Globally Integrated 

Operations: Transforming 

the JTF Core

U.S. Needs to “Get Smart” 

vs Russia

Countering Threat 

Networks: A Standard Lines 

of Effort Model

Transregional Capstone 

Exercise Trains for 

Tomorrow’s Fight

Campaigning

The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College

“That All May Labor As One”

Featured Essays

Fall 2017
Campaigning 

Fall 2017 

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=69

http://jfsc.ndu.edu/

Commandant 

RDML Jeffrey Ruth, USN

Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs 

Dr. Amie Lonas 

Editor 

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley 

Editorial Board: 

Assistant Professor William S. Marlowe 

Dr. Kenneth P. Pisel 

Dr. Frederick R. Kienle 

Cover image: JCWS Seminar 14 Students 17-04, 

2017. Photo by Daniel McCauley. 

Director, Joint and Combined

Warfighting School

CAPT Paul Crump, USN

Director, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School

CAPT Miguel Peko, USN

Director, Joint Continuing

and Distance Education

School

COL Ernest Parker, USA

Director, Joint Command,

Control and Information

Operations School

COL Rolf Watts, USA

Campaigning Fall 2017 i
In this issue of Campaigning: 

Editor’s Corner........................................................................................iii 

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley 

Features 

Globally Integrated Operations: Transforming the JTF Core.................................1

Col Camille Nichols, COL Robert Paddock, LTC (P) Jasper Jeffers, and Lt Col Sean Monteiro 

Countering Threat Networks: A Standard Lines of Effort Model...........................13

Col Chris Goodyear, COL Brian Greata, LTC Timothy Payment, and Col Martin Wetterauer 

U.S. Needs to “Get Smart” vs Russia..............................................................27

CDR David P. Wolynski, LTC John R. Cuva, Maj Ryan A. Reynolds, and MAJ Anthony P. Newman 

Transregional Capstone Exercise Trains for Tomorrow’s Fight............................37

LCDR William Buell, Maj Erin Dorrance, and MAJ Bob West 

Commentary 

Developing an Operational Approach for the Transition from War 

to Peace through Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Development: 

Understanding Critical Aspects of the Environment..........................................46

Associate Professor Tom Snukis 

Polarity Management in International Relations..............................................50

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley and Dr. Sadi Sadiyev 

The Foresight Factor 

Strategic Foresight Tools and the Russia National Security Strategy: US Policy 

Implications............................................................................................57

MAJ Kent E. Justice 

Author Submission Guidelines....................................................................73

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National 

Defense University, or the Department of Defense. 

Campaigning Fall 2017 ii
Welcome to the Fall 2017 edition of 

Campaigning. One of the desired outcomes 

of the Joint Professional Military Education 

system is to develop Joint officers who can 

think creatively and adapt to change. This 

edition of Campaigning presents seven

essays from students and faculty who think 

critically and strategically while applying 

joint warfighting principles at all levels of 

war. 

The Features section begins with an essay 

by Col Camille Nichols, COL Robert 

Paddock, LTC (P) Jasper Jeffers, and Lt Col 

Sean Monteiro. Their essay, “Globally 

Integrated Operations: Transforming the JTF 

Core,” posits that a globally integrated Joint 

force is necessary to meet today’s global 

security challenges, but the DoD enterprise

is not operationally optimized to do so. The 

authors suggest changes to doctrine, 

organization, training and leadership to 

create greater synergy for future globally

integrated operations. 

The second featured essay, “Countering 

Threat Networks: A Standard Lines of Effort 

Model,” by Col Chris Goodyear, COL Brian 

Greata, LTC Timothy Payment, and Col 

Martin Wetterauer proposes that 

understanding networked adversaries and 

countering threat networks is becoming an 

increasingly challenging problem for Joint 

force commanders. The authors identify 

generally accepted means to understand 

these threats along with the lines of effort 

necessary to combat these challenges 

successfully. 

CDR David Wolynski, LTC John Cuva, Maj 

Ryan Reynolds, and MAJ Anthony

Newman provide our third featured essay, 

the “U.S. needs to ‘Get Smart’ vs Russia.” 

In this essay, the authors argue that Russia is 

re-emerging as a global actor and that their 

use of ‘smart power’ differs from the 

traditional approach used by the U.S. and its 

Western partners. The authors suggest that 

an adaptable and responsive integration of 

all of the U.S. instruments of national power 

is needed to successfully counter Russia’s 

strategic progress. 

Our final featured essay is “Transregional

Capstone Exercise Trains for Tomorrow’s 

Fight,” by LCDR William Buell, Maj Erin 

Dorrance, and MAJ Bob West. Building 

upon General Joseph Dunford’s priority of 

improving the Joint force’s ability to 

integrate joint capabilities in a transregional, 

multidomain, and multifunctional fight, the 

authors propose institutionalizing a 

Transregional Capstone Exercise Program to 

do so. The authors support this thesis by 

identifying basic exercise requirements, 

propose training objectives, and address 

three potential challenges to exercise 

implementation. 

This edition’s Commentary section presents 

two essays for your consideration. The first 

essay, “Developing an Operational 

Approach for the Transition from War to 

Peace through Stabilization, Reconstruction, 

and Development: Understanding Critical 

Aspects of the Environment,” by Tom 

Snukis, is the third in a series of four essays. 

This essay focuses on the challenges of 

Editor’s Corner

Campaigning Fall 2017 iii
failed and failing states and the affect they 

have on the U.S.’s ability to provide 

stabilization and reconstruction after armed 

intervention. Professor Snukis provides the 

reader with a keen understanding of the 

problem of failed and failing states and an 

understanding of the forces within the 

environment that must be understood and 

managed. 

Our final Commentary essay is by Dr. 

Daniel H. McCauley and Dr. Sadi Sadyev 

who apply the concept of polarity 

management to the current international 

relations environment. Using historical and 

current examples of natural counter-poles, 

the authors identify the inherent dangers in a 

uni-polar environment. Given the lack of a 

natural counter-pole to the U.S. in the 

current strategic environment, the authors 

argue that the U.S. must act as if there is a 

counter-pole to minimize the natural 

oppositional reaction to an unopposed 

hegemon. 

Finally, in this edition’s Foresight Factor 

essay, MAJ Kent Justice applies foresight 

tools in an assessment of Russia’s National 

Security Strategy. In this essay, “Strategic 

Foresight Tools and the Russia National 

Security Strategy: U.S. Policy Implication,”

he argues that using foresight tools can 

provide policy makers with a different 

perspective with which to develop a national 

policy to counter Russian security interests 

that run contrary to U.S. interests. After a

detailed analysis, MAJ Kent provides the 

reader with a policy recommendation. 

We hope you enjoy this edition of 

Campaigning. You can let me know what 

you think by emailing me at 

mccauleyd@ndu.edu. 

Daniel H. McCauley 

Editor 

Campaigning Fall 2017 iv
Globally Integrated Operations: 

Transforming the JTF Core 

by

Col Camille Nichols, COL Robert Paddock, LTC (P) 

Jasper Jeffers, and Lt Col Sean Monteiro

“I personally don’t believe the current 

planning and organizational construct or 

command and control are optimized for the 

current fight,...What really is required is 

global integration.” Gen Joseph Dunford, 

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1

As Chairman Dunford asserts, the 

United States needs a Joint Force organized, 

trained, equipped, and ready to execute 

globally integrated operations (GIO) to meet 

the complex challenges of today and the 

future. The ability of the globally postured 

Joint Force to purposefully combine quickly 

with mission partners to integrate capabilities 

fluidly across domains, echelons, geographic 

boundaries, and organizational affiliations 

currently is not operationally optimized. 

Rapidly emerging, destabilizing phenomena 

such as the effective rise of transregional 

violent extremists (for example, the Islamic 

State in the Levant (ISIL)), regional 

pandemics, and aggression by near peer 

actors are the “new normal.” Events like 

these will require the Joint Force to 

effectively aggregate swiftly, reconfigure 

amid operations, and disaggregate ready to 

execute again. The world that the nation will 

face is fraught with transregional, multidimensional, multi-domain threats. These 

threats will increasingly cut across the 

regional commands, operate as asymmetrical 

actors, and compete in multiple domains 

threatening to overwhelm US military war 

fighting plans and resourcing. Chairman 

Dunford’s approach to managing such crosscutting threats better “is improving the ability 

of the Defense Secretary to work with the 

wide swath of functional and regional 

commanders, from Strategic and Cyber 

Commands to Central and Northern and 

Pacific Commands.”2

Chairman Dunford has identified 

planning, organizational construct, and 

command and control as three areas in which

the Joint Force is currently not optimized to 

perform GIO.3 While application of GIO is a 

Department of Defense undertaking that 

affects departments, services, and combatant 

commands, the scope of the discussion will 

focus on the joint task force (JTF). Focusing 

on the JTF is key because this is the 

organizational structure upon which the Joint 

Force will aggregate to employ the range of 

military operations across and within 

geographic combatant commands (GCCs). 

Dr. Daniel McCauley has pointed out 

that the current organizational structures of 

the Joint Force are basically anachronisms of 

the Cold War.4 The Joint Force is built to

deliberately mass forces and effects in order 

to dominate the enemy. This construct carries 

service expertise and inclinations. While the 

expertise strengthens the joint approach, 

inclinations can provide detriments to fully 

realizing GIO. In order to optimize, Joint 

Force providers and organizational 

constructs require joint enhancements to 

equip the JTF with the resources and 

Campaigning Fall 2017 1
capabilities to operationalize GIO to meet the 

complex problems of an uncertain world. 

 This essay provides a brief case study 

of the challenges in organizational formation 

of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) 

JTF highlighting areas where the Joint Force 

can focus GIO optimization efforts. From 

there, a framework is presented that consists 

of critical components that future GIO 

optimized JTFs can adopt. Next, the requisite 

training and organization is examined to 

integrate and synchronize the GIO optimized 

Joint Force with other national instruments of 

power required to enhance unity of effort. 

Finally, insight is provided into preparing and 

sustaining a GIO optimized Joint Force. 

These revelations will provide an initial 

pathway for the Joint Force to enhance the 

GIO concept to present the national 

command authority an optimized military as 

an instrument of national power to engage the 

transregional, multi-dimensional, multidomain challenges of the 21st century. 

 

JTF Considerations: OIR Challenges

 

In June 2014, emboldened by 

growing sectarian discord, ISIL emerged 

from the eastern deserts of Syria and began 

an expansion into Iraq. ISIL swiftly and 

effectively captured Mosul, pressing 

southward virtually unimpeded into the 

remaining Sunni territories coming within a 

stone’s throw of Baghdad. In order to prevent 

the fall of the Iraqi capital, the national 

command authority (NCA) authorized 

United States Central Command 

(USCENTCOM) to deploy an assessment 

team, and to conduct air strikes, to defend 

Baghdad. USCENTCOM designated United 

States Army Central Command (ARCENT) 

as a joint force land component command 

(JFLCC) to engage in operations. As the 

operations proved to require a more thorough 

joint approach, USCENTCOM chose 

ARCENT to form the core of a combined 

joint task force (CJTF), designated as CJTFOIR.5 The threat of destabilization posed by 

ISIL provides a pertinent and contemporary 

example of a situation requiring GIO. OIR, 

and the challenges experienced in standing 

up a CJTF in this dynamic and evolving 

operational environment, provide valuable 

insight into where to focus efforts to optimize 

JTF’s for GIO. 

 Prior to the rotation of the initial 

CJTF-OIR command structure, the Center for 

Army Lessons Learned (CALL) conducted 

an initial impressions report. The hard 

lessons observed during the creation of 

CJTF-OIR serve as considerations for 

creating JTF cores that can effectively 

aggregate and execute GIO from the outset. 

Chief among the lessons from CALL are JTF 

manning, interagency interoperability, and 

multinational partnership considerations. 

Manning presented a clear challenge 

to CJTF-OIR as it attempted to stand-up amid 

the roiling crisis. CALL noted that it was 

three months after CJTF-OIR’s October 2014 

establishment before it received intelligence, 

targeting, fires, information operations, civil 

affairs planning, and cyber operations subject 

matter experts.6 This occurred because 

ARCENT did not understand the training 

support and qualifications required to take on 

the full authorities and responsibilities of a 

CJTF. Manning analysis is a seemingly 

Campaigning Fall 2017 2
simple undertaking in benign conditions, but 

a daunting undertaking when conducting 

operations while under force management 

level constraints. CALL also observed that 

ARCENT allowed Service habits to influence 

CJTF manning.7 Taking an approach 

informed by only one way of doing business 

further exacerbated the delay in CJTF-OIR 

obtaining the personnel necessary to 

maximize its mission. Dynamic situations 

requiring GIO are not going to allow for preordained JTF manning packages nor will the 

resource constrained environment allow for 

standing JTFs. Service headquarters elements 

that provide the core of a JTF must begin the 

manning capability analysis well prior to 

receipt of mission. It is important to place 

emphasis on capabilities required and the 

approach to using them. 

 At the outset of operations, CJTFOIR did not adequately address interagency 

and multi-national interoperability. The 

conditions that allowed for the rise of ISIL 

primarily point to areas of governance as 

shortfalls. A fact proven by the nine lines of 

effort (LOE), seven of which fall under the 

capabilities resident in the Department of 

State.8 CALL discerned that CJTF-OIR 

command structure lacked unity of effort.9

This resulted in duplication and friction 

amongst the various organizations tasked 

with conducting missions under OIR 

auspices. Another hindrance on unity of 

effort was the ability to share information 

within CJTF-OIR and across its partners. 

CALL observed that OIR participants had 

trouble sharing information due to differing 

Service information enterprises and multinational partner classification levels.10 JTFs 

optimized for GIO will need to account for 

institutional and information enterprise 

interoperability requirements.

These examples are a few lessons that 

future JTFs can consider in optimizing for 

GIO. The Joint Force and future JTF 

commanders are wise to prepare for friction 

points. As the DoD continues to evolve the 

Joint Force to better build JTF cores, it must 

also develop an approach to meet the 

challenges upon which GIO is designed. 

There is a current functioning example of an 

interagency and coalition integrated JTF with 

global operational responsibilities that can 

offer a potential roadmap: the United States 

Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

Benchmarking for GIO Success

USSOCOM, through its theater 

special operations commands, provides a 

model for the implementation of GIO 

optimized to engage the transregional, multidimensional, multi-domain threats. The 

previous USSOCOM commander, General 

Joseph Votel, highlighted the ongoing global 

responsibilities of USSOCOM in his posture 

statement to Congress in March 2016. “Our 

actions in support of the GCCs include such 

mission sets as: enhancing partner 

capabilities, coordinating counter-terrorism 

(CT) planning and operations, supporting the 

capabilities of our interagency partners, and 

developing critical relationships with key 

influencers”11

The description of USSOCOM’s 

global responsibilities is remarkably similar 

to the vision of GIO as described by 

Chairman Dunford, “We need to make sure 

Campaigning Fall 2017 3
in the context of transregional, multi-domain, 

multifunctional conflicts that we have the 

right command-and-control construct in 

place to integrate joint capabilities and 

support rapid decision-making by national 

command authorities.”12 USSOCOM 

maintains persistent capabilities and 

personnel in more than 80 countries. These 

capabilities remain in the environment on a 

constant basis to generate understanding, 

faster relationships, and reduce reaction time. 

These elements support the regional or 

geographic combatant commander, but are 

simultaneously integrated into USSOCOM’s 

global network of US and International 

Special Operations Forces (SOF). This 

connection permits collaboration across 

geographic, functional, and bureaucratic 

boundaries that do not routinely occur in the 

regionally focused combatant commands. 

There are a number of unique aspects 

of SOF that cannot be replicated in the 

general purpose force – in fact, two of the 

‘SOF Truths’ are that “SOF cannot be mass 

produced” and that “Quality is more 

important than Quantity.” The quantity and 

types of capabilities required to address the 

transregional threats exceed both the mass 

production and quality maxims of SOF. 

However, there are key fundamentals in 

USSOCOM’s global approach that do 

transcend the SOF core mission sets and are 

scalable to all Joint Forces.

USSOCOM uses three critical 

components to execute GIO: the relationship 

network, the information technology 

network, and persistent forward presence. 

These underlying principles are prominent in 

the USSOCOM mission, and reinforced by 

GEN Votel, “Our mission, as I pointed out 

last year, is to synchronize the planning of 

special operations and provide SOF to 

support persistent, networked, and 

distributed Geographic Combatant 

Command (GCC) operations to protect and 

advance our nation’s interests.”13 

The ‘relationship network’ is not a 

specific USSOCOM description, but refers to 

the effort and focus on nurturing and 

investing in key allied and partner nation 

individuals and institutions. USSOCOM has 

consistently increased the number of foreign 

liaisons to its headquarters facility in Tampa, 

increasing the total number of contributing 

partner nations to 17 over the last two years.

Each USSOCOM element in the more than 

80 countries where SOF deploys is in part a 

liaison node and views the maintenance and 

investment in host nation partners essential. 

GEN Votel describes this during his posture 

statement, “...we are continuing to build 

relationships with international and domestic 

partners through sustained security 

cooperation, expanded communication 

architectures, and liaison activities.”14

USSOCOM has strengthened the 

relationships and connections that provide 

the foundation for this network to enable 

more regular communication and 

collaboration. The number of participating 

nations is just a measure of performance. The 

proven ability during many crisis operations 

for SOF elements to lead general purpose 

force elements into unfamiliar environments 

leveraging their relationships and networks, 

as in Mali in 2013 and returning to Iraq in 

2014, is the key measure of effectiveness. 

Despite the importance of the relationships, 

Campaigning Fall 2017 4
the ability to effectively communicate 

information to the right decision maker is

even more important, especially if that 

decision maker is on the other side of the 

globe. 

The information technology (IT) 

network is perhaps the most underestimated 

and overlooked element leading to the 

successful integration of global operations. 

SOF operates and manages its own IT 

networks. This permits a level of access, 

control, and ability to adapt that does not 

exist on larger DoD systems. The most 

critical difference in the way SOF approaches 

the IT network is that they do not differentiate 

between the tactical and strategic networks. 

In SOF, there is one network that is used by 

both elements in CONUS performing 

garrison and training functions, and elements 

in forward persistent presence locations. 

Deploying conventional forces bring their 

own tactical network that is unique to that 

unit, and it does not integrate well with the 

global strategic network. Merely shifting the 

principle approach of the Joint Force to a 

single, interoperable network, would pay 

tremendous dividends to effecting GIO. GEN 

Votel describes the importance of the 

principle of side-by-side systems in his 

posture statement, “Our facility provides our 

international partners access to their own 

national classified communication systems 

while placing them in a single collaborative 

space, side-by-side with their US 

counterparts.”15 While the principle of sideby-side systems seems intuitive, it is not the 

norm. The rapid movement of information 

transregionally is so important that GEN 

Votel invested resources to ensure that 

USSOCOM maintains a competitive 

advantage. “Another critical effort is our SOF 

Information Environment, which supports 

our need for better situational awareness, 

collaboration, decision-making, and 

synchronization under complex conditions. 

While these technologies are important, we 

believe humans are more important than 

hardware.”16 The right relationships and the 

right communication tools are enabled by the 

final focus. In order to truly understand the 

environment, you must be in the 

environment. 

GEN Votel comments, “In all of these 

examples, which cover just a segment of our 

activities, SOF plays a key role by working 

with a range of partners on complex and 

demanding problem sets. Even in those 

situations where SOF are in the lead for 

small-footprint, high-risk missions, we are 

fully integrated with, and fully dependent 

upon, our conventional force.”17 USSOCOM 

executes this using a mix of rotational forces 

and permanent assignments, and is 

comfortable operating with very small 

footprints in remote locations. This concept 

of employment allows for greatly increased 

understanding of the environment and for

increased ability for indications and warning, 

which reduces risk to time and distance 

considerations when key military advice or 

capabilities are required. 

Securing additional basing 

agreements could be exceptionally difficult, 

but there may be an opportunity to look at 

expanding the use of commercial Afloat 

Forward Staging Base (AFSB) platforms and 

increasing, within the Army specifically, a 

set of forward rotational exercises and 

Campaigning Fall 2017 5
deployments to give the Joint Force a more 

forward presence (Figure 1). The commercial 

company Maersk has already looked at the 

concept of converting a commercial ship to 

an AFSB, with projected costs of 60-75% 

less than newly built ships and Navy

platforms.18

Figure 1. Rendering of converted commercial 

vessel AFSB19

These three key focus areas: 

persistent presence, the relationship network 

and the information technology network, are 

key scalable elements that are proven in the 

USSOCOM model for GIO. However, while 

USSOCOM provides the Department of 

Defense an example of a functional 

command with global operational 

responsibilities, other agencies and 

departments must be integrated with the joint 

force to truly achieve globally integrated 

operations. 

Realizing Effective GIO Partnerships

One of the critical shortfalls in the 

current organization of the JTF for executing 

GIO is the lack of an element dedicated to 

maximizing the synergy with the other three 

components of the Joint, Interagency, 

Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) 

environment. While current doctrine 

governing JTF operations highlights the 

necessity of coordinating in the JIIM 

environment in order to facilitate unity of 

effort, achieve common objectives, and 

provide common understanding, 

organizationally, JTFs only account for the 

Joint, leaving the Interagency, 

Intergovernmental and Multinational 

elements to be worked out later.20 Without 

these elements present, a JTF commander 

will be hindered in meeting the requirement 

identified by former Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, 

that forces be globally postured and able to 

move quickly across traditional boundaries.21

As Dr. Dan McCauley correctly points out, 

GIO requires leaders who are experts in 

operating in the JIIM environment.22

However, these leaders cannot be created 

overnight, nor can they create effective JIIM 

teams without preparation and training. This 

integration of JIIM efforts into the JTF must 

begin even before planning for the JTF 

commences in order to ensure trust and 

effectiveness within the JIIM team. 

