PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 11-1136

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

AHMOI LEWIS,

 Appellant

______________

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN 

ISLANDS

(D.C. Criminal No. 3:10-cr-00022)

Chief Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gómez

______________

Argued December 8, 2011

______________

Before: FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR., and ROTH, Circuit 

Judges.

(Opinion Filed: February 22, 2012)
2

George H. Hodge, Jr., Esq. (argued)

P.O. Box 803

St. Thomas, VI 00804

Counsel for Appellant Ahmoi Lewis

Nelson L. Jones, Esq. (argued)

Office of the United States Attorney, District of the Virgin 

Islands

5500 Veteran’s Drive, Suite 260

St. Thomas, VI 00802

Counsel for Appellee United States of America

______________

OPINION

______________

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

After receiving a tip from a reliable source that 

individuals in a white Toyota Camry were carrying firearms,

police officers in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands initiated a traffic 

stop of the vehicle. During the traffic stop, a firearm was 

discovered on the driver, Appellant Ahmoi Lewis (―Lewis‖). 

Before pleading guilty to two firearm offenses, Lewis 

unsuccessfully moved to suppress the firearm as the fruit of 

an unlawful search and seizure. We must determine whether 

the traffic stop was supported by the requisite reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity under the Fourth Amendment 

based on either: (1) the illegal tints on the vehicle’s windows; 

or (2) the tip that firearms were in the possession of the 

individuals in the vehicle. We hold that neither basis 

establishes the reasonable suspicion necessary for the traffic 
3

stop. Hence, the firearm discovered on Lewis should have 

been suppressed. We will vacate Lewis’s judgment of 

conviction and sentence, reverse the denial of his motion to 

suppress, and remand for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND

On July 28, 2010, the District Court held a pretrial 

hearing on Lewis’s motion to suppress. The first law 

enforcement officer to testify at the suppression hearing was 

Officer Evans Jackson (―Jackson‖), a peace officer employed 

in the enforcement section of the Virgin Islands Department 

of Planning and Natural Resources. Jackson testified that on 

April 9, 2010, he received a phone call from a reliable source 

stating that there were firearms in a white Toyota Camry, 

with the number ―181‖ in the license plate, located in the 

vicinity of the Gottlieb gas station. Jackson had known the 

source for approximately two years at the time and testified 

that he had received reliable information from the source in 

the past.1 The phone call was brief, lasting approximately 

one minute. Jackson did not inquire about how the source 

 

1

Jackson’s testimony about having received reliable 

information from the source in the past was contradictory. 

Jackson testified that the first time he received a credible tip 

from the source was approximately two weeks prior to the tip 

he received on April 9, 2010. (App. 43.) However, Jackson 

also testified that this first credible tip was received around 

―late April, early June‖ in 2010 (App. 33), even though 

information provided at that time would have post-dated the 

tip received in this case. The District Court concluded that 

Jackson’s source was reliable. (App. 102-03.) Because the 

reliability of the tip is not integral to our decision, we will not 

address the District Court’s factual determination.
4

learned of the information in the tip. More importantly, the 

source provided no details about the legal status of the 

firearms. 

Jackson was traveling on foot at the time that he 

received the tip, without his patrol vehicle. He determined 

that he could not investigate the tip himself. Jackson called

his partner, Officer Gerald Mercer (―Mercer‖), and asked to 

be picked up. Mercer was off-duty at the time, and Jackson 

instead asked Mercer whether any other officer was nearby. 

Mercer replied that Officer Kendelth Wharton (―Wharton‖) 

was next to him. Jackson spoke to Wharton and relayed the 

tip that he had received about the white Toyota Camry. 

Jackson had no further involvement in the traffic stop.

The only testimony at the suppression hearing 

specifically related to the traffic stop came from Officer Jose 

Mendez (―Mendez‖), an officer with the Virgin Islands Police 

Department. Mendez testified that he responded to a request 

for assistance from Wharton over the police radio system in 

the area of the Ulla Muller Elementary School. Mendez was 

the second officer to arrive on scene. Upon Mendez’s arrival, 

Wharton had already initiated the traffic stop of Lewis’s 

vehicle.

