Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JC-2076 | March 14, 2019 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Gregory L. Fumarolo

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine A. Cornelius

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of M.R. and T.L. 

(Children in Need of Services)

A.R. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

March 14, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JC-2076

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Charles F. Pratt, 

Judge

The Honorable Sherry A. Hartzler, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause Nos.

02D08-1712-JC-758

02D08-1712-JC-759

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JC-2076 | March 14, 2019 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary

[1] A.R. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order adjudicating M.R., aged sixteen,

and T.L., aged thirteen, (“Children”) as Children in Need of Services

(“CHINS”), upon the petition of the Allen County Department of Child 

Services (“DCS”). Mother presents a single issue: whether the CHINS 

determination is clearly erroneous. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 7, 2017, Fort Wayne Police Officer Christopher Brautzsch 

(“Officer Brautzsch”) was dispatched to Mother’s residence in response to a 9-

1-1 call from M.R.’s boyfriend, K.J., reporting that Mother had battered M.R. 

Although M.R. and K.J. maintained a relationship, K.J. was subject to a 

protection order forbidding him from contacting Mother or M.R.

[3] K.J. met Officer Brautzsch outside the residence. Mother answered the door

and began yelling vulgarities, insisting that the police leave, and threatening

K.J. that he was going to “end [up] dead” for seeing M.R. and threatening 

Mother. (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 8.)

[4] Officer Brautzsch attempted to speak with Children but Mother stood between 

the officer and her daughters. Officer Brautzsch asked if Children were okay, 

and each nodded in response. However, M.R. broke down in tears and Mother 

“shut the door in [the officer’s] face.” Id. at 9. Officer Brautzsch persisted, 

threatened forced entry, and eventually entered the house through a back door. 
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He could see that M.R. had a cut inside her mouth and it appeared to be a fresh 

cut. According to Officer Brautzsch, Mother was behaving toward both the 

police and K.J. in a manner that was “angry,” “hostile,” and “vulgar.” Id. at 

10. Mother was handcuffed and placed on the sofa so that officers could 

conduct their investigation and interview M.R. in private. 

[5] M.R. reported to officers that Mother had become very angry about M.R. 

seeing K.J. at their mutual workplace and then bringing home a backpack

containing K.J.’s shoes. M.R. alleged that she and Mother had struggled over 

the backpack, Mother ordered the younger sibling, T.L., to get a knife to cut the 

backpack strap, and Mother had then taken the knife and stabbed the backpack. 

Unable to wrest the backpack away from M.R., Mother grabbed M.R.’s hair, 

repeatedly struck her in the face, and sat on her. M.R. complained to Mother 

that she could not breathe, and Mother responded “[she] didn’t care.” Id. at 25. 

M.R. stated that she was able to escape to her bedroom and text K.J. to get 

help.

[6] Mother was arrested, and Children were placed in relative care. T.L. returned 

to Mother’s home a few days later, while M.R. remained in relative placement.

[7] Evidence was heard at a fact-finding hearing conducted on March 21 and 

March 22, 2018. Mother testified and denied that her disagreements with M.R. 

had been anything other than verbal. In contrast, M.R. testified that Mother 

had struck and injured her on December 7, 2017, and she also described a 

physical altercation one or two weeks earlier. Finally, she described an incident 
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where Mother had confronted S.R., the relative with whom M.R. had been 

placed. M.R. testified that Mother followed her out after a counseling session, 

blocked in S.R.’s vehicle with her own, and then used her fist to strike S.R.’s 

vehicle on the window and door. 

[8] S.R. testified to the same incident, adding that Mother threatened her by 

saying, “bitch you better watch your back.” Id. at 44. M.R. was crying and 

shaking while Mother shouted obscenities. S.R. believed that Mother had 

become enraged because she wanted DCS to place M.R. with her maternal 

grandmother as opposed to S.R. The grandparent placement was eventually 

arranged but, in the meantime, communications between M.R. and Mother 

were problematic. S.R. testified that Mother telephoned M.R. from various

phone numbers, and would direct loud vulgarities toward M.R. and S.R. S.R. 

also testified that she saw texts from Mother to M.R., blaming M.R. for their 

circumstances, and that Mother inappropriately focused upon M.R.’s 

entitlement to Social Security benefits from her father’s death.

[9] Visitation supervisor Paige Walker testified that she had supervised four visits 

between Mother and M.R. and had recommended that the visits be changed to 

therapeutic visits. The basis for her recommendation was that Mother could 

become very angry, she had expressed suspicion that she would be slandered or 

“lied about” in visitation notes, and she brought up M.R.’s Social Security 

benefits excessively. Id. at 64. Mother testified in response that M.R. told lies 

and “the State” had “lied several times.” Id. at 87. Mother reiterated that she 

did not engage in either physical or verbal aggression. 
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[10] On May 29, 2018, the trial court entered its findings, conclusions, and order. 

Among the factual findings were specific findings that: Mother struck and 

injured M.R., Mother ordered T.L. to retrieve a knife and stabbed a backpack 

while M.R. was holding it, T.L. witnessed M.R.’s struggle to breathe, Mother 

attacked S.R. and made threats, and “Mother cannot control her anger and 

provide for a stable home free of verbal and physical violence.” Appealed 

Order at 3. The court concluded that both children were neglected due to the 

domestic violence and that M.R.’s physical health was seriously endangered. 

The court acknowledged that M.R. had been involved in two years of 

counseling (following her father’s death) but further observed that M.R.

reported she was not being heard and she had requested additional services. 

The trial court concluded that Children needed services directed toward the 

prevention of domestic violence that they were unlikely to receive without 

coercive intervention and adjudicated Children as CHINS.

[11] Mother appeals, asserting that Children are now both in her care and the factfinding order should be reversed to “avoid the stigma and negative implication 

of a CHINS finding.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. 

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[12] A CHINS proceeding is a civil action, and thus the State must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS. In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 

102, 105 (Ind. 2010) (citing Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3). In reviewing a CHINS 
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adjudication, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the 

witnesses. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). We consider only the 

evidence that supports the court’s decision and the reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom. Id. We will reverse only upon a showing that the trial court’s 

decision was clearly erroneous. Id.

[13] Where, as here, the trial court has entered sua sponte findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon,1 our review is governed by Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). In re 

S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). As to issues covered by the findings, we 

apply a two-tiered standard of review: first we consider whether the evidence 

supports the factual findings, and then whether those findings support the 

court’s judgment. Id. We review the remaining issues under the general 

judgment standard where we will affirm the judgment if it can be sustained on 

any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id.

Adjudication of Children as CHINS

[14] For the trial court to adjudicate a child a CHINS, DCS must prove three 

elements: (1) the child is under the age of eighteen; (2) one of eleven statutory 

circumstances (codified in Indiana Code Sections 31-34-1-1 to -11) exist that 

would make the child a CHINS; and (3) the child needs care, treatment, or 

rehabilitation that he or she is not receiving and that is unlikely to be provided 

 

1 The CHINS statutes do not require that findings of fact and conclusions thereon be entered as part of a 

CHINS fact-finding order. Here, neither party made a written request for Trial Rule 52 findings and 

conclusions.
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or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. In re K.D., 962 

N.E.2d at 1253 (citing In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105). DCS alleged that 

Children were CHINS under Section 31-34-1-1, the general neglect provision, 

which states:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes 

eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired 

or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or 

neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply 

the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, 

education, or supervision; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B)is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive 

intervention of the court.

I.C. § 31-34-1-1. 

[15] DCS also alleged that M.R. was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 

31-34-1-2(b), which provides in relevant part:

A child is a child in need of services if, before the child becomes 

eighteen (18) years of age, the child:

(1) is a victim of ... an offense under IC 35-42-2-1 [battery]; and
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(2) needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B)is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive 

intervention of the court.

[16] The trial court found that both children were CHINS under the general neglect 

statute and that M.R. was a CHINS because she had been a victim of battery. 

[17] Not every endangered child is a CHINS, permitting the State’s parens patriae

intrusion into private family life. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. The proper focus 

is upon the best interests of the child and whether the child needs help that the 

parent will not be willing or able to provide – not whether the parent is guilty or 

deserving of a CHINS adjudication. Id. at 1285.

[18] A CHINS adjudication under the general neglect provision “requires three basic 

elements: that the parent’s actions or inactions have seriously endangered the 

child, that the child’s needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those 

needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” Id. at 1287. The coercive 

intervention prong exists to protect families from unnecessary state intrusion. 

Id. A CHINS finding should consider the family’s condition when the case was 

filed, but also when the case is heard. Id. at 1290.

[19] Mother denies that M.R. was a victim of battery and that she enlisted T.L.’s 

help. Mother also denies that DCS established that Children’s needs are 

unlikely to be met without State coercion.
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[20] M.R. testified that Mother battered her and caused injuries consisting of a 

“busted lip” and red marks from slaps. (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 29.) She also testified 

that Mother directed her younger sibling to bring a knife to Mother. T.L. was 

witness to her mother using the knife in M.R.’s vicinity, striking M.R., and 

impeding M.R.’s efforts to breathe. Multiple witnesses described events 

indicating that Mother was openly angry and hostile toward those trying to 

assist her. The responding police officer found Mother to be “angry, hostile, 

and vulgar” and described her efforts to keep officers from directly 

communicating with Children. (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 10.) The relative caregiver 

testified that she was confined, threatened, and cursed. The visitation 

supervisor described Mother as erupting in anger and expressing suspicions that 

she would be unfairly portrayed in visitation notes. In sum, there is evidence 

that Mother battered M.R. in T.L.’s presence and generally opposed assistance. 

Upon this evidence, the trial court properly concluded that coercion was needed 

to cause Mother to deal with her anger that had erupted in domestic violence.

[21] Mother observes that M.R. had continuously been in family counseling since

the death of her father and this was not court-ordered. However, Mother 

makes no claim that the counseling sessions have ever addressed Mother’s 

perpetration of domestic violence or verbal opposition to service providers. 

Indeed, a major premise of Mother’s appellate arguments is her denial that she

initiated or participated in any family violence. She does not attack any finding 

of fact as lacking evidentiary support. Rather, Mother simply requests that we 
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reweigh the evidence that was before the trial court and re-assess the credibility 

of M.R. We cannot do so. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253.

[22] Mother alternatively suggests that our review of the adjudication should include 

consideration of her uncontested claim that Children are both in her physical

custody. Mother takes the position that, even if State intervention was needed 

at one time, it is now unnecessary, and we should reverse the trial court so that

Mother can avoid stigma or future collateral consequences. She identifies no 

authority for the proposition that an appellate court reviews a CHINS 

adjudication in hindsight with the benefit of post-adjudication events. The 

evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and the findings of fact 

support the CHINS adjudication. Mother cannot obtain reversal on grounds 

that a CHINS adjudication may have future consequences.

Conclusion

[23] The order adjudicating Children as CHINS is not clearly erroneous.

[24] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.