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<body><div class="header"><p class="header">APHIS Evaluation of Slovakia – CSF, SVD, FMD, and Rinderpest
January 2011
</p>
<p class="header">______________________________________________________________________________________</p>
</div>
<p><img src="embedded:image16.emf" alt="image16.emf"><img src="embedded:image17.emf" alt="image17.emf"><b>   

</b></p>
<p><b>APHIS Evaluation of the Status of Slovakia Regarding Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest</b></p>
<p><b>Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
</b></p>
<p><b>Veterinary Services
</b></p>
<p><b>January 2011</b></p>
<p><b><u>Abbreviations</u></b></p>
<p>APHIS

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
</p>
<p>BIP

Border Inspection Post
</p>
<p>CDB

Central Database
</p>
<p>CFR

Code of Federal Regulations
</p>
<p>CSF

Classical Swine Fever
</p>
<p>CVED

Common Veterinary Entry Document
</p>
<p>CVO

Chief Veterinary Officer
</p>
<p>DVFA

District Veterinary and Food Administration
</p>
<p>EC

European Commission
</p>
<p>EU

European Union
</p>
<p>FMD

Foot and mouth disease
</p>
<p>FVO

Food and Veterinary Office (European Commission)
</p>
<p>LDCC

Local Disease Control Center
</p>
<p>NPVP

National Plan for Veterinary Protection
</p>
<p>NDCC

National Disease Control Center
</p>
<p>OIE

World Organization for Animal Health
</p>
<p>RVFA

Regional Veterinary and Food Administration
</p>
<p>SVD

Swine Vesicular Disease
</p>
<p>SVFA

State Veterinary and Food Administration of the Slovak Republic
</p>
<p>SVI

State Veterinary Institute</p>
<p>TRACES
Trade Control and Expert System
</p>
<p><u>APHIS-defined EU CSF region (9 CFR 93.500 and 94.0)</u>: 