However, current doctrine falls woefully 

short in proposing how to do this. 

While virtually every element of GIO 

would benefit from the inclusion of JIIM 

experts into the JTF construct, there are three 

GIO elements in which such inclusion is 

Campaigning Fall 2017 6
absolutely essential – global agility, 

partnering, and being increasingly 

discriminate to minimize unintended 

consequences. To obtain Global Agility, the 

U.S. must be able to posture when and where 

in the world it needs to. Getting the 

permissions for access, basing, and overflight 

(ABO) requires experts who have developed 

relationships with the State Department and 

the host nation. Another element of GIO, 

Partnering, clearly depends on having a JTF 

with experts who know how to build these 

partnerships. Having personnel on the JTF 

staff with extensive knowledge of JIIM 

partners will also help the commander better 

understand both the friendly and operational 

environments and avoid making missteps 

which have unintended consequences. 

Synchronizing the military element of power 

with the other aspects of national power – 

diplomacy, economics, and information is an 

implied element of GIO and in this regard, 

having a built-in JIIM expert is critical.

Perhaps because the military was 

such a dominant player during the nearly nine 

years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, military 

leaders were slow to develop a structure in 

Iraq in 2014 to optimize integration with the 

other elements of national power, resulting in 

a lack of understanding of the environment 

and a lack of unity of effort, according to 

CALL.23 This was most visible in the 

unsynchronized efforts to build the capacity 

of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) after they 

had been routed in Anbar and Nineveh 

Provinces.24 The CALL report went so far as 

to call the State Department – DoD 

relationship “divisive.”25

In comparison, JIIM coordination 

was handled better outside of Iraq. The 

CENTCOM leadership, utilizing the 

expertise of its foreign area officers (FAOs) 

in the J5 and in the Embassies throughout the 

AOR, developed a relatively effective key 

leader engagement strategy with the regional 

partners and the interagency in Washington, 

which facilitated the rapid building of the 

anti-ISIL coalition and permissions for ABO 

in the AOR.26

Recommendations

Current Doctrine, Organization, 

Training and Leadership (the DOTL of 

DOTMLPF) do not adequately address the 

need to include JIIM when considering and 

creating a JTF to execute GIO. Changes in 

this area could ensure much greater synergy 

between DoD and its JIIM partners in future 

GIO. The doctrine for JIIM coordination 

found in Joint Publication 3-08, 

Interorganizational Cooperation, states that a 

whole of government approach is required to 

achieve unity of effort in any joint 

operation.27 While the doctrine ties 

operational success to the integration and 

harmonization of military and civilian 

efforts, it is more suggestive than directive. 

As currently written, it is likely to lead to ad 

hoc organizations in which no relations or 

trust have developed prior to the crisis. To 

mitigate this, doctrine should be changed to 

require DoD to reach out to interagency 

partners and try to create JIIM teams focused 

on a particular issue (such as Iraq, Korea, 

pandemics, WMD proliferation, etc.) who 

correspond regularly and meet periodically 

Campaigning Fall 2017 7
so that relations and trust are already in place 

if a crisis develops. However, without 

direction from the NSC, or Congress 

rewriting laws, these organizations will 

continue to be ad hoc. For there to be a lasting 

solution, Congress would have to direct a 

Goldwater-Nichols-like law that forced 

members of the interagency, whose leaders 

were members of the NSC, to send 

representatives from their respective 

agencies to the JTF and reward them 

appropriately for taking these assignments.

Creating JIIM organizations would 

require buy-in from the National Security 

Council and the other JIIM members. While 

DoD cannot force these partners to agree to 

create these contingency JIIM organizations, 

it can take steps to address the shortfall in its 

own doctrine regarding JTF organizations. 

Currently, Geographic Combatant 

Commands (GCC) have Joint Interagency 

Coordination Groups (JIACG) that facilitate 

interagency coordination at the GCC level, 

but there is no such requirement at the JTF 

level. Doctrine should require DoD to reach 

out to its interagency partners and try to 

create a JIACG as soon as there is an 

indication that a JTF will be stood up. While 

more difficult, the GCC Commander should 

also help the JTF commander get 

representation from key multinational 

partners to join the JTF. The GCC should 

designate a senior FAO to lead the JTF’s 

JIACG, who can facilitate organizing and 

ensure the effectiveness of JIIM activities. 

Through multiple tours, a senior FAO has the 

experience working with JIIM partners, 

knows how a country team works, can help 

the Commander better understand the 

environment, and can work with the host 

nation to maximize the effectiveness of JIIM 

efforts and the coordination of the national 

instruments of power. Because JIIM 

coordination is such a critical part of the JTF 

effort in GIO, this JIACG leader must be part 

of the Commander’s primary staff with 

regular and direct access to the commander to 

be both an advisor and a “translator” between 

the different cultures that exist within the 

JIIM team.

The JTF’s JIIM team will be much 

more effective if they train together before 

there is a crisis. Planning and war gaming 

possible scenarios for their region or issue of 

interest would help to build mutual 

understanding and trust. These efforts should 

culminate with annual exercises. The State 

Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI) 

regularly runs crisis management exercises 

for Embassies. For GIO to be effective, the 

GCC J7 and FSI should develop exercises to 

build JIIM synchronization. 

Maximizing the effectiveness of JIIM 

in GIO will also require a greater investment 

in the assessment and training of FAOs. 

Because most FAOs do not reach full 

effectiveness until they have multiple JIIM 

tours under their belt, this cannot be done 

quickly or cheaply. However, the relative 

cost of training a single FAO who can then 

maximize the effective synergy of the 

interagency, intergovernmental and 

multinational partners in comparison to the 

cost of large scale military formations, which 

could make situations worse, is bearable. 

Currently, the services pay lip service to the 

need for JIIM expertise, but they do not 

Campaigning Fall 2017 8
assess or promote an adequate number of 

FAOs to fill the growing demand.

Without identifying FAOs 

specifically, the traits McCauley discusses as 

required for Joint Force Leaders in GIO 

already exist in the FAO community and, 

often, the Special Forces community. 

McCauley highlights the need not just to 

understand the culture of the other JIIM 

members, but also one’s own culture in order 

to fully comprehend the different context 

each partner has when viewing a situation.28

The environment these leaders must operate 

in will often be complex, ill-defined and 

multi-cultural, requiring a leader who is 

adaptive and innovative.29 To deal with these 

situations, McCauley proposes three 

competencies for leaders of GIO. First, they 

must understand current and future 

conditions that make strategic sense. Second, 

they must understand global trends and 

implications to the U.S. and other global and 

local actors. Third, they must strive to see 

information that is contrary to the strategy or 

trends.30 To be able to do this, the JTF leader 

must have advisors in the staff who 

understand the JIIM environment. 

Sustaining GIO

As the Department of Defense 

executes GIO, the Department must also 

determine how the implementation of this 

concept will be sustained. The ability of the 

joint force elements to purposefully combine 

quickly with each other and their mission 

partners in order to integrate capabilities 

fluidly across domains, echelons, geographic 

boundaries, and organizational affiliations is 

extremely demanding logistically. As 

warfighters change how they fight, logistics 

organizations also need to be transformed. 

GIO is unattainable without a strong logistics 

system. GIO calls for joint forces to be spread 

widely across the world, often in relatively 

small units conducting a wide assortment of 

missions with different support requirements, 

ranging from humanitarian 

assistance/disaster relief missions to major 

combat operations. For example, one military 

command could have five units operating in 

five different areas utilizing five different 

lines of communications. Logistic 

organizations must provide an enduring 

organizational structure built on

responsiveness and flexibility to support 

GIO. 

The Joint Logistics Enterprise 

recommends the concept of globally 

integrated logistics (GIL) as an answer to 

support GIO in this environment of 

demanding requirements with severe fiscal 

constraints. The Joint Concept for Logistics 

defines GIL as “the capability to allocate and 

adjudicate logistics support on a global scale 

to optimize effectiveness and responsiveness, 

and to reconcile competing demands for 

limited logistics resources based on strategic 

priorities.” 31 If implemented, GIL could 

improve the ability of the joint force to 

rapidly aggregate, reconfigure, and 

disaggregate anywhere in the world; enhance 

the ability to accurately collect and analyze 

logistic information; improve the ability to 

rapidly move forces, supplies, and 

equipment; and leverage operational contract 

support. These few enhancements of the 

Campaigning Fall 2017 9
logistics force should provide GIO future 

success.

Not only does GIO need to be 

sustained by restructuring the joint logistics 

force, the Department of Defense must also 

look at sustaining GIO through changes in 

joint leadership, education and training. 

“Joint Force global leaders must be adaptive, 

innovative, and critical thinkers capable of 

operating in complex, ill-defined, and 

multicultural environments as demanded by 

the globally integrated operations concept.”32

In order to sustain GIO critical leadership 

competencies, the GIO concept must be 

institutionalized into Service and Joint 

education and training programs. 

The Department of Defense must 

grow leaders that are adaptive, innovative, 

and critical thinkers. Therefore, military 

education must incorporate the GIO concept 

at the lowest (i.e., military academies, 

Reserve Officer Training Corps) to the 

highest (i.e., PINNACLE, CAPSTONE, 

KEYSTONE) levels of military schools. 

Leader education must also include advanced 

studies at civilian colleges and universities. 

This education must provide a baseline 

understanding of the GIO enterprise that

leaders can leverage in tactical, operational, 

and strategic assignments. When training 

leaders for the future it is imperative that the 

training replicates the future globally 

integrated operations environment as fully as 

possible. It is imperative that the training is 

realistic, challenging leaders’ knowledge, 

skills, and critical thinking in situations as 

close as possible to the conditions of future 

operations. Combatant Command exercises, 

functional training and combat training 

should be utilized to train leaders to adapt to 

a diverse set of circumstances and become 

experts in a range of different mission (i.e., 

combat, humanitarian assistance and disaster 

relief) types. In addition, this education and 

training must include other government and 

non-government organizations. 

Conclusion 

The Joint Force faces a world of 

continuing challenges and these challenges 

present themselves in real-time with global 

connections. The Joint Force must evolve, 

retaining the fundamental principles of joint 

operations, while shedding the bureaucratic 

vestiges of a bygone era that prevent rapid 

global connection, coordination, and 

employment. The core of this new approach 

will be the JTF. JTFs are the key to 

employing the Joint Force in GIO against 

transregional, multi-dimensional, multidomain threats. How we organize, build, and 

sustain these JTFs will determine their 

ultimate success.

USSOCOM provides a successful 

model for the evolution of the Joint Force for 

GIO, and also illuminates focus areas that can 

lead to true effectiveness for JTFs: persistent 

forward presence, the relationship network, 

and the information technology network. As 

we build JTFs, to optimize the chances for 

success in GIO, the JTF must be able to 

coordinate with JIIM partners and leverage 

their strengths. This requires that JIIM 

expertise be built into the JTF structure and 

training from the beginning. Finally, not only 

does a change need to occur in the operational 

construct to support GIO, the Joint Force 

Campaigning Fall 2017 10
needs to consider making significant changes 

in the logistics, education, and training 

environment in order to sustain the GIO 

concept. The logistics community has 

developed the GIL concept to complement 

GIO. In addition, our education and training 

must restructure to grow the adaptive, 

innovative, and critical thinking leaders 

required for the future. 

There are no simple solutions for the 

transregional, multi-dimensional, multidomain threats, but there are simple choices 

we can control as we organize to address 

these threats. 

Author Biographies:

Colonel Camille Nichols, USAF, is currently serving 

as Director, Program Integration, Joint Contingency 

Acquisitions Support Office, Defense Logistics 

Agency, in Fort Belvoir, VA. She was commissioned 

through North Carolina A & T State University 

Detachment 605 in 1993. Col Nichols earned a BS in 

1 Colin Clark, “CJCS Dunford Calls For Strategic 

Shifts;’ At Peace Or At War Is Insufficient’”, 

Breaking Defense, September 21, 2016, accessed 

October 15, 2016, 

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/09/cjcs-dunfordcalls-for-strategic-shifts-at-peace-or-at-war-isinsufficient/. 2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Dan McCauley. “Globally Integrated Operations: A 

Reflection of Environmental Complexity”, Joint 

Force Quarterly 71 (2013): 64, accessed November 7, 

2016, http://dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq-71.pdf.

5 ARCENT Transition to Combined Joint Task Force 

– Operation Inherent Resolve: Lessons and Best 

Practices, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army 

Lessons Learned (CALL), March 2016), 1,

http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/

16-10.pdf. 6 Ibid. 7, 8.

7 Ibid. 8.

8 ARCENT, 11.

Accounting from North Carolina A & T State 

University in 1993 and an MS in Business 

Administration (Leadership) from Central Michigan 

University in 2008. Prior to her current assignment, 

Col Nichols served as Commander, Defense Contract 

Management Agency Korea, Daegu, South Korea.

Colonel Robert Paddock, USA, is currently serving 

as the Chief of the Security Cooperation Division in 

the J5 of U.S. Central Command. He was 

commissioned through the United States Army 

Reserve Officer Training program in 1989. COL 

Paddock earned a BA in History from the College of 

the Holy Cross in 1989, a MA in Arab Studies from 

Georgetown University in 2002, and a MA in 

Administration and Strategic Studies from Muta’a 

University in Jordan in 2013. Prior to his current 

assignment, COL Paddock served as the Senior 

Defense Official / Defense Attaché in Jordan.

Lieutenant Colonel Jasper Jeffers, USA, is currently 

serving as a staff officer at the Joint Special Operations 

Command at Fort Bragg, NC. He was commissioned 

through ROTC at Virginia Tech in 1996, earning a BS 

in Political Science. Prior to his current assignment, 

LTC Jeffers served in various command and staff 

positions within the special operations community.

 

9 Ibid. 14.

10 Ibid. 12, 21. 

11 US Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, 

Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, U.S. Army, 

Commander, United States Special Operations 

Command, 114th Cong., 1st. Sess., March 8, 2016.

12 Jim Garamone, “Dunford: Command, Control 

Must 'Keep Pace' in 21st Century,” Defense Media 

Activity, January 4, 2016, accessed October 28, 2016, 

http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/639844

/dunford-command-control-must-keep-pace-in-21stcentury

13 US Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, 

Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, U.S. Army, 

Commander, United States Special Operations 

Command, 114th Cong., 1st. Sess., March 8, 2016.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid.

18“Maersk Line Limited, Success Stories, Working 

with US Military”, modified 2016, 

Campaigning Fall 2017 11
http://www.maersklinelimited.com/working-withmll/success-stories/

19 Kyle Mizokami, “A Quick and Cheap Power 

Projection Alternative for Japan,” Japan Security 

Watch: New Pacific Institute, January 26, 2012, 

accessed October 25, 2016. 

http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=9830

20 Joint Publication 3-08: Interorganizational 

Coordination during Joint Operations (Washington, 

DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 June 2011), ix.

21 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint 

Force 2020 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

10 September 2012), iii.

22 Dan McCauley. “Developing Joint Force Leaders 

for Globally Integrated Operations,” Small Wars 

Journal, (January 29, 2013), 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/developing-jointforce-leaders-for-globally-integrated-operations, 1.

23 ARCENT, 14, 32.

24 Ibid. 17.

25 Ibid. 11.

26 The Army, Marine Corps, and Navy refer to their 

regional/interagency specialists as FAOs. The Air 

Force calls its specialists Regional Affairs Specialists 

(RAS). For this essay, FAO refers to this specialty in 

all services.

27 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interorganizational 

Cooperation. Joint Publication 3-08. Washington, 

DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 12, 2016, xiii.

28 Dan McCauley. “Developing Joint Force Leaders 

for Globally Integrated Operations,” Small Wars 

Journal, January 29, 2013, 3-4.

29 Ibid. 3. 

30 Ibid. 5. 31Joint Concept for Logistics. September 25, 2015. 32 Dan McCauley. "Developing Joint Force Leaders 

for Globally Integrated Operations." Small Wars 

Journal, January 29, 2013. 

Campaigning Fall 2017 12
Countering Threat Networks: A 

Standard Lines of Effort Model

by

Col Chris Goodyear, COL Brian Greata, 

LTC Timothy Payment, and Col Martin Wetterauer

Understanding networked adversaries

and countering threat networks (CTN) is an 

increasingly common challenge for joint 

force commanders. This challenge is likely 

to grow as asymmetric approaches and 

hybrid warfare become standard for those 

adversaries who are weaker and search for 

legitimacy in achieving their objectives. The 

implications for commanders is that they 

must be armed with a generally accepted 

means to understand these threats and 

prepare plans to thwart them. 

This network phenomenon is not 

entirely new to U.S. and allied military 

forces, as joint force commanders have 

confronted terrorist networks in Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and around the world before and since 

9/11. U.S. Southern Command has been 

fighting criminal threat networks for over 20 

years through Joint Interagency Task ForceSouth (JIATF-S). Insurgent threat networks 

are an even older phenomenon—as old as 

nation-states and those who have sought to 

overthrow them. These are all valid examples 

of threat networks; however, a critical, 

relatively recent development is the 

convergence of criminal, insurgent, and/or 

terrorist capabilitiesinto hybrid networks that 

leverage their respective strengths to create a 

synergistic threat effect.1

 

With the release of Joint Publication 

(JP) 3-25, Countering Threat Networks, on 

21 December 2016, the joint force now has 

official doctrine to guide joint force 

commanders and their staffs as they 

formulate plans to oppose these most 

challenging problems. JP 3-25 provides a 

number of operational level considerations, 

including the importance of interagency 

integration, planning to counter threat 

networks, and assessing progress towards 

victory against threat networks. It also covers 

the finer details of CTN activities, such as 

fundamentals and best practices for analyzing 

network structure, counter threat finance, 

CTN in a maritime domain, identity 

intelligence activities, and exploitation to 

support CTN. However, doctrine provides 

very few specifics for a commander or staff 

considering how to develop an operational 

approach, and specifically what lines of effort 

(LOEs) best achieve operational and strategic 

end states against threat networks. Finally, 

JP 3-25 only briefly considers CTN outside 

of conflict zones, where the full range of 

friendly military actions will usually be 

severely restricted. 

JP 3-25 is deliberately broad, and, in 

fact, is a very good document for exposing 

personnel to concepts and orienting thought 

against these complex threats. This essay

attempts to refine the guidance found in JP 3-

25 by proposing a methodology to employ JP 

3-25 doctrine through recommended lines of 

effort to counter threat networks. 

Specifically, we intend to prove the following 

thesis: In an Outside Declared Theater of 

Active Armed Conflict (ODTAAC) 2

environment, a whole of government solution 

leading to a judicial (i.e., rule of law) end

state is best achieved through lines of effort 

aligned with threat network functions. In 

examining this thesis, we will attempt to 

Campaigning Fall 2017 13
define an optimal end state and supporting 

operational conditions, and consider potential 

lines of effort that align along the PMESII

(Political, Military, Economic, Social, 

Information , and Infrastructure Systems) 3, 

DIMEFIL (Diplomatic, Information, 

Military, Economic, Finance, Intelligence, 

and Law Enforcement)4

, and Threat Network 

Function models.

5

 Ultimately, we attempt to 

identify a template with the optimal lines of 

effort along which to carry out military 

operations, actions, and activities that 

contribute directly to, or support, 

achievement of objectives to counter threat 

networks. 

Background 

Threat networks are not new. They 

have always existed in various forms, 

activities, and degrees of power. They are, 

per JP 3-25, those networks whose size, 

scope, or capabilities threaten US interests.6 

Common types of threat networks are 

terrorist, criminal, and insurgent networks.7 

Criminal networks can include narcotics, 

human trafficking and human smuggling (to 

include the movement of special interest 

aliens), and weapons smuggling (potentially 

including weapons of mass destruction, 

WMD) amongst other illicit activities. The 

relatively recent convergence of these kinds 

of threat networks is what poses an 

increasingly significant threat to U.S. 

interests. We have already seen the merging 

of all three in the Fuerzas Armadas 

Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in 

Colombia. What began as an insurgent 

movement gradually adopted terrorist tactics, 

and then after funding themselves through 

narcotics trafficking, this became a raison 

d’etre. 8 Likewise, the ability of criminal 

networks to utilize established trafficking 

routes to wittingly or unwittingly move 

terrorists and/or weapons of mass destruction 

constitutes a serious threat. Finally, 

Hezbollah uses the drug trade and other illicit 

activities around the world to fund terrorist 

activities in the Levant.9

These kinds of threats, and the 

environments in which they operate, 

naturally drive friendly networks towards 

whole-of-government solutions due to the 

complexity of the problem and the 

requirement for a comprehensive approach.10 

To combat threats such as these, the U.S. 

Government has undergone a significant 

increase in interagency cooperation since 

9/11. 11 The use of Title 10 forces under a 

Title 50 lead and authority is one area in 

particular that has been utilized to leverage 

the strengths of participating agencies to a 

greater overall effect. 12 Likewise, detailing 

Title 10 personnel to other Federal agencies 

for a specific mission or purpose is another 

way DoD can contribute to an other-thanmilitary effect.

These efforts are commendable, but 

they are niche efforts, usually isolated in 

nature, and limited in achieving the overall 

end state. They don’t constitute a 

comprehensive approach, or provide a “best 

practice” for lines of effort that a joint force 

commander could use to organize operations 

to counter threat networks. 

This is particularly true when 

considering the differences between a 

conflict zone and an ODTAAC environment. 

Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATFS), which conducts detection and monitoring 

Campaigning Fall 2017 14
missions to combat illicit trafficking and is 

widely considered an example of successful 

interagency action, is still largely focused on 

one kind of commodity (narcotics) of one 

type of threat network (criminal) and does not

function cross-domain (it is almost entirely 

limited to the Air and Maritime domains).

