa iver of his rig ht to testify fo cu s es u p o n t h e f

ai l u re o f t h e r ec o rd t o d em o n s tra t e t h at h e w a s a d v i s e d o f t h e l i m i t ed p ri v i l ege ag ainst self-incrimination, i.e. , a n abil ity to t e sti fy abo ut m iti g a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s a ndno t be c ro ssexamined about the fa cts and c ircumstance s of the murder unless he opens the door. Se e Caz e s, 4 875 S.W .2d at 266. Appellant Rimmer took the stand a nd was que stioned b y d ef ense c ounsel reg arding his decision to testify on his own behalf. T he following colloquy occur red:

[C ounsel for A ppellant]: Mr. Rimm er, do y ou understand t h at all of the proof that has bee n prepa

red by the def ense ha s been submitted in this case?

[Mi chae l Rim mer]: Yes, sir, I do . . . .

[C ounsel for A ppellant]: Do y ou know that the state ha s rested it’s [sic] case and have no othe r proof

, unless they

decide to put on some rebuttal proof?

[Mi chae l Rim mer]: Yes, sir.

[C ounsel for A ppellant]: You know that we a r e now to the point wher e y ou have to m ak e a d ec i s ion as to whether y ou want to take the witness stand on y our own behalf ?

[Mic ha e l Rim me r]: Ye s, sir , I un de rs ta ndthat.
[Cou ns e l for Ap pe lla nt]: An d th a t is a su bje c t tha t we ha ve dis c us se d fr om tim e to t ime , th ro ug ho ut this tr ia l; i s it no t?

[Mic ha e l Rim me r]: Ye s, sir , q uit e a bit

. [C ounsel for A ppellant]: And when I say , “we ”, I ’m talking about my self and Mr. Spring er, w ho is myco-c ounsel . . . , and y ou, in and out of the c ourtroom we have ta lked about y our rig ht to take the stand on y our own be half?-23-

[Mi chae l Rim mer]: Yes, sir.

[C ounsel for Appellant]: We have informed y ou that y ou have a Constit utional rig ht to take the stand a nd testify on y our own be half, if y ou decide d to do so?

[Mi chae l Rim mer]: Yes, sir, I do.

[C ounsel for A ppellant]: You also know that y ou have a Constit uti o nal rig ht not to t ake the wi tne ss sta nd , be c a us e the la w s a y s th a t y ou c a n’ t be ma de to b e a wi tne ss ag ainst y ourself?

[Mi chae l Rim mer]: Yes, sir, I do.

[C ounsel for A ppellant]: And if y ou decide not t o ta k ethe witness stand, that the J udg e. . . will instruct the j ury that they cannot c onsider that as e vidence ag ainst y ou in this c a se , b e c a us e y ou ’r e sta nd ing on y ou r C on sti tut ion a l r ig hts ?

[Mic ha e l Rim me r]: Ye s, sir , I ’m a wa re of that.
[C ounsel for Appellant]: Have y ou, at this time, Mr. Rimm er, made a decision as to whethe r y ou would like to take the stand a nd testify on y our own be half?

[Mi chae l Rimm er]: Yes, sir, I have made that decision.

. . . The burden of pr oo f i s o n th e state , it

is n ot o n me , s o th e re fo re I a m no t g oin g to t ake the sta ndin this trial, Your Honor.

[ C o u n s e l f

o r A p p e l l a n t ] : Y o u ’ v e d e c i d e d n o tt o t e s t i f y?

[Mi chae l Rim mer]: Yes, sir. The burden of proof is on the state.

. . .
The trial c ourt then informed the Appellant that the decision to te stify was a n individual decision and

a s k e d w h e t h e r h e h a d b e e n p r e s s u r e d o r c o e r c e d i n a n y w a y r e g ar d i n g h i s d e c i s i o n n o tt o t e s t i f y. Appellant Rimmer re sponded, “this is of my own fre e will, my

own ac cord.”

The c olloquy

betwee n the Appellant a nd trial counsel re veals that Mr. Rimmer wa s questioned re g arding his decision to testify . He wa s informed that he had a rig ht to testify

and that he hada r ig h t n o t t o te s ti f

y if h e s o c h o s e

. A p p e ll a n t R im me r r e s p o n d e d th a t th e b u r d e n o f p roof was on the State a nd not him and that he would not take the stand and testi fy . He f urther stated that he h a d n o tb e e n p r e s s u r e d o r c o e r c e d i n a n y

w a y r e g ar d i n g h i s d e c i s i o n

. A p p e l l a n tR i m m e r a l so ag ree d that he had disc ussed the dec ision to testify with his trial attorney s on numerous occ asions throug hout the course of the trial.Ap pel l ant Ri mm er ac kn owl edges t hat no objec t i on t o t he i nf ormat i on was m ade at t r i al as t he i nf ormat i on was 5
l ar gel y el i ci t ed by defens e c ouns el

. H e f ur t her conce des t hat t he i s s ue was not r ai s ed i n t he A pp el l ant ’ s mo t i on for n ew tria l. In this re g a rd , A p p e llan t i n v o k e s the “n o w a ive r” ru le in c a p ital c a se s.
-24- Ba sed upon the recor d, this Court declines to adopt the Appellant’ s attempt to ex pand the Momon require ments. Nothing in Momon re qu ir e s e ith e r de fe ns e c ou ns e l or the tr ia l c ou rt

to a dv ise the de fe nd a nt o f e ve ry

po ssi ble fa c tor

that c ou ld n e c e ssa

ri ly re su lt fr om h is d e c isi on to t e sti fy or his decision not to testify , including the permissible scope of cross-e x amination. Moreove r, there is no indication in the rec ord that Appellant Rimm er failed to unde rstand the conseque nces of his decision not to testify

. Ag ain, t he record refle cts that Appellant R immer’s decision not to testify was ba sed, in larg e part, upon his assertion that he did not bear the burde n of proof ; rather , the burde n of proof rested w ith the State. The Appe l l an t was informed that the State’s c ase ha d conclude d and that defe nse counsel had presented all the evidence that they had prepare d in mitigation. We rejec t the Appellant’s a

rg ument that he was not suf ficiently advised of the salient conse quence s of exercising his fundamental c onstitut ional rig ht to testify . We further conclude that the re cord r efle cts that Ap pe lla nt Rimm e r’ s wa ive r of his c on sti tut ion a l rig ht wa s v olu nta ri ly , kno wi ng ly

a ndint e lli g e ntl y made. Appe llant Rim mer is not entitled to relief on this cla im.

VII. Reve lation to Jurors that Appellant had been on Death Row
Appellant Rimmer ar g ues that the re velation to the jury that he wa s a death row inmate a nd, thus, had bee n sentenc ed to death by a previously

empane led jury

constitutes plain error

as it violated his right to a reliable non-arbitrary sentenc ing determination. The information complained of was 5 elicited during the direc t ex ami nation of the Appe llant’s mitigation witness, Thomas Mac h. Specifica lly , the re cord r evea ls the following r efe renc es to the Appe llant’s previous death sentence :
[C ounsel for A ppellant]: And how is it that y ou know Mr. Micha el Rimmer?

[Thomas Mach]: I visited him i n prison. I ’m involved in prison minist ry at Riverbend.

. . . . [Cou ns e l fo r Ap pe lla nt]: No w, y ou state d y ou met Mi chael while h e wa s on de a th row?

[Thomas Mach]: Yes, sir.

[C ounsel for Appellant]: And how would y ou describe hi s interest in the service s and the wo rs hip se rv ic e s?

[Thomas Mac h]: Michae l’s done amazing things in unit four. When he was taken of f of de ath row a nd went to unit four, . . . h e go t ei gh teen men inter ested in the [B]i ble. . . .-25-

Th e fo llo wi ng c oll oq uy

oc c ur re d o n c ro ss- e xami natio n o f this wi tne ss:
[P rosec utor]: How long have y ou known the def endant in prison?

