IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

T. J., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

The Pennsylvania State Police of :

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, : No. 123 M.D. 2018

Respondent : Submitted: December 12, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: January 9, 2023

Petitioner, T.J., through counsel, filed an amended petition for review 

(Petition) seeking a declaration that he is no longer required to register as a sex 

offender in Pennsylvania and that his personal information must be removed from 

the Pennsylvania State Police (Police) sex offender registry. Presently before this 

Court is T.J.’s Application for Summary Relief (Application).1 For the reasons 

discussed below, we deny the Application.

I. Background

In September 1997, T.J. pleaded guilty in New York to one count of

second degree rape based on an offense that occurred in May 1994. Pet. ¶ 2; 

1 The Police have not filed a parallel application.
2

Declaration of Trooper Matthew Web (Web Decl.) ¶ 4. T.J. avers that he received 

a sentence of six years’ probation; the Police respond that T.J. received a sentence 

of five years’ probation. Pet. ¶ 3; Answer to Petition (Ans.) ¶ 3.

The parties disagree about the age of the victim at the time of the 

offense. T.J. asserts that she was 16 years old and, moreover, that he and she have

now been married for over 20 years and are raising four children. Pet. ¶ 2 n.1; Appl. 

¶ 20. The Police aver that she was 12 years old at the time of the offense. Ans. ¶ 2.

T.J.’s conviction subjected him to reporting and inclusion in New 

York’s sex offender registry for a period of 20 years beginning in 1997. Appl. ¶ 23; 

Web Decl. ¶ 12. The parties disagree regarding whether T.J. was continuously 

compliant with his registration requirements in New York, but in any event, he 

received a letter in October 2017 from the New York State Sex Offender Registry 

informing him that he had completed his registration obligation and had been 

removed from that registry. Appl. ¶ 19 & Ex. A.

Meanwhile, T.J. moved to Pennsylvania in 2000. Pet. ¶ 4; Appl. ¶ 20; 

Ans. to Appl. ¶ 20. Upon receiving notice from the Police in 2011 that he was 

required to register as a sex offender in Pennsylvania, T.J. began registering with the 

Police in 2011 and has continued to do so. Pet. ¶ 5; Ans. ¶ 5; Web Decl. ¶¶ 16-17.

II. Issues

In the Application, T.J. asserts two arguments, which we discuss in 

reverse order as follows. First, T.J. asserts that he committed his offense before 

Pennsylvania enacted any statute requiring registration by sex offenders, and he 

cannot be subjected to registration requirements retroactively. Appl. ¶ 25. The 
3

Police respond that under a line of recent appellate decisions, retroactive application 

of sex offender registration requirements is constitutionally permitted.

Second, T.J. asserts that even if he was required to register in

Pennsylvania, he was required to do so only for the greater of 10 years or the 

remainder of his New York registration obligation. Appl. ¶ 21. Thus, he contends 

that he has completed his registration obligation in Pennsylvania. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. The 

Police respond that T.J.’s New York offense subjects him to a lifetime registration 

requirement in Pennsylvania. Web Decl. ¶¶ 14-15.

III. Discussion

“At any time after the filing of a petition for review in an appellate or 

original jurisdiction matter, the court may on application enter judgment if the right 

of the applicant thereto is clear.” Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). This Court may grant an 

application for summary relief only if, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party’s right to judgment is clear and 

no material issues of fact are in dispute. Cao v. Pa. State Police, 280 A.3d 1107, 

1109 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (first citing Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b); and then citing Eleven

Eleven Pa., LLC v. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 169 A.3d 141, 145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2017)).

With this applicable legal standard in mind, we address the two issues 

raised in T.J.’s Application.

A. Retroactive Registration Requirement 

Recently, in Cao, this Court addressed very similar issues to those 

raised by T.J. The petitioner in Cao, like T.J. here, asserted that the registration 
4

requirements of the most recent version of the Sexual Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (SORNA II)2 were punitive as applied to him and that applying 

those registration requirements retroactively violated the ex post facto clauses of the 

United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.3 Cao, 280 A.3d at 1108. We rejected 

those arguments in Cao, and we likewise do so here.

The predecessor statute of SORNA II, known as SORNA I,4 was 

enacted in 2011, effective December 20, 2012. In Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 

A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that SORNA I violated 

constitutional ex post facto provisions to the extent that it was applied retroactively 

to increase the registration obligations of sex offenders who were convicted of 

certain crimes before SORNA I’s effective date. See Cao, 280 A.3d at 1108.

