FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SOUHAIR KHATIB, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 08-56423

v. D.C. No.

COUNTY OF ORANGE, a political  8:07-cv-01012-

subdivision; MICHAEL S. CARONA, DOC-MLG

an individual; BRIAN COSSAIRT, an OPINION individual,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 13, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed March 15, 2011

Before: Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, Mary M. Schroeder,

Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Sidney R. Thomas,

M. Margaret McKeown, Raymond C. Fisher,

Ronald M. Gould, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Richard R. Clifton,

Sandra S. Ikuta, and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown;

Concurrence by Judge Gould

3587
COUNSEL

Jennifer Mathis and Becki F. Kieffer, Troutman Sanders LLP,

Irvine, California; Mark D. Rosenbaum (argued) and Hector

O. Villagra, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Los

Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

David D. Lawrence (argued) and Christina M. Sprenger, Lawrence Beach Allen & Choi, PC, Santa Ana, California, for the

defendants-appellees. 

Conor B. Dugan (argued) and Gregory B. Friel, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae United

States.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

Recognizing the significance of religious freedom in all

aspects of life, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA” or “the

Act”) to “protect[ ] institutionalized persons who are unable

freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore

3590 KHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE
dependent on the government’s permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544

U.S. 709, 721 (2005). RLUIPA prohibits state and local governments from imposing “a substantial burden on the religious

exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution”

unless the government demonstrates that imposing that burden “is the least restrictive means” of furthering “a compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The

term “institution” includes “a jail, prison, or other correctional

facility” and “a pretrial detention facility.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997(1)(B). We consider whether the Orange County Santa

Ana Courthouse holding facility, where every day hundreds

of individuals are detained in connection with court proceedings, is an “institution” as defined by RLUIPA. We conclude

that this facility is such an “institution” under RLUIPA, and

thus the Act covers persons detained at the facility. 

Our interpretation of the statute is guided by three principles. To begin, the focus of our inquiry is narrow and preliminary. The only question before us is whether Orange County’s

facility is an “institution” under RLUIPA; other courthouse or

detention facilities have unique characteristics that warrant

individualized review. Next, we are mindful that the issue of

accommodation—whether the substantial burden on religious

exercise is “the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest”—is distinct from the threshold

issue of whether the facility is a covered “institution” in the

first place. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The accommodation

question involves serious practical considerations regarding

institutional safety, security, and the feasibility of accommodation that are not before us now. Finally, Congress has

explicitly directed us to resolve any ambiguities in RLUIPA

“in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the

maximum extent permitted.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (emphasis added). With this framework in mind, we turn to the background of the case. 

KHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE 3591
BACKGROUND

Souhair Khatib is a practicing Muslim. In accordance with

her religious beliefs, Khatib wears a hijab, or headscarf, covering her hair and neck when in public. Khatib and her husband pled guilty in Orange County Superior Court to a

misdemeanor violation of California welfare law. The Khatibs

were sentenced to three years’ probation and ordered to complete thirty days of community service. 

Two days before the deadline for completing their community service, Khatib and her husband appeared in Orange

County Superior Court to seek an extension. The court

revoked Khatib’s probation and ordered her taken into custody. Khatib was handcuffed and taken to the Santa Ana

Courthouse’s holding facility. 

At the booking counter, a male officer ordered Khatib to

hand over her belongings and remove her headscarf. Having

her head uncovered in public, especially in front of men outside of her immediate family, is a “serious breach of [Khatib’s] faith and a deeply humiliating and defiling experience.”

Weeping, Khatib explained that her religious beliefs forbade

her from taking off her headscarf and pleaded with the officers to allow her to keep it on. Khatib was warned that the

male officers would remove the headscarf for her if she did

not voluntarily do so. Wanting to avoid being touched by the

male officers—another violation of her religious beliefs—

Khatib reluctantly complied. 

Khatib spent the majority of the day in a holding cell in

view of male officers and inmates. Experiencing “severe discomfort,” “distress,” and “humiliat[ion],” Khatib attempted to

cover herself by pulling her knees into her chest and covering

her head with a vest she was wearing. At a hearing that afternoon, the court reinstated Khatib’s probation and provided an

extension of time to complete community service. 