[Thomas Mach]: Since I met him on death row.

I n contesting the introduction of t he fact t hat he ha d previously been on de ath row, A ppellant Rimm e r a sse rt s th a t “ makin g kn ow n to the jury that a de fe nd a nt h a d p re vio us ly be e n s e nte nc e d to death f or the same crime by

a differe nt jury will also aff ect the jury ’s deliber ations, if for no other

rea son than it would seem to sug g est that bec ause a nother jury conclude d that death wa s the

approp ri a te se nte nc e the pr e se nt j ury sh ou ld a s w e ll. ” I n th is r e g ard , h e a sse rt s th a t th e re lia bil ity of the jury ’s ver dict and sente nce w as diminished by the knowledg e that another jury had sente nced him to die for the same offe nse that wa s under c onsideration at the r esente ncing hearing.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the introduction, during the sentenc ing pha se, of evide nce of

a prior de ath sentenc e i s n o t constitutional error, so long as the e vidence does not aff irmatively

mislead t he jury

and diminish it s sense of se ntencing responsibility

. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 10, 114 S.C t. 2004 (1993). I n Romano, the def endant wa s found g uiltyof murder, and during the subsequent pe nalty phase, the prosec ution introduced evide nce of a pre vious conviction and de ath sentenc e. The defe ndant ar g ued that the admission of the prior de ath sentenc e undermined the jury ’s sense of responsibilityfor de termining the death penalty in violation of the Eig hth Amendment. I n reje cting the def endant’ s arg ument, the Supreme Court stated, “ We do not be lie ve that th e a dmi ssi on of e vid e nc e re g ard ing peti ti one r’ s p ri or de a th s e nte nc e a ff

ir ma tiv e ly misle d the jury

reg arding its role in the sentenc ing pr ocess so a s to dimi nish its s ense of responsibility .” Id. a t 10 , 1 14 S. Ct . at 20 10 ; se e als o S tat e v . B e ll, 302 S.C. 18, 24, 393 S .E.2d 364, 368, cert. de nied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S. C t. 227(1990) (“ [W ]e also rejec t Be ll’s arg ument that the jurors’ knowle dg e of the previous death sentenc e dim inished their sense of responsibilityin deciding wh a t se nte nc e to i mpo se .” ). Ac c or din g ly , th e re le va nt i nq uiry th at th is C ou rt

mus t c on sid e r i s wheth e r th e a d mi s s io n o f e v id e n c e r e g ar d in g th e A p p e ll a n t’ s p r io r d e a th s e n te n c e s o in f e cted the sentenc ing pr ocess with unfa irness as to re nder the jury ’s impositi on o f the de ath pena lty a denia l of due pr ocess.

Af te r r e vie w o f the re c or d, we c on c lud e that A pp e lla nt R imm e r h a s no t e sta bli sh e d h ow thi s passing ref

ere nce to “ death r ow” misled the jury reg arding its role in the sentenc ing pr ocess or diminis hed its sense of responsibility

. I n rea ching this conclusion, t his Court is cog nizant that the

re fe re nc e to d e a th ro w wa s eli c ite d by the Ap pe lla nt on d ir e c t e xami natio n o f h is m iti g a tio n w itn e ss. Appellant Rimm er cannot assert a s err or an act or omission t o which he c ontributed or in which he participated in such fashion. Tenn. R. App. P

. 36(a)

