UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ TRINI ENCINIAS, as personal representative of the Estate of Adonus R. Encinias, deceased, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. NEW MEXICO CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT; BEVERLY WOODBURY; TITO VI DAL; ISABELLE DOMINGUEZ; CHRIS MAURER, Defendants - Ap p ellees. No. 23-2052 (D.C. No. 1:21-CV-01145-KG-SCY) (D. N.M.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before McHUGH , EBEL , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Plaintiff-Appellant Trini Encinias, persona l representative of the estate of her son, Adonus Encinias, appeals the district court’s dismi ssal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of her claim against Defendant -Appellees Isabelle Dominguez, Chris Maurer, Beverly Woodbury, and Tito Vidal. Mr. Encinias was an inmate in the custody of the New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD) who had serious mental health conditions and had attempted suicide on mu ltiple previous occasions.

* This order and judgment is not bi nding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 3, 2024 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 12 Mr. Encinias tragically died by suicide while in NMCD custody. Plaintiff then brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants—a ll of whom worked as NMCD mental health staff a nd interacted with, and evalua ted, Mr. Encinias while he was in custody—alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Encinias’ serious medical needs in violation of th e Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment—as made applicable to the states thro ugh the Fourteenth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 101 (1976). The district court dismissed that claim with prejudice after holding that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not vi olate a clearly estab lished constitutional right. Plaintiff appeals that decision. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND In this appeal from the dist rict court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we accept th e well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint as true. Wilson v. Monta no, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013). 1 Adonus Encinias, the twenty-two-year-old son of Pl aintiff Trini Encinias, entered the custody of the NMCD on February 21, 2018, after pleading guilty to criminal charges. As would be documented by psychiatrists and other mental he alth staff during Mr. Encinias’ time in NMCD custody, he suffered from, among other conditions, substance abuse disorder, a ddiction, and severe depres sion—for which Mr. Encinias

1 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complain t (“Complaint”) is the operative complaint in this case. Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 23 took psychotropic medication—and he had a history of hospitali zations, therapeutic interventions, and suicide attempts before he entered NMCD custody. While in NMCD custody, Mr. Encinias continued to suffer from severe mental health conditions. 2 During his nine months in cust ody, Mr. Encinias was seen by psychiatrists on twelve occasi ons. Psychiatrists diagnosed Mr. Encinias with anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder , psychosis, and substa nce abuse disorder; prescribed medications for his conditions, including Ser oquel, Duloxetine, Haldol, and Benadryl; and adjusted his medicati ons. Mr. Encinias requested additional treatment, including therapy, on multiple occasions. NMCD me ntal health staff indicated in Mr. Encinias’ file that he was “court-ordered for RDAP”—meaning the Residential Drug Abuse Program—and noted that recommended programming included substance abuse treatment, ange r management, psychiatry, and RDAP. (Complaint 5 ¶ 23 ) . Psychiatrists also at times indi cated in Mr. Encinias’ file that they recommended treatment and program ming beyond medication. See, e.g., (Complaint 15 ¶ 79) (note by Dr. Cruz, a psychiatri st, who saw Mr. Encinias while he was on suicide watch, that “[m]ore psyc h meds are NOT the answer – he needs school.”). However, Mr. Encinias was never enrolled in therapy.

2 Mr. Encinias was frequently transfer red between NMCD facilities, including the Central New Mexico Correctional Fac ility (CNMCF), Northeast New Mexico Correctional Facility (NENMCF), and Sout hern New Mexico Correctional Facility (SNMCF). Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 34 Mr. Encinias was placed in “solitary restrictive housi ng units” twelve different times while in NMCD custody. 3 He at times harmed hi mself and attempted suicide. 4 On December 2, 2018, Mr. Encinias was found dead by suicide. We briefly review the allegations in th e Complaint specific to each individual Defendant—Isabelle Dominguez, Chris Maurer, Beverly Wood bury, and Tito Vidal. See Wilson, 715 F.3d at 852 (“In the context of a § 1983 action against multiple individual governmental actors, ‘it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom , to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims ag ainst him or her.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Robbins v. Ok lahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (1 0th Cir. 2008))). The Complaint alleges that Ms. Dominguez and Mr. Ma urer were “NMCD mental health employees.” (Complaint 25 ¶ 135). Mr. Maurer was Ms. Dominguez’s supervisor.

3 The Complaint alleges that NMCD policy required assessing whether an inmate’s mental health conditions “cont raindicate the placement [in restrictive housing].” (Complaint 7 ¶ 38). And the Complaint alleges this policy was created “because the conditions of restrictive housi ng are well known as posing extraordinary dangers to individuals with mental illn ess and suicidal ideat ion.” (Id. at 7-8 ¶ 39). 4 Mr. Encinias wrote a suicide note to his mother and attempted suicide on May 7, 2018. That note was intercepted by NM CD staff on May 14, and it was included in Mr. Encinias’ file . On July 18, Mr. Encinias was placed on suicide watch after reporting that he was actively trying to commit suicide. He remained on suicide watch until July 20. He was placed on suic ide watch again on August 22, after he cut his arms and informed staff that he would commit suicide if he could not speak with a mental health provider. He was taken o ff suicide watch the next day. Finally, Mr. Vidal placed Mr. Encinias on suicide watc h on November 17, and Mr. Encinias was taken off suicide watch on November 20. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Encinias was removed from suicide watch “at the final hour possible before NMCD policy would have required that he be ev aluated by a psychiatrist,” a lthough the decision to remove him was not made by a Defendant in this case. (Com plaint 21 ¶ 112). Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 45 The Complaint refers to Ms. Woodbury as a “behavioral health th erapist.” (Id. at 21 ¶ 111). And the Complaint alleges that Mr. Vidal was a “provisionally-licensed social worker.” (Id. at 21 ¶ 109). As an initial matter, it was alleged that all four Defendants here— Ms. Dominguez, Mr. Maurer, Ms. Wood bury, and Mr. Vidal—had access to, and “reviewed,” Mr. Encinias’ medical and mental health f iles. (Id. at 24 ¶ 130). 5 The allegations in the Complaint indicate that these files included do cumentation of the treatment and evaluation received by Mr. Enci nias throughout his nine months in state custody. 6 We therefore consider Defendants’ alleged conduct with the understanding that they had noti ce of his psychiatric treatment.

5 With respect to Ms. Do minguez, Mr. Maurer, and Mr. Vidal, the Complaint alleges that they actu ally “reviewed” the files. (Complaint 24 ¶ 130). With respect to Ms. Woodbury, the Complaint allege s, “[u]pon informati on and belief, Ms. Woodbury also possessed [the information in the files], as it was common practice of NMCD mental health staff to review a patient’s entire file before beginning to treat him.” (Id. at 25 ¶ 131). 6 See (Complaint 5 ¶ 24) (“On March 6, 2018, while housed at CNMCF, Mr. Encinias was first seen by a prison psychiatrist, Dr. Ta bet, who documented in Mr. Encinias’ prison file . . .”); (id. at 6 ¶ 33) (“On Apr il 2, 2018, Mr. Encinias was evaluated by Centurion psychiatrist Dr. Vera . . . . Dr . Vera noted in Mr. Encinias’ file . . .”); (id. at 11 ¶¶ 57-58) (“Mr. Encinias’ next ps ychiatric appointment did not occur until May 21, 2018, when he was se en by Dr. Nielson while housed NENMCF [sic] . . . . During this appoi ntment, Dr. Nielson documente d that Mr. Encinias had a history of three prior suicide attempts be fore his incarceration.”); (id. at 12 ¶ 66) (“Mr. Encinias’ next psychi atric appointment did not occur until July 2, 2018, when he met with Dr. Granger at CNMCF. No tably, Dr. Granger documented that Mr. Encinias reported severe depression, chr onic anxiety, irritab ility, insomnia, and hallucinations.”); (id. at 13 ¶ 69) (“On Ju ly 18, 2018, Mr. Encinias was placed on suicide watch,” which was reported in a “cri sis intervention report” ); (id. at 14 ¶ 73) (“On August 8, 2018, SNMCF psychiatrist Dr . Cruz evaluated Mr. Encinias . . . Dr. Cruz noted that Mr. Encinias was still experiencing active auditory and visual hallucinations . . .”); (id. at 21 ¶ 111) (“ On November 19, 2018, Mr. Encinias was Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 56 Ms. Dominguez and Mr. Maurer firs t saw Mr. Encinias at SNMCF on August 20, 2018. They noted Mr. Encinias’ mental health concer ns in his file and— acting with knowledge of Mr. Encinias’ psychiatric treatme nt—failed to refer him or enroll him in additional mental hea lth treatment—speci fically, counseling. 7 Then, after Mr. Encinias was placed on suicide watch, taken off suicide watch, and seen twice by a psychiatrist at SNMCF, Mr. Maurer again assessed Mr. Encinias on August 27, noted that he was depressed, and Mr. Maurer did not attempt to provide Mr. Encinias with additional treatment. Ms. Dominguez spoke with Mr. Encinias on September 6 and noted that he was “desperate to meet with behavioral health,” and she again did not attempt to facilitate additional treatmen t. (Id. at 17 ¶ 90). Ms. Woodbury first saw Mr. Encinias while he was on suicide watch at CNMCF on November 19, 2018. She noted “no changes” in Mr. Encinias’ mental health status. (Id. at 21 ¶ 111). Mr . Encinias was taken off suicide watch on November 20, and Ms. Woodbury saw him ag ain on November 21. She noted that Mr. Encinias declined to be interviewed fo r his release assessment and left a required assessment form blank—alle gedly violating NMCD polic y—but she indicated that

seen by behavioral health therapist Ms. Woodbury, who noted that there were ‘no changes’ in his mental health status”); (id. at 19 ¶ 99) (“Upon [Mr. Encinias’] return” to CNCMF on November 9, 2018, “Mr. Vida l completed a mental status examination form”); (id. at 14 ¶ 74) (“On August 20, 2018, Mr. [sic] Dominguez and her supervisor, Mr. Maurer, completed a be havioral health check form for Mr. Encinias”). 7 That Ms. Dominguez and Mr. Maurer had notice of Mr. Encinias’ treatment by psychiatrists is supported by the fact th at they were present at “weekly Thursday meetings held by Dr. Cruz,” one of the psychiatrists who treat ed Mr. Encinias. (Complaint 25 ¶ 132). Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 67 Mr. Encinias “need[ed] the highest level of services.” (Id. at 22 ¶ 116). Finally, Ms. Woodbury saw Mr. Encinias on November 27, 2018—just five days before his death—and noted “no mental health concer ns.” (Id. at 22 ¶ 118). Ms. Woodbury never facilitated additi onal mental health treat ment for Mr. Encinias. Mr. Vidal first saw Mr. Encinias at CN MCF on November 8, 2018. Mr. Vidal completed a mental health st atus examination form indica ting that he had reviewed Mr. Encinias’ file, but he di d not get the form signed by a supervisor as required. Mr. Vidal met with Mr. Encinias again on November 15 and recommended that he read a pamphlet about relaxation. On N ovember 17, Mr. Vidal completed a mental status examination and classified Mr. En cinias as “Clearance Level 5,” which, according to Mr. Vidal, meant Mr. Encinias “needed the highest level of care and treatment.” (Id. at 20 ¶¶ 104-05). Mr. Encinias refused to reassure Mr. Vidal that he would not attempt suicid e, and Mr. Vidal placed him on suicide watch and “recommended that behavioral hea lth intervene.” (Id. at 20 ¶¶ 106-08). Mr. Vidal did not contact a psychiatrist or take furthe r steps to facilitate additional treatment.
Mr. Vidal saw Mr. Encinias th e next day and kept him on suicide watch because Mr. Encinias “would not provide sufficient reason for his safety and security.” ( Id. at
21 ¶ 110). Finally, the Complaint alleges that, when Mr. Encinias was taken off suicide watch and placed in restrictiv e housing on November 20, Mr. Vidal was aware that Mr. Encinias was only allowed out of his cell fo r one hour a day and could have referred Mr. Encinias to the mental health treatment center, but he decided not

to. Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 78 II. PROCEDURE As relevant here, Plaintiff, acting as personal representative of Mr. Encinias’ estate, asserted a cl aim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Ms. Dominguez, Mr. Maurer, Ms. Woodbury, and Mr. Vida l alleging deliberate indiffe rence to Mr. Encinias’ serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Complaint 45-46). 8 Defendants moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss that claim. Specifically, as relevant here, Defendants ar gued they were entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct, as alleged in the Complaint, did not violate Mr. Encinias’ clearly establis hed constitutional rights. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, concludi ng that, while the allegations in the Complaint were sufficient to state a constitu tional claim against Defendant s, they were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violat e clearly established law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s cl aim against Defendants with prejudice, and Plaintiff now appeals that decision.

8 Plaintiff asserted the deliberate indifference clai m against other individual defendants, but the district court granted a joint motion to dismiss those defendants. Plaintiff also asserted thr ee other claims: 1. An Eight h and Fourteenth Amendment claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Centurion Co rrectional Healthcare of New Mexico, LLC—a healthcare provider for NMCD facilities—and MHM Health Professionals, Inc.—Centurion’s subcontractor ; 2. A claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., against the NMCD; and 3. A claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S. C. § 701 et seq., against the NMCD. (Complaint 46-52). The district court gran ted joint motions to dismiss Centurion and MHM. Additionally, in the or der at issue on appeal, th e district court dismissed Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilita tion Act claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff does not challenge the dism issal of those claims on appeal. Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 89 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint because of qualified immunity.” Thompson v. Ragland, 23 F.4th 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2022). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relie f that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotin g Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“While a comp laint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,” “a plaintiff’s obligation to provi de the ‘grounds’ of his ‘en title[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do” (citations omitted)). Here, Defendants moved to dismiss the § 1983 claims against them on qualified immunity grounds. “A § 1983 defe ndant’s assertion of qualified immunity is an ‘affirmative defense [t hat] creates a presumption th at the defendant is immune from suit.’” Truman v. Orem City, 1 F. 4th 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “To overcome this presumpti on, the plaintiff must show (1) the defendant’s actions violated a constitutional or statutory ri ght, and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the de fendant’s complained-o f conduct.” Id. “A right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes if ‘every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Crane v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 15 F.4t h 1296, 1303 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). Generally, this means that “there must be Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 910 a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Schwartz v. Booker, 702 F. 3d 573, 587 (10th Ci r. 2012) (citation omitted). The inquiry focuses on cases de cided before the alle ged violative conduct or cases addressing the state of the law on da tes before the alleged violative conduct. Crane, 15 F.4th at 1304 n.7. Precedent need not be “directly on point,” but it “must have placed the statutory or constitutional qu estion beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); Crane, 15 F.4th at 1303 (“Still, clearly established law must remain moored in a specific set of facts.”). However, “[e]ven when no precedent involves facts ‘mater ially similar’ to [the facts of the present case], the right can be clearly establ ished if a precedent applies with ‘obvious clarity.’” Lowe v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2017) (“When the public official’s conduct is egregious, even a general precedent would appl y with obvious clarity.”).
IV. DISCUSSION This court has “discretion in deciding wh ich of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumst ances in the particular case at hand.” P earson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Consistent with the district court, we choose here to address first whether Defendants’ conduct, as alleged in the Complaint, violated a cl early established constitutional right. We conclude that Defendants di d not violate clearly estab lished law and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity . Thus, we do not addr ess whether any of these defendants violated a constitutiona l right held by Mr. Encinias. Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 1011 1. Defining the Right at Issue To determine whether Defendants’ qualif ied immunity defense should fail— i.e., whether they violated a clearly estab lished constitutional ri ght—we must define the right at issue. “The dispositive question is ‘wheth er the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly estab lished.’” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (emphasis in original) (quoting al-Kidd, 56 3 U.S. at 742). “[ T]his inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2 004) (citation omitted). As explained above, our analysis focuses on the specific allegations agai nst each Defendant, rather than broad or generalized allegations in the Complaint. See Wilson, 715 F.3d at 852. Plaintiff argues on appeal that all four Defendants violated a clearly established right because they failed “to take any steps to protect [Mr. Encinias] from his substantial risk of suicide.” (Aplt. B r. 17) (emphasis in original). 9 This characterization of the right

9 While we do not decide in this appeal whether Defendants violated Mr. Encinias’ constitutional ri ghts, we briefly note the st andards which would govern Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim:
“Deliberate indifference” involves both an objective and a subjective component. The objective co mponent is met if the depr ivation is “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Bre nnan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 [] (1 994). A medical need is sufficiently serious “if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention. ” Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (quo ting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (further quotation omitted)). The subjective component is Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 1112 at issue is not supported by the factual alle gations in the Complain t. Importantly, as described above, all four Defendants were alleged to have provided some medically related assistance to Mr. Encinias and to have reviewed Mr. Encinias’ file, and therefore they would have been on notice of Mr. En cinias’ evaluations by psychiatrists, prescriptions for medications to address hi s mental health conditions, and multiple placements on suicide watch. However, no Defendant arranged for counseling for Mr. Encinias, which is the medical assistan ce he was requesting. When considering whether Defendants violated clearly establishe d law, our analysis must account for the fact that Mr. Encinias received—and Defend ants were aware that he received—some treatment for his mental health conditions and measures to protect him from suicide. 10

met if a prison official “knows of and di sregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 []. Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000). “An official disregards risk when he fails to take reasonable measur es to abate the risk.” Lucas v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127, 1137 (10th Cir. 20 23). However, “[d]isagreement about course of treatment or mere negligence in administering treatment do not amount to a constitutional violation.” Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 2020). 10 The district court correctly explai ned that the mere provision of some treatment does not prevent lia bility for deliberate indiffe rence. See Lucas, 58 F.4th at 1139 (“[M]erely doing something (with no reference to the underlying condition) does not necessarily insulate one from liability. Instead, a court may need to determine whether there was the functional equivalent of a complete denial of care in light of the specific circumstances.” (emphasis in original )). Additionally, the district court correctly noted that the qualified immunity inqu iry focuses on each in dividual De fendant’s conduct—not the aggregate conduct of all pers ons with whom Mr. En cinias interacted while in custody. However, while we do not address whethe r Defendants’ alleged conduct violated the Constitution, we note that the consis tent provision of treatment by medical professionals is a relevant c onsideration when determining whether prison officials with Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 1213 Ultimately, based on the factual allegati ons against each Defendant, (see supra 6-8), the district court correc tly framed the inquiry: whethe r case law at the time of Defendants’ alleged conduct clear ly established “that failure to prescribe or facilitate therapeutic treatment” for Mr. Encinias—who had serious mental health diagnoses, was at risk of suicide, a nd was treated by several psychi atrists—“was a constitutional violation.” (Aplt. App. 135).
2. Analysis We conclude that Plaintiff failed to carry her burden of establishing that Ms. Dominguez, Mr. Maurer , Ms. Woodbury, and Mr. Vidal violated clearly established law. First, none of the Tenth Circuit d ecisions cited by Plaintiff addressed a failure by prison o fficials to facilita te therapeutic treat ment. (Aplt. Br. 17-21); Est. of Hocker by Hocker v. Wa lsh, 22 F.3d 995, 10 00 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding prison staff were not deliberately indifferent wh en they fail ed to seek medical treatment for detainee who was int oxicated, but did not show signs that she was a suicide risk); Cox v. Glanz, 800 F. 3d 1231, 1247 (10th Cir. 2015) (claim involving “an inmate’s right to proper prison suicide sc reening procedures during booking”); Lucas, 58 F.4th at 1134-35, 1139 (c laim involving lack of treatment for cervical cancer, and decided in 2023, after Defendants’ alleged c onduct here); Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 748-49, 758 (10th Cir. 2005) (claim involving failure to treat chest pain culminating in a heart attack); Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1295

awareness of that treatment were deliberatel y indifferent by failing to facilitate further treatment. Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 1314 (10th Cir. 2006) (cla im involving delay in treating de tainee suffering severe pain and vomiting) (overruled on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 as explained in Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1246-47; Sealock, 218 F.3d at 1208, 121 1 (claim involving failure to treat a heart attack); Crows on v. Washington Cnty., 983 F.3d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 2020) (cla im involving failure to treat severe metabolic condition, and decided after Defendants’ a lleged conduct here); Oxendi ne v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001) (claim involving inad equate care in re-attaching detainee’s severed fingertip). Also, while “the weight of authority fro m other courts can clearly establish a right,” two of the three out-of-circuit cases cited by Plaintiff did not involve a failure to provide therapy. Irizarry v. Yehia, 38 F.4th 1282, 12 95 (10th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). See (Aplt. Br. 18); Penn v. Esco rsio, 764 F.3d 102, 106- 07, 113 (1st Cir. 2014) (claim involving failure to take any steps in face of s ubstantial suicide risk, centered on officials’ failure to place de tainee in suicide prevention cell, and not involving deprivation of th erapy); Sanville v. McCaught ry, 266 F.3d 724, 734, 738- 39 (7th Cir. 2001) (claims involving failure by doctors to identify that detainee was suicide risk and failure of pr ison officials to physically pr otect detainee on the day he committed suicide). And while the Third Circuit’s 2017 decision in Palakovic v. Wetzel recognized a deliberat e indifference claim against prison officials who failed to provide additional mental health treatme nt, such as counseling, even though the inmate was seen by psychological staf f on a few occasions and prescribed medication, that lone decisi on does not constitute “the wei ght of authority from other Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 1415 courts” necessary to clearly es tablish a right in this circ uit. 854 F.3d 209, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2017); cf. Irizarry, 38 F.4th at 1294 (findi ng right clearly established when it was supported by one Tenth Circ uit case and “persuasive authority from six other circuits”). 11
V. CONCLUSION In sum, the district court correctly held that Defendant s are entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct, as alleged in the Complaint, did not violate clearly established law. Case law in 201 8 did not put Defendant s on notice that their failure to facilitate therapeutic treatment for Mr. Encinias was unconstitutional. Therefore, we AFFIRM the di strict court’s order dismis sing Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice on the basis of qualified immunity.

Entered for the Court

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge

11 We also note that there are some fa cts that distinguish Palakovic from the present case. For example , while the inmate in Palakovic was prescribed antidepressants, he was not se en at all by a psychiatrist, and he was only seen three times by “psychology staff.” Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 228. Here, Mr. Encinias was seen many times by both psychiatrists and other mental he alth staff. Appellate Case: 23-2052 Document: 64 Date Filed: 10/03/2024 Page: 15