COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Beales, Malveaux and Causey

DAVID ROBERT CANNADAY MEMORANDUM OPINION * PER CURIAM v. Record No. 1184

- 21

- 3 OCTOBER 25, 2022
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY

David V. Williams , Judge ( Michael A. Nicholas ; Daniel, Medley & Kirby, P.C., on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. ( Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Matthew J. Beyrau , Assistant Attorney General, on brief) , for appellee.

David Robert Cannad a

y (“a ppellant ”) was convicted of possession with intent to distribute over ten grams of methamphetamine , in violation of Code § 18.2

- 248 (C)(4) , pos session of marijuana, second offense , in violation of Code § 18.2

- 250.1 , 1 and possession with intent to distribute b uprenorphine/

n aloxone , in violation of Code § 18.2

- 248 (E1)

. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence failed to prove he knowingly and intelligently possessed the drugs

. After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that because “the appeal is wholly without merit,” oral argument is unnecessary. Code § 17.1

- 403(ii)(a) ; Rule 5A:27(a). For the following reasons , we affirm the decision of the trial court.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1 413 , t his opinion is not designated for publication.

1 Code § 18.2

- 250.1 was repealed in 2021 , subsequent to the offense in this case. 2021 Va. Acts. Sp. Sess. 1, chs. 550

- 51. UNPUBLISHED- 2

- BACKGROUND “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Po ole v. Commonwealth , 73 Va. App. 357, 360 (2021) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth , 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018)). In doing so, we discard any of appellant’s conflicting evidence, and regard as true
all credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all inf erences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence. Gerald , 295 Va. at 473. On May 1, 2020, Henry County Sheriff’s Deputy Cory Waddell conducted a traffic stop

on a white Mazda due to a defective br ake light. Appellant was the sole occupant of the vehicle. Corporal Andrew Kenney arrived with a trained narcotics dog in response to Waddell’s request
for assistance. Kenney and Waddell searched the car b ased on the dog’s subsequent “alert” to the presence of narcotics within it . Inside a closed nylon pouch on the front passenger seat, the officers discovered a transparent plastic baggie containing a “clear crystal

- like substance ” later determined to be 11.2 grams of methamphetamine. The pouch also contained another baggie containing “green plant

- like material,” a digital scale, and seventeen “Suboxone strip packages .” Subsequent laboratory testing revealed that the plant material was marijuana and the “Suboxone” strips were compris ed of a b uprenorphine / n aloxone mixture. The officer found additional marijuana stored in a plastic bag within the vehicle’s center console. Deputy Waddell found $2,116 in cash on appellant’s person d uring a search incident to his arrest . Appellant tol d the deputy that he had recently cashed a paycheck for $450 . He further stated that he thought he was carrying approximately $1,800, which he intended to use to pay
bills

. Appellant also said that he was driving his girlfriend’s vehicle and she had rece ntly smoked marijuana inside it. The car was not registered under appellant’s name.- 3

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At trial, Investigator Tim Brummit testified as an expert in narcotics distribution. Brummit estimated the street value of the methamphetamine found in the car to rang e from $5 5 0 to $1200, and he valued the Suboxone strips at over $500. Brummit opined that the value, quantity, and variety of the drugs

— combined with appellant’s possession of an unusual amount of currency, the presence of a digital scale, and the absence of any ingestion devices

— were circumstances inconsistent with personal use. At the conclusion of the evidence, a ppellant moved to strike , arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he knowingly and intentionally possessed the drugs found in the nylon pouch . The trial court denied the motion and convicted appellant of the offenses . This appeal follow ed

. ANALYSIS Appellant asserts that the evidence failed to prove that he knowingly and intelligently possessed the drugs discovered in the nylon pouch

. Appellant contends that there was no evidence that he knew what was in the nylon pouch, nor any evidence demonstrati ng that he was aware of the illegal character of the narcotics contained in the pouch

. We disagree. “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wron g or without evidence to support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth , 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth , 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself
whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth , 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘ any rational trier of fact could ha ve found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth , 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth , 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the- 4

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conviction, ‘the reviewing co urt is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan , 72
Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth , 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018))

. “In a pros ecution for possession of a controlled substance, the Commonwealth must produce evidence sufficient to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s possession of the drug was knowing and intentional.” Ervin v. Commonwealth , 57
Va. A pp. 495, 504 (2011) ( en banc ) (quoting Young v. Commonwealth , 275 Va. 587, 59 1 (2008) )

. “The Commonwealth must also establish that the defendant intentionally and consciously possessed it with knowledge of its nature and character .” Young , 275 Va. at 591 (quoting Burton v. Commonwealth , 215 Va. 711, 713 (1975) )

. “ That knowledge is an essential element of the crime .” Id. “Constructive possession may be established by ‘evidence of acts, statements, or conduct
of the accused or other facts or circumstances which tend to show that the defendant was aware of both the presence and the character of the substance and that it was subject to his dominion and control.’” Logan v. Commonwealth , 19 Va. App. 437, 444 (1994) ( en banc ) (quoting
Powers v. Co mmonwealth , 227 Va. 474, 476 (1984)). Consistent with those principles , we have held that a defendant’s proximity to contraband and “ [o] wnership or occupancy of the premises” where it is found are “factor[s] that may be considered in determining whether a defendant possessed the contraband .” Archer v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 1, 12 (1997)

. Here, appellant was the driver and sole occupant of a vehicle containing contraband within his reach. In addition, “[a] factfinder is permitted to infer that ‘ drugs are a commodity of significant value, unlikely to be abandoned or carelessly left in an

area. ’ ” Ervin , 57 Va. App. at 517 (quoting Ward v. Commonwealth , 47 Va. App. 733, 753 n.4 (2006) ) . In this case, the nylon p o uch contained a wide variety of valuable illicit narcotics- 5

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“unlikely to be abandoned or carelessly left in an area ” outside of one’s dominion and control.
Id. Appellant’s posses sion of an unusually large sum of cash provides further evidence of his knowledge of the presence and character of the drugs. See White v. Commonwealth , 24 Va. App. 446, 453 (1997) ( noting that defendant’s possession of “significant sums of cash

. . . s upports a finding of both possession and intent to distribute ” (emphasis added) )

. Finally , the trial court was entitled to consider appellant’s explanation of the large amount of cash as false and as evidence that he was lying to conceal his guilt y knowledge of the drugs

. See Marable v. Commonwealth , 27 Va. App. 505, 509

- 10 (1998) ( “[T] he fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self

- serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt. ”)

. In sum, the totality of the above circumstances provided support for the trial court’s
conclu sion that appellant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drugs in the pouch

. Therefore, we conclude that the trial co u rt’s denial of appellant’s motion to strike was not plainly wrong or without evidentiary support.
CONCLUSION Because the trial cour

t did not err in denying appellant’s motion to strike , we affirm appellant’s conviction s. Affirmed

.