UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH DIVISION

KYLE STRONGIN, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

v. No. 4:22-cv-0576-P

JOHN B. SCOTT, ET AL.,

Defendants.

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

United States Magistrate Judge Jeffrey L. Cureton issued Findings, 

Conclusions, and a Recommendation (“FCR”) regarding Defendants’

Joint Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 269. The FCR recommends that the 

Court dismiss this case with prejudice. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs then filed a

timely Objection to the FCR. ECF No. 270. 

For the reasons stated below, the Court OVERRULES IN PART

Plaintiffs’ Objections (ECF No. 270), AFFIRMS IN PART, and 

ADOPTS IN PART the reasoning in the Magistrate Judge’s FCR (ECF 

No. 269), and GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 239.

BACKGROUND

In July 2022, pro-se Plaintiffs, a collection of concerned citizens, filed 

a complaint against almost every election official in the state of Texas.

ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs allege that the continued and ubiquitous use of 

electronic voting systems represents a systemic, ongoing, and imminent 

harm that will continue to destabilize the foundation of free government. 

Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the State of Texas from the continued use of 

these systems.

Defendants collectively move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 12(b). They argue that the case should be dismissed for 

several reasons. First, because Plaintiffs lack standing on multiple 

bases; second, because Defendants’ decision to use electronic voting 

systems is a non-justiciable political question; third, because Plaintiffs’

due process and equal protection claims fail; fourth, because none of 

Plaintiffs’ federal statutory claims possess a private right of action; fifth, 

because Plaintiffs’ state criminal law claims fail since the criminal 

statutes do not provide a private cause of action; sixth, because the 

Texas Constitution’s due-course-of-law and open-courts provisions do 

not provide relief for Plaintiffs; and seventh, that Plaintiffs’ claim for 

declaratory relief fails to establish the existence of an underlying 

judicially remediable right. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal, and Plaintiffs timely 

objected. The Court thus conducts a review of the FCR.

LEGAL STANDARD

A magistrate judge’s FCR is reviewed de novo if a party timely

objects. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). And the district court may accept, reject, 

or modify the recommendations or findings in whole or in part. Id. But

a party objecting to the FCR must “file specific written objections to the 

proposed findings and recommendations.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2). This 

means an objection must be “sufficiently specific to put the district court 

on notice of the urged error.” Williams v. K&B Equip. Co., 724 F.2d 508, 

511 (5th Cir. 1984). But where an objection to the FCR is only general, 

the Court reviews the objected conclusion for plain error. Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996).

To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which the objection is made, state the basis for the 

objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. United 

States v. Mathis, 458 F. Supp. 3d 559, 564 (E.D. Tex. 2020). If the 

objecting party fails to assert specific objections, the district court need 

not consider frivolous, conclusory, or general objections. Battle v. U.S.

Parole Comm’n, 834 F.3d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).

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ANALYSIS

The United States Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal because 

“Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue, and, thus, the Court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction over the case.” See ECF No. 269 at 7. Thus, 

Defendants’ remaining arguments were not considered. Id.

Plaintiffs made four objections. First, Plaintiffs objected to the 

Magistrate Judge’s assessment of the facts. ECF No. 270 at 3. Second,

Plaintiffs disagreed with the resulting conclusion on standing. Id. 

Third, Plaintiffs objected to the “Magistrate’s finding no private right of 

action.” Id. And fourth, Plaintiffs objected to the Magistrate Judge’s

“recommendation to dismiss.” Id. Because this case’s primary and 

dispositive issue is standing, the Court will first address Plaintiffs’ first 

and third objections. The Court then addresses Plaintiffs’ remaining

objections in turn.

A. Article III Standing 

The core of federal jurisdiction is Article III’s case-or-controversy

requirement, which requires a plaintiff to have standing to sue. Spokeo, 

Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016). To establish standing, a plaintiff 

must show that: (1) he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, 

particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) the injury was likely caused 

by the defendant; and (3) the injury would likely be redressed by judicial 

relief. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). An injury 

is particularized when it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and 

individual way.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339. And it is concrete when it is

“real” and not abstract. Id. at 340. A plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing standing by alleging facts that prove each of its elements. 

Id. at 338–39.

“Congress’s creation of a . . . cause of action does not relieve courts of 

their responsibility to independently decide whether a plaintiff has 

suffered a concrete harm under Article III.” TransUnion, LLC v. 

Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021). A plaintiff does not automatically 

satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement just because a statute provides a

private right of action. Spokeo, 578 U. S. at 341. “Article III standing 

requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory 

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violation.” Id. 

Courts have routinely dismissed grievances of concerned citizens 

that are undifferentiated and common to all members of the public. See,

e.g., Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 440–41 (2007); Perkins v. Lukens 

Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940) (holding that plaintiffs lacked

standing because they failed to show injury to “a particular right of their 

own, as distinguished from the public’s interest in the administration of 

the law”); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 

U.S. 126, 126 (1922) (“The motion papers disclose no interest upon the 

part of the petitioner other than that of a citizen and a member of the 

bar of this Court.”)

The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are 

not sufficiently concrete to establish standing. The Magistrate Judge 

concluded that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is “generally of speculative 

voting system vulnerabilities on a national scale” and determined that 

Plaintiffs “do not allege sufficient, non-conclusory allegations to 

establish that Defendants’ voting machines have or will be infiltrated.”

ECF No. 269 at 6. And even if they were concrete, the Magistrate Judge 

concluded that the injuries are too general to establish particularity. Id.

“Plaintiffs’ generalized grievances—if they were legitimate—would be 

shared by the public at large.” Id. Thus, the Magistrate Judge concluded 

that Plaintiffs cannot maintain this suit without a concrete injury to a 

particular right of their own.

1. Objection to the “assessment of the facts.”

Plaintiffs generally objected to “several of the Magistrates’ findings, 

conclusions, and recommendations misrepresenting of the facts outlined 

in the above ‘Facts of the Case.’” ECF No. 270 at 1. Specifically, Plaintiffs 

contend that the Magistrate has not addressed the “true facts of the 

case.” Id. Since this objection lacks a connection to any particular finding 

or conclusion of the Magistrate, the Court reviews this portion of the 

Magistrate Judge’s FCR for plain error. Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1429.1

The FCR’s assessment of facts does not deviate from those 

1 “The rule created in Douglass does not ordinarily apply to pro-se litigants, except 

where the magistrate judge’s recommendation explicitly states that a failure to 

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established in the record. Nor does the Court see anything in Plaintiffs’

objection to assert how these particular facts change the FCR’s 

characterization or disposition of the case. The general objection that 

the facts stated by the Magistrate were not recited word-for-word from 

Plaintiffs voluminous complaint is does not overcome a plain-error 

review. Plaintiffs first objection is OVERRULED.

2. Objection to the conclusion that Plaintiffs lack 

standing.

Plaintiffs also object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the 

“Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of Plaintiffs’ claim due to lack of 

standing related to ‘speculative generalized grievances.’” ECF No. 270 

at 1. Plaintiffs offer five recitations from the record to refute that their 

grievances are speculative or general:

• “(1) Plaintiffs were and will continue to be injured due to the actions 

of Defendants conducting elections using Electronic Voting Systems 

(EVS) in the state of Texas that lacked, and continue to lack, lawful 

certification from an accredited laboratory in violation of state law. 

(Tex. Elec §§ 81.60, 81.61 (ECF No. 231 at 13–30)) This caused 

illegal ballots to be cast and counted through which Plaintiffs’ votes 

were negated and personally identifiable information (PII) 

compromised. Plaintiffs claim violations of state law and U.S. 

Constitution.” ECF No. 231 at 144–148.

• “(2) EVS(s) utilized in the state of Texas have multiple certification 

violations that make the EVS(s) ineligible for use in any form of the 

voting process by Defendants coercing Plaintiffs to cast and have 

their illegal ballots counted.” ECF No. 231 at 31–63.

• “(3) Defendants in the case are authorized to administer and 

supervise elections at the state and county level in the state of 

Texas, including verification of EVS certification and protection of 

PII.” ECF No. 231 at 13–30, 144–150; ECF No. 196-2.

• “(4) Defendants are sued in BOTH their official and individual 

capacities (ECF No. 231 at ii–iii), as they are county and state 

specifically object will forfeit de novo review.” Strongin v. Scott, No. 4:22-CV-0576-P, 

2023 WL 3775065, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 2023) (Pittman, J.). That is the case here. 

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officials that have the sole authority of state and federal elections 

however Defendants have been “elected” on uncertified EVS (ECF 

No. 231 at 13–63). Plaintiffs question if County Defendants are 

indeed acting under the color of law as duly elected officials or in 

their individual capacity due to lack of proper legal ballots cast and 

counted.” Id. 

• “(5) Plaintiffs have information and claim that their combined 

private and personal information, collected and stored electronically 

at local and state levels via Texas’ voter rolls, has been shared and 

released to DHS, CIS Security, several federal agency partners, and 

DHS third-party privately owned partners in violation of Plaintiff 

Constitutional rights.” ECF No. 231 at 8–9; ECF No. 196-2.

Upon closely reviewing each portion of the record, the Court 

concludes that they do not pass muster to establish standing. 

As to Plaintiffs first alleged injury, the Court is left with an 

unsubstantiated allegation that Plaintiffs’ personally identifiable 

information was given to a federal agency, along with that of every other 

voter in Texas, and that there is a possible risk of future harassment. 

ECF No. 270 at 1. While Plaintiffs allege that their personal information 

was disseminated to the Department of Homeland Security, ECF No. 

