IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WICHITA FALLS DIVISION

 

CHRISTOPHER REY GONZALES, §

 §

Plaintiff, §

 §

v. § Civil Action No. 7:22-cv-062-O-BP

 § 

COMMISSIONER OF §

SOCIAL SECURITY, §

 §

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Christopher Rey Gonzales (“Gonzales”) applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) 

under the Social Security Act (“SSA”). The Commissioner denied his application, deciding that 

he was not disabled. Gonzales appealed. After considering the pleadings, briefs, administrative 

record, and applicable legal authorities, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that United States 

District Judge Reed O’Connor AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision and DISMISS this case

with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Gonzales seeks disability benefits under Title XVI of the SSA, claiming disability since 

January 17, 2020. Soc. Sec. Admin. R. [hereinafter “Tr.”], ECF No. 11-1 at 15. Gonzales’s SSI

application specified several medical conditions that limit his ability to work, including epilepsy, 

asthma, borderline intellectual functioning, major depressive disorder, ADHD, and cognitive 

disorder. Tr. 17. The Commissioner denied his application initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 

104, 113.

Case 7:22-cv-00062-O-BP Document 16 Filed 01/30/23 Page 1 of 12 PageID 745
2

Gonzales challenged the Commissioner’s denial before an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”) who conducted a telephonic hearing and later affirmed the Commissioner’s denial. Tr. 

12. After the Social Security Appeals Council denied Gonzales further administrative review (id.

at 1), he filed this civil action seeking judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 416(g). ECF No. 1; see

also Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 332, 337 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Commissioner’s 

decision does not become final until after the Appeals Council makes its decision denying the 

claimant’s request for review.”). He claims that he is disabled and thus entitled to SSI. ECF No. 1.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title XVI of the SSA governs the SSI program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f. Claimants 

seeking benefits must prove that they are “disabled” within the meaning of the SSA. See Hollis v. 

Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1382 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating the “relevant law and regulations 

governing the determination of disability under a claim for disability insurance benefits are 

identical to those governing the determination under a claim for [SSI]”). A person is disabled “if 

he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can 

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A). To determine whether a claimant is disabled and thus entitled to benefits, the 

Commissioner employs a sequential five-step evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). 

First, the claimant must not be presently doing any substantial gainful activity. Id.

§ 416.920(a)(4)(i). “Substantial gainful activity” is work that “involves doing significant physical 

or mental activities” for pay or profit. Id. § 416.972. Second, the claimant must have a severe 

impairment or combination of impairments. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Third, disability exists if the 

Case 7:22-cv-00062-O-BP Document 16 Filed 01/30/23 Page 2 of 12 PageID 746
3

impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment in the federal regulatory 

list. See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii) (referencing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1).

Before proceeding to steps four and five, the Commissioner assesses the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) and considers his past relevant work (“PRW”). See id.

§ 416.920(a)(4), (e)-(f). RFC means “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.” 

Id. § 416.945(a)(1). PRW means work the claimant has done “within the past 15 years, that was 

substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it.” Id.

§ 416.960(b)(1). Fourth, if the claimant’s medical status alone does not constitute a disability, the 

impairment or impairments must prevent the claimant from returning to his PRW considering his 

RFC. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). Fifth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any other 

relevant work, considering the claimant’s RFC, age, work experience, and education. Id.

§ 416.920(a)(4)(v); Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1999). “A finding that a 

claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and 

terminates the analysis.” Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987). “The claimant bears 

the burden of showing he is disabled through the first four steps of the analysis; on the fifth, the 

Commissioner must show that there is other substantial work in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform.” Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Judicial review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied correct legal 

standards and whether substantial evidence in the record supports the Commissioner’s decision. 

Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995); Hollis, 837 F.2d at 1382 (“Substantial 

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.”); 

Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 

236 (5th Cir. 1994)). “It is more than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance.” Boyd v. 

Case 7:22-cv-00062-O-BP Document 16 Filed 01/30/23 Page 3 of 12 PageID 747
4

Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 

2000)). “A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices 

or medical findings support the decision.” Id. (quoting same). The Court may neither reweigh 

evidence in the record nor substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s, but it will carefully 

scrutinize the record to determine if substantial evidence is present. Harris, 209 F.3d at 417; Hollis, 

837 F.2d at 1383. “Conflicts in the evidence are for the [Commissioner] and not the courts to 

resolve.” Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Selders 

v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990)).

III. ANALYSIS

The Commissioner, acting through the ALJ, completed the five-step evaluation process 

here. See Tr. 17-25. First, the ALJ found that Gonzales has not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since August 4, 2020. Id. at 17. Second, he found six medically determinable impairments: 

epilepsy, asthma, borderline intellectual functioning, major depressive disorder, ADHD, and 

cognitive disorder. Id. Third, he did not identify any impairments or combination of impairments 

that qualify under the federal regulatory list. Id. at 17-18. He then assessed Gonzales’s RFC in 

relevant part:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the 

claimant has the [RFC] to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 

416.967(c).... The claimant can understand, remember, and carry out simple, 

routine, and repetitive talks. The claimant can relate to supervisors and co-workers 

on a superficial work basis. The claimant can have occasional contact with the 

general public. The claimant can adapt to a work environment. The claimant can 

deal with no more than occasional changes in work processes and environment. 

Id. at 20. Using this RFC determination and after hearing testimony from a vocational expert 

(“VE”), the ALJ determined at step four that Gonzales did not have any PRV. Id. at 24. Finally, at 

step five, after finding that Gonzales’s age, education, work experience, and RFC with additional 

Case 7:22-cv-00062-O-BP Document 16 Filed 01/30/23 Page 4 of 12 PageID 748
5

limitations allowed him to perform the requirements of other jobs, the ALJ then found Gonzales

“not disabled” under Medical-Vocational Rule 201.20 and Rule 201.11. Tr. 25.

Gonzales urges reversal because: (A) substantial evidence in the record did not support the 

ALJ’s finding on Gonzales’s limitation in social functioning, and (B) the ALJ did not properly 

articulate the persuasiveness of the medical opinions in the record. ECF No. 13 at 9-20.

A. Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s finding on Gonzales’s

limitation in social functioning. 

Gonzales argues that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s RFC determination. 

ECF No. 13 at 13. He argues that the ALJ erred by “failing to build a logical bridge” between the 

evidence Dr. Hart and Gonzales’s guardian provided suggesting pure self-isolation with only

limited family interaction and the ALJ’s assessments that Gonzales could in fact interact with 

others in a work setting. Id. at 14. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly conducted 

his analysis by considering the evidentiary record as a whole, including assessments from the State 

Agency Medical Consultants (“SAMC”). ECF No. 14 at 3-4. 

“The responsibility for determining a claimant's RFC lies with the ALJ ... [who] must 

discuss the claimant's ability to perform sustained work activity on a regular and continuing basis 

and resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence.” Ewing v. Colvin, No. 4:13-CV-085-A, 2014 WL

2464765, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 2014) (citing Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1023-24 (5th Cir.

1990); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996)). Moreover, “[t]he ALJ is not 

required to incorporate limitations in the RFC that he did not find to be supported in the 

record.” Id. at *4 (citing Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 790 (5th Cir. 1991)). Instead, the ALJ 

“must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing 

specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, 

observations) ....” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *7.

Case 7:22-cv-00062-O-BP Document 16 Filed 01/30/23 Page 5 of 12 PageID 749
6

The ALJ explained his conclusion regarding Gonzales’s ability to work, citing medical 

evidence from the SAMCs and Gonzales’s various physicians, and discussing how that evidence 

factored into his analysis of Gonzales’s RFC. Tr. 21-23. The ALJ also noted from Gonzales’s 

guardian that he was “able to use [a] phone to text friends, takes care of his dog... was shown to

have a stable mood, and when taking medication, he had [an] increase in motivation.” Id at 23. The 

ALJ concluded that “the record establishes some degree of limitation, but not to the extent 

alleged.” Id. In light of his findings, the ALJ found Gonzales capable of work, but suggested social 

interaction limitations. Id. at 20.

