23-7565 

Alexander v. Gleeson

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A 

COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 

Square, in the City of New York, on the 1st day of July, two thousand twentyfour. 

PRESENT: 

DENNY CHIN,

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

BETH ROBINSON,

Circuit Judges. 

_______________________________________

OWEN MARLON ALEXANDER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 23-7565

ANDREEA GLEESON, TUNECORE INC., DEVON 

ROACH, PADLOCK RECORDS, DR. PHILLIP 

NICHOLS, FACEBOOK, INSTAGRAM, WHATS 

APP, YOUTUBE, ARIEL VARGAS, MOLLY 

WASOW PARKS, NEW ROCK CITY,

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELESS SERVICES, OFFICE 

OF THE OMBUDSMAN, LYMARIS ALBORS,

JASMILKA GONZALEZ, HAMMOND JOHN,
2

RENAIYA THOMAS, CLARA GARCIA, ACACIA 

NETWORK SUPER 8, BRENDA ROSEN, THOMAS 

WASHINGTON, AARON R MCBRYAR, ANA 

FISHER, DAVE BEER, FELICESADE BRANDT,

DAVIDSON HEADLEY, BREAKING GROUND/

HEGEMAN AVENUE HOUSING LIMITED 

PARTNERSHIP, KEISHA ASHMAN, ROY A.

BECOAT, JETTE JOHNSON, LUNA 

MALACHOWSKI BAJAK, ALYSSA WRINKLE,

KRYSTLE BARKLEY, JOSHUA FLINK, SAMUEL 

BARTON, CAMILLE REYES, CENTER FOR 

URBAN COMMUNITY SERVICES (CUCS),

KELLNER, HERLIHY, GETTY & FRIEDMAN,

LLP, CITY OF NEW YORK POLICE 

DEPARTMENT/ 73 PRECINCT, P.O. ANGEL 

RODRIGUEZ, DR. MARTIN BRENNAN, DR.

ROBERT GREEN, LYNN VAIRO, ROBERT O.

STRANDER, NATASHA PAYSON, PROGRAM 

DEVELOPMENT SERVICES INC., CHRISTOPHER 

WRAY, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

MICHAEL WEISBERG, CHERY J. GONZALES,

DEBRA KAPLAN, BRIAN M. COGAN, MONIQUE 

GUIDRY, KATHY HOCHUL, ARCHBISHOP 

CHRISTOPHE PIERRE, APOSTOLIC NUNCIO &

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, 

Defendants-Appellees.*

_______________________________________

For Plaintiff-Appellant: OWEN MARLON ALEXANDER, pro se, New 

York, NY. 

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above. 
3

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of New York (Pamela K. Chen, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the October 6, 2023 judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Owen Marlon Alexander, proceeding pro se (that is, 

representing himself), appeals from a judgment of the district court dismissing 

his claims against various defendants, including several non-profit housing

organizations and their employees, the Roman Catholic Church, the Governor of 

New York, and the internet platforms Facebook and YouTube. He alleges that 

“organized corruption within the judicial branch of government, the 

entertainment industry, housing industry, [and] the mental and . . . medical 

health industry” caused him to be illegally evicted from his low-income housing

unit and prevented him from using an online music streaming platform, among 

other asserted harms. Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 6 (“Am. Compl.”) at 3; see, e.g., id. at 

15–17, 25–27, 30–31. After dismissing Alexander’s original complaint with

leave to amend, the district court dismissed the amended complaint as frivolous 
4

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

remaining facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal. 

We review a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) without 

deference. See Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep’t, 879 F.3d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 

2018). That statute says that if a plaintiff files a lawsuit and has the required 

filing fee waived, the district court may screen and dismiss the complaint if it 

finds that the lawsuit “is frivolous” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 

(2d Cir. 2007). We “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se

litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they 

suggest.” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

At the outset, we note that Alexander’s appellate brief does not 

meaningfully address the district court’s determination that his amended 

complaint was frivolous. While “we accord filings from pro se litigants a high 

degree of solicitude, even a litigant representing himself [must] set out 

identifiable arguments in his principal brief.” Terry v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 826 

F.3d 631, 632–33 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Alexander 
5

has not done so here. Instead, he principally repeats the allegations made in his 

amended complaint and asserts only in passing that the district court

erroneously based its decision on “outdated” information in his previously filed 

complaint, Alexander Br. at 11, 36 – an argument we find unpersuasive, since the 

dismissal order makes clear that the district court considered the amended (and 

operative) complaint in this action, see Alexander App’x at 17–18. By merely 

pointing to his prior factual assertions, Alexander has forfeited appellate review 

of the district court’s dismissal order. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 

88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e need not manufacture claims of error for an appellant 

proceeding pro se.”); see also Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 728 F.3d 

139, 142 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that a pro se litigant forfeited his challenge

because he only mentioned the district court’s ruling “obliquely and in passing”). 

In any event, even after reviewing anew Alexander’s amended complaint,

we agree with the district court that his pleading is frivolous, or at the very least 

does not state any viable legal claim upon which relief could be granted. An 

action is “frivolous” when the factual allegations are “clearly baseless” (that is,

“fanciful” or “delusional”), or when the claims asserted are based on 

indisputably invalid legal theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328
6

(1989); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). 

And even if not frivolous, a complaint must still include “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). 

Alexander’s amended complaint recounts a long series of incidents that 

appear unrelated. While he cites some statutes throughout his complaint, he 

does not describe legally recognized grounds for suing anyone. Certain 

allegations do not make sense or defy belief, rendering them factually frivolous. 

See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). And many other allegations are 

not connected to any legal theory with an “arguable basis in law.” Livingston, 141

F.3d at 437. Alexander alleges, for example, that the New York state judges in 

his eviction proceedings “collaborated” with his landlord and its attorneys to 

falsify evidence, “hack[]” his computer and cell phone, and “manipulate [him] 

into thinking he had a mental health issue.” Am. Compl. at 31. Elsewhere, he

alleges that various individuals – including the Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, the Governor of New York, and a Roman Catholic archbishop – 

either failed to respond to his complaints about his landlord or indicated that 

they could not assist him with his housing issues. See id. at 29–31. The first set 
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of allegations are not plausible, and the second set of allegations, even if true, do 

not support any plausible claim for legal relief from a court. 

Alexander’s more developed allegations – for example, those made 

against Acacia Network, TuneCore, and their respective employees – likewise 

fall short. The amended complaint alleges that employees of Acacia Network, 

a non-profit organization operating the shelter where Alexander resided, bullied

him, failed to help him with his public assistance case, and denied his requests 

for a reasonable accommodation. But these vague and conclusory allegations 

regarding his negative interactions with the shelter’s staff do not give rise to a 

plausible claim for relief. For example, they do not support a cause of action 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act or related federal anti-discrimination 

statutes, as Alexander does not allege a disability or that Acacia Network failed 

to accommodate or otherwise discriminated against him on the basis of such

disability. See McElwee v. County of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 640–41 (2d Cir. 2012). 

Similarly, we discern no viable legal claim arising from Alexander’s allegations 

that he experienced technical difficulties while using TuneCore’s online music 

streaming services. See, e.g., Arista Recs., LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 

2010) (discussing elements of copyright-infringement claim); Orlander v. Staples, 
8

Inc., 802 F.3d 289, 294 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing elements of New York breachof-contract claim). 

In short, even generously construed, the amended complaint lacks an 

arguable basis in law or fact, see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, or otherwise does not

state a plausible claim for relief, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The district court 

therefore did not err in dismissing Alexander’s action.

We have considered Alexander’s remaining arguments and find them to 

be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court