UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUKE T. CHRISMAN, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III, in his official 

capacity as United States Secretary of Defense, 

et al.,

Defendants.

 

 Case No. 6:22-cv-00049-H

PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

Aaron Siri (admitted PHV)

Elizabeth A. Brehm (admitted PHV) 

Wendy Cox (TX 24090162)

Dana Smith (admitted PHV)

Siri & Glimstad LLP

745 Fifth Avenue, Suite 500

New York, NY 10151

(212) 532-1091 (v)

(646) 417-5967 (f)

aaron@sirillp.com

ebrehm@sirillp.com

wcox@sirillp.com

dsmith@sirillp.com

Christopher Wiest (admitted PHV)

Chris Wiest, Atty at Law, PLLC 

25 Town Center Boulevard, Suite 104

Crestview Hills, KY 41017

(513) 257-1895 (v)

(859) 495-0803 (f)

chris@cwiestlaw.com

Thomas Bruns (admitted PHV)

Bruns, Connell, Vollmar & Armstrong, LLC

4555 Lake Forest Drive, Suite 330

Cincinnati, OH 45242

(513) 312-9890 (v)

tbruns@bcvalaw.com

John C. Sullivan

S|L LAW PLLC

Texas Bar Number: 24083920 

610 Uptown Boulevard, Suite 2000

Cedar Hill, Texas 75104

(469) 523-1351 (v)

(469) 613-0891 (f)

john.sullivan@the-sl-lawfirm.com

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iv

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.................................................................... 1

LAW AND ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................. 5

A. PLAINTIFFS ARE THE PREVAILING PARTY AND ARE ENTITLED

TO REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1988(B) ...................... 6

1. The Preliminary Injunction, Never Undone on the Merits, 

Prompted Corrective Action by Defendants and Is Thus Sufficient

For Prevailing Party Status........................................................................................... 7

2. The Agreed Order Is Also Sufficient to Confer Prevailing Party Status...................... 8

B. THE ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS SOUGHT ARE REASONABLE.................... 9

1. The Time Spent on This Case Was Reasonable ......................................................... 10

2. All of the Tasks Dealt with Related Claims and Thus Are Compensable .................. 14

3. The Hourly Rates Sought Are Reasonable ................................................................. 16

C. The Johnson Factors......................................................................................................... 19

1. Time and Labor Required ........................................................................................... 20

2. Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions..................................................................... 20

3. Skill Requisite to Perform the Legal Service Properly............................................... 21

4. Preclusion of Other Employment by the Attorneys Due to Acceptance of the Case . 24

5. The Customary Fee ..................................................................................................... 24

6. Whether the Fee Was Fixed or Contingent................................................................. 24

7. Limitations Imposed by the Clients or Circumstances............................................... 24

8. Amount Involved and the Results Obtained ............................................................... 24

9. The Experience, Reputation, and Ability of Attorneys............................................... 25

10. The “Undesirability” of the Case................................................................................ 30

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11. The Nature and Length of the Professional Relationship with the Client .................. 31

12. Awards in Similar Cases............................................................................................. 31

D. TIME SPENT PREPARING THE FEE APPLICATION ................................................ 34

E. APPLYING THE JOHNSON FACTORS, AN UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IS

WARRANTED................................................................................................................. 34

F. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR EXPENSES ............................................... 35

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................. 35

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................... 37

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abbott v. Biden,

70 F.4th 817 (5th Cir. 2023) ....................................................................................................... 7

Abner v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co.,

541 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................... 15

Adcock-Ladd v. Secretary of Treasury,

227 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 2000) .................................................................................................... 14

Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ.,

2003 WL 27424246 (N.D. Tex. 2003)...................................................................................... 11

Air Force Officer v. Austin,

588 F. Supp. 3d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2022)....................................................................................... 1

Alberti v. Klevenhagen,

896 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1990) .................................................................................................... 10

Amawi v. Paxton,

48 F.4th 412 (5th Cir. 2022) ....................................................................................................... 7

Assoc. Builders & Contractors of La., Inc. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd.,

919 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1990) .................................................................................................... 35

Blanchard v. Bergeron,

489 U.S. 87 (1989).................................................................................................................... 10

Blum v. Stenson,

465 U.S. 886 (1984).................................................................................................................. 16

BST Holdings, LLC v. OSHA,

17 F.4th 604 (5th Cir. 2021) ..................................................................................................... 24

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,

532 U.S. 598 (2001)................................................................................................................ 6, 9

Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist.,

1999 WL 1131554, at *5 (5th Cir. 1999) ..................................................................... 14, 15, 16

Colonel Fin. Mgmt. Officer v. Austin,

622 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (M.D. Fl. 2022)........................................................................................ 2

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v

Cruz v. Hauck,

762 F.2d 1233 (1985)............................................................................................................ 6, 34

Dearmore v. City of Garland,

519 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................. 7, 8

Doster v. Kendall,

48 F.4th 608 (6th Cir. 2022) ....................................................................................................... 2

Doster v. Kendall,

54 F.4th 398 (6th Cir. 2022) ..................................................................................... 2, 22, 30, 32

Doster v. Kendall,

342 F.R.D. 117 (S.D. Ohio 2022)............................................................................................... 2

Doster v. Kendall,

596 F.Supp.3d 995 (S.D. Ohio 2022) ......................................................................................... 2

Fischer v. Thomas,

52 F.4th 303 (6th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................................... 22, 28

Fox v. Vice,

563 U.S. 826 (2011).................................................................................................................. 15

Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra,

2023 WL 4462049, *5, --- F.Supp.3d --- (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2023) ................................ passim

Grisham v. City of Fort Worth,

837 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................... 9

Groff v. Dejoy, (Groff v. DeJoy,

143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023).............................................................................................................. 30

Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424 (1983).................................................................................................... 6, 9, 14, 15

Hill v. Schilling,

2022 WL 17178739 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2022)....................................................................... 34

Hopwood v. Texas,

236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000) .................................................................................................... 32

Human Rights Def. Ctr. v. Ballard,

2020 WL 2513822, at *2 (E.D. Ky. May 15, 2020)................................................................. 11

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Jacobson v. Massachusetts,

197 U.S. 11 (1905).................................................................................................................... 21

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,

488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) ........................................................................................ 10, 19, 20

Johnson v. Sw. Rsch. Inst.,

No. 5:15-297, 2019 WL 4003106, at *21 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2019)..................................... 33

Kassim v. City of Schenectady,

415 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................................... 14

Kendall v. Doster,

2023 WL 8531840 (Dec. 11, 2023)............................................................................................ 2

Kostić v. Tex. A&M Univ. - Commerce,

No. 3:10-cv-02265-M, 2015 WL 9997211, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2015).................... 33, 34

Lefemine v. Wideman,

568 U.S. 1 (2012)........................................................................................................................ 6

Longden v. Sunderman,

979 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1992)..................................................................................................... 9

Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom,

50 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 1995) ...................................................................................................... 10

McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc.,

649 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2011) ........................................................................................ 16, 17, 32

Midcap Media Fin., LLC v. Pathway Data, Inc.,

2018 WL 7890668, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2018) .............................................................. 33

Mid-Continent Cas, Co. v. Chevron Pipe Line Co.,

205 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................... 9

Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc.,

135 F.3d 1041 (5th Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................. 35

Missouri v. Jenkins,

491 U.S. 274 (1989).................................................................................................................. 10

Navy Seal 1 v. Austin,

586 F. Supp. 3d 1180 (M.D. Fl. 2022)........................................................................................ 1

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Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn,

559 U.S. 542 (2010).............................................................................................................. 5, 10

Petteway v. Henry,

738 F.3d 132 (5th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................................... 9

Pittman v. SW. Bell Tel. L.P.,

2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244268, at *29 (W.D. Tex. August 16, 2022) .................................... 33

Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. Dewine,

931 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................... 16

Poffenbarger v. Kendall,

588 F.Supp.3d 770 (S.D. Ohio 2022) ......................................................................................... 2

Roberts v. Neace,

958 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2020) .............................................................................................. 22, 28

Romain v. Walters,

856 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 2017) .................................................................................................. 8, 9

Saizan v. Delta Concrete Products Co.,

448 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................... 11

Seals v. Austin,

594 F. Supp. 3d 767 (N.D. Tex. 2022) ....................................................................................... 2

Sierra Club v. Energy Future Holdings Corp.,

No. 12-cv-108, 2014 2014 WL 12690022, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2014).................... 17, 32

Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty.,

56 F.4th 400 (6th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................................... 22, 28

Sambrano v. United Airlines,

2022 WL 486610 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 2022) ............................................................................... 32

Sweeney v. Crigler,

2020 WL 7038977, *3 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 27, 2020)...................................................................... 11

Tollett v City of Kemah,

285 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................................. 16, 17

Torres v. Gristede’s Operating Corp.,

2012 WL 3878144, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012)...................................................................... 14

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Transverse L.L.C. v. Iowa Wireless Servs. L.L.C.,

992 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2021) .................................................................................................... 15

U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Austin,

27 F.4th 336 (5th Cir. 2022) ....................................................................................................... 2

U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Austin,

578 F. Supp. 3d 822 (N.D. Tex. 2022) ....................................................................................... 1

Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp.,

898 F.2d 1169 (6th Cir. 1990) .................................................................................................. 11

Statutes

42 U.S.C. 1988(b)....................................................................................................................... 5, 6

42 U.S.C. 2000bb............................................................................................................ 2, 5, 15, 34

42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1 ........................................................................................................................ 1

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. CONST., amend. I ......................................................................................................... passim

Other Authorities

National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2023 (“NDAA”)........................... passim

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The procedural history of this historically unprecedented case is complex. 