3592 KHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE
Khatib filed a complaint against the County of Orange, the

sheriff, and courthouse officers (“the County”), alleging,

among other things, violations of RLUIPA. The district court

dismissed Khatib’s RLUIPA claims on the ground that the

courthouse holding facility was not a covered institution

under the Act. The district court wrote at length about the

conditions in longer-term facilities and on the difference

between courthouse holding facilities and longer-term facilities such as correctional centers and prisons. The court concluded that because

an inmate’s stay in a courthouse holding facility is

generally temporary and transitory, . . . constant

movement within holding facilities makes unlimited

exercise of religious and expressive freedoms

impractical. Staff at such facilities do not have the

luxuries that make such freedoms feasible in longerterm institutions, to which RLUIPA plainly applies.

As a result, the Court cannot conclude that Congress

intended . . . RLUIPA to apply to courthouse holding

facilities. 

As we explain below, this exegesis about the practicality of

religious accommodation improperly merges two distinct

inquiries: whether the facility is an “institution,” and the government’s burden as to accommodation. Only the former

question is at issue in this appeal.

ANALYSIS

A. RLUIPA Overview

We apply well-established legal principles of statutory

interpretation. We begin, “as always,” with the text of the

statute. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001). We presume that Congress “says in a statute what it means and

means in a statute what it says there.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v.

Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). Thus, the plain meanKHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE 3593
ing of a statute controls where that meaning is unambiguous.

See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,

530 U.S. 238, 254 (2000).

[1] Section 3 of RLUIPA provides that 

[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden

on the religious exercise of a person residing in or

confined to an institution, as defined in [42 U.S.C.

§ 1997], even if the burden results from a rule of

general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Thus, an individual must have been

“residing in or confined to” a covered “institution” to invoke

the protections of the Act. The key interpretive question is

whether Khatib meets this criterion.

[2] RLUIPA incorporates by reference the definition of

“institution” from the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons

Act of 1980 (“CRIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq., which

defines the term to include “any facility or institution” that is

“a jail, prison, or other correctional facility [or] a pretrial

detention facility.”

1

 Under the ordinary, common meaning of

these terms, the Santa Ana Courthouse holding facility falls

within the definitions of “pretrial detention facility” and of

1CRIPA’s legislative history is consistent with RLUIPA’s broad mandate. According to the House Conference Report on CRIPA, “pretrial

detention facility” is a “generic term . . . intended to cover any institution

or facility which confines detainees who are awaiting or participating in

criminal trials.” H.R. Rep. No. 96-897, at 10 (1980) (Conf. Rep.),

reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 832, 834. The term “jail or prison or other

correctional facility” is similarly broad and encompasses “those institutions in which persons are wholly or partially confined or housed as part

of a criminal sanction or process.” Id. 

3594 KHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE
“jail.”2

See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)

(instructing that “unless otherwise defined, words will be

interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common

meaning”). In reaching this conclusion, we begin with the

County’s own description of the facility.

B. The Santa Ana Courthouse Holding Facility

The best description of the Santa Ana Courthouse holding

facility comes from the Orange County Grand Jury Report, an

annual publication mandated by state law.3 The 2006-2007

report lists the courthouse facility as one of Orange County’s

adult jail facilities and describes it as follows:

COURT HOLDING FACILITY is a secure detention facility located within a court building used for

the confinement of persons solely for the purpose of

a court appearance for a period not exceeding 12

hours. 

2006-2007 ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY, THE STATE OF

ORANGE COUNTY JAILS AND PROGRAMS 1 (June 7, 2007)

(“Grand Jury Report”). The facility is further described by the

County as a “labyrinth of sub-basements, tunnel[s], secured

elevators, and holding cells” through which approximately

600 inmates travel each day. Id. at 4. The facility holds indi2Because there is no ambiguity in the statute and the plain meaning

compels our conclusion, we need not rely on RLUIPA’s generous rule of

construction in this case. However, to the extent there is any question as

to the statute’s applicability, Congress’s mandate that we construe the Act

in favor of “broad protection of religious exercise” to institutionalized persons serves to reinforce our analysis. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g). 

3

See Cal. Penal Code § 919(b). Khatib submitted the 2006-2007 and

2007-2008 reports to the district court, along with a request to take judicial

notice. We construe the court’s incorporation of the reports into its order

as effectively taking judicial notice of the documents. See United States

v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) (courts may take judicial

notice of public reports). 

KHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE 3595
viduals taken into custody at the courthouse as well as

inmates who are transferred from other facilities to appear at

court hearings or trial. Inmates brought into the facility are

“segregated by race, gang affiliation, criminal level of intensity, and other characteristics to prevent trouble.” Id. 

C. Whether the Facility is a “Pretrial Detention 

Facility”

[3] The Santa Ana facility easily fits within the definition

of a “pretrial detention facility.” Because neither RLUIPA nor

CRIPA defines “pretrial detention facility,” we look to the

ordinary meaning of the words to define the term. See Perrin,

444 U.S. at 42. Detention is commonly understood as “a

period of temporary custody prior to disposition by a court.”

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged

616 (1993); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 514 (9th ed.

2009) (“detention” is “[t]he act or fact of holding a person in

custody; confinement or compulsory delay”). The most common definition of a “pretrial detainee” is an individual who is

held in custody pending adjudication of guilt or innocence.

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-37 (1979). Pretrial

detention is simply the “holding of a defendant before trial on

criminal charges.” Black’s Law Dictionary 514. It is thus evident that the common, ordinary meaning of a “pretrial detention facility” is precisely what that phrase suggests: a facility

where individuals who are not yet convicted are held pending

court proceedings. To determine whether the Santa Ana facility falls within this definition we begin with the most logical

place—the County’s own characterization of the facility.

According to the 2006-2007 Grand Jury Report, the Santa

Ana facility is “a secure detention facility located within a

court building used for the confinement of persons.” Grand

Jury Report at 1 (emphasis added). The emphasized words in

this description are an exact match to the text of RLUIPA.

The facility’s main purpose is to temporarily hold individuals

who are awaiting court proceedings, including individuals

3596 KHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE
awaiting trial.4

See id. (the facility is “for the confinement of

persons solely for the purpose of a court appearance”). Our

conclusion could hardly be clearer. Based on the plain meaning of a “pretrial detention facility,” the Santa Ana Courthouse holding facility fits the bill. That Khatib was confined

to the facility is undisputed. 

[4] The County argues that RLUIPA only affords protection to inmates at long-term facilities with residential capabilities. This interpretation reads into the statute an additional

qualification where none exists. The Act does not include any

temporal restriction on the term “institution.” Nor should we

import such a requirement, especially in light of the generous

interpretative rule set forth by Congress.5See United States v.

W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)

(where Congress expressly instructs that provisions of a statute shall be construed liberally, “we should not . . . read into

the statute an unwritten additional hurdle, even if well intentioned”). RLUIPA plainly covers persons “residing in or confined to an institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (emphasis

added). Had Congress intended to cover only long-term, residential facilities, it would not have enacted a provision that

4The fact that Khatib herself was not technically a pretrial detainee

because she had already been adjudicated guilty is of no import. Coverage

under the statute does not hinge on the status of a particular individual or

plaintiff. Rather, the statute protects the religious liberty of individuals

who reside in or are confined to different types of “institutions.” Khatib

was without doubt “confined” to the Santa Ana Courthouse holding facility. 

5Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) states that “[t]his chapter shall be

construed in favor of broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.”

Although “this chapter” is a reference to RLUIPA, and an “institution”

(i.e., a “jail, prison, or other correctional facility,” or a “pretrial detention

facility”) is defined in CRIPA, a separate chapter, RLUIPA incorporates

CRIPA by reference. The question whether the principle of construction

set forth in § 2000cc-3(g) applies to statutory terms in CRIPA need not be

resolved here, however, because we can resolve this case without resorting

to RLUIPA’s interpretative rule. 

KHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE 3597
includes both “confined to” and “residing in.” See Mountain

States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237,

249 (1985) (it is an “elementary canon of construction that a

statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative”) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392

(1979)); Duncan, 533 U.S. at 174 (“It is our duty to give

effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”)

(quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539

(1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The County’s further argument that “pretrial detention”

necessarily “lasts for a material and indefinite period of time”

is not borne out in either case law or the real world. “Pretrial

detention is by nature temporary,” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.

103, 110 n.11 (1975), and in practice it often lasts for short

periods of time, see, e.g., Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d

1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2006) (defendant was arrested and

held at the Ventura County “pretrial detention facility” for

“several hours” before she was released on bail). 

