IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2010-NMSC-025

Filing Date: May 12, 2010

Docket No. 31,288

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO SAVEDRA, JOSE LOZANO, SR.,

and SCOTT YATES,

Defendants-Respondents.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI

Freddie Joseph Romero, District Judge

Gary K. King, Attorney General

Max Shepherd, Assistant Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Thomas E. Lilley, P.C.

Thomas E. Lilley

Roswell, NM

Trace L. Rabern, Attorney and Counselor at Law, L.L.C.

Trace L. Rabern

Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent Alberto Savedra

Gary C. Mitchell, P.C.

Gary C. Mitchell

Ruidoso, NM

for Respondents Jose Lozano, Sr.,

and Scott Yates

OPINION
SERNA, Justice.

{1} In this appeal, we are presented with the recurring issue of how our six-month rules

should be administered when the State dismisses charges in magistrate court and

subsequently refiles the same charges in district court. On separate occasions, Defendants

Savedra, Lozano, and Yates were charged with misdemeanor Driving While Intoxicated

(DWI) in magistrate court, and did not reach a plea agreement. In each case, the State

dismissed the charges in magistrate court and refiled the cases in district court pursuant to

a prosecutorial policy of the district attorney in the Fifth Judicial District, the purpose of

which is to avoid duplicative trials. After more than six months had elapsed from the

arraignment or waiver of arraignment in magistrate court, each of the Defendants moved to

dismiss their cases on the basis of a six-month rule violation. The district court granted each

of the motions. The State appealed the dismissals, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a

consolidated case. State v. Yates, 2008-NMCA-129, ¶ 16, 144 N.M. 859, 192 P.3d 1236.

We granted the State’s petition for certiorari to address whether the Court of Appeals erred

when it affirmed the district court’s orders dismissing the three cases. We affirm.

DISCUSSION

{2} The six-month rules that we have established for our trial courts “provide the courts

and parties with a rudimentary warning of when speedy trial problems may arise.” State v.

Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 46, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. The time limits for the

commencement of trial in magistrate courts are governed by Rule 6-506 NMRA. The rule

provides in pertinent part: “The trial of a criminal citation or complaint shall be commenced

within one hundred eighty-two (182) days after whichever of the following events occurs

latest: (1) the date of arraignment or the filing of a waiver of arraignment of the

defendant[.]” Rule 6-506(B); see also State v. Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, ¶ 6, 140 N.M.

779, 149 P.3d 95 (“Commencement of trial within the stated period, while not jurisdictional,

is mandatory.”). In district court, the time in which a trial must be commenced is governed

by Rule 5-604 NMRA, providing in pertinent part: “The trial of a criminal case or habitual

criminal proceeding shall be commenced six (6) months after whichever of the following

events occurs latest: (1) the date of arraignment, or waiver of arraignment, in the district

court of any defendant[.]” Rule 5-604(B)(1) (emphasis added). However, there is no district

court or magistrate court rule to address the interplay between the six-month rule provisions

for each court when a complaint is dismissed in magistrate court and later refiled in district

court.

{3} Because of this gap in the rules, a long line of appellate court opinions have sought

to preserve the protections of the six-month rule by requiring the State to demonstrate that

its decision to dismiss and refile was not done in bad faith to circumvent the protections of

the six-month rule. See Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, ¶ 7 (reiterating that “the State cannot

escape the effect of the six-month rule if the dismissal and re-filing are done for a bad

reason, including doing so for the purpose of circumventing the six-month rule”); accord

State ex rel. Delgado v. Stanley, 83 N.M. 626, 495 P.2d 1073 (1972); State v. Ahasteen,

1998-NMCA-158, 126 N.M. 238, 968 P.2d 328; State v. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, 122

N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075. Accordingly, in the present appeals, the Court of Appeals
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majority reasoned that it was “inclined to adhere to [its] conclusion in Carreon [, 2006-

NMCA-145, ¶ 11] that the mere existence of the prosecutorial policy of dismissing every

magistrate court case that is not settled before the six-month deadline is insufficient to

sustain the State’s burden.” Yates, 2008-NMCA-129, ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks

omitted). We agree that Carreon is directly on point and dictates that we affirm the district

court’s dismissals.

{4} As in Carreon, the State in these cases dismissed Defendants’ magistrate charges and

refiled the same charges in district court pursuant to a policy in which the prosecutor would

dismiss a case in magistrate court once it became apparent that there would be no plea

agreement and then refile the same charges in district court. The State offered no other

reason for the dismissals and subsequent refilings. The facts in these cases are such that the

Carreon holding—that the mere existence of such a policy is insufficient to meet the State’s

burden—directly applies to Defendants’ cases. Since the State did not meet its burden to

show why its dismissal and refiling was done for reasons other than to circumvent the sixmonth rule, Defendants’ six-month rule time periods commenced with either the arraignment

or waiver of arraignment in magistrate court and continued to run until they expired; a new

six-month rule time period did not commence once the cases were refiled in district court.

{5} We agree with the Court of Appeals that a literal application of Rule 5-604(B)(1),

which would grant the State a new six-month time period in which to bring the case to trial

upon refiling in district court, “violate[s] the spirit of the six-month rule[.]” Yates, 2008-

NMCA-129, ¶ 4. This Court has adopted the six-month rules in order to effectuate a

criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial and to “assure prompt disposition of criminal

cases.” Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 43 (“As a case management tool, the six-month rule

accounts for the amount of delay considered reasonable in bringing cases to trial.”). Thus,

the right protected by the six-month rules belongs to a criminal defendant, not the State, the

courts, or any other party. To allow the State a new six-month time period in which to bring

a case to trial after refiling would permit the State to cause delay in bringing defendant to

trial after he or she was charged in magistrate court. See Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, ¶ 6

(noting that the six-month rules “guard against lack of preparedness on the part of the

State”). The focus of administration of the six-month rule should be on the defendant and

his or her right to have a prompt disposition of his or her criminal charges. Thus, when

charges are dismissed in the courts of limited jurisdiction, which include magistrate,

metropolitan, and municipal courts, and later refiled in district court, the triggering event for

six-month rule purposes is the triggering event that occurred in the court of limited

jurisdiction, and the six-month time period is not automatically reset upon the refiling. In

light of the existing case law in this area, the prosecution should have known that its policy

of dismissing and refiling in district court was an insufficient basis for restarting the sixmonth rule period in district court. Accordingly, the dismissals of Defendants’ cases are

affirmed because they were not brought to trial within the time period required under the

magistrate court six-month rule and there was no basis for restarting the six-month rule

period under the district court’s rule.
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{6} While affirmance is warranted in these cases, we do take note of Judge Castillo’s

special concurrence in these appeals, suggesting that we re-examine the six-month rules for

district and magistrate courts. In particular, Judge Castillo suggested that:

Perhaps it would be helpful for the Supreme Court to consider amending the

Rules of Criminal Procedure for district courts and magistrate courts in order

to explain under what circumstances the arraignment in magistrate court

would remain the triggering event for application of the district court sixmonth rule and under what circumstances a new six-month rule would begin.

Yates, 2008-NMCA-129, ¶ 28 (Castillo, J., specially concurring). As the Court of Appeals

noted in its Opinion, the six-month rules in magistrate and district court do not address the

procedural posture presented in Defendants’ cases—there is no provision in either set of

rules governing a situation when a case is dismissed in magistrate court and then later refiled

in district court. Id. ¶ 13; see also State v. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 26, 138 N.M. 441,

121 P.3d 1040 (noting that Rule 5-604 “is silent on the effect of a dismissal in magistrate

court and refiling in the district court”). 

{7} The Court of Appeals also expressed concerns

that [the classifications of the State’s reasons for dismissing a case as “good”

or “bad”] has unnecessarily judgmental connotations, suggesting that the

focus of our analysis is whether the State has acted with a culpable state of

mind and that six-month rule consequences attach only when the State has

acted in bad faith or engaged in gamesmanship. 

Yates, 2008-NMCA-129, ¶ 9. We share these concerns. The six-month rules were primarily

created to effectuate a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial. But as it stands, the “good

faith-bad faith” analysis developed through the Delgado line of cases renders a defendant’s

right to be promptly tried as a contingent right, one that may provide protection only if the

State had “bad” reasons for dismissing and refiling. We find this impermissible. 

{8} As we have previously stated, the right protected by the six-month rules is a criminal

defendant’sright, not that of the State, the courts, or any other party; it is not a tool to punish

the State for dismissing and refiling cases in bad faith, nor should its diminution be a reward

for the State’s good behavior. Viewed in that light, the cases in which courts have conducted

a “good faith-bad faith” analysis regarding the State’s reasons for dismissing and refiling a

case in order to determine if a new six-month time period should be granted are misguided.

 Instead, any inquiry into the State’s reasons for dismissing and refiling in district court

should be done within the context of any speedy trial challenge the defendant may raise after

the case is refiled in district court. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 28, 48 (providing new

time frames for engaging in the four-factor Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) speedy

trial balancing test and noting that delay resulting from dismissal and refiling should be

weighed against the State); see also State v. Maddox, 2008-NMSC-062, ¶ 13, 145 N.M. 242,
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195 P.3d 1254 (“The reasons for a period of the delay may either heighten or temper the

prejudice to the defendant caused by the length of the delay.”).

{9} In light of the foregoing, we recognize the need to revise our six-month rules to

incorporate our decision set forth in this Opinion. Within the context of criminal

proceedings in our courts of limited jurisdiction, our six-month rules continue to serve a

useful purpose. But in our district courts, the six-month rule has become an unnecessary and

sometimes counterproductive method for protecting a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

Therefore, effective for all cases pending as of the date this Opinion is filed, we withdraw

the six-month rule provisions set forth in Rule 5-604(B)-(E). See State v. Pieri, 2009-

NMSC-019, ¶¶ 19-20, 146 N.M. 155, 207 P.3d 1132 (recognizing the Court’s authority to

make rule changes applicable to pending cases). In its place, defendants may rely upon and

assert their right to a speedy trial whenever they believe impermissible delay has occurred;

whether that delay is the result of a dismissal and refiling or any other cause. We therefore

request that our Rules of Criminal Procedure for District Courts Committee, Rules for Courts

of Limited Jurisdiction Committee, and Metropolitan Courts Rules Committee consider how

best to revise their rules to allow for the dismissal of cases from a limited jurisdiction court

and refiling in district court in a manner that is consistent with the principles set forth in this

Opinion and that protects the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

CONCLUSION

{10} The State failed to meet its burden to show why its dismissals and refilings were not

done to circumvent the six-month rule. Thus, Defendants’ six-month rule time periods

commenced with either the arraignment or waiver of arraignment in magistrate court and

continued to run until they expired; new six-month time periods were not given to the State

once the cases were refiled in district court. Accordingly, the dismissals of Defendants’

cases are affirmed.

{11} IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________

CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice 

____________________________________

PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice

____________________________________

RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
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____________________________________

EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice

Topic Index for State v. Savedra, No. 31,288

CT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CT-JR Judicial Rule Making

CT-ST Speedy Trial

CA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CA-DC Dismissal of Charges

CA-RP Reinstatement of Proceedings

CA-RD Right to Speedy Trial

CA-SP Speedy Trial