United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 16-2222 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

LUIS ALEJANDRO-ROSADO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Torruella and Thompson, Circuit Judges. 

 Edgar L. Sanchez-Mercado and ESM Law Office on brief for 

appellant. 

 B. Kathryn Debrason, Assistant United States Attorney, Rosa 

Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. 

Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate 

Division, on brief for appellee. 

December 23, 2017 
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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. This appeal bores out of a 

district court's imposition of a twenty-four month sentence (the 

statutory maximum) on Luis Alejandro-Rosado for violating his 

terms of supervised release. At the revocation hearing, AlejandroRosado admitted to the multiple violations the government accused 

him of committing and asked that the court sentence him within the 

Guideline Sentencing Range (of four to ten months). After hearing 

lengthy arguments pertaining to both Alejandro-Rosado's violations 

as well as the purported mitigating factors presented, the court 

nonetheless decided the proper sentence was the statutory maximum. 

Alejandro-Rosado now appeals this sentence as unreasonable. 

Having reviewed the record, case law, and arguments, we find that 

the district court exercised reasonable sentencing procedure and 

arrived at a substantively reasonable result. We therefore affirm. 

A. Getting Our Factual Bearings 

Alejandro-Rosado was originally convicted of receiving 

a firearm as a person under indictment in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(n), 924(a)(1)(D), a class D felony. He was sentenced to 

thirty-six months' imprisonment and three years of supervised 

release. His incarceration ended on January 15, 2015, and he 

immediately began serving his term of supervised release. On June 

22, 2016, and July 7, 2016, the United States Probation Office 

filed motions notifying the district court of nine separate 
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violations of Alejandro-Rosado's supervised release terms that had 

occurred between July 2015 and June 2016. 

The violations were as follows. In July 2015, AlejandroRosado failed his first drug test. He again failed drug tests on 

August 14, 2015, August 21, 2015, and November 30, 2015. On May 

5, 2016, Alejandro-Rosado was observed handling a firearm and 

changing the magazine. That same day he was witnessed selling 

cocaine. On May 18, 2016, Alejandro-Rosado was arrested for being 

in possession of synthetic marijuana and prescription pain pills 

(and provided an admission to being the owner of the contraband). 

Moreover, canines twice alerted officers to weapons in his 

apartment. A June 28, 2016, search of his apartment by a probation 

officer found more drugs and a notebook that contained the names 

of various inmates, their register numbers, and numerical 

quantities of money.1 Next to one entry read: "transaction as soon 

as possible so that he not be beheaded." Alejandro-Rosado does 

not dispute committing the violations. 

On September 14, 2016, the district court conducted a 

revocation hearing to determine Alejandro-Rosado's sentence. The 

government asked that the defendant be sentenced to the statutory 

maximum of twenty-four months. Though Alejandro-Rosado admitted 

to committing violations, he asked that the court, in consideration 

 1 As an example, these notebook entries had the following 

format: "Antonio Hernandez-Vilar, 97440-020 $100." 
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of mitigating factors, impose a sentence of four to ten months 

pursuant to the sentencing guidelines.2 Among the factors 

Alejandro-Rosado raised were his poor physical health, 

psychological well-being, misunderstanding of release terms, and 

full acceptance of responsibility for his violations. Though the 

district court acknowledged that the guidelines recommended a four 

to ten month sentence, it reasoned that the twenty-four month 

sentence was nonetheless sufficient but not greater than necessary 

to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In deviating from the 

guidelines, the court explained that a higher sentence was 

necessary in order to "(1) reflect the seriousness of the 

violations, (2) promote respect for law, (3) provide just 

punishment for the offenses, (4) afford adequate deterrence, and 

(5) protect the public from future crimes" by Alejandro-Rosado. 

Alejandro-Rosado concedes that the district court had discretion 

to impose this sentence, but now appeals it as unreasonable. 

