CAMPAIGNING

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

(JAWS)

JOURNAL OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONAL ART AND CAMPAIGNING
2 

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CAMPAIGNING

Mission

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School

produces graduates that can create campaignquality concepts, plan for the employment of

all elements of national power, accelerate

transformation, succeed as joint force operational /

strategic planners and be creative, conceptual,

adaptive and innovative.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not

represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the

Department of Defense.
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CAMPAIGNING

12 January 2006 

Welcome to the inaugural issue of the journal of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School 

(JAWS). Campaigning is dedicated to joint planning practitioners of the combatant commands 

and Joint Staff. We are excited about the interest in this publication and hope that it fosters a 

sense of community for joint campaign planners throughout the world. Campaigning is first and 

foremost dedicated to providing planners with a source of insight into current issues regarding 

planning. It is our expressed desire that the interest in Campaigning will continue to grow due to 

the unique audience we serve and the contributions to our journal from its readers. 

In this volume of Campaigning, Dr. Milan Vego, the author of Operational Warfare has 

contributed a thought provoking piece on the recently approved six phase construct for campaign 

planning. Fred Stein, co-author of Net Centric Warfare and Hugh Kelley have contributed a 

work addressing the implications of Net Work Centric Warfare at the operational level. Planning 

practitioners from the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) have also taken time from their 

busy schedule to contribute to making this journal a success. Representing the PACOM 

Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), Brad Kaplan and Lieutenant Commander Dave 

Fields, describe the process used to integrate Effects Based Operations into the military decision 

making process. Also in this issue you will find the status of the awarding of the Master of 

Science in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy as well as recently published case studies and 

the JAWS war plan collection, all of which are available online. As you can see, this is a very 

exciting publication. 

It is our hope that Campaigning will continue to grow. Future issues will contain a letters to the 

editor section which is designed to provide a venue for planners who are too busy to write a 

complete article to respond or provide an alternative point of view on provocative issues. 

And most importantly, for this journal to succeed, we need your input. Campaigning clearly 

serves a unique population, joint campaign planners. There is not another journal that focuses 

exclusively on topics required by joint campaign planners to defeat our nation’s enemies. 

Campaigning will continue to focus on issues that are intended to serve as a resource for 

planners responsible for ensuring success in the Global War on Terrorism and protecting the 

United States and our way of life. 

If you would like to be placed on the electronic distribution list for Campaigning or would 

like to respond or comment on an article please email your request or comments to 

bollenbergc@jfsc.ndu.edu. 

Craig L. Bollenberg Sr. 

Colonel, USA 

Chairman 

Operational Art and Campaigning 
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CAMPAIGNING

5 Campaign Phasing and the New Joint Publication 5-0 

Dr. Milan Vego 

10 Network Centric Warfare at the Operational Level 

Fred Stein and Hugh Kelley 

21 Operational Net Assessment, Centers of Gravity, and Lines of 

Operation: Merging Existing and Emerging Doctrine 

Brad Kaplan and Dave Fields 

27 Doctrine Update: Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning 

Ed Byrne 

28 Deans Corner 

Fred Kienle 

28 Calendar of Events 

29 JAWS Operational Art and Campaigning Publications 

30 Update: Degree Granting Authority 
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Campaign Phasing and the New Joint Publication 5-0 

By 

Dr. Milan Vego 

The latest JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning Draft, Final Coordination (29 December 2005), like 

its third draft (10 August 2005), represents in many ways a radical departure from the versions of

the same document issued prior to 2003. The authors of the newest version of JP-5-0 apparently 

tried to retain traditional elements of operational planning while at the same time incorporating 

the so-called System of Systems Analysis (SoSA) to a military situation or what Effects Based

Operations (EBO) proponents call the “operational environment.” Center of Gravity (COG) is 

properly defined but the entire concept is made essentially useless by adopting a systems

approach to the COG. Another problem with JP 5-0 is that the authors replaced the four phases 

of campaign planning with six phases (see Figure 1). 

Figure 1: Notional OPLAN Phases Versus Level of Military Effort 

Despite their claims to the contrary, the new construct appears to be prescriptive rather than

descriptive. If actually applied in practice, the new phasing of a campaign will significantly limit 

the combatant commander’s ability to plan and execute a campaign based on strategic guidance

received from the national authorities and the situation. 

Phase 0

OPLAN activation Phases

OPLAN termination

Global Shaping

Enabling 

Civil Authority

Activities Dominating

Stabilizing 

Theater Shaping

Deter 

Phase I

Seize the 

Initiative 

Phase II

Dominate 

Phase III 

Stabilize 

Phase IV 

Enable 

Civil 

Authority

Phase V

Shape 

Phase 0 

 Shape 

OPLAN

xxxx 

Shaping

Activities OPLAN Seizing the 

Initiative xxxx 

Shaping

Deterring

Shaping Activities
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The new construct of campaign phasing as described in the third draft of the JP 5-0 is actually 

termed “Notional Operation Plan Phases Versus Level of Military Effort.” This is very odd 

because normally a campaign is divided into a number of phases without explicitly focusing on 

an OPLAN. Phase 0- Shaping (Global and Theater Shaping) as explained by the authors consists 

of joint force, interagency, and multinational operations aimed to “dissuade or deter potential 

adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies.” These actions are 

intended to “shape” perceptions of both adversaries and allies.i

 They must “adapt to a particular 

theater environment and may be executed in one theater in order to achieve an effect in another.” 

These actions are conducted continuously in support of “defined military and national strategic 

objectives.” So-called “global and theater shaping” measures are clearly the domain of national 

or alliance/coalition strategy and policy and not the combatant commander’s responsibility. This 

was finally recognized in the final coordination draft of JP 5-0, but not in the third draft.ii

Normally, a campaign is planned by the theater commander and is aimed to accomplish a single 

theater-strategic objective, not a national strategic objective. Likewise, Phase I-Deter is normally 

associated with political, diplomatic, military, economic, financial, informational and/or other 

measures and actions in a crisis. They are orchestrated by the national authorities and should not 

be part of campaign plan. A combatant commander also does not have the authority to order 

mobilization or strategic deployment. However, it is in this phase of a conflict or war, when 

deployment of selected combat forces might be planned (by a combatant commander) to produce 

a deterrent effect. In short, Phase 0 and Phase I as described in JP-5.0 should not be presented as 

part of an OPLAN as the authors did in both the third draft and final coordination draft of JP 5-0. 

 

Phase II-Seize the Initiative and Phase III-Dominate in the latest draft of JP 5-0 clearly imply 

that U.S. forces will always be on the offensive. Yet this might not be true in some situations, for 

instance, a conflict on the Korean Peninsula or in the western Pacific. United States forces 

and their coalition partners might find themselves first on the defensive before beginning a 

counteroffensive. Another major problem with suggested phasing of a campaign is that it blurs or 

totally obscures major phases of a campaign (pre-major combat, major combat, and post-major 

combat or post-conflict) with phases within a major combat phase and post-major combat phase. 

Phases within a major combat phase would be normally planned after each intermediateoperational objective (usually on land) is accomplished. In some cases they may be unplanned 

due to some higher than anticipated enemy resistance, inadequate logistical support and 

sustainment or even severe weather as happened during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 

Nowhere do the authors of the new phasing construct discuss the accomplishment and 

consolidation of the theater-strategic objective. Another major omission is the lack of any 

mention of conflict or war termination. This is surprising because they discuss in some detail 

what they call “termination” in the final coordination draft of JP 5-0.iii Why the term conflict or 

 

i

Joint Publication 5-0: Doctrine for Joint Operation Planning Draft, Final Coordination, 29 December 2005, p. IV37. 

ii Ibid., p. IV-37. 

iii Joint Publication 5-0: Doctrine for Joint Operation Planning Draft, Final Coordination, 29 December 2005, p. 

IV-8 thru IV-10. 
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war termination is not used is not explained. The use of the term “termination” only further 

confuses the issue. Among other things, the same term is used for the handover of authority to 

the indigenous government or an international body at the conclusion of stabilization and 

reconstruction. Conflict/war termination is one of the principal responsibilities of the national or 

coalition strategic leadership. It is a domain of strategy and policy. However, it is true that the 

combatant commander must plan for the operational aspects of conflict/war termination based on 

guidance received from higher political authority. Combatant commanders should prepare a 

separate plan for conflict/war termination dealing with its operational, not strategic or policy 

aspects. Obviously, such a plan must be closely related to the basic campaign plan. Lack of 

planning for conflict termination resulted in considerable difficulties in the post-conflict phase. 

Conflict termination is a bridge between the major combat phase and post-conflict phase. It is 

one of the key prerequisites for achieving the ultimately desired (strategic) end state. Successful 

conflict termination signified military victory; while political victory is not attained until the 

desired (strategic) end state is achieved. 

In generic terms, strategy and policy provide an overarching framework for campaign planning. 

A campaign provides, in turn, the operational framework for the subordinate service and 

functional component commanders in planning respective major operations. In generic terms, 

any conflict or war can be divided roughly into three distinctive but overlapping phases: prehostilities, hostilities, and post-hostilities. These phases at the same time provide a framework for 

both policy and strategy and campaign planning. The corresponding phases for a campaign are: 

pre-major combat, major combat, and post-major combat phase, respectively (see Figure 2). 

Strategy and policy are conducted without interruption throughout all phases of conflict or war. 

However, their role in the major combat phase is obviously less pronounced than in the other two 

phases. The strategic objective is accomplished in the major combat phase, while its 

consolidation takes place in the post-major combat phase. All phases of a campaign should 

comprise a seamless whole; otherwise the entire campaign plan would be highly fragmented. All 

the efforts and sacrifices made in the major combat phase can be squandered unless the strategic 

success is ensured in the post-major combat phase. Hence, in generic terms, a campaign should 

comprise separate but highly integrated plans for pre-major combat, major combat, and postmajor combat or post conflict phase. A combatant commander also has the responsibility to 

prepare a plan for conflict or war termination. 

Normally, mobilization, pre-deployment, and strategic and operational deployment take place 

during the pre-major combat phase. Deployment may also continue into the major combat phase. 

However, the major part of one’s forces should be fully deployed in the theater prior to the start 

of hostilities. In defense, it is more likely that the defender will continue deploying his combat 

forces well into the major combat phase. Initially this phase may consist of a single offensive 

phase or it can encompass an initial defensive phase followed by the offensive phase. The 
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STRATEGY & POLICY 

Figure 2: Campaign Planning Framework 

operational commander and his staff plan a series of major operations and some tactical actions

in this phase of a campaign. 

In case of a regional conflict, normally, a single campaign would result in a positive or negative 

outcome for one’s side. In that case, the post major combat phase would coincide with the postconflict phase. However, in case of a larger conflict, several campaigns might be required in 

order to accomplish the ultimate national or alliance/coalition strategic objective. Then, only the

last campaign would have a post-conflict phase, while all the others would end with the post 

major combat phase. 

The post-conflict phase, in turn, consists of several interrelated phases collectively called 

stabilization and reconstruction. The post-conflict phase ends with the so-called termination or 

transition phase when the occupying power hands over the authority to the elected indigenous 

government or to an international body. This point also signifies political victory. 

Conclusion 

Sound joint doctrine should be descriptive rather then prescriptive. Hence, doctrine should not 

prescribe the number of campaign phases, their designation or their content. Phases of a 

campaign cannot be predetermined and one should not rigidly lay down the number of phases

MILITARY POLITICAL

PRE-HOSTIL CONFLICT ITIES 

CONFLICT

STARTS

TERMINATION CONFLICT VICTORY VICTORY

CRISIS RESOLUTION/ RESOLUTION

STRATEGIC/ 

OPERATIONAL 

DEPLOYMENT 

USE OF NON-MILITARY 

INSTRUMENTS OF 

NATIONAL POWER 

ACCOMPLISHMENT

OF THE 

STRATEGIC 

OBJECTIVE 

CONSOLIDATION 

OF 

THE STRATEGIC 

OBJECTIVE 

DETERRENCE HOSTILITIES POST- HOSTILITIES 

PRE - (MAJOR) COMBAT (MAJOR) COMBAT POST- (MAJOR) COMBAT 

•STABILIZATION & 

•RECONSTRUCTION 

• TRANSITION (HANDOVER 

 OF AUTHORITY) 

• REDEPLOYMENT 

MAJOR OPERATIONS

ÆGROUND(LAND) 

ÆAIR(SPACE) 

ÆNAVAL(MARITIME) 

ÆSPECIAL FORCES

TACTICAL ACTIONS

DEFENSE-OFFENSIVE

CAMPAIGN PHASES

MOBILIZATION 

PRE-DEPLOYMENT 
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and their names. Joint doctrine should limit itself to describing three generic campaign phases in 

broad terms. The current attempts in U.S. joint doctrine to arbitrarily divide the campaign into 

six phases and prescribe a standardized format to any situation and any enemy are misguided. 

Old-fashioned and still valid terms such as strategy and policy should be used instead of the term 

global shaping or theater shaping. Major phases should be based on the strategic objectives to be 

accomplished, and not on some pre-determined, lofty-sounding but essentially meaningless terms 

such as “seize the initiative” and “dominate.” The number and designations of phases should be 

left to the discretion of the respective combatant commander. It is the mission and the situation 

alone that should determine the number, designation, and duration of each phase in a campaign. 

Copyright©2006 Dr. Milan Vego 

Dr. Milan Vego joined the Naval War College Joint Military Operations

faculty in August 1991. He is the author of Operational Warfare as well 

as numerous books and articles published in professional journals and 

magazines. Dr. Vego's most recent book is due to be published this spring. 
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CAMPAIGNING

Network Centric Warfare at the Operational Level 

By 

Fred Stein 

Hugh Kelley 

Introduction: 

As American Forces engage in 21st century warfare, success depends on their ability to leverage 

the advances in information technology. Early innovators coined the term “network centric 

warfare” to describe a form of warfare that reflects the new relationships that advanced 

technology enables between decision makers, sensors, and effectors on the battlefield; more 

recently, the term has been shortened to “netcentric.” While it is clearly too soon to fully 

understand the impact of the Information Age on warfare, recent events in Iraq can help the 

Armed Forces to understand what trends are developing. 

The Office of Force Transformation recently sponsored a series of case studies focusing on the 

effects of information-intensive approaches on the battlefield. The study topics include the use of 

information in coalition warfare in NATO, the early Stryker Brigade Combat Team at JRTC, the 

3rd Infantry in OIF, Western Iraq, and air-to-air combat; ongoing studies examine urban warfare, 

the Stryker Brigade in combat, and others to include non combat examples like SARS. The 

Army War College (AWC) has also conducted a study that explores the impact of information on 

combat actions. Since the AWC focuses on the operational and strategic levels of war, this study 

may be of particular interest. The present article summarizes the AWC study, which was 

performed by The MITRE Corporation. It draws directly from three major sources: 

1. USATRADOC Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), “On Point: The US Army 

in Operation Iraqi Freedom (through 1 May 2003),” Aug 2004 

2. USAWC Directorate for Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations (DMSPO), “Joint 

Force Land Component Commander Handbook,” Coordination Draft, 2 June 2005 

 

3. Interview with LTG McKiernan 

Readers should refer to these sources for additional details and explanations not covered in this 

paper. 

New Processes 

Network centric operations (NCO) leverage the new relationships among sensors, decision 

makers, and effectors (weapon platforms). This leveraging results in tighter sensor-to-shooter 

links at the tactical level. NCO can also provide the ability to manage operational tempo, thereby 

allowing a higher degree of operational flexibility and response. As more warfighters experience 

the impact of advanced information technology on the battlefield they develop innovative ways 

to apply its capabilities. This learning process is reflected in the development of new positions 
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and organizations. For example, during the advance on Baghdad both V Corps and 3rd ID created 

the position of Information or Knowledge Officer, which combined some of the responsibilities 

of the Chief of Staff with those of the G2, G3, and G6. Some of the new duties include helping 

the commander understand the systems available to provide him with information, the 

characteristics and limitations of these systems, and how each system’s information can be 

displayed, distributed, and – most important – exploited. 

NCO depends on the existence of an information infrastructure grid that supports information 

sharing and on effective management of that infrastructure. It requires “new thinking” in terms 

of: 

• How to organize sensors into temporary networks to provide information advantage, 

• How to organize combat units and weapons platforms that exploit the information advantage, 

• How to organize staffs to exploit new forms of information sharing, 

• How to exploit new information flows to support the commander’s critical information 

requirements, and 

• How to exploit new information to answer the commander’s questions about actions that 

must be taken rather than updating him on what has taken place. 

US Forces at all levels of command, from the Joint Theater Commander down to the tank 

commander, have already internalized and applied some of that “new thinking” during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The remainder of this paper reviews how the Combined Forces Land 

Component Command (C/JFLCC) and its commander, LTG David McKiernan, translated NCO 

tenets and characteristics into new organizations, processes, and procedures and applied them at 

the operational level of war which he conducted in support of the overall strategic plan 

developed by General Franks. This paper will focus on the changes that LTG McKiernan made 

in his staff to utilize the new information capabilities focuses in particular on the approaches 

used to organize staffs so that they could exploit new forms of information sharing. 

Organization and Reorganization of the C/JFLCCiv

1. Operational Requirements 

The design of the command and control (C2)v architecture plays an extremely important role in 

any campaign, particularly in large-scale ground combat operations.vi The C2 structure must 

remain the purview of the Joint Force Commander (JFC) who, with his staff, must determine the 

 

iv NOTE: Term C/JFLCC, C/JFLCC, and C/C/JFLCC are essentially the same for purposes of this paper. The 

difference in meaning – presence or absence of joint or coalition forces – is becoming moot in 21st century warfare. v

 Sometimes the term C4 is used rather than C2; one must be very cautious when doing this. 

vi p73, On Point: The US Army in OIF (through 1 May 2003), USA TRADOC CALL, Aug 2004 (hereafter referred 

to as “On Point”)
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relationship between the traditional hierarchical organization, the emerging communities of 

interest (COIs), and the data and network structure provided by information engineers working 

for the G6 and G2. This set of relationships is even more vital in joint and combined operations, 

where the social and cultural domains will affect the sharing of information even as the G2 and 

G6 work through the intelligence and signal issues. 

The JFC establish functional component commands to integrate planning, reduce the traditional 

normal span of control, and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information flow, unity 

of effort, weapon systems management, component interaction, and control over the scheme of 

maneuver. JFC considerations when forming a joint land force component include:vii

• Expected duration of the mission, i.e., long enough to merit increased lead time to staff the 

organization, train personnel, and establish C4 and other support systems. 

• Anticipated phasing of land operations, e.g., the simultaneous or sequential introduction of 

land forces into the theater of operations. 

• Deployment of land forces, e.g., contiguous or non-contiguous areas of operation 

• Requirements for one land force to support another land force, e.g., Army logistical support 

to Marine forces operating inland. 

• Amount, level of intensity, and coordination required for other joint force components’ 

support to the land forces. 

• Composition and participation of land forces from other nations – multinational land force 

operations. 

• Desire of the establishing JFC to simplify C2 for planning and execution of joint force land 

operations, particularly coordinated and concurrent multinational and interagency operations 

in a joint operational area. 

The C/JFLCC plans, synchronizes, executes, and assesses major land operations that accomplish 

JFC campaign objectives.viii It prepares a supporting joint land operations plan that provides the 

intent, concept of operations, and supporting details to achieve land force unity of effort. The 

C/JFLCC directs current land operations while continuing to plan and prepare for future land 

operations with the JFC and other component commanders.ix 

In DESERT STORM the CENTCOM commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, elected to 

command the ground operations himself, without a land component commander to integrate 

ground operations. By contrast, for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), CENTCOM commander 

General Tommy Franks decided to establish a C/JFLCC to command the operations of all Army, 

Marine, and coalition ground forces then envisioned for a ground war in Iraq on 20 November 

2001, Franks issued a directive establishing Third US Army, based at Fort McPherson, Georgia, 

 

vii Sec 1a, C/JFLCC Handbook, USAWC, Coordinating Draft, 2 June 2005 (hereafter referred to as “C/JFLCC 

Handbook”) 

viii Tab A to Annex A, C/JFLCC Handbook 

ix P19, C/JFLCC Primer, USAWC, April 2000 
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as the C/JFLCC. General Frank’s order gave Third Army the basis and the authority to organize 

and staff the headquarters as a C/JFLCC.x

 In the winter and spring of 2001–02, prior to OIF, 

Third Army served as the C/JFLCC for OEF in Afghanistan and throughout the region. Much of

the Third Army Headquarters (HQ) was deployed at its forward command post at Camp Doha, 

Kuwait, but by late spring 2002 had redeployed to Fort McPherson. Third Army’s organization 

was the traditional structure of administrative, intelligence, operations, and logistics displayed in

Figure 1. 

Figure 1: C/JFLCC/Third Army Organization during Operation Enduring Freedom (Feb 2002) xi

LTG David McKiernan assumed command of Third Army/C/JFLCC on 7 September 2002. 

Commissioned in 1972, he had commanded a tank battalion, an armored brigade, and the 1st

Cavalry Division. He served with VII Corps in DESERT STORM, where he ran the corps

tactical command post, and with NATO as G2/G3 (Intelligence and Operations) in the Allied

Rapid Reaction Corps, where he learned NATO and coalition staff procedures. LTG McKiernan

applied this experience and understanding of both coalition and joint warfare to the task of 

reorganizing the C/JFLCC for OIF.xii 

C/C/JFLCC theater-wide functions vary from theater to theater and operation to operation. The 

capabilities to perform these functions normally reside in the joint force Service components, 

government and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and/or host-nation resources.xiii 

 

x

 Pp 73-4, On Point xi Org Chart from Monograph 1-03, U.S. Army Forces Central Command In Afghanistan And The Arabian Gulf

During Operation Enduring Freedom: 11 Sep 2001-11 Mar 2003, John A. Bonin, Colonel, USA (Ret.) Scholar-in 

Residence The Army Heritage Center Foundation. xii Ibid

xiii Xx, C/JFLCC Handbook
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OEF was executed by a relatively small, US-only, multi-agency (but Army dominant) force 

supporting and supported by paramilitary tribal forces against predominantly paramilitary forces 

and terrorists. By contrast, OIF would be executed by a large US joint force fighting as a 

member of a coalition force against a fairly substantial conventional force as well as a sizable 

paramilitary force. LTG McKiernan therefore concluded that the C/JFLCC running the ground 

forces for OEF would have to change for OIF. 

It was clear to LTG McKiernan that while C/C/JFLCC might look like a traditional hierarchy 

organization it had to function differently. In particular, it had to allow COIs to share information 

across traditional barriers – a capability that took on even greater importance as the enemy 

shifted from the heavy divisions to a guerrilla/terrorist war on the main supply lines. The ability 

of McKiernan’s staff to operate in a cross-functional manner played a key role in providing him 

with the ability to identify and execute necessary next steps on the battlefield. 

2. Operational Functions 

LTG McKiernan determined that the projected characteristics of the Iraqi war and the C4I 

capabilities emerging from the DOD’s force transformation required a reorganization of the 

C/JFLCC away from the traditional structure of administrative, intelligence, operations, and 

logistics and toward the operational functions that C/JFLCC would perform during the 

impending war with Iraq.xiv Using the existing staff sections as a starting point, LTG McKiernan 

directed the staff to organize around the functions of C4, movement and maneuver, intelligence, 

fires and effects, logistics (sustainment), and protection. This functional alignment would enable 

the commander and senior staff to maintain more “holistic situational awareness” across the 

contributing operating systems.xv 

3. Operational Approach and Procedures 

LTG McKiernan focused the reorganization of C/JFLCC/Third Army HQ on a combined 

objective-based, effects-based operational approach supported by moving staff officers and 

NCOs from the traditional staffs organization to the newly formed functional organizations and 

procedures that would promote the information sharing, collaboration, and synchronization 

necessary to achieve execution superiority over Iraqi military and paramilitary forces.xvi Today’s 

information system, data, and network topographies often mirror the organizational hierarchies, 

which allows for a very stable network but hinders agility, i.e., the ability to adjust to changing 

force structures. The C/JFLCC implemented internal and external processes and procedural 

changes for each operational function in each staff section, between staff sections, and with 

external staff sections – CENTCOM, C/JFACC, C/JFMCC, V Corps, I MEF and 1 UK. These 

procedural innovations and adjustments addressed: 

 

xiv Brief “Forming the LCC,” LTG D. McKiernan USAWC DMSPO, Course Material – Joint Land Component 

Commanders Course, 2004-05 

xv JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, Mar 2004 

xvi Interview, LTG D. McKiernan, FORSCOM HQS, Ft. McPherson, 13 July 2004 
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• Planning 

− Using a systems approach to build a common, shared, holistic perspective of the 

operational environment to support effects-based planning.

− Implementing adaptive planning that adjusts and adapts to key strategic and theater 

variables according to their effect on the operational environment while remaining 

focused on CFC objectives.

• Collaboration and Coordination 

− Establishing interoperable situation awareness capability with higher, lower, and 

adjacent activities to ensure a common understanding of the operational situation and the 

commander’s intent and mission progress. 

− Establishing coordination cells and synchronization boards with permanent membership 

from all affected/affecting functional organizations to ensure and facilitate harmonious 

execution of supported and supporting activities.xvii

• Decision Cycle 

− Synchronizing C/JFLCC battle rhythm with the rhythms of higher, lower, and adjacent 

activities. 

− Altering traditional focus of battle assessments from the current SITREP to an effectsbased assessment of recent decisions and collection and fusion of multi-sourced 

information to support impending decisions 

− Implementing effects-based battle staff drills to ensure appropriate and timely responses 

to anticipated events.

• Communications 

− Integrating and synchronizing a

Changing the flow of information to accomplish the C/JFLCC’s complex missions.

ll systems as a baseline for a common operating picture. 

−

Figure 2 shows the result of this reorganization. On the surface, principal staff responsibilities 

General Franks command style. 

