alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                              JAN-1-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           18700
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    43023
<ALLOWANCES>                                      1932
<INVENTORY>                                        746
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 66039
<PP&E>                                           20389
<DEPRECIATION>                                    8700
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   96438
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            25115
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         50476
<OTHER-SE>                                        9769
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     96438
<SALES>                                          76858
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 76858
<CGS>                                            20683
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    41421
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  9025
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 903
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   5892
<INCOME-TAX>                                      2737
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               3155
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      3155
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .21
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .20
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS IN THE
ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1998 FOR SYMIX SYSTEMS,
INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                           6,115
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   33,988
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,063
<INVENTORY>                                        489
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                41,875
<PP&E>                                          15,715
<DEPRECIATION>                                   9,216
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  66,382
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           28,300
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      1,031
<COMMON>                                            68
<OTHER-SE>                                      30,202
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    66,382
<SALES>                                         58,498
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                97,597
<CGS>                                           14,746
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   35,701
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                59,878
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   353
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 374
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,840
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,196
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,356)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,356)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.21)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.21)
        

</TABLE>
#### GARDNER v. STATE.

No. 19489.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 30, 1938.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 1938.

*404George H. Cavanagh, of Houston, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., óf Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

Conviction is for violation of the Medical Practice Act, Vernon’s Ann.P.C. art. 739 et seq.; punishment, a fine of $50, and confinement in the county jail for one day.

This is a companion case to that of Jack Gardner v. State, 116 S.W.2d 402, this day decided by this court. In that case, the same appellant was convicted of a similar offense alleged to have been committed on a separate date.

Article 742, P.C., provides, among other things, that each day shall constitute a separate offense. This prosecution is based upon and supported by a similar state of facts as the companion case above referred to, but the prosecution therefor was on a different date. In this case, as in that one, the only contention made by appellant is as to the sufficiency of the evidence to show that he was engaged in the practice of medicine. This was a question for the court, under the law, and was determined adversely to appellant. For a discussion of the facts, we refer to the opinion in the above styled and numbered case.

We deem these facts sufficient to justify the court’s conclusion of appellant’s guilt.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.

On Motion for Rehearing.

MORROW, Presiding Judge.

We have again reviewed the record in the light of the motion for rehearing filed by the appellant and are led to the conclusion that the proper disposition of the case was made upon the original hearing. The motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Revey, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Frederic S. Berman, J., on speedy trial motion; Richard C. Failla, J., at trial and sentence), rendered May 9, 1989, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of bail jumping in the second degree and sentencing him, as a predicate felon, to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of from 2 to 4 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s conviction for bail jumping was based on his failure to appear for sentencing on an assault conviction on November 20, 1987. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that his statutory right to a speedy trial *258was violated. *(See,*CPL 30.30.) The court denied defendant’s motion.

The issue is whether the 42-day period from indictment (April 6, 1988) to arraignment (May 18, 1988), during which there was an outstanding bench warrant on the assault case, is chargeable to the People. Defendant argues that before this period may be excluded, the People must demonstrate due diligence in obtaining his presence pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (c). The People concede that the 1984 amendment to CPL 30.30 (4) (c) excluding the period extending from the issuance of a bench warrant to the defendant’s subsequent appearance in court pursuant to the warrant or voluntarily or otherwise is inapplicable since the warrant related to the assault, not the bail jumping charge. This court, however, need not reach the issue of whether due diligence was shown since "[t]he People are entitled to a reasonable period of time between the filing of and arraignment on an indictment”. *(People v Rivera,*160 AD2d 234; *see, People v Pappas,*128 AD2d 556, 558.) The 42-day delay here in bringing defendant back to court and arraigning him was reasonable in light of the facts that he had absconded on the assault charge and that a warrant had been outstanding for more than four months before the instant indictment. Thus, this period of time was properly excludable.

Furthermore, it was not error for the trial court to permit the prosecutor to elicit that defendant had been indicted on an assault charge. Evidence of the underlying charge was highly relevant since it proved one of the essential elements of the crime of bail jumping, i.e., that the defendant has been charged with committing a felony (Penal Law § 215.56). Thus, the evidence was not offered solely to show defendant’s criminal propensity or "inflame” the jury and "divert” its attention from the "real issues”, as defendant contends. In any event, it cannot be said that the mere naming of the felony was unduly prejudicial. We have considered defendant’s remaining point and find it to be without merit. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Ross, Kassal, Smith and Rubin, JJ. *[See,*— AD2d — (June 13, 1991).]
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1435

To amend title 23, United States Code, to permit the use of funds under

the highway bridge replacement and rehabilitation program for seismic

retrofit of bridges, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 23, 1993

Mr. MINETA introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Public Works and Transportation

A BILL

To amend title 23, United States Code, to permit the use

of funds under the highway bridge replacement and rehabilitation program for seismic retrofit of bridges, and

for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. HIGHWAY BRIDGE REPLACEMENT AND REHA4 BILITATION PROGRAM.

5 (a) ELIGIBILITY OF SEISMIC RETROFIT PROJECTS.—

6 Section 144(d) of title 23, United States Code, is amended

7 by inserting before the period at the end of the third sen8 tence the following: ‘‘; except that a State may carry out
2

•HR 1435 IH

1 a project for seismic retrofit of a bridge under this section

2 without regard to whether such bridge is eligible for re3 placement or rehabilitation under this section’’.

4 (b) APPORTIONMENT FACTOR ADJUSTMENT.—Sec5 tion 144(e) of such title is amended by inserting before

6 the period at the end of the fourth sentence the following:

7 ‘‘and by the total cost of all projects carried out under

8 this section in such State for seismic retrofit of highway

9 bridges not eligible for replacement or rehabilitation under

10 this section’’.

Æ
#### Lauri A. Adams, Plaintiff, v Perry’s Place et al., Defendants. Lauri A. Adams, Appellant, v Jefferson Insurance Company of New York, Respondent.

Order and judgment unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: The notice of disclaimer delivered to plaintiff in 1983, although it misquoted the language of an exclusion in the policy, identified the applicable policy exclusion and set forth the factual basis for the insurer’s position that the claim fell within a policy exclusion with sufficient specificity to satisfy the statutory mandate and purpose *(see,*Insurance Law § 3420 [d]; *General Acc. Ins. Group v Cirucci,*46 NY2d 862, 864; *John v Centennial Ins. Co.,*91 AD2d 1104, 1105, *lv denied*59 NY2d 605). The duty to disclaim is distinct from the duty to defend, and the duty to disclaim is satisfied when the insurer provides a notice of disclaimer "as soon as is reasonably possible after it first learns of the accident or of grounds for disclaimer of liability” *(Hartford Ins. Co. v County of Nassau,*46 NY2d 1028, 1029, *rearg denied*47 NY2d 951; *see also, Allstate Ins. Co. v Moon,*89 AD2d 804, 806; *Foremost Ins. Co. v Rios,*85 AD2d 677, *lv denied*55 NY2d 607). The duty to disclaim was satisfied in the subject case when the insurer forwarded the 1983 notice.

The remaining issue, raised by plaintiff for the first time on appeal, is not properly before us, and, in any event, is without merit. (Appeal from order and judgment of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Hayes, J.—declaratory judgment.) Present —Callahan, J. P., Denman, Green, Balio and Davis, JJ.
Exhibit
32.2




CERTIFICATION
OF CFO PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  In
connection with the Annual Report of Moller International (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the year ended June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange commission on the date hereof (the "Report), Paul S. Moller, as Chief
Financial Officer of the Company hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to
the Best of his knowledge, that:
  (1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
  (2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  Date: October
14, 2008
   Signed:
  /s/ Paul S.
Moller
 Chief
Financial Officer
   -51-
Exhibit 23.1


            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM


We have issued our report  dated March 28, 2008  accompanying  the  consolidated
financial  statements of Synergy Brands, Inc. and subsidiaries  appearing in the
2007 Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended  December 31, 2007,  which is
incorporated by reference in the Registration  Statement No.  333-126539 on Form
S-3/A.  We  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in  the  Registration
Statement of the aforementioned  report and to the use of our name as it appears
under the caption "Experts".

