alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-1263

LOUIS A. RODRIGUEZ, SR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

RIDGEWOOD SAVINGS BANK,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Chief District

Judge. (CA-00-2077-A)

Submitted: July 26, 2001 Decided: August 2, 2001

Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis A. Rodriguez, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Grady Craven Frank, Jr.,

Rebecca Everett Kuehn, LECLAIR RYAN, P.C., Alexandria, Virginia,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Louis A. Rodriguez, a former resident of Queens, New York, now

residing in Alexandria, Virginia, appeals the district court’s

order granting Defendant Ridgewood Savings Bank’s motion to dismiss

his complaint. After a review of the record, we find that the

district court properly dismissed this action for lack of personal

jurisdiction over Defendant. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984).

We accordingly affirm the district court’s order. We deny

Rodriguez’s motion to amend his complaint and dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### LOMAX v. STATE.

No. 20033.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 25, 1939.

A. A. Turner, of Conroe, J. W. Simpson, Jr., of Austin, and Geo. B. Darden, of Conroe, for appellant.

. Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is rape; the punishment, death.

The state relied upon appellant’s confession to connect him with the commission of the offense. Appellant did not testify. The court failed to submit the issue as to whether the confession was voluntarily made by the appellant. The matter is properly before this court for review. We quote from the testimony set out in bill of exception No. 7, as follows:

> “C. B. Wages, Deputy Sheriff of Montgomery County, Texas, testified that he arrested the defendant, J. C. Lomax, and put him in the Conroe jail on March 31st, 1938; that the next morning the defendant was taken, from his cell, escorted to the grand jury room and there questioned from 20 to 30 minutes by C. B. Wages, and Gordon Hurst, Deputy Sheriff, and R. D. Holliday and Mr. Williamson, Texas Rangers, concerning the facts of the alleged offense with which he was accused. That not being satisfied with the statements made by defendant that morning, said aforesaid officers went to defendant’s cell, made him strip off naked, and stand up before them about an hour and was again questioned by all of them, to no avail; that again about 8:00 that night the defendant was carried from his cell to the grand jury room and kept there continuously until after midnight, and while in the grand jury room this second time, the defendant was questioned in 40-minute intervals by each of three Texas Rangers and two Deputy Sheriffs who were present, and by the admitted testimony of the Deputy Sheriff, C. B. Wages, and Texas Ranger, R. D. Holliday, both being attesting witnesses to said statement, the defendant was not allowed to sit down during the two 40-minute periods while being questioned by C. B. Wages and R. D. Holli-day; that somewhere in the neighborhood of midnight, the District Attorney, W. C. McClain, was called to come to his office. He was told by Captain R. D. Holliday that the defendant was ready to make a statement and/or confession admitting his guilt; that the officers then carried the defendant, J. C. Lomax, to the District Attorney’s office and after some 2 or 3 hours in the District Attorney’s office, and in the presence of the same officers who were in the grand jury room with the defendant, the purported 2-page confession was extracted from defendant, and signed by him.”

We are constrained to hold that the court should have given a proper instruc*127tion to the jury, requiring them to believe that the confession was voluntary before it could be considered by them.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
7th Amendment to the Amended and Restated Credit Agreement



 EXHIBIT 10.3g 
  

			
		
	 	  	Bank of America
	 	  	Business Capital
	 	  	GA7-293-01-01
	April 21, 2005	  	300 Galleria Parkway
	  	Suite 800
	 	  	Atlanta, GA 30339
		
	Via Telecopy: 813.254.9640	  	Tel     770.859.2400
	 	  	Fax     770.857.2947

 Kforce Inc. 
 1001 East Palm Avenue 
 4th Floor 
 Tampa, Florida 33605 
 Attention:  William L. Sanders 
  

	 	Re:	Amended and Restated Credit Agreement (as amended, the “Credit Agreement”), dated as of November 3, 2000, among Kforce, Inc. (the “Borrower”), certain of its
affiliates, and Bank of America, N.A. (the “Agent”), as agent for itself and certain financial institutions party thereto. 

  
 Mr. Sanders: 
  
 Reference is hereby made to the Credit Agreement. All capitalized terms used herein, unless otherwise defined herein, shall have the meanings ascribed to
such terms in the Credit Agreement. 
  
 Effective December 31,
2004, clause (c)(ii) of Section 7.13 of the Credit Agreement shall be deemed restated to provide: “(ii) the aggregate amount of such Debt (including Capital Leases) outstanding does not exceed $5,000,000 at any time;”. 
  
 Except as expressly provided hereinabove, the Credit Agreement shall remain
in full force and effect. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to be or operate as a waiver of or consent to any Event of Default. 
  

					
	BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., as agent
		
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Mark Henderson


	 	 	 Title:
	 	 Vice President

	
	 Accepted and agreed:

	
	KFORCE INC.
		
	 By:
	 	 /s/ W L Sanders


	 	 	 Title:
	 	 President
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1359 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1359

    To amend the Controlled Substances Act to provide for take-back 
 disposal of controlled substances in certain instances, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 5, 2009

    Mr. Stupak (for himself and Mr. Smith of Texas) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and 
  Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a 
 period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Controlled Substances Act to provide for take-back 
 disposal of controlled substances in certain instances, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Secure and Responsible Drug Disposal 
Act of 2009''.

SEC. 2. DELIVERY OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES BY ULTIMATE USERS FOR 
              DISPOSAL.