In 2018, in response to the Muniz decision, the General Assembly 

enacted SORNA II, which amended certain provisions of SORNA I for the purpose 

of curing SORNA I’s constitutional infirmities. Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. 

Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020), our Supreme Court upheld the validity of 

SORNA II against a constitutional challenge, concluding that retroactive application 

of the sex offender registration provisions in Subchapter I of SORNA II are

nonpunitive and therefore do not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post 

facto laws. See Cao, 280 A.3d at 1109 (citing and discussing Lacombe).

2 Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27, as amended by the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, 42 

Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.10 – 9799.75.

3

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9 (proscribing the passage of ex post facto laws); Pa. Const. art. 

I, § 17 (same). This Court has recognized that these two provisions “are virtually identical, and 

the standards applied to determine an ex post facto violation are comparable.” Cao v. Pa. State 

Police, 280 A.3d 1107, 1108 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (quoting Evans v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 

820 A.2d 904, 909 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (additional quotation marks omitted)).

4 Formerly 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.
5

Nevertheless, the petitioner in Cao argued that SORNA II was 

unconstitutionally retroactive as to him because he committed his offenses before 

the enactment of any sex offender registration laws. Cao, 280 A.3d at 1109. The 

Cao petitioner relied on our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Santana, 

266 A.3d 528 (Pa. 2021), in which the Court held that Muniz applied equally to 

offenders who committed their crimes in other states and later relocated to 

Pennsylvania, and that the critical issue was not where their offenses were 

committed, but when. Cao, 280 A.3d at 1110-11 (citing and discussing Santana, 

266 A.3d at 529-30). T.J. asserts exactly the same argument here and, like the 

petitioner in Cao, relies on Santana to support his position.

In Santana, the petitioner was required to register as a sex offender in 

New York after committing a sex offense there. He was later convicted of violating 

SORNA II’s reporting requirements after relocating from New York to Pennsylvania 

and failing to register with the Police. Our Supreme Court held that Muniz applied

equally to offenders whose triggering offenses occurred in another state prior to 

SORNA I’s enactment; because SORNA I imposed registration requirements that 

did not exist at the time of the petitioner’s triggering offense in his former home 

state, the Court concluded that retroactive application of SORNA I to him was 

punitive and an unconstitutional ex post facto law under Muniz. See Cao, 280 A.3d

at 1111-12 (citing and discussing Santana, 266 A.3d at 529-30 & 538-39).

However, this Court rejected the Cao petitioner’s argument that 

Santana abrogated his registration requirement. We explained that although the 

invalidation of SORNA I in Muniz applied equally to persons relocating to 

Pennsylvania after committing crimes in other states, Santana did not invalidate the 

application of SORNA II’s registration requirements. Cao, 280 A.3d at 1111-12. 
6

As discussed above, Lacombe has established that the registration provisions of 

SORNA II are not punitive and therefore are not unconstitutional when applied 

retroactively to persons who committed offenses prior to its enactment. See Cao, 

280 A.3d at 1109 (citing and discussing Lacombe). Nothing in Santana, which 

relates solely to SORNA I, negates the holding of Lacombe, which relates to 

SORNA II. Accordingly, we conclude that the registration requirements of SORNA 

II are not unconstitutional as applied to T.J. here, and we deny the Application with 

regard to that issue.

B. Duration of Registration Requirement

In the alternative, T.J. argues that, assuming he is subject to statutory 

registration obligations, Pennsylvania law required him to register for the longer of 

10 years or the applicable registration period under New York law, which was 20 

years. The October 2017 letter from the New York State Sex Offender Registry 

notified T.J. that he had completed his registration requirement under New York 

law. Because that requirement was longer than the 10-year registration period he 

asserts was applicable in Pennsylvania, T.J. reasons that he has completed his 

registration obligation in Pennsylvania and is entitled to be removed from the 

Pennsylvania sex offender registry.

The Police counter that T.J. was always subject to a lifetime registration 

obligation in Pennsylvania, not a 10-year obligation. Therefore, they maintain that 

T.J.’s completion of his New York registration obligation and his resulting removal 

from the New York registry did not end his registration obligation in Pennsylvania 

and do not entitle him to removal from the Pennsylvania registry.
7

Under SORNA II, convictions of certain sex offenses carry a 

corresponding registration obligation of 10 years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55(a)(1)(A). 

Convictions of certain other sex offenses give rise to a lifetime registration 

obligation. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55(b)(2)(i)(A). What obligation, if any, applies to 

T.J. depends on which sex offense under Pennsylvania law most closely equates with 

the offense for which T.J. was convicted in New York. Unfortunately, we are unable 

to make that determination on the existing record.

The New York statute at issue provided, at the time of T.J.’s offense, 

that “[a] person is guilty of rape in the second degree when . . . being [18] years old 

or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person less than [14]

years old . . . .” N.Y. Penal Law former § 130.30.

5

 Pennsylvania does not have a 

precisely correlating criminal statute; rather, there are two potentially comparable 

statutes, depending on the age of the victim. 

In Pennsylvania, under Section 3121(c) of the Crimes Code,6 “[a]

person commits the offense of rape of a child, a felony of the first degree, when the 

person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 13 years 

of age.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(c). A conviction under Section 3121(c) gives rise to a 

lifetime obligation to register as a sex offender. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55(b)(2)(i)(A). 

The same obligation applies regarding equivalent offenses committed in other states. 

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.55(b)(2)(ii) & 9799.56(b)(ii).

Pennsylvania also has a statutory sexual assault provision, which, at the 

time of T.J.’s offense and conviction, stated:

5 The current version of Section 130.30, which became effective in 2001, applies where the 

victim is less than 15 years old.

6

18 Pa.C.S. §§ 101–9546.
8

(a) Felony of the second degree. -- Except as provided in 

section 3121 (relating to rape), a person commits a felony 

of the second degree when that person engages in sexual 

intercourse with a complainant under the age of 16 years 

and that person is four or more years older than the 

complainant and the complainant and the person are not 

married to each other.

18 Pa.C.S. formerly § 3122.1.7 Notably, there is no sex offender registration 

requirement associated with a conviction under Section 3122.1. See generally 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.55 & 9799.56.

The Police posit that T.J.’s offense in New York “equated to a lifetime 

registration requirement in Pennsylvania.” Resp’t’s Br. at 2; Web Decl. ¶ 14. 

However, the Police cite no formal determination to that effect and offer no 

explanation of how they reached that conclusion.

Recently, in A.L. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 274 A.3d 1229 (Pa. 

2022), our Supreme Court held that a court must “take[] into account all elements of 

the offenses being compared” when determining whether a criminal statute from 

another jurisdiction is equivalent to a particular Pennsylvania statute for purposes of 

sex offender registration requirements. Id. at 1238. Here, however, the record is 

insufficient to allow such a comparison. The victim’s age is an element of the 

offense under each of the statutes at issue. Arguably, Section 3121 of the Crimes 

Code would be equivalent to New York Section 130.30 for purposes of this case

only if T.J.’s victim was less than 13 years of age; otherwise, T.J.’s offense might

be more equivalent to statutory sexual assault under Section 3122.1. Compare N.Y. 

Penal Law former § 130.30 with 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121 & 3122.1. As stated above, the 

Police assert that T.J.’s victim was only 12 years old at the time of the offense. Ans. 

7 The current version of Section 3122.1, amended in 2011, upgrades the offense to a felony 

of the first degree if the perpetrator is 11 or more years older than the victim.
9

¶ 2. T.J. alleges she was 16. Pet. ¶ 2 n.1; Appl. ¶ 20. We observe that T.J.’s 

conviction under a New York statute applicable to victims under 14 years of age

suggests T.J.’s assertion of his victim’s age may be untrue. Nonetheless, there is 

nothing in the present record before this Court that allows us to reach a conclusion 

on that issue. Accordingly, we cannot determine what section of the Crimes Code 

is equivalent to the New York statute under which T.J. was convicted. Likewise, we 

cannot determine what registration period, if any, presently applies to T.J. in 

Pennsylvania regarding his 1994 crime in New York. Therefore, we cannot grant 

summary relief.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing discussion, we are unable to conclude as a 

matter of law on the present record that T.J. is not subject to a lifetime registration 

requirement in Pennsylvania. Therefore, we must deny T.J.’s Application under the 

current state of the record.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

T. J., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

The Pennsylvania State Police of :

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, : No. 123 M.D. 2018

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 9

th day of January, 2023, Petitioner T.J.’s Application 

for Summary Relief is DENIED.

_______________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge