alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN THIS ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          17,575
<SECURITIES>                                    44,599
<RECEIVABLES>                                   19,234
<ALLOWANCES>                                     3,594
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                83,607
<PP&E>                                          15,760
<DEPRECIATION>                                   6,924
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 102,519
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           30,043
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           157
<OTHER-SE>                                      72,179
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   102,519
<SALES>                                         36,068
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                36,068
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   14,051
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                34,189
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (10,700)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (344)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (10,356)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (10,356)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.67)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.67)


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Swift Energy
Pension  Partners  1994-D,  Ltd.'s  balance  sheet and  statement of  operations
contained  in its Form 10-Q for the  quarter  ended  September  30,  1998 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         1,000
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  33,807
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               34,807
<PP&E>                                         3,162,609
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (2,257,932)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 939,484
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          131,158
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     808,326
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   939,484
<SALES>                                        113,695
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               118,620
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  1,288,195<F1>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,203,851)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,203,851)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,203,851)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
<FN>
<F1>Includes  lease  operating  expenses,  production  taxes  and  depreciation,
depletion and  amortization  expense.  Excludes general and  administrative  and
interest expense.
</FN>

        

</TABLE>
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1187

To amend the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1975

pertaining to fuel economy standards for automobiles and light trucks.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 3, 1993

Mr. CARR introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Energy and Commerce

A BILL

To amend the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings

Act of 1975 pertaining to fuel economy standards for

automobiles and light trucks.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. (a) Title V of the Motor Vehicle Informa4 tion and Cost Savings Act of 1975 is hereby repealed on

5 the effective date of this Act.

6 (b) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, any

7 credits earned by a manufacturer under the provisions of

8 the CAFE Program prior to its repeal can be used by that

9 manufacturer to offset the deficits incurred in any model

10 year in which the manufacturer failed to exceed the appli-
2

•HR 1187 IH

1 cable standard in that model year without regard to the

2 3-year limitation in carrying credits forward and backward

3 as contained in section 502 of the Motor Vehicle Informa4 tion and Cost Savings Act of 1975.

5 SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.—The repeal of title V of

6 the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of

7 1975 will be effective at the end of the 1989 model year,

8 but in no case later than December 31, 1989.

Æ
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1573

To strengthen the international trade position of the United States by

extending the Super 301 provision of United States trade law.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 31, 1993

Mr. LEVIN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Ways and Means

A BILL

To strengthen the international trade position of the United

States by extending the Super 301 provision of United

States trade law.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Super 301 Extension

5 Act of 1993’’.

6 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF ‘‘SUPER 301’’ AUTHORITY FOR FIVE

7 YEARS.

8 Section 310(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19

9 U.S.C. 2420(a)(1)) is amended by striking out ‘‘calendar

10 year 1989, and also the date in calendar year 1990,’’ and
2

HR 1573 IH

1 inserting ‘‘each of calendar years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,

2 and 1998’’.

Æ
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

527 KA 12-00341 PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., PERADOTTO, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ERIC X. MARTINEZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

LEANNE LAPP, PUBLIC DEFENDER, CANANDAIGUA (JOHN E. TYO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
R. MICHAEL TANTILLO, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA (JAMES B. RITTS OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Ontario County Court (Frederick G. Reed, A.J.), entered September 7, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of rape in the first degree and forcible touching (two counts).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of rape in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.35 [1]) and two counts of forcible touching (§ 130.52). We agree with defendant that the waiver of the right to appeal was not valid inasmuch as the record does not establish that it was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered ( see People v Bradshaw , 18 NY3d 257, 259). Although the prosecutor engaged in a colloquy with defendant regarding the waiver of the right to appeal, County Court failed to address the waiver with defendant and we thus conclude that the court “took no measures to ensure that [defendant] . . . understood . . . and . . . validly waiv[ed] his right to appeal” ( People v Bradshaw , 76 AD3d 566, 568, affd 18 NY3d 257).
We further conclude, however, that defendant’s contention that the court erred in denying his motion seeking to sever three counts from the remaining 11 counts of the indictment was forfeited by his guilty plea ( see People v Konieczny , 2 NY3d 569, 572; People v Hansen , 95 NY2d 227, 230). We reject defendant’s further contention that the court erred in refusing to suppress his statement to the police, which was given without the assistance of an interpreter. The court credited the testimony of the police investigator who took the statement that she had no trouble communicating with defendant and that he responded appropriately to her questions. Defendant’s oral statement was reduced to writing, and our review of that written statement establishes that defendant responded appropriately to the investigator’s questions. “The [suppression]-2- 527 KA 12-00341

court’s determination is entitled to deference and will not be disturbed where it is supported by the record” ( People v Sanders , 74 AD3d 1896, 1896; see generally People v Prochilo , 41 NY2d 759, 761). The sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Entered: April 26, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 153 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 153

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend to the principal 
campaign committee of any candidate for elective public office the same 
graduated tax rates which apply to the principal campaign committee of 
                       a candidate for Congress.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 5, 1993

  Mr. Crane introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend to the principal 
campaign committee of any candidate for elective public office the same 
graduated tax rates which apply to the principal campaign committee of 
                       a candidate for Congress.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. APPLICATION OF GRADUATED TAX RATES TO ALL PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGN 
              COMMITTEES.

