No. 83-97 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1984 

REBECCA CAMPBELL, FJidow of Raymond 

Campbell, 

Claimant and Respondent, 

-vsYOUNG !,IOTOR COMPANY, Employer, 

and 

FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: The Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable Timothy 

Reardon, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Corette, Smith, Pohlman & Allen; Robert Carlson and 

Dolphy Pohlman argued, Butte, llontana 

For Respondent: 

Greg J. Skakles argued, Anaconda, Montana 

Submitted: November 30, 1983 

Decided: June 28, 1934 

"- 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Defendants, Young Motor Company, employer, and Federated 

Mutual Insurance, the insurer, appeal a judgment of the 

Workers' Compensation Court awarding death benefits to 

Rebecca Campbell, the widow of Raymond Campbell, who 

committed suicide five years a-fter he sustained a compensable 

iniury . The trial court found there existed a causal 

connection between the injury and the ultimate suicide. We 

affirm. 

The primary question, one not decided by this Court, is 

whether the Workers' Compensation Act permits recovery for a 

suicide, if it can be shown that a previous compensable 

injury was a substantial contributing cause of the suicide. 

Assuming that such recovery is permitted, the second question 

is whether substantial credible evidence supports the 

findings of the trial court that Raymond Campbell's injury 

was a substantial contributing cause of his suicide. The 

third issue is whether the trial court erred in awarding 

costs and attorney fees to the claimant under section 

39-71-611-, MCA, of the Workers' Compensation Act. This issue 

is controlled by our answer to the legal question and to the 

sufficiency of the evidence question, for, under the statute, 

claimant is entitled to costs and attorney fees if the order 

is affirmed. 

Before setting forth the facts on which the claim was 

based, we discuss first the question of whether a claim for 

death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act can be 

based on a contention that an injury eventually led to the 

suicide of the employee. The employer argues that suicide 
was of personal origin and was a superced.ing intervening 

cause a.s a matter of law. 

This state has no statutes dealing with the effect of 

suicide on the right to recover death benefits. One statute 

in effect at the time of the injury (January 8, 1974), bears 

on the question of causation. Section 92-608, R.C.M. 1947, 

provides in substance that if an injury is the proximate 

cause of death, death benefits are payable even though the 

death did not immediately follow the injury. The last part 

of this statute simply provides that there is no liability 

for compensation after a worker's death if the worker dies 

from some "cause other than the in-jury,. . ." This Court, in 

Breen v. Industrial Accident Board (1968), 150 Mont. 463, 436 

P.2d 701, set forth the requirements of proximate cause under 

this statute, and specifically stated that: 

". . . this, of course, does not mean that the 

injury must be the sole cause of death, but it does 

mean that an injury must be a substantial. 

contributing cause in the sense that death would 

not have occurred but for such injuries. "- 150 

Mont. 472-473, 436 P.2d at 706. 

The employer argues for an absolute rule that suicide is 

per - se an intentional act that is an independent, intervening 

cause, and therefore that as a matter of law, recovery of 

death benefits cannot be permitted. Claimant argues, on the 

other hand, that recovery of death benefits is permitted if 

the required connection between the cornpensable injury and 

the suicide is established. 

Both the majority and the minority rules of other 

jurisdictions permit recovery of death benefits where there 

is a suicide. In effect, no jurisdictions recognize suicide 

as an intentional act that automatically breaks the chain of 

causation to defeat a claim for death benefits. Both the 
majority and the minority rules are set forth in Larson's 

Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. IA, § 36.00, at 6-117: 

"Suicide under the majority rule is compensab1.e if 

the injury produces mental derangement and the 

mental derangement produces suicide. The minority 

rule is that suicide is not compensable unless 

there has followed as the direct result of a 

work-connected injury an insanity of such severity 

as to cause the victim to take his own life through 

an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of 

frenzy without conscious volition to produce 

death." 

In applying the law to the facts here, the trial court 

adopted the majority rule, and we approve. 

The minority rule, as Larson explains, was once the 

majority rule, but it ". . . was gradually displaced as 

majority rule by the chain of causation test, which found 

compensability if the injury caused the deranged mental 

condition which in turn. caused the suicide. " Larson, supra, 

5 36.10, at 6-118. In explaining the role of intervening 

cause in the analysis, Larson explains that the focus must be 

". . . not on the employee's knowledge that he is killing 

himself, but rather on the existence of an unbroken chain of 

causation from the injury to the suicide . . . " Larson, 

supra, 5 36.30, at 6-136. In other words, as Larson 

explains: 

". . . if the first cause produces the second 

cause, that second cause is not an independent 

intervening cause. The question whether the actor 

appreciated the consequences of his act should not 

be d-ecisive on the fundamental question whether 

that act was the natural and forseeable result of 

the first injury." Larson, supra, § 36.30, at 

6-136. 

While the employer's position is an easy one to assert 

and apply, that is, that suicide is per se intentional and 

therefore a sufficient intervening cause to cut off the chain 

of cau.sation leading from the initial injury, this position 

adopts too hard and fast a rule on the dynamics of cause and 
effect. The more reasonable and humane rule is one that was 

set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in Delaware Tire 

Center v. Fox (1979) , 401 A.2d 97, where the Court held that 

death benefits were available where the worker committed 

suicide. The Court stated: 

"In applying this [chain of causation] test, death 

by suicide would be compensable if it is caused by 

severe pain and despair which proximately resul-ts 

from a compensable accident, and is of such a 

degree as to override normal and ra-tional judgment. 

A suicide committed under such circumstances cannot 

be said to be 'intentional' even though the act 

itself may be volitional. (Citations omitted.)" 

This ch.ain of causation rule recognizes that the injury 

and the post-injury trauma, mental as well as physical, may 

take a path anticipated by no one, but nonetheless be 

traceable to the injury itself. We are convinced, 

furthermore, that the majority rule we have adopted here more 

completely fulfills the statutory duty (section 39-71-104, 

MCA) imposed under the Workers' Compensation Act to liberally 

construe its provisions in favor of the employee. 

On the question of causation, the employer argues that 

the suicide note itself set forth the reason Campbell took 

his own life, a.nd that it supports only a finding that the 

i.n j ury was not the precipitating cause his suicide. 

Further, the employer argues that the opinion of a 

psychologist, who performed a psychological autopsy on 

Campbell by using his previous medical records and. history, 

was faulty because the psychologist failed to inverview two 

fellow employees at Greyrock Trucking who would not have 

supported the opinion that Campbell had constant pain and 

that he was in a deep depression. 

Before his death, Campbell wrote a sui-cide note that 

read: 
"To Mom [on outside of envelope] 

"I'm going home with Grandma and Grandad. [~oth 

had predeceased him.] 

"Be sure and tell [my son] someday why I went 

there. 

"I'm very sorry mom but L just couldn't let someone 

else take he[r]? 

"Love you always." 

The employer argues that proper application of the chain 

of causation test shows that despite any depression 

precipated by Campbell's inability to work and his heavy 

drinking, the substantial factor in his suicide was the loss 

of his wife and children who moved out one month before the 

death because of his heavy drinking and abusive behavior. 

The employer also attacks the opinion of a psychologist who 

performed a psychological autopsy of Campbell, and who 

concluded that the injury was a very significant and very 

substantial cause of Campbell's depression and ultimate 

suicide. The employer argues that the opinion was faulty 

because the psychologist did not interview Campbell before 

his death and because he failed to interview two fellow 

employees of Ca.mpbe1-1 at Greyrock Trucking who would not have 

supported the psychologist's opinion as to Campbell's 

depression or his suffering from pain as the result of his 

injury. The evidence, however, fully supports the trial 

court's findings and. conclusions. 

On January 8, 1974, Raymond Campbell seriously injured 

his back while working as a car body repairman for Young 

Motor Company in Anaconda. The injury led to two surgeries, 

but the surgeon testified that he expected Campbell to have 

continuing pain in his lower back and right leg for the rest 

of his life. 
After the injury, Campbell had medical treatment and 

physical therapy, but the pain in his back and right leg 

continued. Campbell was referred to Dr. Charles R. Canty in 

Butte, who performed a myelogram. The results showed surgery 

was necessary, and in September 1-974, Dr. Canty performed a 

laminectomy. The pain returned, and approximately six months 

later Dr. Canty performed a second operation. He removed 

scar tissue from nerve roots, retained fibrous tissue, and 

performed a spinal fusion. The doctor told Campbell then 

that he should find a new and less strenuous trade. 

For two and one half years after his injury, Campbell 

was unable to work. During this time, he abused alcohol on a 

daily basis and was depressed most of the time. He told his 

wife that the pain medicine was not relieving the pain and 

that he drank alcohol to relieve the pain. He final-1.y 

returned to work at Anaconda Ford in the summer of 1976 as a 

body repairman. But the pain and the drinking continued. 

Campbell was deeply depressed for the entire period 

after his injury. He was afraid before both back operations 

that he would end up paralyzed, and he continued to fear that 

he would someday be paralyzed and unable to support his wife 

and children. He became more and more withdrawn and no 

longer engaged as frequently in the activities he formerly 

enjoyed such as hunting, fishing, and recreational mechanical 

work. While working for Greyrock Truckinq, however, Campbell 

occasionally went to the woods to cut and haul wood. 

The situation for the wife and children became 

intolerable and his wife threatened to leave him unless he 

stopped drinking. But the drinking continued until November 

1976, when Campbell admitted himself to Galen State Hospital 

and was diagnosed as suffering from acute alcoholism. He 
checked out four days later rather than staying for 

treatment. He did, however, manage to stop drinking for 

almost a month, but then he started again, on a daily basis, 

and usually to the point of intoxication. 

Campbell continued working for Anaconda Ford until the 

summer of 1977, when he went to work for Greyrock Trucking in 

Aria-conda as a truck driver. Medical testimony established 

that truck driving would most likely worsen Campbell's lower 

back and leg pain. 

Campbell's relationship with his wife and children 

continued. to deteriorate while he worked for Greyrock 

Trucking. Although Greyrock personnel described Ca.mpbel1 as 

an "excellent employee," and that they did not observe that 

Campbell was ever in pain, other testimony established that 

Campbell was in constant pain and was drinking even more. 

His wife testified that while at home he was often drunk and 

belligerent and physically abusive to her and. to his son. 

She testified that although Campbell had been jealous and 

over-possessive of his wife since the beginning of their 

marriage, his jealousy and abusive behavior intensified after 

his back injury. His temper flared often and he wrongly 

accused her of being unfaithful. The situation got so bad 

that Campbell's wife took the children and moved to Butte to 

live with relatives. 

Campbell was extremely upset by the prospect of losing 

his family, and after his family had moved out, he 

d.ra.stically curtailed his drinking in an effort to get them 

to return. In fact, in the month before his suicide, 

Campbell did not drink at all. Although Campbell's wife and 

children did drive to Anaconda. to see him several times 

during this month, they did not return to the family home. 
On or about January 10, 1979, Campbell committed suicide by a 

gunshot wound to the heart. 

The trial court realized full well the difficulty of 

assessing and. analyzing the evidence in determining the issue 

of proximate cause based on the chain of causation test. The 

court stated: 

"Where can this Court find the bright line that 

distinguishes the intentional act, the act 

premeditated by intellect, from the act that is the 

result of the diseased mind? This Court must, and 

can only, discover this line by examining the 

pre-accident and post-accident conduct of the 

decedent, conduct which steps forward and speaks on 

his behalf, and the expert testimony of the 

psychologist who performed the psychological 

autopsy. . ." 

The trial court continued: 

"The preponderance of the credible evidence in this 

case reveals the descent of a proud, active and 

accomplished working man into a suicidal 

depression; his descent was powered by the constant 

pain which resulted from his industrial accident 

and was fueled by his alcohol abuse, forced 

inactivity and fear of paralysis." 

Against the background of Campbell's steady, and 

seemingly inexorable decline after his 1974 back injury, the 

employer argues that Campbell's intervening volitional act of 

suicide was the proximate cause of death rather than the back 

injury. The employer argued that despite any depression 

precipitated by Campbell's inability to work and heavy 

drinking, the substantial factor in his suicide was the loss 

of his wife and children who moved out one month before the 

death because of his drinking and abusive behavior. The 

trial court thought differently. 

The trial court, as the finder of fact, met this 

argument by stating: 

". . . Looked at narrowl-y, the last causal event in 

the chain of events that culminated in the 

decedent's suicide was his wife's departure, but 

this artifically narrow view ignores the chain of 
events starting with the cla.imantrs industrial 

accident, and continuing unbroken until he 

committed suicide. That chain, as demonstrated by 

Dr. Walters' [the psychologist] testimony, may be 

summarized simply as follows: 

" (1) The decedent ' s industrial accident severely 

injured him, prevented him from working for two and 

a half years, caused him to suffer almost constant 

physical pain, fear of future paralysis, and a 

consequent inability to work, and depression; (2) 

He drank alcoholic beverages to lessen the pain and 

this intensified his depression and consequent 

distorted view of reality; (3) His increased and 

continuing pain, depression and distorted view of 

reality caused him to become more abusive of his 

wife and children and to continue to drink 

excessively; (4) His wife left him because of his 

excessive drinking and abusive behavior." 

The trial court eloquently and poignantly placed the 

cause and effect of this chain of events in a perspective 

that is almost invariably better appreciated by the trier of 

fact: 

"This sequence of events is roughly analogous to 

the events that can occur when a gust of wind 

strikes a tree branch heavily laden with moist snow 

causing the snow to fall to the snow-covered slope 

and move forward downhill with increasing speed and 

size until it becomes an avalanche that lays waste 

to all that comes within its path. While the cause 

in retrospect may appear remote and slight, the 

chain of events it engendered were, on close 

examination, unbroken and ultimately overpowering. 

The decedent's industrial accident set in motion 

events that coursed through his life with 

increasing destructive force and that, in 

retrospect, proximately caused him to take his own 

life. I' 

The employer challenges the trial court's findings, and 

argues that even under the chain of causation test applied by 

the trial court, the findings are not supported by 

substantial evidence. The employer argues that the opinion 

of the psychologist is legally deficient because he did not 

personally interview Campbell before his suicide, and because 

he failed to interview two fellow Greyrock Trucking 

employees, who, in observing Campbell at work, had a 
different perception of him than that provided by Campbell's 

wife, mother and friends. 

Undoubtedly, it would have been helpful for Dr. VJalters 

to have interviewed Campbell before his death, but no one 

anticipated the precise direction that Campbell's life was 

taking so that he could be rushed to a psychologist. Rut the 

fact that Campbell was not interviewed before his death does 

not render inadmissible a psychologist's opinion based on the 

available data concerning Campbell's pre-injury and 

post-injury condition, physical and mental. 

It is true that Willard Larsen and John Hall, as 

coemployees of Campbell, presented a different picture of him 

just before his death. Both Larsen and Hall testified that 

Campbell was an excellent employee, never missed shifts, was 

competent, and seemed to enjoy his work. They also did not 

observe that he was in pa.in or that he was depressed. This 

portrayal is markedly different from that provided by 

Campbell's wife, mother, and old friends. If, however, the 

employer believed this evidence to be so important, the 

employer could have submitted the information to the 

psychologist before he examined the available data and before 

he formed his opinion as to the reason Campbell committed 

suicide. Furthermore, the employer had ample opportunity to 

cross-examine the psychologist to test whether his opinion 

would have been changed by the testimony given by Larsen and 

Hall. Finally, the trial court had the opportunity of 

weighing this testimony, and the testimony was not considered 

that important to the trial court's conclusion that the 1974 

injury was a. substantial contributing cause to Campbell's 

suicide in 1979. 
Our holding on the first two issues disposes of the 

third issue because, under section 39-71-611, MCA, if an 

employer denied liability for a claim that is later adjudged 

compensable in trial court or on appeal, the employer 

(insurer) "shall pay reasonable costs and attorney fees as 

established by the workers' compensation judge." Here both 

the trial court and this Court have determined the claim to 

be compensable and therefore costs and attorney fees must be 

awarded under the statute. 

The order of the Workers' Compensation Court awarding 

death benefits to claimant is affirmed. 

We Concur: 

?hdtD,WMd 

Chief Justice 

Justices