IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 11–2062 

Filed March 30, 2012 

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY 

DISCIPLINARY BOARD, 

 Complainant, 

vs. 

BRYAN J. HUMPHREY, 

 Respondent. 

 On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa. 

 Grievance commission recommends respondent’s license be 

suspended. LICENSE SUSPENDED. 

 Charles L. Harrington and N. Tré Critelli, Des Moines, for 

complainant. 

Bryan J. Humphrey, Fort Madison, pro se. 
 2

MANSFIELD, Justice. 

An attorney was retained on a contingent fee basis to obtain a 

settlement from an insurance company. The attorney failed to put his 

agreement with his clients in writing. He subsequently allowed the 

matter to languish and did not respond to repeated inquiries from the 

clients. He also failed to respond to inquiries from the Iowa Supreme 

Court Attorney Disciplinary Board after the clients filed a complaint. We 

now have to decide whether the attorney violated our ethical rules and, if 

so, what the sanction should be. 

This case comes before us on the report of a division of the 

Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa. See Iowa Ct. R. 

35.10(1). The Board alleged the respondent, Bryan J. Humphrey, 

violated Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.3, 32:1.4(a)(3), 

32:1.4(a)(4), 32:1.5(c) and 32:8.1(b). The commission agreed and 

recommended Humphrey be suspended from the practice of law. Upon 

our consideration of the commission’s findings of fact, conclusions of 

law, and recommendations, we also agree that Humphrey violated each 

of these rules. Considering Humphrey’s current violations and his prior 

disciplinary record, we order his license suspended indefinitely with no 

possibility of reinstatement for three months. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background.1

 Humphrey was admitted to the Iowa bar in 1981 and practices on 

his own. In July 2005, Humphrey was retained by Marty and Sheryl 

Victory to represent them in negotiating an insurance settlement with 

Amco Insurance Company. The Victorys’ home had suffered fire damage 

 1The relevant facts are not in dispute. The allegations of the Board’s complaint 

are deemed admitted because Humphrey’s answer did not deny them. See Iowa Ct. R. 

36.7. Furthermore, at the hearing, Humphrey acknowledged, “I do admit the 

allegations made against me.” 
 3

following a lightning strike. Humphrey entered into an unwritten 

contingent fee agreement with the Victorys under which he would receive 

one third of their insurance recovery. On July 15, 2005, Humphrey sent 

a letter to Amco requesting that it cover the Victorys’ hotel costs and outof-pocket expenses. Humphrey continued to correspond regularly with 

the Amco adjuster through July 2008. The Victorys received an initial 

insurance payment of approximately $6000 from which Humphrey was 

paid one third. 

However, beginning in October 2008, Humphrey essentially ceased 

responding to inquiries from the Victorys regarding the ongoing status of 

settlement discussions with Amco. From October 16, 2008, through 

December 30, 2009, the Victorys sent thirty-five text messages asking 

about the status of their claim. They received three text message 

responses from Humphrey on September 8, 2009, November 24, 2009, 

and December 2, 2009. The first of these responses came eleven months 

after the first query from the Victorys. 

The Victorys also attempted to contact Humphrey through a series 

of certified letters. The first was sent on March 21, 2009, and stated: 

We have not had any luck getting a hold of you by 

phone so I thought I would try writing to you. We have a few 

questions we want answered. 

1) Why don’t you answer our calls or text messages? 

2) When are you available to meet with us? 

3) Are you still trying to get us settled? 

4) What is the statute of limitation? 

5) Have you filed a lawsuit against Allied? If so when? 

6) Will you send copies of the lawsuit? 

7) Have you tried to call Carl? 

8) Have you sent a letter to Carl for him to sign? 

Please answer these and get back to us as soon as 

possible. 
 4

On April 19, 2009, and May 8, 2009, the Victorys sent two more 

certified letters asking Humphrey the same questions. Although 

Humphrey received all three letters, he did not reply to any of them. 

 On July 13, 2009, Humphrey wrote the Amco insurance adjuster 

about the Victorys’ claim. On November 12, 2009, the Victorys sent a 

fourth certified letter stating: 

 We have not heard from you in quite awhile. You do 

not answer our phone or text messages so I thought I would 

try writing to you. We have a few questions we want 

answered. 

