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In re Wendy G.-R.

IN RE WENDY G.-R.*

(AC 46641)

Bright, C. J., and Suarez and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the

trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor

child, W. W was born in Guatemala and immigrated to New Haven in

2018 with the respondent father. In 2019, following a sexual assault by

a family member, W was adjudicated neglected and committed to the

care of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. From

mid-2019 through December, 2021, the Department of Children and

Families had limited and sporadic contact with the mother, who

remained in Guatemala, and between December, 2021, and August, 2022,

the mother did not respond to communications from the department.

The mother immigrated to New Haven in July, 2022. The department

was unaware of this until August, 2022, when the mother appeared,

unannounced, at a supervised visit between W and the father. Thereafter,

the department referred the mother to various services, with which she

was reluctant to engage until early 2023. Trial on the termination of

parental rights petition commenced in March, 2023. The petitioner initially alleged that, pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (D)), no ongoing

parent-child relationship existed between the mother and W. At the

conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the petitioner’s counsel

orally moved to amend the petition to add the adjudicatory ground of

failure to rehabilitate as to the mother, pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)

(i), ‘‘to conform to the proof elicited at trial.’’ In the absence of any

objection or request for a continuation, the trial court granted the motion

and, thereafter, terminated the respondents’ parental rights, determining,

inter alia, that the petitioner proved that the mother had failed to rehabilitate but not that an ongoing parent-child relationship between the mother

and W did not exist. Held:

1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that she was denied

her due process right to the effective assistance of counsel during the

termination of parental rights proceeding: contrary to the mother’s assertion, the fact that the petitioner sought to amend the petition at the

close of evidence was not, in and of itself, a reasonable ground on which

her counsel should have objected to the petitioner’s motion, as the

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the court.
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In re Wendy G.-R.

applicable rule of practice (§ 34a-1 (d)) permitted an amendment at any

time prior to a final adjudication; moreover, the mother could not satisfy

her burden of demonstrating that her counsel’s failure to object to the

petitioner’s motion to amend the petition could not be explained by one

or more possible strategic reasons that were objectively reasonable, as

the record was bereft of any evidence of the actual strategy the mother’s

counsel employed when she did not object to the petitioner’s motion,

and, instead of developing a record of her counsel’s allegedly deficient

performance or any resulting prejudice by filing a motion to open or a

petition for a new trial, the mother merely claimed that the existing

record amply demonstrated that her counsel acted deficiently and that

her counsel’s lack of competency contributed to the termination of her

parental rights; furthermore, the only legally viable ground on which

the mother’s counsel could have objected to the petitioner’s motion to

amend the petition, namely, that the amendment amounted to unfair

surprise and that she needed additional time to respond adequately to

the failure to rehabilitate ground, was not objectively reasonable because

the record reflected that, at trial, the petitioner presented evidence

related to the failure to rehabilitate ground without objection, including

a copy of the specific steps ordered to facilitate the mother’s reunification with W, a permanency plan study that supported a finding that the

mother had failed to satisfy her specific steps and, accordingly, had

failed to rehabilitate, the testimony of a department social worker with

respect to numerous issues that could interfere with the mother’s ability

to safely assume a responsible position in W’s life, and the testimony

of S, an expert in clinical and forensic psychology, that pertained to the

mother’s failure to rehabilitate; additionally, throughout the trial, the

mother’s counsel attempted to undermine such evidence through crossexamination and by presenting evidence of the mother’s rehabilitative

efforts, and the mother did not assert that her counsel should have

presented any additional evidence or that additional time was necessary

to prepare stronger arguments to refute the failure to rehabilitate ground;

accordingly, this court was not persuaded that the failure of the mother’s

counsel to object to the petitioner’s motion to amend was objectively

unreasonable under the circumstances, and, even if the mother could

satisfy her burden of demonstrating that such failure was objectively

unreasonable, she failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by her

counsel’s incompetency.

2. The trial court properly determined that the respondent mother was

unable or unwilling to benefit from efforts to reunify her with W, and,

accordingly, it was unnecessary for this court to consider the merits of

the mother’s claim that the department failed to make reasonable efforts

to reunify her with W: the mother did not challenge any of the trial

court’s specific subordinate findings as clearly erroneous and, instead,

broadly challenged the court’s assessment of the degree to which she

was receptive to and utilized the services offered as well as its ultimate
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In re Wendy G.-R.

determination that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from the

department’s services; moreover, in its findings, the trial court outlined

the myriad efforts to reunify her with W that were made by the department despite the challenges posed by a global pandemic and the danger

presented by the fact that the mother was residing in Guatemala until

July, 2022, and those efforts were, on their face, not so lacking as to

preclude a finding that the mother was unable or unwilling to benefit

from such services; furthermore, the petitioner demonstrated by clear

and convincing evidence that the mother had inconsistent communication with the department when she was in Guatemala, that she failed

to timely notify the department of her whereabouts prior to July, 2022,

that she was reluctant to engage in services offered by the department

prior to 2023, which detrimentally delayed her ability to gain critical

and necessary knowledge of how W’s needs changed following her

immigration to New Haven, and that, at the time of her evaluation by

S, the mother still demonstrated a lack of insight into W’s traumatic

experiences resulting from her relocation to the United States, particularly her sexual abuse, and what was required for the mother to provide

W with a safe, nurturing, and supportive environment free from insecurity.

Argued December 6, 2023—officially released May 2, 2024**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with

respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Juvenile

Matters, and tried to the court, Conway, J.; judgment

terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from

which the respondent mother appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent mother).

Evan O’Roark, assistant solicitor general, with whom

were Kaelah M. Smith, assistant attorney general, and,

on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for the

appellee (petitioner).

** May 2, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Wendy G.-R.

Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The respondent mother, Mirian R.,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating

her parental rights as to her biological daughter, Wendy

G.-R., pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)

(i).1 The respondent claims that (1) she was denied her

due process right to the effective assistance of counsel,

(2) the court improperly determined that the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify her with Wendy, and (3) the

court improperly determined that she was unable or

unwilling to benefit from reunification services. We

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In its memorandum of decision, the court set forth

the relevant facts and procedural history in this case:

In January, 2014, ‘‘Wendy . . . was born in Guatemala

to . . . [the respondent] and Santos G. [The respondent and Santos] speak only Spanish and understand

little to no English. [Santos] attended three years of

school in Guatemala and the [respondent attended] four

years of school in Guatemala. [The respondent and Santos] read and write very little Spanish. In the fall [of]

2018, [Santos] and Wendy emigrated by bus from Guatemala to the Mexico/Texas border. [The respondent and

Santos] decided to have four year old Wendy accompany [Santos] because it is easier for an adult to successfully cross the border if accompanied by a child. At the

border, [Santos] surrendered himself and Wendy to the

United States Immigration and Custom[s] Enforcement

(ICE) authorities. [Santos and Wendy] were detained

for two or three days and then released. [Santos] and

1 In the underlying action, the court terminated the parental rights of both

the respondent and Wendy’s biological father, Santos G., as to Wendy. Santos

has not appealed from that judgment. In this opinion, we refer to Mirian R.

as the respondent. Unless necessary to our analysis of the claims raised by

the respondent, in this opinion we need not and do not address the court’s

findings and conclusions with respect to Santos.
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In re Wendy G.-R.

Wendy journeyed on by bus to New Haven, initially

residing with relatives.

‘‘In January, 2019, [Santos] and his uncle engaged in

a physical altercation in New Haven. Both men had

been drinking alcohol prior to the altercation. Wendy

sustained head contusions during the fight and bystanders observed five year old Wendy walking down the

street covered in beer and bleeding through the nose.

The petitioner, the Commissioner of . . . Children and

Families . . . was contacted and referred [Santos] for

a substance abuse evaluation. By June, 2019, [Santos]

and Wendy had moved three times and were then sharing a room in a rooming house.

‘‘[Santos] sponsored2 his Guatemalan cousin’s entry

into the United States and on or about June 19, [2019],

[Santos] picked up his cousin, Juan Carlos G., from the

airport. Juan Carlos took up occupancy in [Santos’] and

Wendy’s room in the rooming house. [Santos] never

came home the night of June 22, [2019], and, therefore,

Wendy was left alone in the room with Juan Carlos. On

the morning of June 23, [2019], Wendy told [Santos that]

she was afraid of remaining in their room without him

and asked if she could go with him to work. [Santos]

declined Wendy’s request. Late on June 23, [2019], Wendy’s babysitter brought Wendy to the emergency room

after Wendy disclosed she had been sexually assaulted

by Juan Carlos.3

‘‘On June 24, [2019], [the petitioner] invoked an

administrative, ninety-six hour hold and assumed temporary custody of Wendy. An order of temporary custody . . . soon followed, and, on September 12, 2019,

2 ‘‘[Santos] defined sponsorship to mean that [he] was responsible for his

cousin, Juan Carlos.’’ 3 ‘‘A medical examination revealed a tear to Wendy’s hymen. In a forensic

evaluation, Wendy disclosed [that Juan Carlos] had touched her vagina on

two occasions with his hands and she reported other provocative statements

by Juan Carlos. No arrests were ever made and [the respondent and Santos]

report that Juan Carlos ‘left’ (presumably the New Haven area or the country)

in August or November, 2022.’’
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In re Wendy G.-R.