In August 2021, the U.S. military, by and through the Secretary of Defense, imposed a 

vaccine mandate for Covid-19. (Dkt. 1.) Implementation of that mandate came through the various 

service secretaries. Id. The military offered exemptions to that mandate, which came in three 

flavors: medical exemptions, which were granted for certain conditions (and automatically granted 

to any pregnant women); administrative exemptions, which were liberally granted (usually to those 

who were separating the service or nearing retirement); and religious exemptions. Id. Religious 

exemptions, unlike administrative and most medical exemptions, were legally required under 

RFRA, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1, yet the military (the Army here) systemically denied religious 

exemptions, and did so based on generic, broad assertions of military readiness, not any individual 

analysis of the religious accommodation requests. (Dkt. 1.)

Litigation ensued over these mandates, and more than thirty cases were filed around the 

country challenging the military’s actions. As the Government touted at the preliminary injunction 

hearing in this matter, almost all these cases were unsuccessful, with courts deferring to the 

military in spite of the evidence regarding the military’s non-compliance with RFRA. (Transcript, 

Dkt. 79, at 260-261.) 

But several cases were outliers, and all were brought by experienced attorneys with 

national practices that involved religious liberty litigation, vaccine-related litigation, and/or unique 

experience with military law. In those few successful cases, preliminary injunctions issued,

preventing the military from discharging or court martialing religious objectors. See Air Force 

Officer v. Austin, 588 F. Supp. 3d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2022); U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Austin, 578 F. 

Supp. 3d 822 (N.D. Tex. 2022); and Navy Seal 1 v. Austin, 586 F. Supp. 3d 1180 (M.D. Fl. 2022). 

Case 6:22-cv-00049-H Document 156 Filed 01/22/24 Page 9 of 45 PageID 2984
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The undersigned were part of that success, being on the prevailing end of early cases, with 

preliminary injunctions issued against Air and Space Force officials. See Poffenbarger v. Kendall, 

588 F.Supp.3d 770 (S.D. Ohio 2022); and Doster v. Kendall, 596 F.Supp.3d 995 (S.D. Ohio 2022).

Several of these successful cases involved national class certification orders and class-wide 

preliminary injunctions. Specifically, a national class was certified as to the Navy in Seals v. 

Austin, 594 F. Supp. 3d 767 (N.D. Tex. 2022), as to the Marine Corps in Colonel Fin. Mgmt. 

Officer v. Austin, 622 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (M.D. Fl. 2022), and as to the Air and Space Force in

Doster v. Kendall, 342 F.R.D. 117 (S.D. Ohio 2022). And published appeals court opinions 

followed on the merits in two of those matters: U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Austin, 27 F.4th 336 (5th 

Cir. 2022), and Doster v. Kendall, 48 F.4th 608 (6th Cir. 2022) and Doster v. Kendall, 54 F.4th 

398 (6th Cir. 2022), vacated due to mootness in Kendall v. Doster, 2023 WL 8531840 (Dec. 11, 

2023).

The Army, however, given the wave of litigation, handled things a bit differently than the 

other services and adopted a wait-and-see approach. It held religious exemption appeals at the 

second review level, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (the 

final appeal level from the Army Surgeon General), for months, until mid-summer of 2022, when 

it also began systemic denials of appeals, thus triggering this lawsuit.

This matter was filed on October 3, 2022, on behalf of ten Army members, including 

officers, enlisted members, and cadets, all of whom sought religious exemptions that had been 

denied based on broad, generic assertions of military readiness, and all of whom faced impending 

disciplinary proceedings and unfavorable discharges as a consequence of those denials. (Dkt. 1.) 

There were two substantive claims: one under RFRA (42 U.S.C. 2000bb), and a related claim 

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under the First Amendment. Id. Defendants, with the full weight of the U.S. Government behind 

them, litigated the matter vigorously.

A preliminary injunction was promptly sought in mid-October 2022 (Dkt. 29, 30, 34), and 

was vigorously opposed by the Government on November 8, 2022, with the Government seeking 

and obtaining a page length extension (Dkt. 38). Plaintiffs replied on November 22, 2022 (Dkt.

46) and sought class certification and a class-wide preliminary injunction the next day. (Dkt. 48, 

49, 50, 51.) Despite the litigation, the military charged ahead and threatened impending separation 

of two of the cadet Plaintiffs. (Dkt. 55, 56.)

In light of the above, this Court held a status hearing on December 8, 2022 (Dkt. 57), during 

which the Government declined any agreement to stay its hand and cease separating military 

members while the matter was pending (or at least even during briefing). The Army took this 

position even though the 2023 NDAA— requiring the rescission of the vaccine mandate—was 

being debated in Congress at the time. The Army’s position on separating soldiers prompted the 

Court to immediately set a preliminary injunction hearing for December 16, 2022. (Dkt. 58, 60.) 

The parties then prepared for and presented a full-blown evidentiary hearing on December 

16, 2023, during which Plaintiffs put on three witnesses, and the Defendants none. (Dkt. 79.) A 

preliminary injunction then issued on December 21, 2023. (Dkt. 78.) Significantly, the Court 

further ordered that, if the Government intended to separate any Army member other than Plaintiffs 

(i.e., anyone in the putative class), that it must first inform the Court (presumably to allow the 

Court the opportunity to immediately certify the class and enter a class-wide preliminary 

injunction). (Dkt. 78, 80.)

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Legislation intervened, though, as Congress passed the 2023 NDAA and it was signed by 

the President on December 23, 2022.1 That legislation required the rescission of the mandate 

within 30 days of the enactment of the legislation by the Secretary of Defense, but it did not prevent 

the punishment of those service members who had not complied with the vaccine mandate while 

the mandate had been in force. Id. Subsequently, and separate from what the NDAA required, the 

Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army directed certain corrective action, but only for 

military members and soldiers who had sought an exemption, promising additional punitive 

measures for military members and soldiers who had not.2 Relatedly, testimony before Congress 

established that military officials believed that nothing in the NDAA prevented them from 

punishing past violators of the mandate.3

In the meantime, on February 10, 2023, Plaintiffs amended the complaint to include the 

claims of Mr. Luke Chrisman, who was one of approximately 1,000 Army service members who 

had been separated with an unfavorable discharge for not complying with the vaccine requirement 

(but who sought and had been denied a religious accommodation). (Dkt. 92.) The Government 

then engaged in Motion to dismiss practice. (Dkt. 88, 89, 96, 105, 107, 109, 112.)

The Army failed to fully accomplish corrective action for the original Plaintiffs, 

necessitating additional meetings between Defendants and Plaintiffs to resolve these remaining 

issues, —and prompting the Army through the summer to withdraw from Plaintiffs’ military 

1 See https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/legislation/2022/12/23/press-release-billsigned-h-r-7776/ (last accessed January 14, 2024).

2 See https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jan/10/2003143118/-1/-1/1/SECRETARY-OF-DEFENSEMEMO-ON-RESCISSION-OF-CORONAVIRUS-DISEASE-2019-VACCINATIONREQUIREMENTS-FOR-MEMBERS-OF-THE-ARMED-FORCES.PDF.

3 See https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/feb/28/pentagon-has-its-own-long-covidproblem-over-dropp/; testimony available at: https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings/covid19s-impact-dod-and-its-servicemembers.

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records additional unfavorable information (but again, not for Mr. Chrisman). (Dkt. 122, 123, 124, 

125, 131, 132, 133.)

This Court then dismissed the remaining Plaintiffs (other than Mr. Chrisman) as having 

received the relief they sought in this matter (Dkt. 139), noted that Mr. Chrisman stated a claim, 

did not need to exhaust administrative remedies as claimed by the Government, was potentially 

entitled to reinstatement and backpay under RFRA, denied class certification without prejudice, 

and essentially invited Mr. Chrisman to file another motion for class relief for soldiers with adverse 

discharges who were similarly situated to him. Id.

Ultimately, the case was finally resolved by the parties, after mediation, via a consent order 

on December 7, 2023, which addressed all remaining harms and involved additional concessions 

on behalf of Defendants. (Dkt. 150.) The only remaining unresolved issue between the parties is 

attorneys’ fees and costs. Id.

Plaintiffs now seek attorneys’ fees and costs, which are substantiated by the declarations 

of Plaintiffs’ Counsel, and by the declaration of an outside attorney who provides opinions on the 

market rates and work in this matter. (See Decl. Aaron Siri, Decl. Christopher Wiest, Dec. Thomas 

Bruns, Dec. John Sullivan, Decl. Jonathan Mitchell, in Appendix, Dkt. 157 (“Appx.”) at 4-139.)

II. LAW AND ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs sought relief under RFRA and obtained it. (Dkt. 1, 78, 150.) RFRA is one of the 

express statutes under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) that provides for prevailing party attorney fees. See 42

U.S.C. 1988(b) (“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of ... the Religious Freedom 

Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.] ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the 

prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”). 

The Supreme Court has addressed the importance of appropriate attorneys’ fees in civil rights 

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cases, recognizing in Perdue v. Kenny that “a reasonable fee is a fee that is sufficient to induce a 

capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case.” Perdue v. 

Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010). Given the nature and far-reaching impact of this 

matter, the resources mounted against Plaintiffs, and the novel constitutional claims presented, 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs are warranted. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs 

request the Court to award them reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 

A. PLAINTIFFS ARE THE PREVAILING PARTY AND ARE ENTITLED TO 

REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1988(B)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), a party who obtains injunctive relief is a prevailing party, even 

if no monetary damages are awarded. See Lefemine v. Wideman, 568 U.S. 1, 2 (2012). For more 

than four decades, the national consensus has been that prevailing parties should ordinarily recover 

attorney fees “unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). And the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that “special 

circumstances sufficient to justify a denial of attorneys’ fees are exceedingly narrow.” Cruz v. 

Hauck, 762 F.2d, 1233 (1985). 

With respect to whether Plaintiffs prevailed in this action, the Supreme Court is clear about 

the effect of consent decrees on prevailing party status:

In addition to judgments on the merits, we have held that settlement 

agreements enforced through a consent decree may serve as the 

basis for an award of attorney’s fees. Although a consent decree 

does not always include an admission of liability by the defendant, 

it nonetheless is a court-ordered ‘change [in] the legal relationship 

between [the plaintiff] and the defendant.’ These decisions, taken 

together, establish that enforceable judgments on the merits and 

court-ordered consent decrees create the ‘material alteration of the 

legal relationship of the parties’ necessary to permit an award of 

attorney’s fees.

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Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001)

(internal citations omitted).

1. The Preliminary Injunction, Never Undone on the Merits, Prompted Corrective 

Action by Defendants and Is Thus Sufficient for Prevailing Party Status

To qualify for prevailing party status based on a preliminary injunction, “a plaintiff must 

(1) win a preliminary injunction, (2) based upon an unambiguous indication of probable success 

on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims as opposed to a mere balancing of the equities in favor of the 

plaintiff, (3) that causes the defendant to moot the action, which prevents the plaintiff from 

obtaining final relief on the merits.” Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 524 (5th Cir. 

2008). Those criteria are met here.

As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction based upon 

an unambiguous indication of probable success on the merits, demonstrating the first two factors 

are met. (Dkt. 78.) Indeed, this Court’s 68-page preliminary injunction decision was based 

precisely upon an unambiguous indication of probable success on the merits. Id.

As for causation, Defendants mooted the action following this Court’s ruling by actions 

taken to prevent further litigation. Defendants likely will claim it was the passage of the NDAA, 

and then cite to Amawi v. Paxton, 48 F.4th 412 (5th Cir. 2022), for the proposition that causation 

is not met. But the NDAA did not moot the case. Rather, after the entry of the injunction in this 

case and after the passage of the NDAA, Defendants took voluntary steps not required by the 

NDAA, in an effort to moot the case. For example, after passage of the NDAA Secretary Austin

selectively reserved punishment power for those who did not seek religious or medical 

accommodations (but agreed to pardon those who did) demonstrating that the actual mooting 

actions—rescission of adverse actions and a policy not to pursue enforcement for past violators

who sought religious accommodations—were voluntary actions, not required by the NDAA, that 

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post-dated the entry of injunctive relief. See also Abbott v. Biden, 70 F.4th 817 (5th Cir. 2023) 

(“Secretary Austin did not simply rescind the vaccine mandate and all related enforcement 

measures. Instead, he reserved the ability to punish Guardsmen who didn’t seek a religious, 

administrative, or medical accommodation while the mandate was operative.”). Likewise, the 

Secretary of the Army, after entry of injunctive relief and after passage of the NDAA, also chose 

to make the same selective reservation of punishment power, but only with respect to those who 

did not seek accommodations, recognizing that punishing those who sought accommodations

would prolong the issues at play in this litigation. And without question, Defendants took other

actions (that they were not required to take under the NDAA or arguably even the Secretary’s 

rescission of the mandate) in order to neutralize any remaining controversies between the parties. 

(Dkt. 122, 123, 124, 125131, 132, 133.) 

Plainly, these actions taken after the entry of the preliminary injunction, and after passage 

of the NDAA but not required by the NDAA, were taken in an effort to moot this case, not to 

merely implement Congressional legislation. Thus, the third Dearmore factor is met.

4

2. The Agreed Order Is Also Sufficient to Confer Prevailing Party Status

The December 7, 2023 consent/agreed order, which addressed all remaining harms and 

involved additional concessions on behalf of Defendants, is also sufficient to confer prevailing 

party status. (Dkt. 150.) The Fifth Circuit repeatedly has held that similar orders, that are judicially 

sanctioned and require a Defendant to take affirmative steps—such as those that Defendants were 

required to take pursuant to the December 7 order—are sufficient to confer prevailing party status. 

See Romain v. Walters, 856 F.3d 402, 406–07 (5th Cir. 2017). The agreed order here was: (i) 

4 One factor that the Firth Circuit directs courts to consider on causation is whether Defendants 

appealed. See Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 524, n.3 (5th Cir. 2008). That did not 

take place here.

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judicially sanctioned; (ii) materially altered the relationship between the parties; and (iii) modified

Defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the Plaintiff at the time the relief is entered. 

Id. (citing Petteway v. Henry, 738 F.3d 132, 137 (5th Cir. 2013)). As with the SNAP benefit 

changes in favor of the plaintiff in Romain, here Defendants had to make permanent and enduring 

changes to Plaintiff Chrisman’s records that cannot be undone. (Dkt. 150.) See also Buckhannon

Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (explaining 

consent order was “a court-ordered ‘change [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and 

the defendant,’” which conferred prevailing party status); Grisham v. City of Fort Worth, 837 F.3d 

564 (5th Cir. 2016) (agreed order conferred prevailing party status).

Defendants took these additional actions (that they were not required to take under the 

Secretary’s rescission of the mandate or the NDAA) to neutralize any remaining controversies 

between the parties. These additional actions by Defendants resulted in Plaintiffs being barred 

from obtaining final relief on the merits at trial. Consequently, Plaintiffs qualify as prevailing 

parties with no special circumstances that would justify the denial of reasonable attorneys’ fees. 

B. THE ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS SOUGHT ARE REASONABLE

The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the 

amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied 

by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The product of the 

hours worked multiplied by the hourly rate is the “lodestar.” See Mid-Continent Cas, Co. v. 

Chevron Pipe Line Co., 205 F.3d 222, 232 (5th Cir. 2000). The Court may then adjust the lodestar 

for reasonableness. See Longden v. Sunderman, 979 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1992). The 

computation of reasonable attorneys’ fees thus involves a three-step process: (1) determine the 

nature and extent of the services provided by Plaintiffs’ counsel; (2) set a value on those services 

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according to the customary fee and quality of the legal work; and (3) adjust the compensation on 

the basis of the other Johnson factors that may be of significance in the particular case. See Johnson 

v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other 

grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). The lodestar method is meant to 

“produce[] an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have

received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a 

comparable case.” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 551.

The twelve Johnson factors are:

(1) the time and labor required for the litigation; (2) the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions presented; (3) the skill required to perform 

the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment 

by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; 

(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations 

imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved 

and the result obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of

the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature

and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) 

awards in similar cases.

Johnson, 488 F.2d 717–19.

Because they are undisputedly the “prevailing party,” Plaintiffs respectfully request that 

the Court grant their motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, which are reasonable under Johnson for 

the reasons detailed below. (See Mitchell Decl. ¶ 19, Appx. at 9.) Specifically, Plaintiffs seek 

$1,079,914.50 in attorneys’ fees, and $19,318.83 in compensable costs.

1. The Time Spent on This Case Was Reasonable

To calculate the lodestar amount, the Court must first calculate the number of reasonably 

compensable hours spent on the case. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 

(5th Cir. 1995). This calculation rests on whether the total number of hours claimed is reasonable 

and whether the specific hours claimed were reasonably expended. Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 896 

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F.2d 927, 933–34 (5th Cir. 1990). The work of paralegals is also compensable. Missouri v. Jenkins, 

491 U.S. 274 (1989). The standard of review for the time entries “is whether a reasonable attorney 

would have believed the work to be reasonably expended in the pursuit of success at the point in 

time when the work was performed.” Sweeney v. Crigler, 2020 WL 7038977, *3 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 

27, 2020) (citing Human Rights Def. Ctr. V. Ballard, 2020 WL 2513822, at *2 (E.D. Ky. May 15, 

2020) (quoting Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1177 (6th Cir. 1990))); see 

also Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 2003 WL 27424246 (N.D. Tex. 2003)

Plaintiffs seek compensation for the following attorneys and hours of work, the details of 

which is contained in the declarations and timesheets attached.

Attorney/Professional Hours

Aaron Siri 61.0

Elizabeth Brehm 31.9

Wendy Cox 500.1

Dana Smith 174.5

Gina Mannella 144.8

Christopher Wiest 274.7

Thomas Bruns 161.9

John Sullivan 167.6

(See Siri Decl., Wiest Decl., Bruns Decl., Sullivan Decl., Appx. at 21-139).

Although ten staff members at Siri & Glimstad LLP worked on and billed time to the 

matter, the firm is only seeking attorneys’ fees for five of those individuals. Thus, Siri & Glimstad 

LLP has not billed for 114.5 hours of its time, recognizing that those individuals played more 

minor roles and/or completed some tasks that were administrative in nature or less complex than 

demanded by the other billers. (Siri Decl. ¶ 22, Appx. at 31.)

Each of the attorneys seeking reimbursement has submitted itemized expenses and time 

sheets showing the time spent working on this case. The hours and time spent was reasonable, and 

billing judgment exercised. See Saizan v. Delta Concrete Products Co., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th

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Cir. 2006) (litigants seeking attorneys’ fees bear “the burden of showing the reasonableness of the 

hours billed” and “that they exercised billing judgment.”). 

The above hours reflect deletions and deductions made by Plaintiffs’ Counsel in good faith 

to avoid any unnecessary, duplicative, or otherwise potentially objectional time entries. See

Itemization of Expenses and Time Expended by Siri & Glimstad LLP, attached to the Declaration 

of Aaron Siri, Exhibit B, (“Siri Decl.”); see also Itemization of expenses and time expended for 

Christopher Wiest, attached to the Declaration of Chris Wiest, Exhibit C, (“Wiest Decl.”); 

Itemization of expenses and time expended for Thomas Bruns, attached to the Declaration of 

Thomas Bruns, Exhibit D, (“Bruns Decl.”); and Itemization of expenses and time expended for 

John Sullivan, attached to the Declaration of John Sullivan, Exhibit E, (“Sulivan Decl.”). In fact, 

Counsel have affirmatively indicated that billing judgment was exercised and contemporaneous 

time records kept. (Siri Decl. ¶27; Wiest Decl. ¶22; Bruns Decl. ¶20; Sullivan Decl. ¶ 12, Appx.

at 33, 77, 99, 129.)

As the foregoing declarations demonstrate, Plaintiffs utilized critical experience from 

within the Plaintiffs’ legal team in making staffing decisions and task delegations, and in ensuring 

that every aspect of this case was appropriately and efficiently addressed. (Decl. Siri ¶ 27; Wiest 

Decl. ¶17; Bruns Decl. ¶15; Appx. at 33, 75, 96-97.) For instance, Ms. Wendy Cox served as an 

Army Judge Advocate for more than a decade and was relied on for many military law aspects of 

the case; that insight positioned her to be the primary point of contact with military clients. Id. Mr. 

Wiest had experience both with some of the military law aspects of the case, as well as the 

administrative and constitutional aspects of the case, federal court litigation, and significant 

litigation of constitutional Free Exercise challenges in a pandemic. Id. Mr. Siri and Ms. Brehm had 

experience with legal issues surrounding vaccines as well as experience with the science and 

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medical issues of vaccines, which helped to formulate arguments we made about least restrictive 

means, as well as class action experience, which aided in those aspects of the case. Id. Mr. Bruns 

provided senior litigator perspective as well as experience with the constitutional aspects of the 

case, federal court litigation, and significant litigation of constitutional Free Exercise challenges 

in a pandemic. Id. Mr. Sullivan also brought to bear his substantial free exercise and vaccinerelated litigation experience and provided critical insight into the practices and expectations of 

practice in the Northern District of Texas. Id. Associate and paralegal support came from Siri & 

Glimstad LLP. Id.

Case staffing was managed by delegating tasks to more junior attorneys where possible, 

but where a particular pleading or motion involved a high degree of sophistication or particular 

area of expertise—which was the case with several pleadings in this case—work was assigned 

accordingly based on the needs of the case. (Siri Decl. ¶ 27; Wiest Decl. ¶ 16, Appx. at 33, 75.)

And, as Counsels’ declarations indicate, there was no duplication, but rather a bringing to bear of 

collective and divergent experience on a case with numerous issues of constitutional, 

administrative, and military law. (Siri Decl. ¶ 27; Wiest Decl. ¶¶ 12-18, 23-26; Bruns Decl. ¶¶ 21-

24 at Appx. at 33, 74-76, 99-100.)

At the same time, the Court is certainly aware that every issue and matter in this case was 

hotly contested by the Government. The extensive docket reflects various motions to dismiss, 

oppositions to every motion filed by Plaintiffs, attempts to delay hearings while refusing to pause 

adverse actions, violations of agreements between counsel to disclose witnesses and exhibits to 

the preliminary injunction, and the like, with the Government often extending page limits beyond 

the local rules. (Dkt. 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 59, 60, 63, 64, 66, 70, 71, 88, 89, 90, 105, 106.) All of 

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these actions by Defendants caused Plaintiffs to expend even more hours, many of which could 

have been saved if the Government were not engaging in questionable tactics.

Legal precedent is clear that where significant hours are expended by plaintiffs due to the 

litigation tactics of defendants, defendants cannot then be heard to complain about the hours spent 

contesting those tactics. See Torres v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 2012 WL 3878144, *4

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012) (“The Court notes that much of the work performed by Plaintiffs was due 

to Defendants’ choice of litigation tactics. Given the Defendants’ vigorous approach to litigating 

this case, they cannot now complain as to the amount that Plaintiffs were forced to expend in 

response.”); see also Kassim v. City of Schenectady, 415 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2005) (observing 

that “hours required to litigate even a simple matter can expand enormously” where “attorney is 

compelled to defend against frivolous motions and to make motions to compel [discovery] 

compliance”); Adcock-Ladd v. Secretary of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that 

“defendants’ obstructive and dilatory litigation tactics” gave rise to the fees incurred). That was, 

in no small part, the case here.

2. All of the Tasks Dealt with Related Claims and Thus Are Compensable

“The Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have held that a partially prevailing party may 

recover all reasonably incurred fees, even where the party did not prevail on all claims, as to all 

defendants, or as to all issues.” Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra, 2023 WL 4462049, *5, ---

F.Supp.3d --- (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2023) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) 

and Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 1999 WL 1131554, at *5 (5th Cir. 1999)). “[I]in deciding 

whether the prevailing party should be able to recover fees for time spent litigating unsuccessful 

claims, “the key is whether the successful and unsuccessful claims are based upon the same facts 

and legal theories, i.e., whether the claims are related.” Id. (quoting Coleman, 1999 WL 1131554, 

at *5). That is because “[w]hen the successful and unsuccessful claims involve a ‘common core of 

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15

facts’ or are based upon ‘related legal theories,’ then attorney fees incurred in the presentation of 

unsuccessful claims are recoverable on the theory that they contributed to the plaintiff’s ultimate 

success.” Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 1999 WL 1131554, at *5 (5th Cir. 1999).

Plaintiffs expect that the Government will argue that Plaintiffs did not win every motion 

(for instance, on class certification), and that this time should be deducted and not compensated. 

But the Supreme Court has explained that a reduction of hours for unsuccessful claims is only 

appropriate where plaintiffs “fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which 

he succeeded.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added). Moreover, “[i]n other cases the 

plaintiff’s claims for relief will involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal 

theories.” Id. at 435. “Much of counsel’s time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, 

making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.” Id. “Such a lawsuit 

cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims.” Id. “Instead the district court should focus on the 

significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably 

expended on the litigation.” Id. In assessing fees, district courts are not required to act as “greeneyeshade accountants” and “achieve auditing perfection,” but need only do “rough justice.” Fox v. 

Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). This means that a court can rely on estimates based on its “overall 

sense of a suit.” Id. As the Fifth Circuit describes it, a party need not segregate fees where “the 

fees are based on claims arising out of the same transaction that are so intertwined and inseparable 

as to make segregation impossible.” Transverse L.L.C. v. Iowa Wireless Servs. L.L.C., 992 F.3d 

336, 344 (5th Cir. 2021).

The only claims here were related and intertwined RFRA and First Amendment claims, 

meant to provide relief for everyone in the Army facing the same discriminatory tactics from 

Defendants. (Dkt. 1.) As in Abner v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 541 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2008), the fact 

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that not every aspect of pursuit of the claims were formally successful is no reason to deny or 

reduce compensation (though certainly the requested relief was obtained here: discharges were 

halted and religious believers remained in the service, and in some cases reinstatement offers made 

within the putative class). (Dkt. 78, 80, 90.) Indeed, the entirety of this case was practiced the way 

it was because the facts and issues were so intertwined. (Decl. Wiest ¶¶ 23-25 at Appx. at 77-78.)

As was the case in Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. Dewine, 931 F.3d 530, 544

(6th Cir. 2019), “the [government can] cite[] no precedent in support of this theory [that claims 

should be reduced because Plaintiff did not achieve every form of relief originally requested].”

Here, Plaintiffs pursued related legal claims with a common core of facts that applied to each piece 

of the litigation—and the Court adjudicated issues in tandem as they were related. It is thus 

irrelevant whether Plaintiffs won every motion in order to recover all reasonably incurred fees and 

costs. See Coleman, 1999 WL 1131554, at *5; Franciscan, 2023 WL 4462049, *5.

3. The Hourly Rates Sought Are Reasonable

An attorney seeking fees must request an hourly rate consistent with the “prevailing market 

rate”—the rate charged by “lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation”

who practice in the community where the Court is located. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 

(1984). The Fifth Circuit more recently added a practical adaption to the Supreme Court rule, 

providing that “generally, the reasonable hourly rate for a particular community is established

through affidavits of other attorneys practicing there.” Tollett v City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368

(5th Cir. 2002). “[R]easonable” hourly rates “are to be calculated according to the prevailing 

market rates in the relevant community.” McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 381 (5th

Cir. 2011). Generally, the “relevant market for purposes of determining the prevailing rate to be 

paid in a fee award is the community in which the district court sits.” Tollett, 285 F.3d at 368.

