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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHARLES L.*

(AC 44690)

Elgo, Cradle and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 53-21 (a) (1)), any person who, inter alia, wilfully or

unlawfully does any act likely to impair the health or morals of a child

under sixteen years old shall be guilty.

Convicted, following a jury trial, of risk of injury to a child pursuant to § 53-

21 (a) (1) in connection with his actions in attempting to entice his

three year old daughter, J, to ingest cleaning solution, the defendant

appealed to this court. Following an angry discussion at a friend’s house,

the defendant, J, and his wife and J’s stepmother, D, returned to their

apartment. While the three were standing in the kitchen, the defendant

made a remark that implied that no one loved him or J, and he was just

going to ‘‘take’’ his life and J’s life. He then proceeded to retrieve a

cleaning solution from a cabinet and poured it into two cups for himself

and J, instructing J to come and drink it. D, who was standing next to

J, told her to stay where she was. The defendant then poured the cleaning

solution from J’s cup into his own and went outside. On appeal to this

court, the defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient for the

jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions constituted

an act likely to impair the health of a child and that § 53-21 (a) (1) was

unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the case. Held:

1. There was sufficient evidence presented at trial to convict the defendant

pursuant to the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1): under our Supreme Court’s

decision in State v. Ares (345 Conn. 290), a defendant need not touch

or have direct physical contact with a child in order to be convicted

under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) for engaging in conduct likely to

impair the health of a child, and the defendant’s attempts to distinguish

other cases involving defendants who were convicted for their actions

in either directly handing alcohol to a victim or physically pursuing a

child with a dangerous weapon were not persuasive, as those cases were

instructive in showing that the jury reasonably could have concluded

that the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to rise to the

level of deliberate, blatant abuse under § 53-21 (a) (1); moreover, the

evidence was sufficient for the jury reasonably to conclude that the

consumption of a toxic cleaning solution would be injurious to J and

that it was likely that J, who was only three years old and standing

close to the defendant at the time, would follow her father’s instruction

to consume the toxic substance, and the fact that, subsequent to the

defendant’s actions, D ultimately intervened to protect J did not render

unreasonable the jury’s conclusion that the defendant’s conduct was

likely to impair J’s health.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that § 53-21 (a) (1) was

unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the case, as the

defendant had sufficient notice that his conduct was prohibited by that

statute: the operative information accused the defendant of committing

an act likely to impair the health and morals of a child in attempting

to entice a three year old minor child to ingest a cup of cleaning solution,

and, because prior judicial decisions provided fair warning that § 53-21

(a) (1) prohibited such conduct, the statute was not unconstitutionally

vague as applied to the defendant; moreover, this court’s decision in

State v. March (39 Conn. App. 267), in which a defendant handed a cup

containing rum to a four year old victim who had requested something

to drink, made clear that providing a harmful substance to a young child

was an act likely to impair the health of that child pursuant to § 53-21

(a) (1); furthermore, cases decided well before the defendant committed

the act in question in this case made clear that physical contact with

the victim was not necessary for a conviction under the act prong of

§ 53-21 (a) (1).

Argued October 3, 2022—officially released January 24, 2023

Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with

four counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child and

one count of the crime of cruelty to persons, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford,

and tried to the jury before Graham, J.; thereafter, the

court granted the defendant’s motion for a judgment

of acquittal as to two counts of risk of injury to a child;

verdict and judgment of guilty of one count of risk of

injury to child, from which the defendant appealed to

this court. Affirmed.

Richard E. Condon, Jr., senior assistant public

defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, was Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

CLARK, J. The defendant, Charles L., appeals from

the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial,

of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes

§ 53-21 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that

(1) the evidence was insufficient for the jury to conclude

beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions constituted

an act likely to impair the health of a child and (2)

‘‘§ 53-21 (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied

to the facts of this case . . . .’’ We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which are either undisputed or

reasonably could have been found by the jury, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In April,

2014, the defendant had a daughter, J, with his then

wife. The defendant’s wife died soon thereafter.

In June, 2016, following the death of his wife, the

defendant married D. They had a daughter together, L,

and the two children resided with them in a two bedroom apartment in Manchester. D’s sister, B, and B’s

daughter also lived with them in the two bedroom apartment.

