alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1429 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1429

                  For the relief of Charlotte S. Neal.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 18, 1993

  Mr. Bliley introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
                  For the relief of Charlotte S. Neal.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ELECTION TO PROVIDE ANNUITY.

    For purposes of determining the eligibility of Charlotte S. Neal, 
of Lynchburg, Virginia, former spouse of the late Lieutenant Commander 
Michael D. Christian, United States Navy retired, to an annuity under 
the Survivor Benefit Plan, Lieutenant Commander Christian shall be 
deemed to have made an election under section 1448(b)(3) of title 10, 
United States Code, to provide an annuity to Charlotte S. Neal in 
accordance with the separation agreement incorporated into their 
divorce decree of August 19, 1983. Such election shall be deemed to 
have been made as of September 24, 1983, notwithstanding the death of 
Lieutenant Commander Christian on September 4, 1983.

SEC. 2. LUMP SUM PAYMENT.

    The Secretary of Navy shall pay in a lump sum to Charlotte S. Neal 
the aggregate amount to which she is entitled by reason of section 1 
for the period beginning on October 1, 1983, and ending on the last day 
of the month in which this Act is enacted.

SEC. 3. DEFINITION.

    For purposes of this Act, the term ``Survivor Benefit Plan'' means 
the program provided under subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, 
United States Code.