Wendy was adjudicated neglected4 and committed to

the petitioner’s care. Wendy has remained continuously

in [the petitioner’s] care since June 24, 2019.5

‘‘On March 9, 2021, the court approved a permanency

plan of reunification with the respondent . . . in Guatemala. In January, 2022, [the petitioner] sought and

obtained approval to amend the permanency plan [for]

termination of parental rights and adoption. On January

11, 2022, given the change in permanency plans and

[the respondent’s] Guatemalan residency, the court, sua

sponte, appointed [the respondent] legal counsel. [The

respondent’s] court-appointed attorney filed her

appearance in the case on January 13, 2022. On March

14, 2022, [the petitioner] filed [a petition to terminate

the] parental rights . . . [of the respondent and Santos] Both [the respondent and Santos] were properly

served with the . . . [petition]6 and both were represented by [appointed] counsel throughout the termination proceedings.7

4 ‘‘[In the neglect proceeding, Santos] was defaulted for his nonappearance

on September 12, [2019]. In September, 2019, [the petitioner] had yet to

effectuate service on [the respondent] in Guatemala, and, therefore, the

adjudication of neglect and commitment order entered without prejudice

to the respondent . . . . [Santos] credibly testified that he timely informed

[the respondent] of Wendy’s removal from his care.’’ 5 ‘‘Wendy has lived with her current foster family for the majority of her

stay in foster care, except for a brief period of time when, due to the foster

parents’ medical concerns and the pandemic, Wendy was removed.’’ 6 ‘‘[The respondent] was served via publication and [Santos] was abode

served.’’ 7 ‘‘The April 12, 2022 [termination of parental rights] plea hearing was a

virtual proceeding and [the respondent] was defaulted for her nonappearance. However, given the [respondent’s] out-of-country status, the court

appointed [the respondent’s] already assigned counsel to also represent [the

respondent] for the purposes of the termination of parental rights petition.

[The respondent] never appeared in court, in person or virtually, until the

first day of the termination trial, March 8, 2023.

‘‘[Santos’] initial [termination of parental rights] plea date was continued

due to a lack of a Spanish interpreter. On May 17, 2022, [Santos] appeared

and was advised in Spanish of his rights.’’
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In re Wendy G.-R.

‘‘On May 19, 2022, a competency evaluation of [Santos] was ordered by the court, and on September 22,

2022, [Santos] was found competent. In July, 2022, [the

respondent] arrived in New Haven from Guatemala as

an undocumented person. [The department] did not

learn of [the respondent’s] local presence until late July

or August, 2022. Trial on the [termination of parental

rights petition] commenced on March 8, 2023, continued

on March 15, [2023], and [resumed] again to conclusion

on March 31, 2023. Both [the respondent and Santos]

appeared in person for the multiday . . . trial and both

were assisted by court interpreters throughout the . . .

trial.8 The petitioner initially alleged that [Santos] had

failed to [achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation] and that there exists no ongoing parent-child

relationship between [the respondent] and Wendy. At

the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the . . .

trial, the petitioner orally moved to amend the [petition]

to add the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate

as to [the respondent]. Absent objection and any request

for a continuation,9 the oral motion was granted, and,

therefore, the adjudicatory date for purposes of the

[termination of parental rights petition] is March 31,

2023.10’’ (Footnotes altered; footnotes in original; footnotes omitted.)

Thereafter, the court set forth its findings and legal

conclusions with respect to the petition to terminate

the respondent’s parental rights as to Wendy. In the

adjudicative phase of the proceeding, the court determined that the department had made reasonable efforts

to reunify the respondent and Wendy. Alternatively,

8 ‘‘Just prior to the commencement of trial on March 8, 2023, the court

advised the [respondent and Santos] of their rights in accordance with In

re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, [120 A.3d 1188] (2015).’’ 9 ‘‘See Practice Book § 31a-1 (d).’’

10 ‘‘The termination [petition was] initially filed on March 14, 2022. A

written motion to amend other aspects of the [petition] was granted on May

17, 2022.’’
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In re Wendy G.-R.

the court determined that the respondent was either

unwilling or unable to benefit from such reunification

efforts. The court also determined that the petitioner

proved that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate but

that the petitioner had failed to prove that an ongoing

parent-child relationship between the respondent and

Wendy did not exist. In the dispositional phase of the

proceeding, the court, guided by the considerations set

forth in § 17a-112 (k), determined that it was in Wendy’s

best interest to terminate the respondent’s parental

rights as to her. Thereafter, the respondent appealed

from the court’s judgment terminating her parental

rights as to Wendy.11 We will set forth the court’s analysis in more detail as necessary in the context of the

claims raised in this appeal.

I

First, the respondent claims that she was denied her

due process right to the effective assistance of counsel

during the termination proceeding.12 We are not persuaded.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. In the operative petition at the time of trial, the

11 We note that the attorney for the minor child filed a statement pursuant

to Practice Book § 67-13 indicating that he adopts the brief submitted by

the petitioner. 12 In her brief, the respondent states that she ‘‘does not believe that this

case requires any further evidentiary findings in that both the deficient

performance and prejudice are apparent upon an examination of the record

as it exists.’’ Nonetheless, in what she labels a matter for further review,

the respondent claims that our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Jonathan

M., 255 Conn. 208, 764 A.2d 739 (2001), ‘‘should be reconsidered to the

extent that it established the appropriate options available to a respondent

seeking to supplement the record in order to raise an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim [in a termination of parental rights proceeding].’’ The

respondent correctly acknowledges, however, that this court is bound by

the precedent of our Supreme Court. See, e.g., In re Kyreese L., 220 Conn.

App. 705, 720 n.8, 299 A.3d 296 (this court is bound by Supreme Court

precedent), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023). Thus, we

merely note that the respondent has preserved this issue.
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In re Wendy G.-R.

petitioner alleged, as grounds for termination of the

respondent’s parental rights, that there existed no ongoing parent-child relationship pursuant to § 17a-112 (j)

(3) (D). On March 31, 2023, at the close of evidence,

the court asked counsel: ‘‘[J]ust for clarity, what are

the adjudicatory grounds that are alleged as to [the

respondent]? ‘Cause I only have no ongoing parentchild relationship.’’ Counsel for the petitioner stated

that she believed that the petition had been amended,

but the court stated that it could not ‘‘find it.’’ Following

a recess, the petitioner’s counsel made an oral motion

to amend the petition by adding, with respect to the

respondent, the ground of failure to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). The petitioner’s counsel

stated that the amendment was sought ‘‘to conform to

the proof elicited at trial.’’ The court asked if anyone

wanted to ‘‘be heard’’ with respect to the amendment,

to which counsel for the respondent and counsel for the

minor child each indicated that they had no objection.

Following this acquiescence to the amendment to the

termination of parental rights petition, counsel did not

further discuss the matter. The court thereafter heard

closing arguments. As stated previously in this opinion,

in its memorandum of decision, the court explicitly

stated that it had granted the petitioner’s motion to

amend the termination of parental rights petition in the

absence of an objection or any request for a continuance

in the trial. The court also referred to Practice Book

§ 31a-1 (d).13

For the first time on appeal, the respondent argues

that her counsel acted deficiently by failing to object

13 Practice Book § 31a-1 (d) provides: ‘‘A petition or information may be

amended at any time by the judicial authority on its own motion or in

response to the motions of any party prior to any final adjudication. When

an amendment has been so ordered, a continuance shall be granted whenever

the judicial authority finds that the new allegations in the petition or changes

in the information justify the need for additional time to permit the parties

to respond adequately to the additional or changed facts and circumstances.’’
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In re Wendy G.-R.

to the petitioner’s oral motion to amend the termination

of parental rights petition with respect to the respondent at the close of evidence, after all the parties had

rested, to add an ‘‘entirely separate ground for termination,’’ namely, failure to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a112 (j) (3) (B) (i). The respondent argues that ‘‘no reasonable attorney would have failed to object to the

[petitioner] orally amending its petition in such a fundamental manner just prior to closing arguments.’’ In

arguing that counsel’s conduct fell below the standard

of reasonably effective assistance, the respondent contends that ‘‘there can be no argument that [her] counsel

failed to object for some strategic reason that would

insulate her deficient performance from scrutiny.’’

