VACATE order and DISMISS and Opinion Filed June 21, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-21-01138-CV 

LONERGAN LAW FIRM, PLLC, BAPA BROOKLYN 2004, LLC, 

 AND JONATHAN BLOUNT, Appellants 

V. 

KRISTINA MABEY, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-01216 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Molberg, and Justice Smith 

Opinion by Chief Justice Burns 

Appellants Lonergan Law Firm, PLLC, Bapa Brooklyn 2004, LLC, and 

Jonathan Blount appeal from the trial court’s February 10, 2021 interlocutory 

summary judgment order which they assert became final when the trial court signed 

an order of nonsuit on November 18, 2021. Because it appeared a nonsuit order 

signed on April 21, 2021 rendered the interlocutory summary judgment final, we 

questioned our jurisdiction. At our request, the parties filed letter briefs addressing 

the jurisdictional issue. 
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Appellee Kristina Mabey sued appellants alleging numerous causes of action. 

She subsequently amended her petition to add Gaylene Rogers Lonergan1

 as a 

defendant. Appellee filed a motion for partial summary judgment against appellants 

only, not Ms. Lonergan, on some but not all of her claims. By order signed on 

February 10, 2021, the trial court granted the motion. Appellee then filed a notice 

of nonsuit as to her remaining claims against appellants, but not Ms. Lonergan. The 

trial court signed an order of nonsuit on April 21, 2021 stating “[t]his order resolves 

all pending claims.” More than six months later, appellee filed a second notice of 

nonsuit. In her notice, appellee states: 

To the extent the April 21, 2021 Order Acknowledging Nonsuit 

Without Prejudice was not a final order resolving all claims, which 

is not conceded, and to the extent plenary power still exists with this 

Court, [appellee] hereby files this Second Notice of Nonsuit and 

hereby nonsuits any pending claims against any party that remain 

pending in this cause number without prejudice, and requests that 

this Court, if it determines it has plenary power to do so, enter an 

Order Acknowledging the Nonsuit, dismissing all pending claims 

that have not been resolved by the February 10, 2021order granting 

partial summary judgment, without prejudice. 

On November 18, 2021, the trial court signed a second nonsuit order dismissing all 

pending claims not resolved by the partial summary judgment. At the conclusion of 

the order, the trial court states: “[t]his Order resolves all pending claims and to the 

extent the Court still has plenary power in this action is the final appealable order in 

this matter.” Appellants filed a notice of appeal on Monday, December 20. 

1

 Ms. Lonergan is not a party to this appeal. 
 –3– 

 When a case terminates without a traditional trial on the merits because the 

plaintiff nonsuited its claims, no presumption arises regarding the finality of the 

judgment. See Crites v. Collins, 284 S.W.3d 839, 840 (Tex. 2009); Lehmann v. Har–

Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001). Thus, a dismissal order following a 

nonsuit is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending 

claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes 

of all claims and all parties. See Crites, 284 S.W.3d at 840–41; Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d 

at 205. A judgment signed after the trial court’s plenary power has expired is void. 

See State ex. rel Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam). Our 

jurisdiction over an appeal from a void judgment is limited to vacating the judgment 

and dismissing the appeal. See id. 

In the letter brief filed by appellant Lonergan Law Firm, it asserts the April 

nonsuit order was not final because the notice of nonsuit upon which it is based 

specifically listed the claims being dismissed and those claims did not include the 

claims against Ms. Lonergan. Appellants BAPA Brooklyn 2004 and Blount filed a 

separate letter brief. Like Lonergan Law Firm, they too focus on the notice of 

nonsuit listing the claims to be dismissed. Neither letter brief addresses, however, 

the finality language of the April nonsuit order. The order specifically states that it 

“disposes of all pending claims,” and such language made the order final. 

See Crites, 284 S.W.3d at 840–41; Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. That the order 
 –4– 

disposed of appellees’ claims against Ms. Lonergan when such relief was not 

requested does not make it any less final. See Lehmann 39 S.W.3d at 200. 

The April 21 order of nonsuit rendered the interlocutory summary judgment 

order final. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. That being so, the trial court’s plenary 

power expired on May 21. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). Because the November 18 

nonsuit order was signed after expiration of the trial court’s plenary power, it is void. 

See Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 486. Accordingly, we vacate the November 18 order and 

dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). 

211138F.P05 

 

/Robert D. Burns, III/

ROBERT D. BURNS, III 

CHIEF JUSTICE 
 –5– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

LONGERGAN LAW FIRM, PLLC, 

BAPA BROOKLYN 2004, LLC, 

AND JONATHAN BLOUNT, 

Appellants 

No. 05-21-01138-CV V. 

KRISTINA MABEY, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 191st Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-01216. 

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice 

Burns. Justices Molberg and Smith 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we VACATE the trial 

court’s November 18, 2021 Order Acknowledging Nonsuit Without Prejudice and 

DISMISS the appeal. 

 We ORDER that appellee Kristina Mabey recover her costs of this appeal 

from appellants Lonergan Law Firm, PLLC, BAPA Brooklyn 2004, LLC, and 

Jonathan Blount. 

Judgment entered June 21, 2022.