[5] In sum, we are unpersuaded by the County’s efforts to

redefine the nature of the Santa Ana facility and to insert a

temporal element into the statute. Based on the plain meaning

of the term “pretrial detention facility” and the Grand Jury

Report, the Santa Ana facility is an “institution” under

RLUIPA.

D. Whether the Facility is a “Jail”

[6] Although the Santa Ana detention facility best fits

within the definition of a “pretrial detention facility,” it also

falls within the definition of a “jail.”

6

 Like the term “pretrial

6The United States appears in this appeal as an amicus curiae and, like

Khatib, urges us to hold that the Santa Ana Courthouse holding facility

meets the definition of both a “pretrial detention facility” and a “jail.” In

its brief, the United States underscored that “Congress intended the term

‘institution’ to have a broad and expansive meaning that easily encompasses the courthouse holding facility at issue in this case.” Amici Br. at

9. 

3598 KHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE
detention facility,” because “jail” is not defined in RLUIPA

or CRIPA, we turn to the dictionary. A “jail” is a “building

for the confinement of persons held in lawful custody (as for

minor offenses or some future judicial proceeding).” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 1208;

see also Black’s Law Dictionary 910 (“jail” is a generic term,

used to describe “[a] local government’s detention center

where persons awaiting trial or those convicted of misdemeanors are confined”). 

[7] While RLUIPA requires us to “construe” it “in favor of

broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent

permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution,”

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g), we need not stretch the term “jail”

in the context of the Santa Ana Courthouse holding facility.

Looking yet again to the County’s own description of the

facility, a “secure detention facility . . . for the confinement

of persons solely for the purpose of a court appearance” falls

squarely within the ordinary, common definition of a “jail.”

Grand Jury Report at 1. 

The County suggests that, in adopting an expansive definition of jail, all pretrial detention facilities would be subsumed

within the statute, with wide-ranging consequences. We are

not persuaded by this “sky is falling” logic. Our role is to

interpret the language as written, not to speculate as to the

breadth of potential coverage in a case down the road.

Under the statute, determining whether a facility is a covered institution is a question of function, not just labeling. It

would not be surprising to find functionally identical facilities

labeled as a jail in one jurisdiction and a pretrial detention

facility in another. Nor is it inconsistent that RLUIPA

employs the generic terms “jail” and “pretrial detention facility” in a flexible and somewhat overlapping manner to ensure

that a broad range of custodial facilities are brought within its

reach. This interpretation of RLUIPA’s coverage ensures

“broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum

KHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE 3599
extent permitted.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (emphasis added).

Yet the County would have us construe RLUIPA to categorically exclude a pretrial detention facility that holds up to 600

inmates a day simply because it is located in the courthouse

and the inmates are confined there for relatively short periods.

We do not embrace such a restrictive interpretation in light of

the plain language of the statute and the clearly expressed

congressional intent.

E. The District Court’s Ruling

[8] In resolving the motion to dismiss, the district court

sidestepped the statutory analysis set out above, and instead

focused on the obstacles the Santa Ana Courthouse facility

would face in accommodating religious exercise by Khatib or

any other detainee. This approach put the cart before the

horse. Security and administrative concerns that could frustrate a facility’s ability to accommodate religious exercise do

not implicate whether that facility is an “institution.” Inserting

these concerns into the coverage prong of RLUIPA was error.

The district court should address such concerns at summary

judgment, when it considers whether the burden the County

imposed on Khatib was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-1(a); see also, e.g., Greene v. Solano County Jail,

513 F.3d 982, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2008) (addressing at summary

judgment the county’s argument that group worship was

impracticable at a maximum security facility because the

facility lacked appropriate resources to ensure safety).

[9] The district court also went astray when it reasoned

that short-term detention facilities must be excluded from

RLUIPA because short-term detainees cannot meet the

exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”). No substantive provision of RLUIPA references

the PLRA; the district court’s theory has no basis in the text

of the statute. Further, the PLRA only requires exhaustion of

“administrative remedies as are available,” and thus

3600 KHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE
expressly contemplates cases like Khatib’s where such remedies do not exist. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added).

Finally, inventing an extra-textual limitation on RLUIPA’s

coverage directly contravenes Congress’s instruction that

judges construe the statute in favor of “broad protection of

religious exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g).

