### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15

– 0752
Filed February 10 , 20 1 7 Amended April 19, 2017
STATE OF IOWA , Appellee ,

vs.
JAYEL ANTRONE COLEMAN , Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
Christine Dalton Ploof, District Associate Judge.

Defendant appeals conviction for driving while barred. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
REVERSED.

Micki M. Meier of Meier Law Firm, Davenport , for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Robert C. Bradfield and Steve Berger, As sistant County Attorneys , for appellee.2

APPEL , Justice
. In this case, we consider whether a law enforcement officer, after making a valid traffic stop supported by rea sonable suspicion that an
offens e may be being committed, must terminate the stop whe n the underlying reason for the stop is no longer present. For the reasons expressed below, we hold that under the search and seizure provision of

a rticle I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, the stop must end when
reasonable suspicion is no longer pres ent.
I. Factual and Procedural Background. On the evening of August 18, 2014, Officer James Morris was parked along Highway 61 in Eldridge, Iowa , conducting random computer checks on the license plates of passing motorists to see if the
vehicle was reported stolen or if there were outstanding warrants
associated w ith the owner of the vehicle. His check of the license plate of a vehicle that passed him revealed that the f emale registered owner, Arvis Quinn, ha d a suspended driver’s license.
Because it was dark, Morris could not determine when the vehicle passed him whether the driver was male or female. Morris pulled the vehicle registered to Quinn over to investigate the possibility that Quinn was driving the vehicle while her license was under sus pension. As Morris approached the vehicle, it was clear to Morris that the driver was male, not female. Morris did not terminate the stop upon determining that Quinn was not the driver of the vehicle. Instead, Morris proceeded to ask the
driver of the v ehicle, Jayel Coleman , for his license, registration, and proof of insurance. Coleman did not produce a registration but did produce “an Iowa ID.” Coleman stated that he was driving a vehicle he
had borrowed from his sister. At the time Morris made his requests,3 Morris no longer had reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense had been
committed. Based on Coleman’s identification, Morris determined that Coleman was driving while barred in violation of Iowa Code section s 321.55 5(1) and 32 1.56 1 (2013) . He was so charged. Coleman filed a pretrial motion to sup press with the district court. The district court denied the motion. After a bench trial, Colema n was convicted of the
offense. Coleman appealed. We transferred the case to the co urt of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Coleman sought further review, which we granted. For the reasons expressed below, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and reverse the judgment of
the district court

. II. Standard of Review.
We review the district court’s de nial of a motion to suppress on constitutional grounds de novo . State v

. Tyler , 867 N.W.2d 136, 152 (Iowa 201 5 ). In reviewing a search and seizure dispute under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, we construe the provision “in a broad and liberal spirit.” State v. Height , 117 Iowa 650, 657, 661, 91 N.W. 935,
937

– 38 (1902) (construing fundamental guarant ees, like the right against
self

- incrimination, broadly and liberally) . We strongly favor the warrant requirement, subject only to “jealously and carefully drawn exceptions.” State v. Strong , 493 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1992); accord State v. Ochoa , 792 N. W.2d 260, 285 (Iowa 2010). In interpreting article I, section 8, we may look to federal caselaw, the case law of other states, the dissenting opinions of state and federal courts, and to secondary materials for their persuasive power. State v. Short , 851 N.W.2d 474, 481 (Iowa 2014).4

III. Issue Preservation.
We must initially confront issue preservation. In the district court proceedings, Coleman did not identify either the Iowa or the Federal
C onstitution in support of his motion to suppress. Further, the district court, in its ruling, simply stated that the motion to suppress was
denied. On appeal, Coleman cites both a rticle I, section 8 of the Iowa
C onstitution and the Fourth Amendment. Coleman essentially makes the same argument under both constit utional provisions

— namely, that
the seizure of Colem an could not be constitutionally extended once the underlying reason for the stop was resolved. The State does not contest error preservation. In its briefing on appeal, the State recognizes that Co lema n has made claims under

a rticle I, section 8 and the Fourth Amendment. Like Coleman, the S tate makes the same argument under both constitutional provisions. The
S tate asserts that prolonging the stop to ask for a driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance is permissible. We find the state constitutional issue is minimally preserved. We have held that whe n a defendant in the trial court only identifies the Fourth Amendment as the basis for a search and seizure claim, the state constitutional claim has not been preserved at the district court. State v.
Prusha , 874 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Iowa 2016). 1

1 As in Prusha , counsel here does not make a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in this appeal. When trial counsel fails to preserve an issue below, appellate counsel may, of course, on appeal assert a claim of ineffective assistance. State v. Thorndike , 860 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa 2015). When the ineffective

- assistance claim does not require further development of the factual record, we may decide the claim on direct appeal even though the underlying issue was not preserved in the trial court. Id. When the c laim of ineffective assistance cannot be resolved on the record, however, we will decline to rule on direct appeal and a party may file an action for postconviction5 Here, however, the defendant did not identify either constitution in
the trial court although it was apparent that he was raising a search and
seizure claim. This raises a different preservation question than that presented in Prusha. We have said that w hen a party brings a constitutional claim but fails to identify whether the party is proceeding
under the Iowa or the Federal C onstitution, claims under both the Iowa and the Federal C onstitutions are preserved. State v. Harrington , 805 N.W.2d 391, 393 n.3 (Iowa 2011); King v

. State , 797 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Iowa 2011). The S tate impliedly recog nized our prior case law by declining t o challenge issue preservation under the Iowa C onstitution and addressing both claims. We adhere to the approach in Harrington
and King

. On appeal, Coleman did not state the claim under the Iowa
Constitution should be evaluated under a standard different than that employed by the United States Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment

cases. Nonetheless, he makes only one argument on appeal, namely, that once reasonable suspicion for the original traffic stop was resolved, the State could not extend the stop by asking for Coleman’s driver’s license, registration, and insurance. It would elevate form over
substance to declare that Coleman’s argument actually cannot be
considered under the Iowa C onstitution because he d id not specifically
state that he was asking the court to depart from uncertain federal law. In any event, we reserve the right to apply principles established in the
federal case law in a fashion different from prevailing federal law. See, e.g. , State v. Pals , 805 N.W.2d 767, 771

– 72 ( Iowa 2011); State v

.

relief where the record can be more fully developed. State v. Tate , 710 N.W.2d 237, 240 (I owa 2006). ___________________________6
Bruegger , 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009). Under these circumstances, the argument Coleman specifically made and specifically asks us to resolve is preserved under the Iowa Constitution.
IV. Discussion.
A. Introduction. The question of whether an automobile stop may be extended to require production of documents may sound mundane, and even petty, but it is not. Thousands of persons drive upon the roadways daily. Further, the central purpose of constitutional provisions regarding search and seizure is to structure and limit the scope of police interference i n the daily life of citizens. Generalized police discretion to engage in search and seizure is antithetical to search and
seizure law. See Ocho a , 792 N.W.2d at 287

. Further, as we have noted previously, unlimited discretion to stop vehicles on the open road may give rise to allegations of racial discrimination, characterized by the descriptive phrase “driving while
black.” See State v. Lyon , 8 62 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Iow a 2015) ; see also
State v. Harrison , 846 N.W.2d 362, 371

– 72 (Iowa 2014) (Appel, J., dissenting); Pals , 805 N.W.2d at 772 n.2; David A. Harris, “Driving While
Black” a nd All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops , 87 J. Crim

. L. & Cri minology 544 , 546

– 47 (1997).
As noted in Pals , traffic stops have emerged as a major iss ue in
search and seizure law. 805 N.W.2d at 772

– 73. The use of minor traffic
violations as a springboard into consent searches has prompted charges
of abuse and racial profiling. Id. a t 772; s ee also Barbara C. Salken, The
General Wa rrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution
to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses , 62 Temp. L. Rev. 221, 2 3 5

– 36 (1989).7
Indeed, the case s dealing with automobile stops sometimes ha ve a flavor of racial profiling. See State v. Diaz

- Ruiz , 211 P.3d 836, 846 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2009) (questioning credibility of officer because facts
demonstrated trooper was motivated by a “desire to search the ve hi cle of these two Hispanic men ”). As we said in Pals , we approach these issues
with due regard to the legitimate needs of law enforcement , but with a recognition that our constitutional limitations on searches and seizures by law enforcement protect fundam ental values of liberty and human dignity and are a bulwark against arbitrary governmental intrusions into the lives of citizens.
805 N.W.2d at 773.
B. Scope of Issues. The parties do not dispute that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants is a seizure under a rticle I,
section 8 and the Fourth Amendment. See Delaware v

. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 65 3 , 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 , 667 (1979). Further,
t he parties do not dispute that Morris initially had sufficient reasonable suspicion under both constitutions to initiate a traffic stop under the facts and circumstances of this case. Further, the parties do not dispute
that once Morris determined that Co leman was a male, the reasonable suspicion that triggered the stop was no longer present. The narrow question here, which is strictly a legal question, is whether law enforcement may extend the traffic stop by asking for a driver’s license, vehicle regist ration, and proof of insurance.
C. Federal Casel aw U nder the Fourth Amendment
. 1. Analytic f ramework applicable to automobile s tops. The United States Supreme Court has developed a framework for the evaluation of automobile stops under the Fourth Amendment. The foundation for analysis of an automobile stop is provided in Terry v

. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1,8

88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)

. Although Terry did not involve an automobile stop, the Supreme Court has considered a routine traffic stop more analogous to a Terry stop than a formal arrest. See Knowles v.
Iowa , 525 U.S. 113, 117, 119 S. Ct. 484, 4 88, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 , 498 (19 9 8) ; Berkemer v

. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 4 3 9, 104 S. Ct. 313 8, 3150,
82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 334 (1984). The United States Supreme Court applied Terry principles in the
context of an automobile stop in Prouse , 4 4 0 U

. S

. at 648, 99 S. Ct. at
1391 , 59 L. Ed. 2d at 660

. In Prouse , the Supreme Court considered the question of whether a law enforcement officer may perform a random traffic stop for the purpose of checking license and registration when there is no probable cause or reasonable suspicion that any violation of law is occurring. Id. at 650, 99 S. Ct. at 1394, 59 L

. Ed. 2d at 665.
The Prouse C ourt held that such random stops violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 663, 99 S. Ct. at 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 673. While
Prouse recognized the legitimacy of the state’s general interest in safety as advanced by license and registration requirements, the Prouse C ourt was “unconvinced that the incremental contribution to highway safety of the random spot check justifies the practice under the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 658

– 59, 99 S. Ct. at 1398

– 99, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 670

– 71. Acc ording to the Prouse C ourt, [W]e cannot conceive of any legitimate b asis upon which a patrolman could decide that stopping a particular driver for a spot check would be more productive th an stopping any other driver. This kind of standardless and uncons tr ained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in pre vious cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.
Id. at 661, 99 S. Ct. at 1400, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 672.9

T he United States Supreme Court refined the Prouse analysis in
Florida v

. Royer , 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983).
In the plurality opinion in Royer , the C ourt emphasized that the scope of an investigatory stop “ must be carefully tail ored to its underlying justification ” and “ last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Id. at 500, 103 S. Ct. at 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 238

. In Royer , the Supreme Court plurality emphasized that a person “may
not be detained e ven momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so.” Id. at 498, 103 S. Ct. at 1324, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 236 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court con fronted another traffic

- stop controversy in
Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U

. S

. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 1 6 0 L. Ed. 2d 84 2 (2005) . In Caballes , the Supreme Court considered whether a dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 406

– 07 , 125 S. Ct. at 836

– 37 , 160 L. Ed. 2d at 84 5

– 4 6. The
Caballes C ourt concluded that it did not. Id. at 409, 125 S. Ct. at 838,
160 L. Ed. 2d at 847. The Caballes C ourt viewed a dog sniff as
“sui generis”

— unique, in other words

— because it revealed only the presence or absence of contraband and, therefore, was not a se arch. Id. Even if a dog sniff is not a search, the Caballe s C ourt recognized “ [ a ]
seizure .

. . can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the initial ] mission. ” Id. at 407, 125
S. Ct. at 837, 160 L. Ed. 2d a t 846. In Caballe s , the Illinois Supreme Court had determined, as a matter of fact, that the duration of the stop was justified by the underlying traffic offense. Id. at 408, 125 S. Ct. at 837, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846

– 47. According to the Caballes C ourt, a dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no
information other than the location of a substance that no individual has10 any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 410,
125 S. Ct. at 838, 160 L. Ed. 2 d at 848. Justices Souter and Ginsburg dissented. Justice Souter forcefully argued that a dog sniff was, in fact, a search just like thermal imaging equipment in Kyllo

. Id. at 413, 125 S. Ct. at 840, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 850 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Kyllo v. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 121
S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001)). Such a search ancillary to a traffic stop , according to Justice Souter, must be supported by reason able suspicion. Id. at 41 5 , 125 S. Ct. at 841, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 85 1

. According to Justice Souter, to search for evidence unrelated to the reason for the detention amounts to an “open

- sesame” for general searches that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prohibit

. Id. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that in Terry

- type stops, the limitation related to the “scope” of the seizure was not limited to duration, but also to the manner in which it i s conducted. Id. at 418,
125 S. Ct. at 843

– 44 , 160 L. Ed. 2d at 853

– 54 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Terry , 392 U. S. at 1, 88 S. Ct. at 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 889). Justice Ginsburg thus did not find it dispositive that the length of the stop was not extended. Id. at 420, 125 S. Ct. at 844, 160 L. Ed. 2d at
854

– 55. Shortly after Caballes , the Supreme Court returned to the general topic of automobile seizures in Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U

. S

. 323, 129
S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009). In Johnson , the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether passengers in a lawfully stopped vehicle could be subject to a Terry

- type pat

- down

. Id. at 326, 129 S. Ct. at 784, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 700. The Supreme Court concluded that officers
who conduct routine traffic stops may engage in pat

- downs of a driver11 and any passenger upon reasonable suspicion that they are armed and dangerous. Id. at 332, 129 S. Ct. at 787, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 703.
2. Federal c ase l aw a pplying Terry

- Prouse

- Royer p rinciples to

e

xtended automobile s tops. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit has led the way in considering several traffic

- stop cases in
which the stop was extended after the underlying purposes were
resolved. A frequently cited case in the field is United States v

. McSwain , 29 F.3d 558 (1 0th Cir . 1994 ) . In McSwain , the sole purpose of a traffic stop was to verify the expiration date on a temporary registration sticker
on th e rear window of the vehicle. Id. at 559

– 60. Once the officer determined the temporary registration sticker remained valid, the court held that “further detention of the vehicle to question [th e defendant]
about his vehicle and travel itinerary and to request his license and registration exceeded the scope of the stop’s underlying justification.” Id.
at 561.
McSwain thus drew a “sharp contras t” between a situation where a
traffic violation “ha s occurred or is occurring” and one where the reasonable suspicion for the stop had been completely d ispelled. Id. (quoting United States v. Soto , 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1993)). Only in the later circumstance did the lawfulness of the seizure come to
an end. Id. at 562. In the next case, United States v. Edgerton , the Tenth Circuit again
considered a case in which a vehicle was stopped because a temporary registration tag could not be read because of darkness. 438 F.3d 1043, 1044 (10th Cir. 2006). The Tenth C ircuit held, however, that once the trooper was able to read the temporary tag, the trooper “as a matter of courtesy, should have explained to [the] Defendant the reason fo r the12 initial stop and then allowed her to continue on her way without requiring her to produce her license and registration.” Id

. at 1051.
A third T enth C ircuit case is United States v

. Pena

- Montes , 589 F.3d 1048 (1 0th Cir. 2009). In that case , the Pena

- Montes court confronted the famil iar situation in which an officer pulled over a vehicle believing it lacked a license plate, only to discover that the ve hicle had a proper “dealer tag.” Id. at 1049. In Pena

- Montes , the officer did not end the stop at that point, but continued his investigative activities, questioning a passenger about his immigration status. Id. at 1051. After canvassing the facts, the Pena

- Montes court concluded that no
additional rea sonable suspicion was present. Id. at 1058. In response to the government’s argument that it is reasonable for officers to enquire about dealer tags after a traffic stop even if they appeared lawful, the
Pena

- Montes court declared , “W e decline to sign this blank check.” Id. Finally, in United States v. Trest yn , the Tenth Circuit considered a similar case in which a vehicle was missing a front license plate, but displayed a rear license plate

. 646 F.3d 732, 736 ( 10th Cir. 2011). As in the other cases, when approaching the vehicle, it be came clear that the rear license plate satisfied all statutory requirements

. Id. at 744. At that point, according to the Tenth Circuit, questions of the drivers about their travel plans and a request for their licenses “exceeded the scope of the stop’s u nderlying justification because .

. . [the officer] no longer ha d an objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation had

occu rred or was still occurring.” Id. Another frequently cited case involving extended automobile
searches is the Fifth Circuit case of United States v

. Valadez , 267 F.3d
395 ( 5th Cir. 2001)

. In Valadez , an officer who p assed a motorist traveling in the opposite direction believ ed the motorist was operating a13

vehicle with an expired vehicle registration and il legal window tinting and initiated a traffic stop

. Id. at 396. When the officer approached the
vehicle and spoke with the driver, Valadez , the registration issue was quickly resolved, but the window tinting issue remained. Id. The officer
asked Valadez for his driver ’ s license and insurance card. Id. When he returned to his patrol car, the officer requested a crimi nal history check
on Valadez. Id. While the background check was still in progress, the
officer returned to Valadez ’s vehicle with a wind ow

- tint meter and determined the windows were legal. Id.
But the officer did not terminate the encounter at this point. Id. Although the purpose of the stop had been resolved, the officer proceeded
to ask Valadez if he had any weapons or drugs in the v ehicle. Id. Valadez responded that he had a loaded pistol in the front seat of the car and a rifle in the trunk

. Id. The officer removed the weapons from the car to run a check to determine if they were stolen. Id. The results of his background check indicated that Valadez had a criminal history but did not apparently indicate whether it involved misdemeanors or felonies. Id.
The officer returned to Valadez ’s vehicle and asked him whether he had a felony conviction. Id. Valadez responded that he w as not sure, but that
he m ight have a felony conviction. Id. After being transported to the station, Valadez’s prior conviction wa s confirmed as a felony. Id. at 397. He was subsequently charged with the crime and entered a conditional guilty verdict allowing him to contest an unfavorable suppression ruling.
Id.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Val a dez’s motion to suppress

. Id. at 399. The Fifth Circuit noted that Val a dez did not dispute the initial lawfulness of the stop. Id. at 398. But the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that once the officer determined that the registration14 was valid and the window tinting was lawful, at that point he had no
basis to continue the stop. Id. The Fifth Circuit emphasized the
detention was lawful up until the purposes of the stop were resolved, but when those purposes were resolved, there was no lawful reason to detain
Val a dez. Id. The Sixth Circuit considered the validity of an extension of a traffic stop in United States v. Jones , 479 F

. App ’ x 705 ( 6th Cir. 2012). In
Jones , the Sixth Circuit held that a police officer exceeded the scope of a traffic stop for failure to display proper license plate s when he detained the driver after he observed a lawful temporary tag in plain view. Id. at 712; s ee also United States v

. Mesa , 62 F.3d 159, 162 ( 6th Cir. 1995) (“Once the purposes of the initial traffic stop were completed, there is no
doubt that the officer could not further detain the vehicle or its occupants unless something that occurred during the traffic stop generated the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify a further detention.”)

. The Second Circuit grappled with an automobile stop in United
States v

. Jenkins , 452 F.3d 207 ( 2 d Cir

. 2006) . In Jenkins , the officers
believed that the vehicle pulled over lac ked appropriate license plates.
Id. at 20 9

. After the stop, the officer became aware of a temporar y plate posed on the vehicle. Id. When the officers approached the vehicle to speak to the driver, however, they smelled marijuana. Id. A subsequent search turned up unlawfully possessed firearms

. Id. at 210. The fighting issue in Jenkins was whether the police acted lawfully
after their concern about unlawful licensure had been resolved. Id. at 212

– 13

. The defendant claimed that once the officers observed the temporary license plate they could proceed no further and were required simply to waive the motorist on. Id. at 211. The state contended that15 the officers could reasonably approach the driver to explain the reason
for the stop. Id. The Second Circuit agreed, noting that in McSwai n , the Tenth Circuit suggested in dictum that such a courtesy was not
unlawful. Id. at 213. A number of reported United S tates district court decisions follow the general approach of the Sec ond, Fift h, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits. In United States v

. Salinas , the United S tates d istrict c ourt considered a case where a stop was initiated because of suspicion of a violation of the Texas license plate display requirement. 665 F. Supp. 2d 717, 718

– 19 (W.D. Tex. 2009). The district court noted that the officers could have determined even before they asked for the driver’s license and proof of insurance that there was not a violation of the Texas license plate requirement. Id. at 721. Because “[ t ] hey did not encounter reasonable suspicion of an additional violation

— driving without a license

— until after his traffic stop for failure to display a front license plat e should have
ended , ” the evidence should have been suppressed. Id. ; s ee also United
States v. Castro , 929 F. Supp. 2d 1140 , 1152 (D. N.M . 2013) (“ [O] nce the officer’s suspicion that a traffic violation occurred is dispelled, prolonging the detention by retaining the defendant’s identification, questioning the defendant further, or waiting for the outcome of a computer check, even if the check is in progress, is improper and a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
In United Stat e s v

. Smith , the United S tates d istrict c ourt considered whether a traffic stop could be extended in an obscured
l icense plate case. 37 F. Supp. 3d 806, 80 8 (M.D. La. 2014). The district court determined that once the license plate issue was resolved, there
was no further basis to detain the driver. Id. at 813

– 14. In Smith , the
roadside officer had received statements from another officer that the16 motorist was believed to be a member of a motorcycle gang and suspected drug dealer. Id. at 812

– 13. This alone, however, did not justify prolonging the search. Id. at 813. Whi le the state argued that officer safety was involved, the court rejected the argument, noting among other things that the officers did not act as if they were in fear of their safety, did not condu ct pat

- downs of either occupant of the car prior to their e ventual arrest, and did not isolate them out of the car in order to separate them from a potential weapon. Id. Finally, a federal district court in Iowa considered a traffic

- stop issue similar to that raised in this case. In United States v. Wise , Chie f Judge Longs t aff considered a prolonged detention after any potential reason for the stop

— a question about temporary tags

— had been
resolved. 418 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 110 2 (S.D. Iowa 2006). Relying on Edgerton , Judge Longstaff concluded that the deputy unlawfully detained the defendants when they asked for identification and brought one of the defendants back to the police car, because his investigation was no longer related to the purpose of the stop. Id. at 110 8

. The Eight h Circuit, however, has declined to follow the approach of the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Cir c uits

. For example, in United States v. $404,905.00 of U.S. Currency , the Eight h Circuit held that additional detention for thirty seconds to two minutes after the traffic stop was complete was lawful. 182 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1999) , abrogated by Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492 (2015)

. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that a two

- minute canine sniff

was de minimus , noting, among other things the “ strong interest in interdicting the flow of drugs on the nation’s highways.” Id.
3. The United States Supreme Court ’s m ost r ecent f oray i nto

e

xtended a utomobile s tops: Rodriguez v. United States

. The United17 States Supreme Court returned to the question of extended automobile stops in Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 492. In th at case, t he Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment allows a dog sniff to be conducted after the completion of a traffic stop. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614, 191 L. Ed. 2d
at 498.
The Rodriguez C ourt concluded that the dog sniff in th at case may have unlawfully exte nded the duration of the stop and ordered the issue of independent justification for the dog sniff to be heard on remand

. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616

– 17, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 501. The Rodriguez C ourt observed that when making a traffic stop, beyond determining whether to
issue a tick et, a n officer may engage in ordinary inq uiries incident to the
traffic stop , including “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of in suran ce.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499.
The Rodriguez C ourt, however, concluded that the stop may have
extend ed beyond the ci rcumstances justifying the stop a nd would thus
be unlawful without additional reasonable suspicion

. Id. at ___, 135
S. Ct. at 1616

– 17, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 501. Echoing Caballes , the Rodriguez C ourt emphasized a traffic stop prolonged beyond the “time reasonably required to complete [the stop’s] mission” is unlawful. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500 (quoting Caballes , 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S. Ct. at 837, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846)

. In Rodriguez , the Supreme Court specifically declined to follow the reasoning of the Eighth
Circuit in $404, 905.0 0 in U.S. Currency

. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615,
191 L. Ed. 2d at 499

– 501.18

D
. State Casel aw. 1. Majority a pproach u nder Fourth Amendment to s tops e xtended after original purpose of stop resolved

. A considerable number of states have considered the question of the validity of extended automobile stops. Most of them decide the issue under the Fourth Amendment, but a few have considered the issue under state constitutional provisions. Whether under the Fourth Amendment or under the state constitution, the majority o f the cases have held that once the underlying reason for a traffic stop has been resolved, it cannot be lawfully extended. For example, in State v. Diaz , the Florida Supreme Court
considered a case in which an officer pulled over a motorist because he could not read the temp orary tag on the top of the rear window. 850
So. 2d 435, 436 (Fla. 2003). Once the car was pulled over and the officer approached it, the officer was able to read the tag and learned that nothing was improper. Id. Nonetheless, the officer walked up to the
driver’s window and asked for the driver’s information. Id. The driver could not produce a proper license and was ultimately convicted of felony driving with a suspended license. Id. The Florida Supreme Court c oncluded that the seizure had been unlawfully extended after the underlying purpose of the stop had been
resolved. Id. at 440. According to strong words of the Florida Supreme
Court:
It would be dangerous precedent to allow overzealous law enforcement officers to place in peril the principles of a free society by disregarding the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. To sanction further detention after an officer has clearly and unarguabl y satisfied the stated purpose for an initial stop would be to permit standardless, unreasonable detentions and investigation s
. Id. at 439.19 The Colorado Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in People v. Redinger , 906 P.2d 81 , 85

– 86 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) . The Redinger court confronted facts similar to those in Diaz . An officer pulled over a vehicle after the officer could not see a license plate or temporary sticke r on the rear of the vehicle. Id. at 82. When approaching the stopped car, however, the officer could plainly see a valid temporary plate properly displayed on the rea r window on the
driver’s side. Id. The officer then approached the driver’s window, explained the reason for the stop, but then extended the stop by asking
for driver ’s license, registra tion, and proof of insurance. Id. When the driver removed a wallet from his jacket pocket, a plastic bag containing a
white powdery substance fell onto his leg. Id. The officer then directed the driver to step out of the car, seized t he ba g , and asked the driver to identify the contents. Id. The driver identified the substance as methamphetamine and was charged with a drug crime. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the extended search
violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 86. Accordin g to the Colorado Supreme Court, when “ the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished and no other reasonable suspicion exists to support further investigation, there is no justification for
continued detention and interrogation of citizens. ” Id. 85

– 86. State appellate c ourts in Utah, Indiana, Kansas, Ohio, South Carolina , Texas, Maryland, and Washington have come to similar conclusions to the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Diaz and the Colorado Supreme
Court in Redinger under the Fourth Amendment. See Holly v

. State , 918 N.E.2d 323 , 326 (Ind. 2009); Diaz

- Ruiz , 211 P.3d at 836; Ferris v. State , 735 A.2d 491, 500 (Md. 1999); State v

. Chatton , 4 6 3 N.E.2d 1237 , 1240

– 41 (Ohio 1984); State v

. Pichardo , 623 S.E.2d 840 , 8 52 (S. C

. Ct. App.20 2005) ; Davis v

. State , 947 S.W.2d 240, 24 5

– 46 (Tex. Crim

. App. 1997) (en banc) ; State v. Morris , 259 P.3d 116, 124 (Utah 2011); State v

. DeArman , 774 P.2d 1247, 12 49 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
2. Cases r efusing to a llow e xtended s tops u nder b oth Fourth
Amendment and s tate c onstitutions

. In some cases, however, state supreme courts have invalidated extended searches under both state and federal search and seizure constitutional provisions. In State v. Ha ye n , the South Dakota Supreme Court considered yet another case in which an officer stopped a motorist because he was unable to see the expiration date on the bottom of the temporary thirty

- day dealer’s license. 751 N.W.2d 306, 307 (S.D. 2008). A box in the new pick

- up truck obstructed
the view of the bottom of the license when the officer followed the vehicle.
Id. The officer, however, did not bother to look at the temporary license, but walked by and asked the motorist for driver’s license and proof of
insurance. Id. After this initial contact, the officer stepped back , saw the expiration date on the license , and determined it to be valid. Id. The officer continued the stop by returning to his patrol vehicle to

run a warrant and license check. Id. at 308. The warrant check revealed an outstanding warrant for the driver’s arrest. Id. A search incident to arrest then revealed methamphetamine residue and drug paraphernalia in the driver’s coat pocket

. Id. The state charged the driver with possession of a controlled drug or substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. The defendant filed a motion to suppress. Id.
In Haye n , the South Dakota Supreme Court, citing McSwain , held
that the detention exceeded the lawful investigative stop and that the fruits of prolonged detention were properly suppressed. Id. at 311. Without any further articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the21 extended detention violated Hayen’s federal and state constitutional rights. Id

. A similar case is presented in McGaughey v

. State , 37 P.3d 130 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001). In McGaughey , an officer observed a vehicle pass by and believed that the tail lights on the back of the truck were not working. Id. at 13 2

. The officer pulled the vehicle over. Id. When approaching the vehicle, the officer co uld see that, in fact, the tail lights were functioning properly. Id. Notwithstanding the officer’s awareness of the functioning of the
tail lights, the officer asked th e driver to step out of the car and asked for
his driver’s license. Id. at 132

– 33. The officer then continued to inspect the vehicle, observing a pistol in the driver’s side door pouch. Id. at 133. After determining the gun belonged to the driver and w as loaded, the officer asked if the driver would mind if he searched the vehicle, and the driver responded “ go ahead .” Id. The search revealed three bags of amphetamine between the two front seats. Id. The driver w as then patted down and over $6 000 in cash was seized and the driver arrested.
Id. A later inventory search revealed more drugs and cash. Id.
The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals held that the extended stop was unlawful. Id. at 141. According to the Oklahoma court, Although an officer effecting a valid tra ffic stop can require a driver to exit his car, and produce his licen se, and can check the validity of the inspections sticker on that ve hicle, an officer who realizes that his stop of a vehicle was mistaken

— and who has no othe r cause for reasonable suspicion of the driver

— has no authority to further detain the driver or his vehicle . The seizure becomes illegal at the point where its initial justification has ceased and no new justification has arisen.
Id. 140

– 41. The Oklahoma court declared the search unlawful under
both the s earch and seizure provision of a rticle II, s ection 30 of the22

Oklahoma Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 140.
3. Distinction between extended stop where underlying problem is resolved and ongoing investigation pursuant to valid stop

. A number of
court decisions differentiate between a situation in which the original purpose has been resolved and when the original purpose of the stop is a valid and ongoing concern. See McSwain , 29 F.3d at 561. When the purpose of the original stop remains valid, a number of courts have held that a request for driver’s license, insurance, and registration is not invalid as long as the stop is not unduly prolonged. See , e. g. , Trestyn , 646 F.3d at 744; McGaughey , 37 P.3d at 140

– 41.
4. State court outliers

. The state court cases, however, have not
been unanimous. Other states have allowed a driver’s license check under circumstances similar to the facts presented here. As a general matter, these states hold that if the traffic stop was initially supported by reasonable suspicion, a request for driver’s license, registration, and insurance papers is permitted even after the problem that led to the initial stop has been r esolved in favor of the driver. See , e.g. , State v

. Gulick , 759 A.2d 1085, 1090 (Me. 2000); Hart v

. State , 235 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Tex

. Ct

. App. 2007); State v

. Williams , 655 N.W.2d 462, 468 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002 ).
5. Post

- Rodriguez d evelopments. After Rodriguez , it is noteworthy that one state supreme c ourt changed its course, at least under the
Fourth Amendment. In People v. Cummings , the Illinois Supreme Court suppressed evidence resulting from an extended automobile stop. 6 N.E.3d 725, 733

– 34 (Ill. 2014). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Illinois Supreme Court for consideration in light of Rodriguez

. Illinois v.23 Cummings , ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1892, 1892, 191 L. Ed. 2d 760, 760 (2015) (mem.)

. On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that in light of Rodriguez , a driver’s license r equest of a lawfully stopped driver is permissible irrespective o f whether that request relates directly to the purposes of the stop. Peo ple v. Cummings , 46 N.E.3d 248, 253 (Ill. 2016). As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s suppression of the evidence. Id. Pointedly, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the defendant did not raise a parallel claim under articl e I,
section 6 of the Illinois C onstitution. Id. at 250.
E
. Iowa Casel aw. 1. The c ontours of State v. Jackson

. In State v. Jackson , we considered a case in which the defendant was stopped for lack of a license plate. 315 N.W.2d 766, 767 (Iowa 1982). Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer found the vehicle had a lawful properly displayed department of transportation paper plate. Id

. After making that determination, the officer asked the driver if he had a valid dr iver’s
license. Id

. The driver did not produce a license and admitted that he was driving while his license was under suspension. Id

. The defendant was subsequently charged with driving while his license was under suspension in violation of Iowa Code section 321A.32.
Id. The district court granted a motion to suppress on the ground that
there was no “ articulate and specific reason to b elieve criminal activity [was] afoot.” Id. The s tate appealed. Id. On appeal, the s tate filed a short brief citing Prouse for the proposition that there is no requirement of articulable and reasonable suspicion to support a request for production of a driver’s l icense. See Appellant’s Br. in Jackson at 4

– 5. T he reference to Prouse implies that24 the Fourth Amendment may have been in play. There is no mention at
all of the Iowa C onstitution in the s tate’s Jackson brief. The pro se
defendant did not file a brief in the case and the s tate’ s position was thus
unresisted.
In a brief two

- page conclusory opinion, we held that the initial stop
was valid under Prouse , 440 U.S. at 648, 99 S. Ct. at 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d
at 660. Jackson , 315 N.W.2d at 7 67. Citing only Iowa Code section 321.27 and no other authority, we further stated that “there was not h ing illegal about the fact that, once he was stopped and exonerated, he was asked to display his operator’s license. ” Id

. This conclusion is stated, but perhaps because of the absence of a brief on behalf of the defendant, no reasoning is provided. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Iowa
C onstitution was mentioned in the opinion. See id.
Jackson was decided before the S upreme Court decided Royer

. As noted by the c ourt of a ppeals in this case, Jackson does not specifically
address whether it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the officer to prolong the detention of the motorist to dema nd his or her
driver’s license. In addition , there is certainly no holding under a rticle I,
sect ion 8 of the Iowa C onstitution in Jackson

. 2. Reemergence of independent state constitutional law

. A s has been thoroughly canvassed in some of our other opinion s , the Iowa Supreme Court has a long history of independent adjudication of state
constitutional issues. In recent decades , we have reemphasized that independent constitutional tradition. In State v

. Cline , we reexamined filaments in our prior law noting the ability of state courts to engage in independent constitutional analysis

. 617 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Iowa 2000), overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner , 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001). In Cline , we specificall y declined to follow the approach of25 the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3420, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 698 (1984). Id. at 293

. Subsequent to Cline , we have engaged in independent state
constitutional an alysis in a number of search and seizure cases. See , e.g. , Short , 851 N.W.2d at 481; State v. Baldon , 829 N.W.2d 785, 790

– 91 (Iowa 2013) ; Pals , 805 N.W.2d at 775; Ochoa , 792 N.W.2d at 262 ; S tate v. Tague , 676 N.W. 2d 197 , 206 (Iowa 2004)

. 3

. Recent Iowa cases involving traffic stops

. Since 2010, we have considered the legality of automobile stops in five cases. The first case is
S tate v. Vance , 790 N.W.2d 775 (Iowa 2010). In Vance , we considered whether law enforcement had reasonable suspicion under the Fourth
Amendment to stop a vehicle when the officers knew that the owner of the vehicle had a susp ended driver’s license and when the officers had no evidence or circumstances indicating that the registered owner was not
the driver of the vehicle

. Id. at 781. Joining a majority of jurisdictions, we held that under these circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to make an initial stop. Id

. at 781

– 83. In a footnote, however, we noted that counsel for Vance failed to raise the questio n of whether the basis for the stop continued to be valid upon the officer’s discovery that the driver of the vehicle was not, in fact, the r egistered owner. Id. at 783 n. 1. We also noted that counsel had failed to raise any claim that
the s top was inval id under the Iowa C onstitution. Id

. at 780.
In Vance , we then proceeded to consider an Iowa constitut ional claim that was preserved

— namely, whether Vance’s counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the search of his
car under the Iowa C onstitution

. Id. at 786. In New York v. Belton , the Supreme Court held under the Fourth Amendment that26 when a polic eman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile [ as well as ] any containers found within the passenger compartment.
453 U. S. 454, 460, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 775 (1981) (footnotes omitted) . In a 1981 case, State v

. Sanders , we adopted Belton as the proper analysi s under the Iowa Constitution. 312 N.W.2d 534 , 539 (Iowa 1981), overruled by State v. Gaskins , 866 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 2015).
After Sanders and by the time of Vance , Belton had come under heavy attack as overbroad. As noted in Vance , academic commentators
sh a rply criticized the decision, eight states declined to follow it under
their state constitu tions, and the Supr e me Court itself began to question broad readings of the case in its subsequent opinion. 790 N.W.2d at
787

– 9 0

. Further, at the time Vance was pending, the United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Arizona v. Gant , 552 U.S. 1230,
128 S. Ct. 1443, 170 L. Ed. 2d 274 (2008) (mem

. ) (Certiorari g ranted to answer the question: “Does the Fourth Amendment require law
enforcement officers to demonstrate a threat to their safety or a need to preserve evidence related to a crime of arre st in order to justify a
warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle’s recent occupants have been arrested and secured?”)

. Under these circumstances, we stated in Vance that we would ordinarily proceed to determine whether counsel violated professional norms by failing to challenge Sanders and Belton under the Iowa
C onsti tution. 790 N.W.2d at 789

– 90. We stopped short of finding counsel’s performance deficient on direct appeal , however, on the ground that it was possible that trial counsel failed to raise a challenge to Belton because trial counsel may have reasonably believed that there were other27 exceptions to the warrant requirement that would allow admissibility. Id.
at 79 0. As a result, the matter wa s left for possible post conviction relief.
Id.
In Vance , we did not, then, expressly hold that counsel had been ineffective for failing to challenge the search of the vehicle o n Iowa constitutional grounds. However, there w ould have been nothing to leave for postconviction relief if Sanders and Belton remained good Iowa law.
Our next traffic

- stop case is Pals , 805 N.W.2d at 767. The first
issue in Pals was whether an officer could validly stop a vehicle for an ongoing civi l infraction. Id. at 77 4

. We concluded that such a stop was
lawful under both the Fourth Amendment and the Iowa C onstitution. Id.
at 775. We next considered whether the scope of the search had unlawfully expanded after the initial valid stop. Id. We concluded, however, that the issue was not preserved in the district court and
declined to add ress it. Id. at 776

– 77

. Finally, we considered whether a consent to the search was constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 777. We concluded that it was not. Id. While we recognized that many states had abandoned the United States Supreme Cour t’s “totality of circumstances” vegetable

- blender approach
to consent in the search and seizure context found in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973) , in
favor of the more rigorous knowing and voluntary approach of Johnson v

. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938), w e determined that it was not n ecessary to reach that issue. Pals , 805 N.W.2d at 779

. Instead, w e determined, for the purpose of the case before us, to apply Sch ne ckloth “with teeth” to invalidate the consent to
search because of its coercive features. Id.28

Our next automobile

- stop case is State v. Tyler , 830 N.W.2 d 288 (Iowa 2013). In Tyler , we considered a case where an officer made a traffic stop based on a mistake of law, namely, that a license plate cover unduly obstructed his view of the plate and was unlawful. Id. at 2 90

. After making the initial stop, the officer detected the odor o f alcohol on
the driver’s breath. Id. at 291. In considering the issues in Tyler , we examined a videotape of the stop which demonstrated that both the rear and front license plate
covers were clear rather than tinted. Id. at 290

– 91. The officer who
mad e the stop could plainly read the license plate as demonstrated by his call to dispatch providing the information. Id. at 291. The only
claimed violation of law was a violation of Iowa Code section 321.37(3), which provided that any frame around the regi stration plate must permit full view of all numerals and letters printed on the plate. Id. at 294. We held that the statute was no t violated and the officer had made a mistake of law in initiating the stop. Id. at 29 5

– 96

. As a result, both the Fourth
Amendment and the Iowa C on stitution, article I, section 8 were violated. 2
Id. at 298. We also noted there was evidence in the record indicating the officer has specifically targeted Tyler’s vehicle for a stop for a reason
other than an obscur e license plate. Id. at 297. A friend of Tyler’s with identical license plate covers passed by the officer without incident immediately prior to Tyler’s arrest. Id. We observed in a footnote that

2 After Tyler , the United States Supreme Court determined that a reasonable mistake of law could support reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475, 486 (2014). Of course, the ruling in Tyler under the Iowa Constitution is unaffected by Heien . Further, the approach in Heien would be very difficult to square with our rejection of the good

fa ith exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution in Cline , 617 N.W.2d at 293.29 while Tyler

— who was black

— argued that he was a victim of racial profiling, we did not need to reach that particular issue in light of our
resolution of the case. Id. at 297 n.4. We made the commonsense observation, however, that the possibility for racial profiling requires us to carefully review the objectiv e basis for asserted justificat ions behind the traffic stops. Id

. The next case in our parade is Gaskins , 866 N.W.2d at 1 . In Gaskins , an officer made a routine traffic stop for an expired license plate. Id. at 3

. When the officer approached the vehicle, he smelled marijuana and confiscated a blunt from the driver. Id. A search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle revealed a small portable locked
safe. Id. Police opened the safe without a warrant and disc overed drugs, paraphernalia, and a gun. Id. We held that the search of the safe was
unlawful under a rticle I, secti on 8 of the Iowa C onstitution. Id. In doing so, we specifically overruled Sanders , noting that it was no longer good
law under the Iowa C onstitution. Id. at 16.
The final case is In re Property Seized from Pardee , 872 N.W.2d 384 (Iowa 2015)

. Pardee involved a traffic stop that was prolonged by efforts to engage in a dog sniff for drugs

. Id. at 385

– 86. In Pardee , we noted
under the Fourth Amendment an officer “ ‘ may conduct certain unrelated
checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop ’ but ‘ may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop , absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detainin g an individual. ’ ” 872 N.W.2d at 393 (emphasis added) (quoting Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615,
191 L. Ed. 2d at 499).
F
. Analysis. In developing the proper approach to the Iowa Constitution, we may look to United States Supreme Court opinions,
dissents in those opinions, various federal precedents , state court30 precedent s , and any other persuasive authorities. See Short , 851 N.W.2d at 481; Ochoa , 792 N.W.2d at 26 4

– 67

. Indeed, there is a health y body of independent state constitutional law developing in the area of traffic stops. See Margaret M. Lawton, State Responses to the Whren Decision , 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1039 , 1046

– 54 (2015) (citing cases from Washington, New Mexico, and Alaska depart ing from the doctrine in
Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996) , in which the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that traffic stops based on objective probable cause are reasonable regardless of the officer s actual motivation for the stop ).
We think the federal and state cases have some common themes. First, cabining officia l discretion to conduct searche s is designed to prevent arbitrary use of police power. Limiting both the scope and
duration of warran tless stops on the highway provides important means of fulfilling the constitutional purpose behind article I , section 8, namely, ensuring that government power is exercised in a carefully limited

manner. The case law repeate dly emphasizes that even de minimus extensions of traffic stops are not acceptable. The fountainhead case of
the United States Supreme Court is Royer

. It has been picked up in the
caselaw with some enthusiasm. See United States v

. Stepp , 680 F.3d 651, 663 ( 6th Cir. 2012) ( finding six minutes measurably prolonged traffic stop); U nited States v

. Dolson , 673 F. Supp. 2d 842 , 867 (D. Minn

. 2009) ( finding a delay of one minute and twenty

- four seconds to call drug
task force to be an unlawful extension). That said, it is possibl e that when there is a valid ongoing traffic stop officers may properly seek driver’s identification, registration, and31

insurance information. This distinction is well recognized in the case law. Here, however, there was no on going valid traffic stop. We, of course, are not obliged to follow Rodriguez in our interpretation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. In any event, n othing in Rodriguez is to the contrary. In dicta, Justice Ginsberg indicates that obtaining driver’s license, regist ration, and insurance information is a normal part of an ordinary traffic stop. Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499. But she was referring to a valid, ongoing stop, not a traffic stop in which the underlying reason for th e stop has been satisfied. Early on, the McSwain case recognized the critical distinction between a case in which there is a violation or ongoing violation and one in which the basis for the stop has dissipated. 29 F.3 d at 561. Other cases prior to Rodr iguez emphasized
the distinction as well. See, e.g. , State v. Williams , 136 P.3d 579, 589 ( N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (noting the s tate “ignore[d] the distinguishing fact in
each case cited to support [ its position]

— the initial stop in each case was
valid ”) ; Hayen , 751 N.W.2d at 310 (distinguishing cases where actual traffic violation was present). A leading commentator on the Fourth Amendment emphasizes the distinction between a valid or ongoing investigation and one that has been resolved for purposes of re cords
checks: The importance of the violation of law to the authority to run a check on a license and registration is illustrated by those cases holding that if there is a stopping on either reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a traffic violation wh ich is determined immediately after the stop not to hav e been a violation at all, the officer may not continue the detent ion for a license/registration check

. 4 Wayne R. La Fave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 9.3(c), at 510 n. 162 (5th ed. 2012)

. Thus, the language32 used by Justice Ginsberg in Rodriguez does not suggest a different re sult is required in this case. And even if it did, we would not be deterred from pursuing our own independent path under the Iowa C onstitution. Alth ough this case
raises distinc tive issues, our recent traffic

- stop cases have evinced an awareness of the potential for arbitrary government action on the state’s roads and highways. In Vance , we severely questioned the rationale of

our older precedent reg arding searches of closed containers pursuant to an automobile stop in Sanders

— a case we ultimately explicitly overruled
in Gaskins. See Gaskins , 866 N.W.2d at 16; Vance , 790 N.W.2d at 787;
Sanders , 312 N.W.2d at 539. In Pals , we put traffic stops in the larger context of concerns surrounding racial profiling

. 805 N.W.2d at 772 n.2.
That theme was continued in Tyler where we not ed the stop involved an
African

- American driver in which a previous driver with similar features on the license plate was not s topped. 830 N.W.2d at 297 & n.4

. These
recent cases all have a common feature of demanding compliance with
Iowa constit utional commands in the traffic

- stop context.
W e recognize , however, that o fficer safety is a legitimate and weighty interest in the c ontext of traffic stops. See Pennsylvania v

. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S. C t. 330, 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 , 336

– 37 (1977) (per curiam)

. Yet, as the Supreme Court stated in Knowles , the safety concerns arising out of a potential traffic ci tation are “ a good deal
less than in the case of a custodial arrest. ” 525 U.S. at 117 , 119 S. Ct.
at 487, 142 L. Ed. 2d at 498 . Nonetheless, in Mimms , the Supreme Court held that an officer can direct a driver to get out of the car to ensure the officer ’ s safety. 434 U.S. at 110

– 11 , 98 S. Ct. at 333, 54
L. Ed. 2d at 337.33
Yet, for a more intrusive Terry

- type stop, reasonable suspicion is constitutionally required before the officers may engage in a pat

- down
search. United States v. Clark, 24 F.3d 299, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United
States v. Co ley , 974 F. Supp. 41, 44 (D.C. Dist. 1997)

. There is no categorical approach to pat

- down searches. The validity of a pat

- down search, an important part of ensuring officer safety, depends upon the
fa cts of each case. See Ramirez v. City of Buena Park , 560 F.3d 1012, 1022 ( 9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting Terry

- type pat

- down based on “conclusory
references to ‘ officer safety ’ ” ).
The same is true in the context of extending the duration of an automobile stop when the underlying problem has been resolved

. While
in most extended traffic

- stop cases an officer safety claim has not been asserted, in cases where officer safety has been raised, the courts have repeatedly reject ed generalized, unsubstantiated cl aims related to officer safety as a basis for extending a traffic stop. See , e.g. , United States v.
Henderson , 463 F.3d 27, 45

– 46 ( 1 st Cir. 2006) (conclusory argument of
officer s afety not based on facts insufficient); Smith , 37 F. Supp. 3d at 812

– 13 (insufficient evidence of threat to safety to justify extended stop) ; State v

. McCaulley , 831 N.E.2d 474 , 476

– 77 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (no safety reasons for detention of driver in back seat of squad car). Here, there is no indication in the record that th e officer feared for his safety. Indeed, the officer allowed the unhandcuffed driver to accompany him
back to the vehicle when th e officer conducted the search. Further, our holding does not increase the risks of harm to officers, but in fact lessens it. Under the result in this case, the officer is required to allow the driver to go on his or her way after the resolution of the reason for the stop. This can be accomplished by a bri ef gesture, an
announcement from the back of the vehicle, or a brief conversation at the34 driver’s window. In this case, it would have simply only re quired the officer to say “good

- bye” to the driver and allow him to return to th e car. In fact, any increa sed officer danger arises from continuing the detention
of the driver while the license and warrant checks are conducted. Thus, the very outcome sought by the State in this case would increase danger to officers, not lessen it. Officer safety might be a valid concern when
tethered to a suspect ’s continuing detention , but not when the suspect is free to go. The S tate is not entitled to relief from an exigency of its own
creation. As indicated above, it is not clear whether Jackson was a Fourth Amendment or article I, section 8 case. In any event, to the extent that
Jackson is inconsistent with our holding today, we overrule it. We conclude that when the reason for a traffic stop is resolved and there is
no other basis for reasona ble suspicion, article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution requires that the driver must be allowed to go his or her way without further ado.
V. Conclusion. For the above reasons, we conclude that the motion to sup p ress should have been granted. We t herefore vacate the decision of the court of appeals and reverse the judgment of the district court. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED. All justices concur except Waterman, Mansfield, and Zager, JJ.,
who dissent.35

#15

– 0752, State v. Coleman
WATERMAN , Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court ruling denying Coleman’s motion to suppress, as did the court of appeals. Until today, a police officer who lawfully stopped a motorist could ask to see his or her driver’s license, especially when the officer knew the driver was not the car’s registered owner. Almost all Iowans, I believe, would find this activity completely unobjectionable and, indeed, mundane. But not the majority. I nstead, our court has determined that this act of routine traffic enforcement violates the search and seizure provision of the Iowa Constitution. The United States Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion under the Fourth Amendment in 2015. See Rodr iguez v.
United States , 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492, 499 (2015). To get to its result, the majority overrules another one of our established search and seizure precedents. In State v. Jackson , we correctly decided a quart er century ago that the constitution does not require an officer who lawfully stops a vehicle to “treat the [driver] as if he had never seen him.” 315 N.W.2d 766, 767 (Iowa 1982). Rather, after dispelling the original purpose for the stop, the officer co uld perform the minimally intrusive step of checking the driver’s license, which Iowa drivers are required by statute to carry and display upon an officer’s request. Id. ; see also Iowa Code § 321.174(3) (2013) (“A licensee shall
have the licensee’s driver ’s license in immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall display the same upon demand
of a .

. . peace officer .

. . .”). I would affirm Mr. Coleman’s conviction for driving while barred by following our commonsense decisio n in Jackson and United States Supreme Court precedent explicitly allowing officers to36 check the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance as part of the routine mission of any traffic stop. Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499. We recently followed Rodriguez in In re Property Seized from
Pardee , 872 N.W.2d 384, 391

– 93 (Iowa 2015), and have no good reason to depart from it here. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court with in this past year unanimously applied Rodriguez to uphold a license check under the same facts presented. People v. Cummings, 46 N.E.3d 248, 252 (Ill. 2016). Iowans who get pulled over expect to show their driver’s license to the officer. This practice helps law enforcement get dangerous, illegal drivers off the road. The majority fails to mention why Coleman had been barred from driving. His criminal record includes four prior convictions for driving while barred, two prior convictions for driving
wh ile suspended, several narcotics convictions, and notably, a conviction
for second

- offense operating while intoxicated (OWI) committed two days before Officer Morris pulled him over. The majority gives Coleman a free
pass. The majority goes out of its w ay to connect this case, at least implicitly, to racial profiling. This is hardly the case to impugn motives of Iowa law enforcement. It is undisputed Officer Morris could not see the driver that night and did not know the driver’s gender or race. He
st opped the vehicle because its registered owner (a woman) had a suspended driver’s license, and he reasonably assumed she was driving her own car. There is no evidence or claim by Coleman that Officer Morris pulled him over due to his race. See Kothe v. S tate , 152 S.W.3d 54, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“This is not an instance of an indefatigable Inspector Javert mercilessly pursuing, harassing, and hounding his37 quarry through Paris sewers or Kendall County highways by concocting excuses to detain him.”). To the contrary, Coleman’s counsel expressly rejected this possibility in response to a question from a member of this court at oral argument. Officer Morris was entitled to ask for Coleman’s driver’s license and to detain him upon discovering he was driv ing while barred. After today, habitual offenders stopped under similar circumstances will be able to simply drive away without an identity
check. The majority flouts our error preservation rules to make another end run around precedent by deciding this case under a sua sponte interpretation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. 3 Coleman never raised the Iowa Constitution in district court and never argued on appeal that it provided more restrictions on police than the Fourth
Amendment. I w ould hold Coleman waived any claim for greater protection under the Iowa Constitution. I will now further develop the reasons for my dissent, beginning with the threshold issue of waiver.
A. Error Preservation

— the Iowa Constitution. Coleman’s
motion t o suppress filed in district court did not mention the Fourth

3 See State v. Gaskins , 866 N.W.2d 1, 41 (Iowa 2015) (Waterman, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion that diverged from settled federal precedent and “revers[ed] the district court for failing to credit an argument the defendant never made at trial”); State v. Short , 851 N.W.2d 474, 508 (Iowa 2014) (Waterman, J., dissenting) (“Today’s majority .

. . once again uses the Iowa Constit ution to evade well

- settled Fourth Amendment precedent without setting forth any principled basis for construing Iowa’s nearly identically worded search and seizure provision to require greater restrictions on the law enforcement community and elected bran ches.”); State v. Baldon , 829 N.W.2d 785, 837 (Iowa 2013) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (noting majority had “venture[d] into state constitutional issues that no one has briefed”); State v. Pals , 805 N.W.2d 767, 784 (Iowa 2011) (Waterman, J., dissenting) (“A lthough Pals[’s] appellate brief raised both the federal and Iowa constitutional search and seizure provisions, he never argued our state constitution provided broader protection.”).38
Amendment or Iowa Constitution, 4 nor did he cite to either constitution during the hearing on that motion. Just last term, in State v. Prusha , we unanimously held the defendant failed to pr eserve a state constitutional search and seizure claim when he mentioned only the Fourth Amendment in district court. 874 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Iowa 2016). Now, the majority finds error was preserved when trial counsel failed to
mention either the Fourth Amen dment or the Iowa Constitution.
So less has become more. See State v. Short , 851 N.W.2d 474, 526 (Iowa 2014) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“[I]t almost seems as if a lawyer in
this court would be wiser not to develop an Iowa constitutional argument.”). Constitutional jurisprudence should not be a race to the bottom. Notwithstanding the State’s incorrect statement that error was preserved, Coleman waived his belated claim for broader restrictions on police under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. 5

4 Coleman’s motion to suppress stated in its entirety: COMES NOW the De fendant by counsel and, pursuant to I.R.Cr.P. 2.11(2)(c) 2.12(1)(a), moves the Court for an order suppressing certain evidence seized as a result of a traffic stop, on or about August 18, 2014, on the ground that the stop was[sic] probable case: the regist ered owner of the vehicle was not under suspension. The transcript of the oral hearing on the motion to suppress indicates the district court agreed with the State that our decision in Jackson controlled. Coleman obtained different counsel for his appea l.

5 The State in its appellate briefing indicated it “does not contest error preservation,” presumably because it assumed we would honor our precedent to apply the federal standard when the defendant sought no different standard under the Iowa Constituti on. See, e.g., State v. Tyler , 830 N.W.2d 288, 291

– 92 (Iowa 2013). “Where a party raises both state and federal constitutional claims but does not argue that a standard independent of the federal approach should be employed under the state constitution, we ordinarily apply the substantive federal standards .

. . .” Id . “[W]e generally decline to consider an independent state constitutional standard based upon mere citation to the applicable state constitutional provision.” State v. Lowe , 812 N.W.2d 554 , 566 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v. Effler , 769 N.W.2d 880, 895 (Iowa 2009) (Appel, J., concurring specially)). The State concluded, “Coleman cites both the state and federal constitutions, but does not argue that one requires a different analysis or
resu lt than the other. As such, the Court should treat the claims coextensively.” I39 By surprising the State with a new interpretation of our state constitution, the majority rewards trial counsel’s silence and gives all defense counsel a perverse incentive to lay in the weeds in di strict court. This approach deprives the State of the opportunity to address the state constitutional claim at the trial level, perhaps by making a different evidentiary record. It also deprives the district court of the opportunity
to rule on the state constitutional claim. “Error preservation is important for two reasons: (1) affording the district court an ‘opportunity to avoid or correct error’; and (2) providing the appellate court ‘with an adequate record in reviewing errors purportedly committed’ by the district court.” State v. Ambrose , 861 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. Pickett , 671 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Iowa 2003)). We do not consider issues for the first time on appeal.
See Geisler v. City Council , 769 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Iowa 2009). Because Coleman did not raise a claim under the Iowa Constitution in district court, I would find he did not preserve it. See id. “Our obligation on appeal is to decide the case within the framework of the issues raised by the parties.” Feld v. Borko wski , 790 N.W.2d 72, 78 (Iowa 2010). We should “do no more and no less.” Id. The majority in this case unnecessarily overturns existing law

sua sponte. In so doing, the majority violates the admonition so recently
reiterated in Feld : [I]n the absence of the most cogent circumstances, we do not create issues or unnecessarily overturn existing law sua sponte when the parties have not advocated for such a change. In this case, we are restrained to apply the controlling law as advocated b y the parties, and we do not

agree, but going forward the State should no longer rely on our precedent treating state and federal constitutional claims coextensively. ___________________________40 consider or forecast whether or not that controlling law should be abandoned or changed

. . . . Id. at 78 n.4 (citations omitted). The restraint exercised by our court in
Feld should have been employed here. Error p reservati on rules apply to the S tate and defendant alike

. DeVoss v. State , 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 2002) (“Because error preservation is based on fairness, we think both parties should be bound by the rule.”). 6 We should not reverse the district court for failing to credit an argument a party never made at trial. See id. (“Ordinarily, we attempt to protect the district court from being ambushed by parties raising issues on appeal that were not raised in the dist rict court.”). Judges cannot assume the role of a partisan advocate and do counsel’s work. See Hyler v. Garner , 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996) (“[W]e will not speculate on the arguments [the parties] might have made and then search for legal authority a nd comb the record for facts to support such arguments.”); see also State v. Hicks , 791 N.W.2d 89, 97

– 98 (Iowa 2010) (declining to speculate as to argument not made at district court); Feld , 790 N.W.2d at 83 (Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Judges are not advocates who reach out to decide questions the parties themselves either deem unimportant or, for whatever reasons, fail to raise. The job of the court is to decide concrete cases the parties bring to it.”); In re S.P. , 719 N.W.2d 535, 539

– 40 (Iowa 2006) (stating “the court is prohibited from assuming the role of an advocate” and calling for “what Edmund Burke described as the ‘cold neutrality of an impartial judge’ ” (quoting State v. Glanton , 231 N.W.2d 31, 35 (Iowa 1975))); Stat e v. Biddle , 652 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Iowa 2002) (noting the “constitutional right

6 For example, in State v. Ochoa, we concluded the s tate waived several grounds for upholding a warrantless search of a parolee’s motel room based on consent because it failed to raise those grounds in district court. 792 N.W.2d 260, 291

– 92 (Iowa 2010).41 to have a neutral and detached judge”); Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins.
Co. , 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974) (noting that we do not “assume a partisan role and undertake [a party ’s] research and advocacy”). When Coleman belatedly raised the Iowa Constitution on appeal, he never argued for a different standard than we apply under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, our court should have applied the federal
framework. See, e.g. , R eilly v. Iowa Dist. Ct. , 783 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa 2010) (“Because Reilly has not advanced a standard for interpreting the due process clause under the Iowa Constitution different from its federal constitutional counterpart, we will apply the general princ iples as outlined by the United States Supreme Court.”); State v. Bruegger , 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009) (applying Federal Eighth Amendment
framework because defendant “has not advanced a standard for interpreting the cruel and unusual punishment provis ion under the Iowa Constitution differently”); In re Det. of Garren , 620 N.W.2d 275, 280 n.1 (Iowa 2000) (refusing to deviate from federal analysis in considering state constitutional claim because appellant “ha[d] suggested no legal deficiency in the fede ral principles .

. . nor ha[d] he offered an alternative test or guidelines”). “The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do
not sit as self

- directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal question s presented and argued by the parties before them.” Carducci v. Regan , 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983). We should not break from precedent and plow new ground without affording all parties the opportunity to address the issue in
district court and on appeal. The risk of unintended consequences
escalates when our court freelances. Constitutional errors cannot be fixed legislatively.42

B. The Search and Seizure Analysis. To me, this is an easy case. As Judge McDonald observed in his special concurre nce in this case, “ Jackson is rooted in long

- standing Fourth Amendment principles [that were] reaffirmed in Rodriquez and Pardee .” It is undisputed that Officer Morris lawfully stopped Coleman. Officer Morris could not identify who was driving the moving vehicle at night and its registered owner had a suspended license. In State v. Vance , we determined
an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop of a vehicle to investigate whether the driver has a valid driver’s license when the officer knows the registered owner of the vehicle has a suspended license, and the officer is unaware of any evidence or circu mstances indicating the registered owner is not the driver of the vehicle. 790 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Iowa 2010). Even when an officer is mistaken about a driver’s identity, “[o]ur precedent is clear that a mistake of fact may justify a traffic stop.” Tyler , 830 N.W.2d at 294. Having lawfully stopped Coleman, Officer Morris crossed no constitutional line by simply asking to see Coleman’s driver’s license. The majority gives short s hrift to the dispositive caselaw and reaches the wrong result through a mea ndering discussion of dissenting opinions and out

- of

- date precedent. 7 In Rodriguez , the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, delineated the bounds of a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion. 575 U.S. at ___,
135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499. An officer stopped Dennys Rodriguez for driving on a highway shoulder, a violation of Nebraska law.
Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1613, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 496. After attending to

7 The majority first cites Rodrig uez on page 16 after ten pages discussing earlier Fourth Amendment decisions. The majority first cites Jackson on page 23, after five additional pages discussing pre

- Rodriguez cases from other states. In my view, a proper analysis should begin with the c ontrolling precedent.43 everything related to the stop, including checkin g the driver’s license and issuing a warning citation, the officer detained Rodriguez for another seven to eight minutes to walk a drug

- detection dog around the vehicle.
Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1612, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 497. The Court held this

seven

- to eight

- minute delay violated the Fourth Amendment if it was not supported by independent reasonable suspicion and remanded the case
for determination of that issue. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616

– 17, 191
L. Ed. 2d at 500

– 01. “Like a Terry stop, the tolera ble duration of police inquiries in the traffic

- stop context is determined by the seizure’s
‘mission’

— to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614, 191
L. Ed. 2d at 498 (ci tation omitted). The Court concluded the officer’s mission ended after the time reasonably required to issue the warning
citation. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500. The officer could not prolong the stop by detaining the driver to wa it for the drug dog without independent reasonable suspicion. Id. In so holding, the Court made clear that “[b]eyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’ ” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615,
191 L. Ed. 2d at 499 (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 847 (2005)). “Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. The Court stated these actions serve the same “objective” as the traffic code: “ensuring that vehicles on the road are op erated safely and responsibly.” Id. Rather than an interest in criminal enforcement, the44 Court noted, these actions “stem[] from the mission of the stop itself.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500.
The Court contrasted these “negligibly burdensome precautions” with running a drug dog around the vehicle, which “is a measure aimed at ‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’ ” Id. at ___, 135
S. Ct. at 1615

– 16, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499

– 500 (alteration in original) (qu oting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond , 531 U.S. 32, 41, 121 S. Ct. 447, 454, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 343 (2000)). “Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries,” the Court held unrelated inquiries to search for other criminal wr ongdoing could not prolong the duration of the stop without reasonable suspicion. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499. Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito dissented on the validity of the drug search, but all nine justices agreed the off icer may obtain license and registration information as an ordinary incident of any lawful stop. See id . at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1624, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 509 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting the majority’s conclusion that asking for driver’s license and comple ting a records check on driver was “properly part of the traffic stop”). I would follow this unanimous contemporary decision of our nation’s highest court. We applied Rodriguez in Pardee , 872 N.W.2d at 391

– 93. A highway patrolman on a drug interdictio n mission began trailing a car with California license plates and stopped the driver, John Saccento, for a broken taillight and following a semitrailer too closely. Id . at 386. Robert Pardee was a passenger in the car. Id. at 387. After twenty

- five
min utes, the trooper told the occupants they were free to go, but when they lingered, the officer resumed his questioning. Id. at 388. The officer, based on responses he found suspicious, detained Pardee and the45 driver to run a drug dog around the vehicle. Id. We concluded the officer had unlawfully prolonged the duration of the stop without particularized suspicion of wrongdoing and reversed the district court’s denial of Pardee’s motion to suppress. Id. at 397. But we emphasized [a] dog sniff, unlike matters such as “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance,” can only be undertaken without individualized suspicion if it does not prolong the traffic stop.
Id. at 393 (emphasis added) (quoting Rodriguez , 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 499). 8 Thus, both Rodriguez and Pardee recognized that a license check is within the original mission of the traffic stop. These checks do not require separate, articulable, individualized suspicion because they fall within the scope of the stop.
Well before Rodriguez and Pardee , our precedent allowed an officer to check a driver’s license once the driver had been stopped lawfully. In Jackson , a deputy sheriff pulled over a car driven by Louis Jackson because it had no license plate. 315 N.W.2d at 767. “Upon being alerted
to t he reasons for the stop, defendant directed the officer’s attention to a properly displayed department of transportation paper plate.” Id. At that point, reasonable suspicion for the stop dissipated. Id. But Jackson was unable to produce a driver’s lic ense and admitted his license had been suspended. Id. He was charged with driving under suspension. Id. Jackson filed a motion to suppress, stating, The request of the Defendant to see his license constituted a search and was violative of the court, t he Fourteen[th] Amendment[] of the United States Constitution and the

8 Two members of our court dissented, concluding the drug

- dog search was lawful based on reasonable suspicion raised during the stop. Pardee , 872 N.W.2d at 397

– 98 (Cady, C.J. dissenting).46 Constitution of the State of Iowa as being conducted without probabl[e] cause.” Def.’s Mot. to Suppress in Jackson , at 2. The district court granted the motion to suppress. Jackson , 315 N.W.2d at 767. We reversed the
district court. Id. We held the officer was authorized to ask for the
driver’s license: The stop of defendant’s vehicle was not a random or selective stop. His vehicle did not have license plates displayed. This fa ilure would ordinarily be a violation of section 321.37, [t]he Code. When the department of transportation paper plates were pointed out to the officer there arose no requirement that he treat the defendant as if he had never seen him. Section 321.174, [ t]he Code, requires all persons operating a motor vehicle upon a highway in the state to have immediate possession of a valid operator’s license, and to display the same upon the demand of a peace officer. Notwithstanding the fact that a mistake concernin g the license plates led to the defendant’s stop there was nothing illegal about the fact that, once he was stopped and exonerated, he was asked to display his operator’s license.
Id. I would follow Jackson

. The majority inaccurately suggests Jackson wa s undermined by Florida v. Royer , a 1983 decision correctly stating that investigatory stops should “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 (1983). The majo rity overlooks two subsequent Iowa decisions that belie its conclusion. First, in 2004, we upheld the arrest of a passenger on an outstanding warrant, unanimously holding that the officer did not violate the passenger’s Fourth Amendment rights by checking his identification after the conclusion of a traffic stop. State v. Smith , 683 N.W.2d 542,
547

– 48 (Iowa 2004) (“The entire episode lasted but a minute; it was no
more intrusive to check Smith’s identification than to ask him a few47 questions.”). Here, Co leman voluntarily produced his identification to
Officer Morris and makes no claim that encounter took over a minute. Second, in 2005, we expressly reaffirmed Jackson in State v. Lloyd , when the officer initiated a traffic stop on a mistaken belief that a vehicle had no license plate but a temporary plate actually was in the rear window. 701 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Iowa 2005) (per curiam). The driver was charged and convicted of OWI, with a blood alcohol level over twice the legal limit. Id. at 679. We held the stop was valid and “there was nothing illegal about the fact that .

. . [Lloyd] was asked to display his operator’s license.” Id. at 681 (quoting Jackson , 315 N.W.2d at 767). We cited with approval post

- Royer Eighth Circuit precedent that allowed the officer to check the driver’s identification after stopping the vehicle on the mistaken belief it failed to display a required license plate. Id. (citing
United States v. Smart , 393 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming conviction for felony possessio n of firearm discovered after check of identification showed driver was under suspension and a suspect in a recent shooting). Under the majority’s new regime, after noticing the validly displayed plate, the officer could only wave on the driver, permittin g someone like Lloyd to drive away drunk, and Smart, the shooting suspect and felon, to depart the scene armed. It has long been settled in Iowa, well after Royer , that when an officer lawfully stops a vehicle based on a reasonable mistake of fact, the

o fficer, after resolving that reason for the stop, could proceed to check
the driver’s license. 9 See id. Other jurisdictions, like Iowa, have

9 In Vance , in dicta, we suggested (without citing Jackson or Lloyd ) that the issue of whether an officer could request a driver’s license from a detained motorist was debatable. See 790 N.W.2d at 783 n.1 (“Vance’s counsel failed to raise in the district court or o n appeal whether the stop continued to be valid upon the stopping officer’s discovery that the driver of the vehicle was, in fact, not the registered owner.

. . .48 recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit asking a driver
for identification after the reasonable suspicion that prompted the stop has dissipated. 10 The majority relies on contrary state appellate decisions decided
before Rodriguez. Those now outdated decisions concluded if an officer initiated a traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion from a mist aken observation, the officer could only inform the driver of the mistake and allow him or her to drive away. See, e.g. , State v. Morris , 259 P.3d 116, 124 (Utah 2011). Such decisions are unpersuasive after Rodriguez. Decisions applying Rodriguez consi stently hold that an officer may request identification from a driver lawfully stopped even if reasonable suspicion for the stop has dissipated. 11 See United States v. Reidy, No.
CR 13

- 71

- BLG

- DWM, 2016 WL 6208398, at *3 & n.3 (D. Mont. Oct. 24,

Accordingly, we express no opinion on the merits of this issue because it has not been prese rved for our appellate review.”). Vance did not decide the issue and did not have the guidance of Rodriguez , which was decided five years later.

10 See , e.g. , United States v. Elmore , 304 F.3d 557, 561 n.1 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding no Fourth Amendment v iolation resulted when officer approached driver to request license and registration after pulling over for no license plate and then seeing temporary tag in window); State v. Godwin , 826 P.2d 452, 456 (Idaho 1992) (“[A] police officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment.”); State v. Hill , 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992) (determining after valid stop for mistaken tra ffic violation, asking for license was minimal intrusion and did not violate Fourth Amendment); Hart v. State , 235 S.W.3d 858, 862 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]here the initial traffic stop is valid, a license check of the driver, even if conducted after the officer has determined the motorist is not guilty of the violation for which he or she was originally stopped, is not unreasonable so long as it does not unduly prolong the motorist’s detention.”); State v. Williams , 655 N.W.2d 462, 469 & n.4 (Wis. Ct. App

. 2002) (concluding that officer could have lawfully checked license after pulling over driver who was not registered owner with a suspended license).

11 Several courts have continued to refer to the majority rule without addressing the impact of Rodriguez

. See, e.g. , United States v. Fuller , 120 F. Supp. 3d 669, 681

– 82, 685 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (citing Rodriguez without analysis); State v. Hollister , No. 112,983, 2016 WL 197742, at *8 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2016) (per curiam) (no citation to Rodriguez ). ___________________________49 2016) (ruli ng that deputy who pulled over driver on suspicion that license plate was inadequately illuminated could check driver’s license first); State v. Allen , 779 S.E.2d 248, 251, 254

– 55 (Ga. 2015) (holding
that Rodriguez permitted officer to check identification of a passenger as “part of the authorized mission of the traffic stop”); Cummings , 46 N.E.3d at 252; State v. Cotter , No. 2015AP1916

- CR, 2016 WL 4468406 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2016) (per curiam) (“Consistent with Rodriguez , as well as with Wisconsin prec edent

. . . , [the officer], after determining that he could not issue a ticket on the basis for which the stop was initiated, was permitted to continue the stop for purposes of completing routine matters such as gathering Craig Tomlinson’s license informa tion

. . . .”). The Illinois Supreme Court twice addressed the issue, before and
after Rodriguez , in a factually analogous case, People v. Cummings , 6 N.E.3d 725, 727 (Ill. 2014) ( Cummings I ), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Illinois v. Cumming s , ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1892, 191
L. Ed. 2d 760 (2015) (mem.), decision after remand , 46 N.E.3d 248 (Ill. 2016) ( Cummings II ). Derrick Cummings was driving a van owned by a
woman named Pearlene Chattic. Cummings I , 6 N.E.3d at 727. A police
officer initiated a traffic stop because Chattic had a warrant for her
arrest. Id. The officer knew Chattic was a woman. Id. at 728. After stopping the vehicle, the officer saw the driver was a male. Id. The officer nevertheless asked for his license and reg istration. Id. Cummings
had no license and was arrested. Id. The trial court granted Cummings’s motion to suppress, and the Illinois Supreme Court initially affirmed, holding that reasonable suspicion “disappeared when [the officer] saw that the defend ant was not a woman and, therefore, could
not be Chattic.” Id. at 731. The court concluded that requesting50 Cumming’s license “impermissibly prolonged the stop.” Id. at 731, 734. Two justices dissented, stating, The majority’s rule, while narrow in th is case, casts a wider shadow

— that officers need an independent basis for requesting a driver’s license in a lawful traffic stop. This result protects a driver from an objectively and subjectively minimal intrusion, at the expense of complicating law enfo rcement in a situation “especially fraught with danger to police officers.”
Id. at 738 (Garmin, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032, 1047, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1218 (1983)). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the judgment, remanding to the Illinois Supreme Court “for further consideration in light of Rodriguez v. United States .” Illinois v. Cummings , ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1892, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 760. On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the officer’s actions. Cummings II , 46 N.E.3d at 251. The Illinois Supreme Court observed that Rodriguez
established [t]he seizure’s mission consists of the purpose of the stop

— in Rodriguez , traff ic enforcement

— and “related safety concerns.” Those related safety concerns include “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop,” and typically “involve checking the driver’s license .

. . .”
Id. (quoting Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614

– 15, 191
L. Ed. 2d at 498

– 99). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion applying Rodriguez under nearly identical facts. Cotter , 2016 WL 4468406, at *5. I find the Cummings II court’s analysis of Ro driguez persuasive. “Ordinary inquiries within the traffic stop’s mission clearly do not
offend the fourth amendment.” Cummings II , 46 N.E.3d at 251. In rejecting the defendant’s argument that a license check must relate to the initial purpose of the stop, the Illinois Supreme C ourt reasoned,51 Rodriguez makes clear that unrelated inquiries impermissibly prolong the stop beyond its original mission when those inquiries are not precipitated by reasonable suspicion. Ordinary inquiries incident to the sto p do not prolong the stop beyond its original mission, because those inquiries are a part of that mission. Indeed, defendant’s view would collapse the two parts of the mission

— the initial purpose of the stop and ordinary inquiries of the stop

— into just th e purpose of the stop. Nothing in Rodriguez suggests that license requests might be withdrawn from the list of ordinary inquiries for a nontraffic enforcement stop.
Id. at 252 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Reasonable suspicion may dissipate whe n the officer fulfills one part of the mission of the stop

— to address the perceived traffic violation. However, the officer can still proceed to fulfill the other part of the mission by attending to related safety concerns, such as checking the driver’s l icense. See Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 498. “The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s person al security.’ ” Pennsylvania v.
Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 108

– 09, 98 S. Ct. 330, 332, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 335 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889, 904 (1968)). We must weigh the “balance between the public inter est and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Id. at 109, 98 S. Ct. at 332, 54
L. Ed. 2d at 336 (quoting United States v. Brignoni

- Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 6 14

– 15 (1975)); see also
State v. DeWitt , 811 N.W.2d 460, 468 (Iowa 2012) (“[T]he test for reasonableness of police conduct ‘requires a careful balancing of “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” against the countervailing governmental interests52

at stake.’ ” (quoting Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, 455 (1989))). Checking a driver’s license is within a traffic stop’s original mission and is minimally intrusive. The balancing of interests easily favors the State, given the importance of ensuring that drivers who are lawfully stopped are in fact authorized to drive on Iowa roads. These “negligibly burdensome precautions” an officer takes to “complete his mission safely” are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500. I reach the same
conclusion under the Iowa Constitution. States have a “vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to
do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles.” Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 658, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1398, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 670 (1979). Licenses are issued “to evidence that the drivers holding them are sufficiently familiar with the rules of the road a nd are physically qualified to operate a motor vehicle.” Id. “[D]rivers without licenses are presumably the less safe drivers whose propensities may well exhibit
themselves.” Id. at 659, 99 S. Ct. at 1399, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 671; see also
State v. Mitchell , 498 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Iowa 1993) (“The State has a valid interest in the safety of its citizens on its roads and highways.”). Coleman, a habitual offender, was driving while barred at the time he was pulled over by Officer Morris.
Motorists whose carel ess or reckless driving is so serious as to lead to license suspension constitute a genuine threat to the safety of their fellow citizens, few of whom will appreciate that today’s decision places them at greater risk of injury. Holly v. State , 918 N.E.2d 323, 327 (Ind. 2009) (Shepard, C.J., dissenting). I share the concern that today’s decision will put the driving public at greater risk.53 If a motorist with a suspended license

— who is detained but allowed to drive away without being identified

— later harms someone, it “will be difficult ‘to explain to the family’ of an innocent injured party that the police had a chance to prevent the injury but were powerless to act.”
Id. (quoting Virginia v. Harris , 558 U.S. 978, 978, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12, 175
L. Ed. 2d 322 , 324 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)). Coleman exemplifies the reason officers should be able to check whether a driver they lawfully stop is barred from our roadways. He was pulled over by Officer Morris two days after he w as arrested for a
second

- offense

- drunk

- driving charge, following at least six prior convictions for driving while barred or suspended and multiple convictions for possession of narcotics. Iowa Code section 321.174 obligates drivers to possess a valid
lic ense and have it in their possession at all times when driving.
Id. § 321.174(3). Drivers are required to display the license upon demand by a peace officer. Id. “ The statutory authority for police to
demand a driver’s license would mean little if the police could not check the validity of the license.” State v. Ellenbecker , 464 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). The reason for allowing police to request a driver’s license on demand is to deter persons from driving without a valid license, since a license is a statement that the driver can be expected to comply with the state’s requirements for safe driving. Where it is reasonable for a police officer to ask for a license, running a status check on the license is simply carrying out this deterrent function of the law.
Id. ; see also Godwin , 826 P.2d at 455 (same); People v. Redinger , 906 P.2d 81, 88 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (Vollack, C.J., dissenting) (“Because motorists are required by state law to carry a driver’s license,54 registration, and proof of insurance when operating a motor vehicle, Officer Wise’s request for such documents was proper.”). Officers may request proof of liability insurance during a lawful traffic stop, even without an accident. See State v. Acevedo , 705 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 2005) (stating defendant was stopped for traffic offense and arrested when operating without a license and without proof of insurance). Iowa has a valid interest in enforcing laws requiring liability insurance to protect accident v ictims. Allowing officers to request proof of insurance deters uninsured drivers. In the same vein, checking identification during a lawful stop deters barred motorists who may wreak havoc on our roadways. The majority undermines these legislative goals

. Asking a driver for a license also promotes “transparency in traffic stops.” Cummings I , 6 N.E.3d at 739 (Garmin, C.J., dissenting) (citing 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11

- 212 (West 2012) (requiring law enforcement officers to gather statistical inform ation on drivers stopped or cited and department of transportation to analyze data and assess practices that resemble racial profiling)). As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted, In many cases, police officers are required to make a written report of cont acts with citizens. An officer needs to know whom he or she is assisting in the event a citizen later complains about improper behavior on the part of the officer or makes any kind of legal claim against the officer.
Ellenbecker , 464 N.W.2d at 430. “Req uesting identification may also be beneficial if the seemingly innocuous activity the officer observes later turns out to be illegal

— for instance, if the vehicle turns out to have been
stolen.” State v. Huck , No. 2014AP2120

– CR, 2015 WL 423239, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2015); see also State v. Calzadas , No. 2015AP162

–55 CR, 2015 WL 5146526, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2015). Officer Morris knew by his gender that Coleman was not the registered owner of the

car. 12 What if minutes after the officer had allowed the driver to depart unidentified, the real owner reported the car stolen? The safety of the officer is another reason to permit checks of the driver’s identity. This safety interest “stems from the missi on of the stop
itself.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500. “Traffic stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers.’ ”
Id. (quoting Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 330, 129 S. Ct. 781, 786,
172 L. Ed. 2 d 694, 702 (2009)). The Cummings II court recognized that Rodriguez relies in part on United States v. Holt , which “approved criminal record and warrant checks ‘even though the purpose of the stop had nothing to do with such prior criminal history.’ ” Cu mmings II , 46
N.E.3d at 252 (quoting United States v. Holt , 264 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Stewart , 473 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 2007)). These checks were justified because
“an officer will be better appri[s]ed of whether the detained motorist might engage in violent activity during the stop.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Holt , 264 F.3d at 1222). License checks were relevant to officer safety regardless of the original purpose of the stop: To the extent the ordinary inquiries are justified by the officer safety interest, defendant’s view would also require a conclusion that it is the type of stop, and not the occurrence of the stop itself, that generates danger for officers. The relevant a uthorities instead reveal it is the stop itself that poses danger.

12 In some cases, the officer may be unable to determine the driver is not the registered owner until he or she checks the driver’s license. Some people appear older or younger than their age; even race or gender may not be immediately apparent in a darkened vehicle.56

Id . (citing Rodriguez , 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 500). Traffic stops are inherently dangerous because they involve close
officer contact with unsecured individ uals. 13 See Long , 463 U.S. at 1052,
103 S. Ct. at 3482, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1221

– 22; see also State v. Smith , 739 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa 2007) (noting defendant stopped for speeding fired four shots at officer who was unaware vehicle stolen). The Supreme
Court has repeatedly acknowledged the weighty government interest in officer safety during traffic stops. 14 “Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of
violence or mental disorder.” Hiibel v. Si xth Judicial Dist. Ct. , 542 U.S. 177, 186, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2458, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292, 303 (2004). Officers

13 Statistics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicate that a traffic stop poses the second

- greatest risk of death for an officer, after investigation of a suspicious person, and the third

- greatest risk of assault. More officers have bee n killed during traffic violation stops than in attempting an arrest for burglary, robbery, or drugs, or in responding to domestic abuse violence calls. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed & Assaulted Table, https://UCR .fbi.gov/leoka/2014/home (follow “Overview” of officers feloniously killed hyperlink; then follow “Table 21” hyperlink); Id. Table 79 (follow “Overview” of officers assaulted hyperlink; then follow “Table 79” hyperlink). In 2005

– 2014, ninety

- three officer s were killed during traffic stops. Id. Table 21.

14 See Johnson , 555 U.S. at 330

– 32, 129 S. Ct. at 786

– 87, 172 L. Ed. 2d at 702

– 03 (holding officer authorized to perform pat

- down on passenger because of safety interest of officer); Maryland v. Wilson , 51 9 U.S. 408, 413, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 47 (1997) (recognizing “traffic stops may be dangerous encounters” and citing statistics of officers killed during traffic stops in 1994); Long , 463 U.S. at 1052, 103 S. Ct. at 3482, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1 221

– 22 (“[W]e stress that a Terry investigation, such as the one that occurred here, involves a police investigation ‘at close range’ when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, and the of ficer must make a ‘quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger .

. . .’ ” (quoting Terry , 392 U.S. at 24, 28, 88 S. Ct. at 1881, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 908, 910); Mimms , 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S. Ct. at 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 336 (stating government’s interest in safety is “both legitimate and weighty” and “specifically recogniz[ing] the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile”); Terry , 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S. Ct. at 1881, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906 (“Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.”).57 initiating these stops “need to know who[] they are dealing with in order to assess the situation [and] the threat to their own safety.” Id.
We s hould balance this weighty government interest against the minimal intrusion on the defendant’s liberty interest. “[W]hen stopped for a traffic violation, a motorist expects ‘to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the office r checks his license and registration.’ ” Holt , 264 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S. 420, 437, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3149, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 333 (1984)); see also Hiibel , 542 U.S. at 186, 124 S. Ct. at 2458, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 302 (“Our decisi ons make clear that questions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops.”). Most Iowans will be quite surprised to hear Officer Morris violated Coleman’s constitutional rights by asking to see his driver’s license after lawfully stopping the car he was driving.
In Mimms , the Supreme Court held that an officer can require a driver to step out of a vehicle during a traffic stop based on officer safety concerns. 434 U.S. at 111, 98 S. Ct. at 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 33 7. The Court determined the intrusion requiring the driver to get out of the car
was “ de minimis .” Id. “The police have already lawfully decided that the driver shall be briefly detained; the only question is whether he shall spend that period sitting i n the driver’s seat of his car or standing alongside it.” Id. In Wilson , the Court expanded this analysis to allow officers to order passengers out of the vehicle. 519 U.S. at 413

– 14, 117
S. Ct. at 886, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 47. The Court reasoned,
On the personal liberty side of the balance, the case for the passengers is in once sense stronger than that for the driver. There is probable cause to believe the driver has committed a minor vehicular offense, but there is no such reason to stop or detain the passengers. But as a practical matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the58 stop of the vehicle. The only change in their circumstances which will result from ordering them out of the car is that they will be outside of, rather than insid e of, the stopped car.
Id. Indeed, many people would find providing their identification to a police officer for a computer records check far less intrusive than being ordered out of the car to stand on the shoulder of a busy highway or on the side of a street in their neighborhood.
Allen , 779 S.E.2d at 256; see also United States v. Soriano

- Jarquin , 492 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007) (“If an officer may ‘as a matter of course’ and in the interest of personal safety order a passenger physically to exit the vehicle, he may surely take the minimally intrusive step of requesting passenger identification.” (Citation omitted)); cf. Smith , 683 N.W.2d at
547

– 48 (holding officer did not “seize” passenger by requesting identification). The Supreme Court has st ressed the need to evaluate the initial detention and scope of the stop to ensure traffic stops are not used as “fishing expedition[s].” Ohio v. Robinette , 519 U.S. 33, 41, 117 S. Ct. 417, 422, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 356 (1996). “But the Supreme Court has

ex pressly rejected placing any rigid time limitations on Terry stops; instead, the issue is ‘whether the police diligently pursued a means for investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly

. . . .’ ” Kothe , 152 S.W.3d at 64 (qu oting United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 616 (1985)). A traffic stop’s mission includes both “an investigation into the specific suspected criminal activity and a routine check of the driver’s license,”
but “neither the Fourth Amendme nt nor the Supreme Court dictate that
an officer .

. . must investigate the situation in a particular order.” Id. at 65.59
Here, there is no evidence

— or even suggestion

— that Officer Morris failed to diligently pursue the mission of the traffic stop. Nei ther Coleman nor the majority contend this traffic stop was unduly prolonged by the request to see a driver’s license, which likely transpired in less
than a minute. For these reasons, I do not join the majority’s conclusion that
Officer Morris violated Coleman’s rights under the Iowa Constitution. Mansfield and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.