The respondent also argues that there can be no

dispute that she was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance because the court ultimately concluded

that the petitioner had failed to prove the sole ground

in the termination petition prior to the amendment—

the lack of a parent-child relationship. The respondent

argues that, ‘‘without the amendment to include the

ground of failure to rehabilitate, the respondent’s parental rights could not have been terminated.’’ The respondent asserts that a proper objection ‘‘would likely have

been sustained’’ at trial and, for this reason, ‘‘the respondent is able to meet the burden that the failure to object

contributed to the termination of her parental rights.’’

The respondent further contends that her counsel

should have objected because principles of due process

weigh against permitting the petitioner to essentially

engage in ‘‘a shell game’’ by alleging one or more

grounds in a petition to terminate parental rights and

then, at the close of a trial, seeking to amend a petition

to conform to the evidence presented at trial. According

to the respondent, if her counsel had properly objected

to and argued against the motion to amend, due process
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In re Wendy G.-R.

considerations would have compelled the court to have

sustained the objection.14

We next set forth the principles that guide our review.

‘‘Our Supreme Court has recognized that, ‘[i]n Connecticut, a parent who faces the termination of his or her

parental rights is entitled, by statute, to the assistance

of counsel. General Statutes § 45a-717 (b).’ In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557, 569, 613 A.2d 780 (1992). The

Supreme Court further has held, consistent with that

statutory right, that ‘a parent in a termination of parental

rights hearing has the right not only to counsel but to

the effective assistance of counsel.’ ’’ (Footnote omitted.) In re Danyellah S.-C., 167 Conn. App. 556, 567,

143 A.3d 698, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 913, 150 A.3d

228 (2016).

‘‘In State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 160, 425 A.2d

939 (1979), our Supreme Court set forth the following

standard for determining whether counsel has been

ineffective in a termination proceeding: ‘The range of

competence . . . requires not errorless counsel, and

not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel

whose performance is reasonably competent, or within

the range of competence displayed by lawyers with

ordinary training and skill in [that particular area of

the] law. . . . The [respondent] must, moreover, demonstrate that the lack of competency contributed to

the termination of parental rights.’ . . . ‘A showing of

incompetency without a showing of resulting prejudice

. . . does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.’ . . . In re Matthew S., 60 Conn. App. 127, 132,

758 A.2d 459 (2000). ‘In making such a claim, it is the

responsibility of the respondent to create an adequate

record pointing to the alleged ineffectiveness and any

14 In her brief to this court, the respondent agrees with the petitioner,

however, that the trial court properly granted the motion in the absence of

any objection by her attorney.
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In re Wendy G.-R.

prejudice the respondent claims resulted from that ineffectiveness.’ In re Christopher C., 129 Conn. App. 55,

59, 20 A.3d 689 (2011). In the absence of findings by

the trial court in this regard, we directly review the trial

court record. See In re Dylan C., 126 Conn. App. 71,

90–91, 10 A.3d 100 (2011).’’ In re Jah’za G., 141 Conn.

App. 15, 35–36, 60 A.3d 392, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 926,

64 A.3d 329 (2013); see also In re Alexander V., supra,

223 Conn. 570 (in considering merits of unpreserved

claim that counsel in termination of parental rights proceeding rendered ineffective assistance, reviewing

court undertook plenary review of trial court record).

We are mindful that ‘‘[a] fair assessment of attorney

performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct

the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and

to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at

the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making

the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that [the] conduct [of trial counsel] falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that

is, [an appellant] must overcome the presumption that,

under the circumstances, the challenged action might

be considered sound trial strategy.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Love v. Commissioner of Correction,

223 Conn. App. 658, 668, 308 A.3d 1040, cert. denied,

348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024).

Although it is undisputed that the respondent did not

raise the issue of ineffective assistance before the trial

court, we note that, following the court’s judgment, the

respondent had an opportunity to develop a factual

record related to counsel’s allegedly deficient performance and any resulting prejudice. Our Supreme Court

has explained ‘‘that General Statutes § 45a-719 provides

a number of alternatives through which a parent may

attempt to open the final judgment of termination and

assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
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In re Wendy G.-R.

first option permits a motion to open the judgment in

accordance with General Statutes § 52-212 or General

Statutes § 52-212a. These provisions allow a four month

window from the date of judgment within which such

a motion may be brought.

‘‘Second, the principles governing the opening of

judgments at common law may also provide an indigent

parent a means of gaining a review of the adequacy of

trial counsel at the termination proceeding. It is a wellestablished general rule that even a judgment rendered

by the court . . . can subsequently be opened [after

the four month limitation] . . . if it is shown that . . .

the judgment . . . was obtained by fraud . . . or

because of mutual mistake. . . . Thus, when a judgment of termination is predicated on fraud or mutual

mistake and the indigent’s appointed counsel fails to

address these issues, presumably rendering the assistance ineffective, the parent may have a remedy to open

the judgment at common law.

‘‘Finally . . . a parent may file a petition for a new

trial. See General Statutes § 52-582. Under this option,

a parent whose rights have been terminated has three

years within which to file a petition. General Statutes

§ 52-270 provides that the court may grant such a petition for reasonable cause. Although we express no opinion as to whether a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel always will require a court to grant a

petition for a new trial under § 52-582, we note that this

court has long recognized that [t]he causes for which

new trials may be granted . . . are only such as show

that the parties did not have a fair and full hearing at

the first trial; and the words or for other reasonable

cause, mean other causes of the same general character

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; footnotes omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.)In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn.

208, 236–39, 764 A.2d 739 (2001).
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In re Wendy G.-R.

The respondent did not avail herself of any of the

foregoing opportunities to develop a record of her counsel’s allegedly deficient performance or the prejudice,

if any, that resulted from such performance. As stated

previously in this opinion, however, she argues that the

record amply demonstrates that counsel acted deficiently and that counsel’s lack of competency contributed to the termination of her parental rights. See footnote 12 of this opinion.

Because the claim of ineffective assistance arises

from trial counsel’s response to the petitioner’s motion

to amend, we observe that amendments to petitions to

terminate parental rights are permitted by our rules of

practice. Practice Book § 34a-1 (d) provides: ‘‘A petition

may be amended at any time by the judicial authority

on its own motion or in response to a motion prior to

any final adjudication. When an amendment has been

so ordered, a continuance shall be granted whenever

the judicial authority finds that the new allegations in

the petition justify the need for additional time to permit

the parties to respond adequately to the additional or

changed facts and circumstances.’’ An appellate court

reviews a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to

amend for an abuse of discretion, and discretion is

properly exercised when a court appropriately rules

on any request made for additional time to respond

adequately to new allegations. See, e.g., In re Carl O.,

10 Conn. App. 428, 437–38, 523 A.2d 1339 (concluding

that trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting

petitioner’s request to amend termination of parental

rights petition when request was made on eve of trial

and court had offered to grant respondents continuances for purpose of responding to amendment), cert.

denied, 204 Conn. 802, 525 A.2d 964 (1987), and cert.

denied, 204 Conn. 802, 525 A.2d 964 (1987).

For the reasons previously discussed herein, the

record is bereft of any evidence of the actual strategy,
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if any, that the respondent’s counsel employed when

she did not object to the petitioner’s eleventh hour

motion to amend the petition. In this circumstance, we,

as a reviewing court, are mindful of the presumption

that counsel acted reasonably, and we must contemplate possible strategic reasons that might have supported counsel’s challenged actions before considering

whether those actions were objectionably reasonable.

This is the proper analytical path that governs claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel in habeas corpus

proceedings in which the record does not contain evidence of the actual trial strategy, if any, underlying

trial counsel’s challenged conduct. See, e.g., Jordan v.

