alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 39 Engrossed in House (EH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 39

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION OF USE OF CAPITOL GROUNDS FOR DC SPECIAL 
              OLYMPICS LAW ENFORCEMENT TORCH RUN.

    On June 5, 2009, or on such other date as the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Rules and Administration of the 
Senate may jointly

              

 designate, the 2009 District of Columbia Special Olympics Law 
Enforcement Torch Run (in this resolution referred to as the ``event'') 
may be run through the Capitol Grounds as part of the journey of the 
Special Olympics torch to the District of Columbia Special Olympics 
summer games.

SEC. 2. RESPONSIBILITY OF CAPITOL POLICE BOARD.

    The Capitol Police Board shall take such actions as may be 
necessary to carry out the event.

SEC. 3. CONDITIONS RELATING TO PHYSICAL PREPARATIONS.

    The Architect of the Capitol may prescribe conditions for physical 
preparations for the event.

SEC. 4. ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS.

    The Capitol Police Board shall provide for enforcement of the 
restrictions contained in section 5104(c) of title 40, United States 
Code, concerning sales, advertisements, displays, and solicitations on 
the Capitol Grounds, as well as other restrictions applicable to the 
Capitol Grounds, in connection with the event.

            Passed the House of Representatives March 10, 2009.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
111th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                            H. CON. RES. 39

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Authorizing the use of the Capitol Grounds for the District of Columbia 
              Special Olympics Law Enforcement Torch Run.
```
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

In the Interest of J.L., A.L., and J.L., 

Children

No. 06-19-00078-CV

Appeal from the 102nd District Court of 

Bowie County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 18C0315-

102). Memorandum Opinion delivered by 

Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Morriss and 

Justice Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellants have adequately indicated their inability to pay costs of appeal. 

Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED JANUARY 10, 2020

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
#### STOLLEY et al. v. PETROLEUM PRODUCERS CO. et al.

No. 10711.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

June 26, 1940.

Gerald C. Mann, Robert Kepke, Dur-ward D. Mahon, James Noel, Polk Shelton, and Henry H. Brooks, all of Austin, for appellants.

E. G. Lloyd, Jr., of Alice, Linebau'gh & Guittard, of Victoria, and Kilgore & Rogers, of Wichita Falls, for appellees.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

This appeal is from an order refusing to appoint a receiver of fifty-six acres of land in a proven oil field in Duval County. R. R. Stolley, claiming the leasehold estate in the land under a mineral lease issued to him by the Commissioner of the General Land Office of Texas, brought suit in trespass to try title in the District Court of Duval County against J. B. Wood and the heirs of James F. Welder, who claimed the fee in the land, and their mineral lessees, Petroleum Producers Company and United Producers Company. The State of Texas intervened, claiming fee-simple title to the land. By final judgment of the trial court rendered on May 20, 1939, the State and its lessee, Stolley, recovered title and possession of said land, the fee-simple title thereto being awarded to the State, subject to Stol-ley’s leasehold estate of seven-eighths of the oil, gas and minerals in and under the land, which was awarded to him. From that judgment the defendants appealed, and on December 13, 1939, said judgment was affirmed by this Court in Petroleum Producers Company et al., v. R. R. Stolley et al., Tex.Civ.App., 137 S.W.2d 207, and an application for writ of error therein' was filed by the defendants in our Supreme Court.

Immediately after the trial court rendered said judgment in the above suit,, the State filed in said cause its application for the appointment of a receiver to take possession of the land, with full authority to make contracts for the drilling of oil wells thereon and for the development and operation of such wells and the marketing of oil and gas therefrom, pending appeal from the judgment in the main case. Both Stolley and the defendants answered, Stolley joining in the State’s application for a receiver and the defendants opposing it. Upon a hearing thereof, the trial court refused the application, from which action the State and Stolley appealed to this court.

Pending this appeal and before submission thereof in this court, our Supreme Court ordered dismissal of appellees’ application for writ of error in the main case as upon a correct judgment. In this situation, 'upon submission of this cause in this court, it was deemed proper, as a practical matter, to withhold decision of the appeal until our Supreme Court had acted upon any motions for rehearing in *243the main case. That has been done by overruling appellants’ motion for rehearing, thereby finally determining the main case upon the merits, entitling appellees to writ of possession of the land involved. The questions involved in this appeal are thereby rendered moot, and upon that ground the appeal will be dismissed at the cost of appellants in both the trial court and this court. It is so ordered.
EXHIBIT 32.2 Section 906 Certification




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Golden Eagle International, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Tracy A. Madsen, Principal Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)               The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)               The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





Date: April 12, 2011
/s/ Tracy A. MadsenTracy A. MadsenPrincipal Financial Officer





This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the registrant for the purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. This certification shall not be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of this Report), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.





A signed original of this written statement required by §906 has been provided to the registrant and will be retained by the registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
# ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

May 24, 2024 CR-2023-0963David Otto Jacobson v. State of Alabama (Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court: DC23-1514 and CC-23-727) 

## NOTICE You are hereby notified that on May 24, 2024, the following action was taken in the above-reference cause by the Court of Criminal Appeals: Application for Rehearing Overruled.

D. Scott Mitchell, Clerk
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Almodovar, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Delin, J.), rendered August 26, 1985, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, rape in the first degree, murder in the second degree (two counts), robbery in the first degree, and attempted robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after hearings, of those branches of the defendant’s omnibus *455motion which were to suppress identification testimony and statements made by the defendant (Collins, J., at *Huntley*and *Wade*hearing; Delin, J., at *Cardona*hearing).

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The hearing court correctly denied suppression of the inculpatory statements made by the defendant to the police. According much weight to the determination of the hearing court, which had the advantage of having seen and heard the witnesses *(see, People v Proehilo,*41 NY2d 759, 761), we find that the defendant was properly advised of his constitutional rights pursuant to *Miranda v Arizona*(384 US 436), which he waived prior to making the statements. We further find that the court properly denied suppression of the inculpatory statements made by the defendant to a fellow inmate while at the Nassau County Correctional Facility since this inmate was not an agent of law enforcement officials *(see, People v Cardona,*41 NY2d 333, 335).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]). The sentence imposed was not excessive.

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental *pro se*brief, and find them to be without merit. Bracken, J. P., Brown, Kunzeman and Harwood, JJ., concur.
Case 4:22-cv-00908-P Document 11 Filed 10/12/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 169
Exhibit 31.2CERTIFICATIONI, Patrick J. Pedonti, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of SS&C Technologies, Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this quarterly report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presentedin this quarterly report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this quarterly report is being prepared;  b) Not applicable;  c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisquarterly report based on such evaluation; and  d) Disclosed in this quarterly report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recentfiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors andthe audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.   Date: May14, 2007 /s/ Patrick J. Pedonti     Patrick J. Pedonti  Senior Vice President and ChiefFinancial Officer  (Principal Financial Officer)
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**

June 22, 201 8

No. 04

- 18

- 00291

- CV & 04

- 18

- 00292

- CV

FOR THE BEST INTEREST AND PROTECTION OF H.V. , a Mentally Ill Person

, From the Probate Court No 1, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2018MH1084 & 2018MH1161 Honorable Kelly Cross, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

On June 20, 2018, appellant, H.V., filed a motion to suspend the appellate rules as to briefing and oral argument, a motion to consolidate these appeals

, and a motion of extension of time to file his brief.

Appellant’ s motion to suspend the appellate rules is DENIED. However, the Court recogniz es the expedited nature of these appeals and will dispose of them accordingly.

Appellant’s request to consoli date these appeals is GRANTED. We ORDER Nos. 04

- 18

- 00291

- CV and 04

- 18

- 00292

- CV consolidated for purposes of briefing and argument on appeal. The parties must file motions, briefs, and other pleadings as if the appeals were one but put both appeal numbers i n the style of the case. The cases must be argued together in one brief, as in a single appeal. The court will dispose of the appeals with the same judgment, opinion, and mandate. This order does not extend the briefing schedule.

Appellant’s motion for ex tension of time to file his briefs is GRANTED . Appellant’s consolidated brief was filed on June 20, 2018.

The appellee’s brief is due on July 10, 2018 . Given the expedited nature of these appeals, the appellee is discouraged from seeking any additional t ime to file its brief and is encouraged to file its brief on or before July 10, 2018

.

_________________________________ Karen Angelini, JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 22nd day of June, 2018

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
#### CAMP v. BOND, Chief Justice, et al.

Motion No. 14459.

Supreme Court of Texas.

April 24, 1940.

Bowyer, Gray, Thomas & Jaffe, of Dallas, for the motion.

McCombs & Andress and Wm. And.ress, Jr., all of Dallas, opposing thé motion.

PER CURIAM.

 Relator by motion seeks leave to file in this Court a' petition for mandamus to require the Justices of the Court of Civil Appeals at Dallas to certify certain questions arising upon his' plea of privilege. The privilege casé has twice been appealed. Gn the first appéal the Waco Court remanded the case for a new trial on the privilege question. See Camp v. Screen Broadcasts, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 398. On the next appeal the Dallas Court arrived at a conclusion contrary to that announced by the Waco Court on the former appeal. The opinion of the Dallas Court on the second appeal will be found reported in Film Advertising Corp. v. Camp, 137 S.W.2d 1068; After carefully considering the petition in’ connection with so much Of the record as accompanies same, including the opinion of the Dallas Court, we have concluded that that Court has followed a prior decision of this Court. See Bradley v. Trinity State Bank, 118 Tex. 274, 14 S.W.2d 810. The motion for leave'to file the petition will therefore be denied, even though a conflict exists between the opinions of the two courts of civil appeals upon the question. As stated in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Gallagher, 127 Tex. 553, 94 S.W.2d 410, 412, “* * • * the Supreme Court will not require the certification of a question which it has already decided,, unless the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals on that question is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision thereon.”

The motion is overruled.
#### Carmen Baez, as Executrix of Rosa J. Caraballo, Deceased, and as Testamentary Guardian of Lisa R. Caraballo and Another, Infants, Respondent, v New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

In consolidated medical malpractice actions to recover damages, *inter alia,*for conscious pain and suffering and wrongful death, the defendants New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, John Cece and Yen Chen appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Graci, J.), dated December 9, 1988, as, upon consolidating the actions, denied that branch of their motion which was to dismiss the complaints as time barred, and granted that branch of the plaintiff’s cross motion which was to dismiss their affirmative defenses of untimeliness.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the motion is granted, the cross motion is denied, and the complaints are dismissed as time barred.

The record demonstrates that the decedent died on April 17, 1986, and that the plaintiff was appointed executrix of the decedent’s estate on or about October 7, 1986, and guardian of the decedent’s infant children on November 18, 1986. However, it is undisputed that the plaintiff did not commence an action against the defendant New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (hereinafter the HHC) until on or about July 24, 1987, and only thereafter did she commence similar *530actions against the defendants Cece and Yen Chen. Accordingly, the instant actions were not commenced within the applicable l-year-and-90-day limitations period set forth in McKinney’s Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 7401 (2) *(see, Brennan v City of New York,*59 NY2d 791; *Hammie v City of New York,*143 AD2d 805; *Martinez v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,*137 AD2d 503; *Brann v City of New York,*100 AD2d 504). Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the limitations period commenced running on the date of the decedent’s death rather than on the date of her appointment as executrix or guardian *(see, Brennan v City of New York, supra; Bonilla v Abbott,*113 AD2d 861), and a toll for infancy pursuant to CPLR 208 is unavailable as there was an adult relative of the deceased who could have instituted the action on behalf of the decedent *(see, Ratka v St. Francis Hosp.,*44 NY2d 604; *Bonilla v Abbott, supra; Cruz v Mount Sinai Hosp.,*61 AD2d 915). Similarly, the record fails to support the plaintiff’s claim of estoppel. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have dismissed this action as time barred. Kooper, J. P., Eiber, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.
#### Norstar Bank, National Association, Appellant, v Eastwood Associates and Professional Enterprises, Inc., et *989al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

(Appeal No. 2.)

— Order insofar as appealed from unanimously reversed on the law without costs and motions against defendants James J. Michalek, Leo M. Michalek, Jr., and Daniel Tenerowicz granted. Same memorandum as *Norstar Bank v Eastwood Assocs. & Professional Enters,*([appeal No. 1] 168 AD2d 988 [decided herewith]). (Appeal from order of Erie County Court, Drury, J.— summary judgment.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Den-man, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1057 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1057

 To authorize the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard 
 is operating to issue a certificate of documentation for operation in 
                the coastwise trade for the vessel MAYA.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 12, 2009

  Mr. Herger introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To authorize the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard 
 is operating to issue a certificate of documentation for operation in 
                the coastwise trade for the vessel MAYA.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. VESSEL MAYA.

    Notwithstanding sections 55101, 55102, and 12112 of title 46, 
United States Code, the Secretary of the department in which the Coast 
Guard is operating may issue a certificate of documentation with a 
coastwise endorsement for the vessel MAYA (United States official 
number 1107319).
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 10.1


 


Salaries and Bonuses of Named
Executive Officers


 


The following table sets forth for each person identified as a Named
Executive Officer in the Company’s Proxy Statement for its 2005 Annual Meeting
of Stockholders the discretionary bonuses for 2004 and annual salaries
effective January 1, 2005 approved by the Compensation Committee of the Board
of Directors in December 2004 and January 2005:


 


	
  Name
  of Executive Officer

  	
   

  	
  Bonus for 2004

  	
   

  	
  Salary for 2005

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Leonard P.
  Shaykin*

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  140,000

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  370,000

  	
   

  
	
  Martin Batt

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  120,000

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  270,000

  	
   

  
	
  Patricia A.
  Pilia*

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  60,000

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  235,000

  	
   

  
	
  Gordon Link*

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  100,000

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  240,000

  	
   

  
	
  Anne L. Bailey

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  100,000

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  205,000

  	
   

  
	
  Kai P. Larson*

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  75,000

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  220,000

  	
   

  



 










*                                         Messrs.
Shaykin, Link and Larson and Dr. Pilia are each party to an employment
agreement with the Company for which the most recent bonus and current base
salary of such party determines the amount to be paid by the Company to that party
following a change of control of the Company upon termination of employment by
the Company without cause or resignation by the employee with good reason.


 


1