alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### HARDWARE MUT. CASUALTY CO. v. RIDDLE et ux.

No. 14107.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

June 21, 1940.

King, Dawson & Jones, of Wichita Falls, for appellant.

Napier & Napier, of Wichita Falls, for appellees.

SPEER, Justice.

This is a workmen’s compensation case. Plaintiff Novella Riddle is the employee, defendant Plardware Mutual Casualty Company is the insurance carrier, and Great Western Garment Company is the employer. The parties will thus be designated in this opinion.

Plaintiff sued to recover compensation for the total and permanent loss of her right eye, resulting from an accidental injury sustained while in the course of her employment; in addition, she alleged that she had received a severe nervoiis shock to her entire. body, and that her health had been seriously impaired as a result of the injury to the eye.

Defendant contested the claim under a plea of general denial.

The case was tried on special issues to a jury. The verdict reflects that plaintiff suffered a total loss of vision in her eye on April 2, 1939, and that the total loss of vision in the eye is permanent. In response to other issues it was found that plaintiff suffered no other disability than the loss of vision in the injured eye.

Upon the verdict,' judgment was entered for plaintiff for compensation covering 75 weeks, at a weekly wage rate of $7. The amount accrued since the date of the injury was computed on that basis with accrued interest. New trial was denied the carrier; hence this appeal.

In more than one assignment of error and in different propositions, it is urged that there is no testimony in the case to support the verdict of total permanent loss of vision in the plaintiff’s eye.

It is unnecessary for us to review the testimony on that point. The injured employee, who is appellee here, has filed in this court, in lieu of a brief, a confession of error, saying: “The testimony is insuffi-. cient to show a total loss of vision from April 2nd, 1939”, and concludes by requesting that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded.

Appellant, the insurance carrier, has asked that judgment be rendered for it. This we decline to do. It is obvious that plaintiff has sustained an accidental injury in the course of her employment, and is entitled to have the case remanded for another trial, at which time she will have an opportunity to amend her 'pleadings, if she so desires, develop the facts agreeable thereto and procure such jury verdict thereon as shall be supported by the evidence of the real facts as they exist. We are supported in our conclusion to remand rather than render by the following decisions: Williams v. Safety Casualty Co., 129 Tex. *313184, 102 S.W.2d 178; Colbert v. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank of Dallas, 129 Tex. 235, 102 S.W.2d 1031; Sun Oil Co v. Gunter, Tex.Civ.App., 125 S.W.2d 338; Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Dorman, Tex.Civ.App., 137 S.W.2d 100, writ dismissed, ,judgment correct; Jefferson Amusement Co. v. Eaves, Tex.Civ.App., 137 S.W.2d 104.

1 For the errors shown and confessed, which we find supported by the record, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for another trial.
#### PEARSON v. STATE.

No. 20865.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 28, 1940.

John D. Dashiell, of Jacksonville, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

' GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted by the jury for possessing intoxicating liquor in a dry area for the purpose of sale, and sentenced to serve ninety days in the county jail.

We are met at the threshhold of the consideration of this case with the proposition relative to the proof of the dry status of Cherokee Cottnty. The whole proof offered for the purpose of showing the dry status of such county is as follows :

> “My name is Melvin Sessions. The official position that I hold at this time is County Clerk of Cherokee County, Texas. As County Clerk I am custodian of the records and minutes of Commissioners’ Court. I have in my hand Volume D, on pages 516, I have what is styled an Order Calling a Prohibition Election. I have here, on page 520, an Order Canvassing and Declaring the Results of the Election. I have in my hand now, Volume D of the Commissioners Courts’ Records of Cherokee County, and opened at p. 523, wherein is recorded the Certificate of Publication.

> *29“I have not found any order canvassing the return showing that prohibition has been repealed in this County, I have examined the records carefully.

> “Court admits the above Volume and pages of record.”

In our judgment these orders referred to by the county clerk should have been incorporated in this record in order that such a status could be determined by this court. We do not wish to be understood, however, to hold that same would have been necessary in the event of an agreement on the part of appellant that such area was dry. However we find no such agreement in the record.

It is also noted that the trial court did not instruct the jury that Cherokee County was a dry area, but instead he submitted the question to them in the following phrase: “* * * and if you believe such possession for. the purpose of sale was in a dry area of Texas, as such has been hereinbefore defined to you,” etc.

There are some other matters presented in the record that will doubtless not again occur in the event of another trial hereof.