</p>
<p>The EU Member States of Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man, and Northern Ireland).
</p>
<p><b><u>Table of contents</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>4</b><a href="_Toc264361087"><b><u>Executive summary</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>8</b><a href="_Toc264361088"><b><u>Hazard identification</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2">8<a href="_Toc264361089"><u>1.</u>
<u>Classical swine fever virus</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">9<a href="_Toc264361090"><u>2.</u>
<u>Swine vesicular disease virus</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">9<a href="_Toc264361091"><u>3.</u>
<u>Foot and mouth disease virus</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>11</b><a href="_Toc264361092"><b><u>Release assessment</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2">11<a href="_Toc264361093"><u>1.</u>
<u>Authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">19<a href="_Toc264361094"><u>2.</u>
<u>Disease status in the region</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">25<a href="_Toc264361095"><u>3.</u>
<u>Disease status of adjacent regions</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">27<a href="_Toc264361096"><u>4.</u>
<u>Extent of an active disease control program</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">32<a href="_Toc264361097"><u>5.</u>
<u>Vaccination status of the region</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">36<a href="_Toc264361098"><u>6. </u>
<u>Separation from adjacent regions of higher risk</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">37<a href="_Toc264361099"><u>7.</u>
<u>Movement control and biosecurity from higher risk regions</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">50<a href="_Toc264361100"><u>8.</u>
<u>Livestock demographics and marketing practices in the region</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">55<a href="_Toc264361101"><u>9.</u>
<u>Disease surveillance in the region</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">58<a href="_Toc264361102"><u>10.</u>
<u>Diagnostic laboratory capacity</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">60<a href="_Toc264361103"><u>11.</u>
<u>Emergency response capability</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">64<a href="_Toc264361104"><u>12.</u>
<u>Discussion of identified risk factors</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">75<a href="_Toc264361105"><u>13. </u>
<u>Release assessment conclusions</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>77</b><a href="_Toc264361106"><b><u>Exposure assessment</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2">77<a href="_Toc264361107"><u>1.</u>
<u>Waste feeding to susceptible swine</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">78<a href="_Toc264361108"><u>2.</u>
<u>Imported live animals</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">78<a href="_Toc264361109"><u>3.</u>
<u>Imported genetic material</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>80</b><a href="_Toc264361110"><b><u>Consequence assessment</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_2">80<a href="_Toc264361111"><u>1.</u>
<u>Effects on animal health and production</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">81<a href="_Toc264361112"><u>2.</u>
<u>Control and eradication costs</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">82<a href="_Toc264361113"><u>3.</u>
<u>Effect on the environment</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">82<a href="_Toc264361114"><u>4.</u>
<u>Effect on public health</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_2">82<a href="_Toc264361115"><u>5.</u>
<u>Indirect consequences</u>
</a><u>
</u></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>84</b><a href="_Toc264361116"><b><u>Risk Estimation</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>85</b><a href="_Toc264361117"><b><u>Annexes</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>85</b><a href="_Toc264361118"><b><u>Annex 1: Text of Title 9 <i>Code of Federal Regulations</i> 94.11, 94.13, 94.24, and 98.38.</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>90</b><a href="_Toc264361119"><b><u>Annex 2: Slovakia import data 2002 – 2007 (GTA 2008)</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>92</b><a href="_Toc264361120"><b><u>Annex 3: CSF Surveillance</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p class="tOC_1"><b>94</b><a href="_Toc264361121"><b><u>References</u>
</b></a><b><u>
</u></b></p>
<p><u>
</u></p>
<h1>Executive summary</h1>
<p>The Republic of Slovakia submitted requests to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to be considered free of classical swine fever (CSF), swine vesicular disease (SVD), and foot and mouth disease (FMD) and rinderpest in 2002, 2001, and 1997, respectively. Upon receipt of the requests, APHIS initiated an evaluation of Slovakia’s status with regard to CSF, SVD, FMD and rinderpest in order to assess the risk of opening trade with this country.  
</p>
<p>On 1 May 2004, Slovakia and nine other countries became new Member States of the European Union (EU). As part of the accession process, Slovakia adopted the decisions and directives of the European Commission (EC) regarding animal health, welfare, and identification, including those pertaining to CSF, SVD, and FMD. These decisions and directives became the basis for new standard operating procedures by the time of accession. Slovakia also adopted the harmonized EC legislation regarding import, export, and trade of live animals, meat, and animal products.
</p>
<p>This report represents APHIS’ evaluation of the status of Slovakia with regard to the infrastructure and control measures in place for these three diseases and includes an assessment of disease surveillance measures, import practices, laboratory capacity, emergency response procedures, and other factors that could influence the risk of disease introduction and spread. Since a previous APHIS analysis of the EU prior to accession of the 10 new Member States concluded that the EC control measures for CSF are effective (APHIS 2000), this CSF evaluation focuses in large part on the implementation of EC controls in Slovakia. 
</p>
<p>Supporting documentation for this evaluation consists of documentation provided by Slovakia, observations of a site visit team, information from the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), peer-reviewed articles, reports of missions conducted by the Food and Veterinary Office of the European Commission, and other technical sources. APHIS considered information provided by Slovakia before, during, and after a site visit conducted in November 2004. APHIS used all of the information gathered during the evaluation process to identify risk factors that may require further mitigation. 
</p>
<p>This risk analysis was conducted according to OIE guidelines and therefore includes a hazard identification section, a release assessment, an exposure assessment, a consequence assessment, and a risk estimate. The hazards under consideration are the CSF, SVD, FMD, and rinderpest viruses. Based on the release assessment, APHIS has no evidence that any of these hazards currently exist in domestic swine in Slovakia, although CSF virus is endemic in segments of the wild boar population. CSF virus was last detected in Slovakian domestic swine 16 July 2008.  Slovakia has not reported a case of FMD since 1973 or rinderpest since 1881, and SVD has never been reported in the domestic swine population.  </p>
<p>
<i>Release assessment
</i></p>
<p>FMD was last reported in Slovakia more than 30 years ago; it has been more than 100 years since the last reported outbreak of rinderpest, and SVD has never been reported in the domestic swine population.  Hence the release assessment focuses on the risk of CSF introduction into the domestic swine population in Slovakia. CSF virus circulating among wild boar in Slovakia poses a risk of exposure of domestic swine, as evidenced by the fact that most of the domestic swine outbreaks since 2001 have been attributed to direct or indirect wild boar contact. Slovakian authorities have been proactive in determining CSF-infected areas, initiating control measures and movement restrictions for domestic swine when surveillance detects the virus in wild boar. Slovakian export and trade in domestic swine, swine germplasm and swine products from infected regions are prohibited or severely restricted. A comprehensive plan is in place and has been active for several years with the goal of eradication of CSF in wild boar by utilization of oral vaccination, strategic population reduction, and other disease control practices and methods. 
</p>
<p>The eradication program has been successful to the extent that the level of CSF infection, confirmed through virological testing, in the wild boar population is declining, and several previously infected areas have been released from restrictions. However, based on the current epidemiological situation, CSF virus is likely to remain active at a low level in wild boar in Slovakia for several more years. Additionally, in 2008, newly infected areas with outbreaks in domestic swine were attributed to extended range of CSF-positive wild boar. </p>
<p>The export risk from non-restricted areas is mitigated by commercial production and biosecurity practices on swine confinement operations such as breeding farms, semen collection centers, and large production units. Production and slaughter systems in Slovakia are such that large commercial confinement operations are the most likely source of swine commodities for export to the United States. </p>
<p>Considering the current European epidemiological situation in domestic swine and wild boar, the EC control measures and movement restrictions in place for domestic swine from regions where CSF virus has been detected in wild boar, observed biosecurity standards, and current CSF surveillance practices, APHIS concluded that the export (release) risk to the United States is low. Furthermore, if APHIS opened the U.S. market to Slovakia, additional risk mitigation measures would include prohibiting importation of live swine and swine commodities from infected areas, and taking steps to prevent exposure or commingling with potentially infected animals and animal products.</p>
<p>CSF transmission to domestic swine from native populations of infected wild boar is by far the most immediate and substantial risk identified by the release assessment. However, the assessment also identified several pathways by which CSF, SVD, and/or FMD virus could be introduced into Slovakia from other EU Member States and affected third countries, thereby potentially resulting in risk to the United States in opening trade. Specifically, the following pathways for disease introduction into Slovakia are of interest to APHIS: (1) natural movements of wild boar; (2) import and trade of live swine; (3) import and trade of swine products; (4) incoming vehicular and human traffic; and (5) agricultural commodities for personal consumption.  
</p>
<p>Of the pathways assessed, migrating wild animals and smuggled agricultural commodities appear to present the greatest risk for disease introduction into Slovakia when existing mitigation measures are considered. Slovakia shares common land borders and trades with regions that APHIS has not evaluated for CSF, SVD, and/or FMD and rinderpest, and some important pathways for disease introduction cannot be well controlled (e.g. movement of wild boar). 
</p>
<p>Introduction of CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest into Slovakia by the assessed pathways would only affect export risk to the United States if a susceptible domestic swine population (i.e. breeding swine, breeding animals in a semen collection center, and/or production animals raised for slaughter), became infected and this infection was not detected prior to export. As discussed in the release assessment, commercial production and biosecurity practices substantially mitigate the export risk to the United States. 
</p>
<p>Harmonized EC legislation imposes less stringent restrictions on sourcing of imported ruminants and—to a lesser extent—swine, as well as commodities derived from these species, than is the case for the United States. Current EC import requirements reduce the risk of introducing CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest into Slovakia. However, additional mitigation measures may be necessary to restrict sourcing of swine, ruminants, and derived products for export to the United States and to prevent commingling of these commodities with those from regions that APHIS regards as affected or has not evaluated for these diseases. 
</p>
<p>Sufficient information is available from Slovakia and other EU Member States for APHIS to conclude that there is little substantive difference in the way trade is conducted among these entities. APHIS regards the 15 Member States comprising the EU prior to the May 2004 accession plus the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland (the APHIS-defined EU CSF region) as low risk with respect to CSF. In addition, APHIS considers large portions of the EU free of SVD, FMD, and rinderpest but subject to certain import restrictions based on the existence of common land borders with regions that APHIS does not consider free of these diseases, and/or importation of live animals or animal commodities from such regions. 
</p>
<p>Based on this evaluation, APHIS regards the export risk from Slovakia to be equivalent to that of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region. This region is subject to the import conditions specified in 9 CFR 94.11 for meat and meat products from ruminants and swine; 9 CFR 94.13 and 94.24 for pork and pork products; 9 CFR 94.24 for breeding swine; and 9 CFR 98.38 for swine semen. Slovakia has fully implemented EC control measures at a level equivalent to that of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region. Applying the provisions of 9 CFR 94.11, 94.13, 94.24, and 98.38 to Slovakia would address the outstanding risk issues identified in the release assessment. 
</p>
<p>
<i>Exposure assessment
</i></p>
<p>APHIS assessed the likelihood of exposure of susceptible animal populations in the United States to CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest viruses carried by meat or meat products, live animals, and genetic material imported from Slovakia. The assessment concluded that the likelihood of exposure of susceptible animals to these viruses via waste feeding was low, based on studies of the U.S. waste-feeding sector. Although the unmitigated potential for exposure to infective virus via live animals or genetic material was comparatively high, APHIS concludes that the likelihood of exposure of susceptible U.S. livestock via imported meat or meat products, live animals, or genetic material from Slovakia was low. This is due to mitigation measures in 9 CFR 94.24 for the importation of pork, pork products, and swine from the APHIS-defined EU CSF region, as well as 9 CFR 98.38 for the importation of swine semen from this region, would further limit the risk of exposure to CSF or (indirectly) SVD viruses.</p>
<p><i>Consequence assessment
</i></p>
<p>APHIS also assessed the biologic and economic consequences of introducing CSF, SVD, FMD or rinderpest viruses into the United States. This assessment concluded that CSF FMD, and rinderpest viruses have the potential to cause death and/or significant distress and suffering in affected animals, whereas SVD infection usually follows a less severe course. The economic costs of control and eradication of any of these diseases would be substantial, and export losses due to restrictions imposed by trade partners on animals and products susceptible to these diseases could run into billions of U.S. dollars. An extensive foreign animal disease outbreak could also result in severe psychosocial effects on farmers and farming communities.</p>
<p>
<i>Risk estimate
</i></p>
<p>In summary, although a CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest outbreak in the United States would likely have severe animal health and economic consequences, APHIS considers the risk of infected live swine and ruminants, or commodities derived from these species, entering the United States from Slovakia and exposing U.S. livestock to be low. This risk is further mitigated if Slovakia is subject to the same mitigations measures as are specified for other EU Member States in 9 CFR 94.11, 94.13, 94.24, and 98.38.  
</p>
<h1>Hazard identification
</h1>
<p>The hazards under consideration in this analysis are CSF, SVD, FMD, and rinderpest viruses. 
</p>
<h2>1.
Classical swine fever virus
</h2>
