COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00343-CR

CAMERON BYRAM APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1332976

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DISSENTING OPINION

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I. Introduction

I respectfully dissent. The majority fails to view the evidence and all its 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court’s denial of 

Appellant Cameron Byram’s motion to suppress and fails in its analysis of the 

community-caretaking exception to conduct an objective review focusing on what 

Officer Figueroa observed. 
2

II. The Facts

At the motion-to-suppress hearing, Fort Worth Police Officer Figueroa was 

the only witness. He testified that on July 4, 2013, at approximately 5:30 p.m., he 

was patrolling the bar district in downtown Fort Worth. Because it was a holiday, 

there was “a lot of partying” going on and a lot of vehicle and pedestrian traffic. 

Officer Figueroa stopped his patrol car at a red light at the intersection of 4th 

Street and Houston Street. He had his windows down, and a black Chevy SUV 

pulled up at the light “right next” to the driver’s side of Officer Figueroa’s patrol 

car. The SUV had its passenger-side window “rolled all the way down” giving 

Officer Figueroa an unobscured view into the SUV. Officer Figueroa looked over 

at the SUV and noticed a female hunched over in the front seat. He smelled the 

odor of alcohol wafting from the vehicle. The female passenger was not moving 

and Officer Figueroa was concerned that she was unconscious, had alcohol 

poisoning, or possibly needed medical attention. Officer Figueroa could see the 

driver of the SUV and “yelled over to him,” asking if the female passenger was 

okay. Officer Figueroa had no doubt that the SUV’s driver heard him yell, but the 

driver ignored Officer Figueroa and “just look[ed] forward.” The light turned 

green; the driver ignored Officer Figueroa and drove off. This raised a further 

concern to Officer Figueroa that the SUV driver was trying to avoid contact with 

police; typically, people respond to questions from police officers. 

Because he was concerned about the female passenger, Officer Figueroa 

initiated a traffic stop at the 400 block of West 4th Street. When he approached 
3

the driver’s side of the SUV, he observed that the front-seat female passenger 

had vomited all over herself and the passenger side of the SUV and that she was 

barely conscious. Officer Figueroa determined that the passenger “had some 

sort of medical problem” and “immediately” called Medstar. An ambulance 

arrived within two minutes. Officer Figueroa determined that the SUV’s driver, 

Byram, was intoxicated and arrested him.

III. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a 

bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2000). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. State v. 

Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Therefore, we give almost 

total deference to the trial court’s rulings on (1) questions of historical fact and (2) 

application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and 

demeanor. Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 

However, when the trial court’s rulings do not turn on the credibility and 

demeanor of the witnesses, we review de novo a trial court’s rulings on mixed 

questions of law and fact. Id. When the trial court does not make explicit 

findings of historical facts, as in the instant case, we review the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume the trial court made 

implicit findings of fact supporting its ruling, so long as those findings are 

supported in the record. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327–28. 
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IV. The Community-Caretaking Exception to the Warrant Requirement

The law is well settled that, even without reasonable suspicion or probable 

cause that an offense has been committed, a police officer may reasonably seize 

an individual through the exercise of his community-caretaking function. See, 

e.g., Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851, 854–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding 

community-caretaking exception applied when police officer observed vehicle 

pull onto shoulder of road in isolated area and pulled in behind vehicle to “see if 

everything was okay”); Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1999) (holding community-caretaking exception applied when police officer 

observed front-seat passenger leaning out window of moving car and vomiting). 

As part of his duty to “serve and protect,” a police officer may stop and assist an 

individual whom a reasonable person—given the totality of the circumstances—

would believe is in need of help. Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 151. 

Determining whether an officer has properly invoked the 

community-caretaking function is a two-step process. Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 

272, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). First, the reviewing court must determine 

whether the officer was primarily motivated by a community-caretaking purpose. 

