alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 6**  **925**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. FRANKIE SYLVESTER TURNER , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at N orfolk
. Rebecca Beach Smith , Chief District Judge. ( 2:93

- cr - 00014

- 1; 2:13

- cv - 00255

- RBS )

Submitted : August 22, 2013 Decided: August 27, 2013

Before MOTZ, DIAZ , and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Dismiss ed by un published per curiam opinion
. Frankie Sylvester Turner , Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth Marie Yusi, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY , Norfolk , Virginia , for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Frank ie Sylvester Turner seeks to appeal the district court’s order construing his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013) petition as a 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2013) motion and dismissing it as untimely . The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (2006)
. A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the dis trict court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 ( 2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable clai m of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Turner has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JOHN WESLEY FOWLER,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-cv-00949-P-BJ

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

ORDER

The United States Magistrate Judge made Findings, Conclusions, 

and a Recommendation in this case. ECF No. 22. No objections were 

filed, and the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation is ripe for review. 

The District Judge reviewed the proposed Findings, Conclusions, and 

Recommendation for plain error. Finding none, the undersigned District 

Judge believes that the Findings and Conclusions of the Magistrate 

Judge are correct, and they are accepted as the Findings and 

Conclusions of the Court. 

The Court therefore finds that the Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration’s decision is hereby AFFIRMED. The Court 

therefore ORDERS that Plaintiff’s claims are thus DISMISSED with 

prejudice.

SO ORDERED on this 5th day of October 2023.

Case 4:22-cv-00949-P-BJ Document 24 Filed 10/05/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 1098
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of LeCroy Corporation (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on November 12, 2003 and as amended by Form 10-Q/A filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Thomas H. Reslewic, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.


      February 9, 2004                            /s/ Thomas H. Reslewic
      ----------------                               -------------------
                                                      Thomas H. Reslewic
                                                      Chief Executive Officer




A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Case 3:22-cv-01853-E Document 32 Filed 11/13/23 Page 1 of 3 PageID 119
Case 3:22-cv-01853-E Document 32 Filed 11/13/23 Page 2 of 3 PageID 120
Case 3:22-cv-01853-E Document 32 Filed 11/13/23 Page 3 of 3 PageID 121
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gregory Brown, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard Failla, J.), rendered April 6, 1988, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 6 to 18 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s guilt of manslaughter in the first degree was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We note that defendant was seen stabbing the victim, who was unarmed, by two witnesses, brother and sister, both of whom identified defendant in separate lineups. *(See, People v Brown,*129 AD2d 450.)

There was no error in the court’s ruling which denied defendant’s application to charge manslaughter in the second degree, as a lesser included offense of murder in the second degree. No reasonable view of the evidence supports a conclusion that defendant committed the lesser, but not the greater offense *(People v Green,*56 NY2d 427).

During deliberations, the jury sent out a note requesting the "Cotto’s” testimony, referring to the brother and sister, either one of them or both. Outside of the presence of defendant or his counsel, the court instructed the clerk to ask which witness’s testimony was requested, which was accomplished, and the testimony provided. Although the questioning took place out of defendant’s presence, defendant never objected, and, in any event, the nature of the question did not deprive defendant of his right to be present at a material stage of the proceeding. The question was strictly ministerial *(People v Harris,*76 NY2d 810). Nor did this procedure manifest an improper delegation of judicial authority to the clerk. We have examined defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Ross, Rosenberger, Asch and Wallach, JJ.
#### HORNER *et*al. v. STATE.

No. 21600.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 9, 1941.

Duhig & Romberg, of Houston, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Bethel Horner, C. R. Graham, and Adeline Graham were- jointly charged and prosecuted for the theft of an automobile of the value of less than fifty dollars. Upon conviction, Adeline Graham’s punishment was assessed at sixty days’ confinement in the county jail, and the punishment of Bethel Horner and C. R. Graham was fixed for each at one year’s confinement in the county jail. Only the two last named appealed.

Each of them has now filed his affidavit advising this court that he does not desire to further prosecute said appeal, and upon their request the appeal is dismissed.
**DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY**

**WASHINGTON, D.C.  20220**

November 19, 2013

From the Office of the General Counsel:

Treasury is mindful of the important contributions that employees make to good government when making lawful disclosures of potential incidents of fraud, waste, and abuse.  Treasury strongly supports the objectives underlying the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, in prohibiting retaliation against whistleblowers.  

As a Treasury employee you have the right to make lawful disclosures, to engage in protected activity (such as filing a complaint), and to be free of retaliation for such actions.  Supervisors and managers may not take, fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant because of:  

Any disclosure of information by the employee or applicant that he or she reasonably believes evidences:

                        * A violation of a law, rule, or regulation;      

                        * Gross mismanagement;

                        * Gross waste of funds;

                        * Abuse of authority; or 

                        * A substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.

Finally, as a Treasury employee you may not be retaliated against for making disclosures to, cooperating with, participating in any investigation conducted by, or filing complaints or grievances with, the Office of Special Counsel, the Office of the Inspector General, and/or the United States Congress.

If you have any questions about your rights, please contact the OIG Whistleblower Ombudsman Program at 202-927-0650 or OIGCounsel@oig.treas.gov.

� EMBED Word.Picture.8 ���

# _1371984389.doc
#### Kevin Gillooly, Appellant, v County of Onondaga, Respondent.

Order unanimously reversed on the law with costs, motion denied, complaint reinstated and matter remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings, in accordance with the following memorandum: Plaintiff sustained personal injuries when the vehicle he was driving left the road just before a bridge over Skaneateles Creek and careened down an embankment, landing in the creek. Plaintiff commenced this action against the county, alleging both improper design and improper maintenance of the bridge on the ground that the approach to the bridge had no guiderails. Plaintiff’s cause of action for improper design was dismissed on Statute of Limitations grounds and the action proceeded to trial on the theory of negligent maintenance only.

At trial, the county took the position that the only way plaintiff could prove that the county had notice of a defective *922condition was with proof of prior similar accidents. Plaintiff argued that proof of prior similar accidents was only one means of proving notice. The court, after being informed by plaintiff’s counsel that plaintiff could not offer proof of prior similar accidents, dismissed plaintiff’s action with prejudice. We reverse and reinstate plaintiff’s claim.

A municipality owes a continuing duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition *(see, Friedman v State of New York,*67 NY2d 271, 283; *Blake v City of Albany,*48 NY2d 875; *Sniper v City of Syracuse,*139 AD2d 93, 96), and this encompasses a duty to provide safe guiderails *(see, Kirisits v State of New York,*107 AD2d 156, 158). For a municipality to be cast in damages for negligent maintenance of a roadway, plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality had actual or constructive notice of the existence of a defective condition *(see, Blake v City of Albany, supra; Sniper v City of Syracuse, supra; Barrett v City of Buffalo,*96 AD2d 709). Proof of prior similar accidents is one method by which a plaintiff may prove that a dangerous condition existed and that the municipality had notice of it *(see, Vega v Jacobs,*84 AD2d 813). There are, however, other methods of proof which may be available *(see, Noskewicz v City of New York,*155 AD2d 646; *Kelly v Town of Islip,*141 AD2d 611, 612, *lv dismissed and denied*73 NY2d 865). Plaintiff might prove through admissions of county employees that the county had actual notice of a defective condition and its decision not to install guiderails lacked a reasonable basis *(see, Friedman v State of New York, supra,*at 284; *Alexander v Eldred,*63 NY2d 460, 466). Alternatively, plaintiff might prove constructive notice by offering proof that the defect is so obvious and existed for so long that a municipality, charged with the duty to maintain its highway in good condition, should have discovered and corrected it *(see, Blake v City of Albany, supra).*By limiting plaintiff to proof of prior similar accidents, the court improperly restricted plaintiff’s ability to prove his case. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Miller, J.—negligence.) Present— Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Green, Pine and Davis, JJ.
(logo) LNR

Partners, LLC

 

 

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

 

OF

 

LNR PARTNERS, LLC

 

 

The undersigned, Job Warshaw, being the President of LNR Partners, LLC (the "Special Servicer"), as special servicer under the applicable Pooling and Servicing Agreement for the transactions listed on Schedule I hereto, hereby certifies, subject to any limitations listed on Schedule I hereto, as of the date hereof, on behalf of the Special Servicer, solely in his capacity as an authorized officer of the Special Servicer and not in his individual capacity, as follows:

 

1. A review of the activities performed by the Special Servicer during the period commencing on January 1, 2015 and ending on December 31, 2015 (or any other shorter period set forth on Schedule I hereto) (the “Reporting Period”), and of the Special Servicer's performance under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement has been made under my supervision; and

 

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review and using the applicable servicing criteria under Item 1122 of Regulation AB, the Special Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the applicable Pooling and Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

LNR PARTNERS, LLC,

a Florida limited liability company

 

 

By: /s/ Job Warshaw

Job Warshaw

President 

 

 

Dated: February 23, 2016

 

 

1601 Washington Avenue · Suite 700 · Miami Beach, Florida 33139-3164

Telephone: (305) 695-5600 · Fax: (305) 695-5601

 

 

Schedule I

 

 

COMM 2015-CR25

COMM 2015-CCRE25 Mortgage Trust Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates 

Ref: Heartland Industrial Portfolio, portion contributed into COMM 2015-CRE24

 

 

Deutsche Bank

1761 East St. Andrew Place 

Santa Ana CA 92705-4934 

Amy McNulty

 

 

Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation 

60 Wall Street

New York NY 10005 

Lainie Kaye

 

 

Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving Corporation 

c/o Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP

200 Liberty Street 

New York, NY 10281 

Anna H. Glick
#### BUTLER v. STATE.

No. 21089.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 29, 1940.

Rehearing Denied June 26, 1940.

M. H. Barton, of Overton, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

*349CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is theft of property over the value of fifty dollars. The punishment assessed is confinement in the state penitentiary for a period of two years.

The indictment appears regular. The appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged and waived a jury upon the trial. The record is before this court without a statement of facts or bills of exception.

No error having been perceived, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges 'of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.
Case 3:22-cv-03273-C-BK Document 14 Filed 10/24/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 39
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1251

To permit Members of the House of Representatives to use their unspent

official allowances for reduction of the national debt.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 9, 1993

Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland (for himself, Mr. ARMEY, Mr. BACHUS of Alabama, Mr. BAKER of California, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. BLILEY, Mr.

BLUTE, Mr. CANADY, Mr. CASTLE, Mr. COX, Mr. CRANE, Mr. CRAPO,

Mr. DELAY, Mr. DICKEY, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr. DORNAN, Mr. EMERSON,

Mr. EVERETT, Mrs. FOWLER, Mr. GILCHREST, Mr. GINGRICH, Mr.

GOODLATTE, Mr. GRAMS, Mr. GREENWOOD, Mr. HOEKSTRA, Mr. HOKE,

Mr. HORN, Mr. HUFFINGTON, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. SAM JOHNSON of

Texas, Mr. ISTOOK, Mr. KIM, Mr. KING, Mr. KINGSTON, Mr. KLUG, Mr.

KNOLLENBERG, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. LEWIS of Florida, Mr.

MANZULLO, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, Mr. MILLER of Florida, Mr.

MCCOLLUM, Mr. MCHUGH, Mr. MCINNIS, Mr. MCKEON, Mr. MCMILLAN, Mr. MICA, Ms. MOLINARI, Mr. POMBO, Ms. PRYCE of Ohio, Mr.

QUINN, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. ROHRABACHER, Mr. ROYCE, Mr. SAXTON,

Mr. SHAYS, Mr. SMITH of Michigan, Mr. SPENCE, Mr. THOMAS of California, Mr. TORKILDSEN, Mr. WELDON, Mr. BROWN of Ohio, Ms. ENGLISH of Arizona, Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas, Mr. HASTINGS, Mr. MINGE,

and Mr. PENNY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on House Administration

A BILL

To permit Members of the House of Representatives to use

their unspent official allowances for reduction of the

national debt.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 1251 IH

1 SECTION 1. UNSPENT AMOUNTS FROM ALLOWANCES OF

2 MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA3 TIVES TO BE AVAILABLE FOR NATIONAL

4 DEBT REDUCTION.

5 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, to the

6 extent that an allowance of a Member of the House of

7 Representatives is not otherwise used for a purpose speci8 fied by law or other authority, such allowance shall be

9 available to the Member for reduction of the national debt.

10 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

11 As used in this Act—

12 (1) the term ‘‘Member of the House of Rep13 resentatives’’ means a Representative in, or a Dele14 gate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress;

15 and

16 (2) the term ‘‘allowance’’ means, with respect

17 to a Member of the House of Representatives, the

18 official expenses allowance, the clerk hire allowance,

19 the official mail allowance, or any other official al20 lowance of the Member.

Æ
#### PRYOR et al. v. MODERN MUTUAL HEALTH & ACCIDENT INS. CO.

No. 2363.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

Sept. 19, 1940.

S. J. T. Smith, H. O. Clark, and Winthrop Seley, all of Waco, for plaintiffs in error.

Barney A. Garrett, of Waco, for defendant in error.

ALEXANDER, Justice.

The defendants in the lower court have attempted to remove the cause to this court by writ of error. Acts 46th Leg'., Chap. 2, p. 59, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes, Art. 2249a, provide, in part, as follows:

“Section 1. No party who participates either in person or by his attorney in the actual trial of the case in the trial court shall be entitled to review by the Court of Civil Appeals through means of writ of error.

*222"Sec. 2. All laws and parts of laws, insofar as they conflict with this Act, are repealed. Writ of error shall continue to be available under the rules and regulations of the law to a party who does not participate in the trial of the case in the trial court.

“Sec. 3. It is hereby provided that this Act shall take effect from and after January 1, 1940. * * *”

According to the recitations in the judgment, the defendants participated in the actual trial of the case in the lower court. Final judgment was rendered on February 13, 1940, and writ of error was applied for on June 14,- 1940, long after the act in question had become effective. The case comes clearly within the terms of the above act and is therefore not reviewable through means of writ of error.

The plaintiffs in error, in reply to the motion to dismiss, assert that Sampson Lodge No. 6113, Grand United Order of Odd Fellows, is a necessary party to the suit and since it was not made a party thereto and did not participate in the trial of the case, the statute above quoted is not applicable. It should be noted, however, that said alleged necessary party did not join in the petition for writ of error and is not here seeking a review of the judgment through means of writ of error. All those now seeking such review participated in the actual trial in the lower court and their right to sue out a writ of' error is therefore cut off by the statute.

The appeal is dismissed. .
Exhibit
      10.35





This
      Amending Agreement made this 10 th day of
      September, 2007.





BETWEEN:





**STAR
      CAPITAL INC.**


(hereinafter **“Star”** )


OF
      THE
      FIRST PART





and





**DEEP
      WELL OIL & GAS INC.**


(hereinafter **“Deep
      Well Nevada”** )


OF
      THE
      SECOND PART





and





**DEEP
      WELL OIL & GAS (ALBERTA) LTD.**


(hereinafter **“Deep
      Well Alberta** ”)


OF
      THE
      THIRD PART




and





**NORTHERN
      ALBERTA OIL LTD.**


(hereinafter **“Northern”** )


OF
      THE
      FOURTH PART





**WHEREAS** this
      Amending Agreement is supplemental to an agreement (entitled and hereinafter
      referred to as the “Agreement”) effective the 10 th day of
      September, 2007 between the parties hereto.





**AND
      WHEREAS** the
      parties hereto have agreed to amend the Agreement in the manner and upon the
      terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.










**WITNESSETH:**





1.  Subsection
      2.1 of the Agreement is amended by deleting the words “120 days after the
      effective date of this Agreement” which are contained in the forth line of
      subsection 2.1 and substituting “December 27, 2007” therefor.





2.  The
      Agreement and the terms, conditions, covenants and agreements contained therein
      shall remain in full force and effect, except as amended by this Amending
      Agreement which is deemed to be a part of the Agreement. The Agreement shall
      be
      read and construed with this agreement as though the within provisions had
      been
      inserted in the Agreement at the time of the original execution thereof and
      so
      as to give full force and effect to this agreement.





3.  This
      Amending Agreement may be executed in counterpart and by facsimile, and the
      counterparts when all are executed shall constitute a full and binding
      agreement.





**IN
      WITNESS WHEREOF** the
      parties hereto have executed this Agreement as of the day and year first above
      written.




STAR
              CAPITAL INC.
            
            DEEP
              WELL OIL & GAS INC.per:
            /s/
              Michael Hale
            
            per:
            /s/
              Horst A. Schmid  DEEP WELL OIL & GAS (ALBERTA)
                LTD.
              
              NORTHERN ALBERTA OIL
                LTD.per:
              /s/ Horst A. Schmid
              
              per:
              /s/ Curtis Sparrow