AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Op inion Filed October 11, 2021 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-01160-CR PEDRO SANTIAGO MARIN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TE XAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1952413-Y MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Osborne, Reichek, and Smith Opinion by Justice Smith A jury convicted appellant Pedro Sa ntiago Marin of intentionally and knowingly, during a period of thirty days or more in duration, committing two or more acts of sexual abuse ag ainst a child younger than four teen years of age. The trial court sentenced Marin to thirty years’ confinement. Marin argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convic tion because the State failed to prove that he committed two sexual acts of abuse during a period that was thirty days or more in duration. Marin and the State ask the C ourt to reform the judgment to reflect that the trial court, instead of the jury, assesse d punishment. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.–2– Sufficiency of the Evidence To avoid unnecessary repetition of f acts, we do not include a separate background section, but instead include onl y those facts necessary to dispose of Marin’s sufficiency challenge. See T EX
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. P. 47.1. On February 22, 2019, complainant’s mo ther walked into complainant’s room and saw Marin, who wa s in his boxer shorts, in bed with complainant with his hand under her shirt. Officer Mayr a Balderas was dispatched to the home and after talking to complainant, Officer Balderas determin ed further investigation was necessary. Officers took complainant, who was nine-years-old, to the Children’s Advocacy Center where Jessica Parada conducted a forensic interview. The interview lasted over an hour. Complainant indicated during the intervie w that the first instance of abuse was around September 2018 and c ontinued until around November 2018. The first time Marin abused her, he said he wanted to pl ay a game, but instead, he held her hands down and put his mouth on her vagina. She described a second time in which Marin woke her up in the middle of the night, removed her underwear, and put his penis “on the top of her vagina.” He also put his mouth on her vagina . She told Parada the last time “something happened with he r private parts” was right before her birthday, which was November 30. Although complainant was unsure how many times Marin abused her, she testified during trial that he put his mouth on her vagina mo re than once. Parada also–3– testified during trial to the two incidents complainant described during her forensic interview. Marin argues the evidence if legally in sufficient because the State failed to prove he committed two or mo re acts of sexual abuse duri ng a period of thirty days or more. The State re sponds the evidence is legally sufficient. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of th e evidence, we cons ider whether “any rational trier of fact coul d have found the essential el ements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and defer to the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in testimony, to wei gh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts. See Merritt v. State , 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see also Isassi v. State , 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The testimony of a child vic tim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for continuous se xual abuse of a child. See T EX
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. art. 38.07(a); Garner v. State , 523 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex . App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.). A person commits the offense of continuo us sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen if, during a period that is thirty or more days in duration, he commits two or more acts of sexual a buse and, at the time of the commission of each act, he is seventeen years of age or older and th e victim is a child younger than fourteen years of age. See T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 21.02(b); Garner , 523 S.W.3d at 271.–4– Although the exact dates of the abuse n eed not be proven, the offense requires proof that two or more acts of sexual ab use occurred during a period of thirty days

or more. See T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 21.02(d); Garner , 523 S.W.3d at 271. The statute does not require that the jury agr ee unanimously on the specific acts of sexual abuse the defendant committed or the exact dates when those acts were committed.
See T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 21.02(d); see also Funes v. State , No. 05-18-01174- CR, 2020 WL 5651659, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dal las Sept. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Here, a jury could reasonably infer that one of the described incidents of sexual abuse occurred in September while th e second described incident occurred in late November. Making this determinati on was within the sole discretion of the factfinder. See, e.g. , Trinidad v. State , No. 07-19-00034-CR, 2020 WL 4249745, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (within factfinder’s role to resolve conflicts in evidence, weigh evidence, and draw reasonabl e inferences which included child’s testimony that was “very unsure, provided vague information and scant detail about specific instances of sexual abuse, and was unable to provide specific dates of alleged instances”). Viewing the evidence in the light most fa vorable to the verdic t, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found th e essential elements of the offense of continuous sexual assault of a child beyond a reasonable doubt. See T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 21.02(d); Garner , 523 S.W.3d at 271.–5– In reaching this conclusion, we need not consider Marin’s assertion that the February 22, 2019 breast-touching incident was not an act of sexual abuse because his conviction is supported by tw o other instances of abuse. See T EX
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. P. 47.1. We overrule Marin’s first issue. Modification of Judgment In his second issue, Marin argues the ju dgment should be reformed to reflect that the trial court, not the jury, a ssessed punishment. The State agrees. We have the power to modify the tria l court’s judgment when we have the necessary information to do so. See T EX
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. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529– 30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Here, the record reflects that Marin elected for the judge to assess punishment. The trial court conducted the punishment hearing and stated the punishment on the record at the conclusion of the hearing. Accordingly, we sustain Marin’s second i ssue and modify the judgment to reflect that the trial court, not the jury, assessed punishment.–6– Conclusion As modified, we affirm th e trial court’s judgment.

Do Not Publish T EX
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. P. 47.2(b) 191160F.U05 /Crai g Smith / CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE–7– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
PEDRO SANTIAGO MARIN, Appellant
No. 05-19-01160-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7, Dall as County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-1952413-Y. Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Osborne and Reichek participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this da te, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED to reflect “Punishment Assessed by: Trial Court.”
As REFORMED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered October 11, 2021