### NOT FOR PU BLICA TION

U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CYA PPE L L A T E PA N E L

OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: PA TMO N T MO TO R

W ER K S, IN C . , Deb to r. W ILLIA M D. MC C A N N ,

A p pellant,

v. JEFFR EYW IC HO T; PA M ELAW IC H O T; BA RBA RAW IC HO T,

A p pellees. BA P N o s . N V-17-1221-BTaL NV-17-1288 (C o nso lidated A ppeals) Bk. N o . 3:12-b k-52799-BTB A dv. N o . 3:15-ap-05031-BTB

M E M ORA ND U M *

A rgued and Sub m itted o n July 27, 2018 at Las Vegas, N evada Filed – O c tob er 4, 2018 A ppeal fro m the U nited States Bankruptcy C o urt

fo r the Distric t o f N evada 

# FIL ED
OCT 04 2018 SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. B KCY

. APP. PANEL O F T HE NI NT H CI RCUI T

*Thi s di sposi ti on i s not appr opr i ate for publi cati on. Although i t may be ci ted for whatev er per suasiv e v alue i t may hav e, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, i t has no pr ecedenti al v alue, see 9th Ci r . BAP Rule 8024-1.Ho no r ab le Bruc e T. Beesley, Chief Bankruptc y Judge, Presiding

A ppearanc es: A p pellant W illiamD. Mc C a nn argued pro se; Justin

Henderso n o f Lewis R o c a R o thgerb er LLP argued fo r appellees Jeffrey W icho t, Pam ela W icho t, and Barb ara W icho t.
Befo r e: BRA N D, TAY LO R and LA FFERTY, Bankruptcy Judges.

INT ROD U CT I ON A ppellant W illiam D. Mc C a nn appeals two o rders o f the b ankruptc y c o u rt: (1) the o rder denying his m o tio n fo r relief fro ma prio rsanc tio ns o rder; and (2) the o rder awarding appellees their atto rney's fees inc urred defending Mc C ann's m o tio n fo r relief fro m the prio r sanc tio ns o r der. W e A FFIRM the o rder denying the m o tio n fo r relief fro mthe sanc tio ns o rder and R EVER SE the o rder awarding appellees their atto rney's fees. I. FA CT U A L BA CK GROU N D A N D PROCE D U RA L HIST ORY A . E v ents prior to the s anc tions order Patm o nt Mo to r W erks, Inc . ("Patm o nt") was in the b usiness o f
m anufac turing perso nal transpo rtatio n devic es. Steven Patm o nt ("Steven") was Patm o nt's president; Hannelo re Patm o nt ("Hannelo re"), Steven's wife,

2was Patm o nt's treasurer. 1 Mc C ann had b een c o rpo rate c o unsel fo r Patm o nt

sinc e 1989. Prio rto Patm o nt's b ankruptc y filing, a N ew Jersey state c o urt entered a $27,000,000 default judgment against Patm o nt and in favo r o f Jeffrey W icho t fo r injuries invo lving o ne o f Patm o nt's sc o o ters. Barb ara W icho tand Pam ela W icho t were also parties to the suit. 2 Lewis R o c a R o thgerb er C hristie, LLP ("Lewis Ro c a") represented the W icho ts thro ugho ut Patm o nt's b ankruptc y c ase. Patm o nt filed a chapter 11 3 b ankruptc y c ase o n Dec emb er 14, 2012. Mc C ann is no t a b ankruptc y atto rney b ut was em plo yed as spec ial litigatio n c o unsel to represent Patm o nt in vario us litigatio n m atters during the c ase. Patm o nt's b a nkruptc y c ase was later c o nverted to chapter 7, and a trustee was appo inted. Thereafter, the trustee filed an adversary pro c eeding against Steven and Hannelo re, seeking rec o very o f alleged preferential transfers. Mc C ann represented Steven and Hannelo r e in that

1 Because Mr . Patmont, Mr s. Patmont and Patmont Motor Wer ks, Inc. all shar e the name Patmont, we r efer to Mr . Patmont as S tev en, Mr s. Patmont as Hannelor e, and Patmont Motor Wer ks, Inc. as Patmont.

2 We r efer to Jeffr ey Wi chot, Barbar a Wi chot and Pamela Wi chot collecti v ely as the "Wi chots."

3 Unless speci fi ed other wi se, all chapterand secti on r efer ences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S
. C. §§ 101-1532, all "Rule" r efer ences ar e to the Feder al Rules of Bankr uptcy Pr ocedur e, and all "Ci v i l Rule" r efer ences ar e to the Feder al Rules of Ci v i l Pr ocedur e. 3ac tio n.

The trustee later settled the preferenc e ac tio n with Steven and Hannelo re and filed a m o tio n seeking appro val o f the settlem ent. The W icho t s objec ted to the settlem ent m o tio n and m o ved fo r a Rule 2004
exam inatio n o f Steven and Hannelo r e to investigate their financ ial
c o nditio n and determ ine whether a judgm ent against themwo uld b e c o llec tab le. A s with the settlem ent m o tio n, the Ru le 2004 m o tio n was filed in the m ain c a se. The c lerk entered an o rder in the m ain c ase granting the Rule 2004 m o tio n. A fter the o rder was entered, Mc C a nn filed an o bjec tio n to the Rule 2004 m o tio n o n b ehalf o f Steven and Hannelo re in b o th the
m ain c ase and the adversary pro c eeding. Based o n events that o c c urred at Steven's depo s itio n, the W icho ts requested sanc tio ns against Mc C ann and Steven under C ivil Rule 30(d)(2) fo r their alleged m isc o nduc t during the depo sitio n. The sanc t io ns request was filed as part o f the W icho ts' supplem ental obj ec tio n to the trustee's settlem ent m o tio n, which was b eing heard in five days. Mc C ann and Steven did no t file a written respo nse to the sanc tio ns request b efo re the hearing. A t the A pril 6, 2016 hearing, the c o urt anno unc ed that it wo u ld
sanc tio n Mc C ann and Steven fo r m isc o nduc t at Steven's depo sitio n and
wo uld im po se a sanc tio n o f $2,500 jo intly and severally against them, payab le to Lewis R o c a o n b ehalf o f the W icho ts. The c o urt instruc ted Lewis

4R o c a to prepare the o rder.