13 

While its function concentrates on network 

disruption through evidentiary seizures and 

criminal prosecution, it is limited by charter 

from leveraging all elements of national 

power to achieve a comprehensive approach

and strategy. However, one thing is clear 

from the JIATF-S example, and that is the 

fact that a judicial end state is the de facto 

“approved solution” for the Western 

Hemisphere (WHEM) when combatting 

threat networks. 

The WHEM is not alone in this 

respect, and serves as a good example of an 

ODTAAC environment. In this environment, 

the Military element of national power is deemphasized, creating greater reliance on the 

remaining diplomatic, economic, and 

information instruments. This is 

representative of any ODTAAC area, 

considered diplomatic or “Title 22” 

environments. Although the military is used 

to great effect in these theaters, it is usually 

through soft power and influence, and not 

kinetic strikes as used in theaters of conflict. 

The DIME construct, however, 

ignores some very powerful instruments of 

national power that are utilized not only in the 

U.S. Southern Command AOR, but around 

the world. These include law enforcement, 

intelligence, and financial entities that can 

achieve effects against threat networks and 

which don’t easily fall into one of the 

“DIME” bins. 14 For example, a Homeland 

Security Investigations (HSI) agent is not an 

instrument of diplomatic, military, economic, 

or informational power but the authorities 

and potential effect that HSI can bring to bear 

against transregional actors is significant. 

Likewise, the financial effects that the U.S. 

Department of the Treasury can apply to 

threat network finances presents a 

considerable threat to a network’s resources. 

The DIMEFIL construct better captures the 

full range of instruments of national power. 

This construct first appeared in the National 

Military Strategic Plan for the War on 

Terrorism in 2006 and, although not official 

doctrine, does serve to address an expanded 

view of applicable national capabilities.

15 

This concurrent de-emphasis of 

military power and expanded consideration 

of other instruments of national power has 

resulted in a preference within ODTAAC 

environments for what is commonly referred 

to as a “judicial end state” for threat 

networks. But why should a judicial end state

be desirable over any other? Is this just a 

political ploy, an effort to make US activities 

more palatable? While there is value in 

reinforcing the rule of law during CTN 

activities, there are also some good reasons 

why a judicial end state is desirable outside 

of a conflict zone. 

First, there is the question of jus ad 

bellum, or the theory of just war. If a nonstate actor happens to reside within a 

particular state that is friendly to the U.S., 

what exactly is the right of the U.S. to 

conduct military operations against that 

adversary? If we conduct clandestine warfare 

across regional and country boundaries, our 

actions no longer fit the status quo of justified 

use of force based on the law of armed 

Campaigning Fall 2017 15
conflict and theaters of armed conflict. 16

Second, there is ambiguity regarding what 

level of violence rises above criminality to 

that of armed conflict. Without clear 

definitions of what constitutes a significant 

enough threat to warrant military action, a 

law enforcement solution is preferred. 17

Third, we should consider the impacts to 

accepted norms of proportionality in an 

ODTAAC environment. Current rules 

regarding proportionality arose from 

conflicts in which civilians were deemed a 

part of the enemy, and could share in the 

hardships of war. 18 In an environment in 

which the threat network hides amongst 

civilians who may have no allegiance or even 

awareness of the threat network, a 

reassessment of the legal framework 

governing hostilities may be in order. 19 

Ignoring this consideration, and the potential 

for collateral damage, risks alienating the 

indigenous population and US legitimacy.

For these reasons and others, there is a 

current of thought that emphasizes limiting or 

abandoning the use of military detention, 

limiting the use of lethal force, and a 

preference for criminal prosecution over 

military detention. 20 This effectively 

constitutes the judicial end state. 

This, like any policy or generally 

accepted norm, is bound to run into 

occasional conflicts. For example, within law 

enforcement, one such source of tension is 

between disruption and dismantlement. 

Investigative entities are tasked, and are 

naturally inclined due to the nature of their 

work, to lean towards caution when 

considering disruption activities. They 

generally prefer to delay disruption in order 

to gain greater knowledge of an entire 

network, and thereafter achieve complete 

dismantlement. On the other hand, other law 

enforcement entities are tasked with 

disruption of criminal activities and are quick 

to move against threat network activities in 

order to disrupt imminent threats. Therefore, 

“judicial end state” implies a wide range of 

law enforcement and judicial/prosecutorial 

activities that achieve the desired end state

and reinforce the rule of law within 

ODTAAC environments. 

If we accept that the judicial end state

is preferred in an ODTAAC environment, 

then we must be concerned about how to 

design an operation to achieve it. 

Operational design is “the conception and 

construction of the framework that underpins 

a campaign or major operation plan and its 

subsequent execution.” 21 It results in the 

operational approach, “which broadly 

describes the actions the joint force needs to 

take to reach the desired state.”22 Some of 

the components of an operational approach 

(particularly specific contributing factors or 

intermediate military objectives) cannot, and 

should not, be determined until faced with an 

actual problem and development of a proper 

understanding of the environment, the 

precise threat networks and their capabilities, 

and friendly network. 

Notwithstanding this, the lines of 

effort for CTN within an ODTAAC 

environment should be relatively stable and 

applicable regardless of the specific 

environment or threat network. 

Threat networks are formed at the 

confluence of a catalyst, a receptive 

audience, and an accommodating 

environment. The removal of any or all of 

these is necessary to eliminate the threat that 

Campaigning Fall 2017 16
any network poses, and to achieve an 

acceptable end state. Therefore any 

articulation of an end state should at a 

minimum reflect a satisfactory achievement 

of effects against these three conditions (See 

Figure 1):

23 

End state #1 – No Catalyst. The 

catalyst for establishment of the threat 

network is eliminated or sufficiently 

addressed to reduce the perceived need to 

assemble or take action.

End state #2 – No Receptive 

Audience. Potential threat network audiences 

have more to gain by not participating, are 

not motivated to participate, or do not have 

the means to conduct actions that address the 

catalyst.

End state #3 – Unaccommodating 

Environment. The environment is 

inhospitable to the organization and activities 

of the threat network. (In an ODTAAC 

environment, law enforcement activities are 

critical to achieve this.)

The accomplishment of these three 

end states constitutes success vis-à-vis 

countering a threat network. A joint force 

commander may add to these to meet a 

peculiar additional environmental condition 

that they have been tasked to resolve, but 

cannot take away if they want to address the 

threat network completely.

In order to reach the end state, certain 

operational conditions must be achieved. In 

the case of countering threat networks, it is

possible to backwards plan conditions that 

support the end states listed previously, and 

Campaigning Fall 2017 17
that are applicable to any kind of threat 

network. The following conditions must be 

met; each is listed with the end state(s) that it 

will support (see Figure 2).

- Friendly network narrative or option 

seen as more legitimate and less risky 

than threat network practices or 

ideologies (End states 1, 2, 3). 

o In order to achieve this 

condition, the risks associated 

with the threat network 

outweigh the benefit or profit; 

threat ideologies are seen as 

bankrupt; a narrative alternate 

to the threat network is 

developed and accepted; and 

the threat network, its 

objectives, and its actions are 

seen as illegitimate. These 

may constitute intermediate 

factors (potentially along with 

others) that fall along lines of 

effort to achieve this 

condition. 

- Effective governance presents a safer 

environment and greater economic 

opportunities than a threat network. 

(2, 3) 

 

To achieve this condition, a 

comprehensive approach will assist host 

nation development of available economic 

opportunities; promote effective and 

equitable governance including the rule of 

law; and establish a safe and secure 

environment through successful detention 

and prosecution of threat network members. 

Campaigning Fall 2017 18
- Threat network operations, 

intelligence, and sustainment 

degraded. (3)

o To achieve this condition, 

joint forces should consider 

degradation of threat network 

freedom of movement; 

disruption of their ability to 

gather intelligence or 

resources; and disruption of 

threat network operations, 

actions, and activities 

(OAAs).

The emphasis on the rule of law, the 

establishment of a safe and secure 

environment, successful prosecution, and 

disruption of threat activities all are areas 

where law enforcement and judicial 

processes will contribute heavily. The likely 

“judicial end state” desired given current 

policy and common practice, as well as 

compelling reasons given an ODTAAC 

environment, is reflected in a number of these 

conditions. 

The precise actions that will fall along 

these lines of effort are too specific to be 

considered in this paper, and instead must be 

developed and refined once confronted by a 

specific threat network scenario. These can 

subsequently be tailored and scaled based on 

analysis of the peculiarities of the specific 

environment and threat network. 

The key question that remains is how 

a joint force commander should select lines 

of effort that will support achievement of a 

judicial end state, articulate an appropriate 

DOD role in a whole-of-government 

solution, and provide an ideal application of 

instruments of national power to counter 

threat networks. The following description of 

models and analysis intend to provide a broad 

answer for future application. 

Description 

This paper considers three potential 

LOE models –the DIMEFIL, PMESII, and 

Threat Network Function models. Before 

examining these models there are a few notes 

on considerations that should be common to 

any LOE model adopted by the joint force 

commander. Any solution will have to take 

into consideration conflicting priorities and 

determine a method for resolving such 

conflicts. The Unity of Effort Framework 

Solution Guide provides a useful tool to 

guide operational-level planning and 

development of conflict resolution 

procedures between departments/agencies.

24 

One area in particular that will have 

to be taken into account during planning is 

the tension and balance required between the 

desire (and sometimes requirement) to 

disrupt imminent threats versus the desire, 

particularly among investigative and 

intelligence entities, to leave certain threats in 

place in order to facilitate a longer-term 

dismantlement of a network. Clear triggers 

and acceptable levels of risk must be 

identified to guide this decision making. 25

All three pillars of “network engagement” 

must be considered when developing specific 

actions along whatever LOE construct is 

adopted. That is, while countering the threat 

network, the whole-of-government must also 

partner with the friendly network and engage 

with the neutral network. 26 Finally, a 

comprehensive approach should always be 

pursued and incorporated. Other military 

partners, the Interagency, partner nations, 

Campaigning Fall 2017 19
intergovernmental and nongovernmental

partners, and the capabilities they all bring to 

bear should be incorporated when and where 

they are willing and able in order to achieve 

a comprehensive approach.

The first Line of Effort model 

considered is Friendly Network oriented; the 

DIMEFIL construct (see Figure 3). 

DIMEFIL consists of Diplomatic, 

Information, Military, Economic, Financial, 

Intelligence, and Law Enforcement 

instruments of friendly national power. 

DIME is well established, but as discussed 

previously in the Background, the additional 

FIL instruments are appropriate given the 

nature of the threat, the ODTAAC 

environment considered, and the desire for a 

law enforcement oriented approach. In this 

model, lines of effort are aligned directly 

with (and are named for) each of the seven 

DIMEFIL instruments of power. DOD has its 

own Military LOE, and can support each of 

the other LOEs to varying degrees. 

The second LOE model considered, a 

Threat Network oriented model, was PMESII 

(political, military, economic, social, 

information, and infrastructure). This is a 

systems-based model intended to define the 

structures of an adversary through 

examination of the PMESII characteristics of 

the state. 27 This can be applied towards 

threat networks that exhibit these 

Campaigning Fall 2017 20
characteristics, and instruments of friendly 

power can be applied against each of the 

threat PMESII systems. As with the 

DIMEFIL example, lines of effort are aligned 

with and named for each of the six systems.

(See Figure 4.)

The final LOE model has a mixed 

Threat Network and Friendly Network 

orientation. In this model, three Threat 

Network Functions (Information, 

Operations, and Sustainment / Logistics) are 

supplemented with the addition of a Host 

Nation (HN) Development LOE. The Threat 

Network Functions are derived from various 

functions identified in JP 3-25, and 

generalized to fit any type of threat network. 

The Information LOE can include actions 

against threat intelligence, propaganda, and 

strategic communications (either to build 

their legitimacy or tear down that of the 

friendly network). 

The Operations LOE includes actions 

against training, drug manufacturing, 

operational elements, weapons 

manufacturing, C2/leadership, and 

clandestine network components. The 

Sustainment/Logistics LOE includes 

potential actions against threat finance; 

recruiting; transport of drugs, weapons, 

people, etc.; and other logistical capabilities. 

The addition of the Host Nation 

Development LOE provides sufficient 

attention on the Friendly Network for a 

comprehensive approach toward 

development tasks which support conditions 

Campaigning Fall 2017 21
that can meet the desired end states. (See 

Figure 5.) 

Analysis and Discussion

In developing criteria to evaluate the 

proposed LOE models, we considered first 

the thesis and what criteria would lead us to 

an optimal model for CTN in an ODTAAC 

environment. Based on this analysis, we 

selected the following criteria: 1) The 

maximization of whole-of-government 

coordination and a comprehensive approach, 

2) Applicability to the ODTAAC 

environment and a desired “judicial end 

state”, and 3) Alignment with end state

conditions. 

First Criterion. Our previous 

discussion of threat networks showed that 

CTN naturally requires a whole-ofgovernment solution due to the complexities 

and multifaceted underlying problems that 

give rise to threat networks. Therefore, the 

first criterion is: Maximization of whole-ofgovernment coordination (all instruments of 

national power) and a comprehensive 

approach. At first glance it would appear the 

DIMEFIL model is preferred because it 

captures in dedicated lines of effort a broad 

Campaigning Fall 2017 22
range of instruments of national power. In 

reality, this is counterproductive because in 

building lines of effort along narrow roles, 

agencies may become myopic in focusing 

only upon “their” line of effort, and tend to 

ignore how they might contribute to the other 

lines of effort. This can lead to stove-piping 

of thought and action, and the comprehensive 

approach will suffer as a result. 28 This is 

considered in Joint Publication 5-0, which 

even goes so far as to recommend against this 

approach.29

PMESII is threat- and result-oriented, 

which should drive greater collaboration 

amongst instruments of power to arrive at 

better coordinated activities along the LOEs. 

However, it doesn’t completely eliminate the 

potential organizational “lane” problem, in 

that the Military LOE remains and may drive 

military contributions unnecessarily along a 

sole line of effort. The Threat Network 

Function model doesn’t establish these 

organizational lanes, and instead encourages 

cross-cutting application of the instruments 

of national power across all the lines of effort

(See Figure 5). A potential disadvantage of 

this model is that this requires a significant 

effort to coordinate in order to integrate, deconflict, and synchronize interagency 

contributions. But on balance, this process 

will result in more deeply analyzed and 

coordinated results. For this reason, the 

Threat Network Functions model is 

preferable under this criterion. 

Second Criterion. Considering the 

ODTAAC environment and the desire to 

reinforce the rule of law, we determined that 

an operational approach and associated lines 

of effort should lead a joint force commander 

toward a framework which supports 

successful prosecution and other law 

enforcement activities. Therefore, our next 

criterion is: Applicability to the ODTAAC 

environment and a desired “judicial end

state.” PMESII provided no apparent 

advantage in the ODTAAC / judicial end

state environment. DIMEFIL dedicates an 

entire LOE to law enforcement activities, 

which have a clear tie to the judicial end state. 

The Financial LOE in DIMEFIL includes 

Counter Threat Finance activities, which 

would also support law enforcement and 

prosecution. Threat Network Functions 

avoids a specific LOE for law enforcement, 

instead intending that each instrument should 

integrate activities within each LOE. This is 

slightly more difficult in that it requires a 

concerted effort to coordinate, much as with 

the first criterion.

Third Criterion. Any line of effort 

model should naturally align with end state 

conditions, not crosscut across most or all of 

them. In this way, there should be an 

alignment between cause and effect. 

Therefore the final criterion is: Alignment 

with end state conditions. DIMEFIL fares the 

worst against this criterion, precisely because 

DIMEFIL are the “means” for carrying out 

lines of effort, and LOEs are the “ways”. As 

such, the DIMEFIL instruments should be 

applied across all lines of effort. As a result, 

DIMEFIL is not a good model for 

demonstrating a flow from lines of effort, to 

conditions, to end state. While the DIMEFIL 

elements will certainly support achievement 

of conditions and end states, they do not align 

or “flow” towards the end states. This 

became painfully obvious when creating a 

diagram of operational approaches, creating 

a spider web of contributions from every 

Campaigning Fall 2017 23
LOE to each operational condition (see 

Figure 3). 

PMESII aligns somewhat better with 

the conditions in that there’s an exact 

alignment between the Social LOE and the 

Legitimacy condition, and the Infrastructure 

LOE and the Good governance/economic 

opportunities condition. (See Figure 4.) Two 

LOEs (Political and Economic) support two 

conditions. Only two LOEs contribute to all 

three conditions – the Military and 

Information LOEs. (There is some overlap in 

these two LOEs, as potential military 

information support operations exhibit 

characteristics of both). The Threat Network 

Functions model also aligns with the 

identified conditions and end states. The 

Operations and Sustainment/Logistics LOEs 

align well with the Threat Network 

condition; the Information LOE aligns with 

the Legitimacy and Threat 

Ops/Intel/Sustainment conditions, and the 

Host Nation Development and Information 

LOEs align with the Good governance / 

economic opportunities condition. This is 

overall a much cleaner, straightforward 

alignment than the other two LOE models 

offer.

After considering these criteria, the 

Threat Network Functions model is the best 

model identified for lines of effort that lead 

to end state achievement. The other two 

models simply had deeper flaws when 

compared against the evaluation criteria. The 

problem with the PMESII model is that it’s 

based on a tool designed to analyze an 

adversary and its “system of systems” in 

order to identify critical capabilities, 

Campaigning Fall 2017 24
requirements, and vulnerabilities for center 

of gravity analysis – not to themselves 

become lines of effort. DIMEFIL is usually 

considered the “means” of achieving 

operational and strategic objectives, and 

making them lines of effort (i.e., the “ways”) 

is potentially problematic and should be 

carefully considered during planning. 

DIMEFIL should cut across all LOEs, not 

define LOEs. Its potential for stove-piping 

along organizational/authority lines makes 

this model less than ideal. While DIMEFIL 

arguably dedicates an entire LOE to a core 

interest – that of the primacy of law 

enforcement and rule of law – the Threat 

Network Functions model better aligns with 

conditions and end states, and if properly 

implemented will foster better whole-ofgovernment solutions including support to 

achieving a judicial end state.

Conclusion 

In an ODTAAC environment, a 

whole of government solution leading to a 

judicial end state is best achieved through 

adopting lines of effort aligned with Threat 

Network Functions of Intelligence, 

Operations, and Sustainment/Logistics, 

together with Host Nation Development. 

Our analysis shows that when 

confronted by a threat network, adopting 

lines of effort that conform with Threat 

Network Functions is advantageous as a 

standardized template for developing 

operational design. (See Figure 6.) 

There will always be local conditions 

and factors that cause planners to reevaluate 

their understanding of the environment, 

assessment and definition of the problem, 

what conditions constitute acceptable end

state(s), and how to achieve them. Likewise, 

a joint force commander may face a scenario 

in which countering a threat network is not 

the only challenge. This is very likely in the 

real world. Besides the threat network, there 

probably will be other environmental 

conditions that force a hybrid approach to 

developing end states, conditions, and lines 

of effort. In that case, the recommendation 

we make in this paper will serve as a base 

from which to develop a more complex, 

tailored operational approach to address other 

challenges within the OE.

Based on current policy and practice, 

as well as conformance with the various 

criteria identified in this document, 

organizing elements of national power along 

the Threat Network Function lines of effort 

will best serve a joint force commander 

searching for an effective approach to 

counter threat networks. 

 

Authors Biographies

Colonel Christopher Goodyear, USAF. Col 

Goodyear is currently serving as a United States 

Special Operations Command liaison officer to the 

Drug Enforcement Administration’s Special 

Operations Division. He was commissioned through 

ROTC at The Citadel in 1995. Col Goodyear earned 

a BA in English Literature from The Citadel in 1995 

and an MA in Education from Touro University in 

2007. Prior to his current assignment, Col Goodyear 

served as the commander of the 58th Operations 

Support Squadron, Kirtland AFB, NM.

Colonel Brian Greata, USA. COL Greata is currently 

serving as an operations officer in Special Operations 

Command South. He was commissioned through the 

United States Military Academy (USMA) in 1994. 

COL Greata earned a Bachelor of Science in Regional 

Geography from USMA in 1994 and a MBA with a 

concentration in International Business from the 

University of Colorado, Colorado Springs in 2012. 

Prior to his current assignment, COL Greata served as 

Campaigning Fall 2017 25
the Garrison Commander of U.S. Army Garrison 

Natick.

Lieutenant Colonel Tim Payment, USA. LTC 

Payment is currently serving as the Secretary of the 

General Staff in United States Army Europe. He 

earned his undergraduate degree from Kentucky 

Wesleyan College in 1997 and Masters from Webster 

in 2008. Prior to his current assignment, LTC 

Payment commanded an Infantry Squadron in 2D 

Cavalry Regiment in Europe.

1. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 

Publication 3-25, Countering Threat Networks

(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 

2016), B1.

2 ODTAAC does not appear in any official 

establishing doctrine or policy documents. However, 

it is in wide use as a term of art to refer to any region 

or area outside of “hot” conflict zones. These regions 

generally are marked by the predominance of the 

Department of State, little kinetic activity, and 

cooperation with sovereign partners.

3. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 

Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington DC: 

Government Printing Office, 2017), IV3. 

4. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

National Military Strategic Plan for the War on 

Terrorism (Washington DC: Government Printing 

Office, 2006), 6.

5. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 

3-25, IV3. 

6. Ibid, I1.

7. Ibid, III8.

8. Ibid, B3-B6.

9. Ibid, B6.

10. Ibid, I3.

11. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 

Publication 3-05, Special Operations (Washington 

DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), III-22-III23. USSOCOM’s Interagency Partnership Program 

and Special Operations Support Teams are specific 

examples of increased cooperation between DoD and 

interagency partners since 9/11.

12. Anthony J. Fontanella, “Bringing Out the 

Small Guns: Title 50 Covert Operations As A 

Response to Unconventional Threats in the Modern 

Era,” Connecticut Journal of International Law 31, 

no. 115 (2015): 115.

13. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 

Publication 3-25, V19

14. Ibid, I5.

15. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National 

Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, 6.

Col Martin Wetterauer III, USMC. Col Wetterauer 

was commissioned in 1992 after graduating from 

Louisiana State University. Col Wetterauer just 

recently gave up Command of 8th Marine Regiment, 

2d MARDIV. That tour included a deployment as the 

Commander of the SPMAGTF-CR-AF. Col 

Wetterauer is headed to Bahrain to serve as the Deputy 

Commander of 5th MEB.

16. Robert M. Chesney, “Beyond the 

Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing 

Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism,” Michigan 

Law Review 112, no. 163 (2013): 205-211.

17. Jennifer C. Daskal, “The Geography of 

the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and 

Targeting Outside the ‘Hot’ Conflict Zone,” 

University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151, no. 5 

(2013): 1166.

18. Charles P. Trumbull IV, “Re-Thinking the 

Principle of Proportionality Outside of Hot 

Battlefields,” Virginia Journal of International Law

55, no. 3 (2015): 525. 

19. Ibid, 526.

20. Robert M. Chesney, “Beyond the 

Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing 

Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism,” Michigan 

Law Review 112, no. 163 (2013): 213-219.

21. Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 

Publication 5-0, Joint Operational Planning

(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 

2011), GL13

22. Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Forces 

Staff College, Student Text 1, 6th Edition, The Joint 

Staff Officer’s Guide (Norfolk: NDU Press, 2017): 3-

33.

23. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 

Publication 3-25, II2.

24. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-7 Future Joint 

Force Development, Unity of Effort Framework 

Solution Guide [Washington DC: Government 

Printing Office, 2013], 6. 

25. Ibid, 11. 

26. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 

Publication 3-25, I2.

27. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 

Publication 3-0, IV3.

28. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 

Publication 5-0, III28.

29. Ibid.

Campaigning Fall 2017 26
U.S. needs to “Get Smart” vs 

Russia 

by

CDR David P. Wolynski, LTC John R. Cuva, 

Maj Ryan A. Reynolds, and MAJ Anthony P. 

Newman 

As technology advancements have 

made the world appear smaller, the effects, or 

ripples, of national and international actions 

have changed the global environment in 

which we live and operate. These changes, 

often rapid and sudden, are not always 

apparent until assessed in combination with 

other, sometimes climactic, events. The 

actions of the Russian Federation 

specifically, considered by some to have been 

dormant for a time, are having a profound 

effect on the geopolitical landscape in ways 

that challenge U.S. and Western partner 

interests. 

Politically downplayed by both the 

U.S. and Germany, Russian actions have 

been written off as regionally aligned and 

comparatively childish.1 Whether these 

messages were true statements or verbal 

political fisticuffs, ignoring the indications 

that Russia as a re-emerging international 

actor is foolish. Russia is and has been using 

its own brand of smart power differently from 

those of traditional Western powers and thus 

has led some nations to assume the country’s 

leadership is incapable of exercising such a 

strategy.2

 Understanding how Russia uses 

this strategy is critical and requires a whole 

of government(s) approach that overcomes 

existing barriers and obstacles and that is 

adaptive to meet future challenges. 

Political scientist and the pioneer of 

soft power theory, Joseph Nye, differentiates 

between two types of power. Soft power 

refers to those instruments of national power 

that entice or attract other countries to your 

own country’s point of view or objectives.3

There is no forcing mechanism with the use 

of soft power. Soft power can, however, be a 

powerful instrument to promote national 

interests if it is skillfully used and focused 

appropriately. Hard power, on the other hand, 

is the application of those instruments of 

national power that employ forcing 

mechanisms. Typically military or 

economic4

, these instruments compel or 

coerce other actors. 

Nye further refined and introduced 

the balance of soft and hard power as “smart 

power”.5

 While most national actors use a 

semblance of smart power, the Russian 

application manifests as somewhat unique. 

Whether described as smart power or hybrid 

warfare, several authors have attempted to 

define or characterize Russian applications of 

national power. Royal Air Force Officer, 

Andrew Chisholm, argues that Russia’s use 

of smart power goes through several distinct 

phases. These phases, once identified, can 

provide insight on Russian intentions and 

objectives, especially during a crisis.6

Russia’s unique smart power strategy, 

previously undefined and unacknowledged, 

has resulted in a shift of regional and 

international power. 

Russia has a recent history of its own 

brand of smart power focused on deception. 

This deception has caused Western powers to 

miss opportunities to react. Referring to 

Russia, Chisholm states “A critical and 

essential element of this smart power 

approach is the use of a deception strategy to 

minimize the Western reaction and create 

Campaigning Fall 2017 27
time and space, albeit limited, to allow 

coercive hard power to work.”7 Russia’s 

combined use of soft and hard power, 

intertwined with deception is apparent in 

recent history. 

In its conflict with Georgia in 2008, 

Russia used a distinct smart power strategy. 

This military struggle began after a long 

period of tensions between the two countries 

over the sovereignty of several pro-Russian 

regions in Georgia. On the soft power side, 

Russian propaganda painted Georgian 

President Mikheil Saakashvili as dangerously 

unstable and, if successful in his ambitions, a 

threat to the entire Caucasus region.8

 Russia 

also painted Saakashvili as a brutal dictator 

who had taken draconian actions against the 

indigenous Russian population in the proRussian regions in Georgia. Thus, Russian 

citizens were led to believe that military 

action against Saakashvili was morally 

justified and necessary. Russia has also used 

the increasingly conservative and nationalist 

Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of 

soft power, both in Georgia and in the 

broader region.9

 The Russian government 

uses the Russian Orthodox Church’s 

religious rhetoric and authority to push back 

against Western ideas and governments. On 

the hard power side, Russian military forces 

invaded Georgia during the 2008 crisis and 

physically secured the breakaway regions of 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia.10 The Georgian 

government has had to accept the de-facto 

loss of these areas to Russian control. 

Another prominent example of 

Russian smart power is Russia’s seizure of 

Crimea and the eastern Donbas region of 

Ukraine in 2014. On the soft power side, the 

Russian government promotes the false 

narrative of Ukraine being threatened by neoNazis who seek to establish a fascist, antiRussian regime in Ukraine.11 This narrative 

plays deep into the Russian historical mindset 

since the greatest threat faced by Russia in 

modern times was Hitler’s invasion of the 

Soviet Union in World War II. Painting 

Ukrainian forces as a straw man neo-Nazi 

threat enticed the Russian public to support 

the military efforts both in Crimea and 

eastern Ukraine. The straw man neo-Nazi 

threat also played well with the ethnic 

Russian population of Ukraine who generally 

mistrusted the Western regions, especially 

after the Orange Revolution in late 2004 

caused the fall of the pro-Russian 

government in Kiev.12

Russia also successfully used hard 

power tactics in Crimea in 2014 with the 

successful deployment of Russian military 

forces to key bases across Crimea, creating a 

fait accompli for either Ukrainian or possible 

Western intervention.13 Ukraine would risk a 

broader war against Russia if it decided to 

forcibly re-claim the Crimean bases and key 

lines of communication that were quickly 

seized by the Russian military. Additionally, 

in the Donbas region, Russian military forces 

provided direct support to Ukrainian rebel 

forces, allowing the rebels to seize key terrain 

and defend against lopsided Ukrainian 

counter-offensives.14 Similar to Crimea and 

Georgia, the Ukrainian government was 

forced to accept the Donbas rebel gains 

otherwise it would risk a broader war with 

Russia. Russia has also used other hard 

power instruments, such as cutting off natural 

gas and raising tariffs of Ukrainian-produced 

goods to apply pressure on the Ukrainian 

government.15

Campaigning Fall 2017 28
 In Syria, Russia has used smart power 

to justify its military intervention and protect 

its Middle East interests. Russian soft power 

tactics tried to promote a narrative of the 

Syrian fight as a fight solely between the 

legitimate government of Assad and 

“terrorists”.16 According to Russian and 

Syrian regime press releases, everyone that 

was fighting the Assad regime were 

classified as “terrorists”, and thus justified 

the use of Russian military retaliation. The 

Russian government needed to sell the 

narrative that the Syrian intervention was 

justified, especially as the government faced 

an economic downturn and the prospect of 

Russian military casualties. On the hard 

power aspect, the Russians successfully used 

their military to prevent Assad’s collapse and 

reverse Syrian rebel gains. Additionally, 

through military action, Russia has ensured a 

lead role in resolving the Syrian Crisis. This 

will allow Russia to protect its interests in 

Syria that primarily revolve around its warm 

water naval base at Tartus. 

 Unfortunately for Russia, their soft 

power efforts in Ukraine, Georgia, and most 

recently Syria, have had little effect in the 

broader international community. Russia has 

not expanded its list of friendly countries or 

populations beyond those who have 

traditionally supported Russian or Soviet 

actions. The one exception has been Russian 

cultivation of hard-right, populist, social 

conservatives in several Western countries 

such as France and the U.S.17 These new 

relationships, however, have yet to translate 

into any pro-Russian policies in Western 

countries. Additionally, Russian soft power 

efforts in Syria suffered a serious blow when 

worldwide audiences recognized and 

condemned Assad’s use of chemical weapons 

against civilians. Russia lost significant 

credibility when it claimed that Assad’s 

regime didn’t have chemical weapons and 

that the April 2017 attack was a result of 

Syrian rebel actions.18

 Despite these soft power setbacks, 

there are several reasons why Russia will 

continue to use a smart power strategy in the 

future. First, using smart power allows 

Russia to effectively leverage its existing 

capabilities and expertise while minimizing 

the risk and possible escalation that could 

come from using hard power exclusively. As 

recently assessed by the U.S. Intelligence 

Community, Russia has a strong soft power 

capacity in many television, media, social 

media, and cyber venues.19 In particular, 

Russia knows how to tailor its social media 

and cyber capabilities to exploit the inherent 

open information societies of the West. This 

is a critical advantage, as Western 

democracies pride themselves on the free 

flow of information and capital that Russia 

cleverly exploits. In combination with this 

soft power approach, Russia will continue to 

use its hard power capabilities in the future. 

While it does not have a strong economic 

instrument of power, it does have some 

levers, such as natural gas, which Western 

Europe relies on. Additionally, Russia 

continues to modernize its military despite its 

economic challenges. For nearly all the 

countries bordering on Russia, this military 

capability represents a destabilizing and 

sometimes existential threat. 

 Another reason why Russia will 

continue to use a smart power strategy in the 

future is that this strategy has been effective 

in achieving short-term Russian strategic 

Campaigning Fall 2017 29
objectives.20 Russia has ensured the de-facto 

sovereignty of Russian enclaves in Georgia, 

eastern Ukraine, and Syria all while 

preventing a Western military response. 

While Russian actions have triggered 

economic sanctions by the West, they have 

yet to reverse any of Russia’s territorial 

gains. Given Putin’s objective of restoring 

Russia’s influence to the days of the Soviet 

Union,21 it is a reasonable prospect that 

Russia will not willingly give up any of these 

acquisitions. 

Countering Russian use of smart 

power requires a whole of government 

approach that overcomes existing barriers 

and obstacles and that is adaptive to meet 

future challenges. It is important to 

recognize the existence of bureaucratic and 

institutional barriers, along with cultural 

barriers, within the U.S. interagency in order 

to help us comprehend where the whole of 

government approach is lacking in its 

capacity to be both adaptive and agile in the 

pursuit of effectively countering the 

conspicuous threat of Russia’s calculated and 

successful use of smart power. 

Barriers or obstacles create 

significant friction in contesting Russia’s 

smart power. While serving as a professor at 

Harvard, social and political scientist Karl 

Deutsch defined power both as “the ability to 

prevail in conflict and to overcome 

obstacles” and as a “symbol of the ability to 

change the distribution of results, and 

particularly the results of people’s 

behavior”.22 One barrier or obstacle when 

dealing with Russia has to do with the lack of 

a centralized entity that analyzes information 

and collectively works towards identifying a 

calculated response. An August 2016 report 

from the Center for European Policy 

Analysis (CEPA) stated that, “In the United 

States, some are calling for the reconstruction 

of the US Information Agency, an institution 

abandoned after the end of the Cold War. 

Such a center could analyze Russian 

information warfare efforts; establish a 

framework for the integration of critical data 

into national strategy; develop, plan and 

synchronize a response across different 

government bodies that would expose foreign 

information operations, and pro-actively 

advance fact-based narratives.”23

 In addition, 

legislation with regards to the “Countering 

Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation 

Act”, was introduced in the United States 

Congress in the Spring of 2016 (initially 

entitled “Countering Information Warfare 

Act”), approved by the House of 

Representatives and Senate in early 

December 2016, and signed into law by 

President Obama on 23 December 2017; 

thereby declaring the establishment of a 

“Center for Information Analysis and 

Response” in the near future. The intent of 

this center is to analyze and collect data on 

the efforts of foreign (Russian) government 

information warfare and to expose and 

counter such (Russian) foreign information 

operations.24 The question is, when this 

center is fully established, will this center 

encompass all of the necessary interagency 

entities required for the performance of its 

charter and will this center effectively 

address Russia’s continuous propaganda 

efforts? 

Cultural barriers can certainly impede 

progressive efforts towards seeking peace 

and stability between two opposing nations 

such as the U.S. and Russia. Svetlana TerCampaigning Fall 2017 30
Minasova, a leading foreign language 

specialist and teacher, said, “The better, 

quicker and easier international 

communication is becoming technically, the 

more irritating are the obstacles, namely, 

linguistic and cultural barriers, undermining 

the possibilities of communication among 

nations.”25 Although the U.S. and Russia do 

indeed have cultural and linguistic barriers 

that help undermine clear and effective 

communication it is also important to note 

that one side (Russia) is certainly benefiting 

from reflexive control. Specializing in 

contemporary Russian and Ukrainian history, 

political scientist Andreas Umland 

eloquently talks about the fact that the 

political and military leaders of the West are 

addressing short-lived threats whereby 

Brussels and Washington are inadequately 

cautious and responding incompetently to 

prevailing new challenges in Eastern Europe. 

This bears a causal relationship with regards 

to Russia’s aggressive posture towards the 

West. He goes on to say that the concrete 

nature, risks, and final resolution of Russia’s 

emotionally antagonistic posture toward 

NATO continues a Cold War stance. In lieu 

of assessing Russia’s challenges and 

entertaining new options to respond, this is 

serving (vice containing) Russia and 

increases insecurity throughout Eastern 

Europe.26

Some barriers to building cultural 

relationships could be a lack of daily 

communication, a lack of clear strategic 

communication, and a lack of any 

development with regards to long lasting 

relationships. This coincides with Joseph 

Nyes’ three dimensions (or stages) of public 

diplomacy: (1) Daily communications

involve the explanation of decisions along 

with dealing with crisis, and if an event 

occurs, and there is a lack of initial 

information provided, others will jump in to 

provide their own spin of the story; (2) 

Strategic Communication, which focuses on 

the development of simple themes; and (3) 

Development of lasting relationships with 

key individuals over a long period of time 

which fosters credibility, especially during 

face-to-face engagements. Regardless of the 

institutional framework, cultivating the 

efficacy of U.S. government public 

diplomacy efforts in the field requires an 

advanced degree of cultural understanding 

and awareness by American diplomatic 

officials.27

The whole of government approach 

lacks in its capacity to be both adaptive and 

agile in its pursuit of effectively countering 

the conspicuous threat of Russia’s calculated 

and successful use of smart power. Retired 

Senior Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. 

Agency for International Development 

(USAID), Dr. James Stephenson, 

experienced firsthand the difficulties of 

whole of government as the Mission Director 

in Iraq. In his chapter entitled, “Whole of 

Government in Diplomacy and Development: 

Whole or Hole?, he touches on this important 

aspect and hi perspective is worthy of 

consideration. He emphasizes the point that 

ambassadors are basically Chief Executive 

Officers (CEOs) of multifaceted interagency 

missions, and that the military is ever more 

engaged in stability operations that have 

become mostly indistinguishable from 

civilian reconstruction and stabilization 

efforts. A successful whole of government 

approach, should set out to streamline efforts 

Campaigning Fall 2017 31
whereby agency representatives initially 

team up to serve the overall mission 

objectives prior to deliberating on any 

individual agency interests. Stephenson goes 

on to state that expanding civilian capacity 

and taking on a more broadening set of 

responsibilities for development, diplomacy 

and most importantly, smart power 

projection can in turn, provide collective 

offsets regarding the continual strain on 

military resources.28 Another point regarding 

the need to counter Russia’s use of smart 

power via a whole of government approach 

comes via the Christian Science Monitor's 

Washington Editor, Peter Grier. He states 

that both U.S. lawmakers and officials alike 

claim that countering Russia’s attacks will 

require a comprehensive use of all levels of 

national power whereby Cyber Defense 

makes up part of the calculation. Grier’s 

article emphasizes that the U.S. suffers from 

shortfalls in the areas of defense, detection 

and deterrence. The U.S. is deficient in using 

two-factor authentication for computer 

access, security within aging legacy systems, 

and good network visibility to spot 

intrusions.29

Understanding that the U.S. faces 

some fairly entrenched, systemic obstacles in 

efficiently and effectively bringing all 

elements of its national smart power to bear 

in preempting or countering Russian 

competition, it would be beneficial to explore 

an approach that might be taken in 

overcoming some of those obstacles. One 

option, that will no doubt stimulate much rich 

debate, is a national level realignment of the 

executive agencies that wield this power. 

Conceding that it may be an overly simplistic 

conceptualization, the application of U.S. 

diplomatic, informational, military, and 

economic (DIME) “smart” power, originates 

as policy from the President in consultation 

with the National Security Council (NSC), is 

detailed by the various executive 

departments, and implemented by U.S. 

ambassadors and executive department 

representatives abroad. While the NSC and 

the associated National Security Staff are a 

codified means of promoting U.S. 

government unity of effort for the application 

of national “smart” power in pursuit of 

national interests, there are very few 

legislatively established mechanisms below 

this strategic-level organization that provide 

continued support through execution. The 

inevitable outcome is that, despite the 

numerous formal and informal coordination 

and synchronization mechanisms that have 

been implemented over the years, the various 

departments of the executive branch are 

largely left to their own devices in 

determining how they will align themselves 

in achieving national strategic goals. 

An exception to this assessment is 

exemplified by the country team construct 

employed at U.S. embassies and diplomatic 

missions around the world. These teams 

represent, in effect, a microcosm of the 

executive branch. The ambassador, as the 

President’s personal representative to the 

host nation, is the lead executive that 

manages all the elements of national “smart” 

power being applied in the host nation by 

leveraging the support, expertise, and legal 

authorities provided by the individual 

executive departments based on the national 

interests associated with that country, and to 

a certain extent, the geographic region to 

which it belongs. The ambassador, though 

Campaigning Fall 2017 32
always subject to Presidential direct 

intervention, is vested with the executive 

authority to coordinate, synchronize, and 

align the whole-of-government application of 

U.S. “smart” power within the host nation. 

In the NSC and embassy country 

teams, the U.S. has well-established means 

for the coordinated application of national 

“smart” power. The NSC provides this at the 

global/strategic level, while the ambassador 

and country team do the same at the local, 

host nation level. In the former, the obstacles 

of executive branch institutional and cultural 

biases, along with bureaucratic friction, can 

be overcome, or at least mitigated by direct 

interaction between leadership at the highest 

levels of government. In the latter, individual 

department and agency influence are 

subordinated to the ambassador’s singular 

Presidentially appointed authority, driving 

unified direction and effort in the application 

of “smart” 

power. If the 

coordination of 

“smart” power 

application is 

occurring at the 

global and 

country levels, 

the question 

then becomes: 

what, if 

anything, is 

being done at 

the regional 

level? Its 

inherent and 

necessarily 

broad 

perspective will 

always challenge the responsiveness and 

adaptability of the NSC. Conversely, the 

country team can be responsive and adaptive 

in its application of power because, even 

though its actions are aligned with global 

strategic end states, its focus is necessarily 

narrow, constrained primarily to the host 

nation with subordinate emphasis placed on 

regional imperatives that lie outside its 

authority. 

A proposed way ahead is the 

implementation of a regionally aligned 

organization that can approach the 

responsiveness and adaptability of the 

country team model but whose focus is on 

coordinating and aligning the application of 

regional “smart” power in the pursuit of 

global strategic goals. The executive 

departments have various regional structures 

that seek to meet this objective to one degree 

or another. The most prominent examples 

Campaigning Fall 2017 33
being the Department of Defense (DOD) 

geographic combatant commands that are 

stipulated in the Unified Command Plan, 

and the Department of State (DOS) 

geographic bureaus. However, the regional 

alignments captured in these two models do 

not match and there is no formal mechanism 

to drive unity of effort between them below 

the level of their respective secretaries. The 

associated resources of these existing 

organizations should be reorganized into a 

new construct that merges departmental 

authorities and capabilities to achieve more 

effective and efficient DIME “smart” power 

management. For simplicity, this new model 

can be labeled as the “DIME Manager” 

concept (see figure above). Similar to a 

country ambassador, the DIME Manager is a 

civilian Presidential appointee vetted and 

approved by Congress that assumes 

“smart” power on a regional basis. The 

DIME Manager is supported by a staff of 

senior executive department representatives 

that provide the means, in terms of expertise, 

capabilities, and capacity that are necessary 

to achieve the national security goals directed 

by the President and the NSC. The specific 

authorities that reside within the individual 

departments are subordinated to the 

executive authority of the DIME Manager; 

this unity of authority allows for greater 

responsiveness and adaptability at the 

regional level. The regional DIME Managers 

will work collaboratively with the NSC to 

inform the development of national security 

strategy and policy end states and the DIME 

Manager staffs will coordinate with the NSS 

and executive departments on the ways in 

which those end states will be realized. While 

the DIME Managers cannot assume an 

intermediate position between individual 

country ambassadors and the President, both 

the ambassadors and the DIME Managers 

derive their authority from the same source. 

That being the case, it is imperative that both 

work closely with one another to ensure that 

regional and global strategic goals are not 

jeopardized by too narrow a focus on host 

nation requirements, nor that individual 

country team efforts are derailed by regional 

demands. 

This proposal is not meant to be 

definitive but rather a prompt for further 

discussion. One concern with the model is 

that it continues a trend of “smart” power 

application on a national rather than 

multinational basis. It is certain that partner 

nations, no matter how friendly, will rarely 

have national interests that are in exact 

alignment but the future points to an 

environment where “smart” power must be

inclusive of partnership rather than exclusive 

as unilateral action may dilute or even negate 

its potency. The DIME Manager model is 

supportive of this in that a single regional 

authority invites coordination for collective 

advantage. Second, while this proposal may 

be a step in the right direction for improving 

the U.S. “smart” power game against Russia 

and other competitors, it does not directly 

address the global challenges of 

responsiveness as it focuses on improving 

regional performance. The requirements for 

interregional coordination, though perhaps 

somewhat streamlined, still remain leaving 

action and reaction at the global level 

somewhat wanting. One further weakness of 

the DIME Manager proposal is the extent of 

the reorganizational efforts that will have to 

occur in the face of the aforementioned 

Campaigning Fall 2017 34

authority over the application of U.S. 
institutional and departmental cultural 

barriers as well as the historical inertia of the 

current bureaucratic system. Nevertheless, 

the need for change to a more responsive and 

adaptive approach seems apparent. 

It is safe to assume that cultural 

barriers are difficult to change, and some 

would argue they are necessary to our current 

Western values. Using this assumption, 

institutional adaptation is necessary if the 

international community is to understand the 

changing environment we live in. Russia is 

evolving and demonstrating an astute and 

effective model for the application of 

national smart power. Her end states and 

timeline for achievement are unclear as are 

the international community’s willingness 

and ability to challenge these methods and 

objectives. Understanding the indicators and 

use of Russian smart power is critical and 

requires institutional change at the regional 

and international level. An adaptable and 

responsive integration and synchronization 

of all aspects of national power is required if 

the U.S. and its partners are to successfully 

counter Russia’s strategic progress. 

Authors Biographies 

Commander David P. Wolynski, United States 

Navy, is currently serving with the Nimitz Operational 

Intelligence Center, in Washington D.C. Commander 

Wolynski’s experience includes multiple joint and 

1

 Jonathan Adelman, "The Surprising Resurgence of 

Russia as a Great Power," The Huffington Post, 

September 08, 2015, 1, accessed May 17, 2017, 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathanadelman/the-surprising-resurgence_b_8104486.html. 

2 Andrew Chisolm, “Disrupt, Coerce, Legitimize, 

Attract: The Four Dimensions of Russian Smart 

Power” (master’s thesis, National Defense 

University, 2017), 2. 

overseas tours with coalition partners. Notably, 

Commander Wolynski served with the United States 

Special Operations Command, Central and United 

States Naval Forces, Central supporting coalition 

efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Commander 

Wolynski also recently served as the Defense 

Intelligence Department Chair for the United States 

National Intelligence University in Washington D.C. 

Lieutenant Colonel John R. Cuva, United States 

Army, is currently serving as the Director of 

Personnel, Administration, and Support for the United 

States Military Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO). Lieutenant Colonel Cuva’s 

experience with coalition and joint partners includes 

assignments as the J1’s lead strategic planner for 

United States European Command, multiple tours to 

Iraq supporting United States Forces Iraq, and six 

months supporting Operation Joint Guardian in 

Kosovo. 

Major Ryan A. Reynolds, United States Marine 

Corps, is currently serving as a Special Operations J5 

Planner for United States Special Operations 

Command, Pacific in Honolulu, Hawaii. Major 

Reynolds’ experience includes multiple years serving 

with the Republic of Korea as a J5 Planner for Special 

Operations Command, Korea and deployed tours 

throughout the Pacific. Major Reynolds also has 

multiple tours deployed to Iraq supporting United 

States Forces, Iraq. 

Major Anthony P. Newman, United States Army, is 

currently serving as the J4, Director of Logistics, for 

the White House Communications Agency in 

Washington D.C. Major Newman’s experience 

includes multiple tours to Afghanistan serving with 

International Security Assistance Force in Regional 

Commands, East and North. Major Newman also has 

experience in the Pacific serving with coalition efforts 

in the Republic of Korea, the Kingdom of Thailand, 

and the Philippines. 

3

Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and Conflict Management 

in the Information Age,” in Turbulent Peace: The 

Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. 

Chester A. Croker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela 

Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 

Peace Press 2006), 354. 

4

 Ibid, 354. 

5

Joseph Nye, “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft 

Power,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 88 No. 4 (July/August 

2009): 160-163.

Campaigning Fall 2017 35
6

 Chisholm, 39. 

7

 Ibid, 23. 

8 No Author, “A Scripted War,” The Economist, 

August 14, 2008, accessed May 15, 2017, 

http://www.economist.com/node/11920992. 

9 No Author, “Portrait of a Country,” The Economist, 

February 14, 2015, 73. 

10 No Author, “A Scripted War,” The Economist, 

August 14, 2008, accessed May 15, 2017, 

http://www.economist.com/node/11920992. 

11 No Author, “Great Patriotic War, Again,” The 

Economist, May 2, 2015, 43. 

12 Ibid, 44. 

13 No Author, “What Russia Wants: From Cold War 

to Hot War,” The Economist, February 14, 2015, 20.

14 Ibid, 21. 

15 Ibid, 19. 

16 Simon Sebag Montefiore, “Putin’s Imperial 

Adventure in Syria,” The New York Times, October 9, 

2015, A31. 

17 No Author, “Russia’s Active Measures: The 

Motherland Calls,” The Economist, December 10, 

2016, 52. 

18 Martin Chulov and Kareem Shaheen, “Syria 

Chemical Weapons Attack Toll Rises to 70 as 

Russian Narrative is Dismissed,” The Guardian, 

April 5, 2017, accessed May 16, 2007, 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/04/syri

a-chemical-attack-idlib-province 

19 No Author, “What Russia Wants: From Cold War 

to Hot War,” The Economist, February 14, 2015, 22. 

20 Ibid, 21. 

21 No Author, “Great Patriotic War, Again,” The 

Economist, May 2, 2015, 43-44. 

22 Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, The Analysis of 

International Relations, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: 

Prentice-Hall, 1978), Ibid, 23. 

23 Lucas, Edward and Pomeranzev, Peter, Defending 

and Ultimately Defeating Russia’s Disinformation 

Techniques: A Report by CEPA’s Information 

Warfare Project in Partnership with the Legatum 

Institute https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2690 

August 2016 

24 Fitsanakis, Joseph, US government to set up ‘antipropaganda center’ after Obama signs new law. 

https://intelnews.org/tag/us-center-for-informationanalysis-and-response/ Intel News, 28 December 

2016

25 Svetlana Ter-Minasova, War and Peace of 

Languages and Cultures?, 

http://web.uri.edu/iaics/files/04-SvetlanaTerMinasova.pdf, (Moscow State University, 

Intercultural Communication Studies XVII: February, 

2008), Ibid 52 

26 Umland, Andreas, Why the West Misunderstands 

Russia’s Challenge: Looking past the bluster and 

hyperbole of Russia’s political leaders and business 

elites. https://www.theglobalist.com/westmisunderstands-the-russian-challenge/ The Globalist, 

June 8, 2016. 

27 Nye, Joseph S., Smart Power Needs Smart Public 

Diplomacy. 

http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/smartpower-needs-smart-public-diplomacy Harvard 

Kennedy School Analysis and Opinions - Daily Star, 

February 15, 2010 

28 Stephenson, James., Conflict Management and 

“Whole of Government”: Useful tools for U.S. 

National Security Strategy?, 

http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1102.pdf 

Strategic Studies Institute Book, CH. 9, April 2012. 

29 Grier, Peter., Election meddling: When Russia 

returns, will the US be ready? 

http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2017/0331/

Election-meddling-When-Russia-returns-will-theUS-be-ready The Christian Science Monitor, March 

31, 2017. 

Campaigning Fall 2017 36
Transregional Capstone Exercise 

Trains for Tomorrow’s Fight 

by

LCDR William Buell, Maj Erin Dorrance, and MAJ 

Bob West 

Train the way you fight because you will 

fight the way you train. Just about every U.S. 

military commander will tell you that they 

embrace this time-honored military mantra. 

In his first “From the Chairman” column for

JFQ, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(CJCS) Joseph Dunford described how he 

sees the current and future fight. Noting the 

significant implications for how the Joint 

Force will fight he writes, “...it [is] probable 

that future conflicts will most often be 

transregional and fought across multiple 

domains and functions. Driven by this 

assumption, one of my highest warfighting 

priorities is to improve our ability to integrate 

joint capabilities in a transregional, 

multidomain, and multifunctional fight.”

1

To realize one of the Chairman’s 

highest warfighting priorities, the joint force 

must institutionalize a Transregional 

Capstone Exercise Program (TCEP) 

incorporating all geographic combatant 

commands (GCCs) and functional combatant 

commands (FCCs). While the joint force has 

shown steady progress toward exercising in 

multiple domains and across multiple 

functions within regional theaters, 

transregional exercising is virtually 

nonexistent. This article will highlight the 

transregional threat that the exercise should 

address, delineate some basic exercise 

requirements, propose four training 

objectives, and address three potential

challenges to implementation.

Transregional Threats and Response 

Militaries must now operate in a 

complex and extraordinarily dynamic world 

where several multifaceted real-world threats 

may exert a cumulative effect on the evergrowing battlefield. Not only do state actors 

such as Russia, China, and Iran have the 

capability to conduct transregional 

operations, but a variety of non-state actors 

such as the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS), Al 

Qaeda, and a multitude of transnational 

criminal organizations (TCOs) also threaten 

to disrupt the international order across 

traditional combatant command boundaries. 

While globalization trends have connected 

countries around the world, they have also 

enabled threat networks and violent extremist 

organizations (VEOs) to operate on the 

global stage. In Admiral Kurt Tidd’s 2017 

posture statement for U.S. Southern 

Command, he states that some criminal 

networks in his area of responsibility (AOR) 

are globally-integrated enterprises with profit 

margins that rival Fortune 500 companies. 

These networks smuggle precursor chemicals 

and fentanyl from China into Central 

America and Mexico in order to make 

extremely potent heroin that causes overdose 

epidemics in the U.S. There are networks that

transport large cocaine shipments to the U.S., 

West Africa, Europe, and Australia, while 

others make tremendous profits by illegally 

mining gold in Guyana, Peru, and Colombia. 

Other networks kidnap, money launder, and 

extort—all while moving illicit goods across 

the globe.2

 

Campaigning Fall 2017 37
The majority of combatant 

commanders recently testified before 

congress that they face some subset of five 

key challenges (Russia, China, Iran, North 

Korea, and VEOs), commonly referred to as 

the “4+1”, in their geographic region or 

functional area.3

 Speaking at the annual Air 

Force Association conference in 2016, 

Chairman Dunford observed that such threats 

increasingly operate across the regional 

combatant command structure.4 For 

managing these threats he recommended 

improving the ability of the Secretary of 

Defense to work across both geographic and 

functional combatant commanders and 

strengthening of the Joint Staff (JS).5

According to the JS J7, leadership 

often discusses the benefits of crossCombatant Command (CCMD) activities; 

however, the U.S. military has not fully 

understood or addressed challenges in crossCCMD coordination. Specifically, how the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

will establish authorities, responsibilities, 

and processes with required JS support 

required for globally-integrated operations 

outlined in the Capstone Concept for Joint 

Operations (CCJO) has yet to be tested.6 The 

J7 clearly views reallocation processes for 

critical resources such as munitions, 

intelligence, support, strategic lift, and cyber 

assets as limiting to mission success in a 

global fight.7 No doubt there are many other 

challenges DoD has not considered that a 

transregional global exercise could reveal. 

The TCEP involving all GCCs and 

FCCs would give Secretary of Defense 

(SECDEF) James Mattis and Chairman 

Dunford a realistic, in-time transregional 

training platform to prepare for conflict 

against the five key challenges. One 

transregional capstone exercise (TCE) per 

challenge: TCE-RUS, TCE-PRC, TCE-IRN, 

TCE-NK, and TCE-VEO, would allow 

focused training and sufficient time for 

planning. Currently there are a handful of 

exercises that do, in fact, attempt to exercise 

transregionally with more than one CCMD. 

In February of 2017, the three-week Austere 

Challenge exercise included four combatant 

commands: U.S. European Command, U.S. 

Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, 

and U.S. Strategic Command.8

 U.S. 

European Command Commander, Gen. 

Curtis M. Scaparrotti, described the exercise 

as a complete success stating that the exercise 

validated these CCMDs’ ability to rapidly 

respond together with decisive and 

overwhelming success in Europe and to 

enable other CCMDs.9

 Austere Challenge is 

a good initial step to transregional exercising; 

however, there has never been a U.S. military 

exercise that encompassed all GCCs and 

FCCs working collaboratively against a truly 

global challenge. 

Exercise Program Requirements 

As part of the Joint Training Policy, 

the Chairman’s Exercise Program (CEP) is 

designed to improve capability and the 

readiness of U.S. military forces to conduct 

joint operations through the conduct of 

regularly-scheduled strategic, national-level 

exercises that look at plans, policies, and 

procedures under different simulated crisis 

situations.10 The CEP further stipulates that 

Department of Defense (DoD) entities 

conduct exercises for a multitude of purposes 

to include joint training, theater-engagement 

Campaigning Fall 2017 38
activities, mission and plan rehearsal, 

concept analysis, lessons learned evaluation, 

doctrine validation, and interagency 

integration.11 The TCEP would fall under and 

embrace all facets of the CEP with special 

emphasis on joint training, concept analysis, 

and doctrine evaluation. 

 Implementing the Joint Training 

Policy, the annual Chairman’s Training 

Guidance, released in January of 2017, is a 

clear call for leadership to shift their way of 

thinking about training and exercising. It 

directs the joint force to conduct “exercises 

involving multiple CCMDs, the Joint Staff, 

and appropriate CSAs [Combat Support 

Agencies] oriented on the priority strategic 

challenges [4+1] and homeland defense.” It 

also notes that these exercises will 

“strengthen the ‘connective tissue’ between 

leaders and organizations, validate 

assumptions, examine globally integrated 

operations and other mature concepts, test 

key ideas, and confirm the joint force can 

execute assigned missions.”12

 

 The 2017 Chairman’s Training 

Guidance lists four essential characteristics 

that joint training should incorporate. First, 

the training must reflect the strategic 

environment and its respective challenges. 

Second, training must emphasize global 

integration across the five key challenges. 

Third, training must span the range of 

military operations. The fourth and final 

essential characteristic is that training must 

enable innovation.13 The TCEP should 

include all of the Chairman’s four essential 

characteristics of joint training for maximum 

benefit. 

 The same guidance also describes 

eight required joint training elements to 

address the current environment and essential 

characteristics. One of these elements is 

Transregional Joint Training. The guidance 

states, “Every priority strategic challenge is 

transregional in nature, as potential 

adversaries’ interests, influence, capabilities, 

and reach extend beyond single geographic 

regions. Joint training must specifically 

address the higher-level collaboration of the 

Joint Staff with OSD, as well as horizontal 

coordination among CCMDs, to achieve 

desired effects.”14 The TCEP epitomizes the 

transregional joint training element and, if 

designed properly with concrete objectives, 

can strengthen the “connective tissue” 

between key leaders that will be needed in 

crisis. 

TCE Objectives 

To realize the Chairman’s 

transregional training guidance, a TCE 

should accomplish four specific training 

objectives directed toward supporting one of 

the five key challenges to give GCCs and 

FCCs realistic training against a benchmark 

competitor. These objectives include: 1) 

exercising command and control constructs, 

2) improving situational awareness on 

transregional problems across GCC 

boundaries, 3) improving cross-CCMD 

coordination, and 4) stress testing 

communications systems. 

Global Command and Control 

Exercising command and control as a 

training objective in a global scenario is 

needed to address shortfalls in DoD’s ability 

to integrate operations under the current 

Campaigning Fall 2017 39
regional command construct. Chairman 

Dunford does not believe the current 

organizational and command and control 

constructs are ready for the current or future 

fight.15 He says what is truly required is 

global integration.”16 In attempting to 

address mission command and synergy 

challenges, the JS J7 recommended 

incorporating the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) into exercises as a best 

practice. He writes, “Where applicable, 

exercise the agility of OSD as the 

establishing authority together with the JS 

under crisis conditions to plan and direct 

responsive and synchronized crossCombatant Command Operations.”17

To best train for this objective, a TCE’s

primary training audience should be at the 

Tier One level and include the SECDEF, 

CJCS, JS, and all CCMDs. The Tier One 

level of training is designed to prepare 

national-level organizations and CCDRs and 

their staffs at the strategic and operational 

levels of war to integrate interagency, nongovernmental, and multinational partners in 

highly-complex environments. The Joint 

Training Policy advocates integrating a 

diverse audience into exercises in order to 

identify “core competencies, procedural 

disconnects, and common ground to achieve 

U.S. unity of effort.”18

Understanding that the SECDEF and 

CJCS will likely be unable to clear their 

schedules for the entire exercise duration, a 

global command and control objective will 

also test the ability of these leaders, as well as 

combatant commanders, to synchronize and 

coordinate information while traveling or 

attending to real-world schedules. This 

would differ sharply from current exercises 

where typically a role player is appointed to 

play the SECDEF and Chairman and updates 

occur at regular intervals, an unlikely 

scenario during a major crisis. 

Common Situational Awareness 

Global participation would test not 

only command and control, but also 

coordination between nine unified combatant 

commands as the joint force strives to meet 

the second objective of improving situational 

awareness on transregional problems across 

GCC boundaries. This second objective 

would be useful to determine how the joint 

force will collectively contribute to shared 

awareness amidst a multitude of defense and 

commercial options for building a common 

operating picture (COP) or common 

intelligence picture (CIP). While Global 

Command and Control System-Joint (GCCSJ) is the program of record intended to 

provide a one stop shop for joint planners to 

build awareness, most CCMDs gravitate 

toward some sort of tailored system for their 

region for a variety of reasons. Google Earth, 

All Partners Access Network (APAN), 

CENTRIXS, and BICES are all examples of 

systems currently in use to build a COP or 

CIP. Classification, bandwidth, manpower 

management requirements, and compatibility 

considerations can be evaluated in an 

exercise environment and lessons learned 

applied to doctrine development or 

acquisition programs. 

Cross Combatant Command Coordination 

Once common awareness is 

established, the joint force should be stressed 

Campaigning Fall 2017 40
to use that information in a coordinated 

fashion against the adversary. Hence, a third 

training objective to improve crosscombatant command coordination is needed 

to bridge the gap from information to action. 

In the joint concept on rapid aggregation, the 

JS J7 recommends that CCMDs become 

increasingly collaborative and 

interdependent in both planning and 

execution. “They must expand virtual and 

physical collaboration among commands to 

allow for shared situational understanding 

and for the collective capacity of multiple 

commands to quickly combine and solve 

problems.”19

Communications Systems Stress

Finally, a TCE should stress 

communication systems as a fourth training 

objective. An exercise could then validate 

communications systems architecture, 

including satellites, information servers, 

multinational collaboration networks, and 

email services, when all CCMDs are 

straining communications infrastructure 

simultaneously. U.S. Southern Command 

Commander, Adm. Kurt Tidd, capitalized on 

a unique opportunity to stress test 

communications when he found himself 

required to travel for other obligations during 

PANAMAX 2016, an exercise that brings 

together sea, air, and land forces in a joint and 

combined operation focused on defending the 

Panama Canal. The staff coordinated 

multiple video teleconference calls that 

patched into HQ, Joint Training Center 

Norfolk, and CENTRIXS systems from a 

variety of locations, including one 

occurrence while airborne. This unintended 

inject, though fraught with challenges, 

provided great realistic training and lessons 

learned to the CCMD. 

A proposed TCE can satisfy the four 

proposed training objectives only with full 

participation from the primary training 

audience. Full participation is needed to test 

a variety of dilemmas that leaders may face 

such as how the CJCS and SECDEF will 

prioritize assets to CCMDs when every 

CCMD would be making requests at the same 

time for the same challenge or threat. 

Conducting this exercise once every two 

years would efficiently train key leaders and 

their staffs during their command tenures and 

provide valuable lessons learned to improve 

the ability to fight transregionally. 

Challenges 

Too Hard to Integrate With Existing 

Exercises 

Some may say a biennial exercise 

which includes all GCCs and FCCs is 

unrealistic given the often times frantic 

operations tempo and fiscal constraints that 

burden the DoD. At present, this is true. 

However, reevaluating existing exercises and 

either cancelling or integrating them into the 

capstone exercise could alleviate much of the 

additional burden of a new mandatory 

requirement for the JS and CCMDs. 

Development of a TCE should follow the 

lessons learned from NATO. In the wake of 

the Crimea crisis, NATO quickly went from 

about 100 exercises to 300 exercises per year 

and reached the capacity of allies to support. 

Instead of adding additional exercises, 

NATO is now focused on increasing their 

Campaigning Fall 2017 41
realism, flexibility, and robustness. This 

change in thinking has allowed for NATO to 

plan and execute faster.20 Likewise, a TCE 

provides an opportunity for CCDRs to set 

aside redundant training exercises while 

keeping the intent of higher guidance 

providing a “less- is-more” training option 

for the CCMD. 

The first full biennial capstone 

exercise should not be executed until 2020 to 

provide planners adequate lead time to plan 

and schedule the exercise across the DoD. 

Further, a TCE would have to be assigned 

priority event status to ensure prioritization 

throughout the DoD. Once scheduled far in 

advance, planners should be able to schedule 

other events around an established battle 

rhythm that runs a TCE every other year, on 

even years, starting in 2020. 

Scheduling and Resources

Others might argue that a TCE is just 

another exercise requirement that takes away 

time they could spend on real-world issues 

and that there is not enough time and 

resources to do both. The DoD and other 

agencies are indeed faced with fiscal 

challenges that have resulted in the U.S. 

having the smallest Army and Navy since 

World War II.21 At the same time, with the 

plethora of exercises already being executed, 

finding a time window that would work 

across the joint force would be difficult. To 

address this concern, the JS and CCMDs 

should first establish a culture that recognizes 

the value of a TCE, and set it as a top training 

priority in order to solidify support for 

aggressive exercise participation. Rotating 

through the five key challenges in a variety of 

scenarios can further validate the legitimacy 

of the exercise as it would allow CCMDs 

assigned synchronizing responsibilities to 

exercise against a variety of benchmark 

threats. Despite the resource challenges, 

ensuring the SECDEF, JS and all GCCs and 

FCCs participate in the exercise is central to 

achieving proposed training objectives, 

especially command and control and 

communications stress testing. Each GCC 

and FCC’s unique capabilities and 

geographic expertise should be represented in 

the exercise and this will indeed pose the 

greatest challenge to scheduling and 

execution. 

To address the resourcing issue, it 

will be important to put a mark on the 

calendar as soon as possible to enable Global 

Force Management processes time to allocate 

any shift in resources. JS and CCMDs will 

also need to quickly determine required staff 

to serve as role players and determine how 

best to meet this need. Options for building 

the necessary training elements could include 

assigning select staff TDY, employing 

modular training teams, hiring short-term 

contractors, or creating computer system 

simulations. For an exercise of this scale, new 

collaboration mechanisms between training 

elements may be required as physical space 

to house a training element of this magnitude 

will likely not permit complete co-location. 

Sufficient time for planning will be the key to 

addressing all of these challenges. 

Not Enough Doctrine to Exercise

Another argument against 

incorporating a TCE into all GCCs and FCCs 

training schedules is the lack of transregional 

Campaigning Fall 2017 42
joint doctrine. The Joint Training Policy for 

the armed forces of the U.S. states that 

training must be based on approved joint 

doctrine unless the training is being used 

primarily for concept development.22

Currently, there is not a sufficient amount of 

cross-CCMD doctrine. When combined with 

the need to determine resourcing described 

above, this will indeed be a formidable 

challenge for joint force planners. It is 

important to note, however, that this exercise 

could be a firestarter to generate and/or 

validate joint doctrine in development. 

Each successive TCE could aid 

doctrine development by feeding a cycle of 

assessment. As a starting point for 

development, exercise planners could aim to 

test some of the ideas put forward in the 

Globally Integrated Operations CCJO. This 

concept advocates eight key elements among 

which mission command, global agility, and 

flexibility in establishing joint forces could 

be tested in a TCE.23

While mission command may be preferable 

in most situations, complex conflicts with 

near-peer adversaries may require integrating 

mission command with centralized control 

mechanisms required for employment of 

nuclear weapons or other national 

capabilities. Training objectives on global 

agility could test the joint force’s ability to 

shift resources between CCMDs as strategic 

dilemmas emerge and help validate existing 

posture. Lastly, the CCJO insight on 

flexibility in establishing Joint Forces should 

be tested. It notes that while current joint 

forces are typically organized around 

geographic or functional considerations, the 

future force may have to consider that “this 

might be done globally” or as a “joint task 

force operating across multiple noncontiguous geographic areas to accomplish 

its mission against a single threat.”24

Conclusion 

The CJCS has stated that his 

warfighting priority is to improve the 

military’s ability to integrate joint 

capabilities in a transregional, multidomain, 

and multifunctional fight. While the joint 

force has shown steady progress toward 

exercising in multiple domains and across 

multiple functions within regional theaters, 

transregional exercising is virtually 

nonexistent. The joint force needs to 

institutionalize the TCEP incorporating all 

GCCs and FCCs as a key element to realizing 

the Chairman’s highest warfighting priority. 

A TCE should test command and control 

constructs, improve situational awareness on 

transregional problems across GCC 

boundaries, enhance cross-CCMD 

coordination, and stress test communication 

systems as primary training objectives. These 

objectives reflect current shortfalls and are 

needed to prepare the joint force to face any 

of the “4+1” challenges.

Though implementation of a TCE will be met 

with challenges from competing priorities, 

scheduling, resourcing, and nascent 

transregional doctrine, overcoming these 

challenges will set the joint force on a 

trajectory to defend the U.S. against the 

transregional threats of tomorrow. Without 

this exercise or another like it, critical 

shortfalls in joint force capability to address 

these threats will persist. Adopting the TCEP 

will help realize the Chairman’s vision for the 

future joint force and help him fulfill his 

Campaigning Fall 2017 43
statutory responsibilities to advise, direct, 

assess, and execute joint operations against 

the most challenging transregional threats. 

Using a TCE, we can train the way we fight 

so we will fight the way we train. 

1

 DUNFORD, JOSEPH F. "From the Chairman." 

JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly no. 80 (2016 1st Quarter 

2016): 2-3. Military & Government Collection, 

EBSCOhost (accessed April 11, 2017), 1. 

2 Admiral Kurt Tidd, “U.S. Southern Command 

Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services 

Committee Hearing,” April 6, 2017, 6. 

3 Admiral Harry Harris, “U.S. Pacific Command 

Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services 

Committee Hearing,” Feb. 23, 2016. 

General John Hyten, “U.S. Strategic Command 

Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services 

Committee Hearing,” April, 4, 2017. 

General Lori Robinson, “U.S. Northern Command 

Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services 

Committee Hearing,” April 6, 2017. 

General Curtis Scaparrotti, “European Command 

Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services 

Committee Hearing,” March 23, 2017. 

Admiral Kurt Tidd, “U.S. Southern Command 

Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services 

Committee Hearing,” April 6, 2017. 

General Joseph Votel, “Special Operations Command 

Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services 

Committee Hearing,” March 18, 2017. 

General Thomas Waldhauser, “African Command 

Posture Statement for the Senate Armed Services 

Committee,” March 23, 2017.

4 Clark, Colin. “CJCS Dunford Calls For Strategic 

Shifts; ‘At Peace Or At War Is Insufficient’” 

September 21, 2016. 

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/09/cjcs-dunfordcalls-for-strategic-shifts-at-peace-or-at-war-isinsufficient/

5

 Ibid 

6

“Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Mission 

Command and Joint Force Synergy,” March 2013. 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/mission_command_f

p.pdf, 12.

7

 Ibid 

Authors Biographies 

LCDR William “Flanders” Buell, USN, is currently 

assigned to U.S. Southern Command as a Theater 

Campaign Planner in the J5 Directorate. 

Maj Erin Dorrance, USAF, is assigned to 

SOUTHCOM as the deputy to the Office of 

Congressional Affairs which is located in Miami, FL. 

MAJ Bob West, USA, is assigned to SOUTHCOM as 

the Supply and Services Branch Chief in the J4 

Directorate.

8

 Vandiver, John. Stars and Stripes. “From ‘Sleepy 

Hollow’ to war-fighting footing, EUCOM muscles 

up. Oct. 13, 2016. https://www.stripes.com/fromsleepy-hollow-to-war-fighting-footing-eucommuscles-up-1.433867#.WP4xtIWcHVg

9

 EUCOM Participates in Global Command, Control 

Exercise. DOD. 

https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/10876

01/eucom-participates-in-global-command-controlexercise/. 

10 “CJCSI 3500.01H (Joint Training Policy for the 

Armed Forces of the United States),” April 25, 2014. 

http://www.jcs.mil/Library/CJCS-Instructions/, B-5. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Ibid, 5. 

13 “CJCSN 3500.01 (2017-2020 Chairman’s Training 

Guidance),” January 12, 2017. 

http://www.jcs.mil/Library/CJCS-Instructions/, 2. 

14 Ibid, 3. 

15 DUNFORD, JOSEPH F. "From the Chairman." 

JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly no. 80 (2016 1st Quarter 

2016): 2-3. Military & Government Collection, 

EBSCOhost (accessed April 11, 2017), 1. 

16 Clark, Colin. “CJCS Dunford Calls For Strategic 

Shifts; ‘At Peace Or At War Is Insufficient’” 

September 21, 2016. 

http://breakingdefense.com/2016/09/cjcs-dunfordcalls-for-strategic-shifts-at-peace-or-at-war-isinsufficient/, 2. 

17 “Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Mission 

Command and Joint Force Synergy,” March 2013. 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/mission_command_f

p.pdf, 8.

18 “CJCSI 3500.01H (Joint Training Policy for the 

Armed Forces of the United States),” April 25, 2014. 

http://www.jcs.mil/Library/CJCS-Instructions/, B-6. 

19 “Joint Concept: Rapid Aggregation,” May 22, 

2015. 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts

/ joint_concept_rapid_aggregation.pdf, 8. 

Campaigning Fall 2017 44
20 Tadjdeh, Yasmin. 2017. "NATO Increasing 

Training to Counter Resurgent Russia." National 

Defense C1, no. 758: 20-21. Military & Government 

Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed April 20, 2017), 1. 

21 Ullman, Harlan. Defense News. “Smallest Army 

and Navy Since Before WWII: So What?” Aug. 10, 

2015. 

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/comment

ary/2015/08/10/smallest-army-and-navy-sincebefore-ww-ii-so-what/31428429/

22 “CJCSI 3500.01H (Joint Training Policy for the 

Armed Forces of the United States),” April 25, 2014. 

http://www.jcs.mil/Library/CJCS-Instructions/, C-1.

23 “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint 

Force 2020.” September 10, 2012. 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/concepts.htm, 

4 

24 Ibid, 4-6 

Campaigning Fall 2017 45
Developing an Operational 

Approach for the Transition from 

War to Peace through Stabilization, 

Reconstruction, and Development: 

Understanding Critical Aspects of 

the Environment

by

Thomas J. Snukis

This essay is the third in a series of 

essays that focus on the transition from war 

to peace through stabilization, 

reconstruction, and development. The first 

essay identified and summarized the essential 

US governmental strategic guidance, 

concepts, and doctrine surrounding 

stabilization, reconstruction, and 

development. The second essay examined 

other relevant literature on the subject and 

highlighted several areas that the US national 

security policymaker, diplomat, joint 

warfighter and other governmental agencies 

must account for as they seek to understand 

an emerging post-intervention environment. 

This essay focuses on a critical challenge 

resident in the international environment that 

impacts the US ability to stabilize, 

reconstruct, and develop nations before, 

during, and/or after armed intervention. That 

challenge is the ever increasing number of 

fragile, failing, failed, and collapsed states 

and the state-building requirement within 

these nations. 

The Problem

Ashraf Ghani, the current president of 

Afghanistan, and Clare Lockhardt, cofounder and director of the Institute for State 

Effectiveness, counsel that the international 

community has a mutual challenge. “Forty to 

sixty states, home to nearly two billion 

people, are either sliding backward and 

teetering on the brink of implosion or have 

already collapsed.”1 They concisely capture 

an ongoing and ever expanding global issue, 

“in a period of unprecedented wealth and 

invention, people throughout Africa, Central 

Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East are 

locked into lives of misery [and] politicians, 

generals and business leaders are beginning 

to realize that we must arrest and reverse state 

failure... in order to overcome the effects of 

these weak, failing, and failed states.”2 As 

the United States has been recently involved 

in two state-building efforts following 

combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 

and anticipates potential involvement in 

similar situations, it is imperative to 

understand the intricacies and nuances of 

these environments and handle them with 

more sophistication and skill then we have in 

the recent past. To do this we must gain a 

better understanding of the environment and 

possible approaches to the problem. 

Understanding the Environment

Francis Fukuyama captures the 

essential nature of state-building and the 

international dilemma when he emphasizes, 

“state-building is one of the most important 

issues for the world community because 

weak or failed states are the source of many 

of the world’s most serious problems, from 

poverty to AIDS to drugs to terrorism...while 

we know a lot about state-building, there is a 

great deal we don’t know...We need...more 

thought, attention, and research on this 

area.”3 Robert Rotberg echoes Fukuyama’s 

Campaigning Fall 2017 46
counsel, “In a time of terror awareness, 

moreover, appreciating and responding to the 

dynamics of nation-state failure motivate 

critical policy debates. How best to 

understand the nature of weak states, to 

strengthen those poised on the abyss of 

failure, and to restore the functionality of 

failed states, are among the urgent policy 

questions of the twenty-first century.”4 

While we will not explore this topic in great 

depth, we present and emphasize several 

crucial points for practitioners as they deal 

with this challenge, especially following 

some sort of armed intervention. 

In 1950 Richard Hartshorne 

published his The Functional Approach in 

Political Geography where he added to the 

understanding of weak states with his 

concepts in the context of state effectiveness. 

He proposed the following, “The fact that a 

country has a name and a government, that an 

international treaty recognizes its existence 

as a state and defines its territorial limits-all 

that does not produce a state.”5 Hartshorne 

recognized two forces within a nation that

contribute to or detract from state 

effectiveness. “We have been considering a 

variety of centrifugal factors in the regional 

geography in a state-area which make it 

difficult to bind those regions together in an 

effective unit...[to produce a state] it is 

necessary to establish centripetal forces that 

will bind together the regions of that state, in 

spite of the centrifugal forces that are always 

present.”6

 A deep understanding of these 

forces becomes essential in developing a 

coherent approach to catalyze state-building 

under any circumstances. Hartshorne’s 

research emphasized, “The basic centripetal 

force must be some concept or idea justifying 

the existence of this particular state...; the 

state must have a raison d’etre – reason for 

existing.”7 Understanding the centrifugal and 

centripetal forces resident within a country 

becomes an essential prerequisite to generate 

a positive outcome. Without this 

understanding we will fail every time as

Richard Helms, CIA director during the 

Vietnam era, noted regarding US 

involvement in Vietnam, “ At the root of this 

failure of intelligence was “our national 

ignorance of Vietnamese history, society, and 

language.”8

Volumes of literature evaluate the 

basic US state-building approach in both 

Afghanistan and Iraq as ineffective and 

extremely costly. Addressing the extreme 

cost and effort required by outside entities in 

state-building, especially that following an 

armed intervention, several scholars and 

practitioners offer alternative approaches for 

those weak and failing states that struggle to 

become contributing members of the

international community. Ghani and 

Lockhardt propose a strategic framework that 

“argues for a citizen-based approach to state 

building: a new legal compact between 

citizen, state and the market, not a top-down 

imposition of the state.”9 This approach has 

promise in some areas but what happens 

when the basic centripetal force described by 

Hartshorne a “raison d’etre” is absent or so 

inextricably blurred by competing views or 

imposed fracturing that progress is next to 

impossible?

Jeffery Herbst also offers an approach 

that addresses this issue, “let states fail: allow 

new forms and centers of political authority 

to emerge through conflict and cooperation 

without outside direction or 

Campaigning Fall 2017 47
intrusion...redraw national boundaries to 

reflect these new arrangements, rather than 

seeking to perpetuate the untenable fictions 

of many existing states.”10 This approach 

may have utility but in the process of failing 

many of these states become safe havens for 

terror groups or perpetrate great crimes 

against their population which cannot be 

ignored by the international community 

under the UN responsibility to protect (R2P) 

mandate. Jeremy Weinstein offers a strategy 

of “autonomous recovery” as an alternative, 

whereby states reach “a lasting peace, a 

systematic reduction in violence, and postwar 

political and economic development in the 

absence of international intervention.”11

Under better scrutiny and deeper analysis, the 

pros and cons of each will emerge. 

Regardless if one or the other or a hybrid 

would work in a given circumstance, they 

must, at a minimum, be considered with other 

available alternatives in a discourse 

contemplating the use of force or other 

extreme measures. Although the Marshall 

Plan receives high praise from most for jumpstarting European Recovery, there are several 

scholars who question whether it was 

economically necessary. “The historical 

guild sitting in judgement [almost seventy 

years later] has yet to render its final 

verdict.”12 

Considering the above we clearly 

recognize that state-building is not only a 

critical issue globally but is also an acute 

issue in the Middle East. Difficult, costly, 

manpower intensive, and time-consuming 

under the best of circumstances, in areas that 

require forceful intervention to enact change, 

force alone may not be sufficient to build 

what we want. Additionally, in populous 

countries it is even harder, “the effort needed 

to stabilize Bosnia and Kosovo has proved 

difficult to replicate in Afghanistan or Iraq, 

nations that are eight to 12 times more 

populous.”13 Moreover, “the more sweeping 

a mission’s objectives, the more resistance it 

is likely to inspire. Resistance can be 

overcome, but only through a wellconsidered application of personnel and 

money over extended periods of time.”14 

We also recognize that our 

understanding of state-building remains 

incomplete and potentially flawed. “The 

deeper problem is insufficient understanding 

of state-building’s complexities – in 

particular, its intrinsic tensions and 

contradictions.”15 Fukuyama cautions that 

there are “grave limitations to the ability of 

external powers to create demand for 

institutions...” necessary to generate 

effective state-building.16 He argues that the 

international community, or whatever entity 

has intervened with the intent of building a 

state, is “not simply limited in the amount of 

capacity it can build” but even more 

worrisome, Fukuyama argues, “It is actually 

complicit in the destruction of institutional 

capacity in many developing countries.”17

Ultimately depending on how the U.S. and 

the international community approach statebuilding whether before, during, or after an 

armed intervention, it is highly possible that 

with the best of intentions and despite an 

exceedingly large investment the effort may 

make the situation worse as we experienced 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

As joint operational commander’s 

and staffs think through these issues and 

prepare plans and orders for similar 

environments in the future they must fully 

Campaigning Fall 2017 48
account for the nuances and intricacies of 

these complex issues resident in many 

struggling nations throughout the 

international community! They cannot 

overlook the requirements and tensions 

inherent in these fragile, failing, failed, and 

collapsed states.

1 Ghani, Ashraf, and Clare Lockhart. 2008. Fixing 

failed states: a framework for rebuilding a fractured 

world. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 

1.

2 Ibid. 4.

3 Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. State-building: 

governance and world order in the 21st century. 

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ix.

4 Rotberg, Robert I. 2004. When states fail: causes 

and consequences. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 

University Press. 1.

5 Hartshorne, Richard. 1950. The functional approach 

in political geography. Annals of the Association of 

American Geographers, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jun., 1950), 

pp 95-130. 110. 6 Ibid. 109-110. 7 Ibid. 110.

8 Weiner, Tim. 2011. Legacy of ashes: the history of 

the CIA. London: Penguin. 244.

Author Biography

Thomas J. Snukis is a retired U.S. Army infantry 

officer and is an associate professor at the Joint Forces 

Staff College.

9 Ghani and Lockhart. Fixing failed states: a 

framework for rebuilding a fractured world. 7. 10 Paris, Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk. 2009. The 

dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the 

contradictions of postwar peace operations, security 

and governance series. London; New York: 

Routledge. 12.

11 Ibid. 12 Machado, Barry 2007. In search of a usable past: 

the Marshall Plan and postwar reconstruction today. 

Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Foundation. 15.

13 Rand xxxvii 14 Ibid. xx-xxi 15 Paris and Sisk, The dilemmas of statebuilding: 

confronting the contradictions of postwar peace 

operations, security and governance series. 13. 16 Fukuyama, State-building: governance and world 

order in the 21st century. 39. 17 Ibid.

Campaigning Fall 2017 49
Polarity Management in 

International Relations

by

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley and 

Dr. Sadi S. Sadiyev

A nation’s grand strategy is a product 

of the state, its society, and political values.

1

It is essentially “the use of power to secure 

the state.”2 In general, when discussing

grand strategy, scholars argue that three 

conditions must be taken into account: the 

nation’s interests, priorities, and the 

instruments of power.3 A national interest is 

defined as, “...a public good of concern to 

all or most [citizens]....”4 Priorities allow 

decision-makers to “rack and stack” 

competing objectives based upon the 

situational factors. The instruments of power 

are those resources that nation states use to 

promote their interests, such as diplomatic, 

information, military, and economic (DIME) 

means.

In a great deal of literature 

describing the current international system, 

the benefits of a uni-, bi-, or multipolar 

world permeate national security 

discussions. The concept of polarity 

management, however, and the dynamic 

interplay of the poles is rarely discussed and 

understood. Therefore, a discussion of 

polarity management is undertaken from 

which key “takeaways” are identified. 

According to the definition in the paragraph 

above, three major characteristics of a grand 

strategy emerge: economic, political, and 

socio-cultural. Although these are identified 

as individual characteristics, the three are 

intrinsically related. For the purposes of this 

argument, international relations problems 

are viewed as social problems5

, which 

encompass the political and economic 

characteristics or variables.

Within the international system, 

polarization can be described as a process 

in which several groups or nations merge 

into one larger unit under an agreed upon 

coordinated direction for an economic, 

social, or political purpose. In international 

relations, a nation or group of nations, are

always trying to maximize the international 

system in a manner that best serves its 

citizens, which, in one school of thought, 

comes at the expense of other nations or 

groups of nations. Russian expansion 

efforts in Georgia and Ukraine are recent 

examples, and Armenia’s expansion and 

occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh 

region in Azerbaijan, originating in the 

early Twentieth Century, is a historical 

example. In each example, one nation or 

group thinks one way and another nation or 

group thinks the opposite. 

