Filed 3/22/22 Woods v. Superior Court CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

BYRON O. WOODS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS 

ANGELES,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B313502

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20LBCV00525)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Marc C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.

Byron O. Woods, Sr., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Cummings, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Assoc., Sarah L. 

Overton, for Defendant and Respondent.

___________________________________
2

Plaintiff and appellant Byron O. Woods brought this 42 

United States Code section 1983 action (1983 action) against the 

Superior Court of California (the Superior Court), alleging claims 

for damages arising from the court clerk’s mishandling of a City 

of Long Beach prosecution against Woods for driving while under 

the influence (DUI).1 Woods alleges that from 2011 to 2013, the 

clerk failed to notify him about the filing of the criminal 

complaint, to correctly index the complaint, to notify Woods about 

fees and fines he had to pay as part of the judgment, to hold a 

hearing to assess whether Woods could pay the fees and fines, or 

to waive an attorney fees assessment. Woods alleged that as a 

result he was denied law enforcement jobs at unspecified times 

during the ensuing nine years, and denied internships with the 

District Attorney’s and Public Defender’s Offices in 2020. The 

trial court sustained the Superior Court’s demurrer to the 

complaint without leave to amend on the grounds that the 

complaint was time-barred and the Superior Court enjoyed 

absolute immunity for the quasi-judicial conduct of its clerk. 

We affirm. A court is absolutely immune from liability 

arising from a court clerk’s performance of quasi-judicial duties.

1 Woods originally named the “City of Long Beach Clerk’s 

Office, Governor George Deukmejian Courthouse” as the 

defendant, then amended the complaint to name the “Superior 

Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Governor George 

Deukmejian Courthouse” and “County Clerk’s Office, Superior 

Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Governor George 

Deukmejian Courthouse” as defendants. On appeal, Woods 

moved to change the caption of this case to name the “Superior 

Court of California, County of Los Angeles, et al.” as defendants. 

We grant the motion in part, as reflected in the caption above. 
3

BACKGROUND

We take the facts from the first amended complaint, 

assuming they are true for purposes of this appeal, and from 

court records of which the trial court took judicial notice.

On September 14, 2011, Woods appeared for arraignment

in an underlying DUI action, but when his case was not called

the court clerk informed him no complaint had been filed, and 

gave him a document indicating he had properly appeared. On 

October 5, 2011, Woods was informed that a bench warrant had 

nevertheless been issued for his arrest due to his failure to 

appear. He appeared at the warrant hearing the following day 

and was given a new arraignment date of October 20, 2011. He 

appeared on that date, pled nolo contendere to DUI, and was 

sentenced to three years of probation; payment of a fine or 

performance of community service in lieu thereof; enrollment in 

an alcohol education and counseling program; and payment of 

$129 in attorney fees pursuant to Penal Code section 987.8, $120 

in court costs, $100 in restitution, and $129 in booking fees. 

On the advice of a financial evaluator in the Public 

Defender’s Office, Woods performed community service in lieu of 

paying some of the fines, but the court’s records continued to 

show they were still owing. As a result of the nonpayment, the 

court scheduled a hearing for which Woods, who had moved and 

believed no cause remained to update the court on his address, 

received no notice. When he failed to appear, additional fines 

and fees were assessed. Woods paid all amounts by August 23, 

2013, but the court clerk “quietly and without notice” submitted 

his case “to collections” for failure to pay a $159 attorney fee 

assessment. 
4

After 2011, Woods applied to several law enforcement jobs, 

and in 2020 applied for internships with the Riverside County 

District Attorney’s Office and the San Bernardino Public 

Defender’s Office. All agencies rejected his applications due to 

his extant DUI case. 

On August 11, 2020, Woods learned for the first time that 

the DUI from 2011 remained open due to the unpaid attorney fee 

assessment, although the court clerk continued to inform him he 

owed no money. Woods alleged that the clerk breached a duty 

pursuant to Penal Code section 987.8 to give him notice of the 

assessment and hold a hearing to determine his ability to pay it.

Woods sued the Superior Court on September 14, 2011, 

under 42 United States Code section 1983, alleging “[t]he Clerk’s 

office failed to perform a mandatory judicial ministerial 

function . . . by failing to place [Woods’s] misdemeanor 

information on the [Superior Court’s] index,” and failed to comply 

with Government Code sections 815.6 and 69842. Woods alleged 

the court clerks “should be liable because of their failure to 

perform that judicial act, which was a mandatory judicial act in 

violation of a declaratory decree, Gov. Code Section 69842.” He 

alleged that the clerks’ “quasi-judicial immunity for this 

mandatory ministerial function should be abrogated due to their 

egregious actions.” 

Woods prayed for an order correcting the record in the 

underlying DUI action; a determination why the court clerk 

failed to notify him that the fees and fines were due; an order 

finding that the Superior Court erred in issuing a bench warrant 

for his failure to appear at the initial arraignment; and $1 million 

in damages. 
5

The Superior Court demurred to Woods’s first amended 

complaint, which is operative, arguing the state was immune 

from liability under the Eleventh Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, the Superior Court as a judicial body was 

immune from liability in its own right, the action was timebarred, and Woods failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause 

of action. 

On April 8, 2021, the trial court issued a tentative ruling, 

which it adopted after oral argument, sustaining the demurrer 

without leave to amend. The court found that because the 

alleged actions of the Superior Court clerks were judicial in 

nature or part of the judicial process, the clerks enjoyed absolute 

quasi-judicial immunity from liability, which the Superior Court 

as their employer also enjoyed pursuant to Government Code 

section 815.2, subdivision (b). 

