alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### BURTON-LINGO CO. v. LAY.

No. 3946.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

May 30, 1940.

Stubbeman, McRae & Sealy, of Midland, for plaintiff in error.

J. P. Williams, of Andrews, for defendant in error.

WALTHALL, Justice.

This suit was filed on- or about the 15th day of October, 1938, in the County Court of Andrews County, Texas, by Burton-Lingo Company, a corporation, as plaintiff, complaining of Katie T. Lay, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of W. J. Lay, deceased, seeking judgment upon a promissory note executed February 15, 1935, by the said W. J. Lay, deceased, to the order of Burton-Lingo Company in the principal amount of $301.60, payable on or before June 1, 1935, with interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum, said note showing credits in the arrio,unt of $100. The case was set down for trial on December 14, 1938. Plaintiff failed to appear until late in the afternoon of said date, and, although defendant’s answer on file in said cause contained no cross action, discovered that default judgment had already been entered by the court, decreeing that plaintiff take nothing.

The court overruled plaintiff’s motion for a new trial and plaintiff seasonably filed its petition for writ of error, bond and citation and the case is properly before us for review.

By assignment of error and proposition thereunder plaintiff submits error of the trial court in rendering judgment that plaintiff take nothing by its suit; that the only judgment the court could properly have rendered, defendant having filed no cross action or action for affirmative relief, was a dismissal of plaintiff’s suit.

The judgment rendered that plaintiff take nothing was a trial on the merits. The case, on the facts stated, was not before the court for a trial on the merits. The court was without jurisdictional power to render any judgment other than a dismissal of plaintiff’s suit for want of prosecution.

The judgment rendered was fundamental error.

The following cases clearly sustain plaintiff’s contention: R. B. George Machinery Co. v. City of Midland, Tex.Com.App., 29 S.W.2d 966, and the cases there referred to by Judge Harvey; Burger v. Young, 78 Tex. 656, 15 S.W. 107; Parr v. Chittim, Tex.Com.App., 231 S.W. 1079; Harris v. Schlinke, 95 Tex. 88, 65 S.W. 172; Short v. Hepburn, 89 Tex. 622, 625, 35 S.W. 1056.

The case is reversed and remanded.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly
Report of World Health Energy Holdings, Inc., (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2015
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each of the undersigned,
in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:



1. The Report fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. The information contained in
the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.



|Date: November 23, 2015 | By: | /s/ Jason Lurie        
|----------------------- | --- | -----------------------
|                        |     | Jason Lurie            
|                        |     | Chief Financial Officer



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Carlos Andujas, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Goldberg, J.), rendered June 9, 1988, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts), criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts), and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly instructed the jury that it could not accept his agency defense unless he acted "solely” as the agent of the buyer, who in this case was an undercover police officer *(see, People v Lam Lek Chong,*45 NY2d 64; *see also,*3 CJI[NY] PL art 220, at 1750). Moreover, the court’s agency charge, viewed in its entirety, did not suggest to the jury that the defendant could not be an agent of the undercover officer if he received some benefit from the transaction. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim that the court’s agency charge deprived him of a fair trial is without merit. Eiber, J. P., Sullivan, Balletta and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 10-31185 Summary Calendar
KEYNEL KNIGHT, Petitioner-Appellant

v. BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, Respondent-Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:08-CV-4721
Before WIENER, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Petitioner-Appellant Keynel Knight, Lo ui s i an a p ri s o n er # 4 8 3 6 7 3 , ap p e als the dismissal of his application for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his 2004 conviction of second degree murder. Knight contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by interfering with his right to testify in his own behalf at trial, and that the federal district court erred in failing to develop the record as to this issue. U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Janu ary4, 201 2 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 , the cour t hasd ete rm inedt hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR
. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 10-31185 Document: 00511712999 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/04/2012No. 10-31185

As Knight’s ineffective-assistance cl ai m w a s a d j u dicated by the state court
on its merits, the district court’s review was limited to the record before the state court. See Cullen v. Pinholster , 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398-1402 (2011)

. Knight’s conclusional and self-serving contentions in the state court ar e insufficient to carry his burden of showing that the state court’s rejection of t h i s claim was
co n trary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or that it resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The judgment is AFFIRMED.

2 Case: 10-31185 Document: 00511712999 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/04/2012
EXHIBIT 32


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, the
undersigned officer of Western Ridge Acquisition Corporation
(the "Company"), hereby certify to my knowledge that:

The Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,
2015 of the Company fully complies, in all material respects,
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the
Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.


                             /s/ James Cassidy
                                 President
                                 Chief Financial Officer
Date: April 13, 2016
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

JAMAL HARRIS, A/K/A JAMAL 

MUHAMMAD,

Petitioner

v.

PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION 

AND PAROLE,

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 390 MAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of December, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 96 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 96

 Designating the week of February 1 through 7, 1993, as ``Travel Agent 
                          Appreciation Week''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 3, 1993

   Mr. Oberstar introduced the following joint resolution; which was 
       referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
 Designating the week of February 1 through 7, 1993, as ``Travel Agent 
                          Appreciation Week''.

Whereas travel and tourism has become one of the fastest growing industries in 
        the United States, generating more than $350,000,000,000 in 1992;
Whereas over 40,000 travel agencies in the United States perform many vital 
        services that save American consumers and business valuable time and 
        money;
Whereas both business and leisure travelers have come to rely on the travel 
        agent for accurate, professional advice;
Whereas travel agents are an integral part of the travel and tourism industry;
Whereas travel agents generated over $51,000,000,000 in revenue for the airline 
        industry in 1992 alone;
Whereas travel agents are located in all the 50 States in the United States, and 
        are an important source of jobs from entry level to middle management in 
        almost every town throughout the country; and
Whereas it is fitting to set aside a time to honor and recognize these highly 
        trained travel professionals: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the week of February 1 
through 7, 1993, is designated as ``Travel Agent Appreciation Week'', 
and the President is authorized to issue a proclamation calling upon 
the people of the United States to observe this week with appropriate 
ceremonies and activities.

                                 <all>
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DEMATIC CORP., §

§ No. 180, 2023

Defendant Below, Appellant, §

§ Court Below: Superior Court

v. § of the State of Delaware

§

FORTIS ADVISORS, LLC, §

§ C.A. No. N18C-12-104

Plaintiff Below, Appellee. §

Submitted: April 17, 2024

Decided: May 7, 2024

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 

O R D E R

Now this 7th day of May 2024, the Court having considered this matter on the briefs 

and oral arguments of the parties and the record below and having concluded that the same 

should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the Superior Court in its 

Post-Trial Memorandum Opinion dated December 29, 2022; its Final Order and Judgment 

dated April 24, 2023, and its Stipulation and Amended Final Order and Judgment dated 

May 3, 2023.

1

1

In this appeal, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Fortis Advisors, LLC, argues on cross-appeal that the 

Superior Court erred when it granted a set-off to indemnify Dematic Corp. for certain legal fees 

and settlement costs incurred in a related litigation. Specifically, Fortis argues that the Superior 

Court incorrectly placed the burden of proof on it as opposed to placing the burden on Dematic

Corp. The Superior Court found that Fortis did not offer any persuasive testimony regarding the 

reasonableness of the set-off amounts. The trial court’s opinion indicates that it was satisfied that 

Dematic had put forward evidence sufficient to support the reasonableness of the set-off. This 

evidence included testimony from Dematic’s head of accounting who testified that he authorized 

the settlement amount after consultation with Dematic’s executives and lawyers, and that the 

amount authorized was consistent with Dematic’s estimates created during due diligence regarding 

the likely cost of resolving that related litigation. The court also noted that Fortis did nothing to 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the decision and judgments of the 

Superior Court be and the same hereby are AFFIRMED. 

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice

rebut this testimony. Based upon the record before us, we conclude that, to the extent the trial 

court erred in allocating the burden of proof on this issue, it is not reversible error.
EXHIBIT 32


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, the
undersigned officer of Kayak Ridge Acquisition Corporation
(the "Company"), hereby certify to my knowledge that:

The Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,
2015 of the Company fully complies, in all material respects,
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the
Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.


                             /s/ James Cassidy
                                 President
                                 Chief Financial Officer
Date: April 13, 2016
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 91 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 91

    Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
 authorizing the President to veto an item of appropriation in any Act 
                 or resolution containing such an item.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 3, 1993

 Mr. Franks of Connecticut introduced the following joint resolution; 
          which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
    Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
 authorizing the President to veto an item of appropriation in any Act 
                 or resolution containing such an item.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, (two-thirds of each House 
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be 
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States 
within 7 years after the date of its submission by the Congress:

                              ``Article--

    ``Section 1. The President may disapprove an item of appropriation 
in any Act or resolution presented by the Congress, except as provided 
in section 2.
    ``Section 2. The President may not disapprove under section 1 an 
item of appropriation for the operations of the judicial branch of the 
Federal Government.
    ``Section 3. Following disapproval under this article of an item of 
appropriation, the President shall return such item with objections to 
the House in which the bill or resolution containing such item 
originated.
    ``Section 4. Following the return of an item of appropriation, the 
Congress may reconsider the item in the manner prescribed under section 
7 of article I of the Constitution for bills disapproved by the 
President.''.

                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 99.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of BWAY Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30,
2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Jean-Pierre M. Ergas, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





|(1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




|(2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




/s/ Jean Pierre M. Ergas Jean-Pierre M. Ergas Chief Executive Officer August 12,
2002
#### HALL v. MATTHEWS.

No. 3698.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

June 2, 1938.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 12, 1938.

W. Van Sickle, of Alpine, for plaintiff in error.

E. B. O’Quinn, of Marfa, and Harry V. Fisher, of Alpine, for defendant in error.

NEALON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by way of writ of error from a judgment of the County Court of Brewster County sustaining a general demurrer to plaintiff’s (appellant’s) petition. Defendant’s pleadings contained a general demurrer in the usual form and a pleading styled a plea in abatement, which was not filed in due order. The *165third paragraph of the so-called plea in abatement was sustained by the Court. That paragraph was really a general demurrer, being merely an exception upon the ground that the petition “fails to set out or sufficiently describe or declare upon or allege any obligation or instrument as a basis for his purported or attempted cause of action.” The instrument declared upon was a dishonored check. It was nowhere alleged that defendant executed or delivered the check, nor were any other facts alleged showing liability thereon. Plaintiff declined to amend and the case was dismissed. The judgment of the Court was correct. Further opinion is unnecessary. Tucker v. Higdon, Tex.Civ.App., 115 S.W.2d 973; Associated Indemnity Corporation v. Gatling, Tex.Civ.App., 75 S.W.2d 294.

The judgment is affirmed.
EX-10.1






Exhibit 10.1




Summary Compensation Information

for Janet Hawkins




In connection with the appointment of Janet Hawkins to President, Franchise Division of
RemedyTemp, Inc. (the “Company”), the Leadership Development and Compensation Committee of the
Company’s Board of Directors approved an increase in Ms. Hawkins’ compensation, effective as of
December 2, 2004. Ms. Hawkins’ annual base salary was increased to $260,000 and she will be
eligible for a potential bonus up to 50% of her base salary. Ms. Hawkins’ bonus will be determined
based on corporate and Franchise Division objectives. Ms. Hawkins will also be reimbursed for
certain social club dues. In addition, on April 25, 2005, Ms. Hawkins was granted 6,000 options to
acquire shares of the Company’s Class A Common Stock at a per share exercise price equal to the
fair market value on such date, pursuant to the Company’s 1996 Stock Incentive Plan. These options
vest in equal annual installments of 20% on each anniversary of the grant date.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 

 § 

VS. § CRIMINAL NO. 4:22-CR-330-Y 

 § 

JON MICHAEL CURB (1) § 

ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND ADJUDGING DEFENDANT GUILTY 

The Court has reviewed all relevant matters of record in this case, 

including especially (1) the Consent to Administration of Guilty Plea 

and Allocution by United States Magistrate Judge and (2) the Report of 

Action and Recommendation on Plea Before the United States Magistrate 

Judge. No objections to either have been filed within fourteen (14) 

days of service in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Therefore, 

the Court concludes that the report and recommendation of the magistrate 

judge on the plea of guilty is correct, and it is hereby accepted by the 

Court. Accordingly, the Court accepts the plea of guilty, and defendant 

is hereby adjudged guilty. The defendant’s sentence will be imposed in 

accordance with the Court’s sentencing scheduling order. 

SIGNED January 3, 2023. 

 

 _________________________________ 

 TERRY R. MEANS 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:22-cr-00330-Y Document 37 Filed 01/03/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 56
#### SELLMAN v. STATE.

No. 20801.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 31, 1940.

Glenn Capps, of Mason, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is possessing beer in a dry area for the purpose of sale; the punishment, a fine of $250.

The offense charged is denounced by Art. .666 — 4, Vernon’s Ann.Texas P.C. The penalty applicable is set forth in Art. 666 — 41, Vernon’s Ann.Texas P.C., the minimum penalty being $100. The trial court gave the penalty prescribed in Art. 667 — 26, Vernon’s Ann.Texas P.C., in which the minimum penalty is fixed at $25. In charging the provisions of the article last mentioned the court fell into error, and appellant’s exception to the charge should have been sustained. However, it is not every misstatement of the penalty that will work a reversal of the judgment. In the present case it is observed that the fine assessed against appellant was $250, which was an amount between the minimum'fine and the maximum fine prescribed in Art. 666 — 41, supra. Under the circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the erroneous charge of the court relative to the penalty did not injure the .rights of the appellant. Sulak v. State, 118 Tex.Cr.R. 112, 40 S.W.2d 157.

The evidence is deemed sufficient to support the judgment of conviction.

The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
# Official Journal L 32/2012

| | ISSN 1977-0677
  doi:10.3000/19770677.L_2012.032.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 32 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 553 February 2012 |

ISSN 1977-0677

doi:10.3000/19770677.L_2012.032.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 32

English edition

Legislation

Volume 553 February 2012

---

| Contents | | I   Legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Regulation (EU) No 70/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 January 2012 on statistical returns in respect of the carriage of goods by road (1) | 1 |

Contents

I   Legislative acts

page

REGULATIONS

*

Regulation (EU) No 70/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 January 2012 on statistical returns in respect of the carriage of goods by road (1)

1

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.