O n A p ril 8, 2016, Lewis Ro c a em ailed a pro po sed sanc t io ns o rder to Mc C ann at the A O L em ail address he had on file with the c o urt. Mc C ann respo nded with objec tio ns to the pro po sed o rder o n A pril 11, and filed an
objec tio n to the pro po s ed sanc tio ns o rder in the adversary pro c eeding o n A pril 12. The obj ec tio ns went to the m erits o f the c o urt's sanc tio ns ruling rather than to the fo rmo f o rder. Mc C ann's A O L em ail address was listed
o n the pleading. Lewis R o c a filed a respo nse to Mc C a nn's objec tio n, a c o py o f which was em ailed to Mc C ann's A O L ac c o unt. The b ankruptc y c o urt entered the sanc tio ns o rder against Mc C ann and Steven under C ivil Rule 30(d)(2) in the m ain c a se o n A pril 20, 2016. Mc C ann was listed o n the EC F servic e list, indic ating that a c o py o f the
o rder was em ailed to his A O L ac c o unt. B. E v ents leading

to the m otion for relief fromthe s anc tions order Eleven m o nths after entry o f the sanc tio ns o rder, the W icho ts m o ved to set aside twoprio rsales that had o c c urred in the m a in c ase. In the
m o tio n, the W icho ts no t ed that Mc C ann and Steven were in c o ntem p t fo r failing to pay the $2,500 sanctio n o rdered b y the c o urt in A pril 2016. Thereafter, Mc C ann exchanged em ails with Lewis R o c a c o unsel discussing the A pril 2016 sanc tio ns o rder. In sho rt, Mc C ann disputed the
o rder's finality fo r lac k o f no tic e. Mc C ann explained that, b ec ause he had appeared o nly in the adversary pro c eeding, he did no t rec eive EC F no tic es
5o f do c ket entries in the m ain c ase, such as the sanc tio ns o rder, which was

do c keted o nly in the m ain c ase. Mc C ann also argued (erro neo usly) that the
c o u rt issued the $2,500 sanctio n at a hearing fo r the adversary pro c eeding,
no t the m ain c ase. Mc C ann faulted Lewis R o c a fo r filing the pro po sed
sanc tio ns o rder in the m ain c ase, even tho ugh, in Mc C ann's m ind, the
sanc tio n was related toa disc o very dispute in the adversary pro c eeding. Mc C ann ac c used Lewis Ro c ao f intentio nally filing the o rder in the wro ng c ase sohe wo uld no trec eive no tic e o f it. The b ankruptc y c o urt held a hearing o n the W icho ts' m o tio n to set aside the sales; Mc C ann appeared as atto rney fo r Steven and Hannelo re. The c o u rt no t ed near the end o f the hearing that it wo uld no tto lerate any disc o very m isc o nduc t, particularly fro m Mc C ann's c lients, and asked Mc C ann whether he understo o d that instruc tio n. Mc C ann said he understo o d. When Mc C ann tried to address the c o urt further, the c o urt instruc ted the c lerk to c a ll fo r security and to ld Mc C ann to sit do wn. Later that sam e day, Mc C a nn sent (and filed) a letter to Judge Beesley expressing that Judge Beesley had dem o nstrated "b latant prejudic e" against himat the hearing earlier that day, as well as at prio r hearings. Mc C ann stated that he was fo r c ed to withdraw as c o unsel fo r Steven and Hannelo re as a result o f that c o nduc t. Judge Beesley did no t respo nd to Mc C ann's letter. ////
6C. M otion for relief fromthe s a nc tions order

O n June 14, 2017, in the adversary pro c eeding, Mc C ann (and Steven) filed a Mo tio n to R ec o nsider, Resc ind, o rA lter Sanc tio ns O rder o r R ec alendering the Date o f Entry Thereo f ("Ru le 60(b ) Mo tio n"). Mc C ann
m aintained that he never rec eived EC F no tic e o f the A pril 2016 sanc tio ns o rder. He c laim ed he first learned o f it in the W icho ts' m o t io n to set aside the sales filed in March 2017, where the W icho ts stated that he and Steven were in c o ntem pt fo rfailing to pay the $2,500 sanctio n. Mc C ann explained that, b ec ause the pro po s ed o rder was in dispute, he assumed the c o urt
wo uld first rule o n that issue b efo re entering any sanc tio ns o rder. Mc C ann stated that he repeatedly reviewed the adversary do c ket after the A pril 2016 hearing lo o king fo rthe c o urt's sanc tio n ruling b ut never saw o ne. A ltho ugh c iting C ivil Rule 62, Mc C a nn so ught relief fro m the
sanc tio ns o rder under C ivil Rule 60(b )(1) and (b )(6). Fo r relief under (b )(1), Mc C ann argued that he and Steven were the vic tim s o f m istake; Mc C ann did no t get EC F servic e o f the sanc tio ns o rder and Lewis R o c ahad failed to
serve no tic e o f entry o f the sanc tio ns o r der in vio latio n o f Lo c al Rule 9022. Mc C ann m ade no argum ent fo r relief under C ivil Ru le 60(b )(6), stating
o nly the rule. A ttached to Mc C ann's dec laratio n in suppo r t were "sc reen sho ts" fro mhis em ail ac c o u nts — b o th his fo rm er A O L ac c o unt and new Gm ail ac c o unt — allegedly sho wing that no em a il regarding the sanc tio ns o rder was rec eived o n A p ril 20, 2016.

