alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1574

To permit national banks to underwrite municipal revenue bonds.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 31, 1993

Mrs. MALONEY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs

A BILL

To permit national banks to underwrite municipal revenue

bonds.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

4 (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

5 (1) State and local governments presently have

6 few available options for raising funds for local im7 provement projects; and

8 (2) this lack of options results in higher bor9 rowing rates for State and local governments when

10 funds are needed for local improvement projects.

11 (b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are—
2

•HR 1574 IH

1 (1) to permit national banks to underwrite mu2 nicipal revenue bonds to provide for enhanced finan3 cial services for State and local governments; and

4 (2) to encourage municipalities to utilize local

5 resources to finance improvement projects in an ef6 fort to reduce the overall cost to the taxpayer of

7 such projects.

8 SEC. 2. MUNICIPAL REVENUE BOND UNDERWRITING.

9 The paragraph designated the ‘‘Seventh’’ of section

10 5136 of the Revised Statutes (12 U.S.C. 24) is amended

11 by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

12 ‘‘The limitations and restrictions in this section per13 taining to dealing in, underwriting, and purchasing securi14 ties for a national bank’s own account shall not apply to

15 any obligation issued by or on behalf of any State, the

16 District of Columbia, any territory or possession of the

17 United States, or any political subdivision, agency, or in18 strumentality of any such State, District, territory, or pos19 session. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, such lim20 itations and restrictions shall apply to a private activity

21 bond (as defined in section 141 of the Internal Revenue

22 Code of 1986) unless—

23 ‘‘(1) a State, the District of Columbia, or a ter24 ritory or possession of the United States, or any po25 litical subdivision of any such State, District, terri-
3

•HR 1574 IH

1 tory, or possession, pledges its full faith and credit

2 for payment of the entire principal of and interest

3 on such bond; or

4 ‘‘(2) the interest on such bond is excluded from

5 gross income under section 103(a) of the Internal

6 Revenue Code of 1986, and the issuer, or the gov7 ernmental unit on behalf of which such bond was is8 sued, is the sole owner, for Federal income tax pur9 poses, of the facility to be financed from the pro10 ceeds of such bond.

11 For purposes of the preceding sentence, any bond de12 scribed in section 1312(c)(2) of the Tax Reform Act of

13 1986 to which section 141(a) of the Internal Revenue

14 Code of 1986 does not apply (by reason of section 1311,

15 1312, or 1313 of such Act), shall not be treated as a pri16 vate activity bond.’’.

Æ
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 01-1263

LOUIS A. RODRIGUEZ, SR., Plaintiff - Appellant, versus RIDGEWOOD SAVINGS BANK, Defendant - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Chief District Judge. (CA-00-2077-A) Submitted: July 26, 2001 Decided: August 2, 2001Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis A. Rodriguez, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Grady Craven Frank, Jr., Rebecca Everett Kuehn, LECLAIR RYAN, P.C., Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Louis A. Rodriguez, a former resident of Queens, New York, now residing in Alexandria, Virginia, appeals the district court’s order granting Defendant Ridgewood Savings Bank’s motion to dismiss his complaint. After a review of the record, we find that the district court properly dismissed this action for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984). We accordingly affirm the district court’s order. We deny Rodriguez’s motion to amend his complaint and dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### ROCHELL v. STATE.

No. 20205.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 22, 1939.

J. T. Ranspot, of Mineral Wells, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State's Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

The conviction is for driving an auto1 mobile upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; penalty assessed at a fine of $400 and ninety days confinement in the county jail.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bill of exceptions, hence no question is presented for review. All matters of procedure appearing regular, the judgment will be affirmed.
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 Amiyah Davis
As an advocate and activist for youth in the juvenile justice system and related systems of care, Amiyah Davis uses her experience, voice, and influence to push for micro and macro policy change in communities across the United States. As an individual with lived experience, Davis understands that no effective change can be made without intentional partnerships with young people who are victims of the injustices in our nation’s juvenile justice and child welfare systems.

Currently, Davis serves as a Project Coordinator at the Center for Juvenile Justice Reform at Georgetown University’s McCourt School of Public Policy, where she supports leaders in the youth-serving field to implement research-based system transformation efforts that elevate the voices of youth and families. In her career, Davis has led community outreach efforts, presented at national and state conferences, and facilitated meaningful partnerships with youth on various projects. She is blazing a path to impact policy change and the experiences of youth for generations to come, pushing youth-serving professionals to enhance their community-based efforts that prevent youth from system contact altogether.

Davis works at the national, state, and local levels to advocate for youth. In addition to her work at Georgetown, Davis was one of twelve individuals selected nationally to serve on the prestigious Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Juvenile Justice Youth Advisory Council and also was appointed to serve as a member of the Michigan Committee for Juvenile Justice. Davis is also certified to teach restorative practices.
  
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**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANTTO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with thisQuarterly Report of UnionBanCal Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending March 31,2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), I, David I. Matson, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1)          The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)          Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| Dated: May 8, 2007 |   |                       |
|-------------------------|--------|----------------------------|
|                    | By:    | /s/ DAVID I. MATSON        |
|                    |   | David I. Matson            |
|                    |   | *Chief  Financial Officer* |

 

----
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-12-00505- CR NO. 03-12-00506- CR NO. 03-12-00507- CR
Nathan Ke vin Carter , Appellan t

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F B ELL COUNTY , 264 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NOS . 656 25, 6 5626 & 656 27, H ONO RAB LE MARTH A J. TRUDO , JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Nathan Kevin Carter seeks t o ap peal three judgme nts of conviction for burg lary of a habitation. The trial court has cer tified that (1) these are plea barg ain case s and Carter has no rig ht of appe al, and ( 2) Carte r has waived the rig ht to appea l these cases. Ac cording ly , we dismiss the appe als for w ant of jurisdiction. SeeTex. R. App. P . 25.2(a) (2), ( d).

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton, and H enson Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction Filed: August 17, 2012 Do Not Publish
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-7011

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus TROY LAMONT MCFARLANE, a/k/a Jagi, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (3:97-cr-00290-RLV; 3:07-cv-00208-RLV) Submitted: October 5, 2007 Decided: October 24, 2007 Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Troy Lamont McFarlane, Appellant Pro Se. Robert James Conrad, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Troy Lamont McFarlane seeks to appeal the district court’s order treating his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion, and dismissing it on that basis. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); Reid v. Angelone , 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that McFarlane has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. Additionally, we construe McFarlane’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims- 3 - based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review; or (2) newly discovered evidence, not previously discoverable by due diligence, that would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), 2255 (2000). McFarlane’s claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Aaron Klein, an Infant, by His Father and Natural Guardian, Michael Klein, et al., Respondents, v Shabse *431Schifenbauer, an Infant, by His Father and Natural Guardian, Milton Schifenbauer, Defendant, and Milton Schifenbauer, Appellant.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Milton Schifenbauer appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Held, J.), dated November 17, 1988, which denied his motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as it asserted a cause of action against him individually.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court correctly determined that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action cognizable at law against the defendant Milton Schifenbauer individually, sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss *(see,*CPLR 3211 [a] [7]; *Nolechek v Gesuale,*46 NY2d 332; *Rosenberg v Mermelstein,*116 AD2d 712; *see also, Guggenheimer v Ginzberg,*43 NY2d 268, 275). Thompson, J. P., Brown, Balletta, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
*OPINION ISSUED OCTOBER 10, 2007*

#### ELMER MICKEY HODGE and SHIRLEY ANN HODGE VS. DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS

(CC-07-071)

Claimants appeared *pro se.*

Jason C. Workman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Claimants brought this action for vehicle damage which occurred when their 2006 Chevrolet HHR struck a broken section of road while claimants were traveling on Goodwill Road in Wayne County. Goodwill Road is a road maintained by respondent. The Court is of the opinion to make an award in this claim for the reasons more fully stated below.

The incident giving rise to this claim occurred on March 13, 2007. Goodwill Road is a two-lane highway at the area of the incident involved in this claim. Claimant Shirley Hodge testified that she was driving on Goodwill Road with a vehicle traveling towards her in the other lane when her vehicle struck the broken section of road. She stated that she had seen the broken section of road previously but had been able to avoid it on other occasions. Ms. Hodge testified that the broken section of road was approximately eight to ten inches deep and six to eight inches wide. She further testified that there was Division of Highways equipment and machines along the side of the road to repair it at the time of her incident. Claimants’ vehicle struck the broken section of road sustaining damage to the right front tire totaling $125.08.

The position of the respondent is that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition on Goodwill Road at the site of the claimants’ accident for the date in question. Respondent presented no evidence or witnesses at the hearing of this matter.

The well-established principle of law in West Virginia is that the State is neither an insurer nor a guarantor of the safety of travelers upon its roads. *Adkins vs. Sims,*130 W.Va. 645; 46 S.E.2d 81 (1947). In order to hold respondent liable for road defects of this type, a claimant must prove that respondent had actual or constructive notice of the defect and a reasonable time to take corrective action. *Chapman vs. Dept. of Highways,*16 Ct. Cl. 103 (1986).

In the instant case, the Court is of the opinion that respondent had at least *43constructive notice of the broken section of road which claimants’ vehicle struck and that this broken section of road presented a hazard to the traveling public. The size of the broken section of road and the time of the year in which claimants’ incident occurred leads the Court to conclude that respondent had notice of this hazardous condition and respondent had an adequate amount of time to take corrective action. Thus, the Court finds respondent negligent and claimants may make a recovery for the damage to their vehicle.

In accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated herein above, the Court is of the opinion to and does make an award to the claimants in this claim in the amount of $ 125.08.

Award of $125.08.
#### TIJERNIA v. STATE.

No. 20474.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 14, 1939.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 1939.

J. W. McCullough, of McKinney, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

The conviction is for driving an automobile upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; penalty assessed at a fine of $50 and confinement in the county jail for five days.

The record before us contains neither a statement of facts nor bills of exception. The indictment seems to be in proper form. All matters of procedure appearing regular, the judgment will be affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The appellant only complains in his motion for rehearing of the sufficiency of the indictment. We have again carefully examined the same and remained convinced that it is sufficient to charge the offense.

The motion ¿for a rehearing is overruled.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the-Court.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.53


                               M E M O R A N D U M


TO:    Bob G. Alexander, President & CEO

FROM:  Melissa H. Rutledge
       Leslie J. Wylie
       R. Kent Lueders
       Philip D. Devlin

DATE:  December 3, 1998

RE:    Severance Policy

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

         It is our understanding that the Board of Directors has instituted a
Severance Policy which requires that existing Executive Employment Agreements
with the Company be terminated. Each of the undersigned (the "Executive") agrees
to terminate his/her existing Executive Employment Agreement with the Company
upon enrollment in the Company's Severance Policy; provided the Company agrees
that in the event the Company (other than for "cause" as defined in the
Severance Policy) or any court shall declare the Severance Pay Benefit described
in the Severance Policy to be reduced or denied to any Executive, such Executive
shall have the right to claim any benefits or rights under his/her respective
Executive Employment Agreement, which shall be deemed to be in full force and
effect as if the Severance Policy had not been adopted by the Board of Directors
of the Company.



                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Melissa H. Rutledge, Vice President



                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Leslie J. Wylie, Vice President



                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        R. Kent Lueders, Vice President



                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Philip D. Devlin, Vice President

NATIONAL ENERGY GROUP, INC.


By:
    ----------------------------
    Bob G. Alexander
    President and CEO
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1677 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1677

To amend the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 to 
  improve access to grants and loans for evidence-based substance use 
  disorder treatment services in rural areas, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 31, 2017

  Mr. Donnelly (for himself and Mr. Strange) introduced the following 
      bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                  Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 to 
  improve access to grants and loans for evidence-based substance use 
  disorder treatment services in rural areas, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DISTANCE LEARNING AND TELEMEDICINE.

    Section 2333(c) of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade 
Act of 1990 (7 U.S.C. 950aaa-2(c)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
            ``(5) Substance use disorder treatment services.--
                    ``(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B), the 
                Secretary shall make available not less than 20 percent 
                of amounts made available under section 2335A for 
                financial assistance under this chapter for substance 
                use disorder treatment services.
                    ``(B) Exception.--In the case of a fiscal year for 
                which the Secretary determines that there are not 
                sufficient qualified applicants to receive financial 
                assistance for substance use disorder treatment 
                services to reach the 20-percent requirement under 
                subparagraph (A), the Secretary may make available less 
                than 20 percent of amounts made available under section 
                2335A for those services.''.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32-1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of WNC Housing Tax Credit Fund V, L.P., Series 3 (the “Partnership”) for the quarter ended September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), and pursuant to 18 U.S.C., section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, Wilfred N. Cooper, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer of WNC & Associates, Inc., general partner of the Partnership, hereby certify that:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Partnership.








/s/WILFRED N. COOPER, JR.


Wilfred N. Cooper, Jr.


President and Chief Executive Officer of WNC & Associates, Inc.