<p>CSF, also known as hog cholera, is a contagious and economically damaging viral disease of domestic swine and wild boar with worldwide distribution. It is caused by the CSF virus of the family Flaviviridae, genus <i>Pestivirus</i> (Wengler et al 1995). CSF virus is quite hardy, being stable between pH 4 and 10 (Depner et al 1992) and also stable at low temperatures (Harkness 1985). The virus would likely remain viable even after carcass maturation, and is unlikely to be destroyed by transport or cold storage. Laboratory confirmation of infection, essential during an outbreak situation, is complicated by the close antigenic relationship of the CSF virus with bovine viral diarrhea virus and border disease virus (Wengler et al 1995). 
</p>
<p>The incubation period for CSF is 7-10 days for pigs exposed postnatally (OIE 2008) The virus multiplies in the epithelial crypts of the tonsils and may be carried to local lymph nodes and into the bloodstream for distribution throughout the body (Trautwein 1988). Blood and all tissues, secretions and excretions of sick and dead animals are sources of virus (OIE 2008). CSF virus has been recovered from muscle and lymph nodes of infected pigs, and high titers of virus have been isolated from bone marrow (Wood et al 1988). The disease may also be introduced or spread via infected semen (Elber et al 1999).
</p>
<p>CSF can spread in an epidemic form as well as establish enzootic infections in domestic swine and wild boar populations. Infection generally spreads directly from pig to pig, but products including fresh, frozen, or cured pork can remain infectious to other pigs via the oral route (Edwards 2000). Imported pig products are frequently implicated in the introduction of CSF virus into previously disease-free regions, primarily through the practice of swill feeding (Fritzemeier et al 2000). Dahle and Liess (1992) demonstrated that the oral infectious dose of CSF virus is very low. Indirect transmission by fomites may occur via movement of people, wild animals, and inanimate objects such as live-haul trucks (Elbers et al 2001).
</p>
<p>The role of wild boar as a virus reservoir and possible source of infection for domestic swine is well known and epidemiological links between CSF virus infection in wild boar and domestic swine have been reported repeatedly in recent years (Biagetti et al 2001; Laddomada et al 1994). In countries that are free of CSF in domestic swine, epidemics in wild boar are often started by feeding of infected food waste (EC 1999). Abnormal mortality and sometimes obviously sick animals are the first indicators of CSF introduction into a wild boar population (EC 1999). A recent review of European wild boar population dynamics summarized population densities across known distribution areas and indicated a worldwide increase in the number and geographical spread of wild boar populations in recent decades (Ruiz-Fons 2008).
</p>
<p>Four distinct clinical forms of CSF have been described, including acute, chronic, congenital, and mild manifestations (Moennig et al 2003; Paton and Greiser-Wilke 2003). The acute form involves a disease progression of 2-4 weeks and is characterized by high fever, generalized illness, hemorrhagic lesions, immunosuppression with secondary infections, and high mortality.  The chronic form may last 30-90 days before death and usually involves older swine or congenitally infected piglets. Congenitally infected piglets may develop symptoms of chronic CSF within 3-6 months, or may never develop symptoms but continuously shed virus. Mild CSF is typically seen only in sows and may result from exposure to a low virulent strain. Infected sows may show no overt clinical signs but continuously shed virus to their young and to other swine they contact. 
</p>
<h2>2.
Swine vesicular disease virus
</h2>
<p>SVD is a contagious and economically damaging disease of domestic swine and wild boar. The disease has historically been recorded in Hong Kong, Japan, and several European countries; however the disease has been primarily limited to Italy and Portugal (OIE 2008, EC 2007e). The SVD virus belongs to the family Picornaviridae, genus <i>Enterovirus</i> (Wengler et al 1995). SVD virus is particularly hardy, resistant to pH changes between 2.5 and 12 (Herniman et al 1973), and is very stable under cold conditions (Dawe 1974). The virus is therefore unlikely to be destroyed by the post-mortem decrease in muscle pH that accompanies carcass maturation. SVD virus is also resistant to fermentation and smoking processes, and may remain in hams for 180 days, sausages for over a year, and processed intestinal casings for over two years (OIE 2008).
</p>
<p>The incubation period for SVD is 2-7 days following exposure to infected pigs and 2 to 3 days after the ingestion of contaminated feed (Spickler and Roth 2006). The intestinal tract is the primary site of infection. However, all tissues contain virus during the viremic period. Blood and feces of sick animals, as well as epithelium from vesicles and vesicular fluid, are good sources of virus. Although SVD virus does not appear to have a tropism for skeletal muscle cells, it is easily isolated from muscle tissue from infected animals after slaughter and bleeding out. SVD may be introduced into a herd by feeding garbage containing infected meat scraps, by introducing infected animals, or by contacting infected feces (e.g., an improperly cleaned truck) (Hedger and Mann 1989; USAHA 1998). After the initial introduction the disease spreads through contact of susceptible pigs with infected pigs and infected feces.
</p>
<p>The clinical signs of SVD are easily confused with those of FMD and include fever, sudden lameness, and vesicles with subsequent erosions along the snout, feet, and teats. Morbidity rates may be low throughout a whole herd but high in certain pens. SVD causes essentially no mortality, and recovery usually occurs within 1 week (up to 3 weeks). Persistence of infection with SVD is rare (Lin et al 2001); however, some strains produce only mild clinical symptoms or are asymptomatic, and are detected only through laboratory surveillance (OIE 2008). For example, a 2002 outbreak of SVD in Italy involved subclinical infection in all but one of 10,312 affected pigs (Brocchio et al 2002). 
</p>
<h2>3.
Foot and mouth disease virus
</h2>
<p>FMD is a contagious and economically damaging disease of cloven-hoofed animals, including domestic ruminants and pigs, as well as over 70 wildlife species (Coetzer et al 1994). The disease is endemic in large areas of Africa, Asia, and South America, and outbreaks are not uncommon in previously free areas throughout the world (Alexandersen et al 2003). The FMD virus belongs to the family Picornaviridae, genus <i>Apthovirus</i>, and 7 distinct serotypes with indistinguishable clinical effects have been identified: O, A, C, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and Asia1 (Belsham 1993). FMD virus is stable under cold conditions (Bachrach et al 1957; Cottral 1969).</p>
<p>The incubation period for FMD is 2-14 days (OIE 2008). The virus initially multiplies in the pharyngeal area and is then carried to the regional lymph nodes and the bloodstream for distribution throughout the body (Burrows et al 1981; Alexandersen et al 2003). Subsequent viral amplification occurs within the cornified stratified epithelium of the skin, particularly on the feet, mammary gland, and tongue, as well as in the myocardium of young animals. Saliva, feces, urine, and breath are sources of the virus, and virus may be present in milk and semen up to 4 days before clinical signs appear (OIE 2008). 
</p>
<p>Other sources of viable virus are meat and meat products in which the pH has remained above 6.0, as well as convalescent animals, exposed vaccinates, and carrier animals, particularly cattle and water buffalo. The FMD virus survives in lymph nodes and bone marrow at neutral pH, but is destroyed in muscle when the pH is less than 6.0 (OIE 2008). Pig meat does not consistently reach as low an ultimate pH during carcass maturation as beef, so the inactivation of FMD virus in pig meat may not be as complete as that occurring in beef (Farez and Morley 1997). Virus inactivation has not been examined in detail in small ruminant meat (Alexandersen 2003). The virus can persist in contaminated fodder and the environment for up to 1 month, depending on the temperature and pH conditions. 
</p>
<p>Susceptible livestock may be infected with FMD virus as a result of direct or indirect contact with infected animals or an infected environment (Alexandersen et al 2003). Indirect transmission may occur via movement of people, wild or domestic animals, or inanimate objects (vehicles, farm implements, clothing), and long-range airborne transmission is also possible. Transmission of FMD virus via meat or meat products is well documented. For example, a review of 627 known sources of FMD outbreaks throughout the world from 1870-1993 found that 411 of the outbreaks (66%) were attributable to infected meat, meat products, or garbage (APHIS 1994).
</p>
<p>Laboratory confirmation is essential during outbreak situations, since FMD cannot be distinguished from other vesicular disease such as SVD, vesicular stomatitis, and vesicular exanthema of swine on the basis of clinical findings (Alexandersen et al 2003). The classical form is characterized by fever and vesicles with subsequent erosions in the mouth, nares, muzzle, feet, or teats. However, serological field surveys and experimental investigations have shown that FMD in small ruminants may be clinically inapparent in a significant proportion of animals (Barnett and Cox 1999; Donaldson and Sellers 2000), and certain strains of the virus may be of low virulence in some species (Donaldson 1998). FMD generally causes low mortality in adult animals but mortality may be high in young animals due to myocarditis.</p>
<h1>4.
Rinderpest virus
</h1>
<p>Rinderpest is an infectious disease of cattle, domestic buffalo, and certain other species.  It is characterized by fever, oral erosions, diarrhea, lymphoid necrosis, and, in populations with low immunity, high mortality.  The OIE is prepared to issue a formal declaration of global eradication of the disease some time in 2011.</p>
<h1>Release assessment
</h1>
<p>A release assessment describes the biological pathway(s) necessary for an importation activity to introduce pathogenic agents into a particular environment and estimates the probability of that occurring (OIE 2008a). This release assessment addresses the 11 factors described in 9 CFR 92.2 for evaluation and regionalization of countries for foreign animal disease status. APHIS evaluated the current status of CSF, SVD, FMD and rinderpest in Slovakia as well as pathways for disease introduction into Slovakia with the potential to impact the assessed status. Risk factors and issues of concern, which may directly or indirectly affect the risk estimate, are identified and discussed at greater length in Section 12, including risk mitigation measures currently existing in Slovakia.  
</p>
<h2>1.
Authority, organization, and infrastructure of the veterinary services
</h2>
<p>1.1
Legal authority for animal health activities
</p>
<p>The main legal authority for the animal health activities of the official veterinary services in Slovakia resides in Act No. 488 of 19 June 2002 on veterinary care (Veterinary Act) (SVFA 2004b). This law regulates the main tasks and responsibilities of the official veterinary services, ensures access by government officials to private property, and gives the official services powers of inspection and enforcement. In addition, the Veterinary Act requires all animal owners, caretakers, and veterinarians to report suspicions of CSF, SVD, and FMD to the veterinary authorities (SVFA 2004b). The Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) must notify the EC and EU Member States within 24 hours of a confirmed disease outbreak, secondary outbreak, or removal of restrictions.
</p>
<p>Commission Decisions and Regulations became directly applicable in Slovakia on 1 May 2004 and therefore were not transposed into Slovakian legislation (FVO 2004b). Act No. 416/2004 Coll. of 24 June 2004 on the Official Journal of the EU mandated that acts published in the Official Journal are legally binding in accordance with the international treaty of accession of Slovakia to the EU. 
</p>
<p>Council Directives, which bind Member States to the objectives to be achieved within a certain timeframe but leave the means to the national authorities, are implemented in Slovakian legislation. These are transposed in secondary legislation such as Ordinances of the Government of the Slovak Republic. Based on Ordinance No. 321/2003, the CVO is empowered to issue instructions and guidelines for implementing directly applicable EC legislation (FVO 2004b). Affected parties are notified of new legislation via publication on the official veterinary services website and in the official legislative journal. 
</p>
<p>The primary articles of EC legislation pertaining to control of CSF, SVD, and FMD are listed in Table 1.1 with the corresponding transposition of EC Directives into Slovakian legislation (SVFA 2004b; SVFA 2004c). During the APHIS site visit in 2004, official veterinarians appeared familiar with the essential provisions of EC and Slovakian legislation concerning CSF, SVD, and FMD (APHIS 2004b). 
</p>
<p>According to Commission Regulation (EC) 1774/2002, which is directly applicable in Slovakia, feeding of animal by-products and processed products, including catering waste or feed material containing or derived from catering waste, to farmed animals other than fur animals is prohibited. The veterinary authorities select farms at random to monitor compliance with the waste feeding ban; commercial farms are inspected at least once per year (APHIS 2004b). During 2004, more than 700 swine holdings, out of 6018 registered in the central database, were inspected without significant findings (FVO 2004a). Inspections of catering establishments are under the control of the Ministry of Health; each establishment must have a contract with a rendering company for destruction of waste (FVO 2004a). </p>
<p><b>Table 1.1: Transposition of critical EC legislation regarding CSF, SVD, and FMD
</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>Disease</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>EC legislation</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Slovakian legislation</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>CSF</p>
</td>	<td><p>Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever (as amended)</p>
</td>	<td><p>Ordinance of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 276/2003 Coll. on measures for the control of classical swine fever.</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>Commission Decision 2002/106/EC of 1 February 2002 approving a Diagnostic Manual establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for evaluation of the laboratory test for the confirmation of classical swine fever (as amended)</p>
</td>	<td><p>Directly applicable to Member States
</p>
<p></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>SVD</p>
</td>	<td><p>Council Directive 92/119/EEC of 17 December 1992 introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease (as amended)</p>
</td>	<td><p>Ordinance of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 308/2003 Coll. introducing the measures for control of certain animal diseases and the specific measures relating to the swine vesicular disease.</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>Commission Decision 2000/428/EC of 4 July 2000 establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for the evaluation of the results of laboratory tests for the confirmation and differential diagnosis of swine vesicular disease</p>
</td>	<td><p>Directly applicable to Member States</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>FMD</p>
</td>	<td><p>Council Directive 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease repealing Directive 85/511/EEC and Decisions 89/531/EEC and 91/665/EEC and amending Directive 92/46/EEC</p>
</td>	<td><p>Ordinance of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 731/2002 Coll. on measures for the control of foot and mouth disease.</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>Commission Decision 91/42/EEC of 8 January 1991 laying down the criteria to be applied when drawing up contingency plans for the control of FMD, in application of Article 5 of Council Directive 90/423/EEC</p>
</td>	<td><p>Directly applicable to Member States</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>The Veterinary Act provides for penalties of up to 10,000 SKK (340 USD) for noncompliance with the regulations, and up to 20,000 SKK (680 USD) if the noncompliance involves emergency or extraordinary measures (SVFA 2004b). Penalties for infringements committed in the course of business activities range from 100,000 SKK (3,400 USD) to 5,000,000 SKK (170,000 USD). 
</p>
<p>1.2 
Organization of the official veterinary services
</p>
<p>1.2.1
Central competent authority
</p>
<p>The official veterinary service of Slovakia was created in 2002 within the Ministry of Agriculture (see Figure 1.1). The central office is the State Veterinary and Food Administration (SVFA) in Bratislava, which is headed by a Director General who is also the CVO (APHIS 2004b; FVO 2004a). The CVO reports directly to the Minister of Agriculture. 
</p>