. Also, the t rial court proper ly instructed the jury as t o the applicable l aw. We presume that the j ury followed the trial court’s instruction. Apply ing these fa cts, this Court holds that passing ref ere nces to the fac t that the Appellant was pre viouslyon de a th r ow didno t c or

ru pt h is c on sti tut ion a l g ua rante e to a fa ir re -s e nte nc ing jury

. Th e Ap pe lla nt i s not entitled to relief on this issue.-26- III. Jury Verdict
Appellant Rimm er contends that the jury verdic t is incomplete as it fails to contain a finding that th e a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums tan ce wa s p ro ve n b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. In s up po rt

of his arg ument, Appellant R immer quotes the ver dict form as f ollows: “We, the jury , unanimously find the following listed statutory ag g ravating c ircumstance or circumstance s.” He asserts t hat t he fa ilure to re fl e c t that the a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e wa s fo un d be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t vi olate s h is s ta te

a ndfe de ra l c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts , in c lud ing that the ve rd ic t f orm pe rm itt e d th e se nte nc e of de a th t o be imposed on a lowe r burde n of proof than re quired by

statute.

Our supreme court reje cted the identical arg ument in State v. Faulkne r, 154 S.W .3d 48 (Tenn. 2005) . Our supre me court, in doing so, conc luded:

The verd i ct fo rm i n co rp o ra t ed t h e l an gu age o f T en n es s ee C o d e A n n o t at ed sec tion 39- 13-204(g )(1) (B ) (1997), wh ich provides: “We, the jury , unanimously find the following listed statutory ag g ravating c ircumstance or circ umstances . . . .” The statu t o ry form also omits the burden of proof f or establishing ag g ravating circ umstances.
Reg ardle ss of waive r, a simil ar issue was rejecte d by this Court recently in State v. Davidson, 121 S.W .3d 600, 619-20 (Tenn. 2003). We concluded that such an e rror can be distinguished fr om the reve rsible er ror in the ve rdict form in Sta te v . Ca rte r, 988 S.W .2d 145, 152 (Tenn. 1999). See D avidson, 121 S.W .3d at 620. I n Car te r, the wrong form wa s used, and the form was not merely silent as to the burden or proof but conflicted w ith the trial court’s instruc tions reg arding the burde n. L ike Davidson, the lang uag e used in the ve rdict form in the prese nt case was statutorily mandated, and the tria l court re peate dly and cle arly i n s t ructe d the jury that it must find any statutory ag g ravating c ircumstance s bey ond a re asonable d o u b t . We conclude, there fore , that the failu re o f t he ver dict form to re cite that the jury found the ag g ravating c ircumstance “bey ond a re asonable doubt” did not rende r the ve rdict invalid.

Faulkner
, 154 S.W .3d at 61-62. Applying the Faulkner holding to the f

acts be fore this Court, we conclude that the Appellant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

IX. Cum ulative Error
Appellant Rimmer, re citing the litany of hi s alleg ed errors, asserts t hat t his Court should not

c on sid e r i n is olatio n a ny e rr or s that thi s Cou rt wo uldde e m ha rm le ss. He a sse rt s th a t “ ind ivi du a lly and in combination the for eg oing e rror s resulted in an a rbitrary and unre liab l e i m p o s i t i o n of the death pe nalty .” B eca

use our r eview of

the individually

assig ned er

ror has conclude d err ors are either wi tho ut m e ri t or harm le ss, the Ap pe lla nt’ s ar g ume nt of c umu la tiv e e rr or is l ike wi se wi tho ut m e ri t.-27- X. Constitutionality of Deat h Pe nalty
Appellant Rimmer next raises n u m er ous challeng es to the constitutionalityof Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ctions 39-13-204 and 39-13-206. Spec ifically , Appellant Rimmer ar g ues that (A) the de a th s e nte nc e is i mpo se d c apric iou sly a ndarb itr ari ly ; ( B ) the app e llate re vie w pr oc e ss in d e a th pe na lty c a se s is c on sti tut ion a l l y

i n a de qu a te ; a nd(C ) l e tha l in je c tio n is c ru e l a ndun us ua l pu nis hme nt.

A. The De at h Se nt e nc e Is I m pos e d Ca pr ic iou sly and A r bit r ar ily
Ap pe lla nt R imm e r a

rg ue s th a t th e de a th sen te nc e is i mpo se d c a pric iou sly a ndarb itr ari ly beca use (1) the jury

is require d to unanimously ag ree to a life ve rdict in violation of Mc Koy v . No rth Carolina, 4 9 4 U. S . 433, 110 S. Ct . 1227 (1990), a nd Mills v. Maryland, 48 6 U .S. 36 7, 10 8 S. Ct. 1860 (1988); (2) unlimit ed discre tion is vested i n t he prose cutor a s to whether or not to seek the death pe nalty ; and (3) the death pe nalty is imposed in a discriminatory manner based upon r ace , g eog raphy , and g ender . Our supre me court has re j ec t ed ea ch of these ar g uments. Se e Hi ne s, 919 S.W. 2da t 58 2; Sta te v . B rim me r, 87 6 S.W. 2d 75 , 8 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) ; Caz e s, 87 5 S. W.2 d at 26 8; Sta te v. Smith, 85 7 S. W.2 d 1 , 2 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; State v. Thompson, 768 S.W .2d 239, 250-52 (Te nn. 1989). Th e se c la ims are wi tho ut m e ri t.

B. Th e Appellate Re view Pr ocess in Deat h Pe nalty Cases Is Constitutional ly Inad equate

Th e Ap pe lla nt a lso c on te nd s th a t th e app e llate re vie w p ro c e ss i n d e a th p e na lty c a se s is constitutionall y i nadequate. Specific ally , the appe llant contends that the re view proc ess is not

“ me a nin g fu l” a nd that the statut orily ma nd a te d pro po rt ion a lit y re vie w vio la te s due pr oc e ss. B oth arg uments have been reje cted by our supre me court. See V ann, 97 6 S. W.2 d a t 11 8- 19 ; Caz e s, 875 S.W .2d at 270-71. More over, our supreme c ourt has held that, “ [w] hile important as an a dditional safe g uard a g ainst arbitra ry or ca pricious sentenc ing, compar ative proportionalityrevie w is not constitutionallyrequire d.” State v. Bland, 9 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d 6 5 1
, 6 6 3 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 7 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, Ap pe lla nt R imm e r i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is c la im.

C. Le th al I nj e c ti on i s C r ue l an d Un usua l P unis hm e nt
Appellant Rimmer contends that lethal injection constitutes crue l and unusual punishment beca use the use of

Pavulon with sodium pentothal and potassium chloride cre ates a risk of

unnece ssary

phy sical and psy cholog ical suff ering and bec ause the lethal injection protocol lac ks

writt e n p ro vis ion s o r o the r a pp ro pria te sa fe g ua

rd s. Ou r s up re me c ou rt

ha s r e c e ntl y

re je c te d the se claims in Abu-Ali Abdul ‘Rahman v . Bredese n , 1 81 S.W. 3d29 2, 30 7- 31 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 5). Whil e Ap pe lla nt a c kn ow le dg e s this ru lin g , he make s spe c if ic c ha lle ng e s as t o th e va lid ity of ou r s up re me court’s r easoning . We, as an interme diate appe llate court, are bound by t h e d ec i s i o n s of the Tenne ssee Supre me Court as to state and fede ral constitutional que stions. Sta te v . P e nd e rg ra ss , 13 S.W. 3d38 9, 39 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 99 ). Th us , we de c lin e the Ap pe lla nt’ s in vit a tio n to re vis it thi s c la im.

XI. Revie w Pursuant to Section 39-13-206( c), Tennessee Code Annotated-28-

Pur su a nt t o T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 06 (c )( 1) , w e arere qu ir e d to revie w the application of the dea th penalty to determine w hether

(A ) T he se nte nc e of

de a th w a s impo se d ina ny arb itr ary fa sh ion ; (B ) The e vidence supports the jury ’s finding of statutory ag g ravating c ircumstance

or c ir c ums ta nc e s; (C) The e vidence supports the jury ’s finding that the ag g ravating c ircumstanceor circ umstances outwe igh any mitigating circ umstances; and (D ) T he se nte nc e of de a th is e xce ssi ve or dis pr op ortio nate to the pe na lty imp os e d in sim ila r c a se s, c on sid e ri ng bo th the natur e of the c ri me a ndthe de fe nd a nt.

A. Ar bit r ar ine ss
Having thoroug hly

revie we d the re cord, w e conc lude that the sente nce of death wa s not imposed in any

arbitra ry fashion.

B. Su ff iciency of Statutory Aggravating Circum stances F ound by Jury

I n imposing the de ath pena lty , the jury found the pro o f s u p p o rt ed the (i)(2), prior violent felony , ag g ravating f

actor relied upon by

the State. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204( i)(2 ). During the pe na lty ph a se , th e Sta te pr e se nte d p ro of that th e Ap pe lla nt w a s c on vi cte d in 19 85 of a ssa ult wi th intent to commit robbery

with a dea dly wea

pon and ag g ravated assault. The proof f urther r evea led that, in 1989, the Appellant ente red g uiltypleas to ag g ravated assault and r ape. T he jury ’s ver dict ref lects t h at it found that the State had prove n the pre sence of the prior violent felony

conviction ag g ravating f

actor . The re cord supports this findi ng. W e co n cl ude that the State’ s evidenc e wa s sufficie nt to establish the (i)(2) a g g ravating c ircumstance

. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204( i)(2).
C. Totality of Aggravating Fac tors Applied

With c on sid e ratio n o f the e vid e nc e be fo re the jury , we c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e su pp orts the jury ’s finding that the ag g ravating c ircumstance outweig hed any mitigating circ umstances be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t.

D. P roportionality

This Court is r equire d by Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-13- 206( c)( 1)(D) and under the mandate s of Bland, 95 8 S. W.2 d a t 661- 74 , to c on sid e r w he the r theAp pe lla nt’ s se nte nc e of de a th is disproportionate to the pena lty i mposed in simil ar c ases. See State v . Godsey
, 60 S.W .3d 759, 78 1- 82 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . T he c omp arativ e pr op ortio na lit y re vie w “ is d e sig ne d to ident if y abe rr a nt, arbitra ry , or ca pricious sentenc ing.” Sta te v . S tou t, 46 S.W. 3d 68 9, 70 6 (T e nn . 200 1) . I t do e s th is by determining whe ther the de ath pena lty in a g iven ca se is “‘di s p ro p o rt i o n ate to the punishment imposed on others convic t ed o f t h e same crime.’ ” Bland, 9 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d at 6 6 2 (q u o t i n g Pulley v

. Ha rri s, 465 U.S. 37, 43, 104 S. Ct. 871, 876 (1984))

. I f a case is “‘pla inly lacking in circumstanc es-29-

c on sis te nt w ith tho se in c a se s w he re the de a th p e na lty ha s b e e n impo se d, ’ th e n th e se nte nc e is disproportionate.’” Sto ut, 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d at 7 0 6 (q u o t i n g Bland, 958 S.W .2d at 668).

I n conducting our proportionalityrevie w, this court must compare the prese nt case with case s inv o lving similar def

endants a nd simil ar c rimes. See id.; see also Terry v . State, 46 S.W .3d 147, 163-64 (Tenn. 2001). We se lect only from those case s in w hich a capital sentenci n g h ea ri n g was actua lly conducte d to de termi n ew h e th e r th es e n te n c es h o uld be life imprisonment, life imprisonment without t h e p o s s i b i l i t y

of par ole, or de ath. Se e Sta te v . Ca rru the rs, 35 S.W .3d 516, 570 (Tenn. 20 00 ); see also Godse

y, 60 S.W .3d at 783.
This Court beg ins with the presumption that the s entenc e of death is proportionate with the crime of first deg ree murder. See Terry
, 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d at 1 6 3 (c i t i n g Sta te v . H all
, 958 S.W .2d 679, 699 (Tenn. 1997)). This pr esumption a pplies only if the sentenc ing pr ocedur es foc us discretion on the “particularized natur eo f

th ec rim eand the pa

rticularized cha

rac teristics of the individual def endant.” Id

. (q u o t i n g McCleskey v . Kemp, 4 8 1 U. S

. 2 7 9
, 3 0 8
, 1 0 7 S

. C t

. 1 7 5 6 , 1 7 7 5 (1 9 8 7 ) ( q u o t i n g Gregg v. Ge orgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206, 96 S. C t. 2909, 2940-41 (1976)) ).
Apply ing this appr oach, in c omparing this case to other ca ses in which a de fenda nt was convicted of the same or

simil ar c rime, this Court looks “at the fac ts and circ umstances of the crime, the cha rac teristics of the de fenda nt, and the ag g ravating a nd mitigating fac tors involved.” Se e Te rry , 46 S.W .3d at 164. Reg arding the circ umstances of the crime itself, numerous fac tors are considere d, including the following : (1) the means of death; (2) the manne r of de ath; (3) the motivation for the killing; (4) the pla ce of death; (5) the vi ctim’s ag e, phy sical conditi on, and psy cholog ical condition; (6) the a bsence or pre sence of pr o v o cation; (7) the absenc e or pr esenc e of pr emeditation; (8) the absenc e or pr esenc e of justification; and (9) the injury to and effec t on non-dec edent victims

. Sto ut, 46 S.W. 3da t 70 6; see also Terry, 46 S.W .3d at 164. Contemplated within the revie w are numerous other fac t o rs, including the Appellant’ s “(1) prior criminal recor d; (2) ag e, ra ce, and g ender ; (3)

me nta l, e mot ion a l, andph y sic a l c on dit ion ; ( 4) ro le in the mur de r; (5 ) c oo pe ratio n w ith a uth or iti e s; (6) leve l of remor se; (7) know ledg e of the victim’s helplessness; and (8) potential for r ehabilitation.” Sto ut, 46 S.W. 3da t 70 6; Terry, 46 S.W .3d at 164. I n completing our revie w, we r emain cog nizant of the fa ct t hat “no two case s involve identical circ umstances.” Terry, 46 S.W .3d at 164. Thus, our fu nc tio n is no t “ to l imi t ou r c omp ari so n to tho se c a se s w he re a defe nd ant ’s death s e nte nc e ‘i s perf ectly sy mmetrical,’ b u t o n l yto ‘identify and to invalidate the a

berr ant death sentence .’” Id. (q u o t i n g Bland, 958 S.W .2d at 665).

Tu rn ing to the ins ta nt c a se , we fi rs t a c kn ow le dg e that a se nte nc e of

de a th h a s b e e n u ph e ld wher e the defe ndant ki lled an estrang ed wife or g irlfriend. See, e .g., State v. Iv y , 188 S.W .3d 132 (Tenn. 2006) (def

endan t am b ushed estra ng ed g irlfriend shooting her f ive times at close r ang e); Faulkner , 1 54 S.W. 3d at 14 8 (defe nd a nt b e a t e str a ng e d w if e to d e a th w ith ir on sk ill e t) ; State v. Keough, 18 S.W. 3d17 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) (d efen dan t stab be d e str a ng e d w if e to d e a th a ft e r a

rg ume nt; de a th p e na lty

a ff ir me d b a se d o n ( i) (2 ) a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e ); Sta te v . H all
, 8 S.W .3d 593 (Tenn. 1999) (de fend an t s tr an g le d estrang ed wife to death af ter a ssault on her pe rson; death pe nalty aff irmed ba se d o n ( i) (5 ) a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e ); State v. Smith, 868 S.W .2d 561 (Tenn. 1993) (def endant-30-

