alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### McCHRISTY v. STATE.

No. 21325.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 18, 1940.

*874H. D. Stringer, of Memphis, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was charged by information and complaint with the possession of an alcoholic beverage, to-wit:- “chock”, same being an intoxicating liquor, for the purpose of sale, in a dry area, and upon a trial, was fined the sum of $100.

We find this record supported mainly by facts identical in words with our cause, 145 S.W.2d 872, against the same appellant, and these facts fail, as did the facts in that case, to show that the liquor so possessed was capable of being used as a beverage.

There are further errors complained of herein which we will briefly notice.

Appellant’s requested charge No. 3 stated a correct proposition of law not embodied in the court’s charge, and in our opinion should have been given'. This charge was based on the prima facie evidence statute relative to the possession of intoxicating liquor. In the court’s charge he embodied the statute making the possession of one quart of liquor in a dry area prima facie evidence of possession for the purpose of sale. See Art. 666 — 23a, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., which seems to deal with “liquor,” such being defined by statute as “any alcoholic beverage containing alcohol in excess of four (4) per centum by weight, unless otherwise indicated.” See Art. 666 — 3a. In the present case the pleadings allege the possession of “chock” for the purpose of sale, a beverage containing more than one-half of one per cent of alcohol by volume. It is our opinion that the prima facie evidence statute governing such liquor thus designated as “chock” is found in Art. 667 — 25 (b) of Vernon’s Ann.P.C., and reads as follows: “Possession by any person in any dry area of beer in any quantity exceeding twenty-four (24) bottles having a capacity of twelve (12) ounces each shall be prima facie evidence of possession for the purpose of sale in a dry area.”

Of course, if the liquid was not contained in bottles, then the possession of the equivalent of twenty-four bottles of twelve ounces each could be used as prima facie evidence of possession for the purpose of sale in a dry area. This matter was called to the trial court’s attention in a special requested charge.

We further observe that the State should introduce in evidence, and there should be incorporated in the record, the different orders of the commissioners’ court relative to the local option election wherein the county became a dry area.

For the errors discussed, this judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
# C_2004239EN.01002402.xml

| 25.9.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 239/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 239/24

---

ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

of 9 June 2004

in Case T-91/04 R: Alexander Just v Commission of the European Communities

(Proceedings for interim measures - Competition procedure - Suspension of enforcement - Admissibility)

(2004/C 239/53)

Language of the case: German

In Case T-91/04 R: Alexander Just, residing in Brussels (Belgium), represented by G. Lebitsch, lawyer, against Commission of the European Communities (Agent: H. Krämer, assisted by B. Wägenbaur, lawyer, with an address for service in Luxembourg) — application for the suspension of competition COM/A/2/02 to constitute a reserve of assistant administrators (A8) in the field of ‘Environment’, or alternatively for the suspension of the validity of the reserve list of candidates in that competition — the President of the Court of First Instance made an order on 9 June 2004, the operative part of which is as follows:

| 1. | The application for interim measures is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

| 2. | Costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Costs are reserved.

---
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.4


                            DEGOLYER AND MACNAUGHTON
                       4925 GREENVILLE AVENUE, SUITE 4OO
                               ONE ENERGY SQUARE
                              DALLAS, TEXAS 752O6


                                 March 15, 2005





NEG Operating LLC
1400 One Energy Square
4925 Greenville Avenue
Dallas, Texas 75206

 Ladies and Gentlemen:

         We hereby consent to the incorporation of the references to DeGolyer
and MacNaughton and to the use by reference of information contained in our
"Appraisal Report as of December 31, 2004 on Certain Properties owned by NEG
Operating LLC" and "Appraisal Report as of December 31, 2003 on Certain
Properties owned by NEG Operating LLC" (our Reports) in the "Supplementary Crude
Oil and Natural Gas Reserve Information (Unaudited)" section of the NEG
Operating LLC Annual Report on Form 10-K (the Annual Report). However, since the
estimates of crude oil and natural gas reserves set forth in our Reports have
been combined with reserves estimates of other petroleum consultants, we are
necessarily unable to verify the accuracy of the reserves estimates contained in
the aforementioned Annual Report.

                                             Very truly yours,

                                             /s/ DEGOLYER AND MACNAUGHTON
                                             DeGOLYER and MacNAUGHTON
#### Thomas Kolodzinski, Appellant, v Francisco Ferreiras, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Coppola, J.), entered August 22, 1989, as, upon granting the defendant Francisco Ferreiras’s motion for reargument, vacated its prior order entered June 14, 1989, and granted the defendant Ferreiras’s cross motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as it is asserted against him on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

We agree with the Supreme Court that the plaintiff did not comply with the requirements of CPLR 309 (a) with regard to the service of process on the then infant defendant Francisco Ferreiras. CPLR 309 (a) provides, in pertinent part, that when the defendant is an infant over 14 years of age, personal service of the summons must be made on a parent and also on the infant. The proof submitted established that the infant defendant was served, pursuant to CPLR 308 (2), by the delivery of a single copy of the summons and complaint to his father at their dwelling place and by the mailing of a single copy of the summons and complaint to the infant defendant’s residence. However, there was no personal service of an additional copy of the summons and complaint on the infant defendant’s father.

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, there is no evidence *432nor can it be reasonably inferred that the infant defendant’s father knew that the service of process was being made on him, as well as his son. Indeed, the record indicates that the plaintiffs counsel was not even aware that Francisco Ferreiras was an infant and the process server’s affidavit of service does not indicate that he intended that the service of the single copy of the summons and complaint would constitute service on the father. Rather, it appears that the service of process on the father, who was not named as a defendant, for delivery to his son was merely fortuitous. Therefore, under the circumstances as evidenced herein, it cannot be said that the delivery of a single copy of the summons and complaint to the infant defendant’s father constituted compliance with CPLR 309 (a) *(see,*McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C309:l, at 363; *see also, Fox v 18-05 215th St. Owners,*143 AD2d 804, 805; *see generally, Raschel v Rish,*69 NY2d 694, 696-697). Lawrence, J. P., Kooper, Sullivan and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
IA

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 24

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution to provide for a balanced budget

for the United States Government and for greater accountability in

the enactment of tax legislation.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 5, 1993

Mr. EMERSON introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to

the Committee on the Judiciary

JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution to provide for

a balanced budget for the United States Government

and for greater accountability in the enactment of tax

legislation.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con5 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all

6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified
2

HJ 24 IH

1 by the legislatures of three-forths of the several States

2 within seven years after its submission to the States for

3 ratification:

4 ‘‘ARTICLE—

5 ‘‘SECTION 1. Prior to each fiscal year, the Congress

6 and the President shall agree on an estimate of total re7 ceipts for that fiscal year by enactment into law of a joint

8 resolution devoted solely to that subject. Total outlays for

9 that year shall not exceed the level of estimated receipts

10 set forth in such joint resolution, unless three-fifths of the

11 total membership of each House of Congress shall provide,

12 by a rollcall vote, for a specific excess of outlays over esti13 mated receipts.

14 ‘‘SECTION 2. Whenever actual outlays exceed actual

15 receipts for any fiscal year, the Congress shall, in the en16 suing fiscal year, provide by law for the repayment of such

17 excess. The public debt of the United States shall not be

18 increased unless three-fifths of the total membership of

19 each House shall provide by law for such an increase by

20 a rollcall vote.

21 ‘‘SECTION 3. Prior to each fiscal year, the President

22 shall transmit to the Congress a proposed budget for the

23 United States Government for that fiscal year in which

24 total outlays do not exceed total receipts.
3

HJ 24 IH

1 ‘‘SECTION 4. No bill to increase revenue shall become

2 law unless approved by a majority of the total membership

3 of each House by a rollcall vote.

4 ‘‘SECTION 5. The provisions of this article are waived

5 for any fiscal year in which a declaration of war is in ef6 fect.

7 ‘‘SECTION 6. Total receipts shall include all receipts

8 of the United States except those derived from borrowing.

9 Total outlays shall include all outlays of the United States

10 except for those for repayment of debt principal.

11 ‘‘SECTION 7. This article shall take effect beginning

12 with fiscal year 1995 or with the second fiscal year begin13 ning after its ratification, whichever is later.’’.

Æ
#### Levi BOYLES, Appellant, v. STATE, Appellee.

No. 21439.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 11, 1940.

LeRoy Neal, of Gladewater, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Conviction is for burglary, punishment assessed at two years in the penitentiary.

■Since the jurisdiction of this court attached, appellant hás filed his affidavit advising the court that he does not desire further to prosecute his appeal, and at his request the same is ordered dismissed. '
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM SEPTEMBER
1998 10-K.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000869495
<NAME> ALLIED DEVICES CORP
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         275,238
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,568,774
<ALLOWANCES>                                    42,706
<INVENTORY>                                  8,903,220
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            12,111,583
<PP&E>                                      13,174,149
<DEPRECIATION>                               5,566,903
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              22,973,619
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,516,831
<BONDS>                                              0
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<COMMON>                                         4,948
<OTHER-SE>                                   9,111,153
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                22,973,619
<SALES>                                     18,448,483
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            18,448,483
<CGS>                                       12,163,602
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               12,163,602
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,282,634
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                42,706
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             387,574
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,614,673
<INCOME-TAX>                                   584,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,030,673
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,030,673
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .22
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .22
        

</TABLE>
#### BROWN v. STATE.

No. 21209.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 6, 1940.

E. R. Wright and S. K. Long, both of Beaumont, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

This is an appeal from a sentence of thirty-five years in the penitentiary for murder. The record is before us without a statement of facts and without bills of exception. We have examined the record and it appears to be regular.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1318 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1318

 To provide for the liquidation or reliquidation of a certain entry of 
           warp knitting machines as free of certain duties.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 11, 1993

  Mr. Coble introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide for the liquidation or reliquidation of a certain entry of 
           warp knitting machines as free of certain duties.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RELIQUIDATING ENTRY OF WARP KNITTING MACHINES.

    Notwithstanding section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 
1514) or any other provision of law, upon proper request filed with the 
appropriate customs officer before the 180th day after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall--
            (1) liquidate or reliquidate as duty free Entry No. 100-
        3022436-3, made on July 12, 1989 at the port of Charleston, 
        South Carolina; and
            (2) refund any duties paid with respect to such entry.

                                 <all>
```
Case 6:22-cv-00049-H   Document 135   Filed 08/01/23    Page 1 of 2   PageID 2794

Case 6:22-cv-00049-H   Document 135   Filed 08/01/23    Page 2 of 2   PageID 2795
#### DOBBS v. STATE.

No. 21039.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 10, 1940.

E. J. Conn, of Lufkin, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the' State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is assault with intent to murder with malice; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for two years.

The record is before us without a stater ment of facts or bills of exception. No question is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.

*104PER CURIAM.

The foregoing 'Opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1132 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1132

  To improve the environmental protection of Barnegat Bay, New Jersey.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 24, 1993

   Mr. Saxton (for himself, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Gallo, Mr. Pallone, Mrs. 
 Roukema, Mr. Payne of New Jersey, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Klein, 
  Mr. Franks of New Jersey, and Mr. Zimmer) introduced the following 
bill; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Public Works and 
            Transportation and Merchant Marine and Fisheries

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To improve the environmental protection of Barnegat Bay, New Jersey.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Barnegat Bay Marine Environmental 
Improvement Act''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENT.

    Section 320(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 
U.S.C. 1330(a)(2)(B)) is amended by striking ``and Peconic Bay, New 
York'' and inserting instead ``Peconic Bay, New York; and Barnegat Bay, 
New Jersey''.

                                 <all>
```
Opinion issued October 11, 2012

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-12-00305-CR

———————————

THANH NGUYEN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 1 

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1670951

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Thanh Nguyen, has filed a “Request to Withdraw Appeal,” in 

which he states that he does “not wish to further prosecute this appeal” and 

“request[s] that the notice of appeal be withdrawn.” The Court construes this 

request as a motion to dismiss the appeal. The motion is signed by the appellant, 
2

in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a). See TEX. R. APP.

P. 42.2(a). We have not issued a decision in the appeal.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f). We 

dismiss any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Massengale, and Brown.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
#### MALLEABLE IRON RANGE CO. v. FORD.

No. 10751.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

June 5, 1940.

*470C. Burtt Potter and Miller & Dawson, all of Sinton, for appellant.

Roclcey Plarkey and Plenry *V.*Broady, both of Sinton, for appellee.

NORA/ELL, Justice.

Appellant, Malleable Iron Range Company, a foreign corporation with no permit to transact business in the State of Texas, brought this action against appellee, H. M. Ford, upon a promissory note payable to appellant at Sinton, Texas. Appellee sought to abate the suit under the provisions of Articles 1529 and 1536, Vernon’s Tex.Civ.Stats.

The trial court, upon hearing, sustained the plea in abatement and dismissed the action, hence this appeal.

Findings of fact were requested and filed. These disclose that, (1) a representative of appellant called upon appellee during the latter part of the year 1934 and solicited orders; (2) appellee at that time placed orders for $500 worth of merchandise “subject to approval of Malleable Iron Range Company, Beaver Dam, Wisconsin”; (3) appellant’s representative stated that repairs and replacement parts could be- set cured at Houston, Texas; ‘ (4) appellee thereafter mailed certain orders to appellant in Wisconsin; (5) an attorney representing appellant had called upon appellee in regard to the account owed to appellant and secured a promissory note payable at Sinton, Texas, for the amount due; (6) ap-pellee had sent to appellant in Wisconsin a conditional sales contract of a third party and the amount thereof had been credited to appellee’s account.

Based upon these facts the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the plea in abatement should be sustained.

The findings of fact do not support the conclusions of law and the case therefore must be reversed. The statement made by appellant’s representative that repairs or replacement parts could be secured at Houston, Texas, is no evidence of the existence of a branch office operated by appellant within the State of Texas. The fact that an attorney employed to collect a debt due a foreign corporation secures a promissory note representing the debt, does not show that the corporation is doing business in the State within the meaning of Article 1529. Baldwin Music Shop, Inc. v. Watson, Tex.Civ.App., 88 S.W.2d 516; Norton v. W. H. Thomas *&*Sons, Tex.Civ.App., 93 S.W. 711. The fact that the first sale to appellee was effected through a soliciting agent or representative of appellant, would not make the transaction an intrastate transaction. York Mfg. Co. v. Colley, 247 U.S. 21, 62 L.Ed. 963, 38 S.Ct. 430, 11 A.L.R. 611; Southern Discount Company v. Rose, Tex.Com.App., 296 S.W. 482; Southern Discount Co. v. Rose, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W. 861. None of the other facts found by the trial court justify its conclusion that appellant was doing an intrastate business.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1336

To amend title 38, United States Code, to revise eligibility for outpatient

services provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 15, 1993

Mr. MONTGOMERY (by request) introduced the following bill; which was

referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs

A BILL

To amend title 38, United States Code, to revise eligibility

for outpatient services provided by the Department of

Veterans Affairs.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That section 1712(a)(1) of title 38, United States Code,

4 is amended—

5 (1) by striking out ‘‘and’’ at the end of sub6 paragraph (A);

7 (2) by striking out the period at the end of sub8 paragraph (B) and inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘; and’’;

9 and
2

•HR 1336 IH

1 (3) by adding at the end the following new sub2 paragraph:

3 ‘‘(D) for any disability of a veteran who has a

4 service-connected disability and who has been award5 ed the Purple Heart.’’.

Æ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

LUCAS HORTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

ADVANTAGE ONE BROKERS

CORP.,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

Case No. 3:22-cv-02474-B-BT

ORDER

The Court has entered its Order Accepting the Findings, Conclusion, and Recommendation

of the United States Magistrate Judge.

It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff Lucas Horton’s Motion for Default Judgment (ECF

No. 12) is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED, this 26

th

 day of June, 2023.

_________________________________

JANE J. BOYLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1

Case 3:22-cv-02474-B-BT Document 16 Filed 06/26/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 86