Volume 1 Number 1 February 2015 

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ii

The United States Army War College 

 Student Publications 

Volume 1  Number 1  February 2015 

Research

Learning Trust: A Leadership Lesson 1

Colonel Stephen C. Rogers

United States Army

Conflict Prevention: A Cautionary Analysis 11

Colonel Michael Robert Butterwick

United Kingdom

On Theory: War and Warfare Reconsidered 24

Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. Blomme

United States Air Force

Insights

RAF Enhanced: Civil-Military Engagement Teams 42

Colonel Timothy D. Brown

United States Army

Thinking about Strategic Landpower 46

Colonel Landy T. Nelson

United States Army

Army War College Review U.S. Army War College 

Vol. 1, No. 1, Feb. 2015, 1-10 Student Publications 

Learning Trust: 

A Leadership Lesson 

Stephen C. Rogers

The Army must learn the value of speaking truth to power as a means of achieving leadership goals. 

The ability to dialogue within, across, and outside the Force is essential to mission success. In the 

midst of significant transition, reflecting upon the experiences of the last twelve years of combat 

provides an opportunity to implement effective change in the strategic culture. By understanding 

the origins of mission command and approaching its implementation from a perspective of 

changing organizational culture, the Army stands to reap benefits well beyond empowering 

subordinate leaders. If successful, leaders will develop the ability speak truth to power when 

nothing less will do. 

Keywords: Mission Command, Strategic Culture, Organizational Change, Speaking Truth to Power

As we begin our transition following this time of twelve years of war, we must 

rededicate ourselves to the development of our leaders as our best edge against 

complexity and uncertainty. 

—General Raymond T. Odierno1

The Army is at a strategic inflection point. Operations in Iraq are now behind us, the war in 

Afghanistan has transitioned to support mode, and the U.S. military is reorienting toward the AsiaPacific region. All of this is occurring during a time of fiscal austerity, dwindling resources, and a 

four-year plan to draw personnel strength down to 490,000 or below. In the midst of embarking on 

a significant posture change, the Army must reflect on its experiences over the last twelve years of 

combat, counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations, and seize the opportunity to improve 

its core capabilities: leading Soldiers, executing missions, and meeting obligations. 

Much is to be learned from recent experiences and accumulated lessons spanning the full range 

of how the Army prepares and employs its personnel and equipment in accord with doctrine. Positive 

change in leadership strategy has great potential to strengthen the military force as well as to help 

Stephen C. Rogers (M.S.S. United States Army War College) is a Colonel in the United States Army. An earlier version of 

this article, written under the direction of Professor Philip M. Evans, earned a prestigious Army War College Foundation 

award for Outstanding Strategy Research Paper for the USAWC class of 2014. 

1

 General Raymond T. Odierno, Remarks at the Army War College Graduation Ceremony, Carlisle Barracks, PA, June 8, 

2013, http://www.army.mil/article/105138/June_8__2013____CSA_s_remarks_at_the_Army_War_College_graduation_ceremony/
2 S. Rogers

develop a competitive advantage that cannot be replaced by technology, weapon systems, or 

platforms.2 Two related leadership challenges must be addressed: (1) Generating a means of 

empowering subordinates with disciplined initiative while concurrently underwriting the risk 

associated with that initiative. The full benefit of empowering subordinate leaders though the 

doctrinal concept of mission command has yet to be fully realized and remains largely 

misunderstood. The implementation of mission command provides an opportunity to positively 

change the Army’s organizational culture in favor of a stronger, more empowered force. (2) 

Developing leader capacity to speak “truth to power” particularly when addressing senior leaders, 

civilians, and policymakers. Within senior ranks, the general lack of dissent in response to 

questionable applications of military forces tasked with securing strategic objectives threatens 

mission success. Army leaders must learn to dialogue within, across, and outside the Force 

undeterred by the trepidation associated with speaking truth to power when proffering dissenting 

views, alternative perspectives, and potentially unpopular options. Fortunately, both concerns can 

be addressed simultaneously as empowering subordinates and gaining voice are mutually 

reinforcing.

Speaking Truth to Power in Iraq

The war in Iraq revealed significant fractures in American civil-military relations. Many in the 

military at the time opined that the war was severely mismanaged by senior civilian officials. 

Secretary Rumsfeld’s dominant personality, excessive control, and micromanagement of tactical 

details forged an environment that was not conducive to entertaining contrarian perspectives. Senior 

military officers, however, cannot be wholly absolved from all responsibility associated with the 

decisions leading up to the war, nor its outcomes. By standing pat with the statutory obligation to 

provide the best military advice to political decision makers, senior leaders shaded the profession’s 

moral courage and demonstrated leadership’s inability to provide candid and compelling military 

counsel when needed.

3

This indictment came as a surprise to many military professionals at the time, particularly in 

light of the renewed emphasis on providing candid military advice inspired by H.R. McMaster’s 1998 

seminal work, Dereliction of Duty. The complicity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to form and pursue 

misguided policies in Vietnam, as described by McMaster, served as a “cautionary tale” for the Army 

officer corps and for many leaders across the military writ large.4 Senior leaders, both military and 

civilian, agreed publically that the type of behavior McMaster detailed was unacceptable in today’s 

military. In May 2004, recalling how General Hugh Shelton had distributed copies of McMaster’s 

book to all senior military leaders while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former commander 

of U.S. Central Command, General Anthony Zinni, USMC, (Ret.) stated:

The message to us, after we heard this from Hugh Shelton, is that will never happen 

here. And the message to us from Secretary [William S.] Cohen at that time, too, is 

that the door is always open, and your obligation to the Congress, which is an 

obligation to the American people to tell them what you think, still stands strong.5

 

2 Ibid.

3 Frank Hoffman, “E-Notes, Dereliction of Duty Redux?” Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 2007, 

http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200711.hoffman.derelictionofdutyredux.html#note7 (accessed February 27, 2014).

4 Martin L. Cook, “Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics,” Parameters 38, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 6.

5 Gen. Anthony Zinni, USMC, (Ret.) Remarks at CDI Board of Directors Dinner, May 12, 2004," Center for Defense 

Information, 22 May 2004, quoted in Martin L. Cook, “Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics,” 

Parameters 38, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 6.
Learning Trust 3

Unfortunately, and possibly regrettably, both Cohen and Shelton retired from their positions in 2001, 

well before the Iraq invasion.

The failure of senior officers to question dubious analyses of intelligence reports and to provide 

subsequent sound military advice prior to the invasion of Iraq has been thoroughly documented. The 

issue surfaced most prominently in what has become known as the “Revolt of the Generals.” In 2006, 

six retired flag officers spoke against military policies pursued in Iraq, criticizing the civilian leaders 

most responsible for them.6 Not surprisingly, the “revolt” generated as much controversy as did 

claims of failed generalship. The most obvious criticism was that these officers waited until they were 

retired before voicing dissent, causing some to wonder where their voices were while on active duty. 

In April 2006, retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold publically 

expressed regret that neither he nor others challenged the actions that led up to the invasion of Iraq 

more openly: 

Flaws in our civilians is one thing: the failure of the Pentagon’s military leaders is 

quite another. Those are the men who know the hard consequences of war but, with 

few exceptions, acted timidly when their voices urgently needed to be heard. When 

they knew the plan was flawed, saw intelligence distorted to justify a rationale for 

war, or witnessed arrogant micromanagement that at times crippled the military’s 

effectiveness; many leaders who wore the uniform chose inaction.7

That same month, General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, offered a parallel, yet 

somewhat theoretical criticism of his fellow generals, without intimating any wrong doing by senior 

civilian policymakers or Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Pace stated, "We had then, and have now, 

every opportunity to speak our minds, and if we do not, shame on us because the opportunity is 

there."8 If the opportunity to speak their minds persisted throughout the war, senior military officers 

continued to forgo that opportunity in the face of additional contentious decisions. In late 2006, the 

war in Iraq was on the verge of being lost; General Casey’s strategy of transitioning security 

responsibility to the Iraqi military was failing; and any hope of achieving the U.S. strategic objective 

of “a democratic Iraq that upholds the rule of law, respects the rights of its people, provides them 

security, and is an ally in the war on terror” was rapidly slipping away.9 The increasing problem of 

sectarian and intra-sectarian violence demonstrated that the Government of Iraq (GOI) could not 

effectively build a representative democracy in the absence of greater reconciliation. A new strategy 

was in order. 

Early in 2007, one was adopted: “achieve sufficient security to provide the space and time for the 

Iraqi government to come to grips with the tough decisions its members must make to enable Iraq 

to move forward.”10 To meet this goal, the U.S. military deployed an additional five U.S. Army 

brigades (bringing its total to 20) and extended the tours of approximately 4000 Marines already 

deployed. The force in Iraq, numbering 168,000 by September 2007, employed counterinsurgency 

practices that sought to underscore the importance of living among the people, improving security 

 

6 Don M. Snider, “Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions,” February 19, 2008, 

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=849 (accessed March 1, 2014).

7 Gregory Newbold, “Why Iraq was a Mistake,” Time, 167, April 17, 2006, 42-43.

8 General Peter Pace, DoD News Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Pace from the Pentagon (Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 11, 2006).

9 George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 23, 2007, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2007/index.html

10 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Lieutenant General 

David H. Petraeus, USA, to be General and Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, 110th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 2007. 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg42309/html/CHRG-110shrg42309.htm 
4 S. Rogers

by wresting sanctuaries from Al Qaeda’s control, and disrupting the efforts of the Iranian-supported 

militia extremists.11

Unfortunately, a significant mismatch existed between the military strategy and the political 

objectives the strategy was designed to achieve. Most troubling about the military strategy and, more 

importantly, the strategic objectives aligned with the U.S. national goal, was that everything beyond 

the pressing strategic military objective relied solely on the will of the Iraqi Government to conform 

to governing standards that were absolutely foreign to its institutional history. The U.S. certainly had 

a role in helping the GOI develop the systems and framework to form their governmental institutions, 

but to pursue a truly democratic Iraq that shared power and revenues was, and continues to be, a 

decision only for those with the authority and power to govern Iraq. Testifying before Congress, thenLieutenant General David Petraeus stated:

Some of the members of this committee have observed that there is no military 

solution to the problems of Iraq. They are correct. Ultimate success in Iraq will be 

determined by actions in the Iraqi political and economic arenas on such central 

issues as governance, the amount of power devolved to the provinces and possibly 

regions, the distribution of oil revenues, national reconciliation and resolution of 

sectarian differences, and so on. Success will also depend on improvements in the 

capacity of Iraq’s ministries, in the provision of basic services, in the establishment 

of the rule of law, and in economic development.12

Achieving drastic improvements, reconciliations, and setting conditions to establish democracy, 

would be phenomenal in the most passive environment. Attempting to achieve significant changes 

within the security context and political environment of Iraq in 2007 proved virtually impossible. 

Somewhere within the process of changing strategy and implementing the surge, senior military 

officials and the Bush administration apparently embraced the assumption that Prime Minister 

Nouri al-Maliki would deliver on his commitment to take reconciliation seriously and implement 

change in his national policies and political processes. Unfortunately, that would not be the case. 

An alternative view is that no one in the USG administration or anyone among the senior military 

officials felt compelled to provide a dissenting opinion. Instead of considering alternative 

approaches, the U.S. “doubled-down” militarily in Iraq on this arguably false assumption. As a result, 

the U.S. military remained in Iraq for another five years, until late in 2011, having fully achieved none

of its strategic goals or national security objectives.

Generally speaking, telling people things they do not want to hear is a difficult proposition, even 

in the most benign of situations. That difficulty compounds exponentially when the situation involves 

controversial information or contrarian recommendations delivered to powerful senior officials who 

hold sway over the messenger’s career. Strategic leaders cannot be expected to possess the innate 

ability to begin speaking truth to power after they have arrived at the highest professional levels—

those that require them to provide counsel and advice to their political masters. Senior military 

leaders must develop that skill much earlier in their careers, long before speaking truth to power 

becomes an essential component of their work, military action, and U.S. national security.

Learning to speak truth to power early in a career, however, cannot occur unless the environment 

welcomes candid professional exchange. Leaders at all levels must create a culture in which open, 

professional dialogue is accepted, expected, and desired. In senior subordinate relationships, 

 

11 General David H. Petraeus, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, 10 September 2007. 

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/petraeus-testimony20070910.pdf.

12 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Lieutenant General 

David H. Petraeus, USA, to be General and Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq.
Learning Trust 5

reasonably open communication requires a significant degree of trust both up and down the chain of 

command.

Because mission command is built on mutual trust, effective mission command can also serve as 

the foundation for improving professional dialogue and improving human interaction.

13 By 

understanding the origins of mission command and approaching its implementation from a 

perspective of changing organizational culture, the Army stands to improve its operational 

capabilities. In sowing the seeds of true professional dialogue, the Army may yet generate a lasting 

capacity to speak truth to power.

The Seeds of Mission Command

In 2006, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Ollivant and First Lieutenant Eric Chewning argued that 

the combined arms maneuver battalion, partnering with indigenous security forces and living among 

the population, should be the primary tactical unit upon which COIN operations are organized and 

conducted.14 The article was so convincing that it won first place in Military Review’s 2006 annual 

writing competition and, more importantly, it captured the attention of General Petraeus.

On January 8, 2007, shortly after it became public that he would succeed General Casey as the 

commander of all Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I), Petraeus sent an email to Ollivant, then 

serving as the Plans Chief (G5) for the First Cavalry Division, Multi-National Division-Baghdad 

(MND-B), asking if he still believed his thesis and if it could be implemented in Baghdad. Ollivant 

told Petraeus that he did believe that the fundamental elements of the article formed the operational 

approach for MND-B’s impending security plan Fardh al-Qanoon or “Enforcing the Law.” This 

approach would move battalions and their subordinate companies off the Forward Operating Bases 

and into the communities. Senior commanders would empower company-grade and noncommissioned officers, now in extended daily contact with the population, with authority to secure 

the populace and improve their quality of life, using whatever innovative techniques these junior 

leaders deemed necessary and appropriate.15

According to Ollivant, “While we cannot transform our hierarchical Army into a fully networked 

organization overnight, powering down to the lowest practical level will enable the most adaptive 

commanders to implement a Galula-like solution.”16 The proposal to shift to networked operations 

was profound for an Army that historically concentrated decision making at the top.

17 Yet, it was not 

an altogether new concept among some senior Army leaders. General Stanley McChrystal, for 

example, noted that a similar networked approach had been instrumental in improving the 

effectiveness of special operations forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in late 2004.18 Among conventional 

forces, however, successful application of this approach would require patience and determination 

at all levels of command.

Many have argued that this operational approach, coupled with the surge of additional combat 

forces into the Baghdad area of operations (AOR), resulted in a significant decline in violence due 

 

13 Michelle Maiese, "Dialogue," Beyond Intractability, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, 

Colorado, September 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/dialogue (accessed February 27, 2014).

14 LTC Douglas A. Ollivant and 1LT Eric D. Chewning, “Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN 

Operations,” Military Review 86, no. 4 (July-August, 2006): 50.

15 LTC Douglas A. Ollivant, email from General David H. Petraeus, January 8, 2007, provided to author during 

telephonic interview, January 31, 2013.

16 Ollivant, “Producing Victory,” 59.

17 Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (New York: 

Public Affairs, 2008), 122.

18 Stanley A. McChrystal, My Share of the Task (New York: Penguin, 2013), 260, iBooks e-book. 
6 S. Rogers

largely to the incorporation of local fighters into the security apparatus. In what would grow to 

become the “Sons of Iraq” program, local men from multiple communities in Baghdad, familiar with 

their neighborhoods and the foreign AQI affiliates that had infiltrated them, organized into small 

groups that wrested control of their streets from AQI and continued to patrol and provide security in 

conjunction with U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Recognizing, supervising, nurturing, and 

weaving local groups into Baghdad’s fragile security fabric was not a task that could be driven, 

managed or even directed from the upper echelons of command. Rather, it required the initiative of 

junior leaders operating at the tactical level who understood the unique dynamics of each individual 

community, as well as the personalities of its governing body, ISF commanders, and a host of other 

informal local leaders including sheiks, imams, and advisory council members.

Initiative at this level and of this magnitude clearly entailed great risk, not only to the Soldiers 

who were operating alongside local fighters, many of whom were themselves former low-level 

insurgents, but also to overall mission success. Such initiative, therefore, had to operate within the 

bounds of a commander’s intent and had to be underwritten by commanders willing to accept the 

associated risk. Fortunately, both were displayed and opportunities flourished in 2007.

One of the first examples in Iraq where a senior commander underwrote risk of this magnitude 

occurred in early June 2007. Approximately one week after the first group of local fighters rose up 

against AQI and began fighting alongside soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry in the Western 

Baghdad community of Ameriyah, Colonel Chip Daniels (then a Major and serving as the operations 

officer of 1-5 CAV) was summoned for a morning run with General Petraeus. Petraeus often used 

morning runs with junior officers to gain unfiltered feedback about areas of particular interest. After 

updating the commander on the week’s progress, Daniels expressed his concern that several 

members of the unit were nervous about the kind of risk they were assuming. “Do not stop! Do not 

let our Army stop you; do not let the Iraqi government stop you,” Petraeus replied emphatically. “You 

are doing the right thing and now is the time to take risks.”19

Instances of empowering junior leaders were not confined solely to general officers enabling field

grade officers, majors, and lieutenant colonels. A recent New York Times article recounted the story 

of a young Lieutenant empowered well beyond the responsibilities normally associated with junior 

rank. Then Lieutenant (now Captain) Brandon Archuleta described one experience when he was 

approached by his battery commander to help lead a team of representatives in a town council where 

he supervised the administration of public services, conducted reconciliation talks with tribal elders, 

and distributed payroll funds to the ISF.20 “My battery commander and my battalion commander 

realized they had a big challenge with governance. They knew they couldn’t be everywhere at once. 

It was quite empowering for them to delegate those authorities to me.”21

The idea that this kind of empowerment, springing from the bold and unique operational 

approach developed in Iraq in 2007, produced resounding tactical success is assuredly important; 

yet tactical successes would not be the enduring legacy. This approach with conventional forces—

mirroring the similar approach instituted by General McChrystal in counter-terrorism Task Force 

(TF) 714—clearly demonstrated that Army forces of all types and at all levels could empower 

subordinates with initiative, exploit their successes, and underwrite the risk associated with 

inevitable mistakes.

 

19 Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends, 238-239. 

20 Thomas Shanker, “After Years at War, the Army Adapts to Garrison Life,” New York Times, January 18, 2014.

21 Ibid.
Learning Trust 7

Mission Command Takes Root

Some senior leaders took notice and began to take measures to institutionalize this initiative. 

During his 2010 Kermit Roosevelt Lecture at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), General 

Martin Dempsey presented his vision for how the Army should organize and operate as it approached 

the end of a decade of combat and adapted for the future and an increasingly uncertain global 

environment. His vision included the “need to redefine and rearticulate the command and control 

war-fighting function and reintroduce it to the force as mission command.”22 For more than three 

years now, spanning his tenure as the TRADOC Commander, through a short five-month stint as the 

Army Chief of Staff, to his present responsibilities as the 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

General Dempsey has been promoting mission command. He has emphasized the need to demand 

that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative while acting aggressively and 

independently to accomplish their missions—a tall order in today’s Army.23

According to General Dempsey, mission command “implies that collaboration and trust are as 

important as command and control.”24 That might appear to many as something of an 

understatement, considering the words that followed: “Importantly, mission command is also about 

understanding, sharing and mitigating risk. As we decentralize capability, authority and 

responsibility to lower tactical echelons, we must not decentralize all the risk as well.”25 If the Army 

truly embraces the concept and philosophy of mission command, then collaboration and trust will 

become more than simply important. If commanders and leaders accept the risk associated with 

affording junior leaders the authority and responsibility to make decisions that impact mission 

outcome, then collaboration and trust will be absolutely essential.

The challenge will be to harness these experiences and lessons and then translate them back to 

“Garrison Life” as troop reduction and fiscal austerity reduces training opportunities. After returning 

from Afghanistan in 2010 and in command of his own company, Captain Archuleta complained that 

he missed the responsibilities that his superiors had given him in war; and stated that many of his 

peers who felt similarly simply left active duty for business schools and the private sector.26

Currently, despite improvements over the last ten years of combat, the Army is culturally 

misaligned to exercise the kind of collaboration and trust we need to prepare for the future. At its 

core, the Army remains a very hierarchical organization. Its historical high power distance is not 

always conducive to implementing the kind of change that encourages organizations to become more 

flexible and adaptive.27 Senior Army leaders who create both the value and the direction of the Army 

as an organization have instilled an expectation of obedience to orders and adaptation to 

organizational norms that thwart initiative and effectively limit the acceptance of risk.

As the Army transitions from more than a decade at war, a time when junior leaders enjoyed a 

great deal of flexibility and initiative as the tactical situation dictated, a return to historical and 

conventional organizational norms will appear more prominent and will likely increase the divide 

 

22 General Martin E. Dempsey, “A Campaign of Learning; Avoiding the Failure of Imagination,” Royal United Services 

Institute Journal155, no. 3 (June, 2010): 6-9. 

http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/maro/news/2010/Journal_201006_Dempsey1.pdf (accessed September 5, 2013).

23 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 

11, 2011), II-2.

24 Dempsey, “A Campaign of Learning,” 8-9.

25 Ibid., 9.

26 Shanker, “After Years at War, the Army Adapts to Garrison Life.”

27 Stephen J. Gerras, Leonard Wong, and Charles D. Allen, “Organizational Culture: Applying a Hybrid Model to the 

U.S. Army,” November 2008, 

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/dclm/Organizational%20Culture%20Applying%20a%20Hybrid%20Model%20to%20t

he%20U.S.%20Army%20Nov%2008.pdf (accessed September 5, 2013).
8 S. Rogers

between junior and senior leaders. Unless the Army is able to adapt at the senior levels—loosening 

at least the appearance of tighter control—junior leaders who have experienced greater flexibility, 

exercised more initiative, and made tough decisions in combat, will likely not conform well to tighter 

controls in a garrison environment. Less conformity, of course, will spiral toward tighter controls 

from the top, and the divide will widen even further. Mutual trust, running both up and down the 

chain of command, will diminish and the concept of mission command will likely remain just that.

The Way Forward: Nurturing Mission Command to Fruition

If the Army is going to implement the Chairman’s vision to become more adept at decentralizing 

capability and authority, then we must recognized that change, like building mutual trust, takes time. 

Fortunately, the Chairman has developed a foundation for implementing the types of changes 

required to adapt Army culture to achieve the desired outcome. General Dempsey’s actions over the 

past three years when viewed through the lens of the Kotter model (Figure 1) indicate that he has: (1) 

established a sense of urgency, (2) created a guiding coalition through the Mission Command Center 

of Excellence (MCCOE), (3) developed a vision and strategy through his previously published White 

Paper, (4) communicated his vision, and (5) has begun to empower subordinates for broad-based 

action.

Figure 1: Kotter’s Eight Step Process for Creating Major Change28

1. Establishing a sense of urgency

2. Creating the guiding coalition

3. Developing a vision and strategy

4. Communicating the change vision

5. Empowering broad-based action

6. Generating short-term wins

7. Consolidating gains and producing more change

8. Anchoring new approaches in the culture

If the Army pursues Kotter’s model and builds upon General Dempsey’s accomplishments, only 

three steps in the change process remain: generate short term wins, consolidate gains, and anchor 

new approaches within the culture. Junior leaders have been accorded greater latitude and displayed 

exceptional initiative and leadership in the complex and ambiguous environments of Iraq and 

Afghanistan. In essence, the Army has already generated short-term wins and must now continue to 

recognize, reward, and encourage these junior leaders while opportunity for doing so still exists.

Cultural change takes considerable time and effort. Kotter’s model suggests, however, that the 

Army may be reasonably close to establishing the conditions required for institutionalizing the 

Chairman’s vision. To increase the likelihood of success, the Army should enact Kotter’s final two 

steps by implementing three initiatives: (1) refine training requirements for echelons below division; 

(2) incorporate feedback from 360-degree assessments into the promotion and command selection 

processes; and (3) incorporate mission command into all levels of professional education. The first 

two recommended initiatives facilitate efforts to consolidate gains and produce more change, while 

the second and third work to anchor those changes within Army culture.

Simply attempting to induce change through Kotter’s model, however, is not enough. Focus must 

be on implementing the right things when pursuing the model. All three recommendations align with 

 

28 John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 1996), 21.
Learning Trust 9

what Schein calls embedding mechanisms. The first two align with “what leaders pay attention to, 

measure, and control on a regular basis.” The final aligns with the “leader’s use of teaching and 

coaching.”29 By implementing these types of changes, the Army can effectively introduce and inscribe 

new assumptions about how the organization operates. Understanding what this means requires 

clarity with regard to the best practices for implementing change.

Refining training requirements at the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and below will further 

enhance trust establishing efforts between senior and subordinate leaders by empowering field grade 

officers to craft unit training plans based on their assessments of unit readiness. Currently, training 

is perceived as being overly burdened by cumbersome requirements generated from arbitrary 

checklists promulgated by multiple layers of bureaucracy from higher echelons of authority that 

never actually interact with the units in question. Trusting leaders who have been in the Army for ten 

to twenty years to develop training plans based on unit capabilities, while still retaining the rigor 

required to assure readiness, removes an unnecessary interdependency between small units and big 

Army. Moreover, providing mid-level leaders the opportunity to express their training priorities, 

specifically in terms of what their formations do not need to do, allows leaders latitude of judgment 

and increased responsibility. In short, this initiative provides emerging senior leaders with regulated 

opportunities to speak truth to power and take responsibility for doing so.

Consolidating gains and producing more change is a key tenet in Kotter’s process. Organizations 

are better able to build trust if they eliminate policies and structures that do not align with one 

another or the transformation vision.30 Brigade and battalion commanders who have the latitude to 

train their subordinate formations will be more likely to “power-down” that latitude over time as 

senior leaders display the willingness to accept the risk associated with freedom to execute 

professional responsibility. Junior-level leaders will be accountable and will have to bear the 

consequences of risk, but that will establish a heightened sense of accountability, increased diligence, 

and enhanced professionalism.

Incorporating 360-degree feedback into the promotion and command selection processes 

institutionalizes the concept of professional dialogue, encourages speaking truth to power, and 

should be accomplished through two specific methods. First, leaders at all levels must be required to 

discuss a synopsis of their 360-degree feedback with subordinates two levels down. Second, seniorraters must be required to review the results of their subordinate leaders’ 360-degree feedback and 

consider that feedback when penning remarks on their officers’ evaluation report (OER).

The first of these two initiatives should establish open communication between leaders and those 

that they lead, increasing the likelihood of achieving true dialogue on key topics involving direct and 

organizational leadership skills. By displaying the willingness to describe and discuss what junior 

leaders assess as their strengths and weaknesses, even if it is institutionally directed, senior leaders 

build a sense of trust and confidence at all levels up and down the chain of command. That then 

establishes the conditions for senior leaders to analyze a subordinate’s 360-degrees assessment and 

incorporate that feedback when providing written comments on the OER. These initiatives promote 

the final two steps of Kotter’s model. They help to consolidate gains by developing people who can 

implement that change vision and they anchor these new approaches within the culture by promoting 

better performance through subordinate-oriented behavior.31 When leaders at all levels 

understand—from their subordinates’ perspective—the implications of their actions and leadership 

 

29 Stephen Gerras, “Organizational Culture”.

30 Kotter, Leading Change, 21, 141-142.

31 Ibid., 21, 157.
10 S. Rogers

methods, they are more likely to be receptive to feedback and to provide constructive feedback to 

others.

Finally, incorporating the tenets of mission command into the officer and non-commissioned 

officer professional education system is an enduring step that will ultimately anchor change into the 

military culture. A key component of this process is to develop effective ways to focus on leaderdevelopment and senior-leader succession.32 Because the Army is an organization that promotes 

from within, and all members of the organization begin at the entry-level, this concept carries 

heightened importance. By incorporating the fundamental aspects of mission command into the 

educational system, the Army establishes the means to continue to communicate the change vision 

throughout the organization in a manner that is accessible at each echelon. Young leaders in their 

basic non-commissioned officers’ courses, along with emerging senior leaders at a senior service 

college, will receive messages targeted at their specific role in the process. By utilizing this approach, 

the Army will ably target all significant stakeholders, from colonel to corporal while maximizing 

institutional acceptance of change.

Not represented in this change scenario, however, are the Army’s most senior officers who must 

ensure that desired changes take root and become culturally embedded. To meet this goal, General 

Dempsey actively communicates his message to these leaders, utilizes his guiding coalition that 

includes fellow general officers at Fort Leavenworth (MCCOE) and TRADOC to help propagate the 

message, and supervises the revision of Joint doctrine to inform and guide supporting Army doctrine.

To be successful, these reinforcing mechanisms must be received and supported by the senior 

Army leaders. If executed correctly, comprehensively, and with appropriate senior leader 

involvement, the Army can build enduring trust among leaders at all levels, institutionalize the 

concept of mission command, help the Chairman achieve his vision for the future force, rejuvenate 

professional dialogue, and promote the artful skill of speaking truth to power. Ideally, achieving these 

objectives will reestablish a culture of professional forthrightness in the Army and, over time, prevent 

the kind of tacit complicity to misguided policies observed at senior levels in both Vietnam and Iraq.

Conclusion

Hindsight is reportedly 20/20. That is only partially true, however. While professionals can 

certainly see what happened by studying the past, understanding why it happened is frequently 

elusive without close investigation. Thoughtful, unbiased analysis is required. The true importance 

of hindsight lies in learning from past mistakes and then fulfilling professional obligations to 

implement changes that help ensure similar mistakes do not occur in the future. Pursuing cultural 

change in the Army, particularly through effective inculcation and implementation of mission 

command, can better equip Soldiers and leaders to adapt in the contemporary strategic environment. 

Building upon the lessons of the last twelve years, nurturing and fostering the level of initiative and 

professional trust that young leaders have grown accustomed to, will help carry the force into the 

next generation, increasing the capacity, combat capabilities, and flexibility of Soldiers in a complex 

and ambiguous world. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly of all, increased trust will promote 

more frequent and higher quality professional dialogue between leaders and those who are led. With 

time, honest and frank professional exchanges will build the kind of confidence necessary to voice 

dissent and speak truth to power both within and external to the military organization.

 

32 Ibid., 21.
Army War College Review U.S. Army War College

Vol. 1, No. 1, Feb. 2015, 11-23 Student Publications

Conflict Prevention: 

A Cautionary Analysis

Michael Robert Butterwick

In the wake of Afghanistan and Iraq, the United Kingdom (UK) is pursuing a preventative 

approach to conflict in order to avoid embroilment in protracted military operations. To be 

successful, the UK must fully understand what prevention entails. A purely structural analysis of 

conflict may not be sufficient. Both hard power and soft power are key to effective prevention. To 

be successful the UK must remain a credible military power willing to act globally. Generating 

political will is essential and decisive. UK political leaders must explain to an increasingly skeptical 

public why early intervention, possibly involving military force, is vital to the UK’s national 

interests. Prevention is not simple. It requires significant moral courage backed by political and 

financial investment.

Keywords: Conflict Prevention, Strategy, United Kingdom National Security Policy

After bloody, costly and controversial conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United Kingdom’s (UK) 

political leaders have sought fresh approaches to securing the UK’s national interests without 

embroilment in protracted military operations. The UK’s 2011 National Security Strategy (NSS), 

called for a “radical transformation in the way we think about national security and [how we] 

organize ourselves to protect it.”1 This transformation emphasizes conflict prevention and the ability 

to “identify crises emerging overseas early, to respond rapidly to prevent them . . . and to tackle the 

causes of instability, fragility and conflict upstream.”2

Conflict prevention is not new. In 2001, Kofi Annan urged world leaders to move from a “culture 

of reaction to a culture of prevention.”3 He spoke in the wake of the international community’s failure 

to prevent genocide in Rwanda, stop bitter ethnic war in Bosnia, and arrest Somalia’s descent into 

 

Michael Robert Butterwick (M.S.S. United States Army War College) is a Colonel in the British Army. An earlier version of 

this article, written under the direction of Professor Len FullenKamp, earned a prestigious Army War College Foundation 

award for Outstanding Strategy Research Paper for the USAWC class of 2014. Colonel Butterwick resides in England.

1 Her Majesty’s Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (London: Her 

Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2010), 3.

2 Her Majesty’s Government, Building Stability Overseas Strategy (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2011), 18.

3 Alex Bellamy, “Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,” Global Governance, No.2 (April-June 2008): 

137.
12 M. Butterwick

state failure.4 Indeed the concept is enshrined in Article 1 of the UN Charter which sets out to 

“maintain international peace and security and to that end: to take effective collective measures for 

the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 

other breaches of the peace.”5 Since 2001, the concept has been increasingly institutionalized through 

the creation of new positions (e.g., The UN established Office of the Special Adviser for the

Prevention of Genocide), institutions (e.g., the EU created Early Warning and Fusion Centre), and 

practices (e.g., African Union’s Panel of the Wise intervention in a series of post-2007 African 

crises).6 As Ban Ki Moon put it, conflict prevention “is without doubt one of the smartest investments 

we can make.”7 

Yet civil war rages in Syria; Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia all teeter on the edge of instability; South 

Sudan is divided by bitter conflict; and violence has erupted in Ukraine. Clearly, conflict prevention 

is not a simple strategy. It requires financial, political and moral investment. As the UK’s failure to 

intervene in Syria indicates, generating the will for early intervention may be more problematic than 

the NSS suggests. Is the UK guilty of seeking to avoid protracted warfare on the cheap? 

This article explores the national implications of adopting a preventative approach to conflict. If 

the UK is to be prepare conceptually, physically, and morally for this transformation, more work 

must be done in terms of (a) defining conflict prevention and it is parameters (what do we mean by 

“conflict prevention,” are we clear about which conflicts we are trying to prevent and why?), (b) 

exploring implications for its implementation (In what “ways” will prevention be conducted? When 

will we need to act and for how long? How will we generate the will to act in advance of a crisis? Do 

we have the strategic patience that may be required? What “means” will impact success? What 

instruments of national power will require investment? How must the instruments, particularly the 

military instrument, be organized?), and (c) embracing complexity. Doing nothing may often be the 

easy political option but it is not necessarily the right one. Exploring implications helps ensure that 

“preventing conflicts upstream” represents much more than empty words. 

Conflict Prevention

“Conflict prevention” is generally regarded as an interventionist approach based on the 

assumption that problematic structural dynamics cause outbreaks of violence within fragile societies. 

Change the dynamics to prevent the conflict. Build institutions through which disagreements can be 

channeled without recourse to violence. Seek to develop the rule of law, more representative forms 

of governance, and a more equitable distribution of wealth. Under this strategic umbrella, the 

military role serves, in part, to professionalize the security sector while ensuring that security forces 

act in ways that reduce the risk of violence rather than fuel it.8 

 

4 See for example, Boutros Boutros Ghali, “The timely application of preventative diplomacy is the most desirable and 

efficient means of erasing tensions before they result in conflict” or Dag Hammarskjold who coined the term “preventative 

diplomacy” in 1960. Both quoted in A. Williams, Conflict Prevention in Practice: From Rhetoric to Reality (Canberra: 

Australian Civil-Military Centre, 2012), 1.

5 Christoph Mikulaschek and Paul Romita, “Conflict Prevention: Toward More Effective Multilateral Strategies.” 

Rapporteurs, (December 2011), 2.

6 Robert Muggah and Natasha White, Is there a preventive action renaissance? The policy and practice of preventive 

diplomacy and conflict prevention. (NOREF, Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre, Report, February 2013), 7.

7 Williams, Conflict Prevention in Practice, 2.

8 Numerous articles exist concerning the different concepts of “conflict prevention.” For further analysis, see Alice 

Ackerman, “The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention,” Journal of Peace Research, no.40 (May 2003), 339-347 or 

Williams, Conflict Prevention in Practice, 2.
Conflict Prevention 13

“Structural prevention” underpins the UK’s approach. The UK’s cornerstone document, Building 

Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) defines both “stability” and “conflict” but not specifically conflict 

“prevention.” Stability—the desired end state—is characterized as a set of “political systems which 

are representative and legitimate, capable of managing conflict and change peacefully, and societies 

in which human rights and the rule of law are respected, basic needs are met, security established 

and opportunities for development are open to all.” The challenge is for the UK to address "violent 

conflict” that emerges when individuals and groups have “incompatible needs, interests and beliefs.”9

This approach to conflict prevention targets the root cause(s) of instability, not merely symptoms.

The BSOS attempts to establish the attractiveness of pursing conflict prevention. Warfare, it 

states, is “development in reverse” and “conflict deprives millions of their basic rights to life and 

security.” As violence spreads to more stable areas through refugee flows, terrorist activity, and 

organized crime, the UK’s security is negatively impacted. Conflict costs the world economy up to 

12.6 billion dollars a year, undermining trade and commerce. Restoration of stability through 

deployment of UK armed forces entails significant financial and political costs associated with 

stability restoration.10 Minimizing costs chimes well with the NSS’ declaration that “our most urgent 

task is to return our nation’s finances to a sustainable footing.”11 Prevention rather than reaction 

makes moral, political and financial sense.

The BSOS analysis is insufficient, however. Neither “radical” nor “transformative,” it fails to 

tackle the hard questions: Under this program, will the UK really be less likely to need to intervene 

militarily in the future? If the UK focuses on the structural causes of conflict, what other drivers of 

conflict must be addressed? Is violent conflict simply a result of an inability to manage “incompatible 

needs, interests and beliefs,” or are there other elements in play? If some conflict can be usefully 

explained via this lens (e.g., the ‘Arab Spring’ or violence in South Sudan), what about conflicts with 

incompatible parameters (e.g., the motivation of Saddam Hussein in 1990, the tension on the Korean 

Peninsula, or Indian and Pakistani disagreements over Kashmir)? Is a preventative approach 

grounded in structural interventions inevitably going to fall short? 

Likewise, the BSOS falls short of addressing the relationship between intra-state and inter-state 

conflict and change. Clausewitz comments that, “War is not merely an act of policy but a true political 

instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”12 A onedimensional view of conflict can be disastrous, even to the point of instigating war. As Thucydides 

noted, “the growth of the power of Athens and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta made war 

inevitable.”13 For Spartan leaders “fear, honor and interest” were pre-eminent in their calculations. 

Athens’ decision to conduct a calamitous expedition to Sicily resulted from passionate debates about 

Athenian honor inspired by the oratory of men such as Alcibiades and Demosthenes.14 Today, 

tackling instability between states is as central to the UK’s interests as is tackling instability within 

states. 

Personality, leadership, and cold calculations of interests all play a role in causing violent 

conflict. Bosnia may have stemmed from an inability to resolve ethnic tensions but it took the rhetoric 

of Milosevic and Karadzic to turn festering discontent into bloody civil war. If the UK is to help “shape 

 

9 Her Majesty’s Government, Building Stability, 5.

10 Ibid., 8.

11 Her Majesty’s Government, A Strong Britain, 14.

12 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 

87.

13 Robert B, Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. (New York: 

The Free Press,1996), 80, 1,140.

14 Ibid., 6,18.
14 M. Butterwick

a stable world,” then the preventative approach must address each element in light of its position in 

and effect on the larger geopolitical environment.

15 Doing so requires a wholly different toolkit. 

Diplomacy backed by effective deterrence must be part of that kit. 

The role of deterrence and diplomacy in preventing conflict is hardly new, yet the UK faces new 

fiscal and political constraints with austerity threatening credibility. By 2020 the British Army’s 

strength will be at its lowest level since 1850.16 The Royal Navy lacks an aircraft carrier until 2018 at 

the earliest. And, significantly, defense is not immune from future cuts.17 In short, the jam is already 

spread very thin. Credibility is also a function of political will. When the UK joined the invasion of 

Iraq, traditional allies questioned the UK’s wisdom but respected the military muscle on display. 18

Conversely, the UK’s unwillingness to intervene in Syria caused consternation among Gulf allies. The 

Prime Minister’s insistence that there would be “no boots on the ground” in either Libya or Syria was 

important for the domestic audience, but raised questions for allies and adversaries alike.19 When

the UAE recently cancelled an order to buy UK Typhoons it may have concluded that the UK was no 

longer a reliable security partner.20 The narrative of the UK’s military decline and its unwillingness 

to act must change if the UK is to be serious about prevention.

Credible deterrence and effective diplomacy are essential components of any conflict prevention 

strategy, but they cannot stand alone. The character of conflict is changing. What relevance has a 

credible military deterrence to preventing international terrorism? Great statesmen and 

conventional military forces are impotent weapons in the face of cyber attack or organized crime 

networks such as the narcotics cartels in Mexico. Transnational factors such as poverty and climate 

change also have the potential to cause violence both now and in the future.21 If conflict is changing 

then prevention strategies must adapt and adjust.22

If the UK is seeking to avoid costly embroilment in inconclusive military campaigns, then the UK 

must be able to prevent violent conflict in all manifestations. If the causes of conflict are complex 

then our preventative approach must be complex too. A focus solely on upstream structural 

prevention will not achieve the results the UK anticipates or desires. Rather the UK must be able to 

intervene to prevent conflict across a broad spectrum ranging from structural indicators of 

impending intra-state violence to diplomatic signs of inter-state war. To do this the UK must ensure 

 

15 The UK’s core objectives are a “secure and resilient UK” that is “shaping a stable world.” Her Majesty’s Government, A 

Strong Britain, 10.

16 Louisa Brook-Holland and Tom Rutherford, Army 2020, (London: House of Commons Library 2012), 

http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN06396/army-2020 (accessed March 20, 

2014).

17 See the UK’s First Sea Lord’s comments at, “Navy needs to be credible says Admiral Sir George Zambellas,” BBC 

website, February 10, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-26115095 (accessed February 27, 2014).

18 Drawn from a conversation with officials at the British Embassy in Riyadh in 2010.

19 See for example: “David Cameron: There is ‘no question’ of an international invasion of Libya.” The Telegraph

website, April 17, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8457019/DavidCameron-There-is-no-question-of-an-international-invasion-of-Libya.html (accessed January 10, 2014).

20 See for example: “Blow for Britain and BAE Systems as UAE rules out Eurofighter deal.” The Telegraph website, 

December 20, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/epic/badot/10528636/Blow-for-Britain-and-BAESystems-as-UAE-rules-out-Eurofighter-deal.html (accessed January 10, 2013). See also Saudi reactions to lack of US and 

UK action in Syria, “Saudi Arabia officially rejects Security Council seat,” New York Times website, November 14, 2013, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/world/saudi-arabia-officially-rejects-security-council-seat.html?_r=0. (accessed 

January 10, 2014).

21 B. Rubin and B. Jones, “Prevention of Violent Conflict: Tasks and Challenges for the United Nations.” Global 

Governance, 13, (2007), 401. Consider, for example, the potential for conflict due to melting polar ice caps which exposes 

new maritime routes, fishing areas and other resource opportunities in the Arctic Ocean. See, “Russia to establish Arctic 

military command.” The Diplomat website, February 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/russia-to-establish-arcticmilitary-command/ (accessed March 01, 2014).

22 Muggah and White, Is there a preventive action renaissance? 2.
Conflict Prevention 15

that its instruments of soft power are matched by the instruments of hard power. The development 

“carrot” must be backed by the military “stick.”

Of course the UK cannot prevent conflicts everywhere.23 Instead, the UK must develop a robust 

mechanism to identify where future conflicts might take place and why they matter. After all, if the 

UK is going to prevent conflict its first action must be to understand it. A start has been made in this 

area. The NSS specified that the UK will generate an early warning mechanism derived from “all 

sources” that looks out 5 to 20 years.24 This risk-based approach is proving to be effective in ensuring 

that countries at risk of instability are identified, cross government strategies are developed, and the 

National Security Council (NSC) receives due warning. The UK is not alone in identifying this 

requirement.25 The EU’s Early Warning and Fusion Centre is a sophisticated initiative to identify 

trends in global conflict. ECOWAS, the AU and the OSCE have all invested in similar mechanisms. 

Early warning, however, does not equate with early action. 26 Commentators predicted the 

catastrophes of Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur but despite this, little effective action was taken in 

time.27 Generating political will is decisive. Political will unlocks resources. In the current context, 

however, generating political will is deeply problematic. The scars from Afghanistan and Iraq run 

deep. How deep is hard to quantify. The UK acted boldly in Libya, albeit only after violence had 

erupted and the Gadaffi regime had begun to attack civilians. Yet the language of the Syrian debate, 

the need for the Government to emphasize “no boots on the ground,” and a growing debate across 

Whitehall as to the utility of military force and land power in particular, all point to a dramatically 

changing political landscape.28 Within Whitehall the fear of being dragged in to new conflicts limits 

ambition.29 Yet prevention requires ambition if it is to work. Targeted development activity, defense 

engagement, and quiet diplomacy are all vital prevention tools though they may not have the desired 

effect.30

Doing more requires public engagement. Early intervention will require political leaders to gain 

the trust of a skeptical public. Arguments should not be based on graphic media imagery of 

suffering.31 Rather, early intervention should be based on predictions by intelligence services as to 

 

23 SDSR states, “We will be more selective in our use of the Armed Forces, deploying them decisively at the right time 

but only where key UK national interests are at stake; where we have a clear strategic aim; where the likely political, 

economic and human costs are in proportion to the likely benefits, where we have a viable exit strategy.” Her Majesty’s 

Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review. (London: Her 

Majesty’s Stationery Office 2010), 17.

24 Her Majesty’s Government, A Strong Britain, 34.

25 See USIPs work in this area at the USIP website, http://www.usip.org/events/second-annual-conference-preventingviolent-conflict. (accessed January 06, 2014). In addition see the conclusions of The Genocide Prevention Task Force at 

Madeline Albright and William Cohen, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for US Policy Makers, (Washington DC: US 

Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008) 111-115.

26 The Genocide Prevention Task Force recommended that “warnings of potential genocide or mass atrocities must be 

made an automatic trigger for a policy review.” This would prove useful but it still misses the point. The Genocide 

Prevention Task Force at Albright and Cohen, Preventing Genocide, 111-115.

27 Bellamy, “Conflict Prevention,” 137.

28 See the language of the Syria debate at “Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons” Parliament website, August 29, 

2013, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130829/debtext/130829-0001.htm. (accessed 

March 06, 2014).

29 Personal observations whilst working in MOD 2009-11.

30 See for example, “UK fund to prevent global conflict fails to make major impact,” The Guardian website, July 13, 

2012, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/jul/13/uk-fund-prevent-conflict-impact, (accessed February 

20, 2014). The report highlights the findings of an independent report into the Conflict Pool at 

http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Evaluation-of-the-Inter-Departmental-Conflict-Pool-ICAIReport1.pdf. (accessed February 20, 2014).

31 S. Stedman, “Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling Preventative Diplomacy.” Foreign Affairs, 74, no. 3, (1995) 

14-20.
16 M. Butterwick

the likely trends within a country or region. The problem for the UK is that trust has been broken by 

the Iraq war. The Chilcott Inquiry has yet to report, but the public narrative of Iraq and WMD is one 

of lies and intelligence manipulation.32 Reestablishing trust is an essential pre-requisite for 

prevention.

The problem goes deeper, however. While routine engagement is likely to go unnoticed, more 

sizeable activity which risks soldiers’ lives may not. By intervening militarily in advance of a crisis 

the UK will be lowering the threshold for military force.33 Political leaders will not be able to use the 

narrative that military intervention stems from the failure of diplomacy and is a matter of last resort. 

Military intervention could even be the instrument of first choice.34 Former U.S. Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, emphasized this, commenting that “the military may 

be the best and sometimes the first tool” for policy makers in a crisis.35 Political leaders will need to 

change the public’s perception about the purpose of military force. This debate has not yet occurred 

with the British public. If and when it does, political leaders will be unlikely to get an easy ride.36

Military intervention is not the only instigator of controversy. The development focus of the 

BSOS requires the UK to continue to be a global leader in international aid. Currently the UK spends 

about $13.6Bn per year on aid and is the world’s second biggest donor in absolute terms. By 

percentage of GDP the UK stands at number 6.37 This is impressive. It is also contentious. When the 

Coalition committed to preserving the overseas aid budget in 2010 despite sweeping cuts to the rest 

of government spending, heated debate ensued. As soldiers have been made redundant, the UK has 

been ravaged by flooding, and investigative reporters have exposed wasteful aid projects, the tabloid 

press debate has become embittered.38 Certainty of funding is critical to effective development 

initiatives. If the narrative of the UK’s commitment to overseas aid changes then once again the UK’s 

credibility will be at stake. 

Clearly, conflict prevention is a factor of will. Much of what the UK will do may occur without 

notice by the NSC. However, when the UK needs to be decisive and act early—especially if military 

force is involved—questions will be raised and they will require an appropriate response from 

political leaders. A strategic document that declares that the UK will “prevent conflicts upstream” 

means nothing to a public tired of war, suspicious of intelligence, and concerned by wasteful aid 

 

32 See for example, “Iraq war the greatest intelligence failure in living memory,” The Telegraph website, March 18, 2013,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/9937516/Iraq-war-the-greatest-intelligence-failure-inliving-memory.html. (accessed February 20, 2014).

33 Goro Matsumura, “Conflict Prevention in the Information Age: The Role of Military in Crisis.” (Carlisle, PA: US Army 

War College, 2001) 16.

34 See the argument for early use of military force by Michael Lund, “Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and 

Practice,” in J. Bercovitch, V. Kremenyuk and I.W. Zartman eds., The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, (London: 

SAGE, 2009) 306.

35 See Mullens’ speech on Military Strategy to Kansas State University, March 2010 at http://www.cfr.org/defensestrategy/admiral-mullens-speech-military-strategy-kansas-state-university-march-2010/p21590. (accessed March 03, 

2014).

36 Indeed SDSR acknowledges this when it comments on the limits guiding the use of UK Armed Forces. This limitation 

drives the desire for prevention while restricting utility. See Her Majesty’s Government, Securing Britain, 17.

37 Figures derived from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 

http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernmentstightenbudgets.htm. (accessed February 26, 

2014).

38 See for example the following articles: “How can a nation ring fence foreign aid but slash defence? We reveal how your 

money is misspent...and even makes poverty worse.” Mail online September 17, 2010, 

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1313139/How-nation-ring-fence-foreign-aid-slash-defence-In-week-exposed-aidofficials-living-high-hog-shocking-investigation-reveals-money-misspent--makes-poverty-worse.html. (accessed February 

28, 2014) or “Stop wasting aid budget on wealthy countries ministers told,” The Telegraph February 16, 2014, 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10642649/Stop-wasting-aid-budget-on-wealthy-countries-ministers-told.html. 

(accessed February 28, 2014).
Conflict Prevention 17

spending. This moral issue requires a much more detailed explanation as to why the UK is pursuing 

the preventative approach and what a preventative approach actually entails.39

Implications for Implementation

The UK is unlikely to be able to compel adversaries or have sufficient resources to change 

societies unilaterally.40 We cannot act alone. Prevention must be multi-lateral. Unfortunately, as the 

failure to prevent civil war in Syria has dramatically shown, international consensus is often elusive. 

International actors must agree on the issues at hand. Differing perspectives will yield differing 

responses; national interests will guide actions. Russian responses to the violence in Syria have 

angered western politicians but their genesis lies in a rational calculation of Russian interests in the 

region. Is the UK any different? Consider, for example, the UK response to the Arab Spring. Whilst 

welcoming democratic change, the UK trod a careful path with its Gulf allies to ensure that its rhetoric 

did not affect commercial interests, military basing, or the oil supply. Yet in Libya the UK acted 

decisively. Was this a reaction to Gadaffi’s barbaric actions or pragmatism to ensure that post-Gadaffi 

the UK could benefit from the investments it had made in Libya since 2004?

Prevention also challenges sovereignty. This operates at two levels: national and international. 

First political leaders within fragile countries often wish to avoid internationalizing their internal 

disputes. Resolving conflicts may require bestowing legitimacy upon opposition groups.41 Leaders 

may be in denial as to the risks they face.42 Intervention may undermine the patronage networks 

upon which political leaders rely.43 All these dynamics were at play in Yemen prior to President 

Saleh’s removal in 2012. The UK sought to arrest Yemen’s decline by developing more accountable 

governance, promoting the rule of law, and economic diversification. For Saleh the objective was 

simply personal survival. His priority was defeating secessionist claims in the south and Al-Huthi 

rebellions in the north. AQ-AP’s presence was irritating but drew western aid and thus his activity to 

remove them was limited.44 Economic restructuring and governance reform required a level of 

political risk he was not prepared to take. The result was stagnation and ultimately revolt which 

descended into violence in 2011. Second, the international community remains divided on the 

principle of intervention in internal affairs. The “Responsibility to Protect” was agreed at the UN 

World Summit in 2005.45 Yet its implementation remains controversial. China and Russia continue 

to prevaricate and emerging powers such as Brazil, Argentina and India remain wary of policies that 

challenge the principles of sovereignty. This concern provided the narrative for Chinese and Russian 

inaction over Syria. 46 

 

39 For an in depth discussion of the limitations of political will see: Richard H Solomon and Lawrence Woocher, 

“Confronting the Challenge of Political Will.” United States Institute of Peace, March 18, 2010, 

http://www.usip.org/publications/confronting-the-challenge-political-will, (accessed March 01, 2014).

40 See, for example, the conclusions of an independent report on UK conflict prevention spending:

http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Evaluation-of-the-Inter-Departmental-Conflict-Pool-ICAIReport1.pdf (accessed February 20, 2014). Even UK actions in Sierra Leone occurred within the framework of a long 

standing UN mission. See for example, “Sierra Leone: one place where Tony Blair remains an unquestioned hero,” The 

Guardian, online article, April 17, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/18/sierra-leone-international-aidblair (accessed February 20, 2014).

41 B. Rubin and B. Jones, “Prevention of Violent Conflict: Tasks and Challenges for the United Nations.” Global 

Governance, 13, (2007), 400.

42 Mikulaschek and Romita, “Conflict Prevention,” 9.

43 Williams, “Conflict Prevention,” 3.

44 See, for example, leaders “hedging” to ensure continued aid in Mikulaschek and Romita, “Conflict Prevention,” 17.

45 Ibid., 3

46 Williams, “Conflict Prevention” 5.
18 M. Butterwick

Does this mean that multi-lateral prevention is inherently flawed? Not necessarily. In 

Macedonia, the UN and OSCE acted decisively and in concert to ensure that ethnic violence did not 

spill over from neighboring Bosnia.47 The OSCE’s work in Estonia following the collapse of the Soviet 

Union prevented simmering ethnic tensions from becoming violent.48 Regional organizations, in 

particular the AU, have opted for conflict prevention. The creation of the African Standby Force is a 

testament of intent.49 The EU is similarly investing in conflict prevention. International norms are 

shifting. 50 The UK must seize this opportunity. The “Responsibility to Protect” may be beyond the 

institutional capacity of the UN at the moment, but its adoption has signaled a direction for the 

future. If the UK is committed to a preventative approach then it must continue exerting influence to 

shape international norms. The UK must champion the “Responsibility to Protect.” It must also 

encourage regional bodies such as the AU to develop their preventative capabilities further.51

Achieving international consensus may be problematic, but that should not justify inaction.

Coherence internationally is important but coherence domestically is a necessity. Whole of 

government approaches rather than departmental stovepipes are essential in generating effective 

strategies.52 The UK has learned hard lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq, but the culture of working 

across Government appears to have become ingrained into the British governmental psyche. The 

creation of the NSC in 2011, the establishment of the Stabilisation Unit in 2007, and also the presence 

of a myriad of other cross-Whitehall teams, stand as evidence that the UK understands the value of 

the comprehensive approach.53 My own experience of working on Yemen 2009-2011, highlighted 

that the comprehensive approach was not just based upon formal processes but rather was embedded 

in daily informal discussions between desk officers. This led to deeper understanding, a greater 

willingness to compromise, and the generation of trust at the strategic level.54 As always, more can 

be done but the UK is pursuing the right path in this regard. Two areas remain problematic, however. 

First, resources must be aligned with strategic ends. The UK has created the tri-departmental 

Conflict Pool to fund prevention work. This pool ensures that country based preventative projects 

are underpinned by specific resources.55 At the local level the fund is important, but its overall impact 

 

47 Alice Ackerman, “Managing Conflicts Non-Violently Through Preventative Action: The Case of the Former Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia.” Journal of Conflict Studies, 19, no. 1, (1999). This operation stands as a much quoted example of 

how conflict prevention can work. Ackerman suggests that a combination of UN, OSCE and other NGO actions were 

combined with the will of the Government and people of Macedonia to avoid ethnic conflict. Moderate behavior by ethnic 

leaders and institutional reform all helped to prevent rhetoric fuelling tension. 

48 Williams, “Conflict Prevention,” 4.

49 In addition ECOWAS was instrumental in preventing escalating violence in Guinea in 2009. See Muggah and White, 

Is there a preventive action renaissance? 7.

50 Ibid., 1.

51 Ibid., 8.

52 Lund, “Conflict Prevention,” 296.

53 See, for example, cross government organizations such as the Cross Whitehall Afghanistan Group which seeks to pull 

together policy on Afghanistan with experts from the MOD, FCO and DfID embedded. Also see how the Cabinet Office draws 

personnel on secondment from the three main departments and the Treasury to ensure expertise pooling on key issues. See 

the Stabilisation Unit’s website for further details on its work at http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/. (accessed March 01, 

2014).

54 The physical of geography of Whitehall helps. With the MOD facing the Cabinet Office which stands next to the 

Foreign and Commonwealth Office which itself stands next door to HM Treasury with the Department for International 

Development a short 20 minute walk away ensures that informal contact is easy. During the Yemen strategy creation 

process informal discussion at desk level enabled issues to be resolved, wording to be amended and decision making at more 

senior levels to be enhanced.

55 See the online guidance for the Conflict Pool at, “Conflict Pool, Strategic Guidance,” 

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/200169/Conflict_Pool_Strategic_Guida

nce_FINAL.pdf. (accessed February 20, 2014).
Conflict Prevention 19

has often been limited.56 Conflict prevention is not simply a result of a series of well-meaning aid 

projects, it relies as much on hard power as on soft. Departmental turf wars over budgets are the stuff 

of government and it is wholly unrealistic to expect this to change. If prevention is to be the approach

of the UK, however, political leaders must understand that prevention is actually funded by more 

than prevention specific funds. Reductions to the diplomatic footprint, cuts to the fighting capability 

of the UK’s armed forces, and damage to the UK’s international standing, will all impact preventative 

capability. Political leaders must fund the approach not just the activity if prevention is to succeed. 

Second, a failure to work in a comprehensive fashion at the tactical level could undermine 

strategic effect. For the military, this will require new thinking. To be relevant, the Joint Force must 

contain a balance of hard and soft capabilities. Army 2020 is a bold starting point for the type of 

organizational change that is required. The creation of a Reactive Force (RF) focused on warfighting 

and an Adaptive Force (AF) focused on engagement and stabilization could make a significant 

contribution to prevention.57 The RF must be capable and credible and the AF must be useful. The 

AF must be culturally aware, regionally aligned, and knowledgeable professional forces who can 

partner with indigenous forces effectively. Clumsy actions can entail strategic implications.58 Given 

the decentralized nature of likely missions, the UK needs sustained investment in specialist training, 

often overseas, personnel procedures aligned to create continuity, and low level leadership of the 

highest order. The Army must now place institutional value on the tools of soft power. Future cuts to 

defense spending cannot be ruled out. The easy option will be to target the AF. To do so could have a 

significant effect on its moral component, however. If the perception is that the AF is undervalued, 

the net effect on the utility of the AF will be devastating. 

If the military is to change then so too must their civilian colleagues. The effective work of the 

PRTs in Afghanistan and the International Stabilisation Response Team in Libya has provided the 

UK with a blueprint for cross government approaches to stabilization.59 The key now is not to regress 

to type. Cross government teams working at the tactical level under a unified leadership must be the 

norm. The model of stabilization response must be applied to upstream conflict prevention as well. 

This requires the same attitude to risk pre-conflict as it typifies post-conflict. If the UK cannot 

conduct cross-government prevention work in dangerous places, then the desired effect is unlikely.60

Prevention will not be risk free.

The timing of prevention is key. The UK uses the language of preventing conflicts “upstream,” 

but fails to specify how early in a conflict cycle “upstream” occurs, and whether “upstream” is always 

the right time to act. Early action is designed to address the structural grievances that can lead to 

 

56 See for example, “UK fund to prevent global conflict fails to make major impact,” The Guardian online article, July 13, 

2012, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/jul/13/uk-fund-prevent-conflict-impact. (accessed February 

20, 2014). The report highlights the findings of an independent report into the Conflict Pool at 

http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Evaluation-of-the-Inter-Departmental-Conflict-Pool-ICAIReport1.pdf. (accessed February 20, 2014).

57 The British Army, Transforming the British Army; Modernising to Face an Unpredictable Future. (Andover: CGS 

Design Studio, 2012) 3.

58 The emphasis on pre-deployment training for Afghanistan on cultural awareness and preventing “green on blue” 

incidents was profound. From my own observations as CO 2RRF, 2011-2013.

59 See the post deployment report of the Libya International Stabilisation Team at: 

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67470/libya-isrt-June2011.pdf. (accessed 

February 22, 2014).

60 UK activity in Yemen for example is limited on account of the difficult situation on the ground. See for example the 

notes at para entitled, “what will we be stop doing?” in the DfID Yemen Operation Plan 2012-2015, (London: DfID, August 

2012), 2 at, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67341/yemen-2012.pdf. 

(accessed March 01, 2014). It is important to question whether this is acceptable if the UK is pursuing a preventative 

approach? If so what does it mean for the UK’s risk appetite?
20 M. Butterwick

conflict. Intervening late in the conflict cycle is much harder. By that point, positions have become 

embittered, emotions are running high, and options are more limited. Conflict may still be averted, 

but the causes may linger indefinitely.61 Early intervention theory is compelling and has enjoyed 

some success. Following violence during the disputed 2008 elections in Kenya, for example, the UN 

and AU proactively sought to avoid a repeat for the 2012 elections through a coordinated series of 

interventions drawn from the lessons of 2008. The elections passed peacefully. The key was political 

will, a desire by Kenyans to avoid violence, and an identifiable activity around which to plan: the 

elections.62 

Early intervention in the abstract—without an identifiable ‘moment’—however, is more 

problematic. The earlier the intervention the more difficult the generation of favorable political will. 

Conflict analysis is also more likely to be disputed. Will the fragile state simply muddle along? Will 

the grievances actually lead to conflict? 63 The outcome is often piecemeal preventive activity which 

fails to deliver the required impact.64 On the other hand intervening late when violence is occurring 

is difficult. When UK politicians voted against intervention in Syria, the debate centered on what the 

UK could actually do to solve the conflict. The time for peaceful resolution had passed. These 

examples suggest there may be a “sweet moment” for intervention, perhaps when enough evidence 

exists of “danger ahead” to mobilize political will, yet well before widespread violence has erupted. 

Identifying that moment requires careful analysis, intuition, and bold leadership. Missing the 

moment in the face of the impetus to “do nothing” could be overwhelming.

Another consideration is ensuring that interventions are well targeted. The principle of ‘first do 

no harm’ applies. Inappropriate, ill-timed intervention holds the power to fuel potential conflict 

rather than halt it.65 In Kosovo in 1999, for example, NATO air activity provided a catalyst for ethnic 

violence. Chadian peacekeepers operating in the Central African Republic have been accused of bias 

at best and war crimes at worst.66 As the crisis in Ukraine has unfolded we question the extent to 

which the EU’s economic package actually helped to create the political dynamics which ultimately 

led to the current perilous situation.

67

 

Security co-operation activity adds to the complexity. Reforming the security sector is important 

to prevention, yet proceeds with mixed effect. During 2011-2012, for example, protestors across the 

Middle East and North Africa clashed with security forces that were trained and equipped by the 

 

61 Mikulaschek and Romita, “Conflict Prevention.” 3.

62 Sebastien Babaud and James Ndungu, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention by the EU: Learning Lessons from the 

2008 post-elections violence in Kenya, Initiatives for Peacebuilding (Brussels, March 2012). Also the successful Macedonian 

intervention by the UN in 1994 had similar characteristics. Violence in neighboring Bosnia provided the focus, political 

leadership within Macedonia ensured UN action was welcomed and a desire amongst Macedonians to avoid violence 

ensured success. See Alice Ackerman, “Managing Conflicts Non-Violently,” 

63 Stedman, “Alchemy for a New World Order,” 14-20. See also Ackerman, “The Idea and Practice,” 342.

64 Personal observations suggest that this bedeviled UK policy towards Yemen in the period 2009-11 where a desire to 

avoid entanglement prevented the UK from allocating the resources that were necessary to make a difference to the 

structural dynamics within the country.

65 Lund, “Conflict Prevention” 298. Consider also how opposition groups may step up violence in order to be taken 

seriously and gain a seat at the negotiating table, see B. Rubin and B. Jones, “Prevention of Violent Conflict.”400. See also

the arguments of Edward Luttwak with regard to how war can result in a lasting peace whilst intervention to stop conflicts 

can cause lasting embitterment in, Edward Luttwak, “Give war a chance.” Foreign Affairs, July-August 1999, 

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55210/edward-n-luttwak/give-war-a-chance. (accessed March 21, 2014).

66 See for example “HRW: Chadian peacekeepers help rebels flee” The Washington Times online article, February 6, 

2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/6/hrw-chadian-peacekeepers-help-car-rebels-flee/ (accessed 

March 21, 2014).

67 In addition, UK policies towards Yemen 2009-11 were designed to promote economic and political reform. Yet reform 

would have threatened the fortunes of key tribal leaders and violence would have been more likely rather than less. It was 

hardly surprising that Saleh sidestepped and evaded. 
Conflict Prevention 21

UK—a situation not lost on those protesting. The UK sometimes condemned security force action yet 

remained quiet at others.68 The UK’s continuing need for military basing, oil, cooperation on counterterrorism and trade—particularly defense sales—muddied the waters of prevention in the Region. If 

the UK wishes to look through a preventive lens then it must consider how to square this particular 

circle. National priorities will drive action. A deep understanding of the situation in all its complexity, 

however, will ensure that those responsible for setting priorities are well informed.

Embracing Complexity

Strategic decision making is driven by deadlines, schedules, an insatiable media appetite, and 

competing priorities. Leaders simply do not have the time to go deep so simplifying an issue is the 

goal of any strategic adviser. Simplicity briefs well. Yet simplicity is the enemy of effective prevention. 

How, then, is this “un-squarable” circle to be completed? To start, realistic strategic objectives must 

be developed. ‘Tackling the root causes of instability rather than just its symptoms” is a useful 

mindset but one that can generate false expectations. 69 Political leaders must recognize that conflicts 

act like systems where interventions against one aspect of the conflict may have consequences, often 

unforeseen, in other areas. Interventions designed to “prevent” conflict may be better seen as 

“transforming” an aspect of a conflict on the path towards prevention. Thus, rather than simplifying 

a conflict, a better approach may be to simplify the objective sought.70

How long will conflict prevention take? For the UK merely averting violence is not enough. As 

Robert Muggah notes, the “causes of conflict may be different to the causes of peace.”71 The UK must, 

therefore, not only prevent conflict but also its reoccurrence. Approximately 50% of countries 

experiencing civil war return to conflict within 10 years.72 The danger lies with merely freezing a 

conflict rather than solving it. Changing structural dynamics, however, will require sustained 

engagement. When France intervened in Mali it envisaged a short deployment. Yet a developing 

insurgency and the need to re-stabilize Mali have extended the mission.73 At the inter-state level 

prevention may require long term deterrence. For example post-1982 the UK has maintained a 

credible garrison on the Falkland Islands backed by regular maritime activity. Evidently, conflict 

prevention is rarely a quick fix.74 The UK will need to develop strategic patience. 

 

68 See for example, “Bahrain’s deadly crackdown condemned by West,” The Telegraph online article, February 17, 2011, 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/bahrain/8331875/Bahrains-deadly-crack-down-condemned-byWest.html (accessed February 23, 2014). See also Inge Friekland, “Rethinking Stability” in Small Wars Journal, February 

19, 2014, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/rethinking-stability (accessed March 21, 2014). Friekland argues that the 

pursuit of stability has reinforced the position of authoritarian regimes which has had long term consequences for the U.S. 

She highlights, for example, that U.S. military aid to the Mubarak regime was at least $1.3Bn per year whilst the literacy rate 

for women stood at 60%. 

69 Her Majesty’s Government, A Strong Britain, 25.

70 Consider the changing objectives for the UK in Yemen. In 2009 the UK sought to “prevent state failure.” With the 

resources available this was an unrealistic objective. By 2012 the DfID objective was “a more stable, secure and prosperous 

Yemen.” A recognition perhaps that the UK could not achieve the objective of preventing state failure but also that 

interventions yield dynamics of their own. See Department for International Development, “Yemen Operational Plan 2012-

2015” at, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67341/yemen-2012.pdf. 

(accessed March 21, 2014). 

71 Robert Muggah, Conflict Prevention and Preventative Diplomacy: What works and What Doesn’t? (New York: 

International Peace Institute, 2012), 2.

72 Mikulaschek and Romita, “Conflict Prevention”13.

73 See for example, “French Lawmakers extend Mali intervention,” Voice of America website, online article, April 22, 

2103, http://www.voanews.com/content/french-lawmakers-extend-mali-intervention/1646825.html. (accessed March 03, 

2014).

74 Muggah and White, Is there a preventive action renaissance? 5. Also see Megan Grace Kennedy-Chouane, 

“Improving Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Assistance through Evaluation.” OECD Journal, 1, no. 8, (2010) 99.
22 M. Butterwick

Conflict prevention must have an end point as UK commitment cannot be indefinite. To 

determine when to end UK commitment requires understanding the effect that preventive activity 

has had. Yet measuring prevention is problematic. As Bill Flavin has commented, “It is difficult to 

prove that prevention works, because if it does, nothing happens.”75 While the failure of prevention 

in Rwanda, Georgia, and Bosnia is tangible, is the absence of conflict between say China and Japan 

a result of economic ties, the upholding of international norms, or the deterrent power of the U.S. 

Navy? In austere times, measures of effect are essential for justification of continued funding. There 

is no easy answer here. No internationally recognized system for measuring prevention exists. 

Political leaders must recognize this difficulty. Measurement is more art than science. Artificial 

timelines are dangerous as are inflated expectations and a need to demonstrate success. The UK must 

develop an intuitive feel for how it needs to act, for how long, and with what level of effort. Developing 

that sensibility will require understanding well beyond the work of secret intelligence. Highly 

knowledgeable and trustworthy soldiers, diplomats and development workers will be critical in 

providing the understanding necessary to analyze problems, identify interventions, and assess their 

impact. 

Perhaps most critically of all, political leaders must recognize that preventing conflict is less of 

an end state where mission success can be declared, than it is a process. The level of UK involvement 

in that process must be guided by a clear understanding of the value of the interests at stake. As 

Clausewitz noted, if “the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must 

be renounced.”76 Thus, in determining the end point for the UK, political leaders will need to 

understand how UK action is affecting conflict dynamics as well as the moment at which involvement 

is no longer in the UK’s interests. Identifying that moment will not be simple.

Conclusion

With a public skeptical as to the value of overseas aid and military interventions, a deficit that 

continues to require more austerity, and an international environment that prevaricates on issues of 

sovereignty, questioning whether the UK has backed the wrong horse is apposite. Prevention is a 

noble aspiration, but is it realistic or even advisable?77 These are tough issues. Yet if the UK adopts a 

purely reactive posture we must be prepared for the next Rwanda. We must accept that the Syrian 

civil war will continue to rage potentially resulting in the spread of violence and regional instability. 

Embracing conflict prevention strategies may be the United Kingdom’s best hope for protecting its 

national sovereignty while affecting positive change in the world. Thus, the case for prevention 

remains compelling. On occasion it has worked. In 1991 the Kurds were protected by swift 

intervention, in Macedonia conflict was contained, in Kenya electoral violence was averted. Lund 

captured the issue neatly, commenting that “prevention is not simply a high ideal but a prudent 

option that sometimes works.”78 

Political leaders must understand the limits and difficulties that a preventative approach entails. 

They must understand prevention does not come cheap. The UK will need to maintain credible and 

capable military forces that continue to deter adversaries, be able to project power globally and 

display the will to do so, and take the lead in ensuring that international norms enable preventative 

activity. The UK must champion the “Right to Protect.” Political leaders must explain their positions 

 

75 William Flavin, “The Dogs that do not bark: Prevention as the Path to Strategic Stability.” Small Wars Journal, 

August 2, 2013.

76 Clausewitz, On War, 92.

77 For a critical analysis of Conflict Prevention as an approach see, S. Stedman, “Alchemy for a New World Order,” 14-20.

78 Lund, “Conflict Prevention,” 288.
Conflict Prevention 23

and actions more coherently to skeptical publics. The impact of inactivity on the economy and 

wellbeing will require public debate. The utility of military force, not as a tool of last resort, but as an 

early option for defusing a developing crisis will require explanation. Prevention strategies must be 

realistic, guided by a clear articulation of national interests, and accommodate a long term 

perspective. If political leaders are not prepared for the long haul then the UK is likely to waste 

resources in the short term. Finally, prevention will require sustained investment in the people who 

will actually deliver the strategy on the ground. 

In 2002 Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense at that time, published a check list detailing 

what U.S. leaders must consider before they intervened abroad.79 A similar list for the UK’s political 

leaders embarking on a preventative approach might read as follows:

 Conflict prevention requires fully understanding each conflict in all its complexity.

 Doing nothing entails consequences.

 Prevention strategies without political will are wasted.

 Prevention is a process not an end state. 

 Prevention is art, not science. 

 Set realistic goals.

 Prepare for a long haul.

 Prevention is not risk free as it may carry unforeseen consequences.

 Prevention requires coordination of all instruments of national power.

 The military option may be the best first option. If so, this must be explained to the public.

This cautionary list is designed to help ensure that an approach to conflict prevention is 

pragmatic and has substance. The UK must move beyond mere policy to invest financially, politically, 

and morally in the concept. If conflict prevention is, indeed, consistent with UK national interests, 

and is a worthy investment leading to a more stable and secure world, then we must do considerably 

more than we are doing at present.

 

79 “In Rumsfeld’s Words: Guidelines for Committing Forces,” New York Times, International, Monday, October 14, 

2002, A9. The newspaper cites excerpts from a memorandum by Donald Rumsfeld which was made public by DOD.
Army War College Review U.S. Army War College

Vol. 1, No. 1, Feb. 2015, 24-41 Student Publications

On Theory: 

War and Warfare 

Reconsidered

Mark E. Blomme

Theory examining the purpose and motivations of war weds itself to human nature and obtains a 

degree of immutability. Theory regarding the conduct of war, namely warfare, more easily 

conflicts with the changes brought by science and technology. Clausewitz provided a prophetic and 

lasting theory describing the tendencies and motivations that lead to war and limit its political 

aims, but his theory for the conduct of war has proven less enduring. His Napoleonic-era 

prescriptions maintained a powerful hold on the theory of warfare for nearly a century. Disruptive 

technologies, such as the gift of flight, eventually forced a reevaluation of theory and led to a 

rediscovery of sixth-century B.C. theory attributed to Sun Tzu. Modern theorists like Julian Corbett, 

John Boyd, John Warden, and Shimon Naveh extended Sun Tzu’s concepts, perhaps unwittingly, 

such that Sun Tzu’s theory continues to resonate within the twenty-first-century American theory 

of warfare. These theorists demonstrated that Sun Tzu remains relevant to the perpetually 

changing realm of warfare, while Clausewitz’s theory on war remains quintessential to the analysis 

and understanding of the purpose and motivations of war.

Keywords: Boyd, Clausewitz, Corbett, Design, Naveh, Strategy, Sun Tzu, Systems, Warden

One purpose of theory is to expose logical explanations of observed patterns to constructive discourse

which allows theory to evolve over time.1 To the extent that theorists examine the purpose and 

motivations of war, their theories are wed to human nature and obtain a corresponding degree of 

immutability. Theories that address warfare, i.e., the conduct of war, more easily conflict with 

realities associated with technological advances. The implication is that while theories on warfare are 

useful, they are not as enduring as theories on war, and, consequently, should evolve and be 

 

Mark E. Blomme (M.S.S. United States Army War College) is a Colonel in the United States Air Force. An earlier version of 

this article, written under the direction of Colonel Chad A. McGougan, earned the prestigious Colonel Jerry D. Cashion 

Memorial Writing Award for the USAWC class of 2014. 

1 Kenneth N. Waltz offers the following: “A theory, though related to the world about which explanations are wanted, 

always remains distinct from that world. ‘Reality’ will be congruent neither with a theory nor with a model that may 

represent it.” See Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010), 6.
On Theory 25

questioned. In short, changes in warfare are the bane of military theorists who aim to provide 

principles guiding the practice of war. Theorists who focus on the generalities and motivations of war 

achieve far greater longevity. Of the latter, the nineteenth-century work of Carl von Clausewitz holds 

distinct prominence in American military teachings, yet the sixth-century B.C. theory of Sun Tzu is 

more prescient, especially with respect to incorporating lasting prescriptions for warfare.2

Clausewitz’s gift to military studies was a theory on war that resulted from his exploration of the 

motivations influencing and limiting war’s political aims. However, he occasionally ventured into the 

realm of prescriptive advice for the conduct of war, and the weight of his influence contributed to a 

century of relatively unquestioning abidance to Napoleonic-style warfare. Clausewitz’s theory on 

warfare revolved around massed armies in rigid formations pursuing decisive battle. Adherence to 

that mentality increasingly led to bloody wars of attrition as technology wrought increasingly efficient 

mechanisms for killing. It took future gifts of science, most notably flight, to force a renaissance of 

theory, disrupt mechanistic Clausewitzian views, and restore Sun Tzu-like warfare wherein surprise, 

initiative, and flexibility are valued. 

Julian Corbett was one of the first to break from Napoleonic-era principles of warfare. His 

maritime theory revealed that presumptions for land warfare were not universal to all domains. As 

airpower evolved, it also challenged the legacy of Clausewitz’s prescriptions on warfare. Airmen like 

John Boyd and John Warden played a significant role in shifting emphasis from firepower and 

attrition to maneuver and deception. In doing so, they resurrected principles that harkened back to 

Sun Tzu. Boyd also emphasized the importance of a “mind-time-space schema” as an instrument to 

communicate a synthesized understanding of reality.3 He viewed these schemas as a way to facilitate 

initiative of distributed forces while achieving synchronization of effort in the context of a cognitive 

orientation to the relative world. Those thoughts reverberate today in the design-type thinking 

stemming from the work of Shimon Naveh. Both Naveh and Boyd espouse the necessity for discourse, 

challenging of assumptions, and exposure of the logic that underpins strategy—three keys to 

unleashing initiative, disrupting enemy decision-making, and keeping an adversary off-balance. In 

aiming to defeat an enemy’s strategy, modern theorists focus on the acme of Sun Tzu-like skill and 

place emphasis on maneuver, thinking, and asymmetric warfare rather than mass, brute force, and 

bloody pursuit of decisive battle. Indeed, theory on warfare is evolving, but it has returned to Sun 

Tzu roots. Meanwhile Clausewitz’s theory on war remains as valid as it did nearly two centuries ago. 

Clausewitz – On War, not on Warfare

In the Western world, the study of military theory is nearly impossible without analysis of

Clausewitz’s work. His insights on war remain relevant for two simple reasons. First, Clausewitz’s 

explicit purpose in writing On War was to develop an enduring theory.

4 Therefore, he generally 

avoided discussion of tactics that might have limited the longevity of his work.5 Second, unlike 

 

2 In the forward to a translation of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, B.H. Liddell Hart comments that “amongst all the 

military thinkers of the past, only Clausewitz is comparable, and even he is more ‘dated’ than Sun Tzu.” Sun Tzu, The Art of 

War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), v.

3 John Boyd, "Patterns of Conflict," Air Power Australia, http://www.ausairpower.net/JRB/poc.pdf (accessed 

February 24, 2014), 74. Boyd describes a “mind-time-space schema” as “a common outlook possessed by ‘a body of officers’ 

[that] represents a unifying theme that can be used to simultaneously encourage subordinate initiative yet realize superior 

intent.”

4 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1984), 63.

5 Ibid., 134. Clausewitz said an “irreconcilable conflict” exists between theory “to equip the conduct of war with 

principle” and the actual practice of war. Ibid., 134.
26 M. Blomme

theorists who merely accepted war as a natural part of human existence, Clausewitz explored the 

essence of war and factors that limit its aims.6

On War is a dialectic that drags a reader through a lengthy exploration of the essence of war. A 

close reading of the work generates a sense that one is being forced to accompany Clausewitz on a 

tedious cognitive journey in which he struggles with the logic of war in his own mind.7 While this 

provides fascinating insight into the process of human reasoning, it may dissuade a reader’s own 

critical thinking. To be fair, Clausewitz’s death preceded completion of On War,

8 and historians note 

that Clausewitz’s wife, and others, edited manuscripts prior to publication.9 Hence, the source of On 

War’s inconsistencies remains unclear;10 however, the distinct dialectical style of On War is a barrier 

to understanding of Clausewitz’s own making.11 Regardless, Clausewitz’s thesis is most prophetic—

war is the result of a “paradoxical trinity”12 of tendencies composed of the “blind natural force”13 of 

enmity, the rationale of political aims, and probabilistic calculus14—passion, reasoned policy, and 

probability.15

Unfortunately, various translations of On War result in differing conclusions regarding 

Clausewitz’s intent. Howard and Paret’s widely studied English translation of Clausewitz’s trinity 

lends itself to the use of physical analogy: “Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a 

balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.”16 David

 

6 Whereas Clausewitz saw war as an instrument of policy, a fourth-century B.C. Indian philosopher known variously as 

Kautilya, Chanakya, or Vishnu Gupta, tended to see policy as an instrument of war. If Kautilya had lived in the nineteenth 

century, he might have argued with Prussian general, historian, and theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s conclusion about the 

futility of contemplating “absolute war,” but from a perspective of not wanting to limit the methods of war – namely warfare. 

Nevertheless, given Kautilya’s background in economics, he would likely have found solace in Clausewitz’s analysis of the 

nature of war and his theory about human nature’s proclivity to engage in probabilistic calculus when making decisions 

regarding the aims of war. See Glenn K. Cunningham, "Eastern Strategic Traditions: Un-American Ways of War," in U.S. 

Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, 5th ed., Vol. 1. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

2012), 133-143; Kautilya, Artashastra, trans. R. Shamasastry (Bangalore, India: Government Press, 1915).

7 Clausewitz walks his readers through the creation and destruction of his own ideas. Without sufficient warning, this 

linguistic style can be confusing, but it is essentially the scientific method in prose – hypothesis, analysis, and synthesis. 

Emphasis was placed on the words creation and destruction as an allusion to later references to John Boyd’s paper entitled 

“Destruction and Creation.”

8 Clausewitz, On War, 65.

9 Christopher Bassford, "Clausewitz and His Works," March 18, 2013, 

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Cworks/Works.htm (accessed March 12, 2014).

10 Multiple sources discuss contradictions and inconsistencies in On War. Joseph Strange and Richard Iron address 

inconsistencies regarding Clausewitz’s center of gravity analogy in Joseph Strange and Richard Iron, "Understanding 

Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities," http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf (accessed March 13, 

2014). See also Eugenio Diniz and Domício Proença, "A Criterion for Settling Inconsistencies in Clausewitz's on War," 

Journal of Strategic Studies (2012).

11 Clausewitz’s dialectical style is a slow, brooding approach that would just as likely infuriate someone today, as did the 

dialectical approach practiced by ancient Athenian philosophers such as Socrates and Plato – a style known as the Socratic 

Method.

12 Clausewitz, On War, 89. Various scholars prefer translations such as “miraculous,” “remarkable,” “fascinating,” and 

“paradoxical.” Those favoring “miraculous” note Clausewitz used the same German phrase that describes Christianity’s Holy 

Trinity, while those who favor “remarkable” or “fascinating,” over “paradoxical,” may fail to see as a lack of any paradox. 

However, the weighing of passion and reason seems indeed a paradox of choice between human motivations of the heart 

and mind, yet the most fascinating or remarkable idea is in contemplating a notion of stability for the Clausewitzian trinity. 

Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

2007), 44, 72-79; National War College, "Clausewitz I & II - Instructors Guide," 

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/NWC/ClausewitzNotesAY2008.htm (accessed February 25, 2014).

13 Clausewitz, On War, 89.

14 Ibid.

15 Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War provides remarkable accounts of how fear, honor, and interest, are 

motivations both of, and in, war. Clausewitz more clearly extracts these motivations to compose a theory on the influences of

war. The works of the two authors are complementary with respect to the study of war.

16 Clausewitz, On War, 89.
On Theory 27

Gillie disputes Howard and Paret’s translation, offering a more literal interpretation: “The task for 

theory, then, is to float (wander/isolate) freely in suspension between these three tendencies as 

between three points of attraction.”17 Grammatically, the former makes the task the reader’s 

responsibility (presumably guided by Clausewitz), while the later places responsibility on theory 

itself.18 The Howard and Paret translation also implies a concept of balance between the trinity of 

tendencies that ignores Clausewitz’s warning about trying to fix an arbitrary relationship between 

the three.19 According to Clausewitz, theory must consider all three, yet they are “variable in their 

relationship to one another,”20 and any theory seeking “to fix an arbitrary relationship between them 

would conflict with reality.”21 Scholars preferring the Howard and Paret translation sometimes use 

the analogy of a pendulum suspended between three magnets to extend Clausewitz’s thoughts in a 

manner consistent with the notion of war as deterministic chaos.22 Meanwhile, scholars preferring 

more literal translations remain unburdened by inconsistencies and analogies that Clausewitz may 

not have even intended. Instead, they take a purist perspective, holding only that Clausewitz insisted

that a theory of war must include consideration of each tendency. Raymond Aron and Janeen Klinger 

fall in the latter camp and consider war’s various forms a reflection of the limitless arrangement and 

relative strength of the Clausewitzian trinity’s elements.23

Regardless of the debate emanating from various translations, an enduring takeaway from On 

War is the subjugation of warfare to political objectives.24 Equally important is Clausewitz’s 

discussion of the inevitable “fog” and “friction” of war, where fog is the result of inevitable 

uncertainty,25 and friction is the outcome of natural stresses that render otherwise easy tasks 

difficult.26 As is typical in On War, Clausewitz’s discussion of fog and friction tends to be descriptive, 

while other theorists emphasize the value of accentuating these inevitable features. The inclination 

to be descriptive is appropriate for a book titled On War, versus one titled On Warfare, but 

occasionally Clausewitz ventures toward prescriptive advice.27 Most significantly, he espouses that a 

commander-in-chief must function simultaneously as both a statesman and general.28 In functioning 

as a statesman, a commander-in-chief must keep political objectives in mind, when functioning as a 

 

17 David R. Gillie, "Interpreting Clausewitz’s Miraculous Trinity - Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis: A Study of the Essential 

Intellectual Content and Didactic Purpose of the Trinitarian Model," National War College, December 9, 2009, 

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Gillie-ThesisAntithesisSynthesis.htm (accessed February 25, 2014).

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid. Clausewitz’s warning about trying to fix an arbitrary relationship between the elements of the trinity is 

contained in the sentence immediately preceding his comments that have generated debate. 

20 Clausewitz, On War, 89.

21 Ibid.

22 Bassford, "Clausewitz and His Works." In this analogy, the apparent complexity is dependent on the magnitude of 

the disturbance, as well as the strength and position of the magnets in relation to the pendulum. For additional information, 

see Christopher Bassford, "Teaching the Clausewitzian Trinity," 2007, 

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TrinityTeachingNote.htm (accessed December 22, 2013).

23 Janeen Klinger, "The Social Science of Carl von Clausewitz," Parameters, 

http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA486428 (accessed February 23, 2014).

24 Clausewitz, On War, 88.

25 Ibid., 101.

26 Ibid., 121.

27 The idea of Clausewitz writing a descriptive, instead of prescriptive, theory is found in many sources. Whether that is 

a positive or negative does not seem to be debated. Hew Strachan tends to comment on this nature as a positive feature, and 

it is probably what has helped with the longevity of Clausewitz’s theory on war. Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in 

the Twenty-First Century, 80.

28 Clausewitz, On War, 112. Eliot Cohen’s book, Supreme Command, provides an interesting examination of civilmilitary relations required when the statesman and general are not the same person. Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: 

Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (New York: The Free Press, 2003).
28 M. Blomme

general, the commander-in-chief must remain realistic about possibilities achievable given the 

available resources.29

In terms of modern strategy, political objectives drive the “ends” that actions are intended to 

achieve, whereas available resources are the “means” which the general must consider when 

conceiving “ways” to achieve the ends. This Ends-Ways-Means construct is a typical framework for 

discussing strategy, and Clausewitz’s insight regarding the duality required of a commander-in-chief 

provides a useful perspective for settling a classic philosophical debate about the best approach for 

developing strategy. Many planners take an ends-centric perspective to developing strategy, arguing 

that the purpose is to identify the ways and means necessary to achieve desired ends. Alternatively, 

others hold a means-centric perspective and believe resources necessarily limit the ends which action 

can seek. Clausewitz clearly espouses the importance of a duality in perspective that is required at 

high command. Thus, debating the primacy of an ends-centric versus a means-centric perspective is 

pointless because the underlying question is but a logical fallacy—a false dichotomy. While some may 

feel compelled to continue the debate, Clausewitz would likely suggest the debate is as pointless as 

arguing about whether war is more art or science.30

Unlike Clausewitz’s theory on war, the limits of nineteenth-century knowledge abridged the 

longevity of his theory on warfare. Criticizing Clausewitz for failing to account for the uniqueness of 

operations in air, space, and cyberspace, therefore, may be unfair. It is fair, however, to criticize his 

failure to address the uniqueness of the maritime domain. In fact, considering a perspective beyond 

the land domain may have helped Clausewitz take a strategic view on warfare, not just war, and could 

have helped future militaries avoid undue fixation on decisive battle, seizure of territory, and an 

imperfect center of gravity analogy.31 The analogy has utility,32 but it loses relevancy in the highly 

fluid, decentralized, and distributed operations typical of contemporary American warfare.33

As with any model or analogy, the center of gravity construct is an incomplete representation of 

reality.34 Too literal an interpretation extends the physical analogy beyond usefulness if it insists on 

the impossibility of more than a single source of strength35 or place to focus effort.36 After Operation 

 

29 Clausewitz, On War, 112.

30 Ibid., 149. Clausewitz states “war does not belong in the realm of arts and sciences; rather it is part of mans’ social 

existence.”

31 Rudolph Janiczek offers a perspective on the confusion and disagreement over interpretations of the center of gravity 

analogy. Rudolph M. Janiczek, "A Concept at the Crossroads: Rethinking the Center of Gravity," Strategic Studies Institute, 

http://www.clausewitz.com/bibl/Janiczek-ConceptAtTheCrossroads.pdf (accessed March 13, 2014).

32 The utility of the center of gravity analogy is that it provides a warning about maintaining a degree of coordination to 

ensure unity of effort / purpose.

33 Antulio Echevarria seems to concur with this view regarding the applicability of the center of gravity analogy in 

distributed warfare, as indicated in an article he published a decade prior. Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Clausewitz's Center of 

Gravity: It's Not What We Thought," Naval War College Review 61, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 115.

34 Interpreted too literally, the center of gravity analogy implies a degree of mechanistic determinism that is 

inconsistent with a world dominated by humanistic indeterminism. Mechanistic Determinism – Events are completely 

determined and caused by previous events. Mechanistic Indeterminism – Events are not completely determined or caused 

by previous events and regardless of the amount of information obtained, it is still not possible to predict or explain any 

causality. Humanistic Indeterminism should imply a degree of indeterminism even greater than Wesley Salmon implies 

with the term “mechanistic determinism.” Wesley C. Salmon, Causality and Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

1998), 37.

35 Bassford, "Clausewitz and His Works." Bassford tends to reference the center of gravity as the source of an enemy’s 

strength.

36 Echevarria II, 117. Echevarria prefers to think of the center of gravity as the point at which efforts should be focused 

to defeat an enemy. He believes Clausewitz intended more of an “effects-based” approach, instead of a capabilities-based 

approach, in thinking about centers of gravity. An effects-based approach makes Echevarria consistent with maneuver and 

parallel warfare discussed later in this article; however, Echevarria seems concerned that John Warden’s parallel warfare 

can result in “so many COGs as to reduce the concept to an absurdity.” In essence, that may be the problem with the center 
On Theory 29

Desert Storm, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Purvis expressed frustration that “the CENTCOM 

staff became more focused on what [the center of gravity] was as opposed to what do we do with it.”37

Remarkably, Antulio Echevarria notes that while some strategists and planners argue there can be 

only one enemy center of gravity, they simultaneously claim it can change or vary depending on a 

somewhat arbitrary notion of levels in war—strategic, operational, or tactical.38 Clausewitz’s 

inconsistent use of the center of gravity analogy is likely the source of much of the confusion, but 

concurrently hints at the imperfections of the analogy itself. Thus, the analogy can facilitate spirited 

academic debate, but an insistence on reducing the complexity of war to a “single” center of gravity 

tends to stifle options and encourage head-on, brute-force, clashes in search of decisive battle.

If Clausewitz’s center of gravity analogy had existed when France began its foray into Russia in 

1812, Napoleon might have described Russia’s army as the center of gravity—basing strategy on the 

belief that he could force the Russian Army into decisive battle.39 When decisive battle eluded him, 

Napoleon might have claimed Moscow was the center of gravity and thus justified his occupation of 

the Russian capital. Given the benefit of hindsight, military historians can now argue that Russia’s 

center of gravity was the resolve of its people. A Russian force that was able to lose in battle, yet win 

the war, confounded Napoleon.40 Russians were willing to endure sacrifice while luring the French 

deep into the Russian heartland, even burning Moscow to keep the French from exploiting its 

refuge.41 In the end, the only thing decisive about Napoleon’s campaign into Russia was that it helped 

lead to the demise of the French Empire.42

Fixation on a single center of gravity can lead to fixation on decisive battle, and there are clues 

that doctrine is taking new generations down the primrose path of Clausewitz’s dated prescription

on warfare. Whereas U.S. Army doctrine previously defined Full Spectrum Operations as 

“simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations,”43 the latest version 

replaces Full Spectrum Operations with the term Decisive Action:

44 “continuous, simultaneous 

combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks.”45

Hence, either U.S. Army doctrine now portends that any continuous synchronized action will be 

decisive, or more confusingly, that Decisive Action may not always be decisive. Furthermore, the 

 

of gravity analogy, and in expressing concern Echevarria appears to fall into the ground-centric tendency of desiring only a 

few key (ideally one) centers of gravity to accommodate the massing of forces. Ibid., 108-109.

37 Collin A. Agee, Peeling the Onion: The Iraqi Center of Gravity in Desert Storm, SAMS Monograph (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, July 4, 1992), 26-27.

38 Echevarria II, 116-117.

39 Richard K. Riehn, 1812: Napoleon's Russian Campaign (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 226.

40 Harry Summer recounts a similar situation with the American experience in Vietnam. Although the literal validity of 

the facts may be in question, the following conversation is still prescient: “’You know you never defeated us on the 

battlefield,’ said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. ‘That may be so,’ he 

replied, ‘but it is also irrelevant.” Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: 

Presidio Press, 1982), 1.

41 Riehn, 1812: Napoleon's Russian Campaign, 285.

42 Adam Zamoyski, Moscow 1812: Napoleon's Fatal March (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 544. Napoleon’s failed 

analysis of Russian determination played a significant role in the failure of his Russian campaign, the disintegration of his 

army, an inability to confront a crippling guerilla war in the Montaña of Spain, and the eventual collapse of the French 

Empire. The consequences of Napoleon’s insistence on trying to obtain a decisive battle against the Russian Army should be 

a warning to those who insist on trying to identify a single center of gravity and to those who think they can predict what will

be decisive in a complex, adaptive, human-based system.

43 U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, FM 3-0 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2008), viii.

44 U.S. Department of the Army, Unified Land Operations, ADRP 3-0 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 

2012), v.

45 Ibid., 2-2.
30 M. Blomme

doctrine claims that “effective decisive action relies on lethality,” 46 apparently discounting lessons of 

the past decade and ignoring the potential decisiveness of cyber, electronic, or Unrestricted 

Warfare47—a concept emanating from Chinese military theorists.

The point is not to argue that Clausewitz’s thoughts on warfare should be completely discarded—

they should not—but rather to argue that they require increased skepticism in light of modern 

technology and the inseparable, overlapping, interdependent, and even intangible domains of 

modern warfare. The true power of his work is the descriptive theory he offers for analyzing war. If 

military leaders naively use Clausewitz as a guide to warfare they may unnecessarily constrain 

opportunity by insisting on massing forces in pursuit of a decisive battle, against an assumed single 

center of gravity. Clausewitz wrote On War, not On Warfare.

Sun Tzu – On War, and on Warfare

Amazingly, Chinese general Sun Tzu professed a set of enlightening and pithy aphorisms on war 

and warfare two thousand years before Clausewitz.48 Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is far more concise 

than Clausewitz’s On War, yet the insights it provides in short, easy to remember verse, are 

extraordinary.

49 His elegant, yet vague, pearls of wisdom tend to linger in the mind, and contribute 

to inquisitive reflection that a student of Clausewitz may be discouraged from practicing. While 

Clausewitz’s literary style clearly suggests that he valued his own critical thinking. Sun Tzu’s succinct 

adages more effectively encourage his students to practice critical thinking of their own.

Sun Tzu offers a broad and intellectually engaging perspective on strategy. Whereas Clausewitz’s 

strategy is about military campaigning,50 Sun Tzu’s approach more closely reflects what is today 

understood as grand strategy. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz each recognized the connection between war 

and policy, but Clausewitz’s experience as a European continental soldier, the period’s indelible 

Napoleonic influence, and the relatively constrained geography of Western Europe prejudiced his 

perspective.

51 Clausewitz saw battle between armies as the primary tool of war. Sun Tzu viewed 

attacking armies as preferable only to attacking cities.52

 

46 Ibid., 2-13. Historian Hans Delbruck famously postulated the existence of two fundamental strategies for war –

annihilation and attrition strategies. After more than a decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is difficult to 

comprehend the U.S. Army’s apparent preoccupation with annihilation strategy thinking (Decisive Action). A few examples 

of militaries going to war with a false expectation of a short decisive campaign include: Napoleon’s campaigns in Spain, 

Calabria, and Russia; Germany’s Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union, America’s Vietnam War, Operation 

Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

47 Liang Qiao and Xiangsui Wang, Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America, trans. CIA Foreign 

Broadcast Information Service (Panama City, Panama: Pan American Publishing, 2000). Unrestricted Warfare, a book 

written by two Chinese Colonels and translated by the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), espouses a 

theory termed “beyond-limits combined war.” The central theme is that non-military means are the best way to attack the 

United States and suggests targeting information hubs within multiple echelons of the American system. The authors do not 

suggest that there are “no limits” in warfare. Instead, they advocate going “beyond” normal boundaries to conduct a 

systemic attack on multiple components of an enemy’s system.

48 There is some debate about whether Sun Tzu ever existed, or whether the works attributed to him are the result of a 

collaboration of thoughts in the Warring States period of Chinese history (453 – 421 B.C.). Reference the introduction by 

translator Samuel Griffith in Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 1.

49 Short, easy to remember verse was probably more important for communicating ideas in sixth-century B.C. Asia than 

it was in nineteenth-century Europe.

50 Clausewitz, On War, 128.

51 One is tempted to wonder whether the great expanse of ancient China contributed to theories that more closely 

resemble maritime theory than the emphasis on decisive battle found in the writings of Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri 

Jomini.

52 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 78.
On Theory 31

While there is no clear evidence that Clausewitz was aware of the Chinese master’s work,53 it is 

doubtful Clausewitz would have found it at fault. Nor should one expect that Sun Tzu would have 

differed with Clausewitz’s conclusions about the forces that lead to and sustain war. Sun Tzu, 

however, probably would have criticized Clausewitz’s On War for its failure to provide practical 

insight with respect to guiding warfare. Both theorists saw war as a natural extension of state policy, 

inherently driven by estimates of the probability of success, and requiring populous support. 

However, their approach to warfare varies substantially, in the same way that classical Western 

philosophy differs from Eastern philosophy with regard to a general approach to life.

Whereas a low-lying Western city might build massive levies and pumping systems to prevent 

flooding, an Eastern approach would be more likely to accept the natural way of things. Instead of 

trying to keep the water out of its cities, for example, an Eastern approach might result in cities built 

on stilts.54 Similarly, Clausewitzian warfare presumes that with sufficient effort and proper 

leadership, one can defeat any opponent through brute force and will. The Clausewitzian approach 

focuses on symmetric, army-versus-army warfare, with maneuver to concentrate forces at the 

decided place and time to achieve victory through mass and firepower in decisive battle.55 Sun Tzu’s 

preferred style of warfare advocates an asymmetric, harassing approach, designed to inflict 

maximum damage at minimum cost—a concept Clausewitz implies is purely fallacious.56 Students of 

Sun Tzu disdain impatient cries for battle, convinced that victory achieved through the defeat of an 

enemy’s calculus or strategy is preferable to battle. Clausewitz cautions that most intelligence reports 

are contradictory, false, or unclear.57 Sun Tzu, however, takes a strategic view, seeking intelligence to 

understand the enemy while recognizing that deception can amplify the natural fog of war.58

Unwavering confidence in superior “military genius” and the ability to hold forces in reserve are 

typical Western approaches for coping with the fog and friction of war.59 Instead of merely trying to 

 

53 As Clausewitz’s opens On War, he provides a comment on the maximum use of force, which may be a faint allusion 

to an axiom of Sun Tzu, but it would be a stretch to deduce that this implies Clausewitz was aware of Sun Tzu’s writing based 

on this one comment. Clausewitz states, “Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to 

disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as 

it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness 

are the very worst.” Clausewitz, On War, 75. Sun Tzu argues, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. 

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy; next best is to disrupt his alliances; the next 

best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.” Sun Tzu, The 

Art of War, 77-78.

54 Conclusion based on reading François Jullien, A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking, 

trans. Janet Lloyd (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004). Many people in both Eastern and Western cities remain in 

low-lying areas and vulnerable to flooding, but this seems to be more a function of geography and resources than what their 

philosophical approach might be for dealing with flooding.

55 Defensively, the Clausewitzian approach might seek to blunt, block, or absorb an enemy’s attack, while a student of 

Sun Tzu would be more likely to pursue avenues for deflecting or dodging an opponent’s offensive efforts in order to 

preserve strength for a more advantageous opportunity.

56 Clausewitz, On War, 75.

57 Ibid., 117.

58 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 9.

59 Clausewitz, On War, 100-101, 119. Careful reflection allows a military officer to develop the qualities of Clausewitz’s 

“military genius” or Gary Klein’s “experts” which he describes in Sources of Power. Experience allows these elites to skillfully 

recognize familiar aspects of complex situations and quickly develop “high-quality” courses of action. “Experts can perceive 

things that are invisible to novices.” Klein’s research found that the first course of action reasonably considered by an expert 

is usually as good, or nearly as good, as the ones they choose when time is not a factor. Klein calls this skillful application of 

experience Recognition-Primed Decision-making (RPD). Gary A. Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions

(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 16, 175. Similarly, Clausewitz notes that the military genius should “in all doubtful cases stick 

to one’s first opinion and refuse to change unless forced to do so by a clear conviction.” Clausewitz, On War, 108. Martin Van 

Creveld simply refers to these decisions as emanating from intuitive judgment, but it is clear that they each recognize the value 

of experience, training, and practice. Martin L. Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 
32 M. Blomme

compensate for fog and friction, Sun Tzu seeks to accentuate these natural phenomena through 

deception, cunning, speed, and stealth.60 Sun Tzu would also encourage the use of misdirection to 

bolster one’s image in the mind of the enemy, align one’s strengths against the enemy’s weakness, 

acknowledge natural propensities, and await the opportunity for advantage.61 The Eastern approach 

favors patience and its practitioners find it acceptable, even preferable, to let an enemy exhaust 

itself,62 whereas the Western approach seems based upon a culturally developed psychological need 

to link their own actions to victory. The differences hint at respective cultural inclinations toward 

passive or active aggression.63

East Meets West – Twentieth-Century’s Disruptions to Warfare

History is replete with evidence of the West’s penchant for Clausewitzian-style warfare. However, 

the twentieth century’s introduction of Sun Tzu’s treatise into Western military studies, has helped 

frame the experience of the century’s wars and influenced military theorists. The speed of 

communication, impact of radar, flexibility of airpower, awe of the atom, high-ground of space, 

power of computers, and resilience of networks have dramatically changed warfare. While 

Clausewitz’s trinity continues to serve as a powerful explanation for war, technology has enabled 

Western warfare to retain its impatient roots while simultaneously increasing congruency with Sun 

Tzu’s approach to warfare.

Today, Western warfare has shifted its focus from the psychological effect created by armies 

massing for decisive battle toward the psychological effect posed by the unknown, the unseen, and 

the unheard. In the early twentieth century, Julian Corbett enunciated the nuance of maritime 

theory. Later in the twentieth century, theorists like John Boyd and Shimon Naveh tackled cognitive 

processes to cope with emergent qualities of complex adaptive systems,64 while John Warden gave 

theory physical form.65

 

267. The author drew the preceding information in this footnote from thoughts expressed in a previous paper. Reference: 

Mark E. Blomme, Decentralizing Centralized Control: Reorienting a Fundamental Tenet for Resilient Air Operations. SAMS 

Monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 20 March 2008), 33.

60 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 9, 98.

61 Ibid., 83.

62 Ibid., 85. Sun Tzu said “Invincibility depends on one’s self; the enemy’s vulnerability on him.”

63 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been successful in forming an ASEAN identity that trumps 

many elements of nationalism and coalesces around a unified, multilateral, and consensus based passive-aggressive balance 

of power mechanism to thwart aggressive assertiveness. The so-called “ASEAN Way” has generally proven effective at 

preventing armed interstate conflict in Southeast Asia and has indirectly enlisted the power of U.S. military deterrence 

against a rising China while also allowing the U.S. to avoid taking sides with any particular ASEAN member. For more 

information regarding the “ASEAN Way,” see Gillian Goh, "The 'ASEAN Way': Non-Intervention and ASEAN's Role in 

Conflict Management," Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 3, no. 1 (Spring 2003).

64 John Boyd and Shimon Naveh are two modern military theorists who seem to address the need for improved 

cognitive frameworks of warfare to provide “Decision Advantage” in what many people see as an increasingly complex 

environment. John Boyd’s theory is best known in military and business circuits by his famous OODA Loop (Observe, 

Orient, Decide, Act). Shimon Naveh’s theory of Systemic Operational Design was the genesis of the U.S. Army’s exploration 

of concepts that have led to “Design.” Naveh’s theory shows strong signs of being influenced by Systems Theory and his 

conceptual processes are very similar to Boyd’s OODA loop, even if more specific in purpose. Like Boyd, Naveh has been a 

controversial figure because of his intellectually demeaning character. He published a book in 1997 that provides some 

insights into his views on Operational Theory. For more information, see John Boyd, "Destruction and Creation," 

http://www.goalsys.com/books/documents/DESTRUCTION_AND_CREATION.pdf (accessed December 19, 2013); Shimon 

Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory, The Cummings Center Series (London: 

Frank Cass, 1997).

65 David S. Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power's Quest for Strategic Paralysis, SAASS Thesis (Maxwell 

Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1995), 3. Fadok’s thesis on John Boyd and John Warden is the source of the idea that 

Warden gave “form” to Boyd’s “process” focused theory.
On Theory 33

Julian Corbett – Relative Control of Vast Commons

Corbett’s maritime theory espoused a concept of relative or temporary “command of the sea” and 

illuminated the infeasibility of continuously controlling the maritime environment.66 His theory 

embraced the seas’ ability to facilitate the avoidance of unfavorable battle, while discouraging massed 

navies.67 In many ways, his theory is contrary to traditional Clausewitzian warfare, and specifically 

contrary to Antoine-Henri Jomini’s belief regarding superiority of internal lines of operation.68 While 

internal lines of operation provide advantage from a traditional land-centric perspective, Corbett saw 

distinct advantage offered by exterior lines of operation in the maritime domain. He may have 

recognized a conceptual similarity between the vast maritime environment and the secluded 

accommodation offered by mountains, forests, and jungles, for his maritime theory is similar to 

guerilla warfare.69

The global commons of air, sea, space, and cyberspace each possess a quality of vastness that 

limits control in the sense that one controls terrain, and at least one student of theory proffers 

Corbett’s work as a basis for space-power theory.70 While topography defines the maritime domain’s 

convergence with land, convergence with land is less constraining for air, space, or cyber theory. Of 

the three, airpower theory is most mature; it espouses the exploitation of speed, maneuverability, 

misdirection, and stealth to bypass territorial defenses and strike strategic vulnerabilities directly.71

Moreover, space and cyber theorists are likely to think in similar terms.72 As Robert Kaplan 

eloquently argues, geography and topography remain important, but air, space, and cyber 

capabilities have diminished their importance.

73

Early Airpower Theory – Struggles with Disruptive Opportunity

Although first used as a reconnaissance platform, theorists soon realized that airplanes could 

help direct land and maritime forces, provide protection from enemy aircraft, and attack enemy 

 

66 Julian Stafford Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 103-

105.

67 Ibid., 129-134.

68 Interior and Exterior lines of operation are concepts most often associated with Antoine-Henri Jomini. While Jomini 

contended that interior lines were stronger than exterior lines, there seems to be a strong case that his contention only 

applies to traditional land warfare. For more on Jomini’s theory, see Antoine-Henri Jomini and Horace E. Cocroft, The Art 

of War, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Rockville, MD: Arc Manor, 2007).

69 Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Marc Becker (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 25.; John Lawrence 

Tone, The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain (Chapel Hill: University of North 

Carolina Press, 1994).

70 John J. Klein, "Corbett in Orbit: A Maritime Model for Strategic Space Theory," Naval War College, 

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA421953 (accessed October 21, 2013).

The physics of orbital mechanics do not facilitate the ease of maneuverability accommodated by forces of buoyancy in the 

maritime domain. In the maritime domain, the low compressibility of water aids in countering Earth’s gravitational 

influence, while orbital mechanics depends on sustained momentum to perpetuate a balance between falling back to Earth 

and being propelled into space. The energy required to change orbits in space is enormous, especially considering the lack of 

available resources to sustain propulsion in space.

71 Airpower theory aligns better with Sun Tzu’s theory of warfare than with the Clausewitzian approach and that 

alignment has increased over time.

72 Space theory is limited in practice by international prohibitions on the weaponization of space; however, 

demonstrated Chinese anti-satellite capability hints that space theory needs to be thinking about the implications of future 

weaponization. As the newest domain, Cyber theory is still in its infancy. It is very likely that space and cyber theory will

develop outside of public view.

73 Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle 

against Fate (New York: Random House, 2012).
34 M. Blomme

forces directly.74 More significantly, theory began espousing that aircraft could function in more than 

just a support role, as the third dimension highlighted a potential to break from Napoleonic-style

warfare and bypass fielded forces to strike directly at the heart of an enemy. By the early 1920’s, 

Italian airpower theorist Giulio Douhet was espousing a belief that only a single type of aircraft 

“should make up the operating mass of an Independent Air Force,”75 and he called it a “battleplane.”76

Similarly, the U.S. Army’s Air Corps Tactics School (ACTS) envisioned something akin to flying 

battleships conducting unescorted bombing missions.77 There was a general belief that “the bomber 

will always get through,”78 and a presumption about bombing accuracy that failed to recognize 

atmospheric complexities.79 Moreover, notions of rigid massed formations, decisive battle, and an 

enemy’s center of gravity held early airpower theory hostage, stifling innovative application of a 

significant disruptive technology.80

As Clayton Christensen notes, disruptive technologies do not tend to flourish in well-established 

businesses because disruption requires organizations to discard long-held concepts and measures of 

value—something that is harder to do than most people realize.81 Similarly, Andrew Hill argues that 

this dilemma also exits in the military. Hill notes that in “the United States military . . . innovation is 

not a scientific or technical problem; it is an organizational challenge.”82 The bureaucracy of large 

organizations can result in an inertia that is difficult to overcome and frequently prevents an 

innovation’s potential from being recognized. Unplanned circumstances, however, may enable 

disruptive technologies to find a niche and eventually dislocate previously dominant technologies, 

methods, processes, and concepts.

83 Hence, there is ironic familiarity in noting that post-World War 

I restrictions on Germany’s military programs drove them to develop theory that would reveal the 

 

74 Charles Griffith, The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II (Maxwell Air 

Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1999), 6.

75 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, ed. Joseph Patrick Harahan and Richard H. Kohn, trans. Dino Ferrari 

(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2009), 119. Giulio Douhet was one of the first airpower theorists, and his book, 

The Command of the Air, may have derived its title from Julian Corbett’s concept of “command of the sea.”

76 Ibid., 117-119. Douhet conceded to two variants only if an amphibian version proved impractical because he foresaw 

the need to project airpower from both land and sea. Although the battleplane was not the only type of aircraft Douhet 

envisioned, he seemed to distinguish it from other aircraft, which he apparently viewed as “non-operational.” These “nonoperational” types of aircraft included reconnaissance aircraft and armed air cruisers.

77 Griffith, The Quest, 77. Griffith’s book also highlights that engineers advised members of the ACTS that it was 

impossible to design a fighter with the range to escort long-range bombers. However, aeronautical science and innovation 

eventually allowed the design of the P-51 Mustang with drop-tanks that could escort bombers into Germany.

78 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin; a Biography (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 735. British Prime Minister 

Stanley Baldwin is the source of the well-known phrase: “the bomber will always get through.” The statement was part of an 

address to the British Parliament in 1932 entitled “A Fear for the Future.” 

79 Griffith, The Quest, 77, 163-164. Griffith noted that “the winds often reached 200 knots over the targets, causing the 

bombers to drift 45 degrees, but the bomb sights could correct for only 35 degrees. To further complicate matters, winds at 

lower altitudes often changed in direction and velocity, forcing the bombardier to make any number of corrections.” 

80 Early theory attempted to fit airpower into existing doctrinal concepts instead of recognizing that disruptive 

technologies generally fail to meet their potential while captive to pre-existing value models.

81 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book That Will Change the Way You Do 

Business (New York: Collins Business Essentials, 2005), 259.

82 Andrew A. Hill, "The Shock of the New: Innovation in Military Organizations," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 

College, 2013), 3.

83 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is well known for developing technologies that 

commercial research may otherwise have considered too risky to pursue. DARPA is willing to take high risks because they 

recognize the exceptional strategic payoff that these investments can create for the nation’s national security. In addition,

the “Motley Fool Rule Breakers” newsletter is an investment tool that attempts to identify companies with tremendous 

growth potential due to disruptive technologies.
On Theory 35

disruptive nature of airpower.84 Meanwhile, the Allies continued to think in terms of a battleplane, 

even as the era of the battleship was beginning to wane. 

The battleship proved to be no match against the flexibility, speed, and maneuverability 

demonstrated by non-rigid swarms of lightly armored fighter-bombers. The 1941 Japanese attack on 

Pearl Harbor made this point painfully clear and vindicated the oft-accosted predictions of previously 

court-martialed airpower theorist Billy Mitchell.85 Centralized command utilizing decentralized 

control of airpower, through mission-type orders, enabled distributed operations to achieve strategic 

effects and presaged John Boyd’s future conclusion that unshackling initiative enables rapid 

decision-making and maneuverability that can paralyze an enemy.

John Boyd – Maneuver Warfare

Described by military biographer Robert Coram as the greatest military theorist since Sun Tzu,86

John Boyd’s brash, foul-mouth personality gave him a well-deserved reputation as a maverick.87 That 

reputation and a penchant for slide presentations are probably why most students of warfare do not 

study his contribution to theory in much detail.88 Interestingly, discussions about Strategic 

Landpower, the Human Domain, and adding “Influence”89 as a possible seventh U.S. Army 

warfighting function seem to arrive at the same conclusion as Boyd’s successors:90 tactical action 

means little if it does not have a strategic effect on human behavior.91 This concept is not new. The 

fact that it continues to arise as if it were a novel discovery suggests that the concept is easily 

overshadowed by fixation on battle per se rather than on the purpose of battle.

 

84 The submarine is another classic disruptive technology that was developed out of necessity by the Germans between 

World War I and World War II.

85 James J. Cooke, Billy Mitchell (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 278.

86 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 

445.

87 Franklin C. Spinney, "Genghis John: An Architect of Victory in Desert Storm Is Remembered," Proceedings - United 

States Naval Institute 123, no. 7 (1997): 42-47. Within the U.S. Air Force, Boyd had earned nicknames such as Genghis 

John, The Mad Major, and The Ghetto Colonel.

88 Coram, Boyd, 445. Familiarity with Boyd’s work was not helped by the fact that he was an Airman discarding 

Clausewitz’s theory of warfare at a time when the Army was in the middle of reinvigorating professional military education 

that embraced On War in the years following the Vietnam War. The Marine Corps, however, fully embraced his theory.

89 Grant M. Martin, "The Sublime: The Paradox of the 7th Warfighting Function," Small Wars Journal, November 25, 

2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-sublime-the-paradox-of-the-7th-warfighting-function (accessed February 

3, 2014).

90 The U.S. Army’s Warfighting Functions are similar to, and no doubt the origin of, the Joint Functions listed in Joint 

Doctrine. The Army’s Warfighting Functions are currently: Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, 

Fires, Sustainment, and Protection. The only variance with the Joint Functions is that the Army has recently decided to 

change one of their functions from “Command and Control” to “Mission Command,” which just seems to express their 

preference to promote a command philosophy that emphasizes decentralized control. The Army proposal to make 

“Influence” the seventh warfighting function confuses an important point. Influence is not a function of warfighting; it is the 

purpose of warfighting. There are certainly other ways to influence people, but it is difficult to imagine what other reason 

humanity would have for waging war. For more information on the Army’s warfighting functions, see U.S. Department of 

the Army, Unified Land Operations, 3-2.

91 This is the fundamental premise behind a concept known as Effects Based Operations (EBO). As Edward Smith notes 

in Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War: “The broad utility of effectsbased operations grows from the fact that they are focused on actions and their link to behavior, on stimulus and response, 

rather than on targets and damage infliction. They are applicable not only to traditional warfare, but also to military 

operations short of combat. Effects-based operations are not new. Good generals and statesmen have always focused on 

outcomes and on the human dimension of war (e.g. will and shock). Indeed, we can trace how the principles of effects-based 

operations have functioned in hundreds of crises and conflicts to distill a straightforward definition: Effects-based 

operations are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crisis, and 

war.” Edward Allen Smith, Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare to Peace, Crisis, and War

(Washington DC: Command and Control Research Program, 2002), xiv.
36 M. Blomme

Fighter pilots may know John Boyd as the father of the Energy-Maneuverability (EM) Diagram, 

but they probably do not know that Boyd went back to undergraduate school to study engineering.92

Already regarded as one of best fighter pilots in the Air Force, he was seeking scientific theory to 

explain what experience had taught him about aerial combat maneuvering. The Air Force initially 

denied his request, but eventually acquiesced under Boyd’s infamous persistence. The result was an 

undergraduate Captain inventing a method to compare the maneuverability of aircraft based on laws 

of thermodynamics.93 Boyd would forever see the analysis and synthesis of diverse concepts as a 

powerful force for shaping understanding and guiding action.

In the years that followed, Boyd and his theory disrupted the status quo of fighter aircraft design 

by challenging underlying value models.94 He also challenged broader notions of existing warfare 

theory, and his willingness to question unstated assumptions is largely what made him an unsung 

legacy in the annals of modern warfare. John Boyd became the key intellectual powerhouse behind 

doctrine for maneuver warfare and the development of AirLand Battle as an operational concept.95

That concept turned post World War II manning, equipping, and training concepts on their head by 

replacing the U.S. military’s “emphasis on firepower and attrition with a more fluid doctrine based 

on maneuver and deception.”96

In retirement, a slide presentation entitled “Patterns of Conflict,” became Boyd’s preferred forum 

for communicating conclusions about the art of war and his “time-based theory of conflict.”97 The 

presentation demonstrated a profuse fondness for Sun Tzu’s teachings while highlighting the fallacy 

of overly prescriptive and constraining, top-down, attrition-based warfare that emanated from the 

study of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini.98 While he believed Napoleon demonstrated a 

remarkable degree of adaptability and flexibility at his level, he noted that Napoleon’s tactics 

depended on rigorous drill-like discipline that failed to allow initiative once the battle had begun.99

Unfortunately, nineteenth-century militaries wed themselves to the idea of massed armies, becoming 

dependent on large-scale logistics that telegraphed movement while simultaneously “suppress[ing] 

ambiguity, deception, and mobility.”100

By 1990, maneuver warfare doctrine espoused many of Boyd’s concepts, but few military officers 

outside of the Marine Corps were aware of the tremendous role Boyd had played in preparing the 

 

92 Coram, Boyd, 103.

93 Ibid., 123-134. Boyd’s EM Diagrams revolutionized the understanding of aerial combat and allowed the still 

rambunctious Major Boyd to convince the Pentagon that it needed to scrap its replacement plans for the F-111 and F-4. Boyd 

then played a significant role in the development of the A-10. Many people refer to Boyd as the father of the F-15 and F-16. 

Ibid., 5-8.

94 Previously, aircraft designs centered around speed and power. Boyd’s revelation was that energy was the key factor in 

aerial combat. Ibid., 132.

95 Grant Tedrick Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security (Washington DC: Smithsonian 

Institution Press, 2001), 151-154.

96 Ibid., 154. Americans won World War II because of their ability to produce sufficient numbers of soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, marines, and equipment to overwhelm the Axis powers, and it ended with the U.S. as the only atomic power. That 

preeminence did not last long, however, and soon the world found itself in the midst of a Cold War. Boyd was one of a few 

strategic thinkers recognizing that the Cold War demanded a completely different mindset, and he became a key figure in 

urging a shift from attrition-based warfare to maneuver warfare. Boyd played a significant role in developing a well-trained 

and integrated high-tech Western military that emphasized flexibility, innovation, and adaptability as a balance against 

numerically superior Soviet military forces, and his influence lasted well after his retirement in 1975.

97 Coram, Boyd, 328.

98 Boyd, "Patterns of Conflict."

99 Ibid., 38.

100 Ibid., 48.
On Theory 37

military for Operation Desert Storm.101 His unconventional thinking and “Patterns of Conflict” 

presentation gained many followers in the business world, but also within powerful political 

circles.102 Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense at the time, credits John Boyd as a major influence 

in the decision to shift the ground campaign from a classic Clausewitzian frontal-attack, to the Sun 

Tzu-like plan known as “the left hook.”103 Similarly, Commandant of the Marine Corps General 

Charles Krulak credited Boyd’s influence for the success of the campaign saying, “John Boyd was an 

architect of that victory as surely as if he’d commanded a fighter wing or a maneuver division in the 

desert.”104 That is quite a tribute from a Marine about an Airman who had retired fifteen years before 

Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Boyd had a fundamental belief in the importance of thinking in terms of “mind-time-space,”105

and his unpublished 1976 paper “Destruction and Creation”106 provides insight on his philosophical 

perspective of looking at the world through the lens of continual analysis and synthesis—a process 

he called a Conceptual Spiral.107 In classic Boyd fashion, the paper synthesized Heisenberg’s 

Uncertainty Principle and Gӧdel’s Incompleteness Theory to emphasize the certainty of imperfect 

knowledge and the continual need to question the context of a problem.108 Boyd’s goal was to create 

“a foundation for vitality and growth, or in a more formal sense . . . a foundation for comprehending, 

shaping, and adapting in an unfolding, adapting reality that is uncertain, ever-changing, [and] 

unpredictable.”109 Nearly three decades later, advocates of a concept called Design were similarly 

discussing “problem setting”110 or “problem framing”111 as a way to cognitively cope with a Volatile, 

Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous (VUCA) world.112 In delivering his “Patterns of Conflict” 

presentation, Boyd would frequently comment that “progress is the creation of confusion at a higher 

 

101 Coram, Boyd, 378-379, 444. On page 444, Coram cites a May 6, 1991 U.S. News & World Report article crediting 

three men with the innovative tactics that won the Gulf War: John Boyd, Mike Wyly, and Huba Wass de Czege. Huba Wass 

de Czege has continued to be an intellectual force for a concept this author refers to as “intellectual maneuver.” Wass de 

Czege worked extensively with Shimon Naveh to introduce “Design” to the U.S. military (Design and Naveh are discussed 

later in this paper). On page 378, Coram also provides an interesting phone dialogue describing the first interaction between

Boyd and Wyly, who was an instructor at the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School. The dialogue helps paint a picture 

of Boyd’s personality: Wyly, “I hear you have a theory about warfare.” Boyd, “It’s not a theory. It’s a briefing. I call it 

‘Patterns of Conflict.’ It’s five hours long.” Wyly, “My class has only two hours.” Boyd, “I can’t do it in two. It takes five 

hours.” Wyly, “We don’t have five hours.” Boyd, “Then you get zero.” Wyle eventually relented. Coram also relates a similar 

situation when the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) expressed interest in hearing 

Boyd’s presentation. Boyd told their offices he needed 5 to 6 hours to provide the presentation; however, when he was told 

that the generals only had an hour available, Boyd responded “Since your boss is so pressed for time, here’s an idea that will 

save him a lot of time: how about no brief?” before hanging up on the CNO’s executive officer. Ibid., 329-330.

102 Ibid., 355, 384.

103 Ibid., 424.

104 "Col. John Boyd," Congressional Record 143, no. 37 (1997).

105 Boyd, "Patterns of Conflict," 184. The concepts behind Boyd’s “Mind-Time-Space” schema are essentially the same 

points being made today in the push for decentralized execution and mission-type orders to encourage initiative.

106 Boyd, "Destruction and Creation."

107 John Boyd, "Conceptual Spiral Presentation by John Boyd 1," YouTube, 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_fjaqAiOmc (accessed December 23, 2013).

108 Boyd, "Destruction and Creation."

109 Boyd, "Conceptual Spiral Presentation by John Boyd 1."

110 John F. Schmitt, "A Systemic Concept for Operational Design," 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/mcwl_schmitt_op_design.pdf (accessed December 19, 2013), 3.

111 U.S. Department of the Army, Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 

(Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2008), 17.

112 T. O. Jacobs, Strategic Leadership: The Competitive Edge (Washington DC: National Defense University, 2008).
38 M. Blomme

level,”

113 a concept that is remarkably similar to the ideas conveyed by retired Israeli Brigadier 

General Shimon Naveh when discussing development of Systemic Operational Design (SOD).114

John Warden – The Enemy as a System

While John Boyd was instrumental in shaping the doctrinal, material, and intellectual 

foundation of late-twentieth century warfare, Colonel John Warden deserves credit for giving Boyd’s 

maneuver warfare theory an analogous form. Often credited with being the architect of the 1991 Gulf 

War air campaign, Colonel John Warden’s theory of warfare conceptualizes the enemy as a living 

system with nominally five concentric subsystems.115 Contrary to mechanistically focusing on a single 

center of gravity, Warden’s conceptualization presents multiple opportunities to leverage 

vulnerabilities in each subsystem.116 He compares these enemy subsystems to the subsystems of the 

body: leadership (brain), organic essentials (food and oxygen), infrastructure (blood vessels, bones,

and muscles), population (cells), and fighting mechanisms (white blood cells).117

In Warden’s abstract system, a brain-like command element synchronizes the five critical 

subsystems, yet the system depends on each of the subsystems. Warden believed the best way to 

counter the innate adaptability of an enemy was to attack the subsystems through parallel, versus 

sequential, warfare.118 Warden’s theory attempts to free warfare of the cognitive limitations of serial, 

attrition warfare, while holding that the synergistic effect of parallel warfare results in greater 

coercive pressure than the mere sum of each action.119 Inputting disruptive energy into each 

subsystem should prevent an enemy from being able to adapt, perhaps even creating self-defeating 

emergent characteristics in the wake of induced confusion. Most notably, it completely discards the 

notion of a single enemy center of gravity.120

Whereas Clausewitz drew upon the language of early Newtonian physics to describe concepts 

such as an enemy’s center of gravity, Warden’s theory drew linguistic and conceptual inspiration 

from Systems Theory and Cybernetics while remaining consistent with Sun Tzu and Boyd-like 

theories of warfare.121 Not surprisingly, Systems Theory and Cybernetics offer a logical starting point 

 

113 John Boyd, "Colonel John Boyd," YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rbb48uUOkqQ (accessed December 

23, 2013).

114 This conclusion is based on this author’s discussions with Shimon Naveh at the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced 

Military Studies (SAMS) during the period between Fall 2006 and Spring 2007. 

115 John A. Warden III, "The Enemy as a System," Airpower Journal 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995). Warden’s 1988 paper from 

the National War College was entitled “The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat” and espoused a more Clausewitzian view of 

warfare focused on the singular perspective of a Center of Gravity and decisive action. In Warden’s writing, he continued to 

reference Clausewitz, while espousing concepts that seem more aligned with Sun Tzu. It is interesting to wonder whether his 

views morphed as a result of planning for Operation Desert Storm, or if they had already begun as a result of his studies at 

the National War College. It would also be interesting to know how much exposure to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War Warden 

received through professional military education; he clearly had been exposed to Clausewitz’s theory On War.

116 About a year later, while a professor at the U.S. Marine Corps War College, Joseph Strange expressed a similar 

concept of focusing on vulnerabilities. Like Warden, Strange tends to view the enemy as having a multitude of vulnerabilities

instead of becoming focused on a single center of gravity. These approaches get to the “so what” of adversarial analysis and 

tend to make them more practical to the strategist and planner. For more information on Strange’s work, see Joseph 

Strange, Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All 

Speak the Same Language (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 1996); Strange and Iron, "Understanding 

Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities."

117 Warden III.

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid.

120 Another key advantage of parallel warfare is that it allows greater opportunity to observe how the enemy system 

reacts to various actions, and it facilitates learning that would not be achievable if only focused on a single center of gravity.

121 The title of Warden’s paper is “The Enemy as a System,” and Cybernetics is the study of systems (mechanical, 

physical, biological, social, etc.). This author found significant similarity between Systems Theory and the French 
On Theory 39

for a much-needed theory of cyber warfare, yet the study of Boyd suggests inspiration might arrive 

from synthesis of disparate fields. 

Shimon Naveh – Systemic Operational Design 

Similar to Warden, Systems Theory influenced Shimon Naveh’s perspective, but his study of 

postmodern French philosophy, literary theory, psychology, and architectural design also had a 

significant influence.122 Like Boyd and Warden, Naveh’s thinking appears distinctly Sun Tzu-like in 

its attempt to outthink the enemy, exploit surprise, and seek asymmetric opportunities to render an 

enemy’s strategy ineffective. According to Naveh: 

The enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want to 

obey this interpretation and fall into his traps. Not only do I not want to fall into his 

traps, I want to surprise him! This is the essence of war. I need to win. I need to 

emerge from an unexpected place...This is why we opted for the methodology of 

moving through walls . . . Like a worm that eats its way forward, emerging at points 

and then disappearing.123

Compared to Warden, Naveh is less prescriptive in offering a framework for modeling a “rival.”124

Warden provides a five-ring, bio-inspired framework picturing an enemy as a living system, while 

Boyd and Naveh focus more on the demand for rigorous intellectual examination and discourse 

regarding underlying cognitive beliefs. 

Although Sun Tzu-like, Naveh’s concept of Design emerges from the study of architectural design 

and a desire to differentiate the thought processes associated with Design from the process of military 

planning. Unfortunately, like Boyd, Naveh expresses most of his thoughts through briefing slides and 

he uses an overly active vocabulary that isolates his concepts from most military practitioners. 125

Even the fact that the word “Design” can be used linguistically as a either a noun or verb has been 

the source of some confusion and debate. Is Design something that one performs—a verb? 

Alternatively, is Design the product of some activity—a noun?126

The noun argument could stem from common architectural analogies where architects produce 

designs, architectural engineers produce plans, and then builders use plans to guide the work of 

artisans. The analogy is useful if one appreciates how an architect must engage in a set of dialogues 

with a sponsor. While the sponsor usually has some initial vision in mind, the architect may only 

realize what the sponsor desires through the presentation of options that generate discussions of 

philosopher Gilles Deleuze’s Assemblage Theory. Deleuze’s thoughts may also have been an influence on Shimon Naveh. For

more information on Assemblage Theory, see Manuel De Landa, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and 

Social Complexity (London: Continuum, 2006). 

122 Yotam Feldman, "Dr. Naveh, or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Walk through Walls," Haaretz, October 25, 

2007, http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/dr-naveh-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-walk-through-walls1.231912 (accessed February 4, 2014). 

123 Eyal Weizman, "Lethal Theory," http://www.skor.nl/_files/Files/OPEN18_P80-99(1).pdf (accessed February 13, 

2014). 

124 Shimon Naveh, "Systemic Operational Design: Transforming the Triad, Extending the Potential," 

http://www.slideshare.net/ubiwar/shimon-naveh-powerpoint (accessed December 20, 2013). Naveh’s work offers 

important practical insights and proffers three lenses through which one should view the world when trying to transition 

from “system framing” to “operational framing.” These three lenses include viewing the Rival as Rationale, Logistics as 

Rationale, and Command as Rationale for the ensuing strategy (or design, if one considers the word as a noun). 

125 John Schmitt and William Young wrote early papers on design that this author found useful. Additionally, although 

Alex Ryan joined the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) after the school had been exploring designs for a 

couple years, his academic background in Complexity Theory allowed him to quickly contribute to the intellectual 

development of Naveh’s concepts and he has provided many coherent thoughts on design.

126 Some in the military seem to use Design both as a verb and as a noun. 
40 M. Blomme

fiscal, physical, cultural, and other limitations. The sponsor and architect cooperatively agree on a 

design through a process of discovery that allows both to emerge with an understanding of the 

rationale behind necessary choices.127 The sponsor’s vision shapes, and is shaped by, the architect. 

Similarly, the architect shapes, and is shaped by, the sponsor’s desire, engineer’s plans, builder’s 

schedule, and artisan’s skill.128

While this architectural analogy may be helpful in thinking about the conceptual difference 

between designing and planning, it is surely not perfect. Thinking about Design as a noun can lead 

to confusion about the role of a design versus a strategy, or a plan. If one considers the underpinning 

and emphasis of Design, then the verb form appears to have more utility and fits better within 

existing military lexicon. In this sense, one can talk linguistically and cognitively about “designing a 

strategy” with logical consistency between Ends, Ways, and Means.129 According to Naveh, Design 

requires a discourse and a scrutiny of mental constructs.130 This logical extension of an important 

concept is embedded within the “orient” phase of Boyd’s frequently over-simplified Observe, Orient, 

Decide, and Act Loop (OODA Loop).131 Perhaps because he was a soldier, Naveh’s work garnered 

attention by the U.S. Army as it sought to distinguish between a concept-driven method to design 

strategy and a planning process that many officers view as linear and checklist-driven.132

In recent years, overly academic language has started to fade from discussions of Systemic 

Operational Design, Campaign Design, Operational Design, and Design. Joint doctrine has 

increasingly embraced the concept, and design-type thinking has become a part of Professional 

Military Education (PME) courses such as the Joint Combined Warfighting School and the various 

staff and war colleges. The premise of design-type thinking is the application of systems, critical and 

creative thinking to facilitate iterative analysis and synthesis. The military should inculcate these 

skills at all levels if they truly hope to embrace a philosophy of command that practices decentralized 

control to enable initiative. At the same time, trust and confidence must become the motivation for 

 

127 John Boyd would describe this common/shared understanding as a “mind-time-space schema.” For more 

information, see Boyd, "Patterns of Conflict," 74.

128 This concept is similar to the earlier discussion about Clausewitz’s belief that a commander-in-chief must function 

as both a statesman and a general, balancing political “ends” with available “means.” The cognitive tension resulting from 

the noun-verb dilemma and the architect-engineer-artisan analogy discussed in this article are refinements of the author’s 

thoughts conveyed in a paper written at the Joint Combined Warfighting School (JCWS). Reference: Mark Blomme, 

Matthew Childs, and Jim Di Crocco III, “Design, EBO, and JOPP: Reconciling Tension and Embracing Problem-Setting” 

(Joint Forces Staff College, 2010), 6-7.

129 The Ends, Ways, Means framework is a recent construct of concepts expressed by Clausewitz in On War. Clausewitz 

spoke in terms of Ends and Means, but he clearly expressed and understanding of the importance of planning on how to link 

the two. Clausewitz also acknowledged this is not a novel or erudite idea: “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his 

senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to 

conduct it.” Clausewitz, On War, 579. Clausewitz, however, firmly believed that Ends are tied to political objectives, and he 

describes the How, or Way, as the operational objectives.

130 Based on this author’s discussions with Shimon Naveh at the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies 

(SAMS) during the period between Fall 2006 and Spring 2007.

131 The author draws this conclusion from years of inquiry with graduates of various U.S. military staff and war colleges. 

USMC officers seem to have a much deeper appreciation for Boyd’s contribution to the corpus of warfare theory than any 

other service, including the Air Force. Robert Coram’s book, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, helped 

this author understand the strong association between John Boyd and the USMC. As a graduate of the Air Force Squadron 

Officer School, Air Command and General Staff College (ACSC), Air Force Institute of Technology, Army School of Advanced 

Military Studies (SAMS), Air War College (AWC), Joint Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), and a student at the Army 

War College (USAWC), the author has experienced very little formal exposure to John Boyd’s work. Nevertheless, while 

studying Naveh’s theory of Systemic Operational Design there was a nagging suspicion and curiousity that led to further 

exploration of Boyd’s work.

132 Ketti C. Davison, Systemic Operational Design (SOD): Gaining and Maintaining the Cognitive Initiative, SAMS 

Monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, May 25, 2006), 15.; William T. Sorrells 

and others, Systemic Operational Design: An Introduction, SAMS Monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command 

and General Staff College, 2005), 10-11.
On Theory 41

individual action. This may be difficult to achieve in a culture that revolves around inviolable 

deference to rank. These are not exclusive concepts, but initiative derives from trust and confidence, 

not merely legal authority and prescribed obligation.133

Conclusion 

Before his death, Clausewitz indicated that he hoped On War would last more than “two or three 

years.”

134 The fact that it is widely studied nearly two hundred years later suggests he achieved his 

aim. On War provides a prophetic theory summarizing the confluence of tendencies and motivations 

leading to war and limiting its aims, and his descriptive theory on war remains prescient today. In 

contrast, theory on warfare stagnated for over a century under the influence of his prescriptions for 

the conduct of war. As technology and industrialization increased the efficiency of killing, 

Clausewitzian-style theory of warfare continued preaching the virtue of mass and postulating 

decisive engagement while minimizing, if not ignoring, surprise and maneuverability. 

Unlike Clausewitz, Sun Tzu’s principles for warfare have demonstrated an uncanny ability to 

survive the clash of time and technology. Throughout the twentieth century, technology continued to 

increase the lethality of firepower, but it also enabled a renewed focus on speed, stealth, and 

maneuverability. While many technologies were at play, none necessitated a departure from 

Clausewitzian-style warfare more than the airplane. It changed the speed and dimensions of warfare 

while lifting many geographical constraints and resulted in a renaissance of Sun Tzu-like theories on 

warfare. Central to that renaissance was John Boyd’s willingness to challenge conventional wisdom. 

His ability to critically analyze and creatively synthesize diverse viewpoints enabled him to answer 

questions that many others refused to ask. 

In many ways, Boyd’s approach to theory is similar to Shimon Naveh’s design-type thinking and 

is the essence of what previously allowed Julian Corbett, and later John Warden, to provide their 

contributions to theory. Emerging space and cyber theory may be able to draw upon existing 

maritime and parallel warfare theory, respectively; however, theorists must be willing to recognize 

and accept that these new domains may well disrupt existing notions of warfare. Cultural barriers to 

critical thinking must not be allowed, and students must question the validity of theories of war and 

warfare. Failure to do so will lead to another stagnation of theory and eventually strategic failure. 

The future belongs to those who ask questions and embrace design-type thinking while remaining 

open to the possibilities of imagination. 

133 The legal authority of command will remain an important aspect of military service, but initiative is less likely to 

stem from legalistic motivations than from a sense of teamwork that revolves around trust, confidence, and a shared goal. 

Trust and confidence are crucial and must be bi-directional within an organization, but they are also crucial factors in 

facilitating unity of effort amongst organizations that have no formal command relationship. Hence, trust and confidence 

can have vertical and horizontal aspects. General (Retired) Gary Luck is fond of the phrase “the speed of trust”, which he 

borrows from a book of the same title by Stephen M.R. Covey. In a paper on the insights and best practices of joint 

operations, Luck says, “we see successful commanders building personal relationships, inspiring trust and confidence, 

leveraging the analytical ability of their staffs, prioritizing limited resources, and decentralizing to the lowest appropriate 

level capable of integrating assets to empower their subordinates. However, we continue to see a tendency among 

commanders to control subordinates to a point where they unintentionally compromise the unit’s agility and speed.” Gary E. 

Luck and Mike Findlay, Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices, 3rd ed. (Norfolk, VA: United States Joint Forces 

Command, 2011), 3; Stephen M. R. Covey and Rebecca R. Merrill, The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes 

Everything (London: Pocket Books, 2008). 

134 Clausewitz, On War, 63. 
Army War College Review U.S. Army War College 

Vol. 1, No. 1, Feb. 2015, 42-45 Student Publications 

RAF Enhanced: 

Civil-Military Engagement Teams 

Colonel Timothy D. Brown

Now is the time to integrate the Defense Department’s Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF) initiative 

with the efforts by the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) to 

generate civil-military operational engagement teams focused on conflict prevention, crisis response, 

and stabilization. Interested teams should be resourced and capable of designing and implementing 

activities that address the underlying causes of destabilizing violence. Geographic Combatant 

Commanders (GCCs) and expeditionary CSO diplomats will be hamstrung without whole-ofgovernment synergy, unity of effort, and unity of command in regionally focused diplomatic, 

informational, military, and economic initiatives. 

“The forces of geopolitics, globalization and history are reordering the balance of international 

economic and political power, presenting the United States and its like- minded allies (the West) with 

the greatest threats to their global influence in perhaps 500 years.”1 Rising regional powers and 

increasingly disruptive non-state actors that “breed conflict and endanger stability, particularly in 

Africa and the broader Middle East” threaten to undermine the global institutions that have 

maintained international order for the past half-century.2 In response to a sluggish economy, a 

looming debt crisis, and numerous foreign policy disappointments, many Americans are calling for 

a refocus on domestic issues. The interconnectedness of the global system precludes any possibility 

that the U.S. will ever retreat to the homeland proper. This state of affairs necessitates proactive 

American leadership with innovative ideas and economy of force solutions. 

In the 2012 Special Operations Command Posture Statement to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, Admiral William McRaven argued for the use of both direct and indirect approaches to 

countering the nation’s adversaries, stating that a direct approach “ultimately only buys time and 

space for the indirect approach and broader governmental elements to take effect.” Thus, long-term 

Timothy D. Brown (Master of Military Arts and Science, United States Marine Corps University) is a Colonel in the United 

States Army. An earlier version of this article, written while the author was a United States Army War College Fellow at 

Harvard University, earned third place in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014 Strategy Article Competition. 

1

 Reginald Dale and Daniel J. Mahaffee, America in a Multipolar World: The Regional Working Groups (Center for 

the Study of the Presidency and Congress, 2010), 2, accessed April 15, 2014, 

http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/America_in_a_Multipolar_World_Regional_Working_Groups.pdf. 

2 Michael Glenn Mullen, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011: Redefining 

America’s Military Leadership (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 3–4.
RAF Enhanced 43

activities like building partner capacity, engaging key populations, addressing local needs, and 

advancing ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of violent extremism are essential.3

Military forces are experts in projecting hard power to defeat enemy combatants. The campaign 

in Iraq, however, demonstrated that winning the contest of arms alone is not in and of itself sufficient. 

The combatant-centric strategy initially employed by coalition forces swiftly delivered regime change 

in 2003.4 But that approach nearly ended in mission failure. The game-changer occurred in 2007 

when General David Petraeus recognized the need for a population-centric, broader governmental 

civil-military approach to address root causes of the then mounting violence and increasing 

instability found throughout Iraq.5 

In 2011, after observing the “military’s inability to field adequate numbers of appropriate 

personnel” to perform the types of tasks needed to address instability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, 

Haiti, and the Balkans, dating back to the 1990s,6 the State Department established the Bureau of 

Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO).7 The CSO charter is to “engage in conflict prevention, 

crisis response and stabilization, aiming to address the underlying causes of destabilizing violence.”8 

The Bureau works with both government and nongovernmental organizations in over 20 countries 

to interrupt cycles of armed conflict, reduce drug and gang related violence, clear minefields, support 

elections, and assist victims of natural disaster.9 A core function of CSO is to lead, coordinate, or 

influence partners in multinational public and private prevention or stabilization efforts.10 Due to a 

lack of manpower and funding, however, CSO efforts are limited in that regard.11 

The primary human capital source designated for the CSO to manage in the field is the Civilian 

Response Corps (CRC). Established in 2008, The CRC is an interagency unit envisioned to have over 

4000 active, standby, and reserve civilians who provide a broad array of “civilian skills needed to 

help stabilize” areas threatened by violence.12 Inadequate appropriated funding and valid but 

competing priorities in government agencies have marginalized CRC participation and limited its 

growth. To date, the CRC has reached only a fraction of its envisioned size and the CRC-R, civilian 

reserve, has not (yet) been established.13 

3 ADM William H. McRaven, U.S. Navy, Posture Statement of Commander: United States Special Operations 

Command (Washington DC, 2012). 

4 Barbara Salazar Torreon, “US Periods of War and Dates of Current Conflicts” (Congressional Research Service, 

Library of Congress, 2011), accessed April 16, 2014, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21405.pdf. 

5 David H. Petraeus, “How We Won in Iraq,” Foreign Policy, October 29, 2013, 14–15, 21, accessed January 22, 2014, 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/29/david_petraeus_how_we_won_the_surge_in_iraq. 

6 Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 

November 12, 2003), 10–20, accessed April 16, 2014, 

http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA435041. 

7

 Nina M. Serafino, In Brief: State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) (Washington, 

DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2012), 1. 

8 “Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations,” U.S. Department of State, last modified April 16, 2014, accessed 

April 16, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/cso/. 

9 U.S. Department Of State, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, “Creative Solutions for Stabilizing 

Conflict,” Other Release, last modified July 5, 2013, accessed November 2, 2013, 

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/2013/206639.htm. 

10 Serafino, In Brief, 3–5.

11 CSO at Two Years: Engaging Around the World, Report (Department Of State Bureau of Public Affairs, March 13, 

2014), accessed April 17, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/cso/releases/pressreleases/2014/223397.htm. 

12 Serafino, In Brief, 6–7.

13 Ibid., 7. 
44 T. Brown 

The State Department requested $45 million for CSO’s 2014 budget.14 By comparison, war 

funding for Iraq in 2008 surpassed $140 billion—roughly $390 million per day.15 The long-term 

costs are much higher. Including Afghanistan combat operations through the end of 2014, total costs 

for the post-9-11 campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq through 2017 are projected to run between $4 

and $6 trillion.16 Deliberate and consistently funded prevention and stabilization efforts aimed at 

assisting host nation partners to reduce instability and defeat the appeal of extremism are 

considerably more affordable and likely more effective than financing intrastate and regional 

conflict. Programmed active and reserve military manpower, employed by combatant commanders 

through RAF in a soft power role, can fill CSO’s human capital void. 

The Army Chief describes the RAF as designed to assist Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, 

and multinational partners to foster a stronger global security environment.17 Africa Command 

(AFRICOM) is now using active and reserve military units in the regional alignment program to build 

military-to-military relationships and prepare foreign partners to serve as peacekeepers.18 The Army 

Reserve includes deployable medical, legal, agricultural, development, and other specialists with 

expertise cultivated in fulltime civilian professions. If appropriate civilian skills were properly 

tracked, well-qualified reservists could be leveraged to support CSO initiatives by filling the 

undeveloped CRC-R billets. 

A key element of the RAF initiative is that it leverages trained and ready military forces when 

they are otherwise not deployed. RAF provide a source of expeditionary manpower. The Army 

Brigade Combat Team (BCT) aligned to AFRICOM, for example, has approximately 4,000 Soldiers 

which is strikingly comparable to the total CRC manpower shortage.19 Where CSO possesses unique 

expertise in designing conflict prevention and stability activities, the military is unmatched in 

manpower, logistics, planning, and training capacity.20 

A regionally aligned CSO staff, fully integrated at the executive level and below into each 

geographic combatant command (GCC), is needed to properly coordinate civilian-military 

prevention and stabilization activities.21 Where robust GCC military staffs excel at planning and 

execution, they critically lack expertise resident in the civilian agencies. Exchanging liaison officers 

is simply an inadequate response.22 Instead, reciprocal assignments that exchange upwardly mobile 

Foreign Service and military officers could respond to immediate needs while building better senior 

leaders for the future.23 

14 Fiscal Year 2014 Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations (Department of State, 2013), 20, 

accessed April 14, 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208290.pdf. 

15 Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11

(Congressional Research Service, March 29, 2011), 3, accessed March 20, 2014, 

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf. 

16 Linda J. Bilmes, “The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain 

Future National Security Budgets,” last modified March 2013, accessed October 26, 2013, 

https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=8956&type=WPN. 

17 GEN Raymon T. Odierno, “Regionally Aligned Forces: A New Model for Building Partnerships,” Army Live, last 

modified March 22, 2012, accessed October 27, 2013, http://armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/aligned-forces/. 

18 Michelle Tan, “AFRICOM: Regionally Aligned Forces Find Their Anti-Terror Mission,” Defense News, last 

modified October 20, 2013, accessed November 8, 2013, 

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131020/SHOWSCOUT04/310200014/AFRICOM-Regionally-Aligned-ForcesFind-Their-Anti-terror-Mission. 

19 Serafino, In Brief, 6–7.

20 AMB Marc Grossman, “U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (2011-2012)”, November 1, 2013.

21 Ibid. 

22 Ibid. 

23 Ibid. 
RAF Enhanced 45

The CSO’s expeditionary diplomatic corps must be sufficiently robust and resourced to train 

alongside and then deploy with the RAF military units in support of CSO in the field. Forming teams 

with apt preparation and training will build trust while simultaneously identifying knowledge, 

capability, and capacity gaps. As soon as teams deploy to forward locations, relationships with local 

nationals, language and cultural immersion, and the focus on the mission itself will make resolving 

interagency coordination issues more difficult. For maximal success, civil-military operational 

engagement teams should build relationships, resolve questions of authority, and establish a 

common purpose well before arriving in a host nation. 

Under the Budget Control Act of 2011—also known as sequestration—Congress and the executive 

branch are aggressively pursuing cost savings government-wide.24 Budget considerations are forcing 

military service chiefs to critically underfund readiness, drastically cut force strength, and, in effect, 

take “a decade-long modernization holiday.”25 Conflict prevention and post conflict stabilization 

initiatives are the right investment to protect U.S. national security interests in the long run. They 

must be prioritized and properly funded, however, if we are to forestall far more costly military 

interventions in the future.26 Spending years and trillions of dollars to establish questionably 

effective broad governmental elements capable of executing decisive activities is not acceptable. We 

must not repeat the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq. To do so would not only consume 

increasingly scarce national resources, but could well erode America’s credibility and international 

standing. 

Expanding and integrating the Defense Department’s RAF strategy and the State Department’s 

CSO Bureau is a useful way for the United States to reassert itself abroad for meaningful conflict 

prevention and stabilization initiatives. The GCC is the right location and functional level to integrate 

Defense and State executive leadership and staff to develop strategies, review authorities, plan 

missions, and coordinate operational engagement team employment. Establishing the right sized 

U.S. national security apparatus requires numerous trade-offs if we are to successfully balance 

national priorities and strategic interests. Given fiscal realities and the current global environment, 

conflict prevention and stabilization are vital national security interests. Congress and the President 

should prioritize and fully resource coordinated efforts to integrate RAF and CSO activities in the 

GCCs, civilian agencies, and military services. Countering disruptive forces through well-coordinated 

long-term prevention and stabilization efforts is not just more affordable than conventional military 

intervention, it should prove far more effective. 

24 Bill Heniff Jr., Elizabeth Rybicki, and Shannon M. Mahan, The Budget Control Act of 2011 (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 19, 2011). 

25 Tilghman, Andrew, “Hagel: Cuts Will Shrink Pay, Benefits and Force,” Defense News, last modified July 31, 2013, 

accessed November 8, 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130731/DEFREG02/307310023/Hagel-Cuts-WillShrink-Pay-Benefits-Force. 

26 Serafino, In Brief, 10. 
Army War College Review U.S. Army War College 

Vol. 1, No. 1, Feb. 2015, 46-48 Student Publications 

Thinking about 

Strategic Landpower 

Colonel Landy T. Nelson

Land component forces must evolve to meet the threats and challenges of the twenty first century. 

The Strategic Landpower White Paper released in May 2013 by the Chief of Staff of the Army, the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Commander of Special Operations Command lays an 

important framework for critical thinking, lively debate, and ultimately advances implied solutions 

for how best to adapt landpower forces in support of national security objectives. The framework is 

flawed, however, by its limited definition of Strategic Landpower as the “application of landpower 

towards achieving overarching national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives 

and guidance for a given military campaign or operation.”1

 Landpower must be conceived more 

broadly and must include the additional governmental tools which will be required in concert with 

ground forces to achieve strategic success. Conceptual broadening is essential for three reasons: (1) 

Army, Marine, and Special Operation forces cannot achieve national strategic objectives alone; (2) 

The current ad hoc and stovepiped framework of Unified Action is not sufficient to meet twenty 

first century challenges; and (3) a more comprehensive definition of Landpower that incorporates 

other governmental departments may provide the needed impetus to reform U.S. approaches to 

national security. In short, relying primarily on U.S. power within the land domain is ill advised. 

Advancing a narrow definition of Landpower promulgates unrealistic expectations about what 

Landpower alone can actually achieve and limits thinking about land force best practices in the 

twenty first century environment. While the White Paper correctly identifies strategic success as 

often occurring within the land domain, it fails to acknowledge that this success is most likely to be 

achieved by the collaborative application of many elements of national power, not by Landpower 

alone. That land forces will necessarily perform a fundamental role and will set the conditions for 

other instruments of national power to achieve desired political endstates is highly probable if not 

virtually assured. The U.S. may yet find itself in a major conflict in which destruction of adversarial 

land forces is the prime strategic objective. Given the contemporary security environment, 

however, such a scenario is not likely. 

Landy T. Nelson (M.S., Budapest University) is a Colonel in the United States Army. An earlier version of this article, written 

while the author was a United States Army War College Fellow at Stanford University, was among the top four USAWC 

short papers selected for participation in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Article Competition.

1 Strategic Landpower Task Force, “Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills” (May 2013), 3. Whitepaper link at 

Strategic Landpower homepage, http://www.arcic.army.mil/Initiatives/strategic-landpower.aspx (accessed 10 September 

2013). 
Strategic Landpower 47

Much more probable are multiple scenarios in which the United States faces a wide range of 

challenges, including state and non-state actors operating as regular, irregular, or hybrid threats. 

Adaptive adversaries will exploit technology and telecommunications, develop and employ assorted 

capabilities such as cyber, proxy forces, possibly weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and 

generally maneuver away from the U.S. preferred way of warfare.2 Success against twenty first 

century adversaries, therefore, will require more than destroying combat forces. The U.S. 

government will need to blend lethal military operations with a broader range of tools—including 

financial, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, developmental, and strategic 

communications—in order to influence multiple audiences and ultimately to break adversarial will. 

Offensive operations and use of deadly force will still be required. Their execution by land 

component forces, however, must be combined with defensive and stability operations in order to 

create the conditions necessary for employing diplomatic, informational, and economic tools in 

support of the desired political outcome. 

The U.S. military, of course, attempts to integrate tools from other agencies under the joint 

doctrine of “Unified Action”—defined as the “synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of 

the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve 

unity of effort.”3 Because the different departments and agencies develop and execute the bulk of 

their plans and strategies independently, Unified Action, however, rarely meets this laudable goal. 

The net result is failure to bring a truly unified approach to the problem. At best, Unified Action 

results in separate civilian and military operations that the military or other lead agency attempts 

to coordinate and integrate. Far too often, however, unity of effort is not achieved. When it is, that 

unity is achieved by perceptive, cooperative leadership on the ground in the absence of apt and 

much needed thoughtful design. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly demonstrate the failure 

of the current ad hoc approach to achieving national security goals. If the U.S. intends to shape the 

outcomes of confrontations, conflicts, and crises in the complex twenty first century environment, 

then we cannot continue muddling through with a Unified Action scenario as currently practiced. 

Trends in the global environment indicate that a multitude of forces will create more frequent 

and more violent conflicts and catastrophes.4 Major impacts to the global security environment 

include: Rapid global population growth which will put tremendous pressure on states to compete 

for energy, water and food to support life and economic and societal development;5 a growing cyber 

awakening in which perceptions of inequality and other grievances are heightened, intensified, and 

lead to social tension, instability and potentially conflict;6 a continuation of ideological extremism 

driven by religion, ethnic differences, or nationalism;7 and predicted increases in global 

temperature will prompt shifts in agricultural patterns and food production likely to trigger 

humanitarian crises, if not conflict per se.8 All have the potential to undermine U.S. contingencies. 

Diverse pressures on the global security environment, coupled with likely adaptive adversaries, 

will require the U.S. government to develop and execute comprehensive approaches that employ 

2 Robert W. Cone, Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations (Joint 

Base Langley-Eustis, HQ Training and Doctrine Command, August 2012), 14. 

3 Martin E. Dempsey, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 October 2013), 284. 

4 Paul R. Newton, Global Strategic Trends out to 2040, 4th Edition (Shrivenham, UK: UK Ministry of Defense, 27 October 

2013), 15. 

5 Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations (August 2012), 22; 

Global Strategic Trends out to 2040, 4th Edition (Shrivenham, UK: 27 October 2013), 25. 

6 Ibid, 34. 

7

 Ibid, 12. 

8 Global Strategic Trends out to 2040, 4th Edition (Shrivenham, UK: 27 October 2013), 26. 
48 L. Nelson 

expeditionary interagency teams capable of applying a broad range of tools to achieve national 

security objectives. While the Strategic Landpower Task Force cannot direct this to happen, it can 

effect a paradigm shift by conceiving of Strategic Landpower more broadly as the application of 

U.S. power in the land domain, to include military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, 

developmental, and strategic communications tools, to achieve U.S. national security objectives. 

This conception entails a significant change from Unified Action by recognizing that operations in 

the land domain must begin as a comprehensive interagency approach from the proverbial “getgo,” rather than as military operations in which relevant agencies are essentially integrated as an 

afterthought. 

Creating institutional change in our approach to national security will be difficult. In the past, 

many national security experts have recommended changes and have identified legislative action 

needed to establish the necessary authorities, funding, and training.9 Despite these and other 

insightful recommendations, however, reform has not taken place and top-down legislative change 

seems unlikely. A paradigm shift is required. The Strategic Landpower Task Force should lead the 

way by embracing new ideas about Strategic Landpower and collaboratively developing concepts 

with the interagency for employing and implementing expeditionary teams. The goal would be to 

prompt Executive Branch reform with an Executive Order (E.O.) that captures these concepts while 

identifying lead and supporting departments and their associated roles for national security 

missions. To force a more integrated approach under austere fiscal conditions, the E.O. should 

establish a consolidated budget line for national security, including at minimum the Department of 

Defense, Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Intelligence 

Community.10 

While addressing security challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government developed 

and employed several programs of note. Specifically, the Provincial Reconstruction Team 

program—created to employ combined teams of military, diplomatic and reconstruction experts in 

Afghanistan and in Iraq—could serve as a prime model for developing expeditionary interagency 

teams. Additionally, the Ministry of Defense Advisory Program, while only composed of DoD 

personnel, should be reviewed as a potential model for training and deploying civilians to assist 

foreign governments with institutional capacity building. These two model programs focus solely 

on stability operations. Others will need to be developed to address the full spectrum of operations 

in the land domain where each is tailored and scaled with the appropriate blend of lethal and nonlethal tools. Creating fresh innovative concepts while adapting existing ones with buy-in from other 

governmental agencies may be the spark required to prompt needed reform for dealing with the 

complex problems of the twenty first century. 

While this paradigm shift and institutional change will be far from easy to implement, it 

constitutes an important first step toward adapting our land forces and other national security tools 

to more effectively apply U.S. power in the land domain. Change might well begin with an 

expansion of the definition for Strategic Landpower. The Strategic Landpower Task Force must 

expand its reach to include the other elements of national power. Combat operations have drawn to 

an end in Afghanistan. The time to reconsider, think broadly, and innovate has arrived. Failure to 

do so, especially with regard to Strategic Landpower may result in a failure to achieve U.S. national 

security objectives. That is not a risk we can afford to accept.

9 Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 

21st Century (Washington, DC: U.S. Institutue of Peace, 2010), xii. 

10 Ibid, xiii. 
The United States Army War College 

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while 

advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower. 

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates who are skilled critical thinkers 

and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” 

for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and 

debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving national security objectives. 

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national security and strategic 

research and analysis to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between 

military and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development contributes to the 

education of world class senior leaders, develops expert knowledge, and 

provides solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national 

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute provides subject matter 

expertise, technical review, and writing expertise to agencies that develop 

stability operations concepts and doctrines.

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program supports the United 

States Army War College’s lines of effort to educate strategic leaders and provide 

well-being education and support by developing self-awareness through leader 

feedback and leader resiliency.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic leaders by providing a 

strong foundation of wisdom grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, 

and by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in the analysis, 

evaluation, and refinement of professional expertise in war, strategy, operations, 

national security, resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, conserves, and exhibits 

historical materials for use to support the U.S. Army, educate an international 

audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.