shot estrang ed wife , slit her throat and stabbe d her multiple times; death sentenc e upheld ba sed upon (i )( 5) a nd(i )( 12 ); State v. Johnson, 74 3 S.W.2 d 154 (T e nn . 198 7) (d e fe nd a nt suf fo c a te d w if

e ; de a th pe na lty a ff ir me d b a s e d u p o n ( i) (2 ) and(i )( 5) a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s) ; Sta te v . Mill e r, 674 S.W .2d 279 (Tenn. 1984)
, on remand, 77 1 S. W.2 d 401 (T e nn . 198 9) (d e fe nd a nt be a t gi rl frie nd to d e a th w ith fists and fire poker, he then stabbed h er nume rous times; death pena lty upheld under

(i)(5) ag g ravating c ircumstance ).

The de ath s entence has be en upheld ba sed on the sole a g g ravating c ircumstance of a prior violent felony

conviction, T.C.A. § 39-13-204( i)(2). See, e .g., State v. Mc Kinney, 74 S.W .3d 291 (Tenn. 2002) (prior c onviction f or ag g ravated robbe ry

as adult and a g g ravated assault as juve nile); Sta te v . Ch alm e rs, 28 S.W. 3d91 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) (p ri or c on vic tio ns fo r atte mpt e d e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d ro bb e ry a nd a tte mpt e d fi rs t de g re e mur de r) ; Keough, 18 S.W .3d 184 (prior c onvictions fo r a ssa ult wi th i nte nt t o c omm it v olu nta ry ma ns la ug hte r andmans laug hte r) ; State v. Smith, 993 S.W. 2d6 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) (p ri or c on vic tio ns fo r r ob be ry

a ndfi rs t de g re e mur de r) ; State v. Boy d, 959 S.W. 2d55 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; S t a t e v

. Ad k ins
, 725 S.W .2d 660 (Tenn. 1987) (prior c onviction for ag g ravated assault). The prior violent felony

fac tor is an a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e that th e c ou rt s of this state have described as “ more qua litatively persua sive and objec tively reliable than others.” McKinney
, 74 S.W. 3da t 31 3; Sta te v . H owe ll, 868 S.W .2d 238, 261 (Tenn. 1993)

.
I n c omp le tin g ou r re vie w, we ne e d n ot c on c lud e that th is c a se is e xac tly lik e prior c a se s in

e ve ry re sp e c t, no r mus t thi s Co urt de te rm ine that th is c a se is “ mor e or le ss” lik e oth e r d e a th p e na lty

case . Rather, this Court need only identify “abe rra nt death se ntence s by analy zing whethe r a c apital

case plainly

lacks c ircumstance s simil ar to those c ases in the pool of cases in which a death se ntence has bee n upheld.” Ivy , 1 88 S.W. 3da t 15 8. Th e pe na lty imp os e d b y

the jury in the pr e se nt ca se is

c le arl y no t di sp ro po rt ion a te to the pe na lty imp os e d f

or sim ila r c ri me s.

Conclusion

I n acc ordanc e with the mandate of Ten n es s ee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-206( c)( 1), Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d, a nd the princ ipl e s a do pte d in prior de c isi on s of the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court, we have considere d the entire rec ord i n this capital case and determine that the sentenc e of death wa s not imposed in any arbitra ry fashion, that the evidence supports the jury ’s finding of the statutory ag g ravating c ircumst an ce, and that the jury ’s finding that the ag g ravating c ircumstance outweig hed mitigating c ircumstance s bey ond a re asonable doubt. T.C.A. § 39-13-206(c )(1) (A)- (C). A compar ative proportionality revie w, considering both “ the nature of the c rime and the defe ndant,”

c on vin c e s u s th a t th e se nte nc e of de a th i s n e ith e r exce ssi ve no r d isp ro po rt ion a te to the pe na lty imposed in simi l ar cases. We c onclude that no e rror exis ts requiring reve rsal. Ac cording ly , the sentenc e of de ath is aff

irmed.

______________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE