alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1




CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14(B) AND RULE 15D-14(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350




In connection with the Quarterly Report of Auxilio, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, Joseph J. Flynn, Chief Executive Officer and Paul T. Anthony, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of our knowledge:




(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and the results of operations of the Company for the periods presented.




Date: August 15, 2011




By:           /s/ Joseph J. Flynn


Joseph Flynn,


President and Chief Executive Officer




By:           /s/ Paul T. Anthony


Paul Anthony,


Chief Financial Officer




A signed original of this written statement required by section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




This certification accompanies the Quarterly Report pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1405 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1405

   To amend title 38, United States Code, to revise the formula for 
   payments to States for care furnished to veterans in State homes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 18, 1993

Mr. Hochbrueckner introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                   the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title 38, United States Code, to revise the formula for 
   payments to States for care furnished to veterans in State homes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PAYMENTS TO STATES FOR CARE FURNISHED IN STATE HOMES.

    (a) Revision in Rates.--Subsections (a) and (b) of section 1741 of 
title 38, United States Code, are amended to read as follows:
    ``(a) The Secretary shall pay to a State amounts to offset costs 
incurred by that State for domiciliary care, nursing home care, and 
hospital care furnished to veterans who are eligible for such care in a 
Department facility and who receive such care in a State home of that 
State.
    ``(b)(1) The amount of payments under subsection (a) for any period 
with respect to care provided at any State home shall be the product 
of--
            ``(A) the number of days of veteran-patient care during 
        such period; and
            ``(B) the greater of--
                    ``(i) 30 percent of the per diem cost of care in 
                that home; or
                    ``(ii) the current per diem rate authorized by the 
                Secretary for domiciliary care, nursing home care, or 
                hospital care, respectively.
    ``(2) In no event shall the payments made with respect to any 
veteran under this section exceed one-half of the cost of the veterans' 
care in such State home.
    ``(3) In this subsection, the term `per diem cost of care' means--
            ``(A) the total cost of operation of a State home over a 
        specified period, divided by
                    ``(B) the number of days of patient care during 
                that period.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to payments for care furnished in State homes after 
the last day of the fiscal-year quarter in which this Act is enacted.

                                 <all>
```
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § 2:22-mj-186-BR (1)

§

TIMETHY MARRUGO (1) §

§

Defendant. §

ORDER ON

PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION AND DETENTION HEARING

On today’s date, Defendant, TIMETHY MARRUGO (1), appeared in person and with 

counsel, before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, for the purpose of a Preliminary 

Examination and Detention Hearing. The United States appeared by and through the Assistant 

United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas.

The government had previously filed a Motion for Pretrial Detention of the defendant 

alleging there are no conditions of release that will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance, 

as required, nor the safety of any other person and the community. The government gave notice 

that they would seek to invoke the rebuttable presumption against the defendant on the basis that 

there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed a ten (10) + year drug offense.

After consideration of the proffer and argument presented at the hearing, the Court finds 

the defendant failed to rebut the presumption of flight and danger. The government’s Motion for 

Pretrial Detention is GRANTED. The Court finds there is probable cause to believe defendant 

committed the offense as charged in the Complaint, and this case is Ordered bound over for 

presentation to the Grand Jury.

Case 2:22-mj-00186-BR Document 16 Filed 10/25/22 Page 1 of 2 PageID 18
Defendant, TIMETHY MARRUGO (1), is remanded to the custody of the United States 

Marshal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED on October 25, 2022.

LEE ANN RENO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:22-mj-00186-BR Document 16 Filed 10/25/22 Page 2 of 2 PageID 19
Revised Schedule



 Exhibit 10.2(a) 
  
 Revised Schedule to Severance Agreement 
  
 Horace Mann Educators Corporation (“HMEC”) entered into severance agreements with the following persons on the dates shown. These agreements are
substantially identical to the one included as Exhibit 10.7 to HMEC’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2001 except that (1) the multiple of the highest annual compensation received by the employee in the five preceding
years used to determine a one-time cash payment is equal to the duration listed below and (2) the specified period during which such employee’s insurance benefits would continue is equal to the duration below, and except as indicated in
footnote (a). 
  

					
	Employee

	 	Duration

	 	Agreement Date


	Louis G. Lower II (a)	 	3 years	 	02-01-2000
			
	Ann M. Caparrós	 	2.9 years	 	03-07-1994
	Peter H. Heckman	 	2.9 years	 	04-10-2000
	Douglas W. Reynolds	 	2.9 years	 	11-12-2001
	Paul D. Andrews	 	2 years	 	07-02-2001
	Bret A. Conklin	 	2 years	 	01-14-2002
	Dwayne D. Hallman	 	2 years	 	01-21-2003
	William S. Hinkle	 	2 years	 	07-19-1999
	Deborah F. Kretchmar	 	2 years	 	06-17-2002
	Ricky A. Renner	 	2 years	 	07-09-2001
	Robert E. Rich	 	2 years	 	02-19-2001
	Peter M. Titone	 	2 years	 	01-08-2001



	(a)	HMEC entered into a severance agreement with Louis G. Lower II as set forth in the Lower Employment Agreement contained in Exhibit 10.12 to HMEC’s Annual Report on Form 10-K
for the year ended December 31, 1999.
NUMBER 13-15-00419-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

GLENWOOD HAMMONS, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 377th District Court 

of Victoria County, Texas.

ORDER TO FILE APPELLATE BRIEF

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Longoria

Order Per Curiam

This cause is currently before the Court on appellant's third motion for extension of 

time to file the brief. The reporter’s record was filed on January 4, 2016, and appellant’s 

brief was originally due to be filed thirty days thereafter. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.6(a). 

This Court has previously granted appellant two extensions of time totaling 131 days to 
2

file the brief, and appellant now seeks an additional 30 days, until July 28, 2016, to file the 

brief. 

The Court GRANTS appellant’s third motion for extension to file the brief and 

ORDERS the Honorable Arnold Hayden to file the brief on or before July 28, 2016. The 

Court looks with disfavor on the delay caused by counsel’s failure to timely file a brief in 

this matter. No further extensions will be granted absent exigent circumstances. If 

counsel fails to file the brief within the specified period of time, the Court will act 

appropriately to ensure that appellant's rights are protected. See id. R. 38.8(b)(4). 

PER CURIAM

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

7th day of July, 2016.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-K
FOR THE YEAR ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           1,550
<SECURITIES>                                     3,407
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,846
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (1,515)
<INVENTORY>                                     10,122
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                31,505
<PP&E>                                           8,120
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (4,581)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  41,144
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,680
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        17,262
<OTHER-SE>                                      17,333
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    41,144
<SALES>                                         53,151
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                53,151
<CGS>                                           22,956
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   22,956
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                31,344
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (576)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       689
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                142
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       142
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.03
        

</TABLE>
#### Edward A. Metzger et al., Respondents, v William W. Esseks et al., Appellants.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shirley Fingerhood, J.), entered on or about November 28, 1989, which granted plaintiffs’ motion to vacate a default, restored defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 510 (3) to the calendar, and denied said motion, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants argue the court improperly exercised its discretion in vacating plaintiffs’ default on the basis of an affirmation by plaintiffs’ counsel which alleged only that his office had never received service of the motion papers. We find the affidavit of service by defendants’ attorney’s employee (Jean Poplawski), dated November 3, 1989, insufficient in that it does not specifically state that the affiant herself mailed the letter enclosing the motion papers, nor does it recite that the letter was mailed to plaintiffs’ attorneys at their designated address in the manner specified by CPLR 2103 (b) (2) *(see, Coonradt v Averill Park Cent. School Dist.,*73 AD2d 747).

We further find the court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendants’ motion to change venue from New York County to Suffolk County for the convenience of witnesses. The witnesses to be called by defendants are expected to *288testify only as to the damages arising from defendants’ alleged legal malpractice. The complaint alleges defendant attorneys purportedly failed to serve a necessary party in a CPLR article 78 proceeding, resulting in dismissal of the proceeding as time barred. The basis of the article 78 proceeding was to determine plaintiffs’ rights to construct a single-family residence on a parcel of land located on Dune Road, in Quogue, New York. Defendants expect their witnesses to give testimony regarding the feasibility and impediments to the development on the subject parcel of land. By this testimony, defendants seek to establish the lack of actual damages suffered by plaintiffs as a consequence of the legal malpractice.

Since the witnesses proffered by defendants are essentially experts who will give testimony relating to damages only *(see, Wecht v Glen Distribs. Co.,*112 AD2d 891, 893), we find the court properly exercised its discretion in retaining venue in New York County.

Defendants’ argument that Suffolk County is the proper forum for this action because the judgment would affect the use or enjoyment of real property located in Suffolk County *(see,*CPLR 507) is unpersuasive. The property here is unaffected by the instant action which merely seeks damages for alleged legal malpractice. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Carro, Milonas and Rubin, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Karl W. and Another, Children Alleged to be Abused.

Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs and matter remitted to Onondaga County Family Court for a new fact-finding hearing. Memorandum: In this abuse and neglect proceeding, Family Court erred in ordering the Law Guardian, appointed pursuant to Family Court Act §§ 241 and 249 (a), to refrain from contacting the children whom she represented. We cannot perceive how the Law Guardian can act effectively to protect children in the course of a fact-finding hearing in the absence of meaningful communication with them *(see generally, Matter of Orlando F.,*40 NY2d 103, 112). Thus, Family Court’s order, under the circumstances of this case, deprived the children of effective assistance of counsel *(see, Matter of Karl S.,*118 AD2d 1002, 1003). Further, we find that the court did not err in denying the Law Guardian’s recusal application *(see, People v Moreno,*70 NY2d 403). In view of our determination, we do not address petitioner’s and the Law Guardian’s remaining contentions. (Appeal from order of Onondaga County Family Court, McLaughlin, J.—child ? abuse.) Present—Denman, ? J. P., Boomer, Pine, Davis and Lowery, JJ.
Exhibit 32.03

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 1350 OF CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18 OF
THE UNITED STATES CODE

I, Gregg Buckbinder, the Chief Financial and Operating Officer and principal
financial officer of Millburn Ridgefield Corporation, the Managing Owner of The
Millburn World Resource Trust (the "Trust"), certify that (i) the Quarterly
Report of the Trust on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2006 fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in such Quarterly Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Trust.

/s/ Gregg Buckbinder
--------------------
Gregg Buckbinder
Chief Financial and Operating Officer
August 14, 2006
Sanitized Copy

Sanitized Copy Attachment 6 Manufacturing Process
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 165 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 165

    To amend title 10, United States Code, to require an element in 
preseparation counseling for members of the Armed Forces on assistance 
  and support services for caregivers of certain veterans through the 
                    Department of Veterans Affairs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 17, 2017

  Mr. Rounds introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
              referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend title 10, United States Code, to require an element in 
preseparation counseling for members of the Armed Forces on assistance 
  and support services for caregivers of certain veterans through the 
                    Department of Veterans Affairs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Caregiver Program Information 
Dissemination Act of 2017''.

SEC. 2. ELEMENT IN PRESEPARATION COUNSELING FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED 
              FORCES ON ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT SERVICES FOR CAREGIVERS 
              OF CERTAIN VETERANS THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 
              AFFAIRS.

    Section 1142(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(18) A description, developed in consultation with the 
        Secretary of Veterans Affairs, of the assistance and support 
        services for family caregivers of eligible veterans under the 
        program conducted by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs pursuant 
        to section 1720G of title 38, including the veterans covered by 
        the program, the caregivers eligible for assistance and support 
        through the program, and the assistance and support available 
        through the program.''.
                                 <all>
```
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-40025

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Agusto Lazo-Aguirre, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:16-CR-15-1

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Agusto Lazo-Aguirre, federal prisoner # 15209-002, appeals the 

denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for compassionate release. 

He argues that he has shown extraordinary and compelling reasons 

warranting relief, given that he suffers from numerous medical conditions 

that could result in severe illness or death if he were to contract COVID-19 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 22, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-40025 Document: 00516795733 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/22/2023
No. 23-40025

2

and given that his parents are suffering from chronic health conditions 

requiring his assistance as a caretaker. In addition, Lazo-Aguirre maintains 

that this court has no basis to review the denial of relief because the district 

court failed to consider whether he was entitled to release pursuant to the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Although in the district court Lazo-Aguirre alleged 

that the proliferation of black mold in the prison constituted an extraordinary 

and compelling reason for release, he does not repeat that argument before 

this court, and it is deemed abandoned. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 

224-25 (5th Cir. 1993).

We review the district court’s denial for an abuse of discretion. See

United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). Lazo-Aguirre

has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in finding that there 

were no extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting relief. See

United States v. Rodriguez, 27 F.4th 1097, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 2022); United 

States v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 433-35 (5th Cir. 2021). As the district court 

concluded that Lazo-Aguirre failed to show extraordinary and compelling 

circumstances, it was not necessary for the court to address the § 3553(a) 

factors. See United States v. Jackson, 27 F.4th 1088, 1093 n.8 (5th Cir. 2022).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Case: 23-40025 Document: 00516795733 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/22/2023
II

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1513

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 5 (legislative day, April 19), 1993

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and

Public Works

SEPTEMBER 20 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 7), 1993

Committee discharged

AN ACT

To designate the United States courthouse located at 10th

and Main Streets in Richmond, Virginia, as the ‘‘Lewis

F. Powell, Jr. United States Courthouse’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

4 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE.

5 The United States courthouse located at 10th and

6 Main Streets in Richmond, Virginia, is designated as the

7 ‘‘Lewis F. Powell, Jr. United States Courthouse’’.

8 SEC. 2. LEGAL REFERENCES.

9 Any references in any law, regulation, document,

10 record, map, or other paper of the United States to the
2

•HR 1513 CDS

1 courthouse referred to in section 1 is deemed to be a ref2 erence to the ‘‘Lewis F. Powell, Jr. United States Court3 house’’.

Passed the House of Representatives May 4, 1993.

Attest: DONNALD K. ANDERSON,

Clerk.