7The W icho ts o ppo sed the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n and argued that they

sho uld b e awarded atto rney's fees. The W icho ts argued that Mc C ann's "m istake" argum ent lac ked m erit b ec ause he had no tic e o ver a year ago that he and Steven had b een sanc tio ned b y the c o urt. The W icho ts also argued that the Ru le 60(b ) Mo t io n was untim ely as to a c laimunder (b )(1), having b een b ro ught m o r e than o ne year after the sanc t io ns o rder was entered, and that Mc C ann had failed to estab lish any b asis fo r relief under (b )(6). N either Mc C ann no r Steven appeared at the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n hearing. Ho wever, atto rney Justin To w nsend appeared in Mc C ann's plac e. The c o u rt did no t find c redib le Mc C ann's assertio n that he did no t rec eive a
c o p y o f the sanc t io ns o rder via EC F when it was entered o n A pril 20, 2016; Mc C ann had filed an objec tio n to the W icho t s' m o tio n fo r Rule 2004
exam inatio ns o f Steven and Hannelo re o n March 3, 2016, which auto m atic ally put himo n elec tro nic no t ic e o f anything filed in the m ain
c ase thereafter. The c o u rt further no ted that Mc C a nn had no t info rm ed the
c o u rt o f the c hange in his em ail address fro m the A O L ac c o unt to the Gm ail
ac c o u nt until June 2, 2017. If Mc C ann was no t using the A O L ac c o unt at the tim e the sanc t io ns o rder was entered in A pril 2016 b ut rather his Gm ail
ac c o u nt, as Mc C ann m aintained, it was Mc C ann's fault fo r no t no tifying the
c o u rt o f the em ail change and was no t a pro per b asis fo r relief under C ivil Rule 60(b )(1). The c o urt did no t address the request fo r relief under C ivil

8Rule 60(b )(6).

A t the end o f the o r al ruling, the c o urt invited Lewis R o c a to file a
m o tio n fo r atto rney's fees to b e awarded against Mc C ann. A s fo r To wnsend's appearanc e at the hearing, the b a nkruptc y judge explained the ethic al perils o f appearing in the c ase fo r Mc C ann, warned ab o ut prob ab le
c o nsequenc es, and warned To wnsend no t to appear in his c o urt again. The judge anno unc ed that he wo uld b e issuing an o rder to sho w c ause why Mc C ann sho uld no t b e held in c o ntem pt fo r filing a frivo lo us m o tio n, fo r wasting the c o urt's tim e, and fo r failing to appear at the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n hearing. The c o urt entered the O SC o n July 17, 2017, in the adversary pro c eeding, setting a hearing fo r A u gust 15, 2017. Fo rreaso ns unkno wn, o n A ugust 4, 2017, the c o urt withdrew the O SC and vac ated the related hearing. Mc C ann tim ely appealed the b a nkruptc y c o u rt's o rder denying the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n ("Rule 60(b ) O rder"). D . M otion for attorney' s fees A s instruc ted, Lewis R o c a filed its applic atio n fo r atto rney's fees o n b ehalf o f the W icho ts requesting $7,230 in fees incu rred fo r respo nding to the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n. Lewis R o c a requested additio nal sanc tio ns under the c o urt's inherent autho rity. Mc C ann o ppo s ed the fee applic atio n. He argued that the b ankruptc y c o u rt lac ked jurisdic tio n to award atto rney's fees b ec ause the Rule 60(b )
9O rder was o n appeal. He further argued that the c o u rt's apparent sua

spo nte sanc tio n under Rule 9011 was b arred b ec ause (1) the O SC had sinc e b een withdrawn, and (2) the O SC was no t issued until after the adversary pro c eeding had b een dism issed, 4 which left the c o urt unab le to im po se
m o netary sanc t io ns per Rule 9011(2)(B). Finally, Mc C ann argued that he had a right to b e represented b y To w nsend at the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n hearing, and that the c o u rt's o rder fo r To wnsend to never appear in his
c o u rt again vio lated his due pro c ess rights and prevented himfro musing
c o u nsel o f his cho ic e. In reply, the W icho ts disputed Mc C ann's Rule 9011 argum ents; the adversary pro c eeding had b een reinstated prio r to the O SC, and no O SC
was even nec essary b ec ause they were seeking fees and sanc tio ns under the c o urt's inherent autho rity, no tRule 9011. The W icho ts further argued that Mc C ann was no t deprived o f c o unsel o f his cho ic e; To wnsend said he
was no t representing Mc C ann fo r the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n b u t o nly appearing in his stead. The W icho ts requested an additional $4,125 in fees incurred to respo nd to Mc C ann's o p po sitio n to the fee applic atio n. Mc C ann appeared at the fee applic atio n hearing. In suppo rt o f
sanc tio ns under the b a nkruptc y c o urt's inherent autho rity, the W icho ts

