*

Honorable Jerome Farris, Senior U. S. Circuit Judge for the

Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

PUBLISH

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 96-8299 _______________

D. C. Docket No. 1:94-CV-1539-JEC

JACQUELINE PARAMORE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

Defendant,

DELTA FAMILY-CARE DISABILITY AND SURVIVORSHIP PLAN,.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

______________________________

(December 2, 1997)

Before BIRCH, Circuit Judge, HILL and FARRIS*

, Senior Circuit

Judges.
2

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

Jacqueline Paramore, a former flight attendant for Delta Air

Lines, Inc. (“Delta”), filed this action under the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(1)(b) and

(e), in which she sought an award of long-term disability benefits

pursuant to the Delta Family Care Disability and Survivorship Plan

(“the Plan”). Paramore contended that the Administrative

Committee, acting in its capacity as administrator and fiduciary,

violated the terms of the Plan and the governing federal law

embodied in ERISA by denying the requested benefits. The district

court determined that the Administrative Committee’s decision to

deny long-term disability benefits was neither arbitrary nor capricious

and granted summary judgment in favor of Delta. For the reasons

that follow, we conclude that the “arbitrary and capricious” standard

of review is the appropriate standard by which to evaluate a plan

administrator’s factual findings in cases involving the denial of

benefits under ERISA. We further conclude that the district court
3

properly applied this standard of review to the facts of this case in

upholding the Administrative Committee’s decision. We therefore

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

For the limited purpose of resolving the issues presented in this

appeal, the following facts are found to be undisputed: Jacqueline

Paramore worked for approximately eleven years as a flight

attendant for Delta. In 1991, while performing her job during the

course of a flight, Paramore was involved in an incident that resulted

in injury to her neck and shoulder. After an initial period of

recuperation at home, Paramore returned to work sporadically for

approximately one year. Paramore subsequently sought and

received short-term disability benefits pursuant to the Plan; these

benefits were awarded based on certifications from two treating

physicians, Dr. Kenneth Lazarus and Dr. Patricia Tewes, who

affirmed that Paramore had experienced a cervical strain. Paramore
4

next requested long-term disability benefits and sought certification

for such benefits from Dr. Tewes. Dr. Tewes, however, indicated

that Paramore could perform some light clerical work. Based on Dr.

Tewes’ observations, the request for long-term disability benefits

was denied.

In accordance with the Plan’s procedural framework, Paramore

appealed this decision to the Administrative Subcommittee (“the

Subcommittee”). Paramore specifically requested the

Subcommittee to afford greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Lazarus,

her treating physician, rather than Dr. Tewes, to whom she had been

referred. At the Subcommittee’s request, Paramore also was

examined by Dr. Nicol, who withheld his opinion concerning

Paramore’s long-term prognosis pending further tests; Dr. Nicol did

note his initial impressions of Paramore’s condition as follows:

Difficult to know exactly what’s going on with

this lady. She has symptoms of cervical strain

and sprain, but no focal organic neurological

deficits and, in fact, she has some “deficits” that

would lead me to believe that there is a very
5

large functional component to her disorder at

the present time. 

Exh. 11 at 3. Dr. Lazarus forwarded to the Subcommittee a letter

stating his belief that Paramore would be “unable to work in any

capacity on even a part-time basis” and that her condition likely

would “continue indefinitely despite maximum treatment.” Exh. 12.

Paramore also received a psychological examination by Dr. Wright,

who rendered the following findings:

Psychological testing results with this patient

suggest considerable stress, but very little

subjective psychological discomfort. Most of

her stress and psychological pressures are

being diverted into somatic symptoms, and she

is quite preoccupied with her somatic

processes while attempting to deny and

repress any subjective psychological

discomfort. I could not rule out the possibility of

a conversion disorder. She has developed

most of the classic signs of “chronic pain

syndrome.” Test indications regarding

cognitive and intellectual abilities show the

patient to be functioning within the brightnormal range with no problems. There were

indications of organic brain dysfunction on

testing. 
6

Exh. 17. Pursuant to these observations, Dr. Wright recommended

that Paramore would benefit from psychotherapy in addition to any

other treatment she was receiving for chronic pain. Dr. Nicol

subsequently wrote to the Subcommittee after reviewing both Dr.

Wright’s report and the results of the tests he previously had

ordered. With respect to psychological aspects of Paramore’s

condition, Dr. Nicol stated: “I don’t think that Ms. Paramore is

suffering from any major physical disability, but psychosomatic

aspects of her illness have supervened and are causing the majority

of her problems at the present time.” Exh. 20. In a separate letter,

Dr. Nicol stated, in pertinent part:

At the present time it would be my

professional opinion that she is disabled, but I

can’t say as a result of demonstrable injury,

because there was no demonstrable injury, at

least from a purely physical standpoint. I think

there probably is demonstrable injury from a

psychological standpoint.

I hope that this answers your questions

satisfactorily. I hope that you will be able to get

Ms. Paramore some ongoing psychological
7

help so that she will [be] able to get back to

work full time in the not too distant future as a

flight attendant once these other issues have

been addressed.

Exh. 21. Dr. Nicol further observed that although Paramore, in his

view, was not capable of performing her customary job on a full time

basis without limitations, she nonetheless was physically capable of

performing sedentary work. See id.

On the same date on which Dr. Nicol filed his report with the

Subcommittee, Dr. Tewes notified the Subcommittee that Paramore

was no longer under her care and that Dr. Lazarus should make any

further decisions regarding her capacity to work. Dr. Lazarus

subsequently wrote a letter to a Subcommittee representative

concerning Paramore’s case and stated:

With regard to Ms. Paramore’s disability status,

I believe that it would be appropriate for Ms.

Paramore to return to some sort of sedentary

work activity. I think this would be helpful to

her, both with regard to her self-esteem and

her recovery from her injury. . . . [I]n an

appropriately supportive environment, I believe
8

that Mrs. Paramore could and should return to

some form of sedentary work.

Exh. 27. 

After reviewing the doctors’ submissions, the Subcommittee

affirmed the denial of benefits and determined that Paramore’s

entitlement to disability benefits terminated as of November 14,

1992. Paramore appealed this decision to the Administrative

Committee. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Lazarus wrote to the

Administrative Committee a letter stating, in relevant part:

I have been the treating physician for Mrs.

Paramore and have been primarily responsible

for her care. Decisions on her benefit status

were apparently made with reference to forms

filled out from other treating physicians, despite

the fact that I have been the primary treating

physician in this case. I am not certain on what

basis the other physicians made their

determination. It is my opinion that Mrs.

Paramore was unable to return to any sort of

gainful employment, even on a part-time basis

prior to February 22, 1993. From that time

forward, however, I do believe she has been

capable of part-time sedentary work.
9

Exh. 33. The Administrative Committee determined, “[b]ased on

information obtained from Dr. Tewes and from independent

examinations performed by Dr. Nicol and Dr. Wright, Ms. Paramore

could perform some type of work; . . .” Exh. 46 at 3. Consistent with

this determination, the Administrative Committee decided that

Paramore’s disability benefits were correctly denied as of November

14, 1992.

II. DISCUSSION

The district court’s grant of summary judgment is subject to

plenary review. See Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Continental Ins.

Co., 999 F.2d 1547, 1554 (11th Cir. 1993). We therefore apply the

same legal standards as those controlling the district court. Id. The

standard that properly should have governed the district court’s

evaluation of the Administrative Committee’s findings, however, is

disputed by the parties. Paramore contends that, although the

Administrative Committee’s interpretation of the Plan’s terms are
1

Our discussion of the standard of review refers primarily to

the proper level of deference afforded a plan administrator; our

conclusions in this regard obtain with equal force, however, to

plan fiduciaries. We previously have noted that the Supreme

Court’s treatment in Firestone of the possible standards of review

that might apply to determinations rendered under ERISA-governed

plans “applies equally to the decisions of fiduciaries and the plan

administrator.” Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. , 898

F.2d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1990). 

10

subject to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the court

should have reviewed the Administrative Committee’s factual

determinations de novo. Delta responds that the court appropriately

examined the propriety of the Administrative Committee’s factual

and interpretive conclusions solely to ascertain whether the denial

of benefits in this instance constituted either an abuse of discretion

or an arbitrary and capricious resolution of Paramore’s claim.

ERISA does not provide a standard to review decisions of a

plan administrator. In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489

U.S. 101, 109 S. Ct. 948, 103 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1989), the Supreme

Court looked to the principles underlying trust law as largely defining

the role and responsibilities of a plan fiduciary or administrator;1

more specifically, the Court reasoned that, “where discretion is
11

conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power,

its exercise is not subject to control by the court except to prevent an

abuse by the trustee of his discretion.” Id. at 111, 109 S. Ct. at 954

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Applying these

principles, the Court established a range of standards that pertain to

benefits determinations under ERISA:

a denial of benefits challenged under §

1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de

novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the

administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority

to determine eligibility for benefits or to

construe the terms of the plan. . . . Of course,

if a benefit plan gives discretion to an

administrator or fiduciary who is operating

under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be

weighed as a facto[r] in determining whether

there is an abuse of discretion.

Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115, 109 S. Ct. at 956-57 (citations and

quotation marks omitted). 

Consistent with the Court’s directive in Firestone, we have

adopted three standards of review for plan interpretations: (1) de

novo, applicable where the plan administrator is not afforded
12

discretion, (2) arbitrary and capricious when the plan grants the

administrator discretion, and (3) heightened arbitrary and capricious

where there is a conflict of interest. Buckley v. Metropolitan Life,

115 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir.), rehearing denied, ___ F.3d ___ (11th

Cir. 1997) (citing Maracek v. BellSouth Services, Inc., 49 F.3d 702,

705 (11th Cir. 1995). 

Paramore and Delta agree that the plan at issue in this case

affords the Administrative Committee discretion to construe the

Plan’s terms. For instance, the Plan expressly mandates that

eligibility for disability benefits “shall be determined by the

Administrative Committee or its designees,” R1-1, Exh. A at 23, and

confers on the Administrative Committee the power 

[t]o interpret the Plan, and decide all questions

of eligibility of any Eligible Family Member to

participate in the Plan or to receive benefits

under it, its interpretation thereof in good faith

to be final and conclusive; [t]o determine the

amount, manner, and time of payment of

benefits which shall be payable to any

Employee or Dependent, . . . [and] to decide all

questions concerning the Plan; . . .
13

Id. at 48-49. 

Neither party contends that the Administrative Committee’s

interpretation of the plan’s terms is at issue here; rather, the parties

ask us to decide what constitutes the proper standard of review with

respect to the Administrative Committee’s factual determinations as

incorporated in its ultimate conclusion that Paramore was not

entitled to long-term disability benefits. 

Our court has not yet conclusively stated the standard

applicable to an ERISA plan administrator’s factual findings.

Significantly, we consistently have applied the arbitrary and

capricious standard to eligibility determinations – without necessarily

distinguishing the factual from the legal, interpretive bases of those

decisions – in all instances in which a plan vested the administrator

or fiduciary with discretion to interpret the plan’s terms or to resolve

questions of eligibility. See, e.g., Hunt v. Hawthorne Assoc., Inc.,

119 F.3d 888, 912 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The arbitrary and capricious

standard is the appropriate standard of review in this case
2

It is worth noting that our decisions involving the review of

administrative decisions under ERISA-governed plans do not

distinguish between the terms “arbitrary and capricious” and “abuse

of discretion.” See Jett, 890 F.2d at 1139 (“When conducting a

review of an ERISA benefits denial under an arbitrary and

capricious standard (sometimes used interchangeably with an abuse

of discretion standard), the function of the court is to determine

whether there was a reasonable basis for the decision. . . .”).

Although we hereinafter refer to the proper standard of review

regarding the Administrative Committee’s factual findings by the

term “arbitrary and capricious,” we recognize that, for purposes of

14

because the Plan contains express language conferring

discretionary authority upon the administrator to construe its

terms.”); Shannon v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 113 F.3d 208, 210 (11th

Cir. 1997) (“Denial of benefits under an ERISA plan that gives the

plan administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility

for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan is reviewed by the

district court for abuse of that discretion.”); Jett v. Blue Cross and

Blue Shield of Alabama, 890 F.2d 1137, 1139 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The

plan in this case does give the administrator of the plan discretionary

authority to determine eligibility for benefits and to construe the

plan’s terms. . . . Accordingly, the arbitrary and capricious standard

of review applies here.”) (internal citations, markings, and quotation

marks omitted).2

 Indeed, in only one case have we differentiated
evaluating a plan determination, there is no substantive

distinction between the terms “arbitrary and capricious” and “abuse

of discretion.”

