Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College 28 October 2021

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A Crowded North: 

NATO Considerations for China's Arctic Ambition

Written by1

MAJ Drew Hargraves,

MAJ Timothy Chess, and

Lt Col Armin Blueggel

Captured in the 2018 National Defense strategy, the “reemergence of long-term, strategic 

competition,” has reentered the public dialogue as the preeminent national security concern.1

Within the U.S. Defense enterprise, the assertion drives a perspective on potential competitors 

and their impacts on U.S. and Allied strategic objectives. One of the competitors, China and its 

Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and subsequent plan in the Arctic, the Polar Silk Road 

(PSR), potentially threatens the security of the U.S. and its preeminent alliance, the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Captured in a 2010 strategic concept, NATO’s core tasks include: safeguarding the freedom and 

security of all its members by political and military means; promoting a community committed 

to the principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; and preserving and promoting 

the transatlantic link to maintain Euro-Atlantic security.2 The document also defines its approach 

to security as the collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security mandates.3 The 

document directs NATO to discuss issues of territorial integrity and political independence.4

Finally, the alliance calls on the continued modernization and transformation efforts to maintain 

NATO as an effective body.5 Despite NATO’s collective defense treaty, China could exploit the 

Alliance’s gaps through bilateral economic agreements, engaging those pro-NATO, but nonmembers in Europe, and executing calculated actions that would fail to garner the unanimous 

thirty-member vote required for an official response.

Concerningly, China has a history of operating with significant disregard for global legal 

frameworks vis-à-vis military coercion in the South China Sea (SCS) and predatory lending 

practices in Africa.6 China’s behavior merits examination using factor analysis to understand the

implications of China’s expansion into NATO’s area of responsibility (AOR). As a self-declared

“near-Arctic State,” China continues to increase its political, economic, and physical influence in 

the Arctic Region; its activities directly impact the eight Arctic nations, five of which are NATO 

members: Canada, the United States, Iceland, Norway, and Denmark.7

Examination of China’s influence and methods in the SCS, Africa, and in the Arctic within the 

Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) framework provides valuable 

examples and indicators as to future Chinese actions in the Arctic. The analysis suggests that 

China may exploit its bi-lateral relationships with NATO Alliance members purposefully or 

1 The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of Joint 

Forces Staff College, National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College 28 October 2021

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inadvertently undermine NATO security interests in the region. China may also look to fill 

seams between both NATO members and enhanced partners (Finland and Sweden), using 

economic and diplomatic influence to shape their relationship with NATO. More broadly,

China’s increased presence in the Arctic Region can generally be viewed as an extension of 

actions in other geographical domains and may indicate the effects the PSR may have on 

NATO’s security.

Belt and Road Initiative Background

China’s economic growth has fueled its global expansion. Since the early 1990s, China’s 

increasingly deep purse has allowed it to impress its national goals on the world and achieve an 

increasing level of influence as it expands outward. China unveiled its BRI in 2013, as a grand 

plan to connect trade partners from Asia, Africa, and Europe, and expand opportunities for 

Chinese influence and exports.8 The plan seeks to establish two routes, an overland route

through the heart of Asia and a maritime route that follows established sea transportation routes. 

China’s ambitious plan includes transportation node development, telecommunication 

improvements, and energy investments to entice host nation governments to sign trade 

agreements that enable increased Chinese trade throughput. A key portion of the maritime route 

moves north from the Chinese mainland and into the Arctic Ocean along a route referred to as 

the North Sea Route (NSR). The NSR follows the Russian coastline around the Scandinavian 

countries and into the North Sea. As China expands its BRI initiative, it has identified the North 

Sea route as key to its plan and titled it the “Polar Silk Road” Relevant to NATO and America’s 

European allies, one of China’s stated purposes for the PSR is to increase its participation in the 

policies and governance of the Arctic region.9

China’s Diplomatic and Information Actions in the South China Sea, Africa, and the Arctic

China has invested considerable time and resources to ensure the diplomatic and informational 

underpinnings of the BRI are successful, with the intention of creating a foundation for future 

objectives. Specifically, China seeks to engage at formal diplomatic levels to foster beneficial 

relationships and reduce negative perceptions that may hinder BRI objectives.10 From the onset 

of the BRI initiative, China has actively engaged governments around the world to promote its 

objectives using informational mechanisms, including social media, YouTube, television, radio, 

etc., and formal diplomatic venues like the United Nations, all with an aim at controlling the 

global narrative.11

Their process started domestically in the SCS; China passed domestic laws validating the 

legitimacy of its SCS claims, including Taiwan.12 Often referenced as the nine-dash line, the 

laws include vague geographic delineations, including, among others, the Spratly and Pratas 

islands.13 Worth noting, the same islands have also been claimed, to varying degrees, by 

Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines.14 A 2016 Tribunal for the Law of the 

Sea ruled China’s nine-dash line lacked historical precedent.15 China’s departure from widely 

accepted practice is made even more complicated by its ratification of the United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an agreement that defined maritime boundaries 

they now dispute.16 The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggressive behavior in the SCS has 

undermined the legal approach. China highlighted its half-billion-dollar support to the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to counter the negative perceptions and 

promote a more benign image.17 Despite their philanthropy, the sentiment in the SCS still 
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appears to paint China as an expansionist power concerned with achieving hegemony “at any 

cost.”18 The narrative casting China as a villain, however, has not stopped China from attempting 

to recharacterize its efforts as both legitimate and well-intentioned, an effort they have pursued 

diligently throughout Africa.19

Frequent prominent bilateral diplomatic engagements with countries in Africa established a 

discourse by which China promulgates its message of non-interference and promotes the benefits 

of economic cooperation.20 China’s approach is largely characterized by the pursuit of business 

before ethics and has, in some cases, resulted in material support to abusive governance.21

Simultaneous with China’s diplomatic engagements, the state has been reaching out to broader 

national audiences to manage its image abroad. Chinese efforts have aimed at courting 

government leaders to lay the groundwork for long-term relations. China has facilitated the 

education of “hundreds of African elites,” often coming from the families of officials or 

powerful businesses.22 Professional training offered in Beijing has included seminars on China’s

government structure, cadre management, civil servant relations, tax collection, and media 

relations. One university alone, Ningbo Polytechnic, has hosted trainees from forty-eight African 

states.

23

Outreach efforts have further bolstered the CCP’s involvement in foreign infrastructure 

development. China has heavily invested in Africa’s telecommunication networks and 

companies, owning a 20% stake in South Africa’s second-largest media company.24 It remains to 

be seen if China will use the access to shape its information campaign in the region; however, a 

significant stake in a telecommunication network will at a minimum provide it the opportunity. 

Many of the initiatives fall under the umbrella of China’s Confucius Institute, with 

approximately three hundred offices worldwide that facilitate education on Chinese language and 

culture.25 Western governments have accused the offices of promoting Chinese ideology and 

political values at the expense of objectivity.26

As part of the BRI, China’s strategic aims in the Arctic make use of policies and approaches 

already at work in the SCS and Africa. Meanwhile, Chinese diplomats have promoted inroads 

with Russian companies fostering an understanding necessary for subsequent economic 

engagement.27 Similar in function to the UN bodies that drafted UNCLOS, the Arctic Council 

also plays a critical role in defining acceptable behavior in the high north. In 2013, The Arctic 

Council approved China’s “observer” status, a position that affords them no formal power, but 

one that provides it a means to wield its economic and political influence. Additionally, a 2018 

