alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
V

N THE TINITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

JOHN SLATE,

TDCJ-CID No.664223,

Plaintiff,

2:22-CV- 196-Z-8R

DIRECTOR, TDCI, et ol.,

Defendants.

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

AND

DISMISSING CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM

Before the Court are the findings, conclusions, and recommendation ("FCR") of the United

States Magistrate Judge to dismiss the civil rights claim filed by Plaintiff. ECF No. 26. No

objections to the findings, conclusions, and recorrmendation have been filed. After making an

independent review of the pleadings, f,rles, and records in this case, the Court concludes that the

findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are correct. It is therefore

ORDERED that the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are

ADOPTED and the case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.T

IT IS SO ORDERED.

September M 2oz3

MA J. KACSMARYK

LINITED STATES DISTRICT JTJDGE

I ECF Nos. 17, 18, and 25 are DENIED, and ECF No.25 will become moot by final judgment.

Case 2:22-cv-00196-Z-BR Document 27 Filed 09/18/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID 702
#### JONES v. STATE.

No. 21137.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 23, 1940.

D. F. Sanders and J. A. Veillon, both of Beaumont, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is knowingly passing a forged instrument; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for two years.

*961The question involved in the appeal is the same as that discussed in the companion case of Alfred Cormier v. State, 143 S.W.2d 959, this day delivered. There we reversed the judgment after holding the following charge to be erroneous: “The instrument must purport to be the act 'of another and you are instructed that within the meaning of the word ‘another’ as herein used, are included any other person except N. S. Wittman.” The act involved in the forgery of the check appellant is alleged to have passed purportedly was the act of N. S. Wittman. The same charge appears in the record herein. It was timely and properly excepted to. We deem it unnecessary to do more than refer to the opinion in Cormier’s case in making disposition of the appeal herein.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
#### Thomas Leonard, Respondent, v Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Lauren Brown, J.), entered October 11, 1989, which upon a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and a stipulation as to the amount of damage, awarded plaintiff the amount of $151,891.30, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff commenced this action against his employer Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH) under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA; 45 USÓ § 51) to recover damages for injuries sustained in July 1983. While mere injury to an employee is not in itself proof of PATH’S negligence, it is clear that the standard of negligence under the FELA is substantially more liberal than that governing ordinary common-law negligence actions. In a FELA action, the "test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with *342reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury * * * for which damages are sought.” *(Rogers v Missouri Pac. R. R. Co.,*352 US 500, 506, *reh denied*353 US 943.) The jury is required to weigh myriad factors, including the nature of the task and its hazards, to decide whether an employer has furnished its employee with a reasonably safe place to work. *(Ackley v Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co.,*820 F2d 263, 267 [8th Cir 1987].) Only in instances where reasonable jurors could reach only one conclusion may the court decide the question as a matter of law. *(Gallose v Long Is. R. R. Co.,*878 F2d 80, 85 [2d Cir 1989].)

Based on the evidence adduced by plaintiff, a jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant had actual knowledge of the dangerous conditions that existed in the shop’s pit area, and should have anticipated the potential hazard that could arise in other areas of the workshop as a result. Although one of PATH’S employees regularly washed the greasy pit area, nevertheless oil and other lubricants constantly collected in the pit area. A reasonably prudent person could anticipate that other employees may step in and spread the hazardous material to work areas outside the pit area.

We have considered defendant PATH’S other claims and find them to be without merit. Concur—Ross, J. P., Carro, Asch, Wallach and Smith, JJ.
EXHIBIT
      32.2





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**  **18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
      ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Ronco
      Corporation (the “Company”) for the period from July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006,
      as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
      “Report”), I, Ronald C Stone Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, that:




(1)
        the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




November
      3, 2006




/s/
                Ronald C StoneRonald
                C Stone
                Chief
                  Financial Officer
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Ever-Glory International Group, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q, for the fiscal quarter ended March 31,
2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, Edward Yihua Kang, Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:
      May 13, 2009
              /s/         
      Edward Yihua KangEdward
      Yihua KangChief
      Executive Officer
                (Principal
      Executive Officer)
# Official Journal C 188/2011

| | ISSN 1725-2423
  doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2011.188.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 188 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5428 June 2011 |

ISSN 1725-2423

doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2011.188.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 188

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5428 June 2011

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| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | OLAF |
| 2011/C 188/01 | Activity Report of OLAF Supervisory Committee (June 2009 – December 2010) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

OLAF

2011/C 188/01

Activity Report of OLAF Supervisory Committee (June 2009 – December 2010)

1

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| EN | |
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EN
**Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention**

**Quarterly Meeting**

**Friday, May 11, 2012**

# U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs

**810 Seventh Street NW, 3rd Floor Conference Center, Washington, DC 20531**

**10:00–10:10 a.m.	Welcome and Opening Remarks**

*Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., Chair, Coordinating Council*****

**10:10–10:40 a.m. 	Update on Changing Practice:  Family and Field Perspectives**

*Moderator:  Sue Badeau, Director, Knowledge Management, Casey Family*

*Programs*

*Grace Bauer, Co-director, Justice for Families*

*Grace Warren, Co-director, National Parent Caucus*

*Shay Bilchik, Director, Center for Juvenile Justice Reform, Georgetown University*

**10:40-11:00 a.m.	One Year Later:  Family Engagement and Partnering**

*****Melodee Hanes, U. S. Department of Justice, and Vice Chair, Council*

*David Esquith, U. S.  Department of Education*

*Martha Moorehouse, U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)*

*Larke Huang, Substance and Mental Health Services Administration, HHS*****

***11:00-11:15 a.m.	Break***

**11:15 -11:50 a.m.	Panelist Comments and Discussion of Family Engagement**

*Moderator: Judge Trina Thompson, Immediate Past Presiding Judge,*

*Juvenile Court, Alameda County, and Council Practitioner Member*

**11:50-12:10 p.m. 	Agency Announcements and Updates**

**Information Sharing Committee**

*Mark Sakaley, Co-Chair*

**Other Announcements and Updates**

*****Kathie Soroka, U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development*

****

**12:10 to 12:15 p.m.	Summary and Meeting Adjournment**

*Eric H. Holder, Jr., Chair*

# image1.jpeg
# Official Journal C 94A/2008

| | ISSN 1725-2423 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 94A |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5116 April 2008 |

ISSN 1725-2423

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 94A

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5116 April 2008

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES |
| | Commission |
| 2008/C 094A/01 | Common catalogue of varieties of agricultural plant species — third supplement to the 26th complete edition | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Commission

2008/C 094A/01

Common catalogue of varieties of agricultural plant species — third supplement to the 26th complete edition

1

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| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
#### C. H. HUNSUCKER, Appellant, v. BEAUMONT MOTOR CO., Appellee.

No. 3896.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

Sept. 18, 1941.

Morris & Bennett, of Beaumont, for appellant.

W. C. Ross, Jr., of Beaumont, for ap-pellee.

WALKER, Chief Justice.

This appeal was prosecuted from the County Court of Jefferson County, at Law, Jefferson County, Texas. Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed without written opinion. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Futch, Tex.Civ.App., 127 S.W.2d 1040.
#### WOFFORD v. STATE (six cases).

Nos. 21098-21103.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 29, 1940.

Rehearing Denied June 26, 1940.

M. H. Barton, of Overton, for appellant,

. Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., 03⁄8 Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Appellant was given two years sentence-in the District Court of Smith County on his plea of guilty upon an indictment charging theft of over $50. From that judgment he appeals.

The record is before us without statement of facts or bills of exception. All of the proceedings in the case appear to be regular and there is nothing presented for review by this court.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
TYPE

OF SERVICE

DATE OF COMPLETION DURATION OF 

MAINTENANCE

INDIVIDUAL

PERFORMING WORK

AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION

NO.

DESCRIPTION OF

WORK PREFORMED

REMARKS & COMMENTS

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING ENTRIES ARE TRUE AND CORRECT:BY: _____________________________ DATE: _______________________________________

HOEGGER COMMUNICATIONS UAS MAINTENANCE LOG

Date: 5.15.2015 Revision: Original
#### FURNACE v. STATE.

No. 21831.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 17, 1941.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1942.

L. D. Johnson, of Waxahachie, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

The offense is the possession of an illicit beverage, namely, whiskey, in a container to which no stamp was affixed showing the payment of the tax due thereon; the punishment, a fine of One Hundred Dollars.

The recognizance shown in the record is fatally defective in that it is not stated therein that the appellant has been convicted of the offense charged or of a misdemeanor. It is essential that the recognizance contain a recital that the accused has been convicted of an offense. Art. 831, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.; Gressett v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 295, 135 S.W.2d 990; Maultsby v. State, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 646, 106 S.W.2d 1056; Black v. State, 123 Tex. Cr.R. 538, 59 S.W.2d 1086; and authorities collated under Note 2 of Art. 831, Vernon’s Annotated Code of Criminal Procedure.

The defect in the recognizance renders this court without jurisdiction of the appeal.

The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.

On Motion to Reinstate Appeal.

KRUEGER, Judge.

At a former day of this term, we dismissed the appeal by reason of a defective recognizance. Since then and in due time, appellant has filed in this court a certified copy of a recognizance containing the same defects, together with a prayer for a rehearing in this case. Appellant has not deemed it necessary to file a motion to reinstate the appeal, accompanied by an appeal bond or a corrected recognizance. Hence we adhere to our original opinion dismissing the appeal.

*894Furthermore, we note that there is no judgment of conviction in the record.

The motion to reinstate the appeal is overruled.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15** 
**- 1488** 

In re: DAVID HILL ,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. ( 1:01

- cr

- 00191

- CMH

- 1 )

Submitted : September 9 , 2015 Decided: September 11, 2015

Before SHEDD, WYNN, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by un published per curiam opinion

.

David Hill, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

David Hill petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging that
the district court has unduly delayed in ruling on Hill’ s April

2015 motion to vacate his 2001 criminal judgment . He seeks an
order from this court directing the district court to act. We

find the present r ecord does not reveal undue delay in the

district court. Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and deny the mandamus petition. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the mater ials before th is court and argument would

n ot aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

STEVEN CARL COLEGROVE,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 608 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 28th day of April, 2021

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
#### In the Matter of Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority, Respondent, v Empire Mutual Insurance Co., Appellant.

In a proceeding to permanently stay arbitration demanded by Empire Mutual Insurance Co. for reimbursement from the petitioner Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority under Insurance Law § 5105, Empire Mutual Insurance Co. appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Kutner, J.), entered April 7, 1989, which granted the petition and permanently stayed the arbitration.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the permanent stay is vacated, the petition is denied, the proceeding is dismissed, and the parties are directed to proceed to arbitration.

The appellant Empire Mutual Insurance Co. (hereinafter Empire) paid out approximately $37,000 under a no-fault insurance policy and commenced an action in Supreme Court, New York County, against the petitioner Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority (hereinafter the MSBA), which is self-insured, for reimbursement pursuant to Insurance Law § 5105. Empire’s complaint was dismissed as time barred based upon the l-year-and-30-day limitation period applicable to an action against a public authority "founded on tort” (Public Authorities Law § 1276 [2]). The MSBA then sought, in the instant proceeding, to permanently stay arbitration Empire demanded on its reimbursement claims. The petition was granted and *452the matter was permanently stayed on claim-preclusion grounds. This appeal followed. In the meantime, on appeal, the order of the Supreme Court, New York County, was affirmed by the Appellate Division, First Department, on other grounds. That court held that Empire’s claim pursuant to Insurance Law § 5105 for reimbursement of first-party benefits should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, since Insurance Law § 5105 (b) provides that mandatory arbitration is the sole remedy for Empire’s claims *(see, Empire Ins. Co. v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth.,*159 AD2d 312).

The dismissal of the prior action for lack of jurisdiction does not bar arbitration pursuant to Insurance Law § 5105 (b). The permanent stay must be vacated, as the First Department’s holding leaves no doubt that the instant claim is arbitrable. The arbitration proceeding was commenced within the applicable three-year limitations period and the dismissal of the action in the Supreme Court, New York County, is without preclusive effect. Therefore, the arbitration should be permitted to proceed. Balletta, J. P., Miller, O’Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.
#### ROSENBAUM v. STATE.

No. 20812.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 31, 1940.

Rehearing Denied March 20, 1940.

Forrest Campbell, of San Antonio, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Appellant was convicted for the offense of unlawfully carrying a pistol and his punishment was assessed at a fine of one hundred dollars.

The record is' before us without statement of facts or bills of exception, in the absence of which nothing has been presented authorizing a reversal of the conviction. ....

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

•GRAVES, Judge.

This cause has been heretofore affirmed, there having been an absenc'e of á statement óf facts and bills of exception. In this motion, however, óur' attention is called to the fact that the complaint and information charge Harry Rosen *baum*with unlawfully carrying a pistol, and the judgment and sentence refer to the defendant as Harry *Rosenbauer.*It is to be noted however that upon the reading of the State’s pleadings herein appellant pleaded not guilty and made no suggestion of a misnomer-; that a jury was waived and the matter presented to the court; that 'appellant was by the court found guilty and assessed a fine of $100; .and that appellant, under the name of. Rosenbauer, filed a motion for a new triál.

Under Art. 495 et seq., C.C.P., if there is no suggestion made by the defendant as to a mistake in his true name, the trial shall proceed in the name set forth in the indictment or information.

*108We have heretofore held in the case of Kinkead v. State, 61 Texas Cr.R. 651-654, 135 S.W. 573, 575, as follows: “In regard to the suggestion that defendant was not indicted in his true name, this is immaterial. Under articles 548 [now 495] and 549 [now 496], C.C.P., he had a right to suggest his true name when the case was called for trial. Not having done so, he cannot for .the first time complain in this court. Henry v. State, 38 Tex.Cr.R. 306, 42 S.W. 559.”

The motion is overruled. ■
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

September 26, 2007 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD FRANK WEBB

 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Cumberland County

No. 7796 Leon Burns, Jr., Judge

No. E2006-01793-CCA-MR3-CD - Filed March 12, 2008

The defendant, Ronald Frank Webb, was convicted by a Cumberland County Criminal Court jury

of driving under the influence, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor, for which the court sentenced

him to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 120 days to be served in jail at seventy-five percent

release eligibility. The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred in giving lengthy and

confusing instructions to the jury and in commenting that the instructions were confusing. We affirm

the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JOSEPH M. TIPTON, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR.,

and NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JJ., joined.

Thomas Harding Potter, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant (on appeal) and Larry M. Warner,

Crossville, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, Ronald Frank Webb.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Leslie E. Price, Assistant Attorney General;

William Edward Gibson, District Attorney General; and Douglas E. Crawford, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The defendant did not retain a court reporter for the trial, and we are limited to review of the

statement of the evidence and the written instructions given to the jury. Additionally, no issue

regarding the jury instructions was raised in the motion for new trial. The defendant claims he is

entitled to relief as a matter of plain error.

We have reviewed the appellate record and the arguments of the parties. We hold that the

defendant has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to plain error relief on the basis that the

instructions were erroneous or that the trial court’s statements to the jury were prejudicial.
-2-

Otherwise, we note that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict and that no error of law exists

that would require a reversal of the judgment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

___________________________________ 

JOSEPH M. TIPTON, PRESIDING JUDGE
#### TECHNICAL CHEMICAL COMPANY, Appellant, v. O. R. FLANNAGAIN, Appellee.

No. 3688.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Beaumont.

June 27, 1940.

House & House, of Dallas, for appellant.

Reasonover & Reasonover and Ellsworth A. Weinberg, all of Dallas, for appellee.

COMBS, Justice.

This suit originated in the county court of Dallas County at Law No. 1 and involves money demand of $200. Judgment was entered by the trial court in favor of the appellee, who was plaintiff, for that amount. We have carefully examined the record and finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed without written opinion. See Texas & N. O. R. R. Co. v. Futch, Tex.Civ.App., 127 S.W.2d 1040.