### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE N ove m be r 16, 200 4 S es sio n LI NDA JUNE CR OSS v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Cum berland Coun ty

No. 3187 Leon C. Burns, Jr., Jud ge

No. E2003-01969-CC A-M R3-P C - F iled May 6, 2005

The pe titioner, Linda J une Cross, was c onvicted by a jury in the Cumberland C ounty Criminal Court of first deg reemurder. She w as sentenc ed to life imprisonment in the Tenne s s ee De p artment of Correc ti o n
. Su b s e q u e n tl y , th e p e ti ti o n e r f il e d a p e ti ti o n f

o r p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f, a ll e g in g that beca use her trial counsel ha d an ac tual conflict of interest in r epre senting her, counsel was ther efor e ineffe ctive. The post-conviction cour t denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our revie w of the r ecor d and the pa rties’ brie fs, we a ffirm the judg ment of the post-c onviction court.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.
N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich D AVI D H. W EL L ES and D A V ID G. H AYES , J J ., joined.
Ursula B ailey , Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee ( on appeal) and Kay M. Doy le, Cookeville, Tenne ssee ( at trial), fo r the app e llant, Lind a

June Cr os s. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Michelle Chapman McIntire, Assi stant Attorney Gene ral, Willi am E. Gibson, District Attorney Gene ral; and B enjamin W. Fann and David Patterson, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
. OP IN ION
I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound
I n 1992, the petitioner wa s convicted of first deg reemurder ( here inafter “the murde r ca se”)

. After a delay ed appe al, this court af firmed the judg ment of the trial c ourt. See State v. Linda J une Cross, No. 03C01-9810-CR-00358, 1999 WL 1076958, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvil le, Nov. 30, 1999). Subsequently , the petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, al l egi ng that her tria l counsel we re ine ff

e c tiv e
. Th e pe tit ion e r wa s re pr e se nte d at tria l by Jame s FranklinL og a n, Jr., a ndKe nn e th-2-

L ee Miller. T he petitioner a sserted that beca use L og an had previously sued her civilly on behalf of another client, he had an actua l c onflict of intere st in repre senting her in the murde r ca se. F urther, the petitioner c ontended that L og an’s c onflict tainted Miller’s re prese ntati o n b ec ause Mill er and L og an we re me mbers of the same law firm and ha d repr esente d her jointly in the murder c ase. The petitioner’s claims of conf lict beg in in 1982 when L og an re prese nted Charles “ Bubba ” Smit h in a civil action ag ainst the petitioner to re coup funds stolen by the petitioner (he reina fter “ the civil c ase” ). L og an obtained a def ault judgme nt ag ainst the petitioner in the amount of $100,000. L og a n te sti fi e d at th e po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng that

we issued an execution, and quite frankly , I didn’t know if [the petition er ] woul d ever

speak to me a g ain, bec ause w e executed our judgme nt, and came to he r residenc e at a time in which she wa s not expecting an ex ecution, no exemptions had been fil ed, and we levied u p o n a l l o f

h e r p e r s o n a l p r o p e rt y.
Nea rly contemporaneously

with the civil case , a criminal action was instituted ag ainst the petitioner for embezzlement ( here inafter “the embezzlement c ase” ). The pe titioner was re prese nted in the embezzlement case by Miller. The pe titioner ultim ate l y p l ed gu i lty to embezzl ement of an amount over $200.
L ater , in 1985 or 1986, Smit h disappea red and wa s presumed de ad. At the post-c onviction he ari ng , L og a n te sti fi e d th a t he did no t re pr e se nt Smith ’s e state

. I ns te a d, Smith’ s su rv ivi ng sp ou se retained attorne y s to repre sent the estate

. I n 1 98 9, Mil le r j oin e d L og a n’ s law fi rm
. Th e re a ft e r, in 199 2, the pe tit ion e r wa s cha rg e d w ith the murd er o f her e x -husband’ s g irlfriend. L og an testified at the post-conviction hea ring that the petitioner’s sister and brother- in-law c ontacted him a bout r epre senting the petitioner in the murder case . At the post-conviction hea ring , L og an testified that the petitioner knew that he had be en the attorney for Smith. Mil ler testified that the petitioner knew that he had r epre sented he r in the embezzlement case
. Additionally , both attorney s testified that L og an’s pr evious repr esentation of Smit h did not result i n a conflict of i ntere st prohibiting them from r epre senting the petitioner in the murder c ase. Counsel a sserted that they would have de clined to ac cept the mur der c ase ha d there been a conflict of inter est. Specifically , L og an stated:
You under stand, Ms. Cross was coming to me for r epre sentation. Th e pe rs on wh o mi g ht p os sib ly ha ve ha d s omere a so n to pr e ve nt m e from doing so would have be en, in my mind, that if Mr s. Smi th, who at that time had that asset, or would have ha d that asset, if ther e we re so me be ne fi t.
Miller acknow ledg ed that at the m urder trial, evidenc e was prese nted that the petitioner ha d been indicte d on char g es of e mbezz ling a pproxi mately

