alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 232 (Friday, December 1, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 75308]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-30606]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


Notice of Lodging of Consent Decree Pursuant to the Safe Drinking 
Water Act

    Under 28 CFR 50.7, notice is hereby given that on November 13, 
2000, a proposed Consent Decree (``the Decree'') in United States v. 
Russell Wilkey, Civil Action No. 4:97 CV-239-M, was lodged with the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.
    The Defendent was the owner and operator of four underground 
injection wells located in Daviess County, Kentucky. The Complaint 
filed by the United States alleged that Defendent violated the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (``the SDWA''), an Administrative Order on Consent 
(``AOC'') issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
to Dependent under the SDWA, and regulations contained in the 
Underground Injection Control (``UIC'') program for Kentucky in his 
operation of those injection wells. The Decree will resolve all of the 
United States' claims against the Dependent. Dependent has agreed to 
pay the United States a civil penalty of $20,000 for the violations. 
Dependent has already plugged and abandoned all of the injection wells.
    The Department of Justice will receive for a period of thirty (30) 
days from the date of this publication comments relating to the Decree. 
Comments should be addressed to the Assistant Attorney General, 
Environmental and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of 
Justice, P.O. Box 7611, Washington, D.C. 20044-7611, and should refer 
to United States v. Russell Wilkey, DOJ No. 90-5-1-1-4487.
    The Decree may be examined at the Office of the United States 
Attorney for the Western District of Kentucky, 510 W. Broadway, 10th 
Fl., Louisville, Kentucky, and also at the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Region 4, Environmental Accountability Division, 61 
Forsyth Street, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia.
    A copy of the Decree may also be obtained by mail from the Consent 
Decree Library, P.O. Box 7611, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, 
D.C. 20044-7611. In requesting a copy of the Decree, please enclose a 
check in the amount of $3.25 (25 cents per page reproduction cost), 
made payable to the ``Consent Decree Library.''

Walker B. Smith,
Deputy Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section, Environment & Natural 
Resources Division.
[FR Doc. 00-30606 Filed 11-30-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-15-M
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the period ended
September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Francis X. McCarthy, Jr., the Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



/s/    FRANCIS X. MCCARTHY, JR.Francis X. McCarthy, Jr.Chief Financial Officer ofTrump Entertainment Resorts, Inc.




November 14, 2005
#### PRUITT v. STATE.

No. 21142.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 12, 1940.

No attorney for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge..

Conviction is for burglary, punishment assessed being two years in the penitentiary.

We observe no defect in the indictment. The record is before this court without statement of facts or bills of exception. In such condition nothing is presented for review.

.The judgment is affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 232 (Friday, December 1, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 75319]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-30576]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION


U.S. National Assessment Synthesis Team; Notice of Final Report

    The National Science Foundation (NSF) announces that the following 
advisory committee, established pursuant to the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA) (Public Law 92-463, as amended), completed its 
work and issued its final report on October 31, 2000. As this committee 
was established under the auspices of the interagency Subcommittee on 
Global Change Research (SGCR), see 63 Fed. Reg. 9267 (Feb. 24, 1998), 
its final report (which followed a 6-day public comment period) was 
provided to the SGCR Chair and a copy sent to the NSF.
    Name: U.S. National Assessment Synthesis Team (#5219).
    Availability of Report: The report is viewable and downloadable on 
the Worldwide Web at www.gcrio.org/NationalAssessment/. Publication is 
in progress and information on ordering a copy of the report is also 
provided on the Website. The report is also available for public 
inspection and use at the Library of Congress in accordance with 
section 13 of the FACA.
    Contact Person: Tom Spence, National Science Foundation, 4201 
Wilson Blvd., Suite 705, Arlington, VA 22230. Telephone: (703) 292-
8500.

    Dated: November 27, 2000.
Karen J. York,
Committee Management Officer.
[FR Doc. 00-30576 Filed 11-30-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555-01-M
##### 



EXHIBIT 10.508 December 18, 2003 XXX
XXX
XXX Dear XXX: I am pleased to inform you that Cygnus will pay you a retention bonus of
$  upon any acquisition of Cygnus, Inc., if such acquisition occurs,
provided that you remain an active employee and have not given notice of
resignation prior to the date of the sale. In addition, you have been granted a stock option for   shares, priced at
$  each, based on a grant date of December 18, 2003. These options will
vest over a two-year period, vesting 1/24 of the original grant per month. While Cygnus looks forward to a mutually rewarding relationship, nothing in
this letter changes the at-will nature of your employment relationship or
provides a guarantee of any additional compensation. As a reminder, the terms and conditions of this letter are confidential and
should not be shared with anyone, with the exception of your spouse/significant
other, accountant, and the officers of Cygnus, Inc. XXX, you are a critical member of the Cygnus team and we value your
contribution as we move forward. Regards, /s/ John C Hodgman John C Hodgman
CEO, President, and Chairman
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-7011

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

TROY LAMONT MCFARLANE, a/k/a Jagi,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees,

District Judge. (3:97-cr-00290-RLV; 3:07-cv-00208-RLV)

Submitted: October 5, 2007 Decided: October 24, 2007

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Troy Lamont McFarlane, Appellant Pro Se. Robert James Conrad, Jr.,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Troy Lamont McFarlane seeks to appeal the district

court’s order treating his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as a

successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion, and dismissing it on

that basis. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice

or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1) (2000); Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir.

2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that McFarlane has

not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate

of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Additionally, we construe McFarlane’s notice of appeal

and informal brief as an application to file a second or successive

motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Winestock, 340

F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to

file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims
- 3 -

based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously

unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on

collateral review; or (2) newly discovered evidence, not previously

discoverable by due diligence, that would be sufficient to

establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the

movant guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), 2255

(2000). McFarlane’s claims do not satisfy either of these

criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive

§ 2255 motion. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Cheryl K. Brown, Appellant. Thomas F. Hartnett, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment

Insurance Appeal Board, filed August 22, 1989, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because her employment was terminated due to misconduct.

Claimant quit her job and gave two weeks’ notice. However, prior to the time she was scheduled to leave she turned in her keys. Claimant admitted that by doing so she no longer considered herself to be store manager. Therefore, the record indicates that claimant intended to remain on the payroll for two more weeks although she did not intend to perform her job duties as store manager. This conclusion, coupled with the fact that claimant left the store unattended one day, provides the requisite substantial evidence to support the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s finding that claimant was terminated due to misconduct *(see, Matter of Douglas [Hartnett],*143 AD2d 458).

Decision affirmed, without costs. Weiss, J. P., Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.
#### Carole Muss, Plaintiff, *v.*Stephen H. Muss, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Nassau County,

December 18, 1957.

*Sprague and Stern*for defendant.

*Rothenberg, Atkins & Koss*for plaintiff..

Marcus G. Christ, J.

In an action for a separation the defendant moves to vacate the plaintiff’s notice to examine him before trial concerning his assets, property, earnings, financial condition and the living expenses of the parties from January 1, I960 to date. In four separately stated causes of action plaintiff asserts four alleged grounds entitling her to a judgment of separation, namely, abandonment, cruel and inhuman treatment, conduct making cohabitation unsafe and improper and, finally, failure and refusal “to make adequate contribution for the support and maintenance of the plaintiff and the children of the parties” which the plaintiff alleges constituted “ neglect ” of the plaintiff.

*499In the absence of a showing of the existence of special circumstances, the plaintiff is not entitled to examine the defendant before trial prior to establishing her right to a judgment of separation. It is the plaintiff’s contention that she is entitled to an examination before trial because her action is in part based on “ neglect It is thus apparent that in seeking this examination before trial, the plaintiff is not claiming that she is entitled to such an examination insofar as her action is based on alleged abandonment, cruel and inhuman treatment or conduct making it unsafe or improper to cohabit. She relies on the fourth cause of action in the complaint which she characterizes as one for “neglect”. It is open to serious question whether the fourth cause of action as stated in the complaint states a cause of action at all. The right to maintain an action for a separation is statutory in nature and the grounds upon which such an action may be based are enumerated in subdivisions 1 to 4 inclusive of section 1161 of the Civil Practice Act. There is no ground of ‘ ‘ neglect ’ ’ therein stated. Under this portion of section 1161, it is not the neglect by defendant of the plaintiff which provides the basis for maintaining a separation action, but rather the neglect or refusal of the defendant to *provide*for the plaintiff. If the fourth cause of action were to be regarded liberally as intended to allege a cause of action either for nonsupport or inadequate support, it nevertheless is of questionable validity since there are no facts therein alleged showing either nonsupport or inadequate support. The allegations directly dealing with the matter of providing for the plaintiff are wholly conclusory and in no way factual. Consequently, even if the court were to consider that the fourth cause of action is based on nonsupport, which in the light of the language pleaded it cannot, that would be insufficient to establish the special circumstances required to justify a departure from the general rule denying examinations before trial in matrimonial actions *(Hurwitz*v. *Hurwitz,*3 A D 2d 744; *Liebmann*v. *Liebmann,*3 A D 2d 660). The motion to vacate the notice of examination before trial is granted.

Settle order on notice.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

_____________________

No. 14-10846

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff  Appellee 

v.

DAVID HEREDIA-HOLGUIN,

Defendant  Appellant

__________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas, Lubbock

__________________________

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion June 16, 2015, 5 Cir., 2015, 789 F.3d 625)

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, JOLLY, DAVIS, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, 

CLEMENT, PRADO, OWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES 

HIGGINSON and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

A member of the court having requested a poll on the petition for 

rehearing en banc, and a majority of the circuit judges in regular active 

service and not disqualified having voted in favor,

It is ordered that this cause shall be reheard by the court en banc 

without oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will 

specify a briefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.
#### THOMPSON v. STATE.

No. 22067.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 15, 1942.

Rehearing Denied May 27,1942.

Alex P. Pope, of Tyler, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The offense is passing a forged instrument. The punishment assessed is confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of two years.

*1072The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception. Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged and waived a jury upon the trial. No error appearing in the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
exv10w23



 






Exhibit 10.23




AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT




THIS AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (the “Amendment”) is entered into as of April 26, 2005
by and between J. Barry Morrow (the “Executive”), and Collegiate Funding Services, Inc., a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware (the “Company”).




WHEREAS, Executive is currently employed as Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company
pursuant to an employment agreement dated June 30, 2004, between Executive and the Company (the
“Employment Agreement”); and




WHEREAS, in recognition of Executive’s contributions to the success and accomplishments of the
Company and to provide additional incentive for the Executive’s continued contributions and
accomplishments, the Company wishes amend the terms of the Employment Agreement as set forth
herein; and




WHEREAS, the Company and Executive agree to enter into such amendment on the terms set forth
herein.




NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and obligations contained herein, and
intending to be legally bound, the parties, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein,
agree as follows:




PART I. DEFINITIONS. CAPITALIZED TERMS NOT DEFINED HEREIN SHALL HAVE THE MEANING SET FORTH IN THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT.




PART II. AMENDMENTS.





	 	A.  	There is added a new Section 6(d) to the read as follows:






Upon a Change of Control (as defined in Section 13.3(a)), All Stock Options and/or
Restricted Shares held by Executive shall fully vest and, as applicable, be
exercisable immediately, and all restrictions on Restricted Shares shall lapse.




	 	B.  	Section 13.3(e) of the Employment Agreement is deleted in its entirety.





PART III. GENERAL





	 	A.  	Except as set forth in Section 2 of this Amendment, the Employment Agreement
remains in full force and effect.
	 
	 	B.  	This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, and each such
counterpart shall be deemed to be an original instrument, but all such counterparts
together shall constitute one and the same instrument.





[Remainder of page intentionally left blank.]




 









 








IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Amendment to be executed the day and year first
written above.




COMPANY




Collegiate Funding Services, Inc.



By: ________________________




EXECUTIVE









J. Barry Morrow

Title: Chief Executive Officer and President
#### Marco Joseph Coccellato, Respondent, v Marco J. Coccellato, Appellant.

Mahoney, P. J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Connor, J.), entered April 30, 1990 in Greene County, which, *inter alia,*denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiffs father (hereinafter decedent) and defendant were partners, with a motel in Greene County as a primary asset. There is a dispute over whether the partnership was still in existence when decedent died in 1983 in California. An ancillary administrator was appointed and sought permission from Surrogate’s Court to sell decedent’s alleged interest in the real property to defendant. Plaintiff, who is a residuary beneficiary under decedent’s will, objected to the sale and Surrogate’s Court refused permission, finding unresolved issues which required attention in "an appropriate court”. Apparently no appeal was taken. More than two years later, plaintiff commenced this action seeking an accounting and constructive trust on the property from the alleged partnership. Defendant answered, denying the existence of a partnership at the time of decedent’s death and asserting, *inter alia,*plaintiffs lack of standing as a defense. Supreme Court denied a motion by defendant for summary judgment and this appeal ensued.

We are of the view that as a residual beneficiary under decedent’s will, plaintiff is a "person interested” in decedent’s estate *(see,*SCPA 103 [39]) who can commence a proceeding in Surrogate’s Court *(see,*SCPA 2101 [1] [a]). The questions surrounding the existence of a partnership between decedent and defendant certainly concern "the affairs of decedents” over which Surrogate’s Court has jurisdiction (SCPA 201 [3]; *see generally, Matter of Piccione,*57 NY2d 278). It strikes us, therefore, that this case more appropriately belongs in Surrogate’s Court for resolution and, invoking our authority to exercise the powers of Supreme Court *(see, Matter of Joint Diseases N Gen. Hosp. [Department of Taxation & Fin.]*148 AD2d 873, 877 [Mahoney, P. J., concurring]), we transfer it accordingly *(see,*NY Const, art VI, § 19 [a]). Upon transfer, Surrogate’s Court should join as a necessary party the ancillary administrator *(see,*CPLR 1001 [a]; SCPA 2102 [1]). Since *873defendant’s alleged interest in the alleged partnership could be pursued by the ancillary administrator *(see,*EPTL 11-1.1 [b] [13]; 11-3.1; RPAPL 1501 [1]), defendant should remain as a party. We further find no merit to defendant’s contentions that summary judgment is appropriate as we find numerous questions of fact precluding summary judgment. We add that since the issues involved have been pending for several years, the parties should devote themselves to resolving this dispute and finalizing estate matters with due haste.

Order modified, on the law, without costs, by transferring the action to the Surrogate’s Court of Greene County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this court’s decision, and, as so modified, affirmed. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Mercure, JJ., concur.
#### WILCOXSON v. STATE.

No. 20075.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 4, 1939.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 8,1939.

Floyd Harry, of Farmersville, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is transporting whisky in a dry area; the punishment, a fine of $400.

The record is before us without a state-ment of facts or bills of exception. No question is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-24-1998
<CASH>                                          29,514
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   24,995
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    219,658
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               312,166
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<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          335,031
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                           213
<OTHER-SE>                                     125,720
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,142,212
<SALES>                                        588,442
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               588,442
<CGS>                                          433,945
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  433,945
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              13,325
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 16,708
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