COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Annunziata and Humphreys 

Argued by telephone conference 

CATHERINE ANN STARK 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1568-00-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 JUNE 26, 2001 

DENNIS NEIL RANKINS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

George F. Tidey, Judge 

 Matthew N. Ott for appellant. 

 Steven S. Biss for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 This appeal arises in a divorce proceeding from an order 

determining a distribution of the property of Catherine Ann 

Stark and her husband, Dennis Neil Rankins. Stark and Rankins 

challenge several aspects of that distribution. We affirm the 

trial judge's ruling, in part, and reverse, in part. 

 I. 

In the decree dissolving the marriage, the trial judge 

found that Stark and Rankins were married on September 4, 1983 

and last cohabitated as husband and wife on July 16, 1998. The 

trial judge granted a divorce on the grounds that Stark had 

"wilfully and constructively deserted [Rankins]." 
A letter opinion contained the trial judge's findings that 

the fair market value of the jointly-owned marital home was 

$370,000. The home had liens in the amount of $195,000 and 

equity of $175,000. Based on testimony that Stark contributed 

$20,000 of money inherited from her grandmother as a part of the 

down payment to purchase the home, the trial judge found that 

Stark's contribution was separate property. After Stark 

challenged the trial judge's failure to award her the 

appreciated value of the $20,000, the judge found further that 

"any increase in value of the $20,000 [was] a gift [by Stark] to 

the family." 

During the evidentiary hearing, Rankins testified that his 

architectural business was dissolved in September 1999 and had 

no value. In the letter opinion, the trial judge found that the 

business had no value. 

In the order determining the distribution of property, the 

trial judge awarded to Rankins the marital home, his retirement 

account, two automobiles, miscellaneous accounts, and various 

other personal property. He also ordered Rankins to pay Stark 

$68,000, which included $20,000 of separate property that Stark 

contributed to the initial purchase of the marital home. The 

judge awarded to Stark her retirement account, an automobile, 

miscellaneous accounts, and her bank account, which contained 

$4,100 at the date of separation. 

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II. 

 Initially, we note that Rankins does not identify any 

objection that he made at trial to the issues he now asserts on 

cross-appeal. He contends the trial judge erred (1) in finding 

that $20,000 of the purchase price of the marital residence was 

Stark's separate property, (2) by including $20,000 in separate 

property in the net equity of the residence and using that same 

amount again in calculating the payment Rankins was to make to 

Stark, and (3) in finding no marital property existed in a 

condominium Stark purchased after their separation. 

 Rankins' attorney endorsed the final order with the word 

"seen." We have clearly held that "endorsing a decree 'seen and 

objected to' does not preserve an issue for appeal unless the 

record further reveals that the issue was properly raised for 

consideration by the trial court." Twardy v. Twardy, 14 Va. 

App. 651, 657, 419 S.E.2d 848, 851 (1992) (en banc). We find no 

indication in the record that Rankins stated an objection at 

trial to any of these issues. We will not address an issue on 

appeal when no objection was made at trial. Rule 5A:18. 

 III. 

 Stark contends the trial judge erred by failing to 

attribute passive appreciation to her separate contribution to 

the purchase of the marital residence. She also contends that 

the trial judge erred by ruling "that any increase in value of 

the $20,000 [w]as a gift to the family." We agree. 

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 In pertinent part, Code § 20-107.3(A)(1) provides that 

"[t]he increase in value of separate property during the 

marriage is separate property, unless marital property or the 

personal efforts of either party have contributed to such 

increases and then only to the extent of the increases in value 

attributable to such contributions." Read as a whole, 

subsection (A) of the statute contains a "presumption that the 

increase in value of the separate property is separate." Martin 

v. Martin, 27 Va. App. 745, 753, 501 S.E.2d 450, 454 (1998). 

Moreover, we have held that the trial judge has a duty "to 

determine the extent to which [a spouse's] separate property 

interest in the home increased in value during the . . . 

marriage." Id. at 752, 501 S.E.2d at 453. 

In Martin, we applied the "Brandenburg formula," first 

approved in Hart v. Hart, 27 Va. App. 46, 497 S.E.2d 496 (1998), 

to calculate a husband's proper share of a marital home. See

Martin, 27 Va. App. at 753, 501 S.E.2d at 454. The husband had 

used $26,634.22 of separate property to purchase a marital home 

worth $60,100. At the time of distribution, the home had a 

value of $110,000. We held that the husband's separate property 

interest in the home was $26,634.22, plus $22,113.88 of passive 

appreciation. Id. at 753 n.3 and 4, 501 S.E.2d at 454 n.3 

and 4. 

Although we did not hold in Martin that the Brandenburg 

formula was the exclusive method to resolve this question, the 

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facts of this case are similar enough that the formula is 

appropriate here as well. The formula is: Nonmarital 

contribution divided by total contribution multiplied by equity 

equals the total nonmarital property including both the initial 

contribution and the appreciation. Hart, 27 Va. App. at 65, 497 

S.E.2d at 505. In this case, the trial judge did not make 

findings as to all of these values. Clearly, Stark's nonmarital 

contribution was $20,000 and the total equity in the home is now 

$175,000. Stark appears to have argued at the trial level that 

the initial down payment for the purchase of the home was 

$55,000, including the $20,000 from Stark and $35,000 which 

Rankins borrowed and then repaid with marital funds. The judge 

made no finding, however, that this amount was the total that 

the couple had contributed towards the purchase of the home over 

the course of the marriage. Therefore, we reverse this decision 

and remand for a factual finding as to the values necessary for 

a Brandenburg calculation, including the total contribution of 

the parties towards the purchase of the home. 

 The trial judge also found that the appreciation in the 

value of separate contribution was a gift to the family. No 

evidence supports this finding, and certainly insufficient 

evidence existed to overcome a presumption that the separate 

property remained separate. Therefore, we hold that the judge 

erred in not awarding to the wife the appreciation in her 

separate contribution to the marital home. 

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IV. 

 Stark also contends that the trial judge erred in finding 

that the husband's business had no value. She argues that the 

evidence demonstrated that the business had "retained earnings" 

of roughly $37,000 when the husband's partner left the 

enterprise in August 1999. 

 "The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded 

the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has the 

opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented." 

Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 

732 (1995). Rankins testified that the business had a bank 

account he used to pay bills and that a document finalizing the 

business arrangement with his partner showed "retained earnings" 

of $37,500. He further testified, however, that that amount 

"would be shared. It's in the company. I have no $37,000 

. . . . It would have been in the company account if anywhere 

. . . and what we had to do was bring every account we had up to 

that date [when the partner left] including payables . . . and 

try to come up with a split that was equitable." 

 The trial judge was free to believe the husband's testimony 

that the business had no value. Furthermore, the evidence that 

the husband had control over the $37,000 in retained earnings is 

hardly conclusive. Rankins testified that the money belonged to 

the company and that his business partner had an equal interest 

in that money at dissolution and, furthermore, that this amount 

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was used to pay creditors of the business. On this record, we 

cannot say that the judge erred in finding that the business had 

no value. 

V. 

 Stark further contends the trial judge erred in his 

allocation to her of $4,100 that was in her bank account. She 

maintains that she used this money for living expenses between 

the time of separation and the time of the distribution award 

and that the trial judge should not have determined the value of 

the account as of the former date. In addition, she contends 

the judge erred in determining the value of a brokerage account. 

 We find no indication, however, that Stark objected to 

these rulings on the order distributing the property. We also 

can find no objection anywhere else in the record. Therefore, 

we will not consider these issues on appeal. Rule 5A:18. 

 For these reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and 

remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. 

 Affirmed in part, reversed in

 part, and remanded. 

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