CCP white paper on China’s Arctic policy asserts that China is a “near-Arctic” state, and events 

in the Arctic directly impact the country.28 Examined collectively, the diplomatic maneuvers

suggest a measured and deliberate approach to reduce negative perceptions and engage 

diplomatically with the Arctic’s current decision-makers.29

The nature of China’s diplomatic and information activities in the SCS, Africa, and the Arctic 

are all unique—often dramatically.30 With ice melting sooner, and for longer periods, the Arctic 

has great promise as a shipping lane. Furthermore, the promise of large energy reserves makes 

the region attractive to the world as global energy demands continue to rise. China’s diplomatic 

and informational engagements in the Arctic are intended to foster a benign image, undermining 

the reputation of a regional bully (vis-a-vis SCS) and establish conditions by which China can 

secure its presence for future exploitation.
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China’s Actions in the South China Sea, Africa, and the Arctic within the Military 

Instrument of National Power

China’s utilization of the military instrument of national power in support of its BRI remains 

immature compared to its diplomacy, information, and economics instruments. However, 

China’s use of its military remains a key component to achieving national objectives and 

supporting its BRI. In the last thirty years, China has focused its efforts and capabilities on 

becoming a global maritime power.31 Chinese activity in the SCS, Africa, and the Arctic

demonstrates its ability to use its military when necessary to achieve its strategic goals.

In the SCS, China is focused on the physical aspects of the area to maintain Sea Lines of 

Communication (SLOC) instrumental to oceanic trade routes and vital energy imports to sustain

its economy and complete its BRI. The SCS, as an enclosed geographic space shared between 

China, Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei, provides the perfect conditions for 

regional competition, as well as global competition since a major world shipping route passes 

through the Malacca Strait. China’s efforts to deter competitors in the SCS involve a series of 

defensive and offensive activities. Within the SCS lay dozens of small islands and reefs claimed 

by multiple littoral nations. While most littoral nations have increased their military or dualpurpose infrastructure on the islands, China has far outpaced the others. For example, China has 

added 5.6 kilometers of landmass to the Mischief Reef, complete with a military-grade airstrip, 

communication centers, and a harbor, all within the Filipino exclusive economic zone.32

In the Spratly Islands alone, China has reclaimed 3,200 acres of land compared to just 120 acres 

total for all other claimants combined.33 The examples are just a few instances of China building 

a landmass and adding military capabilities within the SCS to ensure their dominance; other 

islands include aircraft hangers, military-grade ports, and missile batteries.34

Anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities allow China to protect its SLOCs and posture forces 

to protect regional resources in the SCS. Offensively, China uses its coast guard and a maritime 

militia to expand its influence in the area. Both the coast guard and maritime militia actively 

prevent the use of fishing grounds and oil exploitation in Chinese-claimed territory. Independent 

militia comprised of Chinese citizens, trained by the Chinese military, often strong-arm civilian 

and commercial fishing vessels and oil rigs, while providing the Chinese government a level of 

deniability.35 Since 2010, 73% of the reported vessel to vessel incidents in the SCS have 

involved a Chinese flagged ship.36 China’s actions in the SCS remain heavily focused on military 

use as they seek to establish regional dominance against militarily smaller nations and ensure 

seamless completion of the BRI network.

Chinese military activities in Africa, in support of its BRI, center on training, weapons sales, and 

power projection. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducts multiple training exercises 

with over a dozen African nations, primarily focused on counterterrorism and humanitarian 

assistance.37 The exercises reinforce relationships and influence with those countries China 

deems important for its BRI, possess geostrategic importance, and provide subsequent access to 

natural resources and commercial markets. The nations targeted by China also lack credible 

instruments of national power to rebuke China’s progress if threatened. Weapons sales are 

another method to increase its influence with host nations. The Chinese government offers better 

prices, faster delivery times, and less vetting than the western alternatives, making Chinese arms 
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sales the better option for developing nations.38

The key to the Chinese military’s support for BRI is power projection. In 2017, the Chinese built 

a naval base in Djibouti, only a few miles from an American base, with additional bases planned 

in the future.39 The base not only provides a location for the Chinese military to project its power 

into the African continent, but it is also a strategically important location from which to secure 

the SLOC that runs through the Red Sea and around the Horn of Africa. Chinese military actions 

in Africa directly support its BRI and military power projection, focusing on nations in 

geographically important locations that lack the capabilities to resist Chinese aggression.

