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CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL

v. ZENAS ZELOTES

(AC 35867)

Beach, Alvord and Bear, Js.

Argued April 22—officially released August 19, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, Hon. Frank H. D’Andrea, Jr., judge

trial referee.)

Zenas Zelotes, self-represented, the appellant

(defendant).

Suzanne B. Sutton, first assistant chief disciplinary

counsel, with whom was Karyl L. Carrasquilla, assistant disciplinary counsel, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

BEAR, J. In this presentment1filed by the plaintiff,

Chief Disciplinary Counsel, alleging misconduct by the

defendant, Attorney Zenas Zelotes, the defendant

appeals from the judgment of the trial court concluding

that he violated rules 1.7 (a) (2) and 8.4 (4) of the Rules

of Professional Conduct (rule), and ordering that he be

suspended from the practice of law for a period of five

months. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the

court’s findings and the record evidence are inadequate

to establish a concurrent conflict under rule 1.7 (a) (2);

(2) the court erred in finding that he violated rule 8.4

(4); (3) he was denied due process of law because

he did not have fair notice that his conduct could be

considered professional misconduct; and (4) the court

denied him the benefit of his affirmative defenses. We

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which were found by the trial

court and which are not contested by the parties, and

the court’s conclusions in this case, inform our review.

‘‘Michael Aliano (Michael) and his wife Terry Aliano

(Terry), Connecticut residents, were having some problems in their marriage. On March 19, 2010, they were

in New London . . . to try to reconcile and were at a

jazz bar together. The defendant was there with his

girlfriend, Sharon [Wise], and struck up a conversation

with the Alianos. The couples exchanged phone numbers and began seeing one another as couples, in a

social capacity. The defendant became friendly with

Michael and Terry and socialized together as a threesome. Thereafter, in June, 2010, the defendant started

seeing Terry alone, going on walks in the park together,

going to movies, for drinks and began ‘dating.’

‘‘The defendant had an ‘intimate’ relationship with

Terry. . . . He believed he had an obligation to help

her proceed with her divorce, and promote her welfare

and make her a happier person. On more than one

occasion, their date consisted of sitting close together

at the kitchen island in Terry’s and Michael’s marital

home (without the presence of Michael), holding hands,

sharing a glass of wine, with candles, music and dimmed

lights. . . . Their first kiss came on such an occasion

on September 24, 2010. The defendant filed his appearance on behalf of Terry in the Aliano divorce case three

days later on September 27, 2010. . . .

‘‘Sometime in December, 2010, Michael came home

earlier than expected . . . and the defendant and Terry

were again sitting together at the kitchen island with

the same ambience and sharing wine. The defendant

described Michael’s demeanor (not surprisingly) as

antagonistic. . . .

‘‘Michael filed a motion in the divorce case to disqualify the defendant from representing Terry in the matter.

[The court] Shluger, J., granted the motion on January
24, 2011. After the disqualification, the defendant and

Terry ceased theirintimate relationship and presumably

their ‘dating.’ . . .

‘‘The plaintiff’s presentment complaint contains several alleged violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. These include [rule] 1.8 (j). This section prohibits

sexual relations with a client unless the relationship

predates the representation. The defendant denies any

sexual relations with Terry at any time during their

courtship. The court cannot find, one way or the other,

on this issue, but focuses rather on rules 1.7 (a) (2) and

rule 8.4 (4). . . .

‘‘The risk that existed under [rule] 1.7 (a) (2) in this

case is that their intimacy and the love that the defendant professed for his client might have terminated or

its level diminished, bringing into question the future

level of competency, diligence and detachment of the

defendant. Thus, the court concludes that because of

his ‘personal interest,’ the plaintiff has proven, by clear

and convincing evidence, the violation by the defendant

of rule 1.7 (a) (2) . . . .

‘‘The Rules of Professional Conduct also state that a

lawyer shall not ‘[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice’ . . . Rules of Professional Conduct 8-4 (4). The facts show that the defendant knowingly injected himself into the personal life

of Terry Aliano, and into the marital status of her and

her husband, Michael Aliano. He became more than her

friend, but developed an ‘intimate’ relationship with

her, and they began to ‘date.’ He encouraged her to go

forward with her divorce against Michael . . . and

filed an appearance on her behalf in lieu of prior counsel. He believed he was looking out for her welfare and

would make her a happier person. The court concludes

that attorneys in Connecticut and a reasonable general

public would regard the defendant’s conduct as appalling, and would thoroughly disapprove. The court shares

that view. ‘It is professional misconduct for a lawyer

to . . . [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice’ . . . Rules of Professional

Conduct 8.4 (4). Based on the relevant facts that have

been set forth, the court rules that the plaintiff has

proven, by clear and convincing evidence, a violation

of the Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4 (4).

‘‘However, a disciplinary committee need not prove

the violation of a specific rule. ‘Rather, reference to a

specific rule simply assists the trial court in drawing

its conclusions as to whether, under the totality of circumstances, professional misconduct occurred.’ Statewide Grievance Committee v. Botwick, 226 Conn. 299,

310, 627 A.2d 901 (1993). Under the totality of the circumstances here, the court concludes that, by clear

and convincing evidence, the defendant has committed

professional misconduct. . . . The court hereby suspends the defendant from the practice of law for a
period of five months commencing August 1, 2013.’’2

(Citations omitted; footnotes omitted.) This appeal

followed.

The following well established principles govern the

relationship between the Superior Court and members

of the bar. ‘‘The Superior Court possesses inherent

authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline

the members of the bar. . . . The judiciary has the

power to admit attorneys to practice and to disbar them

. . . to fix the qualifications of those to be admitted

. . . and to define what constitutes the practice of law.

. . . In the exercise of its disciplinary power, the Superior Court has adopted the Code of Professional

Responsibility [now the Rules of Professional Conduct]. . . .

‘‘Disciplinary proceedings are for the purpose of preserving the courts from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. . . . The proceeding to

disbar [or suspend] an attorney is neither a civil action

nor a criminal proceeding, but is a proceeding sui generis, the object of which is not the punishment of the

offender, but the protection of the court. . . . Once

the complaint is made, the court controls the situation

and procedure, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may seem to it to require. . . . [T]he power of the

courts is left unfettered to act as situations, as they

may arise, may seem to require, for efficient discipline

of misconduct and the purging of the bar from the

taint of unfit membership. Such statutes as ours are

not restrictive of the inherent powers which reside in

courts to inquire into the conduct of their own officers,

and to discipline them for misconduct. . . . In [disciplinary] proceedings . . . therefore, the attorney’s

relations to the tribunal and the character and purpose

of the inquiry are such that unless it clearly appears

that his rights have in some substantial way been denied

him, the action of the court will not be set aside upon

review. . . .

‘‘[T]he clearly erroneous standard . . . is the preferable standard of review in attorney grievance appeals.

. . . The clearly erroneous standard of review provides

that [a] court’s determination is clearly erroneous only

in cases in which the record contains no evidence to

support it, or in cases in which there is evidence, but

the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki, 150 Conn. App. 472,

478–79, 91 A.3d 932 (2014).

‘‘Additionally, because the applicable standard of

proof for determining whether an attorney has violated

the Rules of Professional Conduct is clear and convincing evidence . . . we must consider whether the [fact

finder’s] decision was based on clear and convincing

evidence.’’ (Citation omitted.) Briggs v. McWeeny, 260
Conn. 296, 322–23, 796 A.2d 516 (2002). ‘‘[C]lear and

convincing proof denotes a degree of belief that lies

between the belief that is required to find the truth or

existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action

and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal

prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence

induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that

the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the

probability that they are true or exist is substantially

greater than the probability that they are false or do

not exist.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henry

v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 111 Conn. App. 12,

21 n.9, 957 A.2d 547 (2008). With these principles in

mind, we turn to the defendant’s claims on appeal.

I

The defendant claims that the ‘‘findings and evidence

were inadequate—as a matter of law—to sustain a finding of a ‘concurrent conflict’ under rule 1.7 (a) (2).’’ He

asserts that, because he challenges only the propriety

of the court’s conclusion and not any of the court’s

factual findings, the appropriate standard of review for

this claim is plenary. The plaintiff argues that ‘‘the trial

court’s finding of a rule 1.7 (a) violation was not clearly

erroneous, was based on sound legal grounds and was

supported by the evidence.’’ On the basis of the undisputed facts, we agree with the plaintiff.

As stated previously, the preferred standard ofreview

in attorney grievance appeals is the clearly erroneous

standard. Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki,

supra, 150 Conn. App. 479. Accordingly, we will examine the record to ascertain if it contains evidence to

support the court’s determination that the defendant

was in violation of rule 1.7 (a). See id. Additionally, we

will consider whether the court’s decision was based on

clear and convincing evidence. See Briggs v. McWeeny,

supra, 260 Conn. 322–23.

Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides: ‘‘(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation

involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent

conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of

one client will be directly adverse to another client; or

(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of

one or more clients will be materially limited by the

lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the

lawyer.

‘‘(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent

conflict of interest under subsection (a), a lawyer may

represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes

that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and

diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the

representation is not prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by
one client against another client represented by the

lawyer in the same litigation or the same proceeding

before any tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives

informed consent, confirmed in writing.’’

The court found, inter alia, that the defendant specifically violated rule 1.7 (a) (2), which, in this case,

required the court to have found by clear and convincing

evidence that there was a significant risk that the defendant’s representation of Terry Aliano would be materially limited by his personal interest. The defendant

argues that the court’s finding of a concurrent conflict

‘‘rested on nothing more than mere speculation that a

chain of events whose occurrence theoretically could

one day lead counsel to act counter to his client’s interests might in fact occur.’’ He contends that our review

of the record will necessitate a conclusion that the

evidence does not support the court’s conclusion of a

violation of rule 1.7 (a). We are not persuaded.

The uncontested findings of the trial court along with

the defendant’s own trial testimony reveal the following. When the defendant met Terry Aliano in March,

2010, Terry and her husband were attempting to reconcile after having filed for dissolution of their marriage.

The defendant and his girlfriend3 became friendly with

the Alianos and began to socialize with them through

July or August, 2010, including with the Alianos’ children. Despite the defendant’s having a girlfriend, with

whom he had a sexual relationship and with whom he

appears to have remained involved, and despite knowing that the Alianos were attempting to reconcile their

marriage and keep their family together, he decided,

in June, 2010, while he and his girlfriend were still

socializing with the Alianos, that he wanted to get close

to Terry ‘‘to gain her confidence . . . .’’

The defendant testified that he had ‘‘resolved to date

Terry Aliano in an effort to say, sweetheart, this is what

the other sides look like, to get her excited about life,

to get her remembering what it was like to do the things

that she loved to do that she couldn’t do in the relationship because I believe that if I gave her the emotional

strength, if she remember[ed] what it was like to be in

a healthy relationship and happy, then she would have

the conviction and the courage that she needed to move

forward in the divorce.’’ He stated that he wanted to

be Terry’s protector, and that he had a ‘‘moral obligation’’ to give her ‘‘the strength and the encouragement

to move forward with [her divorce attorney].’’4

The defendant testified that in June, 2010, he began

advising Terry about her divorce, both as a friend and

as an attorney. When questioned by the court, however,

he asserted that his conversations with Terry were privileged because he is an attorney. The defendant also

testified that he started spending time alone with Terry

in June, 2010, and they began dating, going on walks

in a park together, going to movies, and going out for
drinks. He also gave her legal advice about her divorce,

‘‘educating her about her rights, about remedies,’’

despite his knowledge that she had an attorney, whom

the defendant held ‘‘in high regard’’ and with whose

representation he did not want to interfere. The defendant testified that he had an intimate relationship with

Terry but that they did not engage in sexual intercourse.

They held hands, hugged, shared wine,5

lit candles, listened to music, and dimmed the lights. Their first kiss

occurred on September 24, 2010, three days before the

defendant filed his official appearance on behalf of

Terry in the Aliano dissolution case.6

The defendant testified that he had a retainer

agreement with Terry that called for his standard charging rate of either $200 or $250 per hour, and that Terry

had paid him a retainer of $10,000—$9000 of which

went to his fees, and $1000 of which was applied to

other fees and costs. He also stated that he had put his

bankruptcy practice on hold so that he could devote

his full attention to the Aliano case. He further stated

that the cost of his services had amounted to approximately $20,000, but, because the trial court did not

award attorney’s fees to Terry, he ultimately released

her from the balance that she owed. Additionally, the

defendant testified that he had worked out a quid pro

quo with Terry where she would work for his law office

in exchange for some of the money she owed him.

He also testified that Terry had complained about the

paralegal costs of her former attorney, so the defendant

told her that he would ‘‘take [her] under [his] wing.’’

He told herthat she could perform some of the paralegal

functions for him and reduce her costs by ‘‘play[ing]

an active role’’ in the case. The defendant told Terry:

‘‘But if you are with me, then not only are you going

to be shielded from that potential cost, but you are

going to also be able to put the time and labor and love

into making sure that this case is properly presented.

So, it’s going to mitigate your financial risk.’’ The day

after this conversation, Terry asked the defendant to

file an appearance on her behalf. The defendant did not

pay Terry for her paralegal services, and he did not

recall if the quid pro quo was written into his

retainer agreement.

Additionally, during the defendant’s representation

of Terry, he sometimes visited the marital residence

where both Terry and Michael continued to reside. On

one of those visits in particular, Michael returned to

the home at approximately 11:20 p.m. and witnessed

his wife and the defendant sharing a glass of wine by

candlelight. When Michael tried to engage in conversation with the defendant, the defendant told him that

‘‘the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit[ed] [him]

from engaging [Michael] in conversation’’ and that

Michael needed to communicate only through his own

attorney. Although the defendant testified before the

trial court that he was visiting Terry only as a social
guest, he also stated that when Michael was present,

he quoted the Rules of Professional Conduct to Michael,

took out legal books, and he showed Terry how to mark

exhibits, create a trial notebook, and create a table of

contents. He also testified that, although he was at the

Alianos’ marital home purely as a social guest, there

were times when his communication with Terry while

in the home was privileged because, in his words: ‘‘If

it’s a communication to counsel for the purpose of

obtaining advice in connection with a legal matter, then

that would be privileged. Now, if, in the next sentence,

we are talking about the Super Bowl, then that would

not be privileged . . . .’’

On the basis of this evidence and the court’s findings,

the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that

the defendant had violated rule 1.7 (a) (2). We conclude

that the record fully supports the court’s decision.

In People v. Beecher, 224 P.3d 442, 444 (Colo. O.P.D.J.

2009), the respondent attorney was found, in part, to

have violated rule 1.7 (b), which mimics our rule 1.7

(a) (2), by his intimate, nonsexual relationship with his

client during her dissolution of marriage case. The court

found that the attorney’s relationship with the client

was so close that it compromised the attorney’s responsibilities to his client. Id., 450. Specifically, the court

found that the attorney had lived, worked, and traveled

with the client, who was emotionally strained because

of her divorce, and that he ‘‘saw himself as [the client’s]

personal protector, as opposed to her counsel in her

divorce . . . . In this role he lost all objectivity and

the independent judgment needed to help [the client]

navigate through an emotionally trying divorce.’’ Id.

Additionally, although the attorney believed that no

conflict existed, the court found that ‘‘his belief was

unreasonable . . . [and that the client’s] ability to

make an informed decision on this issue had been

severely compromised.’’ Id., 450–51. Similarly in the

present case, the defendant saw himself as Terry’s protector. He then intentionally interjected himself into

the middle of her dissolution, giving her legal advice,

despite knowing that she was represented by counsel,

telling her to proceed with the dissolution instead of

attempting to reconcile with her husband, and intentionally seeking to date her and gain her confidence.

In Musick v. Musick, 192 W. Va. 527, 453 S.E.2d 361

(1994), the court discussed ‘‘Formal Opinion Number

92-364 of the American Bar Association (ABA) Standing

Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility

(the committee). . . . [The committee found that]

there are several provisions of the Model Rules that

may be implicated by a sexual relationship, particularly

one that arises after the formation of the attorney-client

relationship. First, because of the dependence that so

often characterizes the attorney-client relationship,

there is a significant possibility that the sexual relation-
ship will have resulted from exploitation of the lawyer’s

dominant position and influence and, thus, breached

the lawyer’s fiduciary obligations to the client. Second,

a sexual relationship with a client may affect the independence of the lawyer’s judgment. Third, the lawyer’s

engaging in a sexual relationship with a client may

create a prohibited conflict between the interests of

the lawyer and those of the client. Fourth, a non-professional, yet emotionally charged, relationship between

attorney and client may result in confidences being

imparted in circumstances where the attorney-client

privilege is not available, yet would have been, absent

the personal relationship.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id., 530–31.

The court then explained: ‘‘As noted in the ABA opinion, if the lawyer’s interests in the relationship with the

client interfere with decisions that must be made in the

client’s behalf, the lawyer’s representation of that client

will have been impaired and perhaps materially limited.

The ABA committee further opined that a sexual relationship between an attorney and client may confuse

the line to be drawn in protecting client confidences.

This is caused by the fact that only those confidences

imparted in the context of the attorney-client relationship are protected by privilege. Confidences imparted

in a personal relationship, except for husband and wife,

are not protected.

‘‘The ABA committee also observed that the attorneyclient relationship is a fiduciary one and that a lawyer’s

fiduciary obligation is heightened if the client is emotionally vulnerable to the extent that the client’s ability

to make reasoned judgements about the future is

affected. This could be of particular concern in a

divorce proceeding where emotions run high and the

proceedings may present the equivalent of a life crisis

for the client. The nature of the representation may

also affect the degree of dependence the client feels

toward the attorney. Obviously, in a divorce or other

advers[e] domestic relations proceeding, the issues are

more emotionally charged. Thus, as the committee

observed, the more vulnerable the client, the more

imperative it becomes for the lawyer to maintain a

normal attorney-client relationship.’’ Id., 531.

Although in the present case, the defendant testified

that his relationship with Terry was nonsexual, and the

court determined that it had no evidence to reach a

contrary determination, the intimate and romantic

nature of the defendant’s relationship with Terry is not

contested. Moreover, although the defendant contends

that this intimate relationship predated his filing of an

appearance in the Alianos’ divorce proceeding, it is

uncontested that he gave Terry legal advice about her

divorce beginning in June, 2010, despite the fact that

she already was represented by counsel, and despite

the fact that the defendant and his girlfriend socialized
with the Alianos and their children. Additionally, it is

uncontested that the defendant set out to date Terry

and to gain her confidence in June, 2010, in an effort

to give her the ‘‘conviction and the courage that she

needed to move forward in the divorce,’’ apparently at

the same time he was giving her legal advice, although

he was not her attorney at that time, and socializing

with her husband and children.

The defendant proudly admits that he did not maintain a normal attorney-client relationship with Terry,

and that, because of their intimate relationship, he was

willing to ‘‘go the extra mile.’’ See generally In the Matter of Tsoutsouris, 748 N.E.2d 856, 860 (Ind. 2001) (‘‘[i]n

their professional capacity, lawyers are expected to

provide emotionally detached, objective analysis of

legal problems and issues for clients who may be

embroiled in sensitive or difficult matters’’ [internal

quotation marks omitted]). He injected himself into the

middle of the Alianos’ marriage issues and dissolution

proceedings, and he antagonized Michael Aliano. See

Chestone v. Chestone, 322 N.J. Super. 250, 259, 730 A.2d

890 (App. Div. 1999) (‘‘We recognize that the nature

of family litigation sometimes causes the litigants to

become emotionally involved. Unfortunately, on occasion, the emotional involvement leads to acrimony.

When those two factors are present the parties, on

occasion, permit their emotions and acrimony to predominate over reason. The attorney, on the other hand,

must be detached from emotion and acrimony.’’). The

defendant drank wine with Terry while the children

were home despite an agreement that Terry had made

with the Department of Children and Families prohibiting anyone who was under the influence of alcohol

from caring for the children, a copy of which was hung

on her refrigerator. The defendant also put his bankruptcy practice on hold so that he fully could concentrate on this one case.

He also testified that, when he was discussing with

Terry the possibility of representing her, he worked out

a quid pro quo with her to help offset her legal expenses

and agreed to write off the balance of his fees if the

court did not award those fees in the dissolution action.

The defendant told Terry that if she were represented

by him, that he would take her under his wing, that she

would be shielded from the higher costs of her other

attorney, and that she would mitigate her financial risk.

Despite all of this, the defendant declares that ‘‘the

court correctly observe[d]—that at no time—has [the

defendant] expressed remorse’’ and that he ‘‘remains

resolute.’’7

On the basis of these uncontested factual findings of

the trial court and the defendant’s own trial testimony,

we conclude that the court’s finding that the defendant

violated rule 1.7 (a) (2) by having a concurrent conflict

that created a significant risk that his representation
of Terry would be materially limited by his personal

interest is fully supported by clear and convincing evidence, and is not clearly erroneous.8

II

The defendant also claims that the court erred in

finding that he violated rule 8.4 (4) because: (1) his

conduct purely was personal and beyond the scope

of rule 8.4 (4); (2) there are no clear and meaningful

standards for the imposition of discipline under rule

8.4 (4); and (3) the court’s finding of a rule 8.4 (4)

violation ‘‘tramples upon core constitutional rights to

pursue and maintain intimate associations.’’ We will

consider each of these in turn.

A

The defendant claims that the court erred in finding

that he violated rule 8.4 (4) because his conduct purely

was personal and beyond the scope of rule 8.4 (4). He

argues that our ‘‘Supreme Court has not yet articulated

the test to be used to determine if conduct—which does

not violate any other disciplinary rule—is independently punishable as prejudicial to the administration

of justice—it is a matter of first impression.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Because we have concluded in part I

ofthis opinion thatthe court’s finding that the defendant

violated rule 1.7 (a) (2) was supported by clear and

convincing evidence and was not clearly erroneous, the

defendant’s argument that there cannot be an independent violation of rule 8.4 (4) is moot.

B

The defendant next claims that we must determine

‘‘whether the judge imposed discipline in the absence

[of] clear and meaningful standards. As concerns [rule]

8.4 (4)—clear and meaningful standards are a constitutional requirement.’’ (Emphasis in original.) He also

argues that the trial court’s ‘‘subjective declaration that

. . . ‘under the totality of the circumstances, professional misconduct occurred’ does not satisfy the

requirement that an independent [rule] 8.4 (4) violation

rest on clear and meaningful standards.’’ (Emphasis

in original.) The defendant alleges that the lack of standards is a due process violation.

It is unclearto us exactly what the defendant is claiming. He appears to argue that rule 8.4 (4) does not

contain clear and meaningful standards of application,

that an independent violation of rule 8.4 (4) cannot

occur in the absence of clear and meaningful standards,

and that the court thus erroneously found that he violated rule 8.4 (4) and imposed discipline in the absence

of clear and meaningful standards. The plaintiff

responds by stating that rule 8.4 is constitutional and

by demonstrating that the defendant had adequate

notice and an opportunity to be heard. In his reply brief,

the defendantresponds that the plaintiff did not address

his claim properly. He states that he readily acknowl-
edges that rule 8.4 is constitutional but asserts that he

is making an ‘‘as-applied challenge’’ to the rule. He then

argues that ‘‘(1) no clear and meaningful standards

exist; that (2) [he] lacked fair notice of the (nonexistent) standards; and that (3) these (nonexistent) standards fail to comport with the requirements of strict

judicial scrutiny.’’ (Emphasis in original.)

We readily understand if the plaintiff was confused by

the defendant’s claim and his arguments. After careful

consideration, and on the basis of the arguments set

forth in the defendant’s brief and his reply brief, we

conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of the

defendant’s arguments is that he is claiming that rule

8.4 is unconstitutional because there are no clear and

meaningful standards established for its application,

which appears to be a vagueness argument rather than

an as-applied challenge.

As generally stated, ‘‘[t]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal

offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people

can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a

manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [The doctrine] embodies two

central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect

of a governing statute or regulation and the guarantee

against standardless law enforcement. . . . The United

States Supreme Court has emphasized that the more

important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual

notice, but . . . the requirement that a legislature

establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. . . . Thus, [i]n order to surmount a vagueness

challenge, a statute [must] afford a person of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is

permitted or prohibited . . . and must not impermissibly [delegate] basic policy matters to policemen, judges,

and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective

basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. . . . Finally, [i]f the meaning

of a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not

be void for vagueness . . . for [i]n most English words

and phrases there lurk uncertainties. . . . [T]he statute

must contain some core meaning within which the

defendant’s actions clearly fall. . . . References to

judicial opinions involving the statute, the common law,

legal dictionaries, or treatises may be necessary to

ascertain a statute’s meaning to determine if it gives fair

warning.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. McMahon, 257 Conn. 544, 551–53, 778

A.2d 847 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130, 122 S. Ct.

1069, 151 L. Ed. 2d 972 (2002).

Despite what the defendant argues in his reply brief,

he has not briefed an ‘‘as-applied’’ challenge to rule 8.4.

The defendant appears to set forth a claim that rule 8.4

is unconstitutionally vague, and he ‘‘expressly acknowledges [that rule] 8.4 is constitutional.’’ (Emphasis in
original.)

As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit explained in Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843

F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109

S. Ct. 531, 102 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1988), the rules of practice

‘‘appl[y] only to lawyers, who are professionals and

have the benefit of guidance provided by case law, court

rules and the ‘lore of the profession.’ ’’ In explaining a

rule identical to our rule 8.4 (4), the court in Howell

stated: ‘‘DR 1-102 (A) (5) provides in pertinent part that

a lawyer shall not ‘[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial

to the administration of justice.’ This provision is not

peculiar to the State of Texas. It was part of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated in 1969 and subsequently adopted by

almost every State in the Union. There was nothing

startlingly innovative in DR 1-102 (A) (5)’s contents.

Since the early days of English common law, it has

been widely recognized that courts possess the inherent

powerto regulate the conduct of attorneys who practice

before them and to discipline or disbar such of those

attorneys as are guilty of unprofessional conduct.’’ Id.,

206; see also Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 Conn. 539, 553–54, 663 A.2d 317 (1995)

(‘‘Superior Court possesses inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the member of

the bar’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

We conclude that although the plain text of rule 8.4

(4) may lack detail and precision; see 2 G. Hazard &

W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering (3d Ed. Supp. 2009)

§ 65.6, pp. 65-15 and 65-16; its meaning is clear from

the rules, the official comments to the rules, and case

law interpreting rule 8.4 (4) or rules that substantively

are identical to our rule 8.4 (4). Attorneys are sufficiently on notice of what behavior is proscribed and

what conduct is required of them. See id.; Howell v.

State Bar of Texas, supra, 843 F.2d 208 (rule prohibiting

conduct prejudicial to administration of justice is neither vague nor overbroad because case law and ‘‘lore

of the profession’’ provide sufficient guidance to

attorneys).9

C

The defendant also claims that the court erred in

finding that he violated rule 8.4 (4) because the court’s

finding of a rule 8.4 (4) violation ‘‘tramples upon core

constitutional rights to pursue and maintain intimate

associations.’’ He argues that the court ‘‘punish[ed] the

time, place and manner of [his] and Terry’s dating practices—impermissibly trampl[ing] upon their respective

rights to maintain and pursue an intimate association.’’

(Emphasis omitted.) We disagree.

‘‘[A] comprehensive disciplinary scheme has been

established to safeguard the administration of justice,

and designed to preserve public confidence in the sys-
tem and to protect the public and the court from unfit

practitioners. . . . General Statutes § 51-90g and the

parallel rules of practice authorize the grievance committee to act as an arm of the court in fulfilling this

responsibility. . . . These rules exist within the

broader framework of the relationship between attorneys and the judiciary. . . . This unique position as

officers and commissioners of the court . . . casts

attorneys in a special relationship with the judiciary

and subjects them to its discipline. . . .

‘‘An attorney as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, is continually accountable to it for

the manner in which he exercises the privilege which

has been accorded him. His admission is upon the

implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the

right conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit

and safe person to exercise it, so that when he, by

misconduct in any capacity, discloses that he has

become or is an unfit or unsafe person to be entrusted

with the responsibilities and obligations of an attorney,

his right to continue in the enjoyment of his professional

privilege may and ought to be declared forfeited. . . .

Therefore, [i]f a court disciplines an attorney, it does

so not to mete out punishment to an offender, but [so]

that the administration of justice may be safeguarded

and the courts and the public protected from the misconduct or unfitness of those who are licensed to perform the important functions of the legal profession.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra,

234 Conn. 554–55.

In this case, we do not agree with the defendant’s

contention that the court disciplined him under rule 8.4

(4) for ‘‘the time, place and manner of [his] and Terry’s

dating practices . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted.) As the

facts set forth fully in part I of this opinion establish, and

which need not be restated, the defendant’s behavior in

this case created a significant risk that his representation of Terry would be materially affected by his personal interest. It is the timing and totality of this

behavior, not the time, place and manner of his dating,

that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

III

The defendant next argues that he was denied due

process of law because he did not have fair notice that

his conduct could be considered professional misconduct under the rules. He contends that even if his other

claims fail and the court properly determined that his

conduct was within the scope of the rules, that alone

‘‘would not . . . form a sufficient basis to impose discipline.’’ He purports: ‘‘Not once has a Connecticut lawyer—ever—been disciplined under rule 8.4 (4) on

account of the time, place and manner he or she maintained a pre-existing nonsexual relationship. Not once

has a Connecticut court held that the mere existence
of an intimate relationship is—alone—sufficient to

establish a concurrent conflict. Not once. The resulting

suspension is unconscionable. There is no fair notice.’’

(Emphasis omitted.)

The problem with the defendant’s argument, as

explained throughout this opinion, is that the court did

not suspend him for ‘‘the mere existence of an intimate

relationship . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted.) The defendant clearly fails to recognize the seriousness and the

disturbing nature of his continuing conduct, and he now

contends that the court’s action in suspending him was

‘‘unconscionable.’’

First, we reiterate that the court reasonably could

have concluded that the defendant’s conduct violated

both rule 1.7 (a) (2) and rule 8.4 (4). We also reiterate

that the rule prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to

the administration of justice is neither vague nor overbroad because case law and ‘‘lore of the profession’’

provide sufficient guidance to attorneys in determining

proper conduct. Howell v. State Bar of Texas, supra,

843 F.2d 208. The defendant also offered no argument

that rule 1.7 was vague or overbroad.

To the extent that the defendant’s arguments relate

to the specific sanction imposed by the court, as our

Supreme Court previously has noted, ‘‘it is not the function of this court to determine the sanction we would

have imposed on the [defendant had we been] faced

with that task. . . . In matters of attorney misconduct,

[the trial] court is free to determine in each case, as

may seem best in light of the entire record before it,

whether a sanction is appropriate and, if so, what the

sanction should be. . . . As with any discretionary

action of the trial court, appellate review requires every

reasonable presumption in favor of the action, and the

ultimate issue for us is whether the trial court could

have reasonably concluded as it did.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Briggs v. McWeeny, supra, 260 Conn. 335–36.

‘‘The trial court has inherent judicial power, derived

from judicial responsibility for the administration of

justice, to exercise sound discretion to determine what

sanction to impose in light of the entire record before

it. . . .

‘‘The American Bar Association has promulgated

standards for the imposition of sanctions. . . . [A]fter

a finding of misconduct, a court should consider: (1)

the nature of the duty violated; (2) the attorney’s mental

state; (3) the potential or actual injury stemming from

the attorney’s misconduct; and (4) the existence of

aggravating or mitigation factors. . . .

‘‘The aggravating factors referenced in the standards

include (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or

selfish motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple

offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules

or orders of the disciplinary agency; (f) submission

of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive

practices during the disciplinary process; (g) refusal to

acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of victim;(i) substantial experience in the practice

of law; [and] (j) indifference to making restitution. . . .

The mitigation factors include: (a) absence of a prior

disciplinary record;(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish

motive; (c) personal or emotional problems; (d) timely

good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; (e) full and free disclosure to

disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; (f) inexperience in the practice of law; (g)

character orreputation;(h) physical or mental disability

or impairment; (i) delay in disciplinary proceedings; (j)

interim rehabilitation; (k) imposition of other penalties

or sanctions; (l) remorse; [and] (m) remoteness of prior

offenses.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki,

supra, 150 Conn. App. 487–88.

In the present case, the court’s memorandum of decision reveals that it carefully considered the appropriate

standards forimposing discipline. The court considered

the defendant’s prior disciplinary sanction, which

occurred in 2005, the defendant’s continued lack of

remorse, and his ‘‘failure to perceive the risks involved

in his activities . . . .’’ The court also carefully examined mitigating factors, including the defendant’s ‘‘misplaced belief that his actions were of a benevolent

nature and enured to the benefit of Terry Aliano.’’ On

the basis of the serious nature of the defendant’s misconduct, we conclude that the trial court reasonably

could have concluded that the defendant was unfit to

practice law and, consequently, that a suspension was

warranted. See Statewide Grievance Committee v.

Shluger, 230 Conn. 668, 680, 646 A.2d 781 (1994). We are

not persuaded that the trial court acted unreasonably

or that the ‘‘resulting suspension is unconscionable.’’

(Emphasis omitted.) Accordingly, we conclude that the

trial court acted within its discretion in suspending

the defendant from the practice of law for a period of

five months.

IV

The defendant’s final claim is that the court denied

him due process by ‘‘fail[ing] to adjudicate core issues

essential to this action . . . .’’ He asserts that the court

failed to consider and adjudicate the meritorious good

faith affirmative defenses that he raised. The defendant

argues that, because he had a good faith belief that his

conduct was outside of the scope of the rules and that

he was exercising his core constitutional rights, his

conduct was not actionable. He also argues that the

court improperly declined to apply the rule of lenity

and that he was entitled to such application because
of ambiguity in the rules. The defendant contends that

he ‘‘was afforded an opportunity to be heard—but not

a meaningful opportunity satisfying the requirements

of due process. As concerns these questions of law—

[he] was afforded a trial—in name only.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff argues that the trial

court considered all of the defendant’s defenses, which

were raised in motions, briefs and at oral argument. It

also argues that the rule of lenity does not apply here

because there is no ambiguity in the rules that the

defendant violated. We agree with the plaintiff.

The defendant does not argue that he was barred

from presenting a defense; he argues that the court did

not consider the defenses he raised and that it failed

to apply the rule of lenity. Essentially, the defendant

argues that, because he believed he was acting outside

the scope of the rules, and no attorney previously had

been disciplined merely for engaging in an intimate

relationship with a person who was not a client at

the time the intimacy began, he either could not be

disciplined orthe rule oflenity should have been applied

because he could not have known that the conduct was

improper under the rules.10

Again, the problem with the defendant’s argument is

that he fails to see the serious nature of his conduct.

He was not disciplined for a mere intimate relationship

with a nonclient. First, although the defendant contends

that his intimate relationship with Terry predated his

filing of an appearance in her dissolution case, it is

uncontested that he gave Terry legal advice about dissolution issues beginning in June, 2010. At that time, Terry

already was represented by counsel and that fact was

known by the defendant. The defendant and his girlfriend, Wise, also socialized with the Alianos and their

children, while, at the same time, the defendant intentionally schemed to date Terry and to gain her confidence beginning in June, 2010. He admittedly did this

in an effort to persuade and encourage Terry to proceed

with her pending dissolution case, despite knowing that

she was represented by counsel and was attempting to

reconcile her marriage and her family. The defendant

also proudly admits that he did not maintain a normal

attorney-clientrelationship with Terry, but that because

of their intimate relationship he was willing to ‘‘go the

extra mile.’’ The defendant injected himself into the

middle of the Alianos’ marriage, and antagonized

Michael Aliano. The defendant shared wine with Terry

while the children were home despite an agreement

that Terry had made with the Department of Children

and Families prohibiting anyone who was under the

influence of alcohol from caring for the children; a copy

of this agreement was hung prominently on Terry’s

refrigerator, and, although the defendant was not subject to this agreement, his client, Terry, was a party to

it. The defendant also put his bankruptcy practice on

hold so that he fully could concentrate on this one case,
and he worked out a quid pro quo with Terry to help

offset her legal expenses. He additionally agreed to

write off the balance of his fees if the court did not

award those fees in the dissolution action. The defendant told Terry that if she were represented by him,

that he would take her under his wing, that she would

be shielded from the higher costs of her other attorney,

and that she would mitigate her financial risk.

These are the facts that led the court to not accept

the defendant’s ‘‘good faith affirmative defense[s],’’

although it certainly did recognize that the defendant

mistakenly thought his actions were noble.11 This case

presents much more than a mere intimate relationship

starting before Terry was an ‘‘official’’ client. The defendant’s belief that his actions were proper and that he

had no way of knowing that he could be subject to

discipline may be an attempt to explain away or to

justify his actions, but, as the court found by clear and

convincing evidence, his misguided belief is not a valid

or acceptable defense to rules 1.7 (a) (2) and 8.4 (4).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 See Practice Book § 2-47.

2 General Statutes § 51-84 provides: ‘‘(a) Attorneys admitted by the Superior Court shall be attorneys of all courts and shall be subject to the rules

and orders of the courts before which they act.

‘‘(b) Any such court may fine an attorney for transgressing its rules and

orders an amount not exceeding one hundred dollars for any offense, and

may suspend or displace an attorney for just cause.’’

3 The defendant also had represented this girlfriend in her marital dissolution proceedings. He testified that their relationship, which was sexual,

began well before his representation of her, however.

4 The defendant testified that he felt this way because of something Wise

had told him about Michael Aliano, the details of which are not important

to this opinion, as the defendant did not offer the details for their truth.

The defendant also testified that ‘‘the duty—the lawyer’s obligation is to

look out for the client’s comprehensive quality of life, that a lawyer, in

addition to the considerations of the case, can factorin other considerations,

such as economic, religious, sociological . . . what have you.

‘‘Now, ultimately, [Terry’s] quality of life benefited from the promotion,

the assistance, and the maintenance of an intimate relationship. It was a

positive in her life, positive in my life.’’

He also admitted that he had told the grievance committee that he would

advise a woman going through a divorce to ‘‘find a competent trial lawyer

and make him your boyfriend,’’ and that if you ‘‘aggravate a client, maybe

you lose their business [but if] you aggravate a sweetheart, you are sleeping

on the couch . . . .’’ Further, the defendant testified that he ‘‘believe[d]

that a litigant benefits from dating a talented trial lawyer . . . .’’

Additionally, the defendant testified that ‘‘a lawyer’s love and affection

for his client is a motivating factor to give—to go the extra mile. You know,

now, it doesn’t mean that if the intimate relationship ends that the lawyer

is somehow precluded from providing exceptional representation or making

the extra effort, but certainly if you care about your client, if you genuinely

care about the cause that you are litigating, you are going to go the extra

mile. But this—there is no requirement that you go the extra mile. It’s just

something that you do selfishly because you care.’’ The court then asked

the defendant what he meant by going ‘‘an extra mile . . . .’’ The defendant

explained that he might ‘‘writ[e] a more extensive brief in support of the

client’s cause.’’ The court next asked the defendant if he represented different clients differently, to which the defendant responded, ‘‘I think that could

be argued. I think that’s a fair statement . . . .’’

5 The defendant and Terry shared wine in the Aliano home while the

children were present in the home despite an agreement that each of the
Alianos had with the Department of Children and Families stating that each

party ‘‘agreed not to allow anyone [who] . . . is under the influence of

alcohol or drugs to care for the children.’’ A copy of this agreement hung

prominently on the refrigerator door in the Aliano home.

The defendant argues that the agreement is irrelevant because he ‘‘was

not caring for the children—their mother—Terry Aliano was. A court cannot

discipline [the defendant]—because the mother—Terry Aliano drank a glass

of wine.’’ The plaintiff responds that the document illustrated ‘‘that [the

defendant], while representing Mrs. Aliano, engaged in conduct which

caused her to violate a [Department of Children and Families’] agreement.

It was not used to infer some sort of agreement on his part personally to

refrain from drinking. [The defendant’s] misunderstanding of the evidence

is indicative of how his personal interest clouded his professional judgment.’’

6 The defendant testified that Terry approached him and said that her

attorney needed another $30,000, but that she did not have the money. The

defendant then told Terry that he was ‘‘available for [her]’’ if she needed

him, and that, although he was not a family law practitioner, he had ‘‘an

exceptional command of the facts of [the] case by virtue of the time that

[they had] spent daily talking about [the] case, day after day after day, [and

that he had] a command of [the] case that no other attorney could reasonably

expect to acquire because of [their] relationship . . . .’’ The defendant also

told Terry: ‘‘[L]ook, I genuinely care for you. This is not—if you ask me to

represent you, this is not just an ordinary case. You are not going to get

an average attorney or some average attorney who just treats it like any

other [case].’’

7 During his defense testimony at trial, the defendant testified on the issue

of remorse as follows: ‘‘The last thing that I would say, Your Honor, is sister

counsel has talked about a lack of remorse, and she’s right. I am about as

remorseful as Rosa Parks on the [front] of the bus. Now, I’m sure some folks

might’ve said, hey, Rosa, why are you upsetting the white folks? Wouldn’t it

have been easier for you to just get up and go to the back of the bus? I

suppose she could’ve. But, well, you know how that story played out. And

I suppose the same could be said of me. Hey, Mr. Zelotes, wouldn’t it have

been easier if the angry white man walked in the door, that you just got

up, went to the back of the bus. What sister counsel calls a lack of remorse,

I call principle and adherence to integrity.’’

8 The defendant also complains that the trial court failed to discuss rule

1.7 (b) in its decision. He argues that even if he violated rule 1.7 (a) (2) by

having a concurrent conflict, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Terry

waived the conflict and consented to his representation, and that his only

failure was that he did not get her informed consent in writing, which, he

argues, merely is a violation of rule 1.7 (b) (4). We do not agree.

Pursuant to the relevant portion ofrule 1.7 (b), even if there is a concurrent

conflict, a lawyer may represent a client only if ‘‘(1) the lawyer reasonably

believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent

representation to each affected client . . . and (4) each affected client gives

informed consent, confirmed in writing.’’ Accordingly, the lawyer’s belief

must be reasonable, and the lawyer must obtain written informed consent

from the client. See 1 G. Hazard & W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering (3d

Ed. Supp. 2004) § 11-8, p. 11-22 (rule 1.7 [a] [2] ‘‘contemplates a case-bycase weighing of the facts and permits representation only where there is

both fully counseled client consent and a reasonable belief on the part of

the lawyer that the conflict is not insurmountable, as required by rule 1.7

[b]’’ [emphasis in original]).

In the present case, it is undisputed that the defendant failed to obtain

his client’s written informed consent. Therefore, we conclude that rule 1.7

(b) does not apply to this case. Because rule 1.7 (b) does not apply without

the informed written consent of the defendant’s client, we need not discuss

or opine on the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that he could

provide competent and diligentrepresentation to his client underthe circumstances of this case or whether the client’s purported consent in this case

was informed.

9

In Henry v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 111 Conn. App. 12,

we noted the broad reach of rule 8.4 (4): ‘‘We begin by noting that rule 8.4

(4) casts a wide net over an assortment of attorney misconduct. O’Brien

v. Superior Court, 105 Conn. App. 774, 805, 939 A.2d 1223 (DiPentima, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 287 Conn. 901, 947

A.2d 342 (2008).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henry v. Statewide

Grievance Committee, supra, 24. In footnote 11 of that opinion, we also

noted that ‘‘Connecticut courts, although only occasionally considering the
matter, have upheld findings of rule 8.4 (4) violations where an attorney

wrote a letter accusing a judge of extorting money from his client; Notopoulos

v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 277 Conn. 218, 236, 890 A.2d 509, cert.

denied, 549 U.S. 823, 127 S. Ct. 157, 166 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2006); where an

attorney refused to attend several criminal pretrial conferences; Statewide

Grievance Committee v. Whitney, 227 Conn. 829, 830, 633 A.2d 296 (1993);

and where an attorney failed to pay a judgment that had been rendered

against him in a timely manner. Daniels v. Statewide Grievance Committee,

72 Conn. App. 203, 210, 804 A.2d 1027 (2002).’’ Henry v. Statewide Grievance

Committee, supra, 24 n.11.

We further noted that ‘‘[o]ur sister states have found 8.4 (4) violations

under even further reaching circumstances. See, e.g., In re Selmer, 749

N.W.2d 30, 36 (Minn. 2008)(failure to file income tax); State ex rel. Oklahoma

Bar Assn. v. Whitworth, 183 P.3d 984, 991 (Okla. 2008) (failure to appear

in court on behalf of client); North Carolina State Bar v. Ethridge, [188

N.C. App. 653, 664–65, 657 S.E.2d 378 (2008)] (preparation and recordation

of deed conveying client’s property to self contrary to client’s intent); In re

Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 486–87 (Del.) (submission of brief including inflammatory language), cert. denied sub nom. Abbott v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 552 U.S. 950, 128 S. Ct. 381, 169 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2007); Attorney Grievance

Commission v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 701, 919 A.2d 669 (2007) (careless

management of escrow account); Florida Bar v. Barcus, 697 So. 2d 71,

72–74 (Fla. 1997) (appeal filed solely for purpose of delaying foreclosure);

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 390, 396–97, 692

A.2d 465 (1997) (failure to appear at alcohol treatment facility in violation

of court order); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Singleton, 315 Md. 1,

6, 553 A.2d 222 (1989) (failure to notify client of own suspension from legal

practice).’’ Henry v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra, 111 Conn. App.

24 n.11.

10 In Daniels v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 72 Conn. App. 203, 210–

11, 804 A.2d 1027 (2002), we explained that a violation of rule 8.4 (4) does

not require scienter or knowledge that the conduct is a violation of the rule:

‘‘We also reject the plaintiff’s argument that the failure to pay a judgment

promptly does not constitute a violation of rule 8.4 (4) and that intent is a

prerequisite finding to a violation of that rule. Regarding that point, the

[trial] court correctly stated: ‘Judges no less than lawyers are chargeable

for deviations from the codes governing their conduct, even though the

application of the canons to particular circumstances may not be readily

apparent. [Patterson v. Council on Probate Judicial Conduct, 215 Conn.

553, 567, 577 A.2d 701 (1990)]; Grievance Committee v. Rottner, 152 Conn.

59, 65–66, 203 A.2d 82 (1964). A judge may be sanctioned for a wilful violation

of one of the canons of judicial conduct if he intended to engage in the

conduct for which he is sanctioned whether or not [he] knows that he

violates the rule. In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157, 183, 690 A.2d 865, cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 865, 118 S. Ct. 172, 139 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1997).’ . . . That

reasoning equally is applicable to lawyers and, therefore, we conclude that

the [trial] court properly held that rule 8.4 (4) does not have a scienter

requirement.’’

11 When examining the mitigating factors, the court considered the defendant’s ‘‘misplaced belief that his actions were of a benevolent nature and

enured to the benefit of Terry Aliano.’’