IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

JUSTIN JONES, § 

TDCJ No. 1887186, § 

 § 

Petitioner, § 

 § 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-1684-S-BN 

§ 

DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, § 

§ 

Respondent. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Through a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254, filed in 2022, Petitioner Justin Jones, a Texas prisoner, collaterally attacks his 

2013 Dallas County convictions for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and for 

murder. See Dkt. Nos. 3, 4. 

His application has now been referred to the undersigned United States 

magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing 

order of reference from the presiding United States district judge. The State 

responded to the application and first argues that it should be dismissed with 

prejudice as time barred. See Dkt. No. 39. And Jones replied. See Dkt. Nos. 46-50. 

The undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendation that the Court should dismiss the federal habeas petition with 

prejudice as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

Legal Standards 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 

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“introduced both ‘simple logic’ to the federal habeas landscape and uniform rules for 

federal courts to apply.” Wallace v. Mississippi, 43 F.4th 482, 492 (5th Cir. 2022) 

(quoting Smith v. Titus, 141 S. Ct. 982, 987 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from 

denial of cert.), then citing Day, 547 U.S. at 202 n.1). “Namely, it implemented a host 

of greatly needed procedural requirements for petitioners seeking habeas relief.” Id.

(citing Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1524 (2022) (“In many ways, the statute 

represented a sea change in federal habeas law.”)). 

One such requirement is “the one-year period for an individual in custody 

pursuant to a state-court judgment to file a § 2254 petition for habeas relief” that 

“begins running from the latest of four events.” Id. at 497 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)): 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or 

other collateral review is pending is excluded from the limitations period. See id. § 

2244(d)(2). 

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The one-year limitations period is also subject to equitable tolling – “a 

discretionary doctrine that turns on the facts and circumstances of a particular case,” 

Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999), and only applies in “rare and 

exceptional circumstances,” United States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002) 

(citing Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)). “[A] litigant is entitled to 

equitable tolling of a statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes two 

elements: ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.’” 

Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255 (2016) (quoting 

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). 

“‘The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, 

not maximum feasible diligence.’ What a petitioner did both before and after the 

extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from timely filing may indicate 

whether he was diligent overall.” Jackson v. Davis, 933 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2019) 

(quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 653; footnote omitted). 

But “[a] petitioner’s failure to satisfy the statute of limitations must result from 

external factors beyond his control; delays of the petitioner’s own making do not 

qualify.” Hardy v. Quarterman, 577 F.3d 596, 598 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 

(citation omitted). So this “prong of the equitable tolling test is met only where the 

circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are both extraordinary and beyond [the 

litigant’s] control.” Menominee Indian Tribe, 577 U.S. at 257. 

A showing of “actual innocence” can also overcome AEDPA’s statute of 

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limitations. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). But the actual 

innocence gateway is only available to a petitioner who presents “evidence of 

innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial 

unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional 

error.” Id. at 401 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)). That is, the 

petitioner’s new, reliable evidence must be enough to persuade the Court that “‘no 

juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.’” Id. at 386 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329); see also Johnson v. Hargett, 978 

F.2d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The Supreme Court has made clear that the term 

‘actual innocence’ means factual, as opposed to legal, innocence – ‘legal’ innocence, of 

course, would arise whenever a constitutional violation by itself requires reversal, 

whereas ‘actual’ innocence, as the Court stated in McCleskey [v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 

(1991)], means that the person did not commit the crime.” (footnotes omitted)); Acker 

v. Davis, 693 F. App’x 384, 392-93 (5th Cir 2017) (per curiam) (“Successful gateway 

claims of actual innocence are ‘extremely rare,’ and relief is available only in the 

‘extraordinary case’ where there was ‘manifest injustice.’” (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 324, 327)). 

Analysis 

The timeliness of most Section 2254 applications – Jones’s is no exception – is 

determined under Subsection A, based on the date on which the judgment became 

final. A state criminal judgment becomes final under AEDPA “when there is no more 

‘availability of direct appeal to the state courts.’” Frosch v. Thaler, No. 2:12-cv-231, 

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2013 WL 271423, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2013) (quoting Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 

U.S. 113, 119 (2009)), rec. adopted, 2013 WL 271446 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2013). 

On September 10, 2013, Jones entered negotiated pleas of guilty: he pled guilty 

as charged to the two aggravated robberies and was sentenced to terms of 30 years of 

imprisonment, see State v. Jones, Nos. F12-16773-I, F12-61705-I (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 

2, Dall. Cnty., Tex. Sept. 10, 2013) [Dkt. No. 40-1 at 90-97; Dkt. No. 40-27 at 90-97], 

and, while he was charged with capital murder, he pled guilty to murder and was 

sentenced to life imprisonment, see State v. Jones, No. F12-61728-I (Crim. Dist. Ct. 

No. 2, Dall. Cnty., Tex. Sept. 10, 2013) [Dkt. No. 40-5 at 85-93]. 

Jones did not appeal. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 3 at 3. And he did not file state habeas 

petitions concerning these convictions until July 2021. See Ex parte Jones, W12-

16773-I(A), W12-61705-I(A), W12-61728-I(A) (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2, Dall. Cnty., Tex.) 

[Dkt. No. 40-1 at 19; Dkt. No. 40-27 at 19; Dkt. No. 40-5 at 19]; see also Ex parte Jones, 

WR-93,067-01, -02, -03 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2021) (denying habeas relief without 

written order). 

So his state criminal judgments became final for federal-limitations purposes 

on the thirtieth day after the state judgments were imposed that was not a Saturday, 

Sunday, or legal holiday – which was on October 10, 2013. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

26.2(a)(1). And, “[b]ecause [Jones’s] state habeas petition[s were] not filed within the 

one-year period” that commenced on that date, they “did not statutorily toll the 

limitation clock.” Palacios v. Stephens, 723 F.3d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Scott 

v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000) (in turn citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2))). 

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Accordingly, the Section 2254 habeas application, filed no sooner than July 20, 

2022, see Dkt. No. 3 at 14, was filed more than eight years too late and should be 

denied as untimely under Section 2244(d)(1)(A) absent tolling of the limitations 

period. 

Jones neither explains how another provision of Section 2244(d)(1) could apply 

here nor advances a claim of tolling under the narrow actual innocence gateway. 

But, through a Motion to Suppress Time Barr Recommendation, filed after his 

reply, Jones does argue that “[t]he state court did not forward [to him] legal 

notification in regards to the illegal and unlawful conviction until October 2016 which 

was over 3 year the period the Respondent claim was expired,” which he claims made 

it “impossible for [him] to meet the time limitation.” Dkt. No. 47. Jones offers no 

evidence to support this argument, belied by the state court record – namely his 

September 2013 judicial confessions. And, even if the Court were to accept it, Jones’s 

argument – that he did not know until October 2016 that he should challenge his 

convictions – fails to show that he acted with reasonable diligence where he did not 

file his state petitions until July 2021. 

Jones has therefore also failed to establish equitable tolling. And the Court 

should therefore dismiss the Section 2254 petition with prejudice as time barred. 

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss Petitioner Justin Jones’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas 

application with prejudice as time barred. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

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all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: February 16, 2023 

_________________________________________ 

 DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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