1) Why don’t you answer our phone calls or text 

messages? 

2) About a year ago you told us everything would be 

done by the end of the year, what happened? 

3) Are you still working for us? 

4) Have you been in contact with the insurance 

company at all? 

5) Are you going to file a lawsuit against the insurance 

company for us? 

6) If you are still working for us what is going on? 

7) Have we said or done something to make you not 

want to help us? 

 . . . . 

 There are 202 days left before the 5 year anniversary 

of the fire. 

Humphrey received this fourth letter on November 18 but still did not 

respond to the Victorys, although he did write the insurance adjuster 

again on their behalf on November 20, 2009. 

Finally, on January 25, 2010, the Victorys mailed yet another 

letter which stated: 

We have not heard from you in quite a while. I wanted 

to enclose some of the many text that I (we) have sent to you 

with little response from you as you can see. We have sent 

registered letters to you with no response. The only time we 

get to talk to you anymore is when we run into you some 

where. When we hired you to help us, we believed in you 

and you continually let us down. Our number #1 question 

at this time is “Why?” 
 5

. . . . 

There are 137 days left before the 5 year anniversary 

of the fire. 

Humphrey did not respond to this fifth letter, so on March 17, 

2010, the Victorys filed a complaint with the Board. Humphrey 

responded to the Board’s initial inquiry, but did not reply to a 

subsequent July 15, 2010 letter asking him to “provide the Board with 

copies of [his] written communications with the insurance carrier, the 

complainants, and an accounting of all settlement checks received from 

the insurance carrier.” He also did not reply to a second Board letter 

dated October 15, 2010. 

The Victorys completed their negotiations with Amco on their own. 

On August 18, 2010, they agreed to a final settlement that involved an 

additional payment by Amco of $13,272.54. No portion of this insurance 

payment went to Humphrey. There is no evidence that the Victorys 

suffered any tangible financial loss because of Humphrey’s actions or 

that Humphrey unreasonably profited from his work on their behalf. 

However, a substantial, multiyear delay occurred before the Victorys 

received their final insurance payment. 

On August 5, 2011, the Board filed a complaint against Humphrey 

alleging that he had violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4(a)(3), 32:1.4(a)(4), 

32:1.5(c) and 32:8.1(b). In his answer, Humphrey admitted he had 

violated rule 32:1.5(c) which requires that “[a] contingent fee agreement 

shall be in writing . . . .” He denied the other four alleged rule violations. 

Humphrey’s answer did not respond at all to the thirty-six numbered 

paragraphs of factual allegations in the Board’s complaint. Accordingly, 

the Board filed a motion asking that those alleged facts be deemed 
 6

admitted. Humphrey did not respond to this motion; an order was 

entered granting it on September 26, 2011. 

The commission held a hearing on November 17, 2011. The Board 

offered three exhibits in evidence showing Humphrey’s past disciplinary 

history: a public reprimand in 1995, a sixty-day license suspension in 

1995, and a three-year license suspension in 1996. See Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Humphrey, 551 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 

1996); Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Humphrey, 529 N.W.2d 255 

(Iowa 1995). 

Humphrey appeared pro se and offered no witnesses or exhibits 

but did testify on his own behalf. He admitted that his fee agreement 

with the Victorys was not in writing and that he had received a 

contingent fee out of the first $6000 insurance payment to them. 

Humphrey maintained that the Victorys had obtained other insurance 

payments through his efforts, from which he did not receive a share. 

Humphrey conceded he did not have anything to do with the Victorys’ 

obtaining the final $13,272.54 payment. 

Humphrey also admitted that “there were times I did not respond 

to my client.” He said he had not responded to the Board’s letters “from 

fear of being here, and I’m here now.” He explained: 

I have no evidence to present. I do admit the 

allegations made against me. . . . I won’t try to mitigate what 

happened by telling you the circumstances. 

When asked, “Is there anything else in your life or in your practice 

that you feel would be a mitigating circumstance you would like us to 

take into account?” Humphrey answered, “Honestly, I wish there were, 

but there’s not. . . . And no, I don’t—I can’t blame anything. . . . No, I 

don’t have any excuses.” When asked what in hindsight he would have 
 7

done differently, Humphrey stated he would have withdrawn from the 

case. 