For the reasons herein stated this judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JUNE 27, 2024

NO. 03

- 24

- 00200

- CV

S. E. , Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services , Appellee

APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY

BEF ORE CHIEF JUSTICE BYRNE, JUSTICES SMITH AND THEOFANIS

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE THEOFANIS

This is an appeal from the o rder signed by the tr i a l court on February 22, 2024

. Having reviewed

the record and the parties’ arguments, the C ourt holds that there was no reversible error in the

trial court’s order

. Therefore, the C ourt affirms the trial court’s order

. Because appe llant is

indigent and u nable to pay costs, no adjudica t i on of costs is made.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                               5
<MULTIPLIER>                            1000
<CURRENCY>                              U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                           6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                       DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                          JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                            JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                   1
<CASH>                                        7,103
<SECURITIES>                                      0
<RECEIVABLES>                                66,046
<ALLOWANCES>                                      0
<INVENTORY>                                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            122,291
<PP&E>                                       40,329
<DEPRECIATION>                              (14,011)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              447,754
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        48,690
<BONDS>                                           0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                             0
<PREFERRED>                                  51,468
<COMMON>                                        220
<OTHER-SE>                                  185,804
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                447,754
<SALES>                                           0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            183,336
<CGS>                                             0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               169,808
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            6,998
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               6,530
<INCOME-TAX>                                  2,758
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           3,772
<DISCONTINUED>                                    0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                 647
<CHANGES>                                     3,125
<NET-INCOME>                                      0
<EPS-BASIC>                                    0.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0.13


</TABLE>
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Aaron Michael Marshall , Appellant

No. 06

- 23

- 00163

- CR v.

The State of Texas , Appellee Appeal from the 5th District Court of Cass County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 2022F 0 0025 ).

Panel cons ists of Chief Justice Stevens and

Justices van Cleef and Rambin. Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice

Rambin

.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant, Aaron Michael Marshall , has adequately indicated his

inability to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED JULY 1 2 , 2024
BY ORDER OF THE COURT
SCOTT E. STEVENS
CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:
Debra K. Autrey , Clerk
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1583

To amend title 11 of the United States Code to make nondischargeable

debts for postpetition fees payable to a membership association with

respect to the debtor’s interest in, and for the period during which

the debtor occupied, a dwelling unit that has condominium or cooperative

ownership.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 1, 1993

Mr. HYDE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on the Judiciary

A BILL

To amend title 11 of the United States Code to make

nondischargeable debts for postpetition fees payable to

a membership association with respect to the debtor’s

interest in, and for the period during which the debtor

occupied, a dwelling unit that has condominium or cooperative ownership.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Fairness to Condomin5 ium and Cooperative Owners Amendment of 1993’’.
2

•HR 1583 IH

1 SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS.

2 Section 523(a) of title 11, United States Code, is

3 amended—

4 (1) in paragraph (11) by striking ‘‘or’’ at the

5 end,

6 (2) in paragraph (12) by inserting ‘‘or’’ at the

7 end, and

8 (3) by adding at the end the following:

9 ‘‘(13) for a fee that becomes payable after the

10 order for relief to a membership association with re11 spect to the debtor’s interest in a dwelling unit that

12 has condominium or cooperative ownership, if such

13 fee is payable for a period during which the debtor

14 occupied such dwelling.’’.

15 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.

16 (a) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Except as provided in sub17 section (b), this Act and the amendments made by this

18 Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this

19 Act.

20 (b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.—The amend21 ments made by section 2 shall not apply with respect to

22 cases commenced under title 11 of the United States Code

23 before the date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-10091

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Bruce Kintrell Green, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:17-CR-150-1

Before Haynes, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Bruce Kintrell Green was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment 

after violating the terms of his supervised release. On appeal, he challenges 

the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), which mandates a term of 

imprisonment for any offender who violates certain conditions of supervised 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should 

not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 

5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 2, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 20-10091 Document: 00515550998 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/02/2020
No. 20-10091

2

release such as possessing a controlled substance or refusing to comply with 

the drug-testing requirement. Relying on United States v. Haymond, 139 S. 

Ct. 2369 (2019), Green contends that § 3583(g) is unconstitutional because 

it requires revocation of a term of supervised release and imposition of a term 

of imprisonment without affording the defendant the constitutionally

guaranteed right to a jury trial, which requires proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt. He concedes that his plain-error challenge is foreclosed under United

States v. Badgett, 957 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2020), but he raises the issue to 

preserve it for further review. The Government has filed an unopposed 

motion for summary affirmance and, alternatively, for an extension of time 

to file its brief. 

The Supreme Court held in Haymond that revocation of supervised 

release and imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(k), based on judge-made findings by a preponderance of the 

evidence, violated due process and the right to a trial by jury. See Haymond, 

139 S. Ct. at 2378-83. Unlike § 3583(k), which mandated a mandatory 

minimum of five years for certain offenses such as possession of child 

pornography, § 3583(g) does not provide for a mandatory minimum sentence 

based on judge-found facts. See § 3583(g), (k). Further, the Haymond

plurality limited its decision to § 3583(k) and its mandatory minimum 

provision. See Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2382-84 & n.7. In Badgett, we held 

that, because Haymond had not been extended to § 3583(g) revocations, the 

district court did not commit clear or obvious error in applying the statute. 

See Badgett, 957 F.3d at 540-41. 

In view of Badgett, Green’s sole argument on appeal is foreclosed. 

Accordingly, the Government’s motion for summary affirmance is 

GRANTED, its alternative motion for extension of time is DENIED AS 

MOOT, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. See 

Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).

 Case: 20-10091 Document: 00515550998 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/02/2020
From: <Alicea.Jezebele@epamail.epa.gov>

To: "Kris E. DuBois" <KEDuBois@gvea.com>

Date: 7/22/2010 3:42 PM

Subject: Re: Extension Request - Golden Valley Electric Association

Attachments: pic07288.gif; GVEA Ext Req EPA WW ICR 071410.pdf

Greetings,

EPA has reviewed your extension request for the steam electric effluent

guidelines questionnaire for the Golden Valley Electric Association

(GVEA) Healy facility. The deadline for your plant to submit Version 2

of the completed questionnaire is extended to October 15, 2010. If you

need assistance during the completion of the steam electric

questionnaire, please contact the steam electric helpline via e-mail at

steamhelp@erg.com or by phone at 1-877-353-7560.

Sincerely,

(Embedded image moved to file: pic07288.gif)

 

 From: "Kris E. DuBois" <KEDuBois@gvea.com> 

 To: Jezebele Alicea/DC/USEPA/US@EPA 

 Date: 07/14/2010 04:12 PM 

 Subject: Extension Request - Golden Valley Electric Association 

Good afternoon: GVEA requests an extension for completion of the Steam

Electric Power Generating Industry ICR. Please see the attached

document. A hard copy is forthcoming via certified mail. Thank you for

considering our request and please call me if you have any questions. –

Kris DuBois/GVEA Environmental Officer

Kristen DuBois

Environmental Officer

Golden Valley Electric Association

758 Illinois Street

Fairbanks, AK 99707-1249

(907) 451-5627 office

(907) 458-6369 fax

(907) 388-6300 cell

 (See attached file: GVEA Ext Req EPA WW ICR 071410.pdf)
From: Bailey Leopard Sent: Thursday, June 24, 2010 1:35 PM To: 'Thuy.Cooper@dot.gov'; 'esta.rosenberg@dot.gov' Cc: 'Urs, Krishna Raj'; 'Limaye-Davis, Y Viki'; 'm ary.street@ost.dot.gov'; 'Keith.Glatz@dot.gov' Subject: Application for Hong Kong-M anila Frequencies, DOT-OST-2010-0160

I have completed polling on the FedEx Express application for two Hong Kong-Manila fifth-freedom frequencies in the above-referenced docket, and none of the interested parties served with the application have an objection. Therefore, I respectfully request t hat the Department grant the application as soon as possible.

I will file a copy of this e-mail in the above-referenced docket and e-ma il a service copy to all interested parties.

Best regards,

Bailey Leopard

Senior Counsel FedEx Express Memphis, TN 38125

901.434.6664 TEL

901.428.8950 CEL

901.434.8283 FAX http://www.fedex.com
<PAGE>

                                                               EXHIBIT 10(xxxv)

CONFIDENTIAL                                           [AMERICAN GREETINGS LOGO]
------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



DATE:        October 4, 2000

TO:          Erwin Weiss

SUBJECT:     SPECIAL BONUS

In recognition of your leadership in the successful accomplishments of the
Gibson and CPS integration plans, American Greetings will implement the
following special bonus:

     ON MARCH 1, 2005, AMERICAN GREETINGS WILL PLACE IN YOUR DEFERRED
     COMPENSATION PLAN A SUM OF $250,000.

The only condition I place on the above commitment is that you must be employed
by the company throughout the period ending February 28, 2005. Should you
voluntarily separate for whatever reason prior to February 28, 2005, you will
forfeit the entire $250,000 benefit. Should you be terminated, you will receive
your pro-rata share.

