alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 31.1

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Jeffrey G. Clevenger, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Apex Silver Mines Limited;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the
registrant and have:

a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures
to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report
is being prepared;

b. Designed such internal controls over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over
financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles;

c. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

d. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors:

a. All
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report
financial information; and

b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.

Date: November 10, 2008



/s/ Jeffrey G. ClevengerJeffrey G. ClevengerPresident and Chief Executive Officer
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

BRIANNA C. MENDOZA, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D17-2761

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed August 24, 2018. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hendry 

County; Scott H. Cupp, Acting Circuit 

Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, 

and Megan Olson, Assistant Public 

Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Jeffrey H. Siegal, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for 

Appellee.

BLACK, Judge.

Brianna Mendoza seeks correction of the order finding her in violation of 

her probation. She does not challenge the finding that she violated probation or the 

resulting sentence, and we affirm both without comment. But because 
- 2 -

the revocation order should reflect the oral pronouncement, we remand for the trial court 

to strike the revocation order and enter a corrected revocation order reflecting two 

condition 5 violations and conforming to the oral pronouncement in all other respects. 

See Reed v. State, 127 So. 3d 817, 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

Affirmed; remanded with instructions.

LaROSE, C.J. and SALARIO, J., concur.
Exhibit 10.2


Compensatory Arrangements with Certain Executive
Officers


            In January of 2004, a bonus program
was approved for Daren G. Hogge and Craig D. Huff wherein they could earn
bonuses in addition to bonuses payable pursuant to the Company’s Incentive
Compensation Plan (the “Additional Bonus Program”).  Such bonuses were based upon the growth in
sales revenue and operating income in Synergy Worldwide and the reduction in
selling, general and administrative expenses as compared to sales revenue on a
consolidated basis.  Set forth below are
the cash bonuses paid to such officers on February 22, 2005 pursuant to the
Additional Bonus Program for performance in 2004:  




	
  Name and Title

  	
   

  	
  Cash Bonus for Fiscal 2004

  	
   

  	 

	
  Daren G. Hogge 

  Executive Vice
  President

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  301,257

  	
   

  
	
  Craig D. Huff 

  Executive Vice
  President, Chief Financial 

  Officer, Vice
  President, Finance

  	
   

  	
  $

  	
  235,888
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14

- 50209 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v. PATRICK RENE RODRIGUEZ, also known as Patrick Rene Rodrigez , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 7:13

- CR

- 185

- 1

Before JONES, BENAVIDES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Patrick Rene Rodriguez appeals his guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine for which he was sentenced to 240 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. He contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED January 28, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 14-50209 Document: 00512918014 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/28/2015No. 14

- 50209
Procedure 11(b)(1)(G) and (I) by failing to properly advise him of the mandatory minimum sentence

. Rodriguez raised no Rule 11 error i n the district court. Accordingly, review is for plain error. See United States v. Vonn , 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002). The district court is required to ensure the defendant understands th e nature of the charge to which he is pleading and any mandatory minimu m penalty.
F ED

. R. C RIM

. P . 11(b)(1)(G), (I). Rodriguez was sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years. S ee 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The district court correctly and consistently advis ed Rodriguez that he faced a 20

- year mandatory minimum sentence . The record does not support Rodriguez’s argument s that he was misled by the alternative minimum sentences set forth in the enhancement information and plea agreement or the Government’s promise to pursue only one prior felony drug conviction for statutory enhancement purposes. Even if Rodriguez could demonstrate plain error, he cannot show “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez , 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004) ;

see a lso United States v. Alvarado

- Casas , 715 F.3d 945, 954

- 55 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied , 134 S. Ct. 950 (2014)

. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

2 Case: 14-50209 Document: 00512918014 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/28/2015
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### F LORIDA



### S ECOND 

### D ISTRICT

STEPHANIE AMANDA RUSSO

,

Appellant

,

v.

ROBERT D'ADDARIO and PAULA BATISTA,

Appellee s

.

No. 2D 2023

- 1892

June 21, 2024

Appeal from the C ounty Court for Pasco County; Patrick Moore , Judge.

Stephanie Amanda Russo, pro se.

John Allen Parvin, Palm Harbor , for Appellee s.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

BLACK, ATKINSON , and LABRIT, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 374

JOINT RESOLUTION

Designating August 2, 1994, as ‘‘National Neighborhood

Crime Watch Day’’.