4 The tr ustee's adv er sar y pr oceeding agai nst S tev en and Hannelor e was inadv er tently di smi ssed on Apr i l5, 2017. On the cour t's moti on, that pr oceeding was r einstated on May 22, 2017. 10asked the c o urt to find that Mc C ann had ac ted with b a d faith o rwillful

m isc o nduc twhen he filed his frivo lo us R ule 60(b ) Mo tio n. Mc C ann again stated that he did no t rec eive no tic e o f the A pril 2016 sanc tio ns o rder fro m either Lewis R o c a o r the c o urt, which prevented him fro mtim ely appealing it, and no ted that his objec t io ns to the pro po sed sanc tio ns o rder were never heard. The c o urt info rm ed Mc C ann that if he wanted his objec tio ns to the pro po sed sanc tio ns o rder c o nsidered, he had to set the m atter fo r hearing. Mc C ann c o nc eded he was no t aware that setting a hearing was required. U po n further argum ent, the b ankruptc y c o urt stated that Mc C ann's lac k o f understanding o f b ankruptc y pro c edure was his o wn fault, and that his inc o m petenc y was c a using the W icho ts to expend m o ney to fight what the c o urt viewed as a frivo lo us m o tio n to set aside the sanc tio ns o rder: the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n was tim e-b arred and no t well-taken b ec ause Mc C ann had ac tual no tic e o f the o rder. The c o urt dec lined to award any additio nal
sanc tio ns, b ut it awarded the W icho ts their atto rney's fees o f $11,355. The
c o u rt also dec lined to find "b ad faith" given Mc C ann's explanatio n, b ut said it wo uld find b ad faith if Mc C ann failed to fo llo w pro per pro c edure in the future. Mc C ann tim ely appealed the b a nkruptc y c o u rt's o rder awarding the W icho t s their atto rney's fees o f $11,355 ("Fee O rder"). II. JU RISD I CT ION The b ankruptc y c o urt had jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and

11157(b )(2)(A ). W e have jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . § 158. III. ISSU E S 1. Did the b ankruptc y c o urt ab use its disc r etio n in denying the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n? 2. Did the b ankruptc y c o urt ab use its disc r etio n in awarding the W icho t s their atto rney's fees as a sanc tio n against Mc C a nn?

I V . ST A ND A RD S OF RE V IE W Ac o urt's denial o f a m o tio n under C ivil Rule 60(b ) is reviewed fo r an ab use o f disc retio n. Lem ogev. United S ta tes , 587 F.3d 1188, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2009); Alo nso v. S um m erville (In re S um m erville) , 361 B.R . 133, 139 (9th C ir. BA P 2007). An o rder im po sing sanc tio ns is alsoreviewed under an ab use o f disc retio n standard. M iller v. C a rdina le (In re D eV

ille) , 361 F.3d 539, 547 (9th C ir. 2004); O rto n v. H o ffm a n (In re K

ayne) , 453 B.R . 372, 380 (9th C ir. BA P 2011). Ab ankruptc y c o urt ab uses its disc retio n if it applied the wro ng legal standard o r its findings were illo gic al, im plausib le o rwitho u t suppo rt in the rec o rd. Tra

fficS cho o l.co m, Inc. v. Edriver Inc. , 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011). V . D ISCU S SION A . T he bankruptcy c ourt did not abus e its dis c retion in denying the Rule 60(b) M otion. 1. A lthoug hthe c ourt failed to apply Pione e r–B rione s , s uc h error was harm les s bec aus e M c Cann' s reques t for relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(1) wasuntim ely.
12Under C ivil Rule 60(b )(1), as inc o rpo rated b y Rule 9024, a c o urt m a y

relieve a party fro ma final o rder upo n a finding o f exc usab le neglec t. In Pio neer Investm ent S ervices C o . v. Brunswick

Asso cia tes LP, 507 U .S. 380, 395 (1993), the Suprem e C o u r t held that exc usab le neglec t, fo r purpo ses o f Rule 9006(b )(1), enc o m p a sses an atto rney's negligenc e in c o m plying with a filing deadline. To determ ine whether a party's neglec t is excusab le, c o urts mu st apply a fo ur-fac to r equitab le test, exam ining: (1) the danger o f prejudic e to the o ppo sing party; (2) the length o f the delay and its po tential im pac t o n the pro c eedings; (3) the reaso n fo r the delay; and (4) whether the m o vant
ac ted in go o d faith. Id. The N inth C irc uit ado p ted the Pio neer test fo r C ivil Rule 60(b )(1)
c ases in Brio nes v. R ivieraH o tel & Ca sino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir.1997). Thro ugh sub sequent dec isio ns, Ba tem a n v. U .S . Po sta l S ervice , 231 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (9th C ir. 2000), and Pincay v. Andrews , 389 F.3d 853, 860 (9th Cir. 2004) ( e n ba nc ), the N inth C irc uit has further c larified ho wc o urts sho uld apply this test. C o urts must "explic itly use the Pio neer–Brio nes fram ewo rk fo r analysis o f exc usab le neglec t under [C ivil] Rule 60(b )(1)[.]" Lem oge, 587 F.3d at 1192 (citing Ba tem a n , 231 F.3d at 1224). A c o urt's m ere failure to c ite the Pio neer–Brio nes test will generally no t require reversal, b ut the c o urt
m ust have ac tually engaged in the equitab le analysis tho se c ases m andate. Lem oge, 587 F.3d at 1193; Ba tem a n , 231 F.3d at 1224.
13Here, the b ankruptc y c o urt neither c ited Pio neer-Brio nes no rapplied

the fo ur-fac to r test required. Generally, this wo uld require reversal. S ee Lem oge, 587 F.3d at 1192 (ho lding that distric t c o urt ab used its disc retio n fo r no t c iting to Pio neer

