IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

MARTIN MUNOZ, § 

#1594-22, § 

 § 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

V. § No. 3:22-cv-2411-B-BN 

§ 

RED OAK POLICE DEPARTMENT, § 

§ 

Defendant. § 

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Plaintiff Martin Munoz, an inmate at the Ellis County jail, filed a pro se

complaint in which he alleges that Red Oak police officers violated his constitutional 

rights. See Dkt. No. 3. 

United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred the complaint to the 

undersigned United States magistrate judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) 

and a standing order of reference. 

The Court granted Munoz’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the PLRA), see Dkt. Nos. 4, 5, a statute 

requiring that, where a prisoner (whether incarcerated or detained pending trial) 

seeks relief from a governmental entity or employee, a district court must, on initial 

screening, identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the 

complaint, that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). 

Case 3:22-cv-02411-B-BN Document 8 Filed 12/28/22 Page 1 of 6 PageID 31
- 2 - 

Under this obligation, the Court issued a screening questionnaire. See Dkt. No. 

6. And Munoz submitted verified answers, see Dkt. No. 7, thereby amending his 

allegations, see Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

“responses to [a court’s questionnaire] become part of the plaintiff’s pleadings” 

(citation omitted)). 

After reviewing the allegations as amended, the undersigned enters these 

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should 

dismiss the complaint as amended with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and count 

the dismissal of this lawsuit as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Discussion

Although Munoz names a police department as the sole defendant, he alleges 

that he is seeking “compensation” because, when he was arrested on June 16, 2021, 

officers “deliberately elicited” from him “an incriminating response” and thereby 

“violated [his] right to counsel” under the Sixth Amendment. Dkt. No. 3 at 4; see id.

at 3 (“Deliberate Elicitation ‘Massiah rule’ 6th Amendment violation”). And, in 

response to the Court’s interrogatory asking whether he is “facing criminal charges 

based on the June 16, 2021 arrest involving police officers that also is the basis for 

your current civil allegations,” Munoz answered “yes”; that he is “currently awaiting 

trial” on drug possession charges. Dkt. No. 7 at 1; see also id. at 2-4. 

To start, Munoz’s filing this civil lawsuit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

based on the same facts underlying a pending criminal prosecution implicates 

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 

Case 3:22-cv-02411-B-BN Document 8 Filed 12/28/22 Page 2 of 6 PageID 32
- 3 - 

That is, while Section 1983 “is an express authorization from Congress 

permitting federal courts to enjoin state proceedings in order to protect federal 

rights,” Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 

407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972)), this provision of federal law “does not ‘qualify in any 

way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court 

when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding,’” id. (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 

243; citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-47). 

So, under Younger, a federal court should generally abstain from exercising its 

jurisdiction where to do so would result in the interference in certain, select state 

proceedings, chiefly ongoing state criminal proceedings. 

But Younger abstention “applies only where there is ‘no question that [a 

complaint] allege[s] injuries under federal law sufficient to justify the District Court’s 

retention of jurisdiction.’” Boyd v. Farrin, 575 F. App’x 517, 519-20 (5th Cir. 2014) 

(per curiam) (quoting Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 204 (1988); citing Marts v. 

Hines, 68 F.3d 134, 135 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1995); citation omitted). And the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has “interpreted this limitation to mean that a 

stay is not required where the district court determines that the claim for damages 

is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” Id. at 520 (collecting cases). 

Such is the case here, as Munoz’s Sixth Amendment claim is frivolous. The 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated when the government “use[s] against 

[a criminal defendant] at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which 

[law enforcement officers] ... deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted 

Case 3:22-cv-02411-B-BN Document 8 Filed 12/28/22 Page 3 of 6 PageID 33
- 4 - 

and in the absence of his counsel.’” United States v. Bates, 850 F.3d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 

2017) (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)). 

So, “[t]o allege a Massiah violation, a criminal defendant must establish” first 

that “a Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached.” Id. (citing Henderson v. 

Quarterman, 460 F.3d 654, 664 (5th Cir. 2006)). But, unlike “the Fifth Amendment 

right against self-incrimination,” which “must be respected from the moment it is 

asserted,” “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel ... does not attach until the 

initiation of an adversary judicial process in respect to a specific crime.” Arrington v. 

Cnty. of Dall., 970 F.3d 1441, 1445 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 

501 U.S. 171 (1991); citations omitted). 

In sum, because Munoz does not allege facts from which the Court may infer 

that the Sixth Amendment had attached when police, at the time of Munoz’s arrest, 

allegedly “deliberately elicited” from him “an incriminating response,” the Court 

should dismiss the complaint as amended with prejudice for Munoz’s failure to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Flowers v. City of Harlingen, Civ. 

A. No. B-04-085, 2005 WL 8167150, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2005) (“Though it is not 

at all clear from the pleadings, it is possible that Plaintiff intended to argue that the 

Supreme Court’s extension of the right to counsel in Messiah applied to his case. This 

interpretation of the Sixth Amendment would only be appropriate if HPD had 

continued to question Plaintiff after he was indicted and attempted to use any 

statements they may have procured from him to gain a conviction at trial. Plaintiff 

does not make such an allegation. He only claims that he was interrogated by police 

Case 3:22-cv-02411-B-BN Document 8 Filed 12/28/22 Page 4 of 6 PageID 34
- 5 - 

officers without benefit of an attorney after being arrested. He does not allege that 

this interrogation took place after criminal charges were filed nor that the 

information gleaned from the questioning affected his subsequent conviction in state 

court for making a terroristic threat. Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 

does not attach until the initiation of an adversary judicial process in respect to a 

specific crime, Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to overcome Defendants 

qualified immunity defense. As such, this claim is also ripe for 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) dismissal.” (citations omitted)), rec. adopted, 2005 WL 8167153 (S.D. 

Tex. July 6, 2005). 

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss the complaint as amended with prejudice under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A and count the dismissal of this lawsuit as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g). 

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these 

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections 

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure 

Case 3:22-cv-02411-B-BN Document 8 Filed 12/28/22 Page 5 of 6 PageID 35
- 6 - 

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the 

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or 

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). 

DATED: December 28, 2022 

 _________________________________________ 

DAVID L. HORAN 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 3:22-cv-02411-B-BN Document 8 Filed 12/28/22 Page 6 of 6 PageID 36