Nations are societies that are a 

moving complex of overlapping and nested 

structures and situations of conflict, power 

balancing, balances of powers, and 

structures of expectations.6 What emerges 

from this dynamic is a type of polarization 

between the two nations or groups of 

nations in which neither group is willing to 

subvert (compromise) its own interests to 

another. The ongoing conflict within Iraq 

and Syria is an example. With neither 

group willing to change, the dynamic 

becomes intractable. International relations 

problems, just like many social problems, 

therefore, become polarities to manage, not 

problems to solve. 

After World War II, European 

countries and America founded NATO to 

merge and unite their political, 

economic, and military force against the 

Soviet system. Just as communism and 

capitalism needed each other to show the 

merits of their respective ideologies during 

the Cold War, polarities are sets of 

opposites that cannot function well 

Campaigning Fall 2017 50
independently. As the two sides of any

polarity are interdependent, a solution for 

one side cannot be made without 

considering the other side.7 The 

experiences of these organizations reveal 

basic factors that, with varying force, affect 

religious, ethnic, cultural, and social 

polarization. 

Polarities in international relations 

are chronic, ongoing, unavoidable issues 

that are also unsolvable. The need to manage 

these types of polarities increases or 

decreases as the system or relationship 

changes in complexity, diversity, speed of 

change, and resistance to change. In most 

academic problems, the definition of solving 

a problem posits that there is only one right 

answer or two or more right answers that are 

independent. In reality, virtually almost all 

academic problems are problems with one 

right answer. In problems with polarities, as 

in most social problems, by definition, 

polarities have 2 or more right answers that 

are interdependent. 

Managing polarities in international 

relations requires analysts who understand 

that these types of problems have 2 or more 

right answers that are interdependent.

Managing polarities in international 

relations is essential for one generation to 

pass key elements of its culture on to the 

next generation. When typical problem 

solving skills are used to address polarity 

issues, there is a high likelihood that the 

problem will be made worse.

8

Polarity is managed well when you 

capitalize on the inherent tensions between 

the two poles. You get the benefits of both 

upsides and the synergies between them. 

Polarity is managed poorly when one pole is 

focused on to the neglect of the other. This 

is likely to occur when the issue is seen as 

an either/or problem.9

As international relations are tied to a 

nation’s grand strategy with the intention of 

shaping the global environment for the 

benefit of its own citizens, a polarity 

dynamic is automatically put into place that 

consists of an “us versus them” mentality. 

Immediately following the 9/11 attacks in 

the U.S. in 2001, President George W. 

Bush stated that, “You’re either with us or 

against us in the fight against terror.”10 The 

idea was that there were only two sides to 

the conflict and each side was the extreme 

opposite of the other. More recently, U.S. 

President Donald Trump declared the 

concept of ‘America First’ loud and clear 

throughout his campaign and his 

inauguration speech setting the stage for a 

polarity dynamic between America and the 

rest of the world.

11 

The key to understanding and 

managing international relations polarity 

issues is to get past the idea that “I’m right 

and my opposition is wrong.” If either pole 

were allowed to “win out,” the downside of 

either extreme would eventually undermine 

the positive aspects resulting in a problem 

worse than the original one. Just as both 

poles have positive aspects, they also have 

negative components that would manifest 

themselves if given the time and lack of 

opposing constraints. Rather, the necessary 

approach is to understand that both 

opposing parties are not only right, but that 

they are dependent upon each other’s truth 

over time. The two opposite poles serve as 

a counterbalance to the other, while not 

allowing the most positive aspects of either 

pole to come to fruition, the most negative 

aspects are mitigated as well.

Campaigning Fall 2017 51
 Figure 1.

Figure 2.

An example of polarity management 

is show in Figures 1 through 4. In Figure 1, 

the two poles are identified which sit at the 

extreme opposite of each other. In Figure 2, 

the relationship between the two poles is 

represented by the oval tying the two poles 

together. 

In Figure 3, there is an inherent 

tension between the two poles in the system 

that results in some sort of equilibrium 

between the poles. In Figure 4, that 

equilibrium is changed when Pole 2 tries to 

increase its influence over the status quo. 

Pulling the equilibrium nearer to Pole 2

requires energy and creates a tension 

required to keep the new equilibrium in 

place.

Figure 3.

Figure 4.

Pole 1 does not simply allow Pole 2 

to create a new equilibrium at its expense. 

As a natural result of Pole 2’s action, Pole 1 

develops a counter-tension or energy that 

acts in an opposite direction as Pole 2’s as 

shown in Figure 4. In most cases, the 

counter-tension required to move the 

equilibrium back to its original position 

requires even more energy, which results in 

an overshoot or even more extreme positon 

than the original state. Over time, these 

tensions and counter-tensions either go back 

to the original status quo or a new 

equilibrium is reached. 

Managing polarity is more 

complicated than simply managing tensions. 

In the context of international relations, each 

Campaigning Fall 2017 52
pole represents a school of thought or 

ideological framework that best supports 

that nation’s interests. In theory, two nations 

could have ideological frameworks that are 

polar opposites. A historical real-world 

example would be the ideological battle 

between communism and capitalism during 

the Cold War. Each side believed they were 

right and the other side wrong. As a result, 

each tried to force the other side to 

capitulate through various means in which 

the great powers of the contemporary system 

have been joined by a few regional 

groupings-Europe, NATO, Warsaw Pact, 

European Trade Union, etc. There were, 

and are, however, plusses and minuses to 

each ideological pole. For the Cold War 

period, some of the positive aspects of the 

communist ideology are identified in the 

upper left-hand quadrant of the diagram

(Figure 5). The negative aspects of 

communist ideology is located in the lower 

left-hand quadrant. Likewise, the positive 

and negative aspects of capitalism are listed 

in the upper and lower right-hand quadrant 

respectively. All things being equal, the 

tension between the two poles is equidistant 

to both. 

Figure 5.

In theory, if in the natural course of 

environmental interactions the positive 

aspects of capitalism started to pull the 

equilibrium to the upper right, many of the 

positive aspects of capitalism would start to 

be realized Figure 6. 

Figure 6.

Over time, however, without a 

counterbalance, the natural tendency would 

be for the negative aspects of capitalism to 

begin to come into play (Figure 7.) As a 

result, the equilibrium would start to shift to 

the lower right-hand quadrant. 

Figure 7.

Once the negative aspects of 

capitalism came to the fore, the natural 

positive aspects of communism would 

become more appealing. The equilibrium 

would start to shift into the upper left-hand 

quadrant (Figure 8). 

Once the equilibrium established 

itself on the left-hand side of the quadrant, 

over time, the negative aspects of the 

ideology would come into play, creating the 

dynamics for an equilibrium swing in the 

opposite direction (Figure 9).

Campaigning Fall 2017 53
 Figure 8.

 Figure 9.

The positive aspects of capitalism 

would come back into play and the 

equilibrium would start to shift back to the 

right (Figure 10). Over time, the system’s 

equilibrium would develop a continuous 

figure eight pattern reaching a balance that 

might not eliminate the negative aspects, but 

does provide for a constant “refresh” by not 

staying in any one quadrant for very long. In 

addition, within a bipolar system, a result of 

the natural dynamic systemic balancing, 

secondary states were able to play one 

superpower off against the other providing 

opportunities that would not normally be 

available.12

Normally, one would think that 

removing a polar counter-balance would be 

good. Unfortunately, without the countertension, the system usually stays in one 

quadrant with the negative aspects becoming 

reinforced over time (Figure 11). The United 

States and its concept of capitalism has 

experienced a similar phenomenon since the 

demise of the Soviet Union and the natural 

counter-tension of communism. Over time, 

the negative aspects of capitalism come to 

the fore and the other actors and 

stakeholders in the environment then equate 

those negative qualities to the Americans 

themselves, undermining both the ideology 

and the legitimacy of the United States. 

 Figure 10.

In any unipolar environment, the 

specific characteristics of any unipolar 

system depends on the behavior of the 

unipolar state. Global incentives, 

constraints, and restraints associated with 

the unipole’s position within the 

international structure can affect behavior. 

In addition, the unipole’s domestic 

institutions and processes, intrinsically 

linked to the international system, might 

undergo significant change based upon the 

immediate effects of its behavior within the 

international system.13 

In the case of the two decades 

immediately following the Cold War, the 

U.S. used its economic and military 

resources to dominate the international 

environment. This domination, however, 

came at a price as the U.S. bore the 

preponderance of costs while first 

Campaigning Fall 2017 54
Figure 11.

attempting to shape the world in its image, 

and then underwriting global security. 

Initially, the U.S. had an interest in bearing 

these costs as it directly benefitted from 

promoting its values and interests within the 

international system.

14 Just as the theory 

assumes, however, given that the U.S. was 

unchallenged by any peer competitors 

during that time period, U.S. interests 

became more parochial at the expense of 

international order and state and non-state 

actors. 

Over time, the cost of bearing the 

disproportionate expense naturally inclines 

the unipole, in this case, the U.S., to seek the 

economic and security assistance from

others within the global environment who 

have benefitted to varying degrees from the 

promotion of its national interests. As such, 

the unipole leverages its position of 

privilege to force these adjustment burdens 

on other states. These other states naturally 

develop a sense of resentment of the forced 

coercion, especially in light of the unipole’s 

efforts to maintain its position at the expense 

of others within the international system.

15

In addition, the now visible manifestations 

of the negative outcomes inherent within 

any unipolar system, serve as an opportunity 

for other international actors to attribute all 

of the negative conditions on the unipole 

whether it has anything to do with them or 

not. 

In international relations, polarity 

management posits that the poles are 

necessary to act as natural counter-balances

to the development of extreme ideology or 

extreme effects from taking place. The 

tension between opposite ideologies, 

however, can be lessened through an 

understanding that both poles represent truth 

and that neither is wrong. To lessen the 

tension, and eliminate the more detrimental 

overshoot response, some middle ground, or 

for some that very unsatisfying word 

‘compromise,’ must be reached. 

Of course, tension is increased even 

as the middle ground is sought; however, 

each polar system is likely to manage the 

smaller amounts of tension required over 

time as opposed to a huge one-time 

requirement. 

Whereas national interests are in a 

sense unipolar, the manner in which these 

interests are ultimately pursued in the

international system would benefit greatly 

from a bi- or multipolar approach. In the 

case of the U.S., an economic or military 

counterbalance would naturally lessen the 

negative aspects that would develop over 

time from a purely American approach. A 

purely unipolar approach creates a sense of 

“us versus them,” which tends to create a 

system marked by antagonism. A unipolar 

system also tends to make the unipole the 

adversary of all other system actors leading 

them to focus almost entirely on the 

unipole—to counter, contain, or exploit it—

at the expense of other threats that may be 

more severe. A bi- or multi-polar 

international environment would provide 

other international actors a sense of choice 

or opportunity while providing a sense of 

system balance. 

In the current international 

environment in which the U.S. is still the 

dominant military and economic power, 

U.S. national interests must be pursued in a 

Campaigning Fall 2017 55
manner that supposes there are counterpoles even when there are not. To do 

otherwise will undermine all of the good 

that the U.S. brings to the world. 

Authors Biographies 

Daniel H. McCauley is currently serving as a faculty 

member with National Defense University’s Joint 

and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) in 

Norfolk, Virginia. In addition to teaching in the 

classroom, he has served in several course director 

and curriculum development capacities. Dr. 

McCauley has served on the military faculty at the 

Canadian Forces College in Toronto, Ontario, 

Canada, and as adjunct faculty for the U.S. Marine 

Corps Command and Staff College and the U.S. Air 

Force Command and Staff College. 

Sadi S. Sadyev is currently serving in the military 

education and sciences environment in Baku, 

Azerbaijan. Dr. Sadyev was admitted to the State 

University of Languages in 1996 and earned his 

Bachelor’s degree of Faculty of Translation (English 

and German) in 2000. In 2002, he earned a Master’s 

degree in the same field of study. In 2002, Dr. 

Sadyev was accepted to into the PhD program at the 

Institute of Literature of the National Academy of 

Sciences of the Republic of Azerbaijan, earning his 

PhD in 2006. In 2014, he was awarded the rank of 

associate professor and in 2015 was promoted to 

professor at Azerbaijan Republic War College of the 

Armed Forces. Dr. Sadyev has published a book, 

"Literature of Balkan Turks," and has more than 50 

scientific articles on literature and strategic issues. 

Dr. Sadyev’s email is: sanansadiyev@yahoo.co.uk. 

1 Sargeaunt, H.A., and West, Geoffrey. 

Grand Strategy, University of Michigan, 

Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1941. 2 Hooker, Richard, D. Jr., The Grand Strategy of the 

United States, National Defense University Press, 

Washington D.C., October 2014. 3 Drew, Dennis and Snow, Donald. “Grand 

Strategy,” in Making Strategy: An 

Introduction to the National Security 

Process and Problems, Maxwell AFB, AL: 

Air University Press, 1988. 4 Huntington, Samuel. “The Erosion or 

American National Interests,” Foreign 

Affairs, 76, No. 5, Sep-Oct, 1997, 36. 5 Tsygankov, Andrei, P. and Tsygankov, Pavel, A. 

“Russian Theory of International Relations,” in 

International Studies Encyclopedia, edited by Robert 

Denemark, Vol. X, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 

2010, 6375 – 6387. 6 Rummel, R.J. Understanding Conflict and War, 

Vol. 4: War, Power, and Peace, “Chapter 2, 

International Relations,” Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE 

Publications, 1979.

7 Johnson, Barry. Polarity Management. 

Identifying and Managing Unsolvable 

Problems. HRD Press, Inc.: Amherst, MA, 

1996.

8 Johnson, Barry. Polarity Management. A 

Summary Introduction. Polarity 

Management Associates, June 1998.

9 Johnson, Barry. Polarity Management. A 

Summary Introduction. Polarity 

Management Associates, June 1998.

10 “You are either with us or against us,” 

CNN.COM, November 6, 2001, 

Washington, DC. Available at: 

http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.at

tack.on.terror/ 11 Graham, David, A. “America First': 

Donald Trump's Populist Inaugural 

Address,” The Atlantic, January 20, 2017. 

Available at: 

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive

/2017/01/trump-inaugural-speechanalysis/513956/. 12 Ikenberry, G. John, Mastanduno, and

WholforthWilliam C. “Introduction: Unipolarity, 

State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” in 

International Relations Theory and the Consequences 

of Unipolarity, Cambridge University Press: 

Cambridge, UK, 2011, p. 11.

13 Ikenberry, G. John, Mastanduno, and 

WholforthWilliam C. “Introduction: Unipolarity, 

State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” in 

International Relations Theory and the Consequences 

of Unipolarity, Cambridge University Press: 

Cambridge, UK, 2011, p. 11.

14 Ikenberry, G. John, Mastanduno, and 

WholforthWilliam C. “Introduction: Unipolarity, 

State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” in 

International Relations Theory and the Consequences 

of Unipolarity, Cambridge University Press: 

Cambridge, UK, 2011, p. 11.

15 Ikenberry, G. John, Mastanduno, and 

WholforthWilliam C. “Introduction: Unipolarity, 

State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” in 

International Relations Theory and the Consequences 

of Unipolarity, Cambridge University Press: 

Cambridge, UK, 2011, p. 11.

Campaigning Fall 2017 56
Strategic Foresight Tools and the 

Russia National Security Strategy: 

US Policy Implications

by 

MAJ Kent E. Justice

 Despite the dissolution of the Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, the 

follow-on manifestation of Russia, the 

Russian Federation, remains a powerful and 

influential actor in the international arena. It 

maintains a seat on the United Nations (UN)

Security Council with requisite veto power, 

and is a leading nuclear capable nation. With 

such stature, it remains paramount for the 

United States (U.S.) to thoroughly 

understand the security strategy and national 

interests of Russia in order to devise an 

appropriate policy approach for furthering 

U.S. interests. The government of Russia 

published an updated National Security 

Strategy (NSS) in December of 2015. 1 It 

allows for insights into how Russia sees the 

world, its place in it, and sources of concern / 

perceived threats. Russia published this 

document in the midst of having a litany of 

national level concerns such as a stagnating 

economy, declining birthrate, weak 

institutions, and weakening social cohesion. 

Analysis of this document can provide 

perspective to U.S. policy makers in how to 

approach Russia, and how to achieve desired 

effects. Understanding how Russia perceives 

causes and effects in a variety of areas such 

as the economy and national defense can 

provide U.S. officials an awareness of 

potential policy levers. This work utilizes a 

variety of analytical strategic foresight tools 

to dissect the 2015 Russian NSS, and 

concludes with a recommended way ahead 

for U.S. policy. 

Elements and Relationships within the 

NSS

The first tool utilized in examining 

the Russian NSS is a causal loop diagram 

(CLD). The CLD presents the elements of the 

NSS and the relationships between them. It 

allows for a clear reflection of what Russia 

considers to have bearing on its national 

security, and presents what Russia 

understands it needs to do in order to improve 

or maintain certain areas. 

Figure 1 is a summarized CLD for the 

NSS as a whole. The summarized CLD 

shows the core relationship of the NSS, 

which is the central association of national 

security and socioeconomic development. As 

provided in the NSS, each has a positive 

effect on the other. As national security 

improves, or is guaranteed, the 

socioeconomic development of Russia 

improves. As the socioeconomic 

development of Russia improves, so 

improves the national security. 

With the balance between national 

security and socioeconomic development 

residing at the center of the CLD, the graphic 

reflects various elements present in Russia 

that have bearing on either national security 

or socioeconomic development. The major 

elements reflected in this summarized 

diagram are:

• strong state and public security;

• improvement of the quality of life of

Russian citizens;

Campaigning Fall 2017 57
 Figure 1. 

 

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• economic growth;

• improving science, technology, and 

education; 

• development of the population’s 

health / development of health care;

• culture;

• preservation of environmental 

security and rational environmental 

management;

• strong national defense; 

• strategic stability.

Key elements, along with some 

influencing elements, are grouped by color 

for clarity. Additionally, some key negative 

influencers are reflected in red font. As this is 

a summary graphic, there are other negative 

influences which can be seen in detailed 

CLDs for each major element (not included 

in this publication). Some negative elements 

reflected in Figure 1 are:

• Corruption; 

• Imposition of restrictive economic 

measures against Russia;

• Decline in the quality of education; 

• Low standard of qualification for 

medical personnel;

• North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) military activity near 

Russian borders. 

Anytime Russia identifies a negative 

element in the NSS, it provides a listing of 

countermeasures. The conclusion of the 

document provides a listing of indicators that 

Russia views as valid evaluation criteria for 

its NSS. Presumably, Russia intends to 

monitor such figures as citizen satisfaction, 

proportion of modern arms used in the 

military, life expectancy, and per capita 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (among 

others).

Relative Strength of NSS Elements

Not all elements reflected in the CLD 

bear equally on Russian national security and 

socioeconomic development. To gain an 

appreciation of which factors may bear more 

weight than others, the Force Field Diagram 

(FFD) in Figure 2 contains the elements from 

the CLD that had a positive effect on national 

security and socioeconomic development, as 

well as some primary factors that work 

against those positive effects. The numbers 

reflect relative strength, demonstrating the 

overall relative importance of each element 

in achieving national security and 

socioeconomic development. Assigned 

values are subjective, based on perceived and 

understood influence. 

National defense remains a primary 

concern for Russia. It is arguably the 

strongest factor towards protecting national 

security. Besides encapsulating the Russian 

military organization itself, it also represents 

Russia’s strategic deterrence capability 

manifest in its nuclear readiness. One 

primary factor working against the national 

defense of Russia is the military activity of 

NATO. Russia remains critical of NATO 

activities in Eastern Europe, and views them 

as a direct threat against the Russian 

Federation. 

Campaigning Fall 2017 59
 

 

The second strongest factor in improving 

national security is state and public security. 

Strong border protection and effective law 

enforcement remain important in ensuring 

the security of the nation. Working counter to 

internal security are the activities of terrorist 

or radical groups. Russia keenly monitors the 

activities of extremist groups around the 

world, particularly in its region, and is forced 

to maintain vigilance against any potential 

activities within Russia. The April 2017 

metro blast in St. Petersburg provides a 

recent example of the internal security 

concerns of Russia.2

 

Improving citizen quality of life is the third 

strongest factor listed on the FFD. Russia 

believes that developing the potential of its 

population, providing for needs, and 

increasing income will have a positive impact 

on socioeconomic development. Economic 

sanctions, however, continue to have a 

negative impact on quality of life. These 

measures negatively impact the availability 

of goods and capital, which can have 

secondary and tertiary effects on other areas, 

such as science and technology development. 

The quality of life of the Russian people 

continues to slip in the face of slow economic 

growth.

Figure 2. Force Field Diagram for Safeguarding the Russian Federation’s National Security and 

Socioeconomic Development.

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Economic growth remains a priority for 

Russia, and Russia believes this factor has a 

positive impact on socioeconomic 

development. However, in recent years, 

Russia’s economy has stagnated, and the 

positive impact of economic growth on 

national security is diminished (Figure 3).

3

Significantly impacting this, along with other 

areas, is corruption. Cited in numerous areas 

in the NSS, corruption appears to permeate 

throughout society to the point where it is 

perhaps a part of the culture. This has 

significant impacts given the precarious 

position in which it places government 

budgets, along with the negative effect it can 

have on state security. 

The remaining elements listed, both 

positive and negative, in the FFD do not 

appear to weigh significantly on Russian 

national security or socioeconomic 

development relative to the other factors. Of 

note is the mention of culture in the NSS, and 

the concern about an erosion of traditional 

morals. The government is taking a keen 

interest in maintaining a sense of Russian 

identity. A fracturing of what it means to be 

a Russian could inhibit the government’s 

ability to muster the population’s support 

around policy approaches to resolving 

Russia’s problems moving forward. 

Furthermore, the government is battling to

reduce the ‘brain drain’ of professionals, as 

trust in public officials, systems, and 

institutions is wavering (Figure 4).

4

Implications for the Future

The use of a Futures Wheel (FW) 

(Figure 5) allows for structured 

brainstorming in order to gain an 

appreciation of potential first and second 

order effects about trends for Russia. Given 

the results of the analysis from the CLD and

Figure 3. Russia’s GDP at Purchasing Power Parity chart. This graphic reflects the negative effect of 

sanctions in 2014, and negligible growth forecast into the future.

3

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FFD, a FW that examines increasing NATO 

buildup and continuing economic sanctions 

provides insights into potential impacts of 

these policy decisions. 

Increasing NATO military buildup in 

NATO’s ‘Eastern Flank’ is a stressor to 

Russia’s national defense and overall 

strategic stability. Increasing buildup could 

reflect any enhanced military activity from 

increasing troop numbers in the vicinity of 

Russia’s borders, to the deployment of 

improved equipment that provides an 

advantage over Russian equipment, such as 

enhanced radar. This is of particular concern 

to Russia, as its domestic technology 

industries that support military systems 

development will be taxed to retool and 

develop in the face of challenges from the 

international arena.5

 Given this concern, the 

deployment of new capabilities would cause 

alarm, as Russia would perceive itself 

as outmatched and unable to catch up in the 

near term. 

Second order effects of a NATO 

buildup could see a negative effect on 

diplomatic relations with NATO member 

states and Russia, a reciprocal military 

buildup by Russia, and a domestic Russian 

population that feels increasingly unsafe. 

Any negative effect on diplomatic relations 

could see short to long term diminishing

relationships between Russia and NATO 

members, a loss in reciprocal tourism (as 

Russia may ban travel to certain countries, 

or hike visa fees), and a reduction in trade. 

For Russia’s military buildup in response, 

this will drive a demand for an increased 

security and defense budget, require 

innovation to counter any new NATO 

system capabilities, and require a continued 

heightened level of military readiness. 

Lastly, if the population begins to feel 

unsafe, this could result in a 

Figure 4. Worldwide Government Corruption Perception Index graphic. Russia’s rating of 2.39 

places it on par with or below some African nations, making it one of the most perceived corrupt 

nations in the world.

Campaigning Fall 2017 62
loss of national pride for the Russian people, 

a general questioning of the competence of 

the Russian government, and a demand by 

the people for a government response. 

The continuation of economic 

sanctions on Russia has direct effects on the 

economy and other aspects of its national 

security. Following Russia’s annexation of 

Crimea in 2014, a slew of nations imposed 

punitive sanctions with a focus on energy 

related trade on Russia. Russia responded by 

applying responsive sanctions, including the 

total banning of food imports from select 

nations and the European Union (EU). 

This aided in precipitating the 

collapse of the Russian ruble, and plunged

Russia into a financial crisis. An Austrian 

study indicated that the sanctions could cost 

the EU over 100 billion euros in lost trade, as 

well as potentially putting approximately two 

million jobs at risk. The U.S. further 

sanctioned Russia in 2016 over allegations of

Russian involvement with election related 

hacking. These sanctions have had a tangible 

effect on the Russian economy, as 

Figure 5. Futures Wheel for Increasing NATO Military Buildup.

Campaigning Fall 2017 63
they partially contributed to a contraction of 

the GDP of around four percent in 2015, and 

will have reciprocal stressful effects on EU 

and other nations’ economies as well. 6

Second order effects of the sanctions are the 

inability for Russia to import or export 

certain goods, damage to Russian prestige, 

and future Russian invasion plans being 

deterred. The inability to import and export 

certain goods will result in a decline in tax 

revenue, reduced demand for production, an 

increasing backlog of goods across the board, 

a lack of essential goods in critical industries, 

and a negative impact on Russian quality of 

life. However, this can also serve as a 

stimulus for Russia’s domestic industry, as it 

seeks to fill gaps where goods are not being 

imported. For Russia’s international prestige, 

this will result in a loss of international status 

and influence, a loss of public confidence in 

the government, and a possible decline in 

foreign investment. If the intent of the 

sanctions is achieved and future Russian 

invasions are deterred, then Western powers 

successfully demonstrate their resolve, 

Russia is forced to respect Western influence, 

and stability is increased in Eastern Europe. 

Policy Implications

While the intent of the sanctions is to 

alter current and future behavior, what are the 

Figure 6. Futures Wheel for Continuing Economic 

Campaigning Fall 2017 64
enhances that it will actually do so? The use 

of an Implications Tree (Figure 7) allows for 

an examination of potential policy 

implications for maintaining sanctions on 

Russia. Russia remains a proud nation, 

drawing on its historical influence as the 

USSR and its current regional influence. 

While Western perspectives may 

rationalize that by punishing behaviors it will 

reduce the likelihood that they will be 

repeated, it remains to be seen how far 

Russian resolve and determination will aid in 

overriding negative impacts of the economic 

sanctions. 

In terms of economic decline, there 

remains a high probability that this will occur 

due to the sanctions. The immediate effects 

were rather significant. However, over time, 

Russia may be able to compensate by

drawing on domestic sources, such as energy 

resources, and relying on friendly foreign 

partners for lines of credit. Depending on the 

severity of the sanctions, and how they may 

be adjusted in the future, it is possible to have 

a continued negative impact that may be 

lessened as Russia’s domestic industry 

adjusts. In the short to near term, with 

economic decline comes certain negative 

effects on domestic employment and quality 

of life.

There remains a high probability that 

Russia will see its international prestige 

negatively affected. In many ways, this is 

already the case. Continued application of 

sanctions demonstrates that Western 

countries continue to judge Russia’s behavior 

Figure 7. Implications Tree for the Impacts of the US Maintaining 

 

Campaigning Fall 2017 65
as unacceptable, which could have continued 

impacts on how the world views Russian 

activities. As a result of this, it remains likely 

that Russia will see a decline in its status and 

a loss of public confidence. While foreign 

investments will likely drop from those 

countries that apply the sanctions, Russia 

could petition to non-sanction applying allies 

for support. 

The crux of the sanctions’ intent is to 

change behavior. This is unlikely to occur. 

The severity of the sanctions is not on a level 

to create any crisis situations within Russia. 

Rather, they are on a level to force Russia to 

more seriously consider the implications of 

its actions. Once Russia completes its survey 

of the fallout from its activities, and 

determines methods for recovery (for 

example, by adjusting domestic industries to 

compensate or firming relationships with 

non-sanctioning allies), it probably will 

determine that the risk is worth the reward. 

However, on the low probably that Russia 

decides to change its behavior in the future, 

this would directly result in a diminished 

level of Russia intelligence collection 

activities and hacking offenses (i.e. actions 

viewed as provocative). 

The more likely scenario is that 

Russia does not change its behavior and 

continues its escalation of provocations. 

There is a moderate chance that they could 

increase in frequency, as Russia aims to 

continue its advance on whatever strategy it 

may have for regaining territories that it sees 

as having a rightful claim over. Should 

Russia continue on this path, it is almost 

certain that it will seek to refine its techniques 

in order to avoid detection or direct criticism. 

The use of proxy organizations, alternate 

methods that do not utilize direct military 

invasion, coercion, or other activities that 

may fall below the threshold of international 

interest would likely be seen by Russia as the 

effective way ahead for continuing activities 

seen as provocations by the West.

Potential Future Developments

The execution of policy can yield 

expected and unexpected results. While not 

all results can be foreseen, anticipation 

allows for policy makers to remain cognizant 

of the possibilities, and take steps to mitigate 

any potential negative consequences. The 

Cross-Impact Matrix (Figure 8) compares the 

potential effects between trends. This 

approach yields insights into anticipated and 

potentially unanticipated results. This CrossImpact Matrix analyzes potential cross 

effects between declining economic growth; 

declining quality of life; declining science, 

technology, and education; NATO buildup; 

and continuing sanctions. 

Declining economic growth, 

declining quality of life, and declining 

science, technology, and education are likely 

to have negative influences upon each other. 

The areas of interest are in the interplay 

between the NATO build up and economic 

sanctions, and the above stated elements. As 

may be expected, NATO buildup and 

sanctions will have an overall negative effect 

on elements of Russia’s national security. Of 

interest is that if sanctions are successful and 

positively influence Russian behavior, it 

could undercut the justification for a NATO 

buildup. Without continuing Russian 

provocations, NATO members may seek to 

Campaigning Fall 2017 66
withdraw forces and capabilities. If this is a 

moment that Russia is anticipating, then it 

would create a security vacuum in the exact 

region that Russia would desire decreased 

security. Similarly, if the NATO buildup is 

successful in deterring Russian actions, then 

it removes the rational for continuing 

economic sanctions. Given the fallout 

enduring on the EU from the sanctions, a 

unified voice may quickly rise calling for an 

end to the economic measures against Russia. 

Sanction applying nations must also remain 

cognizant of the internal effects the sanctions 

are having in Russia, as they could 

unwittingly create unintended crisis 

conditions. 

 

Recommended Policy Approach

Analysis of the Russian NSS reveals 

how Russia views its national security and

socioeconomic development. While 

understanding that Russia values these two 

key components, and views them as essential 

towards furthering its NSS, it remains 

important to understand what is driving their 

betterment. 

Overall, national defense, state and 

public security, and improving the quality of 

life are the strongest elements currently 

positively impacting Russia. However, there 

are significant variables acting against these 

elements, as NATO military buildup, 

economic sanctions, and corruption erode 

national security.

Figure 8. Cross Impact Matrix of Various Trends and Policies towards 

Russia.

 

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The latest U.S. National Security 

Strategy is from 2015. While this is from the 

prior presidential administration, it identifies

the four main areas of concern for U.S. 

national security as security, prosperity, 

values, and international order.7 In order to 

further progress towards these elements, the 

U.S. can shape policy towards each of 

Russia’s contributing elements of its NSS.

Russia’s national defense 

mechanisms present a clear threat towards 

the stability of Eastern Europe and NATO 

allies of the U.S. Recent actions explicitly

reflect this, and are in conflict with the 

security aspects of the U.S. NSS. The U.S., 

along with other NATO partners, has 

responded by pursuing a buildup of military 

forces and capability in the ‘Eastern Flank’ of 

NATO. Given the relative weakening of

Russia’s economy, lack of ability to quickly 

innovate on newer capabilities, and demand 

for a military response in kind, this activity 

presents a significant stressor to the Russian 

state. Additionally, the action itself can act as 

a deterrent to future military provocations 

from Russia, causing it to give pause to its 

actions so as not to exacerbate the situation to

a level beyond its capacity to effectively 

respond. To counter Russia’s national 

defense element, the U.S. should continue to 

pursue engaging the NATO capacity to 

maintain military capabilities forward 

deployed in areas in the vicinity of locations 

assessed to be of future interest to Russia. 

Russia’s capability to maintain state 

security remains essential for it to combat 

foreign state intelligence activities, extremist 

activity, radical nationalist groups, and 

criminal organizations. Additionally, the 

ability to respond effectively to natural 

disasters mitigates long term negative effects 

of these occurrences. Russia is struggling to 

fight corruption in its ranks, as this has an 

overall negative effect on the capability of 

law enforcement and internal security. In 

terms of maintaining security and 

international order, it is in the interest of the 

U.S. to cooperate with Russia in the fight 

against global Islamic extremist

organizations. Any successes inside Russia 

by groups of interest would be detrimental to 

overall U.S. efforts to reduce the global 

influence of these groups. Intelligence 

sharing and security capacity building in this 

regard could be a point of cooperation, 

should Russia be willing to entertain such 

efforts. Cooperation in the area of response 

and management of natural disasters is also a 

potential area for the U.S. to pursue, as this 

can positively reinforce international order, 

effectively mitigating second and third order 

effects. One caveat to any cooperative policy 

recommendation is that until the current 

stalemate regarding sanctions and Russia’s 

provocative actions is resolved, it may 

remain politically untenable for U.S. policy 

makers to pursue overt cooperation with 

Russia, even in areas where it is in the mutual 

interest of both nations. 

In regards to the improvement of the 

quality of life of Russian citizens, many of 

the elements supporting this rely on domestic 

policy for the Russian Federation and are 

outside of the concern of the U.S. in terms of 

U.S. national security. However, content and 

satisfied populations of nations across the 

globe can positively support international 

order. Additionally, the promulgation of U.S. 

values remains important to ensure that 

democracies across the world are preserved, 

Campaigning Fall 2017 68
rights for minority groups are maintained, 

and mass atrocities are prevented. In this light, 

the U.S. can continue strategic messaging 

when engaging with Russia to encourage 

protection for ar-risk population groups; 

displaced persons; and migrant workers. 

Additionally, the U.S. can continue to 

advocate to Russia in terms of its support for 

civil society and freedom of expression. 

 Russian economic growth has 

suffered under the recent adoption of 

economic sanctions. While this was the intent 

of the sanctions, the U.S. should remain 

vigilant of the exact effects they are causing 

in Russia. The intent is to punish Russia for 

its territorial incursions, not to destabilize the 

government or Russian society. The U.S. 

should remain cognizant of the magnitude of 

the sanctions, and ensure that they do not 

broaden to a level that would cause undue 

suffering to sectors of the Russian economy

or population. It is a delicate balance to 

achieve the desired effects of the sanctions, 

and U.S. policy makers must remain vigilant 

on metrics associated with the sanctions’ 

effects so as to avoid sparking any internal 

crises in Russia. 

For Russia’s advancements in science 

and technology, and its level of education, 

progress has been slowed in recent years. The 

recent sanctions have denied goods and 

technologies that would aid in development 

and innovation. While this denies 

advancements in technologies that can 

support infrastructure and consumer goods, it 

also slows progress in military capability

advancements. Given Russia’s provocative 

actions, this promotes U.S. security interests. 

Maintaining sanctions in areas that would 

positively contribute to military capability 

development to help counter NATO 

capabilities is a plus. The U.S. can also 

persist in attracting professional talent from 

Russia, effectively denying them home 

grown experts that could have contributed in 

Russia. Maintaining robust employment 

opportunities in the U.S., while maintaining a 

lenient visa program in this regard, can also 

serve to keep Russia in check in this area.

Russia’s focus on its health related 

interests include a desire to increase 

longevity, lower mortality rates, and increase 

the size of its population. Doing so would 

increase an available labor population, while 

not placing an undue drain on resources for 

medical care. Of interest in this sector to the 

U.S. is the ability of Russia to contain 

epidemics, the spread of disease, and the 

spread of illicit drug use. The U.S. can pursue 

cooperative programs with Russia’s medical 

sector to ensure best practices are employed 

towards the rapid identification of diseases, 

and containment when pandemics are 

identified. There is also a common interest in 

stifling drug trafficking and use. The sharing 

of information related to the identification of 

international drug trafficking methods and 

resources for the treatment of drug addiction 

are potential policy considerations for the 

U.S. to pursue. 

Culture and the Russian identity are 

increasingly becoming an area of concern for 

the Russian government. Professionals are 

abandoning service in Russia in pursuit of 

freedoms and income afforded in Western 

countries. It is a critical point in time for 

Russia, as it appears to be on the losing side 

of the narrative of what it means to be a 

Russian. Drawing top talent from Russia 

hampers Russia’s economy and strengthens 

Campaigning Fall 2017 69
U.S. prosperity. The U.S. can continue to 

serve as a model for advancing equality at 

home and promoting equal opportunity. The 

projection to the world of having an 

empowered civil society that promotes on 

merit with little corruption is of tremendous 

appeal. However, a fractured Russia works 

against the interest of maintaining an 

international order. U.S. messaging should 

avoid inciting any conflicts amongst 

disgruntled groups in Russia, and should 

continue to maintain messaging related to the 

appeal of the values of the U.S.

Russia’s environmental security and 

use of natural resources serve as a platform 

for shoring up economic security. The 

availability of raw materials is essential, as it 

will allow them to proceed without having to 

rely on imports. Should Russia find itself 

with a dwindling supply of essential 

materials, the U.S. can utilize this as a lever 

in trade relations. In terms of pollution and 

waste treatment, these are issues that the U.S. 

can cooperate on with Russia. As seen with 

China, pollution can present a great number 

of negative externalities to the region. The 

U.S. can continue to promote responsible use 

and management of resources and waste 

management. Effective sharing of 

technologies and best practices related to 

environmental management are in the interest 

of the U.S. and should be pursued when 

possible with Russia. 

The last element to address is 

strategic stability. The deployment and 

maintenance of troop levels in the ‘Eastern 

Front’ of NATO provides stability and 

reassurance to NATO allies. However, this 

measure can also act to destabilize, as Russia 

may consider necessary reactions to ensure 

its national security. The U.S. should 

advocate to NATO to continue messaging the 

troop deployments as a direct action taken in 

response to Russian provocations, and 

highlight the non-aggressive nature against 

Russia in the troop deployments. Russia’s 

NSS proposes pursuing stability of 

international law, honoring arms reduction 

agreements, participating in nuclear arms 

related discussions, and supporting 

peacekeeping missions. The U.S. advocates 

for responsible participation in maintaining 

peace and order in the international arena, 

and it is in the U.S. interest to advocate the 

same from Russia. Each of these areas 

provide potential areas for cooperation 

between the U.S. and Russia. Should 

relations come to an impasse, U.S. policy 

makers can turn to these measures for points 

of engagement with Russia where trust and 

cooperation can be restored before venturing 

into more contentious issues (i.e. trust 

building). 

 

Conclusion 

 Once the prime adversary of the U.S. 

in the Cold War, Russia has slipped from its 

role as leading world power to that of a 

declining regional hegemon. Nonetheless, 

the nation continues to carry great influence, 

and the U.S. must continue to seriously 

regard the actions and activities of the 

Russian government. The NSS provides 

insights into the mechanisms driving 

Russia’s strategy. Analysis of these elements 

gives indications to U.S. policy makers of 

potential policy levers to utilize when 

seeking to influence Russian behavior. 

Campaigning Fall 2017 70
Economic sanctions have made a 

significant impact on the Russian economy 

and the quality of life of its citizens. However, 

the extent to which they will impact Russian 

behavior is yet to be seen. As domestic 

industry in Russia responds, and Russian 

allies provide aid to Russia, the U.S. and its 

allies may find themselves at a decision point 

of how to proceed forward. Shaping 

sanctions smartly to a level that can influence 

government behavior while not overtly 

crippling the economy or the population will 

require continued monitoring and 

consideration by policy makers. Additionally, 

the buildup of NATO troops in Eastern 

Europe has sent a clear message to Russia 

that its actions will not go unnoticed. The 

stressors placed upon Russia by this action 

require attention and consideration from 

Russian policy makers. As with the economic 

sanctions, it remains to be seen if Russian 

behavior will be influenced long-term by the 

troop presence. Policy makers should 

continue to be mindful of potential Russian 

reactions, and appropriately shape policy 

decisions going forward. 

Despite recent points of conflict, 

there remain areas where Russia and the U.S. 

can cooperate. Doing so would further U.S. 

national interests, but could be politically 

unpalatable to decision makers in the U.S. 

This could send contradictory messaging, 

and cause confusion on how the U.S. could 

cooperate in some areas, while coming in 

1 Russian President, 2015, Russian National Security 

Strategy (December 31). 

2 CNN. “St. Petersburg Metro Explosion: At Least 11 

Dead in Russia Blast” Last modified April 4, 2017. 

Accessed June 9, 2017. 

http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/03/europe/stpetersburg-russia-explosion/index.html.

conflict in others. Ultimately, the U.S. should 

continue on a policy path of encouraging 

responsible behavior by nations in the 

international arena while not destabilizing 

regions. Influencing measures should be 

tailored and carefully considered in 

coordination with allies. This ‘whole of 

nations’ can send a consistent and unified 

message. Continual adjustment of measures 

as needed will ultimately provide 

conditioning feedback to Russia while 

guiding it to its place as a responsible 

member in both its region and the world. 

About the Author

MAJ Kent Justice, U.S. Army, wrote this article for 

the Strategic Foresight elective at the Joint Forces 

Staff College’s Joint and Combined Warfighting 

School, Class 17-1. He currently lives in Seoul, South 

Korea where he works as a Policy Officer in the J-5, 

U.S. Forces Korea. MAJ Justice graduated from the 

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Command and 

General Staff Course Class #60 in July 2015. MAJ 

Justice was commissioned from the U.S. Military 

Academy in 2002, and received an M.A. in Political 

Science as an East-West Center Fellow at the 

University of Hawaii. Additionally, he is a linguist in 

the Korean and Japanese languages. He previously 

served in intelligence assignments in Korea and with 

the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Joint Base 

Lewis-McCord, where he deployed twice to the 

Philippines in support of Joint Special Operations 

Task Force – Philippines. MAJ Justice’s next 

assignment will bring him to Tokyo, Japan as the 

Training and Doctrine Command’s Liaison Officer to 

the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.

3 The Moscow Times. “Experts Predict ‘Lost Decade’ 

for Russia’s Stagnating Economy”. Last modified 

August 19, 2016. Accessed June 9, 2017. 

https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/expertsproclaim-lost-decade-for-russias-stagnatingeconomy-55039. 4 The Moscow Times. “Russia’s Brain Drain Worse 

Than Previously Believed – Report”. Last modified 

Campaigning Fall 2017 71
October 6, 2016. Accessed June 9, 2017. 

https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russias-braindrain-worse-than-previously-believed-report-55635. 5 The National Interest. “Russia’s Massive Military 

Modernization Might Be in Big Trouble”. Last 

modified December 2, 2014. Accessed June 18, 2017. 

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-massivemilitary-modernization-might-be-big-trouble-11768.

6 Reuters. “Update 1 – Russian Economy Contracts 

3.7 Percent in 2015, Slump Set to Continue”. Last 

modified January 25, 2016. Accessed June 9, 2017. 

http://www.reuters.com/article/russia-economyidUSL8N15917O.

7 US President, 2015, US National Security Strategy, 

(February 2015).

Campaigning Fall 2017 72
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