alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Myron Jackson, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Peggy Bernheim, J.), rendered on September 21, 1987, convicting defendant, upon a plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and sentencing defendant to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 4 to 12 years, is unanimously affirmed.

We are unpersuaded that the sentence imposed was unduly harsh or severe. Taking into account, "among other things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the court and the purpose of a penal sanction”, we *280perceive no abuse of discretion warranting a reduction in sentence. *(People v Farrar,*52 NY2d 302, 305.)

Further, defendant was sentenced in accordance with his plea bargain and within statutory guidelines. "Having received the benefit of his bargain, defendant should be bound by its terms.” *(People v Felman,*141 AD2d 889, 890, *lv denied*72 NY2d 918.) Concur—Murphy, P. J., Milonas, Rosenberger and Asch, JJ.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32 Certification pursuant to
Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code In connection with the Quarterly Report of Digene Corporation (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2004 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
we, the undersigned Evan Jones and Charles M. Fleischman, being respectively
the Chief Executive Officer, and the Chief Financial Officer, of the Company,
do each hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 that, to my knowledge:  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
and  2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company. Date: May 7, 2004 /s/ Evan JonesEvan JonesChief Executive Officer/s/ Charles M. FleischmanCharles M. FleischmanChief Financial Officer
 The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350; it is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any
filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless
of any general incorporation language in such filing.
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1585

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the standard

mileage rate deduction for charitable use of passenger automobiles.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 1, 1993

Mr. RANGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase

the standard mileage rate deduction for charitable use

of passenger automobiles.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. INCREASE IN STANDARD MILEAGE RATE EX4 PENSE DEDUCTION FOR CHARITABLE USE OF

5 PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE.

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (i) of section 170 of

7 the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to standard

8 mileage rate for use of passenger automobile) is amended

9 to read as follows:
2

•HR 1585 IH

1 ‘‘(i) STANDARD MILEAGE RATE FOR USE OF PAS2 SENGER AUTOMOBILE.—

3 ‘‘(1) GENERAL RULE.—Except as provided in

4 paragraph (2), for purposes of computing the deduc5 tion under this section for use of a passenger auto6 mobile, the standard mileage rate shall be 16 cents

7 per mile.

8 ‘‘(2) SUBSEQUENT ADJUSTMENTS.—

9 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—If the Secretary ad10 justs the business standard mileage rate for any

11 period after 1993, the Secretary shall also ad12 just the standard mileage rate set forth in para13 graph (1). The adjustment in the rate set forth

14 in paragraph (1) shall be made in a manner

15 consistent with the adjustment to the business

16 standard mileage rate; except that only costs al17 lowable as a deduction under this section shall

18 be taken into account.

19 ‘‘(B) BUSINESS STANDARD MILEAGE

20 RATE.—For purposes of subparagraph (A), the

21 term ‘business standard mileage rate’ means

22 the standard mileage rate which may be used in

23 computing the deduction under section 162 for

24 the use of a passenger automobile.’’
3

•HR 1585 IH

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by

2 subsection (a) shall apply to taxable years beginning after

3 December 31, 1992.

Æ
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Digene Corporation (the
Company) on Form-10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
I, Evan Jones, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 that, to
my knowledge:



|1. |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
and
|-- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company.
|-- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/s/ Evan Jones
Evan Jones
Chief Executive Officer
February 13, 2004
# FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

## MAR - 

## 52009 "-rMAYERWH II..**n.~**mlNGTON C'l:ou .,..,.ong,rllCTCOURt' IoIJ1I\ Harvey 1. Hudson, Plaintiff,
v. United States Attorney General 

### et ai., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil ActionNo. 

# 09 0419

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court onplaintiffs

### pro se complaint and his application to proceed 

### informapauperis. The Court will grant the application to proceed 

### informapauperis and dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff, a federal prisoner now confined at the U.S. Penitentiary at Tuscon, Arizona, has filed a complaint 42 U.S.C. 

### § 1983 for $50 billion in damages and for injunctive relief. (CompI.**~~** 22-23.) He alleges that when he was taken from his cell at the U.S. Penitentiary at Allenwood
on September 9,2008, to be transferred to the prison at Tuscon, he was required to leave behind, unpacked, all his personal belonging, papers, and effects. 

### (Id.**~~** 10-11.) He alleges that he arrived at the Tuscan facility approximatelytwo months later, and that bythe end ofJanuary 2009 he had not received any ofthe belongings he had been forced to leave behind. 

### (Id.**~** 12.) He alleges negligent and/or willful theft and/or destruction ofhis property. 

### (Id.**~~** 9, 14.) Asserting that some ofthe missing papers were particularly valuable for the information they contained, he contends that his missing property is evidence ofa widespread conspiracy by the defendants to violate his constitutional rights, and he seeks the arrest and prosecution ofthe defendants. 

