SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).

State v. C.H. (A-56-15) (076535)

[NOTE: This is a companion case to State v. William R. Joe (A-62-15) (077034), also filed today.]

Argued October 13, 2016 -- Decided March 7, 2017

FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the Court considers whether a defendant who is simultaneously sentenced to consecutive 

sentences on two separate indictments is entitled to the application of jail credit against both indictments.

Defendant was charged in Warren County under separate indictments for multiple charges involving 

misconduct with two minors, D.H. and D.M. Indictment 2010-10-00377 (Indictment 1) charged defendant with 

certain crimes against D.H.; Indictment 2010-10-00378 (Indictment 2) charged defendant with crimes against D.M. 

Defendant was arrested on November 19, 2009, and was confined until sentencing, which took place on August 22, 

2012. In total, defendant spent 1007 days in pre-sentence custody.

Defendant was tried on each indictment in separate jury trials. On March 20, 2012, a jury found defendant 

guilty of one count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and one count of third-degree endangering the welfare 

of a child on Indictment 2. On May 18, 2012, another jury found defendant guilty of two counts of fourth-degree 

criminal sexual contact and one count of fourth-degree endangering the welfare of a child on Indictment 1. 

Defendant was sentenced on both indictments on August 22, 2012. The court first addressed the sentencing 

for Indictment 2. For the aggravated sexual assault conviction, the court sentenced defendant to ten years’ 

imprisonment subject to an 85 percent parole ineligibility period. For the endangering the welfare of a child 

conviction, the court sentenced defendant to a concurrent term of three years’ imprisonment. The court applied 

1007 days of jail credit to the sentences imposed under Indictment 2. The jail credits applied to the terms of 

imprisonment and to defendant’s parole ineligibility period.

On Indictment 1, the court sentenced defendant to twelve months’ imprisonment on each of the two 

criminal sexual contact convictions and four years’ imprisonment for the endangering the welfare of a child 

conviction. The court ordered each of the three sentences to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively to 

the sentences imposed under Indictment 2. Over defense counsel’s objection, the court held that the 1007 days of 

jail credit would apply only to the Indictment 2 sentences.

Defendant appealed, asserting that he was entitled to 2014 jail credits pursuant to State v. Hernandez, 208 

N.J. 24 (2011). The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded for resentencing. 

Specifically, the appellate panel directed the lower court to apply 1007 days of jail credit to the sentences for both 

Indictment 1 and Indictment 2. The panel highlighted the statement in Hernandez that “defendants are entitled to 

precisely what [Rule 3:21-8] provides: credits against all sentences ‘for any time served in custody in jail or in a 

state hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence’ on each case.” 208 N.J. at 28 (quoting R. 3:21-8). The 

panel concluded that the proper application of Rule 3:21-8 and Hernandez demanded the imposition of 1007 days of 

jail credit against the sentences imposed in connection with each indictment.

The Court granted the State’s petition for certification as to the jail-credit issue and denied defendant’s 

cross-petition, which challenged his convictions. 224 N.J. 281 (2016).

HELD: Defendant’s sentences should be viewed together and jail credit applied to the front end of the aggregate 

imprisonment term for both indictments. To the extent that State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 (2011), has been read 

differently with respect to consecutive sentences, Hernandez is modified as follows: double credit should not be 
2

awarded where a defendant is sentenced to consecutive sentences under separate indictments and receives the optimal 

benefits of jail credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody. Instead, the sentencing court should treat the sentences as 

a unified proceeding and maximize the benefits to the defendant by applying jail credit to the front end of the 

imprisonment term. 

1. Rule 3:21-8 states that “[t]he defendant shall receive credit on the term of a custodial sentence for any time 

served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence.” These credits for presentence custody are referred to as “jail credits.” In Hernandez, this Court held that, under Rule 3:21 8, defendants 

are entitled to jail credit “against all sentences ‘for any time served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between 

arrest and the imposition of sentence’ on each case.” 208 N.J. at 28 (emphasis added) (quoting R. 3:21-8). 

“Therefore, as interpreted by Hernandez, Rule 3:21-8 requires that a defendant receive jail credit even though the 

charges are not directly responsible for his or her incarceration.” State v. Rawls, 219 N.J. 185, 194 (2014). (pp. 8-9)

2. In Hernandez, this Court reviewed two consolidated jail credit cases. In the first case, defendant Andrea 

Hernandez was sentenced in two separate proceedings for offenses committed in Passaic County and Ocean County. 

She received concurrent sentences, but the trial court did not provide her with credit against her parole ineligibility 

period. The Court observed that, if jail credit for her total time in pre-sentence custody applied to the Passaic 

County sentence (for which Hernandez was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment with an 85 percent parole 

ineligibility period), Hernandez would spend less time imprisoned because the parole ineligibility term would be 

reduced. Recognizing the inequity of such a scenario, the Court held that “Hernandez should be entitled to jail 

credit on the Passaic County sentence for the time she spent in custody between her Passaic County arrest and the 

date sentence was imposed in Ocean County.” 208 N.J. at 47. In the second case, concerning defendant Derrick 

Wayne Rose, the Court held that when multiple charges are brought in a single indictment, “the total amount of jail 

credit reduces the aggregate custodial sentence imposed.” Id. at 47-48. The Court sought to avoid scenarios in 

which jail credits “might have different consequences if the same consecutive sentences are embodied in a single 

judgment than if they are embodied in separate indictments and the credits applied only to one” of the judgments. 

Id. at 48. (pp. 9-12)

3. Here, defendant was arrested on November 19, 2009, and charged in two separate indictments. He remained in 

custody until he was sentenced for both indictments on August 22, 2012. Altogether, defendant spent 1007 days in 

pre-sentence custody. He received 1007 days of jail credit against the front end of his aggregate sentence. (p. 12)

4. Contrary to defendant’s contentions, Hernandez does not warrant the application of double jail credit in this case. 

Here, unlike the situations presented in Hernandez, defendant did not suffer any adverse consequences due to the 

trial court’s application of jail credit. Defendant received the optimal benefits of jail credit for the entire time he 

spent in pre-sentence custody. The 1007 days of jail credit were applied to the Indictment 2 sentences, which 

carried a parole ineligibility term. The jail credits reduced both defendant’s aggregate prison term and his parole 

ineligibility period. Therefore, the jail credits were applied to the front end of defendant’s aggregate sentence. This 

application of jail credit is equitable because it maximizes the benefits to defendant. (p. 13)

5. The Court recognizes that some language in Hernandez may have caused confusion about whether jail credits can 

reduce sentences on each charge of a consecutive sentence, thereby allowing defendants to receive jail credit for 

twice the amount of time spent in pre-sentence custody. To the extent that language in Hernandez suggests that a 

defendant is entitled to jail credits for time simultaneously spent in custody on each charge for which he receives a 

consecutive sentence, the Court makes clear that such double credit is not allowed. The appropriate course of action 

is to view the separate sentences together and apply jail credit to the front end of the aggregate sentence. This 

application maximizes the benefits of jail credit for defendants without awarding double time. The approach also is 

consistent with the policy purposes of Hernandez. (pp. 13-16).

The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the sentence imposed by Superior Court, Law 

Division is REINSTATED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, SOLOMON, 

and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-56 September Term 2015

076535

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

C.H.,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued October 13, 2016 – Decided March 7, 2017

On certification to the Superior Court, 

Appellate Division.

Daniel I. Bornstein, Deputy Attorney 

General, argued the cause for appellant 

(Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General of 

New Jersey, attorney).

Stephen P. Hunter, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for respondent 

(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney).

JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In this appeal, we consider whether a defendant who is 

simultaneously sentenced to consecutive sentences on two 

separate indictments is entitled to the application of jail 

credit against both indictments pursuant to Rule 3:21-8.

On October 27, 2010, a Warren County grand jury charged 

defendant in two separate indictments for crimes committed 
2

against two minors, D.H. and D.M. Defendant spent 1007 days in 

pre-sentence custody. 

Defendant was subsequently convicted for charges in both 

indictments and sentenced in a consolidated hearing. For one

indictment, defendant received a total of ten years’ 

imprisonment with an 85 percent parole ineligibility period. He 

was credited with 1007 days of jail credit for time spent in 

confinement. For the other indictment, defendant was sentenced 

to a total of four years’ imprisonment, to be served 

consecutively with the sentences on the first sentenced

indictment. Over defense counsel’s objections, the trial court 

did not apply jail credit in the second sentencing.

The Appellate Division remanded defendant’s case for 

resentencing. The panel held that defendant was entitled to 

1007 days of jail credit for the sentences on both indictments, 

totaling 2014 days of jail credit. 