Considering the ALJ's explanation, it is clear that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's 

RFC determination. The SAMC’s findings show that Gonzales could “understand, remember, and 

carry out simple instructions, make simple decisions, concentrate for extended period of times, 

interact with others, and respond to changes.” Id. at 74. On reconsideration the SAMC noted that 

Gonzales was “able to present with an appropriate appearance, cooperate, carry on a normal 

conversation, get along with others at home, in public, and at work despite occasional problems 

with social interaction.” Id. at 94. The medical records also routinely confirmed, among other 

things, that Gonzales’s medicine helped him, that he was making progress, was more motivated,

and interacted with nurses, family members, and others when needed. Id. at 322, 345, 390-93, 420, 

422-23, 452, 453, 493-94, 499-500, 517-518, 522, 529, 532, 555, 565. While Gonzales argues that 

other medical evidence in the record contradicted the evidence that the ALJ cited, this argument is 

unpersuasive. ECF No. 13 at 14-15. Gonzales’s “burden is not to highlight evidence contrary to 

the ALJ's ruling, but to show that there is no substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's 

decision.” Caldwell v. Colvin, No. 4:15-cv-00576-O-BL, 2016 WL 3621097, at *3 (N.D. Tex.June

10, 2016), rec. adopted, 2016 WL 3523780 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2016).

Case 7:22-cv-00062-O-BP Document 16 Filed 01/30/23 Page 6 of 12 PageID 750
7

In all but the rarest cases of exceptional evidentiary clarity, a certain amount of medical 

evidence will always exist that could theoretically support a different RFC determination. Modern 

SSI applications and appeals involve voluminous evidentiary records, which is why “[c]onflicts in 

the evidence are for the Commissioner and not the courts to resolve.” Brown, 192 F.3d at

496 (quoting Selders, 914 F.2d at 617). The Court's job is not to reweigh the evidence nor second 

guess the Commissioner, but only to ensure that substantial evidence supported his 

decision. Harris, 209 F.3d at 417; Hollis, 837 F.2d at 1383. The Court finds that substantial 

evidence supported the ALJ's determination in Gonzales’s case. Moreover, although Gonzales 

does not agree with the ALJ’s limitations stated in the RFC, the ALJ considered the entire record 

and reached a conclusion grounded in substantial evidence. See, e.g., ECF No. 11-1 at 20-23. Thus, 

substantial evidence supports his determination that Gonzales could relate to supervisors and coworkers on a superficial basis, and reversal is not warranted on this ground.

B. The ALJ properly considered Dr. Hart’s medical opinion and articulated why 

it was unpersuasive.

An ALJ has broad discretion to resolve conflicts in the evidence without a court secondguessing him. See Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995)). An ALJ is free to reject 

any medical opinion when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. See generally Harris, 209 

F.3d at 417; Bradley v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir. 1987). An ALJ may even completely 

disregard a treating physician’s opinion. See Brown, 192 F.3d at 500.

Regardless of whether an ALJ accepts or rejects a medical opinion, the ALJ must 

“articulate in his determination or decision how persuasive he find[s] all of the medical opinions ... 

in [a claimant's] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b); Guy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 4:20-

CV-01122-O-BP, 2022 WL 1008039, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2022), rec. adopted 2022 WL 

1004241 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2022). While ALJs need not exhaustively recount their reasoning, they 

Case 7:22-cv-00062-O-BP Document 16 Filed 01/30/23 Page 7 of 12 PageID 751
8

must “explain how [they] considered the supportability and consistency factors for 

... medical opinions ... in [a claimant's] determination or decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2); 

Guy, 2020 WL 1008039, at *3. This requirement is obligatory for claims filed on or after March 

27, 2017. Id. Gonzales applied for SSI on August 4, 2020, and is, therefore, entitled to the 

explanation. 

Gonzales claims that the ALJ failed to comment on the persuasiveness of Dr. Hart’s

medical opinion. ECF No. 13 at 15. Dr. Hart was Gonzales’s treating physician, but her opinion is

not the last word on Gonzales’s disability status. The opinions of treating physicians are not 

conclusive. Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237). 

The law permits an ALJ to discount evidence for good cause. “Good cause may permit an ALJ to 

discount the weight of a treating physician relative to other experts where the treating physician's 

evidence is conclusory, is unsupported by medically acceptable clinical, laboratory, or diagnostic 

techniques, or is otherwise unsupported by the evidence.” Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455-56

(5th Cir. 2000). Gonzales claims that the ALJ did not show good cause to disregard Dr. Hart’s 

opinion and did not discuss in any detail why he found it unpersuasive. ECF No. 13 at 15. Gonzales

then alleges that the ALJ’s failure to explain why he found Dr. Hart’s opinions to be less than 

persuasive was harmful error. Id. at 21. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly articulated

and discussed why Dr. Hart’s opinion was not persuasive, based on objective evidence in the 

record. ECF No. 14 at 5-10. 

ALJs must “explain how [they] considered the supportability and consistency factors for 

. . . medical opinions . . . in [a claimant's] determination or decision.” Guy, 2022 WL 1008039, at 

*3. Mere evidentiary summaries fall short of § 416.920c's requirements, as the plain meaning of 

the regulatory text shows. Id. Determining supportability and consistency involve different 

Case 7:22-cv-00062-O-BP Document 16 Filed 01/30/23 Page 8 of 12 PageID 752
9

analyses and “require the ALJ to explain [her] reasoning for [her] persuasiveness finding with 

respect to each factor.” Heleodoro C. v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, No. 3:20-

CV-3520-E-BK, 2022 WL 4359148, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 20, 2022), rec. adopted 2022 WL 

4360555 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2022) (quoting Kilby v. Kijakazi, No. 4:20-CV-03035, 2022 WL 

1797043, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2022)). While “supportability” measures the degree of 

relatedness between a medical provider's opinion and the medical evidence she provides to support 

that opinion, “consistency” is “an all-encompassing inquiry” that focuses on “how well a medical 

source is supported, or not supported, by the entire record.” Id; See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(c)(1), 

416.920c(c)(2).

In his decision, the ALJ explained why he found Dr. Hart’s testimony to be unpersuasive, 

as follows: 

The medical opinion at exhibit B9F, page 3 and following is not persuasive as it is not 

supported by medical evidence. As stated above, while taking his medication, the claimant 

was repeatedly noted to be making good progress with a stable mood and increase in 

motivation and no feelings of depression. 

Tr. 24. The “as stated above” section to which the ALJ referred included three pages in his decision 

discussing the objective medical records that are consistent with his opinion. Id. at 21-24. Although 

providers diagnosed Gonzales with depression and ADHD, along with borderline intellectual 

functioning, the medical reports confirm that while he was on his medication, his “depression 

[was] under control.” Id. at 22. Providers’ notes recorded between April 2020 and January 2021

reported that he was making fair progress and had more motivation. Id. Multiple reports stated that 

his mood was stable, that he had no feelings of depression, and that he was “using coping skills 

that work and remains engaged in the recovery process.” Id. at 23. Finally, Gonzales told his 

providers that while on his medication he was “getting up out of bed, watching TV, playing video 

Case 7:22-cv-00062-O-BP Document 16 Filed 01/30/23 Page 9 of 12 PageID 753
10

games and spending time with his family.” Id. Moreover, “all [his] needs [were] being met at this 

time.” Id. 

The ALJ’s explanation of his conclusion meets the supportability and consistency 

requirements, even though he did not state it in a single paragraph labeled “persuasiveness.” The 

court views the ALJ’s decision in its entirety. See Hubbard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. No. 4:20-cv00588-BP, WL 196297, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2022) (ALJ’s discussion was sufficient when 

taken in the context of the entire RFC discussion preceding it); Tischler v. Kijakazi, No. 4:20-cv0721-P, 2021 WL 5832843, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2021). The entire record of providers’ notes 

does not support Dr. Hart’s final opinion that “claimant frequently has symptoms severe enough 

to interfere with attention and concentration... and that he would have difficulty working at a 

regular fulltime job on a sustained basis due to psychological limitations, paralyzing fear and 

anxiety.” Tr. 21-24. Further, Dr. Hart’s report was incomplete in not including her examination 

findings, diagnoses, and prescribed course of treatment. ECF No 13 at 20. The ALJ did note the 

report of Gonzales’s guardian, Isabel Diaz, which discussed Gonzales’s fears, anxiety, and desire 

to be alone in his room. Tr. 21. The ALJ explained why he did not find Dr. Hart’s opinion 

persuasive, and the evidence he references in the record supports that conclusion. This point does 

not require reversal. 

Even if the ALJ did not properly consider Dr. Hart’s medical opinion, the Court need not 

reverse the ALJ’s decision because Gonzales did not meet his burden to show harmful error. The

harmless error doctrine provides that “[p]rocedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not 

required,” and a court “will not vacate a judgment unless the substantial rights of a party are 

affected.” See Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988). To prevail on this point, 

Gonzales must show the ALJ's failure to explain his consideration of Dr. Hart’s opinion prejudiced 

Case 7:22-cv-00062-O-BP Document 16 Filed 01/30/23 Page 10 of 12 PageID 754
11

him. In the Fifth Circuit, harmless error exists when it is inconceivable that a different 

administrative conclusion would have been reached absent the error. Davidson v. Colvin, 164 F. 

Supp. 3d 926, 944 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2015). 

The ALJ’s decision shows that he recognized Dr. Hart’s medical opinion because he 

mentioned it. Tr. 23. The ALJ also noted the limitations present in her clinical findings. Id.

Gonzales argues that had the ALJ properly considered Dr. Hart’s medical opinion, he may have 

reached a different decision. ECF No. 13 at 21. He contends that a different interpretation of the 

medical records would have led to a different answer to one of the hypotheticals that the VE 

provided during his testimony. Id. at 23. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ need not rely on 

the VE’s response based upon evidentiary assumptions that the ALJ ultimately rejected. Owens v. 

Heckler, 770 F.2d 1276, 1282 (5th Cir. 1985). 

The Court concludes from this evidence that the ALJ considered Dr. Hart’s opinion, and 

even if he had failed to properly articulate the persuasiveness of that opinion, Gonzales did not 

show that if the ALJ had provided further explanation, then he would have adopted her opinion.

Miller v. Kijakazi, No. 22-60541 (5th Cir. January 18, 2023). Gonzales invites the Court to reweigh 

the evidence and conclude that the ALJ’s alleged failure harmed him. This is not in the Court’s 

purview. See Garcia v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, Gonzales has 

not met his burden to show harmful error, and the Court should not reverse on this point.

IV. CONCLUSION 

Because substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ’s decision, and the ALJ 

properly explained the persuasiveness of Dr. Hart’s medical opinion, the Court should AFFIRM 

the Commissioner’s decision and DISMISS this case with prejudice.

Case 7:22-cv-00062-O-BP Document 16 Filed 01/30/23 Page 11 of 12 PageID 755
12

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties 

in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, 

and recommendation must file specific written objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). To be specific, an objection must 

identify the particular finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except 

upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th 

Cir. 1996) (en banc).

SIGNED on January 30, 2023.

______________________________________

Hal R. Ray, Jr.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 7:22-cv-00062-O-BP Document 16 Filed 01/30/23 Page 12 of 12 PageID 756