J-S38006-15 and J-S38007-15

2015 PA Super 250

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

STEWARD STECKLEY, JR.

Appellee No. 1995 MDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order of November 5, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-54-CR-0001033-2009

 CP-54-CR-0001215-2009

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

STEWARD STECKLEY, JR.

Appellant No. 2103 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered on November 5, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-54-CR-0001033-2009

 CP-54-CR-0001215-2009

BEFORE: WECHT, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY WECHT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2015

In this consolidated case, both the Commonwealth and Steward 

Steckley (“Steckley”) appeal the November 5, 2014 order granting 

Steckley’s petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 
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(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and 

remand for resentencing. 

In 2009, the Commonwealth charged Steckley with two counts of 

possession of child pornography and one count of prohibited offensive 

weapons.1 Prior to trial, the Commonwealth provided sentencing guideline 

worksheets to Steckley’s attorney. Those worksheets contained the 

guideline sentencing range for each of the above offenses. Based upon 

Steckley’s prior record score, the standard range of the sentencing 

guidelines called for a sentence of nine to sixteen months’ imprisonment for 

each count of possession of child pornography, with an aggravated range of 

sixteen to nineteen months’ imprisonment. The sentencing worksheets 

prepared by the Commonwealth did not indicate that any mandatory 

sentences were applicable to the crimes charged. 

On December 3, 2009, immediately before jury selection began, 

Steckley’s attorney engaged in guilty plea negotiations with the district 

attorney. The Commonwealth offered to recommend an aggregate sentence 

of three to six years’ imprisonment if Steckley pleaded guilty to all charges. 

Steckley rejected that offer because it “didn’t make sense to [him]” in light 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6312(d) and 908, respectively. The Commonwealth 

filed these charges in two separate criminal complaints. On May 20, 2009, 

the Commonwealth charged Steckley (at CR-1033-2009) with one count of 

possession of child pornography and one count of prohibited offensive 

weapons. On July 20, 2009, the Commonwealth charged Steckley (at CR1215-2009) with a second count of possession of child pornography. The 

Commonwealth consolidated these cases for trial pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

582. 
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of the sentencing guideline worksheets provided by the Commonwealth, 

which indicated a standard range sentence of nine to sixteen months’ 

imprisonment. Notes of Testimony PCRA (“N.T.P.”), 8/5/2014, at 21. The 

Commonwealth then offered to reduce the recommended sentence to a term 

of two to six years’ imprisonment, which Steckley declined for the same 

reason. Id. Having failed to reach an agreement, the parties proceeded to 

jury selection. 

On December 10, 2009, a jury found Steckley guilty of two counts of 

possession of child pornography, but found him not guilty of prohibited 

offensive weapons. The trial court ordered Steckley to undergo an 

evaluation by the Sexual Offender Assessment Board (“SOAB”) prior to 

sentencing. The trial court subsequently continued Steckley’s sentencing 

hearing so that he could seek an independent evaluation from a forensic 

psychologist. Once these evaluations were completed, the trial court 

scheduled Steckley’s sentencing hearing for April 30, 2010. 

On April 30, 2010, the parties appeared for sentencing. However, the 

Commonwealth’s witness from the SOAB failed to appear at the hearing. 

The trial court continued Steckley’s sentencing until June 30, 2010. On June 

22, 2010, eight days before Steckley’s rescheduled sentencing hearing, the 

Commonwealth provided Steckley notice of its intent to seek imposition of a 

mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment due to 

Steckley’s prior conviction, in 1994, for indecent assault. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9718.2 (mandatory sentencing scheme for repeat sexual offenders). 
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On June 30, 2010, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 

twenty-five to fifty years’ imprisonment for each of Steckley’s possession of 

child pornography convictions. Steckley timely filed a post-sentence motion. 

Therein, Steckley maintained that the Commonwealth was required to 

provide pretrial notice of its intention to seek a mandatory minimum 

sentence. Steckley based his argument upon the plain language of 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9718.2(d), which, at the time, provided as follows: 

Authority of court in sentencing.—Notice of the application of 

this section shall be provided to the defendant before trial. If 

the notice is given, there shall be no authority in any court to 

impose on an offender to which this section is applicable any 

lesser sentence than provided for in subsections (a) and (b) or to 

place the offender on probation or to suspend sentence. . . .

42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.2(d) (2009) (emphasis added). 

On September 23, 2010, the trial court denied Steckley’s motion, 

finding that the Commonwealth’s post-trial notice “was sufficient under the 

terms of the [s]tatute.” Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 9/23/2010, at 2. On 

August 16, 2011, a divided panel of this Court affirmed Steckley’s judgment 

of sentence in an unpublished memorandum decision. Commonwealth v. 

Steckley, 1738 MDA 2010 (Pa. Super. Aug. 16, 2011). The majority held 

that subsection 9718.2(d) imposed a duty upon defense counsel, rather than 

the Commonwealth, to give his or her client notice of the mandatory 

minimum sentence prior to trial. Id. at *5. 

On September 15, 2011, Steckley filed a petition for allowance of 

appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. On December 20, 2011 the 
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General Assembly amended Subsection 9718.2(d), eliminating the 

requirement that “[n]otice . . . be provided to the defendant before trial.” 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9718.2(d) (2009). On April 4, 2012, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court granted Steckley’s petition for allowance of appeal, but 

subsequently dismissed the appeal as having been improvidently granted. 

See Commonwealth v. Steckley, 41 A.3d 855 (Pa. 2012); 

Commonwealth v. Steckley, 67 A.3d 758 (Pa. 2013). 

On April 29, 2014, Steckley timely filed a PCRA petition. Therein, 

Steckley alleged various instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Relevant to this appeal, Steckley alleged that his attorney was ineffective in 

failing to inform him of the potential that the Commonwealth would seek 

imposition of a twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence. 

On August 5, 2014, the PCRA court held a hearing on Steckley’s 

petition. Steckley’s attorney testified that she was unaware of the potential 

twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence, and, therefore, did not 

apprise Steckley of the same. N.T.P. at 6. She also unequivocally testified 

that her failure to recognize the extent of Steckley’s potential exposure at 

sentencing negatively affected her representation of Steckley. 

Q: If you had been aware of the mandatory minimum, would 

you have changed how you approached the case[?]

A: Absolutely. 

Q: What would you have done differently?

A: I probably would have more strenuously discussed actually 

taking a plea or working something out by way of not 
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having the Commonwealth pursue that mandatory and 

taking the offered plea. 

Q: Do you feel you were able to adequately advise [Steckley] 

regarding the plea offer since you didn’t know about the 

mandatory minimum?

A: In hindsight, no, I didn’t. 

Id. at 11-12. 

Steckley testified that his attorney engaged in guilty plea negotiations 

with the district attorney immediately before jury selection began on 

December 3, 2010. Steckley’s attorney informed him that the 

Commonwealth was willing to recommend an aggregate sentence of three to 

six years’ imprisonment if Steckley would plead guilty to all of the charges. 

Steckley rejected that offer because it “didn’t make sense to [him]” in light 

of the sentencing guideline worksheet provided by the Commonwealth, 

which indicated a standard range sentence of nine to sixteen months’ 

imprisonment. Id. at 21. The Commonwealth then offered to recommend a 

sentence of two to six years’ imprisonment, which Steckley declined for the 

same reason. Id. Steckley testified that, had he known about the twentyfive year mandatory minimum sentence, he would have pleaded guilty on 

December 3, 2010. Id. at 23. 

On November 5, 2014, the PCRA court entered an order granting 

Steckley’s PCRA petition, vacating his convictions, and relisting his cases for 

trial. On November 24, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal. 

Although not ordered to do so by the PCRA court, the Commonwealth filed a 
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concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on December 1, 2014. 

Also on December 1, 2014, Steckley filed a notice of appeal. On December 

8, 2014, the PCRA court ordered Steckley to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Steckley 

timely complied. On January 9, 2015, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) opinion. We sua sponte consolidated the above-captioned cases for 

unitary review. 

The Commonwealth presents two issues for our consideration: 

1. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err as a matter of law in determining 

th[at Steckley] carried his burden of proof to show that he 

was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s errors?

2. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err as a matter of law in determining 

that, where trial counsel fails to inform her client that there is 

a mandatory minimum sentence applicable to the crimes 

charged, the proper remedy is vacating the conviction and 

granting a new trial?

Brief for Commonwealth (1995 MDA 2014) at 4. 

In his cross-appeal, Steckley’s sole issue parallels the 

Commonwealth’s second issue: “Did the [PCRA] court err and commit an 

abuse of discretion when, after granting [Steckley’s] petition for postconviction relief, it ordered that the appropriate remedy was a new trial?” 

Brief for Steckley (2013 MDA 2014) at 3 (capitalization modified). 

This Court analyzes PCRA appeals “in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party at the PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. 

Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2012). Our “review is 

limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of 

record” and we do not “disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is 

supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.” Id. 
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Similarly, “[w]e grant great deference to the factual findings of 

the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they 

have no support in the record. However, we afford no such 

deference to its legal conclusions.” Id. (citations omitted). 

“[W]here the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of 

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Finally, 

we “may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the 

record supports it.” Id. 

Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

Pennsylvania has recast the two-factor inquiry regarding the 

effectiveness of counsel set forth by the United States Supreme Court in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as the following threefactor inquiry: 

[I]n order to obtain relief based on [an ineffective assistance of 

counsel] claim, a petitioner must establish: (1) the underlying 

claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for 

counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) petitioner suffered 

prejudice as a result of counsel’s error such that there is a 

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would 

have been different absent such error.

Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216, 1221 (Pa. 2005) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987)). Trial counsel is 

presumed to be effective, and a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of 

pleading and proving each of the three factors by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365, 369 

(Pa. Super. 2006); see Commonwealth v. Meadows, 787 A.2d 312, 319-

20 (Pa. 2001). 

Instantly, the PCRA court found that Steckley established each of the 

three prongs of the Pierce test. On appeal, the Commonwealth argues only 
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that Steckley “wholly failed to prove the prejudice prong of his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim.” Brief for Commonwealth (1995 MDA 2014) at 

18. Thus, we need not discuss at length the unreasonableness of Steckley’s 

attorney’s failure to inform her client that he might be sentenced to a 

lengthy mandatory term of imprisonment if he opted to go to trial and did 

not prevail.2 

In Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012), the 

Supreme Court of the United States elucidated the showing necessary to 

satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong (the third prong of the Pierce test) in 

cases where counsel’s ineffectiveness causes a defendant to reject a plea 

offer. In that case, a criminal defendant, Cooper, shot a woman “in her 

buttock, hip, and abdomen,” but the woman survived. Id. at 1383. Cooper 

was charged with, inter alia, assault with intent to murder. Id. Cooper 

twice rejected a favorable plea offer, “allegedly after his attorney convinced 

him that the prosecution would be unable to establish his intent to murder 

[the victim] because she had been shot below the waist.” Id. Cooper 

proceeded to trial and was convicted. Id. He then received a sentence 

much harsher than the one the prosecution initially offered. Id.

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2 We acknowledged trial counsel’s deficient performance, albeit in dicta, 

when this case was before us on direct appeal. See Steckley, 1738 MDA 

2010, slip. op. at 6 (Pa. Super. Aug. 16, 2011) (“[I]t is the duty of [] 

defense counsel to inform his client of those things he needs to know to 

make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision whether to seek a 

negotiated guilty plea or go to trial. Certainly, knowledge of sentencing 

exposure is necessary information.”). 
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The Supreme Court concluded that Cooper’s counsel had been 

ineffective, and explained that a post-conviction petitioner seeking relief on 

the basis that ineffective assistance of counsel caused him or her to reject a 

guilty plea must demonstrate the following circumstance:

[B]ut for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable 

probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the 

court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and 

the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of 

intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted 

its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the 

offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the 

judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed. 

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385. 

The Commonwealth maintains that Steckley failed to demonstrate 

every one of these elements. The Commonwealth first argues that Steckley 

did not establish that he would have accepted the Commonwealth’s plea 

offer but for his attorney’s ineffectiveness. According to the Commonwealth, 

Steckley did not meet his burden because he “presented nothing more than 

his own self-serving statement that he would have taken the plea.” Brief for 

Commonwealth (1995 MDA 2014) at 14. The Commonwealth also contends 

that Steckley’s PCRA hearing testimony is contradicted by the fact that he 

“maintained up through trial that he was innocent of the charges.” Id. 

As a preliminary matter, we note that nothing prevents a PCRA 

petitioner from meeting his burden under Lafler with “his own self-serving 

statement” that he would have entered a guilty plea but for counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. As long as the PCRA court finds the petitioner’s testimony to 
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be credible, there is no coherent justification for characterizing such 

evidence as inherently deficient as a matter of law. In cases such as the one 

sub judice, where a petitioner’s testimony is credible and uncontradicted, it 

may suffice to establish a reasonable probability that the petitioner would 

have accepted the prosecution’s plea offer. 

Nonetheless, Steckley’s willingness to enter into a plea agreement 

finds corroboration in the record before us. Steckley’s trial counsel testified 

that she “strenuously” would have encouraged Steckley to accept the 

Commonwealth’s plea offer had she known about the mandatory sentencing 

scheme for repeat sexual offenders. N.T.P. at 11. At a minimum, Steckley’s 

attorney believed that her client was amenable to a plea bargain. In 

addition, the substantial disparity between the recommended sentence of 

two to six years’ imprisonment under the Commonwealth’s plea offer and 

the twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence lends credence to 

Steckley’s claim that he would have accepted the proposed bargain. 

The Commonwealth cites Foster v. United States, to support its 

contention that a PCRA petitioner cannot carry his or her burden with “selfserving” testimony. 735 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 2013). The Commonwealth’s 

reliance upon Foster is misplaced for two reasons. First, Pennsylvania 

courts are not bound by the decisions of the federal courts of appeals. See 

Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 609 n.12 (Pa. 2008). Second, 

Foster does not stand for the proposition that a post-conviction petitioner 

can never demonstrate prejudice based upon his or her own testimony. In 
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fact, the court explicitly declined to reach that conclusion. See Foster, 735 

F.3d at 567.

In Foster, an attorney neglected to inform his client that the 

government might file a Section 8513information, which would have the 

effect of doubling the defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence from ten to 

twenty years’ imprisonment. When, ten days prior to trial, the government 

filed a Section 851 information, counsel approached his client and suggested 

that he might still be able to secure a favorable plea agreement. The 

defendant steadfastly refused to accept a plea bargain, and reiterated his 

desire to proceed to trial. A jury subsequently convicted the defendant of 

some, but not all, of the crimes with which he was charged. 

Following his sentencing, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his 

judgment of conviction. Therein, he contended that he would have agreed 

to plead guilty had his attorney informed him that the government might file 

a Section 851 information. At a hearing on the defendant’s motion, trial 

counsel testified that the defendant stated he wanted to go to trial even if it 

meant that he might be sentenced to life imprisonment. According to trial 

counsel, the defendant reiterated his refusal to accept a guilty plea 

agreement even after the government filed its Section 851 information. In 

light of this evidence, the district court found the defendant’s testimony to 

____________________________________________

3 See 21 U.S.C. § 851 (sentencing enhancements for repeat felony drug 

offenders). 
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be incredible, and his attorney’s testimony to be credible. Foster, 735 F.3d 

at 566.

Steckley did not learn about the applicable mandatory minimum until 

after he was convicted at trial. In contrast, the defendant in Foster refused 

to enter into a plea agreement even after he learned that the government 

was seeking imposition of a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence. 

Unlike the district court in Foster, the PCRA court did not find Steckley to be 

an incredible witness, nor did Steckley’s PCRA hearing testimony conflict 

with his attorney’s testimony. 

Foster is neither controlling nor persuasive authority. Both the facts 

of that case and its procedural posture plainly are distinguishable. 

Furthermore, even if Foster were factually analogous to the case sub judice, 

a close reading of the opinion belies the Commonwealth’s assertion that 

Foster stands for the proposition that a petitioner cannot demonstrate 

prejudice with his or her own testimony. See Foster, 735 F.3d at 567 

(noting that such a precept has “shaky foundations” and a “lack of firm 

support” in case law). 

The Commonwealth’s argument that Steckley did not demonstrate a 

reasonable probability of prejudice because he “maintained up through trial 

that he was innocent of the charges” is also unpersuasive. See Brief for 

Commonwealth (1995 MDA 2014) at 14. The PCRA court did not err in 

concluding that Steckley demonstrated prejudice even though he had 

maintained that he was innocent of the crimes charged. While a defendant’s 
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declaration of innocence is a factor that the PCRA court may consider, it is 

not determinative. 