    (a) In General.--Subparagraph (A) of section 527(h)(2) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (defining principal campaign committee) 
is amended by striking ``a candidate for Congress'' and all that 
follows and inserting ``a candidate for any Federal, State, or local 
elective public office as his principal campaign committee for purposes 
of this subsection. A committee may not be designated by a candidate 
for purposes of this subsection if such candidate designates a 
different committee as his principal campaign committee for purposes of 
section 302(e) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 
432(e)).''
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1992.

                                 <all>
```
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§

v. § CASE NO.: 3:22-CR-296-X

§

ARMANI MORRIS (1) §

§

ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY

After reviewing all relevant matters of record, including the Notice Regarding Entry of a Plea of Guilty, 

the Consent of the defendant, and the Report and Recommendation Concerning Plea of Guilty of the United 

States Magistrate Judge, and no objections thereto having been filed within fourteen days of service in 

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the undersigned District Judge is of the opinion that the Report and 

Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge concerning the Plea of Guilty is correct, and it is hereby accepted by 

the Court. Accordingly, the Court accepts the plea of guilty, and ARMANI MORRIS (1) is hereby adjudged 

guilty of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), 923(a), and 924(a)(1)(D) – Engaging in the Business of Dealing Firearms 

Without a License Sentence will be imposed in accordance with the Court's scheduling order.

 The defendant is ordered to remain in custody.

☐ The Court adopts the findings of the United States Magistrate Judge by clear and convincing evidence 

that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if 

released and should therefore be released under § 3142(b) or (c).

☐ Upon motion, this matter shall be set for hearing before the United States Magistrate Judge who set 

the conditions of release for determination, by clear and convincing evidence, of whether the 

defendant is likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if released under § 

3142(b) or (c).

☐ The defendant is not ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) pending determination of 

whether it has been clearly shown that there are exceptional circumstances under § 3145(c) why the 

defendant should not be detained under § 3143(a)(2), and whether it has been shown by clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the 

community if released under § 3142(b) or (c). This matter shall be referred to the United States 

Magistrate Judge who set the conditions of release.

Signed this 6th day of February, 2023.

________________________________

BRANTLEY STARR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 3:22-cr-00296-X Document 25 Filed 02/06/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 53
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and

Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 16

- BG

- 466

IN RE: PETER R. ESTES, Respondent. Bar Registration No. 358466 DDN: 290

- 15

BEFORE: Glickman, Associate Judge, and Nebeker and Farrell, Senior Judges.

ORDER (FILED

- August 4, 2016)

On consideration of the certified order of the Supreme Court of California suspending respondent from the practice of law in that jurisdiction for a period of one year, stayed in favor of a 90

- day suspension followed by a two

- year probationary period with co nditions including the payment of restitution, this court’s June 3, 2016, order suspending respondent pending further action of the court and directing him to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed, the statement of Disciplinary Counsel regarding reciprocal discipline, and it appearing that respondent has failed to file either a response to this court’s show cause order or his D.C. Bar R. XI, §14 (g) affidavit, it is

ORDERED that Peter R. Estes is hereby suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for a period of one year, stayed in favor of a 90

- day suspension, to be followed by a two

- year probationary period subject to the conditions imposed by the state of California, including the payment of restitution.

See In re Sibley , 990 A.2d 483 (D.C. 2010), and In re Fuller , 930 A.2d 194, 198 (D.C. 2007) (rebuttable presumption of identical reciprocal discipline applies to all cases in which the respondent does not participate). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that for purposes of reinstatement respondent’s period of suspension will not begin to run until such time as he files an affidavit that fully complies with the requirements of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 (g).

PER CURIAM 8/4 /16
*OPINION ISSUED JULY 3, 2007*

#### ANNABELLE BAILEY, as Administrator of the Estate of ROGER E. BAILEY VS. DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS

(CC-02-228)

Juliet Walker Rundle, Attorney at Law, for claimant.

Andrew F. Tarr, Attorney at Law, for respondent.

*15PER CURIAM:

This claim was submitted to the Court for decision upon a Stipulation entered into by claimant and respondent wherein certain facts and circumstances of the claim were agreed to as follows:

1. On June 2, 2000, decedent, Roger E. Bailey, was killed when a vehicle emerged from a dirt alley onto County Route 1 and struck Mr. Bailey’s vehicle on the driver’s side.

2. Claimant alleged that trees and weeds beside County Route 1 contributed to the accident by obstructing the vision of the driver who pulled out of the dirt alley and struck Mr. Bailey’s vehicle.

3. Respondent was responsible for the maintenance of County Route 1 which it failed to maintain properly on the date of this incident.

4. Claimant and respondent agree that an award of $13,000.00 would be a fair and reasonable amount to settle this claim.

The Court has reviewed the facts of the claim and finds that respondent was negligent in its maintenance of County Route 1 on the date of this incident; that the negligence of respondent was the proximate cause of the accident which resulted in Mr. Bailey’s death; and that the amount of the damages agreed to by the parties is fair and reasonable. Thus, claimant may make a recovery for her loss.

Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion to and does make an award in the amount of $13,000.00.

Award of $13,000.00.
EXHIBIT 11
                             Computation of Per Share Earnings
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>


                                                                                 Three Months Ended
                                                                                      March 31,
                                                                                1998             1997
<S>                                                                        <C>               <C>

BASIC
         Weighted average shares outstanding                                  12,788,615         5,584,121
         Contingently issuable shares in business combinations                   827,272         3,085,222
                                                                           -------------     -------------
         Number of common shares outstanding                                  13,615,887         8,669,343
                                                                           =============     =============

DILUTED
         Weighted average shares outstanding                                  12,788,615         5,584,121
         Contingently issuable shares in business combinations                   827,272         3,085,222
         Net common shares issuable on exercise of certain stock
              options and warrants (1)                                         2,874,964         2,947,886
         Other dilutive securities                                                -                 -
                                                                           -------------     -------------
         Number of common shares outstanding                                  16,490,851        11,617,229
                                                                           =============     =============
</TABLE>


(1)  Net common  shares  issuable  on  exercise  of certain  stock  options  and
     warrants is calculated based on the treasury stock method
*OPINION ISSUED OCTOBER 10, 2007*

#### *41ISAIAH BLEDSOE and JUDY BLEDSOE VS. DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS

(CC-07-009)

Claimants appeared *pro se.*

Jason C. Workman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Claimants brought this action for vehicle damage which occurred when their 2003 Chevrolet Impala struck a section of broken pavement while claimant Isaiah Bledsoe was traveling on Martha Road near Barboursville, Cabell County. Martha Road is a road maintained by respondent. The Court is of the opinion to make an award in this claim for the reasons more fully stated below.

The incident giving rise to this claim occurred at approximately 9:30 p.m. on December 20, 2006. Martha Road is a two-lane highway at the area of the incident involved in this claim. Claimant Isaiah Bledsoe testified that he was driving on Martha Road when his vehicle struck a broken section of pavement that he had not seen. Mr. Bledsoe testified that the broken section of pavement was at least a five inch drop. Claimant’s vehicle struck the broken section of pavement sustaining damage to both passenger side rims totaling $201.79.

The position of the respondent is that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition on Martha Road at the site of the claimant’s accident for the date in question. Mike King, Highway Administrator for the respondent in Cabell County, testified that he had no knowledge of any broken pavement on Martha Road near Barboursville for the date in question. Mr. King stated that at the time of claimants’ incident, crews for respondent were involved in snow removal and ice control.

The well-established principle of law in West Virginia is that the State is neither an insurer nor a guarantor of the safety of travelers upon its roads. *Adkins*vs. *Sims,*130 W.Va. 645; 46 S.E.2d 81 (1947). In order to hold respondent liable for road defects of this type, a claimant must prove that respondent had actual or constructive notice of the defect and a reasonable time to take corrective action. *ChapmanCl*vs. *Dept. of Highways,*16 Ct. Cl. 103 (1986).

In the instant case, the Court is of the opinion that respondent had at least constructive notice of broken section of pavement which claimants’ vehicle struck and that the broken pavement presented a hazard to the traveling public. Photographs in evidence depict the broken section of pavement provide the Court an accurate portrayal of the size and location of the broken pavement on Martha Road. The size of the broken section of pavement leads the Court to conclude that respondent had notice of this hazardous condition and respondent had an adequate amount of time to take corrective action. Thus, the Court finds respondent negligent and claimants may make a recovery for the damage to their vehicle.

In accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated herein above, the Court is of the opinion to and does make an award to the claimants in this *42claim in the amount of $201.79.

Award of $201.79.