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“[U]nder certain limited circumstances,” counsel may be entitled to charge the prevailing 

market rate of his or her home district, as opposed to the district wherein the court sits. McClain, 

649 F.3d at 381–82. The Fifth Circuit has stated that where “abundant and uncontradicted 

evidence” prove the necessity of turning to out-of-district counsel, the counsel’s “home rates 

should be considered as a starting point for calculating the lodestar amount.” Id. at 382 (quotation 

marks omitted). Turning to out-of-district counsel might be necessary, for example, where local 

counsel is not willing and/or able to assist, or where counsel have shown they participate in a 

market requiring more specialized and sophisticated legal services. Id. at 383; Sierra Club v. 

Energy Future Holdings Corp., No. 12-cv-108, 2014 2014 WL 12690022, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 

29, 2014). Indeed, specialized experience has been required, and out of market rates allowed, for 

comparable religious liberty cases against the Government. Franciscan, 2023 WL 4462049, *5. 

Here, Mr. Chrisman and Ssgt. Schelske both have provided abundant testimony that they were 

unable to find counsel in the local market. See Exhibit F Declaration of Robert Schelske ¶¶ 3-5

(“Schelske Decl.” at Appx. at 141); see also Exhibit G Declaration of Luke Chrisman ¶ 2

(“Chrisman Decl.” at Appx. at 144.) 

The rates requested are supported by the Declaration of Jonathan F. Mitchell, (“Mitchell 

Decl.” at Appx. at 4-20) who has extensive practice experience in Texas federal courts and attests 

that the requested hourly rates are reasonable and consistent with the legal market in the Northern 

District of Texas, the substantive nature of the action, and counsels’ experience. Id ¶¶ 12-15. Mr. 

Mitchell agreed to provide his affidavit without compensation and has no financial stake in this 

matter or in the ultimate amount of recovered fees. Id.

Requested rates and years of experience (for attorneys):

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Name of 

Professional

Position Years of Experience 

(for attorneys)

Requested Hourly 

Rate (per hour)

Aaron Siri Partner 18 $975

Elizabeth A. Brehm Partner 14 $975

Wendy Cox Associate 18 $875

Dana Smith Associate 7 $775

Gina Mannella Paralegal N/A $240

Christopher Wiest Partner 18 $825

Thomas Bruns Partner 33 $850

John Sullivan Partner 11 $975

The fee charged for Aaron Siri is $975 per hour. This is the amount reflected in the 

itemization submitted by Mr. Siri and is reasonable in view of Mr. Siri’s experience and ability. 

See Itemization of expenses and time expended for Siri & Glimstad LLP, attached to Siri Decl.; 

see also Siri Decl. ¶¶ 12-15 at Appx. at 25-27.

The fee charged for Elizabeth Brehm is $975 per hour. This is the amount reflected in the 

itemization submitted by Mr. Siri and is reasonable in view of Ms. Brehm’s experience and ability. 

See Itemization of expenses and time expended for Siri & Glimstad LLP, attached to Siri Decl.; 

Id. ¶ 16 at Appx. at 28.

The fee charged for Wendy Cox is $875 per hour. This is the amount reflected in the 

itemization submitted by Mr. Siri and is reasonable in view of Ms. Cox’s experience and ability. 

See Itemization of expenses and time expended for Siri & Glimstad LLP, attached to Siri Decl.; 

Id. ¶ 17 at Appx. at 29.

The fee charged for Dana Smith is $775 per hour. This is the amount reflected in the 

itemization submitted by Mr. Siri and is reasonable in view of Ms. Smith’s experience and ability. 

See Itemization of expenses and time expended for Siri & Glimstad LLP, attached to Siri Decl.; 

Id. ¶ 18 at Appx. at 29-30.

The fee charged for Gina Mannella is $240 per hour. This is the amount reflected in the 

itemization submitted by Mr. Siri and is reasonable in view of Ms. Mannella’s experience and 

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ability. See Itemization of expenses and time expended for Siri & Glimstad LLP, attached to Siri 

Decl.; Id. ¶ 19 at Appx. at 30.

The fee charged for Christopher Wiest is $825 per hour. This is the amount reflected in the 

itemization submitted by Mr. Wiest and is most reasonable in view of Mr. Wiest’s experience and 

ability. See Wiest Decl. ¶ 18 at Appx. at 75-76.

The fee charged for Tom Bruns is $850 per hour. This is the amount reflected in the 

itemization submitted by Mr. Bruns and is most reasonable in view of Mr. Brun’s experience and 

ability. See Bruns Decl. ¶ 16 at Appx. at 97.

The fee charged for John Sullivan is $975 per hour. This is the amount reflected in the 

itemization submitted by Mr. Sullivan and is most reasonable in view of Mr. Sullivan’s experience 

and ability. See Sullivan Dec. ¶ 10 at Appx. at 129.

Total lodestar calculation:

Attorney/Professional Number of Hours Rate Hours x Rate

Aaron Siri 61.0 975 $59,475.00

Elizabeth Brehm 31.9 975 $31,102.50

Wendy Cox 500.1 875 $437,587.50

Dana Smith 174.5 775 $135,237.50

Gina Manella 144.8 240 $34,752.00

Chris Wiest 274.7 825 $226,627.50

Tom Bruns 161.9 850 $137,615.00

John Sullivan 159.2 975 $155,220.00 

Total: $1,217,617.00

C. THE JOHNSON FACTORS

Once a lodestar amount is determined, the Court looks to the following twelve Johnson

factors: (1) the time and labor required for the litigation; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the 

questions presented; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion 

of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) 

whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the 

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circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the result obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and 

ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 

717–19.

1. Time and Labor Required

The time expended, set forth above, was all reasonably necessary for this litigation: 

Attorney/Professional Hours

Aaron Siri 61.0

Elizabeth Brehm 31.9

Wendy Cox 500.1

Dana Smith 174.5

Gina Mannella 144.8

Christopher Wiest 274.7

Thomas Bruns 161.9

John Sullivan 159.2

(See Decl. Siri, Decl. Wiest, Decl. Bruns, Decl. Sullivan, Mitchell Decl. ¶ 20 at Appx. at 4-139.)

2. Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions

This case involved a First Amendment religious freedom challenge, during a pandemic,

against the Army’s systematic denial of religious accommodation requests to its Covid-19 vaccine 

mandate where it liberally allowed medical and administrative exemptions. As a result of the 

preliminary injunction obtained by Plaintiffs, upwards of 10,000 service members were protected 

from being separated from the Army or otherwise administratively or criminally punished for 

refusing the Covid-19 vaccine due to their sincerely held religious beliefs. See Wiest Decl. ¶ 30 at 

Appx. at 78. Consequently, Plaintiffs were also protected from having to involuntarily receive an 

(irrevocable) vaccine that violated their religious beliefs in order to maintain their employment 

and service. 

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This litigation was among the most challenging that any of Plaintiffs’ counsel has handled 

in their careers: it involved complex issues of constitutional law, administrative law, and military 

law. It involved the presentation (and eventually mooting out) of class certification issues. Every 

issue in this case involved contested questions of law and fact with the opposing side—represented 

by the Department of Justice—vigorously defending the Army’s discriminatory actions with every 

resource available to the United States Government. (See Siri Decl. ¶ 24; Wiest Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; 

Bruns Decl. ¶¶ 11-12 at Appx. at 11, 74, 95-96.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel also took on considerable risk in advancing this case. Before filing the 

case, strong Supreme Court support for vaccine mandates had endured for over a century. See

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). And judicial deference to the military on vaccine 

questions was also commonplace (as the Government constantly reminded the Court). Moreover, 

contemporaneous with the rollout of mandates, the climate surrounding Covid-19 vaccination 

became exceedingly controversial, political, and polarized. Attempting to challenge century-old 

rationale at a time where the decision-makers are inevitably bombarded by the media daily with 

sensationalized, contradictory content directly related to the issue at hand involved considerably 

more risk and demanded more hours to competently advance the claim than would a more 

straightforward civil rights case. Those circumstances warrant an upward variance in the lodestar.

3. Skill Requisite to Perform the Legal Service Properly

Representation options for those seeking redress to constitutional violations by the United 

States Army are limited, especially regarding ingrained military vaccination policies and 

especially regarding a vaccine regime that enjoyed widespread public support. Likewise, 

representation options for those seeking redress for religious violations and those seeking to 

challenge vaccine mandates were and are limited, with both the federal Government and many 

businesses pushing their own version of a mandate. The confluence of these issues rendered this 

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challenge risky and highly unattractive to most counsel, in addition to complicated for even 

experienced counsel willing to accept the risk. (See Siri Decl. ¶ 25; Wiest Decl. ¶¶ 12-15; Bruns 

Decl. ¶¶ 11-14 at Appx. at 32, 74, 95-96.) Because religious and vaccine issues are not typically 

seen as a lucrative practice area, there are not an abundance of options for attorneys who 

successfully perform the type of work presented by this case. (See Mitchell Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11; Decl. 

Schelske; Decl. Chrisman at Appx. at 7, 140, 143.)