    (a) Regulatory Authority.--Section 302 of the Controlled Substances 
Act (21 U.S.C. 822) is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(g)(1) An ultimate user who has lawfully obtained a controlled 
substance in accordance with this title may, without being registered, 
deliver the controlled substance to another person for the purpose of 
disposal of the controlled substance if--
            ``(A) the person receiving the controlled substance is 
        authorized under this title to engage in such activity; and
            ``(B) the disposal takes place in accordance with 
        regulations issued by the Attorney General to prevent diversion 
        of controlled substances.
    ``(2) The Attorney General may, by regulation, authorize long-term 
care facilities, as defined by the Attorney General by regulation, to 
dispose of controlled substances on behalf of ultimate users in a 
manner that the Attorney General determines will provide effective 
controls against diversion and be consistent with the public health and 
safety.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 308(b) of the Controlled 
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 828(b)) is amended--
            (1) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (2) and 
        inserting ``; or''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(3) the delivery of such a substance for the purpose of 
        disposal by an ultimate user or long-term care facility acting 
        in accordance with section 302(g) of this title.''.
                                 <all>
```
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1102

To make permanent chapter 44 of title 28, United States Code, relating

to arbitration.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 24, 1993

Mr. HUGHES (for himself and Mr. MOORHEAD) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To make permanent chapter 44 of title 28, United States

Code, relating to arbitration.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Court Arbitration Au5 thorization Act of 1993’’.

6 SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF REPEAL.

7 Section 906 of the Judicial Improvements and Access

8 to Justice Act (28 U.S.C. 651 note), and the item relating

9 to such section in the table of contents contained in section

10 3 of such Act, are repealed.
2

•HR 1102 IH

1 SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

2 Section 905 of the Judicial Improvements and Access

3 to Justice Act (28 U.S.C. 651 note) is amended—

4 (1) in the first sentence by striking ‘‘for the fis5 cal year’’ and all that follows through ‘‘4 fiscal

6 years,’’; and

7 (2) in the third sentence by striking ‘‘, except

8 that’’ and all that follows through ‘‘this Act’’.

9 SEC. 4. ARBITRATION ALLOWED TO BE ORDERED IN ALL

10 DISTRICT COURTS.

11 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF ARBITRATION.—Section

12 651(a) of title 28, United States Code, is amended—

13 (1) by striking ‘‘described in section 658’’;

14 (2) by striking ‘‘described in section 658(1)’’;

15 and

16 (3) by striking the last sentence.

17 (b) CERTIFICATION OF ARBITRATORS.—Section

18 656(a) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by

19 striking ‘‘listed in section 658’’ and inserting ‘‘which au20 thorizes the use of arbitration under this chapter’’.

21 (c) REMOVAL OF LIMITATION.—Section 658 of title

22 28, United States Code, and the item in the table of sec23 tions at the beginning of chapter 44 of title 28, United

24 States Code, that relates to such section, are repealed.
3

•HR 1102 IH

1 SEC. 5. EXCEPTION TO LIMITATION ON MONEY DAMAGES.

2 (a) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding section 652(a)(1)

3 of title 28, United States Code, establishing a limitation

4 of $100,000 in money damages with respect to cases re5 ferred to arbitration, a district court whose local rule on

6 the date of the enactment of this Act provides for a limita7 tion on money damages, with respect to such cases, of not

8 more than $150,000, may continue to apply the higher

9 limitation.

10 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 652(a)(1)

11 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking

12 ‘‘section 901(c) of the Judicial Improvements and Access

13 to Justice Act’’ and inserting ‘‘section 5(a) of the Court

14 Arbitration Authorization Act of 1993’’.

15 (c) REMOVAL OF PRIOR PROVISION.—Section 901 of

16 the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act is

17 amended by striking subsection (c) (28 U.S.C. 652 note).

Æ
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1665 

To authorize the State of Utah to select certain lands that are available 

for disposal under the Pony Express Resource Management Plan to 

be used for the support and benefit of State institutions, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 27, 2017 

Mr. HATCH introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To authorize the State of Utah to select certain lands that 

are available for disposal under the Pony Express Resource Management Plan to be used for the support 

and benefit of State institutions, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Confirming State Land 

5 Grants for Education Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to valid existing rights, 

8 the State of Utah may select any lands in T6S and T7S, 


SSpencer on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1665 IS

1 R1W, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, that are owned by 

2 the United States, under the administrative jurisdiction 

3 of the Bureau of Land Management, and identified as 

4 available for disposal by land exchange in the Record of 

5 Decision for the Pony Express Resource Management 

6 Plan and Rangeland Program Summary for Utah County 

7 (January 1990), as amended by the Pony Express Plan 

8 Amendment (November 1997), in fulfillment of the land 

9 grants made in sections 6, 8, and 12 of the Act of July 

10 16, 1894 (28 Stat. 107), as generally depicted on the map 

11 entitled ‘‘Proposed Utah County Quantity Grants’’ and 

12 dated June 27, 2017, to further the purposes of the State 

13 of Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administra14 tion, without further land use planning action by the Bu15 reau of Land Management. 

16 (b) APPLICATION.—The criteria listed in Decision 3 

17 of the Lands Program of the resource management plan 

18 described in subsection (a) shall not apply to any land se19 lected under subsection (a). 

20 (c) EFFECT ON LIMITATION.—Nothing in this Act af21 fects the limitation established under section 2815(d) of 

22 the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

23 2000 (Public Law 106–65). 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with BILLS
#### THOMPSON v. STATE.

No. 19732.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 13, 1938.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 1938.

Gray & Pope, of Tyler, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

Conviction is for possession of liquor for purpose of sale in dry area; punishment, a finé of $150 ¿ñd confinement in the county jail for sixty days.

The record fails to show that notice of appeal was given and entered upon the minutes of the trial court. In the absence of such .a showing, this court is without jurisdiction to hear and determine matters sought to be presented for review. See Long v. State, 3 Tex.App. 321; Lenox v. State, 55 Tex.Cr.R. 259, 116 S.W. 816; Roberts v. State, 99 Tex.Cr.R. 492, 269 S.W. 103; article 827, C.C.P.

The attempted appeal is dismissed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.

On Motion to Reinstate Appeal.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant offers uj nothing new in his motion for a rehearing. It is our opinion that the cause was properly disposed of in our original opinion herein. Therefore his motion is overruled.
#### ARMSTRONG v. DALLAS RAILWAY & TERMINAL CO.

No. 3693.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

June 6, 1940.

S. L. Lewis, of Dallas, for plaintiff in error.

Burford, Ryburn, Hincks *&*Charlton and W. M. Taylor, Jr., all of Dallas, for defendant in error.

WALKER, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff in error’s action was against defendant in error for damages for personal injuries, as a passenger on one of its street cars. Judgment was for defendant in error on the verdict of the jury finding that it was guilty of negligence in one of the respects charged by plaintiff in error— and only one — but that such negligence was. not a proximate cause of her injuries; and also finding that plaintiff in error was. guilty of negligence in one respect charged against her by defendant in error — and only one — but that her negligence was not a proximate cause of her injuries. It also found that plaintiff in error’s injuries, were not the result of “an unavoidable accident.” Plaintiff in error duly prosecuted her appeal to the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals; the cause is on our docket by order of transfer by the Supreme Court. The record is before us without a statement of facts on plaintiff in error’s assignment of “conflict” between the findings on the issues of proximate cause and unavoidable accident.

The first point presented is defendant in error’s motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not filed and prosecuted according to law. The facts on this proposition are as follows: Final judgment in the court below was rendered on the 25th day of March, 1939; plaintiff in error filed her petition for writ of error on the 12th day of September, 1939. Defendant in error concedes that the petition was filed within the six month period provided by Article 2255, R.C.S.1925, reading: “Writ of error, in cases where the same is allowed, may be sued out at any time within six months after the final judgment is rendered.”

Plaintiff in error attempted to perfect her writ of error by filing her affidavit of inability to pay costs, in lieu of a writ of error bond, on the 29th day of December, 1939, more than nine months after the rendition of the final judgment. The affidavit should have been filed “at the time” the petition for the writ of error bond was filed, under the provisions of Article 2258, R.C.S.1925, reading: “Plaintiff at the time of filing such petition shall file with the clerk a writ of error bond, or affidavit in lieu thereof, as provided by law.”

There are expressions in Chopelas v. North River Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 105 S.W.2d 693, with which we are in agreement, at least to the extent that the bond *677on appeals must be filed within the six months, to the effect that the failure to file the “bond, or affidavit in .lieu thereof” in the time provided by Article 2258 is jurisdictional. On this conclusion the appeal should be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-40197

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAVIER BARRIOS-HERRERA,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. M-97-CR-270-1

- - - - - - - - - -

October 20, 1998

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Court-appointed counsel for Javier Barrios-Herrera has filed

a brief as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

Barrios has not responded to this motion. Our independent review

of the brief and the record discloses no nonfrivolous issue. 

Accordingly, counsel is excused from further responsibilities

herein, and the appeal is DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. SS.1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Image Sensing System, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2005, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, James Murdakes, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.


                                                /s/ James Murdakes
                                                -------------------------------
                                                James Murdakes
                                                Chief Executive Officer
                                                April 29, 2005























                                       20
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 23

- 00467

- CR

Martiriano Estrada GARCIA

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 81st Judicial District Court

, Wilson County, Texas

Trial Court No. CRW2009249

Honorable Jennifer Dillingham , Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARTINEZ

, JUSTICE ALVAREZ , AND JUSTICE WATKINS

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is

AFFIRMED.

SIGNED June 5, 2024.

_____________________________ Beth Watkins, Justice
#### DURHAM v. STATE.

No. 19710.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 13, 1938.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1938.

Floyd .Harry, of Farmersville, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.'

Conviction is for misdemeanor theft; punishment, a fine of $10 and confinement in the county jail for twenty days.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exceptions. The information is in due form and sufficient to charge the offense.

We note from an inspection of the judgment that the trial was had before the court without the intervention of a jury and that upon appellant’s plea of guilty, the trial judge, entered a finding that he was guilty and assessed the penalty at a fine of $10 and confinement in jail for twenty days. In basing the judgment upon the finding, it appears that in entering the judgment the clerk inadvertently provided that the term of confinement in the county jail should be ten days, whereas if the finding of the court is followed, the judgment would read twenty days as above noted.

The judgment is reformed in order that it may be shown that the punishment assessed against the appellant is a fine of $10 and confinement in the county jail for twenty days. As reformed, the judgment is affirmed.

All other matters appearing regular, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.

*95On Motion for Rehearing.

Appellant in his motion for a rehearing herein again urges the insufficiency of the testimony as ground for the granting of his motion. Unfortunately there is not brought forward in the record any statement of facts which we could use for a reviewal thereof. Wé are, therefore, unable to know what the facts are, nor can we inform ourselves of their sufficiency.

The motion will therefore be overruled.