B. Analysis 

1. Procedural Reasonableness 

Alejandro-Rosado first challenges the procedural 

reasonableness of his sentence. While we generally review a 

 2 Under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a), the violations committed by 

Alejandro-Rosado were determined to be grade B violations because 

he was in possession of a firearm. Based on a criminal history 

category of I, the sentencing range for grade B violations is four 

to ten months. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). 
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sentence following revocation of supervised release for abuse of 

discretion, see United States v. Butler-Acevedo, 656 F.3d 97, 99 

(1st Cir. 2011), Alejandro-Rosado did not object to the procedural 

reasonableness of his sentence below and it is therefore 

unpreserved. We review an unpreserved procedural challenge for 

plain error, a steep climb for defendants on appeal. See United 

States v. Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d 445, 448 (1st Cir. 2017); United 

States v. Rodríguez-Meléndez, 828 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2016). To 

prevail under plain error review, a defendant must show "(1) that 

an error occurred (2) which was clear and obvious and which not 

only (3) affected his or her substantial rights, but also (4) 

seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings." Rodríguez-Meléndez, 828 F.3d at 38 

(quoting United States v. Roy, 506 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2007)). 

Under Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007), 

the Supreme Court outlined the procedural framework that district 

courts should use in determining a sentence. In particular, it 

explained that (1) the court must calculate the applicable 

guidelines sentencing range, (2) it must allow both sides to argue 

for the sentence they feel is appropriate, and (3) it must then 

consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors before imposing its 

ultimate sentence. Id. Here, Alejandro-Rosado contends that the 

district court procedurally erred when (1) it failed to consider 

certain mitigating factors and (2) it varied beyond the recommended 
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range. The government disagrees, arguing that the district court 

specifically addressed the mitigating factors and adequately 

justified the upward variance. We agree with the government on 

both of these procedural challenges. 

Alejandro-Rosado's contention that the court did not 

adequately consider mitigating factors does not hold water. 

Indeed, while the district court must consider all § 3553(a) 

factors, it need not do so in "some sort of rote incantation when 

explicating its sentencing decision." United States v. Dixon, 449 

F.3d 194, 205 (1st Cir. 2006). A defendant is entitled to raise 

mitigating factors but "[m]erely raising potentially mitigating 

factors does not guarantee a lesser sentence." United States v. 

Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2010). Here, the 

district court heard vigorous arguments on Alejandro-Rosado's 

mitigating factors. The court acknowledged these arguments and 

then stated the § 3553(a) factors it considered before ruling. 

This procedure evidences adequate consideration of the factors. 

See United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 

2015) (finding no plain error when counsel vigorously argued the 

mitigating factors and the district court acknowledged the 

arguments); see also United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 592 

(1st Cir. 2011) (explicit statements that the court considers 

certain factors are "entitled to some weight"). Though the 

district court's consideration was unfavorable to the defendant, 
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the fact that it weighed some factors more heavily than others 

does not amount to procedural error. See United States v. VargasGarcía, 794 F.3d 162, 167 (1st Cir. 2015) ("While the defendant 

points to some mitigating considerations, a sentencing court is 

entitled to conduct an appropriate triage and weigh some factors 

more heavily than others."). 

Alejandro-Rosado's second procedural challenge is also 

easily put to rest. Alejandro-Rosado submits that the court erred 

when it upwardly varied from the guideline standard, but this 

argument misconceives the court's obligation. While upward 

variants should be justified, all that's required is that the 

district court offer a "plausible and coherent rationale" for its 

variance. United States v. Guzman-Fernandez, 824 F.3d 173, 178 

(1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Del Valle–Rodríguez, 761 

F.3d 171, 177 (1st Cir. 2014)). Moreover, under plain error 

review, the district court need only "touch[] upon each of factors 

that it supportably found significant." United States v. MárquezGarcía, 862 F.3d 143, 147 (1st Cir. 2017). Here, the district 

court articulated a plausible and coherent rationale for its 

determination when it listed each violation, emphasized the 

severity of each, and observed that Alejandro-Rosado is "unable to 

comply with the law or the conditions" of release. Though not 

long winded, we do not require an exhaustive justification, and 

thus the district court's articulation of its reasoning was 
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procedurally reasonable. See id. (finding even an "admittedly 

terse" justification sufficient under plain error review). 

2. Substantive Reasonableness 

Alejandro-Rosado also seems to argue that the district 

court's sentence was substantively unreasonable. The government, 

again, disagrees and argues that the sentence was plausibly 

reasoned and resulted in a defensible outcome. We agree with the 

government. 

The standard of review for substantive reasonableness is 

"somewhat blurred" when it comes to unpreserved challenges to the 

substantive reasonableness of a federal sentence. See RuizHuertas, 792 F.3d at 228. As we have done numerous times before, 

we "skirt this murky area" and assume, favorably for AlejandroRosado, that the standard of review is abuse of discretion. 

Márquez-García, 862 F.3d at 147; see also Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 

at 228 (making similar assumption). As both parties concede, the 

inquiry for substantive reasonableness is whether the sentencing 

rationale is plausibly reasoned and resulted in a defensible 

outcome. See United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 

2008). Because "in most cases there is not a single appropriate 

sentence, but rather a universe of reasonable sentences," United 

States v. Rivera-González, 776 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2015), 

sentencing often becomes "a judgment call." Martin, 520 F.3d at 

92. We will reverse only where the sentence is either outside the 
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"universe of reasonable sentences" or was implausibly reasoned. 

Rivera-González, 776 F.3d at 52. We turn first to the inquiry of 

whether the sentence was within the universe of reasonableness. 

 We need not go far to determine that it was because one 

of our recent decisions is directly on point. In United States v. 

Márquez-Garcia, a twenty-four month sentence was determined 

reasonable on a four to ten month guideline recommendation (the 

same upward variant as we have before us). 862 F.3d at 147-48. 

The court reasoned that because the severe violations occurred 

less than a year after the release date, the sentence was 

substantively reasonable for deterrence purposes. Id. Similarly 

here, not only did the violations follow quickly on the heels of 

Alejandro-Rosado's release, but they were numerous and severe. He 

was found racking a pistol. Canines twice alerted police to 

weapons in his apartment. He was reported to be selling drugs, 

and was found with a notebook full of inmate names, register 

numbers, and dollar amounts. Specifically, one entry had the 

rather ominous notation: "transaction soon as possible so that he 

not be beheaded." And these are just some of his numerous 

violations. In light of these facts, Alejandro-Rosado's sentence 

was clearly within the universe of reasonableness. See Soto-Soto, 

855 F.3d at 450-51 (statutory maximum of two years was 

substantively reasonable where the guideline recommended a five to 
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eleven month sentence but the violations were repetitive and 

severe). 

Alejandro-Rosado nevertheless argues that the guidelines 

recommended a sentence of four to ten months and the district court 

improperly exceeded this recommendation. But these guidelines are 

"merely advisory." See Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d at 451. Regardless of 

whether we agree that this was the appropriate sentence, merely 

deciding on appellate review that "some lesser sentence [is] 

appropriate is not, in itself, a sufficient reason to disturb the 

district court's exercise of discretion." Del Valle-Rodríquez, 

761 F.3d at 177 (1st Cir. 2014). 

Turning next to the inquiry reviewing the district 

court's rationale, we determine that it was plausibly reasoned. 

Where district courts stress the factors that lead to its sentence 

and explain the purposes for the sentence, we have upheld its 

reasoning. See, e.g., Rivera-González, 776 F.3d at 52 (district 

court's sentence was plausibly reasoned because it stressed the 

seriousness of the crime and need for the sentence). Here, the 

district court did both. It highlighted the frequency of 

Alejandro-Rosado's violations, the severity of them, and his 

refusal to follow the probation officer's instructions. See United 

States v. O'Brien, 870 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2017) (reasoning was 

clear when it emphasized the severity of the conduct). Next, it 

plausibly explained that in light of these factors, the sentence 
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was necessary to "provide just punishment for the offense, afford 

adequate deterrence, and to protect the public from further crimes" 

by the defendant. In light of these justifications, we find that 

the district court's reasoning was entirely plausible. 

C. Conclusion 

For the reasons made clear above, we uphold the sentence 

imposed on Alejandro-Rosado for violation of his terms of 

supervised release. 

Affirmed.