At some time in September, 2017, the defendant, D,

J, L, and B were visiting the defendant’s friend, who

lived nearby. At one point during that visit, D said that

she was ready to leave, and B joked that they were

going to leave J with the defendant. In response, the

defendant ‘‘blew up,’’ said, ‘‘f this! You all act like you

all love [J],’’ and then said that no one cared for J. The

family then left the friend’s house and began walking

back to their apartment, and the defendant argued with

B as they walked.

After the family returned to their apartment, the

defendant went to the kitchen with D and J. Still angry,

the defendant stated: ‘‘[I]f anybody loved me and [J],

then I’m just going to take our lives.’’ He then proceeded

to retrieve a generic brand cleaning solution from a

cabinet, as well as a cup for himself and a cup that

specifically belonged to J, and then poured the cleaning

solution into both cups. He instructed J to ‘‘come here

and drink this . . . .’’ D was standing next to J and

told her to stay where she was, and J obeyed. The

defendant then poured the cleaning solution from J’s

cup into his own and went outside. D left the apartment

with J.

In December, 2017, D disclosed this incident to an

investigator with the Department of Children and Families (department) while present at a meeting between

the investigator and B. The department prepared a

report reflecting these allegations and submitted it to

the Manchester Police Department. On December 13,

2017, Officer Antony DeJulius spoke with the defendant

about the allegations in the report, and the defendant

admitted to them, stating that he was angry and ‘‘just
reacted.’’ The defendant then became upset and threatened to harm himself, so DeJulius prepared a hospital

committal form and brought the defendant to a hospital.

In January, 2018, DeJulius obtained written statements

from D and B about the September, 2017 incident.

DeJulius then obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant. The defendant was arrested on February 8, 2018.

The state charged the defendant with three counts

of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a)

(1),1

two counts of threatening in the second degree in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-62, and one count

of strangulation in the second degree in violation of

General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 53a-64bb. The state

subsequently filed a new short form information that

removed the threatening and strangulation counts,

added a fourth risk of injury count, and added a count

charging the defendant with cruelty to persons in violation of General Statutes § 53-20 (b) (1). On April 11,

2018, the defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges

and requested a jury trial.

Prior to trial, on January 14, 2020, the state filed a

five count long form information, setting forth specific

accusations supporting the crimes charged.2 On January

22, 2020, the defendant’s trial commenced. After the

state rested its case, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Practice Book §§ 42-40

and 42-41 on counts one, two, and four, which charged

the defendant with risk of injury, and count five, which

charged the defendant with cruelty to persons. The trial

court granted the motion as to counts two and four but

denied it as to counts one and five.

On January 23, 2020, the state amended its long form

information, removing the two counts of which the

defendant had been acquitted and renumbering the

counts so that count three, which charged the defendant

with risk of injury, and count five, which charged the

defendant with cruelty to persons, were now labeled

counts two and three, respectively. After the close of

evidence, the court instructed the jury as to the

remaining three counts, and the jury returned a verdict

of guilty as to count one and not guilty as to counts

two and three. On March 9, 2021, the court, Graham,

J., sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment

of ten years, execution suspended after five years, and

five years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional

facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of risk of injury to a child pursuant

to the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1). Specifically, he argues

that the state ‘‘did not present evidence that [he] committed an act of blatant physical abuse or engaged in

conduct directly perpetrated on J,’’ as he contends is
required by State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 466–67,

542 A.2d 686 (1988). To that end, he argues that ‘‘[t]here

is no evidence that the defendant ever approached J,

nonetheless physically touched or committed blatant

physical abuse upon her . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) He

further argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant’s ‘‘act’’ was ‘‘likely’’

to be injurious to J’s health. For the reasons discussed

herein, we disagree with the defendant.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the well established legal principles for assessing an insufficiency of

the evidence claim. ‘‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a

[two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the

light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second,

we determine whether upon the facts so construed and

the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder

of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Petersen, 196 Conn. App. 646, 655, 230 A.3d

696, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 921, 232 A.3d 1104 (2020).

‘‘In particular, before this court may overturn a jury

verdict for insufficient evidence, it must conclude that

no reasonable jury could arrive at the conclusion the

jury did. . . . Although the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to

find the defendant guilty of the charged offense . . .

each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those

conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable

doubt.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Rhodes, 335 Conn. 226, 233, 249 A.3d

683 (2020).

The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because there was no

evidence that he engaged in ‘‘blatant physical abuse.’’

Specifically, he claims that, in order to be convicted

under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) for conduct likely

to impair the health of a child, there must be evidence

that the defendant physically touched the child. He further argues that, even if the statute does not require a

defendant to physically touch a child, his conduct was

not sufficiently egregious for the jury to have concluded

that he engaged in ‘‘blatant physical abuse’’ of a child.

We begin our discussion with a brief overview of

§ 53-21 (a) (1). Section 53-21 (a) provides in relevant

part: ‘‘Any person who (1) wilfully or unlawfully causes

or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to

be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of

such child is endangered, the health of such child is

likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely

to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the

health or morals of any such child . . . shall be guilty

of . . . a class C felony . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Our

courts ‘‘have [long] recognized that subdivision (1) of
§ 53-21 [now § 53-21 (a) (1)] prohibits two different

types of behavior: (1) deliberate indifference to, acquiescence in, or the creation of situations inimical to the

[child’s] moral or physical welfare . . . and (2) acts

directly perpetrated on the person of the [child] and

injurious to his [or her] moral or physical well-being.

. . . Cases construing § 53-21 have emphasized this

clear separation between the two parts of the statute

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Robert H., 273 Conn. 56, 65, 866 A.2d 1255 (2005).

Since its passage, a judicial gloss has been imposed

on § 53-21. Pertinent to the issues raised in this appeal,

our Supreme Court in State v. Schriver, supra, 207

Conn. 461, distinguished between acts likely to impair

the ‘‘morals’’ of a child and acts likely to impair the

‘‘health’’ of a child. It stated that an act likely to impair

the morals of a child involves ‘‘deliberate touching of

the private parts of a child under the age of sixteen in

a sexual and indecent manner . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 463. The court found that the

defendant had not engaged in such conduct and, thus,

‘‘had no reasonable opportunity to know that his conduct was prohibited by the impairment of morals clause

of § 53-21.’’ Id., 466. As for acts likely to impair the

health of a child, the court found that prior cases had

‘‘provide[d] an authoritative judicial gloss that limits

the type of physical harm prohibited by § 53-21 to

instances of deliberate, blatant abuse’’; id.; and concluded that ‘‘the irreducible minimum of any prosecution under the [act prong] of § 53-21 is an act directly

perpetrated on the person of a minor.’’ Id., 467.

Following oral arguments in the present appeal, our

Supreme Court decided State v. Ares, 345 Conn. 290,

284 A.3d 967 (2022). In Ares, the defendant, using a

book of matches, set fire to a mattress on the front

porch of the first floor of a three-family residence where

he lived after an argument with his stepfather. Id., 293.

By the time police arrived at the scene, ‘‘all three stories

of the building were already engulfed in flames . . . .’’

Id., 294. ‘‘All twelve occupants who were at the scene

at the time of the incident were evacuated from the

building,’’ including ‘‘the four minor children who were

inside of the building’s second floor apartment.’’ Id.

None of the children were injured. Id.

The defendant was subsequently charged and convicted of various crimes, including four counts of risk

of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1). Id.,

295. On appeal before our Supreme Court, he argued

that the evidence against him was insufficient to convict

him under the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1). Id., 296.

Specifically, he argued ‘‘that, because the evidence

introduced at trial demonstrated only that he lit fire to

a mattress on the building’s front porch, the state [could

not] establish that he ever took any act directly on the
person of a minor.’’ Id., 300–301. Our Supreme Court

stated that ‘‘[t]he fact that the defendant’s actions were

motivated by his fight with the occupants on the first

floor, rather than being specifically directed at the four

children themselves, is not categorically dispositive

. . . .’’ Id., 301–302. The court further stated that ‘‘[t]he

fact that the children escaped from the building without

being harmed by the resulting flames or smoke is, likewise, not dispositive [because] proof of actual injury is

not required.’’ Id., 302. The court concluded that ‘‘[a]

reasonable finder of fact could have concluded, on the

basis of the totality of the circumstances present [on

that] particular record, that such conduct was sufficiently egregious to rise to the level of blatant abuse.’’

Id., 303. The court reasoned that, ‘‘[a]lthough the initial

distance between the four children and the fire’s origin,

together with their eventual escape from the structure,

may well have been relevant to the question of whether

such physical injuries were sufficiently probable to warrant conviction, ample evidence about the speed of the

blaze—together with the intensity of both the heat and

smoke it produced—undisputedly supports the trial

court’s factual finding in that regard.’’ Id. It therefore

rejected the defendant’s claim of evidentiary insufficiency. Id.

In Ares, the court observed that, ‘‘[o]ver the decades

following Schriver, two particularly relevant legal principles have embedded themselves in our state’s risk of

injury jurisprudence. The first is that the state need not

prove specific intent in order to establish a violation

under either the situation or act prong. See, e.g., State

v. Maurice M., 303 Conn. 18, 28, 31 A.3d 1063 (2011)

(specific intent is not required to establish violation of

situation prong); State v. March, 39 Conn. App. 267,

274–75, 664 A.2d 1157 (specific intent is not required

to establish violation of act prong), cert. denied, 235

Conn. 930, 667 A.2d 801 (1995). Evidence sufficient to

support a finding of general intent will suffice. See,

e.g., State v. McClary, [207 Conn. 233, 240, 541 A.2d 96

(1988)]; State v. Euclides L., 189 Conn. App. 151, 161–62,

207 A.3d 93 (2019).

‘‘The second well established legal principle is that

the state need not prove actual injury in order to secure

a conviction under either the situation prong or the act

prong of § 53-21 (a) (1). See, e.g., State v. Burton, 258

Conn. 153, 161, 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (‘[Section] 53-21

does not require a finding that the victim’s [health or]

morals were actually impaired. On the contrary, § 53-

21 provides [in relevant part] that anyone ‘‘who . . .

wilfully or unlawfully . . . does any act likely to

impair the health or morals of any such child’’ may

be found guilty.’ (Emphasis added.)); see also State v.

Gewily, 280 Conn. 660, 669, 911 A.2d 293 (2006); State

v. Padua, [273 Conn. 138, 148, 869 A.2d 192 (2005)];

State v. Samms, 139 Conn. App. 553, 559, 56 A.3d 755

(2012), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 902, 60 A.3d 287 (2013).
Although Schriver requires that the defendant commit

an act of ‘deliberate, blatant abuse’; State v. Schriver,

supra, 207 Conn. 466; it does not require that the defendant cause an actual injury. It remains possible for

a defendant’s conduct to be sufficiently egregious in

nature that it rises to the level of deliberate, blatant

abuse, even in the absence of a defendant’s direct physical contact with a child. See, e.g., State v. Owens, 100

Conn. App. 619, 622–23, 638, 918 A.2d 1041 (concluding

that ‘the mere fact that the defendant did not physically

touch [the child] while pursuing her should not relieve

him of criminal liability under the act prong’ when

defendant chased child with knife after stabbing child’s

mother), cert. denied, 282 Conn. 927, 926 A.2d 668

(2007). Although proof of physical contact has been

required to sustain a conviction under the act prong of

§ 53-21 in certain other contexts; see State v. Pickering,

[180 Conn. 54, 64, 428 A.2d 322 (1980)] (statutory proscription of acts likely to impair morals of children

required ‘deliberate touching of the private parts of a

child under the age of sixteen in a sexual and indecent

manner’); neither the statute’s plain text nor the case

law applying it requires proof of such contact in all

cases.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Ares, supra, 345

Conn. 299–300.

Our Supreme Court’s decision in Ares makes clear

that a defendant need not touch or have ‘‘direct physical

contact with’’ a child in order to be convicted under

the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1) for engaging in conduct

likely to impair the health of a child. Id., 300. We therefore reject the defendant’s contention that evidence

of physical contact with J was required to sustain his

conviction.

The defendant nevertheless contends that, even if

§ 53-21 (a) (1) does not require a defendant to physically

touch a child, there was insufficient evidence for the

jury to conclude that his conduct constituted ‘‘ ‘deliberate, blatant abuse’ ’’ for purposes of the statute. In support of that claim, he cites to a number of cases in

which a defendant was convicted for conduct that he

argues was more egregious in nature insofar as the

defendants in those cases either directly handed alcohol

to a victim; State v. Hector M., 148 Conn. App. 378, 392,

85 A.3d 1188, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 936, 88 A.3d 550

(2014); State v. March, supra, 39 Conn. App. 276; or

physically pursued a child with a dangerous weapon.

State v. Owens, supra, 100 Conn. App. 622–23. We are

not persuaded. Although the defendant attempts to distinguish those cases from the facts of this case, we find

those cases instructive.

In Owens, which our Supreme Court cited to approvingly in Ares; see State v. Ares, supra, 345 Conn. 300;

the defendant stabbed a woman, and, when the woman’s child entered the room and told the defendant to

leave her mother alone, he told the child to ‘‘get the
fuck out of here’’ and ran two or three steps toward

her with the knife, chasing the child out of the room.

State v. Owens, supra, 100 Conn. App. 622–23. This

court upheld the defendant’s conviction under § 53-21

(a) (1) for committing an act likely to impair the health

of a child, concluding that ‘‘the mere fact that the defendant did not physically touch [the child] while pursuing

her should not relieve him of criminal liability under

the act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1).’’ Id., 638. This court

reasoned that, ‘‘[i]f we were to hold otherwise and adopt

the defendant’s arguments that a physical touching is

required to convict the defendant, it would make the

language of § 53-21 (a) (1) meaningless and frustrate

its purpose. For example, pursuant to the defendant’s

interpretation, if one threw a knife at a victim or

attempted to stab a victim while in pursuit, his or her

culpability would depend on the accuracy of his or her

arm or on his or her speed in relation to that of the

intended victim. Such an interpretation of § 53-21 (a)

(1) would render the statute an absurdity.’’ Id., 638–39.

In Hector M., the defendant was convicted of risk of

injury to a child after providing alcohol to his daughter.

State v. Hector M., supra, 148 Conn. App. 388. The evidence revealed that the daughter had only ‘‘a couple of

sips’’ of the alcoholic beverage before she decided not

to continue drinking. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 383. The defendant argued that the state failed

to prove that he violated § 53-21 because his daughter

did not drink enough to become intoxicated. Id., 390. In

rejecting the defendant’s argument, this court reasoned

that, ‘‘[p]ursuant to the defendant’s interpretation, one’s

culpability would depend on whether a child under the

age of sixteen was actually intoxicated or impaired in

order for a defendant to be found in violation of the

statute.’’ Id., 390–91. We explained that ‘‘[s]uch a view

is at odds with the stated purpose of § 53-21 (a) (1),

which is to protect the health and morals of children.’’

Id., 391. Citing Owens, we stated that the defendant’s

argument ‘‘also fail[ed] to provide a proper focus on

the behavior of the defendant, as our precedent

requires.’’ Id. In concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction, this court reasoned that

‘‘[t]he fact that [the daughter] had only a few sips of

the alcohol is irrelevant because she decided, on her

own, not to continue drinking. Allowing a defendant to

circumvent a charge of risk of injury to a child when

the [child] chooses not to drink would render § 53-21

an absurdity.’’ Id., 391–92. We observed that the facts

of that case were ‘‘akin to State v. March, [supra] 39

Conn. App. 267 . . . where a defendant was convicted

of risk of injury to a child for giving a four year old a

cup containing rum and soda’’ and ‘‘the child was not

impaired after drinking the alcohol.’’ State v. Hector

M., supra, 392. We emphasized in Hector M. that ‘‘[t]here

is no requirement . . . that the state prove an actual

injury to the child. Rather, courts are required to focus
on the acts committed by the defendant in order to

determine whether those acts were likely to endanger

the life of the child.’’ Id.