While the potential exists for Chinese military actions in support of the BRI in the Arctic or the 

PSR, there are few historical precedents. The only physical presence made by the PLA was a 

2015 trip to the Bering Sea after completing military exercises with the Russian Navy.40 Despite 

the minimal PLA presence, China’s increasing military partnership with Russia provides them a 

supporting presence in the Arctic. In the long-term, the Chinese strategy suggests that if Arctic 

resources and shipping routes provide a significant contribution to the Chinese economy and are 

under threat, they will deploy forces to protect the assets.41 As the Chinese pursue diplomatic and 

economic objectives in the Arctic, the potential for Chinese military activity in the region 

increases if the CCP determines threats to national priorities.

China’s Economic Actions within the South China Sea, Africa, and Arctic Region

China’s use of the economic instrument of national power has focused on achieving economic 

security through solidifying its access to vital commodities and the infrastructure necessary for 

extraction and transportation. To meet its strategic objectives, China has implemented a 

globalized approach singularly focused on achieving economic ends while varying ways and 

means in response to a combination of geopolitical and environmental constraints.

In the SCS, Chinese economic security is located just below the seabed with large amounts of oil 

and natural gas reserves pumping twenty-three to thirty billion tons of oil and sixteen trillion 

cubic meters of natural gas into their economic machine.42 The area is a resource-rich and 

crowded environment with more than 200 companies engaged in petroleum extraction 

activities.43

The Strait of Malacca is one and seven-tenths of a mile wide at its most narrow point and the

choke point sits on the shortest navigational route between Europe and Pacific Asia. The Strait is 

vital to China with 85% of all Chinese oil imports transiting the Strait, and it is vital to global 

commerce because one-third of world shipping passes through the narrow body of water.44 As 

key terrain, the Strait is critical to the global economy, and whoever controls it could dictate 

global economic affairs.45 In response to the vulnerability, China made plans to secure the Strait 

of Malacca through the employment of maritime militia vessels. The vessels would clog the 

strait to deny other countries access and halt global trade.46 As evidenced in the SCS, China’s 

pursuit of economic security at the expense of others is an example of policy by domination and 

not cooperation.

In Africa, China has focused on the extraction of minerals and petroleum products from 

countries facing widespread corruption and failing economies. The instability within the 
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countries created opportunities for China to entice political leadership into debt-trap 

diplomacy.47 The predatory lending practice offers large amounts of money for development 

projects through opaque lending practices that withhold key repayment terms from the 

borrower.48 The loans usually contain hidden conditions with poorly defined repayment 

criteria.

49 Other terms of the loans mandate Chinese firms manage the construction projects with 

all disputes being mediated through Chinese courts.50 The terms and clauses designating 

Chinese construction firms have led to significant cost overruns and schedule slips, making 

projects much more expensive than projected.51 The widespread cost overruns forcing countries 

into loan defaults are likely by design to further China’s debt-trap-diplomacy. Though initially 

appealing, the financial assistance eventually burdens countries with high-interest debt they are 

unable to repay.52 The Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway is an excellent illustration of the practices.

The Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway cost Ethiopia nearly a quarter of its 2016 budget.53 If a 

country defaults on its payments, the Chinese government assumes ownership of the 

infrastructure or mining operation and resources to further its economic goals at the expense of 

the country.54

China’s incessant need to control economic corridors and hoard resources is a manifestation of 

their deep-seated anxieties.55 The ruling party fears an economic slowdown resulting from supply 

disruptions or material shortages could lead to civil unrest and eventual regime change.56 To 

mitigate the single point of failure and secure its vital interests, China turned its attention towards 

the North Sea Route, the third leg of its belt and road initiative.57

Since 2003, China has invested nearly $90 billion into the Arctic region with the acquisition of 

two polar-capable ice breakers and infrastructure development from Canada to Siberia.58 The 

alternate corridor has significant advantages over the Strait of Malacca by reducing shipping 

time by 22% and lowering transportation costs by as much as $127 billion dollars.59 Another 

significant advantage to an Arctic route is Chinese shipments would transit more secure 

waterways instead of traversing pirate-infested waters off the coast of Somalia or around 

unstable countries whose internal instability could impact maritime activity.

