UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

BRANDI R. MOSLEY,

INSTITUTIONAL ID NO. 2415074,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:22-cv-0795-P

SHERIFF BILL E. WAYBOURN,

ET AL.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

This civil-rights action stems from a traffic stop that led to Plaintiff 

Brandi R. Mosely’s state drug convictions.1 Mosley claims that 

Defendants violated his constitutional rights during his arrest and 

subsequent state criminal proceedings. Proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”), Mosely seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the following reasons, the Court 

DISMISSES Mosley’s Amended Complaint.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Nature of Claims

Before a district court adjudicates the merits of a pro se prisoner’s 

claim, it should review and decipher the underlying nature and essence 

of the claim, regardless of the title affixed to the suit. See Odom v. West, 

174 F.3d 198, 1999 WL 153008, at *1 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing United 

States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983)). A § 1983 action is 

the appropriate remedy for recovering damages for illegal state action. 

Taylor v. Cass Cnty. Dist. Ct., 178 F.3d 1291, 1999 WL 236119, at *1 

(5th Cir. 1999) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). The writ 

of habeas corpus is the appropriate federal remedy for a state prisoner 

challenging the fact or duration of his confinement. See Preiser v. 

1According to the “Inmate Information Details” found on the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice’s website, Mosley was convicted in Tarrant County, Texas on two 

charges of possessing methamphetamine and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. See

https://inmate.tdcj.texas.gov.

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Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 

789, 792–96 (5th Cir. 1993). If a complaint contains both habeas and § 

1983 claims, the district court should, if practicable, separate the § 1983 

claims from the habeas claims. See Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Ctr., 136 

F.3d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 1998).

B. 28 U.S.C. § 1915

A district court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint if, at any 

time, it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious; fails to state 

a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against 

a defendant that is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B); see also Norwood v. O’Hare, 404 F. App’x 923, 924 (5th 

Cir. 2010). 

1. Frivolity

A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. 

Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005). “A complaint lacks 

an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputable meritless legal 

theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest 

which clearly does not exist.” Id. (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 

F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997)).

2. Failure to State a Claim

Dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e) are reviewed 

de novo, using the same standard applicable to dismissals under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 497 (5th 

Cir. 2011) (citing Praylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 430 F.3d 1208, 

1209 (5th Cir. 2005)). Under the 12(b)(6) standard, all well-pleaded facts 

are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff 

must allege facts that support each element of the cause of action in 

order to state a valid claim. See City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride 

Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 154–55 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough 

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”)). The court does 

not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” City of Clinton, Ark., 

632 F.3d at 153 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

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C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must 

allege that (1) some person has deprived him of a federal right; and (2) 

that the person acted under color of state or territorial law. See Arnold 

v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 

446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)). 

1. State Actor

Private individuals generally are not considered to act under color of 

state law. See Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 518 (5th Cir. 2005). A 

defense attorney, whether privately retained or appointed by the court, 

when exercising his independent professional judgment in a criminal 

proceeding, is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. Small v. Dallas 

Cnty., Tex., 170 F. App’x 943, 944 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Hudson v. 

Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996)); see Mills v. Criminal Dist. 

Court No. 3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988).

2. The Heck Doctrine

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States 

Supreme Court considered the effect of a criminal conviction on a 

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. Thomas v. Pohlmann, 681 F. App’x 401, 406 (5th 

Cir. 2017) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994)). The 

Heck court held that a plaintiff is not permitted to use a § 1983 action to 

challenge the validity of his conviction or sentence unless he 

demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has been reversed or 

invalidated. Id. The Supreme Court imposed this requirement on § 1983 

plaintiffs to avoid collateral attacks by plaintiffs on convictions that are 

still outstanding. Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 872 (5th Cir. 1996) 

(citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487)). Thus, when a defendant who has been 

convicted of a crime brings a § 1983 claim, “the district court must first 

consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his § 1983 claim 

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” See 

Connors v. Graves, 538 F.3d 373, 376 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Heck, 512 

U.S. at 487)). If so, the claim is barred unless the plaintiff proves that 

his conviction or sentence “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged 

by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s 

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id.

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3. Absolute Immunity

The doctrine of absolute immunity denies a person whose federal 

rights have been violated by a government official from obtaining any 

type of remedy, regardless of the conduct. Beck v. Texas State Bd. of 

Dental Exam’rs, 204 F.3d 629, 634 (5th Cir. 2000). Because absolute 

immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to 

liability, it is appropriate for district courts to resolve the question of 

absolute immunity before reaching the Heck analysis when feasible. See

Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Mitchell v. 

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985)). If a defendant is dismissed on 

absolute immunity grounds, it becomes clear that the § 1983 plaintiff 

will never have a viable claim against the defendant based on the 

particular facts alleged, even if the plaintiff is a state prisoner who 

eventually satisfies the precondition to a valid § 1983 claim under Heck. 

Boyd, 31 F.3d at 284. 

Criminal prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from claims for 

damages asserted under § 1983 for actions taken in the presentation of 

a state’s case. Boyd, 31 F.3d at 285 (citing Graves, 1 F.3d at 318). 

Prosecutorial immunity applies to the prosecutor’s actions in initiating 

the prosecution and in carrying the case through the judicial process. Id.

This means that prosecutors are absolutely immune with respect to 

activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 

criminal process.” See Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 631-32 (5th Cir. 

2003) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). Conduct 

falling within this category is not limited only to the act of initiation 

itself and to conduct occurring in the courtroom, but instead includes all 

action which occur in the course of the prosecutor’s role as an advocate 

for the State. See Cousin, 325 F.3d 632 (citations omitted). Moreover, 

absolute immunity shelters prosecutors even when they act 

“maliciously, wantonly, or negligently.” Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 

897 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Morison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 

242, 248 (5th Cir. 1985)).

ANALYSIS

After reviewing Mosley’s Amended Complaint and Answers to the 

Court’s Questionnaire, the Court concludes that he raises both habeas 

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and § 1983 claims in this action. The Court will address each category 

below.

A. Habeas Claims

Mosely filed his Amended Complaint on September 15, 2022. At that 

time, he was a pretrial detainee confined in Tarrant County Jail, where 

he was presumably awaiting trial on the possession charges. Eight days 

later, he was convicted. Mosley seeks to have the “charges dropped.” See

ECF No. 5 at 4. 

To the extent that Mosley is challenging legality of his pretrial

detention and asking the Court to interfere in his state criminal 

proceedings, the Court concludes that his claim is habeas in nature and 

not cognizable under § 1983. See Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280, 1282–

84 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct. of Kentucky, 

410 U.S. 484 (1973)). Moreover, the Court concludes that such pretrial 

habeas claims have been rendered moot by his conviction. See Yohey v. 

Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Fassler v. United States, 

858 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1988)).

To the extent that Mosely is challenging the fact and legality of his 

current detention on the ground that his state conviction was unlawfully 

obtained, the Court likewise concludes that his claim is habeas in nature 

and not cognizable under § 1983. Under these circumstances, the Court

would normally sever Mosley’s post-conviction habeas claims from this 

action. However, the Court declines to do so because Mosley, in essence, 

admits that he has not exhausted his available state remedies, which is 

required before seeking federal habeas relief.2 Instead, the Court 

2To be eligible for habeas relief under § 2241, a pretrial detainee must be “in 

custody” and must have exhausted his available state remedies. Dickerson v. State of 

La., 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987). The exhaustion doctrine is designed to protect 

the state courts’ role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state 

judicial proceedings, as it gives state courts the first opportunity to review and correct 

all claims of constitutional error. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–19 (1982). A 

prisoner satisfies the exhaustion requirement when he has fairly presented the factual 

and legal basis for a federal claim to the highest state court for review in a procedurally 

correct manner. See Satterwhite v. Lynaugh, 886 F.2d 90, 92–92 (5th Cir. 1989). In 

Texas, this means that a prisoner must present his claims to the Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”). See Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 

1997). In his Answers to the Court’s Questionnaire, Mosley admits that he has not

challenged the legality of his pretrial detention or conviction in the TCCA. See ECF 

No. 14 at 4.

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concludes that these claims should be dismissed without prejudice for 

lack of exhaustion.

B. § 1983 Claims

Mosely seeks to recover monetary damages from Defendants, 

presumably in their individual capacities,3 for the same constitutional 

violations that he contends led to his arrest and conviction. 

1. Detective Mitchell

Mosley’s arrest and conviction stem from a traffic stop. On April 22, 

2021, City of Euless police officers initiated a traffic stop of Mosely’s 

vehicle and found methamphetamine inside. Mosley was transported to 

the City of Euless Jail, where he met and conferred with Defendant 

Detective Mitchell. Mosley alleges that Detective Mitchell released him 

from custody the same day in return for Mosley’s help in locating a 

known drug dealer named Richard Wiley. Mosely did not locate Wiley 

and was arrested “months later” for possessing the drugs that were

found in his vehicle on April 22. See ECF Nos. 5, 14.

Mosely claims that Detective Mitchell violated the Fourth 

Amendment because he did not have probable cause to initiate his arrest 

based on criminal conduct that occurred months prior. Mosley argues 

that any probable cause Detective Mitchell may have originally had to 

arrest him on April 22, in essence, expired. See ECF No. 14 at 5.

In accordance with Heck, the Court must consider whether a 

judgment in Mosley’s favor would necessarily imply the validity of his 

conviction. The Court concludes that it would. See Cormier v. Lafayette 

City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 493 F. App’x 578, 583 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We 

33To the extent that Mosley seeks to recover monetary damages from Defendants 

Mitchell, Waybourn, Brown, and Nguyen in their official capacities, the Court 

concludes that Mosley fails to state a plausible § 1983 against them. As discussed 

below, these defendants are municipal employees. Suits brought against municipal 

employees in their official capacities “generally represent only another way of pleading 

an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” See Monell v. New York 

City Dep’t of Social Serv.’s, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). In other words, in order to recover 

damages under § 1983 from municipal employees in their official capacities, a plaintiff 

must demonstrate that the municipality itself is liable for the alleged unlawful 

conduct. But municipalities are only liable if official policies or customs cause injuries 

to the plaintiff. Id. Here, Mosley does name the City of Euless or Tarrant County as 

defendants in this case. Nor does he even allege, much less plead any facts to show, 

that these entities’ policies and/or customs led to his alleged unlawful arrest and 

conviction.

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have specifically noted that false-arrest and malicious-prosecution 

claims challenge the existence of probable cause and, thus, by their 

essence are collateral attacks on a criminal judgment’s validity.”) 

(citations omitted). Thus, Mosley has no viable claim for damages 

against Detective Mitchell unless he can demonstrate that his conviction 

has been invalidated. Mosely has not done so. Although Mosley contends

that his detention was invalidated by the 396th Judicial District Court, 

Tarrant County, Texas, his statement is belied by public record.4 See

ECF No. 14 at 3. Further, he admits that he has not yet challenged the 

legality of his pretrial detention and/or conviction in the TCCA. Id. at 4.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Mosley’s claims against 

Detective Mitchell are barred by Heck and, therefore, not cognizable 

under § 1983.5 

2. Bill E. Waybourn

Mosley claims that Tarrant County Sheriff Bill E. Waybourn 

unlawfully held him in Tarrant County Jail while his state criminal 

proceedings were pending. He alleges that his detention there was 

unlawful because City of Euless police officers had no probable cause to 

arrest him and that his bond was excessive. Because a ruling in Mosley’s 

favor on this claim would implicate the invalidity of his otherwise 

unchallenged conviction, the Court concludes that his claim against 

Waybourn is barred by Heck and, therefore, not cognizable under § 1983.

3. Mike Brown 

Mosley sues Defendant Mike Brown, the “Chief of Euless City Jail.” 

He claims that Brown is the supervisor of Mosley’s arresting officers 

and, therefore, is responsible for their alleged unlawful arrest of him. 

Mosley is incorrect.

Under § 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of 

subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability. See Thompkins v. Belt, 

4After conducting an online search via www.texascourts.gov, the Court takes 

judicial notice of the fact that, to date, there is no public record that shows Mosley has 

challenged his pretrial detention or conviction in the TCCA.

5See Anderson v. Galveston Cnty. Dist. Clerk, 91 F. App’x 925 (5th Cir. 2004) 

(finding district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint as 

frivolous given that the damages claim raised therein was Heck-barred and thus had 

no arguable merit); see also Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996).

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28 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). However, a 

supervisor may be held liable if there exists either (1) his personal 

involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 

constitutional violation. Id. Supervisory liability can be established 

without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory 

officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 

repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the 

constitutional violation. Id. at 304 (citations omitted). Existence of a 

constitutionally deficient policy cannot be inferred from a single 

wrongful act. Id.

Here, Mosley does not allege that Brown was personally involved in

his arrest or that his conduct otherwise led to his arrest. For example, 

Mosley does not allege that Brown directed City of Euless Police officers 

to initiate his arrest or that Brown was, in any way, personally involved 

in making the decision to do so. Nor does Mosley argue or plead any facts 

to demonstrate that Brown implemented or otherwise adopted an 

unconstitutional practice or policy of any kind.

The Court, therefore, concludes that Mosley has failed to state a 

plausible § 1983 claim against Defendant Mike Brown.

4. Paul Nguyen

Mosley alleges in a conclusory statement that Tarrant County 

District Attorney Paul Nguyen “conspired” to unlawfully indict him. But 

he does not plead any facts in support of this claim. Importantly, Mosley 

does not allege that Nguyen was, at any relevant time, not acting in his 

role of representing the district attorney’s office during Mosley’s 

criminal proceedings. See ECF No. 14 at 6.

Because the decision to file criminal charges is protected, the Court 

concludes that Mosley’s § 1983 clam against Nguyen is barred by the 

doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

5. Harold Johnson

Mosley also sues his court-appointed attorney, Harold Johnson. 

Mosley alleges in a conclusory manner that Johnson lied under oath and 

received compensation for services that the did not provide. See id. at 7.

Because Johnson is not considered a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983 

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and Mosley does not plead any facts to demonstrate that Johnson’s 

actions, at any relevant time, were taken outside the course of his 

professional representation of Mosely in his criminal proceedings, the 

Court concludes that Mosely fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim 

against Johnson. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Mosley’s habeas claims are DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of exhaustion.6

Mosley’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Detective Mitchell and 

Sheriff Bill E. Waybourn are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to 

their being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met. See 

Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996).

Mosley’s § 1983 claims against Defendant Paul Nguyen are 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by the doctrine of 

absolute prosecutorial immunity. 

Mosley’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Mike Brown and Harold 

Johnson are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a 

claim.

Lastly, in his October 17, 2022 letter to the clerk of Court, Mosley 

complains that his former fellow inmate at Tarrant County Jail took 

personal property from his cell. See ECF No. 10. Because this claim is 

wholly unrelated to the claims raised in Mosley’s Amended Complaint, 

the Court will not adjudicate its merits here. However, if Mosley wants

to file a separate lawsuit to address this new claim, he may file a new 

complaint on the proper form, which is available in his unit’s library.

SO ORDERED on this 10th day of January 2023.

6This dismissal does not prohibit Mosley from attempting to seek federal habeas 

relief after he has fully exhausted his available state remedies. However, should he 

choose to do so, the Court expresses no opinion whatsoever on the underlying merits 

of his claims.

Mark T. Pittman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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