A defendant’s assertion of innocence does not necessarily belie his 

later claim that he would have accepted a guilty plea offer. A criminal 

defendant might maintain his innocence up until the point of pleading guilty 

in order to strengthen his bargaining position. Indeed, a defendant may 

enter a guilty plea while continuing to maintain that he is factually innocent. 

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33 (1970). The 

Commonwealth’s argument also ignores the troublesome fact that some 

innocent defendants do plead guilty. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, 

J., dissenting) (“[Plea bargaining] presents grave risks of prosecutorial 

overcharging that effectively compels an innocent defendant to avoid 

massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense[.]”). 

Next, the Commonwealth argues that Steckley “failed to show that the 

plea offer would have been made to begin with if the prosecuting attorney 

would have known about the mandatory minimum.” Brief for 

Commonwealth (1995 MDA 2014) at 14. Here too, the Commonwealth 

attempts to expand the showing required to establish prejudice beyond the 

burden enunciated in Lafler. Steckley was not required to demonstrate that 

a more diligent prosecutor would have made the same offer. Whereas 

Steckley had a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, 

the Commonwealth did not. Steckley’s attorney should have informed her 
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client of the possibility that he could face a mandatory twenty-five year 

sentence irrespective of whether the district attorney knew of the same. 

The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable probability exists that the 

district attorney would have discovered the mandatory minimum and 

withdrawn the pendent plea offer prior to the court’s acceptance of it. See 

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385. The Commonwealth argues that the PCRA court 

was left to speculate on this issue. This is true. But, the test set forth in 

Lafler necessarily requires courts to speculate as to what would have 

transpired absent trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Cf. Missouri v. Frye, ___ 

U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1413 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (denouncing 

Lafler’s prejudice inquiry as “retrospective crystal-ball gazing posing as 

legal analysis”).

Here, the Commonwealth discovered the mandatory minimum 

sentence nearly seven months after Steckley rejected the Commonwealth’s 

plea offer and proceeded to trial. Based upon this timeline, the PCRA court 

found it to be reasonably probable that Steckley would have accepted the 

plea offer long before the Commonwealth sought imposition of the 

mandatory minimum sentence. Furthermore, even if the Commonwealth 

had learned of the applicable statute earlier, it does not inevitably follow that 

it would have withdrawn the plea offer. It is just as likely that the 

Commonwealth would have used the draconian mandatory sentence as a 

means to encourage Steckley to plead guilty, thereby avoiding the expense 

and uncertainty of a jury trial. 
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The Commonwealth next argues that Steckley failed to demonstrate 

that, had he entered a guilty plea, the trial court would have accepted it. It 

is well established that “[w]hile the Commonwealth and a criminal defendant 

are free to enter into an arrangement that the parties deem fitting, the 

terms of a plea agreement are not binding upon the court. Rather the court 

may reject those terms if the court believes the terms do not serve justice.” 

Commonwealth v. White, 787 A.2d 1088, 1091 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

Under the terms of the Commonwealth’s proposal, Steckley would 

plead guilty to each of the crimes charged, and the Commonwealth would 

recommend that the trial court impose an aggregate sentence of two to six 

years’ incarceration. Because this arrangement did not involve the dismissal 

of charges or a negotiated sentence that would bind the trial court upon its 

acceptance of the plea, it is difficult to imagine any reason why the court 

would have rejected it. It defies common sense to believe that the trial 

court, for no apparent reason, would have rejected the plea bargain and 

ordered the parties to endure a lengthy and expensive trial. Cf. 

Commonwealth v. Chazin, 873 A.2d 732, 737 (Pa. Super. 2005) (rejecting 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the trial judge explicitly stated 

that he would not have accepted petitioner’s guilty plea where the 

agreement called for a negotiated sentence of four to eight years’ 

imprisonment). 

The Commonwealth underscores that, at Steckley’s sentencing 

hearing, the court remarked as follows: “the legislature has commanded me 
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to impose this sentence[,] but even if the legislature did not, I would impose 

it anyway.” Notes of Testimony, 6/30/2010, at 58. Lafler requires there be 

a reasonable probability that the sentence “under the offer’s terms would 

have been less severe” than the sentence actually imposed. Thus, the 

sentencing court’s declaration that it would have imposed an identical 

sentence notwithstanding the mandatory minimum, if taken at face value, 

may have been fatal to Steckley’s claim that he suffered prejudice. Upon 

closer inspection however, a sentence of twenty-five to fifty years’ 

imprisonment based upon Steckley’s convictions would have constituted an 

illegal sentence unless the mandatory sentence applied.4 This fact 

controverts the sentencing court’s contention that it would have, or even 

that it could have, imposed an identical sentence irrespective of 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9718.2. 

The PCRA court did not err in concluding that Steckley demonstrated a 

reasonable probability that, had he accepted the Commonwealth’s plea offer, 

the court would have imposed a sentence less severe than the one he 

received following trial. As a matter of law, Steckley necessarily would have 

received a significantly more favorable sentence by accepting the 

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4 The jury convicted Steckley of two counts of possession of child 

pornography, each of which was graded as a third degree felony. Even if the 

court imposed the statutory maximum sentence for each count, and imposed 

those sentences consecutively, Steckley’s aggregate sentence would have 

been seven to fourteen years. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103 (“[A] person who has 

been convicted of a [third degree] felony may be sentenced to imprisonment 

. . . for a term which shall be fixed by the court at not more than seven 

years.”). 
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Commonwealth’s plea offer. This is true even though the proposed 

agreement required Steckley to plead guilty to prohibited offensive weapons, 

an offense that he ultimately was acquitted of at trial. Even if the court 

rejected the Commonwealth’s recommendation of two to six years’ 

imprisonment, imposed the maximum allowable sentence for each of the 

three counts, and imposed all of those sentences consecutively, Steckley’s 

aggregate sentence would have been nine and one-half to nineteen years’ 

imprisonment.5 

Viewing the record before us in the light most favorable to Steckley—

as our standard of review requires—the Commonwealth has not persuaded 

us that Steckley failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his 

attorney’s ineffectiveness. See Rigg, 84 A.3d at 1084 (“This Court analyzes 

PCRA appeals in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA 

level.”). Steckley was not required to prove that trial counsel’s deficient 

conduct caused a worse result for him. A “reasonable probability” is 

sufficient. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385. In granting Steckley postconviction relief, the PCRA court found reasonably probable Steckley’s 

contention that he would have accepted the Commonwealth’s plea offer 

without either the Commonwealth withdrawing it or the trial court rejecting 

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5 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103 (“[A] person who has been convicted of a 

[third degree] felony may be sentenced to imprisonment . . . for a term 

which shall be fixed by the court at not more than seven years.”); 18 

Pa.C.S. § 1104 (“A person who has been convicted of a [first degree] 

misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprisonment for a definite term which 

shall be fixed by the court and shall be not more than . . . [f]ive years.”). 
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it. Because the certified record supports those findings, we may not disturb 

them on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 

(Pa. Super. 2012) (“The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless 

there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”). 

Having concluded that the PCRA court did not err in granting 

Steckley’s petition, we now must determine whether the appropriate remedy 

was to vacate Steckley’s convictions and to order a new trial. Both the 

Commonwealth and Steckley argue that it was not. We agree. 

Although the Supreme Court left to the trial courts how best to 

exercise their discretion based upon the circumstances of a particular case, 

it set forth the following general principles: 

Sixth Amendment remedies should be “tailored to the injury 

suffered from the constitutional violation and should not 

unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.” United States 

v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981). Thus, a remedy must 

“neutralize the taint” of a constitutional violation, id. at 365, 

while at the same time not grant a windfall to the defendant or 

needlessly squander the considerable resources the State 

properly invested in the criminal prosecution. See United 

States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986) (“The reversal of a 

conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, 

witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to 

expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a 

trial that has already once taken place; victims may be asked to 

relive their disturbing experiences.”).

* * * *

The time continuum makes it difficult to restore the defendant 

and the prosecution to the precise positions they occupied prior 

to the rejection of the plea offer, but that baseline can be 

consulted in finding a remedy that does not require the 

prosecution to incur the expense of conducting a new trial. 
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Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388-89. 

The PCRA court vacated Steckley’s convictions and awarded him a new 

trial. Yet, the prejudice Steckley suffered—a sentence substantially longer 

than the one offered under the imprudently rejected plea offer—might 

remain after one retrial or even after ten retrials. A new trial cannot 

resurrect Steckley’s foregone opportunity to accept the Commonwealth’s 

plea offer any more than his first constitutionally sufficient trial did. If 

Steckley is reconvicted, the Commonwealth, once again, could seek 

imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence. On the other hand, a new 

trial gives Steckley another opportunity to obtain an acquittal, a remedy that 

would be disproportionate insofar as Steckley has neither pleaded nor 

proved any irregularity in the jury’s guilty verdict. 

The PCRA court’s remedy disregards all of Lafler’s guiding precepts. 

It fails to “neutralize the taint of [the] constitutional violation,” “needlessly 

squander[s] the considerable resources the [Commonwealth] properly 

invested in the criminal prosecution,” and risks “grant[ing Steckley] a 

windfall.”6 Id. Because the court’s sentencing discretion is confined by a 

____________________________________________

6 The PCRA court reasoned, “[t]o require the Commonwealth to reoffer 

the original plea proposal, in light of the Commonwealth’s error in failing to 

seek the mandatory minimum in the sentencing guidelines, would be 

granting a windfall to [Steckley.]” PCRA Court Opinion, 1/9/2015, at 5. It is 

true that the Commonwealth’s relinquishment of a mandatory sentence 

generally is advantageous for a criminal defendant. Nevertheless, such a 

“windfall” likely would have ensued in this case had Steckley’s Sixth 

Amendment right to effective counsel been scrupulously honored. 

In a similar vein, the learned Dissent argues that “[d]irecting the trial 

court to order the Commonwealth to offer the rejected plea again would be 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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mandatory minimum sentence, the only logical remedy to neutralize 

Steckley’s constitutional injury is “to require the prosecution to reoffer the 

plea proposal.”7 Id. Accordingly, we reverse the PCRA court’s order to the 

extent that it awarded Steckley a new trial, and we remand this case to the 

PCRA court with instructions to resentence Steckley according to the plea 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

futile, since that offer was based upon a mutual mistake.” See Concurring 

and Dissenting Op. at *3. The Dissent does not cite any cases in which 

courts have held that a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the 

assistance of effective trial counsel is diminished when a prosecutor makes a 

lenient plea offer. In many cases throughout this Commonwealth, 

prosecutors enter into plea agreements that they might have considered too 

generous but for some misconception about the available evidence or the 

applicable law. After a defendant accepts a favorable plea offer, his 

sentence remains final even if the prosecutor later learns of his or her 

misjudgment. The fact that Steckley was provided with constitutionally 

deficient representation should not compel a different conclusion in this 

case. Stated simply, the fact that this case presents a “mutual mistake” is 

of no consequence. Counsel’s mistake amounted to a constitutional 

violation; the district attorney’s mistake did not. Although we must remedy 

the former, the latter is beyond our purview. 

7 Although the learned Dissent acknowledges that our remedy “must 

‘neutralize the taint’ of a constitutional violation,” the remedy that it 

proposes would do no such thing. See Concurring and Dissenting Op. at *3. 

To require that the Commonwealth simply “make a good faith plea offer” 

upon remand would put Steckley in a far worse position than that in which 

he would have found himself had the state provided him with constitutionally 

effective representation in the first instance. Id. Indeed, the learned 

Dissent would license the trial court to “leave the conviction and sentence 

resulting from the trial undisturbed.” Id. at *4. This is not a remedy at all, 

and would do nothing to neutralize the violation of Steckley’s Sixth 

Amendment right to effective counsel. We agree with the learned Dissent 

that “it must be the trial court that decides how best to exercise its 

discretion under the circumstances[.]” Id. at *4. Because the plea 

agreement in this case did not include a negotiated sentence, the remedy 

that we order today fully preserves the trial court’s sentencing discretion, 

while ensuring that the court does not disregard the underlying 

constitutional violation. 
J-S38006-15 and J-S38007-15

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bargain that he previously rejected due to his attorney’s deficient 

performance. 

Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Musmanno joins the opinion.

Judge Stabile files a concurring/dissenting opinion. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/30/2015