Commissioner of Correction, 341 Conn. 279, 290, 267

A.3d 120 (2021) (‘‘when trial counsel is not available to

testify . . . the court must contemplate the possible

strategic reasons that might have supported the challenged action and then consider whether those reasons

were objectively reasonable’’); Roman v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn. App. 111, 135, 307 A.3d

934 (2023) (‘‘[A]lthough [appellate counsel] did not present arguments about the petitioner’s mental health and

competence on direct appeal, the petitioner did not

call [appellate counsel] to testify at the habeas trial to

explain why, and the petitioner did not offer any other

evidence of [appellate counsel’s] reasons for choosing

which claims to raise on direct appeal. In the absence

of such evidence, the petitioner did not otherwise meet

his burden of overcoming the strong presumption that

[appellate counsel] exercised reasonable professional

judgment.’’), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 952, 308 A.3d 1039

(2024); Godfrey-Hill v. Commissioner of Correction,

221 Conn. App. 526, 543–44, 302 A.3d 923 (when trial

counsel cannot recall trial strategy, court must ‘‘affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [that]

counsel may have had for proceeding as [he] did’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
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929, 304 A.3d 861 (2023); Crocker v. Commissioner

of Correction, 220 Conn. App. 567, 585, 300 A.3d 607

(‘‘although not automatically fatal to a petitioner’s

claim, failure to elicit testimony from counsel about

trial strategy renders it less likely that the petitioner

can prevail with respect to his burden to demonstrate

deficient performance’’), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 911,

303 A.3d 10 (2023); Bush v. Commissioner of Correction, 169 Conn. App. 540, 550, 151 A.3d 388 (2016)

(‘‘There is a strong presumption that counsel has rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. . . . Just as the decision of trial counsel not to

object to certain evidence is a matter of trial tactics, not

evidence of incompetency . . . the tactical decision of

appellate counsel not to raise a particular claim is ordinarily a matter of appellate tactics, and not evidence of

incompetency, in light of the presumption of reasonable

professional judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.)), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 920, 157 A.3d 85

(2017). We see no reason, and the respondent has not

cited any relevant authority to the contrary, why this

analytical path should not apply to the present claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Contrary to the respondent’s arguments on appeal,

because Practice Book § 34a-1 (d) permits amendments

at any time prior to any final adjudication, the fact that

the petitioner sought to amend the petition at the close

of evidence was not, in and of itself, a reasonable ground

on which to object to the petitioner’s motion. The

respondent also strongly emphasizes that counsel

should have advanced due process concerns as the

grounds for objecting to the motion. As the respondent

correctly observes, the fundamental pillars of due process encompass adequate notice of the grounds on

which the petitioner relies so that the respondent has

‘‘a reasonable opportunity to prepare’’ and a right to
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be heard. See In re P. T.-W., 223 Conn. App. 571, 584–85,

309 A.3d 394 (2024) (‘‘[i]t is the settled rule of this

jurisdiction, if indeed it may not be safely called an

established principle of general jurisprudence, that no

court will proceed to the adjudication of a matter involving conflicting rights and interests, until all persons

directly concerned in the event have been actually or

constructively notified of the pendency of the proceeding, and given reasonable opportunity to appear and be

heard’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, § 34a-1 (d) does not, as the respondent suggests,

condone ‘‘a shell game . . . .’’ It permits the petitioner

to amend the petition, thereby giving the respondent

actual notice of the statutory grounds for termination

of parental rights on which it intends to rely.15 It also

provides a clear mechanism to protect the respondent’s

right to prepare and be heard by requiring the court

to afford the respondent additional time to respond

adequately to the additional or changed facts and circumstances.16 See Practice Book § 34a-1 (d).

15 In this regard, we note that Practice Book § 34a-1 (d) uses the word

‘‘shall,’’ thus triggering a mandatory duty on the part of the court to afford

a respondent the time necessary to respond adequately to any amendments.

See, e.g., In re Adrien C., 9 Conn. App. 506, 509, 519 A.2d 1241 (observing

for purposes of statutory interpretation that ‘‘the word ‘shall’ is generally

determined to be mandatory’’), cert. denied, 203 Conn. 802, 522 A.2d 292

(1987). 16 As our Supreme Court has observed, ‘‘[i]t is well established that a

person in jeopardy of having his or her parental rights terminated has

a constitutional due process right to adequate notice of the grounds for

termination. . . . Notice is not a mere perfunctory act in order to satisfy

the technicalities of a statute, but has, as its basis, constitutional dimensions.

An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding [that] is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under

all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the

action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. . . .

Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently

in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that [a] reasonable opportunity

to prepare will be afforded, and it must set forth the alleged misconduct

with particularity. . . . [T]here is no violation of due process when a party

in interest is given the opportunity at a meaningful time for a court hearing

to litigate the question [at issue].’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Gabriel S., 347 Conn. 223, 232–33, 296 A.3d 829 (2023).
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With respect to the present claim, the respondent, in

order to satisfy her burden of proving that counsel

rendered deficient representation, must do more than

demonstrate that counsel failed to object to the motion

to amend. Instead, she must demonstrate that counsel’s

failure to object cannot be explained by one or more

possible strategic reasons that are objectively reasonable. The respondent cannot satisfy that burden. It

appears that the only legally viable ground on which

the respondent’s counsel might have objected was, as

the respondent suggests, on the ground that the amendment amounted to unfair surprise and that she needed

additional time to respond adequately to the failure to

rehabilitate ground. If counsel pursued such an objection, however, the remedy to which the respondent

would have been entitled was additional time.

Such an objection does not appear to be objectively

reasonable in the present case because, as the respondent acknowledges before this court, the record reflects

that, prior to the motion, the petitioner presented evidence related to the failure to rehabilitate ground. We

briefly observe that, at the time of the trial, although

the petition set forth the sole ground of no ongoing

parent-child relationship, the petitioner nonetheless

presented a copy of the respondent’s court-ordered specific steps to facilitate the respondent’s reunification

with Wendy. The petitioner also presented a permanency plan study dated September 30, 2022, which supported a finding that the respondent had failed to satisfy

her specific steps and, thus, had failed to rehabilitate.

In the absence of any objection, the petitioner presented

testimony from a department social worker with

respect to numerous unresolved issues that could interfere with the respondent being able to safely assume

a responsible position in Wendy’s life. There was evidence that, in 2022, the respondent’s youngest child
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was found outdoors, at night, in a city street. The petitioner also presented testimonial evidence from a

department social worker that was relevant to the issue

of the respondent’s failure to rehabilitate.

Furthermore, the record reflects that the respondent’s counsel challenged the failure to rehabilitate

ground through cross-examination and by presenting

evidence of the respondent’s rehabilitative efforts. For

example, during cross-examination of the social

worker, the respondent’s counsel elicited testimony

from the social worker that tended to demonstrate that

the respondent’s residence was clean and that she had

satisfied her specific step requiring her to consistently

visit with Wendy. The respondent also testified with

respect to the 2022 incident, in which she allegedly had

failed to adequately supervise her youngest child. The

respondent testified that, while she was cooking food,

the child had wandered off briefly and was found at

the edge of a city street.

The petitioner presented testimony from Tina Schiappa, an expert in clinical and forensic psychology who

had evaluated the respondent. Several portions of Schiappa’s examination pertained to the respondent’s failure to rehabilitate. Schiappa testified that she had evaluated the respondent’s ‘‘ability to parent.’’ Without

objection, counsel for the petitioner asked Schiappa

whether she believed that the respondent ‘‘ha[d] rehabilitated to the point where Wendy could be returned

to her care today?’’ Schiappa replied in the negative.

Counsel for the petitioner also asked Schiappa, ‘‘[G]iven

the age and needs of Wendy, do you think [the respondent] should be given more time to achieve . . . that

level of understanding that she could get through counseling and classes . . . in order for Wendy to be safely

reunified with her?’’ Schiappa opined that it was not

‘‘fair’’ for Wendy to have to wait for that and that she

did not believe that the respondent should be given
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additional time. Moreover, during the cross-examination of Schiappa, the respondent’s counsel attempted

to undermine these opinions in various ways. Counsel

for the respondent also asked Schiappa questions that

were relevant to the respondent’s alleged failure to rehabilitate, such as whether she believed that the respondent should have been afforded ‘‘a little bit more time

. . . once she got here to do services?’’

An examination of the record reflects that, without

objection at trial, the petitioner presented evidence that

was relevant to the issue of whether the respondent

had failed to rehabilitate. The respondent’s counsel

attempted to undermine this evidence throughout the

trial. Unless the respondent’s counsel had new evidence

to present with respect to the failure to rehabilitate

ground, believed that additional examination of the petitioner’s witnesses would be beneficial to dispute the

new ground, or she simply needed additional time to

prepare for closing argument, it would not have been

a reasonable trial strategy to object to the motion to

amend the petition for the purpose of seeking additional

time. The respondent has failed to present any evidence

as to what additional steps her counsel could or should

have taken had she been given additional time in which

to respond to the new ground. In fact, the respondent

does not assert that her counsel should have presented

any additional evidence or that additional time was

necessary to prepare stronger arguments to refute the

failure to rehabilitate ground. For these reasons, we

are not persuaded that counsel’s failure to object to the

petitioner’s motion to amend was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.

Even if the respondent could satisfy her burden of

demonstrating that it was objectively unreasonable for

her counsel not to object to the motion to amend on

the basis of the only ground on which she could object,

namely, that she needed more time to defend against the
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new adjudicative ground, she has failed to demonstrate

that she suffered prejudice in that counsel’s incompetency contributed to the loss of her parental rights. In

the present case, the respondent does not present us

with a record to demonstrate what additional evidence

or argument her counsel should have presented if she

had asked for additional time to respond to the amendment. In fact, she does not even argue that there was

anything that her counsel should have done differently

to respond to the amendment.17 Instead, the respondent

argues that prejudice is readily apparent in this case

because the court ultimately relied on the failure to

rehabilitate ground. For the reasons already discussed

in this opinion, that argument is fundamentally flawed.

The respondent’s argument overlooks the fact that our

rules of practice permit the petitioner to amend a termination of parental rights petition at any time prior to

a final adjudication of the petition, provided that the

respondent is afforded additional time as necessary to

respond to the amendment. See Practice Book § 34a-1

(d). As we have already concluded, the respondent has

not demonstrated that it was objectively unreasonable

for her counsel not to request additional time in light

of the facts of this case.

17 With respect to this type of a claim, a respondent is unable to demonstrate that he or she suffered prejudice simply because the court subsequently rendered an adverse judgment. See, e.g., In re Gabriel S., 347 Conn.

223, 238, 296 A.3d 829 (2023) (‘‘[t]o the extent that the respondent claims

that he did not receive adequate notice that his failure to rehabilitate would

be one of the grounds for terminating his parental rights when the trial

continued because it was possible that the petitioner would proceed under

[§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)], any constitutional violation was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt because he makes no claim that there was additional

evidence on that issue that he would have presented if he had received

adequate notice’’); In re Ivory W., 342 Conn. 692, 732 n.6, 271 A.3d 633

(2022) (suggesting that, even if trial court improperly denied motion for

continuance in termination of parental rights proceeding, denial was harmless because ‘‘the respondent [mother never] explained how the testimony

that she would have given if the trial court had granted her motion for a

continuance would have affected the outcome of the termination proceeding’’).
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On the basis of the foregoing, we reject the respondent’s claim that her trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance at the termination of parental rights trial.

II

The respondent next raises two claims of error

related to the court’s determinations made pursuant to

§ 17a-112 (j) (1). Specifically, the respondent claims

that the court improperly determined that (1) the

department made reasonable efforts to reunify her with

Wendy, and (2) she was unable or unwilling to benefit

from reunification efforts.18 We conclude that the court

properly determined that the respondent was unable

or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. Given

our resolution of this claim, it is unnecessary for us to

consider the merits of her claim that the department

failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent and Wendy.19

18 General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior

Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear

and convincing evidence that (1) the [department] has made reasonable

efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in

accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds

in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from

reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court

has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b, or determines at

trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, (2) termination is

in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has been

found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected, abused or uncared

for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child . . . has failed

to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the

belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the

child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the

child . . . .’’ 19 Our Supreme Court has stated that, ‘‘[b]ecause the two clauses [of § 17a112 (j) (1)] are separated by the word ‘unless,’ this statute plainly is written

in the conjunctive. Accordingly, the department must prove either that it

has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is

unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. . . . [E]ither showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.’’ (Emphasis in original.)

In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552–53, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).
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We begin by setting forth additional findings of the

court. Even though, as we have stated, we need not

consider the merits of the respondent’s claim regarding

the reasonableness of the efforts made by the department to reunify her with Wendy, we nevertheless set

forth the court’s findings and conclusions concerning

those efforts because those efforts are relevant to the

claim that the court improperly determined that she was

unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s

rehabilitative efforts. ‘‘[The department] made reasonable efforts to locate [the respondent]. As noted above,

[the respondent] (who was pregnant with Yeni20 at the

time [Santos] and Wendy left Guatemala in 2018)

remained behind in Guatemala. [Santos] provided [the

department] with [the respondent’s] cell phone number

in Guatemala and credible testimony revealed that various [department] social workers assigned to the case

from mid-2019 to December, 2021, had contact, albeit

limited and intermittent . . . with [the respondent], via

cell phone or through the use of the WhatsApp app (a

free virtual communication platform commonly used

to video chat and/or text, particularly overseas).

‘‘[Santos] testified that [the respondent] always had

access to a cell phone in Guatemala and he would

video call [the respondent] during his weekly in-person

supervised visitation sessions with Wendy so that [the

respondent] and Wendy could visit with one another.

[The respondent] also testified that [Santos] would

video call her during his weekly visits with Wendy and

Wendy and [the respondent] virtually connected with

one another. [The respondent] also had some degree

of cellular or video communication, independent from

[the department], with Wendy and Wendy’s foster family.

20 The court found that Yeni is Wendy’s younger sister and that Yeni

immigrated with the respondent to New Haven in July, 2022.
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‘‘In July, 2019, Attorney Jennifer Avenia, the Director

of Immigration Practice for [the department], was consulted for her expertise on how the [department] could

best serve the family. [Avenia’s] recommendations in

this case included (1) referrals for local services to

assist [Santos] and Wendy, (2) securing Wendy special

immigrant juvenile status,21 and (3) exploring the potential reunification of Wendy with [the respondent] in

Guatemala.

‘‘The potential reunification of [the respondent] and

Wendy in Guatemala required pursuing a study of [the

respondent] and the family’s Guatemalan home. [The

department] reached out to International Social Services (ISS-USA) to conduct the out-of-country study. In

December, 2019, ISS-USA shared a completed study

with [the department], which recommended [that]

Wendy be reunified with [the respondent] in Guatemala.

‘‘The family’s home22 is located in Jocota ́ n, Guatemala. Jocota ́ n is a rural village or municipality in the

Chiquimula department of Guatemala. [Avenia] credibly

testified [that] Jocota ́ n is not far from the Honduras

border, Guatemala experiences a high homicide rate,

and Chiquimula has the third highest homicide rate in all

of Guatemala. Additionally, Guatemala’s rainy season

spans from approximately May to October, and roadways in and around Jocota ́ n, Chiquimula are dirt roads

which can wash out in the rainy season, thereby making

road travel only possible with SUV-like vehicles. [The

respondent] does not own a motor vehicle, and,

according to the ISS-USA report (which was not placed

in evidence nor shared with the court), [the respondent’s] available modes of transportation [are] by foot

or horseback. Nonetheless, [the respondent] credibly

21 ‘‘Special juvenile immigration status potentially affords Wendy a path

to United States citizenship.’’ 22 ‘‘The family home in Guatemala is a single dirt floor room. The home

has no indoor plumbing. Beds are rope woven entities.’’
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testified that a bus ride she undertook in 2019 from her

Jocota ́ n home to Guatemala City (the country’s capital)

took twelve hours. An international airport is located

just outside Guatemala City. [Avenia] testified that the

United States State Department categorizes Guatemala

as a country in which travelers from abroad should

‘reconsider travel.’23

‘‘Given ISS-USA’s December, 2019 recommendation

of reunification, in early 2020, [the department]

attempted to formulate a plan to safely return Wendy

to [the respondent] in Guatemala. [Avenia] was told

that Wendy’s passport was lost or stolen or taken at

the Mexico/Texas border. In reality, Wendy was never

issued a passport. In an attempt to arrange for Wendy’s

legal entry back into Guatemala in 2020, [the department] reached out to the Guatemalan consulate seeking

a passport for Wendy. However, the Guatemalan government engaged in only minimal contact with [the

department]. Ultimately, sometime between April and

June, 2020, the Guatemalan government issued Wendy

a one-way travel visa into Guatemala.24

23 ‘‘The court takes judicial notice of the United States Travel Advisory

System, which is comprised of four levels. Level 1 recommends exercising

normal precautions, Level 2 recommends exercising increased caution, Level

3 recommends reconsidering travel, and Level 4 recommends do not travel.

Guatemala is a Level 3 country.’’ 24 ‘‘[The respondent] testified that, while pregnant with her daughter, Yeni

(born [in] 2019), [the respondent] traveled by bus from her Jocota ́ n home

to Guatemala City to obtain a passport for Wendy. ([The respondent] was

unsuccessful in procuring Wendy a passport.) The [respondent and Santos]

sought to obtain a passport for Wendy in 2019 because they wanted Wendy

to return to [the respondent’s] care in Guatemala (apparently with [Santos]

remaining in the United States). [Santos] credibly testified that [he and

the respondent] reconsidered that decision as Wendy began speaking and

understanding more English than Spanish. [The respondent] expressed to

[Santos] a concern that if Wendy were to return to her care in Guatemala,

[the respondent] would not be able to understand what Wendy was saying

in English.

‘‘The Guatemalan government’s meager responses to [the department’s]

overtures and the Guatemalan consulate’s 2020 decision to only issue Wendy

a one-way visa appears to have been driven, in whole or in part, by the
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‘‘Thereafter, [the department] assessed the options of

sending Wendy, accompanied by a [department] social

[worker], to Guatemala and/or sending six year old

Wendy unaccompanied to Guatemala. Formulating a

plan to return Wendy to [the respondent] in Guatemala

in mid-2020 included navigating the global challenges

attendant to the COVID-19 pandemic. After carefully

considering the profound health risks associated with

traveling abroad in the pandemic, and the State Department’s travel advisory warning, and the homicide rate

in Guatemala (and, particularly, in the department of

Chiquimula), [the department] concluded any attempt

to return Wendy to Guatemala in 2020 posed unacceptable health and safety risks to Wendy and [department] staff.25

COVID-19 pandemic. It is noteworthy that, had the [respondent and Santos]

secured a passport for Wendy prior to the pandemic or prior to Wendy’s

and [Santos’] 2018 departure from Guatemala, [the department] could have

contemplated flying Wendy into Guatemala secure in knowing that if [the

respondent] did not timely appear at the Guatemalan airport, Wendy could

return to the United States and remain in [the petitioner’s] custody.’’ 25 ‘‘A[n] extremely compelling concern for [the department] in 2020 was

whether [the respondent] would/could actually timely appear at the Guatemalan airport to assume physical custody of Wendy. In 2020, [the respondent]

was not maintaining reliable or consistent contact with [the department].

Per [the respondent], it is a twelve hour bus ride from her home to Guatemala

City and, as noted previously, the airport is located just outside of the capital

city. [The department] was justified in its decision that it was not appropriate

for [department] social workers to travel with Wendy from the Guatemalan

airport to Jocota ́ n, assuming road travel was even possible. As noted . . .

the Guatemalan government’s one-way visa precluded Wendy from returning

to the United States once she entered Guatemala. As discussed previously,

[the department] had justified concerns about the safety and well-being of

their [department] social workers staying indefinitely anywhere in Guatemala, both due to the health risks posed by the pandemic in 2020 and the

physical safety of travelers to Guatemala given the State Department’s rating.

[The department] also vetted a contingency plan of turning Wendy over to

Guatemalan child protection officials if [the respondent] did not appear.

[The department] appropriately concluded [that] subjecting Wendy to Guatemala’s less than robust foster care system, in the midst of a global pandemic,

with a military that is known for seeking and obtaining bribes, was not in

Wendy’s best interests.’’
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‘‘In early 2022, [Avenia] recommended the 2019 ISSUSA study be updated/repeated to determine if reunification with [the respondent] in Guatemala was a viable

possibility in 2022.26 When ISS-USA attempted to make

contact with [the respondent] in Guatemala in 2022,

[the respondent] could not be contacted or located.

Unbeknownst to ISS-USA and to [the department], [the

respondent] left Guatemala with her younger daughter,

Yeni, paying a ‘coyote’27 to secure her and Yeni’s passage

to the Mexico/Texas border. Although [the respondent]

and Yeni arrived in New Haven on or about July 10,

2022, [the department’s] first 2022 contact with [the

respondent] did not occur until [the respondent]

appeared, unannounced, at an in-person supervised

father-daughter visit in August, 2022. [The respondent]

testified she did not reach out to [the department] prior

to her August, 2022 appearance at the father-daughter

supervised visit because she did not have a cell phone.28

‘‘In September, 2022, [the department] referred [the

respondent] to [Integrated Refugee and Immigrant Services (IRIS)]. For an immigrant’s first two years in New

Haven, IRIS will work with individuals requiring assistance. By November, 2022, [the respondent] had yet to

engage with the IRIS worker. The IRIS worker therefore

reached out to [the respondent’s] counsel. IRIS was

able to finally convince [the respondent] to meet and

IRIS conducted its first home visit with [the respondent]

26 ‘‘By 2022, the 2019 ISS-USA study had expired.’’

27 This court previously has observed that ‘‘coyote’’ is a slang word that

refers to ‘‘a person paid to guide children . . . and other persons to and

across the United States border.’’ In re Pedro J. C., 154 Conn. App. 517, 523

n.4, 105 A.3d 943 (2014), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Henrry

P. B.-P., 327 Conn. 312, 173 A.3d 928 (2017). 28 ‘‘Again, according to [Santos], [the respondent] ‘always’ had cellular and/

or virtual platform communication accessibility in Guatemala. It is unknown

what [the respondent’s] cell phone access was en route to the United States.

However, what is known, is that upon arriving in New Haven in mid-July,

2022, [the respondent] and her younger daughter, Yeni, resided with [Santos]

and [Santos] had cell phone/virtual platform capability.’’
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in December, 2022. [The respondent] continued to be

unwilling to share necessary background information

with IRIS and [the respondent] would not engage with

IRIS. It took [approximately five] months for the IRIS

worker to establish a trusting, working relationship

with [the respondent].29 Since February, 2023, IRIS has

been assisting [the respondent] and [the respondent] is

engaging with the IRIS worker.

‘‘In late August, 2022, New Haven police responded

to a call that Wendy’s three year old sister, Yeni, had

been found unsupervised standing/walking in the

streets of New Haven. When [the respondent] appeared

at the scene, [the respondent] appeared to be under

the influence. She was arrested for risk of injury [to a

child].30

‘‘After Yeni was found unsupervised in the street, [the

department] referred [the respondent] for a substance

abuse evaluation and there were no recommendations

for follow-up treatment. [The department] also referred

[the respondent] to [Intensive Family Preservation

(IFP)], an in-home, parenting education and coaching

service. The IFP worker continues to partner with IRIS

to encourage [the respondent] to engage with IRIS and

in obtaining community based social and legal services.

‘‘Since August, 2022, [the respondent] and Wendy

have enjoyed weekly supervised visits facilitated by [the

department] and/or a supervised visitation center. Both

[the respondent and Santos] . . . participate in the

family visits with Wendy. At times during the visits,

the family requires the assistance of an interpreter.31

[Santos] testified that Wendy speaks a lot more English

29 ‘‘The IRIS worker credibly testified that, in her experience, distrust and a

reluctance to engage is not uncommon with the population she works with.’’ 30 ‘‘The criminal case was eventually dismissed.’’

31 ‘‘[Department] social worker [Kelly] Tibault testified that, if a Spanish

speak[ing] worker or interpreter is not present at the supervised visits, the

Google Translate app is utilized.’’
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than she does Spanish. According to [Santos], Wendy’s

lack of fluency in Spanish played a part in [his and

the respondent’s] reconsidering sending Wendy back

to [the respondent’s] care in Guatemala. Reportedly,

Wendy understands spoken Spanish more than she can

speak it, and she requires a translator for some of her

verbal exchanges with [Santos and the respondent]. To

enhance communication between [Santos, the respondent] and Wendy, [the department] explored enrolling

Wendy in Spanish language classes. Wendy declined

Spanish language classes, claiming she learns better

(Spanish) listening to her bilingual foster parents (and

foster siblings) speak Spanish at home.

‘‘From July, 2022, to February, 2023, [the respondent]

and Yeni primarily resided with [Santos] in a rooming

house on Kimberly Avenue in New Haven. . . . [T]he

rooming house’s common area was observed to have

sticky floors, bugs, and cockroaches.32 [The department] attempted to screen the other rooming house

tenants and view their individual rooms. Presumably

because of the tenants’ undocumented status, some

refused to interact with [the department] and [the

department] could not adequately vet the other occupants or assess the physical structure of the rooming

house (as to potential safety or hazardous issues applicable to a three year old). In mid-February, 2023, [the

respondent] and Yeni began renting a room from an

unrelated male acquaintance in another rooming house

in New Haven, which [the department] assesses is

appropriate for [the respondent] and Yeni.

‘‘[The respondent] works as an undocumented

worker at a Mexican restaurant. [The respondent] and

32 ‘‘The house refrigerator contained mold and had a foul odor. Like [Santos

and the respondent], [the department] surmised that the others in the rooming house work in the food service-restaurant business and their dietary

needs, in large part, are met with ‘take-out’ food, presumably from where

they work.’’
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Yeni subsist in part on food from the restaurant and

food donations from providers such as IRIS. One of the

social/parenting issues IRIS and IFP were addressing

with [the respondent] as recently as February and

March, 2023, is the importance of securing safe and

responsible child care for Yeni when [she is] not in [the

respondent’s] care.33

‘‘Wendy was referred for mental health treatment to

address the trauma and uncertainties she experienced

in her young life, the journey to this country and ICE

detention, the physical violence she witnessed and

experienced while living with [Santos] in 2019, the sexual assault she endured by Juan Carlos . . . and [Santos’] failure to keep her safe, her removal from [Santos’]

care and entry into foster care, and the substantive loss

of contact with [the respondent] from the latter part of

2018 to August, 2022. Wendy last discharged successfully from counseling in November, 2022. By all

accounts, Wendy is an outgoing, resilient, and

healthy child.

‘‘The testimony and evidence reflect that, from 2019

through the end of 2021, [the respondent] had limited,

sporadic contact with the various assigned [department] social workers and [the respondent] joined in

virtually on [Santos’] and Wendy’s supervised visitation

sessions. In December, 2021, through August, 2022,

[department] social worker [Kelly] Tibault unsuccessfully attempted contact with [the respondent], either

directly ‘dialing’ the cell phone number provided by

[Santos] or through the use of the WhatsApp messenger

app. . . . Tibault routinely texted [the respondent]

through the WhatsApp platform. [The respondent] did

not respond.

33 ‘‘In January, 2023, [the petitioner] filed a neglect petition as to Yeni.

Said neglect petition remain[ed] pending [at the time of the trial court’s

judgment].’’
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‘‘[The department] was unaware of [the respondent’s]

2022 emigration from Guatemala until after [the respondent’s] July, 2022 arrival to New Haven. It may be [that

the respondent’s] lack of communication with [the

department] in 2022 was tied to her decision to emigrate

and the actual journey to Connecticut. Nonetheless,

when ISS-USA attempted to connect with [the respondent] to complete an updated and/or second home study

in 2022, [the respondent] could not be contacted or

located. [The department] did not become aware of

[the respondent’s] and Yeni’s July, 2022 arrival to New

Haven until very late July/early August, 2022, and by

late August, 2022, [the department] began attempting

to engage with [the respondent] and to refer [the respondent] to IRIS, IFP, substance abuse evaluation, and

weekly supervised visitation sessions with Wendy.34

‘‘Case law is clear [that] reasonable efforts is defined

as doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.

Clearly, the barriers to reunifying Wendy with [the

respondent] in Guatemala could not be mitigated in

2020. However, had [the respondent] responded to [the

department’s] repeated attempts to communicate with

her in 2022, and had [the respondent] made herself

available for the second ISS-USA study in Guatemala,

returning Wendy to Guatemala in 2022 (as the world

emerged from the constraints of the pandemic) may

have been possible (assuming a favorable and current

ISS-USA study).

‘‘Since [the respondent’s] and Yeni’s August, 2022

arrival to New Haven, [the department] has attempted

to work with [the respondent], both in maintaining Yeni

safely in [the respondent’s] care and in supporting/nurturing [the respondent’s] relationship with Wendy. In

34 ‘‘It is of no moment to the court’s reasonable efforts analysis that [the

department’s] efforts to engage with [the respondent] in August, 2022, were

not isolated to just Wendy and [the respondent], but also included services

and providers applicable to Yeni and [the respondent].’’
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addition to weekly supervised parent-child visitation,

[the department] has connected [the respondent] to

IRIS and to [IFP] services. [The department] has diligently remained cognitive of the significant language

and cultural barriers attendant to the case and [the

department] has consistently worked around and

through both [Santos’ and the respondent’s] substantive

illiteracy and language fluency challenges. Additionally,

[the department] sought a court-ordered psychological

evaluation and parent-child interactional. Accordingly,

the court finds that [the department] made reasonable

efforts to reunify [the respondent] and Wendy.’’

(Emphasis in original; footnotes added; footnotes

altered; footnotes in original; footnotes omitted.)

With respect to whether the respondent was unable

or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts

made by the department, the court set forth the following findings and conclusions: ‘‘[T]he court finds that

[the respondent] is unable to benefit from reunification

efforts. As noted previously, [the respondent] communicated and/or virtually interacted with Wendy and [Santos] and with the foster family at least from 2019 to

the end of 2021.35 Although [the respondent’s] perhaps

culturally derived distrust of others (as testified to by

the IRIS worker) and her decision to attempt to immigrate to the United States and her journey to Connecticut may have factored into [the respondent’s] 2022

incommunicado stance with [the department], that reality rendered [the respondent] unable or unwilling to

benefit from reunification efforts.

‘‘The court is not indifferent to the fact that [the

respondent] and Yeni undertook an arduous and uncertain journey to reunify with Wendy and [Santos] in

35 ‘‘Although it is not clear, a careful review of [the testimony of the

respondent and Santos] suggests [that the respondent] participated in virtual

visits with Wendy during [Santos’] supervised visitation sessions beyond

the end of 2021.’’
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2022. Unfortunately, [the respondent’s] failure to timely

inform [the department] of her presence in New Haven,

and then her subsequent resistance to engage with providers until just recently, detrimentally delayed [the

respondent] in the opportunity [to] gain critical and

necessary knowledge and insight as to what constitutes

safe and nurturing parenting in an urban American

city.36

‘‘Inexplicably, [the respondent] does not endorse or

accept Wendy’s truth of being sexually assaulted by

Juan Carlos while in [Santos’] care in 2019. At the January, 2023 court-ordered parent-child interactional conducted by [Schiappa], [the respondent] asked then nine

year old Wendy (a sexual assault victim) if she (Wendy)

had a boyfriend. To be sure she understood [the respondent’s] question, Wendy asked [Schiappa] to translate

[the respondent’s] question into English. [Schiappa]

credibly testified [that] Wendy was shocked at [the

respondent’s] sincerely and seriously asked question.

[The respondent’s] boyfriend question is emblematic of

[the respondent’s] lack of insight into and appreciation

for Wendy’s past victimization. Until and unless [the

respondent was] to exhibit an ability to validate Wendy’s traumas (physical abuse, sexual abuse, [Santos’]

neglect and failure to protect, removal from [Santos’]

care and entry into and protracted stay in foster care),

continued reunification efforts are of limited, if any,

value.

‘‘The court credits [Schiappa’s] testimony that, given

that [the respondent] had been living in New Haven

for only six months at the time of the January, 2023

psychological evaluations, perhaps [the respondent]

could benefit from additional time to gain insight and

understanding as to why Wendy had come into foster

36 ‘‘To [the respondent’s] credit, she has recently start[ed] receiving positive parenting reports from her IFP worker.’’
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care, and why Wendy remained in foster care, and the

foreseeable challenges or issues for Wendy if she were

to leave her long-term foster [care] family and [return]

home to [the respondent’s] care. However, in the additional months since [Schiappa’s] evaluation, [the

respondent’s] lack [of] insight and understanding continues unabated. For all of those reasons, the court

finds that, in addition to [the department] having made

reasonable efforts to reunify [the respondent] and

Wendy, [the respondent] is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.’’ (Footnotes altered; footnote omitted.)

The court later set forth additional findings concerning the respondent’s inability to benefit from the department’s reunification efforts: ‘‘When asked what [the

respondent] needed to do for reunification to be possible, [Schiappa] credibly testified [that the respondent]

would need to (1) provide a sufficient and safe living

space for her and her children, (2) demonstrate insight,

knowledge and proficiency in safely caring for a nine

year old while also caring for a three year old, (3)

exhibit meaningful insight about how [the respondent’s]

decisions and behaviors have impacted Wendy, (4) be

accepting of Wendy’s truth regarding the sexual assault,

[and] (5) acknowledge the other traumatic events

Wendy has experienced and how said trauma(s) have

impacted Wendy and may continue to impact Wendy

in the future.’’

With respect to the respondent’s claim that the court

improperly determined, pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (1),

that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from the

department’s efforts to reunify her and Wendy, we

observe that she does not challenge any of the court’s

specific subordinate findings as clearly erroneous.

Instead, the respondent broadly challenges the court’s

ultimate determination, which was based on those subordinate findings, that she was unwilling or unable to
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In re Wendy G.-R.

benefit from the department’s reunification efforts. She

asserts, contrary to the court’s assessment of her conduct, that the evidence demonstrated that, as of the

time of the trial, she had ‘‘positively engaged’’ with

the services that the department offered to her, which

included IRIS, a psychological evaluation, a substance

abuse evaluation, and parenting classes. The respondent argues that, ‘‘[b]ecause the department did not

offer [her] necessary services toward reunification and

. . . [she] actively and appropriately engaged in the

services the department did offer her, the trial court

erred in determining [that she] was unable or unwilling

to benefit from services.’’

This court has observed that, pursuant to § 17a-112

(j) (1), ‘‘[t]he [petitioner] must prove [by clear and convincing evidence] either that [the department] has made

reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the

parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from the reunification efforts. Section 17a-112 (j) clearly provides that

the [petitioner] is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy

this statutory element.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal

quotation marks omitted.) In re Corey C., 198 Conn.

App. 41, 66, 232 A.3d 1237, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 930,

236 A.3d 217 (2020).

‘‘[A]lthough it is true that a finding that the department made reasonable reunification efforts is not a

necessary predicate to a finding that a parent is unable

to benefit from such efforts, this does not mean that a

trial court could never view those two issues as interrelated. . . . [T]he question of whether the [department]

made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with

her child is inextricably linked to the question of

whether the respondent can benefit from such efforts.

. . . Depending on the case, a trial court might well

conclude that the department’s reunification efforts

were so lacking as to preclude both a finding that the
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department made reasonable reunification efforts and

that a parent is unable to benefit from such efforts.

. . . However, the department is only required to prove

either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or,

alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to

benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112 (j)

clearly provides that the department is not required to

prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is

sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.’’ (Citations

omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Cameron H., 219 Conn. App. 149, 161

n.5, 294 A.3d 50, cert. denied, 347 Conn. 903, 296 A.3d

171 (2023).

We review a trial court’s reunification determinations

for evidentiary sufficiency. See, e.g., In re Oreoluwa

O., 321 Conn. 523, 533, 139 A.3d 674 (2016);In re Kyreese

L., 220 Conn. App. 705, 716, 299 A.3d 296, cert. denied,

348 Conn. 901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023). Pursuant to that

standard, ‘‘we consider whether the trial court could

have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established

and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that

the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to

justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . When applying

this standard, we construe the evidence in a manner

most favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial

court. . . . We apply the identical standard of review

to a trial court’s determination that a parent is unable

to benefit from reunification services. . . . That is, we

review the trial court’s ultimate determination that a

respondent parent was unwilling or unable to benefit

from reunification services for evidentiary sufficiency,

and review the subordinate factual findings for clear

error. . . . [An appellate court does] not examine the

record to determine whether the trier of fact could have

reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . .

[Rather] every reasonable presumption is made in favor

of the trial court’s ruling. . . .
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‘‘In our review of the record for evidentiary sufficiency, we are mindful that, as a reviewing court, [w]e

cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of

the witnesses. . . . Rather, [i]t is within the province

of the trial court, when sitting as the fact finder, to

weigh the evidence presented and determine the credibility and effect to be given the evidence. . . . Moreover, it is within the province of the trier of fact to

accept or reject parts of the testimony of a single witness.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Gabriella A., 319 Conn. 775, 789–90, 127

A.3d 948 (2015).

The respondent does not challenge the correctness

of any of the court’s subordinate factual findings concerning the conduct of the department or the respondent in the present case. Instead, the respondent challenges the court’s assessment of the degree to which

she was receptive to and utilized the services offered

as well as its ultimate determination that she was unable

or unwilling to benefit from the department’s services.

Among the court’s relevant subordinate findings was

that, although the respondent had access to a cell phone

while she was living in Guatemala, from mid-2019 to

December, 2021, she had only ‘‘limited and intermittent

contact’’ with the department. From December, 2021,

through August, 2022, the respondent did not respond

to communications, whether in the form of telephone

calls or texts, from the department. The respondent’s

failure to let the department know of her whereabouts

led to an inability of ISS-USA to conduct an updated

home study in 2022. The respondent did not make the

department aware of the fact that she intended to immigrate to the United States and did not contact the department in a timely manner when she arrived in New Haven

on or about July 10, 2022. Rather, the respondent

appeared, unannounced, at a supervised visit between

Wendy and Santos in August, 2022.
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The court found that, for several months, the respondent was very reluctant to engage with the services

the department offered through IRIS. This finding was

supported by the evidence that, although the department referred the respondent to IRIS in September,

2022, an agreed upon home visit did not occur until

December, 2022. Moreover, the respondent did not fully

share information about her living situation with IRIS,

and it took until February, 2023, before IRIS workers

could develop a working relationship with her.

In August, 2022, the respondent participated in a substance abuse evaluation as well as parenting services

provided through IFP. The respondent also submitted

to court-ordered psychological evaluation and a parentchild interactional study with Schiappa, a licensed psychologist, in January, 2023. The court relied on the

detailed report prepared by Schiappa. Among her findings was that ‘‘[the respondent] did not appear to understand why Wendy couldn’t just be returned to her care

now that she is living in the United States. She does

not appear to understand the impact that her behaviors

have on her ability to safely parent the children.’’ Schiappa stated that the respondent did not come prepared

to the parent-child interactional study, as she had

brought her younger daughter, Yeni, but did not bring

anything with which to entertain her. She was indifferent to the fact that Yeni attempted to open a packet of

medicine from her purse and that the evaluator ultimately had to intervene to prevent Yeni from ingesting

the medicine. Schiappa opined that ‘‘[the respondent]

does not appear to understand the differences in culture

or recognize how her behaviors are impacting her ability

to parent. [The respondent] minimizes any problems.

She was cooperative to the evaluation process but has

limited insight and judgment.’’ Schiappa also opined

that the respondent lacks ‘‘a good understanding of

Wendy’s needs or the capacity to meet them.’’ She stated
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that termination of the respondent’s parental rights

appears to be in Wendy’s best interest, that her biological parents are unable to provide her with a stable and

safe home, and that, ‘‘[g]iven the amount of time that

has passed, it does not appear within an appropriate

time frame [that the respondent will be able] to provide

stability and permanency for Wendy.’’ Schiappa

observed that ‘‘[i]t would be impossible for [the respondent or Santos] to be [Wendy’s] psychological parents

as neither of them have ever really provided the care

for her that a parent would. In Guatemala, [Wendy’s]

grandmother provided this care.’’

In its detailed findings, the court outlined the myriad

efforts to reunify that were made by the department

in this case despite the challenges posed by a global

pandemic and the danger presented by the fact that the

respondent was residing in Guatemala until July, 2022.

Mindful of the importance of reunification efforts made

by the department,37 we conclude that the department’s

reunification efforts were on their face not so lacking

as to preclude a finding that the respondent was unable

or unwilling to benefit from such services.38 The petitioner did not prove by clear and convincing evidence

37 ‘‘The requirement of reunification efforts provides . . . substantive protection for any parent who contests a termination action, and places a

concomitant burden on the state to take appropriate measures designed to

secure reunification of parent and child. . . . This requirement is based on

the well settled notion that [t]he right of a parent to raise his or her children

[is] recognized as a basic constitutional right.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572,

584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003). 38 Although it is unnecessary for us to reach the merits of the respondent’s

claim that the court improperly determined that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify her with Wendy, we nonetheless observe that

‘‘[t]he reasonableness of the department’s efforts must be assessed in the

context of each case. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the

department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged,

using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the

federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]easonable

efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. . . .
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that the respondent failed to engage with all of the

department’s services, but such proof was not necessary. The petitioner demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, and the court found, that the respondent

had inconsistent communication with the department

when she was in Guatemala, she failed to timely notify

the department of her whereabouts prior to July, 2022,

and she was reluctant to engage in services offered by

the department until early 2023, which supported its

finding that the respondent was unwilling to benefit

from services offered by the department.

The respondent’s failure to timely engage in services

offered by the department detrimentally delayed her

ability to gain critical and necessary knowledge of how

Wendy’s needs changed upon her immigration to an

American city. The petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence, and the court found, that, at the time

of her evaluation by Schiappa, the respondent still demonstrated a lack of insight into Wendy’s traumatic experiences resulting from her relocation to the United

States, particularly her sexual abuse, and what was

required for her to provide Wendy a safe, nurturing, and

supportive environment free from insecurity. Affecting

her ability to benefit from services was the fact that

the respondent, who did not speak English and was

undocumented, required community based services to

meet even basic needs for food and shelter for herself

and Yeni. Her inability to converse in English with

Wendy was an obvious barrier to her being able to meet

Wendy’s psychological needs. The court also observed

that the respondent struggled to parent Yeni, showing

a lack of insight as to what was necessary to provide

[R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable

efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Omar I., 197 Conn. App. 499, 589, 231 A.3d 1196, cert. denied, 335 Conn.

924, 233 A.3d 1091, cert. denied sub nom. Ammar I. v. Connecticut,

U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 956, 208 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2020).
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a safe environment for her, as well. The cumulative

effect of these findings supported the court’s ultimate

determination that the respondent, due in part to her

lack of understanding of what was required of her to

nurture Wendy and her struggles to have basic needs

met for herself and Yeni, was unable to benefit from

reunification efforts made by the department.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.