Tn'ilraSBEWO I Enit7i - a c, pisT 

involved in residential burglaries and had brought stolen items to the 

house where appellant was living, and that appellant had previously 

pawned other stolen items for the juveniles. We conclude that a rational 

trier of fact could reasonably infer from this evidence that appellant knew 

the rifle was stolen and entered the pawn shop with intent to obtain 

money by false pretenses and thus committed burglary with a dangerous 

weapon. See NRS 205.060(1), (4). A rational trier of fact could also 

reasonably find that appellant was in possession of a stolen rifle, see NRS 

202.360(1)(a), and that he was a felon in possession of a firearm, see NRS 

205.275(1). Although some evidence may have suggested that appellant 

did not actually know that the rifle was stolen, it was for the jury to assess 

the weight and credibility of that evidence, and circumstantial evidence 

alone may sustain a conviction. See Buchanan v. State, 119 Nev. 201, 217, 

69 P.3d 694, 705 (2003). At trial, the State also presented evidence that 

appellant offered and gave a confidential informant methamphetamine in 

exchange for a stolen computer. A rational trier of fact could reasonably 

infer from this evidence that appellant engaged in the unlawful sale or 

exchange of methamphetamine. See NRS 453.320(1)(a). Thus, we 

conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions. 

Second, appellant argues that his convictions for burglary, 

possession of stolen property, and being a felon in possession of a firearm 

are redundant and violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because they 

punish the same illegal act—entering a pawn shop with a rifle. We 

disagree. Each of appellant's convictions requires proof of an element that 

the others do not: burglary requires proof that a defendant entered a 

building with the intent to obtain money by false pretenses, NRS 

205.060(1); possession of stolen property requires proof that the defendant 

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possessed property knowing that it is stolen, NRS 205.275(1)(a); and being 

a felon in possession of a firearm requires proof that the defendant 

possessed a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, NRS 

202.360(1)(a). Accordingly, appellant's convictions do not violate the 

Double Jeopardy Clause. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 

304 (1932) (establishing an elements test for double jeopardy purposes); 

Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. „ 291 P.3d 1274, 1278 (2012), petition for 

cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Mar. 5, 2013) (No. 12-9118). Further, 

because the statutes do not indicate that cumulative punishment is 

precluded, appellant's convictions are not redundant. See Jackson, 128 

Nev. at , 291 P.3d at 1278 (applying the Blockb urger test to 

redundancy claims when the relevant statutes do not expressly authorize 

or prohibit cumulative punishment); NRS 202.360; NRS 205.060; NRS 

205.275. 

Third, appellant claims that his sentence is excessive and 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because he received 31 years 

for pawning a single rifle. He also claims that the district court relied 

upon impalpable or highly suspect evidence during sentencing because the 

court considered his prior criminal history in determining that the 

sentences should run consecutively. We disagree. This court will not 

disturb a district court's sentencing determination absent an abuse of 

discretion. See Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 

(1987). Appellant's consecutive prison terms of 72-180 months, 48-120 

months, 28-72 months, and 28-72 months fall within the parameters 

provided by statute, and are not "so unreasonably disproportionate to the 

offense as to shock the conscience." CuIverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 

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596 P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 

1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion). 

Furthermore, appellant has failed to demonstrate that the 

district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. See Silks v. 

State, 92 Nev. 91, 93-94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976). Although appellant's 

sentence is substantial, nothing in the record suggests that the district 

court considered impalpable or highly suspect evidence or other improper 

matters in imposing consecutive sentences, and appellant does not identify 

any inaccuracies in his criminal history. To the extent that he argues that 

the district court should not have considered his criminal history at 

sentencing, we conclude that this argument lacks merit. See Martinez v. 

State, 114 Nev. 735, 738, 961 P.2d 143, 145 (1998) (stating that the district 

court may "consider a wide, largely unlimited variety of information to 

insure that the punishment fits not only the crime, but also the individual 

defendant"); see also NRS 176.015(6); NRS 176.035(1). Therefore, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing 

and the sentence imposed does not constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment. 