2

 Wharton was positioned by the driver’s side of the 

 

2 Although subpoenaed by the Government to testify at 

the suppression hearing, Wharton did not appear, prompting 

the Government to request a bench warrant for his arrest. 

Questioning whether Wharton had ever received the subpoena 

in accordance with police protocol, the District Court 

reasoned that a bench warrant should not be issued. Counsel 

for Lewis argued that, as the police officer that initiated the 

traffic stop, Wharton’s testimony was critical and moved to 

stay the hearing. The District Court declined to do so. The 
5

vehicle, and Mendez positioned himself by the passenger’s 

side. Mendez observed that the vehicle was heavily tinted, 

preventing both him and Wharton from seeing how many 

occupants were inside.

Although the testimony was unclear as to how many 

occupants were inside the vehicle, Lewis was the driver and

Jesus Grant (―Grant‖), Lewis’s co-defendant, was in the front 

passenger’s seat. Lewis and Grant were ordered out of the 

vehicle individually. Based on their respective positions on 

the street, Wharton handled Lewis when he exited the vehicle, 

while Mendez handled Grant. When Mendez asked Grant if 

he had any weapons on him, Grant became argumentative, a

struggle ensued, and Mendez eventually placed Grant in 

handcuffs. Upon frisking him for weapons, Mendez 

discovered a hard object in Grant’s waist area. Mendez 

searched further and discovered a firearm on Grant, at which 

point Mendez placed Grant under arrest. Mendez had no 

knowledge of Wharton’s interaction with Lewis but noted

that Lewis also was placed under arrest.

On cross-examination, Lewis’s counsel questioned 

Mendez about whether Wharton provided any information 

about why he initiated the traffic stop of the vehicle:

Q. [W]hat did you hear on the 

911 call that indicated 

 

District Court determined that because the Government bore 

the burden of persuasion on Lewis’s motion to suppress, 

Wharton’s failure to appear only inured to the Government’s 

detriment. Wharton’s testimony would have been undeniably 

essential given the focus of our inquiry on the legality of the 

traffic stop. 
6

[Wharton] needed 

assistance for a traffic 

stop?

A. Well, to my understanding, 

I don’t know what was his 

reasons to make that stop. 

All I responded was [a] 

request of a fellow officer, 

he needed assistance in 

making a stop. . . .

Q. The point is that you don’t 

know whether he was 

making a traffic stop 

because he was planning to 

stop a vehicle in the traffic, 

or whether there was a 

traffic violation. Is that 

correct?

A. That’s correct.

(App. 64-65.)

Officer Terrance Celestine (―Celestine‖), an officer in 

the Traffic Bureau of the Virgin Islands Police Department, 

testified about what happened to the vehicle following the 

arrest. Celestine testified that he received a phone call from 

Wharton on April 9, 2010, requesting his assistance in 

determining whether the tints on a vehicle involved in a 
7

traffic stop were in violation of Virgin Islands law.

3

 Wharton 

informed Celestine that the vehicle was located under the 

sally port at the Virgin Islands Police Department. On April 

10, 2010, the day after the traffic stop, Celestine inspected the 

vehicle’s tints. Based on his initial inspection, the tint on the 

vehicle surpassed the AS1 line—a demarcation on a 

windshield that serves as a boundary rendering illegal any

obstruction crossing below the line. Using a tint meter, 

Celestine discovered that the tints far exceeded the 35% 

threshold permissible under Virgin Islands law.

4

 Celestine 

issued a citation that day for illegal tints.

After the three officers testified, the District Court 

heard argument on the motions. The Government asserted 

that the totality of the circumstances—the tip Jackson 

received from the reliable source and the tints that Celestine 

discovered on the vehicle—rendered the traffic stop 

constitutionally valid. Lewis’s counsel, on the other hand, 

argued that suppression of the firearm was warranted because 

Jackson’s source was unreliable and the tip failed to provide 

any information that would lead officers to believe that Lewis 

illegally possessed the firearm.

 

3 Celestine was certified to examine the legality of a

vehicle’s tints.

4

The numerical percentage of a tint is directly 

proportional to the amount of light that can pass through the 

window. As the percentage of a tint decreases, less light can 

pass through the window, rendering both the window and the 

inside of the vehicle darker to an outside observer. (App. 48-

49.)
8

In a ruling from the bench, the District Court 

concluded that suppression of the firearm recovered from 

Lewis was not warranted. The District Court first addressed 

whether the tip that Jackson received provided the requisite 

level of reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop:

[T]he Court . . . agrees with the 

defense that the tip certainly 

cannot be the basis for the stop, 

because the fact that someone has 

a firearm is not a basis for a stop, 

in and of itself. And I believe 

there’s case law in our circuit that 

makes that very clear, because the 

ownership of a firearm is not 

illegal in the Virgin Islands. You 

simply have to have a license, of 

course, to possess one. But 

someone saying that someone has 

a firearm doesn’t mean that you 

can just stop them. So a stop 

based on the tip certainly would 

present problems for the 

government.

(App. 103.)

The District Court then determined that the illegal tints 

provided the necessary justification for the traffic stop:

But that’s not all that’s attendant 

here. In fact, what we have here 

is a – the tip information was that 

there were some firearms, there 
9

was a description of the vehicle, 

there was a description, I believe, 

identification of the specific 

license plate number for that 

vehicle. But there’s more. And 

this is, I think, what presents a 

problem for the defense. The 

vehicle that was described was 

heavily tinted. The testimony 

during this hearing revealed that. 

And the Court is aware that it is a 

violation of the law to have tint in 

excess of a certain amount. So 

while there’s been some concern 

about the motivation for the stop, 

again, that’s not dispositive here. 

Once there is a valid reason for 

the stop – here, a tint that exceeds 

the limit . . . . even if it’s 

pretextual, even if there is some 

motive that is questioned by the 

defense, there is certainly a valid 

reason for the stop: a violation of 

the tint requirements.

(App. 103-04.) The District Court went on to reason that, 

once the traffic stop was initiated, the resulting discovery of 

the firearm on Lewis was lawful.

On October 5, 2010, Lewis conditionally pled guilty to

two of the eleven counts in the charging information: Count 

Three (possession of a stolen firearm) and Count Six 

(unauthorized possession of a firearm). The District Court 

sentenced Lewis on January 13, 2011 to a term of fourteen 
10

months of imprisonment on Count Three, a concurrent term 

of fourteen months on Count Six, and three years of 

supervised release.

On January 14, 2011, Lewis filed a timely appeal from 

the judgment of conviction, challenging the District Court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress.5

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 

3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review 

the District Court’s judgment of conviction. We review a 

district court’s order denying a motion to suppress under a 

mixed standard of review. United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 

140, 146 (3d Cir. 2010). We review findings of fact for clear 

error, but we exercise plenary review over legal 

determinations. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment protects the public from 

―unreasonable searches and seizures.‖ U.S. Const. amend. 

IV. ―Generally, for a seizure to be reasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment, it must be effectuated with a warrant 

based on probable cause.‖ United States v. Robertson, 305 

F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). A wellestablished exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 

requirement permits an officer to ―conduct a brief, 

investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.‖ Illinois 

 

5 Grant also pled guilty to certain offenses but filed no 

appeal.
11

v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 

The requirement of reasonable suspicion for a Terry

stop-and-frisk applies with equal force to a traffic stop of a 

vehicle. United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397 

(3d Cir. 2006). When determining whether an officer 

possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop, we 

must consider the totality of the circumstances. United States 

v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1000 (3d Cir. 2008). Once a valid 

traffic stop is initiated, ―an officer who develops a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion of criminal activity may expand the 

scope of an inquiry beyond the reason for the stop and detain 

the vehicle and its occupants for further investigation.‖ 

United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2003)

(citation omitted). Where reasonable suspicion for the traffic 

stop is lacking, the evidentiary fruits of the traffic stop must 

be suppressed. United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 447 

(3d Cir. 2010). 

Here, we must determine whether Wharton possessed 

the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop of

the vehicle.

A. Illegal Tints on the Vehicle

The District Court concluded that the excessive tints 

provided a legal justification for the traffic stop, regardless of 

whether Wharton was motivated by the desire to investigate 

the tip about the firearms. We have noted that ―the Supreme 

Court established a bright-line rule that any technical 

violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop, even if the stop 

is merely pretext for an investigation of some other crime.‖ 
12

United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) 

(citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)). 

While case law continues to afford police officers

increasing latitude to initiate traffic stops that pass 

constitutional muster, see id., our obligation to scrutinize 

police action is no less demanding. We agree with the 

District Court’s determination that pretextual traffic stops 

supported by reasonable suspicion do not run afoul of the 

Fourth Amendment. That proposition is not in dispute. But 

we cannot lend our imprimatur to the District Court’s 

erroneous conclusion that the illegal tints provided the 

necessary pretext in this case. Needless to say, a pretextual 

traffic stop requires the officer to have observed a traffic 

violation prior to initiating the traffic stop. Otherwise, the 

officer’s motivation for the stop could not be pretextual. The 

corollary of this fundamental principle is that ex post facto

justifications are impermissible.

After receiving testimony at the suppression hearing, 

the District Court reasoned that the tints provided a legal 

justification for the traffic stop. This determination was 

unsupported by the factual record. Based on our review of 

the testimony, the only logical conclusion is that the tints 

were a contrived, after-the-fact explanation for the traffic 

stop. As such, the tints cannot justify the stop of Lewis’s 

vehicle. 

Jackson provided no testimony at all about the 

vehicle’s tints. This is unsurprising given that his role was 

limited to relaying the tip to Wharton that precipitated his

search for Lewis’s vehicle. Jackson never observed Lewis’s 

vehicle and had no communication with Wharton about the 

traffic stop. While Mendez participated in the traffic stop, his 
13

first observation of the vehicle’s tints did not occur until after

he arrived on scene. By that point, Lewis’s vehicle had been 

pulled over, and the occupants were on the cusp of being 

ordered out of the vehicle. Moreover, Mendez testified on 

cross-examination that he could not identify the reason for the 

traffic stop and had not discussed the issue with Wharton.

Whatever testimony Celestine provided about his 

inspection of the vehicle’s illegal tints is of no moment to our

determination. Celestine had no involvement in the actual 

traffic stop. His testimony shed no light on why the traffic 

stop occurred as it did. He had no knowledge of whether 

Wharton observed a traffic violation prior to initiating the 

stop of the vehicle. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 

(2000) (―The reasonableness of official suspicion must be 

measured by what the officers knew before they conducted 

their search.‖). Celestine’s only involvement in this case—

the inspection of the vehicle’s tints—occurred the day after 

Lewis was arrested. This inspection is inconsequential to our 

inquiry. The Government’s undue reliance on Celestine’s 

testimony is insufficient to resuscitate the Government’s 

doomed argument. 

The absence of testimony that Wharton or any other 

officer observed a traffic violation, prior to the initiation of 

the traffic stop, precludes a finding that the stop was 

pretextual. See Mosley, 454 F.3d at 251. The District Court 

erred in concluding that the illegal tints provided a pretextual 

justification for the traffic stop. We are left to conclude on 

these facts that the vehicle was stopped because of the tip

about the firearms. 
14

B. Tip Regarding the Firearms

We can nevertheless affirm the District Court’s denial 

of Lewis’s motion to suppress if the tip that Jackson received 

about the firearms in the white Toyota Camry itself provided 

reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.

In United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 

2000), we analyzed whether reasonable suspicion existed to 

support a Terry stop in the Virgin Islands. There, individuals 

in St. Thomas were celebrating a street carnival festival

during which alcohol consumption was widespread. Id. at 

215. An anonymous informant approached several officers 

and informed them that a young man (the defendant) standing 

in the crowd of celebrants had a firearm in his possession. Id. 

The informant described the defendant’s clothing and 

appearance but did not state that the defendant was acting in a 

suspicious manner or that the firearm was unlawfully 

possessed. Id. After the informant pointed in the direction of 

the defendant, officers walked over to the young man. Id. 

Although the defendant exhibited no suspicious behavior, 

officers proceeded to conduct a pat-down search and 

discovered an unregistered firearm with an obliterated serial 

number. Id.

At a hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the 

firearm, officers testified that they based their decision to stop 

and frisk the defendant solely on the anonymous informant’s 

tip. Id. The district court denied the defendant’s motion to 

suppress the firearm. Id. We held that the search and seizure 

of the defendant was unlawful and vacated the conviction. Id.

at 214. We premised our decision on two considerations:
15

First, it is not a crime to possess a 

firearm in the Virgin Islands—

even when standing in a crowd. 

Second, the anonymous tipster 

who approached the authorities 

had said nothing that would 

indicate that [the defendant] 

possessed the gun unlawfully 

(e.g., without registration); that he 

was committing or about to 

commit a crime; or that he posed 

a threat to the officers or anyone 

in the crowd.

Id. We analogized the tip provided by the informant about 

the firearm to a tip that the defendant ―possessed a wallet, a 

perfectly legal act in the Virgin Islands, and the authorities 

had stopped him for this reason.‖ Id. at 218. ―For all the 

officers knew, even assuming the reliability of the tip that [the 

defendant] possessed a gun, [the defendant] was another 

celebrant lawfully exercising his right under Virgin Islands 

law to possess a gun in public.‖ Id. Absent additional 

information, ―a mere allegation that a suspect possesses a 

firearm, as dangerous as firearms may be, [does not] justify 

an officer in stopping a suspect absent the reasonable 

suspicion required by Terry.‖ Id. at 217.

Less than three months after our decision in Ubiles, we 

clarified that ―reasonable suspicion does not require that the 

suspect’s acts must always be themselves criminal.‖ United 

States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting 

that the ―Supreme Court has found reasonable suspicion 

based on acts capable of innocent explanation‖). In 

Valentine, the totality of the circumstances—an in-person tip 
16

that the defendant was carrying a firearm, received in a highcrime area of Irvington, New Jersey at 1:00 a.m., where the 

defendant and his companions walked away upon observing a 

police car—provided officers with reasonable suspicion to 

conduct a Terry stop.6 Id. at 357. We have since concluded 

on several occasions that a totality of the circumstances 

inquiry rendered a Terry stop lawful. See, e.g., United States 

v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 213 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that

tip provided by anonymous informant that man brandished 

firearm at gas station in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania was

reliable to justify traffic stop).

For cases arising out of the Virgin Islands, however, 

the treatment afforded firearms under territorial law continues 

to be of paramount importance in our analysis. In United 

States v. Gatlin, 613 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2010), an officer 

received a tip from a reliable source that a man was walking

on a street in Wilmington, Delaware with a firearm in his 

jacket. Id. at 376-77. Based on the man’s description, 

officers responded to the area where the informant indicated 

that the man could be found. Id. at 377. Officers located the 

man, handcuffed him, and patted him down, finding an 

unlicensed handgun in violation of Delaware law. Id. 

We noted that the facts in Gatlin resembled those in 

Ubiles—i.e., the sole evidence to support the Terry stop was a 

tip about a firearm—but nonetheless concluded that 

reasonable suspicion existed to frisk the defendant for 

 

6 Given the totality of the circumstances regarding the 

tip, we declined to address the Government’s alternative 

argument that New Jersey, unlike the Virgin Islands, 

presumes that an individual lacks a permit to carry a 

concealed firearm. Id. at 357.
17

weapons. Id. at 378-79. Critical to our analysis was the 

presumption under Delaware law, unlike in the Virgin 

Islands, that an individual has no license to carry a concealed 

firearm. Id. The reliable tip coupled with the presumption of 

illegality provided officers with reasonable suspicion to 

conduct an investigatory stop within the confines of Terry. 

Id. at 379.

The District Court concluded that the tip Jackson 

received, which he relayed to Wharton, was insufficient to 

justify the traffic stop. We agree. It is lawful for certain 

individuals in the Virgin Islands to carry a firearm provided 

that a license is obtained. See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 454. 

Ubiles recognized that the possession of a firearm in the 

Virgin Islands, in and of itself, does not provide officers with 

reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop. 224 F.3d at 217 

(―[A] mere allegation that a suspect possesses a firearm, as 

dangerous as firearms may be, [does not] justify an officer in 

stopping a suspect absent the reasonable suspicion.‖). Indeed, 

Virgin Islands law contains no presumption that an individual 

lacks a permit to carry a firearm. Gatlin, 613 F.3d at 378-79.

As we observed in Gatlin, the Government bears the burden 

of proof in the Virgin Islands that the defendant had no 

license for a recovered firearm. Id. at 379 (citing United 

States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626, 630 (3d Cir. 1997)).

Our conclusion here that the tip was insufficient to 

justify the traffic stop of Lewis’s vehicle flows logically from 

the reasoning in Ubiles. Jackson received a tip that

individuals in a white Toyota Camry, bearing the number 

―181‖ in the license plate, had firearms in their possession. 

Jackson testified that his conversation with his source was 

brief and that no information was provided about the legality 

of the firearms. This information alone does not permit an 
18

officer to suspect—let alone reasonably suspect—that 

possession of either firearm was illegal or that the firearms

were being used in a criminal manner.7 Jackson relayed the 

tip about innocuous conduct to Wharton, who proceeded to 

initiate a traffic stop of the vehicle. Absent any information 

about the criminality of the firearms, the mere possession of 

the firearms could not provide Wharton with reasonable 

suspicion to stop the vehicle.8

The Government argues that the totality of the 

circumstances—based on the tip and the illegal tints—

justified the traffic stop. (Appellee’s Br. at 7.) The 

Government misapprehends the totality of the circumstances 

standard. Facts known to an officer at the time of a Terry

stop must bear individual significance if they are to be 

considered in the aggregate. See United States v. Mathurin, 

 

7

This is true even assuming the reliability of the tip, 

which contained no information about suspicious activity. Cf.

United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 449 (3d Cir. 2010) 

(finding anonymous informant’s tip reliable where informant 

observed criminal activity in progress). 

8

This is not to say that an officer must receive 

information about or observe criminal behavior in progress to 

constitute reasonable suspicion. To the contrary, as we noted,

―reasonable suspicion may be based on acts capable of 

innocent explanation.‖ United States v. Whitfield, 634 F.3d 

741, 744 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). But, whereas here, the sole information provided 

by the informant concerned the mere possession of firearms

in a vehicle in the Virgin Islands, without more, there are no 

facts upon which to predicate reasonable suspicion.
19

561 F.3d 170, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2009) (―We will examine the 

factors separately to address their individual significance, and 

then in the aggregate to assess the agents’ reasonable 

suspicion under our totality of the circumstances inquiry.‖). 

As we explained in supra Part III.A., based on the 

testimony at the suppression hearing, the illegal tints on the 

vehicle were an impermissible ex post facto justification for 

the traffic stop. The informant’s tip about the white Toyota 

Camry is equally of no aid to the Government. We cannot 

consider in the aggregate these two facts that individually 

have no relevance to our totality of the circumstances 

assessment.9

IV. CONCLUSION

Because neither the illegal tints nor the tip was 

sufficient, the Government failed to meet its burden of 

proving that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable 

suspicion. See Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 397. The District 

Court erred by not ordering suppression of the firearm 

discovered on Lewis. We will vacate Lewis’s judgment of 

conviction and sentence, reverse the denial of his motion to 

suppress, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

 

9 At oral argument, counsel for the Government 

conceded that the tip was insufficient, stating that suppression 

of the firearm discovered on Lewis would be required if the 

tip remained the sole support for the traffic stop.