MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 1 

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

 DALLAS DIVISION 

MARCUS THORNTON, § 

 § 

 Plaintiff, § 

 § 

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-2079-N 

 § 

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS § 

SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL § 

CENTER, § 

 §

 Defendant. § 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 This Order addresses Defendant University of Texas Southwestern Medical 

Center’s (“UTSW”) second motion to dismiss Plaintiff Marcus Thornton’s claims [24]. 

Because Thornton failed to state a claim even after the opportunity to cure the defects in 

his original complaint, the Court grants UTSW’s motion and dismisses Thornton’s claims 

with prejudice. 

I. ORIGINS OF THE MOTION

 This case arises out of Thornton’s termination from UTSW. UTSW hired Thornton 

as a research associate in June of 2015. Pl.’s Amended Complaint at ¶ 3 [19]. Thornton 

alleges that he experienced several incidents of racial discrimination by his manager, 

Norma Anderson, over the course of the two years he worked for UTSW. Id. at ¶ 12–16. 

Thornton complained to various members of UTSW’s Human Resources team and filed 

formal complaints alleging that his manager’s discriminatory behavior was based on his 

race, which Thornton alleges was never adequately addressed. Id. at ¶ 19. Thornton later 

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took medical leave to seek treatment for mental health issues. Id. at ¶ 21–22. UTSW 

approved his request for leave from August 2017 to October 2017. Id. at ¶ 22. UTSW 

informed Thornton that he could not return from leave without presenting a fitness to return 

to work notice. Id. Thornton alleges that at the end of the leave period, he attempted to 

return to work but was denied and terminated. Id. at ¶ 25–26. Thornton filed suit against 

UTSW alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). 

 This Court granted UTSW’s first motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and 

gave Thornton leave to amend his complaint. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss [18]. 

UTSW now moves to dismiss Thornton’s amended complaint, arguing that Thornton again 

failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Def.’s Motion [24]. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD UNDER RULE 12(B)(6) 

 When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether 

the plaintiff has asserted a legally sufficient claim for relief. Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 

42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). “When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court 

must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as . . . documents incorporated into the 

complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Funk v. 

Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

viable complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To meet this “facial 

plausibility” standard, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

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v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court generally accepts well-pleaded facts as true 

and construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gines v. D.R. 

Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012). But a plaintiff must provide “more than 

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “Factual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that 

all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (internal citations 

omitted). A well-pleaded complaint must include allegations “respecting all the material 

elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” United States v. 

Marlin Med. Solutions LLC, 579 F. Supp. 3d 876, 883 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007)). 

III. THE COURT GRANTS THE MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE THORNTON HAS 

FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED

A. Thornton Has Not Pleaded Adequate Facts to Support His Discrimination Claim 

 Thornton alleges that UTSW discriminated against him in connection with the 

compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment on the basis of his race 

in violation of Title VII. Pl.’s Amended Complaint at ¶ 35. Thornton failed to plead 

sufficient facts to support this claim, and therefore has not satisfied his pleading burden 

under Rule 12(b)(6). 

 To demonstrate a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must 

show that he (1) belongs to “a protected class,” (2) “was qualified for the position,” (3) 

experienced “an adverse employment action,” and (4) was “similarly situated” to other 

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employees who were not members of [his] protected class and who “were treated more 

favorably.” West v. City of Houston, Tex., 960 F.3d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting 

Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2004)). Failure to allege 

adequate facts on any of these essential elements is fatal to the claim. See Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 562.

 This Court previously held that, in his original complaint, Thornton failed to 

sufficiently identify similarly situated employees who were not members of his protected 

class who were treated more favorably. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 4–5. Here, 

Thornton did not meaningfully amend his complaint to include sufficient factual 

allegations and again failed to identify his comparators. 

 To show that someone is a comparator, a plaintiff must show that the proffered 

comparator and the plaintiff: “(1) held the same job or responsibilities; (2) shared the same 

supervisor or had their employment status determined by the same person; (3) have 

essentially comparable violation histories; and (4) have engaged in nearly identical 

conduct” as the conduct that resulted in the adverse employment action at issue. Ross v. 

Judson Indep. School Dist., 999 F.3d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 2021). While Thornton does not 

at this stage need to provide evidence of comparators meeting these criteria, he has failed 

to plead sufficient facts to permit the Court to reasonably infer that such comparators exist. 

Thornton’s amended complaint does not allege that there are other research assistants who 

are not African American, that those other research assistants have taken leave for health 

reasons, that those other research assistants have not been terminated under substantially 

similar circumstances as Thornton, or any other facts that would allow the Court to infer 

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that these non-African American employees were sufficiently similar to Thornton. 

Thornton’s only references to alleged comparators identifies them merely as “other 

similarly situated employees that were not African American” or simply “non-African 

American employees” or “non-African Americans.” Pl.’s Amended Complaint at ¶ 29–

30, 34. These allegations are vague and conclusory and do not sufficiently identify 

similarly situated employees who were treated more favorably than Thornton. 

 While Thornton’s amended complaint includes more specific allegations regarding 

the treatment he received, that treatment cannot be considered discriminatory unless it can 

adequately be compared to any similarly situated individual not of the same protected class. 

Thornton’s failure to identify a comparator is fatal to his claim of racial discrimination. 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses this claim. 

B. Thornton Has Not Pleaded Adequate Facts to Support His Retaliation Claim 

 Thornton alleges that UTSW violated Title VII by terminating his employment in 

retaliation for Thornton engaging in protected activity. Pl.’s Amended Complaint at ¶ 39. 

Thornton failed to plead sufficient facts to support this claim, and accordingly has not 

satisfied his pleading burden under Rule 12(b)(6). 

 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) []he 

engaged in [a] protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a 

causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” 

Donnelly v. Academic Partnerships LLC, 2024 WL 1877043, at *5 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing 

Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles, LLC, 736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2013)). Thornton 

attempts to rely on a showing of temporal proximity between his protected conduct and his 

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termination to allege a causal link between the two. However, Thornton’s alleged protected 

activity and the adverse employment action are not sufficiently temporally linked to give 

rise to a presumption of a causal connection. 

 Thornton alleges that he “filed multiple internal complaints that are considered 

protected activity under Title VII” from April 2016 to June 2017. Pl.’s Amended 

Complaint at ¶ 39. Thornton alleges that UTSW terminated his employment in November 

2017, which constituted an “adverse employment action under Title VII.” Id. at ¶ 44. 

These actions are separated by a period of approximately five months. This is too great a 

lapse in time to give rise to a presumption of causation based on temporal proximity. 

 The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that “to establish causality, the protected 

activity and the adverse action must have ‘very close’ temporal proximity, and ‘a fivemonth lapse is not close enough . . . to establish the causal connection element of a prima 

facie case of retaliation.’” Newbury v. City of Windcrest, Tex., 991 F.3d 672, 679 (5th Cir. 

2021) (quoting Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2020)). 

Accordingly, “a time lapse of five months does not, without additional evidence of 

retaliation, establish causation.” Robinson v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg’l Med. Center, 

Inc., 535 F. App’x 348, 353 (5th Cir. 2013) (unpub.) (citing Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light 

Co., 278 F.3d 463, 472 (5th Cir. 2002)). Thornton does not plead any other facts that would 

give rise to a reasonable inference of causation. Thornton’s only other allegation in support 

is the fact that the UTSW employee that terminated his employment had knowledge of his 

complaints. Pl.’s Amended Complaint at ¶ 44. This, without more, does not allow the 

Court to infer that Thornton was terminated because of he engaged in protected activity, 

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especially where five months elapsed after the protected activity occurred and Thornton 

was permitted to go on his requested leave during that time. 

 Thornton has not pleaded any facts that are legally sufficient to support his claim 

that his protected activity caused UTSW to terminate his employment. Thornton’s failure 

to plead adequate facts to show causation is fatal to his claim of retaliation. Accordingly, 

the Court dismisses this claim. 

CONCLUSION

 Because Plaintiff Marcus Thornton failed to state a claim for which relief can be 

granted, the Court grants Defendant UTSW’s motion to dismiss. Because Thornton has 

not requested leave to amend a second time, the Court will not give Thornton an 

opportunity to amend his complaint. Moreover, even if Thornton had sought leave to 

amend, the Court holds that Thornton has pleaded his best case. A plaintiff has pleaded 

his best case after he has been “apprised of the insufficiency” of its complaint but does not 

amend or state material facts that he would include in an amended complaint to overcome 

the deficiencies identified by the court. Wiggins v. Louisiana State University—Health 

Care Services Division, 710 F. App’x 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2017). Because Thornton knew 

of the insufficiency of his complaint but did not fix its deficiencies, Thornton has pleaded 

his best case. Accordingly, the Court will not give Thornton an opportunity to amend. The 

Court dismisses Thornton’s claims for racial discrimination and retaliation with prejudice. 

 

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 Signed May 29, 2024. 

 ___________________________ 

 David C. Godbey 

 Chief United States District Judge 

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