 

and authority remained essentially the same. What changed was that ad hoc collaboration and 

coordination between staffs were replaced by a deliberate arrangement to ensure each operational 

requirement was planned, coordinated, and executed in a holistic fashion that addressed all 

aspects of that requirement. While the C/JFLCC reorganization may appear more evolutionary 

than revolutionary, the commander’s willingness to establish boards and centers as venues for 

planning, coordinating, collaborating, synchronizing, and managing cross-functional activities 

required the courage and determination to break barriers at his command level as well as 

understanding that his information flow to senior command levels would have to change. The 

understanding that these changes in the C/JFLCC organization might impact negatively on the 

communications flow from this headquarters to the higher indicates a strong understanding and 

support of the higher headquarters. This is in keeping with what the authors understood of 

xvii Interview, LTG D. McKiernan, FORSCOM HQS, Ft. McPherson, 13 July 2004
16 

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Figure 2: C/JFLCC/Third Army Functions and Processes 

The remainder of is new functional 

cus to develop and implement processes and procedures that facilitated information sharing, 

perational level for a combined / joint campaign has some unique imperatives: 

is the degree to which the C/C/JFLCC’s intent

the land component. No amount of communications 

 

this paper will examine how the C/JFLCC used th

fo

collaboration, and synchronization. These, in turn, enabled and enhanced the C/JFLCC’s battle 

command of complex, simultaneous coalition/joint operations during OIF.

Planningxviii

Planning at the o

1. Commander’s Intentxix The single strongest determinant of success in C2 

is articulated and understood throughout

assets or manipulation of command relationships will adequately substitute for a clear statement 

of commander’s intent that is germane to the campaign, precisely articulated, and widely 

understood. The commander’s intent anchors collective efforts in an increasingly complex, 

ambiguous or conflicting, data-rich, and fast-paced operational environment. Equally important, 

this intent frames the boundaries for planning and action by subordinates, thus enabling their 

development of intent and operational designs. 

xviii Chapter 14, C/JFLCC Handbook

xix Chapter 2, C/JFLCC Handbook
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Intent must address not only pending combat operations, but also what the C/JFLCC envisions 

for the complete depth of land operations that will support the success of the other components 

nd, most specifically, the JFC’s campaign. Therefore, early in the planning process, the 

/JFLCC must determine the major tasks, methods, and desired end state for joint force land 

2. Whiteboard capabilities that allow the staffs and subordinates to meet and share maps 

s can be posted in a rich 

rmat;

ular forces were much more of an issue than regular 

rces. 

st be completely woven into the plan 

nd not be mere operational intersections where friction may occur. Changing command 

ixes, and the participation of coalition members, other government 

intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations in land component 

 the campaign plan can vary from 

difficulty of a given course of action to eliminating it as a feasible 

ariables of concern during OIF planning included: 

 infiltration of evildoers 

− ailable with (1, 2, or 3) divisions on G-Day 

a

C

operations. Further, the C/JFLCC must decide how to communicate intent to ensure clarity. The 

commander has several tools available to assist in this endeavor: 

 1. Video teleconferences in which the commander and his staff provide updates in real 

time, “face to face,” without the need to travel to the command center; 

and operational concepts in real time; and 

 3. Web pages, where the commander’s intent and expectation

fo i.e., with links to information generated by other staffs and commanders. During the 

march to Baghdad one of the most challenging problems was how to secure the lines of 

communications. It was apparent that irreg

fo These irregular forces both foreign and domestic faded into the fabric of the communities 

and used civilians as shields. LTG Mc Kiernan used the tools listed above to make his 

commander’s intent on how to deal with this problem. His use of these information tools and the 

reserve forces of the 82nd Air Borne allowed the lines of communications to remain open and the 

supply lines to flow necessary supplies to the front lines. 

2. Transitions 

Transitions between phases in the land operation plan mu

a

relationships, force m

organizations and both 

operations all mandate focused, clearly defined objectives. 

Adaptive Planning 

The C/JFLCC had to continuously monitor and assess the dynamic variables of the theater and 

the mission. The potential impact of these variables on

increasing the level of 

approach. Some theater v

− Iraq (will/will not) employ WMD 

− Iraqi (will/will not) flood the Euphrates Valley before coalition forces reach Al Kut or 

An Najaf 

− Syria and Iran (will/will not) allow

− Theater access through Turkey (will/will not) be obtained until C-Day 

V US Corps will be av
18 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

− Iraq receives (2 or 4) days warning prior to G-day. 

C/JFLC according to their

effects on the operational environment and the ability of the land forces to accomplish the 

mission. The so-called “adaptive planning process” was actually the military decision-making 

process s collaboration with, the planning 

C campaign planning adjusted and adapted to these key variables

executed iteratively, in parallel with, and in continuou

activities of the CFC/JFC, the other component commands (JFACC, JFMCC, JSOC), and their 

assigned forces (V Corps, I MEF, 1 UK). Adaptive planning remained focused on CFC 

objectives while responding to strategic and operational changes as they occur. 

 

tuality. They

meet any number of possible strategic event stances. This process

included enabling the land that any branch can be 

flows, which include security levels and culture as well as bandwidth. 

he G2 and G3 advised the commander about any security risks and promote policies that 

Figure 3: C/JFLCC Adaptive Planning 

The C/JFLCC developed “branches” or contingency plans for each significant even

were continuously reviewed and revised as required to provide current and viable alternatives to 

s and operational circum

forces to maintain a flexible posture so

executed on short notice. 

This very complex set of decision loops were linked by information systems and connected by 

communication systems – a key aspect of NCO. The staff must therefore understand the 

restrictions on information

T

allowed the vital information flow while retaining the necessary level of security. The

commander and the chief of staff were on constant guard against allowing tradition to restrict the

flow and sharing of information. 

The issue of bandwidth can perhaps be addressed best if the commander decrees that it will be

treated as a “Class of Supply” so that it receives the same consideration during operational 
19 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

discussions as the other vital classes of supply. This will help focus the staff to allocate 

e of NCO conducted at the operational level during OIF. 

and his staff used more information systems and more connectivity then ever 

an, coordinate and execute the battle plan in support of General Franks. What 

en ever before.

act outside the norm. For 

•

erations, but also what the commander envisions throughout the complete

•

mon AO are a significant force multiplier. 

ncreasingly integrated 

•

interagency and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), all must focus on a 

bandwidth in line with the mission 

Summary 

Below is a summation of the natur

LTG McKiernan

before seen to pl

does this teach us about modern warfare and how does this relate to the concepts of NetworkCentric Operations? 

• Modern staffs will have to deal with even more complexity and multilevel staff

coordination th

• Information systems can assist to reduce this level of complexity by integrating and 

displaying information in ways never before available to the commander and staff. 

• Bandwidth must be considered as a class of supply and the ability to provide down trace 

to subordinate commanders is key as well as the ability to monitor and understand the 

flow up to superior commanders to include the White House. 

• The commander must understand the human dimension of his staff and the impact new 

technology will have on it. He must allow more flexibility in their formations of 

communities of interest while directing them to think and

example, the formation of the synchronization boards requiring cross cutting

coordination. 

Commander’s Intent remains essential–it anchors collective efforts in an increasingly 

complex, ambiguous, data-rich, and conflicting environment. Intent must address not

only combat op

depth of the campaign. 

Reality of “shared battlespace” on the ground increases the need for greater coordination 

among functional components–effective, close integration of land, air, and special

operations within a com

• C4I connectivity and C2 agility (command and support relationships) are key–the LCC 

must take the lead in integrating and synchronizing all systems as a baseline for a 

common operational picture. Battle command systems must be i

into both training and operations. Digital skills for staff and leaders are absolutely 

essential. 

“Transitions” must be completely woven into the campaign construct–changing C2 

relationships, force mix, increasing participation with LCC operations by and with 

coalition,

common, clearly defined objective with supporting tasks. 
20 

CAMPAIGNING

he OIF mission of the C/JFLCC required a highly networked staff that was linked to both 

igher and lower level staffs and functioned both in the traditional hierarchical manner as 

ell as in a cross functional manner. As more and more commanders and staff address the 

creased complexity of today’s warfare and have to deal with the large amounts of

T

h

w

in

information and interrelationship the model from this C/JFLCC should be very useful. 

Fred Stein, a retired Colonel of the United States Army is currently

MITRE’s Senior Principal Engineer for Network Centric Warfare and the

Director of Operations for Ft. Hood. He co-authored the book “Network 

Centric Warfare” with David Alberts and John Garstka and has a second 

book on Network Centric Warfare scheduled for release this year. 

Hugh Kelley also retired as a Colonel from the United States Army. He 

currently serves as a Principal Engineer in MITRE's Department for 

Army Enterprise Systems Engineering. 

Winter 2006 
21 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

Operational Net Assessment, Centers of Gravity, and 

Lines of Operation: Merging Existing and Emerging 

Doctrine 

By 

Brad Kaplan 

Dave Fields 

Introduction: 

Operational Net Assessment (ONA), a key enabler of Effects Based Operations (EBO), enhances 

understanding of a potential adversary (Red) or intended party (Green or Gray). However, the 

ONA process does not fit neatly into the current joint planning process. While very similar to 

the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB), ONA databases and Systems of 

System Analysis (SoSA) are not doctrinally integrated into the JIPB. Thus operational planners 

must make a specific effort early in the planning cycle to integrate ONA and SoSA or risk a 

failure to properly incorporate the Effects-Nodes-Action-Resource (ENAR) links, the essence of 

EBO. 

ONA consists of a database of pre-analyzed information based on processed intelligence and 

collaborative subject matter expert input. ONA supports effects-based planning and assessment, 

provides a range of options for application of the elements of national power, and supports risk 

assessment by associating primary, secondary, tertiary, and unintended effects with these actions. 

While ONA is a key enabler of Effects-Based Operations (EBO), current approaches to nodal 

identification and analysis do not fully leverage analysis that is conducted during the military 

decision making process (MDMP). This paper explores one method to better leverage the Center 

of Gravity (COG) analysis conducted during Mission Analysis to improve ONA support and to 

describe how ENAR links can be used when developing lines of operation (LOO).

Mission Analysis and the Effects-Based Planning

The planning cycle begins with the Mission Analysis Phase. This phase provides the general 

focus for the development of the ONA Database, as well as the focus for a Red and Green Cell 

analysis though the development of Objectives. Analysis of End State and the Objectives 

developed to support it are fed directly into the Priority Effects List (PEL). The PEL and the 

ONA are used to derive ENAR/2U linkages, which ensure the ENAR links support the 

commander’s Objectives. The Red-Green Analysis, also a product of End State Analysis, 

supports COG analysis but currently has no direct input to the ONA process or ENAR/2U 

linkages. 
22 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

As can be seen in Figure 1, the current EBO process, ONA development does not directly 

leverage either the COG analysis conducted by the Red-Green Cell, or the LOO developed by 

planners. By conducting these processes in isolation from one another there is risk that 

Objectives, PEL, and ENAR links will not focus on the adversary’s COG resulting in a 

fundamental flaw in campaign design. 

COA Development, Analysis 

and Selection 

Mission Analysis 

End State 

Analysis

Red, Green 

Analysis ENAR/2U 

ONA

PEL

Objectives 

COG 

Analysis

Lines of 

Operation 

Effects-Based 

Plan 

Plan Development 

Figure 1. CONPLAN Development and Effects Based Planning. 

Current Nodal Analysis 

ONA is based on a System of Systems Analysis (SoSA) approach that explores the relationship 

between Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) nodes.

After determining a focus area, SoSA analysts conduct all-source data mining to identify the 

nodes (a person, place, or thing) that will provide the foundation for each system study. This 

analysis consists of a determination of the strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, relationships 

and links between key nodes in each of the systems. This data is then used to support both 

effects-based planning and effects-based assessment. However, since this process is not tied to

current doctrinal planning processes, it is often conducted in isolation from both JIPB and 

Mission Analysis causing great potential for a disconnect between ENAR links developed by 

SoSA and objective-tasks developed by planners. See Figure 2. 
23 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

Relationships 

Weaknesses

Key Nodes 

Strength

s

Political Military Infrastructure 

Vulnerability

Information

Links 

Figure 2. ONA and the SoSA Approach. 

COG Analysis and Development 

COG analysis attempts to identify an adversary’s primary sources of strategic and operational 

power, its Critical Capabilities (CC), Critical Requirements (CR), and Critical Vulnerabilities

(CV) associated with these sources and/or capabilities (Figure 3). Unlike the detailed nodal

analysis of ONA, COG analysis tends to be higher order, identifying general characteristics of a 

COG. COG analysis and ONA are not currently conducted in a complementary fashion, though 

alignment of these efforts will focus each group on pertinent adversary characteristics that 

pay great benefit in later stages of planning. COG analysis helps focus and shape the ONA and 

SoSA process by providing the operational view of enemy capabilities. In turn, the ONA 

process should provide planners with a detailed perspective that will reduce speculation and 

drive a more disciplined approach to COG analysis. 

CR 

COG Links 

CR CR CR CR CR

CC CC CC

Center of Gravity

Critical Capability

Critical requirement

Critical vulnerability

Figure 3. Center of Gravity Analysis.
24 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

LOO Analysis and Development 

LOOs represent the conceptual path from actions to effects to the Commander’s objectives. Each 

line can be associated with a specific component of national power (i.e. Diplomatic, Information, 

Military, and Economic) or with critical functions (security, governance, economic development, 

etc.) that provide a logical progression of major activities or establishment of critical conditions

required for a successful operation. Points along the LOO (major tasks, decisive points, or 

critical battlespace conditions) represent key events or functions necessary to attain the desired 

effects, objectives, or endstate (Figure 4) and may also be used as measures of effectiveness and 

performance necessary for assessing the execution of an effects based plan. By using points 

along the LOO to measure performance and effectiveness, the LOO can be tailored to support the 

commander’s decision-making process by relating the actions performed to his decision points 

and the progress of the entire campaign. 

Time 

Diplomatic EN

D

S

T

A

TE or Objective

Information 

Military 

Economic 

Decisive points,

tasks, or conditions 

Figure 4. LOO Development.

Improving ONA Support for CONPLAN Development and 

Execution 

At SJFHQ Pacific, ONA support during CONPLAN development is being improved by using the 

COG analysis process to shape the ONA nodal analysis and provide feedback to planners as they 

evaluate a COG’s CC, CR, and CV. In this fashion, the planner’s COG analysis helps to form a

bridge between the Intelligence Community’s JIPB and the ONA process at SJFHQ. By

identifying specific nodes related to the COG analysis early in the process, operational planning 

teams (OPT) are able to conceptualize potential node-action links that shape Concept 

Development and focus it on stated objectives. Conceptualizing the node-action links early also 

helps to more clearly define desired effects to achieve the commander’s objectives and end 

states. As Plan Development continues, ENAR links are used to help derive initial LOO, which 

in turn are fed back into the ONA process to ensure all critical nodes associated with movement 
25 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

along the LOO are properly analyzed and accounted for. This iterative process improves

analytical efficiency by more clearly defining areas of interest and reducing the total number of 

nodes in the ONA Database. Most importantly, the cross walk between Mission Analysis and

ONA aligns the Planning and SoSA cell efforts, acquaints planners with a more holistic view of 

the adversary, and makes the nodes identified more directly relevant to the COA and Plan

Development process. A conceptualization of how COG analysis can be used to shape ONA 

nodal analysis is provided in Figure 5. 

Cross-PMESII Nodal Analysis COG Analysis 

Figure 5. Using COG Analysis to Shape ONA Nodal Analysis.

Grouping of nodes forming a 

critical capability

Infrastructure Military 

Links 

CR CV

CC 

Focused COG 

Nodal 

Analysis

Disciplined 

COG 

analysis 

LOO’s are also being used as templates for the construction of ENAR/2U links. The actions 

associated with these links would not only support the achievement of desired effects, they also

support attainment of decisive points (critical fights and functions in the military LOO). Again, 

by leveraging the analysis used to develop LOO, the ONA team can improve efficiency, reduce 

the number of ENAR links, and ensure that the links that are developed are of direct relevance to 

the war fighter. A conceptualization of how Lines of operation and decisive points can be used to 

shape the development of ENAR links is provided in Figure 6. 

ENAR link identifies 

action supporting both 

effect and decisive points

ENAR link supports 

desired effect

ENAR links identify resources 

to carry out the LOO 

Time 

Diplomatic 

Information Military 

Effects

ENAR links identify nodes 

and actions (tasks) 

appropriate for LOO 

ENAR link identifies action 

supporting tasks, decisive 

points, and effects 

EN

D

S

T

A

TE or Objectiv

Economic e 

Figure 6. Using LOO to Shape Development of ENAR links. 
26 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

Summary and Recommendations 

ONA is a key enabler for EBP and execution. The current SoSA approach to ONA nodal

development fails to leverage COG and LOO analysis conducted during the MDMP cycle. As a 

result, a significant amount of time is expended analyzing nodes and developing ENAR links 

that may never be used by operational planners. By modifying the effects-based process to 

leverage COG and LOO analysis (Figure 7), this approach promises to shorten the amount of 

analytical time spent on node and ENAR link development, reduce the number of nodes and 

ENAR links in the database, and make the ONA made more relevant to operational planners and 

war fighters. 

End State 

Analysis

Red, 

Green 

Analysis

ENAR/2U 

Mission Analysis COA Development, 

Analysis and Selection 

ONA

PEL

Lines of 

Operations 

Objectives 

COG 

Analysis

EffectsBased Plan

Plan Development

Figure 7. Revised Effects-Based Process using COG Analysis and LOO.

Mr. Brad Kaplan and LCDR Dave Fields are assigned to the Standing 

Joint Force Headquarters, United States Pacific Command. Mr. Kaplan is 

the Information Superiority Chief and Effect Working Group leader. 

LCDR Fields is the Political-Military Plans Officer and a 2005 graduate 

of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School 
27 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

Doctrine Update 

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning 

By 

Ed Byrne

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, is nearing completion of its major overhaul, and 

should be on the streets in April 2006. In the 11 years since the last revision, our nation has 

planned, executed, and gleaned lessons from numerous worldwide operations, and is indeed in 

the midst of a Global War on Terror that promises to extend to at least another generation. The 

proposed version of JP 5-0 promises to better reflect the planning process and requirements 

necessary to respond to our new, dynamic, strategic environment. 

The current 1995 version was an incremental improvement from the Cold War era, modifying a 

planning process designed to address a monolithic threat to include how to conduct Operation 

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Today’s strategic landscape requires military

planners to rapidly respond to multiple threats across the globe, and our civilian leadership must 

be able to provide cogent and dynamic strategic guidance based upon resource constraints within 

our government and our allies. This strategic guidance will be heavily influenced by the ability 

of the joint force commander to rapidly provide the President and Secretary of Defense high 

fidelity, executable plans with multiple options. 

Taking lessons learned from the emerging Global Force Management process; Operational 

Availability studies; the adaptive planning initiative; the Quadrennial Defense Review; and 

Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM, the JP 5-0 joint 

working group is putting the finishing touches on a planning document that promises to be more 

relevant to the joint force planner. 

Significant changes include: addition of the new Strategic Communication planning guidance;

incorporation and consolidation of Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)

contingency (deliberate) and crisis action planning; initiation of and amplification on the 

adaptive planning (AP) process; enhanced interagency and multinational planning 

considerations; regional expertise and language requirements; and the six-phase campaign 

construct. 

The JP 5-0 joint working group is scheduled to meet one final time from 31 January through 2 

February 2006. Although the draft has been out for planner coordination for some time, all 

recommendations for improvement are welcome and encouraged. For a copy of the latest draft, 

or to provide comments, please contact LTC Ed Byrne, USA, at the Joint Operational War Plans 

Division, J7, the Pentagon, at commercial 703-571-0969, or DSN 671-0969; e-mail at 

Edward.byrne@js.pentagon.mil. 

LTC Ed Byrne is currently assigned to the Joint Staff, J7, Joint Operational 

War Plans Division as a Regional Planner for U.S. CENTCOM and U.S. 

STRATCOM and serves as the Lead Agent for JP 5.0. 
28 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

Deans Corner 

By 

Colonel Fred Kienle 

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) continues progress and growth with the help of 

its faculty, students, alumni and faithful supporters throughout the professional military 

education, planning and greater defense community. Class 05-06, with 29 students, is 

capitalizing on the student feedback, graduate recommendations and many lessons learned from

the first year of the JAWS program. The addition of four interagency students in Class 05-06 (2 

Department of State, 1 Defense Intelligence Agency, 1 National Security Agency) has already

proven to be quite beneficial by ensuring interagency considerations are continually woven into 

all seminar discussions. Once again the Services have endeavored to select JAWS students well 

suited to undertake the rigorous study and inquiry resident in the JAWS program. 

Our current class is rapidly approaching the mid-point of the JAWS academic year, having

completed their collaborative theory papers and their strategy papers and having conducted 

research visits to Gettysburg, the National Capital Region and both Combatant Command 

Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base. 

JAWS faculty are busy preparing for the April visit of the CJCS’ Process for the Accreditation of

Joint Education (PAJE) team while continually revising, updating and rewriting curriculum to 

ensure currency and relevancy with the rapidly changing joint-warfighting landscape. The 06-07 

JAWS Class will again retain interagency student participation and we expect our first U.S. 

Coast Guard officer in the student ranks. 

 

Finally, JAWS is bidding farewell to Colonel Stevenson “Sting” Ray (USAF) as he departs for

an assignment at Lackland AFB, Texas; the JAWS Team looks forward to the early Spring 

arrival of Colonel Bill “Bigfoot” Eliason, a USAF SAASS graduate currently serving at 

USJFCOM. 

Upcoming Events 

27 February to 2 March: Component Week 

• Service Advanced Programs provide day-long class on their respective component 

9-10 March: Joint Senior Leaders Course (JSLC) 

• Conducted by the Joint Requirements Office (JRO) CBRN Defense, Joint Staff J-8.

10-13 April: Joint Special Operations University course 

24-27 April: COCOM West Trip 

16 June: JAWS Graduation 
29 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

JAWS Operational Art and Campaigning Publications 

The following campaign planning publications are available from the Joint Advanced 

Warfighting Schools, Department of Operational Art and Campaigning web site. 

http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jaws/publications.asp

Case Studies 

• Horatio Nelson and the 1798 Mediterranean Campaign 

• The Mexican American War 

War Plans 

The following collection of war plans are from the Joint Forces Staff College Library. These are 

original World War II campaign plans that have been scanned electronically to enable easy 

accessibility by students of campaign planning. Each campaign plan consists of a back ground 

introduction (Word document) followed by the original plan in PDF format. 

• Introduction Reno IV Outline Plan 

− RENO IV Outline Plan 6 March 1944 

• Introduction Mindoro Operations Instruction NO. 74 MINDORO 

− Operations Instruction NO. 74 MINDORO 13 October 1944 

• Introduction to Tarakan Island Operations Instruction NO. 99 

− Operations Instruction NO. 99 Tarakan Island 21 March 1945 

• Introduction to Operation “ECLIPSE” 

− Operation “ECLIPSE” Appreciation and Outline Plan 24 November 1944 
30 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

Update: Degree Granting Authority 

The Defense Authorization bill was signed by the President on 6 January 2006. This bill 

authorizes the National Defense University to award graduates of the Joint Advanced 

Warfighting School (JAWS) a Masters of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and 

Strategy. The bill is grandfathered to include the 2005 JAWS graduates. Following is the 

language authorizing the degree. 

“Subtitle C-Education and Training 

PART I-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SCHOOLS GENERALLY 

SEC. 521. AUTHORITY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY AWARD OF DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN JOINT 

CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND STRATEGY. 

(a) JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE PROGRAM.-Section 2163 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as 

follows: ''§ 2163. National Defense University: master of science degrees 

''(a) AUTHORITY TO AWARD SPECIFIED DEGREES.-The President of the National Defense University, upon the 

recommendation of the faculty of the respective college or other school within the University, may confer the master 

of science degrees specified in subsection (b). 

''(b) AUTHORIZED DEGREES.-The following degrees may be awarded under subsection (a): 

''(1) MASTER OF SCIENCE IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.-The degree of master of science in national security 

strategy, to graduates of the University who fulfill the requirements of the program of the National War College. 

''(2) MASTER OF SCIENCE IN NATIONAL RESOURCE STRATEGY.-The degree of master of science in national resource 

strategy, to graduates of the University who fulfill the requirements of the program of the Industrial College of the 

Armed Forces. 

''(3) MASTER OF SCIENCE IN JOINT CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND STRATEGY.-The degree of master of science in joint 

campaign planning and strategy, to graduates of the University who fulfill the requirements of the program of the 

Joint Advanced Warfighting School at the Joint Forces Staff College. exercised under regulations prescribed by the 

Secretary of Defense.''. 

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The item relating to section 2163 in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 108 

of such title is amended to read as follows: 

''2163. National Defense University: master of science degrees.''. 

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.-Paragraph (3) of section 2163(b) of title 10, United States Code, as amended by subsection (a), 

shall take effect for degrees awarded after May 2005.” 

Services are currently working to have the degrees annotated to officer records. Degree 

certificates will be mailed to 2005 JAWS graduates during late January to early February 2006. 

Please ensure Mrs. Joanne Hooper hooperj@jfsc.ndu.edu has your current mailing address. 
31 

Winter 2006 

CAMPAIGNING

Intent

The Joint Advanced Warfighting School

(JAWS) is envisioned to populate the Joint Staff

and combatant commands with a cadre of officers

expert in the joint planning processes and capable

of critical analysis in the application of all aspects

of national power across the full range of military

operations. Graduates will be capable of

synergistically combining existing and emerging

capabilities in time, space and purpose to

accomplish a range of operational or strategic

objectives. 

 
CAMPAIGNING

32 

Winter 2006 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not

represent the views of the Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University or the

Department of Defense.