COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

CRIZMAR, INC. t/a 

 BELGIAN WAFFLE & STEAK HOUSE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 3083-96-1 JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES 

 JULY 8, 1997 

HELEN L. SANBORN AND 

 UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S FUND 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Paul H. Wilson (Wilson & Wilson, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Cheryl A. Wilkerson, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General; John J. Beall, Jr., Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee 

Uninsured Employer's Fund. 

 No brief or argument for appellee Helen L. 

 Sanborn. 

 Crizmar, Inc. t/a Belgian Waffle & Steak House (employer) 

appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission 

(commission) awarding benefits to Helen L. Sanborn (claimant). 

Employer contends that the commission erred in (1) finding that 

claimant sustained an injury by accident arising out of her 

employment on June 11, 1995; and (2) not granting employer's 

motion to dismiss claimant's appeal to the full commission based 

upon her failure to file a written statement as ordered by the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
commission.1

 Finding no error, we affirm the commission's 

decision. 

 

 1The Uninsured Employer's Fund filed a brief in support of 

the arguments made by employer in its brief. 

 I. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). 

 So viewed, the evidence showed that on June 11, 1995, while 

working in employer's restaurant as a cook, claimant fell and 

fractured her left ankle. Employer's kitchen area, where 

claimant fell, measures approximately three feet by twelve feet, 

with a work area along both sides. The kitchen floor is composed 

of cement with a tile covering. 

 Claimant testified that on the morning of June 11, 1995, her 

co-worker, Buddy Blair, finished mopping and sweeping the kitchen 

area at approximately 7:00 a.m. At approximately 7:30 a.m., 

claimant walked into the freezer and retrieved some items. She 

loaded the items onto a pushcart and then exited the freezer. As 

claimant carried a pan of meat from the pushcart across the 

kitchen area, she slipped and fell. Claimant described the 

incident as follows: 

 I picked it up and started to walk, and I hit 

something on the floor. I don't know what. 

It could have been water. It could have been 

butter because it was right where the sink 

was and the toaster. My feet went from under 

me, and I throwed [sic] the pan, and I went 

down because I couldn't grab on nothing 

because my hands was full. 
 3 

Claimant stated that her left foot went under her when she fell, 

and it began to hurt immediately after the fall. Claimant sought 

medical treatment at Mary Immaculate Hospital on June 11, 1995, 

where she reported a history of slipping and falling at work. 

X-rays revealed a bimaleolar fracture of the left ankle. 

 Claimant came under the care of Dr. Boyd W. Haynes, III. On 

June 13, 1995, claimant reported a history of slipping at work to 

Dr. Haynes. In a May 16, 1996 letter to claimant's counsel, Dr. 

Haynes opined that claimant "did have a pre-existing problem with 

arthritis of [the left] knee but [I] feel with the history that 

was given, that this is not what caused her to fall, but it was 

due to the slickness of the floor at the time." 

 Claimant testified that she had seen other employees fall in 

the kitchen and that water, butter, or grease frequently were 

spilled on the floor. She admitted that she was not able to 

determine what she slipped on, that she did not notice any 

substance on the floor before she fell and that she did not feel 

any particular substance as she fell. At the time of her fall, 

claimant was wearing work shoes with nonskid soles. 

 Willie Lancaster, claimant's supervisor, testified that he 

was present at the restaurant between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. on the 

date of claimant's fall. He was cooking with his back to 

claimant when he heard a commotion. He turned around and saw 

claimant sitting on the floor, with one leg tucked under her body 

and one leg forward. After the incident, Lancaster examined the 
 4 

area where claimant fell and did not see any foreign debris, 

water, or slippery substance. However, Lancaster acknowledged 

that the floor was frequently splattered with cooking substances 

or water. Lancaster testified that in a telephone conversation a 

few days after the accident, the claimant told him that she was 

not sure how she fell, that she may have slipped or her leg may 

have given out. Claimant denied telling Lancaster that her leg 

may have given out. 

 Based upon this record, the full commission found that 

claimant sustained a compensable injury by accident when she 

slipped and fell on June 11, 1995. The commission relied upon 

claimant's testimony that she slipped, along with the medical 

histories indicating that she slipped. The commission noted that 

"[w]hen the evidence preponderates that an employee slipped at 

work, it is not critical that the slippery substance be 

positively identified, as long as the cause of the fall was a 

risk of the employment." 

 "Whether an injury arises out of the employment is a mixed 

question of law and fact and is reviewable by the appellate 

court." Plumb Rite Plumbing Serv. v. Barbour, 8 Va. App. 482, 

483, 382 S.E.2d 305, 305 (1989). 

 An injury arises out of the employment "when 

there is apparent to the rational mind upon 

consideration of all the circumstances, a 

causal connection between the conditions 
 5 

under which the work is required to be 

performed and the resulting injury . . . . 

But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly 

be traced to the employment as a contributing 

proximate cause and which comes from a hazard 

to which the workman would have been equally 

exposed apart from the employment. The 

causative danger must be peculiar to the work 

and not common to the neighborhood. It must 

be incidental to the character of the 

business and not independent of the relation 

of master and servant." 

Central State Hosp. v. Wiggers, 230 Va. 157, 159, 335 S.E.2d 257, 

259 (1985) (quoting Richmond Memorial Hosp. v. Crane, 222 Va. 

283, 285, 278 S.E.2d 877, 878-79 (1981)) (other citation 

omitted). 

 Claimant's testimony, which was corroborated by the medical 

histories, constitutes credible evidence to support the 

commission's finding that claimant fell on June 11, 1995 because 

she slipped due to a work-related risk, not because her knee gave 

way. In its role as fact finder, the commission was entitled to 

give more weight to claimant's testimony than to Lancaster's 

testimony. Claimant's evidence established a causal connection 

between the conditions under which employer required her to 

perform her work and her resulting injury. Although claimant 
 6 

could not identify the specific substance or foreign debris that 

caused her to slip, the commission could have reasonably inferred 

from the evidence that she slipped due to a condition or danger 

peculiar to her workplace. "Where reasonable inferences may be 

drawn from the evidence in support of the commission's factual 

findings, they will not be disturbed by this Court on appeal." 

Hawks v. Henrico County Sch. Bd., 7 Va. App. 398, 404, 374 S.E.2d 

695, 698 (1988). 

 II. 

 We find no merit in employer's contention that the 

commission erred in failing to dismiss claimant's appeal to the 

full commission because she did not file a written statement. 

Claimant complied with the commission's notice by sending a 

letter to the commission, which it received on October 4, 1996, 

stating that she did not intend to file a written statement 

because she could not afford to hire an attorney to do so. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.