### (Id.**~~** 14-14).


# ..3Section 1983 provides a remedy where a person has been deprived ofany "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although plaintiffconclusorily alleges a violation ofhis constitutional rights, he has not identified the constitutional right he thinks was violated and the facts he alleges do not suggest the violation of
a constitutional right. At the most, the factual allegations in the complaint suggest negligent or willful theft or destruction ofpersonal property, a matter that may possibly be cognizable as a tort claim, but does not implicate constitutional protections. Therefore, plaintiffhas not stated a claim under 42 U.S.c. 

### § 1983 upon which reliefmay be granted. To the extent that the plaintiff seeks the criminal prosecution ofthe defendants, his complaint also fails for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 

### § 1983 upon which reliefmay be granted. Only the federal government
can bring a federal criminal prosecution. Because the complaint does not state a claim upon whichreliefmay be granted, federal law obligates this Court to dismiss this complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (requiring a court to dismiss a complaint ifit fails to state a claim upon which reliefmaybe granted). A final order accompanies this memorandum opinion. 

# L(**~** L. 

# J JjUrdC**--~----------------** United States DistrictJudge

2
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Milton Goodman, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Owens, J.), rendered May 19, 1988, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contentions that the corporeal identification *570procedure was unduly suggestive because 4 out of the 5 persons selected to stand in the lineup had darker skin than he did, is without merit. The evidence supports the hearing court’s conclusion that the lineup procedure was not unduly suggestive, given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the lineup *(see, People v Rodriguez,*64 NY2d 738; *People v Norris,*122 AD2d 82). There is no requirement that a defendant in a lineup must be surrounded by individuals nearly identical in appearance *(see, People v Dobbins,*155 AD2d 551; *People v Mattocks,*133 AD2d 89). An examination of the lineup photographs indicates that all of the participants were similar in appearance to the defendant. Specifically, they all had similar haircuts, no facial hair, and comparatively similar skin color.

We find that the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion by limiting cross-examination of prosecution witnesses concerning the drug operation *(see, People v Dickman,*42 NY2d 294; *People v Sandoval,*34 NY2d 371). The defense counsel was still able to thoroughly cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses about their drug selling business and drug involvement. Objection to questions concerning the amount of money and the number of customers obtained through the drug operation were properly sustained since responses to these questions would have violated the witnesses’ privilege against self-incrimination *(see, Matter of Anonymous Attorneys,*41 NY2d 506).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review and we decline to consider them in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Balls,*69 NY2d 641; *People v Vidal,*26 NY2d 249). Hooper, J. P., Eiber, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.
#### William Benson, Appellant, v Boston Old Colony Insurance Company, Respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Tompkins, J.), entered August 30, 1989, which, *inter alia,*denied plaintiffs motion to settle an order based on a decision dated November 24, 1981 and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, is unanimously affirmed with costs.

On December 6, 1975, plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck by an automobile insured by the defendant. He applied for and received no-fault benefits for various periods between December 6, 1975 and January 1, 1977. Payments of those no-fault benefits were limited to $800 per month.

Plaintiff sought additional no-fault benefits for the period of June 6, 1977 to December 6, 1978. After an arbitrator for the American Arbitration Association denied plaintiff’s application for additional no-fault benefits, plaintiff sought to vacate the arbitrator’s decision. His application was denied in a decision by the Supreme Court, dated November 24, 1981, which also directed that an order be settled. No order was ever settled pursuant to the 1981 decision. Plaintiff, however, did seek reargument on four occasions and each time his motion was denied.

In 1980 the Court of Appeals determined that under Insurance Law § 671 (now § 5102) a covered person who sustained lost earnings of more than $1,000 per month could recover, as first-party benefits, 80% of actual lost earnings up to $1,000 per month rather than $800 per month. *(Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.,*49 NY2d 451.) In 1982 the Court of Appeals held that *Kurcsics*should be given retroactive effect. *(Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas. Co.,*55 NY2d 184.)