Following the hearing, the commission issued a report finding that 

Humphrey had violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4(a)(3), 32:1.4(a)(4), 32:1.5(c) 

and 32:8.1(b). The commission recommended a five-year suspension of 

Humphrey’s license to practice law. 

II. Scope of Review.

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Ct. R. 

35.10(1); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Fields, 790 N.W.2d 

791, 793 (Iowa 2010). We give respectful consideration to the 

commission’s findings and recommendations but are not bound by them. 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 860, 864 

(Iowa 2010). “The board has the burden of proving attorney misconduct 

by a convincing preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “This burden is less 

than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but more than the preponderance 

standard required in the usual civil case.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l 

Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 674 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 2004). It is also a 

less stringent burden than clear and convincing evidence which is “the 

highest civil law standard of proof.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics 

& Conduct v. Ronwin, 557 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1996). If a violation is 

proven, we “may impose a lesser or greater sanction than recommended 

by the [grievance] commission.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Murphy, 800 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Iowa 2011); Iowa Ct. R. 35.10(1). 

III. Review of Alleged Ethical Violations.

 The Board alleged, and the commission found, that Humphrey 

violated five separate provisions of the Iowa Rules of Professional 

Conduct. Upon our review, we agree with those findings. 
 8

 In the twenty-month period between July 2008 and the filing of the 

Victorys’ complaint in March 2010, the only action Humphrey took to 

represent his clients was to send two letters to the claim adjuster. The 

first letter Humphrey sent was on July 13, 2009, nine months after the 

Victorys had sent Humphrey their first text message, four months after 

Humphrey received the first certified letter from them, and two months 

after he received the third certified letter. Humphrey did not dispatch his 

second letter to Amco until November 20, 2009, after he had received his 

fourth certified letter from the Victorys. These incomplete and severely 

delayed actions do not comply with the rule 32:1.3 standard requiring a 

lawyer to act with “reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 

a client.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Ginkel, __ N.W.2d __, __, (Iowa 2012) (holding that 

an attorney’s omissions and delays in handling an estate amounted to a 

“consistent failure” to perform the duties and responsibilities of an 

attorney and therefore violated rule 32:1.3). 

 Also, between October 2008 (when the Victorys began sending text 

messages to their attorney) and March 2010 (when they filed their 

complaint), Humphrey contacted his clients only three times, and each of 

these communications was by text. Although his lack of action on their 

behalf gave him little to report, he apparently did not even inform them 

about the two letters he had written to the adjuster. This lack of 

communication violated rule 32:1.4(a)(3), requiring an attorney to “keep 

the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.” Iowa R. 

Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a)(3); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Cunningham, __ N.W.2d __, __, (Iowa 2012) (finding a violation of 

rule 32:1.4(a)(3) when attorney failed to keep his client informed about 

the status of her divorce case). 
 9

In addition to being obligated to take the initiative to keep his 

clients informed, Humphrey was also required to follow rule 32:1.4(a)(4) 

by “promptly comply[ing] with reasonable requests for information.” Iowa 

R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a)(4); see also Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d at 868 

(finding an attorney in violation of rule 32:1.4(a)(4) for not keeping his 

probate clients informed and not responding to their attempts to reach 

him). The Victorys’ informational requests were numerous, explicit, and 

reasonable, yet Humphrey ignored nearly all of them for at least 

seventeen months. Thus, he violated rule 32:1.4(a)(4) as well. 

The commission also found that Humphrey did not respond to the 

Board’s correspondence, thereby violating rule 32:8.1(b) requiring that a 

lawyer in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not “knowingly fail 

to respond to a lawful demand for information from a[] . . . disciplinary 

authority.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.1(b). We agree with this finding 

as well. It is undisputed that Humphrey disregarded the Board’s July 

15, 2010 letter asking him to provide “copies of your written 

communications with the insurance carrier, the complainants, and an 

accounting of all settlement checks received from the insurance carrier.” 