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that a 

proper application of State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24 (2011), 

entitles defendant to only 1007 total days of jail credit. 

Neither the disposition of Hernandez nor the overarching policy 

considerations in that opinion warrant the application of double 

jail credit. Instead, defendant’s sentences should be viewed 

together and jail credit applied to the front end of the 

aggregate imprisonment term for both indictments. Accordingly, 
3

we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate 

the sentence of the trial court. 

I. 

Defendant was charged in Warren County under separate 

indictments for multiple charges involving misconduct with two 

minors, D.H. and D.M. Defendant was arrested on November 19, 

2009, and was confined until sentencing, which took place on 

August 22, 2012. In total, defendant spent 1007 days in 

pre-sentence custody. 

On October 27, 2010, a Warren County grand jury indicted 

defendant separately for crimes committed against D.H. and D.M. 

Indictment 2010-10-00377 (Indictment 1) charged defendant with 

the following crimes against D.H.: two counts of second-degree 

sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c); two counts of fourth-degree 

criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b); and one count of 

third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

4(a). 

Indictment 2010-10-00378 (Indictment 2) charged defendant 

with the following crimes against D.M.: one count of 

first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a); two 

counts of second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); and 

one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). 
4

Defendant was tried on each indictment in separate jury 

trials before the same judge. On March 20, 2012, a jury found 

defendant guilty of one count of first-degree aggravated sexual 

assault and one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of 

a child on Indictment 2. Defendant was found not guilty of all 

other counts in Indictment 2. On May 18, 2012, another jury 

found defendant guilty of two counts of fourth-degree criminal 

sexual contact and one count of fourth-degree endangering the 

welfare of a child on Indictment 1. Defendant was found not 

guilty of all other counts in Indictment 1. 

Defendant was sentenced on both indictments in a 

consolidated hearing held on August 22, 2012. The court first 

addressed the sentencing for Indictment 2. For the aggravated 

sexual assault conviction, the court sentenced defendant to ten 

years’ imprisonment subject to an 85 percent parole 

ineligibility period, pursuant to the No Early Release Act 

(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. For the endangering the welfare of 

a child conviction, the court sentenced defendant to three 

years’ imprisonment. 

The sentencing court ordered both sentences under 

Indictment 2 to run concurrently. The court also imposed 

applicable fines and penalties. Lastly, the court applied 1007 

days of jail credit to the sentences imposed under Indictment 2. 
5

The jail credits applied to the terms of imprisonment and to 

defendant’s parole ineligibility period. 

On Indictment 1, the court sentenced defendant to twelve 

months’ imprisonment on each of the two criminal sexual contact 

convictions and four years’ imprisonment for the endangering the 

welfare of a child conviction. The court ordered each of the 

three sentences to run concurrently with each other, but 

consecutively to the sentences imposed under Indictment 2. 

Again, the court applied applicable fines and penalties. 

The court then addressed the issue of jail credit for the 

Indictment 1 sentences. Defense counsel requested that 

additional credits be applied to the Indictment 1 sentences 

pursuant to Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 24. The State argued 

that if the sentence was imposed as suggested by defense 

counsel, defendant would receive 2014 days of jail credit 

despite spending only 1007 days in pre-sentence custody. 

After expressing concern that a second application of jail 

credit would “take away . . . the consecutive nature of the 

sentence,” the court held that the 1007 days of jail credit 

would apply only to the Indictment 2 sentences. The court 

explained that it was applying credits only to the Indictment 2 

sentences because otherwise “the consecutive sentence wouldn’t 

mean anything.” 
6

Defendant appealed, asserting that he was entitled to 2014

jail credits pursuant to Hernandez. In an unpublished per 

curiam decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s 

convictions but remanded for resentencing. Specifically, the 

appellate panel directed the lower court to apply 1007 days of 

jail credit to the sentences for both Indictment 1 and 

Indictment 2, totaling 2014 days of jail credit. 

The Appellate Division reviewed this Court’s interpretation 

of Rule 3:21-8 in Hernandez, supra, and highlighted our 

statement that “defendants are entitled to precisely what the 

Rule provides: credits against all sentences ‘for any time 

served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest 

and the imposition of sentence’ on each case.” 208 N.J. at 28

(quoting R. 3:21-8). The panel concluded that the proper 

application of Rule 3:21-8 and Hernandez demanded the imposition 

of 1007 days of jail credit against the sentences imposed in 

connection with each indictment. 

We granted the State’s petition for certification as to the 

jail-credit issue and denied defendant’s cross-petition, which 

challenged his convictions. 224 N.J. 281 (2016). 

II. 

The State argues that the Appellate Division erroneously 

awarded defendant twice the amount of jail credit he had 

accrued. The State asks this Court to “make clear that a 
7

defendant is not entitled to double jail credit when the judge 

orders consecutive sentences and gives full jail credit toward 

the sentence with the greater parole disqualifier or later 

parole-eligibility date.”

The State further asserts that the purpose of Hernandez --

preventing criminal defendants from suffering real-time 

consequences due to the inevitable delay in resolving multiple 

charges -- does not justify double jail credit in this case. 

The State contends that the Appellate Division’s application of 

jail credit results in a windfall for defendant because the 

double jail credit “will virtually consume” the second sentence 

and defendant will serve less time than if he had posted bail. 

The State notes that, unlike the defendants in Hernandez, 

defendant’s credits were applied to his parole ineligibility 

period. 

Defendant argues that the Appellate Division properly 

applied the tenets of Hernandez. According to defendant, the 

State is asking this Court to reverse Hernandez rather than 

clarify existing precedent. He maintains that the State 

presents no compelling reasons for reversing well-established 

precedent. Additionally, defendant notes that the trial court 

was free to consider the impact of jail credit upon the real 

time he would spend incarcerated when issuing the sentences.

III.
8

Rule 3:21-8 states that “[t]he defendant shall receive 

credit on the term of a custodial sentence for any time served 

in custody in jail or in a state hospital between arrest and the 

imposition of sentence.” These credits for pre-sentence custody 

are referred to as “jail credits.” State v. Rawls, 219 N.J.

185, 192 (2014). “When the Rule preconditions for the 

application of jail credits are satisfied, the award of such 

credits is mandatory, not discretionary.” Hernandez, supra, 208 

N.J. at 37. 

“Jail credits are ‘day-for-day credits.’” Ibid. (quoting 

Buncie v. Dep’t of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 214, 217 (App. Div. 

2005), certif. denied, 186 N.J. 606 (2006)). Jail credits apply 

to the “‘front end’ of a defendant’s sentence, meaning that [the 

defendant] is entitled to credit against the sentence for every 

day defendant was held in custody for that offense prior to 

sentencing.” Ibid. In practice, this application means that 

“jail credits will ‘reduce a[] [parole] ineligibility term as 

well as the sentence imposed.’” Ibid. (alterations in original) 

(quoting State v. Mastapeter, 290 N.J. Super. 56, 64 (App. 

Div.), certif. denied, 146 N.J. 569 (1996)).

This Court recognizes that jail credits “serve important 

policy goals.” Rawls, supra, 219 N.J. at 193. Specifically, 

jail credits further equal protection and fundamental fairness 

considerations by preventing the “double punishment” of 
9

defendants who spend time in custody prior to sentencing. Ibid.

(quoting Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 36). Jail credits 

thereby prevent indigent defendants who cannot afford to post 

bail from serving greater time in custody than wealthier 

defendants. Ibid. In addition, jail credits discourage 

prosecutors from manipulating trial dates and promote uniformity 

in sentencing. Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 48-49.

In Hernandez, supra, this Court held that, under Rule

3:21-8, defendants are entitled to jail credit “against all 

sentences ‘for any time served in custody in jail or in a state 

hospital between arrest and the imposition of sentence’ on each 

case.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added) (quoting R. 3:21-8). 

“Therefore, as interpreted by Hernandez, Rule 3:21-8 requires 

that a defendant receive jail credit even though the charges are 

not directly responsible for his or her incarceration.” Rawls, 

supra, 219 N.J. at 194.

IV.

In Hernandez, this Court reviewed two consolidated jail 

credit cases. In the first case, defendant Andrea Hernandez was 

arrested in connection with an armed robbery in Passaic County 

on October 25, 2006. Hernandez, supra, 208 N.J. at 28-29. She 

remained in Passaic County custody until January 22, 2007, when 

she was transferred to Ocean County custody. Id. at 29. On 

January 23, 2007, Hernandez was charged with an Ocean County 
10

burglary unrelated to the Passaic County charges. Ibid. 

Thereafter, she pleaded guilty to the Ocean County burglary 

charge and was sentenced on August 24, 2007. Ibid. Hernandez 

was sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment, to be served 

concurrently with any sentence she would receive in Passaic 

County. Ibid. The trial court credited Hernandez with 213 days 

of jail credit, representing the number of days she spent in 

Ocean County custody between January 23 and August 23, 2007. 

Ibid. 

Hernandez then pleaded guilty to the Passaic County charges 

on October 4, 2007. Id. at 30. She was sentenced to twenty 

years’ imprisonment with an 85 percent parole ineligibility 

period pursuant to NERA. Ibid. The trial court credited 

Hernandez with ninety days of jail credit, representing the time 

she spent in Passaic County custody between October 25, 2006, 

and January 22, 2007. Ibid. 

Hernandez appealed, arguing that she was entitled to jail 

credits for the time period between October 25, 2006, and the 

Ocean County sentencing on August 24, 2007. Id. at 31. This 

Court agreed with Hernandez. Id. at 46-47. We observed that, 

if jail credit for her total time in pre-sentence custody 

applied to the Passaic County sentence, Hernandez would spend 

less time imprisoned because the parole ineligibility term would 

be reduced. Ibid. Recognizing the inequity of such a scenario, 
11

we held that “Hernandez should be entitled to jail credit on the 

Passaic County sentence for the time she spent in custody 

between her Passaic County arrest and the date sentence was 

imposed in Ocean County.” Id. at 47. 

In the second case, defendant Derrick Wayne Rose committed 

multiple offenses in Union County. Id. at 31. He allegedly 

sold controlled dangerous substances (CDS) to undercover 

officers in Plainfield on May 4, 2006, and August 14, 2006, but 

was not arrested either time. Ibid. On January 26, 2007, Rose 

was arrested in connection with a theft in Linden. Ibid. While 

incarcerated, Rose was indicted for the CDS offenses: he was 

indicted for the first CDS offense on April 26, 2007, and for 

the second CDS offense on May 1, 2007. Ibid. Rose was then 

charged for the Linden theft on May 31, 2007. Id. at 31-32. 

Rose pleaded guilty to charges in all three indictments and 

was sentenced on January 18, 2008, to two concurrent five-year 

sentences with three years of parole ineligibility for both CDS 

offenses, to run consecutively with a four-year sentence for the 

theft offense. Ibid. He received one day of jail credit toward 

the first CDS offense; no jail credit toward the second CDS 

offense; and 357 days of jail credit toward the theft offense, 

representing the time between his January 26, 2007, arrest and 

his sentencing date. Id. at 33. 
12

Rose appealed, asserting that all jail credits should have 

been applied toward the three-year parole bar on the two CDS 

sentences. Id. at 35. Defense counsel pointed out that by the 

time Rose served his three-year parole ineligibility period, he 

would be parole eligible regardless of the 357 days of jail 

credit applied to his four-year theft sentence. Ibid. This 

Court agreed with Rose. Id. at 47-48. We held that in 

situations where multiple charges are brought in a single 

indictment, “the total amount of jail credit reduces the 

aggregate custodial sentence imposed.” Ibid. We sought to 

avoid scenarios in which jail credits “might have different 

consequences if the same consecutive sentences are embodied in a 

single judgment than if they are embodied in separate 

indictments and the credits applied only to one” of the 

judgments. Id. at 48. We concluded that Rose was entitled to 

jail credits against all three offenses. Ibid. 

V. 

Here, defendant was arrested on November 19, 2009, and 

charged in two separate indictments. He did not make bail and 

remained in custody until he was sentenced for both indictments 

on August 22, 2012. Altogether, defendant spent 1007 days in 

pre-sentence custody. He received 1007 days of jail credit 

against the front end of his aggregate sentence. 
13

Contrary to defendant’s contentions, Hernandez does not 

warrant the application of double jail credit in this case. 

Here, unlike the situations presented in Hernandez, defendant 

did not suffer any adverse consequences due to the trial court’s 

application of jail credit. In Hernandez, supra, neither of the 

defendants received the full benefits of the time they spent in 

pre-sentence custody. Id. at 29-33. Instead, both defendants 

received jail credits that did not fully apply time spent in 

pre-sentence custody to their parole ineligibility terms. Ibid. 

Those inequitable scenarios warranted the application of jail 

credits to all sentences received by both defendants. 

In this matter, however, defendant received the optimal 

benefits of jail credit for the entire time he spent in 

pre-sentence custody. Defendant received 1007 days of jail 

credit, reflecting the full time between his arrest and 

sentencing. The 1007 days of jail credit were applied to the 

Indictment 2 sentences, which carried a parole ineligibility 

term. The jail credits reduced both defendant’s aggregate 

prison term and his parole ineligibility period. Therefore, the 

jail credits were applied to the front end of defendant’s 

aggregate sentence. This application of jail credit is 

equitable because it maximizes the benefits to defendant. 

We understand that some language in Hernandez may have 

caused confusion about whether jail credits can reduce sentences 
14

on each charge of a consecutive sentence, thereby allowing 

defendants to receive jail credit for twice the amount of time 

spent in pre-sentence custody. Defendant Hernandez received 

concurrent sentences, but the trial court did not provide her

with credit against her parole ineligibility period. Id. at 29. 

This Court required that Hernandez’s jail credit apply to her 

parole ineligibility period. Id. at 46-47. In contrast, 

defendant Rose received both consecutive and concurrent 

sentences, but the trial court did not provide him with credit 

against his parole ineligibility period. Id. at 32-33. This

Court stated that Rose was “in custody on all three matters [at 

the same time] and traditionally entitled to ‘jail credits’ on 

all charges thereafter.” Id. at 48. To the extent that 

language suggests that a defendant is entitled to jail credits 

for time simultaneously spent in custody on each charge for 

which he receives a consecutive sentence, we now make clear that 

such double credit is not allowed. To hold otherwise would lead 

to the perverse result that a defendant held in custody would be 

better off than one released on bail or supervision.

Both defendants in Hernandez were entitled to have the full 

amount of time spent in pre-sentence custody applied to the 

front end of their aggregate sentences. The appropriate course 

of action is to view the separate sentences together and apply 

jail credit to the front end of the aggregate sentence. This 
15

application maximizes the benefits of jail credit for defendants 

without awarding double time. 

Moreover, the application of 1007 days of jail credit is 

consistent with the policy purposes of Hernandez. Crediting 

defendant with 1007 days of jail credit does not provide 

defendant with “double punishment,” nor does it disadvantage him 

for not posting bail. Id. at 36; see also Rawls, supra, 219 

N.J. at 193. Rather than disadvantage defendant, the 

application of 1007 days of jail credit to the front end of his 

aggregate sentence fairly credits him with the entire time spent 

in pre-sentence custody. In contrast, the award of double jail 

credit would result in disparate real-time sentences for 

defendants who can and cannot afford to post bail. If 

defendants who cannot post bail are awarded double jail credit 

in such scenarios, their real-time sentences will be reduced for 

time they did not actually spend in pre-sentence custody. Our 

holding in Hernandez, supra, sought to ensure uniformity in 

sentencing and does not call for such irregular results. 208 

N.J. at 48-49. 

In Hernandez, supra, we also cautioned against a system in 

which defendants endure different consequences for sentences 

imposed on one indictment or on multiple indictments. Id. at 

47-48. Noting that such a system would be ripe for manipulation 

by prosecutors, we concluded that “[t]he issue of credits simply 
16

cannot turn on such happenstance.” Id. at 48. Under the 

application of jail credit urged by defendant, such happenstance 

would dictate the real-time sentences defendants receive. For 

example, if defendant was charged and sentenced to consecutive 

prison terms under a single indictment, he would be entitled to

only 1007 days of jail credit for his time in pre-sentence 

custody. But, because defendant was sentenced under two 

separate indictments, he would be entitled to 2014 days of jail 

credit despite spending the same amount of time in custody. 

Such a system defies uniformity and leaves too great of 

variation to happenstance. 

In sum, Hernandez is modified as follows: double credit 

should not be awarded where a defendant is sentenced to 

consecutive sentences under separate indictments and receives 

the optimal benefits of jail credit for time spent in presentence custody. To the extent that Hernandez has been read 

differently with respect to consecutive sentences we do not 

follow that approach. Instead, the sentencing court should 

treat the sentences as a unified proceeding and maximize the 

benefits to the defendant by applying jail credit to the front 

end of the imprisonment term. We caution that this holding in 

no way alters the applicability of gap-time credits should 

sentences be imposed on different dates. 

VI. 
17

The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the 

sentence imposed by the trial court is reinstated.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, 

PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s 

opinion.