Chinese economic strategy for the Arctic is more ambitious than simply accessing maritime 

corridors. China’s government-controlled corporations have aggressively used instruments of 

national power to secure lucrative economic arrangements within the non-NATO Arctic nations 

of Sweden and Finland. Chinese firms have bought large interests of Swedish corporations and 

used their influence to attempt acquisitions of military and civilian infrastructure. The latest 

such attempt involved a proposal to construct and manage a deep-water port to secure their 

footprint.60 To date, Sweden has blocked the Chinese expansionist activities, but Chinese 

diplomatic efforts have aimed at reversing Swedish policy, illuminating their strategic intent for 

the Arctic.

61 Within Finland, Chinese firms have relied heavily on an amalgamation of 

diplomatic activities to exert the leverage needed to increase economic access. Successful 

corporate partnerships with local business owners and politicians have enabled China to solidify 

its economic access within the relatively small but strategically important country. The 

arrangements have become increasingly transparent as CCP umbrella corporations throughout 

Finland make the population dependent on Chinese trade and susceptible to its political

manipulation.62

Discussion & Findings
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Establishing a pattern by which China pursues its objectives remains difficult as the CCP has 

proven it will make use of the range of national instruments of power. Diplomatically, China has 

pursued its BRI initiatives with both heavy-handed coercion and dexterous collaboration, 

utilizing whichever method best achieves the desired end-state. Simultaneously, however, the 

CCP has also demonstrated a disregard for international tribunal findings to which it is a party. 

The differing approaches suggest flexibility and an ability to approach diplomatic initiatives 

pragmatically. In the Arctic, China’s approach has been slow and deliberate, mindful of the 

established powers in place and willing to invest in long-term initiatives. Likewise in Africa, 

China has shown its willingness to engage in scientific and political forums with the only 

appreciable benefit of fostering new diplomatic opportunities or creating a narrative of wellmeaning expansion.

The willingness to use information as a tool of power is also highly illustrative. Many of China’s 

endeavors in the Arctic, such as polar research, do not yield rapid results, if they yield results at 

all. Rather, China has taken a similar tact to its engagements throughout Africa, in that it hopes 

to promote its image and reduce the political costs of its aggressive behavior along the BRI. 

Coupled with a willingness to engage over years and decades, China’s informational initiatives 

appear to be focused on setting the stage for future opportunities. Given China’s immense energy

needs and recognition of the Arctic as a potential energy-rich region, it stands to reason that they 

are forecasting their national resource needs. To ensure unfettered access to the Arctic when the

time comes, China is making a concerted effort to be known as a collaborative neighbor and 

downplay its criticized heavy-handed methods used in the SCS.

The process of fostering the narrative is not itself a problem for NATO. What is important is that 

the information campaigns are indicative of future intent and may directly influence NATO 

efforts. Planners within NATO need to know when natural or logistical resources may be 

unavailable to them and a concerted effort by China to improve relations with a NATO member, 

or a large company native to said country, is indicative of Chinese interest. If a Chinese 

enterprise reaches an agreement with a port written into NATO plans, it may negatively impact 

NATO’s ability to project power in the region. Maintaining situational awareness of China’s 

information campaigns, as well as its diplomatic engagements, can help NATO stay abreast of a 

changing geopolitical landscape and integrate this awareness into its planning process.

The process of observation includes China’s scientific, economic, and most critically, military 

endeavors in the Arctic. China’s military actions vary from almost non-existent to hyperaggressive. As China continues its long game to expand its influence and prestige in the world 

order, it will use the military instrument of national power in varying degrees to achieve its 

objectives. Like the SCS, there remains a potential that positions within the Arctic will be 

developed into military staging points. Whether they are built by China or allotted by agreements 

from other nations, their military capabilities will be utilized to ensure strategic objectives. While 

China has demonstrated a willingness to bully less militarily capable nations it does not appear to 

be China's approach in the Arctic. Often military in nature, e.g., SCS, such coercion might also 

occur by way of economic tools, one of China’s most frequently used methods of influence.63

China’s economic approach has varied significantly based on the political and geographic 

constraints. Like diplomatic, informational, and military methods, economic efforts have also 
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varied greatly. What has stayed consistent throughout China’s economic expansion, however, is 

its objective to control access to resources from extraction through transportation. As evidenced 

through multiple endeavors, China has begun its economic exploitation through means to build 

infrastructure and gain access to resources. It appears to be partnering for the mutual benefit of 

both countries and over time begins to monopolize power over the strategic assets. Once under 

its control, China then leverages its position to dominate other aspects of the region, further 

controlling strategic access at the expense of neighboring nations. China’s movement into the 

Arctic shipping lanes through the acquisition of Arctic capable ships and its efforts to build 

infrastructure along the route is the first step of many by which they will slowly take control of 

the strategic waterway for transportation and resource exploration. The infrastructure 

development and the control implicitly developed by it could directly impact NATO and its 

freedom of navigation within a region, as it enters an economic contest of wills frequently seen 

in other areas of Chinese influence.

NATO Establishes Standing Communications Protocol to the Chinese Navy

If China opts to make use of northern sea lanes, more accessible in the future because

of melting ice, there is a commensurate risk of miscommunication and potentially military 

action. Like the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, establishing a “red-phone” to 

facilitate immediate communications between NATO and the CCP would help avert potentially 

dangerous situations. While a CCP Navy presence in the Arctic may be unlikely, if the ruling 

party feels its interests are at risk, they may opt to provide an escort for commercial vessels. As 

evident in the SCS, China’s Naval Forces and government-sanctioned maritime militia 

frequently dictate authority over other nations’ vessels. Given NATO Allies’ flagged vessels 

operating in the Arctic, it remains prudent that NATO can communicate directly with the CCP to 

clarify the task and purpose of any CCP military forces. As more ships enter a finite space, there 

will undoubtedly be problems, and having the capability to resolve the disputes will help avert a 

crisis.

NATO Incorporates Intelligence Assessments of Chinese Arctic Activities into its Planning 

Cycle 

Based on China’s current engagements in the Arctic, any potentially upsetting actions it may 

take will likely be preceded by lengthy periods, with years and maybe decades, of informational 

campaigns and diplomatic engagements. Maintaining situational awareness of Chinese activities 

remains prudent to NATO as risks to the alliance are not exclusively military in nature. Should 

China secure a controlling interest in major ports or airfields for its interests, even if purely 

economic, it may undermine the ability to use those same logistics nodes for military activities 

unrelated to China.64 Ultimately, NATO may be unable to influence the outcomes, but at least 

the staff will be aware so that they can adjust their plans accordingly.

NATO Establishes or Revisits Protocol Guiding Economic Decisions

One of China’s most effective tools is its considerable economic influence. Just like the 

Gazprom pipeline planned to support Russia-Western Europe power needs, any significant 

investment on the part of China could create a similar dynamic. To some extent, there may be 

little that can be done out of respect for national sovereignty. If NATO members opt to pursue 
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close economic endeavors with China, the degree to which the cooperative efforts may impact 

NATO interests should remain transparent to the alliance writ large.

Conclusion

There is little doubt that China will not halt its pursuit of a greater presence in the Arctic. NATO 

must remain aware of China's Arctic efforts and account for them in NATO planning. NATO’s 

planning awareness will help it shape initiatives by reducing the likelihood of miscommunication 

and accommodating China’s diplomatic and economic influence on its member states. The 

Arctic is poised to be an increasingly busy place in the coming years, and NATO must be 

prepared to work in a dynamic and potentially crowded Arctic.

Notes

1 U.S. Secretary of Defense, Summary of the National Defense Strategy of The United States of America, Sharpening 

the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018), 2. 

https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels, Belgium: NATO, 2010). 3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ronald O’Rourke, Laura B. Comay, Peter Folger, John Frittelli, Marc Humphries, Jane A. Leggett, Jonathan L. 

Ramseur, Pervaze A. Sheikh, and Harold F. Upton, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, 

(Washington, DC: GPO, November 4, 2020), 19.

7 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy, The State Council 

Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, (Beijing, China: January 2018). 8 Andrew Chatzky, and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Backgrounder, Council on 

Foreign Relations, (January 28, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative. 9 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy, (2018). 

http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1618243/1618243.htm

10 Lina Benabdallah, “Power or Influence? Making Sense of China’s Evolving Party-to-Party Diplomacy in Africa.” 

African Studies Quarterly, no. 3–4 (2020): 94. 11 Michael Lelyveld, China's Arctic Investments Generate Heat. Washington: Federal Information & News 

Dispatch, LLC, (2019). http://search.proquest.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/reports/chinas-Arctic-investmentsgenerate- heat/docview/2229734154/se-2?accountid=12686. 12 Katherine Morton, “China’s Ambition in the South China Sea: is a Legitimate Maritime Order Possible?”

International Affairs 92, no. 4 (2016): 918. 13 Ibid, 918. 14 Morton, “China’s Ambition,” 917. 15 Victor Teixeira. “The United States’ China Containment Strategy and the South China Sea Dispute.” Central 

European Journal of International & Security Studies 13, no. 3 (September 2019): 166–93. https://search-ebscohostcom.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,url,uid&db=tsh&AN=139654090&site=ehostlive&scope=site: 172.

16 Morton, “China’s Ambition,” 918. 17 Mikail Kalimuddin, and David A. Anderson. “Soft Power in China’s Security Strategy.” Strategic Studies 

Quarterly no. 12 (2018): https://search-ebscohostcom.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,url,uid&db=tsh&AN=131616216&site=ehostlive&scope=site., 123.

18 Morton, “China’s Ambition,” 910. 19 Kalimuddin and Anderson, “Soft Power,” 121. 20 “Chinese Campaigns for Political Influence in Africa” Stimson Center, May 13, 2020, (accessed Jan 30, 2020),

www.stimson.org/2020/chinese-campaigns-for-political-influence-in-africa/
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21 Maria Carrai, “Adaptive Governance along Chinese Financed BRI Railroad Megaprojects in East Africa.” World 

Development, volume 141, (2021): 1. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105388 22 Benabdallah, “Power or Influence?” 94. 23 Esther Nakkazi, “China Ramps Up Support for African Higher Education,” University World News, September 

07 2018, https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20180907083412817.

24 Jack Steinberg, “Countering Chinese Influence in Africa,” Harvard Model Congress, Boston (2021): 4. 

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5cb7e5637d0c9145fa68863e/t/5f7a64eec8f18a2d034829e6/1601856752444/St 

einberg+-+NSC+FINAL.pdf. 25 Amy Stambach, “Confucius Institute Programming in the United States: Language Ideology, Hegemony, and the

Making of Chinese Culture in University Classes.” Anthropology & Education Quarterly 46 (1), (2015),

doi:10.1111/aeq.12087, 57.

26 Z.A. Huang, “The Confucius Institute and Relationship Management: Uncertainty Management of Chinese Public 

Diplomacy in Africa.” Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy. (2021): https://doi.org/10.1007/978-

3-030-54552-9_8 27 O’Rourke, et al., 30. 28 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy, (2018). 

http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1618243/1618243.htm. 29 Huang, “Confucius Institute,” 2021. 30 Ties Dams, Louise van Schaik, and Adaja Stoetman. “China's Arctic Strategy in Iceland and Greenland” 

(Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2019). 

http://search.proquest.com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/reports/chinas-Arctic-strategy-icelandgreenland/docview/2423772930/se-2?accountid=12686.1.s. 31 Morton, “China’s Ambition,” 911. 32 Ibid., 927. 33 Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, “Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea,” Naval War College 

Review, 71, no. 1 (2018): 15. 34 Ibid., 15. 35 Bonnie Glaser and Gregory B. Poling, “Rough Waters in the South China Sea: A Conversation with Greg Poling,” 

China Power Project Podcast, Center for Strategic and International Studies, (July 30, 2019), 

https://www.csis.org/node/53522. 36 Glaser and Poling, “Rough Waters.” 37 Jack Steinberg, “Countering Chinese Influence in Africa,” Harvard Model Congress (2021): 4. 38 Nick Turse, “U.S. Generals Worry About Rising Russian and Chinese Influence in Africa, Documents Show,”

The Intercept, (August 13, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/08/13/russia-china-military-africa. 39 Dean Coslovi, “Like Water: An Inquiry into China’s Soft Power Strategy in Africa,” Journal of Military and 

Strategic Studies, 18 (2018): 182. 40 Dams et al., “China's Arctic Strategy,” 16. 41 Shiloh Rainwater, “China’s Arctic Strategy and Its Implications,” Naval War College Review, 66, no. 2 (2013): 

69.

42 Morton, “China’s Ambition,” 915. 43 Ibid., 915. 44 Rainwater, “China’s Arctic Strategy,” 65. 45 Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, "Getting Serious About Strategy In The South China Sea."

Naval War College Review 71, no. 1 (2018): 16. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26398089. 46 Glaser and Poling, “Rough Waters.” 47 David Dollar, “Understanding China's Belt and Road Infrastructure Projects in Africa.” Brookings Institute, 

(2019), 2 www.brookings.edu/research/understanding-chinas-belt-and-road-infrastructure-projects-in-africa. 48 Steinberg, “Countering Chinese Influence,” 4. 49 Ibid., 4. 50 Ibid., 3. 51 Mark Green, “China's Debt Diplomacy.” Foreign Policy, Apr 25, 2019, 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/25/chinas-debt-diplomacy. 52 Wade Shepard, “What China Is Really Up To In Africa.” Forbes Magazine, Oct 3, 2019. 

https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2019/10/03/what-china-is-really-up-to-in-africa/#4fba6b6e5930
Campaigning: The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College 28 October 2021

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53 Ibid. 54 Green, “China's Debt Diplomacy.” 55 Rainwater, “China’s Arctic Strategy,” 65. 56 Ibid., 65. 57 O’Rourke et al., “Changes in the Arctic,” 30. 58 Ibid., 16. 59 Geoffrey F. Gresh, To Rule Eurasia’s Waves : The New Great Power Competition at Sea. (New Haven: Yale 

University Press, 2020), 2670. https://search-ebscohost- com.nduezproxy.idm.oclc.org/ 60 Jerker Hellstrom, “Solving Sweden’s China Puzzle,” June 30, 2020, https://www.echo-wall.eu/knowledgegaps/solving-swedens-china-puzzle.com. 61 Ibid. 62 Matti Purane, “China-Finland: Beijing’s ‘Model Relationship’ in Europe?” February 29, 2020, 

https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/china-finland-beijings-model-relationship-in-europe/. 11 63 Kenneth Rapoza, “Watch Out for China Buying Spree NATO Warns,” Forbes, (April 18 2020), 

https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2020/04/18/watch-out-for-china-buying-spree-natowarns/?sh=507a70911758. 

64 Ibid.