From the Commandant: An 

Interview with RDML Brad 

Williamson

Building the Joint “Bench”: 

Borrowing Best Corporate 

Practices to Enhance Talent 

Management 

The Straw that Stirs the Drink: 

The Implications of Resurgent 

Religion for Strategists and 

Policy Makers

Where Are the Cops? 

Addressing the Missing Focus 

of U.S. Counterterrorism 

Efforts Abroad

Campaigning

The Journal of the Joint Forces Staff College

Featured Essays

That All May Labor As One

Spring 2016
Campaigning 

Spring 2016 

https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=69

Commandant, Joint Forces Staff College 

RDML Brad Williamson, USN

Dean, Joint Forces Staff College 

Dr. Patricia B. Strait

Editor

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley

Editorial Board: 

Assistant Professor William S. Marlowe

Dr. Kenneth P. Pisel

Dr. Frederick R. Kienle 

Cover image: Students of 

JCWS Seminar 13, Class 16-01 

apply design concepts during a 

seminar exercise at NSA Norfolk, 

VA on Mar 2, 2016. Photo by 

Daniel H. McCauley. 

Director, Joint and Combined

Warfighting School 

CAPT John M. Maxwell, USN

Director, Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School 

Col Peter E. Yeager, USMC

Director, Joint Continuing

and Distance Education 

School 

Col Tricia L. York, USAFR

Director, Joint Command,

Control and Information 

Operations School 

COL Maxwell Thibodeaux, USA

Campaigning Spring 2016 i
In this issue of Campaigning: 

Editor’s Corner.......................................................................................iii

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley

Features

From the Commandant: An Interview With RDML Brad Williamson....................1 

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley, JFSC Faculty

The Straw That Stirs the Drink: The Implications for Resurgent Religion 

for Strategists and Policymakers..................................................................11 

CDR Steven L. Dundas, JFSC Faculty

Building the Joint Bench: Borrowing Best Corporate Practices to Enhance Talent 

Management...........................................................................................17 

LTC Eric J. Weis, Col Paula Hamilton, and Col Laura Lenderman, JCWS

Where Are the Cops? Addressing the Missing Focus of U.S. Counterterrorism 

Efforts Abroad...........................................................................................29

Lt Col M. Honoré Spencer, Col Gene Hughes, and LtCol Cesar Rodriguez, JCWS 

Commentary 

The American Way of Strategy...................... .............................................40

Maj Paul Franz, CDR Robert W. Lightfoot, MAJ Vincent Luther, and LTC Matt Rinke, JCWS 

Amending Goldwater-Nichols: The Need to Create a Language Requirement or 

General Officers........................................................................................49

MAJ Steven Lacey, LTC Tyler Oxley, Maj Eric Doctor, and LTC Aldo Vergara, JCWS 

The Foresight Factor

Improving the International Community’s Response to Mass Conflict Refugee 

Migration...............................................................................................56

MAJ Alison Hamilton and Lt Col Jeremy Goodwin, JCWS 

It’s Time for the U.S. to Turn Down the Aid and Turn Up the Pressure on the 

Government of South Sudan for Peace and Security..........................................66

Lt Col Chad Diaz and MAJ Joshua Fishman, JCWS 

Author Submission Guidelines.....................................................................86

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Joint

Forces Staff College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

Campaigning Spring 2016 ii
As the world’s preeminent military 

and economic power, the United States faces 

an international security order rife with 

complex challenges. The faculty and students 

of JFSC not only recognized those 

challenges, but are determined to meet them 

head-on. The Spring edition of Campaigning 

presents eight essays all of which promote 

various methods to perform the Joint force’s 

missions more effectively while making the 

world a little more secure. 

This edition’s main features begins 

with “From the Commandant: An Interview 

With RDML Brad Williamson,” which was 

an opportunity for the Commandant to share 

his views on the Joint Forces Staff College, 

Joint professional military education, and his 

vision for the future. The second featured 

essay was written by CDR Steven Dundas 

titled, “The Straw That Stirs the Drink: The 

Implications for Resurgent Religion for 

Strategists and Policymakers.” In this essay, 

CDR Dundas discusses the role that religious 

ideology plays in influencing societies and 

international relations. He posits that there is 

a growing religious influence outside of the 

Middle East that is threatening to subvert 

Western secular models of the state.

The third featured essay, “Building 

the Joint Bench: Borrowing Best Corporate 

Practices to Enhance Talent Management,” 

was written by LTC Eric Weis, Col Paula 

Hamilton, and Col Laura Lenderman. In this 

essay, the authors argue that as operational 

environment becomes more complex, 

building a “bench” of future joint leaders who 

have the requisite skills necessary to tackle 

this complexity is a critical concern. The 

authors propose transitioning from what has 

been a “train and develop” approach to leader 

development to one that maximizes the best 

practices from industry through an “assess 

and select” approach. 

The last featured essay, “Where Are 

the Cops? Addressing the Missing Focus of 

U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts Abroad,” by Lt 

Col Honoré Spencer, Col Gene Hughes, and 

LtCol Cesar Rodriguez contend that a 

main feature of the U.S. strategy to 

combat terrorism is through the 

development of stronger law 

enforcement and criminal justice 

institutions. Unfortunately, U.S. 

Government efforts to develop effective law 

enforcement abroad is fragmented and 

suffering from parochial agendas. The 

authors propose enhancements for the 

development of foreign police capabilities. 

This edition’s commentary features 

“The American Way of Strategy,” by Maj 

Paul Frantz, CDR Robert Lightfoot, MAJ 

Vincent Luther and LTC Matt Rinke 

suggest that the U.S. Government’s 

process for creating grand strategy 

has become increasingly ineffective 

because of overly 

Editor’s Corner

Campaigning Spring 2016 iii
prescriptive legislation. The authors argue 

that the U.S. Government should seek to 

create balance across the DIME in its strategy 

production process rather than applying rigid 

focus on the Department of Defense alone. 

The second commentary feature is 

“Amending Goldwater-Nichols: The Need to 

Create a Language Requirement for General 

Officers,” written by MAJ Steven Lacy, LTC 

Tyler Oxley, Maj Eric Doctor, and LTC 

Aldo Vergara, discusses that despite the 

rhetoric, foreign language and cultural 

expertise in today’s military is lacking. 

The author’s suggest that the GoldwaterNichols Act must be amended to create a 

foreign language requirement for General 

Officers. 

This edition’s Foresight Factor 

features are “Improving the International 

Community’s Response to Mass Conflict 

Refugee Migration” by MAJ Alison 

Hamilton and Lt Col Jeremy Goodwin and 

“It’s Time for the U.S. to Turn Down the Aid 

and Turn Up the Pressure on the Government 

of South Sudan for Peace and Security” by Lt 

Col Chad Diaz and MAJ Joshua Fishman. 

MAJ Hamilton and Lt Col Goodwin use 

foresight tools to analyze and assess the U.S. 

policy toward the Syrian refugee migration, 

which is undermining regional stability. 

Security, perceived risk to civilian life, and 

stability are the biggest drivers in the mass 

refugee migration system, causing 

populations to displace both internally and 

externally. As such, there must be a 

committed effort to establish security before 

the refugee crisis will begin to abate.

Lt Col Diaz and Maj Fishman also 

apply foresight tools in the analysis and 

assessment of the U.S. policy toward the 

newly established nation of South Sudan. 

Efforts to stabilize the new nation consist of 

providing relatively large sums of money and 

aid to South Sudan; however, these efforts 

are not achieving the desired effects. Based 

upon their assessment, the authors propose an 

alternative strategy that dismantles the failing 

system currently in place.

We hope you enjoy this edition of 

Campaigning. You can let me know what 

you think by emailing me at 

mccauleyd@ndu.edu. 

Daniel H. McCauley

Editor 

Campaigning Spring 2016 iv
From the Commandant

An Interview 

with RDML Brad Williamson 

By 

Dr. Daniel H. McCauley

Photos by Mr. David McManaway

On November 20th, 2015 Campaigning had 

the opportunity to interview RDML Brad 

Williamson, the Commandant of Joint Forces 

Staff College (JFSC). The following is a 

transcript of that interview.

Campaigning: After six months at the 

helm, what are your impressions of JFSC?

RDML Williamson: It’s really an 

outstanding organization. I did not have the 

opportunity to go through any of the 

schoolhouses here earlier in my career, but 

I’ve certainly been stationed in and around 

the Joint Forces Staff College several times. 

The thing I found, after immediately 

reporting here, was the dedication and quality 

of the staff and faculty here and how engaged 

they are in the mission. I’ve had the 

opportunity to spend six months now 

engaging the students, engaging the staff, and 

engaging the faculty. I can tell you that the 

mission performed here at JFSC is absolutely 

critical in supporting the combatant 

commanders and joint staffs, ensuring they 

get the people they need to operationalize the 

strategies of our senior leaders. That’s true 

whether I’m talking about one of the C4I 

courses, the JCWS class, the JAWS class, or 

the AJPME class. All of our students leave 

here and the go directly to operational staffs 

and make a difference as soon as they arrive. 

We are probably the only PME institution 

that is focused like that. 

Campaigning: What do you think are 

JFSC’s strengths?

RDML Williamson: I think two things. One 

is the faculty and the way that we are set up 

here. What I have seen is them doing a 

tremendous job of taking what we are 

teaching, and then looking at it in an honest 

and objective fashion each cycle, and then

adapting the curriculum to stay focused and 

relevant. Every year our military missions 

change and so if we end up with a static 

curriculum, in some period of time it will 

become outdated. So what I have seen is 

faculty who are talking about what is going 

on right now and adapting the instruction to 

ensure that it is relevant to what’s going on. 

So that’s the first thing. Then the second 

thing is just the overall climate here. A lot of 

our students come here for 10 weeks and they 

are very focused because of the structure of 

the course. The JAWS students, who are 

PCS’d here, they are brought together in a 

joint environment where they are forced to 

interact with each other. We could have the 

best instruction in the world, but if it wasn’t 

done in an in-residence joint environment it 

wouldn’t carry the same weight. That applies 

even to AJPME folks even though they do a 

40 week course, and most of it is done on-line 

or in synch sessions on-line, we still bring 

them here and put them in the same room 

with each other and that enculturation into a 

joint setting is critical. From my time at the 

National War College, although the 

instruction was fabulous and the educational 

experience was wonderful, the fact that I was 

Campaigning Spring 2016 1
in a committee and other classes with people 

who were from other Services and 

organizations, that was the true value of the 

education. I think that remains true today. 

RDML Brad Williamson and PS3 Amber Downs

Figure 1

Campaigning: How have your experiences 

in the Navy as a Surface Warfare Officer 

shaped your perspective of Joint 

education?

RDML Williamson: I tell people, and a lot 

of the classes coming in, that I was so “heads 

down” and operationally-focused for the first 

part of my career as a junior officer that I was 

absolutely convinced that the surface warfare 

community had all of the answers to the 

world’s problems. It wasn’t until I went to the 

National War College after my executive 

officer ride that I was exposed to other 

perspectives. This could not have come at a 

better time for me personally because my 

next tours were on the OSD staff and then in 

command. Because of the Joint education at 

National one is able to think more broadly, 

and what you are able to provide your bosses, 

whether it’s a naval officer or someone from 

another Service, is a better perspective on 

how we might approach a problem or

challenge. One of the things I say to the 

students when I have the opportunity to 

engage with them, when they go to a joint 

staff or a combatant commander staff, it’s not 

about providing the commander with a 

solution, we can all do that and what will 

happen is that we will tend to be very 

parochial based upon our own experiences. 

What we need are officers who can work on 

that staff and provide the best solution, and 

that means the best solution while taking into 

account all of the things that the combatant 

commander has going on. And that may be a 

Naval officer saying the Air Force has a 

capability here we should be utilizing; when 

we have done that, then we have done our 

jobs well—and by that, I mean officers are 

thinking about solutions to problems without 

thinking of their own Service. The students 

that are coming in right now they understand 

joint as they have lived it in Iraq or 

Afghanistan or in other places. As a naval 

officer, I always say that the Navy and 

Marine Corps team is kind of joint in its own 

right. We bring aviation forces, surface 

forces, and amphibious forces and utilize 

them together. I just came from an exercise, 

the last thing before I got here, BALTOPS in 

the Baltic Sea, and we had naval forces from 

multiple nations, allies, and partners; we had 

Marine and Army forces on the ground; and 

we had B-52s participating. This is how we 

have to fight and I can think of no situation in 

the future where it won’t be a multi-Service 

operation, and that means also Interagency, 

and it will almost certainly be a coalition of 

some sort. I see no instance in where a 

Service will go it alone. The days of the Navy 

saying “hey, we’ve got this,” or the Army 

Campaigning Spring 2016 2
saying “we’ve got this,” that’s not going to 

happen again. That’s really a testament to all 

of the joint education that has occurred over 

the past 25 years or so where we have really 

focused on making our officers think that 

way. 

VADM William “Dean” Lee, USCG, Commander, 

Atlantic Area and RDML Brad Williamson

Figure 2

Campaigning: In the past, General 

Dempsey spoke about the need to develop 

agile and adaptive leaders who are 

comfortable with ambiguity. Do you see 

this need affecting the way JFSC currently 

teaches? 

RDML Williamson: I don’t know, I think 

we do a pretty good job of that, teaching 

people how to think and interact and not so 

much what to think. When we talk about 

adaptive and agile leaders it’s about leaders 

who are always seeking to understand what’s 

happening. When you look at the lessons 

from Iraq and Afghanistan, I don’t think there 

is anyone who would look at those and say 

we knew everything we needed to know on 

the day we went in. I do think we did a pretty 

good job of learning and of how we might

adapt what we were doing. I think because of 

that, people understand better, especially at 

the more junior levels that this is part of the 

process. That you have to go in 

understanding that no matter how good your 

plan is it’s not going to account for 

everything that you need to account for. You 

have to be ready to adapt your plan. The 

other thing I would tell you is that when you 

look at Iraq and Afghanistan, that where there 

were successes, that most of those successes 

occurred in environments where the missions 

were as joint as they could possibly be

(Meaning Interagency, coalition, etc.). We 

should recognize that, and applaud that, and 

make sure we are ready to work that way. 

RDML Brad Williamson and CS2 Wordell Bradley

Figure 3

Campaigning: Are there any external 

surprises or wild cards that have the 

potential to significantly impact the Joint 

education community? 

RDML Williamson: I think so. I don’t 

want to say that surprise is the new normal, 

but I think that the potential for surprise is 

much greater nowadays. Now, having said 

Campaigning Spring 2016 3
that, I also think we are more ready to deal 

with it. I think, to be honest, 9-11 was a big 

surprise for us. Because of that, we have 

learned that the potential for events like that 

at different places in the world is possible. 

What we saw in France, unfortunately, 

over the last week is that we were still caught 

off guard, but I don’t think we were 

surprised. I think we have to be thinking 

about how we can best utilize all of our 

national instruments to address the 

security challenges we are going to face 

over the next 20 or 30 years. I think they 

will be broad. So thinking that we can just 

build a solution today and that it will stand 

the test of time over the years is probably a 

fool’s errand. I also think this is what we are 

teaching our students to do in all of our 

courses here. To think about how we look 

at problems and not so much what to 

think. The facts will continue to change, 

and if you get caught up in thinking just 

about the facts, and not how the facts apply 

to (current) potential solutions, then you will 

get trapped in kind of a time warp where 

what may have been true five years ago is 

no longer valid. 

Chief of the Border Patrol Michael J. Fisher and 

RDML Brad Williamson

Figure 4

Campaigning: What do you think are the 

most urgent challenges facing the JPME 

community today? 

RDML Williamson: Well, obviously, I’m 

not involved in the current budget 

negotiations, but the budget environment 

over the past couple of years has caused us to 

take some significant cuts here at the Joint 

Forces Staff College. I think right now 

though that we are where we should be and I 

think what you see is some other folks 

coming on line and saying, quite rightly, that 

if we are going to have an environment for 

the next 10 or 15 years where certain parts of 

the military don’t receive the resources that 

perhaps they have in the past, then joint 

professional military education ought to be a 

priority because we provide the bridge to the 

future. I know there are a lot of people right 

now looking at how we educate our officers 

and our enlisted personnel across all of our 

Services not just in professional 

military education, but across the board. 

Again, if you look at the last 10 plus 

years in Afghanistan and Iraq, we can’t 

lose sight of the fact that joint is the only 

way we are going to fight and we are going 

to have to continue to educate our officers 

in that way, and so I think when I look at 

professional military education, 

specifically at the National Defense 

University schools, I think it is the best 

possible investment of our scarce 

resources. As I said, I think there are others 

who also recognize that and are becoming 

more vocal that this is the wrong place to 

take further cuts because, again, the officers 

that we are training right now, some of 

whom were in the graduation ceremony 

today, are our future and we should invest in 

our future. 

Campaigning Spring 2016 4
Campaigning: If you had five minutes with 

the Chairman, what question(s) would you 

ask that would make him re-think Joint 

education? 

RDML Williamson: I have a simple answer 

to this—what do we value?” What do we 

value in our officers? What makes us the 

military that we are and what will make us 

the military we want to be in the future? If 

it’s not the education of our officers, I would 

ask what is it then? I think when I look at 

our military, whether it’s the Navy or any 

of the other Services, it’s the men and 

women who serve that set us apart from 

other institutions around the world. An 

investment in those people, one that 

recognizes that they are the reason that we 

maintain the capabilities and the standing 

that we rightfully deserve right now, and 

investing in their talents is a wise 

investment. So, again, I would ask him what 

is it that we value? Twenty years from now, 

if we have a lot of kit, but not great people, 

we won’t be a great military. But if we 

have great people and we decide that we need 

more kit, we can buy the kit, but I don’t 

know if we can mass produce the people. 

So, in an austere environment, investing 

in the education of our people is a wise 

choice. That doesn’t mean you don’t need kit 

for right now or to help you to operate right 

now, but when you look at the overall 

budget, investing in the education of our 

people, which is both a retention tool and 

a training tool for those people, is a very 

Twise investment. he second part of that is, as I remind people, 

we got to joint because we were pushed and 

shoved here a little bit, we the Services, but 

we are here now and I think we all recognize 

that we are a better military because of that. I 

think there should be a recognition that joint 

education, and joint staffs and joint training 

are imperative for us to be more efficient in 

the future. I think the efficiencies we have 

been able to gain by operating in a joint 

environment are overlooked sometimes. 

Those are the dividends of the joint education 

of officers. Our ability to do things when the 

Navy doesn’t have all of the assets but can 

utilize the Army or the Air Force. That’s a 

benefit that is being realized right now 

because of the joint mindset of our officers. 

Campaigning: JPME Phase II at JFSC is 

written into law—other than that legal 

requirement, what is your vision for the 

College that will promote and sustain 

JFSC’s relevancy for the next 15-20 years? 

RDML Williamson: Well, the reality is that 

what makes it relevant is what we discussed 

earlier, which is that there are things we can 

leverage to make JPME II more accessible, to 

continue to make it relevant, not just to the 

stakeholders that utilize the product, but to 

make it easier for the students. So, the vision 

for 15 to 20 years from now ought to be that 

at some point we can get to where the 

students walk in with their device and we are 

able to operate with them on their device that 

they take with them with their notes on it, at 

least all of the unclassified information. 

Maybe we can offer some training to people 

via distance education, synch sessions, and 

other things, but I would never lose sight that 

what makes joint education work is putting 

people from the different services and 

agencies in the same room. So, no matter 

Campaigning Spring 2016 5
where you go in the future you have to have 

that as part of the curriculum. If you don’t, 

then we are educating but we are not 

inculcating. We have to have people who are 

inoculated to think there is a different view 

on this subject. Back to my own experience, 

if I had taken the curriculum from National 

War College on my own, on-line, I would 

have probably, from an educational 

standpoint, understood the material just as 

well, but I wouldn’t have had a joint view 

imposed on it. I got that because I sat there 

with people from other Services who 

provided me with their perspective on the 

issue or problem. This forced me, for really 

the first time in my life, to think about 

different ways to do things. That only 

happens when you are in the room with each 

other. 

RDML Williamson and JFSC Faculty Members

Figure 5

Campaigning: What are the five or six 

values that underpin that vision?

RDML Williamson: As I said, jointness is at 

the top of that list...you have to be joint. 

Two, we have to be thinking, and to use 

earlier terms, I think adaptive. So, we can 

have a curriculum in place, but we have to be 

able to adapt not only what we teach, but 

perhaps how we teach it. I think we ought to 

be innovative and that is slightly different 

than adaptive. I always use adaptive as you 

responding to impetus put on you from the 

outside. Innovation is you forcing your will 

on the rest of the world, and so, I think we can 

be innovative. I think what we are doing right 

now for the satellite program for JCWS is 

fairly innovative. So now we are trying to 

adjust other things to make that work. 

Finally, different than thinking, we should be 

thoughtful. By that, I mean we have to be 

honest with ourselves about where we are not 

meeting the mark and we have to continually 

evaluate the product we are providing, 

interacting with our stakeholders, and trying 

to determine if the product that we are 

providing to the combatant commanders, 

joint task forces, and others is meeting the 

mark and what can we do with the resources 

we have available to make it better. I think if 

we can do those things, we’ll be not only just 

as relevant in the future but perhaps even 

more relevant. 

Campaigning: What can JFSC do that no 

other educational institution can 

replicate?

RDML Williamson: There is nothing we 

can do that others can’t replicate, but right 

now what we do that is unique is two things. 

One, and this doesn’t apply to some of the 

other NDU institutions, but a lot of the other 

PME institutions are joint, but they are still 

heavily dominated by their Service...that’s 

just the nature of their institutions that are 

providing that education. Here at the Joint 

Forces Staff College, across the board in all 

Campaigning Spring 2016 6
of our curriculum, we are joint. We are as 

evenly split among the services, interagency, 

and international students as we can possibly 

be. We are the same way on our faculty side. 

Because of this, the perspectives that the 

students get in the classroom are really a little 

bit different than what they might get 

elsewhere. 

The second thing is that that we are 

operationally focused. By that I mean, at the 

other institutions someone might go through 

one of the courses and he/she might come out 

and go to a command that recognizes that he 

just attended War College X, but nobody is 

going to say to him apply what you just 

learned to your new job. Almost to a man and 

a woman, everyone who goes through one of 

our courses, when they leave here the place 

they go immediately following their 

educational experience is going to expect 

them to apply what they just learned here. 

Again, it doesn’t matter if it’s one of our 

courses upstairs in the SCIF, it’s a JCWS 

class, or one of our JAWS students. People 

are going to expect them to perform at a 

higher level based on what they learned here. 

We make that clear to our students when they 

come in and I think it is very clear to them 

when they go back by how much better 

prepared they are. I recently had the 

opportunity to fly down to Tampa and speak 

at the graduation ceremony for our satellite 

program down there. Almost every single 

person said to me how valuable they thought 

the course was. We had people in the course 

that were at various stages within their joint 

tour down there. The ones closer to the end 

[of their tour], said how much they had 

wished they had gone through the course 

earlier in their tour, and the ones at the 

beginning of their tour said how fortunate 

they felt that they got this so early in their 

tenure. So, I think that speaks volumes to how 

valuable it is immediately to the people who 

graduate.

iCollege Chancellor Janice Hamby, RADM, USN 

(Ret.) and RDML Brad Williamson

Figure 6

Campaigning: How does JFSC ensure its 

stakeholders understand and appreciate 

the value of its educational experience?

RDML Williamson: Obviously we conduct 

surveys to try and get feedback from all of the 

stakeholders about the value they see in the 

students that have graduated from here and 

go to their staffs. We do outreach at the senior 

leader/director level to reach out to ensure we 

are meeting the mark. That being said, this 

goes back to the thoughtful piece, I think 

there are ways perhaps that we can do that 

part of our mission even better. To really find 

out. You know I asked a question when I first

arrived here, and again, being the new guy 

it’s easy to ask questions, and I said how do 

we know how many of our students do the 

various combatant commands really want? 

Because we should be working off of a size 

and comp that is looking out into the future, 

but I don’t know that anyone has gone to a 

Campaigning Spring 2016 7
combatant commander yet and said would 

you rather have five more JAWS graduates or 

five graduates from another War College? 

So, I think at the highest levels as part of this 

look at the overall continuum of education 

that this has to be part of the conversation. 

We ought to be asking our customers, the 

combatant commands and joint staffs, which 

of these curriculums do you value on your 

staffs? Which of these people make a 

difference for you? And then we ought to 

weigh that pretty seriously as part of how we 

build the construct of education. Saying that 

we want everyone to have this degree is 

interesting, but if the feedback we get from 

the stakeholders is that they wish they had 

five more guys who have been through the 

C4I course or wish they had more JAWS 

graduates or more JCWS graduates, and, 

listening to them, being thoughtful, we 

should take this into consideration. What 

people should really start to look at is what is 

really valued and why is it valued? And then, 

should we be doing more of it if it is 

valuable? I think that, again, especially if the 

resources become even more constrained, 

that’s something that’s got to happen. We 

have to realize what is making a difference 

and then we have to ensure that’s where the 

resources are being applied.

Campaigning: The Services have a 

fantastic network of alumni and 

associations that support their PME 

institutions. Can JFSC strengthen its 

alumni connections? If so, how? 

RDML Williamson: Yes, and we are 

working on that right now. Currently, COL

Yeager has done a great job looking at JAWS 

graduates. I think we are starting to see, just 

because of the timing of when people started 

attending that course, that we are having our 

first flag and general officers who are JAWS

graduates. So, getting those people to come 

back and engage the classes is important. 

The other thing that is coming up is our 70th

anniversary of the Armed Forces Staff 

College, which was our predecessor here. We 

are going to use that event as a means to kind 

of recognize some of our previous graduates 

and the impact that those graduates have 

made on our Services and on our nation in 

some cases. So, we are in the middle right 

now of going through our JCWS graduates 

and trying to identify some people that we 

would like to include in that. At first blush, 

what we have found is how many of the 

people that are walking around the Services 

now as flag and general officers have been 

through one of the courses here. Just today, 

we had Maj Gen Jamieson here to be our 

graduation speaker and she spoke about how 

21 years ago she was a JCWS student. That 

has a powerful impact on the JCWS students 

who are sitting there listening to her and 

really having to recognize that someday one 

of them is going to be that graduation 

speaker. So, I think that’s good for us. 

Campaigning: How do you see the 

relationship between the College and the 

City of Norfolk and surrounding cities? 

RDML Williamson: Well, it’s interesting, I 

actually had the opportunity to have dinner 

with Mayor Fraim and some of the other 

people from the Norfolk government. Of 

course the Dean and I are involved in the 

Tidewater Consortium for Higher education 

and so I think we have an excellent 

Campaigning Spring 2016 8
relationship with the schools in the area and 

with the City of Norfolk. In fact, I invited 

some of those leaders to come by and to see 

the PME institution that resides here in 

Norfolk so they can have a better idea of what 

we do here and who is here doing that. You 

can never underestimate the value of having 

good working relationships, not just with the 

government officials or the school officials, 

but with the community in general. You 

know our students come in here, a lot of them 

here for short periods of time as geobachelors, so a lot of them are out in the town 

and we want the area here to be proud of 

being the home of the Joint Forces Staff 

College. We want our students and our staff 

and faculty to feel like they are part of the 

community. I think, my view, is that 

everyone feels that way. Obviously, we can 

always do more things to help that, but 

overall I like what I have seen about our 

engagement. 

Campaigning: Campaigning traditionally 

asks new faculty members what was the 

last book they read. What’s on your 

nightstand?

RDML Williamson: I’ve got three right 

now. Admiral Stavridis’ book, The 

Accidental Admiral, is on my nightstand back 

home. My roommate at the Naval Academy, 

his father wrote a book called Ambrose, and 

it’s about his great grandfather who was in 

the Civil War and survived four years of 

fighting. Because of the personal 

connection with that book, I kind of moved 

that to the top. Then the third book, which 

isn’t really a book that one might think has 

any applicability, is called, Think Like a 

Freak. It’s a third in the series of the 

“Freakonomic” books. I am, kind of by trade, 

an analyst and have looked at things a lot of 

times in an objective rather than subjective 

manner. The two key things I like in the 

“Freakonomic” books that I think are 

applicable when we look at strategy, and 

these were really brought home in the first 

book, are: Correlation does not always mean 

causation and are we prepared for the second , 

third, and fourth-order effects of what we do? 

When we look at a lot of the situations in the 

world right now it’s very easy for people to 

say that “this caused this” and it’s of course not 

always the case. There are usually lots of 

factors that caused something to happen. I 

think if we can take a broader view and step 

back and say why did this really happen we 

would be better served. A lot of times we like 

to analyze things in the simplest of terms, and 

by that I mean the things that are easy for us 

to count, and if you can count something or 

measure something you tend to measure it 

without really stepping back and saying “is 

this the thing you should measure. In some

situations we look at things and we think 

somehow we’ve figured out the answer 

because we went in with a question we 

wanted to ask because we knew in advance 

we could come up with the answer. So, if you 

think you can count or measure something a 

lot of times you pose the question knowing 

that you can get an answer, but it doesn’t 

mean it’s the right question. 

The second thing is: Are we prepared 

for the second, third, and fourth-order 

effects of what we do? And again, from a 

strategic sense, I think that’s really where we 

don’t do a great job. We understand when we 

do “this” what the immediate reaction will 

Campaigning Spring 2016 9
be; I think if you look at the last 15 years, it’s 

those second-, third-, and fourth-order effects

that we have had a very difficult time 

understanding before we took the initial 

action. This is why we had to adapt in what 

we were doing in the Middle East, Iraq, and 

Afghanistan. We didn’t really understand 

what the second-, third-, and fourth-order 

effects of our actions were going to be. 

Because we didn’t understand those, we 

didn’t anticipate them, and then we were 

reacting and trying to adapt what we were 

doing because things were happening that we 

didn’t foresee happening. Again, from an 

economics standpoint, that thought process 

of “if this happens, what will really happen 

next?” A great economic example of that 

right now is what is playing out is the world 

oil prices. When the prices started coming 

down, there were lots of people writing a lot 

of things about what the impact would be but 

I don’t think any of them properly captured 

what the end result and I think we will see 

more impact coming. As an analyst, I look at 

the strategic environment through an 

analytical lens and I think sometimes we 

measure things simply because we can 

measure them, but without thinking about 

whether they are the right things to measure. 

I find that fascinating and interesting for me. 

Some people might not find that aspect of it 

as fascinating, but I do. The other two books 

were more for my professional pleasure. 

Campaigning Spring 2016 10
The Straw that the Stirs the Drink

The Implications of Resurgent Religion 

for Strategists and Policy Makers

By 

CDR Steven L. Dundas, CHC, USN

One can never separate war and the 

means by which it is fought from its political 

ends. There are, however, many societies 

whose language and religious ideology shape 

the leader’s political ends. To borrow the 

immortal words of legendary baseball 

slugger Reggie Jackson, religion is often “the 

straw that stirs the drink.” The fact that 

religious ideologies influence societies and 

international relations is not new, but after 

almost three centuries of decline the twentyfirst century promises to begin a new age of 

religious influence. Samuel Huntington 

notes, “Western secular models of the state 

are being challenged and replaced”1 in many 

nations as religious influence grows. The 

indicators of this shift, religious, cultural, and 

racial, are glaringly obvious in the Middle 

East but clearly present in Eastern Europe, 

Russia, the Balkans, India, Latin America, 

and the United States, and threaten to subvert 

Western secular models of the state.

According to Clausewitz, war is an 

extension or continuation of politics. 

Clausewitz, a product of classic German 

Liberalism, understood the term politics in 

light of the German concept 

Weltanschauung, which translates as “World 

View.” The term is not limited to a particular 

doctrine or the ideology of party politics, but 

it encompasses the worldview of a people or 

culture and includes religion. Religious 

leaders, as well as media outlets and 

politicians, use a world view to influence 

their population. In fact, the world view is 

often crucial in the decision by a people to go 

to war, their rationale for going to war, whom 

they war against, the means for conducting 

war, and the end state they envision from 

warring. 

Because Weltanschauung includes all 

elements of culture, to include race, religion, 

and economy, as well as sociological and 

historical factors; religious leaders, as well as 

media outlets and politicians, use it to 

manipulate their people. Radical proponents 

of religious fundamentalism around the 

world, who reject the pluralities of 

modernism and science, skillfully “use each 

new method of communication”2 to spread 

their message of fear in a dualistic manner to 

influence those most vulnerable to the threat 

of change.

Modern Americans and Western 

European policy makers tend to look at the 

world, and issues of politics and policy in 

isolation from each other, and especially in 

isolation from religion. Such an atomistic 

method ensures that many policy makers 

cannot see the forest for the trees. This is 

particularly true when religion is a 

motivating factor and an ideological 

component of conflict. Religiously based 

ideology is a powerful and “often intractable 

force that can be quite unresponsive to all the 

instrumentalities of state power, let alone the 

instrumentalities of foreign policy,” 3 and has 

been so from the advent of civilization to the 

present day. Samuel Huntington observed, 

“To a very large degree, the major 

civilizations in human history have been 

closely identified with the world’s great 

religions; and people who share ethnicity and 

Campaigning Spring 2016 11
language but differ in religion may slaughter 

each other....”4

Even among religions that claim to 

worship the same god beliefs may differ, and 

that fact underscores Colin Gray’s all 

important, “contexts of war.” Gray makes the 

case for seven essential contexts policy 

makers and military leaders must understand 

regarding war that “can have strong negative 

consequences,”5 if ignored or misunderstood.

Each of the contexts is associated 

with the manner of social development, and

define the essential characteristics of a 

particular armed conflict. In many areas of 

the world religion functions as the “central 

political pillar maintaining the power of 

[the] ruler - a major pole in determining 

people’s loyalty - and as a key 

ingredient in determining a nation’s 

stability or instability.”6 Religion and 

religious values remain instrumental to 

the ethics and the social norms of a 

society and dictate how it deals with other 

nations and peoples, as well as how it 

conducts war. Over the course of the last three 

centuries the emphasis on rational and 

empirical thought predisposed western 

strategists and policy makers to exclude 

religion as a component of analysis. 

Furthermore, the scientific methodology used 

by many analysts dictates that they asses 

individual components of issues in isolation 

from each other, and often without 

connection to their opponent’s world view. 

Experts dissect economic factors, military 

capabilities, existing political systems, 

diplomatic considerations, and the ways 

societies gather information and exhaustively 

examine and evaluate each individual 

component. But the problem comes when 

policymakers fail to understand how world 

view, ideological factors, history, and 

religious belief impact how a given opponent 

will conduct war. 

In part, policy makers tend to 

interpret information through their own 

worldview. As Gray notes, “Policy and 

strategy will be influenced by the cultural 

preferences bequeathed by a community’s 

unique interpretation of its history as well as 

by its geopolitical-geostrategic context.” 7 As 

such, both military and civilian policy makers 

fail to address the criticality of religion to 

developing effective strategy. Barbara 

Tuchman wrote, “When information is 

relayed to policy-makers, they respond in 

terms of what is already inside their heads 

and consequently make policy less to fit the 

facts than to fit the notions and intentions 

formed out of the mental baggage that has 

accumulated in their minds since 

childhood.”8 A world view imposes cultural 

prejudices and blinders on western policy 

makers and strategists, that predispose them 

to look for shortcuts, or the most convenient 

explanations selected from the information 

they can see. Edward Luttwak wrote: 

Enlightenment prejudice has remained amply 

manifest in the contemporary professional analysis of 

foreign affairs. Policymakers, diplomats, journalists, 

and scholars who are ready to overinterpret economic 

causality, who are apt to dissect social differentiations 

most finely, and who will minutely categorize political 

affiliations are still in the habit of disregarding the role 

of religion, religious institutions, and religious 

motivations in explaining politics and conflict, and 

even in reporting their concrete modalities. Equally 

the role of religious leaders, religious institutions, and 

religiously motivated lay figures in conflict resolution 

has also been disregarded – or treated as a marginal 

phenomenon hardly worth noting.9

Campaigning Spring 2016 12
Unbeknownst to policy makers, their 

prejudices, the world view blinders they 

wear, inhibit them from seeing how 

interconnected the most primal elements of 

the human experience are to others’ 

worldviews, even their own. As such, both 

military and civilian policy makers fail to 

address the criticality of religion to 

developing effective strategy.

Many people believed that modern 

ideas, “such as science, technology, sec -

ularism, and humanism would overcome the 

religious concept of the universe that 

dominated premodern society.”10 Contemporary Western strategists and policy 

makers came to adulthood in a culture that 

supplanted the importance of religious ideas 

and need. A global, four-decade resurgence 

of religious ideals makes adaptation for 

strategists and planners difficult because of 

the dramatic shift in essential, unquestioned 

views.11 Others’ worldviews, including religious beliefs, often influence the 

application of economic, political, 

diplomatic, military power, and the use and 

dissemination of information. That fact 

remains true despite the religion or sect 

involved, and especially in a decidedly 

secular, or at least outwardly non-religious, 

nation. Perhaps, by ignorance or a refusal to 

admit the importance of religious motivations 

in conflict, strategists and planners fail to 

realize the western culture arose from primal 

religious beliefs that informed politics, 

philosophy, ethics, law, economics, art, racial 

constructs, and science for nearly 1500 years. 

Perhaps, that refusal fueled a justified appall 

or embarrassment of the religious justifications their forbearers used to incite war 

that subjugated or exterminated peoples. 

The United States Military made a 

belated attempt to address ideology, culture, 

and religion in terms of counter-insurgency 

doctrine when it published the U.S. 

Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Manual. 

The discussion of these issues is limited to 

two pages that specifically deal with various 

extreme Moslem groups that use religion as a 

pillar of their ideology, strategy, and 

operations. But the analysis in the 

counterinsurgency manual is limited because 

its focus is very general and at a tactical level. 

While the manual encourages leaders to 

attempt to understand the cultural differences 

it contains little to help leaders understand the 

importance of religion and ideology at the 

strategic and operational levels.

Commendably, the manual discusses 

how terrorist and insurgent groups use 

ideology, which is frequently based on 

religion to create a narrative. The narrative 

often involves a significant amount of myth 

presented as history, such as how Al Qaida 

and ISIL use the Caliphate as a religious and 

political ideal that for many Moslems, 

“produces a positive image of the golden age 

of Islamic civilization.”12

A purely intellectual understanding of 

how Al Qaida and ISIL use symbolism and 

imagery limits how strategists and planners 

can develop methods to counter it. Rather, 

strategists and planners would benefit from a 

historical introspection that leads to a 

personal reflection, aimed at understanding 

how the theological tools of the Christian 

religion subjugated peoples and the 

ramifications today. Protestant Christianity, 

particularly the Puritan concept of “a city set 

on a hill” undergirded the American belief in 

the nation’s Manifest Destiny, which in large 

Campaigning Spring 2016 13
part led to the extermination of the Native 

Americans, the War with Mexico, the 

romanticism of the ante-bellum American 

South, the belief that African Americans 

were sub-human, and that God ordained 

slavery. The concept persisted after the Civil 

War in the myth of the Lost Cause, and was 

exported abroad as the United States 

belatedly entered the race for overseas 

colonies. 

The concept of Manifest Destiny is 

still an essential element of the idea of 

American Exceptionalism, which often 

justifies much of American foreign policy. 

Former President George W. Bush alluded to 

this idea in his 2003 State of the Union 

Address where he said, “that freedom is the 

right of every person and the future of every 

nation. The liberty we prize is not America's 

gift to the world, it is God's gift to 

humanity.”13 Throughout the Bush presi -

dency, the President’s idea that God 

undergirded the policy of the United States 

led to a mismatch of policy ends and the 

means to accomplish them. Former Israeli 

Ambassador to the United States and 

historian Michael Oren wrote:

Not inadvertently did Bush describe 

the struggle against Islamic terror as a 

‘crusade to rid the world of evildoers.’ Along 

with this religious zeal, however, the 

president espoused the secular fervor of the 

neoconservatives...who preached the Middle 

East’s redemption through democracy. The 

merging of the sacred and the civic missions 

in Bush’s mind placed him firmly in the 

Wilsonian tradition. But the same faith that 

deflected Wilson from entering hostilities in 

the Middle East spurred Bush in favor of 

war.14

Only when policy makers and 

strategists understand that the use of religious 

ideology to conquer, subjugate, and terrorize 

in the name of God is universal, does it 

become easier to defeat those who employ it. 

American Presidents often invoke the 

name of God to justify the compulsion to 

conquer, such as McKinley did when he 

decided to annex the Philippines in 1899 

following the defeat of the Spanish. The war 

against the Filipinos used some of the most 

bloodthirsty tactics employed to fight the 

Filipino insurgents, who only wanted 

independence, and stained our own national 

honor. Mark Twain wrote: “There must be 

two Americas: one that sets the captive free, 

and one that takes a once-captive’s new 

freedom away from him, and picks a quarrel 

with him with nothing to found it on; then 

kills him to get his land. . . .”15

A doubtlessly sincere McKinley 

sought counsel from God about whether he 

should annex the Philippines or not. Barbara 

Tuchman wrote: “He went down on his 

knees, according to his own account, and 

'prayed to Almighty God for light and 

guidance’. He was accordingly guided to 

conclude “that there was nothing left to do for 

us but to take them all, and to educate the 

Filipinos. And uplift and civilize and 

Christianize them, by God’s grace to do the 

very best we could by them, as our fellowmen 

for whom Christ died.”16

The counterinsurgency manual does 

mention how “Ideology provides a prism, 

including a vocabulary and analytical 

categories, through which followers perceive 

their situation.”17 But again, it does this at a 

micro-level and the lessons are not applied at 

the higher levels of strategic thinking and 

Campaigning Spring 2016 14
policy. This is often due to the fact that 

American and other western strategists and 

policy makers view religion “as a set of 

theological issues rather than as a profoundly 

political influence in public life.”18 Even 

after nearly a decade and a half of unremitting 

war against enemies for whom religion is at 

the center of their politics, policy makers still 

misread or neglect the importance of religion 

and religiously based ideology in the political 

motivations of their opponents. In many 

cases, the religion of a people is a stronger 

part of their identity than that of the state. 

Nations created during the post-colonial era 

“continue to see religion, clan, ethnicity, and 

other such factors as the markers of 

community identity”19 Despite the advances 

in communications and technology and the 

globalization of so many western concepts, 

the political and religious leaders of Islamic 

nations view modern western political and 

social concepts as unwanted intrusions on 

their ancient cultures, and more importantly, 

insults to their religion. 

But, lest American policy makers and 

strategists see this rise as something 

completely foreign, a similar phenomenon is 

occurring in the United States. Despite the 

fact that a growing number of Americans 

espouse no-religious preference and, 

according to multiple studies conducted over 

a period of two decades, are leaving 

organized Christianity, adherents of two 

highly motivated and militant branches of 

Christianity have grown in strength and 

political power over the last forty years. The 

group known as Christian Dominionism 

advocates Christian domination of all parts of 

society and culture, and Pre-Millennial 

Dispensationalists believe in the imminent 

return of Christ to earth, including the belief 

that most of the earth’s population will be 

killed during the Apocalypse. A Pew 

Research Center survey found that by the 

year 2050, that 41% of Americans believe 

that Jesus Christ will return to earth.20

Leaders, politicians (including major 

conservative presidential hopefuls), pundits, 

and preachers often weigh in on public 

policy, to include military strategy, and claim 

that God’s law supersedes that of the state. 

They simultaneously reject secularism while 

legislating against those they deem enemies, 

and advocate for a “holy war” against Islam 

without distinction to Islam’s own divisions 

and denominational detectives. 

Such beliefs may appear irrational 

American strategists and policy makers, but 

it is completely rational to those who 

subscribe to it. The study of history, 

particularly how the deep roots of religion 

and faith shape cultural worldviews, as well 

as the actions of various peoples and nations, 

helps the policy maker and strategist adapt 

policy, strategy, and ultimately operational 

and tactical methods to the context of the 

conflict at hand. To do this effectively it is 

important that American strategists not be 

afraid to examine our own past to see how our 

ancestors used religion for good as well as for 

evil. However, the often dark mirror of 

history can be disconcerting to peer into. 

People tend to be uncomfortable when the 

face that they see in the mirror is all too 

similar to their current enemies, to the point 

that one might turn away in fear of what they 

see. The inability to look into the dark mirror 

of our own history is especially perilous 

when enemies are perfectly willing to wage 

war without end unto the destruction of the 

Campaigning Spring 2016 15
world in the name of their God, because when 

you belatedly look back in the mirror, failure 

will be staring you right in the face. 

Author Biography

Commander Steven L. Dundas, CHC USN is currently 

serving as Command Chaplain, Ethics Lead Instructor 

and Instructor for the Gettysburg Staff Ride for the 

National Defense University’s Joint Forces Staff 

College in Norfolk Virginia. He has over 33 years of 

experience in the Army, Army National Guard, Army 

Reserve and U.S. Navy. He has served as a Medical 

Service Corps Officer and Chaplain in a wide variety 

of command and staff positions as well as ICUs, 

trauma departments and ethics committees of major 

civilian and military medical centers and taught 

1 Huntington, Samuel P. Who Are We? America’s 

Great Debate The Free Press, Simon and Schuster 

Europe, London 2004 p.360

2 Jacoby, Susan. The Age of American Unreason 

Revised and Updated Vintage Books, A Division of 

Random House, New York 2008 p.18

3 Luttwak, Edward. The Missing Dimension in 

Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft Oxford 

University Press, Oxford and New York 1994 p.13 4 Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations 

and the Remaking of the World Order Touchstone 

Books, New York 1997 p.42

5 Gray, Colin S. Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, 

Peace, and Strategy Potomac Book, Dulles VA 2009

p.5

6 Rubin, Barry Religion in International Affairs in 

Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft Oxford 

University Press, Oxford and New York 1994 pp.20-

21

7 Ibid. Gray Fighting Talk p.25 8 Tuchman, Barbara W. Practicing History Alfred A. 

Knopf, New Your 1981 p.289

9 Ibid Luttwak The Missing Dimension pp.9-10 10 Ibid. Rubin Religion in International Affairs p.21 11 Ibid. Rubin Religion in International Affairs p.21 12 ___________ U.S. Army/ Marine 

Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24 MCWP 3-

Western Civilization at Park University. Chaplain 

Dundas researches and writes extensively on 

Gettysburg, Military History, Counter-Insurgency 

History, Religion and PTSD. He has spoken at 

conferences on the subjects of PTSD, Moral Injury and 

care for wounded warriors and their families. He holds 

a B.A. in History from California State University at 

Northridge, a Master of Divinity from Southwestern 

Baptist Theological Seminary, a Master of Arts in 

Military History with Honors from American Military 

University and has completed a year-long residency in 

Clinical Pastoral Education at Parkland Memorial 

Hospital in Dallas, Texas. He is an ordained Priest in 

the Apostolic Catholic Orthodox Church.

33.5 15 December 2006 with and forward by General 

David A Petraeus and General James Amos, Konecky 

and Konecky, Old Saybrook CT 2007 p.26

13 Bush, George W. State of the Union Address 

Washington D.C. January 28th 2003 retrieved from 

Presidential Rhetoric.com

http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.28.

03.html 10 June 2015 14 Oren, Michael Power, Faith and Fantasy: America 

and the Middle East 1776 to the Present W.W. Norton 

and Company, New York and London 2007 p.584

15 Twain, Mark To the Person Sitting in Darkness

February 1901 Retrieved from The World of 1898: The 

Spanish American War The Library of Congress 

http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/twain.html 12 

December 2014

16 Ibid. Tuchman Practicing History p.289 17 Ibid. U.S. Army/ Marine Counterinsurgency Field 

Manual p.27 18 Ibid. Rubin Religion in International Affairs in 

Religion p.20

19 Ibid. Rubin Religion in International Affairs p.22 20 Pew Research Center, U.S. Politics and Policy, 

http://www.people-press.org/2010/06/22/public-seesa-future-full-of-promise-and-peril/

Campaigning Spring 2016 16
Building the Joint “Bench”

Borrowing Best Corporate Practices to 

Enhance Talent Management

By

LTC Eric J. Weis, USA, Col Paula Hamilton, USAF, 

and Col Laura Lenderman, USAF

“It became clear to me that at the age of 58, I would 

have to learn new tricks that were not taught in 

military manuals...the arts of persuasion and guile. 

I must become an expert in a whole new set of 

skills.” - attributed to George C. Marshall 1

Between 1936 and 1939, George 

Marshall went from commanding an Infantry 

Brigade (approximately 5000 soldiers) to 

being a four-star Army General and Chief of 

Staff. While this tremendous acceleration 

occurred during a unique period of a World 

War build-up, it is not surprising that 

Marshall felt slightly unprepared for the 

demands required in his new position.2 The 

quote above addresses a common concern 

across organizations throughout the world. 

As leaders continue to move up the corporate 

ladder into levels of increasing authority and 

responsibility, has their varied exposure to 

experience, stretch assignments, tough onthe-job training, and formal/informal 

education prepared them for these highest 

levels of leadership? Traditional commercial 

organizations and the military industrial 

complex typically address this problem set by 

trusting that their system of evaluative 

performance success in a progressive set of 

demanding positions effectively winnows the 

field from regular performers to the 

potentials – a train and develop approach. It 

is these potentials that are then further 

groomed for increasing levels of leadership 

in accordance with the organization’s 

succession plan. Be it the production of Csuite executives or General/Flag officers, this 

system has enjoyed past success. However, 

unlike the military, the corporate world also 

has a back-up plan in case this grooming 

process fails to produce the necessary crop of 

heir-apparents. They can out-source by 

utilizing a careful assessment and selection 

approach that actively seeks and matches the 

potential candidates with the specific 

cognitive, psychological, and emotional 

attributes required for the targeted position. 

While outsourcing for mid- to seniorlevel talent is not feasible in the military, one 

might ask if the military necessarily 

constrains itself with a dominant “train and 

develop” approach, without maximizing the 

advantages of the “assess and select” method 

used with great success in the corporate 

world. As today’s operational environment 

becomes more complex, building the 

“bench” of future leaders to address future 

challenges is a critical strategic and 

operational concern. While not ineffective, 

our current model for building these future 

leaders remains anachronistic and relies too 

much on traditional models of development. 

This paper explores a complementary talent 

management approach, to focus the 

assessment, selection, training, and 

development of key attributes required at the 

strategic leadership level. A summary of the 

extant literature on leadership competencies 

across varying levels of responsibility will be 

followed by a closer examination of both the 

traditional military leader development 

approaches as compared to a singular best 

practice of Assessment Centers being utilized 

in the corporate sector. This foundation then 

Campaigning Spring 2016 17
provides an opportunity to recommend key, 

cross-profession aspects that could be 

incorporated to address this complex problem 

set. Although the maxim, “If it ain’t broke, 

don’t fix it,” tends to be the default position 

when exploring the challenge of building the 

bench of future joint leaders for our military 

services, as professionals we should be 

asking ourselves if we are truly doing 

enough. 

 

Stratified Leadership Literature

The study of leadership has enjoyed a 

place of prominence in the social science 

literature for the last century. Numerous 

perspectives have significantly contributed to 

the leadership field (i.e., traits/competencies, 

leader-follower exchanges, transformational/transactional), many of which were 

either sponsored by the U.S. Armed Forces or 

quickly incorporated into military doctrine. 

However, one in particular is highly relevant 

to the purpose of this discussion: that 

leadership processes and the competencies 

required vary across leadership levels. Both 

research and experience indicate that the 

performance demands required of leaders as 

they progress through increasing levels of 

authority and responsibility (e.g., organizational levels) change significantly. While 

this may represent a blinding flash of the 

obvious, the ancillary truth to this reflects 

that these performance demands will in turn 

require associated critical competencies – 

competencies that must be enhanced if 

already present or must be developed if they 

are not. Effectiveness at any level is 

dependent on the successful execution of role 

behaviors within this increasingly complex 

environment. Acquisition of these skills is 

based strongly on increases of cognitive 

conceptual ability and associated critical 

competencies as leaders’ progress from low, 

to middle-, to higher-levels or executivelevels of management. Decisions and 

thinking skills increase in complexity as one 

progresses from low- to high. Competencies 

developed and honed at each leadership level 

progressively builds and adds value to 

subsequent levels. A comprehensive 

literature review of all leadership 

competencies is beyond the scope of this 

paper. Therefore, to lay the foundation for the 

subsequent argument, a description of one of 

the more influential theories on stratified 

leadership competencies is provided. 

Additional competencies or knowledge/skills/abilities/other characteristics 

(KSAOs) are highlighted in the Table 1 in the 

final section.

In 1987, Jacobs & Jaques described 

this differentiated pattern of leader behavior 

and competencies across organizational 

levels in their Stratified Systems Theory.3 

They argued that organizational levels could 

be sub-divided into three primary levels 

(direct ~ tactical; organizational/operational; 

indirect ~ strategic/systems), with further 

differentiation into a total of seven sub-strata. 

In essence, leadership requirements become 

more complex with respect to possessing a 

greater sphere of control/influence and longer 

temporal outlook for the organization. 

Personal leadership progresses from direct 

control to indirect control, requiring greater 

capacities for organizational and 

environmental sense-making within settings 

consisting of greater complexity and 

ambiguity. 

Campaigning Spring 2016 18
Lower levels of an organization rely 

primarily on direct leadership. These front 

line supervisors have direct access (typically 

face-to-face) and control of subordinates 

(understanding and articulating work 

demands), and work tends to be more 

structured and less ambiguous.

4 Based on this 

closeness of direct reports, cognitive and 

interpersonal skills play primary roles. 

Technical and administrative skills also play 

prominent roles to accomplish hands-on, 

basic production processes. 5 

As leaders progress to mid-level 

positions, the nature of their internal and 

external job requirements expand. This 

conceptualization is key because at this midlevel, a leader now controls subordinates who 

in turn fulfill leader roles for sub-elements or 

teams – requiring greater conceptual and 

social complexity.6 Technical skill is 

replaced by cognitive and non-cognitive 

skills associated with management with the 

ability to deal with more diverse elements. 

There is also a greater focus on internal and 

external resource allocation, interpretation 

with a two-way vertical orientation, and more 

indirect facilitation of task accomplishment. 7 

Leadership at the organizational summit 

can also moderate the influence of leader 

attributes. As illustrated earlier, high-level 

organizational leaders have the greatest 

sphere of control, are generally externally 

focused, and are expected to develop an 

integrated vision for long-term performance.8 

Their indirect influence on concrete actions 

(e.g., sales, tactical/operational decisions) is 

complemented by a stronger, direct impact on 

vision, policies, and strategic decisionmaking (e.g., profit margins, operational/strategic impacts).9 Leaders at this highest 

level create and integrate complex systems, 

oversee direct operation of subordinate 

divisions, organize the acquisition and 

allocation of major resources, and 

create/apply policy.

10 They require additional 

competence in strategic thinking, business 

acumen, interpersonal behavior, and 

cognitive capacity for not only dealing with 

ambiguous situations, but more importantly 

predicting the next major event to proactively 

place the organization in the best position.11 

Finally, they also must possess a more global 

and societal perspective, allowing them to 

deal with increasing uncertainty, address a 

broader range of decisions with longer time 

spans, anticipate and assume greater risks, 

and incorporate higher level interests, goals, 

and priorities at the national level. 12 Whether 

in a corporate board room or 

Corps/Fleet/Numbered Air Force leaders in 

the highest organizational positions must 

have substantially increased capacities for 

knowledge (tactical and technical business 

savvy), conceptualization (capacity to deal 

with complexity), social competence (being 

able to interpret complexity of social 

systems), tempered personality (tolerance to 

ambiguity and openness to experience), and 

discretion (leads to traits playing larger role). 

Although the strata or levels of leadership 

build upon one another, certain nuances, as 

described by Jacobs and Jaques, specifically 

within areas of cognitive, interpersonal, 

business, and strategic complexity tend to 

have differential, moderating impacts on 

overall organizational performance when the 

leader competencies are aligned with the 

level in which they lead. 13

Campaigning Spring 2016 19
Traditional Leader Development 

Approaches

Today’s model for building senior 

military leaders is informed by traditional 

strategic leadership development theory 

dating back to early nineteenth century 

Prussia. Following devastating defeats by 

Napoleon and France, the Prussian 

government recognized the importance of

developing a cadre of professional military 

leaders and subsequently established new 

criteria for officer development.14 Rather 

than rely exclusively on aristocratic lineage 

as the primary qualification for senior 

leadership positions, the Prussian 

government established a system of meritbased military schools for the development 

and intellectual training of young officers.15 

The young officers who attended these 

schools and rigorous follow-on training were 

exposed early on to strategic planning 

concepts and graduated with “common 

methods and outlook, and an almost monastic 

dedication to their profession.”16 The top 

graduates of these schools were then 

appointed to the General Staff where junior 

officers would undergo further training, often 

outside traditional military studies, and 

alternate between line and staff duties.17 This 

served to expose select junior officers to the 

highest levels of strategic decision making as 

well as stretch them intellectually and 

experientially, ultimately providing Prussia

with a deep bench for succession planning for 

future leadership positions. 

Prussia’s revolutionary approach to 

professional officer development and its 

subsequent military successes influenced 

officer development practices throughout 

many armies around the world in the early 

twentieth century.18 The Prussian model of 

leadership development was particularly 

influential in shaping the thinking of Elihu 

Root, U.S. Secretary of War from 1899 to 

1904. Secretary Root is credited with 

reforming the War Department in the 

aftermath of the Spanish American War by 

establishing the General Staff as well as 

changing procedures for promotions, 

organizing the military education system, and 

instituting the principle of rotating officers 

from staff to line.19 Within Secretary Root’s 

system of rotating between staff and line 

positions and periodic professional education 

and training experiences, the assumption was 

that “officers with the desired characteristics 

and attributes could be ‘grown’ by putting 

them through a series of varied 

developmental experiences.”20 However, 

unlike the Prussian model of strategic officer 

development, this system focused on 

developing a cadre of operational generalists 

rather than officers with depth of skills, 

knowledge, and behaviors.21 

Although warfare has changed 

dramatically throughout the past century, the 

U.S. military has steadfastly applied

Secretary Root’s Industrial Age philosophy 

toward strategic officer development. While 

the officer management system has been 

tweaked along the margins over the years, 

officers across all of the military services 

today continue to follow the same general 

path to the Pentagon’s E-ring as they did 

during General Marshall’s time. This 

developmental path includes short-term 

operational and staff assignments 

interspersed with periodic educational 

opportunities and episodic self-development 

initiatives. The figure (Figure 1) below 

Campaigning Spring 2016 20
highlights a “typical” Air Force officer career 

path today and is illustrative of the military’s 

general “train and develop” approach 

towards strategic officer development.22

 

 Figure 1.

Moreover, even though the 

illustration shows that today’s system offers 

limited opportunities for select officers to 

pursue broadening assignments outside the 

traditional military realm of studies, the 

current model generally recognizes (and 

rewards) sustained operational excellence as 

the “linchpin component of leader 

development.”23 Herein lays a widely 

recognized but rarely communicated military 

management truth: that despite the 

acknowledgment that our current/future 

operational and strategic leaders should 

possess a strong balance of Spartan martial 

prowess and broadening Athenian erudition, 

the journey to pursue this equilibrium can 

result in a terminal conclusion. A system that 

disproportionately rewards the former and 

either disregards or 

unofficially 

penalizes the latter, 

will undoubtedly 

serve as a blueprint 

for future career 

path decisions. This 

position reflects a 

similar opinion 

expressed in the 

mid- 19th century 

British Army officer 

General Charles 

George Gordon who 

opined, “The nation 

that will insist on 

drawing a broad line 

of demarcation 

between the fighting 

man and the 

thinking man is

liable to find its fighting done by fools and its 

thinking done by cowards.” 24

 Furthermore, under the current 

system, the primary means of identifying, 

tracking, assessing, and ultimately promoting 

officers to strategic leadership positions is 

based on a mass board process that 

expeditiously reviews an array of annual 

performance evaluation reports. These 

reports, in general, are assessed by senior 

raters who retroactively evaluate officers’ 

performance across broad categories, such as 

military bearing, mission accomplishment, 

Campaigning Spring 2016 21
and leadership abilities. Based on 

performance across these general categories, 

officers are then stratified against peers. 

Those who demonstrate the “highest” level 

performance are promoted after a fixed 

number of years-in-grade to positions of 

greater strategic responsibility. As an 

evaluation system that serves as the primary 

means to select future strategic leaders, its 

primary focus on performance provides an 

incomplete picture of the candidate pool, 

specifically by omitting key information 

related to key competencies and critical

attributes required at the next level of 

assignment. While this one-size fits all 

approach to officer performance evaluation, 

coupled with the century-old “train and 

develop” approach to officer assignments, 

has resulted in military success over the 

years, it may no longer be the most effective 

and efficient means to capture and leverage 

the strategic skill sets needed in the future.

Traditional Corporate Leader Assessment 

and Selection Approaches

In a talent management benchmark 

study designed to review how top companies 

assess their high-potentials and senior 

executives, executive assessment and 

development psychologists Church and 

Rotolo concluded that formal candidate 

assessments have become a widespread event 

in the corporate environment, both internal 

and external to individual organizations.25 As 

cited in Church and Rotolo, “assessments 

have become quite popular in practice, 

particularly in the talent management area. It 

is increasingly common, for example, for 

recruiting firms to use pre-employment 

assessments to aid in decision making for 

their clients.”26 Competition for talent has 

raised awareness and concern in many 

organizations about company’s ability to fill 

future gaps. The extant research and 

literature, specifically in the business 

environment, supports high correlations 

between job performance and natural 

ability/experience. Similar to the military, 

leaders at the senior middle management and 

senior executives must possess the skills and 

attributes required to deal with a volatile, 

uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) 

corporate landscape. While many of these 

organizations support promotion from within 

and spend time and energy on long-range 

succession plans, the military may be able to 

learn from its more capitalist-focused 

brethren when it comes to assessment and 

selection. As addressed in the introduction, 

the business world is not constrained by a 

finite internal population pool to draw from. 

As corporations seek to fill key positions, 

they have facilitated the creation of numerous 

tools, processes, and systems designed to 

ascertain levels of alignment between 

available, critical positions and myriad of 

internal and external applicants. 

One of the most widely used and 

accepted tools in the corporate world that 

could be leveraged in the joint military 

environment is the use of Assessment 

Centers. Ironically, this improved talent 

identification and development technique can 

trace its roots back to the military 

environment. Derived initially from methods 

that the Office of Strategic Services used to 

attract and recruit undercover agents in 

World War II, Assessment Centers use 

trained assessors to evaluate candidates’ 

behavior in a series of job-related 

Campaigning Spring 2016 22
simulations, cognitive/emotional/personality/behavioral measurement tests, 

interviews and other socio-metric devices.

27

This combination of assessment activities has 

been shown to accurately predict key 

positional performance and has reliable 

validity in the fairness of the selection 

methods.28 Although expensive to run, the 

Assessment Center method represents “one 

of the most advanced technologies of 

personnel psychology and form part of the 

‘best practice’ prescription both for efficient 

personnel management and as a means of 

protecting equal opportunities.”29

 Although there are a variety of types 

of Assessment Center, the traditional 

construct follows a fairly accepted pattern. 

Prior to assessing a pool of potential 

candidates, it begins with a thorough job 

analysis to derive specific assessment 

dimensions, capabilities, qualities and 

behaviors required for success in particular 

position. Once an acceptable word picture 

describing the KSAOs required for the 

position has been created and approved, a 

pool of potential internal and external 

candidates is invited to participate. The level 

and complexity of the targeted position, as 

well as the number of applicants, typically 

shape the length of the Assessment Center 

process, but in general, they last several days 

due to the intensity of the exercise 

evaluations. 

Although there is no official order of 

the events, the candidates typically begin by 

completing a battery of self-report tests to 

gauge intelligence, determine dominant 

personality traits, assess behavior decisions 

in simulated situations, and measure 

interpersonal communication styles (usually 

in the form of emotional intelligence 

questionnaires).30 Subsequent exercises 

assess candidates in a series of individual or 

group situational tests (e.g., personal 

interviews with a trained assessor; “in 

basket” tests designed to determine how 

candidates plan and prioritize information 

based on explicit or implied guidance;

individual presentations to assess confidence 

and communication skills; leaderless group 

discussions to gauge leadership potential and 

interpersonal acumen; and stress-induced 

role playing to measure empathy, risk-taking, 

and adaptability) to provide a holistic picture 

of each candidate across multiple scenarios 

and environments.

31 The overall assessment 

score of the candidate is usually derived by 

consensus of the panel of assessors. Resulting 

Assessment Center scores can serve multiple 

purposes. From an assessment and selection 

perspective, the scores can be aggregated to 

winnow the candidate pool to the top 

performers designated for follow-on personal 

interviews with key leadership. From a 

training and development perspective, the 

scores can serve as a counseling opportunity 

that captures each candidate’s profile of 

current or emerging strengths and challenges 

for future organizational- and/or selfdevelopment (i.e., the nature and sequence of 

future developmental activities). An 

additional strength of the Assessment Center 

method, is its ability to assess leadership 

potential from three key perspectives: 1) an 

assessment of the individual’s repertoire of 

leadership traits; 2) its ability to measure 

interpersonal aptitude under stressful 

conditions; and 3) an evaluation of critical 

Campaigning Spring 2016 23
thinking skills and behavioral reactions under 

a myriad of simulated situations.32 

Recommendations 

While Assessment Centers tend to 

rise to the top of assessment, selection, 

training, and development methods, it should 

be evident that there exists a wide assortment 

of tools and measures specifically designed 

to address concerns regarding finding the 

best person for the job, or in this case, how to 

fill the joint bench with the proper staff. For 

the purposes of this discussion, it remains just 

as important to recommend “when” these 

assessments are executed in addition to 

focusing on “what” types of measurements 

are used. When approached from this 

perspective, two primary options emerge – 

both with their own challenges and 

opportunities. The first option is to embed the 

assessment into the normal promotion 

schedule. There is an obvious danger to this 

association in which service members would 

equate competency assessment with 

promotion potential. On one hand, the 

services would not want to propagate a 

strategic message that in terms of perception, 

either penalizes or rewards officers’ 

assessment scores based on depth or breadth 

of current/future competency sets. On the 

other hand, as these leaders approach 

promotions designed to align them with the 

highest levels of command and leadership, 

one could argue that it makes extremely poor 

strategic sense to select personnel who lack 

particular strengths in key areas as they 

embark on their future roles. 

The second, and perhaps more 

palatable option, is to embed the assessments 

in the normal officer education system (e.g., 

pre-commissioning, basic branch, advanced 

courses, Command and General Staff 

College or equivalent, War College). This 

system is already in place and could create 

curriculum white space for the required 

assessments. The assessments would become 

Campaigning Spring 2016 24
more determinant as the officers progress 

further into their educational experience with 

the early assessments (O-1 through O-4) 

being more informational and developmental 

based, and the latter assessments (O-5 

through O-7) used as additional indicators for 

specific competency-positional requirement 

matching. An additional benefit to this 

approach allows for longitudinal mapping of 

competency strengths (or weaknesses 

requiring focus) over time – a critical 

developmental tool for leaders at all levels. 

Table 1 summarizes the leadership literature, 

current military doctrine, and timeline 

considerations that can potentially assist in 

updating our assessment and selection 

process.

Conclusion 

In a recent 2015 letter, Acting Under 

Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, Brad 

Carson, outlined several upcoming 

challenges and opportunities by describing 

the “Force of the Future: A Revolution in 

DOD’s Talent Management.”33 Secretary 

Carson highlighted that globalization and 

environmental complexity require a 

workforce with an incredibly diverse set of 

talent, skills, abilities and backgrounds. This 

challenge, in terms of both an evolving work 

context and the need for highly specialized 

and adaptive leaders, has made the realm of 

personnel and talent management 

“increasingly difficult to identify, attract, 

access and retain.”34 Concerned that the 

problem is likely to become even more acute 

in the coming years, he advocated a 

fundamental reform of an antiquated 

personnel system for military and civilians 

that has not experienced a significant change 

in 40 years. The traditional narrow slice of 

information upon which officer management 

and development decisions depends almost 

entirely on a “one size fits all” method, and 

although conducive to creating a population 

pool of similar looking, highly effective 

generalists, it does little to address the 

importance of selecting for targeted KSAOs 

required at the senior levels of leadership. 

The military process of ensuring our 

highest quality personnel are selected for the 

right positions - be it joint staff, large 

formation commanders, or top level 

leadership – is certainly not broken. The 

United States military continues to be at the 

forefront of world powers, of which our 

leadership at the highest levels is 

undoubtedly a key component. However, 

after reviewing the literature and taking an 

honest self-assessment on whether or not our 

services are using the best available means to 

make these determinations becomes 

questionable. With an organization of this 

size, individualism is commonly trumped by 

collective identity. Whether this is due to 

time, cost, or scope, our system is not 

designed to capture critical cognitive, 

interpersonal, behavioral, or strategic 

attributes of individual leaders. Indeed, the 

current evaluation system across the services 

focuses almost entirely on “Spartan” 

performance indicators, and rarely addresses 

the “Athenian” prowess that seems to align 

itself with the highest levels of leadership in 

both the military and corporate world. 

Perhaps the question we should be asking 

ourselves is, “Can we do better.” 

While the training and development 

approach is necessary for providing 

education and experience to leaders who

Campaigning Spring 2016 25
have yet to be exposed to a wide variety of 

complex situations requiring adaptive 

thinking and execution, the proverbial 

honeymoon is over when leaders begin to 

reach the senior mid- and executive level of 

leadership. This is not to say that learning 

does not continue to occur, especially in this 

increasingly VUCA environment; however, 

the increased levels of leadership are 

qualitatively more complex and necessarily 

require an enhanced repertoire of KSAOs. At 

these levels, the services need leaders that hit 

the ground running and can have an 

immediate impact on achieving desired 

strategic or national results. To use a sports 

metaphor, there is no more time for batting 

practice. The leaders in this line up are 

expected to step in (with the requisite tool kit 

of higher functioning leader competencies) 

and knock the next pitch out of the park. 

One of the greatest challenges facing 

the military’s Talent Management system is 

that we have fallen into a comfortable 

bureaucracy with regard to conventional 

paths of upward progression. As a traditional 

hierarchical organization, we have used a 

system of increasingly complex duty 

positions that expand in scope, authority, and 

responsibility as one progresses through the 

ranks. This makes obvious sense based on 

levels of maturity and experience typically 

possessed by leaders that can be applied to 

their duty position, and is supported by 

mountains of leadership literature. But while 

this perspective and accompanying research 

highlights the required attributes that are 

most useful at specific stages of leader 

position (i.e., span of control, time span of 

future visioning, cognitive/conceptual 

mapping, sense-making, interpersonal 

communication), it makes a fundamental 

assumption that these skills and 

competencies are natural by-products of the 

wisdom gained through age and experience. 

The current process does not fully explore 

early potential or the possibility that there 

may be junior members of the 

team/organization that already possess a 

multitude of these desired skills sets. Nor 

does it suggest that matching competencies 

with positions early in one’s career cycle 

could leverage, maximize, and even 

encourage further focused development in 

these select areas to achieve desired 

organizational efficiency and effectiveness. 

In its purest essence, this current/potential 

matching is exactly what “talent 

management” is supposed to do. 

The proposals offered are far from 

capturing the numerous best practices 

available to align the right leader (defined by 

possessing the requisite skills, attributes, and 

competencies) with a specific, targeted 

position. This essay represents an active 

approach to identifying and leveraging talent 

for both job performance success and 

building a bench of high potentials for 

succession planning. The military’s current 

method relies more on performing well in a 

series of progressively complex assignments, 

which in theory is both logical and effective, 

but is more attuned to the collective talent 

management as opposed to a more focused 

individualized approach. Instituting an 

Assessment Center approach to the military 

career progression is not a panacea for 

addressing leadership concerns; however, 

like both Secretary Carson and General 

Marshall, the system we use to assess, select, 

train, and develop must at least evolve at a 

Campaigning Spring 2016 26
rate similar to the increasingly VUCA 

environment in which we expect these 

critical leaders to operate. 

Author Biographies 

Lieutenant Colonel Eric Weis, USA, is currently 

serving as the Deputy Director of the Simon Center for 

the Professional Military Ethic at the United States 

Military Academy and Course Director of the 

Academy’s capstone course on Officership. He was 

commissioned through ROTC at James Madison 

University in 1992. LTC Weis earned a BS in 

Psychology from James Madison University in 1992, 

a MS in Social Psychology from the Pennsylvania 

State University in 2003, and a PhD in Organizational 

Psychology from George Mason University in 2012. 

Prior to completing his PhD, LTC Weis served as the 

Regimental Executive Officer for the President’s 

Escort, the 3rd Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard), at 

Fort Myer, Virginia.

Colonel Laura Lenderman, USAF, is currently serving 

as the Analysis Branch Chief, Program and Budget 

Analysis Division (J-8) in the Pentagon. She was 

commissioned through ROTC at Duke University in 

1993. Col Lenderman earned a BS in Electrical 

Engineering from Duke University in 1993, a MA in 

Organizational Management from George 

Washington University in 2000, a MA in Military 

Operational Art and Science from Air University in 

2006, and a MA in Airpower Art and Science from Air 

University in 2007. Prior to her current assignment, 

Col Lenderman served as the Vice Wing Commander 

at the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing at Al Dhafra Air 

Base, United Arab Emirates.

Colonel Paula A. Hamilton, USAF, is currently 

serving as the Director of Programs and Evaluations 

(J82) at NORAD USNORTHCOM, Peterson AFB, 

Colorado Springs, Colorado. She was commissioned 

through OTS at Medina Annex, Lackland AFB, Texas 

in 1991. Col Hamilton holds an Associates Degree in 

Avionics Technology from Community College of the 

Air Force, a BS in Electronics Management from 

Southern Illinois University, and a Masters Degree in 

Aeronautical Science from Embry Riddle 

Aeronautical University. Prior to her current 

assignment, Col Hamilton served as Air Force 

Operational Test and Evaluation Center’s liaison to the 

Space and Missile Center, Los Angeles AFB, 

California. 

______________________

1. Hall, D.T. (2002). Careers in and Out of

Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Publications, Inc., p. 161. As cited in Colorusso,

M.J. & Lyle, D.S. (2013). United States Army

Senior Officer Talent Management: Fostering

Adaptable Interchange. U.S. Army Office of

Economic and Manpower Analysis, West Point,

NY.

2. Ibid.

3. Jacobs, T. O. & Jaques, E. (1987). Leadership in

complex systems. In J. Zeidner (Ed.), Human

productivity enhancement. Ney York: Praeger.

4. Chen, Z., Lam, W., & Zhong, J. A. (2007). Leadermember exchange and member performance: A 

new look at individual-level negative feedbackseeking behavior and team-level empowerment 

climate. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 202-

212.

5. Jacobs, T. O. & Jaques, E. (1990). Military

executive leadership. In K. E. Clark & M. B. Clark

(Eds.), Measures of leadership (pp. 281-295).

Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership;

Mumford, M. D., Campion, M. A. & Morgeson, F.

P. (2007). The Leader Strataplex: Leadership skill

requirements across Organizational Levels.

Leadership Quarterly, 18, pp. 154-166.

6. Boal, K. B. & Hooijberg, R. (2000). Strategic

leadership research: Moving on. Leadership

Quarterly, 11, pp. 515-549.

7. Jacobs, T. O. & Jaques, E. (1990). Mumford et al.

(2007).

8. Judge, T.A. & Piccolo, R. F. (2004).

Transformational and transactional leadership: A 

meta-analytic test of their relative validity. Journal 

of Applied Psychology, 89, pp. 755-768; Katz & 

Kahn, (1978). 

9. Bass, B. M. & Avolio, B.J. (1993).

Transformational leadership and organizational 

culture. Public Administration Quarterly, 17, pp. 

112-122.

10. Jacob, T. O. & Jaques, E. (1990).

11. Mumford, Campion, Morgenson, (2007).

12. Headquarters, Department of the Army (AUG

2012). ADRP 6-22 – Army Leadership. 

Washington, DC.

13. See Hitt & Tyler (1991). Peterson, R. S., Smith, D.

B., Martorana, P. V., & Owens, P. D. (2003). The

impact of chief executive officer personality on top

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management team dynamics: One mechanism by 

which leadership affects organizational 

performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 

88(5), pp. 795-808. Mumford, T.V., Campion, 

M.A. & Morgeson, F.P. (2007). 

14.Wojack, A. (2014). Is Experience the Missing Link

in Junior Officer Development? Military Review, 

March-April 2014, p. 33.

15. World Wide Web. German General Staff,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_General_St

aff, accessed 20 May 2015.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Wojack, A. (2014), p.33.

19. World Wide Web. “Elihu Root,”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elihu_Root, 

accessed 20 May 2015.

20. Coumbe, A.T. (2014). A History of the U.S. Army

Officer Corps, 1900-1990. Strategic Studies 

Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 

September 2014, p. 36.

21. Idid.

22. Department of the Air Force (2008). Air Force

Instruction 36-2640, Executing Total Force

Development. p. 33.

23. Department of the Army (2010). DPAM 600-3,

Commissioned Officer Professional Development

and Career Management. http://www.careersatisfaction.army.

mil/resources/pdfs/DA%20Pamphlet%20600-

3_Commissioned_Officer_Professional_

Development_and_Career_ Management.pdf,

accessed 30 May 2015.

24. Butler, W.F. (1891). Charles George Gordon.

MacMillan and Company. United Kingdom, p.

85.

25. Church, A.H. & Rotolo, C.T. (2013). How are Top

Companies Assessing Their High-Potentials and 

Senior Executives? A Talent Management 

Benchmark Study. Consulting Psychology 

Journal: Practice and Research, 65(3), pp. 199-

223

26. Ibid, p. 203; Stamoulis, D. (2009). Senior

executive assessment: A key to responsible

corporate governance. Chichester, West Sussex,

United Kingdom: Wiley, Ltd.

27. American Psychological Association (2015).

Assessment Centers help companies identify

future managers.

http://www.apa.org/research/action/managers.asp

x, accessed 25 July 2015.

28. Melchers, K.G. & Annon, H. (2010). Officer

Selection of Swiss Armed Forces: Evaluation of

Validity and Fairness Issues. University Swiss

Journal of Psychology, 69(2), pp. 105–115.

29. Newton, T.J. (1994). Discourse and Agency: The

Example of Personnel Psychology and

Assessment Centers, Organization Studies, pg.

879.

30. Thornton, G. C., III. (1992). Assessment centers in

human resource management. Reading, MA: 

Addison-Wesley. Tziner, A. (1982). Validity of 

an Assessment Center for identifying future 

female officers in the military. Journal of Applied 

Psychology, 67(6), pp. 728-736.

31. Spychalski, A. C., Quiñones, M. A., Gaugler, B.

B., & Pohley, K. (1997). A survey of assessment

center practices in organizations in the United

States. Personnel Psychology, Vol. 50, pp. 71-90.

32. Gowing, M.K., Morris, D.M., Adler, S., & Gold,

M. (2008). The Next Generation of Leadership

Assessments: Some Case Studies, Public

Personnel Management, 37(4), pp. 435-455.

33. Carson, B.R. (20 April 2015). Force of the Future:

A Revolution in DoDs Talent Management

Memorandum.

34. Ibid, p. 1.

Table 1 References (not included in Endnotes)

Bass, B. M. (1985). Leadership and performance 

beyond expectations. New York: Free Press.

Bass, B. M. (1996). A new paradigm of leadership: An 

inquiry into transformational leadership. Alexandria, 

VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavior 

and Social Sciences.

Katz, D. & Kahn, R.L. (1966). The social psychology 

of organizations. Wiley,

New York. 

Zaccaro, S. J. (2001). The nature of executive 

leadership: A conceptual and empirical analysis 

 of success. Washington, DC: American 

Psychological Association.

Campaigning Spring 2016 28
Where Are the Cops? 

Addressing the Missing Focus of U.S. 

Counterterrorism Efforts Abroad

By 

Lt Col M. Honoré Spencer, USAF, Col Gene 

Hughes, ANG, and LtCol Cesar Rodriguez, USMC

Why We Need to Develop Foreign Police

Despite nearly 14 years of concerted 

effort, the United States continues to battle Al 

Qaeda affiliates in countries throughout the 

Middle East, as well as Pakistan and Somalia. 

None of these groups have been eliminated or 

even degraded to the point that would allow 

U.S. counterterrorism (CT) operations to 

substantially decrease.1 Al Qaeda elements 

continue to be the primary CT focus of the 

United States because of their stated 

intentions to continue to attack Western 

interests.

2 President Obama specifically 

took aim at the Al Qaeda spin-off group, the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 

when he publicly commented that the United 

States will “ultimately destroy” the group, an 

accomplishment the United States has yet to 

achieve against any of the Islamic extremist 

terror organizations it has pursued since 9-

11.3

 In contrast, from 2010-2014 the number 

of radical Islamic groups has increased 58 

percent, and extremist fighters have more 

than doubled. Furthermore, the number of 

attacks by al-Qaeda affiliate groups increased 

nine-fold from 2007-2013.4 Terrorist group 

motivations have not subsided. According to 

the Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency, groups such as ISIL continue to 

espouse ambitious external goals, including 

“the expansion of the caliphate into the 

Arabian Peninsula and North Africa and 

attacks against Western, regional, and Shia 

interests.” 5 

In recent decades, U.S. CT efforts

have focused heavily on military solutions to 

combating terrorist networks, with 

significantly less attention paid to improving 

policing capabilities worldwide. However, 

numerous CT and counterinsurgency experts 

argue that policing and intelligence have the 

greatest impact on defeating terrorist 

networks.6 Historical evidence has proven 

policing to be the most effective approach to 

destroying terrorist groups. According to a 

40-year RAND study, since 1968, 40% of 

terrorist groups that have ended were 

defeated as a result of policing, while only 

7% were defeated as a result of military 

force.

7

 Additionally, significant decreases in 

rule of law, in particular due to weak local 

policing and enforcement, have been directly 

correlated with a marked increase in Salafistjihadist groups operating in the Middle East 

and North Africa.8 

Because modern terrorist networks 

are organized in loose, decentralized 

hierarchies, “direct-action” approaches to 

decapitating terrorist leadership have limited 

long-term impact on their own. However, 

terrorist networks are quite vulnerable to 

penetration and exploitation by indigenous 

police working in the communities where the 

groups operate. Furthermore, effective 

community policing provides the means to 

gain critical intelligence from the local 

populace on terrorist group activity and 

membership. Good police work and 

community involvement are at the heart of 

defeating terrorist organizations. Despite 

evidence emphasizing the impact effective 

policing has on combating terrorist groups, 

U.S. and international efforts to integrate 

Campaigning Spring 2016 29
indigenous policing into a comprehensive CT 

plan have been haphazard and ad hoc. 

Some U.S. national guidance notes 

the importance of building foreign law 

enforcement capabilities. The 2006 National 

Strategy for Combating Terrorism 

specifically stressed “building the capacity of 

foreign partners in all areas of 

counterterrorism activities, including 

strengthening their ability to conduct law 

enforcement, intelligence, and military 

counterterrorism operations,”9 while the 

current 2011 National Strategy emphasizes

“the need to build foreign partnerships and 

capacity and to strengthen our resilience.”10 

The National Security Council further 

emphasized the U.S. commitment to help 

build our partner’s organic security capacity: 

“For nations that have the will to fulfill their 

international law enforcement commitments 

but lack the necessary means, the United 

States is committed to partnering with them 

to develop stronger law enforcement and

criminal justice institutions necessary for 

ensuring the rule of law.”11 

Unfortunately, national strategy and 

guidance have not been translated into 

coordinated action by United States 

Government (USG) agencies. USG efforts to 

develop foreign law enforcement capabilities 

in at-risk nations have been wholly 

fragmented and uncoordinated. If defeating 

transnational terrorist groups is truly a top 

national security priority, and developing 

effective law enforcement abroad is a 

supported and proven approach to counter 

these groups, the United States must 

significantly improve its focus and 

coordination with regard to police 

development. 

What’s Impeding Effective Police 

Development Abroad? 

Lack of an Integrating Coordination 

Mechanism and Strategy

Depending on the environment, 

personnel ranging from municipal police 

officers to special operations forces may be 

the most appropriate personnel to assist

indigenous police forces in improving CT

capabilities. Personnel and resources would 

likely come from various organizations, 

partly based on political or legal restraints 

associated with the given environment. 

Remarkably, there are approximately 20 

different USG organizations and associated 

programs across six agencies involved in 

assisting foreign law enforcement. These 

organizations and programs are found in, but 

not limited to, the Departments of State 

(DoS), Defense (DoD), Justice (DoJ), 

Homeland Security (DHS), Treasury 

(TREAS), and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID). Police

development programs range from DoS’s 

Civilian Police (CIVPOL) program, 

providing contracted police advisers to assist 

foreign governments, to DHS’s Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) 

offering specialized training to international 

law enforcement officers.

12 Unfortunately, 

the efforts of the numerous U.S. 

organizations are not coordinated and lack an 

integrated strategy. 

A 2007 Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) report showed extensive 

deficiencies in the ability of U.S. law 

enforcement agencies (LEAs) to assist 

foreign countries in disrupting and 

prosecuting terrorist groups. The GAO 

report illustrated that LEA efforts were 

Campaigning Spring 2016 30
significantly hindered by a lack of clear roles 

and responsibilities, funding priorities 

guidance, performance measurement 

systems, and assessments of countries’ CT 

needs.13 A later 2012 GAO report further 

highlighted that while some higher-level 

coordination of police assistance policies has 

taken place, the U.S. government still has not 

defined agencies’ roles and responsibilities to 

assist foreign police and agencies do not 

consistently share information to assess 

capabilities.14 

The Department of State has lead 

roles in coordinating CT strategy and police 

assistance abroad. The DoS Office of the 

Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is 

responsible for coordinating the development 

of USG strategies to counter terrorism 

abroad,15 while the DoS Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affair normally has the lead 

role for providing police assistance abroad.16 

Unfortunately, DoS alone lacks the resources 

and commensurate authority to effectively 

coordinate assistance and prioritize the 

efforts of other departments. DoS also has a 

considerable array of responsibilities that 

dilute its ability to coordinate actions across 

a large number of disparate USG 

organizations. While many would still argue 

that DoS is the most appropriate agency to act 

in a lead role for USG unity of effort, a 

consistent, interagency coordination 

mechanism is needed to bring the many 

organizations together and coordinate their 

actions utilizing a synchronized approach. 

 Overall, the lack of an effective 

coordinating mechanism to synchronize USG 

efforts and the lack of key national strategy 

elements have contributed to significant 

deficiencies in police assistance programs. 

Unfortunately, this has created an 

interagency system obstructed by 

Departments’ parochial agendas and strongly 

reliant on informal relationships developed 

between agencies. 

 

Legislative Prohibition on Training Foreign 

Police Forces 

Section 660, an amendment to the 

Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, 

prohibits the use of U.S. assistance funds to 

advise, train, or offer financial support to 

foreign police force. This amendment was

passed in 1973 and was designed to prevent 

the USG from supporting and training the 

foreign police forces of repressive regimes, 

particularly those that commit human rights 

abuses. Prior to this legislation, there existed 

an overall lack of effective policy guidance 

with respect to the training of foreign police 

forces. This led to significant training of 

foreign government police forces, but little 

accountability for its long-term impacts.17 

Despite Section 660’s blanket 

prohibitions, over time, numerous exceptions 

to the amendment were implemented for 

select USG organizations to conduct training 

in various post-conflict environments and for 

other specified purposes. These exceptions 

have been granted on a case-by-case basis 

and provide for specific limits to the training 

provided to foreign police forces. Although 

these exceptions have been helpful in 

creating pathways for training foreign police 

forces, the issuance of piecemeal exceptions 

to Section 660 has created a fragmented 

governmental approach to providing 

effective CT training and assistance to 

foreign police forces. We must do better. 

Campaigning Spring 2016 31
How to Enhance Foreign Police Assistance 

To effectively develop foreign police 

to combat terrorist groups, the U.S. 

government must address key legislative 

hurdles and interagency deficiencies. To be 

successful, multiple USG departments must 

coordinate and prioritize the multiple forms 

of support that they can provide. Police 

development must also be a central part of a 

long-term strategy in which USG support 

continues for an extended time while target 

nations’ capabilities incrementally improve. 

The following proposals seek to address 

these key aspects of developing foreign 

police capabilities. 

Rescind Section 660 of the Foreign 

Assistance Act

Section 660 has created a fractured 

system for training and assisting foreign 

police forces to combat transnational terrorist 

groups. Before Section 660 was 

implemented, the Office of Public Safety

(OPS) coordinated the training of thousands 

of police officers worldwide in the 1960s, at 

that time to contain the spread of 

communism. After human rights abuses 

were committed by personnel trained by 

OPS, Congress summarily disbanded OPS, 

creating a disjointed “diaspora” of agencies 

and funding streams to conduct foreign 

police training activities.

18 While assistance 

can be provided by agencies to assist foreign 

police in narrowly defined areas based on 

various exemptions, the patchwork of 

restrictions has made training inconsistent 

and ill-managed. 

Authority for agencies to provide 

assistance to police is somewhat restrictive. 

While limited, DoS and DoD have been the 

top providers of assistance for training 

foreign police.19 Authority for DoD to 

provide police assistance is generally 

restricted to police combating narcotics 

trafficking, and for areas authorized by 

Presidential directive, such as building police 

in Afghanistan.20 These types of legislative 

restrictions prevent or dissuade many USG 

agencies from providing police assistance 

strategically or in a holistic manner, even 

though history proves terrorist organizations 

are best defeated through effective policing. 

While the main impetus for Section 660 

restrictions was to prevent human rights 

abuses, other safeguards exist, such as the 

Leahy Amendment which prohibits security 

assistance to countries that commit human 

rights abuses.21 Additionally, the DoS 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor coordinates with U.S. missions abroad 

to ensure that nations with officials 

committing human rights abuses or corrupt 

practices are not provided assistance.22 

Hence, oversight and guidelines are already

in place to prevent assistance from being 

given to nations committing human rights 

abuses, which, ironically, negates the overall 

purpose of Section 660. 

Congress should rescind the 

legislative prohibition on training foreign 

police forces to remove the patchwork of 

restrictions and exemptions hampering 

effective police assistance and coordination. 

This change would make many more USG 

resources available to develop foreign police 

forces to combat terrorist groups. Various 

DoD forces, such as military police and

Special Operations Forces, could be 

employed and coordinated to provide training 

in appropriate areas such as patrol/checkpoint 

Campaigning Spring 2016 32
operations, weapons and equipment use, 

small unit tactics, and other skills critical for 

an effective CT force. More importantly, the 

resources of numerous USG agencies with 

specialized expertise in law enforcement 

could be better planned and organized 

without the legislative and administrative 

hurdles which dissuade their use and 

coordination. The multiple instruments of 

power from various agencies could be 

employed more synergistically, taking 

advantage of key capabilities within each 

agency, such as DoJ’s capability to enhance 

critical community policing and criminal 

investigative procedures and DoD’s ability to 

deploy and train forces in poor security 

environments.23 Rescinding Section 660 

would pave the way for improving

interagency focus and coordination on 

developing foreign police, while still 

maintaining established processes to prevent 

human rights abuses. 

Establish a Foreign Police Assistance and 

Coordination (FPAC) Sub-Interagency 

Policy Committee (IPC) 

The coordination, oversight, and 

assessment of CT assistance programs for 

police are critical to developing effective 

police capabilities abroad. Interagency 

coordination must take place at the strategic 

level to ensure appropriate departmental 

resources are matched to specific countries’ 

needs and to ensure capabilities are 

developed consistent with a long-term 

strategy. A specifically chartered 

interagency coordination mechanism should 

be established to address this issue. 

The National Security Council (NSC) 

and its subordinate committees are the 

“principle means for coordinating, 

developing, and implementing national 

security policy.”24 The subordinate 

committees to the NSC include the 

Principal’s Committees (PC), Deputies 

Committees (DC), Interagency Policy 

Committees (IPC), and Sub-IPCs. These 

committees serve to analyze and prepare key 

issues at varying levels for potential highlevel deliberation and decision. Historically, 

IPCs and sub-IPCs have served as the main 

forums for interagency coordination through 

policy development, analysis, and resource 

determination.25 

One key IPC, the Security Sector 

Assistance IPC, was established in 2009 to 

provide a forum to review security assistance 

policy, roles, and authorities. This IPC 

would serve as an ideal interagency 

coordination mechanism that has already 

been formed to ensure appropriate 

development of foreign security sector 

capabilities. Unfortunately, the IPC has

historically been underutilized and has not 

met on a regular basis due to reported 

workload and turnover issues faced by the 

National Security Staff (NSS). 26 Given the 

importance of building effective foreign 

security forces to combat terrorist groups 

abroad, the NSS should establish regular, 

consistent meetings of the Security Sector 

Assistance IPC by interagency players. The 

establishment of clear roles and 

responsibilities for all agencies should be at 

the top of the agenda for the IPC. 

Additionally, the IPC should serve as an 

interagency forum to coordinate 

development and sector reform in security 

Campaigning Spring 2016 33
elements to include foreign military, police, 

and judiciary capabilities. 

Subordinate to the IPC, a Foreign 

Police Assistance and Coordination (FPAC) 

Sub-IPC should be established to specifically 

address the crucial role of coordinating 

foreign police assistance to combat terrorism 

and other key security issues abroad. The

proposed FPAC Sub-IPC would act as the 

strategic-level coordination mechanism to 

ensure that police assistance programs and 

activities are effectively synchronized to 

meet national strategy objectives, address

partner nation needs, and optimize the use of 

U.S. and international resources. The FPAC 

Sub-IPC would be responsible for setting 

partner nation assistance priorities, 

designating departmental roles and 

responsibilities, monitoring funding, and 

assessing the effectiveness of assistance. 

Properly fulfilling 

these responsibilities 

would lead to

coordinated actions 

by the departments to 

fulfill national 

strategy/guidance and 

address the main 

factors that impede 

effective interagency 

coordination. 

 

Representation in the 

FPAC Sub-IPC 

should include all 

departments/agencies 

that provide foreign 

police assistance, to 

include DoS, DoD, 

DoJ, DHS, TREAS,

and USAID. Additionally, the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) should have 

representation to assist in monitoring agency 

fund use. DoS would be best suited to serve 

as the chair of the Sub-IPC, primarily since 

the lead role in providing police assistance 

abroad has DoS would be best suited to serve 

as the chair of the Sub-IPC, primarily since 

the lead role in providing police assistance 

abroad has normally been delegated to DoS 

through the Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs. However, 

based on limited capabilities within DoS to 

manage interagency coordination, assistance 

may be needed from other key departments 

such as DoD and DoJ. Within the DoD, the 

most appropriate lead coordinator would be 

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict, which provides guidance 

Organizational Diagram of proposed FPAC Sub-IPC

Figure 1.

International Police 

Assistance Organizations

United Nations Police 

(UNPOL) 

International Criminal 

Police Organization 

(INTERPOL)

International Police 

Training Institute (IPTI) 

International Association of 

Chiefs of Police (IACP)

Partner Nation Police 

Assistance Programs

Foreign Police Assistance and 

Coordination (FPAC) Sub-IPC

Security Sector Assistance 

Interagency Policy Committee 

(IPC)

Deputies Committee (DC)

Principals Committee (PC)

National Security Council (NSC)

Interagency Representation in FPAC Sub-IPC

DoS DoD DoJ DHS TREA USAI OMB

Coord

Campaigning Spring 2016 34
for developing U.S. military capabilities to 

conduct security sector reform activities. 

To enhance police assistance 

coordination internationally, the proposed 

FPAC Sub-IPC would also communicate and 

coordinate with international police 

assistance organizations to include the 

International Criminal Police Organization 

(INTERPOL), United Nations Police 

(UNPOL), International Police Training 

Institute (IPTI), and International 

Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). 

Improved U.S. coordination with these 

international organizations and with partner 

nations possessing well-established police 

assistance programs would greatly enhance 

international capability to leverage resources 

to improve police development in at-risk 

countries. The Sub-IPC could then serve as a 

centralized focal point for strategic 

collaboration and role delineation with 

international organizations and partners 

abroad. The following figure provides an 

organizational chart of the proposed FPAC 

Sub-IPC within the structure of the NSC.

Implement Re-Focused and Coordinated 

USG Strategy for Security Development

Given today’s fiscally and resourced 

constrained environment, it is foolish to 

believe “the United States alone [can] 

eliminate every terrorist or terrorist 

organization that threatens our safety, 

security, or interests.”27 It is imperative that 

we leverage key partners to share our 

common security burdens. Although history 

is replete with examples of counterinsurgency strategies, one that may be 

particularly applicable to combating 

transnational terrorist groups is the oil spot 

strategy. Traditionally, an oil spot strategy 

entails a method of countering insurgency 

and terrorism through the provision of 

effective security and stability in selected key 

areas. Once security and stability is 

established in these key locations, it would be 

methodically and continually expanded 

outwards to neighboring areas; much as an oil 

spot expands outward in porous material.28 

An excellent historical example of the use of 

the oil spot strategy was during the British 

Malayan Emergency (1948-1957) in which 

communist terrorists waged a violent revolt 

against the Malayan government. In 

response, British forces trained indigenous 

security forces and created “oil spots of 

security” through the newly established, and 

well-policed, New Villages. This tactic 

proved especially effective at isolating 

communist terrorists from the populace; their 

source of power. Over time, the 

terrorists/insurgents were weakened and 

eventually defeated. A stable, democratic 

government in Malaya soon followed.29 

Our Malayan Emergency example 

illustrates the effective use of the oil spot 

strategy in context of a single country; 

however, if properly applied, this strategy 

can be equally useful to combat transnational 

terrorist networks regionally and globally. 

Terrorist groups thrive in areas where the 

absence of state control creates safe havens 

and permits terrorists to travel, train, and 

engage in plotting.

30 Thus, a comprehensive 

global oil spot strategy focused on CT 

assistance within strategically selected 

countries, can be the impetus for overall 

regional and global security development. 

As physical security and policing improves in 

a selected country, information sharing 

increases fostering CT intelligence 

Campaigning Spring 2016 35
improvements. This ultimately leads to an 

increased capability to disrupt terrorist 

activities in adjacent areas, thereby allowing 

security to spread as a drop of oil does on 

cloth. 

Central to the success of this strategy 

would be a measured increase in USG focus 

on police assistance, improved coordination 

of police assistance provided by the multiple 

agencies, and synchronization of police 

assistance with other forms of security force 

assistance, both within the USG and with 

other supporting nations. Additionally, with 

numerous resource constraints, the United 

States cannot plan to build security 

capabilities everywhere at the same time. 

Prioritization and continued commitment to 

strategic areas/locations will be critical to the 

long-term success of a global oil spot 

strategy. The Security Sector Assistance IPC 

and FPAC Sub-IPC would serve as excellent 

forums for optimizing the allocation of 

limited USG resources and focusing security 

assistance against key qualified countries, 

utilizing a long-term strategic approach. 

Additionally, these strategic-level 

coordination mechanisms could synchronize 

assistance with international organizations 

and regional partners to avoid duplication of 

effort and best match resources to associated 

assistance goals. 

Valuable to this strategy at the 

country-level would be the placement of 

“Coordinators for Combating Terrorism” in 

embassy country teams. These coordinators 

would aid in improving interagency 

coordination and facilitate developing 

internal security forces in key partner 

nations.31 Additionally, these coordinators 

would enhance in-country agency 

coordination and assist in CT and security 

force capabilities assessment. Coordinators 

would work closely with embassy security 

assistance officers to optimize CT assistance 

programs being employed in-country and 

assess the effectiveness of these programs. 

They would prove invaluable when working 

in conjunction with legal and defense 

attachés to develop close ties with law 

enforcement and military intelligence 

officials, while also fostering and developing

relationships for information sharing. CT 

coordinators could also work directly with 

international organizations, such as the 

INTERPOL, to enhance information sharing. 

Essentially, CT coordinators would serve to 

1) ensure security is improving in the key 

selected countries and their surrounding 

neighbors (i.e., the oil spots are established 

and expanding); and 2) ensure information is 

being shared to better combat local and 

regional terrorist groups. 

Through the systematic development 

of effective security organizations in selected 

key countries, key partner agencies 

coordinated through the FPAC Sub-IPC and 

international organizations would help to 

develop “oil spots” of effective local security 

across the region and globe. With continued 

effective assistance these security spots 

would stabilize and expand improving 

security to larger areas. The improved 

security environment would thus set the 

conditions for the selected redirection of 

additional U.S. and international resources to 

improve other areas such as economic 

development and social well-being. To be 

clear, the most effective long-run strategy 

must include a comprehensive approach 

using all the instruments of national power. 

Security force development efforts should be 

combined with parallel efforts by U.S. and 

Campaigning Spring 2016 36
international agencies to improve civil 

institutions and economic opportunity in atrisk nations to address the root drivers of 

terrorism derived from social, political, and 

economic inequalities. As part of a longterm, multi-faceted approach, an oil spot 

strategy for development could be central to 

neutralizing many transnational terrorist 

groups at the state, regional, and eventually 

global level over time. 

Conclusion 

From a global perspective, U.S. CT 

efforts abroad have been unsuccessful at 

defeating the most dangerous terrorist groups 

that threaten our national interests. 

Unfortunately, military-centric approaches to 

CT operations and partner nation 

development have not been effective over the 

long-term in destroying these resilient 

groups. Years of historical evidence have

shown that effective policing has the greatest 

impact on rooting out terrorist groups. 

Unfortunately, antiquated U.S. legislation 

and ineffective interagency coordination 

have shackled the U.S. government’s ability 

to develop foreign nations’ police 

capabilities.

If the United States is to be successful 

at vitiating the global threat posed by 

extremist groups, it must change the 

development paradigm and reprioritize its 

effort on building localized and connected 

policing capabilities abroad. Rescinding 

legislation prohibiting the training of foreign 

police forces, establishing a strategic-level 

Foreign Police Assistance and Coordination 

Sub-IPC to coordinate interagency and 

international police assistance, and applying 

a global oil spot strategy for comprehensive 

and enduring security force development will 

greatly enhance partner nations’ capabilities 

to combat transnational terrorist groups in 

their own countries. Only with a long-term, 

refocused approach to development, 

synchronized between our own agencies and 

with our international partners, can the 

United States hope to find success at 

eventually vanquishing an extremely resilient 

global threat. 

Author Biographies 

Colonel Gene W. Hughes, Jr., ANG, is currently 

serving as Senior Executive to the Director Air 

National Guard, at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He 

was commissioned through USAF OTS in 1988. Col 

Hughes earned a BS in Physics from Centre College 

of Kentucky in 1987 and an MS in Management from 

Florida State University in 1992. Prior to his current 

assignment, Col Hughes served as Mission Support 

Group Commander at the 178th Wing, Springfield, 

OH.

Lieutenant Colonel Cesar Rodriguez, USMC, is 

currently serving as the Deputy Chief of Combined 

Plans, Combined Forces Command/United States 

Forces Korea in Seoul, The Republic of Korea. He 

was commissioned through the Naval ROTC at the 

University of Texas at Austin in 1995. LtCol 

Rodriguez earned a BA in Economics from the 

University of Texas at Austin in 1995 and a MA in 

Policy Economics from Tulane University in New 

Orleans, Louisiana in 2007. Prior to his current 

assignment, LtCol Rodriguez served as the InspectorInstructor, 2d Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment.

Lieutenant Colonel M. Honoré Spencer, USAF, is 

currently serving as Deputy Division Chief, Joint Staff 

Intelligence Operations, Plans, and Policy (J25-5), at 

the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He was 

commissioned through the United States Air Force 

Academy in 1996. Lt Col Spencer earned a BS in 

Mechanical Engineering from the Air Force Academy 

in 1996, an MS in Mechanical Engineering from the 

University of Maryland-College Park in 1998, and a 

Doctor of Education in Organizational Leadership 

from Nova Southeastern University in 2013. Prior to 

Campaigning Spring 2016 37
his current assignment, Lt Col Spencer served as 

Professor of Aerospace Studies and Commander of 

1 Greg Miller and Craig Whitlock, “U.S. weakens alQaeda groups around the world but hasn’t wiped any 

out,” Washington Post, September 11, 2014, 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-weakens-al-qaeda-groups-around-theworld-but-hasnt-wiped-anyout/2014/09/11/3c28d626-39bb-11e4-8601-

97ba88884ffd_story.html. 2 The White House, National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism, (June 2011), 14. 3 Greg Miller and Craig Whitlock, “U.S. weakens alQaeda groups around the world but hasn’t wiped any 

out,” Washington Post, September 11, 2014, 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-weakens-al-qaeda-groups-around-theworld-but-hasnt-wiped-anyout/2014/09/11/3c28d626-39bb-11e4-8601-

97ba88884ffd_story.html.

4 Seth Jones, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al 

Qa’ida and other Salafi Jihadists, (Santa Monica: 

RAND Corporation, 2014), 35, 

http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR637.ht

ml.

5 James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record - 

Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. 

Intelligence Community,” Senate Armed Services 

Committee, (February 26, 2015), 14, 

http://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clapper_02-26-

15.pdf.

6 See Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How 

Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al 

Qa'ida, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 

125; Mark Sageman, Understanding Terror 

Networks, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 

Press, 2004), 175; Thomas Dempsey, 

Counterterrorism in African Failed States: 

Challenges and Potential Solutions, (Carlisle: 

Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 27. 7 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist 

Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida,

(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 19. 8 Seth Jones, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al 

Qa’ida and other Salafi Jihadists, (Santa Monica: 

RAND Corporation, 2014), 44, 

http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR637.ht

ml.

9 The White House, National Strategy for Combating 

Terrorism, (September 2006), 19. 10 The White House, National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism, (June 2011), 1.

AFROTC Detachment 85 at the University of 

California-Berkeley.

11 National Security Staff, Build International 

Capacity, Cooperation, and Partnerships, 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/t

ransnational-crime/partnerships. 12 Michael Kraft and Edward Marks, U.S. 

Government Counterterrorism: A Guide To Who 

Does What, (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2011), 76-87. 13 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “GAO 

07-697 Combating Terrorism - Law Enforcement 

Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations 

to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists,” (May 

2007), 21, 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07697.pdf.

14 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “GAO 

12-534 Foreign Police Assistance - Defined Roles 

and Improved Information Sharing Could Enhance 

Interagency Collaboration,” (May 2012), 

http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590747.pdf. 15 United States Department of State, Office of the 

Coordinator for Counterterrorism,

http://www.state.gov/s/ct. 16 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-24 

Counterinsurgency, (November 2013), B-4, 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf.

17 U.S. General Accounting Office – National 

Security and International Affairs Division, 

"GAO/NSIAD-92-118 Foreign Aid: Police Training 

and Assistance," (March 1992), 1-2, 

http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat7/145909.pdf. 18 James Saulino, “Fix the Foreign Police Training

Diaspora,” Stimson Center, (August 12, 2008), 

http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/fix-the-foreignpolice-training-diaspora/.

19 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “GAO 

12-534 Foreign Police Assistance - Defined Roles 

and Improved Information Sharing Could Enhance 

Interagency Collaboration,” (May 2012), 2, 

http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590747.pdf. 20 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-24 

Counterinsurgency, (November 2013), B-4, 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf.

21 Robert Andrews and Mark Kirk, "Integrating 21st 

Century Development and Security Assistance." 

(January 2008), 10, 

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080118-

andrews-integrating21stcentury.pdf. 22 U.S. Government Accountability Office, "GAO03-165 Combating Terrorism: Interagency 

Framework and Agency Programs to Address the 

Overseas Threat," (May 2003), 107, 

http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-165. 

Campaigning Spring 2016 38
23 James Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in 

Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies, 

(Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 40-41. 24 Michael Kraft and Edward Marks, U.S. 

Government Counterterrorism: A Guide To Who 

Does What, (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2011), 333. 25 Alan Whitaker, Shannon Brown, Frederick Smith, 

and Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy 

Process: The National Security Council and 

Interagency System, (August 2011), 17, 

http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/pdf/national-securitypolicy-process-2011.pdf. 26 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “GAO 

12-534 Foreign Police Assistance - Defined Roles 

and Improved Information Sharing Could Enhance 

Interagency Collaboration,” (May 2012), 23, 

http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590747.pdf. 

27 The White House, National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism, (June 2011), 6 28 Encyclopedia Britannica, Guerrilla Warfare,

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/248353/

guerrilla-warfare/53111/Counterguerrillawarfare#ref=ref511680. 29 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, 

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 75, 98 

& 103. 

30 The White House, National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism, (June 2011), 9. 31 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “GAO 

07-697 Combating Terrorism - Law Enforcement 

Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations 

to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists,” (May 

2007), 33, 

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07697.pdf. 

Campaigning Spring 2016 39
The American Way of Strategy

By 

Maj Paul Frantz, USAF, Cdr Robert W. Lightfoot, 

USN, MAJ Vincent Luther, Army, Seychelles, and 

LTC Matt Rinke, USA

Over time, the U.S. Government’s 

process for creating grand strategy has 

become increasingly ineffective due to overly 

prescriptive legislation and to fundamental 

misunderstandings of what grand strategy is, 

where it is located, and when it should be 

created. In the future, U.S. leadership should 

ensure the formulation of grand strategy is 

driven by changes in the security 

environment, fiscal environment, or national 

policy goals rather than focusing on rigid 

statutory periodicity. 

Curiously, the term grand strategy 

continues to escape formal definition in US 

government code and doctrine.1 This lack of 

clarity opens the door for misunderstandings 

between the senior leaders of the Executive 

Branch, departments within the Executive 

Branch, and the Legislative Branch. “When 

politicians, officials and soldiers, and of 

course media commentators, speak 

imprecisely of policy, grand strategy, 

military strategy and operations, they fatally 

inhibit their own ability to grasp properly the 

issues of the day.”2

 

The lack of specificity is especially 

alarming considering the breadth and depth 

of statutory requirements oriented towards 

strategy formulation. Numerous think tanks, 

philosophers, and academic professionals 

have produced definitions for grand strategy, 

but many of these definitions are vague and 

generalized, while others provide lengthy 

descriptions paired with detailed caveats. 

Usually, these definitions articulate grand 

strategy in relation to national instruments of 

power: Diplomatic, Information, Military, 

and Economic (DIME).3 Strategy, to the 

Department of Defense, as opposed to grand 

strategy, is typically defined as a risk 

informed balance between ends, ways, and 

means.4 This Department of Defense 

definition for strategy, when applied only to 

descriptions of military strategy, is 

compatible with other national level strategic 

mediums such as diplomatic, economic, and 

informational. For this paper, grand strategy 

is defined as a risk informed balance of ends, 

ways, and means across the DIME. 

Having defined what grand strategy 

is, we must also articulate where grand 

strategy is exists. Locating grand strategy 

presents significant opportunities for 

misunderstanding, but the key to preventing 

this confusion is to articulate grand strategy’s 

location in relation to policy and 

implementation. In particular, identifying the 

territorial boundary between policy and 

strategy presents a challenge. Unfortunately, 

the U.S. Government offers no specific 

definition for policy. The Oxford Dictionary 

describes policy as “a course or principle of

action adopted or proposed by a government, 

party, business, or individual.” However, The 

Oxford Dictionary also names the terms 

strategy and stratagem as primary synonyms 

to the term policy.5 Seeing the terms policy 

and strategy described as synonymous is 

clearly unhelpful and has undoubtedly led to 

confrontation and confusion between policy 

makers and strategy makers. For the purposes 

of this paper, we propose that strategy is 

located between policy and execution. Policy 

comes first and identifies broad intent. 

Campaigning Spring 2016 40
Strategy organizes the intent in terms of a risk 

informed balance of ends, ways, and means. 

The implementation of the strategy is 

execution. 

Ideally, national level policy requires 

a grand strategy that achieves balance and 

mutually supporting relationships between 

the elements of DIME, which in turn leads to 

integrated methods of execution. The idea 

being that the sum of the whole of 

government effort exceeds the sum of the 

parts. Figure 16 provides a visual depiction of 

the relationship between what grand strategy 

is, and where it is located. Grand strategy is 

comprised of all elements of DIME and is 

located between policy and execution. When 

at its best, grand strategy is able to optimize 

the integration of the national instruments of 

power in order to achieve a whole of 

government effort where the sum of the 

whole is more effective than the sum of the 

parts. 

The US Strategy Process and Failures

The US strategy-making process is 

formalized in law. Specifically, the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 formalized 

the requirement for the President of the 

United States to submit an annual report on 

the National Security Strategy (NSS) to 

Congress. The NSS seeks to gather 

subordinate strategies from the various parts 

of the executive branch and merge them into 

a single, cohesive document that expresses 

how the United States views and desires to 

address the multi-faceted world it operates in. 

The NSS however, is just the tip of the 

strategy iceberg, both figuratively and legally 

speaking. 

In addition to the National Security 

Strategy, U.S. law also requires that, “Not 

later than February 15 of each evennumbered year, the Chairman [of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff] shall submit to the 

Committee on Armed Services of the Senate 

and the Committee on Armed Services of the 

Figure 1 – Grand Strategy: What and Where

Campaigning Spring 2016 41
House of Representatives a report containing 

the results of a comprehensive examination 

of the national military strategy” and, a 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).7 The 

first element of the QDR is “to delineate a 

national defense strategy consistent with the 

most recent National Security Strategy 

prescribed by the President pursuant to 

section 108 of the National Security Act of 

1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a).”8 The National 

Defense Strategy (NDS) is a critical 

component of the QDR, but is yet another 

militarily specific strategy document that 

does not appear to differ significantly from 

the NMS, as both are Department of Defense 

products. 

The military element of national 

power, with its robust statutory attention, is 

the only element represented by multiple 

statutorily required strategy documents. The 

State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy 

and Development Review (QDDR) addresses 

the diplomatic instrument of national power 

but is not required by law. 

Interestingly, the information and 

economic elements of national 

power have no departmental level 

strategy and could be considered 

rudderless. Though it must be 

acknowledged that aspects of the 

information and economic 

instruments of power are 

addressed tacitly through the NSS 

itself and the other strategy publications. 

Figure 29 depicts US strategy 

publications within a national instruments of 

power framework. One might conclude that 

the number of strategy publications is 

directly proportional to the budgetary size of 

the department. However, it is also important 

to consider the composition of the National 

Security Council (NSC). The NSC’s 

statutory Secretary level members all 

currently publish quadrennial strategy 

documents as do each of the statutory 

advisors.10 

Like the QDR and the QDDR, The 

Department of Energy’s Strategic Plan is 

nested within the NSC and includes a risk 

informed description of ends, ways, and 

means. With respect to DIME, the 

Department of Energy’s area of 

responsibility is split between the economic 

and military spectrums. The Department of 

Energy strategy addresses nuclear and energy 

security related items that are not and cannot 

be dealt with in the various Department of 

Defense documents. The Energy Strategic 

Plan only touches on the economic 

instrument of power in very limited ways.

In regards to the Information 

instrument of national power, the National 

Strategy for Information Sharing and 

Safeguarding is a domestically oriented 

strategy document and does not discuss the 

application of information as a form of 

national power in respect to nation states, 

terrorists, or other potential existential 

threats. The National Intelligence Strategy of 

the United States, a five-year strategy 

document championed by the Director of 

Figure 2: Strategy documents across the DIME

Campaigning Spring 2016 42
National Intelligence, does focus on external 

threats and concerns, but does not cover the 

full spectrum of the information element of 

national power. The mission of the 

intelligence community is to “Provide timely, 

insightful, objective, and relevant 

intelligence to inform decisions on national 

security issues and events.”11 The 

intelligence community focuses on gathering 

rather than shaping. 

The members of the NSC have clearly 

taken steps to focus on strategy production. 

However, the NSC’s statutory composition 

does not directly reflect the DIME construct. 

The NSC is not task organized and this 

predictably results in an imbalance in grand 

strategy.

By mandating strategies from the 

President, Secretary of Defense, and 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the law 

is inserting Congress into the strategy making 

process 3-4 levels deeper than it reasonably 

might be expected to. The President, as 

Commander-in-Chief, is also “Strategist-inChief” and subordinate strategies do not 

necessarily add to, enhance, or bring clarity 

to U.S. strategy. In reality, the legal 

requirements result in more work for 

headquarters staffs without producing better 

strategy. Strategic guidance may be the rare, 

“less is more” exception.

The framework formed by these 

strategic documents fails the United States in 

many ways. Most critically, the process is 

tied explicitly to internally imposed timelines 

and budget submissions, rather than changes 

in the security environment, fiscal 

environment, or national policy goals. The 

world does not, however, change in lockstep 

with the U.S. strategy making process. 

Because a new strategy is due every year, 

developing it has become a significant 

bureaucratic chore; a duty to fulfill rather 

than an exercise rooted in intellectual rigor. 

By linking the annual NSS submission to the 

submission of the budget, the United States 

has rooted strategy to expenditures. 

Reasoning exists in that the strategy’s ways 

and ends should be driven by the means 

provided through the budget. However, 

following this model inappropriately links 

the two. The NSS is not the programmatic 

basis for the President’s Budget. The strategy 

must be considered, but not as the 

foundational document for acquisition. When 

the defense budget follows the five-year 

Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), changes 

in the means portion of strategy are fairly 

predictable and rarely surprising. 

The law, insomuch as strategy 

documents are concerned, does not appear to 

be followed that closely anyways. Figure 312

depicts how often strategies do not meet their 

required periodicity. The annual NSS appears 

to be the most challenging; published barely 

over half of the time (16 of 29 years). The 

NMS is even more absent, occurring only 6 

of the 13 years required by law. The QDR 

fares the best, appearing every year it was 

required, save for the extra year between the 

2001 and 2006 editions. 

Campaigning Spring 2016 43
This rigid timeline driven process is 

flawed and does not serve the United States 

well. By requiring new strategies and 

comments on strategies so often, Congress 

has opened the door for repetition, work for 

the sake of fulfilling the law rather than 

serving a genuine need, and worst of all, 

contradiction. If the documents’ purpose is to 

provide underpinning for the work of the 

government it should carry weight for longer 

than a few years. If those needing the 

guidance hesitate to implement it for fear of 

a contradictory mandate forthcoming in a 

draft document, then the strategy fails them 

as well. Lastly, if most presidents cannot 

produce a new strategy annually, and the 

need for one is not apparent, then the 

periodicity requirement must be revisited and 

a more effective regimen should be 

developed. 

Counter Argument

The current method by which U.S. 

grand strategy is prepared does yield some 

important positives. Leaders and their staffs, 

who are concerned with strategy’s design, 

thought, and activity may believe that the 

current process of strategy creation (or recreation) is a great benefit. Followers of this 

line of thinking will sometimes quote Dwight 

D. Eisenhower: “Plans are worthless, but 

planning is everything”13 Arguably, regular 

strategy production cycles prohibit senior 

leaders, and their supporting staffs, from 

becoming lax. The idea being that the rapid 

cyclic strategy process may prevent the 

nation from failing to detect and address 

emergent threats before they become 

overwhelming. Additionally, the activity of 

strategy planning can serve as a forcing 

function to ensure the ends directed by the 

strategy are appropriately resourced and 

supported in a synchronized fashion. On the 

other hand, it is important to consider that 

Eisenhower’s comments where intend 

specifically in regards to unexpected 

emergencies in a near term operational 

sense.14 The concept being that emergencies 

happen in unexpected ways and cannot be 

ever fully predicted by pre-made plans. By 

contrast, strategy is fundamentally proactive 

in nature, long term in its duration, and 

Figure 3 – Strategy Publication Timeline

Campaigning Spring 2016 44
typically requires persistence and 

consistence. Eisenhower was not talking 

about strategy. 

Alternatives

There exist some instances where 

U.S. strategy development has been notably 

successful even without statutory 

requirements. In 1950, responding to the 

possibility of the USSR developing a nuclear 

bomb and the victory of Mao Zedong’s 

Communist People’s Republic of China over 

Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China, the US 

issued National Security Council Report 68

(NSC-68).15 Signed by President Truman in 

1951, NSC-68 became, in the eyes of many 

historians, the most important strategic 

document throughout the Cold War, and set 

the tone for US relations with the USSR and 

other communist nations.16 

NSC-68 introduced strategic context 

through a discussion of upheaval caused by 

the previous two world wars. The document 

defined what the purpose of the United States 

is in historical terms and articulated 

foundational national interests. In the same 

way, the Soviet Union’s own designs are 

described with an eye towards understanding 

the underpinning sources of tension between 

the two nations. Crucially, the document 

described ends, way, and means within a 

DIME like framework.17 NSC-68 

emphasized alleviating, “the anxiety arising 

from the risk of atomic war.” NSC-68 

presented four courses of action for the US 

and concluded with recommendations that 

harness all aspects of the DIME to “frustrate 

the Kremlin design for world domination by 

creating a situation in the free world to which 

the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust.”18

NSC- 68’s strength lay, not only in its cogent 

structure, but in providing guiding purpose 

and principle to the whole of the U.S. 

government. Indeed, the whole nation 

marshalled for the struggle against 

communism. The authors of the document 

possessed the capacity to define the problem, 

establish the goals for the U.S. in leading the 

free world, and describe how and with what 

the nation and her citizens could achieve 

those goals. NSC-68 provided unambiguous 

guidance in a world with clearly defined 

sides. 

Of late, the challenge for strategists 

has been to clearly articulate a strategy in an 

uncertain world; one with, “unknown, 

unknowable, and constantly changing 

elements.”19 Breaking from convention and 

the normal documents required by law, in 

January of 2012, the Department of Defense 

issued the Defense Strategic Guidance 

(DSG). The DSG, not a legally mandated 

review of the nation’s defense strategy, 

developed a response to changing 

geopolitical and domestic realities. This new 

strategic document addressed the draw 

downs in Afghanistan and Iraq and spoke to 

the need to protect the Nation’s economic 

vitality and protect U.S. “interests in a world 

of accelerating change.”20 The Department’s 

assessment developed a “defense strategy 

that transitions our Defense enterprise from 

an emphasis on today’s wars to preparing for 

future challenges, protects the broad range of 

U.S. national security interests, advances the 

Department’s efforts to rebalance and 

reform, and supports the national security 

imperative of deficit reduction through a 

lower level of defense spending.”21 

Accordingly, the DSG defined the projected 

Campaigning Spring 2016 45
security environment driving the need for 

change and the military missions for which 

the Department of Defense must prepare.

The DSG, in defining the global 

security environment first declared that the 

United States’ security and economic wellbeing are inexorably tied to the Western 

Pacific, East Asia, Indian Ocean, and South 

Asia. This reality mandates a rebalance to the 

Asia-Pacific region. The document then set 

the geopolitical cause for a new strategy. In 

relating the M of the DIME to the ends, the 

DSG stated, “The maintenance of peace, 

stability, the free flow of commerce, and of 

U.S. influence in this dynamic region will 

depend in part on an underlying balance of 

military capability and presence.”22

Recognizing that the Department needs to 

maintain global presence and vigilance, it 

then discussed the primary security priorities 

for each geographic region and the DoD’s 

responsibilities and activities for addressing 

those priorities such as the Middle East and 

Europe. Throughout the DSG, an emphasis 

was placed on working by, with, and through 

the United States’ partners and allies, both 

regionally globally. Emphasis also was 

placed on the Department’s responsibility to 

support the other instruments of national 

power, particularly economic, and 

diplomatic.

After defining the environment and 

the problem, as well as the military’s role in 

the Nation’s strategy, the DSG directed the 

primary missions for the armed forces. Risks, 

both external and domestic, were discussed 

as well as methods for reducing that risk or 

accepting it. The DSG concludes that “The 

balance between available resources and our 

security needs has never been more 

delicate.”23

Conclusions and Recommendations

Leaders, within the Executive and 

Legislative branches of the U.S. 

Government, should amend the ineffective 

and unbalanced strategy making system 

created by multiple generations of their 

predecessors. The U.S. Government should 

seek to establish statutory and regulatory 

instructions that ensure efficient and effective 

mechanisms for the creation of grand 

strategy; ineffective and counterproductive 

mechanisms should be avoided. More 

specifically, the U.S. Government should 

seek to create balance across the DIME in its 

strategy production process rather than 

applying rigid focus on the Department of 

Defense alone. 

Congress has an important duty of 

oversight, carries the power of the purse, and 

can require that a grand strategy exist if it so 

desires. However, Congress should avoid 

specifying rates of publication that dive two, 

three, or even four levels deep into the 

Executive Branch. With one hand, Congress 

demands a reduction in DoD staff size, while 

with the other hand requiring specific and 

continually increasing rates of strategy 

publication.24 The situation, in the name of 

oversight, has become abusive and 

disproportionately focused on the military. 

The Executive Branch should require the 

national instruments of power be addressed 

through subordinate strategies, and nested in 

the current NSS. As with the NSS, these 

subordinate strategies, one for each facet of 

DIME, need not be tied to a rigid publication 

cycle and should instead focus on creating 

grand strategy formulated, as needed, in 

Campaigning Spring 2016 46
response to changes in the security 

environment, fiscal environment, or national 

policy goals. Implementing such changes 

allows the nation to gain synergy between its 

national instruments of power and will help 

to ensure balance to grand strategy. 

Author Biographies 

Major Paul A. Frantz, USAF. Major Frantz is a Civil 

Engineer Officer and currently serves as a war planner 

with Headquarters US Forces Korea. He was 

commissioned through ROTC at Virginia Polytechnic 

Institute in 200l where he earned a Bachelor of 

Architecture degree. Major Frantz earned a Master of 

Science in National Security Studies from American 

Public University in 2011 and a Master of Strategic 

Studies from the Army Command and General Staff 

College in 2014. Major Frantz has served nine years 

overseas, including 27 months in Afghanistan, and 

was recently selected for promotion to Lieutenant 

Colonel. 

Commander Robert W. Lightfoot, USN. CDR 

Lightfoot is a Surface Warfare Officer currently 

serving as a Strategy Analyst in the Joint ImprovisedThreat Defeat Agency (JIDA). He was commissioned 

through United States Naval Academy in 1999. CDR 

Lightfoot earned a BS in History from the United 

1 Note: JP-1 provides the following comment in lieu of 

a definition for grand strategy: “None. (Approved for 

removal from JP 1-02.).” A definition for grand 

strategy is not presently available in top level US 

legislation, regulation, or doctrine. 

2

Colin S. Gray; “Strategic Thoughts For Defense 

Planners”; Survival: Global Politics and Strategy – 

Vol 52, Issue 3, 2010; 2 June 2010; p. 165

3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine Development 

System, Joint Publication 1-01, (Washington, DC: 

US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000), p. GL-8.

4 Charles T. Hagel, Quadrennial Defense Review

(Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2014), 

p. 63.

5 Oxford English Dictionary online; accessed 28 

October 2015; 

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/ame

rican_english-thesaurus/policy

States Naval Academy in 1999, and a Master of 

Military Studies from Marine Corps University’s 

Command and Staff College in 2013. Prior to his 

current assignment, CDR Lightfoot served as an 

Action Officer on the OPNAV staff.

Major Clancy Vincent Luther, Seychelles Army. 

Major Luther is a member of the Seychelles People’s 

Defense Forces. He graduated from the Seychelles 

Defense Academy in 1990. Major Luther has served 

multiple tours, including duty as commando, company 

commander for special operations, and Captain of the 

Seychelles Careers Maneuvers Course. He attended 

the Staff course in India where he earned an MS in 

Defense Science. Major Luther has held appointments 

as platoon and company Commander, and 

Commandant of Seychelles Defense Academy. Major 

Luther is currently in command of the Seychelles 

military police.

Lieutenant Colonel Matt Rinke, USA. LTC Rinke is a 

Northeast Asia Foreign Area Officer currently serving 

at the Defense Intelligence Agency, en route to US 

Pacific Command. He was commissioned through 

ROTC at Michigan State University in 1994 where he 

received a BS in Zoology. He received a MA in Asian 

Studies from the University of Hawaii at Mānoa in 

2006. Before his current assignment he served as the 

US Special Assistant to the Deputy Commander ROKUS Combined Forces Commander, a Korean four-star 

general officer.

6 Figure 1 is original to this paper

7 10 U.S.C. § 153 

8 10 U.S.C. § 118

9 Figure 2 is original to this paper

10 Note: The NSC statutory members include the 

President, Vice President, Vice President, Secretaries 

of State, Defense, and Energy. The Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Intelligence Director, 

and the Director of National Drug Control Policy are 

advisors to the Council. 

11 James R. Clapper; The National Intelligence 

Strategy of the United States of America; 

(Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence, 2014); p. 2

12 Figure 3 is original to this paper and derived from 

multiple sources.

13 Dwight D. Eisenhower; Remarks at the National 

Defense Executive Reserve Conference; 14 NOV 

Campaigning Spring 2016 47
1957; para 3; available at: 

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10951

14 Eisenhower; para 3 15 National Security Council; A report to the National 

Security Council – NSC 68; (Washington, DC: The 

White House, 1950)

16 US Department of State website; NSC 68 webpage; 

accessed 1 November 2015; 

https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-

1952/NSC68

17 Note: NSC-68 was written before the DIME concept 

was codified. Instruments of national power are 

articulated in a DIME congruent fashion. 

18 National Security Council; A report to the National 

Security Council – NSC 68; (Washington, DC: The 

White House, 1950)

19 General David G. Perkins; “Win in a complex 

world’ – But How?”; Army AL&T Magazine; JanuaryMarch 2015; p. 107-115. 20 Leon E. Panetta; Defense Strategic Guidance – 

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st

Century Defense; (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 

2012); 1.

21 Panetta; Defense Strategic Guidance; 1. 22 Panetta; Defense Strategic Guidance; 2. 23 Leon E. Panetta; Defense Strategic Guidance – 

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st

Century Defense; (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 

2012); 8.

24 Julian E. Barnes; “Pentagon Faces 20% Cut in 

Headquarters Operations”; The Wall Street Journal

online, 16 July 2013; accessed 25 October 2015; 

http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/07/16/pentagonfaces-20-cut-in-headquarters-operations

Campaigning Spring 2016 48
Amending Goldwater-Nichols: The 

Need To Create A Language 

Requirement for General Officers

By

MAJ Steven Lacy, USA, LTC Tyler Oxley, USA, 

Maj Eric Doctor, and LTC Aldo Vergara, Chilean 

Army.

“Throughout my seven years as Combatant 

Commander, both at Southern and European 

Command, and with NATO operating in 

Afghanistan, I’ve learned that shipmates who truly 

have the language, culture and regional skills are 

often ‘silver bullets’ that can transform a difficult 

challenge into a success.”

Admiral James G. Stavridis

The need for cultural and language 

expertise in today’s military is almost cliché. 

Planners, military theorists and senior leaders 

throughout the U.S. armed forces accept a 

need for increased understanding of 

operational environments, a need highlighted 

during the last decade’s conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Leaders periodically decry the 

lack of cultural knowledge or foreign 

language skills of military officers--the 

management class of the force--but have 

provided little incentive for officers to 

develop these capabilities.1

 Initiatives to 

address these shortfalls have failed because 

they lack an adequate incentive for the 

military’s leadership to make cultural and 

language capability a core capability of the 

officer corps. The best mechanism to affect 

this change is amending the GoldwaterNichols Act to create a foreign language 

requirement for General Officers.

The Department of Defense (DoD) 

recognizes the need for better language and 

cultural understanding. According to the 

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review: 

“Today’s operating environment demands a 

much greater degree of language and regional 

expertise requiring years, not weeks, of 

training and education, as well as a greater 

understanding of the factors that drive social 

change.2” 

As early as 2005, the Defense 

Language Transformation Roadmap stated a 

“new approach to warfighting in the 21st

Century will require forces that have foreign 

language capabilities beyond those generally 

available in the force.”3

 DoD even developed 

a Strategic Plan for Language Skills, 

Regional Expertise and Cultural Capabilities 

for 2011-2016 to “enhance and 

institutionalize these critical enablers” yet 

little has changed.4

 And while DoD has 

fallen short of implementing necessary 

change in this area, so too has our legislative 

branch failed to enact meaningful reforms. 

As one congressional subcommittee noted, 

“congressional oversight suffers from lack of 

follow-through on issues examined in 

hearings and briefings. Opportunities to 

make lasting changes are lost when problems 

are identified put proposed solutions are not 

implemented.”5

According to the 2015 National 

Security Strategy (NSS), if the US is to 

maintain its leadership role within the 

international system it must mandate an 

improved cultural approach that will allow a 

better understanding of world societies. We 

must develop an improved cultural 

understanding and empathy that largely can 

Campaigning Spring 2016 49
be achieved through knowledge of local 

languages. US armed forces senior officers 

with a level of linguistic and cultural 

awareness would be able to operate more 

effectively and avoid possible 

misunderstandings that could affect their 

mission accomplishment, not only in military 

matters but also involving other instruments 

of US national power such as the diplomatic, 

informational and economic. Language 

capability also has the potential to reduce the 

breach of cultural asymmetry between the US 

and host nations in an operational 

environment. 

“Because we live in an increasingly small world, we 

are going to be engaged more frequently with other 

nations to solve problems together. The best way to 

do that is to be open, to engage with one another, to 

understand one another’s cultures and 

perspectives. If we can speak one another’s 

languages, and apply the cultural context to our 

interactions, our communication will improve 

dramatically.” 6

 

General Douglas M. Fraser, USAF (RET) 

This paper focuses on language skills 

as the critical enabler for regional expertise 

and cultural understanding. While mastery of 

a foreign language does not automatically 

imbue cultural expertise, there is a strong 

correlation between acquiring a foreign

language and developing cultural 

competence. We consider language skills to 

be a quantifiable skill the DoD can use to 

measure its progress in meeting cultural, 

language and regional expertise goals.

The vast majority of our officer corps is not 

bilingual. Less than 10% of all military 

personnel speak a foreign language; although 

statistics are difficult to come by, the 

percentage is likely even lower among 

officers. The limited number of officers who 

do speak a foreign language fluently usually 

acquired that language in a home where 

English was a second language. Anecdotally, 

this also means that the most common foreign 

language spoken by officers is Spanish. 

Other important world languages, such as 

Chinese, Russian, Farsi and French are not 

widely spoken by our officer corps. This

presents a critical vulnerability during U.S. 

military operations abroad. 

The issue is not that DoD or Congress 

fails to recognize the problem. Conversely, 

the challenge is to force a cultural shift 

among senior leaders in the military that will 

require key decision makers in the uniformed 

services to implement solutions. If senior 

leaders were required to develop a foreign 

language capability in order to reach the 

General Officer/Flag Officer (GO/FO) ranks, 

the services would be forced to adopt a 

training and testing pipeline that ensured its 

most capable officers had the opportunity to 

attain some level of language proficiency. 

We believe that the best mechanism for 

achieving this change is for Congress to 

amend the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to 

require any officer promoted to GO/FO rank 

to have a standard, minimum level of 

proficiency in a foreign language. Many of 

our allies have already made foreign 

language proficiency a requirement for their 

officer corps. In 2014 the U.K. made 

proficiency in a second language (preferably 

Arabic or French) a requirement for 

promotion to Captain7

. Canada has long had 

a requirement for its officers to be able to 

operate in both English and French8. 

Campaigning Spring 2016 50
The logic behind this proposal is 

simple. GO/FO candidates may be among 

the least likely military officers to speak a 

foreign language, unless they happened to be 

one of a handful of Olmsted scholars. This is 

not due to a lack of capability; one could 

argue that our GO/FOs are among our 

brightest and most capable officers. Rather, 

the career track that creates our senior leaders

in each of the military services is unlikely to 

result in a bilingual officer. These officers 

typically spend their careers in highly 

operational assignments, leading combat 

units, ships or air units. There is little 

incentive for fast-track officers to move out 

of these operational assignments due to fierce 

competition for leadership opportunities. 

Yet, knowledge of a foreign language could 

prove a benefit to these officers during 

multinational operations.

Because learning a foreign language 

usually takes considerable time, and because 

promotion boards traditionally have not 

valued foreign language capability above 

other skills or accomplishments, there is little 

incentive for senior leaders to learn a foreign 

language. While our senior leaders may 

appreciate the challenge of learning a foreign 

language and the capability language 

proficiency brings to the fight, very few are 

practitioners of this foreign language skill. 

Requiring GO/FOs to have a foreign 

language proficiency would create a 

powerful incentive for the military services to 

provide fast-track officers better 

opportunities to develop a foreign language 

capability. Once a critical mass of senior 

leaders has developed this capability, they 

will champion initiatives to increase this 

capability among the officer corps.

If language capability was 

institutionalized, opportunities would be 

plentiful. Most officers spend tremendous 

amounts of time in Professional Military 

Education (PME) courses during their career. 

These courses range from a few months, to 

almost a year of full-time instruction. It 

would be feasible to add short language 

course requirements to the services’ staff 

colleges, as well as to each of the War 

Colleges, which are themselves a prerequisite 

for promotion. Imagine if the average Army 

officer, for example, was convinced that 

speaking a foreign language would increase 

his promotion potential, and significantly 

enhanced his potential effectiveness in an 

operational environment. He could start 

learning a foreign language in college, for 

instance through the ROTC Cultural 

Understanding and Language Program 

(CULP)9

, and continue to develop that 

capability through resident and distance 

learning courses throughout his career. By 

the time the U.S. was involved in its next 

significant campaign, it would be more likely 

to have a number of highly qualified officers 

with more than a basic language and cultural 

understanding of the operational 

environment. Of course, this only works if 

the officer is incentivized and believes it 

benefits of his career to devote his time to 

foreign language study. This incentive would 

need to apply equally to all services in order 

to force a cultural shift among all senior 

leaders across the military. 

True language proficiency takes time-

-the amount of time is a matter of some 

debate. Purveyors of the current batch of 

quick learning programs (i.e., the 

discontinued DoD Rosetta Stone program) 

Campaigning Spring 2016 51
make spectacular claims about rapidly 

acquiring fluency with little effort. More 

conservative authorities (who are not selling 

a product) claim that up to 10,000 hours of 

intense training is required to master an 

additional language.10 Quick fix solutions to 

language deficiencies—whether software 

programs or the hiring of battlefield 

interpreters—are an easy trap for leaders who 

lack a true understanding of what it takes to 

develop language capability. The point is, 

language training cannot wait until an officer 

is approaching possible selection as a 

GO/FO. If Goldwater-Nichols required a 

Defense Language Proficiency Test score of 

2/2 for all GO/FO candidates, services would 

ensure they were creating a pool of suitable 

senior field grade officers that met this 

requirement. Similarly, ambitious junior 

officers would want to make sure they 

“checked the box” in hope that stars were in 

their future. The logical progression would 

be to require a modest foreign language 

proficiency either as a prerequisite for 

commissioning, or early in every officer’s 

career. A Defense Language Proficiency 

Test score of 1/1, for example, sets the bar 

fairly low at, “Limited exposure to the 

country, region, or area of specialization. 

Less than 1 year of experience.”11 This 

certainly is not an impossible task. Foreign 

language proficiency at this level is already a 

common requirement either for admission to 

or graduation from many undergraduate 

programs. 

Currently, without any emphasis on 

maintaining these language skills, what little 

capabilities our officers have developed prior 

to entering the military has atrophied, and is 

gone by the time they become mid-grade 

officers. Some initiatives to tackle this 

problem have merit. Service academies 

require that all cadets/midshipmen receive 

foreign language instruction. French was 

once a requirement for all US Military 

Academy cadets.12 Scholarship ROTC 

cadets in non-technical fields of study (Air

Force/Navy) are required to take language 

courses. Ironically, the Army is the only 

service that does not require language 

education for commissioning, and yet it is 

arguably the service most likely to benefit 

from increased language proficiency in a 

military campaign. 

“The military services have each implemented a 

strategy for cultural and foreign language training, 

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense continues 

to highlight the importance of culture in workforce 

development. Time will tell whether these efforts 

are sufficient to ensure that culture does not recede, 

once again, into specialist communities and out of 

the awareness of general purpose forces”13

 

Military Review, July/August 2012

The initiatives mentioned above fall 

short of providing a coordinated solution to a 

problem that should be a priority of our senior 

military leaders. All cadets should be 

required to take the DoD language 

proficiency exam prior to commissioning, 

and language instruction should be a 

requirement for all commissioning programs 

regardless of service and field of study. 

Language training can even be maintained 

through refresher courses concurrent with

PME. However, these initiatives will have 

little effect if not part of a broader, 

coordinated life-cycle of instruction for 

officers.

Campaigning Spring 2016 52
Language proficiency added as a 

requirement to attend (or graduate from) 

Intermediate-Level Professional Education 

(Air Force Air Command and Staff College, 

Army Intermediate Level Education, etc.)

simply should be a continuation of university 

or service academy requirements. This could 

potentially reduce pressure on PME schools 

to require extensive language training in 

house. Officers with current language 

proficiency scores of 2/2 or better could be 

exempted. If officers have a notion that their

careers will not progress beyond O-6 without 

language capability, services and officers 

will have a mutual goal of continuing 

language education. Current university level 

continuing education and country exposure 

would be desired by the officer and supported 

by the service. Continuing education could 

be added to existing PME curriculums with

the proper institutional incentive, and by 

leveraging existing distance learning tools

offered by the Defense Language Institute 

(DLI). 

Flag level officers, in addition to their 

traditional tasks, form military and political 

relationships within NATO and other 

coalitions around the world. In some cases, 

these relationships may be as valuable to the 

DoD as the officers’ primary military

functions. In this context, the knowledge of 

a foreign language and culture would greatly 

enhance a senior leader’s ability in his 

assignment and improve military planning in

support of national strategic and military 

objectives. Globalization has greatly 

impacted military operations. The US 

military is regionally aligned through 

combatant commands and faces the challenge

of operating in more world regions than the 

Victorian-era British Empire. A proficient 

use of “smart power” requires a high degree 

of cultural understanding and language 

proficiency by key leaders. By increasing 

language aptitude in our senior leadership, 

we will make great strides in gaining respect 

among key nations on the world stage. Yet 

we cannot wait until an officer is selected as 

a GO/FO to being the long process of training 

him or her in a necessary foreign language. 

Some might argue that resources are the main 

obstacle to implementing these ideas. This 

argument ignores the plethora of excellent 

language-learning resources DoD currently 

provides (free of cost), that few officers take 

advantage of. While the DoD may require 

additional means to fully implement a 

language requirement in the officer corps, 

plenty of distance learning options currently 

exist for officers to improve language 

capabilities. However, without career 

incentives for officers to devote substantial 

time to these endeavors, little progress will be 

made.

The authors of this paper each 

possesses some level foreign language 

proficiency. We can tell you from experience 

that it takes dedication to continue to improve 

and maintain language capability. A few

officers study and learn foreign languages on 

their own because they have a personal 

interest, but this number will always be small. 

Most officers require an incentive, because 

the opportunity cost of learning a language is 

high due to the amount of time involved. 

Goldwater-Nichols has been hugely 

successful in encouraging the services to 

send officers to Joint Commands and Joint

PME. Without its legislative mandate, the 

services almost certainly would not fill many 

Campaigning Spring 2016 53
of their joint billets, or require Joint 

education. While some have argued for a 

complete overhaul of Goldwater-Nichols, we 

advocate no such thing. We merely 

recommend a small change in law that creates 

a language requirement for officers prior to 

becoming a GO/FO. This small change will 

have major, ripple effects in the DoD, 

institutionalizing language initiatives that are 

often pushed aside for other priorities. 

An alternate approach to a change in 

federal law would be to incorporate language 

training into all Joint PME, although the 

financial costs could be substantial due to 

extended TDY periods and/or increased 

faculty numbers. GO/FOs under Goldwater 

Nichols are required to be Joint qualified, 

which includes necessary PME. Language 

courses and a testing requirement should be 

required during this instruction. Waiting for 

a revision of Goldwater Nichols may delay 

unnecessarily the implementation of a 

language requirement. DoD also needs to 

examine alternate means of institutionalizing 

language capabilities. The Secretary of 

Defense can direct a policy change that 

introduces language training into the Joint 

and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) 

or other joint/National Defense University 

course curriculums as an elective 

requirement. For those unable to attend 

classroom instruction, the Defense Language 

Institute (DLI) can be leveraged for distance 

learning and high demand, low availability 

language instruction. While this alternative 

will do little to encourage language training 

of junior officers in the short term, it would 

represent a significant cultural shift in how 

the officer corps views foreign language 

capability.

It must be understood that the

initiatives we proposes will at best, result in 

an officer corps with rudimentary language 

skills. While these skills will be imperfect, 

and unlikely to reflect all known foreign

languages, the result will be a significant

increase in capability for operations and a 

better likelihood of effectively working in a 

multi-national environment. Amending 

Goldwater-Nichols is an important step, but 

necessary to force a change in military 

culture. Our current military leadership will 

not unilaterally implement necessary changes 

in military language capabilities due to a lack 

of experience and appreciation of this 

capability.

With recent discussions in Congress 

of updating Goldwater-Nichols, the time is 

right to incorporate this requirement into 

legislation. Congressional leaders, including 

Sen. John McCain, have recently called for a 

review of Goldwater-Nichols, 30 years after 

this historic legislation.14 This is an 

opportunity to codify a language requirement 

when Congress is already poised to review 

existing Joint requirements. Again, the need 

for cultural and language expertise in today’s 

military is clear. Despite a known lack of 

foreign language skills among military 

leaders, DoD has provided little incentive for 

officers to develop these skills. Initiatives to 

address these shortfalls have been inadequate 

as they lack an incentive to make cultural and 

language capability a core capability of the 

officer corps. The best mechanism to affect 

this change is amending the GoldwaterNichols Act to create a foreign language 

requirement for General and Flag Officers.

Campaigning Spring 2016 54
Author Biographies 

Major Steven J. Lacy is a Strategic Intelligence Officer 

in the United States Army, enroute to assignment at 

the Joint Staff J2, Pentagon. His previous assignment 

was in the Directorate of Intelligence, Joint 

Intelligence Operations Center Europe, RAF 

Molesworth, UK. He holds an undergraduate degree 

in Russian, Masters Degrees from the George 

Washington University and the National Intelligence 

University, and a Juris Doctor from the College of 

William and Mary. 

Lieutenant Colonel Tyler J. Oxley, is a Signal Officer 

assigned to US AFRICOM. In his previous 

assignments he served as the G6, 20th CBRNE 

Command, Mission Command Training Program 

(MCPT) Senior Signal Trainer and Regimental S6 for 

the 2d Calvary Regiment. His operational experience 

includes; SFOR, KFOR and OIF. He holds a Masters 

Degree in Organizational Leadership from Gonzaga 

University. 

1

 (Stars and Stripes 2013) 2 Department of Defense, Feb 2010. Quadrennial 

Defense Review

3 Department of Defense, Jan 2005. Defense 

Language Transformation Roadmap

4 Department of Defense, 2011. DoD Strategic Plan 

for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and 

Cultural Capabilities, 2011-2016, pg. 4 5 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 

Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, Dec 2010. Building Language Skills 

and Cultural Competencies in the Military: Bridging 

the Gap, pg. 2 6 Dialogo, Digital Military Magazine. 2011 

“Language Proficiency and Cultural Awareness: 

Mandatory Military Skills”. http://dialogoamericas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional

_news/2011/02/18/feature-ex-1906 7 Express. April 2015. “Army in About-Turn Over 

Drive for Bilingual Officers”. 

http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/494922/Armyabout-turn-over-bilingual-officers 8 Les Canadiens Français et le Bilinguisme dans les 

Forces Armées Canadiennes. 1994. Contents: Vol. 1, 

1763-1969 The fear of a parallel army. Vol. II, 1969-

Major Eric C. Doctor is a planner at the Joint 

Functional Component Command for Space, United 

States Strategic Command. He has also served as an 

ICBM Combat Crew Commander at the 742d Missile 

Squadron, Operations Flight Commander for the Air 

Force Satellite Control Network, and, most recently, 

Executive Officer at the Space Security and Defense 

Program. He holds a Master of Public Administration 

and Bachelor of Arts in English Literature, both from 

the University of Toledo.

Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Vergara, is a Chilean Army 

Field Artillery and Staff Officer, currently assigned to 

the Chilean Army Staff War College in Santiago de 

Chile, where he is a team leader and instructor of the 

MILOPS Department. In his previous assignments he 

has served as United Nations Military Observer and 

Military Information and Political Officer in the 

UNMOGIP HQ (Islamabad/Srinagar) in India and 

Pakistan, and he commanded a 155mm Self Propelled 

Field Artillery Battalion in Punta Arenas, Chile. He 

holds a MA in Political Science with mention in 

International Relations from Catholic University, 

Santiago de Chile. 

1987 Official languages: National Defense’s response 

to the federal policy 

9 US Army Cadet Command. 2013 “The Cultural 

Understanding & Language Proficiency (CULP) 

Program”. 

http://www.cadetcommand.army.mil/culp/ 10 Eaton, Sarah Elaine, Ph.D. 2011. “How Long 

Does it Take to Learn a Second Language—Applying 

the ’10,000-Hour Rule’ as a Guide.” Spring 

Institute/Onate Press.

11 Department of Defense Instruction 5160.70, 2007. 

Management of DoD Language and Regional 

Proficiency Capabilities

12 Public Radio International. April 2011. “The 

History of America's Multilingual Military” 

http://www.pri.org/stories/2011-04-25/historyamericas-multilingual-military 13 Abbe, Allison, Ph.D, and Gouge, Melissa. 2012. 

“Cultural Training for Military Personnel Revisiting 

the Vietnam Era” July-August 2012 MILITARY 

REVIEW

14 Clark, Colin. Aug 2015. "McCain Launches 

Goldwater-Nichols Review; How Far Will He 

Go?" Breaking Defense. 26 Mar. 2015. Web

Campaigning Spring 2016 55
Improving the International 

Community’s Response Framework 

for Mass Conflict Refugee 

Migration

By 

MAJ Alison Hamilton, USA and 

Lt Col Jeremy Goodwin, USAF

“We know from recent history that 

massive refugee movements can unbalance 

peace and stability in the world as much as 

any arms race or political or military 

confrontation.”1 Senator Edward Kennedy 

made this statement in 1979 as part of a world 

refugee crisis report for the U.S. Congress. 

While the statement was made over 35 years 

ago as Senator Kennedy was talking about 

mass refugee migration in Indochina, it is as 

relevant today when thinking about the 

refugee crisis from Syria’s five-year civil 

war. Since March 2011, the Syrian civil war 

has caused the mass migration of over four 

million refugees into neighboring countries 

and Europe. In addition, another 7.5 million 

Syrians are internally displaced and could 

become refugees in the future. Many consider 

the Syrian refugees Europe’s worst human 

migration crisis since World War II.2

Mass Syrian refugee migration is 

increasingly threatening regional security 

and political, economic, and social stability 

in Europe. Although the U.S. is the largest 

unilateral provider of humanitarian 

assistance in response to the Syrian refugee 

crisis, humanitarian assistance is no longer 

enough to ensure U.S. strategic security 

priorities. To develop effective national 

policy and inform international response 

frameworks, mass refugee migration requires 

systemic and holistic analysis to understand 

strategic factors, elements, interconnections, 

and drivers that effect complex human 

migration networks. 

Human migration systems are much 

larger and more nebulous than the specific 

case of Syrian conflict refugee migration for 

any number of reasons. Generically, human 

migration is the movement of people from 

one place in the world to another. People can 

either choose to move, voluntary migration, 

or be impelled or forced to move, involuntary 

migration.3 Voluntary migration is usually 

due to perceived economic, educational, or 

quality of life improvement or benefit from 

migrating. The voluntary migration 

population is mostly economic migrants 

trying to escape poverty and seek better 

economic opportunities. In theory, voluntary 

migrants would receive the protection of their 

government if they were to return to their 

home nation. Impelled migrants, like those 

fleeing the Syrian civil war, are refugees 

forced to leave their home country because of 

unfavorable situations such as warfare, 

political instability, or religious persecution. 

There are many factors and forces 

influencing mass human migration, and those 

factors and forces may not be the same for all 

categories of voluntary migrants and 

refugees. Understanding the phenomenon of 

mass human migration is multifaceted and 

multilayered and deserves further analytical 

study; however, this abstract will focus solely 

on developing a systemic understanding of 

mass conflict refugee migration and will not 

analyze all migration categories.

System Element Identification

A mass conflict refugee migration 

system has three main populations – a 

Campaigning Spring 2016 56
population within a nation still living in their 

homes/communities, an internally displaced 

persons (IDP) population, and a population of 

refugees who have migrated outside of the 

nation. Specific Syrian conflict refugee 

migration system elements and elements’ 

behaviors were subjectively interpolated 

from academic articles and news reports on 

Syria since its civil war began in March 

2011.4 Elements and trends within the system 

taken from are:

a. Level of governance in country of 

origin – decreasing

b. Level of stability in country of origin 

– decreasing

c. Level of security in country of origin 

– decreasing

d. Level of access to basic needs in 

country of origin (SWET-EH) – 

decreasing

e. The size of the IDP population – 

increasing

f. The level of international 

community’s(IC)/nongovernmental 

organizations (NGO) access to 

provide services to IDP populations – 

decreasing

g. Intensity of indiscriminate violence 

from armed conflict affecting 

civilians–increasing

h. Size of receiving country economy – 

steady or increasing

i. The level of political stability of 

receiving countries

j. The level of institutional capacity of 

receiving countries

k. The level of Transnational Criminal 

Network activities (smuggling) – 

increasing

l. The level of International Community 

(IC) engagement and capacity – 

increasing. 

Understanding the conflict refugee migration 

system elements’ behaviors over time 

provides insight to element relationships, 

interconnections, and potential correlation or 

causation. Key internal, or push, and 

external, or pull, elements are superimposed 

and mapped below on two Behavior over 

Time (BOT) graphs (Figure 

1). The internal elements 

BOT graph indicates an 

apparent inverse relationship 

between the governance and 

stability in Syria and the 

number of IDPs. 

Additionally, the internal 

elements BOT graph 

potentially shows how 

refugee numbers increase 

gradually during the first 

phases of conflict, perhaps 

when civilians are not as 

affected by warring faction 

Figure 1.

Campaigning Spring 2016 57
violence, then reaches a breaking point of 

sorts, increasing exponentially in a short 

period of time. The closing months of 2013 

saw increased Islamic State of Syria and Iraq 

(ISIS) attacks against Syrian military forces, 

which affected security within Syria in a new 

way,

5 and may have affected individual 

decision making whether to flee Syria. 

External, or pull, elements (Figure 2), 

such as the IC’s ability to provide support and 

humanitarian relief to IDPs and the IC’s 

willingness to accept refugees for 

resettlement, do not appear to have a 

significant effect on refugee numbers. One 

hypothesis is that the number of refugees a 

country is willing to resettle does not impact 

the decision of potential refugees to flee their 

home country because conflict refugees are 

making internal security calculations, not 

external benefit calculations. Many countries 

have publically stated their willingness to 

provide protection to conflict refugees, i.e. 

Germany estimates it will accept up to 

800,000 refugees in 2015.6 But 800,000 is 

meaningless when over four 

million refugees have 

already fled Syria and 7.5 

million more IDPs could 

flee any day. External 

factors, perhaps because of 

the scale of the Syrian 

refugee crisis, appear to 

have little impact on the 

conflict refugee migration 

system. However, current 

IC response policies focus 

almost entirely on building 

humanitarian assistance 

capacity, willingness to 

receive refugees, and other 

external, or pull, factor mechanisms.7 Deeper 

analysis of the complex and dynamic conflict 

refugee system is needed to better understand 

the relationships between strategic factors 

and their effects on the conflict refugee 

migration system, but the BOT graphs 

indicate internal security factors have 

potentially the greatest effect on refugee 

migration decisions. 

To better understand the dynamic 

relationships within the conflict refugee 

migration system, a Causal Loop Diagram 

(CLD), or systems map, helps depicts the 

structure and elements of the system, and 

their interconnections and functions. The 

CLD below (Figure 3) represents the conflict 

refugee migration system on the left and the 

subsystem of refugee movement on the right. 

Both are needed to fully illustrate conflict 

refugee migration. 

Figure 2.

Campaigning Spring 2016 58
The center stocks of the system, 

highlighted in yellow, are the system’s 

foundation and represent the population, 

IDPs, and conflict refugees. These three 

stocks are put into motion by actions or 

effects of other system elements. The most 

influential elements in the system are the 

stability and security within the population’s 

home country. Stability encompasses 

governance (political, economic and 

institutional effectiveness), and access to 

basic services (sewer, water, electricity, 

trash, education, healthcare (SWET-EH)). 

Security encompasses rule of law and 

protection of life. Erosion of stability causes 

the population to migrate internally, 

becoming IDPs, to locations of greater 

perceived stability. This internal migration 

can be reversed with increases in stability. If 

the population perceives there is low risk to 

civilians, and perceives risk and cost of 

leaving are high, the population is likely to 

remain in place. External diplomatic 

engagement, and Intergovernmental and 

Nongovernmental Organization (IGO and 

NGO) involvement positively affect stability. 

Monitoring IGO/NGO access could be an 

indicator of stability – if access is high, 

stability is likely to improve, and if access is 

low, stability is likely to deteriorate. 

Erosion of security causes the 

population (including IPDs) to flee the 

Figure 3.

Campaigning Spring 2016 59
country as refugees. Once the population 

perceives their lives, not just their 

livelihoods, are at risk, they will flee to seek 

protection in another country. Military 

action, either by internal military forces or 

external military forces, will either increase 

or decrease security, depending on the 

population’s perception of that action. If the 

population perceives civilians are at high 

risk, they will weigh the risk and cost of 

leaving against staying, but the risk and cost 

of staying are exponentially higher when they 

feel they are subject to indiscriminate 

violence. Also, over time, risk and cost of 

leaving decrease because a transnational 

refugee migration network is established. 

The transnational refugee network 

provides information, direction and advice to 

those still at home and provides a connection 

to a potential host country.8 Refugee 

migration takes significantly more time to 

reverse than internal migration. Refugees 

seek enduring security, not cease fires or 

temporary improvements in security. 

The population-IDP-conflict 

refugee–stability-security loop is the 

dominate system loop. There is a time delay 

in the system when security disintegrates to 

the point of high perceived risk to the civilian 

population and mass refugee migration. The 

transnational refugee network will take time 

to establish itself. With only a nascent 

Figure 4.

Campaigning Spring 2016 60
refugee network, the population’s perceived 

risk and cost of movement may still outweigh 

the perceived risk of staying. Once the 

refugee network is established, mass 

migration can occur. 

The refugee movement subsystem on 

the right-hand side of the systems map is the 

most important subsystem, and requires 

analysis to fully appreciate the complexities 

of refugee migration and develop effective 

policy responses (Figure 4). A refugee seeks 

immediate protection and assistance in a host 

nation, which are often the nations with 

which their home country shares a border. 

Refugees are likely placed in camps, 

provided humanitarian 

assistance, and, finally, 

processed to obtain some 

type of legal status as a 

refugee. This resettlement 

experience is influenced by 

the host nation’s political, 

economic, social/cultural, 

and institutional capacity to 

receive refugees, and by the 

transnational refugee 

network made up of 

relatives/friends, 

communications 

technologies (cell phones, 

social media), and 

transnational criminal 

networks profiting off of 

smuggling refugees and other migrants to a 

second or third country. Whether a refugee 

stays in the first country they arrive at or if 

they travel on to a second or third country is 

directly related to their level of perceived 

long-term security. 

Identifying Trends and Drivers

Another way to understand the mass 

refugee migration system is to understand the 

various trends and drivers of change within

the system. Determining which factors have 

the most influence on refugee migration will 

help the international community leverage 

the right policy mechanisms to prevent 

further mass migration. The force field 

diagram below (Figure 5) depicts external 

and internal factors and their relative strength 

or influence on refugee migration decisions. 

All factors in the force field diagram were 

assessed as having an influential effect on an 

individual’s decision to flee their country of 

origin. Individual factors were assessed on a 

subjective scale of 1-10 of relative strength of 

influence. As indicated, internal factors 

outweigh external factors by almost two-fold 

when considering influencers of refugee 

migration. 

Figure 5.

Campaigning Spring 2016 61
 The factor that most affects conflict 

refugees is the level of security in their home 

country, directly followed by risk to civilians 

and stability. Again, internal factors appear to 

have greater influence on refugee migration 

decisions than external factors. However, the 

simple factor of having a relative or friend in 

another state is the greatest influencer of 

external influencers. Understanding the 

interrelationship of these four factors merits 

further analysis. 

The force field analysis also indicates 

efforts aimed at eliminating transnational 

criminal smuggling networks are potentially 

an ineffective use of time and resources. 

European Union Naval Forces Atlanta (EUNAVFOR) are specially missioned to target, 

disable, and prevent refugee and migrant 

smuggling by transnational criminal 

networks.9 The counter-smuggling effort 

would be more valuable if the effort was 

solely aimed at preventing refugee 

exploitation and significant loss of life at sea.

The conflict refugee systems analysis, 

supported by the force field analysis, seems 

to indicate targeting TCN smuggling will 

have very little impact on the number of 

refugees seeking to enter Europe, as the 

refugees will find other legal and illicit ways 

to enter a host nation. 

Figure 6.

Campaigning Spring 2016 62
A critical element within the conflict 

refugee migration system is security within 

the country of origin. As security in the 

system erodes, refugee migration increases. 

To understand potential consequences of 

eroding security on future outcomes, a 

futures wheel (Figure 6) was developed to 

identify expected secondary and tertiary 

consequences of this trend. 

The primary trend within the system 

is a worsening security situation. The 

primary, or first order, effects of this trend are 

represented in yellow, while the secondary 

and tertiary effects are represented in orange 

and green respectively. The most likely 

implication is that 7.5M IDPs begin to 

migrate out of Syria. This is obviously highly 

undesirable as it triggers broader regional 

instability, increases the humanitarian crisis, 

and potentially causes militarization of 

border security and border closings. Both the 

collapse of opposition forces and the Syrian 

central government (tertiary consequence of 

US military/coalition action) could result in 

the positive outcome of a negotiated 

transitional government to secure and 

stabilize Syria. 

Current Syrian Refugee Crisis Response 

Efforts and Policy Framework Shortfalls 

The international community, 

specifically the EU and the U.S., is focusing 

response efforts on humanitarian crisis 

response and external factor mitigation, such 

as targeting smugglers, closing borders, and 

limiting refugee resettlement quotas. To date, 

the U.S. has given $4.5 billion in 

humanitarian assistance, the most of any 

nation, with much of the donation going to 

International Governmental Organizations 

(IGOs) working with the refugees. The U.N. 

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

and the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 

have received the largest share, with much of 

the money going to medical care, 

vaccinations, safe drinking water, food, and 

shelter. The U.S. objective in sending money, 

in part, is to resolve the refugee problem 

abroad without additional commitment.10 

Recently, the majority of EU 

ministers voted to take new steps to respond 

to the refugee crisis. They voted to resettle 

120,000 additional refugees, committed more 

money to the humanitarian effort to improve 

conditions in refugee camps in Egypt, Jordan, 

Turkey and other locations, and to tighten 

border security within the EU. Although 

ministers recognized the need to stabilize 

Syria,

11 no policy pathway or tangible 

commitments were made to formalize the 

Syria stabilization effort beyond more than 

just wishful thinking. A recent editorial 

provided an insightful summary of current

response inadequacies: 

“The mass of refugees searching for asylum in Europe 

has made it obvious that solving the refugee crisis on 

European soil is not feasible. Making border fences 

higher and immigration controls more stringent is the 

wrong approach, as it tackles the symptoms rather than 

the causes of the waves of refugees coming to Europe. 

Granting asylum helps many vulnerable people in 

emergency situations, but it does not stop dictators, 

despots and warlords from arbitrarily and coercively 

persecuting and torturing minorities, opponents and 

dissidents. The key to solving the refugee crisis lies in 

the countries of origin – and, more precisely, in the 

hands of their political leaders.”12

As the conflict refugee migration 

system analysis indicated, response efforts 

and policy frameworks focused on external 

Campaigning Spring 2016 63
factors appear ineffective at best, and 

negligent in preventing suffering and 

indiscriminate violence at worse. 

Recommendations

The 2015 National Security Strategy

(NSS) stated, “...a strong and sustained 

American leadership is essential to a rulesbased international order that promotes 

global security and prosperity as well as the 

dignity and human rights of all peoples.”13

Additionally, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Population, Refugees and Migration, 

Secretary Richard, has recognized that the 

Syrian crisis has gone from a nation in crisis, 

to a region in crisis, to a global crisis.

14 This 

rhetoric alone, without the insights garnered

from the systemic analysis of the mass 

conflict refugee migration system, indicates 

the U.S. and the IC must do more than simply 

throw money at the problem. Security, 

perceived risk to civilian life, and stability are 

the biggest drivers in the mass refugee 

migration system, causing populations to 

displace both internally and externally. 

Though humanitarian aid to limit and prevent 

human suffering is critically important, it 

alone will not stop refugees from migrating if 

they perceive they are subject to 

indiscriminate violence. Targeting the root 

cause of instability and insecurity through 

diplomatic, economic, informational, and 

military efforts must be the foundation of any 

1

World Refugee Crisis: The International 

Community’s Response. Senate Committee on the 

Judiciary Report, Aug 01, 1979. CIS Number 79-

S522-15 2

Archick, Kristin; Margesson, Rhoda. Europe’s 

Migration and Refugee Crisis, CRS In Focus. (IF 

10259). Sept 04, 2015

refugee response policy framework. The IC 

has recently taken steps in the right direction 

as foreign ministers from across the IC met to 

discuss beginning negotiations between the 

Assad regime and opposition forces. A 

January 1, 2016 deadline was established for 

beginning the negotiations and agreement on 

a UN-administered cease-fire mechanism 

was reach.15 But without significant, 

committed effort to establish security within 

Syria, political transition and a cease-fire 

declaration will not change the refugee 

decision cycle until the risk of leaving 

outweighs the risk of staying. 

Author Biographies 

Major Alison M. Hamilton, United States Army, is a 

Public Affairs Officer currently assigned to the Joint 

Public Affairs Support Element in Norfolk, VA. 

Major Hamilton has previously worked as a strategic 

planner for the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs 

and as a congressional liaison and fellow. She has an 

MPS in Legislative Affairs from The George 

Washington University and is USMA class of 1999. 

She is originally from Baltimore, MD. 

Lt Col Jeremy Goodwin, USAF, is a political-military 

planner assigned to the Strategic Plans and Policy 

Directorate (J5) of the Joint Staff. As such, he is 

responsible for coordinating DoD and interagency 

efforts associated with national security strategy and 

policy. Jeremy lives in Northern Virginia with his 

wife Louise, and their two sons, Isaac and Caleb.

3

National Geographic Xpeditions Human Migration 

Guide (6-8). Retrieved 8Nov15 from 

http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpeditions/lesso

ns/09/g68/migrationguidestudent.pdf 

4 Margesson, Rhoda; Chesser, Susan. Syria: Overview 

of the Humanitarian Response. June 24, 2014. CRS 

R43119. Also see UNHCR Syrian Refugee Response 

Site at

http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php.; 

Campaigning Spring 2016 64
Archick, Kristin; Margesson, Rhoda. Europe’s

Migration and Refugee Crisis. September 4, 2015.

CRS IF 10259.; Nazare Albuquerque Abell (1996) The 

impact of international migration on security and

stability, Canadian Foreign Policy journal, 4:1, 84,

DOI: 10.1080/11926422.1996.9673082

5 Karouny, Mariam; Holmes, Oliver. “New Front

opens in Syria as rebels say al Qaeda attack means

war.” July 12, 2013. Retrieved on Nov 10, 2015 from

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/12/us-syriacrisis-idUSBRE96Bo8A20130712

6 Bremmer, Ian. 2015. “Europe Divided.” Time

186, no. 15: 84-85. 

7 See EU Responses and Challenges in Archick, 

Kristen; Margesson, Rhoda. Europe’s Migration and 

Refugee Crisis. September 4, 2015. CRS IF 10259 

8 Massey, Douglas S.; Arango, Joaquin; Hugo, 

Graeme; Kouaouci, Ali; Pellegrino, Adela; Taylor, J 

Edward. Theories of International Migration: A 

Review and Appraisal. Population and 

Development Review. Vol 19, No. 3 (Sept 10993), 

pp. 431-466. 

9 Nkala, Oscaar. EU Soon To Target Boats of People

Smugglers. September 12, 2015. Retrieved from

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/shi

ps/2015/09/12/eu-soon-target-boats-peoplesmugglers/71963854/ 

10 Morello, Carol. U.S. gives $419 million more to aid 

Syrian refugees. The Washington Post. 21 September 

2015.

11 Bremmer, Ian. 2015. “Europe Divided.” Time 186, no. 

15: 84-85. 

12 Straubhaar, Thomas. 2015. “Towards a European 

Refugee Policy.” Intereconomics, September, 238- 239. 

Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 

1, 2015) 

13National Security Strategy, The White House (Issued Feb 

2015), 3 

14 Interview of Secretary Richard, 29Sept15 retrieved from 

http://fpc.state.gov/247447.htm 

15 Jahn, George; Lee, Matthew. Diplomats set plan for 

political change in Syria. November 14, 2015. 

Associated Press. Retrieved from 

http://news.yahoo.com/syria-talks-begin-vienna-under-pallparis-attacks-094454124--politics.html 

Campaigning Spring 2016 65
It’s Time for the United States to 

Turn Down the Aid and Turn Up 

the Pressure on the Government of 

South Sudan for Peace and 

Prosperity

By 

Lt Col Chad Diaz, USAF and MAJ Joshua Fishman, 

USA

Seceding from Sudan on July 9, 2011, 

South Sudan, the world’s newest African 

State and 193rd member of the United 

Nations, remains trapped in a vicious cycle of 

violence and corruption. The United States 

bears some responsibility for its current 

conditions as the principle actor drafting the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 

2005.1 Not only did the U.S. invest 

manpower to draft the CPA, but leading up to 

its creation donated close to $10 billion in 

development aid in the region over the years 

to both the governments of Sudan and South 

Sudan to bring about peace and stability in 

central, northern, and the Horn of Africa.2

Although the citizens of South Sudan are 

independent and free as of July 2011, the 

fledgling country is drowning in a sea of 

problems. The U.S. needs to step up and 

reassess the types of rescue efforts needed to 

get the country afloat. Diplomatic efforts 

combined with throwing large sums of 

money and aid at the problems in South 

Sudan are not achieving the desired effects. 

To understand and address the issues facing 

South Sudan and to develop a strategy to 

bring about positive change, it is important to 

layout a process. First, there needs to be an 

understanding of the history and the current 

threats existing in this conflicted region of the 

world. Second, a general understand of the 

United States’ strategic direction and national 

interests in the region. Third, development of 

systems and modeling to understand the 

environment through patterns, relationships, 

and interrelationships with associated first-, 

second-, and third-order effects. Fourth, the 

identification and description of social 

change theories related to key stakeholders. 

Finally, a proposed alternative strategy or 

strategies that, if applied, dismantles the 

failing system currently in place.

Pre-South Sudan Independence

Prior to the breakup of South Sudan 

and Sudan, Sudan underwent two periods of 

civil war stemming back to its independence 

in 1956.3 The major periods of conflict were 

1956-1972 and 1983-2005 in which an 

estimated three million lives were lost due to 

conflict, disease, drought, and starvation.4

Violence emerged primarily between 

populations living in the north, 

predominately Arab Africans who were 

Muslim, and the South, predominately NonArab Africans whose religions were 

Christianity and Animism, over language, 

religion, government representation, and 

resource access.5 A respite from the fighting 

came in 1972 with the “Addis Ababa 

Agreement” that achieved a short-term peace 

for 10 years with the southern portion, 

consisting of the current South Sudan

territory, gaining temporary autonomy.6

Another flare up of violence occurred from 

1983 until 2005, culminating with the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement and a 

period of stability for six years until a final 

vote in January 2011 granting South Sudan 

permanent independence in July 2011.7

 

Campaigning Spring 2016 66
Post-South Sudan Independence

When Sudan lost the South Sudanese 

territory, it also lost 75% of its natural oil 

reserves. This loss brought about immediate 

problems as can be imagined. South Sudan 

refused to pay transit fees to the Sudanese and 

cut oil production. Additionally, South Sudan 

accused the Sudanese administration 

(Khartoum) of stealing over 600 million 

dollars of oil. To add to that, South Sudan 

refused to pay compensation fees to Sudan 

since its secession despite the appeals of the 

African Union (AU) as a means to broker a 

peace deal and stabilize both nations’ 

economies.8

 Subsequent international 

diplomacy among nations and international 

governmental organizations were able to 

resolve the oil argument with South Sudan 

agreeing to pay reparation fees to Sudan for a 

period of several years. However, oil in 

general, where it is drawn, where it flows, 

how it is refined, and where the profits go, 

remains vehemently contested between the 

two states. 

Although the South Sudanese are 

predominately described as non-Arab with 

Christianity and animism as the more popular 

religions, over 200 ethnic tribal affiliations 

exist. Tribal make-up primarily consists of 

the Dinkas (11%), Nuer (5%), Azande, Bari, 

Shilluk and Anwak (3%). The inter-ethnic 

struggles inside the country prevent the 

notion of solidarity. Further adding to the 

problem is a perceived misrepresentation of 

minority tribes in the government. Many of 

the cabinet ministries in South Sudan are held 

by Dinkas, who are of the same tribal 

background as South Sudan’s first and 

current president, Salva KIIR. It is readily 

apparent that South Sudanese government 

seats are awarded due to tribal affiliation 

versus regional populations.9

 

Roughly five identified border region 

issues need to be addressed by both the 

Sudanese and South Sudanese governments. 

Some of these border areas directly resulted 

in violent clashes due to proximity to oil 

fields, such as the Heglig Oilfield10, whereas 

others, such as a buffer zone straddling 

between Sudan and South Sudan, referred to 

as Abyei, contains oil reserves and tribal 

residents argue over access rights. These 

flashpoints could escalate to full-scale war 

and threaten peace and prosperity in this 

region.11

In addition to the energy and border 

issues, infrastructure is poor at best. South 

Sudan contains virtually no transportation 

networks. It is believed that out of a roadway 

network of approximately 12,600 km, only 

4,000 is drivable. Materials to improve roads 

are costly as the materials need to be 

imported. The country also lags in agriculture 

with no modern irrigation system, to include

an absent public water supply system 

throughout the country.12 Despite strong 

international ties with the United States and

Israel as well as regional partners within the 

eastern African countries of Eretria, Ethiopia, 

Kenya, South Sudan continues to fail in 

providing peace and security, good economic 

governance, a strong, and fully representative 

government, and opportunities and 

development for its citizens.13

U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa

In July 2015, President Barak Obama 

conducted a series of speaking engagements 

Campaigning Spring 2016 67
in Kenya, including an address to the Kenyan 

people at Kasarani, the 2015 Global 

Entrepreneurship Summit (GES), and a 

bilateral state address with the Kenyan 

President in Nairobi. In each of his speeches, 

President Obama spoke of the desired 

conditions resident in his 2012 U.S. Strategy 

Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Leading off, the 

President highlighted that Kenya has taken 

the lead in the region as a model where ethnic 

affiliations are being overcome with a sense 

of solidarity. It is this notion of solidarity that 

leads to stability and prosperity.14

Furthermore, Kenya is a nation which enjoys 

true freedom of the press which holds leaders 

accountable.15

Despite progress, however, many 

challenges still face Kenya and the African 

continent as a whole, especially when it 

comes to nations such as South Sudan. The 

President indicated that economic growth is 

not shared among all African state citizens 

resulting in socio-economic disparity. There 

are also widespread regions within African 

nations where growth and development 

efforts are marginal or non-existent—what 

can be referred to as spatial unevenness.16 As 

Africa’s newest nation, South Sudan lags 

well behind in the global modernization 

process. Large-scale corruption is one of the 

central activities undermining preventing 

relatively new African nations from

developing prosperity through access to local 

and global markets. As President Obama put 

it, “Pervasive corruption with bribery as the 

mechanism correlates to stagnation of job 

creation and unbalanced distribution of 

resources throughout a nation, such as clean 

water and electricity.”17 

The President reemphasized the 

pillars of his U.S. Strategy Toward SubSaharan Africa by focusing on strong, 

inclusive, and more transparent and 

democratic governance. Good governance 

leads to economic and social development by

providing opportunity and prosperity for all 

and not just for select groups. It also helps to 

bring about a feeling of national identity.18

Good governance ensures rights equal to 

more citizens and plants the idea that 

differences amongst tribes and ethnicities is a 

strength and not a weakness. Corruption 

practices must be eradicated not only at lower 

levels, but at the highest levels, too. By 

enforcing anti-corruption laws at all levels, 

nations can slowly change social attitudes of 

the acceptance of illegal practices.”19 

The President wrapped up his speech 

by reaffirming that the U.S. will continue to 

partner not only with Kenya, but all nations 

in Africa who strive to and can provide food 

security, utilities throughout all intra-state 

areas, urban and rural; improve health and 

preventative medicine; reduce emissions to 

slow climate change; and publicly denounce 

and physically combat violent extremists and 

violent extremist organizations.20

Relationship of U.S. Strategy Toward SubSaharan African and South Sudan 

To analyze U.S. government 

perspectives and interests toward the current 

South Sudan situation, the 2012 U.S. Strategy 

Toward Sub-Saharan Africa is used as the 

baseline system for analysis. This strategy is 

based on four main pillars: strengthen 

democratic institutions, spur economic 

growth, trade & investment, advance peace & 

security, and promote opportunity & 

Campaigning Spring 2016 68
development.21 These pillars and 

associated sub-pillars provide the 

various elements forming the 

framework of this strategy and 

allows the analysis of it as a 

system. These elements and their 

associated trends are: 

- The degree of strong 

democratic institutions – 

increasing slowly

- The level of peace and 

security – decreasing 

slowly

- The amount of oil 

production – increasing 

slowly

- The amount of 

infrastructure – increasing slowly

- The degree of tribal/ethnic 

relationships – decreasing moderately

- The degree of climate change 

programs – increasing slowly

- The degree of opportunity and 

development – increasing slowly

- The level of stability – decreasing 

slowly

- The level of education – steady

- The amount of economic prosperity 

– increasing moderately

- The level of health care programs – 

decreasing slowly

These nine elements are shown in 

the Behavior-Over-Time (BOT) graphs 

below (Figure 1) as an example. The U.S. 

Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa did 

not associate specific time periods with any 

of the factors or variables, therefore, the 

time axis is non-specific. 

Individual behavior over time graphs 

often do not provide any additional 

information for analysis; however, when 

combined with other trends correlation can 

become more evident. In Figure 2 below, the 

nine individual BOTs were superimposed on 

one another to provide several potential 

linkages. The graphic depicts possible 

relationships between the degree of strong 

democratic institutions, the degree of 

Figure 1. Behavior-Over-Time Elements

Figure 2.

Consolidated Behavior-Over-Time Elements

Campaigning Spring 2016 69
opportunity and development, and the 

amount of infrastructure; all increasing 

slowly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Conversely, 

the graph shows potential relationships 

between the declining factors of stability, 

tribal relations, and peace and security.

Causal Loop Diagrams 

The next several causal loop diagrams 

generate a visual depiction of the issues 

facing South Sudan and the relationship with 

the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan 

Africa. Figure 3 is our initial understanding 

of the U.S. Strategy as published in June 

2012. The strategy entails leveraging a peace 

and security element, an opportunity and 

development element, and an economic 

growth, trade, and investment element on the 

left side of the diagram and a stability 

element on the right side. Both sides are tied 

together in the center by an element of strong, 

inclusive democratic institutions along with 

an initial reinforcing linkage between 

economic growth, trade, and investment and 

local and global prosperity. In other words, 

economic growth, trade, and investment 

leads to local and global prosperity and local 

and global prosperity reinforces economic 

growth, trade, and investment. The rest of the 

offshoots stemming from the major elements 

are one-way relationships and expressed in a 

positive manner. 

As most models are necessarily 

general, it is important to understand more

complex relationships starting with economic 

growth, trade, and investment. In Figure 4, 

economic growth, trade, and investment 

(EGTI) goes beyond facilitating strong, 

inclusive democratic institutions. EGTI

additionally facilitates peace and security 

along with opportunity and development, 

both reinforcing relationships as depicted by 

the “R;” there is a strong relationship 

between EGTI and internal and external 

Figure 3.

Campaigning Spring 2016 70
security as well as EGTI and stability (Figure 

4). Additional reinforcing loops are identified 

between peace and security and strong, 

inclusive democratic institutions and 

between opportunity and development and 

strong, inclusive, democratic institutions. 

Figure 5 highlights the effect strong, 

inclusive democratic institutions have on 

other major and secondary CLD elements. 

Not only is there a positively definitive 

Figure 4.

Figure 5.

Campaigning Spring 2016 71
linkage between strong, inclusive democratic 

institutions and stability, but a few more 

positive and implicit relationships. Strong, 

inclusive democratic institutions begets tribal 

and ethnic diversified strength and 

acceptance, the notion of national solidarity, 

internal and external security, and improved 

and mutually beneficial international 

relationship. 

Figure 6 illustrates the effect 

opportunity and development have on other 

primary and secondary CLD elements. Not 

only are there positive and reinforcing

relationships between this element and 

strong, inclusive democratic institutions and 

economic growth, trade, and investment, but 

additional implied relationships as well. 

Opportunity and development facilitates 

peace and security, educated citizens, 

optimism and idealism, tribal and ethnic 

diversified strength and acceptance, and local 

and global security. 

Figure 7 portrays the effect the 

element of peace and security opportunity 

have on other major and secondary CLD 

elements. Easily identifiable and positive, 

reinforcing linkages exist between this 

element and strong, inclusive democratic 

institutions and economic growth, trade, and 

investment. Additional implicit relationships 

extend from peace and security out to 

tribal/ethnic diversity strength and 

acceptance, local and global prosperity, 

internal and external security. Although not 

depicted, peace and security will also lead to 

a sense of national solidarity. 

Figure 6.

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The CLD in Figure 8 highlights the 

numerous positive reinforcing relationships. 

Additionally, positive, reinforcing 

interrelationships exist between the subelements themselves, specifically 

interrelationships between local and global 

prosperity and national solidarity, and 

between local and global prosperity and 

internal and external security. 

Figure 7.

Figure 8.

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The CLD in Figure 9 portrays the 

interrelationships between the element of 

national solidarity and other CLD elements. 

In addition to the reciprocal relationship with 

local and global prosperity, national 

solidarity leads to tribal/ethnic diversified 

strength and acceptance, internal and external 

security, and improved and mutually 

beneficial international relationships. 

Figure 9.

Figure 10.

Campaigning Spring 2016 74
The iridescent CLD in Figure 10 

integrates the identified specific and implied 

elements and associated connectivity. When 

assimilated, the elemental relationships and 

interrelationships makes one understand the 

high level of complexity associated not only 

with the President’s overarching National 

Security Strategy, but a targeted strategy 

directed at Sub-Saharan Africa 

From a systems thinking perspective, 

one can identify both the leverage elements 

(green) and the outcome elements (blue) as 

seen in Figure 11. Interestingly, the element 

of opportunity and development appears to 

affect more elements than the element of 

economic growth, trade, and investment. 

Unfortunately, opportunity and development 

takes time. Opportunity and development are

delayed in a country like South Sudan and it 

will potentially take ten years or more for 

South Sudan’s system to align with the U.S. 

Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan African 

system. While the leverage element of 

economic growth, trade, and investment will 

generally affect a system sooner, the 

magnitude of the effects could be less than 

the effects driven by the engines of 

opportunity and development and peace and 

security. As was postulated in the 

introduction to this argument, despite the 

billions of dollars in aid invested by U.S. and 

other multinational partners, the current 

system in South Sudan is not improving, it is 

failing. 

 

The outcome variables shown in 

Figure 11 are strong, inclusive democratic 

institutions and stability. Stability emerges as 

the element affected by the greatest number 

of merging linear and reciprocated 

connections. Combining the leverage 

element of opportunity and development with 

the outcome element of strong, inclusive 

Figure 11.

Campaigning Spring 2016 75
democratic institutions, emphasis should be 

placed on both in the development of a 

strategic approach. Perhaps the 2012 U.S. 

Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa should 

have focused less on economic growth, trade, 

and investment and focused more on stability 

ameliorated by opportunity and development.

In Figure 12, identified threats against 

a stable, secure, and prosperous South Sudan 

and a stable, secure, and prosperous SubSaharan Africa as a whole are shown. One 

can ascertain from the diagram that the 

stronger of the threats undermining the 

strategy to stabilize South Sudan are the 

armed militias operating inside the country, 

corruption and cronyism, and tribal/ethnic 

and gender discrimination and oppression. 

Not depicted, but worthy of mentioning, are 

the interrelationships among the threats. For 

example, corruption and cronyism beget 

criminal networks which also beget 

trafficking in persons, social unevenness, and 

spatial unevenness. Corruption and cronyism

also beget a kleptocracy and tribal/ethnic 

divisiveness. The divisiveness is connected 

to armed militias, which are further tied to 

recruitment of child soldiers. 

Global Trends

Global trends are a useful tool that

can be applied to further describe and analyze 

conditions in South Sudan supporting a 

strategy to lead to desired change. The top 

global trends affecting The U.S. Strategy 

Toward Sub-Saharan Africa are derived from 

the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) 

Global Trends 2030 document and Richard 

Watson’s Table of Trends & Technologies 

for the World in 2020. The following trends 

selected are:

- Income inequality

Figure 12.

Campaigning Spring 2016 76
- Increased ideological landscape

- Multiculturalism

- Diffusion of power 

- Economic growth of U.S. 

- Food, water, energy nexus

- Increased interstate conflict

- Increased great power convergence

- Decrease in intrastate conflict

- Hedonism 

In addition to global trends, the following 

endogenous variables were selected: 

- Need for effective, united, sustained 

military

- Need for governmental balance of 

power 

- Need for an educated and trained 

civilian workforce 

- Need to have a national identity

- Desire to have an economic bilateral 

agreement with Sudan

A force field analysis based upon the 

identified global trends is shown in Figure 

13. The purpose of the South Sudanese

system is situated in the middle of the 

diagram, South Sudan’s attempt to establish 

a secure national order post-independence. 

Running down the left- and right-hand sides 

of the diagram are the variables and 

associated intensities of each trend. In 

addition, assessments of each variable as 

either acting in a positive or negative way 

against the system’s purpose in indicated. 

Rated 1 through 10, with 1 being the lowest 

intensity, and 10 the highest intensity, each 

side is added up to get an aggregate of the 

positive and negative trends on the system. In 

this case, although there are fewer negative 

trends on the right side than positive trends 

on the left, the negative trends’ combined 

weight (32) was more than the positive (22). 

Therefore, our identified global trends tend to 

have an overall stronger negative effect on 

Figure 13.

Campaigning Spring 2016 77
South Sudan than a positive effect. The 

stronger negative trends can be attributed to 

historical and recent conflicts, poor economic 

governance, and weak democratic 

institutions. To strengthen the intensity of the 

positive trends and weaken the intensity of 

the negative trends, stronger international 

involvement is essential to reinforce trends 

supporting positive change. 

Building on global trends, income 

inequality was selected to further develop an 

implications tree out to the tertiary order of 

effects. From our developed implications 

trees, many potential implications are 

derived. In Figure 14 below, most of the 1st, 

2nd and 3rd order effects indicate negative 

implications, which is what is being observed

in South Sudan today. 

In Figure 15, another implications 

tree was developed based on the current 

South Sudanese system with the desirability 

and likelihood of each implication 

happening. From this tree we can surmise 

several conclusions: most of the implications 

are undesirable with a high probability of 

occurrence; in addition, the desirable 

implications are the result of some form of 

external intervention. From this, we can 

assess that South Sudan will not prosper on 

its own. It will require the involvement of 

regional or international influences; similar 

to the level of U.S. involvement required to 

finalize the comprehensive peace agreement 

which resulted in South Sudan’s 

independence. 

Figure 14.

Campaigning Spring 2016 78
Alternative Futures

Pertaining to the futures diagram in 

Figure 16 below, two variables with a high 

level of uncertainty were selected: the 

establishment of a stable South Sudanese 

government and cultural acceptance. The 

upper right-hand quadrant represents a future 

in which a stable government is established 

and multiculturalism (tribal/ethnic diversity) 

is accepted. The lower right-hand quadrant 

assumes a future with a failed government, 

but multicultural acceptance. The lower lefthand quadrant represents a future with a 

failed government and continued conflict 

among differing tribal/ethnic groups. The 

upper left-hand quadrant assumes a future 

with an established government, but 

continued ethnic/tribal divisiveness and 

conflict. The quadrants are labeled as 

descriptors of these alternative futures. 

Some of the triggers or indicators for the 

upper right-hand quadrant (Bright Horizon) 

are:

- U.S., regional and/or international 

organizations lead diplomatic 

Figure 15.

Figure 16.

Campaigning Spring 2016 79
solutions to resolve South Sudanese / 

Sudanese border and region disputes 

- International agencies establish 

programs to reduce corruption and 

reinforce rule of law

- Social programs established to 

incorporate differing cultural factions 

to strengthen trust and understanding 

- Oil production issues resolved 

between South Sudan / Sudan as well 

as established policies/practices in 

place to distribute wealth among the 

South Sudanese tribal/ethnic groups 

- Lasting resolutions achieved, such as 

a revised comprehensive peace 

agreement, among rival South 

Sudanese political factions and 

peaceful elections established to 

enhance government legitimacy 

Some of the triggers or indicators for the 

lower right-hand quadrant (Unknown 

Tomorrow) are:

- Tensions remain along South 

Sudanese / Sudanese border 

- Rival South Sudanese political 

factions unable to resolve differences 

and government institutions 

breakdown and are ineffective 

- Differing tribal/ethnic groups 

collaborate to overcome inept 

government support structure 

- Corruption remains rampant among 

government/military institutions

- Regional/international efforts to 

stabilize government are ineffective 

Some of the triggers or indicators for the 

lower left-hand quadrant (Gloom & Doom) 

are:

- South Sudanese / Sudanese border 

disputes escalates into military 

conflict

- Rival South Sudanese political 

factions unable to resolve differences 

and escalation into civil war

- International / regional powers 

remain on the sidelines and do not 

become involved in South Sudanese 

internal and external conflicts

- Oil production stops, increasing 

regional poverty levels and 

exacerbating the Sudan / South Sudan 

wars, further causing disruption in 

global oil markets

- Violence erupts among the varying 

tribal/ethnic groups, as distrust and 

blame is at an all-time-high, leading 

to IDPs inside South Sudan and South 

Sudanese refugees in the bordering 

countries 

Some of the triggers or indicators for the 

upper left-hand quadrant (Unstable Balance) 

are:

- Global power broker tenuous 

agreement among South Sudanese 

political factions

- Emphasis placed on strengthening 

current government institutions, but 

do not effectively address corruption 

practices

- Oil production remains stable, but 

wealth distribution remains a 

challenge

- Resolution achieved over Sudanese 

border disputes, however, both sides 

remain apprehensive 

- Tensions among the South Sudanese 

cultural regions, such as the state of 

Campaigning Spring 2016 80
Jonglei and the Abyei Area, remains 

high as the government has failed to 

take the appropriate steps to improve 

stability and arrive at a diplomatic 

solution to curb the violence 

Social Change

One cannot expect to manage change 

to a system without somewhat of a firm 

understanding on the concept of social 

change and the leading theories describing 

social change. When discussing social 

change, one must keep in mind that it is a 

product of the academic discipline of 

sociology, the study of humans in group 

settings. Sociology can be subdivided into 

social structure and social change.22 Whereas 

social structure focuses on the nature of 

characteristics associated with tribes, groups, 

and societies over time, social dynamics 

focuses specifically on studying the nature of 

the changes to those tribes, groups, and 

societies over time.23 For the purpose of 

strategic foresight, social change is more 

important than social structure based largely 

on the fact that strategic foresight looks to 

both the immediate and long term future.24

To develop a strategy, one must understand 

drivers of social change and make some wellinformed predictions on the future and how 

change might influence that future. Social 

structure is less important as it looks at the 

present and the past in which a great deal of 

hard data is readily available.25 

Despite the existence of numerous 

publications devoted on the topic of social 

change alone, sociologists and strategic 

thinkers are unable to arrive at any unifying 

theory identifying and explaining social 

change, but do present a list of widely 

accepted theories related to social change.26

There is no single explanation describing 

social change, but a string of explanations 

that perhaps fit the model or system that one 

is trying to bring about change to a more 

preferable future.27 Social change is uniquely 

challenging in that it relies on human 

consciousness which is not fully 

understood.28 For each of widely agreed upon 

social change theories, critical assumptions 

exist for each to mitigate 

misunderstandings.29 Military planners and 

strategists identify assumptions to identify 

gaps of information when promulgating 

plans. Concerted efforts are made to fill in 

those gaps to continue or refine plans with an 

ultimate goal of turning assumptions into 

facts. 

The following key stakeholders 

associated with improving conditions in 

South Sudan, to include a description of the 

applicable social change theories, are as 

follows: 

- U.S. – Technology Theory, Progress 

Theory, Market Theory 

- Israel – Culture Theory, Progress 

Theory, Technology Theory 

- China – Progress Theory, Power 

Theory, Conflict Theory 

- South Sudan – Cycle Theory, Culture 

Theory, Conflict Theory 

- Kenya – Progress Theory, Market 

Theory, Culture Theory 

- Sudan – Cycle Theory, Culture 

Theory, Conflict Theory 

The U.S. was selected because 

without its support, South Sudan does not 

secede from Sudan and become an 

independent nation. The Obama 

Campaigning Spring 2016 81
administration indicated, and continues to do 

so, that it will provide support for the budding 

nation.30 China was identified as a key 

stakeholder as South Sudan is increasing its 

relationship with the Chinese despite China’s 

historical ties to Sudan. South Sudan is open 

to building a stronger rapport with China over 

oil and infrastructure.31 As for Israel, South 

Sudan considers Israel as a close ally and 

relates to Israel’s challenges and ability to 

find solutions and become a prosperous 

nation. Israel can provide security 

cooperation through foreign military sales as 

well as provide education system models in 

which South Sudan sorely needs.32 Sudan 

was selected due to its historical relationship 

with South Sudan and the fact that many 

disputes, conflicts, and hostilities remain 

between these two countries. Not 

unexpectedly, change theories for Sudan are 

almost identical for South Sudan. Lastly, the 

African nation of Kenya is included as it is 

viewed by the Obama administration as the 

model for stability and prosperity in the 

region. In addition, if South Sudan can 

sustain peace, it can potentially generate 

billions of dollars in revenue through oil 

exports to Kenya and other eastern African 

states, such as Eretria and Ethiopia.33 

 Social change in the U.S. can be 

described most adequately by Progress 

Theory. Progress Theory, general 

improvement over long periods of time, is the

dominant explanation of social change in 

Western culture.34 Progress Theory 

postulates that while most Western societies 

generally respect the societies and cultures of 

other countries, it is the modern, Western 

society that serves as the bellwether for 

human development and innovation.35 Two 

critical assumptions for the Progress Theory 

are that one, today’s society is better than 

societies of the past, and two, future societies 

will be better than the present.36 Opposition 

pundits of Progress Theory express that the 

theory is too overly optimistic.37

Furthermore, in support of Progress Theory, 

“the U.S. believes that there is a universal 

standard for judging the value of societies, in 

other words, those that do not conform are 

wrong.”38 With Progress Theory, we see a 

direct parallel with the U.S. Strategy Toward 

Sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. will continue 

to partner with South Sudan and other 

African nations as long as they strive for and 

accept strong, democratic institutions, spur 

economic growth, trade, and investment, 

advance peace and security, and promote 

opportunity and development – all Western 

ideals. 

On the opposite side of social change 

theory spectrum, we have Conflict Theory. 

We see Conflict Theory as the current 

dominating theory driving social change in 

South Sudan. Conflict Theory presupposes 

that change occurs as a result of the conflict 

among different groups and individuals in a 

society or organization.39 The assumptions 

for this theory are the following: “one, that 

society is not a unitary entity, but a collection 

of different groups in conflict with each 

other, working to achieve their own goals and 

execute their own agendas, two, that social 

change effects different groups and people at 

both different ways and different times, three, 

that conflict binds more people closely 

together, as long as radical conflict does not 

threaten the very existence of the society, and 

four, that conflict among groups motivates 

people to work harder for their goals and 

Campaigning Spring 2016 82
increases the amount and the rate of social 

change.”40

We believe that Conflict Theory is 

what is driving social change in South Sudan. 

Most of the conflict is the product of 

tribal/ethnic competition against one another 

inside South Sudan. Additionally, there is 

tremendous spatial unevenness throughout 

the states of South Sudan. Some states and 

regions have access to clean water, 

electricity, cellular phones, whereas other 

regions remain in the dark. The Southern 

Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement 

(SPLM), the current ruling party in South 

Sudan, is in conflict with any and all 

opposing parties and, furthermore, is more 

focused on achieving its own goals and has 

its own agenda with little regard for all of 

South Sudan’s citizens. 

Recommended Actions

Current policies aimed at improving 

the conditions in South Sudan are ineffective. 

The spending of vast sums of U.S. taxpayer 

money, tens of millions of dollars, is not 

achieving the desired effects in this country. 

The diplomatic instrument of power is too 

blunt and engagements with the government 

of South Sudan are ineffective. President 

Obama himself publicly stated that South 

Sudan must develop another comprehensive 

peace agreement to end the violence. 

The reality is that a country like South 

Sudan is not a failing state, rather, the current 

system is working in the way it is intended, 

for a few to acquire wealth and power at the 

cost of killing and suffering of many.41 To 

change this system, a multifaceted approach

is recommended. The approach entails 

leveraging both economic incentives and 

disincentives as well as diplomatic 

disincentives. A more hardline approach is 

what is needed to influence regime change in 

South Sudan. A hardline approach is also 

what is needed if one argues that mechanism 

driving change in South Sudan can be 

explained by Conflict Theory. 

With this new hardline approach the 

following actions are recommended: that 

monetary donations from the U.S. be scaled 

back and pressure applied to 

intergovernmental organizations; the United 

Nations and the African Union provide even 

greater protection to innocent South 

Sudanese citizens regardless of tribal and 

ethnic affiliation; and the money the U.S. 

continues to invest in South Sudan for 

opportunity and development purposes and 

peace and security purposes must be audited. 

Audits must come in the form of investigative 

reports and assessments on the ground 

through intergovernmental, interagency, and 

NGO coordination. Measures of 

effectiveness that are appropriate and 

quantifiable on whether financial aid is 

achieving the desirable effects in South 

Sudan must be drafted and used in testing 

whether or not the conditions in South Sudan 

are improving. Should assessments indicate 

that U.S. dollars are continually not 

producing desired effects, then less and less 

amounts will be invested. 

A proposed economic disincentive is 

to keep the implementation of harsh 

economic sanctions available. Referring once 

again to Mr. Prendergast’s idea that in order 

to break up the status quo in South Sudan and 

given the current profitability of conflict,

U.S. policy efforts must center on how to 

make war more costly than peace.42

Campaigning Spring 2016 83
Sanctions on individuals and entities, such as 

illicit financial networks and networks 

responsible for the flow of arms and 

resources to warring factions, need to be 

implemented. In other words, we must follow 

the money. The financial networks that are 

funding violence must be frozen. This is no 

easy task, but with coordination among the 

US departments, IGOs, and foreign 

governments, this indirect approach could 

eventually lead to better behavior on South 

Sudan’s part. 

The next recommendation to bring 

justice to those state and non-state actors who 

continue corruptive practices and rob the 

general South Sudanese population of money 

which could be invested into opportunity and 

development to improve quality of life. 

Again, this is very challenging as corruption 

has become the norm in South Sudan as well 

as throughout most of Africa since the end of 

colonialism. Working with the Department of 

Justice, IGOs, and foreign allies, there needs 

to be arrests, legal prosecutions, and 

sentencing for not only low-level corruptors, 

but the elites as well. If the South Sudanese 

see that those guilty of corruption are being 

held accountable, arrested, tried, and 

sentenced, the idea that crime does not pay 

could begin to percolate. Another message 

tied to justice is that no one is safe, not even 

the president of South Sudan, should the 

president be found to be a direct source of 

corruption. 

A diplomatic disincentive to improve 

the conditions in South Sudan is to publicly 

denounce those actors who continue to 

undermine relief and development efforts. 

Public condemnation of irresponsible 

individuals and entities on the regional and 

global stage could lead to marginalization or 

removal of these nefarious groups and 

individuals from governmental or military 

positions. Incentives need to be developed to 

have the Southern Peoples’ Liberation Army 

(SPLA) remain unbiased and not side with 

certain tribal and ethnic groups and wage 

violence. 

Educational reforms need to be 

pushed hard. According to CIA World 

Factbook, the literacy rate of South Sudan is 

27%. If South Sudan stands any chance of 

breaking out of a perpetual cycle of violence 

and corruption, its citizens need to be literate. 

This can be accomplished if models of 

education from country’s like the U.S. and 

Israel are adopted. Furthermore, literacy must 

be extended to women and girls. As President 

Obama stated, governments that discriminate 

against individuals, be it due to tribal/ethnic 

make-up or gender make-up, are doomed to 

fail in keeping up with global markets. 

Lastly, a completely new draft of a 

comprehensive peace agreement and 

constitution of South Sudan. Diplomacy did 

work and was effective in the first 

comprehensive peace agreement in which 

peace was achieved and South Sudan became 

an independent country. In fact, South 

Sudanese came together as a nation and 

voted, 98%, to secede from Sudan. This 

indicates that the majority of South Sudan 

can unite and most want to see improved 

conditions for themselves and their children. 

Without a hard stand against corruption, 

holding high level officials accountable, and 

allowing financial networks to continue to 

supply weapons and resources to support 

intra-state and interstate violence, the current 

South Sudanese system remains intact.

Campaigning Spring 2016 84
Author Biographies 

Lieutenant Colonel Chad Diaz, USAF. Lt Col Diaz is 

currently serving as a Deputy Division Chief at 

USSTRATCOM, J2 staff. He was commissioned 

through ROTC at Iowa State University in 1997 where 

he earned a BA in political science. He earned an MA 

in International relations from the University of 

Oklahoma in 2003. Prior to his current assignment, Lt 

Col Diaz served on the Aggressor Tactics Group staff 

at Nellis, AFB.

Major Joshua Fishman, USA, graduated from the 

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor with a B.S. in 

1 Lyman, Princeton N., 2013, "The United States and 

South Sudan: A Relationship Under Pressure." The 

Ambassadors REVIEW, Fall: 13-17 The CPA 

ultimately gave rise to South Sudan’s independence by 

authorizing a referendum in which South Sudan voted 

an overwhelming 98% to break away from Sudan and 

become its own sovereign nation

2 Ibid. 3 (Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook: 

South Sudan 2015)

4 Ibid. 5 Sarwar, Nadia, 2012, "Post-Independence South 

Sudan: An Era of Hope and Challenges," Strategic 

Studies. 6 Ibid. 7 Central Intelligence Agency, 2015, World Factbook: 

South Sudan. Aug 6. Accessed Jul - Aug 2015. 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/od.html. 8 Sarwar, 2012.

9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Obama, Barack H, 2015, "US President Barack 

Obama's Speech to Kenyans at Safaricom Indoor 

Arena, Kasarani Stadium," Nairobi, Kenya, Jul 26. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 

Biopsychology and Cognitive Science and earned his 

commission through ROTC in 2001. Prior to his 

current assignment, MAJ Fishman served as the 

Deputy Chief of the United States Forces Korea J32 

Operation Assessment Division and Deputy Director 

of the Military Transition Subcommittee in support of 

the ROK-US Strategic Alliance Initiative. MAJ 

Fishman is currently assigned to the Army Joint 

Support Team at Hurlburt Field, FL where he is a 

Small Group Instructor for Air-To-Ground 

Integration.

17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 The White House, 2012, U.S. Strategy Towards SubSaharan Africa, Washington D.C.: The White House. 22 Bishop, P., & Hines, A. 2012. "Social change," in

Teaching about the future, by P. Hines and A. Bishop, 

112-156. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Sari 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Bishop and Hines, 2012 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 McCauley, Daniel H, 2015. "The Practitioner's 

Guide to Strategic Foresight," NSA Hampton Roads: 

Joint Forces Staff College, April.

39 Bishop and Hines, 2012. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid.

Campaigning Spring 2016 85
Campaigning is a Joint Forces Staff College journal designed as a forum for students, faculty, 

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thinking on current and future operations at the operational level of war. 

 

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Campaigning Spring 2016 86
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execution of joint operations. 

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Educate national security professionals to plan and execute joint, multinational, and interagency 

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attitudes, and perspectives. 

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Campaigning Spring 2016 87