DA 18-0562

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2021 MT 138N

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and Appellee,

 v.

JEDEDIAH KEITH LARSON,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,

In and For the County of Carter, Cause No. DC 17-01

Honorable Nickolas C. Murnion, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, James Reavis, Assistant Appellate 

Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan Krauss, Assistant 

Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Corbit S. Harrington, Carter County Attorney, Ekalaka, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: April 7, 2021

 Decided: June 1, 2021

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

cir-641.—if

06/01/2021

Case Number: DA 18-0562
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Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not 

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this 

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana 

Reports. 

¶2 Jedediah Keith Larson appeals from his conviction for aggravated assault in the 

Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Carter County. Larson contends the District Court erred 

when it answered the jury’s question seeking a definition of “reasonable apprehension,”

because the definition the court provided allowed the jury to convict based solely on the 

victim’s subjective belief of death or serious bodily injury. We affirm. 

¶3 In March 2017, Larson punched his then girlfriend in the head three times, choked 

her, and threw her against the metal bars of a hide-a-bed. The State charged Larson with 

partner or family member assault (PFMA), aggravated assault, and unlawful restraint. 

During deliberations, the jury inquired twice about the definition of “reasonable 

apprehension,” an element of the aggravated assault charge under § 45-5-202(1), MCA. 

After consultation with counsel, the District Court responded: “Reasonable apprehension 

refers to fear that is justified under the circumstances, as judged by the subjective standard 

of the ‘reasonable man.’” The jury convicted Larson of PFMA and aggravated assault and 

acquitted him of unlawful restraint. Larson appeals his conviction of aggravated assault. 
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¶4 We review a court’s jury instructions in a criminal case to determine whether, as a 

whole, they fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. State v. 

Bieber, 2007 MT 262, ¶ 67, 339 Mont. 309, 170 P.3d 444. We apply the same standard of 

review to a court’s decision to provide or deny the jury’s request for additional information 

pursuant to § 46-16-503, MCA. Bieber, ¶ 67. 

¶5 As pertinent to the current case, a person commits aggravated assault under 

§ 45-5-202, MCA, “if the person . . . purposely or knowingly, with the use of physical force 

or contact, causes reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury or death in another.” 

“The standard for determining whether a person has suffered emotional distress or 

reasonably apprehended bodily injury is that of a reasonable person under similar 

circumstances.” State v. McCarthy, 1999 MT 99, ¶ 27, 294 Mont. 270, 980 P.2d 629 (citing 

State v. Martel, 273 Mont. 143,150, 902 P.2d 14, 19 (1995)). That is, “[w]hen faced with 

the conduct complained of, would a reasonable person feel apprehension?” Martel, 

273 Mont. at 150, 902 P.2d at 19. We have explained the “reasonable person standard is 

an objective one.” Martel, 273 Mont. at 150, 902 P.2d at 19. 

¶6 Larson’s main objection on appeal is with the use of the word “subjective” in the 

provided definition. Larson argues the definition provided by District Court did not 

instruct the jury to apply an objective standard as required by our caselaw because the 

definition stated “as judged by the subjective standard of the ‘reasonable man.’” Larson 

argues the use of the word “subjective” allowed the jury to convict based solely on the 

victim’s subjective fears.
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¶7 The reasonable person standard sets an “objective” or universal standard of conduct, 

or what a reasonable person would perceive under the circumstances. This is in contrast 

to a “subjective” or individualized standard, or what the individual in a particular case 

personally perceived. The District Court’s instruction did not instruct the jury the victim’s 

subjective fears were sufficient to convict Larson, but rather instructed the jury to consider 

what a reasonable person would perceive under the circumstances. The court told the jury

reasonable apprehension must be “justified under the circumstances, as judged by the 

subjective standard of the ‘reasonable man.’” The District Court’s instruction properly 

instructed the jury to consider whether a reasonable person would reasonably apprehend or

perceive a risk of serious bodily injury under the circumstances, not just whether the victim 

personally apprehended or perceived a risk of serious bodily injury. Larson’s reading of 

the instruction requires the reader to ignore the final clause “of the ‘reasonable man.’” 

While it arguably would have been better practice to first consult our caselaw and use 

particular language therefrom to instruct the jury on “reasonable apprehension,” rather than 

start with a commercial legal website, we conclude the District Court’s instruction fully 

and fairly instructed the jury on the definition of “reasonable apprehension,” under the 

circumstances of this case. 

¶8 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our 

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the 

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of 
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applicable standards of review. The District Court’s interpretation and application of the 

law were correct. Affirmed. 

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

We concur: 

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

/S/ BETH BAKER

/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR