alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Michael Ecker, Respondent, v Deborah Ecker, Appellant.

In a proceeding by the father for a downward modification of child support, the mother appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Torres, J.), dated September 25, 1989, as denied her objections to an order of the same court (Waltrous, H.E.), dated July 18, 1989, denying her motion to vacate her default in appearing at a hearing on her cross petition, *inter alia,*for an upward modification of child support, and dismissing the cross petition.

Ordered that the order dated September 25, 1989, is reversed insofar as appealed from, as a matter of his discretion, with costs, the appellant’s objections are sustained, so much of the order dated July 18, 1989, as denied the appellant’s motion to vacate her default and dismissed the cross petition are vacated, the motion to vacate her default is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Queens County, for further proceedings on the cross petition.

Upon the failure of the mother and her attorney to appear on a hearing date, the Hearing Examiner scheduled an inquest on the father’s petition for a downward modification of child support and dismissed the mother’s cross petition for an upward modification of child support and for arrears of child support. Prior to the date of the inquest, the mother moved to vacate her default and to restore the matter to the calendar. We find that the denial of her motion constituted an improvident exercise of discretion *(see, Matter of Cohen v Seletsky,*142 AD2d 111). The record reveals that the mother’s failure to appear for the hearing was not willful but was due to her attorney’s mistake as to the correct adjournment date, and that the father would not have been prejudiced by permitting litigation of the merits of the cross petition with his petition. As this proceeding involves the issue of child support, the law favors resolution of the dispute on the merits *(see generally, Matter of Tauber v Tauber,*152 AD2d 674; *Otto v Otto,*150 AD2d 57; *Bustamante v Bustamante,*144 AD2d 418). Bracken, J. P., Harwood, O’Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.
#### Reginald Carthens, Respondent, v City of New York, Appellant.

In an action to recover damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hurowitz, J.), entered January 31, 1989, which, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $150,000.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the complaint is dismissed.

The plaintiff, who generally fit the description of the perpetrator, was identified by an eyewitness and arrested and indicted, *inter alia,*for murder in the second degree. At the Grand Jury proceeding, it was not disclosed that there were *409certain discrepancies between the description given by the eyewitness and the actual appearance of the plaintiff, such as the clothes he was wearing. Ten months later, new evidence resulted in the release of, and dismissal of the charges against the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereafter commenced this action to recover damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Following a jury trial, the plaintiff was awarded the principal sum of $150,000 on the malicious prosecution cause of action only. We reverse.

It is well settled that a Grand Jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause to believe that the plaintiff committed the crime charged *(Colon v City of New York,*60 NY2d 78; *Broughton v State of New York,*37 NY2d 451, *cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg,*423 US 929; *Lee v City of Mount Vernon,*49 NY2d 1041; *Landsman v Moss,*133 AD2d 359; *Boose v City of Rochester,*71 AD2d 59). That presumption may be overcome only by evidence establishing that the police conduct "deviated egregiously from statutory requirements or accepted practices applicable in criminal cases” *(Gisondi v Town of Harrison,*72 NY2d 280, 285; *see also, Lee v City of Mount Vernon, supra,*at 1043), and in any event the plaintiff is required to demonstrate the existence of malice or its factual equivalent *(see, e.g., Colon v City of New York, supra,*at 82).

The discrepancies between the plaintiff’s appearance and the descriptions of the perpetrator are insufficient to overcome the presumption *(see, Gisondi v Town of Harrison, supra; see also, Taylor v City of Mount Vernon,*161 AD2d 631). Moreover, the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of malice or other egregious conduct on which any inference of malice could be based *(see, Broughton v State of New York, supra; cf, Gisondi v Town of Harrison, supra; see also, Taylor v City of Mount Vernon, supra; Boose v City of Rochester, supra).*Lawrence, J. P., Sullivan, Harwood and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, the
undersigned officer of United Energies Development
Corporation (the "Company"), hereby certify to my knowledge
that:

The Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,
2017 of the Company fully complies, in all material respects,
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the
Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.


                             /s/ James Cassidy
                                 Chief Executive Officer
                                 Chief Financial Officer
Date: April 17, 2018
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

400 7th Street, SW, Suite 3E-218

Washington, DC 20219

Report Date: 04/10/2023

Time: 6:32 AM

Quarterly Request Status

Between 1/1/2023 and 3/31/2023

Request Types Requests Received Requests Closed Requests Pending Requests Overdue

(Includes Requests on

Hold)

Certified Documents 280 278 9

FOIA 111 100 35

TOTAL 391 378 44

0

3

3
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 231 (Thursday, November 30, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 71353]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-30530]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Notice of Application for Approval of Discontinuance or 
Modification of a Railroad Signal System or Relief From Requirements

    Pursuant to Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 235 and 
49 U.S.C. 20502(a), the following railroads have petitioned the Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA) seeking approval for the discontinuance 
or modification of the signal system or relief from the requirements of 
49 CFR Part 236 as detailed below.

Docket No. FRA-2000-8039

    Applicant: CSX Transportation, Mr. E.G. Peterson, Assistant 
Chief Engineer, Signal Design and Construction 4901 Belfort Road, 
Suite 130 (S/C J-370), Jacksonville, Florida 32256.

    CSX Transportation seeks approval of the proposed modification of 
the traffic control system, on the single main track, at W. E. 
Stephensport, Kentucky, milepost HR-65.4, LH & STL Subdivision, 
Louisville Service Lane, consisting of the discontinuance and removal 
of absolute controlled signals 55L and 55R. The proposed changes are 
associated with the previous removal of the siding.
    The reason given for the proposed changes is to eliminate 
facilities no longer needed in present day operations.
    Any interested party desiring to protest the granting of an 
application shall set forth specifically the grounds upon which the 
protest is made, and contain a concise statement of the interest of the 
protestant in the proceeding. Additionally, one copy of the protest 
shall be furnished to the applicant at the address listed above.
    All communications concerning this proceeding should be identified 
by the docket number and must be submitted to the Docket Clerk, DOT 
Central Docket Management Facility, Room PI-401, Washington, D.C. 
20590-0001. Communications received within 45 days of the date of this 
notice will be considered by the FRA before final action is taken. 
Comments received after that date will be considered as far as 
practicable. All written communications concerning these proceedings 
are available for examination during regular business hours (9 a.m.-5 
p.m.) at DOT Central Docket Management Facility, Room PI-401 (Plaza 
Level), 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590-0001. All 
documents in the public docket are also available for inspection and 
copying on the internet at the docket facility's Web site at http://dms.dot.gov.
    FRA expects to be able to determine these matters without an oral 
hearing. However, if a specific request for an oral hearing is 
accompanied by a showing that the party is unable to adequately present 
his or her position by written statements, an application may be set 
for public hearing.

    Issued in Washington, D.C. on November 27, 2000.
Edward R. English,
Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance.
[FR Doc. 00-30530 Filed 11-29-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
#### Martyn Taub, Respondent, v Samuel Wulwick et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

In an action to recover a broker’s commission, the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Patsalos, J.), dated May 4, 1989, which granted the plaintiff’s motion to impose sanctions for failure to proceed with pretrial disclosure to the extent of directing counsel for the defendants Wulwick and Kasten to personally pay to the plaintiff’s counsel the sum of $1,000 with *493leave to the plaintiff to seek more severe sanctions should counsel fail to make the required payment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs. The appellants’ time to comply with the order dated May 4, 1989, is extended until 20 days after service upon them of a copy of this decision and order, with notice of entry.

Counsel against whom a sanction was imposed proceeds before us on the assumption that the Supreme Court acted pursuant to 22 NYCRR part 130 and that its failures to observe the procedures set forth in that part and to provide for an appropriate payee *(see,*22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [d]; 130-1.2, 130-1.3) mandate reversal. However, the plaintiff’s motion to impose sanctions was grounded on the refusal of the appellants’ counsel to permit depositions to proceed with "local counsel” after having previously advised the court and the other parties, through "local counsel”, that "local counsel” would formally be substituted for him. Moreover, the plaintiff referred in his notice of motion to certain provisions of CPLR article 31. The motion could therefore only be construed as one for sanctions pursuant to CPLR 3126, which authorizes the Supreme Court to make such orders "as are just” *(see,*CPLR 3126; *see also, Mrs. London’s Bake Shop v City of Saratoga Springs,*144 AD2d 749; *Rosner v Blue Channel Corp.,*131 AD2d 654). We discern no injustice or improvident exercise of discretion in imposing a monetary sanction on counsel *(see, Bermudez v Laminates Unlimited,*134 AD2d 314; *Rosner v Blue Channel Corp., supra)*and do not regard the amount imposed to be excessive. Harwood, J. P., Balletta, Miller and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6308
TYRELL DAVRON ANDERSON, Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus THE STATE OF MARYLAND; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; LISA HARDY; CARIE BLAND; THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (CA-04-4071-AMD) Submitted: April 14, 2005 Decided: April 21, 2005 Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Tyrell Davron Anderson, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Tyrell Davron Anderson appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Anderson v. Maryland , No. CA-04-4071-AMD (D. Md. filed Jan. 28, 2005 & entered Jan. 31, 2005). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
**EXHIBIT 99.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEYACT OF 2002**

**(18 U.S.C. 1350)**

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Wells Real Estate Fund V, L.P. (the “Registrant”) on Form 10-K for the yearended December 31, 2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, Douglas P. Williams, Chief Financial Officer of the corporate general partner of the General Partner ofRegistrant, hereby certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350) that, to the best of his knowledge and belief: 

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant. 

 

/s/ DOUGLAS P. WILLIAMS

----
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1232 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1232

   To direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive the 
application to the District of Columbia Chartered Health Plan, Inc., of 
the requirement under title XIX of the Social Security Act that limits 
 the maximum number of individuals enrolled with a health maintenance 
 organization who may be beneficiaries under the medicare or medicaid 
                               programs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 4, 1993

    Ms. Norton (for herself, Mr. Ford of Tennessee, and Mr. Towns) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                          Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to waive the 
application to the District of Columbia Chartered Health Plan, Inc., of 
the requirement under title XIX of the Social Security Act that limits 
 the maximum number of individuals enrolled with a health maintenance 
 organization who may be beneficiaries under the medicare or medicaid 
                               programs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. WAIVER OF APPLICATION OF MEDICAID ENROLLMENT MIX REQUIREMENT 
              TO DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHARTERED HEALTH PLAN, INC.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall 
retroactively waive the application of the requirement described in 
section 1903(m)(2)(A)(ii) of the Social Security Act to the entity 
known as the District of Columbia Chartered Health Plan, Inc., for the 
period described in section 2, if the Secretary determines that the 
entity is making continuous efforts and progress toward achieving 
compliance with such requirement.
    (b) Period of Applicability.--The period referred to in subsection 
(a) is the period that begins on October 1, 1992, and ends on January 
31, 1994.

                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          33,148
<SECURITIES>                                    16,286<F1>
<RECEIVABLES>                                    9,049
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,014
<INVENTORY>                                      2,331
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                60,534
<PP&E>                                          19,462
<DEPRECIATION>                                  13,872
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  68,798
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           24,148
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       117,284
<OTHER-SE>                                    (86,071)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    68,798
<SALES>                                         36,203
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                36,203
<CGS>                                           16,659
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   16,659
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                32,461
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 844
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (10,931)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       121
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (11,052)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (11,052)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.60)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.60)
<FN>
<F1>This amount represents short-term investments
held by the Company at 12/31/96
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
(logo)****CURCIO

+COHEN

 

 

**Report of IndependentRegistered Public Accounting Firm**

 

Managing Member

Park Bridge Lender ServicesLLC

New York, NY

 

 

We have examinedmanagement’s assertion, included in the accompanying Management’sReport on Assessment of 2016 Compliance by Park Bridge Lender Services LLC withRegulation AB Servicing Criteria (“Management’s Report”),that Park Bridge Lender Services LLC (the “Company”) complied withthe servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of the U.S. Securities andExchange Commission’s Regulation AB as of and for the year ended December31, 2016, excluding those criteria noted as not applicable (N/A) within ExhibitB to Management’s Report. The transactions covered by this report areonly those transactions processed by the Company in its capacity as trustadvisor or operating advisor for the asset backed securities transactions (the“Platform”) identified in Management’s Report. ReferenceExhibit A to Management’s Report for the transactions covered by thisexamination. Management is responsible for the Company’s compliance withthe applicable servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinionon management’s assertion based on our examination.

 

Our examination was conductedin accordance with attestation standards of the Public Company AccountingOversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a testbasis, evidence about the Company’s compliance with the applicableservicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we considerednecessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of a selectedsample of the servicing activities related to the Platform, determining whetherthe Company performed those selected activities in compliance with theapplicable servicing criteria during the specified period. Our procedures werelimited to the selected transactions and servicing activities performed by theCompany during the period covered by this report. Our examination was notdesigned to detect material noncompliance arising from errors that may haveoccurred prior to or subsequent to our tests, that may have affected theCompany’s servicing activities during the period covered by this report.We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company’scompliance with the applicable servicing criteria.

 

In our opinion,management’s assertion that the Company complied with the aforementionedapplicable servicing criteria identified in Exhibit B to Management’s Reportwith respect to the transactions identified in Exhibit A to Management’sReport as of and for the year ended December 31, 2016, for the Platform, isfairly stated in all material aspects.

 

 

/s/ Curcio & Cohen,CPA’s, P.C.

 

 

New York, NY

February 2, 2017

 

 

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTSPC 7 PENN PLAZA, SUITE 1500 NEW YORK NY 10001

TEL: 212 557-9800  FAX:212 557 9819   WEBSITE: WWW.CWCCPAFIRM.COM
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1329 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1329

To amend the Contract Services for Drug Dependent Federal Offenders Act 
    of 1978 to provide additional authorizations of appropriations.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 11, 1993

    Mr. Schumer (for himself and Mr. Sensenbrenner) introduced the 
  following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Contract Services for Drug Dependent Federal Offenders Act 
    of 1978 to provide additional authorizations of appropriations.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Drug and Alcohol Offenders Treatment 
Act of 1993''.

SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION.

    Section 4(a) of the Contract Services for Drug Dependent Federal 
Offenders Treatment Act of 1978 is amended--
            (1) by striking out ``; and'' and inserting a semicolon; 
        and
            (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; 
        $50,000,000 for fiscal year 1993; $55,000,000 for fiscal year 
        1994; and $60,000,000 for fiscal year 1995.''.

                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Ronco Corporation
(the "Company") for the period from October 15, 2004 (Date of Inception) to June
30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, Evan J. Warshawsky, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

      (1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

                             /s/ Evan J. Warshawsky
                             ----------------------
                               Evan J. Warshawsky

November 15, 2005

The foregoing certification is made solely for the purpose of 18 U. S.C. Section
1350, subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other
purpose.