IV 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 217 

Expressing the sense of Congress that the President, in negotiating any 

new bilateral strategic arms agreement with the Russian Federation, 

shall ensure the continued deterrence capability of the United States 

strategic arsenal and flexibility in the allocation of its components in 

the event that third countries may pursue the deployment of significant 

and technologically advanced nuclear strategic forces not covered by 

such a United States-Russian arms agreement. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 3, 2009 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. MCKEON, Mr. BOEHNER, Mr. PENCE, 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS, Mr. PRICE of Georgia, Mr. MCCOTTER, Mr. 

HOEKSTRA, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. TURNER, Mr. FRANKS

of Arizona, Mr. GALLEGLY, Mr. BISHOP of Utah, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. BOOZMAN, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. INGLIS, Mr. LAMBORN, Mr. 

MILLER of Florida, Mr. FLEMING, Ms. GRANGER, Mr. THORNBERRY, Mr. 

KLINE of Minnesota, Mr. ADERHOLT, Mrs. MYRICK, Mrs. BACHMANN, 

Mr. WITTMAN, Mr. BROUN of Georgia, Mr. PUTNAM, Mr. MACK, Mr. 

BONNER, Mr. BARRETT of South Carolina, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. LINDER, 

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. COBLE, Mr. NEUGEBAUER, Mr. TIAHRT, 

Mr. COFFMAN of Colorado, Mr. SOUDER, Mr. GARRETT of New Jersey, 

Mr. CAO, Mr. MCCAUL, Mr. FORTENBERRY, Mrs. CAPITO, Mr. ISSA, Mr. 

GINGREY of Georgia, Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. GRAVES, Ms. 

FOXX, Mr. TIBERI, Mr. AKIN, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. ROGERS of Michigan, 

Mr. CONAWAY, Mr. ROE of Tennessee, Mr. ALEXANDER, and Mr. POSEY) 

submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of Congress that the President, in 

negotiating any new bilateral strategic arms agreement 

with the Russian Federation, shall ensure the continued 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HCON 217 IH 

deterrence capability of the United States strategic arsenal and flexibility in the allocation of its components 

in the event that third countries may pursue the deployment of significant and technologically advanced nuclear 

strategic forces not covered by such a United StatesRussian arms agreement. 

Whereas United States strategic nuclear forces have been 

successful in providing a security framework for the 

United States based on the concept of deterrence, such 

continued successful deterrence of strategic attacks on 

the United States will require the United States to maintain a strategic force capable of deterring attacks, not 

just by the Russian Federation, but by other countries 

with the capability to deploy significant nuclear arsenals; 

Whereas the importance of maintaining strong nuclear capabilities is emphasized in the September 2008 report, 

‘‘National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st 

Century’’, issued by the Department of State and the Department of Defense, which states, ‘‘Nuclear forces continue to represent the ultimate deterrent capability that 

supports U.S. national security . . . [and the] nuclear 

force must be of sufficient size and possess a wide range 

of capabilities to provide credible threat option to deter 

existing and future WMD-armed adversaries’’; 

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union, and, subsequently, the Russian Federation, have already reduced 

the total numbers of deployed strategic nuclear weapons 

by more than three-quarters; 

Whereas, on July 31, 1991, the United States and the former 

Soviet Union, succeeded by the Russian Federation, 

signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), 

which committed both countries to reduce and limit long 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HCON 217 IH 

range nuclear arsenals and which is set to expire on December 5, 2009; 

Whereas in 2002, the United States and the Russian Federation signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, 

known as the ‘‘Moscow Treaty’’, which set out to reduce 

deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 

2,200 warheads on each side by 2012 using the 

verification regime of START I to monitor reductions; 

Whereas, although the United States and Russia have significantly reduced their nuclear missile arsenals, other countries are seeking to enhance and enlarge their nuclear 

weapons capabilities and deployments, including the People’s Republic of China; 

Whereas the People’s Republic of China is the only declared 

nuclear weapons country under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that is expanding its nuclear arsenal; 

Whereas, according to the United States National Air and 

Space Intelligence Center’s April 2009 report, ‘‘Ballistic 

and Cruise Missile Threat’’, ‘‘China has the most active 

and diverse ballistic missile development program in the 

world’’ and ‘‘China’s ICBM force will grow considerably.’’; 

Whereas, in a March 2006 statement to the United StatesChina Economic and Security Review Commission, then 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Affairs Peter W. Rodman said, ‘‘China is pursuing a patient, long-term, comprehensive modernization program 

. . . . newer versions [of ICBMs] such as the DF–31 and 

DF–31A . . . and the JL–2 submarine-launched ballistic 

missile . . . will reach . . . virtually the entire continental 

United States’’; 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
4 

•HCON 217 IH 

Whereas the 2009 Department of Defense annual report to 

Congress on the military power of the People’s Republic 

of China states that ‘‘China is both qualitatively and 

quantitatively improving its strategic missile forces’’, and 

that ‘‘By 2010, China’s nuclear forces will include DF– 

31s and DF–31As; enhanced CSS–4s; CSS–3s; CSS–5s; 

and JIN-class SSBNs, each carrying 12 JL–2 SLBMs. 

The addition of nuclear-capable forces with greater mobility and survivability . . . will . . . enhance [China’s] 

strategic strike capabilities’’; 

Whereas, on July 6, 2009, President Barack Obama and 

Russian Federation President Dmitry Medvedev signed a 

preliminary agreement to replace START I, which is set 

to expire on December 5, 2009, in spite of the fact that 

the Nuclear Posture Review, which is now being conducted by the United States Department of Defense and 

which will establish United States nuclear deterrence policy and examine United States strategic force requirements, will not be ready for submission to the Congress 

until December 2009; 

Whereas the Nuclear Posture Review is intended to provide 

a basis for the negotiations to the follow-on agreement to 

START I, and it would therefore be premature and potentially damaging to the national security interests of 

the United States to hold negotiations on any nuclear 

arms control agreement until the Department of Defense 

completes that Review and the President and Congress 

have had adequate time to carefully review its assessments; and 

Whereas it is estimated that the People’s Republic of China 

now has 40 or more strategic nuclear warheads on missiles capable of reaching the United States in all or in 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
5 

•HCON 217 IH 

part and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center 

April 2009 report states ‘‘. . . the number of warheads 

on Chinese ICBMs capable of threatening the United 

States is expected to grow to well over 100 in the next 

15 years’’: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 

2 concurring), That Congress— 

3 (1) calls on the President to not enter into or 

4 extend any arms control agreement with the Russian 

5 Federation that may in future jeopardize the ability 

6 of the United States to ensure a credible strategic 

7 deterrent with regard to the People’s Republic of 

8 China or other countries that are deemed capable of 

9 deploying a strategic nuclear arsenal and may decide 

10 to do so; 

11 (2) calls on the President to provide Congress 

12 with a detailed report on any plans, negotiations, or 

13 steps taken for the purpose of entering into any bi14 lateral arms control agreement with the Russian 

15 Federation; 

16 (3) calls on the President to report to Congress 

17 on the capabilities and intentions of the People’s Re18 public of China with regard to the future deployment 

19 of a major strategic nuclear arsenal; 

20 (4) urges the President to refrain from negoti21 ating or entering into any follow-on agreement to 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS
6 

•HCON 217 IH 

1 START I until the Nuclear Posture Review is com2 pleted and the President, Congress, and all relevant 

3 United States Government departments and agen4 cies have had an opportunity to carefully review the 

5 determinations provided in the Nuclear Posture Re6 view; and 

7 (5) calls on the President to refuse to enter into 

8 any strategic nuclear arms agreement with the Rus9 sian Federation or any other country that would re10 quire or imply an agreement by the United States 

11 to the limitation or suspension of its efforts to create 

12 missile defense systems for itself and its allies. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSKHWCL6B1PROD with BILLS