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ON POINT

THE JOURNAL OF Avw HISTORY

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ARMY HISTORY

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AMERICAN ANTIAIRCRAFTARTILLERY

GHOONG

IN WORLD WAR

UP

II

By Bryon Greenwald

In combat, no one really cares who gets credit for the changes

a unit makes to survive and win. The paternity of victory is ir

relevant; learning while fighting is key, getting better is good, and

living beats dying.

Not so when one studies military innovation and combat ad

aptation, where some scholars look for specific causality, while

others take a broader, non-linear approach. Those who focus on

causality fixate on whether the change was led from the top down,

pushed from the bottom up, or created from the middle out; the

degree of inter- or intra-service rivalry; and if single- or doubleloop learning occuned. Most military historians, by instinct and

training, however, maintain that military innovation and adapta

tion have multiple, overlapping causes. Indeed, military historians

Freely accept the non-linear nature of change and expect every in

novative or adaptive effort to include several “schools” favored by

those looking for distinct causality.

This article briefly examines how the U.S. Army of World War

II learned to stop shooting at its own airplanes and start down

ing Axis aircraft. It traces the evolving antiaircraft artillery (AAA)

force from its first battles at Pearl Harbor, Clark Field, and Kasser

me Pass, through the process of wartime learning and adaptation to

its ultimate success in air and ground battles across the Mediterra

nean and Northwest Europe. Much like the larger Army it upport

ed, the AAA Force made several mistakes in the rapid transition

Doughboys fire a machine gun ata German observation plane near

Plateau Chemin des Dames, France, % March1918. The U.S.Army

entered World War I with no dedicated antiaircraft artillery (AAA)

units but it hastily formed the Antiaircraft Service to train some

12,000 soldiers to shoot down enemy aircraft. (National Archives)
Ii

Coast artillerymen train on an Ml 918 3-inch mobile

antiaircraft gun in September 1926. After World War I, the

Coast Artillery Corps assumed the responsibility for AAA

units. (National Archives)

a

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from peace to war. Frequently undertrained and ill-equipped. anliaircraft

units initially lost out to more numer

ous Axis pilots who flew higher and

faster than expected. As antiaircraft

units transitioned from defending

static assets to protecting mobile

forces, learning and positive change

occurred at all levels. Stateside train

ing became more realistic, In-theater

coordination between air and an

tiaircraft units reflected a growing

appreciation for the importance of

a synchronized air defense scheme.

Finally, work with combined arms

forces in training paid off in combat

as antiaircraft units not only enforced

local air superiority over their divi

sions and corps, but also provided

them with deadly accurate direct and

indirect ground fire, in many cases

saving ground units from complete

destruction.

Along the way, this force de

stroyed or severely damaged 5,518

IN THE END, THIS BRIEF

EXAMINATION OF WORLD

WAR II AMERICAN MA

SUGGESTS THAT NO

SINGLE THEORY—TOP

DOWN, BOTTOM UP

MIDDLE OUT INTER

OR INTRA-SERVICE

RIVALRY OR SINGLE

OR DOUBLE LOOP

LEARNING—IS SUFFICIENT

TO UNDERSTAND HOW

INNOVATION AND

ADAPTATION OCCURS IN

COMBAT

Italian, German. and Japanese air

craft, a figure that in isolation is ol’

no significance. Added to the 15.880

aerial victory’ victories granted to

the U.S. Army Air Forces during the

war, the total accounts for over twen

ty-five percent of all Axis aircraft

downed by air or land forces. These

same forces also destroyed more than

2,637 V-I pilotless aircraft, either in

England or on the continent. In the

end, this brielexamination of’ World

War II American AAA suggests that

no single theory—top down, bottom

up, middle out, inter or intra-sen’ice

rivalry, or single or double loop

leaming—is sufficient to understand

how innovation and adaptation oc

curs in combat. In this case, change,

like combat, often occurs on multiple

fronts and in several dimensions.

The U.S. Army entered World

War I with absolutely no antiair

craft units, doctrine, or equipment,

through modification of French

VOLUME 24 ISSUE I 37
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doctrine and use of French equipment, the Antiaircraft Service

trained 12,000 artillery gunners (firing the French 75mm gun) and

machine gunners, fielded Four battalions (two gun and two ma

chine gun), and sho down fifty-eight aircraft in a very short time

at the front. After the war, most of the manpower and equipment

disappeared and the fledgling AAA branch of the Coast Artillery

Corps beuan a two decade bureaucratic battle to develop modem

equipment and field a modest force amid national retrenchment.

the Great Depression, and limited budgets.

Toward the end of’ the interwar period, however, interest in

antiaircraft capability grew as airplanes became more numerous

and capable. Furthermore, reports from Spain and China high

lighted the capabilities of airpower and the value in having AAA

to defend against it. Accordingly, the purchase of antiaircraft artil

lery pieces became the top priority for the War Department from

1937 to 1939. Lnfonunately, it took more than money to overcome

the extreme deficit in modem equipment and trained manpower

needed initially to defend the Western Hemisphere and America’s

possessions, particularly in Hawaii and the Philippines, and even

tually begin global operations against Axis forces.

Thus, it was in December 1941 that the antiaircraft forces at

Pearl Harbor and Clark Field were both woefully under-equipped

and poorly prepared to face determined attacks by better trained

and equipped Japanese pilots. At Pearl Harbor, the four antiaircraft

regiments had eighty-six of their authorized ninety-eight 3-inch

guns. As for (heir automatic weapons, which were more valuable

against low-flying attackers, the regiments possessed just twenty

of 120 (sixteen percent) of their 37mm guns and 113 of 246 (for

ty-one percent) of their .50 cal machine guns. More importantly,

while the joint Army-Navy force trained regularly together and

had demonstrated a month earlier that it could detect and intercept

an attacking air three, on 7 December this force had only three of

the six SCR-270 radar sets operating, one of which picked up the

Japanese formation 132 miles out just as it shut down for the day

around 0700. Unfortunately, when this crew reported their radar

contact, the only people in the air information center were a radio

operator and an untrained duty officer. The officer subsequently

waved off the track as a flight of inbound B-17s and told the radar

operator to “forget it.” The warning, however, would have made

little difference for the Army antiaircraft force, as most the AAA

ammunition was still in the ammunition supply point because the

Chief of Ordnance in Hawaii refused to release it for fear it would

get dirty and become corroded, Of the thirty-one separate antiair

craft batteries assigned to Hawaii, only four retrieved their amGunners ofthe7lst Coast Artillery Regiment (Antiaircraft) train on M3 3-inch antiaircraft

guns at Fort Story, Virginia. The M3 became the Army’s standard AAA piece in 1928.

(National Archives)

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38 ARMY HISTORY ON POINT
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munition and reached their positions before the attack ended. Of

all these forces, just one fixed 3-inch gun batten’. prepositioned

on Sands Island, proved it was both trained and ready as the crew

broke into its crate of ready ammunition and opened fire, downing

two Japanese aircraft. In contrast, the Navy, which was manning

just one quarter of its 780 onboard antiaircraft weapons continu

ously, had all of its weapons firing within ten minutes. Thus, at

Pearl Harbor, veil known strategic and operational failures en

abled the Japanese to get close to Oahu, but tactical failures en

gendered by a penurious administrative policy and tired leadership

lost the day.

On 8 December in the Philippines, a similar fate struck U.S.

forces on Luzon, only this time General Douglas MacArthur’s Far

East Air Forces (FEAF) were well aware of the impending Japa

nese attack. At 0400, intercept controllers dispatched a squadron

of P-40s from Iba Field eighty miles north of Clark Field to search

I’or Japanese bombers heading toward Corregidor At 0930, the

30th Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field sent more P-40s toward Ro

sales to intercept the Japanese while simultaneously ordering the

FEAF’s B- l7s airborne. None of the patrols found the Japanese,

some of whom were clearly conducting a feint to draw protection

away from the airfields. At 1130, the B- l7s returned to Clark Field

just as the interceptor command there received a teletvpe report

(between 1130 and 1145) ofinbound bombers. Compared to Pearl

Harbor. at least the air warning system seemed to work. No one.

however, thought to alert the 200th Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft)

Regiment, located on the same compound at Fort Sioisenberg, to

the threat. The “Old Two Hon’erd,” a New Mexico National Guard

regiment, was in the chow hail eating pork chops and chocolate

cake when the Japanese attacked and did not learn about it until the

air raid siren sounded at 1215.

