alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1 Section 906 Certification




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual Report of Golden Eagle International, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K, Amendment No. 1 for the period ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Terry C. Turner, Principal Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)          The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




Date: June 13, 2011
/s/ Terry C. TurnerTerry C. TurnerPrincipal Executive Officer





This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the registrant for the purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. This certification shall not be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of this Report), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.





A signed original of this written statement required by §906 has been provided to the registrant and will be retained by the registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Rice, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously reversed on the law and indictment dismissed. Memorandum: On appeal from his conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, defendant argues that the search of the home of his fiancée (now his wife) violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Defendant has standing to contest the warrantless entry and search of his fiancée’s house. The uncontroverted testimony at the suppression hearing established that defendant was virtually a daily visitor, had a paternal relationship with her son, slept there 5 to 10 nights per month, and, at the time of the search, had been entrusted with the premises in the absence of his fiancée. Thus, defendant established that he was a regular and frequent overnight guest who may have stayed at his fiancée’s home the night before the search. In those circumstances, we conclude that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home *(Minnesota v Olson,*495 US —, —, 110 S Ct 1684, 1687-1690; *United States v Sangineto-Miranda,*859 F2d 1501, 1510; *United States v Haydel,*649 F2d 1152, 1155, *mod on other grounds*664 F2d 84, *cert denied*455 US 1022; *State v Corpier,*793 SW2d 430 [Mo]; *State v Carter,*22 Conn App 118, 576 A2d 572).

*902Turning to the propriety of the entry and search, we conclude that it violated the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted without a warrant or probable cause, on the basis of an anonymous tip of unconfirmed reliability *(see, People v Johnson,*66 NY2d 398; *People v Bigelow,*66 NY2d 417; *People v Elwell,*50 NY2d 231, 241). The suspicion of "burglary” justification raised by the People at the suppression hearing does not accord with the facts of this case. Finally, the People’s reliance on the exigent circumstances doctrine is unavailing because it does not excuse the lack of probable cause *(see, People v Burr,*124 AD2d 5, 8, *affd*70 NY2d 354, 360, *cert denied*485 US 989). (Appeal from judgment of Onondaga County Court, Cunningham, J.—criminal possession of controlled substance, first degree.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Denman, Green, Balio and Davis, JJ.
#### Patricia A. Gray, Respondent, v Paul Pashkow, Appellant.

Yesawich, Jr., J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Torraca, J.), entered February 6, 1990 in Sullivan County, which granted plaintiffs motion for, *inter alia,*a protective order.

In 1966, plaintiff and defendant executed a separation *850agreement, subsequently incorporated into the parties’ foreign divorce decree, by the terms of which defendant obligated himself to pay all maintenance, education, medical and dental costs for the parties’ son, who was born with learning and other disabilities. Claiming that defendant failed to meet this financial obligation, plaintiff instituted an action in 1989 to recover the amounts she purportedly expended supporting her son since 1983. After answering, defendant, utilizing a demand for a bill of particulars and various disclosure techniques, sought, among other things, information regarding plaintiffs income tax returns for the years 1983 through 1988. Supreme Court summarily granted plaintiffs request for a protective order; defendant appeals.

At issue is whether Supreme Court properly denied disclosure of plaintiffs income tax returns and information contained therein for the years involved. We affirm.

Defendant failed to make the requisite showing that the returns were relevant to any defense he might assert for his asserted breach of the separation agreement *(see, Matthews Indus. Piping Co. v Mobil Oil Corp.,*114 AD2d 772; *O’Grady v Burr,*2 AD2d 712, 713). Defendant requested plaintiffs tax information because he believed plaintiff deducted the expenses she had incurred for their son’s care (those same expenses for which she seeks reimbursement from defendant). Whether these payments were in fact deducted, however, is irrelevant to defendant’s liability, which hinges on whether he breached the parties’ agreement.

Generally, damages are computed as of the time the contract is breached *(Rodriguez & Co. v Moore-McCormack Lines,*32 NY2d 425, 429; *Orange & Rockland Utils. v New England Petroleum Corp.,*60 AD2d 233, 235). Any subsequent collateral recovery supplied by a source other than the transgressor does not alter the amount of the breaching party’s obligation (36 NY Jur 2d, Damages, § 128, at 220). Thus, any tax deductions accruing to plaintiff would not reduce defendant’s liability *(cf., Randall v Loftsgaarden,*478 US 647, 660).

Order affirmed, without costs. Kane, J. P., Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.
Exhibit
32.1
  
  CERTIFICATION
BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  
  In
connection with Amendment No. 1 (the “Amendment”) to the annual report of
Numerex Corp. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A for the year ended
December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
March 29, 2010 (the “Report, and as amended by the Amendment No. 1 filed on
the date hereof, the “Amended Report”), I, Stratton J. Nicolaides, as Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
to my knowledge, that:
  (1)           The
Amended Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
  (2)           The
information contained in the Amended Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.
  This
certificate is being furnished solely pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1350 and
is not being filed as part of the Amended Report or as a separate disclosure
document, and may not be disclosed, distributed or used by any person or for any
reason other than as specifically required by law.
  
