FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case Nos. 5D2023-2204

 5D2023-2234

 5D2023-2311

LT Case Nos. 2020-100954-CFDL

2020-CF-000814

2020-CF-356

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DEON JONES,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Courts for Volusia County, St. Johns

County, and Flagler County.

Dawn D. Nichols, Judge.

William R. Ponall and Eric J. Sorice, of Ponall Law, Maitland, for 

Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alyssa M. 

Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for 

Appellee.

August 16, 2024

EISNAUGLE, J.
2

Deon Jones appeals his judgment and sentence imposed after 

entering into an open plea, effectively negotiated between counsel 

for Jones and the trial judge, to resolve three cases in which Jones

was charged with numerous counts of shooting into an occupied 

vehicle and criminal mischief. 

Based on the open plea, Jones’s anticipated sentence was five

years in prison and $20,000 in ordered restitution. Jones also 

entered into a Quarterman agreement1 which allowed him to 

remain out of custody until sentencing at a later date. 

Jones failed to appear as agreed for sentencing and was 

eventually apprehended.

2 At a subsequent sentencing hearing 

where Jones was present, the trial judge sentenced him to the 

lowest permissible sentence (as reflected on the scoresheet) of 

twenty-four years in prison.

On appeal, Jones argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred 

in sentencing him above five years in prison because his failure to 

appear for sentencing was not willful. While it is true that “a 

violation of a Quarterman’s release must be willful,” Cruz v. State, 

303 So. 3d 285, 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020), Jones made no such 

argument below. 

Instead, counsel argued for leniency because Jones 

communicated with his attorney and bondsman, did not flee, was 

just “a kid,” and just “made a stupid, stupid decision not to show.” 

Far from arguing that the trial court remained bound to a five-year 

sentence because the failure to appear was not willful, counsel 

argued:

1 See Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1988).

2 Jones submitted a letter to the trial court purportedly signed 

by a nurse practitioner stating he was at the emergency room on 

the day he was required to appear for sentencing due to an anxiety 

attack, was treated with medication to calm his anxiety, and was 

released after a few hours.
3

I would ask the Court to stick with the five years that 

was originally offered and perhaps somehow limit his 

gain to something. Maybe he’d serve more than he 

thought he would serve during the five-year period. 

Because the actual time we thought he would serve, and 

Mr. Jones thought he would serve, would be less than 

that, because of gain time . . . .

If there is error here, it is not preserved. “To be preserved for 

appeal, the specific legal ground upon which a claim is based must 

be raised at trial and a claim different than that will not be heard 

on appeal.” Chamberlain v. State, 881 So. 2d 1087, 1100 (Fla. 2004) 

(quoting Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 852 (Fla. 2003)); see also 

§ 924.051(3), Fla. Stat. (2023). This rule on preservation “allows

the lower tribunal to consider and resolve errors when they arise,

rather than wait for the process of an appeal,” and importantly,

“serves the purpose of treating the parties, the court, and the

judicial system fairly.” State v. Clark, 373 So. 3d 1128, 1131 (Fla.

2023).

In this case, Jones’s request for leniency did not put the trial 

court on notice of the separate and distinct argument that his

failure to appear was not willful. Cruz, 303 So. 3d at 287. While 

counsel for Jones also informed the trial judge that Jones was at a 

medical facility on the day he failed to appear, when considering 

the context, this argument was to bolster counsel’s request for 

leniency. Given that the argument raised on appeal is not 

preserved, we must affirm. 

AFFIRMED. 

LAMBERT, J., concurs. 

MAKAR, J., concurs specially with opinion, in which 

LAMBERT, J., also concurs. 
4

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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5

Case Nos. 5D2023-2204

5D2023-2234

5D2023-2311

Lt. Case Nos. 2020-100954-CFDL

2020-CF-000814

 2020-CF-356

MAKAR, J., concurring specially.

I concur in affirmance and write separately to highlight a few 

takeaways from this case.

Deon Anthony Jones entered a Quarterman agreement 

requiring that he appear on April 27, 2023, for sentencing. See

Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380, 1381 (Fla. 1988). If he failed 

to appear he risked not receiving an exceptionally favorable 

sentence (five years with credit for time served) for the serious 

felonies he committed by shooting a BB gun into multiple occupied 

vehicles traveling on I-95. He failed to appear for sentencing, his 

defense counsel claiming Jones had been in the hospital with an 

anxiety attack. The trial judge revoked Jones’s bond and issued a 

warrant for his arrest (he was surrendered voluntarily soon 

thereafter), saying she’d entertain a motion to consider 

documentation underlying Jones’s absence later.

On the same day, Jones’s counsel filed a motion to mitigate 

the forthcoming sentence, asserting that several factors weighed 

in favor of doing so. The State’s written response countered that 

Jones did not appear for the initial sentencing date, that he had 

prior felonies, and that he was otherwise not entitled to mitigation. 

Neither side addressed whether Jones’s failure to appear at the 

April 27th hearing was willful, a requirement to void the 

Quarterman agreement. See Gee v. State, 38 So. 3d 806, 807 (Fla. 

2d DCA 2010) (“If a defendant fails to timely appear for sentencing 

as required by a plea agreement, the trial court is not permitted to 

ignore the agreement and impose a harsher term unless the 

evidence supports a finding that the defendant’s failure to appear 

was willful.”).
6

At the subsequent sentencing hearing, which Jones attended, 

the trial court considered letters and testimony from Jones, 

testimony from his grandmother, and testimony from a psychology 

expert, who opined as to Jones’s immaturity and other factors

affecting his judgment. Some of the evidence, primarily from Jones

himself, could be considered relevant to whether his initial nonappearance was willful (such as his submission of a doctor’s office 

letter), but neither the parties nor the trial judge brought up the 

issue. After hearing the testimony, reviewing the evidence, and 

considering argument and legal submissions of counsel, the trial 

judge (the same one who approved the Quarterman agreement) 

sentenced Jones to 24 years, which was the lowest level under 

sentencing guidelines.

Jones now appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in 

failing to make a finding that he willfully failed to appear for 

sentencing on April 27th and that he is entitled to be sentenced to 

the agreed-upon five years. For its part, the State argues that 

Jones failed to preserve the issue of whether his non-appearance 

was willful. It was, of course, the State’s responsibility to seek to 

void the Quarterman agreement in the first instance, which was 

not done. And the State bore the burden to prove willfulness in an 

evidentiary hearing to prevail and nullify the agreed-to sentence. 

See Richardson v. State, 198 So. 3d 1075, 1076 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) 

(“At this hearing, the State bears the burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Richardson willfully failed to 

appear.”).

The State did not do the necessaries to void the Quarterman

agreement; but it is equally true that criminal defense counsel, 

who sees that a trial judge is contravening a Quarterman

agreement, as occurred here at the sentencing hearing, has an 

obligation to object on the record and point out that to do so 

requires record evidence and a judicial finding that the defendant 

willfully failed to appear at the initial sentencing hearing. 

Whether it was intentional and strategic or an oversight, that 

objection did not occur in this case.

What did occur is like what happened in Cruz v. State, 303 So. 

3d 285, 286−87 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020), where defense counsel focused 

solely on leniency in sentencing, choosing to make no objection 
7

challenging the trial court’s departure from the Quarterman

agreement. In Cruz, the State moved to void the Quarterman

agreement, but defense counsel “did not argue that the violation 

was not willful,” apparently because, although there may have 

been good cause for his client’s initial failure to appear (due to 

transportation issues), the client “subsequently failed to turn 

herself in for two months.” Id. at 286. A similar strategic decision 

may have been made in this case, though Jones did not appear to 

be on board with it; indeed, on appeal, he urges error in the trial 

court’s failure to appoint conflict-free counsel to allow him to 

withdraw his plea. These are matters for Rule 3.850 review, not in 

this direct appeal.

The point of Cruz is that defense counsel cannot present a case 

of leniency at sentencing and expect to preserve a claim that his 

client did not breach a Quarterman Agreement. In a Quarterman 

situation, where a potentially valid basis exists to show that a 

defendant’s non-appearance was non-willful, defense counsel has 

an obligation to raise an objection where the trial court seeks to 

depart from the agreed-upon sentence without first making factual 

findings, supported by the record, that the defendant acted 

willfully. Because no such objection was made in the trial court, 

the issue was not preserved under Cruz.

Beyond the preservation issue, the lessons learned in this case 

are fourfold. First, criminal defendants must assiduously adhere 

to the terms of a Quarterman agreement, particularly the 

requirement that they timely appear for sentencing or risk drastic

results, such as here, where a five-year sentence (with release at 

around age 30) was transformed into a twenty-four-year sentence 

(with release at around age 50). Given the nature of a Quarterman

agreement, which grants a criminal defendant both leniency in 

and freedom pending sentencing, it makes no sense to choose to 

not show up at the designated time/place given what’s at stake.

Second, the law erects a high hurdle for voiding a Quarterman

agreement: proof that a defendant willfully failed to show up at 

sentencing. This standard isn’t met when a defendant had a reason 

beyond his control for non-appearance. See Johnson v. State, 501 

So. 2d 158, 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (noting that “only in the most 

merciless and draconian system of justice” would a failure beyond 
8

one’s control “result in a forfeiture of his bargained-for sentence”). 

Courts have upheld a range of good faith reasons that excuse 

appearance at sentencing, such as an accidental car breakdown, a 

letter to the judge beforehand and credible testimony explaining 

lack of transportation on the day of sentencing, a genuinely 

mistaken reading of the date on paperwork where no plausible 

reason for non-appearance existed, and an arrest for a traffic 

infraction on the day of sentencing. See Peacock v. State, 77 So. 3d 

1285, 1288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (compiling cases with valid 

excuses). Applied here, anxiety in advance of sentencing is 

understandable but not an excusable ground for non-appearance 

generally. Anxiety in some people can be extreme and

incapacitating; but definitive documentation showing a clinically 

debilitating anxiety attack—i.e., something more than a cryptic 

note from a walk-in medical clinic—is advisable.

Third, if the State seeks to void a Quarterman agreement it 

should formally move to do so and demonstrate that the 

defendant’s non-appearance was willful. As a general matter, it is 

in both the State’s and the defendant’s interest that a Quarterman

agreement be upheld. In this case, for example, Jones now faces 

nineteen years of additional lost freedom that needlessly imposes 

almost $600,000 of increased incarceration costs on taxpayers.* No 

one questions that stern consequences should befall a recalcitrant 

criminal defendant who willfully fails to show up for sentencing. 

On the other hand, where the reason for nonappearance presents 

a close question as to willfulness, the decision to void a 

Quarterman agreement should be made with circumspection and 

proportionality as to overall consequences, e.g., is the imposition 

of two additional decades in prison for non-appearance costbeneficial to society given that the agreed upon five-year sentence

presumably met the criminal justice goals of deterrence, 

retribution, and reduced recidivism?

Fourth, because a Quarterman agreement is contractual in 

nature, it makes sense that the party seeking to void it should be 

* For Fiscal Year 2022−23, it cost an average of $84.61 per day

to house an inmate in Florida. See 2022−2023 Fla. Dep’t of Corr.

Ann. Rep. 41, https://fdc-media.ccplatform.net/content/download/

3089/file/Annual_Report_22-23_V10.pdf.
9

the one to shoulder the evidentiary burden of proving a breach, 

here the State. It can be difficult for the State to prove willfulness, 

but that is the nature of the bargain struck; prevailing law says 

proof of a willful breach is required. Perhaps the standard for 

establishing a breach of a Quarterman agreement ought to be 

lowered, but it bears noting that section 843.15, Florida Statutes, 

which provides for criminal penalties where a defendant on bail 

fails to appear in court, uses the willfulness standard. § 843.15, 

Fla. Stat. (2024) (stating that a defendant on bail who “willfully 

fails to appear before any court or judicial officer as required” may 

be charged with a felony or misdemeanor). The State must 

demonstrate willfulness under this statute to punish a defendant

for failure to appear, so it makes some sense that it bears a similar 

burden to prove that non-appearance at a Quarterman sentencing 

hearing was willful.

LAMBERT, J., concurs.