Present: All the Justices 

SUGARLAND RUN HOMEOWNERS 

ASSOCIATION 

Record No. 992331 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 September 15, 2000 

WALTER D. HALFMANN, ETC., ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 

Jean Harrison Clements, Judge 

 In this wrongful death case, the dispositive issue is 

one of proximate cause. We review a judgment entered 

against a homeowners’ association in favor of the personal 

representatives of the estate of a child who was struck and 

killed by a motorist as the child was riding his bicycle 

from a pathway located in the common areas owned by the 

homeowners’ association onto a public street. Because we 

conclude that there was insufficient evidence as a matter 

of law to establish that any alleged defects in the pathway 

and its intersection with the street proximately caused the 

accident, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court 

and enter final judgment for the homeowners’ association. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

 Walter R. Halfmann (Halfmann) was killed in January 

1995 as he rode his bicycle from a multi-purpose, private 
pathway1 onto Sugarland Run Drive, a public street in 

Loudoun County, and was struck by a motor vehicle driven by 

Trina Kabiri. The bike path was located in a residential 

subdivision and was part of the common areas owned by 

Sugarland Run Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association). 

 Halfmann’s parents, Walter D. Halfmann and Barbara B. 

Halfmann, as personal representatives of their eight-yearold son’s estate, filed this action against Kabiri, the 

Association, and several other defendants.2 The personal 

representatives alleged that the Association had notice or 

knowledge of “the unreasonably dangerous condition” 

existing at the intersection between the pathway and the 

street where the accident occurred, and that the 

Association failed to take “reasonable and necessary” steps 

to ensure that people utilizing the common areas could do 

so safely. 

 After the personal representatives presented evidence 

at trial, the Association moved to strike that evidence 

because, inter alia, the alleged defects in the pathway 

were not a proximate cause of the accident. The circuit 

 1

 Bicyclists, pedestrians, in-line skaters and 

skateboarders used the paved path. 

2

 At the time of trial, only Kabiri and the Association 

remained as party defendants. 

2
court denied the motion initially and again when the 

Association renewed its motion to strike at the conclusion 

of all the evidence. 

 A jury then returned a verdict against the Association 

in favor of the personal representatives and awarded 

damages to Halfmann’s estate and his statutory 

beneficiaries pursuant to Code §§ 8.01-52 and –53. The 

jury, however, found in favor of Kabiri.3 After denying the 

Association’s motion to set aside the jury verdict, the 

circuit court entered judgment for the personal 

representatives.4 This appeal followed. 

The bike path at issue in this case was designed and 

constructed no later than the summer of 1974, but not by 

the Association. The path intersects Sugarland Run Drive 

and continues on the opposite side of the street. No signs 

or markings were placed along the pathway or on Sugarland 

Run Drive to warn a bicyclist or a motorist about the 

intersection. Nor were any barriers or devices installed 

at the end of the path to prevent or impede a bicyclist’s 

 3

 The personal representatives did not appeal the 

judgment in favor of Kabiri, and she is not a party to this 

appeal. 

4

 The circuit court’s judgment was in accordance with 

the jury verdict except that the court remitted a portion 

of the jury’s award for funeral expenses and for the care, 

3
travelling from the path onto Sugarland Run Drive. The 

only change to the pathway since its construction was the 

installation of curb cuts, or wheelchair ramps, on both 

sides of Sugarland Run Drive. The Virginia Department of 

Transportation constructed the curb cuts in approximately 

1994. 

On the afternoon of the accident, as Halfmann was 

riding his bicycle down the descending pathway and 

approaching the intersection with Sugarland Run Drive, the 

intersection and street were clearly visible to him. 

However, several objects were on his left side between the 

path and that portion of the street where Kabiri was 

operating her vehicle. Two large, electrical 

switch/transformer boxes were located within a few feet of 

the edge of the pathway and approximately 10 to 15 feet 

from the edge of Sugarland Run Drive.5 Two vehicles were 

parked on the side of the street nearest Halfmann about 30 

to 40 feet down Sugarland Run Drive. A house was likewise 

located about 70 feet down the street from the point of 

impact between Halfmann’s bicycle and Kabiri’s car. Bushes 

had been planted along one side of the driveway of that 

__________________ 

treatment, and hospitalization of Halfmann. The personal 

representatives did not object to the remittitur. 

4
house. All these objects, as well as the pathway upon 

which Halfmann was riding his bicycle, were to Kabiri’s 

right as she drove her vehicle along Sugarland Run Drive. 

While no testimony established Halfmann’s speed as he 

rode his bicycle on the path toward Sugarland Run Drive, 

Rachel Susan Toepfer, who was driving along Sugarland Run 

Drive in the direction opposite to that in which Kabiri was 

travelling at the time of the accident, testified that 

Halfmann’s speed did not change as he approached the 

intersection, nor did he stop or look to his left in the 

direction of Kabiri’s vehicle. According to Toepfer, 

Halfmann entered the street and almost travelled past 

Kabiri’s vehicle before the left front of her vehicle (the 

driver’s side) struck the rear wheel of his bicycle. 

Another witness to the accident likewise testified that 

Halfmann did not stop at the intersection and did not 

appear to look to his left, the direction from which 

Kabiri’s vehicle was approaching. 

When the accident occurred, Kabiri was on her way to 

pick up her child from school. Kabiri testified that 

Halfmann passed in front of her car and that she could not 

do anything to avoid hitting his bicycle. She further 

__________________ 5

 The switch/transformer boxes were in place before the 

pathway was constructed. 

5
stated that, if she had seen him, she would have stopped 

but she was not aware of anything in the street until the 

impact occurred.6 However, she knew that children who 

attended the nearby school often walked or rode bicycles to 

that school. 

Jennifer L. Toole, an expert in the field of bicycle 

and pedestrian planning, testified that there were two 

major “flaws” in the design of the pathway and the 

intersection where the accident at issue occurred. First, 

she stated that there should have been a sign inscribed 

with the warning “Bike Crossing” or “Pedestrian Crossing” 

on Sugarland Run Drive at its intersection with the 

pathway. She also recommended that a crosswalk be painted 

on the street. 

The second defect, according to Toole, was the 

inadequacy of “sight lines” between an approaching motorist 

and a bicyclist on the pathway.7 Toole identified the 

 6

 The investigating police officer testified that he 

found no skid marks on Sugarland Run Drive that would 

indicate Kabiri applied her brakes before the impact. 

Likewise, the officer did not find any indication on the 

bike path that Halfmann braked or slowed before entering 

the street. 

7

 Toole testified that “appropriate sight lines” 

provide an “adequate visual distance” for a motorist to see 

a pedestrian and stop in time to avoid hitting the 

pedestrian, based on the speed limit or the prevailing 

6
switch/transformer boxes as the factor that significantly 

blocked the sight lines for Halfmann and Kabiri on the day 

of the accident. However, Toole admitted that, in order to 

analyze whether sight lines are adequate, the respective 

likely speeds of a motorist and bicyclist must be 

determined. Toole further testified that only by removing 

the switch/transformer boxes could proper sight lines have 

been established. If the pathway itself were moved further 

from the boxes, Toole could say only that the sight lines 

would have been “better” since she had not analyzed that 

possibility. 

Toole also stated that the pathway’s downward slope to 

the intersection caused both motorists and bicyclists to 

have only a “narrow window” of visibility in which to see 

each other as they approached the intersection. Toole 

indicated that the pathway should have had only a grade of 

five to eight degrees, but instead, it sloped between 10 

and 15 degrees. Nevertheless, she testified that if 

Halfmann had stopped at the intersection, he would have had 

a clear line of sight down Sugarland Run Drive in the 

direction from which Kabiri was travelling for “quite a 

distance.” Finally, Toole stated that the location of the 

__________________ 

speed of motorists on the road. The term also applies when 

a bicyclist is approaching an intersection with a road. 

7
curb cut was not appropriate because it did not exit into a 

crosswalk.8

ANALYSIS

Several principles guide our analysis of this case. 

On appeal, we review the facts in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party at trial, in this case the personal 

representatives of Halfmann’s estate. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 

Co. v. St. John, 259 Va. 71, 76, 524 S.E.2d 649, 651 

(2000). “[A] party who comes before us with a jury verdict 

approved by the trial court ‘occupies the most favored 

position known to the law.’ " Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v.

Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 57, 419 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1992) 

(quoting Pugsley v. Privette, 220 Va. 892, 901, 263 S.E.2d 

69, 76 (1980)). A trial court’s judgment is presumed to be 

correct, and on appeal, we will not set it aside unless the 

judgment is plainly wrong or not supported by the evidence. 

Ravenwood, 244 Va. at 57, 419 S.E.2d at 630. However, when 

these principles are applied, if it appears that the 

judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it, we must set it aside. Evaluation Research Corp. v. 

 8

 The curb cut was not directly in front of Halfmann as 

he rode down the path. Instead, the curb cut was located 

to the side of the path, thus requiring Halfmann to make a 

turn to his left followed by another similar turn to his 

right in order to access the curb cut and Sugarland Run 

Drive from the path. 

8
Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 147-48, 439 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1994) 

(citing Thompson v. Bacon, 245 Va. 107, 111, 425 S.E.2d 

512, 514 (1993); Whichard v. Nee, 194 Va. 83, 89, 72 S.E.2d 

365, 369 (1952)). 

 The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the 

alleged defects in the design of the pathway and its 

intersection with Sugarland Run Drive were a proximate 

cause of the accident. In order to hold the Association 

liable for that alleged “unreasonably dangerous condition,” 

the evidence must establish that such condition was a 

proximate cause of the accident. See Cannon v. Clarke, 209 

Va. 708, 711, 167 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1969) (to hold owner 

liable for injuries sustained because of alleged unsafe 

condition of premises, it must be shown that such condition 

was a proximate cause of injuries). The personal 

representatives had the burden of proving not only that the 

Association was negligent but also that its negligence was 

a proximate cause of the accident. Commercial 

Distributors, Inc. v. Blankenship, 240 Va. 382, 395, 397 

S.E.2d 840, 847 (1990) (citing State-Planters Bank & Trust 

Co. v. Gans, 172 Va. 76, 81, 200 S.E. 591, 593 (1939)); 

Boyd v. Brown, 192 Va. 702, 711, 66 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1951). 

A proximate cause of an event is that “act or omission 

which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an 

9
efficient intervening cause, produces the event, and 

without which that event would not have occurred.” Beale 

v. Jones, 210 Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1970); 

accord Jenkins v. Payne, 251 Va. 122, 128, 465 S.E.2d 795, 

799 (1996); Banks v. City of Richmond, 232 Va. 130, 135, 

348 S.E.2d 280, 282 (1986). Generally, the issue of 

proximate causation is a question of fact to be resolved by 

a jury. Jenkins, 251 Va. at 128, 465 S.E.2d at 799 (citing 

Brown v. Koulizakis, 229 Va. 524, 531, 331 S.E.2d 440, 445 

(1985)). However, when reasonable people cannot differ, 

the issue becomes a question of law for the court to 

decide. Jenkins, 251 Va. at 128, 465 S.E.2d at 799 (citing 

Hadeed v. Medic-24, Ltd., 237 Va. 277, 285, 377 S.E.2d 589, 

593 (1989)); Alexander v. Moore, 205 Va. 870, 875, 140 

S.E.2d 645, 648-49 (1965). 

With regard to the issue of proximate cause, the 

Association argues that, while the personal 

representatives’ expert, Toole, identified several alleged 

“flaws” in the design of the pathway and its intersection 

with Sugarland Run Drive, she never explained the causal 

connection between those particular defects and the 

accident at issue. To the contrary, the Association points 

out several facts that show that those defects were not a 

proximate cause of the accident. First, Toepfer, who 

10
witnessed the accident, stated that Halfmann never altered 

the speed of his bicycle as he approached the intersection, 

and neither stopped at the intersection nor looked to his 

left for oncoming traffic. Second, the intersection and 

the street were visible to anyone travelling on the pathway 

toward Sugarland Run Drive. Finally, Toole admitted that 

if Halfmann had stopped at the intersection, he could have 

seen Kabiri’s oncoming vehicle. 

The personal representatives respond that there was 

“far more than a sufficient basis to show a causal 

connection” between the defects in the pathway and the 

accident. They point to the inadequate sight lines between 

motorists on Sugarland Run Drive and bicyclists on the 

pathway, the excessive slope of the path, the lack of 

warning signs or a crosswalk, the absence of any barrier on 

the pathway to stop or slow a bicyclist, and the improperly 

located curb cut. The personal representatives also 

contend that the question of proximate cause is actually an 

issue of contributory negligence, and argue that the jury 

found that Halfmann was not contributorily negligent when 

it returned a verdict against the Association.9 We agree 

with the Association. 

 9

 Since Halfmann was eight years old at the time of the 

accident, the circuit court instructed the jury that 

11
Assuming, without deciding, that there was an 

unreasonably dangerous condition at the intersection 

between the pathway and Sugarland Run Drive, and that the 

Association knew or should have known of that condition, 

the burden of proving proximate causation remained with the 

personal representatives. In this case, the evidence did 

not establish that the “flaws” identified by Toole were an 

“omission which, in natural and continuous sequence, . . . 

produce[d] the [accident], and without which [the accident] 

would not have occurred.” Beale, 210 Va. at 522, 171 

__________________ 

Halfmann was presumed to be incapable of contributory 

negligence but that the presumption could be rebutted. The 

court further instructed the jury to find its verdict for 

either defendant if it concluded, as to that defendant, the 

personal representatives failed to prove either negligence 

or proximate cause, or if it found that Halfmann was 

contributorily negligent and that such contributory 

negligence was a proximate cause of Halfmann’s death. 

Although the personal representatives contend that the 

jury verdict in favor of the Association established that 

Halfmann was not contributorily negligent, under the 

instructions given, the jury could have found either that 

Halfmann was not capable of being contributorily negligent 

or that he was not contributorily negligent in this 

instance. The verdict form was a general form that simply 

stated that the jury found in favor of the personal 

representatives and against the Association. Thus, we 

reject the contention that the jury necessarily decided 

that Halfmann was not contributorily negligent. 

Furthermore, an analysis of the question whether a 

tortfeasor’s primary negligence proximately caused an 

accident and, if so, the consequent question whether a 

victim was contributorily negligent often involves review 

of the same or overlapping evidence. That the evidence is 

the same or overlapping does not obviate the necessity of 

an independent examination of each question. 

12
S.E.2d at 853. We reach this conclusion because of the 

particular facts of the accident at issue. See Banks, 232 

Va. at 135, 348 S.E.2d at 283 (in applying rules of 

proximate cause, each case must be decided upon its own set 

of facts). 

First, there is no evidence that Halfmann attempted to 

stop at the intersection and could not do so because of the 

grade of the path, the absence of a barrier or device to 

slow his speed, or the location of the curb cut. In fact, 

according to Toepfer, Halfmann did not alter his speed, 

never stopped, and did not even look to his left for 

oncoming vehicles as he approached the intersection. Next, 

the evidence was uncontradicted that Sugarland Run Drive 

and the intersection were clearly visible to Halfmann as he 

proceeded along the pathway toward the street. Finally, 

Toole admitted that a determination regarding adequate 

sight lines depends on the respective speeds of a motorist 

and bicyclist, but the evidence did not demonstrate either 

Halfmann’s speed or that of Kabiri.10

However, the evidence did establish that if Halfmann 

had stopped at the intersection of Sugarland Run Drive and 

 10 The speed limit on Sugarland Run Drive was 30 miles 

per hour, and the record contained no evidence that Kabiri 

was speeding. 

13
the pathway, he could have seen Kabiri’s car approaching 

that intersection. This case is not one where Halfmann had 

to ride his bicycle into the edge of Sugarland Run Drive 

and look around the switch/transformer boxes in order to 

determine whether any vehicle was approaching from his 

left. Those boxes were 10 to 15 feet back from the edge of 

the street. 

Although all accidents, however “tragic and 

deplorable,” Clark v. Hodges, 185 Va. 431, 438, 39 S.E.2d 

252, 256 (1946), must have some factual cause, “often 

described as the ‘but for’ . . . rule[,] [g]enerally a 

person is not liable to another unless but for [that 

person’s] negligent act the harm would not have occurred.” 

Wells v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 616, 622, 151 S.E.2d 422, 428 

(1966). In this case, the personal representatives failed 

to carry their burden to establish that “but for” the 

Association’s alleged negligence, the accident would not 

have occurred. Id. at 622, 151 S.E.2d at 428. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence was 

insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the 

alleged defects in the design of the pathway and its 

intersection with Sugarland Run Drive were a proximate 

14
cause of the accident.11 Accordingly, we will reverse the 

judgment of the circuit court, set aside the jury verdict 

in favor of the personal representatives, and enter final 

judgment here in favor of the Association. 

Reversed and final judgment. 

 11 In light of our decision, we need not address the 

Association’s other assignments of error. 

15