IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

JAMES DRAUCKER, § 

#00146717, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-2359-M-BN 

§ 

ROCKWALL COUNTY COURT § 

HOUSE, ET AL., § 

§ 

Defendants. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff James Draucker, an inmate at the Rockwall County jail, initially filed 

a pro se complaint against two judges in that county, a state appellate court, and 

officials at the jail, claiming that he is wrongfully incarcerated and requesting his 

immediate release plus monetary damages. See Dkt. No. 3. Draucker also moved for 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and for court-appointed counsel. See Dkt. 

Nos. 4, 5. 

United States District Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn referred Draucker’s civil 

complaint to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial 

management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. 

The Court granted Draucker leave to proceed IFP under the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (the PLRA). See Dkt. No. 6. And, under the PLRA, the undersigned has 

entered findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the Court deny the 

motion to appoint counsel, dismiss this case with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 

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and count this dismissal as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Dkt. No. 7. 

Draucker next filed, in this action, a Petition for Injunction to Grant Plaintiffs 

Release from Confinement [Dkt. No. 20] (the Petition). And the undersigned has 

entered findings and conclusions recommending that the Court deny the Petition, 

construed as brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, without prejudice to Draucker’s right 

to exhaust available state remedies [Dkt. No. 21] (the Habeas FCR). 

Draucker now moves for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining 

order (TRO) to seek his release from confinement. See Dkt. No. 23. 

As “[a] TRO is simply a highly accelerated and temporary form of preliminary 

injunctive relief,” “[t]o obtain a temporary restraining order, an applicant must show 

entitlement to a preliminary injunction.” Horner v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3:17-cv665-D, 2017 WL 978100, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2017) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). But granting a preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary 

remedy which requires the movant to unequivocally show the need for its issuance.” 

Valley v. Rapides Par. Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Allied 

Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. C.D.L. Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989)). 

Draucker must therefore unequivocally “show (1) a substantial likelihood that 

he will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that he will suffer irreparable 

injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) his threatened injury outweighs the 

threatened harm to the party whom he seeks to enjoin, and (4) granting the 

preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Bluefield Water Ass’n, 

Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 250, 252-53 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal 

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quotation marks omitted); accord Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 

567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). 

For the reasons explained in the Habeas FCR, Draucker has not exhausted 

available state remedies. “[A] Section 2241 petitioner’s failure to exhaust available 

state court remedies prevents a district court from finding that he has shown that 

there is a substantial likelihood that he will currently prevail on the merits of his 

habeas claims, and a court need not examine the remaining three requirements.” 

Thomas v. Brown, No. 3:20-cv-1258-C-BN, 2020 WL 3420973, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 

19, 2020) (citation omitted), rec. adopted, 2020 WL 3420941 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2020), 

COA denied, 2020 WL 8184461 (5th Cir. Sept. 28, 2020); see also Money v. Pritzker, 

453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1136 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (denying motion for TRO and preliminary 

injunction after finding that a class of Cook County Section 2241 petitioners had “not 

made a satisfactory showing that the state court system was not every bit as available 

as the federal courts, if not more so”). 

The Court should therefore deny the motion for a TRO and preliminary 

injunction. 

Recommendation

The Court should deny the motion for a temporary restraining order and 

preliminary injunction [Dkt. No. 23]. 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

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within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: December 14, 2022 

 _________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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