$3,600 from Smith and that she had paid JoeW e no te tha t t h e S ta te a rg u e s tha t the p e tit io n e r wa ive d h e r righ t to a p p e a l the d e n ia l o f p o st-co n v ic tio n re lief. 1 H owe v er , t h e St at e pr ev i ou s l y r ai s ed t h i s a r g u men t be for e t h i s c ou r t i n a mot i on t o di s mi s s , w h i ch mot i on w as de n i ed. W e w ill no t no w re v isit this issu e
. -3- Norman, a

co-de fendant in the m urder case , approximately $3,500 to commit the murder. Howe ver, Miller noted t hat he pointed out to the jury that the petitioner a ctually pled g uiltyto embezzl ement of an amount over $200, and the ac tual amount of money taken wa s not determined. Miller f urther explained that the amount of money taken c ould have be en g reater or less than t he amount for whic h the petitioner wa s indicted and ha d no rele vanceto the amount of money paid to Norman.
T h e p et i t i o n erd i dn o tt es t i fyatt h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n h eari n g.
At thec on c lus ionof

thehe ari ng , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt fo un d th a t
Mr . L og a n d id n ot, in m y op ini on, h a ve a

c on fl ic t in repr esenting [t he petitio ner]. His repr esentation ag ainst her ha d c e a se d. No thi ng wa s ob ta ine d by him in the re pr e se ntatio n of his other c lients ag ainst her. No information was obtained in any sort of confide ntial way . She was a war e that he ha d sued h er o n b eh alf of Charles Smith, a nd fre ely then chose to e mploy him to represe nt her in this case. As I

said, there ’s no information or nothing gained from he r i n p ursu ing that c a se of a c tio n a g a ins t he r that w ou ld h a ve in some way compromised the r epre sentation in the criminal ca se. So, one, I don’t see any

conflict, and two, there certainly has been no pr ejudice show n herein the repr esentation by Mr. L og an and Mr. Miller in the trial of the ca se or in the a ppeal. So it would be the judgme nt of this Court then, that the petition fails, has no merit, and should be dismissed. . .
T h e p et i t i o n ern o w a p p ea l s t h i s ru l i n g. 1
II. Ana lys is
To be succ essful in her claim for post-conviction relief , the petitioner must prove all fa ctual alleg ations contained in his post-conviction petition by clea r and convincing evidenc e. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f) (2003). “‘Clea r and convincing evidenc e means e vidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the cor rec tness of t h e conclusions drawn fr om the e vid e nc e .’ ” State v. Ho lde r, 15 S.W. 3d 90 5, 91 1 (T e nn . Crim . A pp . 1 99 9) (quo tin g Ho dg e s v . S. C. To of & Co. , 83 3 S.W. 2d89 6, 90 1 n .2 (T e nn . 1 99 2) ). I ssu e s r e g ard ing thec re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s, the weig ht and value to be acc orded the ir testimony , and the f actua l questions raised by the evidenc e adduced at t ri al areto be re solved by the post-conviction court as the trier of fa ct. See He nley

v. S t at e, 9 6 0 S

. W

. 2 d5 7 2 , 5 7 9 (T en n
. 1 9 9 7 ). T h er ef o re , we af fo rd th e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs-4-

of fa ct the weig ht of

a jury verdic t, with such findings be ing c onclusive on appe al abse nt a showing that the evidenc e in the re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst those finding s. I d. at 578.
A c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of c ou ns e l is a mixe d que sti on of la w an d fa c t. Se e State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . We will review the post-c onviction court’s finding s of fac t de novo with a pre sumption t hat those finding s are corr ect. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 45 8 (T e nn
. 20 01 ). Ho we ve r, we wi ll re vie w the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s c on c lus ion s of la w p ur e ly de novo. I d.
“To e stablish ineffec tive assistance of counse l, the petitioner bea rs the burde n o f proving both that counsel’s pe rformance was de ficient and that the deficiency prejudice d the def ense.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W .2d 363, 36 9 (T enn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984))

. I n evaluating whe ther the pe titioner has met this burden, this court must det er m i n e whe ther c ounsel’s performanc e wa s within the rang e of c ompetencerequire d of attorney s in criminal case s. See B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)

. The pe titioner’s claim of inef fec tiveness stems from her assertion that “[a] t the time he a g re e d to re pr e se nt M s. Cr os s, Attorne y L og a n wa s ac tiv e ly re pr e se nti ng a c on fl ic tin g int e re st o f M s. Cr o s s ’

. ” T h is c o u rt h a s n o te dth a t “ [a ]n a c tu a l c o n f li c t o f in te r e s t i s u s u a ll y

d e f in e dinth e c o n te xt of one attorney repr esenting two or more pa rties with diverg ent intere sts.” State v. Tate, 925 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) ; see a lso Cli nard v. B lackwood, 46 S

. W.3d 177 (Tenn. 2001). Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, DR 5-105 (1992 ), which w as in eff ect at the time of the murder case , sp e c if ic a lly pr ov ide s: (A) Alawy er sha ll decline prof fer ed em ploy ment if the exercise of his independent prof

essional judg ment in behalf of a client will be or is like ly to b e a d v e r s e ly

a f f e c te db y th e a c c e p tan c e o f

th e p r o ffe red employ ment, or if it would be likely to involve him in r ep re s en ting differing inter ests, except to the ex tent permitted under DR 5-105(C). (B ) Ala wy e r s ha ll n ot c on tin ue mul tip le e mpl oyme nt if thee xer c ise of his independe nt professional judg ment in behalf of a client will be o r i s l ikely

to be adve rsely

aff ecte d by his repre sentation of anothe r client, or if it would be likely to involve him in represe nting diff ering interests, except to the extend permitted under DR 5-105(C). (C ) In th e situatio ns c ov e re d [ab ov e ], a la wy e r may re pr e se nt multipl e clients if it is obvious t hat he c an ade quately repr esent the inter est of eac h and if e ach c onsents to the represe ntation afte r full di sclosure of th e p o s s i b l e e f

f e c t o f s u c h r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o n t h e e xe r c i s e o f his independe nt professional judg ment on behalf of ea ch.“ Effec t i v e M ar ch 1, 2003, t h e Code of Pr ofes s i on al Res pon s i bi l i t y w as r epl ac ed by t h e T en n es s ee Rul es of 2 Prof es s i on al Condu ct , l i k ew i s e codi f i ed at T en n es s ee Su pr eme Cour t Rul e 8. ” St at e v
. M cCu l l ou g h , 144 S. W

. 3d 382, 3 8 5 n.1 (T en n. C rim. A p p
. 2 0 0 3 ). N ew R ule 1 .9(a ) o f t he R ules o f

P ro fessio na l C o nd uc t p ro vid es:
A l awy er wh o has former l y rep resen t ed a c l i ent i n a mat t er s hal l not t her eaf t er r epre s ent an ot her per s on i n t he s ame or a s ubs t ant i al l y r el at ed mat t er i n whi ch t hat p erso n’s i ntere st s are m ateriall y ad ve rse to t he i ntere st s o f t he fo rm er c l i en t , un l ess t he fo rme r cl i ent co nsent s i n wri t i ng af t er consul t at i o n.
T enn. Sup

. C t

. R

. 8, RP C 1.9(a) ( 2 0 0 3 ). -5- Se e a ls o T e n n
. Su p
. Ct

. R. 8 , E C 5

- 1 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ( “ T h e p r o f e s s io n a l ju d g me n t o f a la w y e r s hould be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benef it of his c lient and fre e of c ompromising influence s and loy alties.”). 2
I n sum, an ac tual co n fl ict of intere sts ex ists “wherean attorne y is placed in a

position of divided loy alties.” Ke vin Burns v. State, N o. W2000-02871-CCA-R9-PD, 2001 W L 912817, at *4 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. a t Jac ks on , A ug us t 9, 20 01 ). I t is un qu e sti on e d th a t “ a n a c c us e d is e nti tle d to zealous repr esentation by an attorne y

unfetter ed by a conflicting interest.” State v. Thompson, 768 S.W .2d 239, 245 (Tenn. 1989) . To establish a de nial o f t h e S i x th Amendment rig ht to counsel, a petitioner nee d show only that an ac tual conflict e x isted. I d. Prejudice is pre sumed to exi st when an attorne y

repr esents diver g ent intere sts. I d.
Th e pe tit ion e r

c o n t e n d s th at

L o g an h a d an a c tual c on fl ic t of int e re st w hic h d e ve lop e d b e c aus e L og an had pr eviously

repr esente d Smit h in a civil lawsuit ag ainst the peti t i o ner f or embe zz ling money from Smith’s business. The pe titioner arg ues that bec ause the State implied at trial that the money she used to pay

Norman f

or t he murder came from the e mbezz lement, L og an had an actua l c on fl ic t a ndthu s sh ou ld not ha ve re pr e se nte d he r. We f a il t o s e e ho w the fo re g oin g fa c ts i nd ic a te that L og an suffere d from an actual c onflict of intere st in repre senting the petitioner. L og an sued the pet itio n e r c iv il ly a n do b tain e da

d e f au lt ju d g me n t a g a in s t h e r
. T h e p e ti ti o n e r w a s late r

trie d criminally

on embezzlement charg es. During the embezzlement case , the petitioner was re prese nted by Miller. L og an wa s not involved in the crim i n al ca s e, b u t he testified that he monitore d the proce eding s because of the c ivil case. The petitioner ultimately pled g uiltyto embezzl ement. The petitioner later

soug ht L og an’s repr esentation whe n she was char g ed with mur der. Thepetitioner’s c ivi l c a se a ndhe r mur de r c a se didno t in vo lvediv e rg e nt i nte re sts . M or e ov e r, a s th e State no te d in its a rg ume nt d uring thepo st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng :

[T] he best c ompliment that an attorney can have is that afte r he trie s a ca se, that somebody

on the jury comes and retains him to repr esent them, or the other

party comes to him later in a differ ent ca se and a sks to repre sent them. And they do, and ther e’s no c onflict.
Ther ef o re, w e conc lude that the petitioner ha s failed to prove that L og an had an actua l conflict of interest in re prese nting he r.W e no t e t hat the “A m eri can B ar A ss o ci at i o n’ s M o d el R ul es o f P rof ess i o nal C o nd uct

. . . pa t ent l y rej ect s t he 3 [ appear anc e of

i mp r op r i et y ] st andar d. ” C l i nar d, 4 6 S. W

. 3d at 1 86

. Fur t her , T enn es s ee’ s cur r ent R ul es of P r ofes s i onal Condu ct ar e pat t er n ed af t er t h e M odel Rul es
. Se e St at e v
. Chr i s t oph er A. D av i s , M 2001- 01866- CC A- R3- D D , 2003 W L 1 5 2 3 2 7 7 , at *1 9 n. 3 ( T e n n . C rim . A p p . a t N a sh v ill e , M a r. 2 5 , 2 0 0 3 ), a ff ’d , 1 4 1 S .W .3 d 6 0 0 (T e n n . 2 0 0 4 ). S p e c ifi c a lly, this c o u rt h a s n o te d tha t “[n ]e ithe r R u le 1 .1 0 o r 1 .1 1 [o f t h e ne w m o d e l ru le s] a d o p ts a n a p p e a r a n c e o f i m p ro p rie ty s t an dar d. ” St at e v
. Fr an k i e E. C as t ee l , N o. E2003- 01563- CC A- R3- CD , 2004 W L 2138334, a t * 16 ( T en n
. Cr i m. App.
a t K n o x v ill e , S e p t. 2 4 , 2 0 0 4 ), p e rm
. to a p p e a l d e n ie d , (T e n n
. 2 0 0 4 ). H o w e v e r, the se ru le s o n ly ap p ly p ro sp e c tive ly “to
an y r el at i on s h i p e x i s t i n g on or c on du ct t ak en a f t er M ar ch 1, 2003. ” I d. a t * 15. -6- Th e pe tit ion e r also c on te nd s th a t th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt “ e rr ed by li mit ing its de te rm inatio n to th e qu e sti on of a c tual c on fl ic t,” c on te nd ing that th e c ou rt sh ou ld h a ve a lso considere d the possible appe ar an ce of impropriety

. Our re view of the rec ord re veals that the 3 petitioner consistently

maintained that her

claim of inef

fec tive assistance was ba sed solely upon her contention that L og an had an actual conflict of interest. The petitioner neve r asse rted that ther e wa s a n a pp e aranc e of

imp ro prie ty

un til sh e raise d th e iss ue be fo rethi s c ou rt . A n is su e raise d f or thefi rs t tim e on app e a l is c on sid e re d w a ive d. Se e State v. Al va ra do , 9 61 S.W. 2d13 6, 15 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ). We c on c lud e that this iss ue is wa ive d, a nd wewi ll n ot a ddre ss this iss ue on theme ri ts.
III. Conclusi on Finding no err or, we aff

irm the judg ment of the post-c onviction court.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE