NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

GAETANO KEIRAN SPERA, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D18-1702

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

 )

Opinion filed October 23, 2019. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas 

County; Chris Helinger, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, 

and Richard J. D'Amico, Special Assistant 

Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and William Stone, Jr., 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for 

Appellee.

BLACK, Judge.

Gaetano Spera challenges his conviction and sentence for first-degree 

murder. Spera was sentenced to life in prison following a jury trial. He argues on 
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appeal that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta1 hearing after he 

unequivocally requested to represent himself. We agree and are therefore compelled to 

reverse for a new trial.2 

On March 21, 2018, Spera filed a pro se "Motion To Faretta" which stated: 

"Comes Now, the defendant, Gaetano Spera, pro-se, and Moves this honorable Court 

for a Faretta hearing. As grounds for said Motion the following [is] alleged[:] 1. 

Defendant[']s right to self-representation." The court did not conduct a Faretta hearing 

or rule on the motion. The trial began on April 3, 2018, with Spera represented by 

counsel, and the still-pending motion was not addressed. 

"Under the United States Supreme Court's ruling in 

Faretta, an accused has the right to self-representation at 

trial." Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla. 2008). 

"[O]nce a defendant elects to make an unequivocal request 

for self-representation, pursuant to Faretta and this Court's 

precedent, the trial court is obligated to hold a hearing 'to 

determine whether the defendant is knowingly and 

intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel.' " 

McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848, 864 (Fla. 2011) (quoting 

Tennis, 997 So. 2d at 378). The "failure to take the 

preliminary step of holding a hearing on a defendant's 

unequivocal pro se request results in per se reversible error." 

Id.

Herron v. State, 113 So. 3d 852, 853-54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Without question, Spera's 

written motion was an unequivocal request to represent himself. See Combs v. State, 

133 So. 3d 564, 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ("Combs' statement that he was 'notifying the 

1Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 

2Spera also argues that the trial court fundamentally erred in admitting his 

cell phone's historical cell-site location information because the State acquired the 

information without a search warrant. We are not convinced that this rises to the level 

of fundamental error based on the record before us and note that Spera will have an 

opportunity to seek the suppression of the information on remand. 
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court' that he wished to represent himself was unequivocal."); Herron, 113 So. 3d at 

853-54 (holding that Herron's written motion, indicating that "pursuant to rules 3.111(d) 

and 3.160(e) of Fla. R.Crim. P. (2010)" Herron "waive[d] his right to be represented by 

an attorney" and " 'assert[ed] his constitutional right to represent himself' as established 

in Faretta," was an unequivocal request for self-representation); McKinley v. State, 261 

So. 3d 599, 599-600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (holding that McKinley's repeated assertions 

that he wanted to represent himself and would represent himself were unequivocal); 

Hooker v. State, 152 So. 3d 799, 801-02 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (holding that Hooker's 

statement to the court that he would "like to exercise [his] sixth amendment right to go 

pro se" was an unequivocal request for self-representation); Rodriguez v. State, 982 So. 

2d 1272, 1273-74 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding that Rodriguez's statement at the start of 

trial that he would "prefer to represent [him]self" was an unequivocal request for selfrepresentation).

The State contends that Spera's request was equivocal because he did 

not also request to dismiss his counsel. While a request to dismiss counsel may go 

hand in hand with a request for self-representation, the failure to explicitly indicate one's 

desire to discharge counsel does not otherwise make a clear request for selfrepresentation any less so. Cf. Hooker, 152 So. 3d at 801-02; Rodriguez, 982 So. 2d at 

1273-74. This case is distinguishable from McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848, 868 (Fla. 

2011), in which the supreme court determined that McCray's request for selfrepresentation was equivocal because "the record makes clear that McCray . . . sought 

to represent himself while simultaneously having counsel assist him." We have no such 

record in this case. 
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Moreover, Spera's request, which was made approximately two weeks 

before trial, was not untimely. Compare Laramee v. State, 90 So. 3d 341, 345 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2012) ("Nor was Mr. Laramee's request [for self-representation] untimely, as it was 

made one week before trial. While a defendant's request for self-representation may be 

summarily denied if not timely asserted, ordinarily, a request is timely if made prior to 

the trial's commencement."), with Lambert v. State, 864 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2003) (concluding that the trial court did not err in denying the untimely request for selfrepresentation made midtrial), and Davis v. State, 162 So. 3d 326, 327 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2015) (same). Finally, Spera did not waive the issue by proceeding to trial with 

appointed counsel. See Herron, 113 So. 3d at 854-55. 

Accordingly, because the trial court failed to conduct a Faretta inquiry 

following Spera's unequivocal request to proceed pro se, we are constrained to reverse 

the judgment and sentence and remand for a new trial. 

Reversed and remanded. 

MORRIS and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.