COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Frank and Agee 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

PHILLIP JEROME MURPHY 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2626-00-1 JUDGE G. STEVEN AGEE 

 FEBRUARY 26, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY 

William H. Hodges, Judge Designate 

 S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Defender (Public 

Defender Commission, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Phillip Jerome Murphy ("Murphy" or "the appellant") was 

convicted in a Southampton County Circuit Court bench trial of 

possession of heroin with intent to distribute, second or 

subsequent offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-250(C), and 

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, second offense, 

in violation of Code § 18.2-248(C). The trial court denied the 

appellant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized after a 

cautionary frisk of his person. On appeal, he argues that the 

weapons frisk was unlawful and any evidence obtained as a result 

of the frisk should have been suppressed. In the alternative, he 

argues that if the frisk was lawful, the police exceeded the scope 

of a pat-down search for weapons by removing an object from his 
- 2 - 

pocket and that the "plain feel" doctrine does not apply. Murphy 

also contends the police had no lawful basis to remove certain 

objects from his mouth. We disagree and affirm the judgment of 

the trial court. 

I. Background 

 On appeal, the appellant bears the burden to establish that 

denying the motion to suppress was reversible error. The issues 

of whether a seizure occurred and whether a frisk for weapons 

was constitutionally valid involve mixed questions of law and 

fact, which we review de novo on appeal. See McGee v. 

Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 

(1997) (en banc) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 

699 (1996)). "In performing such analysis, we are bound by the 

trial court's findings of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' 

or without evidence to support them . . . ." Id. at 198, 487 

S.E.2d at 261 (citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699). We view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at 

trial, the Commonwealth in this instance. See Greene v. 

Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 606, 608, 440 S.E.2d 138, 139 (1994). 

 Viewed in this light, the evidence at the suppression 

hearing established that on September 21, 1999, Officer Harvey 

of the Franklin Police Department, along with other officers, 

executed a search warrant for the "entire residence at 410 Hall 

Street," for marijuana, cocaine, heroin, firearms and a "black 
- 3 - 

male named Eric Smith." The search warrant did not authorize 

the search of any other individuals found on the premises. 

 Upon entry to the residence, police found five persons 

present on the premises. Officer Harvey ordered Murphy, then 

seated on a couch, to lie on the floor with his arms stretched 

away from his body. Murphy complied and was subsequently 

handcuffed, "to ensure that he couldn't reach anything." "After 

the cuffing had occurred a pat-down for [the] safety of [the 

officers] in the area for weapons was conducted" pursuant to 

Franklin Police Department practice on the execution of search 

warrants. Neither Officer Harvey nor any of the other officers 

knew Murphy, a black male, or Eric Smith. 

 As Officer Harvey performed the frisk, he detected a bulge 

in Murphy's left front pants pocket. He knew "it to be a 

plastic baggy[,] which is a common way through my training and 

experience as a law officer that marijuana is packaged." The 

officer testified that he believed the bulge to be marijuana, so 

he retrieved the item. It appeared on inspection to be 

marijuana, and Murphy was placed under arrest. 

 After Murphy was arrested, another officer, Sergeant Welch, 

asked Murphy a question. Murphy replied in a muffled voice. 

The officers then noticed the appellant "was speaking in an 

unusual manner as if he had his mouth full of something." The 

officers physically forced Murphy to spit the objects out of his 

mouth. The officers recovered a folded one-dollar bill, seven 
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blue envelope-type packages and ten white rock-like substances. 

Analysis of the substances disclosed 8.02 grams of cocaine and 

0.308 grams of heroin. 

II. Analysis 

 On appeal, Murphy contends Officer Harvey was not entitled 

to detain him or subject him to a frisk and, therefore, the 

marijuana evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment and should have been suppressed. In the alternative, 

he avers the officer exceeded the scope of a weapons frisk by 

seizing an object that was clearly not a weapon. For the 

following reasons, we disagree with Murphy's contentions and 

hold he was lawfully detained and frisked and that the 

subsequent seizure of contraband was also lawful. 

A. The Detention 

 The police officers lawfully detained Murphy, an occupant 

of a private residence being searched for narcotics and firearms 

pursuant to a valid search warrant.1 It is well established that 

"a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause 

implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the 

occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." 

