J-S05004-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

FREDERICK BAYNES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2941 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 1, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0005432-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: Filed: May 13, 2021

Frederick Baynes appeals from his August 1, 2019 judgment of sentence 

of eight and one-half to seventeen years of incarceration followed by three 

years of probation, which was imposed after he was convicted of aggravated 

assault and possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”). We affirm. 

The facts giving rise to Appellant’s conviction were summarized by the 

trial court:

On the morning of June 4, 2018, the Complainant (Celestine 

Braaf) arrived at her work office located at 22

nd Street and Toronto 

Street in the City of Philadelphia, where she was surprised to find 

the Appellant sitting on the steps outside of the office. The 

Complainant and the Appellant had known each other since they 

were children and had dated for approximately [three] months 

before ending their relationship three days prior to the incident. 

The Complainant stated that the relationship ended cordially, and 

she had no reason to suspect ill will from the Appellant. 

The Appellant told the Complainant that he needed to print 

some documents for his therapy sessions and asked to use her 
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work computer. The Complainant permitted the Appellant to enter 

the office. Once inside, the Complainant sat at her desk with her 

back to the Appellant as he began to print his documents. 

Approximately [twenty] to thirty minutes later, the Appellant 

approached the Complainant from behind and began striking her 

multiple times in the head with a hammer he had taken into the 

building. 

In a state of shock, the Complainant raised her hands to 

protect her head. As blood poured from her wounds, she 

screamed, “What are you doing?” and “Stop!” Apart from the 

Appellant, the Complainant was the only person in the office. The 

Complainant then retreated under her desk, as the Appellant 

yelled “Come in the back, stop screaming . . . I’m going to kill.” 

Even though both of her hands had been injured when the 

Appellant struck them with the hammer, she came from under the 

desk to better defend herself. As she emerged, the Appellant 

continued to yell “I’m going to kill . . . You’re going to die today 

. . . Do you want that n---er?” When the Appellant tried to strike 

her again, the Complainant grabbed the hammer until she ran 

outside. 

The Complainant tried to enter a nearby masjid before 

running to a neighbor’s house. After she kicked the door, an 

occupant in the house called the police. The police later took the 

Complainant’s statement and had her transported to Temple 

University Hospital. She was treated at the hospital for a frontal 

skull and left ring-finger fractures, multiple lacerations on 

her head, and two right-hand metacarpal fractures. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/11/20, at 3-4 (footnotes omitted and emphases in 

original).

Following a January 16, 2019 jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the 

aforementioned offenses. He was sentenced on August 1, 2019, and he filed 

a timely post-sentence motion. The trial court denied the motion on 
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September 27, 2019, and Appellant filed a timely appeal.1 Appellant and the 

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, and the matter is ripe for our review. 

Appellant presents three issues:

1. Was not the evidence insufficient for guilt on all charges, insofar 

as the evidence of guilt was so unreliable and contradictory as to 

make any verdict based upon it a matter of conjecture?

2. Was not the evidence insufficient for guilt on the charge of 

aggravated assault, causing serious bodily injury insofar as 

serious bodily injury was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt 

and the jury was not charged on aggravated assault -- attempts 

to cause serious bodily injury?

3. Did not the lower court abuse its discretion in sentencing 

[A]ppellant where it failed to take into account the overwhelming 

evidence of severe sexual and physical trauma suffered by 

appellant and otherwise failed to sentence in accordance with the 

dictates of 42 Pa. C. S. § 9721(b)?

Appellant’s brief at 4. 

Appellant maintains that this is one of the rare instances where witness 

testimony is so contradictory as to be unreliable and incapable of supporting 

a finding of guilt. See Appellant’s brief at 21 (citing Commonwealth v. 

Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167, 1170 (Pa. 1993)). He contends that here, as in 

Karkaria, there is no meaningful corroboration whatsoever from physical 

evidence or other witness testimony, and that the only evidence of guilt comes 

from the statements and testimony of Complainant. Id. at 26.

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1 Appellant filed a notice of appeal while the post-sentence motion was 

pending. We treat such premature notices of appeal as having been filed after 

the denial of the post-sentence motion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5). See 

Commonwealth v. Cooper, 27 A.3d 994, 1008 (Pa. 2011).
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Appellant’s claim is presented as a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence. 

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims 

requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to 

the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence 

will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes 

each material element of the crime charged and the commission 

thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is 

to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact 

can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the evidence 

establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial 

does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with 

the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the 

presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute 

our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the 

evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a 

defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s 

convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019).

Preliminarily, certain principles inform our review. “[A] review of the 

sufficiency of the evidence does not include an assessment of the credibility 

of the testimony; such a claim goes to the weight of the evidence.”2 

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2 Appellant filed a post-sentence motion in which he alleged that the verdict 

was against the weight of the evidence. In that motion, he argued that, due 

to inconsistencies between the witnesses’ testimony and the video, the verdict 

shocked the conscience. Appellant did not, however, preserve a weight 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281-82 (Pa.Super. 2009). 

Furthermore, the uncorroborated testimony of the victim alone is legally 

sufficient to support a verdict if the fact finder believes it. See 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 479 (Pa.Super. 2018). 

The certified record belies Appellant’s contention that the 

Commonwealth’s evidence is so contradictory as to be unreliable and 

incapable of supporting a finding of guilt. Complainant testified that Appellant 

hit her eight to fourteen times with the hammer. Video surveillance confirms 

that Appellant was present with Complainant when the attack occurred. The 

nature of her injuries, i.e., a fractured skull, fractured hands and finger, are 

consistent with her account of the assault and the medical records. Appellant’s 

claim that, “[h]ere, as in Karkaria, there is no meaningful corroboration 

whatsoever from physical evidence or other witness testimony - the only 

evidence of guilt comes from the statements and testimony of Ms. Braaf[,]” is 

refuted by the record. Appellant’s brief at 26. Moreover, the inconsistencies 

alleged by Appellant are either not supported by record, explained away by 

the testimony, or irrelevant to the nature of the attack on Complainant. No 

relief is due on this claim. 

Nor do we find any merit in Appellant’s contention that the 

Commonwealth failed to establish that Complainant sustained the serious 

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challenge in his statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 
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bodily injury required for a conviction of aggravated assault. He asserts that 

“several cuts on the head that were sutured, a frontal skull fracture which 

caused no loss of consciousness, no underlying contusions and no 

hemorrhage[,]” a broken ring finger on her left hand that did not heal 

properly, and two metacarpal fractures on her right hand, do not rise to the 

level of serious bodily injury. Appellant’s brief at 27. According to Appellant, 

the injuries did not create “a substantial risk of death” or cause “serious, 

permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of 

any bodily member or organ.” Id. (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301 (defining 

serious bodily injury)). He argues that while she may have suffered an 

impairment of the function of her ring finger, it was determined in the civil 

case of Long v. Mejia, 896 A.2d 596, 600 (Pa.Super. 2006), that a broken 

finger was not a serious impairment to those who were not violinists or 

neurosurgeons. He contrasts cases where serious bodily injury was found. 

Id. at 29. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Nichols, 692 A.2d 181, 184 

(Pa.Super. 1997) (jaw wired shut for six weeks was serious bodily injury); 

Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 668 A.2d 1143, 1145 (Pa.Super. 1995) (serious 

bodily injury where victim faded in and out of consciousness and had to wear 

a body brace for two months). 

Appellant finds the instant case analogous on its facts with 

Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 420 A.2d 674 (Pa.Super. 1980), where this 

Court found only an attempt to cause serious bodily injury although the victim 
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had been repeatedly struck on the head with a tire iron, nine sutures were 

required to close the wounds, and the victim needed surgery to repair a 

fractured orbital socket. See also Commonwealth v. Aycock, 470 A.2d 130 

(Pa.Super. 1983) (finding no serious injury where victim struck on the head 

with an eighteen-inch piece of steel and required twenty-seven sutures). 

Nor, according to Appellant, can the conviction be sustained based on 

proof of an attempt to cause serious bodily injury. While Appellant seems to 

concede that the evidence would support conviction under that theory, he 

maintains that he was not charged in the criminal information with aggravated 

assault for the attempt to cause serious bodily injury. Furthermore, he cites 

Commonwealth v. Kopp, 591 A.2d 1122, 1127 (Pa.Super. 1991), for the 

proposition that since the trial court did not instruct the jury on attempting to 

cause serious bodily injury, that claim cannot support the aggravated assault 

conviction. 

The Commonwealth counters that, by asking this Court to discount the 

severity of Complainant’s injuries, Appellant is requesting that we view the 

evidence in his favor, contrary to our standard of review. Furthermore, the 

Commonwealth contends that the record contains evidence of serious bodily 

injury. At the time of trial, more than seven months after the attack, 

Complainant had a visible dent and scars on her head, suffered from 

headaches, and could not move her right ring finger. See Commonwealth’s 

brief at 12. Moreover, the Commonwealth points out that Appellant was 
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charged in the criminal information with aggravated assault – attempting to 

cause or causing serious bodily injury. While the trial court did not instruct 

the jury on the attempt provision of the subsection, the Commonwealth 

argues that the record supports conviction of aggravated assault on such a 

theory, and that we may affirm on this basis. Specifically, the Commonwealth 

highlights the evidence that Appellant repeatedly struck Complainant’s head 

with hammer, a deadly weapon, fracturing her skull.3 When she raised her 

hands in defense, he continued to strike them with the hammer while uttering 

threats to kill her, fracturing her hands and finger. See Commonwealth’s brief 

at 9-10.

Our review of the record confirms that Appellant was charged in the 

criminal information with aggravated assault pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2702(a)(1), which includes both attempting to cause serious bodily injury 

or causing serious bodily injury. See Criminal Information, 8/1/18, at 1. 

Appellant’s claim to the contrary is mistaken. Aggravated assault pursuant to 

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3 A “deadly weapon” is defined as 

Any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any device designed 

as a weapon and capable of producing death or serious bodily 

injury, or any other device or instrumentality which, in the manner 

in which it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to 

produce death or serious bodily injury.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. Our Supreme Court has noted that “[a]n ax, a baseball 

bat, an iron bar, a heavy cuspidor, and even a bedroom slipper have been 

held to constitute deadly weapons under varying circumstances.”

Commonwealth McCullum, 602 A.2d 313 (Pa. 1992).
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§ 2702(a)(1), is committed either when one “attempts to cause serious bodily 

injury” or “causes such injury intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under 

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]” 

18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1). "A person commits an attempt when, with intent to 

commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step 

toward the commission of that crime." 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). As we reaffirmed 

in Commonwealth v. Fortune, 68 A.3d 980, 985 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en 

banc), “an attempt under subsection 2702(a)(1) requires some act, albeit not 

one causing serious bodily injury, accompanied by an intent to inflict serious 

bodily injury.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Matthew, 909 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 

2006). The specific intent to cause serious bodily injury can be inferred from 

the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body such as the head. See 

Commonwealth v. Nichols, 692 A.2d 181, 184 (Pa.Super. 1997); see also

Commonwealth v. Pandolfo, 446 A.2d 939, 941 (Pa.Super. 1982) (holding 

blows to a portion of the body as vital as the head exhibited intent to inflict 

serious bodily injury). 

Serious bodily injury is defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301, as “[b]odily injury 

which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent 

disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 

member or organ.” When the victim suffers serious bodily injury, the 

Commonwealth need not prove specific intent for aggravated assault. 

Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 103 (Pa.Super. 2018). The 
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Commonwealth must only prove the defendant acted recklessly under 

circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life. 

See Commonwealth v. Patrick, 933 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en 

banc). 

Herein, the trial court instructed the jury only on aggravated assault 

based on “serious bodily injury,” and the jury found Appellant guilty of that 

offense. There is no indication in the certified record that the trial court 

refused to charge the jury in accordance with “attempts to cause serious 

bodily injury” language or that such a charge was not warranted. It appears 

to have been an inadvertent omission.4 Nonetheless, we find the record 

supports the jury’s finding that Complainant sustained serious bodily injury. 

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4 Commonwealth v. Kopp, 591 A.2d 1122, 1127 (Pa.Super. 1991), offers 

no support for Appellant’s contention that since the trial court did not instruct 

the jury on attempting to cause serious bodily injury, that theory cannot 

support the aggravated assault conviction herein. In Kopp, although the 

Commonwealth charged the appellant in the criminal indictment with 

aggravated assault under § 2702(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4), it subsequently filed 

a bill of particulars in which it stated that it intended to prosecute the appellant 

for aggravated assault under only “18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(3) and (4).” At 

trial, the Commonwealth introduced testimony from the injured police officer’s 

treating physician that the officer suffered “serious bodily injury,” but failed to 

offer evidence establishing guilt under subsections 2702(a)(3) or (4). At the 

close of the Commonwealth’s case, the defense demurred. The 

Commonwealth responded by stating its belief that the assault fell within 

§ 2702(a)(1) and (2), and the trial court charged the jury under those 

subsections even though they had not been listed in the bill of particulars. 

This Court reversed, holding that permitting the Commonwealth to proceed 

beyond the scope of the bill of particulars substantively changed the elements 

and grade of the offense, and rendered the purpose and function of the bill of 

particulars meaningless. Nothing in the certified record in the instant case 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The medical records introduced into evidence confirm that Complainant 

suffered a fractured skull for which she spent at least three nights in the 

hospital’s intensive care unit (“ICU”). See Exhibit C7 and D3. The jury could 

reasonably infer from this fact alone that the head injury presented a 

substantial risk of death or permanent injury. Furthermore, she suffered 

permanent disfigurement in the form of a dent and scarring on her head from 

the impact of the hammer and the staples used to close the wounds. Finally, 

she has permanently lost the use of her right ring finger and remains 

debilitated by headaches. The evidence was legally sufficient to support the 

jury’s verdict, and no relief is due on this claim. 

Appellant’s final issue is a challenge to discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. He alleges that “[t]he sentencing court here neither addressed 

societal concerns or [A]ppellant’s rehabilitative needs[,]” and that the 

sentence imposed “is contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the 

sentencing process, violated the sentencing code and is manifestly 

unreasonable and excessive.” Appellant’s brief at 34. 

The law is well settled that an appellant is not entitled to review of a 

discretionary sentencing claim as of right. See Commonwealth v. Moury, 

992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010). Before we may reach the merits of such 

an issue, we conduct a four-part analysis to determine:

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suggests an analogous representation by the Commonwealth that it was 

foregoing an attempt conviction. 
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1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see 

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, see Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 

see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b).

Id. at 170 (citation omitted). 

In the case before us, Appellant filed a timely appeal, a post-sentence 

motion raising the issue, and included a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f) in his appellate brief. Thus, he has met the technical requirements 

for review of a discretionary sentencing claim. The only remaining question 

is whether Appellant has made a colorable argument that his sentence is either 

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to 

the fundamental norms governing sentencing. See Commonwealth v. 

Diehl, 140 A.3d 34, 44-45 (Pa.Super. 2016).

Appellant maintains that his claim that the trial court imposed a 

sentence grossly disproportionate to his crimes without considering his 

background, a relevant sentencing factor under 42 Pa.C.S. §9721(b), presents 

a substantial question. The sentencing court’s failure to address all relevant 

sentencing criteria presents a plausible argument that the sentence is 

“contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” 

Appellant’s brief at 18-19 (citing Commonwealth v. Parlante, 823 A.2d 927, 

928 (Pa.Super. 2003) and Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 622 

(Pa. 2002)). Since we have previously concluded that such claims present a 
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substantial question, we find Appellant is entitled to review. 

See Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 994-95 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(holding claim that a VOP sentencing court failed to consider the factors under 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) raised a substantial question). See also

Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 143 (Pa.Super. 2011) (claim 

of excessiveness coupled with averments that the trial court deviated from 

sentencing norms raise a substantial question); Commonwealth v. Perry, 

883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa.Super. 2005) (same). 

We conduct our review mindful that “[s]entencing is a matter vested in 

the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth 

v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760 (Pa.Super. 2014). Moreover, this Court may 

only vacate a sentence that is within the guidelines if the sentencing court 

applied the guidelines erroneously or the application of the guidelines was 

clearly unreasonable. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

The substance of Appellant’s claim is that the court failed to address on 

the record societal concerns or Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. He contends 

that this was a violation of the Sentencing Code and resulted in a sentence 

that is “manifestly unreasonable and excessive.” Appellant’s brief at 34. 

Appellant complains that the sentencing court gave “very short shrift to the 

overwhelming evidence of severe sexual and physical trauma suffered by 

[A]ppellant and his rehabilitative needs arising therefrom.” Id. at 35. He 
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maintains that if the court had taken these facts and his rehabilitative needs 

into consideration, it would have sentenced him in the mitigated range, i.e., 

below the standard range minimum of eight and one-half years. Id. 

Appellant acknowledges that such facts were presented to the trial 

court, and that the court stated that it considered them. However, since the 

court did not specifically repeat on the record the specifics of the sexual abuse 

suffered by Appellant, he argues that the court did not set forth adequate 

reasons for not imposing a sentence in the mitigated range. 

We note preliminarily that there is no requirement that the sentencing 

court state on the record every fact that it considered in reaching its decision. 

The trial court stated prior to imposing sentence that it had reviewed the 

presentence investigation. See N.T. Sentencing, 8/1/19, at 47. Where the 

sentencing court has the benefit of a presentence investigation report, “we 

presume that the court properly considered and weighed all relevant factors 

in fashioning the defendant’s sentence.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 

652, 663 (Pa.Super. 2013). 

Furthermore, the court stated on the record that Appellant’s prior record 

score was that of a repeat felony offender, and that the offense gravity score 

(“OGS”) for aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury was eleven. It 

recited the sentencing guidelines for aggravated assault, with and without the 

deadly weapon enhancement, and for PIC. The Commonwealth urged the 

Court to impose a sentence of ten to twenty years of imprisonment. 
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The defense submitted Exhibit D1, a mitigation package, Exhibit D2, the 

mental health evaluation, and Exhibit D3, the presentence investigation 

report. The defense also elicited testimony from the social worker who had 

prepared the mitigation package, Kate Rowland. She described Appellant’s 

history of sexual abuse, suicide attempts, and a mental health diagnosis of 

bipolar one disorder, which includes mania and depressive phases, 

schizophrenia, major depressive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder 

(“PTSD”). N.T. Sentencing, 8/1/19, at 26. Ms. Rowland testified that 

Appellant had tried to hang himself in his cell on the day he was arrested for 

these crimes. 

Defense counsel pointed out that despite his mental health issues, 

Appellant was able to maintain steady employment and get his GED. He 

functioned well when he was on his medications. Counsel clarified that 

Appellant’s earlier conviction had been for bank robbery, not armed robbery, 

as he did not have a weapon. The defense requested a mitigated range 

sentence of six to twelve years of imprisonment. 

The Commonwealth countered the defense’s mitigation request with 

argument that the assault was premeditated. Counsel for the Commonwealth 

reminded the court that Appellant brought a hammer, waited for his victim for 

twenty minutes, and bludgeoned her multiple times with the hammer. 

Appellant’s words uttered at the time indicated that he was angry that she 

had moved on to a relationship with another man. 
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Appellant exercised his right of allocution and expressed remorse for his 

conduct. The court stated that it had already reviewed the victim impact 

statement, the presentence report and addenda, and took a recess to consider 

all information presented at the hearing that day, including the mental health 

report. Upon return, the court imposed a sentence of eight and one-half to 

seventeen years of imprisonment on the aggravated assault charge, followed 

by three years of probation on the PIC charge. Id. at 47. The court ordered 

Appellant to pay court costs and fines, awarded him credit for time served, 

and ordered another mental health evaluation to ensure that Appellant receive 

proper treatment and therapy while in custody. Id. at 48. 

Thus, the certified record refutes any notion that the sentencing court 

failed to take into consideration Appellant’s mitigation evidence or his 

rehabilitative needs. In addition to reviewing the contents of a presentence 

investigation report and considering the severity of the victim’s injuries, the 

court heard testimony about Appellant’s mental health diagnoses, history of 

sexual abuse, and his rehabilitative needs. The sentence imposed for 

aggravated assault fell at the low end of the standard range under the 

guidelines. We find no abuse of discretion. 

Judgment affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/13/21