Not that it would have mattered. This collection of Mexicans,

Anglos, and Indians had served as the 111th Cavalry Regiment un

til late 1940, when it joined over 100 other formations the War De

partment hurriedly and clumsily convened to AAA units. Amaz

ingly, less than a year later on 17 August 1941, the Army declared

the “200th.. .the best anti-aircraft Regiment (regular or otherwise),

now available.. .for use in an area of critical military importance.”

Unfortunately, “best” was far from good enough. The regi

ment received a large portion of its actual antiaircraft equipment,

particularly automatic weapons, as it boarded the USS President

Pierce and the USS President Coolidge in San Francisco. During

training at Fort Bliss, Texas, the 37mm batteries had a single 37mm

gun, but no ammunition. Men “simulated guns from boxes and

VOLUME 24 ISSUE I 39
(Library ofCongress)

broomsticks., fired rocks for ammunition and shouted bang.” The

regiment trained primarily with 3-inch guns and M1903 Spring

field bolt action rifles. Alter shipping out, several of the regiment’s

3-inch guns went overboard during a typhoon encountered west of

Hawaii, leaving the gun battalion with twelve of twenty-four guns.

one of which was later sent to Corregidor for repair. Beyond that.

the regiment had one battery of.50 caliber machine guns, twentytwo of thirty-two 37mm guns (seven of which were defective and

sent to Manila for repair),

and a few SCR-268 radar

sets, which were unusable as

ihey were missing the con

necting cables and the M4

directors. Ironically, while

the Philippine Department

received a higher priority for

reinforcements than Hawaii

or the Panama Canal, the

same Ordnance Corps rules

apparently applied. One sol

dier noted his platoon “sas

definitely told. ‘DC) NOT

BREAK THE SEAL on the

ammunition box.’ So prior

to the day’ ot’ ihe war, we had

never seen a Ike round.”

As a result. the first time

any soldier fired a 37mm gun

was in combat. In one case,

a poorly trained soldier fed

.50-caliber ammunition into

a 37mm gun and jammed it.

So overwhelmed, the battery

was “blowing holes through

trucks and tents.” The crews

on the 3-inch guns fared no

better. Most of’ the ammu

nition was manufactured in

1932. An abnormally high

percentage of the rounds

were duds and “most of the

fuses were badly corroded.”

About one in every six shells

actually bred. According

to First Lieutenant Rus

sell Hutchinson, “the shell

casings were green with corrosion. Every time we fired a shot,

[the rounds] had to be cleaned to go into the breechblock, and we

had to break the frozen ‘uses with a wrench. We had World War

I weapons, and our modified ammunition had too much muzzle

pressure for the guns to withstand.” Several gun tubes blew up,

injuring a number of soldiers and killing one. Adding insult to in

jury, most of the shells that did fire exploded 2.000 to 4,000 feet

short of’ their targets. The men of a .50 caliber machine-gun bat

tery found themselves equally confounded. Sergeant Earl Harris

angrily commented that “Our machine-gun ammunition was made

in 1918, re-inspected in 1929, and issued to us in 1941. We had to

polish the corrosion off with steel wool before we could get it into

the belt. The guns were 1918. The mounts werejury-rigged during

World Wart, and they didn’t work.”

After more than an hour, the attack ended. By achieving com

plete tactical surprise, the Japanese had destroyed eighteen of the

original thirty-five B-17s and fifty-three P-40s. The attack dam

aged many other planes along with Clark and Iba Fields. killed

eighty personnel, and wounded 150 others. Japanese losses

amounted to seven aircraft. Despite obsolete weapons, bad am

munition. and limited training, the “Old Two Hon’erd” scored five

confirmed kills during the

attack. UnI’ortunately, they

also shot down at least one

P40 during the confusion,

probably not the first inci

dent of fratricide of the war

and certainly not the last.

The 200th Regiment, as well

as the 60th Coast Artillei’y,

a Regular Army antiaircraft

regiment on Corregidor,

would go on to fight with

valor until forced to surren

der, after which those not

killed in action spent the rest

of the war in captiity.

With the United States

now at war, and recogniz

ing the need for more an

tiaircraft units (as vell as

forces of all types), the

Army moved quickly to

establish them. This situa

tion, however, exacerbated

the training and equipping

problems faced by units like

the 200th Coast Artillery. As

units formed, they placed an

ever-increasing demand on

limited amounts of antiair

craft equipment. Moreover,

the rush to deploy forces.

particularly antiaircraft for

mations. cut unit training

time, spread the number of

trained officer and noncom

missioned officer cadre too

thin, and ensured that the

quality of the training was minimal.

In a significant “top-down” move, the War Department created

the Army Ground Forces in March 1942 under Lieulenant General

Lesley J. MeNair to produce trained and equipped units. As it did

so, the War Department also established the Antiaircraft Command

(AAC), cleaving it from the Coast Artillery Corps and establish

ing its headquarters in Richmond. Virginia. In a smooth transition,

Major General Joseph Green. previously the Chief of Coast Anil

lerv, took over the AAC and continued expanding the antiaircraft

training bases across the United States. The AAC created training

regimens and standards for deployment, published training inspec

tion checklists in the Coast ,liillcn’ Joitnial to spread the word

vertically and horizontally across the rapidly expanding force, and

On 9 March 1942, the Army formed the Antiaircraft Command (AAC)

separate from the Coast Artillery Corps and named Major General Joseph

Green as AAC’s commanding general. Green had commanded the Coast

Artillery Corps from April 1940 until his appointment as AAC commander.

40 ARMY HISTORY ON POINT
attempted to flood early deploying units with enough equipmenl antiaircraft units, particularly in the rear area, as well as an intra and ammunition to develop expertise.

Unfortunately, (lie War Department could not accelerate ev

erything. The Army activated many units with only fifty percent

of their authorized personnel, with recruits joining units through

out the training cycle. The battalion training cycle was a mere

twelve weeks long, with four weeks of individual soldier training

and eight weeks of unit training, and did not include any training

with infantry or armored units. Beset by the enormous increase in

demand for equipment, American industry could not provide the

AAC with sufficient

numbers to outfit

units completely in

training, nor could it

provide enough train

ing ammunition, or

the Army Air Forces

enough towed targets.

to allow those units to

become proficient on

their weapons until

mid-1943, Despite

these problems., the

AAC’ “produced” 154

battalions by the end

of 1942.

A few of these

antiaircraft battalions

joined Allied forces

as they surprised the

Germans and landed

in North Africa on

8 November 1942

as part of Operation

TORCH. During the

ensuing campaign,

American forces, in

cluding antiaircraft Xar II. (National Arcluves)

units, made several

major mistakes, and

learned a great deal. In their first legitimate contact with Field

Marshal Envin Rommel’s A/i’ika Korps in and around Kasserine

Pass in Tunisia from 13 to 23 Februan’ 1943, the few antiaircraft

forces positioned forward with II Corns fought well, but suffered

from a lack of firepower, mobility, training with maneuver units,

and, like the rest of the Army, combat experience.

One of the first lessons learned by theater commanders and

conveyed back to the AAC was the need to position more anti

aircraft forces forward with the maneuvering combat elements.

At the time of Kasserine Pass, there were a total of four antiair

craft regiments (eight battalions total), eight automatic weapons

battalions, and four separate machine gun batteries (one battalion

equivalent) in the rear area, but only one antiaircraft regiment (two

battalions) and the equivalent of a reinforced automatic weapons

battalion forward supporting the II Corps—approximately a 17

to 3 ratio of battalions between the rear and forward areas. This

!!Tangement and the distribution of antiaircraft forces across the

theater led to both an inter-service issue between ground and air

three commanders over whether air commanders should command

service issue between theater commanders and Lieutenant General

MeNair at Army Ground Forces over whether antiaircraft units

should be assigned to divisions and corps.

While they met little initial resistance from the LtifhrafiL’. as

Allied forces moved inland, enemy air activity increased. In the

ever-increasing target rich environment, American AAA units shot

down a number of enemy aircraft. but they also downed several

friendly planes. After all, training at home had been rushed and

the opportunities for joint training with the Army Air Forces in

the United States

were minimal. Many

soldiers had never

seen an American

aircraft, let alone

mastered identify

ing enemy airplanes.

Despite Major Gen

eral Green’s best er

lorts, the need to de

ploy antiaircraft units

overtook the ability

to ensure they were

trained properly

In North Africa,

as the territory cap

tured by Allied forces

expanded. so did the

need for more antiair

craft artillery. Attacks

on air bases and con

voys occurred more

frequently, forcing

Lieutenant General

Dwight D. Eisen

hower and his antiair

craft commander to

choose between de

fending ports and the

ever-increasing num

ber of airfields, or push units forward to protect maneuver forces.

With too few units across the theater, this issue led to challenges

concerning command over antiaircraft units and their assignment

to divisions. Concerned about fratricide, the Army Air Forces

sought control of all antiaircraft forces in theater early on, only to

be rebuffed by the War Department. Eisenhower relented slightly

and established a rear area defense coordinator, essentially giv

ing the theater air force what it wanted in the rear area, but left

it to the Army to command forces in the forward area. After the

most significant fratricide of the war during the invasion of Sic

ily, a combined Army-Navy error that destroyed several transport

planes and killed dozens of paratroopers, the Army Air Forces re

newed their claim, only to be rebuffed again.

If that decision seemed to be an inter-service issue, the ques

tion of whether to assign antiaircraf units to divisions and corps

became a heated intra-sen’ice problem within the War Department.

Eisenhower and several senior commanders had wanted to assimi

mobile antiaircraft automatic weapons battalions, those armed with

a combination of halltracked quad .50 caliber machine guns and

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‘Thewater-coolcd M2 .50 caliber (shown here) and M4 37mm gun served as die Army’s standard

AAA weapons against low-Ilyingaireraft duringdic earlvycars oldie U.S. thvolvcmcnt in NbrId

\OLUME 24 ISSUE I 41
kQ27J 4 I!

37mm guns linked to dual .50 caliber machine guns, to divisions to

protect forward troops and most importantly, their artillery, which

in at least one division area received ninety-five percent of all air

attacks. McNair, however, believed in pooling antiaircraft and

other forces, such as tank destroyers. thinking that centralization

would allow more efficient employment and not slow down at

tacking divisions. In the end, Eisenhower deferred to McNair, but

in theater, American forces, in a middle-out adaptation, attached

units to divisions with increasing regularity, bypassing McNair. By

the No nandv invasion, this situation was fairly routine.

To ensure communication and coordination with theater com

manders, Green recommended that the AAC send officers into

combat theaters to supervise training and disseminate information.

McNair, however, vetoed this plan. To achieve his objective de

spite McNair’s disapproval, Green arranged for an exchange of

general officers between the AAC and the combat theaters. Beyond

this middle-out adjustment, Green also championed the distribu

tion of Antiaircraft Intelligence Circulars and Information Bulle

tins from the AAC to the theaters, just one of several examples of

double-loop institutional learning. Eventually, in November 1943,

the War Department approved Green’s recommendation that each

theater staff include an antiaircraft officer.

In the field, troops adopted several bottom-up techniques to

improve early warning and avoid fratricide. None of them, how

ever, were foolproof: The SCR-268 radar proved very effective,

but mostly in the rear areas. To avoid shooting friendly aircraft

during raids on Allied air bases, antiaircraft artillery commanders

urged pilots to clear the perimeter area and allow antiaircraft units

to fire. Often overzealous pilots would not comply and antiaircraft

gunners frequently had to “withhold fire on [enemy] planes ...be

cause of the presence of our own fighters.” Eventually, inner air

craft zones were created that restricted aircraft during certain peri

ods and became free-fire zones for antiaircraft units. These worked

with middling success and were a continual concern for the Allied

air forces, particularly after the invasion of Normandy. In the for

ward areas where antiaircraft units were on the move, radar was

seldom used or suffered degraded range due to the mountainous

terrain. To get some sort of early warning, one battalion created its

own antiaircraft artillery information system using four vehicles

with radios and positioning them with three-man crews twenty to

twenty-five miles in front of the defended position along the most

probable air avenues of approach. The system worked extremely

well, reduced fratricide, and kept both the antiaircraft battalion and

the unit it supported alert to enemy air attacks.

42 ARMY HISTORY ON POINT
the .N115 Multiple Caliber .50 Machine-Gun Mount

entered sen ice in 1942 and equipped tile Army’s

antiaircraft al-tiller’ —automane weapons (AAA-AW)

battalions. Its iburM2 .5Ocalibermaehinegunsmadcit

an dice tis C capon against low— lb ing enemy a’ rcnft. It

Was also devastating against ground targets luLl earned

tile nicknanies ‘meat chopper” and “knot ,nosverT ibis

example served with die 435th AAA-AN Battalion.

(Nationai Archives)

AACcmployedanumberoftedmiques

and innovations to prevent fratricide

and improve early warning of enemy

air attacks, including the use of the

SCR-268 radar set, such as this one

used by the 184th AAA Battalion in

England in October 1943. (National

Archives)

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IN THE EVER-INCREASING

TARGET RICH ENVIRONMENT,

AMERICAN AM UNITS SHOT

DOWN A NUMBER OF ENEMY

AIRCRAFT BUT THEYALSO

DOWNED SEVERAL FRIENDLY

PLANES. AFTER ALL, TRAINING

AT HOME HAD BEEN RUSHED

AND THE OPPORTUNITIES

FOR JOINT TRAINING WITH

THE ARMYAIR FORCES IN

THE UNITED STATES WERE

MINIMAL.

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VOLUME 21 ISSUE I 43
Many units invented localized solutions to guard against frat- portion from four to eight weeks and instituted a battle-conditionricide, including having friendly aircraft rock their wings upon

returning to Allied lines, painting aircraft noses different colors,

and dropping smoke. By the time of the Nnrmandy campaign, air

craft would sport five alternating black and white invasion stripes.

Some commands even adopted aircraft fiashcards to train troops

in aircraft recognition. While these measures reduced, but did not

eliminate, fratricide, they remained local examples ol’single-loop

learning and were never standardized across the antiaircraft force.

The only anti-fratricide standard institutionalized by the Army at

this point in the war was the one imposed by Brigadier General

Paul Robinette. commander of Combat Command B, IstAmiored

Division, when he directed antiaircraft units to fire at aircraft only

after being attacked. The Army captured this guidance in its Octo

ber 1943 Lessons /1om the Tunisian c’anipaign when it stated that

“positive identification of aircraft is essential before fire is opened.

The best identification under such circumstances is attack by the

alicia/i.”

Back in the United States, top-down intervention via the Chief

ofStafl’. General George C. Marshall, and McNair hastened chang

es in the training cycle operated by the AAC. As equipment be

came more plentiful, units trained more comprehensively and fired

more rounds in practice. Training became tougher and more real

istic and antiaircraft units expanded their exercising with infantry

and armor divisions. Major General Green, upon receiving word

that 40mm and 90mm crews were performing “far below the stan

dard.” dressed down Antiaircraft Training Center commanders and

challenged each officer to take personal responsibility for training

new officers and NCOs. He gained permission from McNair to

lengthen the unit training regimen and dramatically expanded it

between March 1942 and April 1944 in response to feedback f’rom

the battlefield. Spccifically he doubled the individual soldier skills

ing program to expose antiaircraft crews, as much as possible, to

the atmosphere of battle before actually entering a combat envi

ronment. This program included more rigorous and extensive field

training exercises, obstacle courses, forced marches of twenty-five

miles or longer with full field equipment, and the use of live am

munition and explosives to acclimate soldiers to the sounds and

sensations of battle. Green also expanded the collective or unit

portion of the training period from eight to fourteen weeks, added

a four-week period of combined training with ground forces, and,

in early 1944, added a two-week block specifically for QOmm gun

nery at ground targets.

These changes in training, along with continued improve

ments in equipment—like the Variable Time (VT) or proximity

fuse for 90mm guns—ultimately produced a highly effective an

tiaircraft force capable of clearing the skies and assisting ground

units in sweeping away the enemy before them. In North Africa,

despite their initial travails, antiaircraft units destroyed 526 Ger

man aircraft. In Sicily and Italy, Corsica’Sardinia. and southern

France. they added another 866. In the Pacific. antiaircraft crews

downed another 975 aircraft and in Northwest Europe, from D

Day through V-F Day (6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945) they destroyed

(Category I) or probably destroyed (Category II) another 3,151

enemy aircraft—for a total of 5,518. Along the way, at places like

Anzio, Salerno. Omaha Beach. Okinawa, and the Ardennes. anti

aircraft quad .50 caliber “Meatchoppers” and 90mm guns used as

both direct fire snipers and high velocity indirect fires protected

U.S. and Allied forces.

In the end, a non-linear series of innovations, adjustments, and

adaptations occurred in the United States and in combat theaters

across the globe to produce eventually an American ‘Sntiaircraft

force that was extremely well-supplied, well-equipped. andwell

Soldiers ofthe 450th AAA-AW Battalion (Colored) man an Ml 4Omm Bofors

gun near Presenzann, Italy, 14 January 1944. like the MiS, the Bofots was

effective against tow-flying aircraft. (National Archives)
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(,unnc.rs OF thc 62d Coast ArtiIkr Regiment (Anti urcraft) fin. thur

MI 90mm gun in Palermo, Sicily, 15 December 1943. The more effective

9Onun gun began replacing the M3 3-inch AAA piece early in %rld War

4. II. (National Archives)

zsrw. -

trained. This force, by virtue of top-down, middle-out, and bottomup change, continued to learn from its mistakes and improve. As

this brief summary from Pearl Harbor through the North African

campaign suggests, the antiaircraft forces had to overcome a myr

iad of errors, self-inflicted and otherwise, to provide effective air

defense of fixed sites, like ports and airfields, and maneuvering

units. While this article focused on a brief period and location in

the war, these units did so across every possible geographic lo

cation and under every climatic condition. From North Africa to

Western Europe, from the Southwest Pacific to Okinawa to China

and Alaska, antiaircraft forces adapted to every environment and

provided increasingly better protection from air attack, while often

adding devastating ground and artillery fires to the mix.

As service members discovered in World War II, the enemy

can come from any direction. As the antiaircraft artillerymen of

World War II learned, and as this article demonstrates, innovation

and change, like enemy aircraft, can arrive from several directions

and on several levels simultaneously. Ft

About the Author

Colonel Bryon Greenwald, USA-Ret., is a profes

sor of military history and theory at the Joint Advanced

Wathghting School (JAWS), one of the National Defense

University’s constellation ofwar colleges, located in Nor

folk, Virginia. During a twenty-seven-year Army career,

he served in Europe and the United States, where he com

manded 2d Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery (Patriot)

and, as a garrison commander from 2003-2005, where led

the effort to transform Fort Bliss, Texas, into the largest

maneuver post in the Army. He graduated from the Com

mand and General Staff College, School of Advanced

Military Studies, and the National War College, and holds

an M.A. and Ph.D. from The Ohio State University. He is

the author ofSCUDALERT!: The Histon’, Development,

and Military Significance a/Ballistic Missiles on Tactical

Opeivtions (AUSA, 1995) and The Anatomy of Change:

Win’ Armie.c Succeed o;• Fail at Transformation (AUSA,

2000). At JAWS, he teaches military history and theory as

well as an elective on military innovation and change. He

is currently writing the history of U.S. Army antiaircraft

artillery development from 1917 to 1945.

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