United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-30636

Stacy Seville, as Personal Representative of Peter 

Wojcikowski, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Maersk Line, Limited, 

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:20-CV-2727

Before Jones, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff filed suit in a district court that concededly had no personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant and no colorable basis for venue. The district 

court dismissed the suit and refused to transfer venue. We affirm.

I.

Peter Wojcikowski was a seaman employed by defendant-appellee 

Maersk Line, Ltd. (MLL). On October 28, 2017, while working aboard an 

MLL vessel berthed in Bahrain, he was involved in an accident and suffered 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 18, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 21-30636

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a back injury. He returned to the United States for treatment and, a few weeks 

later, died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound.

On October 6, 2020, acting as Mr. Wojcikowski’s personal 

representative, plaintiff-appellant Stacy Seville filed this Jones Act 

negligence claim in the Eastern District of Louisiana. She argued Mr. 

Wojcikowski’s back injury was the proximate cause of his death.

MLL moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing venue 

was improper because MLL is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the 

Eastern District of Louisiana. Seville opposed the motion without contesting 

any of MLL’s jurisdictional arguments. Instead she requested transfer to the 

Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The district court 

granted MLL’s Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction, denied Seville’s request to transfer under § 1406(a), and entered 

final judgment in favor of MLL. Seville timely appealed.

II.

Everyone here agrees the Eastern District of Louisiana was not a 

proper venue for this lawsuit. Appellant says the district court nonetheless 

abused its discretion by denying the motion to transfer venue and dismissing 

the case. We disagree. 

We (A) explain the venue and venue-transfer rules. Then we 

(B) explain why Seville failed to carry her burden to show transfer was 

warranted. Finally, we (C) hold the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in declining to transfer this case.

A.

In suits brought under the Jones Act, venue is “proper in any district 

in which the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.” 1 Admiralty 

and Maritime Law § 6:20 (6th ed., Dec. 2021 update) (citing 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1391(c)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (“A civil action may be brought 

in . . . a judicial district in which any defendant resides[.]”); id. § 1391(c)(2) 

(“[A]n entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under 

applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a 

defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the 

court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question[.]”).

Where venue is improper, the district court should generally dismiss 

the case. But the court retains discretion to transfer it to a proper venue if 

such a transfer would serve “the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) 

(“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the 

wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, 

transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been 

brought.” (emphasis added)). Among the relevant considerations for

determining whether transfer is in the interest of justice, courts examine the 

plaintiff’s reasons for filing suit in the improper district in the first place and 

ask whether the “plaintiff’s belief that venue was proper was in good faith 

and reasonable.” 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 3827 (4th ed. 2021) [hereinafter Wright 

& Miller].

1 And where a “plaintiff’s attorney reasonably could have 

foreseen that the forum in which the suit was filed was improper,” courts 

1 The full paragraph reads: “In most cases of improper venue, the courts conclude 

that it is in the interest of justice to transfer to a proper forum rather than to dismiss the 

litigation. The reasons for doing so are especially compelling if the statute of limitations has 

run since the commencement of the action, so that dismissal might prevent the institution 

of a new suit by the plaintiff and a resolution on the merits, or if the defendant has misled 

the plaintiff on the facts relevant to venue. District courts also are likely to order transfer 

rather than dismissal if it would be more efficient or economical to do so or if the plaintiff’s 

belief that venue was proper was in good faith and reasonable. These are far from the only 

reasons for a court to prefer transfer to dismissal. Indeed, it is enough simply that the 

district judge, in the sound exercise of discretion, concludes that transfer is in the interest 

of justice, as many courts have concluded.” 14D Wright & Miller § 3827.

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“often dismiss rather than transfer under Section 1406(a)” on the idea “that 

similar conduct should be discouraged.” Ibid. That’s because it is “obviously 

not ‘in the interest of justice’ to allow [§ 1406(a)] to be used to aid a nondiligent plaintiff who knowingly files a case in the wrong district.” Dubin v. 

United States, 380 F.2d 813, 816 n.5 (5th Cir. 1967).

That’s true even where a statute of limitations might bar re-filing. Our 

court has long recognized that a district court retains discretion in such cases 

to deny a non-diligent plaintiff’s request for transfer. See, e.g., ibid. (“[The]

statute of limitations” would be “frustrated by” § 1406 if that statute could 

be “used to aid a non-diligent plaintiff[.]”). Numerous other courts agree.2

The rule is clear and well-established: A district court may deny a request for 

transfer under § 1406 and dismiss the case where transfer would reward the 

2 See, e.g., Stanifer v. Brannan, 564 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining 

court’s discretion to deny transfer where there was no “assertion of . . . personal 

jurisdiction that provided some arguable basis for thinking that the action was properly 

brought in the district in which it was originally filed,” even if re-filing is time-barred);

Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1202 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[A] district court does 

not abuse its discretion when it denies, as not in the interest of justice, a plaintiff’s [transfer 

request under § 1406] because the plaintiff’s attorney could reasonably have foreseen that 

the forum in which he/she filed was improper.”); Spar, Inc. v. Info. Res., Inc., 956 F.2d 392, 

394 (2d Cir. 1992) (denying transfer where plaintiff sought “to avoid a statute of limitations 

defect through a transfer of venue” because it “would reward plaintiffs for their lack of 

diligence”); Cirafici v. City of Ithaca, 968 F.2d 1220 (unpublished table decision), 1992 WL 

149862, at *2 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding transfer not in the interest of justice where plaintiff 

“was not diligent in prosecuting his action,” even though plaintiff’s “action may be timebarred”); Deleski v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 819 F.2d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1987) (“It is not in the 

‘interest of justice’ to transfer this case . . . upon appellant’s tardy discovery that her 

complaint is time-barred.”); Coté v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 985 (7th Cir. 1986) (denying 

transfer request where limitations period had run and “[e]lementary prudence would have 

indicated to [plaintiff’s] lawyer that he must file a protective suit” in the forum “where the 

plaintiff can get personal jurisdiction over the defendant before, not after, the statute of 

limitations runs”).

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plaintiff’s lack of diligence—even if the dismissal means the plaintiff will be 

time-barred from filing again in a proper venue.

B.

Appellant failed to carry her burden to show transfer was warranted 

here. That’s because (1) MLL is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the 

Eastern District of Louisiana and (2) that fact was entirely foreseeable to any 

attorney exercising any amount of diligence.

1.

The Eastern District of Louisiana cannot assert general personal 

jurisdiction over MLL. Nor can it assert specific personal jurisdiction over 

MLL. So MLL is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the district where 

appellant filed suit.

First, general personal jurisdiction. A court may assert general 

personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations “when their affiliations with 

the State are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at 

home in the forum State.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 

(2017) (quotation omitted). There are two “paradigm” forums in which a 

corporate defendant is “at home.” Ibid.(quotation omitted). They are (1) the 

corporation’s place of incorporation and (2) its principal place of business. 

See ibid. Beyond those two “paradigm” forums, there may also be 

“exceptional case[s]” where the exercise of general jurisdiction is 

appropriate because a corporate defendant’s operations are “so substantial 

and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home” in the forum State. 

Ibid. (quotation omitted). But it is “incredibly difficult to establish general 

jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place 

of business.” Frank v. P N K (Lake Charles) LLC, 947 F.3d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 

2020) (quotation omitted).

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MLL is incorporated in Delaware. Its principal place of business is in 

Virginia. And appellant offers no reason whatsoever to think this might be

“the exceptional case” where MLL’s activities in Louisiana are so 

substantial as to render it at home there. So MLL is not subject to general 

personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Second, specific personal jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction “focuses 

on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” 

Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (quotation omitted). It “arises 

when a defendant’s minimum contacts with a forum state are related to the 

pending lawsuit.” E. Concrete Materials, Inc. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 948 F.3d 

289, 296 (5th Cir. 2020). Our court applies a three-prong analysis: We 

consider “(1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum 

[S]tate, i.e., whether it purposely directed its activities toward the forum 

[S]tate or purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities 

there.” Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 

2006)). Then we analyze “(2) whether the plaintiff’s cause of action arises 

out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related contacts.” Ibid. Finally, 

we ask “(3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and 

reasonable.” Ibid. It’s the plaintiff’s burden to establish the first two prongs. 

See E. Concrete Materials, 948 F.3d at 296.

Appellant can’t meet that burden. Her complaint alleged that MLL 

does business in Louisiana and is amenable to process there. But there is 

simply no basis to conclude appellant’s cause of action arises out of those

forum-related contacts. All agree the cause of action arises out of events that 

took place far from Louisiana in the waters of Bahrain, and appellant has 

made no effort to connect the accident in Bahrain to MLL’s business in 

Louisiana. Absent any attempt to explain the relationship between the 

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defendant, the forum, and this litigation, there is no way for appellant to

establish specific jurisdiction.

2.

A district court might excuse this sort of mistake where plaintiff’s 

attorney could not reasonably have anticipated the venue problem. That’s 

especially true if it becomes clear the defendant is at fault—where, for 

example, “the defendant has misled the plaintiff on the facts relevant to 

venue.” 14D Wright & Miller § 3827. But where “the plaintiff’s 

attorney reasonably could have foreseen that the forum in which the suit was 

filed was improper,” ibid., transfer is normally unwarranted. And here, it was 

entirely foreseeable that the Eastern District of Louisiana lacked personal 

jurisdiction over MLL.

It is evident from the face of the complaint that MLL is not subject to 

general jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Louisiana. The complaint 

alleged that MLL is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 

businessin Virginia. And the complaint is devoid of any allegations that come 

close to suggesting MLL’s activities in Louisiana are so substantial as to 

render it at home there. So “elementary prudence” should have revealed to 

Seville’s attorney that the Eastern District of Louisiana lacked general 

personal jurisdiction over MLL. Coté v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 985 (7th Cir. 

1986).

So too with specific jurisdiction. As already explained, nothing in 

appellant’s filings suggests a connection between defendant’s forum-related 

contacts and this litigation. Moreover, appellant openly admitted there was 

no basis for thinking such a connection existed: When asked at oral argument 

to identify the connection between this lawsuit and the chosen forum, 

appellant’s attorney told us “there isn’t a connection, other than that we 

[appellant’s attorneys] actually practice here [in the Eastern District of 

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Louisiana].” Oral Arg. at 9:20–9:35. It should go without saying that an 

attorney cannot choose a venue based on personal convenience. 

Nor can an attorney file in the wrong venue and hope his opponent 

doesn’t object. At oral argument, appellant’s counsel purported to justify 

filing in the wrong venue on the ground that personal jurisdiction is waivable.

See Oral Arg. at 11:40–12:30 (Q: “So it’s okay for your law firm to file any 

suit at all in the district where you practice and place the burden on the 

defendant to transfer to the proper venue at any time, is that what you think 

§ 1406 says?” A: “. . . I’m saying yes to your question because there’s always 

a chance that they waive the jurisdiction themselves.”). It’s true that 

personal jurisdiction is waivable. It’s also irrelevant. That’s because the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a good-faith and colorable basis for 

every representation made to a federal court—no matter whether the other 

side objects. Specifically:

Representations to the Court. By presenting to the 

court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by 

signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney 

or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s 

knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 

reasonable under the circumstances:

. . .

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are 

warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 

extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 

establishing new law[.]

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).

Appellant’s attorney filed the complaint in the Eastern District of 

Louisiana and represented that “MLL is subject to and within the 

jurisdiction and venue of [that] Court.” Yet at oral argument, counsel stated 

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that he (1) believed he needed no colorable basis for filing in that district, 

(2) in fact had no colorable basis for the representation he made as to 

jurisdiction and venue, (3) had known from the start that his only real chance

of establishing personal jurisdiction and venue was if the defendant failed to 

object, and (4) figured he could always obtain a transfer under § 1406 if it 

turned out defendant objected. Those statements are equal parts disturbing 

and surprising. Today we hold that such admissions not only foreclose 

transfer under § 1406, on defendant’s objection, but also give rise to Rule 11 

violations.

C.

Section 1406 “confer[s] broad discretion in ruling on a motion to 

transfer.” Stanifer v. Brannan, 564 F.3d 455, 456–57 (6th Cir. 2009). And a 

district court’s decision to deny a motion to transfer venue “will not be 

reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 

868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989).

It was clearly not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny

appellant’s motion to transfer venue in this case. Appellant’s attorney, by his 

own admission, knew there was no colorable basis for laying venue in the 

Eastern District of Louisiana. We have long made clear that it is “obviously 

not in the interest of justice to allow [§ 1406] to be used to aid a non-diligent 

plaintiff who knowingly files a case in the wrong district.” Dubin, 380 F.2d at 

816 n.5 (quotation omitted).

* * *

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order dismissing 

the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and denying appellant’s request to 

transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406.

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