If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re REDMOND, Minor. October 8, 2019

No. 348560

Oakland Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2018-860243-NA

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her minor child 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication continue to exist), and (j) 

(reasonable likelihood that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent). We affirm.

I. FACTS

This case arises out of the termination of respondent’s parental rights to her minor child

as a result of her alcohol abuse. In January 2018, a petition was filed, alleging that the minor 

child came within the trial court’s jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)1 because respondent

had been hospitalized twice for “alcohol dependence” and “delirium” since October 2017 and 

that respondent had left her son, who was two years old at the time, unattended outside while she

attempted to walk to a store in an intoxicated state. According to the petition, respondent had 

failed to follow through with treatment for her alcohol use despite being offered services. After 

a hearing was held on January 29, 2018, the trial court authorized the petition and the minor 

child was placed in the care of respondent’s cousin.

On March 29, 2018, respondent pleaded to the allegations in the petition—namely, that 

she “was abusing alcohol in October 2017 while [the minor child] was in her care.” The trial 

 1 The minor child’s father was also named in the petition, and the father’s parental rights to the 

minor child were terminated at the same time as respondent’s parental rights. This appeal deals 

exclusively with the termination of respondent’s parental rights.
-2-

court assumed jurisdiction, and the parties agreed to proceed with an immediate disposition. The 

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) foster care worker assigned to the case 

provided a parent-agency agreement (PAA) for respondent, which required respondent to (1)

complete a substance abuse assessment and a psychological evaluation; (2) participate in 

substance abuse treatment; (3) attend parenting classes; (4) submit to random alcohol screenings 

three times per week; (5) undergo “a comprehensive medical evaluation,” including a screening 

for Huntington’s disease; (6) maintain suitable housing; (7) obtain a legal source of income; and 

(8) contact the DHHS worker at least two times each month. Respondent was ordered to stop 

consuming alcohol. With respect to the testing for Huntington’s disease, the DHHS worker 

indicated that the disease is hereditary, that the paternal side of respondent’s family has a history 

of suffering from the disease, and that a genetic test was appropriate because respondent might 

be exhibiting some of the early symptoms of the disease.

Respondent’s progress with maintaining sobriety and completing the PAA was poor.

Although respondent was allowed supervised visits with the minor child, her parenting time was 

suspended early in the proceedings because respondent was intoxicated during parenting time on 

two occasions. Parenting time was never reinstated because respondent failed to complete three 

consecutive negative alcohol screenings. In November 2018, petitioner filed a supplemental 

petition seeking termination of respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), 

(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j). The supplemental petition alleged that, 

during the proceedings, respondent failed to appear for a majority of her random alcohol 

screenings and failed to complete other aspects of the PAA, such as submitting to a screening for 

Huntington’s disease. The supplemental petition further alleged that respondent continued to 

abuse alcohol, had several police contacts while “highly intoxicated,” and was hospitalized 

numerous times for excessive intoxication throughout the course of the proceeding. The 

supplemental petition was authorized by the trial court and termination proceedings commenced. 

After the termination hearing was held, the trial court referee concluded that there was no 

evidence that respondent suffered from Huntington’s disease. The referee found that reasonable

reunification services were provided to respondent but that respondent failed to take advantage 

of most of the services. The referee also concluded that statutory grounds existed to support the 

termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j) and that 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the minor child’s best interests. The trial court 

adopted the referee’s findings and terminated respondent’s parental rights on March 28, 2019. 

This appeal followed, and respondent’s sole argument on appeal is that petitioner failed to offer 

reasonable accommodations and services to aid in reunification.

2

 

 2 On appeal, respondent does not argue that the trial court clearly erred by determining that 

petitioner established statutory grounds for termination or by determining that termination was in 

the minor child’s best interests. Nonetheless, upon review of the record, we conclude that the 

trial court did not clearly err when it determined that statutory grounds existed to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j), In re Mason, 486 Mich 

142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), and that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the 
-3-

II. PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The time for asserting the need for accommodation in services is when the [trial] court 

adopts a service plan,” at which time a respondent must “object or indicate that the services 

provided to [her are] somehow inadequate.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 247; 824 NW2d 569 

(2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, respondent’s counsel first objected to the 

services petitioner offered to respondent at the termination hearing on January 9, 2019, arguing 

that the PAA should have been modified to accommodate respondent’s mental “deficiencies” 

and Huntington’s disease. Because respondent did not argue that the services offered to her were 

inadequate until more than nine months after the PAA was adopted, this issue is unpreserved. 

See id. 

Unpreserved claims of error are reviewed for plain error affecting a party’s substantial 

rights. In re Beers, 325 Mich App 653, 677; 926 NW2d 832 (2018). “To avoid forfeiture under 

the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error 

was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” In re 

VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 135; 809 NW2d 412 (2011) (quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “An error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome 

of the proceedings.” In re Beers, 325 Mich App at 677 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets 

omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that petitioner failed to offer reasonable services and accommodations 

for her disabilities and, thus, failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with the minor

child. We disagree.

“Under Michigan’s Probate Code, [DHHS] has an affirmative duty to make reasonable 

efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown 

Minors, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c), and MCL 

712A.19a(2). “As part of these reasonable efforts, the [DHHS] must create a service plan 

outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court 

involvement and to achieve reunification.” In re Hicks/Brown Minors, 500 Mich at 85, citing 

MCL 712A.18f(3)(d). This includes updating the parent’s treatment plan throughout the case, 

and giving the parent reasonable time to make changes and benefit from the services before the 

termination of parental rights. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 156; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). “If a 

parent cannot or will not meet her irreducible minimum parental responsibilities, the needs of the

child must prevail over the needs of the parent.” In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 28; 610 NW2d 

563 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 

minor child’s best interests, In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209; 661 NW2d 216, reh den 468 Mich 

1239 (2003). 
-4-

However, if a parent suffers from an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 

12101 et seq., disability, or “a known or suspected intellectual, cognitive, or developmental 

impairment,” the DHHS has a duty to reasonably accommodate the parent’s disability by 

offering services designed to facilitate the child’s return to his or her home. In re Hicks/Brown, 

315 Mich App 251, 282; 890 NW2d 696 (2016), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 500 Mich 79 

(2017); In re Terry, 240 Mich App at 25-26. In In re Hicks/Brown, this Court explained that 

DHHS must

offer evaluations to determine the nature and extent of the parent’s disability and 

to secure recommendations for tailoring necessary reunification services to the 

individual. The DHHS must then endeavor to locate agencies that can provide 

services geared toward assisting the parent to overcome obstacles to reunification. 

If no local agency catering to the needs of such individuals exists, the DHHS must 

ensure that the available service providers modify or adjust their programs to 

allow the parent an opportunity to benefit equally to a nondisabled parent . . . .

[In re Hicks/Brown, 315 Mich App at 282.] 

“[E]fforts at reunification cannot be reasonable . . . if the [DHHS] has failed to modify its 

standard procedures in ways that are reasonably necessary to accommodate a disability under the 

ADA.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 86. However, “[w]hile the [DHHS] has a responsibility 

to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a 

commensurate responsibility on the part of [the] respondent[] to participate in the services that 

are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). 

A. “DISABILITY” UNDER THE ADA

Respondent argues that petitioner failed to modify the service plan to accommodate her

Huntington’s disease. However, there is no evidence in the lower court record that establishes 

that respondent actually had Huntington’s disease. Based on suspicion that respondent may have 

Huntington’s disease, her PAA required respondent to complete genetic testing to determine 

whether she suffered from the disease. Respondent failed to submit to the evaluations offered by 

petitioner during the 13-month-long proceedings, and the only evidence that respondent suffered 

from Huntington’s disease is her display of some of the symptoms consistent with the disease 

and the fact that the disease is genetic and runs in respondent’s family. Thus, the record 

evidence is insufficient to establish that respondent suffered from Huntington’s disease so as to 

require petitioner to accommodate respondent or to change the PAA. See In re Hicks/Brown, 

500 Mich at 86 (holding that the DHHS fails its duty to provide reasonable reunification services 

when it does not provide reasonable accommodations or modifications “to the services or 

programs offered to a disabled parent”) (emphasis added). 

