1 0 9

- 5 1 7 2

- - c v ( L ) ; 1 0

- 0 9 9 2

- c v ( CO N) A C O R Nv. U ni t ed St at es 1 UNITED STATE S COURT OF AP PEALS 2 FO R T HE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 3 August Term 2009 4 Docket Nos. 09-5172-cv (L) ; 10-0992-cv ( CON) 5 Argued: June 24, 2010 Decided: August 13, 2010 6

_____________________________________________________________________________ 7 AC OR

N, AC OR N INS TI TU TE , IN C. , and MH AN Y M AN AG EM EN T, IN C. , f /k/ a/ N ewYo rk 8 Acorn Housing Company, Inc., 9 10 Plain tif fs- Ap pe lle es , 11 - v.- 12 UNITED STA TES OF AMERICA, SHAU N DONO VAN, Secretary of the Department of 13 Housing and Urban Development, PETER OR SZAG Director Office of Managem ent and 14 Bu dg et, TI MO TH Y R . G EI THNE R J R. , S ecr etary o f t he De partm ent of

Tr eas ury of the Un ite d 15 States, LISA P. JACKSON, A dministrator of the Envir onmental Protection Agency, GARY 16 LO CKE, Se cre tar y o f C om m erc e, an d R OB ER T G AT ES , S ecr etary o f D ef en se, 17 De fen da nts -A

pp ellan ts

. 18

_____________________________________________________________________________ 19 Be fo re: MIN ER , C AB RA NE S, an d W ES LE Y, Ci rcu it Jud ge s. 20 Defendants-appell ants appeal from a preliminary inj unction ente red on December 11, 21 2009, and a permanent injuncti on and declara tory judgment entered on M arch 10, 2010, in the 22 United States DistrictCourt for the Eastern Districtof New York (Gershon, J.), declari ng various 23 appropriat ions laws unconst itutiona l bills of attainder a nd enjoining defendantfrom enforcing 24 those laws agai nst plaint iffs-appellees, t he court havi ng concluded that(1) the pl aintiffs have 25 Article I II standi ng to challe nge the appropr iation l aws against al l of the defendants; and ( 2) the 26 appropriat ions laws singl ing out plai ntiffs from obtaining federa l funds (a) fell wit hin the 27 histori cal meaning of legislati ve punishment, (b) did not furthe r a non-punit ive legis lative 28 purpose, and (c) were supported by a legisla tive rec ord that evi nced an intentto punish. 29 Affirm ed in part, va cated in par t, and remanded. 30 J U LES L OBEL , D ari us Ch arn ey , and W ill iam 31 Qu igl ey , C enter fo r C on sti tut ion al R ights, 32 Pi tts burgh , P A and Ne w Y ork , N Y; W ill iam 33 Go odm anan d Juli e H urw itz , G oo dm an& H urw itz , 34 P.C., Detroit, MI; Arthur Schwartz, New York, NY, 35 for plaintiffs-appel lees. 36 37 M ARK B. S TERN , Michael S. Raab, Benja min S.2 1 Kingsley, and Helen L. Gilbe rt, Appellat e Staff, 2 Civil Divisi on, U.S. Department of Justice (Tony 3 W est, Assist ant Attorney Gener al, Civil Divi sion, 4 U. S. De partm ent of Ju sti ce; Be nto n J . C am

pb ell , 5 U. S. Attor ne y, Ea ste rn D istric t of

Ne w Y ork), 6 W ashington, D.C. and Brooklyn, NY, for 7 de fe nd ants- ap pe llants

. 8 Daniel R. Murdock, Patt on Boggs LLP, New Y ork, 9 NY ; H aar is Ahm ad , A ssi stant C orp oratio n C ouns el, 10 W ayne County, Michiga n, Detroit, MI , for amicus 11 curiae Wayne County, Michigan. 12 David B. Rankin and Mark Taylor , Rankin & 13 Taylo r, N ewYo rk, NY , f or am ici curia e A lli an ce 14 fo r Ju sti ce; Ci tiz enAc tio n o f N ewYo rk; Hake em 15 Jef fr ies ; L ab or E du cat ion

& R ese arc h P roj ect ; 16 Le ga l A id S oc iety o f N ewYo rk C ity ; Marty 17 Mar ko wi tz; Ke vin

Po we ll; W est ern

St ate s C enter ; 18 and Jumaane D. W illia ms. 19 Mark D. Stern, Somerville, MA; J ohn C. Philo, 20 Mau ric e & J an e S ug ar L awCe nte r f or E co no m ic & 21 So cia l Ju sti ce, De tro it, MI, fo r am ici curia e Unit ed 22 El ect ric al, Ra dio & Ma ch ine W ork ers of Am eri ca; 23 Co mm un icatio ns W ork ers of

Am eri ca; 24 Communications Workers of Am erica Local 1180; 25 Tr an sp ort W ork ers Un ion

of Am eri ca; Tr an sp ort 26 W orkers Union of America of Greater New York; 27 Jobs with Justi ce; Inte rfaith Worker Justice; and 28 Mau ric e & J an e S ug ar L awCe nte r f or E co no m ic & 29 So cia l Ju sti ce. 30 Ch arl es S . S im s an d Ann a G . K am ins ka , P ros ka ue r 31 Rose LLP, New York, NY ; Stephen I. Vlade ck, 32 W ash ing ton , D .C . f or am ici curia e C on sti tut ion al 33 Law P rof ess ors Br uc e A ck erm an , E rw in 34 Chem erinsky, David D. Cole, Mi chael C. Dorf, 35 Mark Graber, Set h F. Kreimer, Sanford V. 36 Levinson, Burt Neuborne, and St ephen I. Vladeck.

37 MIN ER , C irc uit

Ju dg e: 38 Defendants-appell ants, Shaun Donovan, Secret ary of Housing and Urban Development 39 (“HUD”); Peter Orsz ag, Directorof the Office of Managem ent and Budget (“OMB”); Timothy 40 Ge ithne r, S ecr etary o f t he Tr eas ury ; L isa

Jac ks on , A dm ini str ato r of the Envir onm ental 41 Protecti on Agency (“EPA”); Gary Locke, Secr etary of Comm erce; RobertGates, Secret ary ofNe w Y ork Ac orn ha s re centlych an ge d it s n am e to MH AN Y M an ag em ent, I nc . 1 3 1 De fen se ; a ndth e U ni te d S ta te s ( co ll ec ti ve ly , t he “g ov ernmen t” or“d efe nd an ts ”) , app ea l f ro m a 2 preliminary injunc tion enter ed on December 11, 2009, and a permanent injunction and 3 declarat ory judgment entered on Mar ch 10, 2010, in the Unite d States Dist rict Courtfor the 4 Eastern Dist rict of New York (Gershon, J.). 5 Plaintiffs-appel lees, Associa tion of Community Organizations for Reform Now 6 (“A CO RN ”), Ac orn Ins tit ute , and Ne w Y ork

Ac orn Ho us ingCo m

pany (“N ewYo rk A co rn” or, 1 7 collect ively with ACORN and Acorn Institut e, the “plai ntiffs”) brought thi s action cha llenging 8 pro vis ion s in

sev era l f ed era l ap pro pri ati on s laws barri ng the dis tri butio n o f f ed era l f un ds to 9 ACORNand its affiliat es, subsidia ries, and al lied organi zations. The Dist rict Courtstruck down 10 the chall enged provisi ons, holding that(1) the pl aintiffs have Artic le III standing to c hallenge t he 11 appropriat ions laws agai nst all of the de fendants, includi ng the Secret ary of Defense and the 12 Director of OMB; and (2) the appropri ations la ws singling out ACORN and its affiliate s from 13 ob tai nin g f

ed era l f un ds (a) fe ll w ith in t

he his tor ica l m ean ingof

leg isl ati ve punis hm ent, ( b) d id 14 no t f

urt he r a n on -pu

nit ive leg isl ati ve purpo se, an d (c ) w ere su pp ort ed bya le gis lat ive rec ord

that 15 evinced an int ent to punish. Accor dingly, the cour t enjoined the defendants from enforcing the 16 challenged pr ovisions of the appr opriati ons laws. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 A. The Plaintiffs 19 ACO RN i s ano n- pr ofi t A rk an sa s c or po ra ti onth ator ga ni ze s l ow- an d mod er at e- in co me 20 persons “to a chieve soci al and economic justic e.” Specificall y, ACORNhas helped overtwo 21 m ill ion

pe op le r eg ist er t o v ote , a dv oc ate d f or i nc rea sin g th e m ini m

um wa ge , w ork ed

ag ain st 22 predatory l ending, prevent ed foreclosures , assiste d over 150,000 people file their t ax returns , and 23 “worked on thousands of issue s that ar ise from the predicaments and problems of the poor, the 24 homeless, the underpaid, t he hungry and the si ck.” ACORN has 500,000 m embers located in 75 25 cities across the United States , with its nat ional offices locat ed in Brooklyn, New York,Fo llo wi ng ora l ar gum ent, H UD de ter m ine d f or p urp os es o f i ts a

pp rop riatio ns lawthat 2 Ne w Y ork

Ac orn “is no t an

af fi liate, su bs idi ary or a lli ed org an izatio n o f A CO RN .” Po stArgument Letter of the United Stat es (dated J uly 8, 2010). 4 1 W ashington, D.C., and New Orleans, Louisi ana. ACORN has received 10% of its funding from 2 the fe de ral go ve rnm ent an d o the rw ise ha s re cei ve d f un din g f rom vario us natio na l an d lo cal 3 so urc es. 4 Ac orn

Ins tit ute is a no n-p rof it N ewOr leans co rpo rat ion that ha s a “ sep arate c orp orate 5 ex ist en ce f

rom AC OR N, wi th a sep arate b oard o f d ire cto rs and sep arate m an ag em ent.” Ac orn 6 Institute, however, coll aborates c losely and cont racts wit h ACORNto carry outmany of the 7 grants wh ich

Ac orn Ins tit ute rec eiv es f

rom , inter ali os , th e f

ed era l go ve rnm ent. S im ilar to 8 AC OR

N, Ac orn Ins tit ute is i nv olv ed

wi th c ivi l ri gh ts, em

plo ym ent, h ou sin g, an d s oc ial -se rvi ce 9 iss ue s o f l ow -in co m e co mm un iti es. As of

Se pte m be r 20 09 , A co rn I ns tit

ute em plo ye d tw enty 10 employees, with its office locat ed in New Orleans, Louisi ana. 11 New York Acorn is a non-profit New York corpor ation that“owns, develops and 12 manages housing affordable to low income fam ilies.” New York Acorn controls over140 13 bu ild ing s an d 1 ,2 00 ap artm ents l oc ate d throu gh out th e b oro ug hs of Ne w Y ork

Ci ty. Ne w Y ork 14 Ac orn

is a sep arate e nti ty f

rom AC OR N b ut i s co ns ide red

anall y o r af

fi liate o f A CO RN

. Ne w 2 15 Yo rk A co rn r ece ive s p art of its fu nd s b y w ayof

su bc ontra cti ng -gr ants f

rom the Ne w Y ork

St ate 16 Ho us ing Fi nanc e A ge nc y, wh ich , in tur n, rec eiv es f

ed era l f un ds fr om

HU D f or s uc h 17 subcontract ing purposes. New York Acorn employs an office staff of thirteen pers ons and a 18 maintenance staff of twenty-four persons. 19 Th e le ga l an d g ov ern an ce s tru cture o f A CO RNan d it s “s ep arate b ut i nte rre lat ed 20 components,” such as Acorn Insti tute and New York Acorn, is “i ncredibly c omplex,” and at one 21 po int

the AC OR

N “ [f ]am ily ” w as e sti m ate d at ap pro xim ate ly 2 00 entit ies . A s f ound in an 22 int ern al r ep ort

iss ue d b y A CO RNin 2 00 8, ho we ve r, t he AC OR N f am ily— whic h s til l in clu de d 23 Acorn Institute and New York Acorn — had diminished to 29 enti ties by tha t time. 24 B. Mis m an ag em ent, F rau d, an d C on gre ssi on al R esp on se5 1 In 1 99 9 and 20 00 , D ale Rathk e, the bro the r of AC OR N’ s f ound er W ad e R athke , 2 em

be zzl ed ne arl y $ 1 m ill ion

fr om the org an izatio n. Up on

dis co ve ry o f t

he em be zzl em ent, “ a 3 sm all gro up of

ex ecutiv es d eci de d to ke ep the inf orm ati on fr om alm os t al l of

the gro up ’s b oard 4 mem

bers and not t o alert l aw enforcement.” A restituti on agreement was signed in which t he 5 Rathke family “agreed to repay[, beginni ng in 2001], the amount em bezzled in e xchange for 6 confidentiali ty.” In June 2008, however , a whistlebl ower forced ACORN to disclose the 7 embezzlem ent, and at t hat time ACORN ’s mism anagement came under serious public s crutiny. 8 AC OR

N i mm ed iat ely

pre pared anint ern al r ep ort

no tin g, am on g o the r is su es, “p ote nti all y 9 im pro pe r us e o f c harit ab le d oll ars fo r po lit ica l pu rpo ses ” as we ll a s p os sib le v iol ati on s o f f ed era l 10 law by ACORNand its “web” of nearl y 200 affiliated organi zations. 11 ACORN ’s reputa tion suffered further upon ac cusations of voterregistr ation fraud, for 12 which ACORN ’s workers had be en convicted i n prior year s. Be tw een Oc tob er 2 00 8 and

May 13 2009, two more AC ORN workers were charged with, and c onvicted of, voter r egistra tion fraud. 14 Whil e A CO RNad op ted “se ve ral go od -go ve rnanc e p oli cie s” t o a dd res s th e p rob lem s id entif

ied in 15 the internal report , a new scandal ar ose in the summer of 2009 when “hidden camera” videos 16 revealed ACORN em ployees and volunt eers provi ding advice and c ounseling in s upport of a 17 proposed prost itution bus iness. 18 In response t o these event s, ACORNcomm issioned an i ndependent repor t to analyz e “the 19 videos thatcaused this summ er’s uproa r” and “the e ntire or ganizati on, its core weaknesses and 20 inh ere nt s tre ng ths .” Th e re po rt, ref err ed to a s th e “H ars hb arg er R ep ort ” b eca us e it wa s p rep are d 21 by Scott Harshbar ger, cite d many of the problems of m anagement previously note d in the 22 int ern al r ep ort

iss ue d in 20 08 . A lth ou ghthe Harsh barge r R ep ort

rev eal ed that th e h idd en -cam era 23 vid eo s w ere he av ilyed ite d, “m an ipu lat ed ,” an d “ dis tor ted ,” the rep ort

no ne the les s cr iti ciz ed 24 AC OR

N’ s “o rganiz ati on al and

su pe rvi so ry w eak

ne ss” an d o ve ral l f

ail ure to p rov ide ad eq

uate 25 organizat ional infrast ructure ne cessary t o manage and oversee its oper ations. 26 In September 2009, the U.S. Census Bureau and the I nternal Revenue Service, both of6 1 which collabor ated with ACORN on certain progr ams, ended their rela tionship wit h ACORN 2 due to its ne gative publi city. That sa me m onth, mem bers of Congress asked t he Government 3 Ac co untab ili ty O ff ice (“G AO ”) t o in iti ate aninv est igatio n into A CO RN ’s a cti vit ies be cau se 4 “there r emain[ed] significant c oncern thatmillions of taxpayer doll ars were used i mproperly, and 5 possibly cr iminally, by the organi zation.” Sever al stat es suspended the ir funding of ACORN 6 an d it s af

fi liates . In

the St ate of

Ne va da , A CO RNan d tw o o f i ts e m plo ye es w ere ch arg ed

wi th 7 partici pating in an i llegal vot er regis trati on scheme. 8 On

Oc tob er 1 , 2 00 9, Co ng res s p ass ed a “s top -ga

p” ap pro pri ati on s law t o f un d f ed era l 9 agencies pr ior to the enactment of the 2010 Fiscal Year appropriat ions. See Continuing 10 Appropriati ons Resolution ( “Continuing Resolut ion”), 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-68, Div. B, § 163, 11 12 3 S tat . 2 02 3, 20 53 (20 09 ). S ect ion 16 3 o f t he Co nti nu ingRe so lut ion sin gle d o ut A CO RNas 12 fo llo ws : 13 None of the funds m ade available by this j oint resol ution or any pr ior Act may be 14 provided to t he Associati on of Com munity Organizations for Reform Now 15 AC OR

N, or anyof

its af fi liates , s ub sid iar ies , o r al lie d o rganiz ati on s. 16 Id. Th e p rov isi on s o f t he Co nti nu ingRe so luti on — in clu din g S ect ion

16 3 — we re s et t o e xp ire 17 on

De cem be r 18 , 2 00 9. Se e D ep artm ent of the Int eri or, Envir onm ent, and Re lat ed Ag en cie s 18 Appropriati ons Act, 2010, Division B — Furthe r Continuing Appropri ations, 2010, § 101, Pub. 19 L. No. 111-88, 123 Stat. 2904, 2972 (2009). 20 In a

m em orand

um dated Oc tob er 7 , 2 00 9, the Di rec tor of OM B a dv ise d th e h ead s o f a ll 21 ex ecutiv e ag en cie s, int er a lia , (1 ) th at S ect ion 16 3 p roh ibi ted

the m fr om pro vid ingany f

ed era l 22 funds to ACORNand its affiliat es, subsidia ries, and al lied organi zations dur ing the peri od of the 23 Co nti nu ing Re so lut ion ; (2 ) to su sp en d anyex ist ingco ntr act s w ithAC OR N and its af fi liates 24 “where permissible”; and (3) to t ake steps “s o that no Federa l funds are awarded orobligated by 25 yo ur g rantee s o r co ntr act ors to A CO RNor i ts a ff ili ate s as su

bc ontra cto rs, or o the r 26 subrecipi ents.” In a s ubsequent mem orandum, the Off ice of Legal Counsel cl arified thatSection 27 16 3 w ou ld n ot p roh ibi t f un ds to b e p aid

pursua nt t o b ind ingco ntr act

ua l ob lig ati on s th at p red ate dThe Department of the Interior , Environment, and Related Agencies Appropr iations 3 Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-88, Division A, Section 427; Consoli dated Appropria tions Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, Division A, Section 418; Consol idated Appropri ations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, Division B, Section 534; Consol idated Appropri ations Act of 2010, Pub. L. 7 1 the exclusi on. 2 C. Entryof Pr eli m inary I nju

nc tio n and

Su bs eq ue nt D ev elo pm ents 3 On

No ve m be r 12 , 2 00 9, the pla int if

fs co mm en ced

anact ion in t he Di str ict

Co urt to 4 enjoin the Unit ed States, t he Secretar y of the Treasury, the Secretary of HUD , and the Direct or 5 of OMB f

rom enforcing Section 163. In its complaint, the plaint iffs argued that the 6 appropriat ions laws viol ated the Fir st Amendm ent, the Due Proces s Clause, and the Bil l of 7 Attainder Cla use. Th e p lai nti ff s th enm ov ed

fo r a p rel im inary i nju

nc tio n, wh ich

the co urt 8 granted in a n opinion and orderfiled on December 11, 2009, after concluding t hat the pla intiffs 9 sh ow ed

a li ke lih oo d o f s uc ces s o n it s b ill -of -attai nd er c lai m . T he Di str ict Co urt did no t ad dre ss 10 the plaint iffs’ remaining First Amendm ent and due proce ss claims. In r esp on se t o th e D ist ric t 11 Court’s rul ing, the OMB resci nded its mem orandum addressing the heads of all executi ve 12 ag en cie s o n S ect ion 16 3. Se e O FFI CE O F M GMT

. & B UDG ET , E XEC

. O FF I CE OF THE P RE S I DE NT , 13 M-10-02, G UI DANC E ON S EC TI ON 163 OF THE C ONT I NUI NG RES OL UT I ON R EG ARDI NG T HE 14 A SSOC I A TI O N OF C OMMUNI TY O RGAN I ZATI ONS F OR RE F OR M N O W (A CO RN ) (O ct. 7, 20 09 ), 15 av ail ab le at http: //www .whit eh ou se. go v/o m b/a sse ts/m em orand a_20 10 /m 10 -02 .p df (la st v isi ted 16 Aug. 10, 2010). 17 Meanwhile, Congress passed appropr iations l aws for fiscal year 2010, which Pr esident 18 Obam a signed int o law. See Consolidate d Appropriati ons Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 19 Stat. 3034 (2009); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, 123 20 Stat. 3409 (2009). One se ction of the appropr iations l aws used identi cal language to that of 21 Section 163 and spec ifically exc luded ACORN and its “affiliates, subsi diaries , and allie [s]” from 22 fe de ral fu

nd ing . F our se cti on s o f t he ap pro pri ati on s laws sim ilarlyex clu de d A CO RNan d it s 23 “subsidiar ies” from federal funding. In additi on to the speci fic exclusion of ACORN f rom 3No. 111-117, Division E, Secti on 511; and The Department of Defense Appropriations Actof

2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, Division A, Section 8123. 8 1 fe de ral fu

nd ing , th e ap pro pri ati on s laws inc lud ed Se cti on 53 5, wh ich

dir ect ed the GA O t o 2 “conduct a re view and audit of the Feder al funds receive d by ACORNor any subsidi ary or 3 af fi liate o f A CO RN ” to de ter m ine 4 (1) whether a ny Federal funds were misused and, if so, the t otal amount of 5 Federal funds involve d and how such funds were misused; 6 (2) wh at s tep s, if any, have be entak ento r eco ve r any F ed era l f un ds that w ere 7 misused; 8 (3) what ste ps should be take n to prevent t he misuse of any Federal funds; and 9 (4) whether a ll necess ary steps ha ve been taken t o prevent the misuse of any 10 Federal funds[.] 11 Commerce, Justice, Scienc e, and Related Agenci es Appropriat ions Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111- 12 11 7, Di v. B, § 5 35 , 1 23 St at. 30 34 , 3 15 7– 58 (20 09 ). S ect ion 53 5 re qu ire d th e G AO to s ub m it i ts 13 report “[n]ot lat er than 180 days a fter the enact ment of this Act.” Id. at 3158. 14 D. Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injuncti on 15 On consent of the government, the plai ntiffs filed an amended com plaint cha llenging t he 16 five sections of the l atest appr opriati ons laws, in addit ion to the by- then-expir ed Section 163. 17 The amended com plaint i ncluded the t hree remaining defendants i n this appeal : the 18 Adm inistr ator of the EPA; the Secr etary of Comm erce; and t he Secretary of Defense. 19 In a

jud gm ent f

ile d o n M arc h 1 0, 20 10 , th e D ist ric t C ourt g ranted

the pla int if

fs ’ re qu est 20 for declarat ory reli ef and a permanent injunction. Specifically, t he Distric t Court held t hat the 21 ap pro pri ati on s laws co ns tit ute d u nc on sti tut ion al b ill s o f atta ind er; that th e p lai nti ff s p os ses sed 22 standing to br ing these cl aims against the named defendants; and tha t a permanent injunct ion 23 wa s w arr an ted

in l ight of

the un co ns tit

uti on ali ty o f t

he ap pro pri ati on s laws an d th e ir rep ara ble 24 inj uri es s uf

fe red bythe pla int if

fs . A s w ithits granti ng of the pla int if

fs ’ m oti on

fo r a p rel im inary 25 injuncti on, the Distri ct Court agai n declined t o reach the pl aintiffs’ FirstAm endment and due9 1 process cl aims in light of its det ermination that t he challenge d laws were bill s of attainder

. 2 Th e g ov ernm ent ti m ely ap pe ale d th e D ist

ric t C ourt’ s ju dg m ent, and we su bs eq ue ntl y 3 granted the government’s motion to stay the inj unction pending t he appeal. On appeal , the 4 government argues (1) t hat the pla intiffs lack sta nding againsttwo of the defendants, namely, the 5 Se cre tar

y o f D ef en se and the Di rec tor

of OM B, be cau se t

he pla int if

fs canno t sh owanact

ua l 6 injury tha t is fairl y traceabl e to any curr ent or anti cipated ac tions by thes e two defendants; and 7 (2) that th e D istric t C ourt e rro ne ou sly de ter m ine d th e ap pro pri ati on s laws to b e b ill s o f atta ind er, 8 because (a) the chall enged laws are notcongruent with a ny histori cal underst anding of 9 punis hm en t; ( b) t

he ch all en ge d laws do no t co ns tit ute punis hm ent as a f

un cti on al m att er; an d (c ) 10 the legis lative r ecord does not e vince an unmistakably punit ive purpose. 11 II. DI SC US SI ON 12 A. Standard of Review 13 W e review a dis trictcourt’s gr ant of a permanent injuncti on for abuse of discreti on. 14 Reynolds v. Giuliani , 506 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2007). A distr ict courtabuses its discret ion 15 “whe n (1 ) it s d eci sio n re sts on anerr or o f l aw(su chas a pp lic ati on

of the wr on g le ga l pr inc ipl e) 16 or a clear ly erroneous factual finding, or ( 2) its dec ision — though notnecessari ly the productof 17 a legal error or a cl early erroneous factual findi ng — cannot be loca ted within t he range of 18 permissible decis ions.” Kickham Hanley P.C. v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 558 F.3d 204, 209 19 (2d Cir. 2009) (i nternal quot ation marks omitted). Our review of questi ons of law is de novo. 20 Se e, e. g. , S pie ge l v. Sc hu lm ann, 60 4 F .3 d 7 2, 76 (2d Ci r. 2 01 0); As cen cio -R od rig ue z v . H old er, 21 595 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2010); Donk v. Mil ler, 365 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2004)

. 22 B. St an din g to Su e th e S ecr etary o f D ef en se and the Di rec tor

of OM B 23 The jurisdi ction of the federal courts is limited to the re solution of “case s” and 24 “controver sies.” U.S. Const. art . III, § 2. The cor ollary of this restri ction is t hat the chal lenging 25 party must have “standi ng” to pursue i ts case i n federal court . See Lujan v. Defenders of 26 W ild lif

e, 50 4 U .S . 5 55 , 5 60 –6 1 (1 99 2). St an din g is est ab lis he d whe re ( 1) t he ch all en gin g p arty10 1 ha s “s uf

fe red an‘in jur y in fa ct’ — an inva sio n o f a

leg all y p rot ect ed

int ere st that is (a) co nc ret e 2 an d p art icu lar ize d and (b) act ua l or imm ine nt, rathe r th anco nje ctural or hyp oth eti cal ”; ( 2) t he re 3 is “ a ca

us al c onne cti on

be tw een the inj ury

an d th e ch all en ge d c on du ct” ; an d (3 ) it is “ lik ely , a s 4 op po sed

to m ere ly s pe cu lat ive , th at the inj ury wi ll b e re dre sse d b y a

favo rab le d eci sio n. ” Gull y 5 v. Nat’l CreditUnion Adm in. Bd., 341 F.3d 155, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2003) (i nternal quot ation 6 m ark s o m itt ed ). “ Th e p arty invo kin g f ed era l juris dic tio n b ear s th e b urd enof est ab lis hin g th ese 7 elements.” Id. at 161. 8 The government challenges t he plainti ffs’ standing to sue t he Secretary of Defense and 9 the Di rec tor

of OM B. Th e g ov ernm ent ar gu es t hat, u nli ke the oth er d ef

en dants in t

his ap pe al, 10 the plaint iffs have never recei ved — and do not inte nd to apply for — grant s or contra cts from 11 the Department of Defense. The government also argues thatthe plaint iffs have not suffered any 12 inj ury

cau sed byOM B b eca

us e S ect ion

16 3 is no lon ge r ef

fe cti ve ; O MB res cin de d it s 13 mem orandum advising the heads of all the executi ve agencies; and, in any event, OMB has no 14 authorit y to enforce federal s tatutes

. 15 Th e p lai nti ff s cann ot b e sa id t o la ck

stand ingto s ue a g ov ernm ent ag en cyco ns tra ine d to 16 en fo rce a law that sp eci fi cal ly n am es A CO RNan d p rev ents the pla int if fs fr om rec eiv ingfe de ral 17 funds. Cf. Foretich v. United States , 351 F.3d 1198, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding t hat plaint iff 18 had standing t o challenge a s a bill of att ainder a st atute tha t deprived hi m of his child vi sitati on 19 rights — eve n though his chil d was eighteen and t he statut e no longer had any e ffect on his right 20 to see her — be cause “Congress’ s act of judging [Foreti ch] and legislat ing againsthim on the 21 ba sis of

that ju dg m ent . . . d ire ctl y g ive [s ] r ise to a co gn iza ble inj ury to h is r ep utatio n” ); s ee a lso 22 5 U .S .C . § 70 2 (whe n e njo ini ng the Un ite d S tat es f or a ge nc y a cti on s, the co urt is r eq uir ed to 23 name all officials who are respons ible for compliance with the injuncti on). Even if the plai ntiffs 24 are not and neve r will be i nterest ed in applying for gr ants or funding from the Department of 25 Defense, the fact that t he defense department’s appr opriati ons law specifical ly prohibit s ACORN 26 an d it s af

fi liates fr om

be ingeli gib le f

or f ed era l f un ds af fe cts the pla int if

fs ’ re putat ion

wi th o the r11 1 agencies, st ates, and pri vate donors. See Gull y, 341 F.3d at 162 (“The Supreme Court has long 2 recognized t hat an injur y to reputat ion will sat isfy the injury element of standing.”). 3 Th e g ov ernm ent’s arg um ent th at the pla int if fs lac k s tan din g to su e th e D ire cto r of OM B 4 is s im ilarlym isp lac ed . A lth ou ghthe go ve rnm ent as ser ts t hat O MB ha s n o a

uth ori ty t o e nf

orc e 5 federal stat utes, OMB “oversee[s] the exec ution” of the federal budget and has a cont inuing 6 responsibi lity to e xplain appropr iations pr ovisions to a gencies. See U.S.C.A. Reorg. Plan 2 7 1970, 84 Stat. 2085, as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 5(b), 96 Stat. 1068, 1085 ( 1982) 8 (stati ng that the OMB performs the “key function of assi sting the Pr esident i n the prepar ation of 9 the annu al F ed era l bu dg et and ov ers eei ng its ex ecutio n” ). S ee g en era llyid. (“W hil e th e b ud ge t 10 fu

nc tio n re m ain s a v ita l to ol o f m an ag em ent, .

. . [t ]h e n ewOf fi ce o f M an ag em ent an d B ud ge t 11 will place much greater emphasis on the evaluat ion of program perform ance . . . [and] expand 12 efforts to improve interagenc y cooperati on.”). To that end, OMB’s now-resc inded mem orandum 13 — which is the bas is for the plai ntiffs’ claim of reputational injury with r espect to Sec tion 163 14 — w as i ssu ed . A s expla ine d b y th e D istric t C ourt, no tw ith stand ingthe res cis sio n o f t he OM B 15 m em orand

um an d e xp iratio n o f S ect ion 16 3, the OM B m em orand um co nti nu es t o e xe rt 16 influence over t he plainti ffs’ reputation: 17 Following [the Distri ct Court’s e ntry of a preli minary injunction], OMB did send 18 an email to all federal agencies’ general couns els informing them of the 19 inj un cti on enter ed

. . . and that th e g ov ernm ent w as c on sid eri ng ap pe al, but O MB 20 did

no t di rec t th em

to i nf orm the ir a ge nc ies , g rantee s, an d g rantee s’ 21 su

bc ontra cto rs o f t

his co urt ’s r

uli ng . T he rep utatio na l harm , th ere fo re, co nti nu es, 22 as t

he ori gin al a dv ice fr om

OM B t o th e hun dre ds , if no t th ou san ds , o f r eci pie nts 23 of that advice has never been re scinded. 24 Ind eed , th e O MB m em orand um pro vid inggu idanc e f

or a pp lic ati on

of Se cti on 16 3 is sti ll 25 av ail ab le o n O MB ’s w eb sit e. Se e O FFI CE O F M GMT

. & B UDG ET , E XEC

. O F F I CE OF T HE 26 P RE S I DE NT , M-10-02, G UI DANC E ON S EC TI ON 163 OF THE C ONT I NUI NG RES OL UT I ON R EG ARDI NG 27 THE A SSOC I A TI O N OF C OMMUNI TY O RGAN I ZATI ONS F OR RE F OR M N O W (A CO RN ) (O ct. 7, 20 09 ), 28 av ail ab le at http: //www .whit eh ou se. go v/o m b/a sse ts/m em orand a_20 10 /m 10 -02 .p df (la st v isi ted 29 Au g. 10 , 2 01 0). Al tho ug h th e w eb sit e st ate s th at the m em orand um ha s b een res cin de d, the re i s12 1 als o a

no tat ion that “the en act ed

res tri cti on s o n f

un din g A CO RNan d a ff

ili ate s . . . rem ain

in 2 force” in lightof this Court’s gr anting the gove rnment’s motion for a stay pending appeal. 3 O FFI CE O F M GMT

. & B UDG ET , E XEC

. O FF I CE OF THE P RE S I DE NT , M EMOR ANDA 2010, htt p:/ /w ww .whit eh ou se. go v/o m b/m em orand a_ de fa

ult / (la st v isi ted

Au g. 10 , 2 01 0). Thus , what 4 5 is call ed a resci ssion in fact functi oned in no such way. In li ght of OMB’s actual and cont inuing 6 res po ns ibi lity to ov ers ee t he m an ag em ent of

the bu dg ets of

Ex ecutiv e B ran chag en cie s, an d it s 7 co ns eq

ue nt i m pa ct o n th e p lai nti ff

s’ r ep utatio n, the pla int if

fs have sh own s uf

fi cie nt i nju

ry t o 8 bring suitagainst t he Directorof the OMB. 9 W e therefore affirm the judgment of the District Courtwith regard t o the issue of 10 standing. 11 C. Bi ll o f A tta ind er 12 The Constituti on prohibits the enactments of “bills of attainder.” See U.S. Const. art. I, § 13 9 (p roh ibi tin g C on gre ss) ; id . § 10 (pr oh ibi tin g s tat es) . H ist ori cal ly, a b ill of att ain de r 14 wa s a d ev ice of ten res ort ed to i n s ixt eenth, sev entee nth an d e ightee nth

centur y 15 En gland

fo r de ali ng wi th p ers on s who ha d atte m pte d, or t hre ate ne d to att em

pt, to 16 ov erthro w the go ve rnm ent. I n a dd iti on to t he de ath senten ce, att ain de r ge ne ral ly 17 car

rie d w ithit a

“co rru pti on of blo od ,” wh ich

m eant th at the att ainted

party ’s 18 he irs co uld no t inhe rit

his pro pe rty . T he “b ill of pa ins an d p en alt ies ” w as 19 identica l to the bi ll of attai nder, except t hat it pr escribed a penalty shor t of death, 20 e. g. , b an ishm ent, d ep riv ati on of the rig ht t o v ote , o r ex clu sio n o f t he de sig nated 21 party’s s ons from P arliament. Most bi lls of attai nder and bill s of pains and 22 pe na lti es n am ed the parti es t o who m

the y w ere to a

pp ly; a f ew , h ow ev er, sim

ply 23 described t hem. W hile some left the designa ted parti es a way of escaping the 24 penalty, othe rs did not. 25 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441–42 (1965) (footnotes omitted). 26 Th e sc op e o f t he Bi ll o f A tta ind er C lau se, ho we ve r, h as b een int erp ret ed

as w ide r th an 27 the histor ical definit ion of a “bill of att ainder.” See M atter of Extra dition of McMull en, 989 28 F.2d 603, 606–07 (2d Cir. 1993) (en ba nc) (“[T]he Bill of AttainderClause broadly . . . 29 prohibit[s] bill s of pains and penalt ies as well as bills of attainder.” ); South Caroli na v. 30 Katze nb ach , 3 83 U. S. 30 1, 32 4 (1 96 6) ( statin g th at the Bi ll o f A tta ind er C lau se p rov ide s 31 “protect ions for individua l persons and pr ivate groups ”); Brown, 381 U.S. at 442 (sta ting thatthe13 1 Constituti on’s prohibi tion agains t bills of attainder “ was intended not a s a narrow, tec hnical (a nd 2 therefore soon t o be outmoded) prohibition, butrather a s an implem entation of the s eparati on of 3 po we rs, a g en era l sa fe gu ard ag ain st l eg isl ati ve ex erc ise of the jud ici al f

un cti on , o r m ore sim

ply 4 — trial by legisla ture”). I ndeed, it can be said thatthe broadness of the Am erican pr ohibition of 5 bil ls o f atta ind er und er Arti cle I, s ect ion 9 is m ore a re fl ect ion

of the Co ns tit

uti on ’s c on cer

n w ith 6 fr ag m en tin g th e g ov ernm ent po we r th anm ere ly p rev entin g th e re curre nc e o f u ns av ory Br iti sh 7 practic es of the time. See generall y Roger J. Miner, I dentifying, Protec ting and Prese rving 8 Individual Rights: Tradi tional Feder al Court Functi ons, 23 S ET ON H ALL L. REV . 821, 826–30 9 (1992–1993) (dis cussing bil ls of attainde r). 10 In i ts c ontem po rar y u sag e, the Bi ll o f A tta ind er C lau se p roh ibi ts any“law that 11 legisla tively det ermines guilt and infli cts punishment upon an identi fiable indivi dual without 12 pro vis ion

of the pro tec tio ns of

a ju dic ial tri al. ” S ele cti ve Se rv. Sy s. v. Minn. Pu b. Int ere st 13 Re search

Gr p. , 4 68 U. S. 84 1, 84 6–47 (19 84 ). T hat is , th e S up rem e C ourt h as i de nti fi ed thr ee 14 elements of an unconstituti onal bill of attainder: (1) “speci fication of the affected pers ons,” (2) 15 “p un ishm ent,” an d (3 ) “l ack of a ju dic ial tri al. ” Id . at 84 7. Al tho ug h th e S up rem e C ourt h as 16 never had occas ion to rule on the issue, we have held that t he scope of the “speci fication of the 17 affected persons” el ement includes corpora te entit ies. See Con. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. 18 Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 2002) (“We therefore hold that c orporati ons must be 19 co ns ide red

ind ivi du als that m ayno t be sin gle d o ut f or p un ishm ent un de r th e B ill of Attai nd er 20 Clause.” (int ernal quota tion marks, altera tion, and cit ation omitted)). 21 W ith respe ct to the e xistence ve l non of punishment, three factors gui de our 22 considerat ion: (1) whet her the chal lenged statute falls withi n the histor ical meaning of legislat ive 23 punishment (histori cal testof punishment); (2) whether t he statut e, “viewed in te rms of the type 24 and severit y of burdens imposed, reasonably can be s aid to furthernonpunitive l egislat ive 25 purpo ses ” (f

un cti on al t est

of punis hm ent); an d (3 ) whe the r th e le gis lat ive rec ord “ev inc es a 26 [legislati ve] intent to puni sh” (motivational t est of punishment). Selecti ve Serv. Sys., 468 U.S.14 1 at 8 52 . A ll thre e f act ors ne ed

no t be sat isf

ied to p rov e th at a

lawco ns tit

ute s “p un ishm ent”; 2 rathe r, “ th[ e] fa cto rs are the ev ide nc e th at i s w eig he d to ge the r in res olv inga b ill of

att ain de r 3 claim.” Con. Edison, 292 F.3d at 350. 4 Because the government does not challenge t he Distric t Court’s det ermination that t he 5 specificit y and lack-of-judi cial-t rial el ements are satisfied i n this case , we focus on whether the 6 laws constitute the type of “punishment” that runs afoul of the Bill of Attainder Clause. 7 1. Hi sto ric al T est of “P un ishm ent” 8 Th e S up rem e C ourt h as r eco gn ize d th at c ert ain typ es o f p un ishm ent ar e “s o 9 disproport ionately s evere and so i nappropriat e to nonpuniti ve ends that t hey unquestionabl y have 10 been held to fall within the pr oscripti on of the [Bill of Attainder Clause ].” Nixon v. Adm ’r of 11 Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473 (1977). “The clas sic example is death, butothers inc lude 12 im

pri so nm ent, b an ishm ent, t he punit ive co nf

isc ati on of pro pe rty , and

pro hib iti on

of de sig nated 13 individual s or groups from participat ion in speci fied employm ents or vocat ions.” Con. Edison, 14 29 2 F .3 d at 35 1 (i nte rna l qu otatio n m ark s, alt eratio n, an d e lli ps is o m itt ed ). Afam ili ar the m e in 15 the se c las sic ex am ple s o f p un ishm ent is the ini tia l de ter m inatio n b y th e le gis lat

ure of “g uil t.” 16 See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) ( “The distingui shing feature of a bil l of 17 attainde r is the s ubstitut ion of a legisla tive for a judi cial det ermination of guilt.”). 18 He re, the pla int if fs an alo giz e th e ap pro pri ati on s laws to t he “cutof f o f p ayto s pe cif

ied 19 go ve rnm en t em

plo ye es h eld

to c on sti tut e p un ishm ent f or p urp os es o f t

he Bi ll o f A tta ind er C lau se 20 [in United States v. Lovet t, 328 U.S. 303, 317–18 (1946)].” In the pla intiffs’ view, thatthe 21 appropriat ions laws do not cons titute a permanent ban or disqual ification of ACORN f rom 22 federal funds is imm ateria l because “t he consequences of even a t emporary ban on government 23 funding for government contractors c an be potenti ally hars h.” Moreover, t he plainti ffs argue 24 that th e ap pro pri ati on s laws pre clu din g A CO RNfr om rec eiv ingfe de ral fu

nd s, de sp ite havin g an 25 expirati on date, could be r enewed every yearand therefore cons titute a de facto permanent ban. 26 The withholding of appropri ations, however, doe s not consti tute a tr aditional form of15 1 punishment that is “cons idered to be punitive perse.” See Con. Edison, 292 F.3d at 351. 2 Co ng res s’s de cis ion to w ithho ld f

un ds fr om

AC OR N and its af fi liates co ns tit

ute s n eithe r 3 im pri so nm ent, b an ishm ent, n or d eat h. Th e w ithho ldi ng of

fu nd s m ayarg ua

bly co ns tit ute a 4 punitive confisc ation of propert y at some point, but the pla intiffs do not asser t that t hey have 5 pro pe rtyrig hts to f ed era l f un ds that have ye t to be dis burse d at th e ag en cy ’s d isc ret ion . W e n ote , 6 fu rth er, that “[ t] he re m aywe ll b e ac tio ns that w ou ld b e co ns ide red punit ive if

tak enag ain st an 7 ind ivi du al, but no t if tak enag ain st a

co rpo rat ion .” Id. at 3 54 . In co m paris on to p en alt ies lev ied 8 ag ain st i nd ivi du als , a tem po rar y d isq ua lif icatio n f rom fu nd s o r de pri vatio n o f p rop erty a im ed at a 9 co rpo rat ion

m aybe m ore aninc onve nie nc e th anpunis hm ent. W hil e A CO RNcla im s th at i t w ill 10 be “d

riv e[ n] clo se t o b ankru

ptc y” an d m aysu ff

er a “co rpo rat e d eat

h s enten ce” wi tho ut f

ed era l 11 fu

nd s, the Harsh

barge r R ep ort

rev eal s th at A CO RNon ly d eri ve s 1 0% o f i ts f un din g f rom fe de ral 12 grants . T hu s, we do ub t th at the dir ect co ns eq ue nc es o f t

he ap pro pri ati on s laws tem po rar ily 13 pre clu din g A CO RNfr om fe de ral fu

nd s ar e “s o d isp rop ort ion ate ly s ev ere ” o r “s o in ap pro pri ate ” 14 as to consti tute punishment per se. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472 (“Forbidden l egislat ive 15 punishment is not involved merely beca use the Act imposes burdensome consequences.”)

. 16 As asserted by t he plainti ffs, the appropriati ons laws “att aint ACORN with a note of 17 infamy . . . [ and] encourage other s to shun ACORN.” But the plaintiffs are not pr ohibited from 18 any activi ties; t hey are only pr ohibited from receiving federa l funds to continue t heir act ivitie s. 19 Al tho ug h th e ap pro pri ati on s laws m ayhave the ef fe ct o f a lie natin g A CO RNan d it s af fi liates 20 fr om

the ir s up po rte rs, Co ng res s m us t have the autho rity to su sp en d f ed era l f un ds to an 21 org an izatio n th at h as a dm itt ed to s ign if icant m ism an ag em ent. T he ex erc ise of Co ng res s’s 22 sp en din g p ow ers in t his way is no t “s o d isp rop ort ion ate ly s ev ere an d s o in ap pro pri ate to 23 nonpunitive ends ” as to inval idate the resulti ng legisla tion as a bi ll of attai nder. See Nixon, 433 24 U. S. at 4 73 ; cf

. S ab ri v . Unit ed

St ate s, 54 1 U .S . 6 00 , 6 05 (20 04 ) (“ Co ng res s h as a uth ori ty u nd er 25 the Sp en din g C lau se t o a pp rop riate f

ed era l m on ey s to pro m ote the ge ne ral we lf are , and it h as 26 co rre sp on din g a

uth ori ty u nd er the Ne ces sar

y and Pr op er C lau se t o s ee t o it that taxp ay er d oll ars16 1 ap pro pri ate d und er that po we r ar e . . . no t f ritter ed aw ayin g raf

t or on pro jec ts und erm ine d whe n 2 funds are siphoned off or corruptpublic officers ar e dereli ct about demanding value for doll ars.” 3 (inter

na l ci tat ion s o m itt ed )). An d, in anyev ent, a cco rdi ng to t he pla int if

fs , at le ast on e st ate that 4 ha d p rev iou sly

su sp en de d f

un din g to the pla int if

fs ha s re sto red

fu nd ingto N ewYo rk A co rn. Se e 5 28(j) Lett er on Behalf of ACOR N (dated June 22, 2010). Thus, t he plainti ffs’ claim of alienation 6 — th at i s, the ir c lai m that th eyhave be entai nte d w ith“a n ote of inf am y” — is no t as sev ere as 7 the plaint iffs assert. 8 Of course, as discusse d in more detail infra Analys is II( B)(3) (Mot ivational Test of 9 Punishment), there is s ome evidence in the recor d indicati ng that ACORN was precluded from 10 receivi ng federal funds upon the legi slature ’s deter mination that ACORN was guilty of abusive 11 and fraudulent pra ctices. Thi s evidence poi nts in the di rection of a tr aditional form of 12 punishment. See De Veau, 363 U.S. at 160. “The fact that the puni shment is inflicted thr ough 13 the instrumentality of an Act specifical ly cutti ng off the pay of certain named individuals found 14 gu ilty o f d isl oy alty, m ak es i t no les s g all ingor e ff ect ive than if

it h ad be endo ne byanAc t whic h 15 de sig nated

the co nd uc t as cri m ina l.” Lo ve tt, 32 8 U .S . at 31 6. No ne the les s, de sp ite statem ents 16 about ACORN’s guilt on the legi slative floor, the appropr iations l aws themselves do not mention 17 AC OR

N’ s g uil t in

any w ay . C f. Co n. Ed iso n, 29 2 F .3 d at 34 4 (t he ch all en ge d law e xp res sly 18 found that Consolidate d Edison had failed “t o exercise reasonable care”). M oreover, unli ke 19 Lovett, here, t here was no congres sional “t rial” t o determine ACORN ’s guilt . Cf. Lovett, 328 20 U. S. at 3 10 –1 2 (i nv olv inga se cre t co ng res sio na l tr ial fo r en ga gin g in su bv ers ive Co mm

un ist 21 ac ti vi ti es , wi th th e s us pe ct edCommun is ts al lo we d t o t es ti fy i n t he irde fen se ). As th e S up re me 22 Co urt

no ted in F lem m ingv. Ne sto r, 3 63 U. S. 60 3, 61 7– 19 (19 60 ), whe re a co urt is l ef t on ly w ith 23 the legis lative hi story of a law thatis impugned as a bill of att ainder, the re must be 24 “unm ist ak ab le e vid en ce o f p un iti ve int ent [ in t he leg isl ati ve his tor

y]

. . . b ef ore a C on gre ssi on al 25 enactment of this kind may be struck down.” Although ther e is some evidence of a 26 de ter

m inatio n o f g uil t in

the leg isl ati ve his tor

y o f t he ap pro pri ati on s laws , f

or t he rea so ns stated17 1 inf ra Ana lys is I I(B )(3 ) (M oti vatio na l T est of Punis hm ent), the re i s n ot “ unm ist ak ab le e vid en ce” 2 of c on gr es si on al in te ntto pu ni sh wi th in th e c on te mpl at io n o f the Bi ll of A tt ai nd erCl au se . We 3 therefore find no basi s for drawing the concl usion that t he challenge d appropriat ions laws 4 constitut e “punishment” as it was hi storica lly underst ood. 5 2. Functional Testof Punishm ent 6 Th e fu nc ti on al te stof p un is hmen t l oo ks to whe th erth e c ha ll en ge d l aw , “ vi ew edin te rms 7 of the type and sever ity of burdens imposed, reasonabl y can be said t o further nonpuniti ve 8 leg isl ati ve purpo ses .” Ni xo n, 43 3 U .S . at 47 5. “It is n ot t he sev eri ty o f a

statut ory burde n in 9 ab so lut e te rm s th at d em on str ate s p un iti ve ne ss s o m uc h a s th e m ag nit

ud e o f t he burde n re lat ive to 10 the purport ed nonpunitive purposes of the statute.” Foreti ch, 351 F.3d at 1222. Thus, “[a] grave 11 im

ba lan ce o r di sp rop ort ion

be tw een the burde n and

the purpo rte d n on

punit ive purpo se s ug ge sts 12 punitivenes s, even where the s tatute be ars some m inimal relati on to nonpunitive ends.” Id.; 13 accord Con. Edison, 292 F.3d at 350 ( “Where a statute est ablishing a punishment declares and 14 im

po ses that pu

nis hm ent on

anide nti fi ab le p arty . . . we loo k b ey on d s im ply a ratio na l 15 relati onship of the statute to a le gitimate public purpose for less burde nsome alternatives by 16 wh ich

the leg isl ature c ou ld h av e ac hie ve d it s le git im ate no np un iti ve ob jec tiv es. ” (i nte rna l 17 qu otatio n m ark s, ell ips is, an d a lte rat ion s o m itt ed )). 18 Ini tia lly , th e p lai nti ff s ap pe ar t o s ug ge st t

hat th e ap pro pri ati on s laws are pre sum pti ve ly 19 unconstitut ional bil ls of attainde r because t hey specifical ly named ACO RN for exclusion from 20 federal funds. But Congress may single out an ent ity or per son in its l egislat ion. See Nixon, 433 21 U. S. at 4 69 –7 2 (r eje cti ng the arg um ent th at “ the Co ns tit uti on is o ff en de d whe ne ve r a l aw 22 im

po ses un de sir ed

co ns eq ue nc es o n an in div idu al o r on a cl ass that is no t de fi ne d at a p rop er 23 lev el o f g en era lity” ); C on . E dis on , 2 92 F. 3d at 3 50 (“Aleg isl ature m ayleg iti m ate ly c reate a 24 ‘class of one’ for many purposes.”). Alt hough the specific na ming of ACORNin the 25 ap pro pri ati on s laws sat isf ies on e cl ass ic m ark

of a b ill of att ain de r — and

is c ert ain ly r ele vant i n 26 assessing t he plausibi lity of the al leged puniti ve purposes of the chal lenged law, see For etich,18 1 351 F.3d at 1224 — such speci ficity does not c reate a pr esumption of unconstitutional ity. 2 Be cau se t

he partych all en gin g a

co ng res sio na l law a s an

un co ns tit uti on al b ill of

att ain de r be ars 3 the burden of proof, see Con. Edison, 292 F.3d at 350 ( “The party chal lenging the s tatute ha s the 4 burden of establi shing that t he legisl ature’s action const ituted puni shment and not m erely the 5 leg iti m ate reg ulatio n o f c on du ct. ” (i nte rna l qu otatio n m ark s an d a lte rat ion om itt ed ) (e m

ph asi s 6 added)), we accor d no presumption that the appropriat ions laws speci fying ACOR N for 7 exclusion cons titute bills of att ainder. 8 W ith respe ct to the non- punitive purpose for the appropr iations l aws, the government 9 argues thatCongress was motivated by its de sire to “ ensur[e] the effective expenditure of 10 taxpaye r do llars. ” A cco rdi ng to t he go ve rnm ent, t

he ap pro pri ati on s laws at i ssu e h ere “p rov ide a 11 tem

po rar y re sp on se t o in co ntr ov ert ibl e ev ide nc e o f m ism an ag em ent by org an izatio ns that ar e 12 part of a complex, poorly-managed fam ily of orga nizations , pending the findings of ongoing 13 inv est igatio ns .” While acknowledgi ng that Congress ha s a legit imate interestin ensuring t he 14 proper use of taxpaye r money, the plaintiffs argue tha t the speci ficity of the affected part ies, the 15 un iqu en ess of

the co ng res sio na l ac tio n, an d th e b rea dth of res tri cti ve act ion

in t his cas e re nd er 16 the appropri ations la ws disproporti onately seve re and thus “puni tive” underthe functional t est of 17 punishment. Specifically, the plainti ffs argue: (1) Congress s ingled out ACORN for exclusion 18 despite ot her contra ctors havi ng similar problems with mism anagement; (2) the appr opriati ons 19 law s, wh ich

af fe ct A CO RNan d it s af

fi liates , s ub sid iar ies , and

ev enall ied

org an izatio ns , is 20 “clearl y overbroad” i n relati on to the laws’ purported l egitimate purposes; (3) the appr opriati ons 21 law s b yp ass ex ist ingreg ulatio ns that ad dre ss c on cer ns ab out f un din g m ism an ag ed

org an izatio ns , 22 such as ACORN; and (4) the appropr iations l aws unnecessari ly preclude ACORN ’s obtaini ng 23 fe de ral fu

nd s f or o ne ye ar, reg ard les s o f t he res ult s o f t

he GA O’ s inve sti gatio n o f A CO RN ’s 24 op eratio ns , i. e. , e ve n if the GA O c on clu de d th at A CO RNwa s n o lo ng er p lag ue d w ith 25 mism anagement, the exclusion from federal funds would continue for the fiscal year. 26 W e n ote that th e p lai nti ff s’ c lai m that th e ap pro pri ati on s laws are punit ive be cau se t he y19 1 sin gle out A CO RNis und erm ine d b y th e p lai nti ff s’ c lai m that th e ap pro pri ati on s laws are als o 2 punitive bec ause they affect hundreds of unnamed “allied” and “a ffiliated” organi zations. I f the 3 appropriat ions laws affect such broa d groups of organizat ions, then the y are similar to a rule of 4 general appl icabili ty and are l ess likel y to have a punit ive purpose. See, e .g., Flemm ing, 363 5 U.S. at 620 (rejec ting clai m that a law excluding cer tain deport ees, i.e., cr iminal, subversive, or 6 ill eg al, fr om

rec eiv ingso cia l se curity b en ef its wa s n ot a

bil l of att ain de r be cau se t

he lawaf fe cte d 7 “the greatmajority of those deported” and because the re was not unmistakable evi dence that t he 8 lawha d a

punit ive purpo se) ; cf

. F ore tic h, 35 1 F .3 d at 12 24 (“[ N] arr owap pli cat ion of a st atute t o 9 a sp eci fi c p ers on

or c las s o f p ers on s ra ise s su sp ici on , b eca us e th e B ill of

Attai nd er C lau se i s 10 pri nc ipa llyco nc ern ed wi th t he sin gli ng out of

anind ivi du al f

or l eg isl ati ve ly p res cri be d 11 punis hm en t.” (inter na l qu otatio n m ark s, alt eratio n, an d e m ph asi s o m itt ed )). Ind eed , b eca us e 12 ACORNand its re lated ent ities make up such an amorphous and sprawling family of 13 org an izatio ns — at on e ti m e co ns ist ingof ap pro xim ate ly 2 00 entit ies go ve rne d b y a str uc tur e 14 that was “inc redibly complex” — it was e ntirel y reasonable for Congress to broadl y exclude 15 AC OR

N’ s af fi liates , s ub sid iar ies , and

all ies fr om

fe de ral fu

nd s, an d le av e it

to t he ag en cie s to 16 determine which organiza tions would be excl uded to further t he congressi onal purpose of 17 pro tec tin g th e p ub lic fi sc f rom AC OR N’ s ad m itt ed fa ilures in m an ag em ent. S ee, e. g. , P os t18 Ar gum ent L ett er o f t he Un ite d S tat es ( dated

July 8, 20 10 ) (r esp on din g to the pla int if fs ’ po st19 arg um en t su

bm iss ion byatt ach inganag en cyletter dated Ju ly 8 , 2 01 0, statin g th at H UD “h as 20 determined that [New York Acorn] is not an affiliate , subsidiary or alli ed organizat ion of 21 ACORN ”). 22 Th e p lai nti ff s’ a sse rti on

that th e ap pro pri ati on s laws are punit ive be cau se t he y b yp ass 23 administrative pr ocedures is also unpersua sive. Although a l aw that bypasses administrative 24 pro ced

ure s m ay“re inf

orc e[ ]” the co nc lus ion

that th e law w as i nte nd ed “to fi nd gu ilt an d o rde r 25 punis hm en t di rec tly ,” Co n. Ed iso n, 29 2 F .3 d at 34 9, the sam e in fe ren ce i s d if fi cu lt t o d rawwh en 26 a co ng res sio na l ap pro pri ati on s law i s at iss ue . C f. id. (f

ind ingvio lat ion

of Bi ll o f A tta ind erA p rel im inary r ep ort iss ue d b y th e G AO states that “the inf orm ati on in t his rep ort is 4 pre lim inary and

su bje ct t o c hang e. W e p lan to i ssu e a r ep ort

lat er this ye ar w ithour f

ina l re su lts relate d to ACORN and potentially rel ated organi zations.” U.S. G OV ’ T A CCOUN TABI LI TY O FF I CE , WAS HI NGT ON , D.C., P RE LI MI NARY O BS ER VAT I ONS ON F UNDI NG , O VE RS I GHT , AND I NVE S TI GAT I ONS AND P RO SECU TI O N S OF ACORNOR P OT EN TI AL LY REL AT ED O RGAN I ZA TI ONS 20 1 Cl au se whe re the leg isl ati ve act , whic h p roh ibi ted Co ns oli dated

Ed iso n f rom rec ov eri ng co sts 2 fr om

its rat ep ay ers , w as a im ed at the all oc ati on

of pri vate f un ds ). W hil e w ithho ldi ng fe de ral 3 fu nd s m ayco ns tit

ute punis hm ent in

cer tai n c irc um stanc es, a te m po rar y b anon fe de ral ass ist an ce 4 to the groups a t issue her e — ACORN(which admitted to mismanagem ent and embezzlement 5 an d s uf

fe red num ero us co nv ict ion s o f i ts w ork ers ), and Ac orn Ins tit ute an d N ewYo rk A co rn 6 (w hic h w ere part o f a co m ple x w eb of

int err elated

entit ies wi th A CO RN ) — i s n ot c om parab le t o 7 congressiona l acts of punishment such as per manent disqualificati on from a certai n vocation or 8 criminalizing pas t conduct. See, e.g., Brown, 381 U.S. at 455; Pi erce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. 234 9 (1872); Ex Part e Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867); Cumm ings v. Missour i, 71 U.S. 227 (1867); cf. 10 Se lec tiv e S erv . S ys ., 46 8 U .S . at 85 3 (u ph old inglawthat w ithhe ld f ed era l st ud ent as sis tan ce t o 11 m enwh o h ad

no t re gis ter ed

fo r th e d raf t); Fl emm ing , 3 63 U. S. at 6 18 –2 1 (u ph old inglawthat 12 excluded cer tain deport ees from receiving social securit y benefits). Compare Am . Commc’ns 13 Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413–15 (1950) (rejec ting bill -of-attai nder chall enge 14 ag ain st a

