COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

B. K. CRUEY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1017-96-3 PER CURIAM 

 NOVEMBER 26, 1996 

SHIRLEY ANN LAYMON 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY 

Barnard F. Jennings, Judge Designate 

 (B. K. Cruey, pro se, on brief). 

 (Charles N. Dorsey; Beth K. Roland; DLC Trial 

Lawyers, on brief), for appellee. 

 B. K. Cruey appeals the decision of the trial judge awarding 

spousal support to his wife, Shirley A. Laymon, and deciding 

other issues. Husband contends the trial judge erred in 

(1) awarding spousal support and ordering husband to pay wife's 

dental and medical bills; (2) not awarding husband an interest in 

the parties' marital property, not awarding husband his separate 

property, and allowing wife to proceed with suit on two notes; 

(3) finding the pre-marital agreement was valid. Upon reviewing 

the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this 

appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the 

decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

Spousal Support and Dental/Medical Bills

 Husband contends the award of spousal support was not 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

supported by the pleadings. The record establishes, however, 

that wife filed a bill of complaint seeking separate maintenance. 

 By notice filed October 27, 1995, wife indicated her intention 

to seek "pendente lite relief including monies for the [wife's] 

support." Wife received an award of support pendente lite 

following the hearing on November 8, 1995. Cf. Boyd v. Boyd, 2 

Va. App. 16, 18, 340 S.E.2d 578, 579 (1986). Furthermore, 

husband's amended cross-bill prayed that "matters of equitable 

distribution and support be determined." 

 Clearly, the issue of support was raised by the pleadings 

and addressed throughout the hearing. We hold, therefore, that 

the trial judge did not err in awarding support. 

 Husband also contends that wife's actions amounted to 

desertion and thus barred spousal support. Under the version of 

Code § 20-107.1 in effect at the time this action commenced, the 

only statutory bar to an award of permanent spousal support was 

adultery. The trial judge found, however, that neither party had 

proven fault. 

 Husband further contends the trial court failed to consider 

the statutory factors concerning support. However, the husband 

fails to identify the factors that were not considered and how 

those factors would have affected the trial court's 

determination. See Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 

S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). "Since this argument was not fully 

developed in the appellant's brief, we need not address this 
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question." Id. Similarly, husband presented no argument to 

support his contention that the trial judge erred in awarding 

payment on wife's medical and dental bills. Thus, we do not 

address this contention. 

 Distribution of Property

 "Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the 

sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be 

set aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it." Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 

S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). "Unless it appears from the record that 

the trial judge has not considered or has misapplied one of the 

statutory mandates, this Court will not reverse on appeal." 

Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 56, 378 S.E.2d 626, 630 

(1989). 

 Both parties presented evidence and testimony concerning the 

distribution of property acquired before and during the parties' 

marriage. The trial court received the parties' evidence, heard 

them testify, and then made the following ruling: 

 With respect to dividing up property and 

honoring the claims that each party alleges 

against the other, I really don't think there 

was any credible evidence that I can rely on 

one way or the other on either side, 

actually, so far as that part of it is 

concerned. The ruling that I'm making 

relating to that does not relate to the 

pending litigation on those two notes [from 

husband to wife]. . . . Again, the ruling 

would be that so far as offering any claims 

that [wife] makes against [husband], any 

claims that [husband] makes against [wife] 

. . . I don't think there is credible 

evidence to support it. 
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 The parties failed to present sufficient evidence of their 

claims to warrant a deviation from the terms of the agreement 

signed by the parties. In that agreement, husband waived any 

interest in wife's property. Our review of the record does not 

indicate that the trial judge was plainly wrong in his assessment 

of the evidence or abused his discretion in conforming the 

equitable distribution decision to the terms of the parties' 

written agreement. 

 Husband also challenges the judge's decision to allow wife 

to proceed with her separate suit on two promissory notes signed 

prior to the marriage. We find no indication that husband raised 

this objection with specificity before the trial court. 

Therefore, we do not address it on appeal. Rule 5A:18. See

Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 229, 441 S.E.2d 195, 201, 

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 234 (1994). 

Pre-Marital Agreement 

 Husband preserved his objection to the award of spousal 

support on the grounds it contradicted the terms of the 

agreement. However, paragraph seven of the agreement 

specifically provides that "in the event of a separation, [wife] 

reserves all right by way of claims for support, alimony, 

attorney fees, costs, or division of property." Husband did not 

object to the judge's consideration of the agreement, the judge's 

finding that the agreement was valid, or the award of payments to 

wife beyond those set out in the agreement. Therefore, we do not 
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consider those issues on appeal. Rule 5A:18. 
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 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.