/s/ Holtz Rubenstein Reminick LLP
Holtz Rubenstein Reminick LLP
Melville, New York
March 28, 2008
#### SPENCER v. STEELE et al.

No. 10708.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Oct. 4, 1939.

Seale & Wood, of Corpus Christi, for appellant.

Hobart Huson, of Refugio, for appellees.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court refusing a temporary injunction restraining appellees from further performance of a certain contract between the parties appellee, pending trial of the main cause on the merits.

This Court is now efficiently advised that since the perfection of this appeal the main suit has been tried and fully disposed of in the trial court, thereby rendering moot the matter involved in this appeal, to-wit: the refused prayer for temporary injunction pending trial on the merits below.

It appears that the proper order to enter in this Court in such case is one dismissing the cause insofar as appellant prays for a temporary injunction, and it- is so ordered, at the cost of appellant, who was plaintiff below. Service Finance Corp. v. Grote, Tex.Com.App., 131 S.W.2d 93; University Interscholastic League v. Sims, Tex.Com.App., 131 S.W.2d 94.
Exhibit 31.1**CERTIFICATIONS**I, Dave Côté, CEO of Packeteer, Inc., certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Packeteer, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) andinternal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b) designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal controlover financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonableassurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financialstatements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accountingprinciples;  c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;and  d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors: (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who havea significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.        Dated: November 7, 2007 /s/ Dave Côté   Dave Côté   Chief Executive Officer
1.
    
    I have reviewed this Form 10-K of PetroQuest Energy, Inc.;
 2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;
 3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;
 4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
     5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):
   /s/ J. Bond ClementJ. Bond ClementChief Financial OfficerFebruary 28, 2011
*

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstancesset forth in 5TH CIR.R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-40860

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSE JUAN ZAPATA,

also known as Jaime Ociel Barrera, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------------------------------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-98-CR-169-1

-------------------------------------------------------

April 16, 2002

Before JOLLY, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jose Juan Zapata, federal prisoner # 71879-079, appeals from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his collateral challenge to his 1998 drug conviction. Zapata had moved in the district court

for issuance of a nunc pro tunc order to correct the sentence that he received under the Sentencing

Guidelines. The district court construed the motion as arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. As federal

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, Zapata must have statutory authority for the filing of his

motion. Veldhoen v. United States Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1998). Section 2255
-2-

of Title 28 isthe means bywhich a federal prisoner may challenge the validity of hissentence. United

States v. Cates, 952 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1992). The district court’s construction of Zapata’s

motion as arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was proper.

Because the district court properly construed Zapata’s motion as arising under 28 U.S.C. §

2255, Zapata must obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) before he can appeal the dismissal of

his motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. A COA ruling should be made in the first instance in the district

court, and the district court should make such a ruling sua sponte if no request is made. Muniz v.

Johnson, 114 F.3d 43, 45 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Youngblood, 116 F.3d 1113, 1114 (5th

Cir. 1997). Although the district court did not construe Zapata’s notice of appeal as requesting a

COA, we decline to remand this case in light of the patent frivolity of Zapata’s motion. See United

States v. Alvarez, 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 2000). We therefore DISMISS this appeal for lack

of jurisdiction.

APPEAL DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
#### W. F. CHENAULT, Appellant, v. ABNEY & BOHANNON, Appellee.

No. 3772.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

Dec. 12, 1940.

Callaway & Callaway, of Brownwood, for appellant.'

Owen & Bohannon, of Brownwood, for appellee.

WALKER, Chief Justice.

This appeal was prosecuted from the County Court of Brown County to the Austin Court of Civil Appeals, and transferred to this court by order of transfer of the Supreme Court.

Finding no error in the record, on authority of Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Futch, Tex.Civ.App., 127 S.W.2d 1040, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed without written opinion.

Affirmed.