Throughout these years, you will be reviewed annually with every consideration
for merit review commensurate with your annual achievement.

Effective March 1, 2005, we will increase your base compensation by $50,000, and
that base will be used for all future bonus calculations.

I trust the above is consistent with our discussion.

I wish you all the best.



/s/ Morry Weiss
Morry Weiss
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          20,669
<SECURITIES>                                    14,163<F1>
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,171
<ALLOWANCES>                                       123
<INVENTORY>                                        924
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                39,784
<PP&E>                                          15,741
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,145
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  49,277
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           29,843
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       122,728
<OTHER-SE>                                   (136,528)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    49,277
<SALES>                                          4,212
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                29,502
<CGS>                                            3,054
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   10,413
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                70,689
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,631
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (50,322)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       138
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (50,460)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (50,460)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.67)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.67)
<FN>
<F1>This amount represents short-term investments held by the company at 12/31/97
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460 OFFICE OF CHEMICAL SAFETY AND POLLUTION PREVENTION MEMORANDUM Date: Subject: June 26, 2012 Kasugamycin: Occupational and Residential Exposure and Risk Assessment to Support Use on Pome Fruit, Walnuts, and on Fruiting Vegetables. PC Code: 230001 D«ision No.: 427885 Petition No.: OF7689 Assessment 

### Type: ORE TXRNo.: NA MRIDNo.: NA DP Barcode: 0376591 Registration No.: 66330404 Regulatory Action: Section 3 Registration Reregistration Case No.: NA CAS No.: 19408-46-9 40 CFR: 180.568 From:

## ~ Shih-Chi Wang, Biologist 

### b. JN-Bof:TAI

Through:

To:

- Christina Swartz, Chemist Risk Assessment Branch II Health Effects Division (7509P) Margarita Collantes, Biologist 

# f"-**~'h.__** Risk Assessment Branch II Health Effects Division (7509P) William T. Drew, Chemist Risk Assessment Branch II, HED and Mary Waller, RM 21 Fungicide Branch Registration Division (7505P) The enclosed document is an assessment ofoccupational and residential exposure and risk estimates associated with the proposed Section 3 registration ofthe fungicide kasugamycin. Conclusions The occupational and residential exposure and risk estimates associated with the proposed uses ofthe fungicide kasugamycin (KASUMIN 2L" r M) on pome fruit, walnuts and on fruiting vegetables do not exceed RED ' s level ofconcern. The pers<>nal protective equipment (PPE) and proposed Restricted Entry Interval (REI) on the proposed label 

### are appropriate. Page 1 of 11
Exhibit 10.1



 





EXHIBIT 10.1




AMENDMENT EXTENDING EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT




      THIS AMENDMENT is being executed as of the 29th day of April, 2005, by and between
TIRE KINGDOM, INC. (“Tire Kingdom”) and ORLAND WOLFORD (the “Executive”), under the following
circumstances:




      A. TBC Corporation, Tire Kingdom’s parent corporation (“TBC”), and the
Executive entered into an Employment Agreement, dated May 8, 2000 (the “Agreement”).




      B. Effective as of June 5, 2000 and with the consent of the Executive, TBC
assigned its rights under the Agreement to Tire Kingdom and Tire Kingdom assumed and
agreed to satisfy and discharge all of TBC’s obligations under the Agreement.




      C. The parties desire to extend the term of the Agreement, which presently
expires on May 8, 2005.



      NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereby agree that Section 2 of the Agreement shall be revised to
read as follows:




      2. Term: Subject to paragraphs 4 and 5 hereof, the term of the
Executive’s employment hereunder shall be for a period commencing on the Effective Date
and terminating on December 31, 2005 (the “Termination Date”).



      THE PARTIES ACKNOWLEDGE that the Agreement, as amended hereby, remains in full force and
effect on the date hereof.



      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the date first set forth
above.



TIRE KINGDOM, INC.



	 	 	 	 	 
	By

	 	/s/LAWRENCE C. DAY
	 	/s/ORLAND WOLFORD
	

	 	 
	 	 
	

	 	Lawrence C. Day,
	 	Orland Wolford
	

	 	Chairman of the Board	 	 







3
#### RISINGER v. STATE.

No. 19795.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 1, 1938.

R. E. Eubank and Chas. Roach, both of Paris, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is selling whisky in a dry area; the punishment, a fine of $100.

We find in the record an information in which it is stated that a complaint had been filed. The complaint is not brought forward. In the absence of a complaint it becomes the duty of this court to order a reversal of the judgment.

The judgment is reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.