United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 14-3240

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Tracy Milam

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

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 Submitted: April 13, 2015

 Filed: July 24, 2015

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Before BYE, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Tracy Milam appeals the district court's affirmance of an Administrative Law 1

Judge's (ALJ) denial of Milam's application for social security disability insurance

benefits. We affirm.

I. Background

Milamapplied for disability insurance benefits on July 12, 2011. She identified

her disability onset date as August 31, 2009—the same day her employer laid her off.

Prior to the layoff, Milam had worked for 20 years, most recently as a

secretary/administrative assistant. Milam alleges that she is now totally disabled

because of back pain, knee pain, hip pain, and osteoporosis.

A. Milam's Medical History

On August 6, 2007, Milam visited Dr. Brent Sprinkle, D.O., complaining of

"[c]ervical pain, some low back pain, [and] intermittent tingling." Dr. Sprinkle tested

both her upper and lower extremities and found no significant limitation in range of

motion, no evidence of instability, no gross misalignments, and no strength deficits.

He also tested her neck and upper spine and found no strength deficits and no

significant limitations on flexion, extension, rotation, or side-bending. His

examination of her lumbar spine, however, revealed decreased motion and thoracic

scoliosis. Dr. Sprinkle ultimately diagnosed "[i]diopathic scoliosis status post fusion

in the 1970s."2

Dr. Sprinkle then ordered an MRI of Milam's cervicalspine. The MRI revealed

a "straightening of the cervicalspine withoutsublaxation" and that Milam's "cervical

The Honorable Jerome Kearney, United States Magistrate Judge for the

1

Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the parties consented to refer the case under

28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

A Harrington rod was implanted along Milam's spine in 1976 to treat her

2

scoliosis.

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cord [was] normal in signal throughout." The MRI indicated that "[m]ild

disc/osteophyte complex[es]" were causing "minimal" or "mild" canal narrowing at

the C3-C4, C4-C5, and C6-C7 discs. The MRI likewise indicated that "[b]road

disc/osteophyte complex[es were] caus[ing] mild to moderate canal narrowing, and

appear[ed] to contact the anterior cord. . . . Mild indentation of the anterior cord [was]

noted without signal abnormality." 

Milam returned to Dr. Sprinkle on August 16, 2007. He diagnosed cervical

degenerative disc disease. He opined that Milam's "pain is more muscle spasmrelated

since about two minutes post trigger point injection her pain was considerably

reduced."

Milam visited Dr. Sprinkle again on September 14, 2007. Dr. Sprinkle

administered a trigger point injection, prescribed Zanaflex (a muscle relaxant) and

Ultram ER (a pain reliever), and recommended a return visit in three to four weeks.

When Milam returned to Dr. Sprinkle on October 12, 2007, Dr. Sprinkle noted

that the trigger point injection "seem[ed] to have made a huge difference" and that

Milam was "not taking the Zanaflex." He then cleared her to return to work.

Milam did not seek treatment from Dr. Sprinkle again for her back pain until

June 3, 2011—nearly four years later, and nearly two years after she claims she

became disabled. During this visit, Milam informed Dr. Sprinkle that she "want[ed]

to pursue disability." Dr. Sprinkle's exam revealed no strength deficits, no instability,

and no significant loss of range of motion except for a certain "decreased range of

motion" in her lumbar spine. He also noted "[d]iffuse myofascial trigger points" and

"bilateral lumbar paraspinal trigger points." An x-ray showed that "previous spinal

hardware for thoracic scoliosis . . . appear[ed] to be in good position" and that "some

mild degenerative is above and below her hardware." Milam was "concerned that her

pain [had] progressed," and Dr. Sprinkle noted "some progression of degenerative

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changes . . . above and below the level of her hardware infusion." Dr. Sprinkle opined

that Milam could not "tolerate sedentary work that requires prolonged sitting." Dr.

Sprinkle noted during the same visit, however, that Milam "has a moderate activity

level. Exercise includes walking and weights. Exercises 3–4 times a week. Exercises

0–5 hours per week." He recommended that she continue the "home exercise

program" and return for treatment "as needed."

