Defendant’s Objection to and Motion to Strike

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint Page 1 of 10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

BRANDON CRIDER, § 

§ 

Plaintiff, § 

§ 

v. § No. 3:22-CV-2415 

§ 

EUGENIA FOUST, § 

 § 

Defendant. § 

DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT: 

Now comes Defendant Eugenia Foust, and files this Objection to and Motion 

to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, and respectfully shows the following:

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court’s January 12, 2023 order (Dkt. 14) permitted Plaintiff to replead his 

case so as to provide “admissible evidence” to support his claims of subject matter 

jurisdiction. On February 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 

17) in an attempt to comply with the Court’s January 12, 2023 Order. However, 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not provide any “admissible evidence,” and 

should be struck.

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II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. Testimony Based on “Knowledge, Information, and Belief” is Inadmissable

Plaintiff attempts to comply with the requirement of providing admissible 

evidence in two ways. First, Plaintiff swears to and subscribes the First Amended 

Complaint before a notary public. (Dkt. 17, pg 17). Second, Plaintiff swears to and 

subscribes the following oath:

After being duly sworn, the Plaintiff, Brandon Shane Dunn Crider, 

makes oath that the contents of the above-captioned Complaint are true 

and correct to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief.

(Dkt. 17, pg 18). Neither formulation provides for “admissible evidence” as required 

by the Court.

A skeletal "argument", really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve 

a claim. United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1230 (7th Cir. 1990). “Judges are 

not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” de la O v. Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 495, 

501 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991)). 

Perfunctory and conclusional assertions will not suffice. Id. Statements made on 

information and belief do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence under 

RULE 56(e). Bolen v. Dengel, 340 F.3d 300, 313 (5th Cir. 2003).1

RULE 56(e) requires statements in affidavits to be based on personal knowledge 

and not based on information and belief. Richardson v. Oldham, 12 F.3d 1373, 1378 (5th 

1 When evaluating admissible evidence presented in response to a motion to dismiss courts use the 

same standards that would apply under RULE 56(e). See, e.g., Davis v. Howard, 561 F.2d 565, 571-

72 (5th Cir. 1977).

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Cir. 1994) (instructing that statements "based on information and belief ... [are] struck 

as not based on personal knowledge and therefore fail[] the requirements of FED. R.

CIV. P. 56(e)"). Neither jurat contained within Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 

defines any testimony as based upon Plaintiff’s personal knowledge. Defining 

testimony as based upon “information, knowledge and belief” is insufficient to render 

any testimony admissible.

Verified pleadings may in some circumstances be treated as affidavits. See 

Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1980). Nonetheless, pleadings, like 

summary judgment affidavits, must meet RULE 56(e)'s requirement that statements 

"shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 

matters stated therein." Lodge Hall Music, Inc. v. Waco Wrangler Club, Inc., 831 F.2d 77, 

80 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)); see also Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 

1259, 1262 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that a verified complaint should be treated as the 

functional equivalent of an affidavit as long as it satisfies the requirements of RULE

56(e)). “Verification must be on personal knowledge alone . . . [not] verified only 

on ‘knowledge, information, and belief.’” Fowler v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 

150, 154 (5th Cir. 1965); see also Marron v. Ream, No. H-06-1394, 2006 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 72831, at *9 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Atakapa Indian De Creole Nation v. Edwards, 

No. 19-28-SDD-EWD, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8485, at *9 (M.D. La. 2019); 

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Charbonnet v. Malveaux, No. 15-799-JWD-RLB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25863, at *3 

(M.D. La. 2017).

Neither jurat within Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is sufficient to yield 

admissible evidence. As a matter of law, Plaintiff has failed to provide “admissible 

evidence” as required by the Court. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint should be 

struck.

B. Plaintiff’s Verification and Oath Are Insufficient to Define Facts to Support 

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

To characterize this case as “alleging a plausible set of facts establishing 

jurisdiction” contravenes established Fifth Circuit precedent, is contrary to an opinion2

from the Northern District of Texas involving these same plaintiff attorneys, does 

violence to the AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT and the rights of individuals with 

disabilities, and undermines public support for the ADA.

