alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERTO BUENROSTRO

- BRAMBILA,

Petitioner,

v. MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 14

- 73418
Agency No. A074

- 222

- 227

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 17, 2018 **

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Roberto Buenrostro

- Brambila, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision denying his motion

to reopen deportation proceedings . Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

DEC 19 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 14

- 73418

§ 1252. We review de nov o legal and constitutional claims, and we review for
abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen

. Mohammed v. Gonzales , 400
F.3d 785, 791

- 92 (9th Cir. 2005)

. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition

for review.
The BIA did not err, abuse its discretion, or violate due process in denying

Buenrostro

- Brambila’s motion to reopen as untimely and number

- barred, where it

found that Buenrostro

- Brambila had not provided an adequate basis to excuse the
filing requirements. See Najmabadi v. Holder , 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010)
(the agency must consider the issues raised and express its decision “in terms
sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and
not merely reacted” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)) ; Lata v. INS , 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (to prevail on a due process challenge, an
alien must show error and prejudice). The record does not support Buenrostro

Brambila’s contention that the BIA ignored evidence or arguments. See
Najma badi , 597 F.3d at 990.

The court’s jurisdiction to review the BIA’s s ua sponte determination is
limited to reviewing the reasoning behind the decision for legal or constitutional
error, and Buenrostro

- Brambila has not established any error. See Bonilla v. Lynch , 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016)

. PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tyrone Shuff, Appellant.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Edwin Torres, J.), rendered May 19, 1988, convicting defendant of rape in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree and sentencing him to concurrent, indeterminate terms of imprisonment of 12 *Vi*to 25 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant stands convicted of sexually assaulting the sister of an acquaintance. At trial, defendant could not remember that a week before the trial started his attorney had given notice that defendant would establish that he was at his uncle’s home at the time in question. On the prosecutor’s rebuttal, defendant’s statement to the investigator and the notice of alibi were introduced into evidence.

The prosecutor was properly allowed to impeach defendant with the notice of alibi, whether it is viewed as a prior inconsistent statement or informal judicial admission. *(People v Rivera,*58 AD2d 147, *affd on opn below*45 NY2d 989.) The alibi notice was offered with defendant’s active participation, and it was a declaration made by defendant in the course of the proceedings inconsistent with the position he assumed at trial. (Fisch, New York Evidence § 803, at 475 [2d ed].) Defendant’s cross-examination on the notice appropriately served to test defendant’s faithfulness to his obligation to testify truthfully. *(People v McGrath,*46 NY2d 12, 21, *cert denied*440 US 972.)

Defendant’s claim that the court should have told the jury that his statement to the investigator was not introduced for its truth is not preserved, as a matter of law, and in the circumstances presented does not warrant review in the interest of justice. There is no likelihood that the jury did not understand that the evidence was introduced only to impeach defendant.

Any error in the prosecutor’s cross-examination of defen*349dant into the facts of his suppressed arrest as a juvenile for "joyriding” is harmless. The prosecutor did argue in summation that the incident weighed on defendant’s credibility, but the defendant’s explanation that he falsely listed the incident on an employment application instead of admitting to a felony conviction was more damaging than the incident itself, and the prosecutor’s questioning on the contents of the employment application was proper. Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Asch, Kassal, Wallach and Smith, JJ.
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1144

To amend title 5, United States Code, to increase by 1 year the maximum

age through which an unmarried dependent child may continue to receive

health benefits coverage as a family member, so long as such child

remains a full-time student.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 25, 1993

Mr. GOODLING (for himself, Mr. BATEMAN, Mr. FROST, Ms. KAPTUR, Mrs.

MORELLA, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER, Mr. MURPHY, Mr.

HANSEN, Mr. SANDERS, Mr. MCCLOSKEY, Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut,

and Mr. SLATTERY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to

the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

A BILL

To amend title 5, United States Code, to increase by 1

year the maximum age through which an unmarried dependent child may continue to receive health benefits

coverage as a family member, so long as such child

remains a full-time student.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That (a) paragraph (5) of section 8901 of title 5, United

4 States Code, is amended to read as follows:

5 ‘‘(5) ‘member of family’ means—
2

•H 1144 IH

1 ‘‘(A) the spouse of an employee or annu2 itant; and

3 ‘‘(B)(i) an unmarried dependent child

4 under 22 years of age, including—

5 ‘‘(I) an adopted child or recognized

6 natural child; and

7 ‘‘(II) a stepchild or foster child but

8 only if the child lives with the employee or

9 annuitant in a regular parent-child rela10 tionship;

11 ‘‘(ii) such an unmarried dependent child

12 regardless of age who is incapable of self-sup13 port because of mental or physical disability

14 which existed before age 22; or

15 ‘‘(iii) such an unmarried dependent child

16 between 22 and 23 years of age who is a stu17 dent regularly pursuing a full-time course of

18 study or training in residence in a junior col19 lege, college, university, or comparable recog20 nized educational institution;

21 for the purpose of clause (iii), a child whose 23rd

22 birthday occurs before July 1 or after August 31 of

23 a calendar year, and while such child is regularly

24 pursuing such a course of study or training, is

25 deemed to have become 23 years of age on the first
3

•H 1144 IH

1 day of July after that birthday; a child who is a stu2 dent is deemed not to have ceased to be a student

3 during an interim between school years if the in4 terim is not more than 5 months and if the child

5 shows to the satisfaction of the Office of Personnel

6 Management that such child has a bona fide inten7 tion of continuing to pursue a course of study or

8 training in the same or a different school during the

9 school semester (or other period into which the

10 school year is divided) immediately after the

11 interim;’’.

12 (b) Nothing in paragraph (5) of section 8901 of title

13 5, United States Code (as amended by subsection (a))

14 which follows clause (ii) of such paragraph shall apply

15 with respect to any individual who became 22 years of age

16 before the date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
#### James P. Wodka, Respondent, v Helen Wodka, Appellant. James Wodka, Respondent, v Helen Wodka, Appellant. Helen Wodka, Appellant, v James P. Wodka, Respondent.

(Appeal No. 1.)

— Order unanimously reversed on the law with costs and matter remitted to Erie County Family Court for further proceedings, in accordance with the following memorandum: It was an abuse of discretion for the court to award permanent custody of the parties’ child to the father without conducting a factual hearing to determine the fundamental issue of the best interests of the child *(Ideman v Ideman,*168 AD2d 1001*[decided herewith]; Mosesku v Mosesku,*108 AD2d 795; *Matter of Blake v Blake,*106 AD2d 916). We find no merit to the father’s contention that the court’s summary resolution of the custody issue was proper because the mother willfully refused to obey a court order to return to New York following her relocation with the child to Oregon. *1001Although not necessary to our determination, we note that the court was without authority to compel the mother to return to New York and that she complied with that part of the order that directed the return of the child. In any event, defiance of a court order is but one factor to be considered when determining the relative fitness of the parties and what custody arrangement is in the child’s best interest *(see, Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer,*55 NY2d 89, 94; *Matter of Nehra v Uhlar,*43 NY2d 242, 251). Accordingly, we reverse the order and remit the matter for a custody hearing to be conducted by a different Judge *(see, Matter of Blake v Blake, supra,*at 916-917). Physical custody is to be continued with the father pending the determination of permanent custody *(see, Mosesku v Mosesku, supra).*(Appeal from order of Erie County Family Court, O’Donnell, J. — custody.) Present — Denman, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Davis and Lowery, JJ.
The Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

The federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) established the 

Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention as an independent body 

within the executive branch of the federal government. Active in some form since 1976, the 

Council's primary functions are to coordinate federal juvenile delinquency prevention programs, 

federal programs and activities that detain or care for unaccompanied juveniles, and federal 

programs relating to missing and exploited children. In accordance with the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act, the Council meets quarterly in public meetings in which members discuss

activities to facilitate and support cross-agency coordination. 

The Council’s chair is the U.S. Attorney General. Its Vice-Chair is the Administrator of the Office 

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). 

In accordance with the JJDPA, the Council is currently comprised of nine ex officio members and 

their designees, as well as nine non-federal practitioner members who are named by the President 

and Congress. The ex officio members are the Attorney General; the Secretaries of Health and 

Human Services, Interior, Labor, Education, and Housing and Urban Development; the 

Administrator of OJJDP; the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy; the Chief 

Executive Officer of the Corporation for National and Community Service; and the Assistant 

Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security. In 

addition, four affiliate federal agencies are represented on the Council: the Departments of 

Agriculture, Defense, Interior, through their respective Secretaries and designees, and HHS’ 

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), through its 

Administrator. The President may also designate other key federal officials with significant 

decision-making authority to serve on the Council. 

For additional information on the Council, including detailed membership information and past 

meeting agendas and summaries, please refer to the Council’s website at 

http://juvenilecouncil.gov.
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 23.2


(NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC. LOGO)


            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM ENGINEERS AND GEOLOGISTS


We hereby consent to the references to our firm and to the use of our reports
effective December 31, 2001, December 31, 2002, and December 31, 2003 in the NEG
Operating LLC Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 to
be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about March 25, 2004.


                                         NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC.


                                         By: /s/ FREDERIC D. SEWELL
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Frederic D. Sewell
                                            Chairman and Chief Executive Officer


Dallas, Texas
March 24, 2004
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eddie James Burks, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Carey, J.), rendered July 18, 1988, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the identification testimony of two eyewitnesses should have been suppressed because the People failed to provide the notice required by CPL 710.30 (1) (b). Initially we note that the defendant waived the notice *457requirement since he moved for suppression of this identification testimony during the trial, a hearing was held, and the motion was denied *(see, People v Bolling,*142 AD2d 733; CPL 710.30 [3]). In any event, there was no identification within the purview of CPL 710.30 (1) (b) for which the People were required to give notice. The hearing court determined that the credible evidence established that the witnesses had not in fact identified the defendant from police photographs. Moreover, as the witnesses had seen the defendant in the area on numerous occasions for 10 years prior to the robbery, any identification would have been merely confirmatory *(see, People v Tas,*51 NY2d 915; *People v Gissendanner,*48 NY2d 543).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]). The complainant testified that he was awakened by noise in his apartment and saw the defendant descending the stairs carrying his television set. Balletta, J. P., Miller, O’Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 32.2**

** **

** **

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

** **

** **

In connection with theQuarterly Report of SITEL Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod ending March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jorge A. Celaya, ExecutiveVice President, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that to my knowledge:

 

(1)          The Reportfully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)          The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

 

 
| /s/  *Jorge A.  Celaya*                                                      |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| **      Jorge  A. Celaya**                               |   |
|       Executive Vice President, Chief  Financial Officer |   |

 

May 10, 2005

 

----
Memorandum to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2010-0505

EPA staff attended the below OMB 12866 meetings. EPA did not have a speaking role in these meetings 

but rather listened to the presenters. 

8/4/2015

E.O. 12866 Meeting on Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources in the Oil and Natural Gas 

Sector. This meeting was requested by EDF.

8/6/2015

E.O. 12866 Meeting on Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources in the Oil and Natural Gas 

Sector. This meeting was requested by National Religious Partnership for the Environment.

8/10/2015

E.O. 12866 Meeting on Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources in the Oil and Natural Gas 

Sector. This meeting was requested by API.

8/10/2015

E.O. 12866 Meeting on Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources in the Oil and Natural Gas 

Sector. This meeting was requested by Noble Energy.

8/11/2015

E.O. 12866 Meeting on Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources in the Oil and Natural Gas 

Sector. This meeting was requested by Sierra Club.

8/14/2015

E.O. 12866 Meeting on Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources in the Oil and Natural Gas 

Sector. This meeting was requested by League of Conservation Voters.

8/14/2015

E.O. 12866 Meeting on Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources in the Oil and Natural Gas 

Sector. This meeting was requested by Clean Air Task Force.

8/14/2015

E.O. 12866 Meeting on Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources in the Oil and Natural Gas 

Sector. This teleconference was requested by NY State Attorney General’s Office.

8/14/2016

E.O. 12866 Meeting on Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources in the Oil and Natural Gas 

Sector. This meeting was requested by NRDC.

8/17/2015

E.O. 12866 Meeting on Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources in the Oil and Natural Gas 

Sector; and Control Techniques Guideline for the Oil and Natural Gas Sector. This meeting was 

requested by American Lung Association.
EXHIBIT 32.2







CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL OFFICER

REGAN HOLDING CORP.

FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2007

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I am the Principal Accounting and Financial Officer of Regan Holding Corp., a California corporation (the "Company"). I am delivering this certificate in connection with the Companys annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007 ("Form 10-K").



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







Date: March 31, 2008



By: /s/ R. Preston Pitts

R. Preston Pitts

Principal Accounting and Financial Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Regan Holding Corp. and will be retained by Regan Holding Corp. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
the agency docket number / agency internal file number
the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Children and Families
 *Title:*
                     Notice of Interstate Lien. *OMB No.:*
                     0970-0153. *Description:*P.L. 104-193, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996, amended section 652(a) of the Social Security Act (the Act) to  require the Secretary of DHHS to promulgate a standard administrative lien form to be used by the State Child Support Enforcement (CSE) programs in interstate cases (See attachment 1.) The OMB approval of the form is expiring and we are taking this opportunity to make minor revisions to the form to further assist States in gaining access to the assets of child support obligors. *Respondents:*
                     States. Annual Burden Estimates
Instrument
Number of 
                             respondents
Number of 
                             responses  
                             per  
                             respondent
Average 
                             burden hours  
                             per response
Total burden hoursNotice of Interstate Lien
29,776
1
0.25
7,444
 
 
 Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 7,444. *Additional Information:* Copies of the proposed collection may be obtained by writing to The Administration for Children and Families, Office of Information Services, 370 L'Enfant Promenade, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20447, Attn: ACF Reports Clearance Officer. *OMB Comment:*
                     OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of information between 30 and 60 days after November 30, 2000. Therefore, a comment is best assured of having  its full effect if OMB receives it before January 2, 2001. Written comments and recommendations for the proposed information collection should be sent directly to the following: Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project, 725 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20503, Attn: Desk Officer for ACF. Dated: November 22, 2000. Bob Sargis, Reports Clearance Officer.


[FR Doc. 00-30495 Filed 11-29-00; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4184-01-M
EXHIBIT 10.50

SUMMARY OF ORAL AGREEMENT WITH MITCHELL I. QUAIN

In December 2003, we entered into a verbal arrangement with Mr. Quain pursuant
to which Mr. Quain is entitled to receive compensation at a rate of $1,000 per
day for each day that he works in excess of seven business days per month,
provided that such compensation does not exceed $3,500 per month.
#### James Leroy LORTON v. UNITED STATES of America.

No. 9082.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

June 24, 1940.

Raine Ewell, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

Frank J. Hennessy, U. S. Atty., and S. P. Murman, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

Before GARRECHT, DENMAN, and PIEALY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant having failed to file brief within time required, and no showing being made of cause for such default after notice thereof duly given, ordered appeal herein dismissed for failure of appellant to file brief, that a judgment of dismissal be filed and entered accordingly, and mandate of this court issue forthwith.