  April 20,
2010
  By:/s/
Stratton J. Nicolaides
 Stratton
J. Nicolaides,
 Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer
# C_2023034EN.01000301.xml

| 30.1.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 34/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.1.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 34/3

---

Notice for the attention of NTV/NTV Mir, Rossiya 1, REN TV, Pervyi Kanal, regarding the application of Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine

(2023/C 34/03)

The Council has concluded that the restrictive measures referred to in Article 4g of Decision 2014/512/CFSP (1) and Article 2f of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (2) are to apply as of 1 February 2023 in respect of all entities referred to in point (2) of the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2022/2478 (3) and Annex V of Regulation (EU) 2022/2474 (4).

The entities concerned are hereby informed that they may submit a request to the Council before 26 May 2023, together with supporting documentation, that the decision to include them under the restrictive measures should be reconsidered, to the following address:

| Council of the European Union |
| --- |
| General Secretariat |
| RELEX.1 |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

RELEX.1

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Email: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

Any observations received will be taken into account for the purpose of the Council’s periodic review, pursuant to Article 9(2) of Decision 2014/512/CFSP.

---

(1)  OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 13.

(2)  OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 322 I, 16.12.2022, p. 614.

(4)  OJ L 322 I, 16.12.2022, p. 1.

---
#### R. P. FARNSWORTH & CO., Inc., v. ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO.

No. 9138.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 2, 1940.

*112McCORD, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

For former opinion, see 112 F.2d 150.

J. C. Henriques and Gordon Boswell, both of New Orleans, La., for appellant.

Irving R. Saal and Lawrence K. Benson, both of New Orleans, La., for appellee.

Before SIBLEY, HOLMES, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

It is urged that our language: “Not until the wall was rebuilt and the order passed to pay the $82.80 was there a final settlement of the contract,” means that payment or an order to pay is requisite to a final settlement. We do not so hold, but we say that there must be an unconditional and final ascertainment of the amount due. So long as the United States contend that the contractor must do something more and is holding back an amount, large or small, to secure full performance, there is no final settlement of the contract. It does not matter in this case whether rebuilding the wall was really a part of the contract or not, the Treasury was so contending, and was refusing payment till it should be done. Not until July 28, 1934, was it admitted that the contract was fully performed, counter claims were waived, and the $82.80 stated to be unconditionally owing. That k was at the same time ordered paid, is not essential, but plainly shows finality.

Rehearing denied.

McCORD, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
#### Marjorie L. Krupski, Respondent, v Dennis J. Krupski, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs, and matter remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings, in accordance with the following memorandum: The court erred by setting aside the oral stipulation entered into by the parties in open court *943and simultaneously ratified by written stipulation. In our view, this stipulation was a valid “opting out” agreement *(see,*Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [3]; *cf., Hanford v Hanford,*91 AD2d 829). Stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and are not set aside absent good cause sufficient to invalidate a contract *(see, Yuda v Yuda,*143 AD2d 657, 658; *Sontag v Sontag,*114 AD2d 892, *lv dismissed*66 NY2d 554) or a showing that the agreement is manifestly unfair to one spouse because of the other’s overreaching *(Christian v Christian,*42 NY2d 63, 71-73). The mere fact that the terms of the agreement favor one party, without more, does not provide a sufficient basis for setting aside a stipulation *(see, McFarland v McFarland,*70 NY2d 916, 918). In our view, the stipulation entered into by the parties here was not the product of the husband’s overreaching and is not manifestly unfair to the wife. Moreover, the wife was represented by independent counsel throughout the negotiation of the agreement.

We, therefore, reverse the judgment except to the extent that it grants a divorce to plaintiff, and remit the matter to Supreme Court for the entry of a judgment which incorporates the stipulation of January 19, 1988. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Fudeman, J.—divorce.) Present—Doerr, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0000943322
<NAME>                        TRUMP HOTELS & CASINO HOLDINGS, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                         187,814
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   76,861
<ALLOWANCES>                                    19,686
<INVENTORY>                                     11,110
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               267,650
<PP&E>                                       2,252,707
<DEPRECIATION>                                 238,109
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,479,114
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          225,366
<BONDS>                                      1,618,056
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     525,997
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,479,114
<SALES>                                        343,380
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               383,198
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  218,453 <F1>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                94,573 <F2>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 2,295
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              52,599
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (20,919)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       883
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (21,802)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (21,802)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Includes gaming, lodging, food & beverage and other
<F2>Includes general & administration and depreciation & amortization
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
<PAGE>   1


                                                                     Exhibit 21


                         SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT



<TABLE>
<CAPTION>


                                                   Percent    Jurisdiction of
                                                     of       Incorporation
        Parent                Subsidiary           Ownership  or Organization
   --------------------  ------------------------  ---------  ---------------
   <S>                   <C>                       <C>        <C>
   CitFed Bancorp, Inc.  Citizens Federal Bank,     100%        Federal
                          F.S.B.

   Citizens Federal      CitFed Mortgage            100         Ohio
    Bank, F.S.B.          Corporation of America

   Citizens Federal      C.F. Property Management   100         Ohio
    Bank, F.S.B.          Company

   Citizens Federal      Dayton Financial           100         Ohio
    Bank, F.S.B.          Services Corp.

   Citizens Federal      Community Development      33.3        Ohio
    Bank, F.S.B.           Corporation
</TABLE>
CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT

                                       OF

                          CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION

                                       OF

                       TRUMP HOTELS & CASINO RESORTS, INC.

          UNDER SECTION 242 OF THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW

     THE UNDERSIGNED, being the duly appointed and acting President of TRUMP
HOTELS & CASINO RESORTS, INC. (the "Company"), a corporation organized under the
laws of the State of Delaware, for the purpose of amending a certificate of
incorporation filed pursuant to Section 102 of the General Corporation Law of
the State of Delaware (the "DGCL"), hereby certifies, pursuant to Sections 242
and 103 of the DGCL, as follows:

     FIRST: The name of the corporation is TRUMP HOTELS & CASINO RESORTS, INC.

     SECOND: The amendment affected hereby was duly authorized by the Company's
Board of Directors and stockholders, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 242 of the DGCL.

     THIRD: The Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Company
is hereby amended so that Article IV.A thereof shall read in its entirety as
follows:

          A. Authorized Capitalization

          The total number of shares of stock which the Corporation shall have
     the authority to issue is 76,001,000 shares of all classes of stock,
     consisting of 1,000,000 shares of Preferred Stock, par value $1.00 per
     share (the "Preferred


<PAGE>

     Stock"), 75,000,000 shares of Common Stock, par value $.01 per share (the
     "Common Stock"), and 1,000 shares of Class B Common Stock, par value $.01
     per share (the "Class B Common Stock").


                                       -2-

<PAGE>

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has made and signed this certificate
this 7th day of October, 1996 and affirms the statements contained herein as
true under penalties of perjury.


                                       /s/ Nicholas L. Ribis
                                       -------------------------------------
                                       Name:  Nicholas L. Ribis
                                       Title: President, Chief Executive
                                              Officer and Chief Financial
                                              Officer


ATTEST:



/s/ John P. Burke
-----------------------------------
Name:  John P. Burke
Title: Senior Vice President
       of Corporate Finance
       and Corporate Treasurer


                                      -3-
<PAGE>


                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.30

                             ALON USA ENERGY, INC.

                      DESCRIPTION OF DIRECTOR COMPENSATION

         Effective upon consummation of this offering, each non-employee
director of Alon USA Energy, Inc. will receive an annual fee of $50,000 and a
fee of $1,500 per board meeting attended. The chairperson of our audit committee
will receive an additional annual fee of $10,000 and each member of our audit
committee will receive a fee of $1,500 per audit committee meeting attended.

         In addition, each independent director and each other non-employee
director who is not affiliated with Alon Israel will receive $25,000 per year in
restricted stock which will vest in three equal installments on each of the
first, second and third anniversaries of the grant date.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Antonio Rosado, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Douglass, J.), rendered October 2, 1985, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, under superior court information No. 568/85, and imposing sentence, and (2) an amended judgment of the same court, rendered October 10, 1985, revoking a sentence of probation, previously imposed by the same court, upon a finding that he had violated a condition thereof, after a hearing, and imposing a sentence of imprisonment upon his previous conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, upon his plea of guilty, under indictment No. 2080/84.

Ordered that the judgment and amended judgment are affirmed.

The defendant’s challenge to the validity of his plea under superior court information No. 568/85 is unpreserved for appellate review by reason of his failure to move to vacate that plea prior to the imposition of sentence *(People v Wilkins,*147 AD2d 601, 602). In any event, the plea allocution was proper and clearly demonstrates that the defendant’s decision to plead guilty was made voluntarily *(see, People v Harris,*61 NY2d 9; *People v Mauro,*158 AD2d 550). By his plea of guilty, the defendant forfeited his right to seek appellate review of his claim that certain allegedly erroneous rulings by the trial court violated his constitutional right of confrontation *(see, People v Taylor,*65 NY2d 1, 5).

The sentences imposed were in accordance with negotiated pleas *(see, People v Kazepis,*101 AD2d 816), and were not harsh or excessive under the circumstances *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80).

We have examined the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Balletta, J. P., Miller, O’Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.