With this as our backdrop, and on the basis of our

review of the evidence presented at trial, we conclude

that the jury reasonably could have concluded that the

defendant’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to rise

to the level of deliberate, blatant abuse. D and B testified

that the defendant, who was visibly angry, stated that

he intended to take his and J’s lives3 and then retrieved

J’s cup and a cup for himself. The jury also heard testimony that, after pouring the cleaning solution into the

cups, the defendant told J, his three year old daughter

who stood nearby, to come to him and drink it. D further

testified that, to the best of her knowledge, the cleaning

solution that the defendant poured into the cup was

poisonous and would be harmful if ingested and that

the defendant was sincere in his efforts to entice J to

drink the cleaning solution. Although there was no

direct physical contact with J, this evidence, and the

reasonable inferences that the jury could have drawn

from it, was sufficient for the jury reasonably to conclude that the defendant violated the act prong of § 53-

21 (a) (1) through acts that constituted deliberate, blatant abuse.

Our discussion does not end there, however. The

defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient

to support a finding that his actions were ‘‘likely’’ to

impair J’s health because D was present throughout the

incident and prevented J from ingesting the cleaning

solution. We are not persuaded.

Construing the evidence in the record in a light most

favorable to sustaining the verdict, as we must when

considering evidentiary sufficiency; see State v. Petersen, supra, 196 Conn. App. 655; we conclude that the

evidence was sufficient for the jury reasonably to conclude that the consumption of a toxic cleaning solution

would be injurious to J and that it was likely that J,

who was only three years old and standing close to

the defendant at the time, would follow her father’s

instruction to consume the toxic substance. See State

v. Owens, supra, 100 Conn. App. 639–40 (reviewing

meaning of ‘‘likely’’). The fact that, subsequent to the

defendant’s actions, D ultimately intervened to protect

J does not render unreasonable the jury’s conclusion

that the defendant’s conduct was likely to impair J’s

health. See State v. Ares, supra, 345 Conn. 302 (evidence

was sufficient to support conviction despite adult

intervening and safely removing children from building

before fire spread). We reiterate that ‘‘[t]here is no

requirement . . . that the state prove an actual injury

to the child. Rather, courts are required to focus on the

acts committed by the defendant in order to determine

whether those acts were likely to endanger the life of

the child.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Hector M., supra,
148 Conn. App. 392. Accordingly, we conclude that the

jury heard sufficient evidence that, if credited, would

support its finding that the defendant’s act of enticing J

to drink cleaning solution was likely to impair J’s health.

II

The defendant also claims that his conviction violates

due process because § 53-21 (a) (1) is unconstitutionally

vague as applied to the facts of this case.4 Specifically,

the defendant argues that there was inadequate notice

that § 53-21 (a) (1) prohibited the conduct here because

the defendant never physically touched J. We disagree.

‘‘The determination of whether a statutory provision

is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law over

which we exercise de novo review. . . . In undertaking

such review, we are mindful that [a] statute is not void

for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivocally is

unconstitutional, making every presumption in favor

of its validity. . . . To demonstrate that [a statute] is

unconstitutionally vague as applied to [him], the [defendant] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate notice of what

was prohibited or that [he was] the victim of arbitrary

and discriminatory enforcement. . . .

‘‘[T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two

central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect

of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against

standardless law enforcement. . . . If the meaning of

a statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be

void for vagueness [because] [m]any statutes will have

some inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words

and phrases there lurk uncertainties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lori T., 345 Conn. 44, 54,

282 A.3d 1233 (2022). Moreover, ‘‘[a] facially vague law

may nonetheless comport with due process if prior

judicial decisions have provided the necessary fair

warning and ascertainable enforcement standards.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Robert H.,

supra, 273 Conn. 67; see also State v. Scruggs, 279 Conn.

698, 710, 905 A.2d 24 (2006) (‘‘[r]eferences to judicial

opinions involving the statute, the common law, legal

dictionaries, or treatises may be necessary to ascertain

a statute’s meaning to determine if it gives fair warning’’

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Count one of the operative long form information

accused the defendant of ‘‘committ[ing] an act likely

to impair the health and morals of [a] child, to wit:

attempting to entice a three year old minor child to

ingest a cup of cleaning solution . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Because prior judicial decisions provided fair

warning that § 53-21 (a) (1) prohibited such conduct,

we conclude that the statute is not unconstitutionally

vague as applied to the defendant.

Our decision in March is particularly instructive. In

that case, we affirmed a § 53-21 (a) conviction based
on a defendant ‘‘hand[ing] a cup containing rum to the

four year old victim who had requested something to

drink.’’ State v. March, supra, 39 Conn. App. 276. The

defendant argued that this conduct was insufficient to

support a conviction under the act prong of § 53-21 (a)

(1) and, instead, was only prohibited under the situation

prong. Id. We disagreed, concluding that, ‘‘due to the

age of the victim, this [was] an act directly perpetrated

upon a child that [was] likely to impair the health or

morals of the child.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id. With that

decision, we made clear that providing a harmful substance to a young child is an act likely to impair the

health of that child pursuant to § 53-21 (a) (1). See id.;

see also State v. Hector M., supra, 148 Conn. App. 391–92

(providing alcohol to fourteen year old who took only

few sips was act likely to impair child’s health); State

v. Ritrovato, 85 Conn. App. 575, 588–90, 858 A.2d 296

(2004) (providing LSD to fifteen year old was act likely

to impair child’s health), rev’d on other grounds, 280

Conn. 36, 905 A.2d 1079 (2006).

Furthermore, although the defendant argues that he

was not sufficiently on notice that his conduct was

prohibited by the statute because he did not physically

touch the victim, as described in part I of this opinion,

cases decided well before the defendant committed the

criminal act in question in this case made clear that no

such contact was necessary for a conviction under the

act prong of § 53-21 (a) (1). See, e.g., State v. Owens,

supra, 100 Conn. App. 638; State v. March, supra, 39

Conn. App. 276. Although the defendant takes issue

with this court’s reasoning in Owens, he cannot claim

that the decision did not put him on notice that his

conduct violated § 53-21 (a) (1). Moreover, as noted

earlier in this opinion, our Supreme Court has since

cited Owens approvingly for the proposition that a

defendant may be convicted under the statute even in

the absence of physical contact with the victim. State

v. Ares, supra, 345 Conn. 300.

Accordingly, because the defendant had sufficient

notice that his conduct was prohibited by § 53-21 (a) (1),

the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied

to him.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the

victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained.

See General Statutes § 54-86e.

1 General Statutes § 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who

(1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of

sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such

child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the

morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to

impair the health or morals of any such child . . . shall be guilty of (A) a

class C felony . . . .’’

2 The five charges arose from separate incidents that were alleged to have

occurred ‘‘in or around August—November, 2017 . . . .’’ Count one accused

the defendant of committing ‘‘an act likely to impair the health and morals
of any such child, to wit: attempting to entice a three year old minor child

to ingest a cup of cleaning solution . . . .’’ Count two accused the defendant

of committing ‘‘an act likely to impair the health and morals of any such

child, to wit: physically and verbally threatening to drown a three year old

minor child . . . .’’ Count three accused the defendant of committing ‘‘an

act likely to impair the health and morals of any such child, to wit: restricting

a three year old minor child’s airway as a form of punishment . . . .’’ Count

four accused the defendant of committing ‘‘an act likely to impair the health

and morals of any such child, to wit: threatening a three year old minor

child with a knife . . . .’’ And count five, cruelty to persons, accused him

of having ‘‘control and custody of a child under the age of nineteen years,

to wit: a three year old minor child, and intentionally maltreated such

child . . . .’’

3 We note again that, in prosecutions pursuant to § 53-21 (a) (1), ‘‘the state

need not prove specific intent in order to establish a violation under either

the situation or act prong. . . . Evidence sufficient to support a finding of

general intent will suffice.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Ares, supra, 345

Conn. 299.

4 The defendant did not raise this issue at trial but argues that it is nonetheless reviewable pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823

(1989). Golding allows review when ‘‘(1) the record is adequate to review

the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude

alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional

violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and

(4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate

harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable

doubt.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 239–40; see also In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn.

773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015) (modifying third prong of Golding). The state

does not challenge the reviewability of the vagueness claim under Golding.

Because the record is adequate for review and the claim is of constitutional

magnitude, we will review the void for vagueness claim under Golding ‘‘to

determine whether a constitutional violation . . . existed and, if so, whether

it caused harm to the defendant.’’ State v. Ortiz, 83 Conn. App. 142, 157,

848 A.2d 1246, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 915, 853 A.2d 530 (2004).