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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.M.-S. D.

APPEAL OF: B.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 852 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 2, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): AN No. 10 of 2019

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.M.-S.D.

APPEAL OF: C.M.-S.D.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 853 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 2, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): A.N. 10 of 2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: MARCH 17, 2021

Appellants B.B. (Mother) and her son, C.M.-S.D., born in October 2008

(Child), through his legal interest counsel, separately appeal from the decree
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terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child, pursuant to Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.1 We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history as 

follows:

In October 2015, Warren County Children and Youth Services 

(CYS) began providing general protective services to Mother, 

Father, and [Child]. Mother and Father had already separated 

prior to involvement by CYS and until this time, [Child] resided 

with Father and paternal grandfather . . . . During this time, 

Mother was minimally involved with [Child]. In October 2015, at 

the age of seven (7) years old, [Child] began his lengthy course 

of psychiatric treatment.

[Child] was in kindergarten during the 2014-2015 school year. 

During this time, [Child] behaved disruptively at school, garnering 

seventy-two (72) restraints by school personnel. As a result, 

[Child] was provided with Family Based Mental Health services in 

the home and school settings as well as emotional support at 

school. This was the last time [Child] was in a public-school 

setting. On September 11, 2015, Father admitted [Child] to 

Millcreek Hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. On September 15, 

2015, Father attempted to remove [Child] against medical advice. 

From October 23, 2015 until August 9, 2018, when [Child] was 

adjudicated dependent, he has had numerous psychiatric 

admissions, including: Beacon Light’s Short-Term Adolescent 

Recovery (STAR) program from October 14, 2015 through 

December 2, 2015; Beacon Light[’s Residential Treatment Facility 

(RTF)] Placement from December 2, 2015 through July 6, 2016; 

Southwood ADD/ID Unit from July 6, 2016 through April 27, 2017; 

Southwood Psychiatric Facility from April 27, 2017 through August 

18, 2017; Barber National Institute where he was hospitalized for

____________________________________________

1 We address the appeals in a single memorandum. In the same decree, the 

trial court also terminated the parental rights of S.C.C. (Father), the biological 

father of Child. Father was incarcerated and attended the evidentiary hearings 

by video conference. Father did not file a notice of appeal, nor did he 

participate in this appeal by filing a brief.
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fifteen (15) days; Sara Reed RTF; and ultimately, George Junior 

Republic where he has resided since August 2018.

[Child] was previously diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder 

with Intellectual Disability with Social Impairment but without 

language impairment and Intellectual Development Disorder. 

Most recently, [Child] was diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant 

Disorder, Rule Out Conduct Disorder—childhood onset type, 

Intermittent Explosive Disorder, Parent Child Relational Problems, 

ADHD-combined type, Victim of Physical Abuse, and Rule Out 

Reactive Attachment Disorder. Despite over eleven (11) months 

at George Junior Republic since his adjudication as dependent, 

[Child] has neither met discharge goals nor maintained progress 

for an uninterrupted period of thirty (30) days, which is the 

prerequisite for achieving in the program’s “level” behavioral 

system. Further, [Child] has frequently required crisis unit 

intervention.

On August 18, 2017, [Child] was discharged from Southwood 

Inpatient Psychiatric Hospital to the care of Mother, after having 

been a resident of Southwood since July 6, 2016. From August 

18, 2017 through October 8, 2017, Mother exercised physical 

custody of [Child] during the week with Father exercising physical 

custody during the weekends. On October 8, 2017, Father was 

arrested for [driving under the influence (DUI)] after police 

discovered Father and [Child] stopped following a one-vehicle 

crash. Subsequently, Father was charged with DUI and 

Endangering the Welfare of a Child. He pleaded guilty to DUI and 

Resisting Arrest . . . .

From October 8, 2017 (the date of Father’s arrest) through April 

10, 2018, Mother did not allow any contact between Father and 

[Child]. On April 11, 2018, following a telephone call between 

[Child] and Father, [Child’s] negative behaviors escalated to the 

point where Mother returned [Child] to Father on April 12, 2018. 

[Child] resided with Father from this point until July 8, 2018. On 

July 8, 2018, [Child] called Mother reporting that he was 

frightened by Father, who was intoxicated and brandishing a 

loaded firearm during an altercation in the home. Mother 

instructed [Child] to call and report the incident to police because 

she declined to get involved. [Child], who was nine (9) at the 

time, complied and called the police resulting in Father’s arrest 

and ultimate conviction following plea negotiations where he 

pleaded guilty to Recklessly Endangering Another Person 
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(specifically, paternal grandfather) and Person Not to Possess/Use 

Firearm—Incompetent, for which he is currently serving a term of 

imprisonment in [a State Correctional Institution (SCI)]-

Houtzdale.

Unfortunately, this was not the only traumatic event that [Child]

had to endure while in Father’s physical custody. [Child] reported 

that Father had killed a family pet, an allegation supported by 

Father’s statement to Connie Snyder, the family’s CYS 

caseworker, “Why should I pay a vet money when there was a 

perfectly good baseball bat sitting nearby?” On March 4, 2016 

Father was cited by CYS for Causing Serious Physical Neglect of a 

Child—Failure to Provide Medical Treatment/Care to [Child]. 

During a weekend visit with Father, [Child] reportedly shot himself 

in the leg with a pellet gun. Father neither sought medical 

attention for [Child] nor reported the incident to authorities. The 

injury only came to light when [Child] complained of pain to 

Beacon Light RTF personnel upon return to their facility following 

the visit to Father’s home. [Child’s] wounds to the knee area of 

his right leg included, “multiple metallic fragments” within the 

“posterior medial soft tissues.” [Child] has been adamant since 

his adjudication hearing that he does not want any contact with 

Father and the Court ordered no visitation until a treating 

therapist deems it appropriate.

Mother has demonstrated significant passivity with respect to 

parenting [Child,] repeatedly stating that she will care for him 

when he has “been fixed” by his mental health treatment 

providers. Throughout [Child’s] lengthy course of psychiatric 

treatment, Mother’s participation in [Child’s] treatment plan has 

been limited to sporadic phone calls or video participation in family 

therapy sessions and visits with [Child]. Since [Child’s] admission 

to George Junior Republic on August 9, 2018, Mother has only 

visited sporadically, with her last family therapy session taking 

place on July 15, 2019. Equally concerning is Mother’s lack of 

attentiveness to [Child] on a personal level. Both [Child] and his 

health care providers report that telephone contact is frequently 

attempted but Mother more frequently than not fails to answer or 

return calls.

From February 2016 through March 2019, Mother resided in 

Warren, Pennsylvania with her boyfriend . . . . When the 

relationship ended, Mother obtained her own apartment in 

Youngsville. During this time, Mother shared custody of her two 
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(2) younger children with their father, [S.B.]. Mother worked as 

a clerk/supervisor at Sheetz and frequently left the children with 

maternal grandparents . . . . In May 2019, Mother’s contact with 

her two (2) younger children ([Child’s] half-siblings) was limited 

to “supervised visitation” based upon a finding of “drinking in 

excess and engaging in verbal and physical confrontations in front 

of the children.” Maternal grandparents currently have custody of 

Mother’s younger children.

At the time of [Child’s] dependency, Mother declined being named 

as a placement resource for him because her then boyfriend was 

unwilling to have [Child] reside with them. From August 2019 

through November 2019, Mother lived with [G.M.] and worked as 

a cashier at Dairy Queen. Mother then moved to Tidioute to live 

with [M.J.] where she worked parttime at a restaurant/bar. 

Mother was told to take parenting classes but never followed 

through with her Family [Service] Plan. In April 2015, Mother was 

charged at Warren County Criminal Docket [ ] with DUI. Mother’s 

alcohol consumption continued to be an issue. At the time of the 

evidentiary hearing Mother was continuing to address her sobriety 

issues but was still unable to live independently.

[Child] is currently eleven (11) years old [and] for several years 

he has suffered violence and trauma in Father’s home and willful 

neglect by Mother. Prior to his adjudication of dependency, 

[Child] has received mental health treatment in numerous 

institutions for close to four (4) years and since his adjudication 

as a dependent child, two (2) foster care placement efforts were 

disrupted before he was eventually placed at George Junior 

Republic, where he still resides today.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/10/20, at 1-6.

On July 17, 2019, CYS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (b). Alan M. 

Conn, Esq., represented the best interests of Child as guardian ad litem (GAL). 

The trial court appointed Cynthia K.D. Klenowski, Esq., to represent the legal 

interests of Child on October 25, 2019. Evidentiary hearings were held on 

February 14, 2020, June 29, 2020, and on June 30, 2020. CYS presented the 
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testimony of Mandy Anderson, the clinical director at George Junior Republic;

Peter von Korff, M.D., a court-ordered psychologist; Connie Snyder, a 

caseworker for CYS; and Kyle Corbin, a caseworker for CYS. Mother did not 

testify or present any witnesses. Child did not testify.

In the decree dated June 30, 2020, and entered on July 2, 2020, the 

trial court found that, with regard to Mother, CYS met its burden of proof 

under Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (b) of the Adoption Act, and 

subsequently terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child. On July 29, 2020, 

Mother filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise statement pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On the following day, July 30, 2020, Child’s 

legal interest counsel filed a notice of appeal and concise statement on behalf 

of Child. 

Child presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [trial] court err and abuse its discretion by determining 

that the burden of proof was met by clear and convincing 

evidence to show that involuntary termination of parental 

rights was warranted under 23 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 2511(a)(1), (2), 

and (5)?

2. Did the [trial] court err and abuse its discretion by failing to 

adequately consider the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of [C]hild?

Child’s Brief at 4 (some formatting altered). 

Mother presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err and abuse its discretion by failing to 

give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of [C]hild pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[ 

] § 2511(b) in that [C]hild had expressed disagreement to any 
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adoption proceeding which would require his consent, [Child] 

had indicated that [M]other and siblings were extremely 

important to him, and that there were no potential permanent 

resources for [C]hild by way of a fit and willing relative or foster 

family at the time of the termination and thus, [C]hild had been 

orphaned by the [trial c]ourt’s decision? 

2. Whether the [trial c]ourt had insufficient evidentiary support to 

find that termination of Mother's parental rights was warranted 

under 23 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 2511(b) because [CYS] did not put forth 

clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best 

interest of [C]hild because the evidence showed that [C]hild’s 

permanency was speculative in nature because no prospective 

placement had been located, [C]hild was opposed to adoption 

and that [C]hild felt strongly toward keeping a relationship with 

[M]other and siblings? 

Mother’s Brief at 7.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is well-settled.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or 

abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id. The 

trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “[T]he trial court is free to believe 

all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all 

credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 
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214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “If competent 

evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record 

could also support the opposite result.” In re B.J.Z., 207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for 

termination followed by an assessment of the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the [trial] 

court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent.

The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the [trial] 

court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination 

of his or her parental rights does the [trial] court engage in the 

second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 921 (citation omitted). We have defined clear and 

convincing evidence as that which is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing 

as to enable the trier[-]of[-]fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 

1108, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). A child has a right to a 

stable, safe, and healthy environment in which to grow, and the “child’s life 

simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the 
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ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 9 

(Pa. Super. 2009).

In the present case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (b). We need only agree with 

the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 

2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the trial court’s decision to terminate 

under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
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We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his [, or her,] physical or mental well-being; and (3) 

the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal[,] as well as incapacity to perform 

parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations 

omitted).

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child 

needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this [C]ourt has 

held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance.

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Moreover, this Court has previously stated:

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in 

resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parentchild relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for 

a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her 

physical and emotional needs.
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Id. (citation omitted). Where a parent does not “exercise reasonable firmness 

in declining to yield to obstacles, his [parental] rights may be forfeited.” In 

re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 481 (Pa. Super. 2010).

As to Section 2511(a)(2),2 Child, through his legal interest counsel,

contends that insufficient evidence was presented to support a determination 

that there was a continued incapacity of Mother to provide essential care for 

Child. Conversely, Child avers that Mother was compliant with the Family 

Service Plan “to the best of [her] ability” and that Mother “has a foundation 

for developing the skills needed to be an appropriate parenting resource.” 

Child’s Brief at 14-15.

CYS argues that the trial court did not err and that Mother’s “passivity 

in parenting [Child] fully justifies and supports the termination of her parental 

rights.” CYS’s Brief at 8. With respect to Mother’s inability to complete her 

goals, CYS explains:

[Child] was removed from his father’s home when placed, which 

was precipitated by his father’s criminal conduct in the home. 

Three months prior, [Mother] had dropped . . . Child off at his 

father’s home and relinquished responsibility for him, repeating a 

prior abandonment of . . . Child to his father in 2014. Even were

[Child] to progress in treatment successfully enough to be 

discharged, [Mother] cannot provide him a home.

Since [Child’s] placement, [Mother] has accomplished nothing 

beyond wishful thinking [to] position herself to parent [Child] 

____________________________________________

2 Mother has not challenged the trial court’s determination that clear and 

convincing evidence exists to satisfy 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2) and (5), but 

rather focuses her challenge on Section 2511(b).
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following his treatment. At the time of the hearing, [Mother] had 

not maintained stable housing, employment, completed any 

parenting classes, maintained sobriety, and was facing an 

impending sentence for her second DUI conviction. She had lost 

custody of her younger two children as a consequence of exposing 

them to domestic violence while she was intoxicated. She had 

failed to consistently address . . . Child’s needs; missing months 

of visits and phone calls and minimally participating in his therapy. 

His preoccupation with her intermittent involvement derails him 

and sabotages his treatment in that he falls into a reenactment 

pattern to force from adults the only response that he knows how 

to handle: rejection.

Id. at 8-9.

The trial court found that the record unequivocally established Mother’s 

unwillingness and inability to acknowledge and make the necessary progress 

in addressing her parental deficiencies that led to Child to be without essential 

parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being. The trial court explained:

Mother was offered numerous resources to fulfill her parental 

duties which she either ignored or discontinued. “Mother was 

encouraged to take parenting classes starting in December 2015 

but she never took any classes. . . She was supposed to be 

attending AA meetings and staying sober, but she didn’t do 

either.” Mother was given many opportunities to visit [C]hild and 

was encouraged to take an active role in his treatment plan, but 

she never fully committed. Dr. von Korff noticed this same 

passivity during his interview and observation with Mother and 

[C]hild. “I guess the overriding comment about that initial 

interview was really any absence of self-directed commentary and 

thought. She really did not put into that initial interview any 

thinking about her own place in [C]hild’s difficulties.” Mother’s 

passive participation in raising and caring for [C]hild and her 

disinterest in actively participating in [C]hild’s treatment, as well 

as her own, clearly shows that she has failed to perform her 

parental duties.

* * *
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. . . Mandy Anderson, the Clinical Director at George Junior 

Republic, discussed [C]hild’s current status at his treatment 

facility. “There have been no family therapy sessions with Mother 

and [C]hild since July 15, 2019.” After several cancellations and 

rescheduled appointments, Mandy Anderson requested that 

Mother let the facility know what times and dates would work with 

her schedule. “I then asked her at that point in time to reach out 

to me, and let me know her availability. And, I had not heard 

from her after that.” Mother was not only given numerous 

opportunities to participate in [C]hild’s treatment, but she was 

also given the luxury of scheduling meetings and appointments to 

do so when it was convenient for her. However, Mother made no 

effort to participate and never got in touch with [C]hild’s facility. 

While Mother did participate in some personal treatment, it was 

short-lived and she quickly reverted back to her prior addiction 

issues. “Mother got her drug and alcohol treatment through 

Family Services and completed the program after her first DUI.” 

However, Mother not only got a subsequent DUI, but she also lost 

custody of her other two (2) children due to her drinking and 

fighting in their presence. Considering the short-lived and 

minimal attempts at progress Mother made towards her own 

sobriety, it is clear that Mother’s incapacity as a parent cannot be 

remedied.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/10/20, at 11-13 (record citation omitted).

The record supports the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Ms. Anderson testified that 

Mother did not attend parenting classes, did not continue to attend Alcoholics 

Anonymous meetings and failed to maintain sobriety, and did not comply with 

mental health services. N.T., 2/14/20, at 184-185; N.T., 6/29/20, at 239. 

Ms. Anderson explained that family therapy was discontinued due to Mother’s 

lack of participation. N.T., 2/14/20, at 46-47. Mother also had a goal of 

maintaining contact with Child while he has been placed at George Junior

Republic; however, out of the fifteen months of his placement, Mother did not 
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visit Child for four months and Ms. Anderson described her phone contact 

being as “[i]nconsistent and sporadic.” Id. at 185-186. 

Based on the forgoing, the record demonstrates clear and convincing 

evidence of Mother’s repeated and continuing incapacity to meet her goals 

that led to Child being without parental care and subsistence, including a safe, 

secure, and permanent environment in which to grow. Further, the evidence 

supports the finding that it is unlikely Mother will remedy the situation given 

CYS’s extensive history of providing services and aid to Mother with Mother 

only achieving inconsistent and sporadic progress in her goals. Accordingly, 

we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s 

determination to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(2). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Child’s first issue, therefore, 

is without merit.

We now proceed to the second part of the analysis under Section 

2511(b). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under Section 

2511(b), our Supreme Court stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “intangibles such as love,

comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 

(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1992)], 

this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between 

the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
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T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. 

With respect to the bond analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b), the Court 

explained, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent 

will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition.” Id. 

“Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also 

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they 

have a bond with their foster parents.” Id. at 268 (citation omitted). 

Moreover, in weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), 

“courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are 

young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their 

healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is 

catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

Mother and Child both challenge the trial court’s determination that 

there was clear and convincing evidence that involuntary termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs of Child.

Mother contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a 

determination that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest 

of Child pursuant to Section 2511(b). Mother asserts that she relinquished 

care of Child to Father in the past because “[t]here was indication that [C]hild 

was difficult to deal with behaviorally[.]” Mother’s Brief at 11. Mother also 

avers that because she shares a bond with Child and an adoptive resource has 
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not been identified, termination of her parental rights will result in Child 

becoming an orphan and cause detrimental emotional effects for Child. Id. 

Mother further argues that, given Child’s age, his preference not to be adopted 

should be given more consideration. Id. at 11-12.

Child contends that the trial court erred when it determined that CYS 

met its burden of proof for termination of Mother’s parental rights and failed 

to adequately consider Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

and welfare. More specifically, Child avers that the trial court failed to take 

into account the possible consequence of creating an orphan if Child refused 

to sign a consent to adoption. Child’s Brief at 18.

In determining that the evidence established that termination of

Mother’s parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare of Child, the trial court explained:

First, the [c]ourt] acknowledges that there is a bond between 

Mother and [C]hild. While Dr. von Korff freely admits that there 

is an emotional connection between Mother and [C]hild, he does 

not believe it is a beneficial one. “What we seem to pick up, 

although more from [Mother] than from [Child] is that his 

preoccupation with her has the idea in it of protecting her from 

trauma.” As discussed earlier, Mother and [C]hild have what Dr. 

von Korff refers to as an “upside-down” relationship where [C]hild 

takes on the parental role over Mother. Mother has looked to 

[C]hild for protection or safety when she does not offer the same 

to him. [C]hild was present when Father brandished a loaded 

firearm and threatened paternal grandfather. [C]hild’s first phone 

call was to . . . Mother looking for help and reassurance. Mother 

not only offered no assistance to [C]hild in this dangerous 

situation, but when relating this incident to Dr. von Korff, she 

recalled stating, “First, I am not coming to save you this time. 

Second, you will have to do this alone. And third, speak for 

yourself, [C]hild.” This clearly demonstrates not only the lack of 
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any meaningful relationship between Mother and [C]hild, but it 

shows how maintaining a relationship with Mother would further 

impede [C]hild’s recovery and ability to move forward in the 

future.

Next, [C]hild claims that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

will have a negative impact upon him. On the contrary, all of the 

evidence presented at the hearing shows that the continuation of 

a relationship between Mother and [C]hild would be detrimental 

to him presently and to his future recovery. The inconsistency of 

their relationship since [CYS] first became involved in October 

2015 has remained to this day. Since that time, Mother has 

relinquished custody of [C]hild twice to his [f]ather, where [C]hild 

was either abused, injured, or a witness to criminal activity. 

Mother has also lived with several male companions, some of 

whom did not want [C]hild to live with them, and Mother’s 

response was to send [C]hild to live elsewhere. [C]hild has never 

been the priority in Mother’s life. Connie Snyder testified about a 

particular time where Mother missed a visit with [C]hild in his 

treatment facility. Mother had planned to come visit and [C]hild 

was expecting her when she called to tell the facility that she 

wasn’t able to come. When the facility inquired as to why she was 

unable to visit, she explained she had gotten a dog while on 

vacation. Connie Snyder had to explain this situation to [C]hild. 

“I did talk to him about the dog. He was disappointed because 

the places where his [M]other lived, she didn’t have space for him 

to come with her if he was to be discharged and he was 

disappointed that she had room for a dog but not for him.” These 

types of events and disappointments have occurred consistently 

throughout the five (5) years of involvement between Mother and 

[C]hild with [CYS]. Dr. von Korff doesn’t believe these behaviors 

come from a place of ill-will, however regardless of the motivation 

of these behaviors, their effects have negatively impacted [C]hild 

for years. “I don’t think she does anything intentionally to. . . 

damage the relationship but she has lack of insight into some 

really highly rejecting behaviors.” It is evident to the [c]ourt] that 

until Mother’s rights are terminated, [C]hild has no possibility of 

ever succeeding in his treatment and being able to move forward 

towards a better and stable life.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/10/20, at 14-16.
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The record supports the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). With respect to the “upside 

down” relationship described by Dr. von Korff, he conceded that while it is a 

form of loving behavior, “it’s not a kind of loving behavior that’s going to 

generate a secure status for the youngster in terms of his place in the world 

and his sense of attachment.” N.T., 2/14/10, at 88. Dr. von Korff noted that 

Child “has experienced [M]other as very inconsistently available as a mother 

in person. Sometimes she is a mother in person, and sometimes she is like a 

peer.” Id. at 93. Dr. von Korff described Mother and Child’s bond as being 

one that is not secure and explained that “at best, you could say it’s a complex 

and troubled attachment.” Id. at 98. Specifically, Dr. von Korff described 

that Child “is avoidant and minimally engaged with [Mother]. So, I see that 

as evidence of an insecure attachment arrangement between them.” Id. at 

110. Ms. Anderson also emphasized that Child needs “consistency” in order 

for him to continue to work on building trust and attachment. N.T., 2/14/20, 

at 33.

Based on the foregoing, there is competent evidence in the record that 

supports the trial court’s credibility and weight assessments regarding Child’s 

needs and welfare. We discern no error or abuse of discretion in its 

determinations under Section 2511(b).

As to Mother and Child’s further arguments regarding Child’s 

preferences and the absence of a pre-adoptive home, our Supreme Court has 
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stated, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination must 

also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether 

they have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. In 

addition, the Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook provides that “[w]hile 

having an identified adoptive resource is not a prerequisite for [termination of 

parental rights], ideally there should be a strong likelihood of eventual 

adoption.” Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts Office of Children and 

Families in the Courts, Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook § 12.1 at 126 

(2010).

Here, at the time of the final termination hearing in June of 2020, Child 

was eleven years of age and had consistently maintained a preference not to 

have Mother’s rights terminated. N.T., 6/29/20, at 300-01. At that time, 

Mother was living in a half-way house for drug and alcohol treatment. Id. at 

285. Moreover, Mr. Corbin testified that CYS had identified two families that 

could be potential adoptive resources. Id. at 284 and 299. The trial court 

credited the testimony of Dr. von Korff about the slim likelihood that the 

attachment between Child and Mother can be made secure or beneficial for 

Child and noted that “[C]hild and [M]other are in a real difficulty at this point 

in time.” Id. at 105. The trial court credited Dr. von Korff’s testimony that it 

has been difficult for Mother to “think hard about the recommendations that 

are being made [by] mental health professionals, and really try to see herself 
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as someone who needs to learn. Someone who needs to rely on expertise.” 

Id. Dr. von Korff cautioned:

Well, I, I fear that he is headed for, if he doesn’t achieve some, 

some measure of security now, he is headed for being an angry 

alienated adult. Very possibly one who has the kinds of anger 

management problems that he has witnesses in his father and 

with the other male figures that have crossed his path.

Id. at 105-106.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court’s findings are 

supported by the competent evidence in the record, and the trial court did not 

err or abuse its discretion in granting CYS’s petition to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights as to Child. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decree.

3

Decree affirmed.

____________________________________________

3 At the hearing, Child’s legal interest counsel asserted that Child would not 

consent to an adoption, questioned CYS’s witnesses, including Connie Snyder, 

on cross-examination about this point, and raised it in her closing argument. 

See N.T., 6/29/20, at 263-65; N.T., 6/30/20, at 336-43. Both Mother and 

Child have included a discussion of this consideration in their briefs, as has 

CYS. See Mother’s Brief at 7, 11-12; Child’s Brief at 10, 16-18; CYS’s Briefs 

at 25-27. The trial court rejected the argument that Child does not wish to 

be adopted as not being the overriding concern because of Child’s best 

interests. 

We acknowledge that this Court has vacated and remanded a termination 

decrees where the child’s appointed counsel failed to raise arguments that a

child would not be amenable to signing a consent to adoption. See Interest 

of D.G., 241 A.3d 1230, 1232 (2020); Interest of D.N.G., 230 A.3d 361, 

367-68 (Pa. Super. 2020)). Here, however, Child’s counsel actively advocated 

at the hearing concerning Child’s position on consenting to adoption and the 

present case presents different facts from which the trial court could properly 

conclude that Child’s remaining in Mother’s care and custody is not in Child’s 

best interest. Therefore, we do not find D.G. or D.N.G. to be applicable. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/17/2021