o r Brio nes and fo r c o nsidering o nly three o f the fo ur fac t o rs); Aha nchia n v. Xeno n Pictures, Inc. , 624 F.3d 1253, 1261–62 (9th Cir. 2010) (ho lding that distric t c o urt ab used its disc retio n fo r failing to c ite o r apply the equitab le test under Pio neer–Brio nes and b asing its dec isio n so lely
o n whether the reaso n fo r delay— the third Pio neer–Brio nes fac to r— c o uld estab lish exc usab le neglec t). A nd Mc C ann's failure to c ite Pio neer o rBrio nes did no t relieve the b ankruptc y c o urt o f its duty toapply the c o rrec t legal standard. S ee Ba tem a n , 231 F.3d at 1224 (party's failure to c ite Pio neer

o r Brio nes o r discuss any o f the fac to rs under the equitab le test did no t relieve distric t c o urt o f its duty to apply the c o rrec t legal standard). Ho wever, in this c ase, any erro r b y the b a nkruptc y c o urt was harm less, b ec ause Mc C ann's request fo r relief was untim ely. Am o t io n under C ivil Rule 60(b )(1) m ust b e filed "no m o re than o ne year after the entry o f the judgm ent o r o rder o r the date o f the pro c eeding." C ivil Rule 60(c )(1). The sanc tio ns o rder was entered o n A pril 20, 2016; Mc C ann filed the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n o n June 14, 2017. Mc C ann c o ntends that he never rec eived a c o py o f the sanc tio ns o rder b ec ause it was entered in the m ain c a se, as o ppo sed to the adversary pro c eeding, and b ec ause Lewis R o c a failed to file and serve him with a no tic e o f entry o f it. Mc C ann
14argues that, b ec ause o f these erro rs, the sanc tio ns o rder was never m ade

final and therefo re his request fo r relief under C ivil Rule 60(b )(1) was tim ely. In additio n, Mc C ann argues that these erro rs ab ro gated his right to appeal the sanc tio ns o rder. Mc C ann's argum ents lac k m erit. R egardless o f whether the sanc tio ns o rder was do c keted in the m ain
c ase o r the adversary pro c eeding, o r the fac t that Lewis R o c a failed to serve himwith no tic e o f entry o f the o rder as required, the EC F servic e list reflec ts that Mc C ann was served with a c o py o f it o n A p ril 20, 2016, at his A O L em ail address. If Mc C a nn was no lo nger using that em ail address on that date (altho ugh he was still apparently using it eight days earlier when he filed his o bjec tio n to the sanc tio ns o r der), it was his respo nsib ility to info rmthe c o urt o f any em ail change. Lo c al Rule 5005(d)(1). 5 A nd, if he failed to do so, servic e m ade to that ac c o unt was still c o nsidered go o d servic e. Lo c a l Rule 5005(d)(2). 6 The c o urt apparently did no t find that

5 Local Rule 5005(d)(1) pr ov i des: If attor n eys change thei r mai ling addr ess or emai l addr ess, a noti ce of change of addr ess of attor ney must be fi led for ev er y case and adv er s ar y pr oceeding for whi ch the attor n ey i s the attor ney of r ecor d in or der to mai ntai n a cur r ent mai ling matr i x. The for m i s av ai lable on the cour t’s websi te. As a separ a te r equi r ement, the attor ney must also update the cour t’s electr oni c case fi ling system. S ubsti tuti ons of attor ney must be obtained for all cases and pr oceedings for whi ch the attor ney wi ll not r emain the counsel of r ecor d.

6 Local Rule 5005(d)(2) pr ov i des: (continued...) 15Mc C ann's evidenc e o f the "sc reen sho ts" fro mb o th em ail ac c o unts sho wing

the ab senc e o f any em ail o f the sanc tio ns o rder suffic iently reb utted the presum ptio n o f rec eipt. Thus, his alleged lack o f rec eipt did no t affec t the finality o f the sanc tio ns o rder o r its appeal tim e. 7 Further, b ec ause o f the c o urt's o ral ruling at the A pril 6 hearing and Mc C ann's rec eipt o f a c o py o f the pro po sed sanc t io ns o rder, he was suffic iently m ade aware that the filing perio d fo r the no tic e o f appeal m ay b e rapidly appro aching. A nd even if no t , Mc C ann adm itted that he first learned o f the sanc tio ns o rder o n March 22, 2017, in the W icho ts' m o tio n to set aside the sales, which was prio r to the expiratio n o f the o ne-year filing deadline under C ivil Rule 60(c )(1). Therefo re, Mc C a nn, a very experienc ed atto rney, m ust alsob e faulted fo r waiting until June 2017 tofile the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n. N o netheless, and what Mc C ann fails to rec o gnize is, C ivil Rule 60(c )(1) pro vides, alternatively, that a m o tio n under C ivil Ru le 60(b )(1)
m ust b e filed within o ne year "o f the date o f the pro c eeding." A ssum ing the "pro c eeding" was the A pril 6, 2016 hearing where the c o u rt anno unc ed its

6 (...continued) If an attor ney fai l s to update thei r mai ling addr ess or emai l addr ess as r equi r ed by thi s r ule, ser v i ce made to thei r addr ess of r ecor d wi ll be deemed good ser v i c e, unless the cour t or der s other wi s e.
7In addi ti on, "fai l ur e to r ecei v e noti ce of entr y of j udgment or or d eri s not an excuse foran unti mely appeal because i t i s the par ty's affi r m a ti v e duty to moni tor the dockets." Warrick v. Birdsell (In re Warrick ), 278 B.R. 182, 187 (9th Ci r. BAP 2002). 16sanc tio ns ruling, Mc C ann c ertainly knew o n that date that he and his c lient

were b eing sanc t io ned $2,500 fo r disc o very m isc o nduc t. Thus, even if no
o rder was ever entered, Mc C ann's request fo r relief under C ivil Rule 60(b )(1) had to b e filed b y no later than o ne year fro mA pril 6, 2016, tob e tim ely. 2. M c Cann' s other argum e n ts lac k m erit. Mc C ann also requested relief under C ivil Rule 60(b )(6), whic h do es no t have a o ne year tim e lim it. Ho wever, he failed to articulate any argum ent b efo re the b a nkruptc y c o urt fo r why he was entitled to such relief. A c c o r dingly, b ec ause Mc C ann failed to preserve that argum ent fo r appeal, we need no t address it. S ee W a l -M a rt S to res, Inc. v. V

isaU
. S .A., Inc. , 396 F.3d 96, 124 n.29 (2d Cir. 2005) (argum ent m entio ned in o ne sentenc e in a trial c o urt b rief is insuffic iently preserved fo r appeal). N ext, Mc C ann argues that Judge Beesley dem o nstrated extrem e b ias, prejudic e and b ad will to ward himand his c lient. Mc C ann argues that Judge Beesley sho uld have disc lo sed that he was a partner at Lewis Ro c a prio r to his b ec o m ing a b ankruptc y judge in 2011 soMc C ann c o uld have filed a m o tio n to rec use. Mc C ann fails to c ite any relevant autho r ity to suppo rt his argum ent that Judge Beesley sho uld have disc lo sed that he was
em plo yed at Lewis R o c a five years prio r to the sanc tio ns m a tter. A nd Mc C ann's inferenc e that Judge Beesley sho wed favo r itismto his fo rm er law firmin this o r any o ther m atter lac ks any fo undatio n.
17In any c ase, "judic ial rem arks during the c o u rse o f a trial that are

c ritic al o r disappro ving o f, o r even ho stile to , c o u nsel, the parties, o r their
c ases, o rdinarily do no t suppo rt a b ias o r partiality challenge. Litek y v. United S ta tes , 510 U .S. 540, 555-56 (1994). They m aydo so if they reveal an
o pinio n that derives fro man extrajudic ial so u rc e; and they willdo so if they reveal such a high degree o f favo ritismo r antago nismas tom ake fair judgm ent im po ssib le." Id. (em phasis in o riginal). Mc C ann po ints to no "extrajudic ial so u rc e" that c o uld have c a used Judge Beesley to have any particu lar b ias against him . He also fails to sho w that Judge Beesley dem o nstrated such a high degree o f favo ritism o r antago nismas to m ake fair judgm ent im po ssib le. While Judge Beesley's stro ng language with Mc C ann sho wed an ob vio u s lac k o f patienc e and was less than desirab le
c o nduc t, "[n]o t estab lishing b ias o r partiality, ho wever, are expressio ns o f im patienc e, dissatisfac tio n, anno yanc e, and even anger, that are within the b o unds o f what im p erfec t m en and wo m en, even after having b een c o nfirm ed as federal judges, so m etim es display. Id. at 555-56. A judge's
o rdinary effo rts at c o urtro o madm inistratio n — even a stern and sho rt-tem pered judge's o rdinary effo rts at c o urtro o madm inistratio n — rem ain im m une." Id. at 556. Despite his anno yanc e with Mc C ann, Judge Beesley's partiality c a nno t b e reaso nab ly questio ned here. W hile he ruled against Mc C ann o n the Rule 60(b ) Mo t io n, there was no legal b asis upo n which to grant it. Further, Judge Beesley c arefully listened to Mc C ann's
18statem ents at the fee applic atio n hearing and ultim ately dec lined to find

that Mc C ann had ac t ed in b a d faith when filing his Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n. Lastly, Mc C ann attem pts to challenge the m erits o f the sanc tio ns o rder. Ho wever, "[a]n appeal fro ma denial o f a C ivil Rule 60(b ) m o tio n b rings up o nly the denial o f the m o tio n fo r review, no t the m erits o f the underlying judgm ent.'" Brio nes , 116 F.3d at 380 (quo ting F loyd v. La w s , 929 F.2d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1991)). Therefo re, we are unab le to c o nsider his argum ents. A c c o rdingly, we A FFIRM the b ankruptc y c o urt's denial o f the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n. B. T he bankruptcy c ourt abus ed its dis c r etion by awarding attorney' s fees on this rec ord. Befo re we address the m erits o f the b ankruptc y c o urt's dec isio n to award the W icho t s their atto rney's fees inc urred fo r defending the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n, we address Mc C ann's argum ents regarding the c o urt's jurisdic tio n and alleged due pro c ess vio latio ns. Mc C ann argues that the b ankruptc y c o urt lac ked jurisdic tio n to rule
o n the fee m o tio n b ec ause he had appealed the R ule 60(b ) O r der. Mc C ann is inc o rrec t. The filing o f a no tic e o f appeal do es no t divest the b ankruptc y c o u rt's jurisdic tio n to "c o r rec t c leric al erro rs, take steps tom a intain the status quo, take steps that aid in the appeal, award atto rney's fees, im po se sanc tio ns, and pro c eed with m atters no t invo lved in the appeal." Hill &
19S a ndfo rd, LLP v. M irz a i (In re M irz a i) , 236 B.R . 8, 10 (9th C ir. BA P 1999)

(c iting Pyro dyne Co rp. v. Pyro tro nics Co rp. , 847 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1988)). Sim ilarly, Mc C ann argues that the b ankruptc y c o u rt lac ked jurisdic tio n to s anc tio n himunder Rule 9011(c )(2)(B) b ec ause the adversary pro c eeding had b een dism issed b efo re the July 12, 2017 hearing. First, as we discuss m o re b elo w, it is no t c lear that the b ankruptc y c o urt im po sed
sanc tio ns under Rule 9011. In any c ase, Mc C ann's argum ent fails b ec ause it is fac tually inc o rrec t. A ltho ugh the adversary pro c eeding had b een inadvertently dism issed in A pril 2017, it was reinstated on May 22, 2017, and rem ains pending. Mc C ann also argues that Judge Beesley deprived himo f his c o unsel
o f cho ic e and, henc e, vio lated his due pro c ess rights, b y pro hib iting atto rney To wnsend fro m ever appearing in his c o urt again. First, To wnsend explic itly stated that he was no t appearing as c o unsel fo r Mc C ann; he was o nly appearing in his stead. Sec o nd, we dono t read Judge Beesley's c o m m ents in iso latio n b ut in the c o ntext o f the hearing. Judge Beesley explained to To wnsend the ethic a l perils o f appearing in the c ase, warned ab o ut prob ab le c o nsequenc es, and, c o nsistent with his stro ng views, warned the atto rney no t to c o m e b a c k to his c o urtro o m . W e ac kno wledge the pro b lem s with the b a nkruptc y judge's cho ic e o f language, b ut in c o ntext, we do no t view his rem arks as an ac tual dec isio n to b ar the atto rney fro mappearanc e in the c ase o r fro m his c o urtro o m . Therefo re, we
20fail to see any vio latio n o f Mc C ann's due pro c ess rights. And, fo r the

reaso ns we stated ab o ve, we also rejec t Mc C ann's argum ent that Judge Beesley sho uld have rec used him self fro mhearing the fee m o t io n. W e no w turn to the m erits o f the Fee O r der. The Fee O rder is silent as to what autho rity the b a nkruptc y c o urt relied upo n to award the W icho ts their atto rney's fees as a sanc tio n against Mc C ann. Essentially, there were three po ssib le b ases fo r sanc tio ns: Rule 9011(the b a nkruptc y c o u nterpart to C ivil Rule 11), § 105, o rthe c o urt's inherent autho rity. Sanc tio ns under § 105 are fo r c o ntem p t, and require a sho wing b y c lear and c o nvinc ing evidenc e o f a vio latio n o f a spec ificand definite c o urt o rder. R enwick v. Bennett (In re Bennett) , 298 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002). Sinc e Mc C ann did
no t vio late any spec ificc o urt o rder, c o ntem pt sanc tio ns were no t availab le. That leaves sanc tio ns under Rule 9011 o r the c o u rt's inherent autho rity. Rule 9011(b ) requires parties and their atto rneys to ensure papers filed b efo re a b ankruptc y c o urt are "warranted b y existing law o r b y a no nfrivo lo us argum ent fo r the extensio n, m o dific atio n, o r reversal o f existing law o r the estab lishm ent o f new law" and that "allegatio ns and
o ther fac tual c o ntentio ns have evidentiary suppo rt . . . ." R ule 9011(b )(2) and (3). Rule 9011(b ) inc o rpo rates a reaso nab leness standard which fo c uses o n whether a c o m petent atto rney adm itted to prac t ic e b efo re the invo lved
c o u rt c o uld b elieve in like c irc um stanc es that his ac t io ns were legally and fac tually justified. S ha la b y v. Ma nsdo rf (In re N a khuda ) , 544 B.R
. 886, 899 (9th

21C ir. BA P 2016), a ff'd, 703 Fed. A pp'x 621 (9th C ir. 2017) (c iting Z a l diva r v. C ity o f L.A. , 780 F.2d 823, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1986)). Afailure to adhere to the rule m ay result in sanc tio ns. S eeRule 9011(c ). Sinc e the b ankruptc y c o urt referred several tim es to the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n as b eing "frivo lo us," it is po ssib le it issued sanc t io ns under Rule 9011. Ho wever, at least two prob lem s exist with such a ruling. A ltho ugh the W icho ts suggested that the c o urt im po se sanc tio ns against Mc C ann in their o ppo sitio n to the Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n, 8 the c o urt invited Lewis R o c a to file the fee m o tio n fo r the purpo se o f sanc t io ning Mc C ann. C ertainly, Lewis R o c a did no t suppo rt its m o tio n with evidenc e that it c o m plied with the safe-harb o rpro c edure under Ru le 9011(c )(1). Therefo re, the m o t io n was o n the c o urt's initiative. S eeRu le 9011(c )(1)(B). When assessing sanc tio ns sua sponte under Rule 9011(c )(1)(B), the b ankruptc y c o urt is required toissue an o rder to sho w c ause desc rib ing the spec ificm isc o nduc t. A ltho ugh the c o urt issued an O C S fo r Mc C ann, fo r reaso ns unkno wn it withdrew the O SC and vac ated the related hearing prio r to the hearing o n the fee m o tio n. That is the first prob lem
. The sec o nd prob lemis the type o f sanc tio n the c o urt awarded. Sanc t io ns awarded o n the c o urt's o wn m o t io n m ay no t inc lude shifting o f fees. S eeRule 9011(c )(2);

8 In that document, the Wi chots r equested attor ney's fees under28 U.S .C. § 1927. S ancti ons underthat statute ar e not av ai lable in bankr uptcy cour ts in the Ninth Ci r cui t. Perroton v. Gray (In re Perroton) , 958 F.2d 889 (9th Ci r . 1992); Determan v. Sandoval (In re Sandoval) , 186 B.R. 490, 495-96 (9th Ci r . BAP 1995). 22Ba rber v. M i ller , 146 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir.1998); Ch a se v. K o sm a la(In re Lo yd) , 304 B.R . 372, 374 (9th C ir. BA P 2003); M iller v. C a rdina le (In re D eV ille) , 280 B.R . 483, 494 (9th C ir. BA P 2002). S ee a lso Ma rk us v. Gschwend (In re Ma rk us) , 313 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) ("It is clear that atto rneys' fees and expenses incurred as a result o f vio lating Bankruptc y Ru le 9011
c an b e shifted o nly at the m o tio n o f o ne o f the parties, and o nly after the rule-o ffending party has b een given the b enefit o f the Ru le's 21-day safe harb o r."). The fac t that the c o urt invited the m o tio n did no t render it as o ne
m ade under Rule 9011(c )(2), b ec ause the m o t io n c o ntem plated b y Rule 9011(c )(2) is the m o tio n pro vided fo r b y Rule 9011(c )(1) — i.e., a party's
m o tio n. In re Loyd, 304 B.R . at 374. Thus, even if the c o urt had no t withdrawn the O SC, it c o uld no t shift the W icho ts' fees to Mc C ann; it c o uld
o nly o rder a m o netary sanc tio n payab le to the c o urt o r so m e no n-m o netary
sanc tio n. A lternatively, the b ankruptc y c o urt c o uld have sanc tio ned Mc C ann under its inherent autho rity. Ab ankruptc y c o urt's inherent sanc tio n autho r ity is rec o gnized under § 105(a). 9 Ca ldwell v. U nified Capita l Co rp. (In

9 S ecti on 105(a) pr ov i des: The cour t may i ssue any or der, pr ocess, or j udgment that i s necessary or appr opr i ate to car r y out the pr ov i si ons of thi s ti tle. No pr ov i si on of thi s ti tle pr ov i ding for the r ai s ing of an i ssue by a par ty i ninter est shall be constr ued to pr eclude the cour t fr om, sua sponte, taki n g any acti on or making any deter minati on necessar y or appr opr i ate to enfor ce or i mplement cour t or der s or (continued...) 23re R a inbo w Ma ga z i ne, Inc.) , 77 F.3d 278, 284 (9th Cir. 1996). Under that autho r ity, the b ankruptc y c o urt m ay sanc t io n a "b r o ad range" o f c o nduc t. Lindbla de v. Knupfer (In re Dy er) , 322 F.3d 1178, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003). Sanc tio nab le c o nduc t inc ludes im pro per litigatio n tac t ic s (e.g., delaying o r disrupting litigatio n), b a d faith, vexatio us o r wanto n c o nduc t, willful ab uses o f judic ial pro c ess, o rac ting fo r o ppressive reaso ns. F ink v. Go m ez, 239 F.3d 989, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2001). In this c o ntext, b ad faith o r willful
m isc o nduc tc o nsists o f so m ething m o re egregio us than m ere negligenc e o r rec klessness." In re Dyer , 322 F.3d at 1196. Inherent power sanc tio ns m ay b e im po sed b y the c o urt sua sponte and c an inc lude an award o f atto rney's fees. In re D eville

, 280 B.R . at 495 (c iting Link v. W a ba sh R . Co . , 370 U .S. 626, 629-32 (1962) (inherent po w er to dism iss a c ase sua sponte ); ( R o a dway Exp., Inc. v. Piper

, 447 U .S. 752, 765-67 (1980) (inherent po wer to award fees sua spo nte )); § 105(a). "Befo re awarding sanc tio ns under its inherent po wers, ho wever, the
c o u rt m ust m ake an explic it finding that c o unsel's c o nduc t 'c o nstituted o r was tantam o unt to b ad faith.'" Prim us Auto . F in. S ervs., Inc. v. Ba ta rse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th C ir. 1997) (c itatio n o m itted); In re N a khuda, 544 B.R . at 899 (spec ificfinding o f b ad faith must prec ede any sanc tio n under the c o urt's inherent autho rity). Here, the b ankruptc y c o urt expressly stated that it was

9 (...continued) r ules, or to pr ev ent an abuse of pr ocess. 24no tfinding b ad faith given Mc C ann's explanatio ns fo r why he filed the

Rule 60(b ) Mo tio n. A nd the c o urt's statem ent that Mc C ann's inc o m petenc e in b a nkruptc y pro c edure was c o sting the W icho ts m o ney so u nds in negligenc e, o r po s sib ly even rec klessness, b ut no t willful m isc o nduc t. The W icho t s argue that we c an find "b ad faith" despite the b ankruptc y c o urt's reluc t anc e to do so, c iting B .K .B. v. Ma ui Po lice D epa r tm ent, 276 F.3d 1091, 1106-08 (9th C ir. 2002). Even if that were the c ase, we c o uld find b ad faith
o nly if we determ ine that the b ankruptc y c o urt's finding o f no b a d faith
was c learly erro neo us. W e do no t disc ern any c lear erro ro n this rec o rd. Therefo re, in light o f the b a nkruptcy c o urt's findings, it c o uld no t im po se sanc tio ns under its inherent autho rity. A c c o rdingly, b ec ause the c o urt c o u ld no t im po s e the sanc tio n o f atto rney's fees under Rule 9011 given the pro c edural prob lem s o r under its inherent autho rity given its refusal to find b a d faith, it ab used its disc retio n in so do ing. Therefo re, we m ust R EVER SE the Fee O rder. V I. CONCL U S ION Fo r the fo rego ing reaso ns, we A FFIRM the Rule 60(b ) O rder and R EVER SE the Fee O rder.

25