Fourth, appellant claims that the district court erred by failing 

to give him three days of credit for time served between the oral 

pronouncement of the sentence and the entry of the judgment of 

conviction. We conclude that this claim lacks merit because the time 

spent incarcerated after the sentencing hearing but before entry of the 

judgment of conviction is already credited as flat time against the 

sentence, as the prison begins to calculate a sentence from the sentencing 

date. 

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Fifth, appellant argues that the district court erred by 

allowing prior bad act evidence at trial. Appellant challenges the 

admission of evidence of burglaries committed by a group of juveniles, of 

certain individuals' use of methamphetamine at the residence where 

appellant stayed, of one of the juvenile's drug addiction, and of a drug 

arrest of a woman who lived at appellant's residence. Appellant did not 

object to the testimony regarding these bad acts, and we conclude that 

there was no plain error from the admission of them at trial. See Green v. 

State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003) ("In conducting plain error 

review, we must examine whether there was 'error,' whether the error was 

'plain' or clear, and whether the error affected the defendant's substantial 

rights."). Evidence regarding the juvenile burglary ring was relevant to 

showing that appellant knew that the rifle was stolen, as appellant had 

previously pawned items stolen by the juveniles. As to the testimony 

about other people's drug use, we conclude that it did not change the 

outcome of the case and thus did not affect appellant's substantial rights. 

Sixth, appellant claims that the district court erred by failing 

to sua sponte instruct the jury on entrapment, the "procuring agent" 

defense, and how to evaluate the reliability of an informant. We conclude 

that no patently prejudicial error occurred here. See McKenna v. State, 

114 Nev. 1044, 1052, 968 P.2d 739, 745 (1998) ("Failure to object to or 

request a jury instruction precludes appellate review, unless the error is 

patently prejudicial and requires the court to act sua sponte to protect the 

defendant's right to a fair trial."). An entrapment defense consists of two 

elements: the State presenting the opportunity to commit a crime and a 

defendant who is not predisposed to commit the act. Miller v. State, 121 

Nev. 92, 95, 110 P.3d 53, 56 (2005). Here, although a confidential 

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informant initiated contact with appellant, appellant initiated the 

transaction by later contacting the informant and asking for a computer, 

and then offering methamphetamine to the informant as partial payment 

for the stolen computer.' Thus, the evidence adduced at trial proved that 

appellant was predisposed to possessing stolen property and 

methamphetamine, and an entrapment instruction was not warranted. 

See id. We further conclude that appellant was not entitled to a 

"procuring agent" jury instruction, as appellant was in no way an agent of 

the purchaser of methamphetamine. See Adam v. State, 127 Nev. „ 

261 P.3d 1063, 1065 (2011). Lastly, as to an instruction on the credibility 

of the informant, we conclude that no such instruction was warranted 

because the informant "was not known to be or deemed unreliable." King 

v. State, 116 Nev. 349, 355, 998 P.2d 1172, 1176 (2000). The informant 

had a consistent history of aiding law enforcement and the informant's 

testimony was consistent with the monitoring detectives' observations. 

See id. Given that none of these instructions were warranted, we conclude 

that the district court did not have a duty to sua sponte proffer the 

instructions to the jury. 

"We note that, while appellant appears to argue that the informant 

was the person who initially suggested payment in drugs, appellant has 

not provided the audio recordings of the wire taps, and the record on 

appeal does not support this assertion. See Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 

43 n. 4, 83 P.3d 818, 822 n. 4 (2004) ("Appellant has the ultimate 

responsibility to provide this court with 'portions of the record essential to 

determination of issues raised in appellant's appeal."); Greene v. State, 96 

Nev. 555, 558, 612 P.2d 686, 688 (1980) ("The burden to make a proper 

appellate record rests on appellant."). 

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Seventh, appellant claims that the district court erred by 

instructing the jury that, if it found that the defendant made false or 

deliberately misleading statements concerning the charges before trial, 

the jury could consider those statements as tending to prove consciousness 

of his guilt. Appellant argues only that the instruction should not have 

been given because his statements were not false or misleading. 

Appellant did not object to this instruction, and we discern no plain error. 

See Green, 119 Nev. at 545, 80 P.3d at 95. 

Eighth, appellant claims that the district court improperly 

allowed Detective Jones to vouch for the credibility of the confidential 

informant. Appellant appears to contend that Detective Jones vouched for 

the informant when the detective testified about other cases that the 

informant worked on, the informant's successful work in prison, the 

number of cases generated by the informant's information, and that the 

informant's work exceeded expectations. We discern no plain error. See 

Anderson v. State, 121 Nev. 511, 516, 118 P.3d 184, 187 (2005) (reviewing 

instances of vouching for plain error where defendant fails to object at 

trial). A witness may not vouch for the credibility of another witness. 

Marvelle v. State, 114 Nev. 921, 931, 966 P.2d 151, 157 (1998), abrogated 

on other grounds by Koerschner v. State, 116 Nev. 1111, 1114-17, 13 P.3d 

451, 454-55 (2000). Here, much of the detective's testimony was elicited 

from appellant on cross-examination to show that the informant was not 

reliable and had a motive to lie. While the detective stated that the 

informant was "actually one of the best informants that I've worked with," 

this statement referred to the informant's ready availability and not to his 

credibility. As such, we determine that the detective did not improperly 

vouch for the credibility of the informant. 

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Ninth, appellant claims that his right to a speedy trial was 

violated by a nearly one-year delay between his arrest and his trial. This 

claim lacks merit. While appellant's trial took place approximately five 

and a half months after the information was filed, appellant's counsel 

waived appellant's statutory right to a trial within 60 days after 

arraignment. See Furbay v. State, 116 Nev. 481, 484, 998 P.2d 553, 555 

(2000). Furthermore, appellant failed to allege that the State acted in bad 

faith or that he was prejudiced from the delay, and the record does not 

support such a finding. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) 

(identifying four factors to be weighed when determining whether a 

defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated). 

Tenth, appellant argues that the district court erred by 

granting the State's motion to join together the charges relating to the 

stolen rifle and charges relating to a computer and drugs. He claims that 

the counts relating to the firearm should have been tried separately from 

the counts relating to a stolen computer and methamphetamine, and that 

charging all of the counts together made it more likely that the jury would 

convict him of the firearm charges. The district court has discretion to join 

or sever charges, and "[e]rror resulting from misjoinder of charges is 

harmless unless the improperly joined charges had a substantial and 

injurious effect on the jury's verdict." Weber v. State, 121 Nev. 554, 570- 

71, 119 P.3d 107, 119 (2005). We conclude that the district court erred in 

joining the charges because they were not part of a common scheme and 

plan and appellant's pawning of a stolen rifle was not connected to 

appellant's transaction of drugs for a stolen computer more than a month 

later. See id. at 571-72, 119 P.3d at 119. Nevertheless, we conclude that 

no reversal is required because the misjoinder of charges did not have a 

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substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. At trial, sufficient 

evidence was adduced to support the convictions relating to the rifle. 

Notably, the juvenile testified that appellant had previously pawned 

stolen property that was unloaded at appellant's residence, and that 

appellant asked the juvenile on the way to the pawn shop what he would 

do if he got caught, which contradicted appellant's statements to the police 

that he repeatedly asked the juvenile if the rifle was stolen and the 

juvenile denied that it was. Therefore, in light of the evidence that 

appellant knew that the rifle was stolen, we conclude that the verdict was 

not substantially affected by the evidence regarding the stolen computer 

and methamphetamine. 

Finally, appellant argues that cumulative error deprived him 

of a fair trial. Because he demonstrates only one error, we conclude that 

appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. See United States v. Sager, 

227 F.3d 1138, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) ("One error is not cumulative error."). 

Having considered appellant's contentions and concluded that 

he is not entitled to relief, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

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EWA 
cc: Hon. Patrick Flanagan, District Judge 

Karla K. Butko 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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