Far from presenting any true claims of injury or discrimination, the cookiecutter, re-hashed lawsuits filed by this Plaintiff and these attorneys have followed a 

familiar pattern of demanding unconscionable sums of money from small businesses.3

2 See Segovia v. Admiral Realty, Inc., 3:21-cv-2478-L, at *7 (N.D.Tex. August 4, 2022) (Plaintiff “has 

failed to demonstrate that he has ‘suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete 

and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;’ therefore, he lacks 

standing. Laufer, 996 F.3d at 272.”).

3 Interestingly (and perhaps tellingly), these cookie-cutter cases only require a brief copy-and-paste 

adaptation, an hour at the most. Yet, counsel seeks the same exorbitant amount ($10,000 to $15,500) 

in virtually each case. No conscientious lawyer will bill twice, let alone 60 times, for the same work, 

warmed over.

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These virtually identical vexatious lawsuits allege technical violations of the 

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA), citing to certain recommendations set 

forth in the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines. Each of these lawsuits 

focuses on allegations of non-compliance with signage, parking lots, and paths of 

travel, such as marked accessible parking, parking signage, and curb cuts, whether or 

not such allegations are factual or real. Each of the allegations is of the sort one could 

attempt to raise by examining Google Maps or other similar databases which include 

street level imagery. 

To date, this Plaintiff has filed at least nine (and Plaintiff’s counsel has filed 

more than 60) of these virtually identical cases in the Northern and Western Districts

of Texas. Each of these has the same boilerplate recitations such as “residing within 

30 miles,” “purchase general goods and services,” and “intends to revisit the subject 

property again in the next six months.” But none of these suits makes any attempt to 

specifically state personal facts regarding how any of alleged non-compliance 

prevented access by the plaintiff, or why the plaintiff requires that specific 

accommodation.

The issue is subject matter jurisdiction and “[t]he burden of proof for a Rule 

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction,” and “[a]t the pleading 

stage, the ‘burden is to allege a plausible set of facts establishing jurisdiction.’” Laufer 

v. Mann Hosp., L.L.C., 996 F.3d 269, 271-72 (5th Cir. 2021), quoting Ramming v. United

States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) and Physician Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius, 691 

F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff herein has failed to do so.

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Examination of “plausible set of facts establishing jurisdiction” must be done in 

the context of all of the more than 60 virtually identical suits in this entrepreneurial 

scheme. The boilerplate repetition in these belies any “plausible set of facts establishing 

jurisdiction.” If a plaintiff’s litigation history may undercut the attempt to prove a 

particularized interest, Hunter v. Branch Banking and Tr. Co., 2013 WL 4052411, at *5 

(N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2013), citing Norkunas v. Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, 2007 WL 

2949569, at * 4 (D.Nev. Oct.10, 2007) (stating that “a plaintiff’s litigation history can 

undercut the sincerity of his or her expressed intent to return”); Brother v. Tiger Partner, 

LLC, 331 F.Supp.2d 1368, 1374-75 (M.D.Fla.2004) (similar), then identical statements 

appearing in more than 60 cookie-cutter lawsuits brought by the same attorneys should 

substantially belie the sincerity of any attempt of this plaintiff to establish jurisdiction.

Mr. Crider has failed to meet, in detail, three criteria: (1) that he has an injury 

in fact; (2) that there is a causal connection between his injury and the conduct 

complained of; and (3) that his injury will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. 

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). By merely verifying the entirety 

of his boilerplate complaint, Plaintiff does not provide admissible evidence of the 

factual detail necessary to establish jurisdiction.4

4 Of course, Plaintiff’s verifications attempting to provide evidence as to the legal conclusions within 

his First Amended Complaint are improper and an additional reason to strike the Complaint. A 

witness cannot be allowed to give testimony on a question of law. “It must be posited as an a priori 

assumption that there is one, but only one, legal answer for every cognizable dispute. There being 

only one applicable legal rule for each dispute or issue, it requires only one spokesman of the law, 

who of course is the judge.” Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 673 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Specht v. 

Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1988)).

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An injury in fact must be “particularized” and must be “concrete.” Spokeo, Inc. 

v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016). “Particularized” injuries “affect the plaintiff in a 

personal and individual way.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Concrete 

injuries are “physical, monetary, or cognizable intangible harm[s] traditionally 

recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” TransUnion LLC v. 

Ramirez, 594 U.S. __, __, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2206, 210 L.Ed.2d 568 (2021); see also

Maddox v. Bank of New York Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 19 F.4th 58, 63-64 (2d Cir. 2021). “An 

uninjured plaintiff who sues seeking to ensure a defendant’s “compliance with 

regulatory law” (and, of course, to obtain some money)” lacks Article III standing. 

TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at ___,141 S.Ct. at 2206.

The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that Article III standing requires that ADA 

plaintiffs allege “in detail” how the supposed ADA violation will “negatively affect 

their day-to-day lives.” See Deutsch v. Annis Enterprises, Inc., 882 F.3d 169, 174 (5th Cir. 

2018); Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 235-36 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Deutsch 

v. Travis Cty. Shoe Hosp., Inc., 721 F. App'x 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2018). Mr. Crider’s

generalized boilerplate assertions, vague and deficient in any factual allegations related 

to him personally, are insufficient under binding precedent from the Fifth Circuit. “A 

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements’ 

of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

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III. CONCLUSION

A “deprivation of a right created by statute must be accompanied by ‘some 

concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation’” Laufer, 996 F.3d at 273. “[T]he 

public interest that private entities comply with the law” cannot “be converted into an 

individual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens 

(or, for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to 

sue.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at ___, 141 S.Ct. at 2206.

These 60 virtually identical cases, with their exorbitant, extortionary, pre-suit 

monetary demands, are a crass and clear attempt at a money grab. The boilerplate 

repetition without personal detail across these suits demonstrate “an uninjured 

plaintiff who sues seeking to ensure a defendant’s “compliance with regulatory law” 

(and, of course, to obtain some money)” TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at ___,141 S. Ct. 

at 2206.

These suits lack Article III standing. Id. Mr. Crider has failed to provide 

admissible evidence of either subject matter jurisdiction or a claim for which relief may 

be granted and his Complaint should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES, ARGUMENTS, and AUTHORITIES 

CONSIDERED, Defendant pray that Plaintiff’s claims for violation of the 

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT be dismissed, and that costs and attorneys’ fees 

be assessed against the Plaintiff and his counsel.

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DATED: February 10, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

Geoffrey N. Courtney

State Bar No. 00790514

ATTORNEY AT LAW

111 Soledad St., Suite 540

San Antonio, Texas 78205-1531

(210) 227-7121 - Telephone

(210) 227.0732 - Facsimile

GNCourtney@GNCourtney.com

________________________________

GEOFFREY N. COURTNEY

James C. Harrington

Texas Bar No. 09048500 

5304 Halmark Drive

Austin, TX 78723

(512) 771-1759 - Telephone

jim.harrington.austin@gmail.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

Eliot Shavin 

State Bar No. 18138200

Corinna Chandler

State Bar No. 24061272

CHANDLER & SHAVIN, PLLC

12377 Merit Drive, Suite 880

Dallas, Texas 75251

(214) 522-2010 - Telephone

Shavin@chandlershavin.com

LOCAL COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of February 2023, I electronically 

filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send 

notification of such filing to the following:

Duncan Strickland 

Counsel for Plaintiff 

State Bar No.: 24072374 

13423 Blanco Road, #936 

San Antonio, TX 78216 

Telephone: (210) 504-7874 

Facsimile: (832) 218-4317 

E-mail: Duncan@StricklandLawFirm.com

and I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document 

to the following non-CM/ECF participants:

NONE.

 /s/ Geoffrey N. Courtney______________ 

GEOFFREY N. COURTNEY

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