15

explicitly between an administrator’s plan interpretations and factbased findings; our resolution of that case, however, rendered a

decision regarding the standard of review with respect to factual

determinations to be unnecessary. See Maracek, 49 F.3d at 707

(“We decline to decide which standard of review should be applied

for factual findings by a plan administrator as BellSouth’s decision

does not survive the most deferential standard of review.”). 

Other circuits that have addressed the question of the level of

deference to which factual findings of an ERISA plan administrator

are due uniformly have held that, where the plan confers

discretionary authority to determine eligibility and to construe the

plan’s terms, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies.

See, e.g., Rowan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 119 F.3d 433,

436 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The de novo standard of review applies only

when the plan does not explicitly vest fact-finding discretion in the
3

Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit has voted to rehear en banc

a case involving the denial of benefits under an ERISA plan. In

its order granting en banc rehearing, the court expressly noted

that it would consider and resolve the following issue: 

Whether the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court

in Firestone . . . , setting the standards for

the review of an administrator’s discretion in

making ERISA plan decisions, encompasses

decisions both of fact and of law, or whether

the Supreme Court’s decision should be limited

only to setting standards with regard to an

administrator’s decisions of legal

interpretation, while allowing unfettered

discretion in all cases with respect to

factual decisions.

Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 106 F.3d 146 (6th Cir. 1997) (en

banc).

16

plan administrator.”); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433,

438-39 (3rd Cir. 1997) (where broad discretion afforded plan

administrator was undisputed, court applied Supreme Court’s

analysis in Firestone and held that “the appropriate standard of

review . . . depends on whether the terms of this Plan grant the

Administrator discretion to act as a finder of facts. . . . [W]e conclude

that the Plan Administrator’s decision to deny . . . [long-term

disability] benefits should be reviewed under an arbitrary and

capricious standard.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).3

 Cf.

Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1562 (5th
17

Cir. 1991) (holding that, regardless of discretionary authority of plan

administrator to interpret terms of plan, “for factual determinations

under ERISA plans, the abuse of discretion standard of review is the

appropriate standard; that is, federal courts owe due deference to an

administrator’s factual conclusions that reflect a reasonable and

impartial judgment.”).

As noted, an examination of our own decisional law reveals that

we consistently have upheld application of the abuse of discretion

standard of review to determinations involving both plan

interpretations and factual findings under ERISA. The consistency

of our decisions in this arena strongly suggests that our court has

interpreted the Supreme Court’s analytical framework in Firestone,

particularly in regard to the application of trust law principles to the

level of deference due an administrator or fiduciary, to mean that,

where an ERISA plan grants discretion to a plan administrator to

interpret the express terms of the plan or to determine eligibility for

benefits, we review both the administrator’s construction of the plan
18

and concomitant factual findings with respect to each case under an

arbitrary and capricious standard of review. See Buckley, 115 F.3d

at 939 (“Given that the . . . Plan at issue here vests the

administrator with discretion, the district court properly employed

the arbitrary and capricious guidelines in judging the

administrator’s factual conclusions.”). We are cognizant of the fact

that other circuits to have decided this issue similarly have found the

arbitrary and capricious standard to obtain when the plan

unambiguously affords discretionary authority on the administrator.

We further find persuasive the Third Circuit’s observation in Mitchell

that “‘application’ of the Plan, like judicial ‘application’ of the law,

must encompass the resolution of factual disputes as well as the

interpretation of the governing provisions of the Plan.” Mitchell, 113

F.3d at 439. 

Thus, where the plan affords the administrator discretion, the

administrator’s fact-based determinations will not be disturbed if

reasonable based on the information known to the administrator at
19

the time the decision was rendered. See Hunt, 119 F.3d at 912

(“Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the court

seeks ‘to determine whether there was a reasonable basis for the

[administrator’s] decision, based upon the facts as known to the

administrator at the time the decision was made.’”) (quoting Jett, 890

F.2d at 1139). 

Applying this standard of review to the facts presented in this

case, we conclude that the Administrative Committee’s decision to

deny Paramore’s request for long-term disability benefits was

reasonable based on the facts known to the Administrative

Committee at all times relevant to this action. Under the Plan at

issue, an employee may qualify for long-term disability benefits if the

following conditions are met:

The Employee shall be eligible for Long Term

Disability provided he is disabled at that time as

a result of demonstrable injury or disease

(including mental or nervous disorders) which

will continuously and totally prevent him from

engaging in any occupation whatsoever for

compensation or profit, including part-time
20

work, but not including work performed in

connection with a rehabilitation program

approved by the Administrative Committee. . .

. The Employee shall be eligible for Long Term

Disability benefits so long as he remains

disabled in accordance with this subsection

and Section 4.01.

R1-1, Exh. A at 21.

As described earlier, the Administrative Committee initially

received conflicted information from Dr. Tewes, indicating that

Paramore was capable of sedentary work, and Dr. Lazarus, stating

that Paramore’s condition was likely to require long-term disability

due to her pain disorder. In an attempt to gather further information,

the Administrative Committee sought evaluations from several other

physicians, including a neurologist, Dr. Nicol, and a psychologist, Dr.

Wright. Although these doctors’ medical evaluations both contained

sporadic, internally inconsistent statements concerning both the

degree to which Paramore suffered from a physiological – rather

than stress-related – condition and the degree to which she was
4

For instance, Dr. Nicol’s report stated both that “[a]t the

present time it would be my professional opinion that [Paramore] is

disabled” and that ”I hope you will be able to get Ms Paramore some

ongoing psychological help so that she will [be] able to get back

to work full time in the not too distant future . . . “. Exh. 21.

Dr. Wright similarly noted that “[p]sychological testing results

with this patient suggest considerable stress, but very little

subjective psychological discomfort,” while at the same time

observed, “I could not rule out the possibility of a conversion

disorder . . . . [and] there were indications of organic brain

dysfunction on testing.” Exh. 17.

5

We find unpersuasive Paramore’s assertion that the district

court should have given greater weight to the Social Security

21

capable of returning to work on some basis,4 the Administrative

Committee’s function was to evaluate the various reports in tandem

and render a determination as to Paramore’s ability to engage “in

any occupation whatsoever for compensation or profit, including

part-time work.” See R1-1, Exh. A at 21. We cannot say that the

Administrative Committee’s appraisal of the available medical

information was unreasonable or inconsistent with the data with

which the Committee had been provided. Stated differently, we

conclude that there existed a reasonable basis to support the

Administrative Committee’s factual determination that, based on the

administrative record examined in its entirety, Paramore was not

entitled to long-term disability benefits.5

 The Administrative
Administration’s determination that Paramore was totally disabled.

Although a court may consider this information in reviewing a plan

administrator’s decision regarding eligibility for benefits under

an ERISA-governed plan, see Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d 784,

790 n.32 (11th Cir. 1994), an award of benefits by the Social

Security Administration is not dispositive of the issue before us,

particularly given the measure of deference that we afford a plan

administrator’s decision. Moreover, as noted by Delta, the

decision of the Social Security Administration to award benefits

was rendered after the Administrative Committee denied Paramore

benefits; that determination consequently was not available to the

Administrative Committee during the relevant time frame. 

22

Committee’s decision to deny benefits in this case thus was neither

arbitrary nor capricious.

III. CONCLUSION

Paramore asks that we reverse the district court’s order

granting summary judgment in favor of Delta. Paramore contends

that the district court applied an incorrect standard of review in

evaluating the Administrative Committee’s factual determinations

and improperly found these determinations to be supported by the

record. We conclude that (1) where an ERISA-governed plan

confers discretion on an administrator to interpret plan terms and

decide eligibility for benefits, we review the administrator’s fact-
23

based conclusions regarding eligibility to determine whether these

conclusions are arbitrary or capricious and (2) although the medical

reports submitted to the Administrative Committee in this case were

not a model of clarity, the Administrative Committee’s overall

evaluation of these reports was rational. Its factual determinations,

therefore, were neither arbitrary nor capricious. The district court’s

order granting summary judgment in favor of Delta is AFFIRMED.