Whereas neighborhood crime is of continuing concern to the

American people;

Whereas the fight against neighborhood crime requires people

to work together in cooperation with law enforcement

officials;

Whereas neighborhood crime watch organizations are effective at promoting awareness about, and the participation

of volunteers in, crime prevention activities at the local

level;
2

•HJ 374 EH

Whereas neighborhood crime watch groups can contribute to

the Nation’s war on drugs by helping to prevent their

communities from becoming markets for drug dealers;

and

Whereas citizens across America will soon take part in a

‘‘National Night Out’’, a unique crime prevention event

which will demonstrate the importance and effectiveness

of community participation in crime prevention efforts by

having people spend the period from 9 to 10 o’clock

postmeridian on August 2, 1994, with their neighbors in

front of their homes: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That August 2, 1994, is designated as ‘‘National Neigh4 borhood Crime Watch Day’’, and the President is author5 ized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon

6 the people of the United States to observe such day with

7 appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities.

Passed the House of Representatives July 25, 1994.

Attest:

Clerk.

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 374

JOINT RESOLUTION

Designating August 2, 1994, as ‘‘National

Neighborhood Crime Watch Day’’.
#### Stafford A. Davis, Appellant, v Board of Education of the City of New York, Respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Barry Salman, J.), entered December 12, 1989, which granted defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict after a jury trial, to the extent of reducing, *inter alia,*the jury award for future pain and suffering from $500,000 to $200,000, unanimously reversed, insofar as appealed from, on the law and facts, without costs, and the matter remitted for entry of judgment.

In this personal injury action, plaintiff sustained the loss of his left eye when he was shot with a BB gun at the age of 13. As limited by the appeal, the sole issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in reducing the jury award for future pain and suffering from $500,000 to $200,000.

Upon examination of the record, we conclude that the sum awarded to plaintiff, who has a life expectancy of an additional 49 years, is not one which "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation”. (CPLR 5501 [c].) *262Among the factors relevant to this determination are plaintiffs permanent condition of blindness in one eye, which deprives him of depth perception and left peripheral vision, and thus makes it difficult or impossible to engage in such activities as driving or playing sports; his continued and frequent severe headaches; and the pain, discomfort and humiliation of the disfigurement, as well as that occasioned by having to remove and clean the prosthesis—which cannot be properly fitted and gives him a "Pop-eyed” look—at least two or three times a day. We have also considered the fact that the pellet which caused the loss of plaintiffs eye is still lodged against his optic nerve, and the unrefuted medical testimony that plaintiff is likely to require further operations and refit-tings for replacement prostheses over the course of his entire lifetime. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Ross, Asch, Kassal and Smith, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000943548
<NAME> DEVX ENERGY, INC.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2001
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                       2,003,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                7,745,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             9,748,000
<PP&E>                                      94,401,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             112,209,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,261,000
<BONDS>                                    139,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     96,000
<COMMON>                                       135,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  65,112,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               112,209,000
<SALES>                                      1,317,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            10,276,000
<CGS>                                          464,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           4,941,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,377,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                      413,000
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,790,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.02
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.01


</TABLE>
#### NEWBERRY v. STATE.

No. 21229.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 23, 1940.

*963H. R. Rolston, of Lufkin, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The conviction is for a violation of the Local Option Law. The punishment assessed is a fine of $100.

The only ground urged by the appellant for a reversal of the judgment of conviction relates to the court’s action in overruling her motion to quash the jury panel for the term. It appears from the record that appellant, in her, motion to quash the array of the jurors summoned, charged that the court failed to appoint a jury commission to select the jurors for the county court in accordance with Article 2109 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas in this, that the May term of the county court convened on the 6th day of May, 1940, and the court appointed a jury commission on the 15th day of April, 1940, to select petit jurors for the succeeding May term of said court; that the court intentionally and arbitrarily declined and failed at the previous December term of said court to appoint a jury commission to select the jury panel for the May term as required by the article of the statute above mentioned. The motion was overruled by the court and the defendant in due. time excepted. The bill of exception sets out the motion in detail. The facts agreed to by and between the State and the defendant pertaining to the allegations of the motion are also set out in the bill and sustain the allegations therein contained. It appears from the bill that the court, after hearing the motion, stated that it was a discretionary matter with him as to when to appoint jury commissioners to select jurors for the court and that he exercised- his discretion in not appointing a jury commission at the preceding December term of said court in accordance with Art. 2108 of the Revised Civil Statutes, and for that reason no jury commission was appointed by the court until the month of April, 1940.

A similar question as the one here presented was before this court in the case of Clark v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 107, 134 S.W.2d 676, wherein we held that the trial court could not arbitrarily disregard the mandatory provisions of the statute. We do not deem it necessary to reiterate what we have said there, for the reason that a mere reference to the opinion in that case will be sufficient. See also Holmes v. State, 99 Tex.Cr.R. 298, 269 S.W. 96, and Johnson v. State, 31 Tex.Cr.R. 456, 20 S.W. 985.

In view of the fact that the court wil-fully disregarded the mandatory' provisions of the statute with respect to the appointment of jury commissioners to select petit jurors, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons 

DAVID R. BIRMINGHAM, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0219-99-4 PER CURIAM 

 JUNE 8, 1999 

CENTURY CONCRETE, INC. AND 

 PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS 

 INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY 

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

(David R. Birmingham, Jr., pro se, on 

briefs). 

(John S. Nevin; Clarke, Dolph, Rapaport, 

Hardy & Hull, P.L.C., on brief), for 

appellees. 

 David Birmingham (claimant) contends that the Workers' 

Compensation Commission (commission) erred in finding that he 

failed to prove that he was totally disabled after May 19, 1998 as 

a result of his compensable February 26, 1997 injury by accident. 

Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we 

conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we 

summarily affirm the commission's decision. See Rule 5A:27. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). Unless 

we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence sustained 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
his burden of proof, the commission's findings are binding and 

conclusive upon us. See Tomko v. Michael’s Plastering Co., 210 

Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970). 

 On February 26, 1997, claimant sustained a compensable injury 

by accident to his face and both hands while working for employer. 

On April 7, 1998, Dr. Jon Loftus, an orthopedist who examined 

claimant for bilateral hand problems, opined that claimant was not 

a surgical candidate. Dr. Loftus referred claimant to a pain 

clinic. On May 19, 1998, claimant received a steroid injection at 

the pain clinic from Dr. Emmanuel Nebab. On the May 19, 1998 

Post-Procedure Discharge Form, Dr. Nebab discharged claimant and 

instructed him to return to his "normal activity," except for some 

minor protective measures for his left hand. 

 Based upon this medical evidence, the commission, as fact 

finder, could reasonably infer that claimant was no longer totally 

disabled as of May 19, 1998. Accordingly, we cannot say as a 

matter of law that claimant's evidence sustained his burden of 

proof.1 Therefore, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.

 1

On appeal, we did not consider any evidence that was not 

properly before the commission when it rendered its decision. 

Moreover, the commission did not err in refusing to consider Dr. 

Nebab's October 29, 1998 letter and Dr. Loftus's September 9, 

1998 New York Workers' Compensation Board form as 

after-discovered evidence. Clearly, Dr. Nebab's opinion could 

have been obtained prior to the hearing by the exercise of due 

diligence, and Dr. Loftus's opinion was not relevant and would 

not have mandated a different result. 

- 2 -
#### HORRMACHEA v. STATE.

No. 19773.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 25, 1938.

Frank B. Buchanan and Leslie J. Bretz, both of San Antonio, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The offense is rape; the punishment assessed is confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of ten years.

The record is before us without a statement of fact or bills of exceptions. The indictment is in due form and sufficient to charge the offense.

All other matters appearing regular, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
```

[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 28 (Thursday, February 10, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 6595]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-3049]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RP00-177-000]

Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, L.L.C.; Notice of Proposed 
Changes in FERC Gas Tariff

February 4, 2000.
    Take notice that on February 1, 2000, Maritimes & Northeast 
Pipeline, L.L.C. (Maritimes) tendered for filing as part of its FERC 
Gas Tariff, First Revised Volume No. 1, following tariff sheet, to 
become effective on February 1, 2000:

First Revised Sheet No. 9

    Maritimes states that it is filing the above tariff sheet to 
implement four negotiated rate agreements pursuant to Rate Schedule 
MN365 and Section 24 of the General Terms and Conditions of Maritimes' 
FERC Gas Tariff.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a motion to intervene or a protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in 
accordance with Sections 385.214 or 385.211 of the Commission's Rules 
and Regulations. All such motions or protests must be filed in 
accordance with Section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. 
Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the 
appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants 
parties to the proceedings. Any person wishing to become a party must 
file a motion to intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the 
Commission and are available for public inspection in the Public 
Reference Room. This filing may be viewed on the web at http://www.ferc.fed.us/online/rims.htm (call 202-208-2222 for assistance).

Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-3049 Filed 2-9-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
```
<PAGE>


                                                                  Exhibit 23.1


Consent of Ernst & Young LLP, Independent Auditors

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
Form S-8, No. 33-80168 pertaining to the Company's 1984 Incentive Stock Option
Plan, Directors' Stock Option Plan, 1988 Nonqualified Stock Option Plan, and
other Employee Benefit Plans; Forms S-8, No. 33-80168 and No. 333-07545
pertaining to the Company's 1993 Stock Option Plan, as amended; Form S-8, No.
333-07331 pertaining to the Company's 1996 Stock Purchase Plan; Form S-8, No.
333-30451 pertaining to the Company's 401(k) Plan; of our report dated May 18,
1998, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of
Active Voice Corporation included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the
year ended March 31, 1998 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.


                                       ERNST & YOUNG LLP

Seattle, Washington
June 25, 1998