Id. Second, the court must determine whether the officer’s belief that assistance 

was required was reasonable. Id. Courts consider four nonexclusive factors in 

determining whether the officer’s belief that the defendant needed help was 

reasonable: (1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual; (2) 

the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone or had 
5

access to assistance other than that offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent 

the individual, if not assisted, presented a danger to himself or others. Id.

V. Analysis

Under the first prong of the community-caretaking analysis, the trial court 

here implicitly found that when Officer Figueroa stopped the SUV, he was 

primarily motivated by a community-caretaking purpose.

1

 The evidence supports 

this implicit finding; Officer Figueroa testified that he stopped the SUV because of 

his concern for the female passenger.2 See id. (“The trial court, as the exclusive 

judge of credibility and finder of fact, could have concluded that [the officer] was 

primarily motivated by community caretaking concerns.”).

Under the second pong of the community-caretaking analysis, the trial 

court implicitly found that, given the totality of the circumstances, Officer 

Figueroa’s belief that assistance was required was reasonable. Viewed in the 

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing established that at approximately 5:30 p.m. on the Fourth of 

July holiday, the female front-seat passenger was hunched over and not moving

in a vehicle that smelled of alcohol and was being driven in the “bar district” of 

downtown Fort Worth by a man who was unconcerned about her condition and 

refused to respond to Officer Figueroa’s inquiry about the woman’s status. 

 

1

The trial court issued no express findings of fact or conclusions of law.

2Byram does not challenge this component of the community-caretaking 

exception.
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Looking to the four nonexclusive factors to assess the reasonableness of Officer 

Figueroa’s belief that the female passenger needed assistance, the nature and 

level of the female’s distress was significant––she was not moving and appeared 

unconscious. The female’s location––in a vehicle driven by a man who appeared 

unconcerned about her well-being––was precarious. Her access to assistance

was doubtful for this same reason––the man driving the SUV exhibited no 

concern about his passenger in response to Officer Figueroa’s query about her 

condition.3 And the female was a danger to herself; she appeared comatose and 

incapable of asking for help. Thus, all four factors––the female’s level of 

distress, her location, her lack of access to assistance, and the danger to 

herself––support the reasonableness of Officer Figueroa’s belief that she needed 

assistance. Based on this objective analysis focusing on what Officer Figueroa 

observed, I would hold that the trial court properly determined that Officer 

Figueroa’s belief that the female passenger needed assistance under his 

 

3

The majority points out that hospitals were nearby and that the female 

was not alone. But these two facts do not make Officer Figueroa’s decision to 

stop the SUV less reasonable because Byram ignored Officer Figueroa’s 

question concerning the female’s condition and exhibited no concern about her, 

which gave rise to a reasonable inference that he had no intention of providing 

assistance. See Flores v. State, No. 04-13-00548-CR, 2014 WL 7340279, at *3 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (holding community-caretaking exception applied when police officer 

observed car parked in McDonald’s parking lot at 3:00 a.m. even though drivethrough lane was open and employees were inside the restaurant because “there 

were no signs that anyone from the restaurant was assisting [the driver]”).
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community-caretaking responsibilities was reasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances. See Gonzales, 369 S.W.3d at 856.

Accordingly, after viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences 

from the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, I would 

hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Officer 

Figueroa was primarily motivated by community-caretaking concerns and 

reasonably believed that assistance was required. See, e.g., Lollie v. State, 465

S.W.3d 312, 315–17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (holding 

community-caretaking exception applied to officer’s decision to pull over car 

driving slowly on isolated, dark road). Thus, the community-caretaking exception 

to the warrant requirement applied. 

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, I would overrule Byram’s sole issue and 

affirm the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

4

 Because the majority 

does not, I dissent.

/s/ Sue Walker

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

PUBLISH

DELIVERED: October 15, 2015

 

4Because I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Byram’s motion to 

suppress based on the community-caretaking exception, I would not reach the 

State’s alternative argument that the stop was supported by reasonable 

suspicion.