About this time, Milam began keeping a "Pain and Function Journal." She

continued making periodic entries until September 26, 2012. Milam's periodic entries

generally noted that she experienced pain, headaches, stiffness, shortness of breath,

and fevers. She usually rated her pain on a zero-to-ten scale. She rated her pain

somewhere between zero and six on the significant majority of days in which she

recorded any pain; in contrast, she rated her pain as a nine or ten only three times

throughout the approximately 16-month period. 

On June 17, 2011, Milam visited Dr. David Shenker, M.D., at a women's clinic

to obtain an annual examination. She denied, among other things, any tingling,

numbness, muscular weakness, joint pain, joint swelling, or difficulty sleeping.

Dr. Steven Strode, M.D., completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity

Assessment of Milam on September 10, 2011. He concluded that Milam could stand

or walk for approximately six hours in an eight-hour workday. He also concluded that

she could sit for approximately six hours in an eight-hour workday; frequently lift or

carry up to ten pounds; occasionally lift or carry up to 20 pounds; frequently climb

stairs or ramps; and occasionally climb ladders, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or

crawl. He noted that Milam "[c]ooks, cleans, does laundry, walks, drives, goes out

alone, and shops in stores." A case analysis performed by Dr. Jerry Thomas, M.D.,

on November 15, 2011, reached the same conclusions with respect to Milam's

limitations. 

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On November 9, 2011, Dr. Bruce Randolph, M.D., performed a consultative

general physical examination of Milam. He diagnosed Milam with scoliosis, chronic

back pain, and arthritis. He also noted that she had normal range of motion in her

shoulders, hips, knees, and spine and had only "moderate limitation in standing,

walking, climbing, squatting, lifting and carrying."

On March 26, 2012, Dr. Sprinkle saw Milam and recorded that she could not

"tolerate hardly any bending[,] lifting[,] twisting[,] or walking[,] or standing to a

significant degree." He noted no significant changes in range of motion, stability, or

strength. He recommended that she take or continue taking Skelaxin (a muscle

relaxant) and NSAIDs (non-steriodal anti-inflammatory drugs), deferred her

injections, and advised her to return for treatment as needed.

Three months later, on June 28, 2012, Milam returned to Dr. Sprinkle for

further assessment. Dr. Sprinkle noted that Milam was feeling pain and that "[t]here

are no relieving factors." He also noted that Milam was pursuing "disability because

of her inability to tolerate primarily prolonged sitting or standing or bending or

twisting and heavy lifting as a result of her diffuse cervical thoracic and lumbar

degenerative disease and scoliosis and Harrington rod placement." Later that same

day, however, he wrote a letter "To Whom It May Concern" stating that Milam "may

return to work," provided she did not bend, twist, lift more than ten pounds, or stand

or sit for prolonged periods of time.

Finally, on October 30, 2012, Dr. Sprinkle completed a FunctionalCapabilities

Assessment in which he opined that Milam could frequently lift lessthan ten pounds,

occasionally lift ten pounds, stand or walk for less than two hours in an eight-hour

workday, and sit for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday. 

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B. ALJ Hearing and Decision

At Milam's request, an ALJ conducted a hearing regarding Milam's application

on October 26, 2012. With respect to her prior employment, Milam testified that her

employer laid her off as part of a reduction in work force. The ALJ noted on the

record his general suspicions about claimants who are "laid off—they work until the

last day and then all of a sudden they're disabled." He also observed that, after

Milam's layoff and alleged disability onset date, she sought and received

unemployment benefits and even looked for a new job.

Milam testified at the hearing that she can drive for only 20 minutes without

back and hip pain, can sit for only 30 minutes continuously before needing to stand

due to pain, can lift up to five to ten pounds, has limited ability to bend her back, and

has difficulties rotating and squatting. She testified thatshe isin pain "24/7 on a good

day" and sleeps an average of four to five hours per night. She submitted letters from

three former coworkersstating, among other things, that Milamwas absentfromwork

up to five days per month.

Milamalso testified about her daily activities. She confirmed thatshe cooks for

up to 20 minutes every day, does laundry, showers on her own, and shops for

groceries. She occasionally uses a walker or a cane that her mother gave her, although

no physician ever prescribed that she use them.

The ALJ then posed two hypothetical scenarios to the vocational expert (VE)

present at the hearing. The first hypothetical consisted of a person similar to Milam

in terms of age and work experience who had mild to moderate pain; could sit for

only four to six hours in an eight-hour workday; could stand for only two to three

hours in an eight-hour workday; could sit or stand continuously for only 30 minutes

at a time; could occasionally climb, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl; and would have

to miss one or two workdays every month. The second hypothetical consisted of a

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similar person who had to miss three to five workdays per month due to moderate to

severe pain.

The VE testified that the person in the first hypothetical could performMilam's

past work as a secretary/administrative assistant but that the person in the second

hypothetical could not find employment due to excessive absenteeism. According to

the VE, "generally when you miss two days or 10 percent on a consistent basis

employers would not tolerate it; however, on[e] day a month . . . for a long-term

employee—employers would tolerate that, your honor." Milam then testified thatshe

missed, on average, three to five workdays every month.

The ALJ ultimately found that Milam was not disabled and issued a written

decision denying Milam's claim. The ALJ found that Milam could perform sedentary

work with the following restrictions:

[She can] sit no more than 4–6 hours and stand no more than 2–3 hours

in an eight-hour workday. The claimant can stand or sit for up to thirty

minutes at a time and then requires the option to sit or stand at will. She

can occasionally climb, stoop, crouch, kneel and crawl. The claimant's

symptoms, including pain, will cause her to miss 1–2 days of work per

month.

C. Procedural History

Milam appealed the ALJ's decision to the Social Security Administration's

Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied her request for review, finding no

"basis for changing the [ALJ]'s decision."

Milamsubsequently soughtreview ofthe ALJ's denial of benefits in the district

court. The district court affirmed, however, finding that substantial evidence on the

record as a whole supports the ALJ's decision.

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II. Discussion

On appeal, Milam argues that substantial evidence in the record as a whole

does not support the ALJ's decision because the ALJ (1) improperly discredited Dr.

Sprinkle's opinion;(2) improperly discredited Milam's subjective complaints; and (3)

improperly relied on VE testimony that, according to Milam, does not support the

ALJ's decision.

We review de novo the district court's decision upholding the ALJ's denial of

social security benefits. Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006). We

will affirm the denial if substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the

ALJ's decision. Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2010). Substantial

evidence is "less than a preponderance but . . . enough that a reasonable mind would

find it adequate to support the conclusion." Id. (alteration in original) (quotation

omitted). "We must consider evidence that both supports and detracts from the ALJ's

decision, but we will not reverse an administrative decision simply because some

evidence may support the opposite conclusion." Perkins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 892, 897

(8th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, we must affirm the denial

of benefits if "it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and

one of those positions represents the ALJ's findings." Id. (quotations and citations

omitted). 

A. Dr. Sprinkle's Opinion

Generally, "[a] treating physician's opinion is given controlling weight if it is

well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques

and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence." House v. Astrue, 500 F.3d

741, 744 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation and citation omitted). "A treating physician's own

inconsistency may [] undermine his opinion and diminish or eliminate the weight

given his opinions." Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing

Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2000)). In this case, Dr. Sprinkle's

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opinion that Milam is unable to work is not only "inconsistent with the other

substantial evidence," it is also inconsistent with his own treatment and notes. 

First, Dr. Sprinkle's opinion that Milam "may return to work" with certain

restrictions does not comport with his opinion that Milam could neither stand nor sit

for a total of even two hours per workday. His opinion that Milam "may return to

work" does comport, however, with the opinions of three other physicians who

independently evaluated Milam's impairments in late 2011 and concluded that she

had only moderate limitations. Dr. Strode, for instance, concluded that Milam could

stand or walk for approximately six hours per eight-hour workday and could likewise

sit for approximately six hours per eight-hour workday. Dr. Thomas agreed with this

assessment. Similarly, Dr. Randolph noted that Milam had only "moderate limitation

in standing, walking, climbing, squatting, lifting and carrying." These medical

opinions cast significant doubt on Dr. Sprinkle's opinions, particularly when

considered in light of Dr. Sprinkle's own belief that Milam "may return to work." Id.;

Juszczyk v. Astrue, 542 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ properly

discounted a treating physician's opinion when it was inconsistent with his own

treatment notes, as well as other medical opinions).

Moreover, Milam's regular physical activities further undermine Dr. Sprinkle's

opinion that Milam could neither stand nor sit for a total of two hours per workday.

Indeed, as Dr. Sprinkle noted on June 3, 2011, Milam "has a moderate activity level,"

her "[e]xercise includes walking and weights," and she "[e]xercises 3-4 times a week"

for up to "5 hours per week." Dr. Sprinkle also recommended she continue the "home

exercise program." In addition to Milam's exercise regimen, Milam regularly cleans

her home, cooks for her family, cares for her pets, pays bills, does laundry, drives a

car, shops for groceries and clothing, attends church, visits family, plays computer

games, watches television, and so forth. Milam even represented in her Function

Report that she cleans, cooks, and does laundry for approximately "4 hours" per day.

To be sure, a claimant's ability to engage in "personal activities such as cooking,

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cleaning, and hobbies" does not preclude a finding that the claimant is disabled.

Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 589 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). In this case,

however, Milam's regular activities support the ALJ's discounting of Dr. Sprinkle's

opinion "given both the extent of [Milam's] daily activities and the independent

medical evidence thatshe was not totally disabled." Ponder v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1190,

1196 (8th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); see also Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842,

852 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding a denial of disability benefits in part because the

claimant "engaged in extensive daily activities, such as fixing meals, doing

housework, shopping for groceries, and visiting friends").

In sum, given Dr. Sprinkle's opinion that Milam could return to work; the

opinions of Dr. Strode, Dr. Thomas, and Dr. Randolph; and Milam's regular physical

activities, we conclude thatsubstantial evidence in the record as a whole supportsthe

ALJ's decision to discredit Dr. Sprinkle's opinion. 

B. Milam's Subjective Complaints

"Where objective evidence does not fully support the degree of severity in a

claimant'ssubjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must consider all evidence relevant

to those complaints." Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 2001)

(citing Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984)). This includes

evidence pertaining to "the claimant's daily activities"; "the duration, frequency and

intensity of the pain"; "precipitating and aggravating factors"; "dosage, effectiveness

and side effects of medication"; and "functional restrictions." Polaski, 739 F.2d at

1322. Of course, "[t]he ALJ need not explicitly discuss each Polaski factor. It is

sufficient if he acknowledges and considers those factors before discounting a

claimant's subjective complaints." Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1072 (8th

Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). "The ALJ may discount complaints of pain if

they are inconsistent with the evidence as a whole. If the ALJ discredits a claimant's

credibility and gives a good reason for doing so, we will defer to its judgment even

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if every factor is not discussed in depth." Perkins, 648 F.3d at 900 (quotations and

citations omitted).

The ALJ identified multiple valid reasons for discrediting Milam's subjective

complaints of pain, including Milam's application for and receipt of unemployment

benefits after she allegedly became disabled. In seeking and obtaining such

unemployment benefits, Milam evinced a willingness and ability to work, which

contradicts her claim of disabling pain. Jernigan v. Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1070, 1074

(8th Cir. 1991) ("A claimant may admit an ability to work by applying for

unemployment compensation benefits because such an applicant must hold [her]self

out as available, willing and able to work." (citation omitted)). Milam's search for a

new job after her layoff further evinces both a willingness and ability to work after

she allegedly became disabled.

The ALJ also noted Milam's relatively conservative treatment history, which

relied on "a conservative course of treatment, including exercises, . . . and

medication." Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted)

(citation omitted). Moreover, Milam did not seek medical treatment for her alleged

pain for long periods of time. In the nearly four years between September 2007 and

June 2011, for instance, Milam did not seek any medical treatment from Dr. Sprinkle

for her back pain—notwithstanding her assertion that she actually became disabled

in August 2009. See Gwathney v. Chater, 104 F.3d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 1997)

(holding that a claimant's "failure to seek medical assistance for her alleged

. . . impairments contradicts her subjective complaints of disabling conditions and

supports the ALJ's decision to deny benefits" (citations omitted)). 

Milam's regular physical activities, as discussed above, further undermine her

assertion that she is unable to perform even sedentary work. Of course, "the ability

to do activities such as light housework and visiting with friends" alone are

insufficient reason to discredit Milam's subjective complaints. Baumgarten v.Chater,

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75 F.3d 366, 369 (8th Cir. 1996) (quotation and citations omitted). But the extent of

Milam's regular physical activities, particularly when considered in conjunction with

the medicalrecord in this case, further supportsthe ALJ's decision. See, e.g., Edwards

v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that the claimant's ability to

shop, drive short distances, attend church, and visit relatives was inconsistent with

her assertion of disabling pain); Lawrence v. Chater, 107 F.3d 674, 676 (8th Cir.

1997) (finding that the claimant's ability to "dress and bathe herself," and "do some

housework, cooking, and shopping" contradicted her "testimony regarding the

severity of her pain and disability").

The ALJ also considered, among other things, Milam's work history. Milam is

correct that her "lengthy work history supports her subjective complaints of disabling

pain." Black, 143 F.3d at 387. "[O]ffsetting this work history[, however,] is the fact

that [Milam] was laid off from her position, rather than forced out due to her

condition." Id. (citation omitted).

In light of the foregoing considerations and the record as a whole in this case,

we find thatsubstantial evidence supports theALJ's adverse credibility determination.

C. VE's Testimony

The ALJ found Milam was not disabled in part because the VE testified Milam

could perform her prior work as a secretary/administrative assistant. As discussed

above, the VE's testimony was based on a hypothetical scenario in which a person

similar to Milam missed one or two workdays per month. Milam takes issue with this

hypothetical in part because she contends her impairments require her to miss up to

five workdays per month. The ALJ specifically found, however, that the objective

medical evidence did not support a need to miss more than one or two workdays per

month. We find no error in the ALJ's hypothetical. See Cruze v. Chater, 85 F.3d 1320,

1323 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The ALJ's hypothetical question need include only those

impairments that the ALJ finds are substantially supported by the record as a whole."

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(quotations and citations omitted)). And we further find that the VE's testimony

constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination that Milamcould

perform her past work. Id. ("Testimony from a VE based on a properly phrased

hypothetical question constitutes substantial evidence." (citations omitted)).

Milam also seemingly argues that the VE's testimony should be interpreted to

mean that an employer would never tolerate two absences in any given month. We

disagree. The VE made clear that she was testifying about absenteeism "on a

consistent basis." The ALJ's hypothetical to the VE assumed only that Milam would

miss up to two workdays per month—not that Milam would consistently miss two

workdays per month, or even that Milam would usually miss two workdays per

month.

III. Conclusion

In sum, the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record

as a whole. We affirm.

BYE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I disagree with the majority's characterization of the evidence regarding

Milam's consistent absenteeismand the ALJ's, at best, unclear resolution of the issue. 

I believe the case should be remanded to the ALJ for further development on the

issue.

The Vocational Expert ("VE") testified that "in terms of an absenteeism, . . .

generally when you miss two days or 10 percent on a consistent basis[,] employers

would not tolerate it; however, on[e] day a month for [Milam's position] for a long-

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term employee—employers would tolerate that." Milam immediately spoke up and

3

said she "missed an average of three to five days a month" during her previous

employment. The ALJ said he would "leave the record open for the absentee records"

to determine how many days she missed on average and then based on her

employment records would make a credibility determination asto how many days she

actually missed. When Milam was unable to acquire her prior work records without

a subpeona and requested a subpeona, the ALJ changed his mind and concluded that

the issue was "not material to the resolution of her claim" because even if she missed

three to five days per month, he did not believe based on the objective medical

evidence that she had impairments that would cause her to miss work at this rate. He

believed, based on her impairments and pain, she would miss "1-2 days of work per

month." The district court recognized that the ALJ erred in finding Milam could still

find work by having to consistently miss one to two days per month but found the

error harmless because her prior employer accommodated her need for absences.

First, I think the ALJ erred in finding immaterial the issue of how many days

Milam missed per month. If Milam would be expected to miss three to five days per

month because of her pain from her impairments, it is undisputed she would be

unemployable. In addition to Milam's own reports of pain and need to miss three to

five days of work per month during her prior employment, three of her former coworkerssubmitted letters explaining how much pain Milamwas consistently in while

at work and how much time she consistently missed. Her manager from1988 to 1998

explained that Milam "consistently was forced to miss work and [was] many times

This testimony is consistent with testimony from vocational experts in past 3

cases. See, e.g., Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 942 (8th Cir. 2006) (Heaney, J.,

dissenting) (noting testimony from the vocational expert that "if Hacker missed more

than two days of work per month, her absenteeism would render her unemployable");

Douglas v. Bowen, 836 F.2d 392, 396 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting testimony from

vocational expert that claimant would be unemployable if he "had an absentee rate

in excess of one or two days a month" (emphasis added)).

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in a great deal of pain while at work." She estimated that "[o]n average, [Milam]

missed 1 to 2 days per month due to back pain." She believed Milam "would have

missed more, but many times, though suffering[,] she would force herself to come to

work just to maintain her job." A different manager provided that during the six years

they worked together, Milam "was absent from work 3 to 5 days a month due to

severe back pain." During this time, her employer also "made special provisions for

her in her work area in an attempt to alleviate some of her back pain and discomfort."

Her other co-worker also explained that during 2003 to 2010, she observed Milam in

"severe back pain at work," not being able to stand up straight, and sometimesin tears

because of the pain. She stated that Milam would be asked to go home because of the

pain an average offive working days per month, sometimesin three consecutive days. 

She also noted that her employer attempted to make her "work space as comfortable

as possible for her," including providing her with a "special desk thatshe could move

her monitor up and down" and a "special chair."

The ALJ disregarded all of this evidence and failed to develop the record

further, all because he did not believe the objective medical evidence before him

would support a conclusion that Milam should miss so much time from work. It is

undisputed, and the ALJ found, that Milam suffered from several back-related severe

impairments. As detailed in the majority opinion, it is undisputed that she suffered

continuing pain and received treatment for the pain, including injections, for many

years as a result of these impairments. She need not be completely sedentary or

often-hospitalized to find she lived with chronic pain, managing it as best she could. 

There is not substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's conclusion that

Milam's impairments and pain would cause her to miss lessthan two days per month. 

See Douglas v. Bowen, 836 F.2d 392, 396 (8th Cir. 1987) ("Any conclusion that

[claimant] could work at a job without having more than one or two absences due to

[her] various impairments is not supported by substantial evidence."). Milam was

"not required to document her absences[, s]he testified that she missed work because

she was sick and there is nothing in the record to suggest that this was not the case." 

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Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 1998). Her employer not only

"conceded that her absences were legitimate," id., but three separate co-workers

provided personal testimony of how severe her pain was and how many days she

consistently missed over the course of many years. In light of the overwhelming

evidence regarding her prior absenteeism, the absence of any reason to suggest she

missed work for anything other than her pain, and the undisputed medical evidence

of severe impairments and pain, I believe the ALJ erred. He should have, at the very

least, developed the record further, as he initially stated he would. See, e.g., Godoua

v. Colvin, 564 F. App'x 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2014) ("[I]t is ALJ's duty to develop record

fully and fairly during claimant's proceedings, which are non-adversarial.").

Second, as the district court acknowledged, putting the issue above aside, the

ALJ concluded Milam's residual functional capacity would cause her to miss one or

two days per month, which wasinconsistent with the VE's testimony that missing two

days per month would not be tolerated by any employer. In fact, the VE testified that

only a long-term employer would tolerate consistent absences of one day per month. 

The ALJ did not explain how Milam could gain employment with a long-term

employer, since her prior company no longer existed. Even if the ALJ concluded

Milam would miss lessthan two days of work per month, it is unclear whether Milam

was employable if she were to miss more than one day but less than two days per

month consistently. Regardless of how we interpret the ALJ'sstatement, I agree with

the district court that "an error was made." I disagree with the district court, however,

that the error was harmless.

The district court believed that although Milam could not secure future

employment as generally found in the economy based on her absenteeism, she could

find work "as she actually performed it in the past" because "her former employer

made accommodationsthat allowed her to take off more than two days a month." But

the question of how she performed her work in the past relates to her job duties and

functions—not how excessively accommodating her prior employer was. See 20

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C.F.R. § 404.1560(b) ("We will first compare our assessment of your residual

functional capacity with the physical and mental demands of your past relevant

work." (emphasis added)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) ("If you can still do this kind of

work . . . ." (emphasis added)). The fact that her prior employer went out of its way

to accommodate Milam cannot be used to contradict the VE's undisputed testimony

that no other employer would tolerate more than one absence per month on a

consistent basis. The ALJ's apparent finding that Milam would miss more than one

day per month consistently was above the threshold the VE testified would be

tolerated by any employer. In light of the undisputed testimony from the VE, I

believe the ALJ erred in finding Milam could find employment if she were to

consistently miss more than one day per month for a new employer.

______________________________

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