alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### NATIONAL AID LIFE OF OKLAHOMA CITY, OKL., v. BROOKS.

No. 2054.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Eastland.

Oct. 25, 1940.

Chrestman, Brundidge, Fountain, Elliott & Bateman, of Dallas, for appellant.

L. H. Welch, of Breckenridge, for ap-pellee.

GRISSOM, Justice.

This is an appeal.from a judgment overruling the plea of privilege of the defendant, National Aid Life of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, to be sued in the county of its residence. In National Aid Life v. Self, Tex.Civ.App., 140 S.W.2d 606, we held that the evidence showed (1) that the defendant therein, National Aid Life, was a state-wide mutual assessment company, within the purview of Subd. 28a, Art. 1995, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St., and (2) that the beneficiary instituting the suit on the policy issued by said defendant resided in Stephens County, wherein the suit was instituted. We, therefore, concluded that the venue of the case was sustainable in said county under subd. 28a. We further held that venue in Stephens County was shown under subd. 23 of Art. 1995, when plaintiff alleged and proved that said defendant was (1) a private corporation, and (2) had an agency, or representative, in said county. We further held that proof of a cause of action, under the circumstances above indicated, was not required as one of the venue facts.

Appellant has graciously filed a stipulation herein, in part, as follows: “Appellant believes that the identical question is involved in this case, and that the final result in the Kate Self case will control the decision herein. It does not waive or withdraw any of its contentions in either case, but desires to save the court the time that would be required in reading the Statement of Facts and Transcript, and agrees that this case is governed by the same basic principles that are involved in the Kate Self case.”

Therefore, upon the authority of National Aid Life v. Kate Self, supra, and authorities therein cited, the judgment is affirmed.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ENVER KARAFILI, Petitioner - Appellant,
v. JAMES E. TILTON, Warden and EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr., Attorney General of the State of California, Respondents - Appellees. No. 09-55388D.C. No. 3:07-cv-01372-BENNLS
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding Submitted September 2, 2011 ** Pasadena, California Before: ALARCÓN, O’SCANNLAIN, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges. Enver Karafili appeals the district c ourt’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). We affirm. 

# FILED
SEP 07 2011 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 The district court did not err in finding that Karafili’s mental condition was not so severe that he was unable to file a timely federal petition. See Bills v. Clark , 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010). As for Karafili’s limited English skills, the record does not establish that he requested and was unable to obtain a translator or that it was his limited English skills that caused him to file an untimely federal petition. Cf. Mendoza v. Carey , 449 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling was correctly denied. We decline to certify the uncertif ied issues raised by Karafili. AFFIRMED.
Employment Agreement



 EXHIBIT 10.1 
  
 May 4, 2005 
  
 Mr. Robert A. Jefferies, Jr. 
 No. 1 Leggett Rd. 
 Carthage, MO 64836 
  

	 	Re:	Employment Agreement and Severance Benefits Agreement 

  
 Dear Bob: 
  
 You have indicated to Leggett & Platt, Incorporated (the “Company”) that you desire to retire as of May 4, 2005. The Company respects your decision and wishes you the best. The Company and you are
parties to an Employment Agreement, dated November 7, 1990, as amended on January 1, 1993 and a Severance Benefits Agreement, dated May 9, 1984. The term of the Employment Agreement is to expire on December 31, 2006. 
  
 You and the Company have agreed that the Severance Benefits Agreement and the
Employment Agreement shall terminate on May 4, 2005. All of the Company’s and your rights and obligations under the Employment Agreement and Severance Benefit Agreement shall thus terminate on May 4, 2005, except for (i) section 10 of the
Employment Agreement, and (ii) rights and obligations involving compensation and benefits to be paid or provided in accordance with the terms of the Company’s compensation and benefit plans (including payment of a pro-rated bonus for the period
January 1, 2005 through May 4, 2005 under Section 4.2 of the Employment Agreement.) 
  
 Rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission will require the Company to report the termination of the Employment Agreement and Severance Benefits Agreement and file a copy of this letter as an exhibit shortly
after May 4. 
  
 Please confirm your agreement with the foregoing
by signing and returning to me a copy of this letter. 
  

	
	Sincerely yours;
	Leggett & Platt, Incorporated
	
	 /s/ Felix E. Wright

	 Felix E. Wright

	 Chief Executive Officer



  

	
	Agreed:
	
	 /s/ Robert A. Jefferies, Jr.

	 Robert A. Jefferies, Jr.


  

 24
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1404

To amend title 38, United States Code, to provide that amounts received

by a veteran in a legal settlement with the Department of Veterans

Affairs for injuries arising from the negligence of the Department shall

be excluded from determinations with respect to annual income for purposes of programs administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs

that are income-based.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 18, 1993

Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs

A BILL

To amend title 38, United States Code, to provide that

amounts received by a veteran in a legal settlement with

the Department of Veterans Affairs for injuries arising

from the negligence of the Department shall be excluded

from determinations with respect to annual income for

purposes of programs administered by the Secretary of

Veterans Affairs that are income-based.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 1404 IH

1 SECTION 1. DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ANNUAL

2 INCOME FOR VETERANS BENEFITS.

3 (a) EXCLUSION OF AMOUNTS RECEIVED IN CERTAIN

4 SETTLEMENTS.—Section 1503(a) of title 38, United

5 States Code, is amended—

6 (1) by striking out ‘‘and’’ at the end of para7 graph (9);

8 (2) by striking out the period at the end of

9 paragraph (10) and inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘; and’’;

10 and

11 (3) by adding at the end the following:

12 ‘‘(11) amounts received from the United States

13 pursuant to an administrative settlement or court

14 order arising from personal injuries caused by the

15 negligence of employees (or contract personnel) of

16 the Department of Veterans Affairs.’’.

17 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

18 subsection (a) shall apply with respect to determinations

19 of annual income for periods after the date of the enact20 ment of this Act.

Æ
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

JK/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

STATE OF WASHINGTON; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 08-35640

D.C. No. 2:06-cv-01687-JCC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 16, 2010** 

Before: SCHROEDER, PREGERSON, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

Andre Brigham Young, a former Washington state prisoner and current civil 

detainee, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. 

FILED

MAR 30 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JK/Research 2 08-35640

§ 1983 action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Whitaker v. Garcetti,

486 F.3d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

The district court properly dismissed the action as Heck-barred because a

judgment in Young’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction, and Young failed to allege that his conviction has been invalidated. 

See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1139-40

(9th Cir. 2005) (applying Heck to civil detainees). However, we vacate the

judgment to the extent that it dismissed the action with prejudice, and remand for

entry of dismissal without prejudice. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d

583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (stating that dismissals under Heck are

without prejudice). 

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Smith 

v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Corporate Trust Services**

  MAC R1204-010  9062 Old Annapolis Road  Columbia, MD 21045  Tel: 410 884 2000  Fax: 410 715 2380 |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

Re:          Annual Statement of Compliance for MSCCG Trust 2015-ALDR Commercial MortgagePass-Through Certificates, Series 2015-ALDR

 

Per the Pooling and ServicingAgreement dated as of May 5, 2015 (the "Agreement"), the undersigned,a duly authorized officer of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as CertificateAdministrator ("Wells Fargo"), hereby certifies as follows as of andfor the year ending December 31, 2016 (the "Reporting Period"):

 

(a) A review of Wells Fargo's activitiesduring the Reporting Period and of its performance under the Agreement has beenmade under such officer's supervision; and

 

(b) To the best of suchofficer's knowledge, based on such review, Wells Fargo has fulfilled all of itsobligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout theReporting Period.

 

 

February 27, 2017

 

 

/s/ Brian Smith

BRIAN SMITH

Vice President

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll  go far |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
II 

Calendar No. 140 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1397 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 6, 2009 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

JULY 30, 2009 

Reported by Mr. LIEBERMAN, without amendment 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 41 Purdy Avenue in Rye, New York, as the 

‘‘Caroline O’Day Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CAROLINE O’DAY POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 41 Purdy Avenue in Rye, New 

6 York, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Caroline 

7 O’Day Post Office Building’’. 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1397 RS

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Caroline O’Day Post 

5 Office Building’’. 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS

wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 140 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1397 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostBuilding’’. New York, as the ‘‘Caroline O’Day Post Office al Service located at 41 Purdy Avenue in Rye, 

JULY 30, 2009 

Reported without amendment 


wwoods2 on DSK1DXX6B1PROD with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                     1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         146,304
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   84,824
<ALLOWANCES>                                    17,453
<INVENTORY>                                     12,333
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               255,669
<PP&E>                                       2,294,486
<DEPRECIATION>                                 277,112
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,473,308
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          228,071
<BONDS>                                      1,624,570
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           241
<OTHER-SE>                                     356,655
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,473,308
<SALES>                                      1,085,862
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,226,082
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  681,964 <F1>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               269,953 <F2>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 6,393
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             157,835
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (14,117)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (14,117)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (14,117)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.62)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.62)
<FN>
<F1> Includes gaming, lodging, food & beverage and other
<F2> Includes general & administration and depreciation & amortization
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the 
     Insignia Financial Group, Inc. December 31, 1996 Form 10-K and is
     qualified in its entirety by reference to such 10-K filing.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>   0000870480
<NAME>  Insignia Financial Group, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                    DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                          54,614
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   46,040
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                0
<PP&E>                          12,083
<DEPRECIATION>                  0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  492,402
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           0
<BONDS>                         69,140
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<COMMON>                        289
<OTHER-SE>                      217,616
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    492,402
<SALES>                         0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                227,074
<CGS>                           0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   164,830
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                34,182
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              14,730
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 14,946
<INCOME-TAX>                    5,680
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             0
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 (702)
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    8,564
<EPS-PRIMARY>                   .27
<EPS-DILUTED>                   .27
        


</TABLE>
#### Dolores J. Drew et al., Respondents, v Frances I. Hooper, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 2.)

— Judgment unanimously reversed on the law without costs and complaint dismissed. Memorandum: Plaintiffs are residuary legatees under a 1965 will of William Hooper. They alleged in their complaint that they are entitled to one half of the balance on a mortgage held by William and his wife, defendant Frances Hooper, based upon defendant’s conversion. William Hooper died on August 24, 1983. Defendant appeals from an order denying her motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and from a judgment upon a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. The order is subsumed in the judgment and is brought up for review on the appeal from the judgment *(see,*CPLR 5501 [a] [1]). That appeal is therefore dismissed.

We agree with Supreme Court that plaintiffs acquired personal jurisdiction over defendant under CPLR 302 (a) (1). Defendant holds a bond and mortgage executed in New York covering property located in New York and used an attorney in New York for the real estate transactions, which demonstrate she has engaged in purposeful activity in this State *(see,*
      *904
      *International Shoe Co. v Washington,*326 US 310; *Reiner & Co. v Schwartz,*41 NY2d 648).

The judgment, however, must be reversed because the jury finding that Mr. Hooper was a domiciliary of New York at the time of his death is contrary to the weight of the evidence *(see, Matter of Swain,*125 AD2d 574, 576, *lv denied*69 NY2d 611). The evidence established that the decedent was a domiciliary of Pennsylvania because he had a fixed, permanent and principal home there and always intended to return there after out-of-State visits to his family *(see,*SCPA 103 [15]). When he died, Mr. Hooper did not own any real property in New York and had not filed any New York State residency income tax returns since he had moved to Pennsylvania in 1968. Moreover, the relevant deed, bond and mortgage all recite Mr. Hooper’s residence in Pennsylvania, as does the death certificate and authorization for deposit of his Social Security payments. Thus, on this record, the evidence overwhelmingly contradicts the jury finding that Mr. Hooper was domiciled in New York at the time of his death *(see, Matter of Brunner,*41 NY2d 917, 918; *Matter of Shindell,*60 AD2d 393, 395-396, *affd*55 NY2d 655). Given our holding, we need not reach the other issues raised on appeal. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Curran, J.—conversion.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Denman, Green, Balio and Davis, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Edwin Ortiz, Appellant.

—Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Joseph Cerbone, J.), rendered on February 16, 1989, convicting defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree and sentencing defendant to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of eight years to life, unanimously affirmed.

We are unpersuaded that the sentence imposed was unduly harsh or severe. Taking into account, "among other things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the court and the purpose of a penal sanction”, we perceive no abuse of discretion warranting a reduction in sentence. *(People v Farrar,*52 NY2d 302, 305.)

Further, defendant was sentenced in accordance with his plea bargain and within statutory guidelines. "Having received the benefit of his bargain, defendant should be bound by its terms.” *(People v Felman,*141 AD2d 889, 890, *lv denied*72 NY2d 918.) Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Milonas, Rosenberger, Asch and Kassal, JJ.
#### David L. Acorn, Appellant, v Raymond C. Maas et al., Respondents.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Rose, J.), entered April 12, 1990 in Tioga County, which, *inter alia,*granted defendants’ motion to cancel a notice of pendency.

Order affirmed, without costs, upon the opinion of Justice Robert S. Rose. Weiss, J.. P., Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1204 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1204

  To amend the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental 
  Relations Act to permit the District of Columbia to impose a tax on 
    income earned by individuals who reside outside of the District.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 3, 1993

  Mr. Regula introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                 Committee on the District of Columbia

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental 
  Relations Act to permit the District of Columbia to impose a tax on 
    income earned by individuals who reside outside of the District.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``District of Columbia Fiscal Fairness 
Act of 1993''.

SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF PROHIBITION AGAINST IMPOSING TAXES ON NONRESIDENTS 
              BY COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

    (a) In General.--Section 602(a) of the District of Columbia Self-
Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (sec. 1-233(a), D.C. 
Code) is amended--
            (1) by striking paragraph (5); and
            (2) by redesignating paragraphs (6), (7), (8), and (9) as 
        paragraphs (5), (6), (7), and (8).
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
take effect October 1, 1993.

                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT
      32.1





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**  **18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE** **SARBANES-OXLEY
      ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Amendment No. 3 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of
      Ronco
      Corporation (the “Company”) for period from July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006, as
      filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Paul Kabashima, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, that:




(1)
        the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
        the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.




February
      8, 2007




/s/
                Paul KabashimaPaul
                KabashimaChief
                Executive Officer