CONCLUSION

[10] The County’s argument reduces to the claim that

because the application of RLUIPA to the courthouse holding

facility is impractical and inconvenient the facility must not

fall within the Act’s definition of “institution.” But this

approach conflates RLUIPA’s coverage and accommodation

prongs. Congress certainly had real-world consequences in

mind when it enacted RLUIPA, and the text of the statute

indicates that it did not intend to minimize the serious security

and other management interests of institutions. It chose, however, to deal with accommodation issues as a second step in

the analysis, not by categorically excluding facilities like the

Santa Ana Courthouse holding facility from RLUIPA. 

The County’s argument will not go unaddressed. RLUIPA

tasks courts with deciding, on a case-by-case basis, whether

the particular restrictions an institution imposes on the religious liberty of its inmates are justified. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-1(a). Given the diversity of courthouse holding

facilities and inmate religious practices, such tailored adjudication accommodates the balance of religious freedom and

institutional order. As the Supreme Court wrote in Cutter,

“[s]hould inmate requests for religious accommodations

become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning of

an institution, the facility would be free to resist the imposition.” 544 U.S. at 726. But, more importantly, regardless of

what we judges think, we are bound by the unambiguous lanKHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE 3601
guage of the statute. RLUIPA plainly covers the Santa Ana

Courthouse holding facility.7

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

GOULD, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur. I agree with Judge McKeown’s opinion that the

Orange County Santa Ana Courthouse holding facility is a

“jail, prison or other correctional facility,” or “a pretrial

detention facility,” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997(1). And I agree that if RLUIPA’s statutory coverage

is invoked, then the state still has the opportunity to justify

restrictions that further a compelling governmental interest

using the least restrictive means and that technically that issue

is not now before us. 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a). However, I write

separately to emphasize an additional factor supporting our

decision that RLUIPA covers the Santa Ana facility. 

In deciding the issue of coverage, we should not lose sight

of the reality that if RLUIPA does not apply, a Muslim

woman in custody loses an important statutory protection for

her religious preference to wear a hijab, a traditional

headscarf—a preference that Congress aimed to protect. It is

commonplace, and has been for centuries, to interpret

ambiguities in remedial statutes by considering three points:

“the old law, the mischief, and the remedy.” 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *87. We are to consider the preexisting

state of the law and what “mischief” Congress intended to

remedy when it enacted the remedial statute. “And it is the

business of the judges so to construe the act as to suppress the

mischief and advance the remedy.” Id. See also Nix v. James,

7On appeal, Khatib also argues that the district court improperly converted the County’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. In light of our decision, we need not address this issue. 

3602 KHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE
7 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1925) (holding that a remedial statute is

“entitled to a liberal construction”). When “words are dubious” and the meaning of a statute seems unclear, we may consider the “reason and spirit” of the law. Blackstone at *60-61.

Such an approach is consistent with RLUIPA’s explicit command that we construe the statute “in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by

the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C.

2000cc-3(g). 

Doubtless Congress intended to safeguard the permissible

religious observance of powerless persons incarcerated by the

state. The legislative history of RLUIPA indicates that Congress, in reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in City of

Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), sought to restore

where constitutionally permissible the protections of the partially invalidated Religious Freedom Restoration Act

(“RFRA”). H.R. Rep. No. 106-219, at 5-12 (1999). Congress

heard testimony describing government facilities that regularly denied individuals the right to exercise their religion.

That testimony included many examples of government facilities that refused to accommodate religious practices, like

wearing religious headwear or eating a kosher diet, until those

facilities were “advised of the possibility of a lawsuit under

RFRA.” Id. at 10. This type of government restriction of religious observance “is the mischief which gives understanding

of the remedy.” People v. Westchester Cnty Nat’l Bank of

Peekskill, N.Y., 132 N.E. 241, (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). It is clear from the legislative history that Congress

intended to reinstate RFRA’s protections against such restrictions when it passed RLUIPA.

A Muslim woman who must appear before strange men she

doesn’t know, with her hair and neck uncovered in a violation

of her religious beliefs, may feel shame and distress. This is

precisely the kind of “mischief” RLUIPA was intended to

remedy. A recognition of this very real harm helps inform our

judgment on the scope of covered institutions. Under longKHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE 3603
observed canons of statutory construction, and under the

terms of RLUIPA itself, it is proper to construe the statute

broadly to give effect to the religious protection intended by

Congress. 

3604 KHATIB v. COUNTY OF ORANGE