Despite the decisions of the Court of Appeals which support plaintiff’s position on the merits and despite the fact that it was defendant, as the successful party, who normally would *336have settled an order following the 1981 decision *(see,*Uniform Rules for Trial Cts, 22 NYCRR 202.48; *Seeman v Seeman,*154 AD2d 584, 585 [2d Dept 1989]; *Matter of Germain,*138 AD2d 918, 919-920 [3d Dept 1988], *lv dismissed*72 NY2d 952 [1989]), plaintiffs delay for eight years in seeking to change that decision by appeal has not been shown to be reasonable. Thus plaintiff cannot now settle an order based on the November 24, 1981 decision. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Carro, Milonas, Smith and Rubin, JJ.
Exhibit 12




              BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES

                        Computation of Ratio of Earnings
                    to Fixed Charges (Deficiency of Earnings
                        Available to Cover Fixed Charges)
                             (Amounts in thousands)



                                              Fiscal Year Ended
                                    ---------------------------------------
                                    September 30, October 2,    October 3,
                                        2000          1999          1998
                                    ------------  -----------   -----------

Income (loss) before income taxes $    (548,648)$    (47,349)$     130,012
Interest expense                         66,264       58,420        59,544
Imputed interest on rent expense          5,487        5,510         5,096
                                    ------------  -----------   -----------
         Total earnings           $    (476,897)$     16,581 $     194,652
                                    ------------  -----------   -----------

Interest expense                  $      66,264 $     58,420 $      59,544
Imputed interest on rent expense          5,487        5,510         5,096
                                    ------------  -----------   -----------
         Total fixed charges      $      71,751 $     63,930 $      64,640
                                    ------------  -----------   -----------

Ratio of earnings to fixed charges      N/A          N/A               3.0
                                                                ===========

Deficiency of earnings available
     to cover fixed charges       $     548,648 $     47,349       N/A
                                    ============  ===========
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

                             FORM 10-Q CERTIFICATION

I, Marc Fierman, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Source Interlink Companies, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)), for the registrant and we have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls over
financial reporting.

June 9, 2004                           /s/ Marc Fierman
                                     -------------------------------------------
                                     Marc Fierman
Compensation Program for Outside Directors as amended April 2005



 Exhibit 10.71 
  
 

 
  
 2005 Compensation Program
for Outside Directors 
  

			
	Annual Board Retainer:	  	$25,000
	Committee Chairs:	  	$15,000/$30,000 for Audit Committee Chair
	Committee Membership:	  	$5,000
	Re-election RSU Grant:	  	6,000 RSUs (vesting 2,000 each year beginning at 1st anniversary of re-election)
	 Annual RSU Grant:
 (to all outside directors at each
 annual meeting*)
	  	2,000 RSUs (vesting in full one year from grant date)



	*	For so long as a director has options vesting pursuant to a grant made under the previous director compensation plan (i.e. program which provided a grant of 48,000 options upon
election, vesting 16,000 at each subsequent annual meeting), he will not be entitled to the Annual RSU Grant. 

  
 All cash payments shall be based on service for a full year; pro rata payment shall be made for service of less than one year. Payment shall be quarterly and may be
deferred. Deferrals must be made in the calendar year preceding the year in which services are rendered. 
  
 Equity awards shall be granted effective at the corresponding Annual Meeting of Shareholders. 
  
 As approved by the Compensation Committee April 13, 2005
Exhibit 34.17



LOGO

Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm



| |  |  |  |                                                                                                                               
| |  |  |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |  |  |  | Audit . Tax . Advisory
Grant Thornton LLP 1201 Walnut St, Suite 2200
Kansas City, Missouri 64106 T 816.412.2400
F 816.412.2404

Board of Directors

Situs
Holdings, LLC

We have examined managements assertion, included in the accompanying Certification Regarding Compliance with Applicable Servicing
Criteria (Managements Assertion), that Situs Holdings, LLC (the Company) complied with servicing criteria set forth in Items 1117, 1119, 1122(d)(3)(i)(A-B) and 1122(d)(4)(vii) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commissions Regulation AB for the Operating or Trust Advisor Services Platform (the Platform) as of and for the year ended December 31, 2016. The platform consists of asset-backed transactions and securities defined by management in
Appendix B of Managements report. Management is responsible for the Companys compliance with the applicable servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on managements assertion about the Companys
compliance with the applicable servicing criteria for the Platform based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with the
standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Companys compliance with the applicable servicing criteria for the Platform and performing
such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing selected asset-backed transactions and securities constituting the Platform and evaluating whether the Company performed servicing activities
related to those transactions and securities in compliance with the applicable servicing criteria for the period covered by this report. Accordingly, our testing may not have included servicing activities related to each asset-backed transaction or
security constituting the Platform. Further, our examination was not designed to detect material noncompliance that may have occurred prior to the period covered by this report and that may have affected the Companys servicing activities
during the period covered by this report. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Companys compliance with the applicable servicing criteria.

In our opinion, managements assertion that Situs Holdings, LLC complied with the aforementioned applicable servicing criteria as of and for the
year ended December 31, 2016, for the Platform is fairly stated, in all material respects.

/s/ Grant Thornton LLP

Kansas City, Missouri

February 28, 2017