                                 <all>
```
#### Santana PEREZ, Relator, v. William M. HOLLAND et al., Respondents.

No. 11140.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.

Aug. 1, 1940.

Harry B. Berry, of San Antonio, for relator.

Gammage, Gammage & Bauer and Charles D. Bauer, all of Houston, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

The application of relator for writ of mandamus was set for hearing on July 29, 1940, but both relator and respondents failed to appear except by said application and by answer of respondents, and' by briefs filed herein. The Hon. William M. Holland has filed by way of answer a full statement of facts which is not disputed, which, in our opinion, requires, as a matter of law, that the application for the writ of mandamus be refused, and it is hereby refused.

Refused.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1118 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1118

  To extend until January 1, 1995, the existing suspension of duty on 
                        certain piston engines.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 24, 1993

  Mr. Peterson of Minnesota introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To extend until January 1, 1995, the existing suspension of duty on 
                        certain piston engines.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DUTY ON CERTAIN PISTON ENGINES.

    (a) Temporary Suspension.--Heading 9902.84.07 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States, relating to certain piston 
engines, is amended by striking ``12/31/92'' and inserting ``12/31/
94''.
    (b) Effective Date.--
            (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
        amendment made by subsection (a) applies with respect to goods 
        entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
        after the 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act.
            (2) Retroactive application.--Notwithstanding section 514 
        of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1514) or any other 
        provision of law to the contrary, upon a proper request filed 
        with the appropriate customs officer before the 90th day after 
        the date of enactment of this Act, any entry or withdrawal from 
        warehouse for consumption of an article described in heading 
        9902.84.07 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
        States that was made--
                    (A) after December 31, 1992; and
                    (B) before the 15th day after the date of enactment 
                of this Act,
        shall be liquidated or reliquidated as though such entry or 
        withdrawal had been made on the date that is 15 days after such 
        date of enactment.

                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AND THE STATEMENTS OF REVENUE AND EXPENSES AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH REPORT ON FORM 10-K.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                       2,929,708
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,219,805
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,179,189
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,219,805
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               536,557
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                25,503
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              (97,153)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (252,831)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### November 29, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice


### 131929 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan 

### PEOPLE OF THE STAT E OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices



### v SC: 131929 COA: 270518 Cheboygan CC: 05-003137-FH JERRY WYMAN ALLRED, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 12, 2006 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

l1120 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

November 29, 2006

Clerk
Exhibit 10.11.1

 

Execution Version

 

GRD HOLDING I CORPORATION

AMENDMENT TO

NONQUALIFIED STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT

 

THIS AMENDMENT TO STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT (the “Amendment”), effective as of the Vesting Start Date set forth on the signature page hereto, is between GRD Holding I Corporation, a Delaware corporation (together with its successors, the “Company”), and the individual whose name is set forth on the signature page hereto (the “Optionee”).

 

WHEREAS, the Company and the Optionee have executed that certain “GRD HOLDING I CORPORATION/NONQUALIFIED STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT”, dated effective as of January 10, 2013, pursuant to which the Company granted to the Optionee the Options set described therein (the “Original Agreement”).

 

WHEREAS, the Company and the Optionee desire to amend the Original Agreement so as to change the date from which the Options become vested and exercisable.

 

NOW THEREFORE, the Company and Optionee hereby agree to the following:

 

1.                                      All references to the “Date of Grant” in Section 4 of the Original Agreement are hereby amended to refer to the Vesting Start Date set forth below the Optionee’s signature to this Amendment.

 

2.                                        Except as expressly modified by this Amendment, all of the terms and conditions of the Original Agreement shall remain in full force and effect and binding upon the parties, as amended hereby.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company and the Optionee have executed this Amendment, effective as of the Vesting Start Date set forth below.

 

	
 
    	
GRD HOLDING I   CORPORATION
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
By: 
    	
/s/ Judd T. Nystrom
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
Name:
    	
Judd T. Nystrom
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
Title:
    	
Chief Financial Officer
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
OPTIONEE:
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
/s/ Peter Corsa
    
	
 
    	
Name: Peter Corsa
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Vesting Start Date:   March 25, 2013
*OPINION ISSUED JULY 3, 2007*

#### JENNIFER HARLESS VS. DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS

(CC-06-200)

*18Claimant appeared *pro se.*

Jason C. Workman, Attorney at Law, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Claimant brought this action for vehicle damage which occurred when her 1995 Chevrolet Monte Carlo struck a hole while she was traveling on County Route 15 in Fayette County. County Route 15 is a road maintained by respondent. The Court is of the opinion to deny the claim for the reasons more fully stated below.

The incident giving rise to this claim occurred between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on May 7, 2006. County Route 15 is a one-lane highway at the area of the incident involved in this claim. Claimant testified that she was traveling at approximately thirty miles per hour with no traffic on County Route 15 when her vehicle struck a hole in the road that she had not seen. Ms. Harless stated that she did not see the hole prior to her vehicle striking it because it was filled with water. Her vehicle sustained damage to a tire and a rim totaling $671.14.

The position of the respondent is that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition on County Route 15 at the site of claimant’s accident for the date in question. Joe Donnally, Transportation Crew Chief for respondent in Fayette County, testified that there had been no complaints regarding holes on County Route 15 prior to claimant’s incident.

The well-established principle of law in West Virginia is that the State is neither an insurer nor a guarantor of the safety of travelers upon its roads. *Adkins vs. Sims,*130 W.Va. 645; 46 S.E.2d 81 (1947). In order to hold respondent liable for road defects of this type, a claimant must prove that respondent had actual or constructive notice of the defect and a reasonable time to take corrective action. *Chapman vs. Dept. of Highways,*16 Ct. Cl. 103 (1986).

In the instant case, the Court is of the opinion that respondent did not have actual or constructive notice of a hole on County Route 15 prior to the incident in question. Consequently, there is insufficient evidence of negligence upon which to justify an award. Thus, the claimant may not make a recovery for her loss in this claim.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion to and does deny this claim.

Claim disallowed.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 233 (Monday, December 4, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 75665-75666]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-30752]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Forest Service


Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area, Oregon and Washington 
States; Statutory Amendments Regarding Appraisal Standards and 
Procedures

AGENCY: Forest Service, USDA.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: As required by the Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 for 
the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies, the Forest Service 
gives notice of the statutory amendments made to the Columbia River 
Gorge National Scenic Area of November 17, 1986.
    Among other things, the Act authorized the Forest Service to 
acquire lands within the designated boundaries of the Columbia River 
Gorge National Scenic Area. To facilitate those acquisitions, Congress 
has recently amended the Act as part of the Fiscal Year 2001 
appropriations act for the Forest Service (Public Law 106-291). These 
amendments provide special direction for the valuation of some lands 
being acquired by the Forest Service within Special Management Areas of 
the Scenic area. Generally, persons owning land within a Special 
Management Area as of September 1, 2000, who offer to sell their land 
to the federal government prior to April 1, 2001, will have their land 
appraised without regard to the effect of certain zoning and land use 
restrictions enacted pursuant to the Columbia River Gorge National 
Scenic Area Act. After April 1, 2001, land will be appraised 
considering all zoning and land use restrictions. In addition to the 
publication of this notice in the Federal Register, notice of these 
amendments is also being given via publication in newspapers of general 
circulation in the area and by direct mail to known landowners in the 
area.

[[Page 75666]]


ADDRESSES: For a copy of the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area 
Act and amendments, write the National Scenic Area Headquarters, Forest 
Service, USDA, 902 Wasco Avenue, Suite 200, Hood River, Oregon 97031.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Pam Campbell, Lands Staff Officer, 
National Scenic Area Headquarters, telephone: 541-386-2333.

    Dated: November 28, 2000.
Nancy Graybeal,
Deputy Regional Forester.
[FR Doc. 00-30752 Filed 12-1-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410-11-M
#### ALLEE et al. v. BRETEUL et al.

No. 3710.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

July 3, 1940.

Rehearing Denied July 10, 1940.

*432Tom F. Coleman, Sr., and C. W. Falvey, both of Lufkin, for appellants.

Collins, Williams, Hatchell & Garrison, of Lufkin, and Ramey, Calhoun & Marsh, of Tyler, for appellees.

O’QUINN, Justice.

Plaintiffs, M. Garner de Breteul et al., sued defendants, Mrs. Ruby, Allee, a widow, et al., in trespass to try title to 168 acres of land, a part of the J. Magano survey in Angelina County, Texas. All parties defendant, except E. M. Lewis, who was dismissed from the case, answered. Libbe Martin .Bell and her husband, W. A. Bell, et ál'.', intervened setting up title to the land against both plaintiffs and defendants. The case was tried to a jury, but at the close of the evidence the court instructed a verdict for the plaintiffs, ap-pellees here, against the defendants and in-tervenors, which was duly . returned and judgment entered accordingly.

Defendants and intervenors filed their motion for a new trial -which was overruled on December 30, 1939, to which action of the court defendants and intervenors excepted and gave notice of appeal. They filed their appeal bond on January 22, 1940. Appellees duly filed motion to dismiss the appeal because the appeal bond was filed too late, more than twenty days after the overruling of the motion for a new trial.

We have examined the record and find the facts as stated in appellees’ motion to dismiss. December 30, 1939, was the last day of the term of the court. The appeal bond was filed January 22, 1940. The term of the court (Angelina County) could not by law continue ‘more than eight weeks, Article- 199, Sec. 2, Vernón’é Ann.Civil Statutes. The appeal, bond having been filed more than twenty days after the ex-" piration of the term of the .court, and more than twenty days after the motion for a ' new trial was overruled, it was too late and did *not*confer *jurisdiction on this*court to entertain this 'appeal. Article 2253, R.C.S.; Dilworth v. Ed Steves & Sons, 107 Tex. 73, 174 S.W. 279; Pessoney v. Cobb-Holman Lumber Co., Tex.Civ.App. 88 S.W.2d 566; Frier v. Krohn, Tex.Civ.App., 104 S.W.2d 537, writ refused.

Appeal dismissed.
ontario_ex1011.htm

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#### COTHREN v. STATE.

No. 21134.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 12, 1940.

Rehearing Granted Oct. 23, 1940.

*959J. Mitch Johnson, of San Saha, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of a violation of the local option liquor laws, and fined the sum of $200.

It was pleaded and proven that appellant had heretofore been convicted in the county court of said county of a similar offense, and on account of such previous conviction he seems to have been given double the lowest penalty.

The herein appealed cause bears the county court number of 1786, and it appears that the previous conviction of a similar offense relied upon in order to enhance the punishment bore the San Saba County Court number of 1744.

The introduction of the previous conviction was objected to as shown by bill of exceptions because this same cause No. 1744 had theretofore been used in cause No. 1786, which is the county court number borne by this case. We also find a further objection to the introduction of such conviction in this cause because, as said in the objection, said No. 1744 had been • theretofore used in enhancing the penalty in county court cause No. 1779. There is no proof, however, of its use in cause No. 1779, and the use of cause No. 1774 in this instant cause impresses us as being free from error in not being shown to have been theretofore used in any case for the enhancement of punishment purposes.

The condition that we find this record in is rather confusing, but we gather therefrom that county court cause No. 1774 was properly used for the enhancement of punishment purposes in this instant cause, it being county court No. 1786, and this judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

In copying the foregoing opinion there has appeared a typographical error whereby the number 1774 has at two places been substituted for number 1744. This has given rise to a vigorous motion for rehearing in this court. Similar errors in the motion make it appear that the former conviction discussed in the opinion had been previously utilized in enhancing the penalty in number “1786”. That is this very case on appeal. However, from an examination of the record, even in the face of the confusion resulting from appellant’s bill of exception, and the still more confusing brief on the- subject, it appears that the former conviction in Cause No. 1744 had been previously util-' ized in another prosecution for a similar offense under Cause No. 1779, as well as in other cases. See Cothren v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 140 S.W.2d 860. The doctrine announced in that case is applicable here and is adhered to.

The motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed. •
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1543

To amend title 28, United States Code to permit payment, from the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund, of State and local taxes on

certain seized property.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 30, 1993

Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER (for himself, Mr. SUNDQUIST, Mr. CLYBURN, Mr.

SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. BLACKWELL, and Mr. NADLER) introduced

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To amend title 28, United States Code to permit payment,

from the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund,

of State and local taxes on certain seized property.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Forfeiture Equity Act

5 of 1993’’.

6 SEC. 2. PAYMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL PROPERTY TAXES

7 ON FORFEITED PROPERTY.

8 Paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of section 524 of title

9 28, United States Code, is amended—
2

•HR 1543 IH

1 (1) by striking out the period at the end of sub2 paragraph (I) and inserting in lieu thereof the fol3 lowing: ‘‘; and’’; and

4 (2) by adding at the end the following new sub5 paragraph:

6 ‘‘(J) the payment of State and local prop7 erty taxes on forfeited property, beginning on

8 the date of the offense giving rise to the

9 forfeiture.’’.

10 SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY.

11 The amendments made by section 2 shall apply with

12 respect to property seized before, on, or after the date of

13 the enactment of this Act.

Æ