Contemporaneous with this litigation, Attorney Chris Wiest, Thomas Bruns, and the law 

firm Siri & Glimstad LLP successfully litigated religious discrimination claims involving 

vaccination mandates against the United States Air Force in Doster v. Kendall, 54 F.4th 398 (6th 

Cir. 2022). Mr. Wiest and Mr. Bruns have successfully litigated First Amendment claims against 

various government actors over the past 10 years and have in just the past two years recorded 

several additional notable victories. See, e.g., Fischer v. Thomas, 52 F.4th 303 (6th Cir. 2022); 

Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., 56 F.4th 400 (6th Cir. 2022); and Roberts v. 

Neace, 958 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Resume of Christopher Wiest, attached to Wiest 

Decl., Appx. at 81-83 and Resume of Thomas Bruns, attached to Bruns Decl.. Appx. at 104-106.

Likewise, John Sullivan has extensive constitutional law and religious liberty experience. See 

Resume of John Sullivan, attached to Sullivan Decl. Additionally, Mr. Sullivan has successfully 

challenged both the federal Government in unrelated cases and vaccine mandates in the private 

sector that lacked religious exemptions. Id. Therefore, the lead attorneys involved in this matter 

were uniquely suited to successfully handle this case.

In making staffing decisions, delegating, and ensuring that Plaintiffs appropriately 

addressed important aspects of this case, Plaintiffs utilized critical experience from within the team

of Counsel. (See Siri Decl. ¶ 27; Wiest Decl. ¶¶ 16-17; Bruns Decl. ¶¶ 14-15 at Appx. at 12, 75, 

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96-97.) For instance, Ms. Wendy Cox served as an Army Judge Advocate for more than a decade, 

and so the team relied upon her for many military law aspects of the case and this insight positioned 

her to be the primary point of contact with military clients. Id. Mr. Wiest had experience with both 

the military law aspects of the case, as well as the administrative and constitutional aspects of the 

case, federal court litigation, and litigation of constitutional Free Exercise challenges in a 

pandemic. Id. Mr. Siri and Ms. Brehm had experience with legal issues surrounding vaccines, 

including experience with the science and medical issues of vaccines, which helped to formulate 

arguments we made about least restrictive means, as well as class action experience, which aided 

in those aspects of the case. Id. Mr. Bruns provided senior litigator perspective as well as 

experience with the constitutional aspects of the case, federal court litigation, and litigation of 

constitutional Free Exercise challenges in a pandemic. Id. Mr. Sullivan provided his substantial 

experience litigating both for and against the government, his unique knowledge of First 

Amendment law, a proven willingness to challenge vaccine mandates without religious 

exemptions, and critical insight into the practices and expectations of practice in the Northern 

District of Texas. (See Sullivan Decl. ¶¶ 4–7, Appx. at 127-128.) Associate and paralegal support 

came from Siri & Glimstad. (See Wiest Decl. ¶¶ 16-17, Appx. at 74.)

This case was more complex than a run-of-the mill single plaintiff/single defendant case. 

The litigation involved ten named Plaintiffs, which added considerable complexities, including 

potential conflicts of interest, client management issues, and increased communication demands. 

There were also multiple government defendants with substantial, near unlimited legal resources 

at their disposal. (See Siri Decl. ¶ 23; see also Wiest Decl. ¶ 12 at Appx. at 32, 74.) Not many 

attorneys are willing to take on cases involving issues such as those litigated in this matter. Those 

circumstances warrant an upward variance in the lodestar.

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4. Preclusion of Other Employment by the Attorneys Due to Acceptance of the 

Case

Due to the time and resources expended to successfully litigate this case, Plaintiffs’ counsel 

declined significant amounts of compensable work they could have otherwise accepted. (See Siri 

Decl. ¶ 28 at Appx. at 33.) Those circumstances warrant an upward variance in the lodestar.

5. The Customary Fee

The requested hourly rates represent customary fees charged for similar litigation. (See Siri 

Decl. ¶ 21; Wiest Decl. ¶18; Bruns Decl. ¶ 16; Sullivan Decl. ¶¶ 10-11 Appx. at 31, 75, 97, 129.)

6. Whether the Fee Was Fixed or Contingent

This case was contingent, with some limited litigation funding provided that will need to 

be repaid from any awarded fees, hence involving substantial risk by Counsel in that the only 

compensation from the clients was the assignment of any attorneys’ fee award. (See Siri Decl. ¶

11; Wiest Decl. ¶ 18 at Appx. at 24, 75-76.) Those circumstances warrant an upward variance in 

the lodestar.

7. Limitations Imposed by the Clients or Circumstances

As the Court is aware, and a review of the docket confirms, this case involved significant, 

time-sensitive handling of matters of the utmost importance, dealing with impending service 

separation for both named Plaintiffs and other members of the Army, particularly at the outset of 

the case, presenting significant challenges. (See Dkt. 1, 14, 29, 30, 34, 38, 39, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 

51, 55, 56, 57, 58.) Those circumstances involving significant irreparable harm—BST Holdings, 

LLC v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604, 618 (5th Cir. 2021)—and the handling of them warrant an upward 

variance in the lodestar.

8. Amount Involved and the Results Obtained

Plaintiffs were successful, obtaining a preliminary injunction from the Court. (Dkt. 78.)

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The injunction insured that army servicemembers whose religious beliefs prohibited them from 

being vaccinated would not lose their jobs or be administratively disciplined. Id. No monetary 

damages were sought or awarded. Id. Furthermore, this case was ultimately resolved in Plaintiffs’ 

favor via consent agreement. (Dkt. 150.) Those circumstances warrant an upward variance in the 

lodestar.

9. The Experience, Reputation, and Ability of Attorneys

Attorney Aaron Siri graduated from University of California, Berkeley School of Law in 

2005, clerked for the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court of Israel, then worked at Latham & 

Watkins LLP as a litigator for roughly five years, and is currently the managing partner of Siri & 

Glimstad LLP which has approximately sixty professionals. Mr. Siri was admitted to the New York 

Bar in 2005 and to the Arizona Bar in 2020, and has prosecuted numerous civil rights matters, 

class actions, commercial and high stakes disputes in state and federal court, at both the trial and 

appellate level. For the past seven-plus years, Mr. Siri’s practice has been heavily focused on 

vaccine policy work, with many of those cases involving civilrightsissues. See, e.g., Public Health 

& Med. Pros. for Transparency v. FDA, No. 4:22-cv-00915 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 2023) (order 

granting timely production of documents); Betten Chevrolet, Inc. v. Department of Labor, OSHA, 

142 S. Ct. 892 (2022); Let Them Choose v San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 85 Cal.App.5th 693 (Cal. 

Ct. App. 2022); Booth v. Bowser, 597 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D. C. 2022); Public Health & Med. Pros. 

for Transparency v. FDA, No. 4:21-cv-01058 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2022) (order granting timely 

production of documents); Massoyan-Artinian v Bharel, Mass. Super. Ct., No. 2084-CV-02924 

(Suffolk County Dec. 18, 2020); Gatto, et al. v. Sentry Services, Inc. et al., No. 13-cv-05721-

RMB-GWG (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2014); Buchanan v. Sirius XM, 17-cv-0728 (N.D. Tex.); and 

Freedom Coalition of Doctors for Choice v. CDC, No. 2:23-cv-00102-Z (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2024).

An appropriate rate for Mr. Siri is at least $975 per hour. (See Siri Decl. ¶ 12-15 at Appx. at 25-28.)

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Attorney Elizabeth Brehm graduated from Boston University in 2001, receiving a Bachelor 

of Arts in Childhood Elementary; from Long Island University in 2004, receiving a Master of 

Science in Computers in Education; and from Hofstra University School of Law, graduating magna 

cum laude, in 2008. She was admitted to the New York State Bar in 2009 and has practiced before 

numerous courts in New York and multiple other states, both at the trial and appellate level. She 

has more than 13 years of litigation experience. Ms. Brehm joined the Firm as an associate in 2020 

and became a partner at the start of 2022. Prior to that, she focused on antitrust and securities class 

action litigation. For close to four years, she has worked almost exclusively on vaccine-related 

policy and litigation work. See, e.g., Public Health & Med. Pros. for Transparency v. FDA, No. 

4:22-cv-00915 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 2023) (order granting timely production of documents); Betten 

Chevrolet, Inc. v. Department of Labor, OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 892 (2022); Let Them Choose v San 

Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 85 Cal.App.5th 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022); Booth v. Bowser, 597 F. Supp. 

3d 1 (D.D.C. 2022); Public Health & Med. Pros. for Transparency v. FDA, No. 4:21-cv-01058 

(N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2022) (order granting timely production of documents); Massoyan-Artinian v 

Bharel, Mass. Super. Ct., No. 2084-CV-02924 (Suffolk County Dec. 18, 2020); Freedom 

Coalition of Doctors for Choice v. CDC, No. 2:23-cv-00102-Z (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2024). An 

appropriate rate for her services is at least $975 per hour. (See Siri Decl. ¶ 16 at Appx. at 28.)

Attorney Wendy Cox received her Bachelor of Science in Nursing at Norwich University 

in 1997. She received her law degree from the University of New York at Buffalo in 2005. She 

has more than 16 years of experience as a practicing attorney for the United States Army, including 

serving as an Operational Law Attorney in Baghdad, Iraq in 2006; a Senior Criminal Litigator in 

Fort Hood, Texas from 2006-2008; a Supervising Attorney at Brooke Army Medical Center in San 

Antonio, Texas from 2009-2012; a Chief Attorney of Federal Litigation for the 4th Infantry 

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Division from 2012-2013; a Supervising Attorney for the 4th Infantry Division from 2013-2014; 

an associate professor at West Point from 2014-2016; a Supervising Attorney for the United States 

Army Medical Command from 2016-2018; and an attorney in the Office of Soldiers’ Counsel from 

2019-2021. After retiring from the military, Ms. Cox joined Siri & Glimstad, where she assisted 

in the firm’s vaccine policy and exemption cases, specifically those pertaining to military 

servicemembers. Ms. Cox’s extensive military legal experience has undoubtedly added 

tremendous value to her representation of Plaintiffs in this action. Her knowledge of military law 

and processes proved highly beneficial and allowed her to serve as the best client liaison for the 

matter. A reasonable rate for Wendy Cox is at least $875 per hour. (See Siri Decl. ¶ 17 at Appx. at 

29; see also Wiest Decl. ¶ 17 at Appx. at 75.)

Attorney Dana Smith received her Bachelor of Arts in Romance Languages from the 

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2008. She graduated cum laude from the North 

Carolina Central University School of Law and was admitted to practice in the State of North 

Carolina in 2016. From 2016 to 2021, she practiced criminal defense law, child welfare law, family 

law, and personal injury law at a general practice firm. These matters involved representing clients 

in various criminal and civil proceedings, such as misdemeanor defense, juvenile delinquency, 

probation violation, child support contempt, child support establishment, emergency custody, 

temporary and permanent custody, equitable distribution, post separation support, alimony, social 

services child removal proceedings, termination of parental rights proceedings, and general civil 

litigation pertaining to personal injury, negligence, and breach of contract claims. From 2021-

2022, Ms. Smith worked as an appeals referee for the North Carolina Division of Employment 

Security, where she conducted unemployment appeals hearings in a judicial capacity and issued 

written opinions. During her time with the State of North Carolina she presided over more than 

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1,500 appeal hearings, and as such is experienced with the constitutional aspects of employment 

law. Ms. Smith joined Siri & Glimstad in 2022 and assists with the firm’s vaccine policy cases. 

An appropriate rate for Ms. Smith is at least $775.00 per hour. (See Siri Decl. ¶ 18, Appx. at 29-30.)

Attorney Christopher Wiest received his law degree from the University of Cincinnati 

College of Law in 2004. He was admitted to practice law in Ohio in November 2004 and Kentucky 

in May 2005. Mr. Wiest has actively practiced law for more than 18 years. (See Wiest Decl. ¶ 2 at 

Appx. at 72.) While he maintains three physical offices for his firm in Ohio and Kentucky, he has

practiced before numerous courts in Ohio, Kentucky, Texas, New Mexico, Virginia, West Virginia, 

California, the District of Columbia, both at the trial and appellate level. Id. ¶ 4. Independent of his 

collaboration with the law firm of Siri & Glimstad LLP, Christopher Wiest has also recently 

recorded noteworthy civil rights and First Amendment victories against various government 

actors. See, e.g., Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2020); Fischer v. Thomas, 52 F.4th 303 

(6th Cir. 2022); and Sisters For Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., 56 F.4th 400 (6th Cir. 

2022). See curriculum vitae of Christopher Wiest, attached to Wiest Decl. An appropriate fee for 

Mr. Wiest is at least $825 per hour. Id. ¶ 19.

Attorney Thomas Bruns received his law degree from the University of Cincinnati School 

of Law in 1990 and was admitted to the Ohio bar the same year, and the Kentucky bar in 1992. He 

has actively practiced law for more than 33 years as a litigator. (See Bruns Decl. ¶ 2 at Appx. at 

94.) He is a named partner with Bruns, Connell, Vollmar & Armstrong, LLP, which employs 11 

attorneys and various other legal professionals. Id. ¶ 3. Along with Mr. Wiest, Mr. Bruns has 

successfully handled a significant number of constitutional matters in court nationwide, including 

many significant First Amendment cases and Covid related cases. See Resume of Thomas Bruns, 

attached to Bruns Decl. Given his experience and expertise, an appropriate rate for Mr. Bruns is at 

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least $850 per hour. Id. ¶¶ 8, 16.

Attorney John Sullivan received his law degree from the University of Notre Dame Law 

School where he was the Executive Editor of the Notre Dame Law Review and the recipient of the 

Farabaugh Prize. (See Sullivan Decl. ¶ 4 at Appx. at 127-128.) He was also a fellow with the 

Blackstone Legal Fellowship and continues to work regularly on cases related to the Fellowship’s 

religious liberty mission. Id. ¶ 4. Following graduation from law school, Mr. Sullivan clerked for 

then-Chief Judge Edith H. Jones of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 

Following his clerkship, he spent the majority of his career in private practice with Morgan Lewis 

& Bockius—one of the largest law firms in the world. He also spent two years as an Associate 

Solicitor General for the State of Texas. Id. ¶ 5. Mr. Sullivan’s career has involved a significant 

amount of work on religious liberty cases, including drafting Supreme Court petitions addressing 

the Establishment Clause and their underlying appeals circuit briefings in the Fourth and Sixth 

Circuits. Id. He also gained substantial experience in class action and employment law at Morgan 

Lewis, handling appeals in multiple circuits involving accommodations. Id. Finally, as Assistant 

Solicitor General of the State of Texas, he drafted Supreme Court briefs for broad coalitions of 

states addressing the interplay between First Amendment law and public accommodations. Id. ¶ 6. 

Mr. Sullivan currently owns his own law firm and practices primarily in federal courts nationwide 

with a focus on class action religious liberty cases. Id. ¶ 7. He has also drafted multiple Supreme 

Court amicus briefs on these topics, including the one in Groff v. Dejoy, (Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. 

Ct. 2279 (2023)) addressing Title VII and the employer’s duty to accommodate religious belief. 

Id. He also challenges government actions regularly and has been involved in multiple lawsuits 

involving private company vaccine mandates that were enforced without religious exemptions. Id.

An appropriate fee for Mr. Sullivan is at least $975 per hour. Id. ¶ 10.

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Additionally, the law firm of Siri & Glimstad LLP, attorney Chris Wiest, and attorney 

Thomas Bruns partnered against the United States Air Force in Doster v. Kendall, 54 F.4th 398 

(6th Cir. 2022).

10. The “Undesirability” of the Case

Vaccine mandates have become a controversial, polarizing, and highly politicized issue in 

the United States. Advocating against vaccine mandates often is not a popular position, (much less 

during a pandemic) as evidenced by the fact that both President Trump and President Biden have 

expressed strong bi-partisan support for vaccines.5

And holding religious objections to vaccination is certainly not a mainstream position. 

Indeed, refusing vaccination for religious reasons in the military can be a very unpopular position. 

See Mitchell Decl. ¶ 17. For example, after authorizing involuntary separation proceedings for 

vaccine refusers, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth stated in a press interview, “Army readiness 

depends on soldiers who are prepared to train, deploy, fight and win our nation’s wars. 

Unvaccinated soldiers present risk to the force and jeopardize readiness.”6

Additionally, this was a high-risk litigation, requiring a substantial output of resources with 

uncertain chances of recovery. As discussed above, there was adverse precedent, and the 

Government was prevailing in most contemporaneous cases challenging the vaccine mandate 

because a high degree of nuance and skill was necessary to overcome the Government’s arguments 

and resources. (See Wiest Decl. ¶ 14; see also Siri Decl. ¶ 26; Bruns Decl. ¶ 13, Mitchell Decl. ¶ 

5

 See The White House, Press Briefing by White House COVID-19 Response Team and Public 

Health Officials, THE WHITE HOUSE (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/pressbriefings/2021/12/17/press-briefing-by-white-house-covid-19-response-team-and-public-healthofficials-74/ (last visited January 14, 2024).

6 U.S. Army to dismiss soldiers refusing to get vaccinated for Covid, NBC NEWS (2022), 

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/us-army-dismiss-soldiers-refusing-get-vaccinatedcovid-rcna15039 (last visited January 14, 2024).

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9 at Appx. at 74, 33, 96, 7.) These factors made this case particularly unattractive from a risk 

standpoint. Further, this case involved ten named plaintiffs and multiple government defendants 

with considerable resources, generating additional demands and making this case less attractive 

on additional levels. Those circumstances warrant an upward variance in the lodestar.

11. The Nature and Length of the Professional Relationship with the Client

Counsel’s relationship with Plaintiff Samuel Galloway began on January 22, 2022, when 

he engaged the services of Siri & Glimstad LLP to assist with the appeal of his religious 

accommodation denial. On August 30, 2022, after his appeal was denied, Plaintiff Galloway 

engaged additional services for the commencement of this action. Various other original named 

Plaintiffs were engaged at a similar time. The Complaint was filed soon after on October 3, 2022,

(Dkt. 1), and final judgment was entered almost two years later on December 7, 2023. (Dkt. 150.)

12. Awards in Similar Cases

“[T]he attorneys’ fees calculus is a fact-intensive one and its character varies from case to 

case.” Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 281 (5th Cir. 2000). At least among Texas federal courts, 

this is indeed true. 

In cases such as this, where the litigation is highly specialized, is not uncommon for the 

Fifth Circuit to award attorney fees well in excess of the market rate. Earlier this year, the Northern 

District of Texas awarded partner level attorneys up to $1,200.00 per hour and junior attorneys up 

to $790.00 per hour. These rates were consistent with the market rates in the highly specialized 

attorneys’ home practice area of Washington D.C. See Franciscan, 2023 WL 4462049, *7. The 

court’s rationale for the higher fee was based on the following:

The Fifth Circuit has held that “under certain limited 

circumstances,” counsel may be entitled to charge the prevailing 

market rate of his or her home district, as opposed to the district 

wherein the court sits. McClain, 649 F.3d at 381–82. The Fifth 

Circuit has stated that where “abundant and uncontradicted 

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evidence” prove the necessity of turning to out-of-district counsel, 

the counsel’s “home rates should be considered as a starting point 

for calculating the lodestar amount.” Id. at 382 (quotation marks 

omitted). Turning to out-of-district counsel might be necessary, for 

example, where local counsel is not willing and/or able to assist or 

counsel have shown they participate in a market requiring more 

specialized and sophisticated legal services. Id. at 383; Sierra Club 

v. Energy Future Holdings Corp., No. 12-cv-108, 2014 WL 

12690022, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2014).

Id. at *6. 

As mentioned previously, this case was highly specialized, with very few attorneys

nationwide having the requisite skills to competently represent Plaintiffs. (See Mitchell Decl. ¶ 9; 

see also Schelske Decl. ¶¶ 3-5 at Appx. at 141-142; see also Chrisman Decl. ¶ 2 at Appx. at 144.)

Due to their contemporaneous success with an almost identical case against the United States Air 

Force (Doster v. Kendall, 54 F.4th 398 (6th Cir. 2022)), and a similar case against United Airlines 

(Sambrano v. United Airlines, 2022 WL 486610 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 2022), the attorney team 

assembled here was uniquely specialized in this area of practice and therefore well-suited to handle 

this matter. Siri & Glimstad LLP is a national law firm that provides legal services and maintains 

offices in New York City, Los Angeles, Miami, Washington D.C., as well as various other high 

cost of living (HCOL) cities. (See Siri Decl. ¶ 9 at Appx. at 24.) While Mr. Wiest maintains 

physical offices in Ohio and Kentucky, he practices in federal courts nationwide, handling matters 

in New York, Washington D. C., Florida, Mississippi, West Virginia, and California within the 

past two years. (See Wiest Decl. ¶ 4 at Appx. at 72.) Likewise, Mr. Bruns has handled cases around 

the country including First Amendment cases in various federal courts, including in the Supreme 

Court. (See Bruns Decl. ¶¶ 7,8 at Appx. at 95.) Mr. Sullivan is based out of Dallas (his office is in 

Cedar Hill) and practices in federal courts across the country. (Sullivan Decl. ¶ 7 at Appx. at 128.)

To be sure, less complex cases in the jurisdiction have been awarded lower fees. In 2015, 

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the Northern District of Texas awarded a compensation rate of $650.00/hour in an employment 

law case for an attorney with 29 years of experience in employment law. Kostić v. Tex. A&M Univ. 

- Commerce, No. 3:10-cv-02265-M, 2015 WL 9997211, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2015). Seven 

years later, the Western District of Texas only awarded $550.00 per hour on an employment law 

case to an attorney with 27 years of experience in employment law. See Pittman v. SW. Bell Tel. 

L.P., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244268, at *29 (W.D. Tex. August 16, 2022). In 2019, the Western 

District of Texas awarded $585.00 per hour in a Title VII discrimination case. See Johnson v. Sw. 

Rsch. Inst., No. 5:15-297, 2019 WL 4003106, at *21 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2019). But just a few 

months prior, a court in the same district had awarded $755.00 per hour for a much less complex 

breach of contract case. See Midcap Media Fin., LLC v. Pathway Data, Inc., 2018 WL 7890668, 

at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2018). While it is impossible to know precisely why attorney fees awards 

can vary widely, none of the above-mentioned cases are comparable in complexity, magnitude, 

novelty or risk to the instant case. 

The requested rates here are generally in line with the rates awarded in Hill v. Schilling, 

2022 WL 17178739 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2022), where the Court awarded, in May, 2022, $820 an 

hour to an attorney with 23 years’ experience. Due to significant inflation, that rate, today, would 

be $861.39 per hour as of November, 2023 inflation data, and is likely higher as of January 2024.7

 

But this litigation bears significant comparisons to Franciscan, in which the Court noted 

that RFRA claims—also at issue here—and particularly those involving challenges to federal 

policy, “participate in a market requiring more specialized and sophisticated legal services.” In 

that case, the Court awarded fees for similarly experienced attorneys, with similar claims, against 

similar federal Defendants, at up to $1,200 per hour. (See Becerra, 7:16-cv-00108-O, Dkt. 224-2

7 See https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last accessed January 14, 2024).

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at Appx. at 146; see also Mitchell Decl. ¶ 18, Appx. at 9.)

A final factor to consider is that inflation has caused considerable upward adjustments in 

legal rates in the market since the earlier cases mentioned above on attorneys’ fees were decided. 

See https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited 12/27/2023) (adjusting $650

from 2015—when the Kostić decision was issued—equates to $853.99 in November of 2023, 

which is the latest month available). But an inflation adjustment alone does not adjust for the 

additional experience that Plaintiffs’ attorneys would have obtained in the last few years, nor does 

it account for general market adjustments to rates in the relevant market which have increased 

somewhat significantly in the past two years, all of which make the requested rates in this matter 

fair, reasonable, and appropriate. (See Mitchell Decl. ¶ 16 at Appx. at 8.)

D. TIME SPENT PREPARING THE FEE APPLICATION

Prevailing parties are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for time spent preparing their fee 

application. See Cruz v. Hauck, 762 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th Cir. 1985) (“It is settled that a prevailing 

plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees for the effort entailed in litigating a fee claim and securing 

compensation”). We will submit time spent on this motion and on the Reply in declarations 

submitted with our Reply.

E. APPLYING THE JOHNSON FACTORS, AN UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IS 

WARRANTED

Once lodestar is determined, the Court may adjust the fees either downward or upward 

using the Johnson factors. Courts have often reduced for poor result or waste of time. See Migis v. 

Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998). Here, however, the opposite is true. 

Plaintiffs achieved a preliminary victory in the form of the injunction. Following this win, the case 

as a whole was settled prior to trial via consent order, with all harms against Plaintiffs restored. 

The application of the Johnson factors warrant an upward adjustment.

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F. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR EXPENSES

Out of pocket expenses and costs have been advanced, to include travel and airfare 

expenses, hotel expenses, copy charges for exhibit books, and similar routine expenses. For Siri & 

Glimstad LLP necessary and customary coststotaling $11,156.96 have been incurred as of the filing 

of this brief in connection with this case. (See Decl. Siri ¶ 30 at Appx. at 34.) Mr. Wiest has 

incurred necessary and customary costs of $5,947.36 in this matter. (See Decl. Wiest ¶¶ 27, 34, 

Exhibit 2, invoice at Appx. at 78-79.) Mr. Bruns has incurred necessary and customary costs of

$854.76 in this matter. (Decl. Bruns ¶¶ 25, 32, Exhibit 2, invoice at Appx. at 100-101, 104.) Mr. 

Sullivan has incurred necessary and customary costs of $1,359.75 in this matter. (Decl. Sullivan ¶ 

12, Exhibit 2 at Appx. at 129, 134.) Thus, total expenses and costs sought are $19,318.83.

Reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, including charges for travel, are recoverable in § 1988 

attorneys’ fee awards because they are part of the expenses normally charged to a client. See Assoc. 

Builders & Contractors of La., Inc. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1990).

That is true for the expenses sought herein. (See Mitchell Decl. ¶ 23 at Appx. at 11.)

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court award reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses, 

totaling $1,079,914.50 in fees, and $19,318.83 in expenses, as sought herein, plus any Johnson

enhancement the Court believes warranted.

Dated: January 22, 2024 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/Aaron Siri

Aaron Siri (admitted PHV)

Elizabeth A. Brehm (admitted PHV) 

Wendy Cox (TX 24090162)

Dana Smith (admitted PHV)

Siri & Glimstad LLP

745 Fifth Avenue, Suite 500

New York, NY 10151

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36

(212) 532-1091 (v)

(646) 417-5967 (f)

aaron@sirillp.com

ebrehm@sirillp.com

wcox@sirillp.com

dsmith@sirillp.com

Christopher Wiest (admitted PHV)

Chris Wiest, Atty at Law, PLLC 

25 Town Center Boulevard, Suite 104

Crestview Hills, KY 41017

(513) 257-1895 (vc)

(859) 495-0803 (f)

chris@cwiestlaw.com

Thomas Bruns (admitted PHV)

Bruns, Connell, Vollmar & Armstrong, LLC

4555 Lake Forest Drive, Suite 330

Cincinnati, OH 45242

(513) 312-9890 (vt)

tbruns@bcvalaw.com

John C. Sullivan

S|L LAW PLLC

Texas Bar Number: 24083920 

610 Uptown Boulevard, Suite 2000

Cedar Hill, Texas 75104

(469) 523–1351 (v)

(469) 613-0891 (f)

john.sullivan@the-sl-lawfirm.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 22, 2024, a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs’ Brief in 

Support of Their Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs was served by CM/ECF on all counsel or 

parties of record.

/s/Aaron Siri

Aaron Siri

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