231 at 8, they do not justify why this alone is an injury. Since this

allegation stems from the alleged transfer of voter rolls, it also 

implicates every single registered voter in Texas. This is a generalized 

injury insufficient to establish standing. Fairchild 258 U.S. at 126 

(1922).

As for future harassment, the threat of future harm must be 

“certainly impending;” mere “[a]llegations of possible future injury” do 

not suffice. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). 

Plaintiffs provide no basis to show their “future harassment” is 

“certainly impending.” Thus, standing based on a future injury is also 

foreclosed.

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ grievances with the continued use of these 

systems and the program’s administration are either too speculative or 

entirely generalized. In their 163-page Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs’

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allegations in support of their theories of injury are exclusively 

hypothetical and show no concrete connection to them or the vote they 

allege is in grave peril. Once again, the Court agrees with the Magistrate

Judge’s assessment that “Plaintiffs generalized grievances—were they 

legitimate—would be shared by the public at large.” ECF No. 269 at 6. 

Here Plaintiffs raise a generally available grievance about the 

governments voting systems that everybody in Texas is subject to. 

Without further individual injury, this does not state an Article III case 

or controversy. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74. 

Thus, Plaintiffs’ second objection is OVERRULED.

B. Objections based on “unlawful election.”

Plaintiffs further objected to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion on 

standing, arguing that the FCR ignores that the group of plaintiffs 

includes candidates who were “unlawfully elected.”2 This allegation 

appears nowhere in the Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 

231. Further, Plaintiffs generally object that the Magistrate Judge 

confused the standing inquiry for the merits but do not identify any 

specific finding or conclusion beyond the general conclusion that they 

lack standing. 

This Court finds no plain error in the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion,

and Plaintiffs’ third objection is OVERRULED. 

C. Objections based on the lack of a private right of 

action.

Plaintiffs object to the Magistrate’s “finding of no private right of 

action” and cite to “magistrate’s fifth point on page 5.” ECF No. 270 at 

13. But the Court assumes that Plaintiffs refer to page 2 of the FCR

2 The Fifth Circuit has concluded that standing for political candidates remains 

unsettled and, even where it has been assumed for the sake of argument, they would 

only have standing to challenge the election in which they participated, and as 

plaintiff’s themselves assert, the issue by then is “incurabl[e].” ECF No. 270 at 12. 

Plaintiffs rely on Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2011) to support

their argument that candidates have “competitive standing,” ECF 270 at 11, but this 

is insufficient to overcome Fifth Circuit precedent holding that “standing in federal 

court is determined entirely by Article III and depends in no degree on whether 

standing exists under state law.” Abraugh v. Altimus, 26 F.4th 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2022) 

(emphasis in original). 

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because that is the only place where the Magistrate Judge enumerates 

a fifth point. ECF No. 269 at 2 (“(5) all of Plaintiffs’ federal statutorybased claims fail because, inter alia, there is no private cause or right of 

action and no cognizable claim is pled”) (reciting the grounds asserted 

by Defendants in their motion to dismiss). The Magistrate Judge is 

merely reciting the procedural history of the action and the grounds on 

which Defendants are seeking dismissal, not endorsing Defendants’ 

contention that Plaintiffs lack a private right of action.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ fourth objection on this ground is 

OVERRULED.

D. Objections to the recommendation to dismiss with 

prejudice.

Plaintiffs’ final objection is to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. See ECF No. 

270 at 16–17. Here, the pro-se Plaintiffs are correct. 

While the Magistrate Judge analyzed the dismissal under a normal 

standard, the FCR erred because this is a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) 

where the Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Because 

“A dismissal with prejudice is a final judgment on the merits . . . .

to dismiss with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1) is to disclaim jurisdiction 

and then exercise it.” Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, LLC v. Sasol N. 

Am., Inc., 544 F. App’x 455, 456–57 (5th Cir. 2013). As a result, Fifth 

Circuit precedent “does not sanction [this] practice.” Id. A dismissal with 

prejudice here would claim that there is no case or controversy and then 

turn around to resolve the controversy completely. 

As such, Pro-se Plaintiffs’ objection to dismissal with prejudice is 

thus SUSTAINED, and their case will thus be dismissed without 

prejudice instead. 

CONCLUSION

Here, Plaintiffs’ bare allegations that the law has not been followed 

is “precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about 

the conduct of government that [courts] have refused to countenance in 

the past.” Lance, 549 U.S. at 442. The Court concludes—in line with the 

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Magistrate Judge’s findings—that Plaintiffs have failed to establish 

standing.

Having considered the Magistrate Judge’s FCR, Plaintiffs’ 

Objections, and the applicable law, the Court OVERRULES IN PART

Plaintiffs’ Objections, ADOPTS IN PART the reasoning in the 

Magistrate Judge’s FCR, and GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 

239. As such, Plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED on this 14th day of August 2023.

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