alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Terence W. Murphy, Appellant, v Sally Capone et al., Respondents.

In an action, *inter alia,*to recover damages for defamation, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Palella, J.), dated April 11, 1989, as granted the defendants’ motion for a final order of preclusion as to certain enumerated items contained in the bill of particulars.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Having received a bill of particulars that they considered to be insufficient, the defendants moved for an order of preclusion or a further bill of particulars *(see,*CPLR 3042 [d]). The court issued a conditional order of preclusion granting the motion to preclude unless the plaintiff served a responsive bill of particulars within 60 days *(see,*CPLR 3042 [e]). The plaintiff responded by re-serving the bill of particulars that had already been deemed insufficient. After the passage of 60 days, the defendants moved for and were granted a final order of preclusion as to the items the court had previously determined to be insufficient. This appeal ensued.

The plaintiff’s contention that reversal is warranted because *437the defendants failed to move for a final order of preclusion within 10 days of receipt of the second bill of particulars *(see,*CPLR 3042 [d]) is without merit. Since no *further*bill of particulars had been received by the defendants when they made their motion, the motion was actually one based upon the plaintiffs failure to comply with the previous order rather than on the ground of insufficiency *(see, Greystone in Westchester Coop. No. 1 v All Boro Paving Corp.,*108 AD2d 720). Thus, the time limitation contained in CPLR 3042 (d) is inapplicable *(see, Greystone in Westchester Coop. No. 1 v All Boro Paving Coop., supra; cf., Murphy v Capone,*121 AD2d 702; *Kursa v Barratiere,*49 AD2d 781). Similarly, the plaintiffs contention that the motion should have been denied because it was not supported by an affidavit of a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the motion to preclude is without merit *(see,*22 NYCRR 202.7 [a]).

We have considered the plaintiffs remaining contentions and find that they are without merit. Bracken, J. P., Brown, Kunzeman and Harwood, JJ., concur.
#### SOUTHERN UNION CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Joe BABINO, Appellee.

No. 3732.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

Nov. 8, 1940.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 20, 1940.

Gammage, Gammage & Bauer, of Houston, for appellant.

Lefler, Lefler & Black, of Beaumont, for appellee.

WALKER, Chief Justice.

This appeal was prosecuted from the County Court of Jefferson County at Law, Jefferson County.- The action was on an insurance policy in the principal sum of $185. Appellee plead for statutory damages and attorney’s fees in a sufficient amount to confer jurisdiction on the county court. Appellant replied by general demurrer, general denial, and certain special defenses. On trial to the court without a jury, judgment was for only the principal amount of the policy with interest, from which appellant duly prosecuted its appeal to this court.

We have examined all of appellant’s assignments of error and, on authority of Texas & N. O. v. Futch, Tex.Civ.App., 127 S.W.2d 1040, the judgment is affirmed without a written opinion.

On appellant’s proposition, advanced only under its general demurrer, appellee’s petition does not show on its face that appellant was a mutual assessment association, and therefore not liable for statutory damages and attorney’s fees, within the rule restated by this court in Mutual Life & Loan Ass’n v. Houston, 58 S.W.2d 1035, and authorities therein cited.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 99.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of WNC Housing Tax
Credit VI, L.P., Series 8 (the "Partnership") for the period ended June 30, 2003
as filed with the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof (the
"Report"),  and  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.,  section  1350,  as adopted  pursuant to
section  906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of  2002,  I,  Thomas  J.  Riha,  Chief
Financial  Officer of WNC &  Associates,  Inc.,  general  partner of the general
partner, hereby certify that to my knowledge:

          1.   The Report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          2.   The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
               material  respects,   the  financial   condition  and  result  of
               operations of the Partnership.




/s/THOMAS J. RIHA
-----------------
Thomas J. Riha
Chief Financial Officer of WNC & Associates, Inc.
September 8, 2003
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc. (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the period
ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, John P. Burke, the Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1) the Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.



|                      |  |                                                                                                               
|--------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: August 13, 2010 |  | /s/    JOHN P.
BURKE                                                                                          
|                      |  | John P. Burke                                                                                                 
|                      |  | Executive Vice President,
Chief Financial Officer and Corporate Treasurer
of Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

 WASHINGTON, D.C. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 

 October 9, 2003 

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL BUREAU HEADS 

FROM: John W. Snow //s// 

SUBJECT: Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 

When I became Secretary of the Treasury, I pledged my commitment to a workplace 

where all employees are treated with dignity and respect. However, I am aware that in every 

workplace, disputes do occur. I am equally committed to resolving these disputes in an 

appropriate, fair and efficient manner. Resolving complaints expeditiously contributes 

significantly to our goal of maintaining an environment that fosters communication, trust, and 

involvement. 

I am a strong advocate of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs. ADR 

techniques successfully defuse workplace conflict; helping us resolve disputes quickly, improve 

communication, and prevent escalations. Therefore, effective immediately, I expect each 

manager in the Department to use ADR techniques whenever possible, and accept the use of 

ADR as a management responsibility. 

Managers and employees working together to solve problems leads to long-term 

relationships and better work products. ADR promotes principles and practices of trust that 

encourage open communication and healthy, productive working relationships. Successful ADR 

outcomes avoid prolonged litigation, promote productivity, and improve morale. 

By working together to resolve workplace disputes, we will continue to build a strong 

Treasury Department. Please share this new policy with all managers and supervisors. I look 

forward to seeing the benefits of the use of ADR in the EEO process throughout the Department.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

LUBBOCK DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 

§ 

§ 

V. § 

§ 

§ 

DAMODRICK DESHUN RUTHERFORD § 

CASE NO. 5:22-CR-054-H-BQ-1 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLEA 

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

This case has been referred by the United States district judge to the undersigned 

for the taking of a guilty plea. The parties have consented to appear before a United States 

magistrate judge for these purposes. This Report and Recommendation on Plea is submitted 

to the eourt under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). 

The defendant appeared with counsel before the undersigned United States 

magistrate judge, who addressed the defendant personally in open comi and informed the 

defendant of, and determined that the defendant understood, the admonitions contained in 

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

The defendant pleaded guilty (under a written plea bargain agreement with the 

government) to Count One of the Indictment, charging defendant with a violation of 

18 US.C. §§ 922(n), 924(a)(l)(D), that is, Receipt of a Firearm While Under Felony 

Indictment. After examining Defendant under oath the undersigned magistrate judge finds 

the following: 

1. Defendant, upon adviee of counsel, has consented orally and in writing 

to enter this guilty plea before a magistrate judge, subject to final 

approval and sentencing by the presiding district judge; 

Case 5:22-cr-00054-H-BQ Document 23 Filed 08/03/22 Page 1 of 2 PageID 40
2. Defendant fully understands the nature of the charges (including each 

essential element of the offense(s) charged) and penalties; 

3. Defendant fully understands the terms of the plea agreement and plea 

agreement supplement; 

4. Defendant understands all constitutional and statutory rights and wishes 

to waive these rights, including the right to a trial by jury and the right 

to appear before a United States district judge; 

5. Defendant's plea is made freely and voluntarily; 

6. Defendant is competent to enter this plea of guilty; 

7, There is a factual basis for this plea; and 

8. The ends of justice are served by acceptance of the defendant's plea of 

guilty. 

Although I have conducted these proceedings and recommend acceptance of 

Defendant's plea of guilty, the United States district judge has the power to review my 

actions and possesses final decision~making authority in this proceeding. Thus, if 

Defendant has any objections to these findings or any other action of the undersigned, he 

is required to make those known to the United States district judge within fourteen ( 14) 

days of today. 

Based on the above, I recommend that Defendant's plea of guilty be accepted, that 

Defendant be adjudged guilty, and that sentence be imposed accordingly. 

Signed August 3, 2022. 

I 

'JR. 

!STRATE JUDGE 

Case 5:22-cr-00054-H-BQ Document 23 Filed 08/03/22 Page 2 of 2 PageID 41
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the annual report of Worldwide Restaurant Concepts, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended April 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, A.
Keith Wall, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



Date: July 17, 2003                 /s/ A. Keith Wall
                                    -----------------
                                    A. Keith Wall
                                    Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of SITEL Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod ending March 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, James F. Lynch, ChiefExecutive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that tomy knowledge:

 

(1)          TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)          Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/  James F. Lynch |   |
|--------------------------|--------|
| James F.  Lynch          |
| Chief  Executive Officer |
|                     |
| May 10, 2004             |

 

----
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1163

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow employers a tax

credit for hiring displaced homemakers.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 2, 1993

Mr. BILIRAKIS (for himself and Mr. SHAYS) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow

employers a tax credit for hiring displaced homemakers.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS ESTABLISHED AS A

4 TARGETED GROUP FOR PURPOSES OF COM5 PUTING THE CREDIT FOR EMPLOYMENT OF

6 CERTAIN NEW EMPLOYEES.

7 (a) GENERAL RULE.—Paragraph (1) of section 51(d)

8 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to mem9 bers of targeted groups) is amended by striking ‘‘or’’ at

10 the end of subparagraph (I), by striking the period at the
2

•HR 1163 IH

1 end of subparagraph (J) and inserting ‘‘, or’’, and by add2 ing at the end thereof the following new subparagraph:

3 ‘‘(K) a displaced homemaker.’’

4 (b) DISPLACED HOMEMAKER DEFINED.—Section

5 51(d) of such Code (relating to members of targeted

6 groups) is amended by redesignating paragraphs (13),

7 (14), (15), and (16) as paragraphs (14), (15), (16), and

8 (17), respectively, and by adding after paragraph (12) the

9 following new paragraph:

10 ‘‘(13) DISPLACED HOMEMAKER.—The term

11 ‘displaced homemaker’ means an individual who—

12 ‘‘(A) has not worked in the labor force for

13 a substantial number of years but has, during

14 those years, worked in the home providing un15 paid services for family members, and

16 ‘‘(B)(i) has been dependent on public as17 sistance or on the income of another family

18 member but is no longer supported by that in19 come, or (ii) is receiving public assistance on

20 account of dependent children in the home.’’

21 (c) TERMINATION NOT TO APPLY.—Paragraph (4)

22 of section 51(c) of such Code (relating to termination) is

23 amended by adding at the end thereof the following new

24 sentence: ‘‘The preceding sentence shall not apply in the

25 case of any displaced homemaker.’’
3

•HR 1163 IH

1 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

2 this section shall apply to amounts paid or incurred after

3 the date of enactment of this Act to individuals who have

4 begun to work for the employer after such date.

Æ
Summary of Board Compensation



 Exhibit 10.4 
  
 Avery Dennison Corporation 
  
 Non-Employee Director Compensation* 
 Summary 
  

				
	 Board members
	  	 	 
	 annual retainer
	  	$	55,000
	 meeting fees
	  	$	1,500
	 annual stock payment (shares of ADC stock)
	  	 	500
		
	 Chairman retainer
	  	 	 
	 Audit Committee
	  	$	10,000
	 Compensation and Executive Personnel Committee
	  	$	10,000
	 Other Committees
	  	$	5,000
		
	 Committee meeting fees
	  	 	 
	 Chairman
	  	$	2,000
	 Members
	  	$	1,500



	*	effective July 1, 2005
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N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT M AURIC IO FLORES C ARL OS, AKA M a uric io Flore s, Pe titione r, v. LORETTA E. LYNC H, Attorne y Ge ne ra l, R

e sponde nt . No. 11-71149 Age n c y No. A096-528-535 M EM O R ANDUM *

On Pe tition for Re vie w of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of Im m igration Appe a ls Subm itte d Fe brua

ry 8, 2016 ** Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia B e fore : KLEINFELD, M c KEOW N, a nd IKUTA, C irc uit Judge s . 

# F IL ED F EB 19 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. * * The pa

ne l una nim ously c o nc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).The B oa rd of Im m igrat ion Appe a ls orde re d tha t M a uric i o Flore s C arlos be re m ove d unde r 8 U.S.C . § 1227(a)(2)(B )(i). W e have jurisdic tion unde r 8 U.S.C . § 1252, a nd we de ny

C arlos’ s pe t ition for re vie w. The B IA he ld C arlos wa s re m ova ble be c a use he ha d be e n c onvic t e d unde r C a lifornia He a lth & Sa fe ty

C ode § 11550(a). C arlos a rgue s tha t his c onvic t ion is not a “ c onvic t ion” for im

m igration purpose s, be c a

use he would ha

ve qua lifie d for re lie f from

de porta tion unde r the Fe de ra l First Offe nde r Ac t, 18 U.S.C . § 3607, ha d he be e n prose c ute d

unde r fe de ra l la

w. Luja n-Arm e nda

riz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 749–50 (9th C ir. 2000), ove rrule d prospe c tive ly on othe r grounds by

Nune z -R e y e s v. Holde r, 646 F.3d 684 (9th C ir. 2011) (e n ba nc ). W e re vie wthe B IA’ s de c ision de novo. Nune z -R e y e s v. Holde r, 646 F.3d 684, 688 (9th C ir. 2011) (e n ba n c ).
If C a rlos ha d be e n prose c ute d in fe de ra l c ourt, C arlos would not ha ve qua lifie d for First Offe nde r Ac t tre atm e nt. Tha t Ac t only a

pplie s to de fe nda

nts c onvic te d of sim

ple posse ssion, a

nd C arlos’ s c onvic tion for “ [b] e ing unde r the influe n c e is not a

le sse r offe nse to sim

ple posse ssion.” Nune z -R e y e s, 646 F.3d a t 685. W e de ny

C arlos’ s pe tition without re m anding to the

B IA be c a

use “ t he issue is pure ly le ga l a

n d it involve s a

n inte rpre t ation of the[First Offe nde r Ac t ] , a sta tute 2whic h the B IA is not c ha rge d with a dm iniste ring.” Aguiluz -Are lla no v. Gonz a le s, 446 F.3d 980, 984 (9th C ir. 2006).
C arlos’ s pe tition is DE NIE D .

3
#### NEWTON v. STATE.

No. 20582.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 11, 1939.

No attorney for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The conviction is for assault with intent to murder. The punishment assessed is confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of eight years.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exceptions. The indictment is sufficient to charge the offense, and procedural matters appear to be in due order.

The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
#### WOFFORD v. STATE (two cases).

Nos. 21093, 21095.

*Court*of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 29, 1940.

Rehearing Denied June 26, 1940.

M. H. Barton, of Overton, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Conviction is for theft of property over the value of $50, punishment being assessed at two years in the penitentiary.

The record is before this court without bills of exception or statement of facts. In such condition nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
#### WILLIAMS v. STATE.

No. 21837.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 14, 1942.

R. W. Webb, of Snyder, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

The appellant was charged with unlawful possession for the purpose of sale, in a dry area, of intoxicating liquor. Upon trial before the court, without the intervention of a jury, he was found guilty and his punishment fixed ¿t confinement in the county jail for nine months.

The record is before us without statement of facts or bills of exception. No error appears on the face of the record.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.