He also failed to reply to a second Board letter sent three months later 

seeking the same discovery information. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo, 799 N.W.2d 524, 534 (Iowa 2011) (finding a 

violation of rule 32:8.1(b) when an attorney failed to respond to the 

Board’s discovery requests for documentation concerning his fee 

agreement and the scope of his representation). 

Finally, as we have noted, Humphrey admitted he had entered into 

an unwritten contingent fee agreement with the Victorys providing that 

he would be paid one third of the insurance recovery. As Humphrey 

admitted, this action violated rule 32:1.5(c) requiring that “[a] contingent 
 10

fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall state 

the method by which the fee is to be determined.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 

32:1.5(c); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 

N.W.2d 591, 598–99 (Iowa 2011) (finding that an attorney violated rule 

32:1.5(c) by failing to execute a written contingent fee agreement with a 

client). 

Based upon our de novo evaluation of the record we conclude the 

Board has shown by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that 

Humphrey has violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4(a)(3), 32:1.4(a)(4), 32:1.5(c) 

and 32:8.1(b). 

IV. Consideration of Appropriate Sanction. 

Having determined that Humphrey violated these five rules as 

charged, we must now consider the appropriate sanction. 

“We have repeatedly held that the goal of our ethical rules is to 

maintain public confidence in the legal profession as well as to provide a 

policing mechanism for poor lawyering.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Knopf, 793 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Iowa 2011) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “Important considerations include 

the nature of the violations, protection of the public, deterrence of similar 

misconduct by others, the lawyer’s fitness to practice, and our duty to 

uphold the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Fleming, 602 N.W.2d 340, 

342 (Iowa 1999). “In fashioning the appropriate sanction, we look to 

prior similar cases while remaining cognizant of their limited usefulness 

due to the variations in their facts.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Wagner, 768 N.W.2d 279, 288 (Iowa 2009) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Often, the distinction between the 

punishment imposed depends upon the existence of multiple instances 
 11

of neglect, past disciplinary problems, and other companion violations, 

including uncooperativeness in the disciplinary investigation.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lesyshen, 712 N.W.2d 101, 

106 (Iowa 2006). Aggravating and mitigating circumstances are also 

important. Knopf, 793 N.W.2d at 531. 

 The core violation committed by Humphrey was the neglect of a 

single client matter.2 Although neglect is not defined in our rules of 

professional conduct “it has generally been recognized to involve 

indifference and a consistent failure to perform those obligations that a 

lawyer has assumed, or a conscious disregard for the responsibilities a 

lawyer owes to a client.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct 

v. Moorman, 683 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Iowa 2004). Neglect goes beyond 

ordinary negligence and “is a form of professional incompetence that 

often involves procrastination, such as a lawyer doing little or nothing to 

advance the interests of a client after agreeing to represent the client.” 

Id. at 552. 

Our past sanctions in cases where neglect was the principal 

violation have generally ranged from a public reprimand to a six-month 

suspension. Id. at 553. “We consider any harm to the client caused by 

the neglect in determining the proper sanction. Additionally, neglect 

compounded by misrepresentation will warrant a more severe sanction 

because of the critical importance of honesty in our profession.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, 794 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Iowa 

2011) (internal citation omitted). We concur with the commission’s 

recognition that “generally speaking, absent other serious concerns or 

aggravating factors, cases involving primarily neglect or communication 

 2We do not minimize, of course, the violation of rule 32:1.5(c). 
 12

issues have been viewed as less egregious than cases in which the 

actions of the attorney have involved deceit or dishonesty, or have caused 

financial harm to a client.” 

Where neglect is the primary violation, we have often chosen a 

public reprimand as the appropriate sanction. See Van Ginkel, __ 

N.W.2d at __; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey, 

761 N.W.2d 53, 62 (Iowa 2009) (stating that “if the neglect evinced by 

Casey constituted his only misconduct, under the circumstances, we 

would be inclined to order a public reprimand”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d 661, 670 (Iowa 2007) (ordering 

a public reprimand for an attorney who neglected two matters and failed 

to respond to the Board, where the attorney had a prior disciplinary 

record including a public reprimand for neglect and also citing other 

neglect cases where a public reprimand was imposed); Dunahoo, 730 

N.W.2d at 205–07 (reprimanding an attorney for failing to account to a 

client and waiting four years to close an estate); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of 

Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Parker, 558 N.W.2d 183, 184–86 (Iowa 1997) 

(imposing a reprimand for delaying the closure of two estates for seven 

and eleven years respectively); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Sather, 534 N.W.2d 428, 429–31 (Iowa 1995) (reprimanding 

an attorney for failure to respond to the Board and neglecting an estate 

closure for eighteen years). 

In Van Ginkel, we recently reviewed our prior neglect cases that 

involved additional violations or aggravating circumstances and therefore 

merited license suspensions of up to six months. ___ N.W.2d at ___. We 

categorized those cases as follows: 

In cases involving multiple instances of neglect, other 

additional violations, or a history of past disciplinary 

problems, however, the sanction has typically involved a 
 13

suspension for some length of time. In cases involving 

neglect in one or two cases and other misconduct such as 

misrepresentations associated with the neglect, the 

suspensions have been in the range of three months. See 

[Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.] Ackerman, 786 

N.W.2d at 497–98 (holding neglect in two estates, 

accompanying multiple misrepresentations, and early receipt 

of fee required a ninety-day suspension); Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey, 761 N.W.2d 53, 61–62 (Iowa 

2009) (holding neglect in two cases, multiple 

misrepresentations, and the early collection of fee required a 

three-month suspension); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Adams, 749 N.W.2d 666, 669–70 (Iowa 

2008) (holding neglect in three cases, misrepresentation 

associated with neglect, failure to account to a client, and 

failure to respond to Board required a four-month 

suspension). In other cases where the pattern of misconduct 

has been more extensive, suspensions have typically been for 

a longer period of time. See Wagner, 768 N.W.2d at 288–89 

(concluding neglect in multiple cases, improper withdrawal 

of fees in probate, failure to return unearned fees, 

misrepresentations to court and clients required a six-month 

suspension); [Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.] 

Humphrey, 738 N.W.2d at 620–21 (holding neglect in six 

estates, with accompanying misrepresentations to court, and 

three instances of depositing unearned fees in business 

accounts required a six-month suspension). 

Id. The neglect in Van Ginkel involved a single probate matter without 

financial harm to the estate, but the attorney had received two prior 

private admonitions, had collected fees prematurely, and most 

significantly had made a false statement to the tribunal, one of the most 

serious aggravating factors. Id. at __. For this combination of 

circumstances, Van Ginkel received a sixty-day suspension. Id. at __. 

 We also imposed a sixty-day suspension in Thomas. 794 N.W.2d 

at 295. Thomas had a history of discipline and admonitions including 

several probate delinquencies and a public reprimand for client neglect, 

and had frequently failed to cooperate fully with Board investigations in 

the past. Id. Thomas’s inaction seriously harmed his client whose auto 

accident claim was dismissed because of his neglect. Id. at 292. 
 14

Thomas compounded this violation by deceiving his client about the 

status of the claim. Id. at 294. 

In Lickiss, we suspended an attorney’s license for a minimum of 

three months after he neglected four probate matters, failed to respond 

to clients’ inquiries for information, took probate fees without prior court 

approval, and failed to notify his clients that he would no longer be 

representing them. 786 N.W.2d at 872. Lickiss had an important 

aggravating circumstance in that he had recently been publicly 

reprimanded for identical occurrences of neglect, although his voluntary 

remedial efforts constituted a mitigating circumstance. Id. at 869–71. 

In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Cohrt, we 

imposed a similar three-month suspension where the attorney had 

engaged in two separate instances of neglect, misrepresented to his 

clients the reason why their claim had been dismissed, had a prior 

private admonition for neglect, and also made misrepresentations to the 

Board. 784 N.W.2d 777, 783 (Iowa 2010). 

 Although suspensions for neglect generally do not exceed six 

months, see Moorman, 683 N.W. 2d at 553, longer suspensions of up to 

two years have been imposed for neglect in combination with much more 

serious violations or aggravating circumstances. See Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Joy, 728 N.W.2d 806, 815–16 (Iowa 2007) 

(collecting cases); see also Cunningham, __ N.W.2d at __ (suspending 

license for eighteen months where two clients suffered significant 

financial harm due to neglect, and the attorney made multiple 

misrepresentations to both the clients and the court and never 

responded to the disciplinary proceedings against him); Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 271 (Iowa 2010) 

(imposing a two-year suspension for an attorney’s “misconduct in 
 15

seventeen client matters, including neglect, failure to communicate, and 

failure to safeguard his clients’ interests upon termination of 

representation, in addition to his trust account violations and conviction 

of two traffic offenses”); Joy, 728 N.W.2d at 812–16 (Iowa 2007) 

(suspending an attorney’s license for eighteen months where the attorney 

neglected four clients’ matters, failed to comply with court orders, made 

several misrepresentations, failed to turn over client papers, and refused 

to cooperate with the Board’s investigation); Moorman, 683 N.W.2d at 

551–55 (imposing a two-year suspension where there were “numerous 

incidents of profuse and pervasive neglect,” five clients were affected 

including one that was greatly harmed, there was absolutely no 

cooperation with the Board, the attorney offered to engage in fraudulent 

conduct and was described as the “worst violator of the time 

requirements of the rules of appellate practice in the state”); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sullins, 613 N.W.2d 656, 

657 (Iowa 2000) (suspending license for one year where an attorney had 

three previous reprimands for neglect, harmed clients financially, 

consistently ignored the Board’s requests, failed to return client 

documents, and failed to return unearned fees). 

Taken on their own, Humphrey’s current violations might merit no 

more than a reprimand. Only one client has been affected, and the 

Victorys ultimately did not suffer financial harm because of the neglect, 

although they were forced to undergo a substantial delay before receiving 

their final insurance payment. See Casey, 761 N.W.2d at 61 (“An 

important consideration in determining the appropriate sanction is the 

harm caused by the neglect.”). Humphrey did not profit from his actions 

(or inaction) and did not engage in deceit or misrepresentation to either 

his clients or the court. Also, although he did not respond to two letters 
 16

from the Board, he did answer the complaint, did testify at the committee 

hearing, and did ultimately admit to the violations he was charged with. 

 However, Humphrey’s three earlier violations must be considered 

relevant aggravating factors. See Van Ginkel, __ N.W.2d at ___, ___ 

(holding that prior reprimands, though “somewhat dated,” were an 

aggravating factor when the violations under consideration took place 

starting in 2007 while the admonitions had been issued in 1987 and 

1994). In 1994, Humphrey was publicly reprimanded for failing to 

respond to inquiries from the Committee on Professional Ethics and 

Conduct. In 1995, we suspended Humphrey’s license for sixty days after 

finding he had neglected three probate matters and a postconviction 

relief matter, and had “stonewalled two judges, as well as the [Committee 

on Professional Ethics and Conduct].” See Humphrey, 529 N.W.2d at 

256–59. A year later, in 1996, we suspended Humphrey’s license 

indefinitely with no possible reinstatement for three years. See 

Humphrey, 551 N.W.2d at 308–09. At that point, Humphrey not only 

had neglected several matters and been nonresponsive to courts, clients, 

and the Board, but also had misled a client about an error he had made 

and instructed another client not to inform the court of a fact that would 

have meant the court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 307–08. 

Although some time has lapsed from these violations, it is 

disheartening that Humphrey has resumed some of the habits that led to 

his difficulties and our imposition of severe sanctions in the 1990s. 

While the current violations do not involve fraud or dishonesty, and are 

limited to a single client matter, the earlier pattern of neglect and 

nonresponsiveness has reemerged. Therefore, despite the passage of 

time, and the somewhat narrower scope of the present violations as 

compared to those we addressed in 1995 and 1996, a substantial 
 17

suspension is appropriate to protect the public and uphold the integrity 

of the profession. 

V. Disposition. 

Considering all the circumstances of this case, we suspend 

Humphrey’s license to practice law in this state indefinitely with no 

possibility of reinstatement for three months. This suspension applies to 

all facets of the practice of law. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(3). Humphrey 

must comply with rule 35.22 dealing with the notification of clients and 

counsel, and meet all the requirements of reinstatement provided in rule 

35.13. The costs of this action are taxed to Humphrey pursuant to rule 

35.26(1). 

LICENSE SUSPENDED.