Further, separate from respondent’s alleged Huntington’s disease, respondent’s counsel 

argued below that respondent’s psychological evaluation “alluded to some ill [sic] deficiencies.” 

Also, on appeal, respondent argues that her low IQ score on certain tests raised a “red flag” that 

required petitioner to investigate and “implement meaningful . . . services” aimed at 
-5-

reunification. However, respondent never explains or rationalizes what those “ill deficiencies” 

were,3 nor does respondent explain how her low IQ constitutes a disability requiring 

accommodation. It is not the duty of this Court to search for authority to sustain or reject 

respondent’s position. See In re Smith, 324 Mich App 28, 45; 919 NW2d 427 (2018) 

(“Respondent does not identify a disability of her own that required accommodation and a party 

may not leave it to this Court to search for authority to sustain or reject its position.”) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Thus, respondent has abandoned any argument that her low IQ and 

“ill deficiencies” amounted to disabilities under the ADA. See id.

Although not argued by respondent as a basis for petitioner’s duty to accommodate 

respondent, there is substantial evidence that respondent suffered from alcoholism, which is a 

“disability” recognized under the ADA. The ADA defines “disability” to mean “a physical or 

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] 

individual.” 42 USC 12102(1). “Mental impairment” includes “any mental or psychological 

disorder such as intellectual disability, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and 

specific learning disability.” 28 CFR 35.108(b)(1). The definition of a physical or mental 

impairment specifically includes alcoholism. 28 CFR 35.108(b)(2). Accordingly, respondent 

suffered from a cognizable disability under the ADA requiring accommodation and “services 

designed to facilitate the child’s return to [respondent’s] home.” See In re Hicks/Brown, 500 

Mich at 86. 

B. REASONABLE EFFORTS TOWARDS REUNIFICATION

Even if respondent was diagnosed with Huntington’s disease, and considering 

respondent’s alcoholism constituted a “disability” under the ADA, see 42 USC 12102(1); 28 

CFR 35.108(b)(2), the record demonstrates that petitioner provided reasonable accommodation 

services to respondent and made reasonable efforts toward reunification. The PAA required 

respondent to, among other things, (1) participate in alcohol screens three times per week; (2) 

complete a substance abuse evaluation, psychological testing, and a medical evaluation for 

Huntington’s disease; (3) undergo inpatient and outpatient treatment for her alcoholism; (4) and 

refrain from alcohol use. Respondent made some progress toward the completion of her PAA, 

including her successful completion of inpatient treatment and her completion of a substance 

abuse and psychological evaluation. For the most part, however, respondent failed to 

meaningfully participate in the services offered by petitioner. Respondent failed to appear for 

120 out of 126 alcohol screenings, missed her scheduled appointments (including her testing for 

Huntington’s disease), and continued to abuse alcohol in the time leading up to termination. In 

fact, the DHHS worker observed respondent intoxicated on numerous occasions, including at 

least two times during scheduled visitations with the minor child. Respondent was also 

hospitalized for excessive intoxication on several occasions after implementation of her PAA and 

had numerous police contacts in which she was reported as being “highly intoxicated.”

 3 Respondent’s hospital records indicate that she suffered from depression and anxiety, but 

respondent has not argued on appeal that those diagnoses require accommodation under the 

ADA.
-6-

Respondent never stated that she did not understand the terms of the PAA or that she 

could not comprehend the importance of maintaining her sobriety so that she could be reunited 

with her minor child. Rather, respondent only questioned the frequency with which she was 

required to complete alcohol screenings, arguing that she did not have transportation to attend 

the alcohol screenings three times per week. The record reflects that respondent was given bus 

passes to attend the screenings, but she used the bus passes for shopping and purposes unrelated 

to the alcohol screenings. Respondent refused rides from the DHHS worker to attend her alcohol 

screenings. Further, the record establishes that respondent failed to participate in outpatient 

substance abuse treatment and that respondent’s continued alcohol abuse escalated throughout 

the course of the proceedings. Thus, the trial court did not commit plain error when it 

determined that petitioner made reasonable efforts to promote reunification and that respondent 

failed to “uphold her commensurate responsibility to engage in and benefit from th[e] services”

offered by petitioner. See In re Smith, 324 Mich App at 45. 

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron