United States District Court 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

SAMUEL VENDRELL-SANTIAGO, § 

#44470-069 § 

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-2261-S-BK 

WARDEN RIVERS : 

ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF 

 

THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

The United States Magistrate Judge made findings, conclusions, and a recommendation in 

this case. Objections were filed. The District Court reviewed de novo those portions of the 

proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which objection was made, and reviewed 

the remaining proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation for plain error. 

The Court agrees that Petitioner Samuel Vendrell-Santiago is ineligible for First Step Act 

(“FSA”) time credits.' As to Petitioner’s request for immediate designation to pre-release 

custody, even assuming jurisdiction over this claim, the Court agrees that because Petitioner is 

ineligible for FSA time credits, it is moot. This claim also fails on the merits. 

Pre-release custody, including designation to a halfway house or home confinement, is still 

a form of confinement and not actual release from Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) custody. See 

18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). “The decision whether—and, if so, for how long—to place an inmate in a 

residential reentry center (“‘“RRC”)—a halfway house—is committed to the BOP under statutory 

authority.” Brown v. Underwood, No. 3:19-CV-1706-B-BN, 2019 WL 5580106, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 

 

' In the Objections [ECF No. 12], Petitioner asserts that the Magistrate Judge “overlooked that 365 of the 

FSA credits may be applied to the back-end of the sentence, such that [Petitioner] is released from custody 

to begin his term of supervised release at an earlier date.” Objs. 5. This claim also fails because Petitioner 

is ineligible to receive FSA time credits, as explained in the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation. 

 

 

Case 3:22-cv-02261-S-BK Document 13 Filed 05/24/24 Page 1 of 2 PageID 101
Aug. 22, 2019) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 5579198 

(N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2019). The FSA did not alter this statutory authority and does not provide the 

Court authority to modify a defendant’s place of incarceration. See id.; see also United States v. 

Urso, No. 03-CR-1382, 2019 WL 5423431, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2019) (“[A]lthough [the FSA 

under] 28 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) authorizes the court to modify a term of imprisonment, it does 

not authorize the court to alter the method of incarceration.” (citation omitted)). It remains within 

the BOP’s discretion to determine a defendant’s place of confinement and his eligibility for RRC 

placement. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, No. 6:06-082-DCR, 2019 WL 508067, at *1 (E.D. 

Ky. Feb. 8, 2019) (“Because the First Step Act gives the Attorney General the discretion to 

determine if and when home confinement is appropriate, this Court does not have authority to 

grant the requested relief.”). As such, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas 

relief based on his request for immediate designation to pre-release custody. 

Therefore, the Court ACCEPTS the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the 

United States Magistrate Judge. 

SO ORDERED. 

SIGNED May 24, 2024. 

 

UNITED 

Te 

STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 3:22-cv-02261-S-BK Document 13 Filed 05/24/24 Page 2 of 2 PageID 102