The court further found that based on the face of the 

complaint, Woods was on notice at least by the bench warrant 

hearing in October 2011 that the court clerk failed to properly 

index the DUI complaint, and that he owed the fines and fees 

assessed at the sentencing hearing on October 20, 2011. The 

court therefore concluded that the pertinent three-year 

limitations period ran long before Woods filed his complaint in 

2020. Finding these defects could not be cured by amendment, 

the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.

Woods appeals from the resulting judgment.

DISCUSSION

Woods contends the trial court erred in sustaining the 

Superior Court’s demurrer because the immunity enjoyed by 

court clerks when performing quasi-judicial duties does not apply 

when the duties are mandatory. We disagree.
6

Preliminarily, the Superior Court argues Woods’s appeal 

should be dismissed because he (1) certified an inadequate record 

that fails to include the demurrer or opposition; (2) certified an 

inaccurate record that includes documents not before the trial 

court; and (3) fails to support his arguments with citation to the 

record or pertinent authority. Because the record is adequate to 

afford meaningful review, we will ignore any such delicts.2

On review of a trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer we

“examine the complaint de novo.” (McCall v. PacifiCare of 

California, Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415.) “We give the 

complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and 

its parts in their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the 

demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do 

not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of 

law. [Citations.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine 

whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause 

of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to 

amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that 

the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial 

court has abused its discretion and we reverse.” (City of Dinuba 

v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865.)

“A public entity is not liable for an injury,” “[e]xcept as 

otherwise provided by statute.” (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) 

“Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not 

liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an 

2

For the same reason, we deny the court’s motion to strike 

documents Woods filed on appeal that were not before the trial 

court.
7

employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from 

liability.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (b).)

A judicial officer is immune from liability arising from his 

or her exercise of judicial authority. (Bradley v. Fisher (1871) 80 

U.S. 335, 347; see also Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 

843, 852 [judicial immunity is “deeply rooted in California law”].)

Judicial immunity extends “to persons other than judges if 

those persons act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” 

(Howard v. Drapkin, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at pp. 852-853.) As 

pertinent here, that immunity extends to court clerks performing 

purely administrative duties that are part of the judicial process. 

(In re Castillo (9th Cir. 2002) 297 F.3d 940, 952; Rodriguez v. 

Weprin (2d Cir. 1997) 116 F.3d 62; Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy 

Court for Dist. of Nevada (9th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d 1385, 1390

[“[c]ourt clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from 

damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that 

are an integral part of the judicial process”]; Castillo, at p. 1273

[“court personnel are immune from administrative tasks if these 

tasks are ‘judicial in nature and an integral part of the judicial 

process’ ”].)

“[A]bsolute judicial immunity extends not only to claims for 

damages but to actions for equitable relief as well.” (Twin Sisters 

Gun Club v. Emlen (E.D. Cal., Mar. 15, 2018, No. 2:17-cv-01526-

MCE-GGH) 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 43030, at pp. *25-26.)

Here, Woods alleges that the Superior Court’s clerks failed 

to properly index his DUI case or notify him about fines and fees. 

These are administrative tasks that are judicial in nature and an 

integral part of the judicial process. The clerks are therefore 

absolutely immune from liability for injuries arising from 

performing or failing to perform those tasks. Because the clerks 
8

are immune, so too is the Superior Court. (Gov. Code, §§ 815, 

subd. (a), 815.2, subd. (b).) Therefore, its demurrer was properly 

sustained.

Woods concedes the court clerks’ actions were part of the 

judicial process, and recognizes that the clerks enjoy absolute 

quasi-judicial immunity, but argues (with citation to no authority

except a repealed article of the Maryland Annotated Code titled 

“Clerks of Courts”) that immunity should not apply here because 

the clerks’ duties were mandatory rather than discretionary, and 

because the clerks breached a plea agreement Woods had reached

with the judge presiding over the underlying DUI action. 

The argument is without merit. Many of a court clerk’s 

duties pertain to substantial rights, including constitutional 

rights, and affect such things as plea agreements, settlement 

arrangements, and so forth. And many are imposed upon the 

clerk in mandatory language. But judicial immunity makes no 

distinction between mandatory and discretionary duties, or 

harmful versus innocuous consequences resulting from the 

breach of those duties. 

Immunity protects the freedom of a judicial officer “to act 

upon his [or her] own convictions, without apprehension of 

personal consequences to himself [or herself]. Liability to answer 

to every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the 

judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, 

and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary 

can be either respectable or useful.” (Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 80 

U.S. at p. 347.) That freedom must be protected whatever the 

origin or nature of judicial duty, whether mandatory or 

discretionary, momentous or routine.
9

In Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 

of Nevada, for example, the plaintiff alleged that the court clerks 

improperly accepted a bankruptcy petition for filing, failed to 

accept a proper amended petition, and failed to give required 

notice regarding the bankruptcy petition. (Mullis v. U.S. 

Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nevada, supra, 828 F.2d at p. 

1385.) The court held that absolute quasi-judicial immunity 

applied to the clerks’ action regardless of whether it exceeded the 

bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, and “even if it result[ed] in ‘grave 

procedural errors.’ ” (Id. at p. 1390.)

So too here. Woods well recognizes the doctrine of absolute 

quasi-judicial immunity—he cites it in the complaint and 

cogently sets forth its parameters both there and in his briefing 

on appeal. He simply urges that an exception be made under the 

circumstance of this case. But no authority or principle supports 

such an exception.

Given the Superior Court’s absolute immunity, Woods 

offers no theory or facts under which he could amend the 

complaint to state a cause of action, and we discern none. We 

therefore conclude that leave to amend was properly denied. 

We need not reach whether Woods’s complaint was timebarred, whether the Superior Court enjoys sovereign immunity

under the Eleventh Amendment, or whether absent defendant’s 

immunity the complaint would adequately state a cause of action.
10

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is to recover its 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CRANDALL, J.*

*

Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.