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (footnotes 

omitted). Among the "legitimate law enforcement interest[s]" in 

detaining the occupants 

 1

 Murphy raised no challenge to the validity of the search 

warrant. 
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is the interest in minimizing the risk of 

harm to the officers . . . . [T]he execution 

of a warrant to search for narcotics is the 

kind of transaction that may give rise to 

sudden violence or frantic efforts to 

conceal or destroy evidence. The risk of 

harm to both the police and the occupants is 

minimized if the officers routinely exercise 

unquestioned command of the situation. 

Id. at 702-03 (citation and footnote omitted). Once Murphy was 

detained, Officer Harvey was entitled to take reasonable steps 

under the prevailing circumstances to protect the safety of the 

officers and everyone else in the house.2 See generally Welshman 

v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 20, 502 S.E.2d 122 (1998) (en 

banc). 

B. The Frisk 

 Murphy was subjected to a frisk for weapons in the interest 

of the officers' safety. Whether this action was lawful, in the 

context of executing a search warrant in a private residence, 

where the search warrant does not name the individual frisked, 

is a question of first impression in the Commonwealth. Upon 

review, we hold that the protective frisk was lawful. 

 2

 In determining what measures were appropriate, the 

officers were entitled to consider the fact that they were in a 

private residence in which a magistrate had found probable cause 

to believe was a site for narcotics distribution. See generally

Welshman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 20, 34, 502 S.E.2d 122, 

129 (1998) (en banc). Appropriate actions would include, among 

other things, having Murphy and the other occupants lie prone 

and extend their arms from their bodies so their hands would be 

in plain view. See id. at 35, 502 S.E.2d at 129. It was also 

permissible to keep the occupants under guard. See Summers, 452 

U.S. 692. 
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1. Application of the Fourth Amendment 

 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides: 

The right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 

issue but upon probable cause, supported by 

Oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the 

persons or things to be seized. 

See also Va. Const. art. 1, § 10. In general terms, the Fourth 

Amendment requires a seizure or subsequent search of a person to 

be based on probable cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 

200 (1979). Murphy was not named in the search warrant, nor was 

there a direction in the warrant to search unnamed individuals 

found on the premises. Murphy's presence on the premises when 

the search warrant was executed would not, alone, provide 

probable cause to justify a full search of his person. See

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Hayes v. Commonwealth, 

29 Va. App. 647, 514 S.E.2d 357 (1999). 

 However, the protective frisk of Murphy was not a full 

search. Such a frisk is permissible under the Fourth 

Amendment's first prong, the "general proscription against 

unreasonable searches and seizures." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 

20 (1968) (emphasis added). The Fourth Amendment does not 

proscribe reasonable searches and seizures. See generally

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Terry, 392 U.S. 1; 
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Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 487, 419 S.E.2d 256, 258-59 

(1992). 

2. Reasonableness of a Protective Frisk 

 In assessing reasonableness, the Supreme Court of the 

United States has said: 

it is necessary "first to focus upon the 

governmental interest which allegedly 

justifies official intrusion upon the 

constitutionally protected interests of the 

private citizen," for there is "no ready 

test for determining reasonableness other 

than by balancing the need to search [or 

seize] against the invasion which the search 

[or seizure] entails." Camara v. Municipal 

Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-535, 536-537 

(1967). And in justifying the particular 

intrusion the police officer must be able to 

point to specific and articulable facts 

which, taken together with rational 

inferences from those facts, reasonably 

warrant that intrusion. 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (footnote omitted). 

 Applying these principles to the case at bar, we recognize 

the governmental interest involved as being the safety of law 

enforcement officers who are assigned an inherently dangerous 

task: to execute a search warrant for narcotics and firearms in 

a private residence. 

 In Terry, the Supreme Court addressed whether an 

investigatory detention and a contemporaneous protective frisk 

for a weapon were permissible. Id. at 15. The Court, 

recognizing the "long tradition of armed violence" by criminals 

and the necessity of an officer to assure himself that an 
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individual at close range is not armed with a weapon, held that 

it is permissible in certain instances for an officer to conduct 

a protective, minimally intrusive frisk. 

[W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for 

law enforcement officers to protect 

themselves and other prospective victims of 

violence in situations where they may lack 

probable cause for an arrest. When an 

officer is justified in believing that the 

individual whose suspicious behavior he is 

investigating at close range is armed and 

presently dangerous to the officer or to 

others, it would appear to be clearly 

unreasonable to deny the officer the power 

to take necessary measures to determine 

whether the person is in fact carrying a 

weapon and to neutralize the threat of 

physical harm. 

Id. at 23-24. 

[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority 

to permit a reasonable search for weapons 

for the protection of the police officer, 

where he has reason to believe that he is 

dealing with an armed and dangerous 

individual, regardless of whether he has 

probable cause to arrest the individual for 

a crime. The officer need not be absolutely 

certain that the individual is armed; the 

issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in 

the circumstances would be warranted in the 

belief that his safety or that of others was 

in danger. 

Id. at 27 (citations omitted). 

 Since Terry, the Supreme Court has applied the 

reasonableness analysis to different fact situations with the 

constant refrain that a limited, protective frisk for weapons 

can be justified by the need for law enforcement officers to 

protect themselves. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 
- 9 - 

333 (1990) (officers have an interest in self-protection which 

can justify a protective sweep); Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 

(protection of police and others can justify protective searches 

when police have a reasonable belief that an individual may pose 

a danger); Pennsylvania v. Mims, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) ("What 

is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced 

against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety."). There 

is abundant, long-standing authority establishing that an 

unreasonable search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment does not 

arise when a law enforcement officer performs a protective 

pat-down when he or she "'reasonably believes, based on specific 

and articulable facts, that the [individual in the officer's 

presence] might be armed and dangerous.'" Welshman, 28 Va. App. 

at 34, 502 S.E.2d at 129 (quoting Phillips v. Commonwealth, 17 

Va. App. 27, 30, 434 S.E.2d 918, 920 (1993)) (emphasis added); 

see also Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 66-67, 354 

S.E.2d 79, 86 (1987) ("Once a police officer has [lawfully] 

detained a suspect he may conduct a limited pat-down search for 

weapons if he reasonably believes that the suspect might be 

armed and dangerous."). 

3. The Frisk of Murphy was Reasonable 

 Having established that a protective frisk is lawful where 

the facts available at the time of the search allow a man of 

reasonable caution to believe that the protective action is 

warranted, we now examine the circumstances of this case to 
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determine whether the frisk of Murphy was reasonable. Terry, 

392 U.S. at 21. 

 Here, significantly, the house was being searched because a 

magistrate determined that there was probable cause to believe 

the house was the site of a narcotics trafficking operation and 

that firearms were present and issued a search warrant 

authorizing a search of the house and the seizure of narcotics 

and firearms discovered.3 See Williams, 4 Va. App. at 67, 354 

S.E.2d at 86-87; see generally Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. 

App. 206, 409 S.E.2d 177 (1991). Murphy and four others were 

present in the house when the warrant was executed. It was 

reasonable to believe that he might have been involved in the 

narcotics operation, and the officers knew from experience that 

those involved in narcotics trafficking are often in possession 

of firearms. "Firearms are as much 'tools of the trade' as are 

most commonly recognized narcotics paraphernalia," United States 

v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977), and "the execution of 

a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction 

that may give rise to sudden violence . . . ." Summers, 452 

U.S. at 702. 

 A "man of reasonable caution" would have believed that it 

was appropriate to subject Murphy to a brief frisk for weapons. 

 3

 Although the "material facts constituting probable cause" 

set forth in the affidavit given in support of the warrant made 

no mention of firearms, the affiant specified "guns" among the 

numerous items to be searched for. 
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See generally Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. By conducting an 

immediate frisk of Murphy, Officer Harvey acted to minimize 

danger and to secure the area. 

[E]ven though the officers who detained [the 

appellant] had no information that he was 

armed or that he had a past history of 

violence, they acted reasonably when 

conducting a protective pat-down search for 

weapons in light of the fact that they had a 

reasonable suspicion that [he] was presently 

engaged in narcotics distribution. To hold 

otherwise would be an invitation to violence 

in what is always a potentially explosive 

situation. 

Williams, 4 Va. App. at 67, 354 S.E.2d at 87. 

 Murphy contends Ybarra, 444 U.S. 85, prohibits a police 

officer from conducting a protective frisk during the execution 

of a search warrant unless the individual is named in the 

warrant or otherwise identified. We disagree. 

 The Supreme Court, in Ybarra, addressed whether it is 

constitutionally permissible to stop and frisk a person present 

in a public place where a narcotics search warrant is being 

executed. In that case, police officers searched a bar pursuant 

to a warrant regarding heroin trafficking, but which did not 

authorize the search of anyone other than the named bartender. 

During the execution of the search warrant, the police frisked 

each of the bar's patrons. Heroin was found on Ybarra, a 

patron. In holding that the search of Ybarra was not supported 

by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently 

dangerous, the Supreme Court explained that the frisk of Ybarra 
- 12 -

was unjustified because the officers knew nothing about Ybarra 

"except that he was present, along with several other customers, 

in a public tavern at a time when the officers had reason to 

believe that the bartender would have heroin for sale." Id. at 

91. The Supreme Court noted that in a public bar, during 

operation hours, it was just as likely that an individual was an 

innocent patron as it was that he was there in furtherance of 

the heroin trafficking operation. 

 We reject Murphy's contention that Ybarra is controlling. 

The protective frisk of Murphy was not a generalized, cursory 

search in a public place of business of the type limited by 

Ybarra. The frisk of Murphy, by contrast, took place in a 

private residence for which there was probable cause to believe 

was used in narcotics trafficking and that firearms were 

present. We have found such protective frisks in similar 

circumstances reasonable and justified. See Ruffin, 13 Va. App. 

at 208, 409 S.E.2d at 178. 

 The officers' duty required them to execute a search 

warrant in a place fraught with the potential for sudden 

violence. It was significantly more likely that Murphy was 

associated with the illegal narcotics activity in the specific 

private residence as compared to a random member of the public 

found in a public bar during the execution of a search warrant. 

See Hayes, 29 Va. App. at 655, 514 S.E.2d at 361. It was, 

therefore, reasonable for Officer Harvey to fear that Murphy, an 
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individual found in the private residence suspected of being the 

location of narcotics trafficking, was armed, particularly where 

the search warrant listed firearms as items to be searched for 

and seized. 

 Our holding is consistent with decisions of other 

jurisdictions that have considered the same issue. 4 For 

example, in People v. Thurman, 257 Cal. Rptr. 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1989), a California appellate court balanced the governmental 

interest in a search of an individual present on private 

premises against the extent of the intrusion on the individual's 

privacy. In Thurman, police officers obtained a warrant to 

search a private apartment for drugs, narcotics paraphernalia, 

and various documents. Id. at 518. When the officers entered 

the apartment, they found Thurman sitting quietly and passively 

on a sofa. Although the officers realized that the warrant did 

 4

 Other jurisdictions utilizing the rationale we have 

employed have upheld frisks of persons encountered during the 

execution of a narcotics search warrant in a private residence. 

See United States v. Jaramillo, 25 F.3d 1146 (2d Cir. 1994); 

United States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United 

States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990); People v. 

Thurman, 257 Cal. Rptr. 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); State v. 

Harris, 384 S.E.2d 50 (N.C. 1989); State v. Zearley, 444 N.W.2d 

353 (N.D. 1989); State v. Alamont, 577 A.2d 665 (R.I. 1990); 

State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 

914 (1993). A few decisions, however, have disallowed the 

protective frisks on essentially identical facts, holding that 

an individual's "'mere presence' at a private residence being 

searched pursuant to a search warrant cannot justify a frisk of 

[his or her] person." State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 101 

(Wash. 1982); see also United States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300 

(5th Cir. 1990). 
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not authorize a search of Thurman, one of the officers frisked 

him for weapons. 

 The court determined that the governmental interest of 

officer safety significantly outweighed the personal intrusion, 

and held the search to be lawful. Id. at 520. The court 

assessed the reasonableness of the officer's actions by weighing 

the extent of the intrusion on the individual searched against 

the safety concerns of law enforcement officials. Id. It found 

the intrusion insignificant compared to the need of police 

officers to protect themselves from potentially armed and 

dangerous narcotics traffickers. Id. Accordingly, the court

concluded that law enforcement officers may lawfully frisk an 

individual present in a private residence during the execution 

of a search warrant for narcotics. Id. (conducting a protective 

search in such circumstances is "manifestly reasonable," even if 

the individual to be frisked does not appear threatening at the 

moment). 

 The court viewed Ybarra as inapplicable to searches on 

private premises for three reasons. Id. at 520-21. First, an 

individual present in a residence where narcotics transactions 

are taking place is likely to be involved in drug trafficking, 

inasmuch as a private residence does not attract visitors off 

the street as do public bars. Id. Second, private surroundings 

which have been judicially determined as the probable site of 

narcotics transactions are generally more dangerous than 
- 15 -

locations open to the general public, such as bars. Id. 

Finally, suspected narcotics traffickers found in a residence 

are more likely to be armed than are customers in a bar. Id. at 

521. 

 Following the reasoning in Thurman, the Wisconsin Supreme 

Court, in State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311 (Wis. 1992), cert. 

denied, 509 U.S. 914 (1993), upheld the search of a person on 

private premises on the ground that Ybarra does not apply to 

private premises searches. Id. at 316. In Guy, the police 

obtained a warrant to search a house for cocaine, scales, other 

indicia of narcotics trafficking crimes, and a man identified as 

"John Doe." The next day, police officers entered the house to 

execute the search warrant. Upon entry, the officers took the 

persons present in the house, including Guy, a woman not named 

in the warrant, to the front porch and handcuffed them. An 

officer then frisked Guy even though she stood motionless and 

did not appear armed. Id. at 312-13. 

 Employing a balancing test of reasonableness, the Guy court 

noted that a magistrate had already determined that the officers 

had probable cause to search the house, thereby supplying the 

reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity 

required by Terry. Id. at 313-15. The court then emphasized 

the danger involved in executing a warrant to search for 

narcotics. Id. at 315-16. The court viewed the searching 

officer's suspicion that Guy was armed as reasonable, based not 
- 16 -

upon a suspicion particular to anything Guy did in the officer's 

presence, but on the officer's personal experience regarding the 

violence associated with narcotics trafficking and the 

reasonable inferences the officer could have drawn from the 

facts surrounding the search. Id.

 We find the reasoned analysis in Thurman and Guy

persuasive. Where police officers execute a search warrant for 

narcotics at a location known for drug trafficking, pursuant to 

an affidavit seeking authority to search for firearms and a 

warrant permitting that search, a person of reasonable caution 

would surely deem a protective frisk of the occupants necessary 

for the safety of all concerned. We do not see such a weapons 

frisk as falling within the ambit of a generalized cursory 

search in a public place as prohibited by Ybarra. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court that 

Officer Harvey acted lawfully in conducting a protective frisk 

of Murphy, and hold the protective weapons frisk did not violate 

any protection afforded Murphy by the Fourth Amendment. 

C. The Marijuana Seizure 

 In the alternative, Murphy contends the trial court erred 

in failing to suppress the evidence as the marijuana recovered 

from his pocket was seized outside the scope of Officer Harvey's 

protective frisk. We disagree. 
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 In Ruffin, 13 Va. App. 206, 409 S.E.2d 177, we upheld, 

during a lawful weapons frisk, the seizure of narcotics 

discovered on the defendant under the plain view doctrine. 

The plain view doctrine, articulated in 

Coolidge [v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 

(1971)], permits the warrantless seizure of 

private possessions where three requirements 

are met. First, the "initial intrusion" of 

the police officer must be lawful or he must 

otherwise properly be in a position from 

which he can view the location of the 

seizure. Id. at 465-68. Second, the 

discovery of the item seized must be 

inadvertent. Id. at 470. Third, it must be 

"immediately apparent" to the police officer 

that the item he observes may be evidence of 

a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to 

seizure. Id. at 466. In Horton v. 

California, [496 U.S. 128] (1990), the 

Supreme Court eliminated the necessity of 

the inadvertence requirement. Thus, two 

requirements must be met for the application 

of the plain view doctrine. First, the 

police officer must be lawfully present. 

Second, it must be "immediately apparent" to 

the police officer that the item to be 

seized may be evidence of a crime, 

contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 

Id. at 208-09, 409 S.E.2d at 178-79. 

 In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), cited by 

the Commonwealth as authority to uphold the decision of the 

trial court in the case at bar, the Supreme Court upheld a 

similar analysis.5 See id. at 375-76.

If a police officer lawfully pats down a 

suspect's outer clothing and feels an object 

whose contour or mass makes its identity 

 5

 Subsequently, the analysis has been termed the "plain feel 

doctrine." 
- 18 -

immediately apparent, there has been no 

invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond 

that already authorized by the officer's 

search for weapons; if the object is 

contraband, its warrantless seizure would be 

justified by the same practical 

considerations that inhere in the plain-view 

context. 

Id. Thus, if the contour or mass of the object makes its 

identity as contraband immediately apparent, the officer may 

lawfully seize it.6

 We have already held that Murphy was lawfully frisked, so 

the first prong of the plain feel doctrine is met: the initial 

intrusion was lawful. The inquiry then turns on whether it was 

immediately apparent that the object discovered was contraband. 

We hold that the seizure was lawful as Officer Harvey testified, 

without contradiction, that he knew the bulge was a plastic 

baggy and that he believed, based on his training and 

experience, that it was marijuana. He identified the item when 

he first felt it. There is no evidence in the record before us 

that any additional manipulation of the baggy was necessary or 

occurred. Officer Harvey's identification of the marijuana is 

strikingly similar to the plain feel seizure in Ruffin: 

The object detected by [the officer] was not 

a facially innocent vessel of a type 

employed by law-abiding citizens, on a daily 

basis, for legitimate uses. It was, on the 

 6

 This was the case in Ruffin, where the officer seized an 

object inside the defendant's sock, as it was immediately 

apparent that it was "an unnatural mass, carried in a manner of 

concealment, consistent with the transportation of illegal 

drugs." 13 Va. App. at 211, 409 S.E.2d at 180. 
- 19 -

contrary, an unnatural mass, carried in a 

manner of concealment, consistent with the 

transportation of illegal drugs. The 

circumstances surrounding the discovery, the 

nature of the search warrant, . . . and the 

discovery of the packet under the 

[defendant's] sock gave [the officer] 

probable cause to believe that it contained 

illegal drugs and authorized its seizure. 

13 Va. App. at 211, 409 S.E.2d at 180 (footnote omitted). 

 We are not persuaded by Murphy's contention, citing Harris 

v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 146, 400 S.E.2d 191 (1991), and Hayes, 

29 Va. App. 647, 514 S.E.2d 357, that the plain feel doctrine 

does not apply. We find Harris and Hayes distinguishable from 

the case at bar and hold the trial court properly applied the 

plain feel doctrine to the facts of this case. In Harris the 

item seized was a film canister whose contents could not 

possibly have been detected by the tactile sense of the police 

officer. 241 Va. at 152-54, 400 S.E.2d at 195-96. In Hayes, 

the police officer testified the object he felt during the frisk 

was "'a lump' . . . [']something in his pocket.'" 29 Va. App. 

at 660, 514 S.E.2d at 363. Only after manipulating the "lump" 

did the officer suspect it was cocaine. In both Harris and 

Hayes, the identity of the object seized during the frisk was 

not "immediately apparent" and required, in effect, an 

additional search for the officer to suspect contraband. The 

uncontroverted record in this case reflects it was immediately 

apparent to the officer, based on the totality of the 
- 20 -

circumstances including his training and experience, that the 

object he touched was likely contraband. 

 Therefore, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the evidence supported the trial court's denial of 

the appellant's motion to suppress on this issue. See Welshman, 

28 Va. App. at 36, 502 S.E.2d at 129. If an officer discovers 

"contraband other than weapons [during a search for weapons], he 

clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the 

Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such 

circumstances." Long, 463 U.S. at 1050; see also Guy, 492 

N.W.2d 311. Under the plain feel doctrine, the officer was not 

limited to seizing weapons. Officer Harvey seized the marijuana 

lawfully. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court 

to deny the motion to suppress is upheld and the appellant's 

convictions affirmed.7

Affirmed.

 7

 Murphy also challenged the officers' actions in forcing 

him to spit out the contraband he hid in his mouth. At oral 

argument, however, he conceded that if the frisk and the seizure 

of the marijuana were lawful, the seizure of the cocaine and 

heroin was lawful as a search and seizure incident to arrest. 

We agree and do not further address this question as the full 

search was performed after Murphy was arrested for possession of 

marijuana and it is well established that the police may conduct 

a full search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. See United 

States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).