lawthat re qu ire d unio n o ff ice rs t o f ile af fi davit s —

that th eywe re n ot C om

m un ist 15 Party mem

bers and thatthey did not favor t he overthrow of the Unite d States government by 16 force or violenc e — in order t o invoke the ass istance a nd services of the NLRB), with Brown, 17 381 U.S. at 455 (declar ing unconstitutional a l aw that made it a crime for a mem ber of the 18 Communist Party to serve a s a union officer or manager). 19 Finally, we rej ect the pl aintiffs’ argument that t he appropria tions laws ar e punitive 20 because they di squalify ACORN f rom f ederal funds even i f the GAO investigation r esults i n a 21 favo rab le d isp os iti on fo r A CO RN . A lth ou ghthe re i s n o p rov isi on in t he ap pro pri ati on s laws that 22 ties the GAO investigation wit h ACORN ’s status to recei ve federal funds, Congress coul d, of 23 co urs e, m od if

y th e ap pro pri ati on s law f oll ow ingthe GA O’ s inve sti gatio n. ” Se e B ell So uth 4(June 14, 2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10648r.pdf. 21 1 Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 687 (D.C. C ir. 1998) (not ing that eve n if there were al ternate ways 2 of fulfilling legiti mate governm ent inter ests, “it[is] up to the legisl ature to make this dec ision”). 3 On the facts of this case , Congress’s re sponse is not s o out of proportion t o its purpor ted non4 punitive goal of protecting publ ic funds from f uture fraud and waste so as to rende r the funding 5 bans punit ive in n atu re. 6 In s um , th e p lai nti ff s h av e f ail ed to s ho w that th e ap pro pri ati on s laws co ns tit ute 7 “punishment” under the functiona l test. 8 3. Motivati onal Test of Punishment 9 The legisla tive rec ord by itsel f is insufficient evide nce for classi fying a statute as a bill of 10 att ain de r un les s th e re co rd r ef lec ts o ve rwhe lm ing ly a

cle ar l eg isl ati ve int ent to punis h. Se e 11 Flemm ing, 363 U.S. at 617 (“[O]nly the clear est proof could suffice to es tablish t he 12 unconstitut ionalit y of a statute on [the] ground [of legisla tive hist ory.]”); see al so Lovett, 328 13 U.S. at 308–12 (recounti ng extensive e vidence of punitive intent i n the legis lative r ecord). 14 St ate m en ts b y a

sm att eri ng of

leg isl ato rs “ do no t co ns tit ute [t he req uir ed ] u nm ist ak ab le e vid en ce 15 of punitive inte nt.” Select ive Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 856 n.15 (i nternal quot ation marks 16 om itt ed ). 17 Here, as the pl aintiffs argue, the legisla tive rec ord reveal s much concern about protect ing 18 the expenditure of taxpayer money against “wast e, fraud, and abuse.” 155 Cong. Rec. S9517 19 (daily ed. Sept . 17, 2009) (SenatorJohanns); se e also 155 Cong. Rec. S11313 (dail y ed. Nov. 10, 20 2009). Senator Bond descr ibed the excl usion as neces sary because of ACO RN’s “endemic and 21 sy ste mwi de cu lture o f f rau d and ab us e” and

stated that C on gre ss h ad

“th e o pp ort

un ityto e nd

thi s 22 rel ati on sh ip n ow .” 15 5 C on g. Re c. S9 31 4 (d ail y e d. Se pt. 14 , 2 00 9). Co ng res sm anIss a 23 published an ei ghty-eight -page staff reportthat concl uded that ACORN and organizations 24 associat ed or alli ed with it cons titute d “a criminal enterprise” t hat had “repe atedly and 25 de lib eratel y e ng ag ed in s ys tem ic f

rau d” an d “ co mm itt ed

a co ns pir acy

to d ef rau d th e Unit ed22 1 States by usi ng taxpayer funds for part isan polit ical act ivitie s.” This repor t was read int o the 2 Congressional Recor d when one of the challenged appropriat ion laws was intr oduced. See 155 3 Cong. Rec. S9308, 9309–10, 9317 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2009) (Senator Joha nns) (descr ibing 4 ACORNas “besiege d by corrupti on, by fraud, and by illega l activi ties, — al l comm itted on t he 5 taxpayers’ dime”). 6 Ac co rdi ng to t he pla int if

fs , n ear ly t enm em

be rs o f t he Ho us e o f R ep res entat ive s as sai led 7 AC OR

N a s “t his cro ok ed

bunc h, ” “t

his co rru pt and cri m ina l or ganiz ati on ,” an d b ein g invo lve d 8 in “child pr ostitut ion,” “shaking down le nders,” “corrupting our e lection pr ocess,” “tr afficking 9 illegal aliens,” a nd being in the “ criminal hall of fame,” am ong other epit hets and accus ations. 10 See 155 Cong. Rec. H9946–10129. There were also, however, r epresenta tives who opposed the 11 ex clu sio n o f A CO RNdurin g th ese de bates . F or e xam ple , S en ato r D urb in s tat ed : “[ W ]e are 12 see ing in C on gre ss an e ff ort to p un ish AC OR N that go es b ey on d anyexpe rie nc e I c anrec all in 13 the time I have been on Capit ol Hill. We have put ourselve s — with some of the pending 14 amendm ents — in the position of prosec utor, judge and j ury.” 155 Cong. Rec. S10181, 10211 15 (da ilyed . O ct. 7, 20 09 ). S en ato r L eahy s im ilarlypro tes ted the att ack

on AC OR N: “E ve ryo ne — 16 ex cep t pe rha

ps m any o f t

he cas ua l ob ser

ve rs who are the tar ge t au die nc e o f t he orc he str ate d anti

17 AC OR

N f ren zy— k

no ws that th e sc ore -at -any-p ric e p art isans hip is b ein g m ixe d in anun see m ly 18 way with public poli cy.” 155 Cong. Rec. S9541–42 (daily ed. Sept . 17, 2009). 19 Despite the e vidence of punitive intent on t he part of some m embers of Congress, unlike 20 in L ov ett , th ere is n o c on gre ssi on al f ind ingof gu ilt in t his cas e. In L ov ett , a

sec ret tri al w as h eld 21 by Congress to dete rmine the guilt or i nnocence of the accuse d subversives . Upon a finding of 22 gu ilt , C on gre ss p ass ed the lawde ny ingthe acc us ed the ir s alary f

or f ed era l se rvi ce. Thus , in 23 Lovett, the congr essional r ecord was “unmistakably” cl ear as to Congre ss’s int ent to punish t he 24 subject i ndividuals. Her e, at most, there is t he “smattering” of legis lators’ opinions rega rding 25 AC OR

N’ s g uil t of

fr au d. Se e Unit ed

St ate s v . O ’B rie n, 39 1 U .S . 3 67 , 3 84 (19 68 ) (“ What 26 m oti vates on e le gis lat or t o m ak e a s pe ech ab out a statut e is no t ne ces sar ilywh at m oti vates sco res23 1 of others to enactit.”); cf. Selective Ser v. Sys., 468 U.S. at 855–56 (upholding la w denying 2 federal financial assista nce for higher educa tion to male students who failed to regis ter for the 3 draft; in tha t case, as he re, many legislator s comm ented thatthe men who f ailed to r egisterfor 4 the dra ft

ha d c om m itt ed a “f elo ny , th eyhave vio lat ed the law , and

the y are n ot e nti tle d to the se 5 ed uc ati on al b en ef

its ”); Be llS outh C orp ., 16 2 F .3 d at 69 0 (s us tai nin g p rov isi on that pl ace d s pe cia l 6 res tri cti on s o n B ell op eratin g c om panie s an d d ism iss inga “f ewscatte red

rem ark s re fe rri ng to 7 . . . abuses all egedly comm itted by [Bell oper ating companies] in the past ” as not provi ding the 8 kind of “‘smoking gun’ evidence of congressi onal vindict iveness”)

. 9 To be sure, a co ng res sio na l f ind ingfo llo wi ng a le gis lat ive tri al i s n ot t he on ly w ayto 10 est ab lis h th e “u

nm ist ak ab le e vid en ce” of punit ive int ent in

the leg isl ati ve rec ord ; ho we ve r, h ere , 11 the stat ements by a handful of legislators are insufficientto establ ish — by themselves — the 12 cle are st p roo f o f p un iti ve int ent ne ces sar y f or a bil l of att ain de r. N or i s th e le gis lat ive rec ord 13 sufficient to demonstrate “puni shment” cum ulativel y with the hist orical a nd functional tes ts of 14 punishment analyzed above. 15 III . CO NC LU SI ON 16 In a cco rdanc e w iththe fo reg oin g, the jud gm ent of the Di str ict

Co urt is a ff irm ed in p art 17 and vacated i n part. We remand f or further proc eedings as t o the plaint iffs’ First Amendm ent 18 and due process c laims.