<p><b>Figure 1.1: Organization of the Veterinary Services in Slovakia</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image1.png" alt="image1.png"></p>
<p>The SVFA headquarters in Bratislava are divided into 6 main departments: animal health and welfare; hygiene of animal products; veterinary certification and controls in trade, imports, and exports; raw materials and foodstuffs of plant origin; feeding stuffs hygiene, ecology, and veterinary pharmacy; and laboratory diagnostics, rapid alert system, and certification (APHIS 2004b; FVO 2004a). Entities under direct supervision of the SFVA include the Regional Veterinary and Food Administration (RVFA) offices, the District Veterinary and Food Administration (DVFA) offices, the veterinary laboratory system, and the border inspection posts (BIP) (SVFA 2002a). 
</p>
<p>In general, the official veterinary services are responsible for disease surveillance, control of animal infectious diseases, zoosanitary inspection, and food safety control. The SVFA is responsible for regulating and controlling all veterinary protection activities in Slovakia as dictated by the Veterinary Act (SVFA 2002a; SVFA 2004b). The Department of Animal Health and Welfare within the SVFA is responsible for regionalizing Slovakia for diseases such as CSF, determining and evaluating surveillance parameters, adopting disease control measures, submitting reports to the EU and international entities, and obtaining and controlling financial resources for official veterinary activities.
</p>
<p>1.2.2
Regional veterinary authority 
</p>
<p>An RVFA office is located in each of 8 political regions within Slovakia (see Figure 1.2). The RVFA offices are organized similar to the headquarters office, although simpler, and each is headed by a Regional State Veterinary Officer appointed by the CVO (SVFA 2002a). The RVFA is primarily responsible for supervision, control, and coordination of the DVFA offices.
</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image18.png" alt="image18.png"><b>Figure 1.2: Map of regional divisions within Slovakia
</b></p>
<p>1.2.3
Local veterinary authority (administrative unit)
</p>
<p>Slovakia is divided into 40 veterinary districts, each with a DVFA headed by a District State Veterinary Officer appointed by the CVO (SVFA 2002a). One DFVA is responsible for 1-3 districts (see Figure 1.3). Each district is regarded by APHIS as an “administrative unit,” or the smallest administrative jurisdiction that has effective oversight of normal animal movements into, out of, and within that jurisdiction, and that, in association with national authorities, if necessary, has effective control over animal movements and animal diseases locally (APHIS 2005). The district is the smallest unit to which APHIS could effectively regionalize for animal disease status under its current regulations.
</p>
<p><b>Figure 1.3: Map of DVFA territories and districts
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image2.png" alt="image2.png"></p>
<p>The organization of the DVFA is also similar to that of the SVFA. The DVFA are responsible for disease prevention activities and public health supervision measures as dictated by existing regulations and the SVFA. Each DVFA also works with the respective District Forestry Office and the hunting associations to ensure adequate surveillance of wild boar. District State Veterinary Officers can issue binding orders that apply only to their administrative unit.
</p>
<p>1.2.4 
Disease control centers and expert groups</p>
<p>In accordance with Council Directives 2001/89/EC and 2003/85/EC, the SVFA’s contingency plans for CSF and FMD include a National Disease Control Center (NDCC) and Local Disease Control Centers (LDCC) that correspond to entities within SVFA headquarter and the DVFA field offices, respectively (SVFA 2004b; APHIS 2004b, FVO 2005).  These centers are responsible for the organization of emergency veterinary measures and coordination of activities with relevant institutions—army, police, fire brigade and municipalities—in the event of disease suspicion or outbreak. Expert groups, consisting of teams of epidemiologists, veterinary scientists and virologists, have been established at the NDCC and each LDCC (FVO 2005). The expert groups assist the control centers with disease preparedness and mobilize immediately to affected areas to perform epidemiological inquiries and other disease control measures. The activities of the disease control centers and expert groups are discussed in more detail in Section 11.</p>
<p>1.2.5
Border veterinary inspection
</p>
<p>The SVFA Department of Veterinary Certification and Control in Trade, Import, and Export is responsible for all BIP-related matters, in particular, implementation of import control legislation and supervision of the BIPs (FVO 2004b). This includes supervision and veterinary control of import, transit, and export of live animals, food, and feedstuffs. BIP staff are employed and paid out of the SVFA budget. At the time that this report was written, Slovakia had three EC-approved BIPs: one road port, one rail port, and one airport (Commission Decision 2006/117/EC). Border security and movement controls are described in more detail in Section 7. 
</p>
<p>1.2.6
Diagnostic laboratory services
</p>
<p>The laboratory system consists of 6 State Veterinary Institutes (SVI) strategically located throughout Slovakia (APHIS 2004b). SVI Zvolen is the national reference laboratory for CSF and also conducts testing for FMD and SVD. The animal health division of SVI Zvolen contains virology, bacteriology, and pathology units. There is a separate quality assurance division. The diagnostic laboratory system is discussed in more detail in Section 10.</p>
<p>1.2.7 Internal and external audit systems
</p>
<p>Internal auditing – The Ministry of Agriculture monitors the performance of veterinary activities and controls the budget to which the SVFA, RVFAs and DVFAs are financially linked (SVFA 2004b). The SVFA is responsible for supervision, management, and performance effectiveness of the RVFAs, DVFAs and BIPs. Documentation of controls is submitted by the DVFA to the SFVA through monthly reports.  Once every two years, the performance of the DVFA is checked by the SVFA and other thematic controls are made as required (FVO 2002).  
</p>
<p>External auditing – The Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) of the EC’s Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General conducts audits of all Member States that include the provisions of any of the agreements on sanitary measures applicable to import or trade in live animals and animal products. Under Commission Decision 98/139/EC, the audited Member State must investigate and correct any identified sources of noncompliance within a given timeframe or may face sanctions applied by the EC.
</p>
<p>The FVO conducted numerous animal health, animal welfare, and food safety inspections in Slovakia prior to accession. Most of these reports have not been made public and were not available for this assessment; however, no derogations were made for animal health issues at the time of accession. Under Commission Decision 98/139/EC the EC has the authority for post-accession auditing actions necessary to ensure uniform compliance with the provisions of Community legislation.
</p>
<p>The FVO has conducted several audits of Slovakia post-accession that are pertinent to this report, including a mission in April 2006 to evaluate the situation concerning CSF in wild boar (FVO 2006). 
</p>
<p>1.3
Infrastructure of the official veterinary services
</p>
<p>1.3.1
Physical infrastructure
</p>
<p>The BIP visited by the APHIS team in 2004 was comparatively new with extensive and comprehensive facilities; additionally, the diagnostic sections of the SVI were recently renovated and well equipped (APHIS 2004b). The SVFA, RVFA and DVFA offices observed by the site visit team were determined to be functionally adequate, fully computerized, and appropriately staffed (APHIS 2006d).</p>
<p>1.3.2
Personnel infrastructure 
</p>
<p>The official veterinary service employs approximately 1,700 people, of which roughly 700 (41%) are veterinarians (OIE 2007; APHIS 2004b). There are 120 veterinarians employed at the headquarters level and approximately 90 employed in laboratories and training institutions. Each DVFA has 7-14 veterinary officers; each BIP has 4-5 official veterinarians, with no technical or administrative staff (SVFA 2002a; FVO 2004b). </p>
<p>Slovakia also has roughly 985 private veterinarians, some of whom contract with the veterinary services to perform official duties such as monitoring animal health and welfare status on farms and collecting samples for disease surveillance. The approved private veterinarians in each district are supervised by the local DVFA in accordance with the Veterinary Act (SVFA 2004b). 
</p>
<p>The SVFA has developed and currently manages veterinary training policy, including the Institute of Postgraduate Training of Veterinarians (SVFA 2004b, SVFA 2002a). Official veterinarians must participate in postgraduate training, professional workshops, and retraining as established by the CVO (SVFA 2004b).  New official veterinarians must complete a 2-year training course within a 3-year period, which includes 180-200 hours of instruction followed by a written/oral exam. Training for private veterinarians is arranged by the Chamber of Veterinary Surgeons with yearly goals for continuing education (FVO 2002). </p>
<p>Training for the expert group and key members of the NDCC is consistent with the Community-wide program of courses on epidemic diseases, including pathogenesis, diagnostics, epidemiology, tracing and surveillance, control measures, predictive data use, and procedures on infected holdings (SVFA 2007). The expert group organizes training exercises for other staff that includes similar course content, as well as communication, decision-making, notification/publicity procedures and control center procedures. There is also a national training plan for inspectors and other official personnel aimed at improving recognition of foreign animal diseases, as specified by the contingency plans for these diseases (SFVA 2006).</p>
<p>The national training plan includes simulation exercises for CSF, SVD, and FMD. Two-day simulation exercises that included participants from the SVFA, DVFAs, RVFAs, and SVIs were conducted in 2003 for FMD and in 2006 for CSF (SFVA 2007). Multiple species holdings, livestock production systems, laboratory staff and operational support facilities are included in these exercises where disease spreads between holdings. Consequences of different control strategies are compared and anticipated problems identified. The effectiveness of the exercises is assessed and reported in order to improve subsequent training events. Foreign animal disease simulation training has also been provided by France (APHIS 2004b). </p>
<p>All staff at BIPs were trained under a program prepared by the Institute of Education of Veterinarians in the EU’s Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES), as well as training under a twinning project with France (FVO 2004b). Contracted state veterinary laboratories and state veterinary and food laboratories are responsible for training and re-training of staff in order to maintain and update the necessary professional skills (SVFA 2004b). 
</p>
<p>1.3.3
Financial resources</p>
<p>Funding for the official veterinary services is allocated from the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture (SVFA 2002a; SVFA 2004a). In 2004, the total budget of the SVFA was 824,737,000 SKK (28 million USD), from which were financed the expenditures of the central, regional, and district SVFA offices. The veterinary services also collect fees for services through the border inspections, laboratory diagnostics, and other sources. 
</p>
<p>Slovakia received funding from the EC for various projects in the course of accession; the EC also covers approximately 50% of the cost of CSF surveillance and, in recent years, vaccination of wild boar against CSF (see Section 5). No EC financing is received for surveillance of SVD or FMD, since these diseases have not been seen in several years and are not considered problematic in Slovakia. In an outbreak situation, indemnity at market value would be paid through the SVFA in accordance with the Veterinary Act (SVFA 2004b). 
</p>
<p>1.4 
Discussion
</p>
<p>The official veterinary services are hierarchically organized and appear to have clear lines of command and reporting. The regional office has a limited administrative role and the chain of command for operational procedures is direct from the SVFA to the DVFA. The responsibilities of personnel at each level are well defined. The official veterinary services have sufficient legal authority and personnel to carry out most animal health monitoring and disease control activities quickly and efficiently, although financial resources are limited. 
</p>
<p>Official veterinarians demonstrated a good working knowledge of Slovakian and EC legislation concerning CSF, SVD, and FMD, and have demonstrated the capability of effectively implementing the provisions thereof, as detailed in Section 2. Regular training programs and simulation exercises are in place to enhance public awareness, disease recognition, prompt reporting and implementation of control measures in the event of suspicion and/or outbreak.</p>
<p>Waste feeding of virus-contaminated household kitchen (food) waste to swine is a common route of introduction of CSF or SVD into a susceptible swine population and feeding, especially among small holders throughout the world. Official Slovakian veterinarians monitor swine holdings for compliance with the waste feeding ban through yearly inspections of commercial holdings and random inspections of small holdings. Although SVFA inspections result in a large degree of compliance, waste feeding on small swine holdings may be difficult to detect through sporadic on-site inspections. The impact on the risk of disease introduction into Slovakia and export risk to the United States is discussed in further detail in Section 12.</p>
<h2>2.
Disease status in the region
</h2>
<p>2.1 
Classical swine fever
</p>
<p>2.1.1
General information
</p>
<p>CSF is currently endemic in the wild boar population in Slovakia, with previously detected occurrences centered around the Trenčín and Banská Bystrica regions.  Outbreaks continue to occur in Slovakia in wild boar, most recently in southern districts bordering Hungary; sporadic outbreaks have also occurred recently in domestic swine (OIE 2008b; SVFA 2004c; SVFA 2007a; SVFA 2008a; SVFA 2008b; SVFA 2008c). Wild boar play a significant role as a source of infection for domestic pigs in affected regions, as CSF virus can spread from infected wild boar to domestic swine via direct or indirect contact. 
</p>
<p>Summary data presented in November 2008 to the EC’s Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health by SVI Zvolen indicated that, from December 1993 until October 2008, 187 CSF outbreaks occurred in domestic swine and 640 cases were recorded in wild boars (SVFA 2008f). Over this same time period, 107,465 laboratory investigations of CSF in wild boar were undertaken and 9,640 wild boar were serologically positive. Also, 135,070 samples were submitted from Slovakian wild boars for virological investigation, of which 640 samples were positive for CSF virus.</p>
<p>SVI Zvolen has conducted virus typing studies using monoclonal antibodies directed against the E2 virus protein to differentiate the CSF virus strains circulating in Slovakia (SVFA 2004c). Using data from 1993 – 2004, the studies found 14 distinct phenotypes from 568 samples, 11 of which circulated in wild boar and 6 in domestic swine. The parent phenotype, named Chrámec 93, was first isolated from domestic swine in the district of Rimavská Sobota in December 1993. This has been by far the most frequently occurring phenotype in both wild boar (85%) and domestic swine (91%) and was the only phenotype able to perpetuate in wild boar populations for the whole 12-year study period. Many other phenotypes occurred as sporadic events and gradually died out or were overgrown by the parent phenotype. 
</p>
<p>2.1.2
CSF in wild boar
</p>
<p>Slovakian authorities reported positive serological findings in approximately 5% of wild boar tested each year from 2001 to 2004, increasing to approximately 14% in 2006, and then declining to 8% in 2008 (see Section 9) (SVFA 2004c; SVFA 2008f). In contrast, the proportion of virus-positive wild boar detected has steadily declined from a high of 2.2% in 1998 to approximately 0.03% in 2008. </p>
<p>In 2002 and 2003, patterns of virus isolation pointed to foci of infection in wild boar in the Trenčín and Banská Bystrica regions (SVFA 2005c). Virus isolation from wild boar declined in 2004, with cases primarily detected in the southern districts of the Banská Bystrica region. CSF virus was detected in 6 wild boar in 2005 and 13 in 2006, all in the Zvolen (18), Lučenec (20) and Vel’ký Krtíš (19) districts of the Banská Bystrica region (see Figure 2.1) (SVFA 2006; SVFA 2008f). Ten cases were detected in 2007, primarily in the Komárno (7) and Nové Zámky (8) districts, which border areas of Hungary where CSF virus has been detected in wild boar (see Figure 2.2) (EC 2007a; EC 2007k; SVFA 2007a; OIE 2008b; SVFA 2008f). Slovakia detected 4 virus-positive wild boar from January to October 2008, all in the Nové Zámky and Levice (9) districts (SVFA 2008f). In recent years, virus-positive wild boar have ranged in age from piglets to adults; few hunted wild boar exhibited clinical signs. </p>
<p><b>Figure 2.1: CSF cases in wild boar in 2005 and 2006</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image19.emf" alt="image19.emf"></p>
<p><b>Figure 2.2: CSF cases in wild boar from January 2007 to October 2008</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image20.png" alt="image20.png"></p>
<p>As discussed in Section 7.4, the EC restricts movement of live swine and swine commodities from regions of Slovakia and other EU Member States in which CSF is endemic in wild boar.  The restricted area in Slovakia is based on recommendations by an expert group and is periodically redefined to reflect the current situation (SVFA 2004c). At the time this report was written, the restricted area consisted of 8 DFVAs comprising 13 districts (Commission Decision 2006/805/EC, most recently amended by Commission Decision 2008/631/EC).
</p>
<p>In the past several years, considerably more wild boar have been positive on serology than virology (see Section 9).  However, wild boar of all ages have been positive on serology – piglets, yearlings, and adults.  Positive serologic findings in juvenile wild boar are generally of particular interest since they indicate recent viral transmission (Rossi et al 2005), except in piglets less than three months of age that may still carry maternal antibodies (Dahle and Leiss 1992; Van Oirschot 1999). 
</p>
<p>Positive findings among samples tested by virus isolation have declined in recent years from a high of 2.2% in 1998 to 0.04% in 2006 (Table 9.2). Virus isolation declines when the incidence of new infection is relatively low because the virus cannot be detected for more than a few weeks following infection (Van Oirschot 1999). In contrast, serologic prevalence is detectable at low incidence levels since antibodies can be detected for the lifetime of the animal (Laddomada 1994; Van Oirschot 1999). The positive serologic findings among piglets and yearling wild boar in Slovakia indicate ongoing exposure to CSF virus in some segments of the population.
</p>
<p>2.1.3 
CSF in domestic swine
</p>
<p>Multiple CSF outbreaks occurred in domestic swine in Slovakia each year prior to 1998, when the SVFA implemented compulsory vaccination (see Section 5) (SFVA 2004c). One more outbreak occurred before vaccination ceased in December 2000. The next outbreak happened in July 2001 in the Partizánske district of the Trenčín region (OIE 2007; FVO 2002), followed by eight outbreaks between November 2003 and January 2004 in the Prievidza and Bánovce nad Bebravou districts of the same region (see Table 2.1) (OIE 2007; FVO 2004a; SVFA 2004c).  
</p>
<p>The index case for the eight outbreaks in the Trenčín region in 2003 – 2004 appears to have been a fattening holding in the village of Dolné Vestenice in the Prievidza district (outbreak 02/03 in Table 2.1) (SVFA 2004c). This holding reportedly had very poor external biosecurity. Subsequent epidemiological investigations indicated that the outbreak spread to other farms via vehicular, human, and animal movements, suggesting inadequate biosecurity. As shown in Figure 2.3, separate outbreaks also occurred in the Lučenec district (20) of the Banská Bystrica region in August and November 2004 (EC 2005; SVFA 2006), and again in August 2005 (SVFA 2006). 
</p>
<p>In most instances, the index case was attributed to direct or indirect contact with infected wild boar, as CSF virus had been detected in wild boar in the area. Emergency measures were applied in response to the outbreaks, including protection and surveillance zones with movement standstill around the outbreak holding (FVO 2002; APHIS 2004b; SVFA 2004c; EC 2008; EC 2008a).  Emergency vaccination occurred in the 2001 outbreak and all vaccinated animals were later killed or slaughtered for national consumption (FVO 2002). All outbreaks in domestic swine from 2003 forward have been controlled by stamping out without vaccination in accordance with Council Directive 2001/89/EC  (SVFA 2004c). 
</p>
<p>No CSF outbreaks in domestic swine occurred in 2006 or 2007; however, three outbreaks were detected in 2008 (OIE 2008b; EC 2008; EC 2008a).  The first outbreak occurred in April on a holding with fattening pigs in the Levice district (9), which is located in the Nitra region (EC 2008). A related outbreak was detected on a farm in Rimavská Sobota district (21) in the Banská Bystrica region, which had received a shipment of 69 pigs from the index holding. 
</p>
<p><b>Table 2.1: CSF outbreaks in domestic swine 2003 – 2008  
</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>No.</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Location</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Date confirmed</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Farm type</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>No. pigs</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Probable source</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>District</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Region</b></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>01/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Prievidza</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>19 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>Breeding </p>
</td>	<td><p>3,983</p>
</td>	<td><p>Contact with farm 02/03 via persons and vehicles  </p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>02/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Prievidza</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>26 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>Fattening </p>
</td>	<td><p>303</p>
</td>	<td><p>Wild boar</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>03/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Prievidza</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>30 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>Breeding</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,952</p>
</td>	<td><p>Contact with farm 01/03 via private veterinarian</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>04/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Bánovce nad Bebravou</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>4 Dec</p>
</td>	<td><p>Breeding</p>
</td>	<td><p>338</p>
</td>	<td><p>Contact with farm 01/03 via animal movement</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>05/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Prievidza</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>4 Dec</p>
</td>	<td><p>Fattening </p>
</td>	<td><p>32</p>
</td>	<td><p>Contact with farm 03/03 via private veterinarian</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>06/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Prievidza</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>17 Dec</p>
</td>	<td><p>Breeding</p>
</td>	<td><p>460</p>
</td>	<td><p>Information not provided</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>01/04</p>
</td>	<td><p>Prievidza</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>7 Jan</p>
</td>	<td><p>Breeding</p>
</td>	<td><p>8,293</p>
</td>	<td><p>Contact with farms 01/03 and 03/03 via persons and vehicles</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>02/04</p>
</td>	<td><p>Prievidza</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>14 Jan</p>
</td>	<td><p>Breeding</p>
</td>	<td><p>8,825</p>
</td>	<td><p>Possibly contact with other infected farms via vehicles</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>03/04</p>
</td>	<td><p>Lučenec</p>
</td>	<td><p>Banská Bystrica</p>
</td>	<td><p>10 Aug</p>
</td>	<td><p>Breeding</p>
</td>	<td><p>324</p>
</td>	<td><p>Wild boar</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>04/04</p>
</td>	<td><p>Lučenec</p>
</td>	<td><p>Banská Bystrica</p>
</td>	<td><p>12 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>Breeding</p>
</td>	<td><p>5,914</p>
</td>	<td><p>Information not provided</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>01/05</p>
</td>	<td><p>Lučenec</p>
</td>	<td><p>Banská Bystrica</p>
</td>	<td><p>9 Aug</p>
</td>	<td><p>Breeding</p>
</td>	<td><p>851</p>
</td>	<td><p>Wild boar</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>01/08</p>
</td>	<td><p>Levice</p>
</td>	<td><p>Nitra</p>
</td>	<td><p>11 April</p>
</td>	<td><p>Fattening</p>
</td>	<td><p>7,176</p>
</td>	<td><p>Unknown or inconclusive</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>02/08</p>
</td>	<td><p>Rimavská Sobota</p>
</td>	<td><p>Banská Bystrica</p>
</td>	<td><p>14 April</p>
</td>	<td><p>Breeding</p>
</td>	<td><p>13,332</p>
</td>	<td><p>Contact with farm 01/08 via movement of pigs</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>03/08</p>
</td>	<td><p>Levice</p>
</td>	<td><p>Nitra</p>
</td>	<td><p>14 July</p>
</td>	<td><p>Fattening</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>Wild boar</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>The index holding in the Levice district was located within the restricted area defined by the EC in Commission Decision 2006/805/EC; however, the contact farm in Rimavská Sobota was outside of the restricted area and was therefore eligible to send live swine and swine commodities to other EU Member States, prior to the outbreak. In response to this outbreak, the EC published Commission Decisions 2008/303/EC of 14 April 2008 and 2008/377/EC of 8 May 2008, which reinforced the measures taken by Slovakia within the framework of Council Directive 2001/89/EC by specifically prohibiting trade in live swine, swine semen, and swine embryos and ova from all of Slovakia. 
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2008/377/EC was subsequently amended by Commission Decision 2008/419/EC of 30 May 2008, which decreased the scope of the restrictions to the Nitra and Banská Bystrica regions. Slovakia reported that the outbreaks were resolved on 16 June 2008 (OIE 2008b) and the EC repealed the associated restrictions via Commission Decision 2008/553/EC of 30 June 2008.
</p>
<p><b>Figure 2.3: CSF outbreaks in domestic swine 2003 – 2008 
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image21.png" alt="image21.png"></p>
<p>A third outbreak was considered unrelated to the two prior outbreaks in 2008 and occurred in July on a small backyard holding (2 pigs) located in the Lučenec district, near the Hungarian border (EC 2008a). The owner reported recent contact with a sick wild boar. One pig died and the other was euthanized; cleaning and disinfection of the affected premises was completed on July 31st, control measures in the surveillance zone were lifted on August 21st, and Slovakian authorities notified international authorities that the incident was resolved as of 3 September 2008 (OIE 2008b).
</p>
<p>2.2
Swine vesicular disease
</p>
<p>Slovakian authorities have not reported any SVD outbreaks in indigenous swine, although SVD was reported in imported pigs on three holdings in 1972 (SVFA 2001; OIE 2007). Sixteen cases were diagnosed in total. The outbreaks were handled by stamping out and no other cases have been reported. SVD has never been reported in wild boar (OIE 2008b).
</p>
<p>2.3
Foot and mouth disease
</p>
<p>Multiple FMD outbreaks of types C and O occurred in Slovakia in cattle and pigs between 1963 and 1973 (SVFA 2002a). The last outbreak occurred in 1973 and the disease was eradicated in the spring of the same year. The OIE considers Slovakia to be free of FMD without vaccination (OIE 2008c).
</p>
<p>2.4
Rinderpest
</p>
<p>According to the OIE, the last rinderpest outbreak in Slovakia was in 1881 (OIE, 2011).</p>
<p>2.5
Discussion
</p>
<p>Rinderpest was last reported in Slovakia more than 100 years ago.  Moreover, over 3 decades have passed since FMD or SVD was reported within the current borders of Slovakia, greatly exceeding the OIE recommended time period for recognition of disease freedom by another country. In contrast, CSF outbreaks in domestic swine occurred in April and July 2008. The April outbreaks were resolved by the end of June with both Slovakia and the EC taking prompt measures to prevent CSF spread to other EU Member States via intra-Community trade. The July outbreak was located within a zone that is restricted due to CSF detection in wild boar (see Section 4); final cleaning and disinfection of the affected premises occurred on 31 July 2008. 
</p>
<p>Current regulations for the APHIS-defined EU CSF region (9 CFR 94.24(a)(1)(ii) and 94.24(b)(2)(ii)) state that at least 6 months must elapse after final cleaning and disinfection before live swine and swine commodities from a previously restricted zone are eligible for export to the United States. At the time of writing, 6 months had passed since final cleaning and disinfection of the last outbreak premises. If Slovakia were included in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region, live swine and swine commodities from non-restricted areas would be eligible for export to the United States. However, such commodities from areas restricted by the EC due to CSF detection in wild boar—which currently include the areas in which the April and July 2008 outbreaks occurred—would remain ineligible for export (9 CFR 94.24(a)(1)(iii) and 94.24 (b)(2)(iii)). </p>
<p>Surveillance indicates that the CSF virus is present in the wild boar population in several southern districts of Slovakia. Both Slovakian and Hungarian authorities have responded swiftly and effectively to control sporadic outbreaks of CSF in their respective wild boar populations along their shared borders. The reservoir of infection in wild boar poses a risk of exposure of domestic swine, as evidenced by the fact that most of the outbreaks in domestic swine since 2001 have ultimately been attributed to direct or indirect contact with wild boar. An active eradication plan is in place for CSF in wild boar as discussed in Section 4.
</p>
<h2>3.
Disease status of adjacent regions
</h2>
<p><img src="embedded:image22.png" alt="image22.png">Slovakia is a landlocked country bordering to the west with Austria, to the northwest with the Czech Republic, to the northeast with Poland, to the east with Ukraine, and to the south with Hungary (see Figure 3.1). APHIS considers Austria, the Czech Republic, and Poland as low risk for CSF and free of SVD, FMD, and rinderpest (APHIS 2006b); Hungary is also considered free of SVD, FMD, and rinderpest and was under evaluation for CSF at the time this report was written. APHIS has not evaluated the risk status of Ukraine for CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest. 
</p>
<p><b>Figure 3.1: Map of Slovakia and surrounding regions
</b></p>
<p>3.1
Classical swine fever
</p>
<p>Austria last reported CSF outbreaks in January 2001 and July 1996 in wild boar in the Niederösterreich region, which abuts the western border of Slovakia (OIE 2007). The Czech Republic reported multiple CSF outbreaks in wild boar in 1999 with the last occurring in November 1999 (OIE 2007; FVO 2000). The outbreaks occurred near Kromĕříž and Břeclav, which lie close to the southeast border with Slovakia. An APHIS risk analysis concluded that CSF virus is circulating at low levels in wild boar in that region of the Czech Republic (APHIS 2006a). CSF is endemic in the wild boar populations of other EU Member States as well, most notably Germany.
</p>
<p>Ukraine last reported a CSF outbreak in wild boar in July 2001 in the Trachtemirivskae regional park, which is centrally located in the country (OIE 2007). In July 2002, Ukraine reported that investigation of 6 wild boar shot in the park gave negative results for CSF. Poland reported CSF outbreaks in domestic swine in September 1994 in the territories of four provinces, none of which border on Slovakia (OIE 2007). No confirmed CSF cases in wild boar have been reported in Poland in recent years. 
</p>
<p>Hungary last reported CSF outbreaks in domestic swine in May 1993 on 4 premises in a single county not directly bordering Slovakia (OIE 2007). During January 2007, Hungary reported 5 cases of CSF in wild boar in Nógrád county (EC 2007a; EC 2007b).   Additional cases were found throughout 2007 and 2008 in Nógrád County, as well as neighboring Pest County (OIE 2008b).  Both counties border Slovakia’s CSF infected area for wild boar (see Section 4).  By July 2008, a total of 195 cases of CSF in wild boar had been identified: 108 in Nograd County and 87 in Pest County (HMARD 2008).  </p>
<p>Hungary’s response was quick and comprehensive and surveillance, detection and control measures for CSF in wild boar are in accordance with EC requirements. The EC has defined an infected area in Hungary based on known CSF infection in wild boar (Commission Decision 2008/631/EC) and restricts trade in live swine and swine commodities from this area in accordance with Commission Decision 2006/805/EC (as amended).
</p>
<p>3.2
Swine vesicular disease
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Poland last reported an SVD outbreak in 1972, Ukraine in 1977, and Austria in 1979 (OIE 2007). SVD has never been reported in either domestic swine or wild boar in the Czech Republic or Hungary (OIE 2007).</p>
<p>3.3
Foot and mouth disease
</p>
<p>Poland last reported an FMD outbreak in 1971, Hungary in 1973, the Czech Republic in 1975, Austria in 1981, and Ukraine in 1988 (OIE 2007). The OIE considers all of these countries free of FMD without vaccination.
</p>
<p>3.4
Rinderpest</p>
<p>APHIS considers Poland, Hungary, Austria, and the Czech Republic to be free from rinderpest.  APHIS has not evaluated the rinderpest status of the Ukraine.
</p>
<p>3.5
Discussion
</p>
<p>APHIS regards most of the countries with which Slovakia shares a common land border to be free of SVD, FMD, and rinderpest. Only Ukraine has not been evaluated for these diseases, and this country has not reported an SVD outbreak since 1977, an FMD outbreak since 1988, and a rinderpest outbreak since 1923. Consequently, while introduction of SVD, FMD, or rinderpest into Slovakia across the border with Ukraine cannot be ruled out in the absence of additional information on surveillance and reporting practices in that country, APHIS considers the likelihood to be low. 
</p>
<p>Introduction or reintroduction of CSF into Slovakia from a neighboring country could occur.  APHIS has not evaluated Ukraine for CSF, the CSF virus is thought to be circulating at very low levels in wild boar in regions of the Czech Republic near Slovakia, and outbreaks have occurred in wild boar in Hungary along the Slovakian border.  However, the EC considers both that area of Hungary and the adjacent area of Slovakia an infected area, with protective measures in place to limit the risk to domestic swine both within and outside of the infected area (see Section 4).  While CSF could be transmitted to domestic swine from wild boar ranging into Slovakia from an adjacent country, the risk is less immediate and substantial than that posed by native populations of CSF-infected wild boar.
</p>
<h2>4.
Extent of an active disease control program
</h2>
<p>4.1
General information
</p>
<p>At the time of the APHIS site visit, Slovakian veterinary officials considered their country free of all former OIE List A diseases except for CSF in wild boar (SVFA 2003; APHIS 2004b); Slovakia subsequently reported outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in February 2006 and exotic Newcastle disease in February 2007 (OIE 2008b). Rinderpest was last reported in 1881, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia in 1902, and sheep and goat pox in 1950 (OIE 2007). None of these diseases are considered endemic to the European region. Programs are in place to control and eventually eradicate several former OIE List B diseases, including rabies, Aujeszky’s disease, paratuberculosis, and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (APHIS 2004b). 
</p>
<p>Slovakia and the EC have defined an area in which CSF infection is endemic in wild boar—the infected area—based on the results of epidemiological investigations, the geographic distribution of the disease, the density of wild boar in the area, and the existence of natural or artificial barriers to movement (SVFA 2004c). EC legislation restricts the movement of live swine and swine commodities from the infected area; hence, it is also called the restricted area. This area has shifted considerably since first defined in 2004, as described below. 
</p>
<p>Slovakia and Hungary established a cross-border expert group in April 2006 which facilitates the exchange of information concerning CSF in the two Member States, coordinates CSF surveillance activities in wild boar, and promotes cooperation between the two reference laboratories (FVO 2006). 
</p>
<p>4.2
Evolution of the infected/restricted area
</p>
<p>In April 2004, shortly before the Slovakia acceded to the EU, the EC recognized areas within Slovakia in which CSF infection was endemic in wild boar and placed restrictions on movement of swine and swine commodities from this area. Commission Decision 2004/375/EC amended Commission Decision 2003/526/EC—which defined protection measures for infected areas of Germany, France, and Luxembourg—to apply similar restrictions to the infected area in Slovakia. 
</p>
<p>As shown in Figure 4.1, Commission Decision 2004/375/EC initially restricted areas controlled by the DVFAs of Trnava (5), Levice (9), Nitra (10), Topol’čany (11), Nové Mesto nad Váhom (13), Trenčín (14), Púchov (16), Prievidza (15), Žiar nad Hronom (17), Zvolen (18), and Banská Bystrica (22). Commission Decision 2003/526/EC was further amended in 2004 by Commission Decisions 2004/625/EC and 2004/831/EC, which extended the restrictions to the DVFAs of Lučenec (20) and Vel’kŷ Krtíš (19) (see Figure 4.2). In 2005, Commission Decisions 2005/225/EC and 2005/946/EC removed restrictions from the DVFAs of Levice (9), Nitra (10), Topol’čany (11), Nové Mesto nad Váhom (13), Trnava (5), Banská Bystrica (22), and the district of Púchov in the DVFA Púchov (16) (see Figure 4.3). 
</p>
<p>In 2006, Commission Decision 2006/805/EC repealed Decision 2003/526/EC without change to the restricted area of Slovakia. This Decision was amended in 2007 by Commission Decision 2007//826/EC, which removed restrictions from the DVFAs of Trenčín (14) and Prievidza (15), as well as the remainder of Púchov (16), but extended restrictions to the parts of Nové Zámky, Komárno, and Levice (see Figure 4.4). Commission Decision 2008/631/EC further amended Decision 2006/805/EC by extending the restricted area to the whole DVFAs of Komárno (7), Nové Zámky (8), Levice (9), and the district of Rimavská Sobota in the same DVFA (21) (see Figure 4.5).
</p>
<p><b>Figure 4.1: Restricted area in April 2004 
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image3.emf" alt="image3.emf"></p>
<p><b>Figure 4.2: Restricted area by end 2004
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image4.emf" alt="image4.emf"></p>
<p><b>Figure 4.3: Restricted area by end 2005
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image5.emf" alt="image5.emf"></p>
<p><b>Figure 4.4: Restricted area by end 2007
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image6.emf" alt="image6.emf"></p>
<p><b>Figure 4.5: Restricted area as of August 2008
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image7.emf" alt="image7.emf"></p>
<p class="comment_Text">According to Commission Decision 2006/805/EC (as amended), live swine may not move from the restricted area in Slovakia to non-infected areas of another Member State; however, live swine may move from the restricted area to other areas within Slovakia under certain conditions (see Section 7).
</p>
<p class="comment_Text">4.3
Eradication program in wild boar
</p>
<p>The SVFA has developed an eradication plan for CSF in wild boar in accordance with the Ordinance of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 276/2003 Coll. that transposes Council Directive 2001/89/EC (SVFA 2004b; SVFA 2004c). The plan was initially approved by the EC in the form of Commission Decision 2005/59/EC and is modified each year to reflect developments in the eradication campaign. The area specified in the eradication plan is essentially the same as the infected/restricted area; the most recent amendment—Commission Decision 2008/686/EC—specifies an eradication area the same as that shown in Figure 4.5.
</p>
<p>Basic components of the eradication plan are intensive serologic surveillance in wild boar and, to a lesser extent, domestic swine in infected regions; increased hunting to reduce the wild boar population; sanitary removal of wild boar found dead or shot; vaccination of wild boar since 2005; and increased external biosecurity and movement controls on holdings in the infected regions (SVFA 2004c). 
</p>
<p>The eradication plan calls for serological and virological testing of all wild boar hunted or found dead in the infected area (FVO 2002; SVFA 2004c; FVO 2006; SVFA 2008e; 2008f).  Elsewhere, in the non-infected areas, the proportion of hunted populations to be tested is decided regionally, but is at least 20%. The hunting associations estimate the number of wild boar per square kilometer based on a spring census and hunting data from the previous year, and work with the DVFA and the district forestry office to coordinate hunting and surveillance activities. In 2008 the eradication plan attempted to increase the number of samples taken from February through July and increase the number of hunted female wild boars to reduce wild boar population (SVFA 2008e). CSF surveillance is discussed in detail in Section 9.
</p>
<p>The official hunting season is 15 July – 31 January but hunting is allowed year round to control wild boar numbers (SVFA 2004c; APHIS 2004b). The objective is to bring the density below 0.7 wild boar per sq km, at which point the Slovakian veterinary authorities have estimated that the reproduction ratio (Ro) will fall below 1, eventually leading to the infection dying out. In infectious disease modeling, when Ro equals 1 each newly infected host is the source of infection for one other host and the disease is maintained in the population (Scott and Smith 1994). An infectious disease generally expands in the population when Ro is greater than 1 and dies out when Ro is less than 1.
</p>
<p>Only individual hunting is allowed in infected areas, and hunting in groups or with dogs is prohibited, to avoid dispersing the wild boar (SVFA 2004c; APHIS 2004b). Hunters are instructed to target younger animals. A reward of 300 SKK is paid for each wild boar killed from February to July; 500 SKK for each female wild boar killed from August to January; 2,000 SKK (70 USD) for each virus-positive wild boar of any age and weight; 2,000 SKK for wild boar killed and disposed of in inaccessible terrain; and 1,500 SKK (51 USD) for each virus-positive dead wild boar reported and properly disposed.
</p>
<p>The carcasses of all boars found dead are sampled and then destroyed by rendering, or buried if found in inaccessible terrain (SVFA 2004c). Hunted wild boar carcasses are identified by a unique number tag issued by the Department of Land, Agriculture, and Forest Economy. Carcasses must be carefully bagged in water-proof plastic and accompanied to a processing establishment by a hunting declaration containing details about the animal, including behavior before killing, animal origin, tag number, and other information. Carcasses are only released after a negative test for CSF virus. 
</p>
<p>Additional measures are taken to increase external biosecurity on domestic swine holdings in the infected area(s) and to prevent the spread of disease via live animals, genetic material, and other pathways. All pigs must be isolated from direct or indirect contact with wild boar; appropriate means of disinfection used at the entrance and exits of the buildings housing swine and the holding itself; appropriate hygienic measures applied by all persons coming into contact with wild boar; and all dead or diseased swine with CSF symptoms tested. In addition, no part of a wild boar nor any material or equipment which could be contaminated by CSF virus can be brought onto the holding. </p>
<p>Further details regarding movement controls are described in Section 7 and the vaccination campaign against CSF in wild boar is described in Section 5.
</p>
<p>4.4
Discussion
</p>
<p>Active disease control programs do not exist in Slovakia for SVD, FMD, or rinderpest, as none of these diseases have been reported in many years (see Section 2).  Surveillance for these diseases and CSF is discussed in more detail in Section 9. A comprehensive eradication plan is in place for CSF in wild boar and is premised on reducing the wild boar population in infected areas to the point where CSF infection cannot be sustained in the population. Vaccination of wild boar against CSF was initiated when it became apparent that the wild boar density could not be sufficiently reduced quickly or easily through hunting. 
</p>
<p>Slovakian authorities have been proactive in determining CSF-infected areas, initiating control measures and movement restrictions for domestic swine when surveillance detects the virus in wild boar. The infected area has changed considerably from 2004, moving away from the northern districts and spreading out along the border with Hungary. The size of the area decreased considerably from 2004 through 2007, but expanded again in 2008 in response to cases in wild boar and domestic swine (see Section 2) (SVFA 2008e). </p>
<p>The program has been successful to the extent that the percentage of CSF virus-positive wild boar is steadily declining (see Sections 2 and 9), and several previously infected areas were released from restrictions when no new virus-positive animals were found in a 12-month period. However, based on the current epidemiological situation, CSF virus is likely to remain active in wild boar in Slovakia, as well as adjacent countries, for an undeterminable period of time. Consequently, increased external biosecurity on all holdings in infected areas will remain essential to reduce the risk of CSF virus transmission to domestic pigs. 
</p>
<h2>5.
Vaccination status of the region
</h2>
<p>5.1
Classical swine fever
</p>
<p>5.1.1
Domestic swine
</p>
<p>Slovakia prohibited routine vaccination of domestic swine against CSF in November 1993, then reintroduced compulsory mass vaccination in March 1998 due to a rising epidemic in wild boar (FVO 2002).  All vaccinated swine were identified by a notch cut in the right ear. Vaccination was again prohibited in December 2000. Emergency vaccination was performed in the protection zone around an outbreak in the Partizánske district in 2001. In accordance with SVFA’s emergency vaccination plan, no live pigs left the vaccination area except for immediate slaughter in a designated slaughterhouse. The meat was heat treated, marked with a special stamp and marketed only in Slovakia (SVFA 2002b). 
</p>
<p>The SVFA’s CSF contingency plan contains provisions for emergency vaccination of domestic swine if approved by the EC (see Section 11) (SVFA 2004c). Movement of pigs from the vaccination zone would be prohibited for at least 6 months after vaccination starts, unless for immediate slaughter at a designated slaughterhouse. After 6 months, seropositive animals could move to a designated slaughterhouse; offspring of seropositive dams could go for slaughter or, if tested negative for CSF, could move to any other holding. Meat from vaccinated animals would be marked with a special stamp and marketed within the vaccination zone. 
</p>
<p>5.1.2
Wild boar
</p>
<p>
<i>Vaccination area
</i></p>
<p>Commission Decision 2005/59/EC approved the SVFA’s plan to eradicate CSF in wild boar and an emergency vaccination plan for wild boar in DVFAs and districts within the eradication area, specifically the DVFAs of Trenčín (14), Prievidza (15), Zvolen (18), Vel’ký Krtíš (19), and Lučenec (20). In March 2005, the vaccination plan was modified to include the DVFA of Žiar nad Hronom (17) and the district of Ilava (Commission Decision 2005/226/EC) (see Figure 5.1).  </p>
<p>No other changes were made to the vaccination area until 2008. Commission Decision 2008/88/EC of January 2008 removed the northern DVFAs of Trenčín (14) and Prievidza (15) and the district of Ilava from the vaccination area, while adding parts of the DVFAs of Komárno (7), Nové Zámky (8), and Levice (9). Commission Decision 2008/686/EC of August 2008 again expanded the vaccination area to include the entirety of these three districts, as well as the district of Rimavská Sobota (see Figure 5.2). 
</p>
<p>Although the vaccination area was originally smaller than the eradication area, the area was expanded after CSF cases were detected in wild boar in 2008 outside of the existing vaccination area, and the two are identical under Commission Decision 2008/686/EC. The vaccination area at the time this report was written was therefore the same as the area currently restricted by the EC under Commission Decision 2008/631/EC (see Section 4). </p>
<p><b>Figure 5.1: Vaccination area as of April 2005
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image8.emf" alt="image8.emf"></p>
<p><b>Figure 5.2: Vaccination area as of August 2008 
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image9.emf" alt="image9.emf"></p>
<p>
<i>Vaccination plan
</i></p>
<p>From 2005 to 2007, Slovakia distributed live attenuated vaccine (C strain) embedded in corn-mass baits in the spring, summer, and autumn (SVFA 2004b; SVFA 2008e). The baits were set out twice in each season at intervals of approximately 28 days; over 360,000 baits were distributed each year. Commission Decision 2008/88/EC of January 2008 decreased the vaccination area from 7,089 sq km to 4,643 sq km. Vaccination was limited due to problems with the supplier and Slovakia set out only 130,000 baits in two distributions in November. </p>
<p>Commission Decision 2008/686/EC expanded the vaccination area for 2009 as described above; at the time this report was written, Slovakia had set out 160,000 baits in two distributions in March (SVFA 2008f). SVI Zvolen attributes the expansion of CSF into new areas in 2008 to the fact that the vaccination area was not immediately expanded when CSF was detected just outside the area, rather than failure of oral vaccination.</p>
<p>The corn-mass bait is placed at bait sites by authorized hunters (a bait site is a place where wild boar are usually enticed with small amounts of feed for hunting purposes). The number of vaccine baits per bait site depends on factors such as wild boar density, number of feeding places in the area, and size of the wild boar groups.  The same bait sites are used throughout the campaign so as to disrupt the environment of the wild boar as little as possible. 
</p>
<p>Each distribution is followed by four days without hunting in order to ensure as complete an uptake of the vaccine baits as possible (SVFA 2004b). The vaccine virus is released when the capsule embedded in the bait is bitten in two; if the entire vaccine suspension is imbibed, it is sufficient to vaccinate a single boar against CSF. Vaccine bait which has not been taken up and vaccine capsules left exposed are collected after 5 days and brought to the DVFA for safe disposal. 
</p>
<p>SVFA veterinary officials plan to continue vaccination for at least 1 year after the last virus identification so as to reduce the probability of the epidemic flaring up again due to virus carriers. During this period, hunting is targeted toward highly susceptible younger animals which generally take up less bait and therefore are less effectively immunized. Hunters actively participate in the wild boar vaccination campaigns and they demonstrate good awareness of the purpose of the campaign (FVO 2005a).</p>
<p>5.2
Swine vesicular disease
</p>
<p>Slovakia has never vaccinated against SVD in domestic swine or wild boar (SVFA 2001).
</p>
<p>5.3
Foot and mouth disease
</p>
<p>Slovakian authorities vaccinated cattle, sheep, and goats against FMD virus types O and A until 1973, then vaccinated using a trivalent vaccine for O, A, and C types (SVFA 2002a; SVFA 2003). Vaccination was carried out in all animals over 3 months of age with re-vaccination at 6 months; older animals were vaccinated annually. Pigs considered in danger of contracting FMD were also vaccinated with a trivalent vaccine. Vaccination against FMD was prohibited in September 1991. It is illegal to import vaccine without permission of the SVFA (SVFA 2003). 
</p>
<p>The SVFA’s FMD contingency plan allows for emergency vaccination against FMD by official veterinarians if deemed necessary and approved by the EC (SVFA 2002a). Vaccinated animals would be marked with a unique, serially-numbered ear tag and a record kept of the number of animals vaccinated and the serial numbers used. In addition, a holding vaccination form would be completed and a copy left with the animal owner. Movement of vaccinated animals and products out of the vaccination zone would be prohibited; after the outbreak was over, vaccinated animals would either be destroyed and the carcasses rendered, or slaughtered with the meat heat-treated and marketed in the vaccination zone (SVFA 2003).</p>
<p>5.4 Rinderpest
</p>
<p>Slovakia does not vaccinate against rinderpest.
</p>
<p>5.5
Discussion
</p>
<p>Routine vaccination against CSF, SVD, and FMD is officially prohibited in Slovakia, except for CSF vaccination in wild boar. The last vaccination against FMD occurred in 1991; consequently, the probability of a vaccine titer interfering with FMD surveillance is low. Vaccination of domestic swine against CSF last occurred in 2000, and thus the potential exists to detect CSF vaccine titers by slaughter surveillance. A CSF-positive result during surveillance testing triggers a comprehensive epidemiological investigation (APHIS 2004b). Slovakia has never vaccinated against SVD.
</p>
<p>Slovakia implemented oral vaccination of wild boar against CSF in 2005. A similar plan appears to have contributed to the limitation of endemic infection in Germany; however, uptake is variable in the target population of weaned piglets and young adults, and frequent boosters are necessary (Moennig et al, 2003). In addition, animals vaccinated with live attenuated C-strain vaccine cannot be distinguished from animals that have recovered from field infection (Moennig et al, 2003; Uttenthal et al 2001), thus presenting a technical challenge with regard to surveillance for assessment of disease prevalence. The vaccination campaign is also subject to outside influences, such as problems with the vaccine supplier, which may have contributed to expansion of the CSF-infected area in 2008 (SVFA 2008e).    </p>
<h2>6. 
Separation from adjacent regions of higher risk
</h2>
<p>6.1
General information
</p>
<p>There are few natural barriers along the majority of Slovakia’s borders with Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Ukraine (SVFA 2002a), although the Danube River provides a substantial barrier along parts of the southeastern border with Austria and Hungary (see Figure 3.1). The Carpathian Mountains in the north are not high enough to substantially limit animal or human movement.
</p>
<p>6.2 Discussion
</p>
<p>Few natural barriers exist to prevent introduction of CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest from neighboring countries via movement of wild animals or human traffic. FMD or rinderpest-susceptible wildlife in Slovakia and neighboring regions includes red deer, roe deer, fallow deer, moufflon, chamois, European bison, and wild boar. Wild boar are also susceptible to CSF and SVD. None of these species is considered to be migratory in nature, but individual animals are known to travel substantial distances in search of food or water, during mating season, or in response to hunting or other habitat disruptions. 
</p>
<p>However, as discussed in Section 3, APHIS considers all of the neighboring countries except Ukraine to be free of SVD, FMD, and rinderpest, and Ukraine has not reported an outbreak of SVD or FMD for over a quarter century, and rinderpest for over 80 years. The likelihood of introduction into Slovakia of SVD or FMD from neighboring countries is thus considered to be low. Introduction of CSF into Slovakia from a neighboring country via wild boar is more likely.  However, the likelihood of disease introduction to domestic swine in Slovakia via this trans-border pathway is considerably less than that posed by native infected wild boar populations. 
</p>
<h2>7.
Movement control and biosecurity from higher risk regions
</h2>
<p>7.1
Border inspection ports
</p>
<p>7.1.1
Infrastructure
</p>
<p>The SVFA Department of Veterinary Certification and Control in Trade, Import, and Export is responsible for conducting veterinary inspections at BIPs on the outer EU border (FVO 2004b; APHIS 2004b). Sixteen BIPs with other EU Member States were eliminated at the time of accession, leaving only two EC-approved BIPs, on the border with Ukraine (Commission Decision 2006/117/EC). The Vyšné Nemecké road port is approved for animal products for human and non-human consumption, equidae, and ungulates (cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, and wild and domestic solipeds). The Čierna nad Tisou rail port is approved for animal products for human and non-human consumption. 
</p>
<p>In addition, the inspection centers at the Bratislava airport were approved in 2005 for animal products for human and non-human consumption (packed products only), equidae, and other animals including zoo animals. All three BIPs are approved for less than 500 consignments of products per year.
</p>
<p>The BIPs were built or remodeled to meet EC specifications as described by Annex II of Council Directive 97/78/EC and Commission Decision 2001/812/EC. Veterinary inspection of live ungulates, other live animals, products of animal origin for human consumption, and products of animal origin not for human consumption occur in separate sectors (APHIS 2004b). The live animal sectors have appropriate facilities for animal restraint and housing, and the product sectors have adequate room for offloading, examination, sampling, and storage at ambient, refrigerated, or freezing temperatures. 
</p>
<p>Each BIP is open 18-20 hours each day, 7 days per week, with 4-5 official veterinarians and no technical or administrative staff (FVO 2004b). Haulers are informed of working hours and must observe them, although a veterinary inspector is on call when the BIP is officially closed. All BIPs are fully computerized with access to TRACES and the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed. 
</p>
<p>Based on an agreement between the SVFA and the Customs Service, the BIP veterinarians have access to all manifests and can open the means of transport without Customs presence. Identification and selection of relevant consignments is largely carried out by the Customs Service based on information provided by the importer or other authorities or handling agents (FVO 2004b). An FVO audit found that the database used by Customs to release consignments for free circulation did not flag the requirement for a Common Veterinary Entry Document (CVED), thereby increasing the risk of veterinary consignments being imported without veterinary checks (FVO 2004b). However, Slovakian authorities have indicated that Customs is developing an electronic risk analysis system that will enable adequate identification and selection of consignments of veterinary interest (SVFA 2007). </p>
<p>The volume of inspection at the BIPs visited by the APHIS team in November 2004 was quite light and the facilities were operating well within the scope of their resources. The veterinary inspectors were knowledgeable of the pertinent EC and Slovakian legislation and were confident in their job skills. All BIPs are audited monthly by the head of the BIP, twice annually by the central SVFS, and on a rotating schedule by the FVO. 
</p>
<p>7.1.2 Biosecurity
</p>
<p>Employees must pass through a clean room to enter any inspection sector of the BIP, with changing facilities on entry and exit (APHIS 2004b). Each facility sector is cleaned and disinfected after an animal conveyance is unloading and reloading, as are the storage rooms if used. Cleaning and disinfection is carried out by the maintenance people with supervision by the inspectors. There is a special disposal container for bedding and leftover feed to be taken to the rendering plant. The head of each facility has the authority to stop movement of animals and products through the BIP, and each BIP has a contingency plan to follow in the event that an infectious animal disease is suspected (APHIS 2004b). 
</p>
<p>The BIPs have tire baths in place that are only used in the event of an outbreak (APHIS 2004b). Routine disinfection of vehicular traffic is not carried out at other border crossings in the absence of a reported outbreak (SVFA 2006). EC legislation requires that all live-haul trucks and rail cars be cleaned and disinfected at the point of destination. Such vehicles from third countries must be accompanied by a certificate indicating that they were disinfected prior to loading. 
</p>
<p>Trains entering Slovakia from Ukraine do not have restaurant cars, so no catering waste is offloaded; catering waste from airplanes landing at the Bratislava airport is collected by a specialized company and brought to a rendering plant in Bratislava (FVO 2004b). The Bratislava DVFA is responsible for supervising the destruction of the offloaded catering waste. There is a large incineration facility in Ladce, located approximately 300 km from Ukraine border and 130 km from Bratislava (FVO 2004b). The three BIPs also contract with a rendering plant in Žilina. 
</p>
<p>7.2 
Import controls
</p>
<p>7.2.1
Legislative controls
</p>
<p>Most live animals, meat, meat products, and genetic materials are harmonized commodities under EC legislation, which means that the restrictions on imports from third countries are standardized across all Member States. Council Decision 79/542/EEC, as amended, lists third countries from which live animals and fresh meat may be imported into the EC. Other legislation specifies third countries from which milk, meat products, meat preparations, wild game meat, and genetic materials may be imported from third countries. 
</p>
<p>Council Decision 79/542/EC, as last amended by Commission Decision 2008/752/EC, permits import of live swine from Switzerland, Chile, Canada, New Zealand, and Iceland. APHIS considers all of these countries free of SVD, with or without restrictions under 9 CFR 94.13
, and all but Switzerland free of CSF, with restrictions on Chile under 9 CFR 94.25
. At the time this report was written, APHIS was evaluating the CSF status of Switzerland, which last reported CSF in wild boar in 1999. 
</p>
<p>APHIS considers Switzerland, Chile, Canada, New Zealand, and Iceland free of FMD under 9 CFR 94.1, with restrictions on Switzerland and Chile under 9 CFR 94.11
. However, EC legislation also permits import of live ruminants into EU Member States from Croatia, which APHIS has not evaluated for FMD. 
</p>
<p>Council Decision 79/542/EC allows import of fresh pork and pork products from Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, and the United States. As noted above, APHIS regards Canada, Chile, and New Zealand as free of SVD, CSF, and FMD, with or without restrictions. APHIS also considers Australia to be free of these diseases, without restrictions. Import of fresh meat and meat products from both domestic and wild ruminants is allowed from several countries that APHIS has not evaluated the risk for FMD, including Croatia, Botswana, Cuba, Serbia, and others.   Slaughter establishments, cutting plants, and cold storage units in third countries must be inspected and approved for export to the EU. The inspection process is stringent, although the EC may grant provisional approval prior to inspection if the exporting country can provide sufficient guarantees that the required conditions have been met. 
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2004/639/EC as amended specifies the import conditions for bovine semen, including the animal health and veterinary requirements, and lists both authorized third countries and approved semen collection centers. Import of bovine semen is permitted from approved semen collection centers in Australia, Canada, Switzerland, New Zealand, Croatia, and the United States. Commission Decision 2006/168/EC permits import of bovine embryos from these countries and also from Argentina, Croatia, Israel, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  However, there are currently no approved bovine embryo transfer teams in Macedonia (EC2008c).   APHIS has not evaluated these countries for the risk of FMD.
</p>
<p>Bovine semen collection centers must be approved by the EC in accordance with Council Directive 88/407/EEC, as amended. Animals must be isolated for 28 days prior to entry into the center and the isolation facility must be located in a region that has been free of FMD for 3 months with no outbreaks within a 20 km radius for at least 30 days. Import of bovine embryos is similarly controlled by EC legislation, including a list of authorized third countries, veterinary certification requirements, and a list of approved embryo collection teams.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2002/613/EC, as amended, specifies the import conditions for swine semen, including authorized third countries, the veterinary requirements, and approved semen collection centers. Import of swine semen is permitted from approved collection centers in Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and Switzerland. Swine semen collection centers must be approved by the EC in accordance with Council Directive 90/429/EEC, which was amended by several commission decisions in response to events such as extensive CSF outbreaks in domestic swine in 1996-97 that involved two semen collection centers. Under Commission Decision 2008/636/EC, import of swine ova and embryos is permitted from third countries from which swine semen is permitted. However, no embryo collection teams for porcine embryos are approved at the time of this writing (EC2008c).
</p>
<p>Swine semen collection centers must be inspected by official veterinarians of the exporting country at least twice per year. Under the amended regulations, swine admitted to a semen collection center must originate from a herd that is not situated in an area restricted due to disease in domestic swine and must be quarantined for at least 30 days prior to entry. In the case of Switzerland, boars must test negative for CSF within the 30 days prior to quarantine and, to maintain approval, routine testing for CSF must be carried out on 25% of the animals in the center every 3 months or on all animals leaving the center within 1 year of admission. All animals must be tested at least once while at the center and at least every 12 months if their stay exceeds 1 year. 
</p>
<p>7.2.2
Certification
</p>
<p>EC certification requirements for import of live animals and animal products from third countries are generally comprehensive with respect to OIE guidelines and must be signed by an official veterinarian of the country of origin. Commission Decision 2004/212/EC lays out models of veterinary certificates for live ruminants, swine, fresh meat from domestic ruminants and swine, and fresh meat from wild suidae and solipeds. Model veterinary certificates for embryos, semen, meat products, and related commodities are provided in other Commission Decisions. 
</p>
<p>The specific certificate used depends on the commodity for export, the exporting country and, in the case of live animals, the purpose for which they are exported (breeding, production, or direct slaughter). BIP inspectors can download country and commodity specific certificates from a website maintained by the EC (VetLex).
</p>
<p>For live animals, an official veterinarian must certify that the exporting region is free of FMD, CSF, and/or SVD as appropriate, that the animals have remained in the region at least 3 months (slaughter animals) or 6 months (breeding or production animals) prior to export, and that they have not been exposed to any imported cloven-hoofed animals in the 30 days prior to export. The veterinarian must also certify that the animals have not been vaccinated, have remained at a designated holding or assembly center for 40 days prior to export, and that no outbreaks have occurred within a 20 km radius in the preceding 40 days. In addition, swine for breeding and/or production from Switzerland, Chile, or Iceland must test negative for CSF and SVD in the 30 days preceding export.
</p>
<p>An official veterinarian must certify similar statements regarding disease freedom for meat and meat products exported to the EU, although meat from ruminants may be accepted from some regions in which vaccination against FMD is practiced. In this case, the meat must maturate at greater than 2oC for 24 hours and the pH as measured in the middle of the <i>longissimus dorsi</i> muscle prior to deboning must be less than 6.0. Milk and cream from countries that have not been recognized as FMD-free for at least two years are subject to treatment sufficient to ensure destruction of the FMD virus. Similarly, certain regions must provide additional certification regarding swill feeding to domestic swine. 
</p>
<p>For bovine semen, an official veterinarian must certify that the exporting country has been free of FMD without vaccination during the 12 months prior to semen collection, and that the semen collection center is approved by the EC and operates under the conditions required for approval (Commission Decision 2004/639/EC). Similarly, an official veterinarian of the exporting country must certify that swine semen originated from donor boars that routinely test negative for CSF antibodies in an approved collection center, in a region free from FMD, CSF, and SVD for at least 12 months without vaccination (Commission Decision 2002/613/EC).
</p>
<p>7.2.3
Veterinary inspection
</p>
<p>Veterinary inspection at the BIPs occur according to a manual of procedures that follows EC requirements as described in Council Directives 91/496/EEC, 97/78/EC, and other regulations (APHIS 2004b; SVFA 2004b). Veterinary documents for incoming shipments, including animal health certificates and the CVED required by EC legislation, must be submitted to the BIP by fax or email at least one working day prior to entry. 
</p>
<p>Once the shipment arrives, there are three stages of control for both live animals and products: (1) a document check to confirm that the health certificate is correct according to EC requirements and that it has been signed by an official veterinarian of the exporting country; (2) an identity check or visual confirmation of correct ear tags, chips, tattoos, or codes; and (3) a general physical examination with a percentage of the shipment singled out for a more thorough examination (APHIS 2004b). 
</p>
<p>If the veterinary inspection is satisfactorily completed, an official veterinarian completes and signs the CVED, then passes it to the Customs Service (APHIS 2004b). Customs officers meanwhile inspect the conveyance if appropriate. The original of the CVED accompanies the shipment to the point of destination. If the shipment is refused, the appropriate information is entered on the CVED and all other EU BIPs are notified of the actions taken.
</p>
<p>Livestock shipments must follow an approved route plan to their destination. Imported live swine and ruminants must be isolated at a previously approved destination facility. After 3 weeks, the animals are eligible for any additional required testing, which may be conducted by an approved veterinarian. 
</p>
<p>7.3
Transit controls
</p>
<p>At the time of the APHIS site visit, control of products transiting between third countries occurred in accordance with Commission Decisions 2002/349/EC and 2002/349/EC (APHIS 2004b). Commission Decision 2002/349/EC, which was replaced by Commission Decision 2007/275/EC, implements a common nomenclature used by custom officials.  Seals are applied to the conveyance at the third country point of origin, although officials at the point of departure from the source country can break and replace the seal for inspection purposes. Veterinary inspectors verify seals on means of transport for export, import, and transit, although a Customs officer may verify seals for transit (SVFA 2003). A veterinary inspector at the entry BIP issues a CVED specifying the exit BIP and route plan, and certifies by stamp the accompanying documentation (SVFA 2004b). The exit BIP is notified of the transit shipment, records the exit, and sends confirmation back to the BIP at the point of entry. 
</p>
<p>7.4
Controls on intra-Community trade
</p>
<p>Trade in live animals and animal products within the EU are primarily governed by a series of Council Directives that were transposed into Slovakian legislation prior to accession. As an EU Member State, Slovakia is free to engage in intra-Community trade with any other Member State as governed by EC legislation. All live animals and animal products must be accompanied by the appropriate certificate. Shipments to EU markets that cross Member State borders must originate from an assembly center and animals are required to remain on the assembly center premises for an observation period prior to trade. Each lot of animals must appear healthy and be separated by gender. 
</p>
<p>For welfare reasons, an official veterinarian supervises the loading and unloading of animals for intra-Community trade. The shipment is entered into TRACES and the server informs the point of destination as well as any border crossing points. An official veterinarian at the point of destination confirms the arrival. Council Directive 90/425/EEC allows for spot checks to be carried out at the points of origin and destination to ensure that consignments are in compliance with the guarantees provided by the health certificates.
</p>
<p>Slaughterhouses, cutting plants, cold storage units, milk processing plants, and semen collection centers must be approved by the Member State in which they reside according to criteria equivalent to those for exporting establishments in third countries. The veterinary services of the pertinent Member State and the FVO conduct periodic audits to monitor compliance with approval criteria and certification requirements.
</p>
<p>7.4.1
Restrictions due to CSF 
</p>
<p class="comment_Text">Commission Decision 2006/805/EC, as amended, restricts movement of live swine from CSF affected regions of Slovakia, Hungary, Germany, France, and all of Bulgaria. Live swine may not move from affected areas in one Member State to non-affected areas of another Member State. However, Germany and France may move live swine from affected areas to other affected areas in Germany or France (limited intra-Community trade), provided that no live swine have been introduced to the holding within 30 days, and negative serological test within 7 days on a statistical sample sufficient to detect 10% prevalence with 95% confidence (no test required if direct to slaughter). 
</p>
<p class="comment_Text">Swine may move from affected areas of a Member State to non-affected areas within the same Member State, contingent upon clinical examination by an official veterinarian and negative serologic testing for CSF; or, if swine are transported direct to slaughter, no examination and serological testing is required. Live swine from non-affected areas are eligible for intra-Community trade, provided that no swine from an affected area have been added to the holding within 30 days. Transit of swine through an affected area must take place on major roads or railways without stopping. The official veterinarian conducting pre-movement inspections also routinely checks that transport vehicles have been cleaned and disinfected (Commission Decision 2006/805/EC; FVO 2005). 
</p>
<p class="comment_Text">Due to the presence of CSF in swine holdings and wild boar in Romania, Commission Decision 2007/779/EC has prohibited intra-Community trade in live swine; swine semen, ova, and embryos; fresh pork meat; and meat preparations and meat products consisting of or containing meat of pigs (unless heat treated) from the whole of that country. In order to guarantee the implementation and control of these measures for meat and meat products, a special health or identification mark that cannot be confused with the oval EU marks, has to be placed on swine meat and meat products (EC 2007d).
</p>
<p class="comment_Text">Commission Decision 2006/805/EC, as amended, specifically prohibits intra-Community trade of swine genetic materials from CSF affected areas of Germany, France, Slovakia, Hungary, and all of Bulgaria; however, there are no prohibitions on movement of genetic materials from affected to non-affected areas within any given Member State. With the exception of Romania, EC regulations do not specifically restrict intra-Community trade of fresh meat, meat preparations, or meat products from affected areas of Member States.
</p>
<p>When movement is permitted, Commission Decision 2006/805/EC identifies health certification requirements for movement of swine and swine products from affected Member States, CSF surveillance requirements and biosecurity measures for holdings located within affected areas, and requirements for cleaning and disinfection of vehicles used to transport swine from holdings located within affected areas. 
</p>
<p>7.4.2
Restrictions due to SVD
</p>
<p>Italy and Portugal have reported SVD outbreaks over the past decade (OIE 2008b).  APHIS considers all of Portugal and the Italian regions of Friuli, Liguria, Marche, and Valle d’Aosta to be free of SVD (9 CFR 94.12), with restrictions under 9 CFR 94.13.
</p>
<p>Portugal reported an outbreak of SVD in domestic swine in 2007 (OIE 2008b). This outbreak was detected through serological testing in Spain of swine for slaughter from Portugal (EC 2007f). Spain immediately implemented emergency response measures for disease spread prevention (EC 2007f). Portugal‘s emergency response measures included stamping out of affected herds, and application of other control and eradication measures specified in Council Directive 92/119/EEC and Commission Decision 2000/428/EC<b>.</b> Italy has experienced numerous outbreaks of SVD in domestic swine in most years since 1996 (OIE 2008b), and is subject under EC legislation to enhanced animal health control measures aimed at controlling and eradicating SVD, and preventing SVD spread to other Member States (Commission Decision 2005/779/EC as amended).   These SVD control measures are applicable to all EU Member States.
</p>
<p>Council Directive 92/119/EEC establishes specific control and eradication measures relating to compulsorily notifiable diseases, including SVD, throughout the EU. In response to continued SVD outbreaks in Italy, the EC issued Commission Decision 2005/779/EC and subsequent amendments which contain provisions to mitigate SVD spread to free areas of Italy or to other Member States through measures aimed at controlling and eradicating SVD. Commission Decision 2005/779/EC prohibits movement of swine from Italy to other Member States, except for swine from holdings recognized as free of SVD that are located in regions recognized as free of SVD, and establishes certification requirements for such movement. 
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2005/779/EC also prohibits movement of swine from holdings not recognized as free of SVD to other holdings, and requires serological testing of swine for slaughter from holdings not recognized as free of SVD, under a protocol designed to detect prevalence of SVD at 5% with 95% confidence interval. This decision also prohibits movement of swine from regions not recognized as free of SVD to other regions of Italy, except under specified conditions, including transport under official supervision in sealed vehicles that are cleaned under official supervision before and after movement; serological testing requirements for the holding of origin (before movement) and destination (after movement); 60 days prior to movement, the holding of origin was not located in a protection or surveillance zone following an SVD outbreak; and the holding of origin was recognized as SVD free for two consecutive years.</p>
<p>7.4.3
Restrictions due to FMD
</p>
<p>Eight FMD outbreaks in the United Kingdom (UK) occurred between August 3, 2007 and September 30, 2007, all localized to Surrey County, England (OIE 2008b). The outbreaks were handled in accordance with EC legislation (Council Directive 2003/85/EC and Commission Decision 2007/554/EC as amended) in terms of stamping out, biosecurity measures, establishing protection and surveillance zones, cleaning and disinfecting affected premises, and national movement restrictions of susceptible species.  Intra-community trade in live bi-ungulates, germplasm, and fresh meat was restricted from areas surrounding the outbreak, and precautions such as additional health certifications from non-affected areas of the United Kingdom were implemented (EC2007h; EC2007i; Commission Decision 2007/554).  
</p>
<p>APHIS initially responded to the outbreaks by administratively prohibiting the importation of live ruminants, live swine, and their products from the entirety of the UK. APHIS subsequently lifted the trade restrictions on most of the UK and published an interim rule that removed only Surrey County from the list of regions recognized as free of FMD (9 CFR 94.1). 
</p>
<p>Swift and decisive measures by UK veterinary authorities and the EC to control the FMD outbreaks and restrict intra-Community movement prevented the spread of FMD to other Member States (EC 2007j). The UK and the EC removed all restrictions in England on December 31, 2007 (OIE 2008b).  At the time of this report, APHIS was soliciting public comment on a risk assessment that concluded that the risk of introducing FMD into the United States with the resumption of trade in live ruminants and swine and their products originating from Surrey County, England, is low (APHIS 2008; APHIS 2008a). 
</p>
<p>7.4.3  Restrictions due to rinderpest
</p>
<p>The last rinderpest outbreak in Europe concluded in 1923, hence the EC does not currently prescribe control measures for this disease. </p>
<p class="body_Text">7.5
Volume and type of imports</p>
<p>7.5.1
Swine and swine products
</p>
<p>Slovakia is a net importer of both live swine and pork (GTA 2008). Live swine imports have been highly variable, increasing above 320,000 in 2004, declining to 135,000 in 2005, then increasing to over 335,000 in 2006, with Poland becoming the major source (see Annex 2). Live swine imports were down again in 2000 at 80,500. Slovakia has historically received swine primarily from the Czech Republic, although substantial numbers of swine have also been imported from Hungary, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, and the Netherlands. </p>
<p>Pork imports more than doubled in 2004 from 2003 levels (11,467 tons), then almost doubled again between 2004 and 2005; pork imports in 2006 and 2007 were just over 55,000 tons (GTA 2008). Pork imports also originated primarily from the Czech Republic, but with substantial amounts from Germany, France, and Poland; one ton of fresh pork meat was imported from Ukraine in 2005. In 2006, pork imports increased from the Austria, Italy, and the Netherlands, with small amounts from Cyprus (less than 200 tons). </p>
<p>APHIS considers most of the countries from which Slovakia has imported live swine or pork in recent years to be free of FMD under 9 CFR 94.1 with the restrictions listed in 9 CFR 94.11; free of SVD under 9 CFR 94.12 with restrictions under 9 CFR 94.13; and low risk for CSF under 9 CFR 94.9 and 94.10, but subject to the restriction in 9 CFR 94.24
 and 98.38
. The CSF status of Hungary and Cyprus was under evaluation at the time this report was written. Since CSF is endemic in certain segments of the wild boar population in Germany, and parts of Italy are affected with SVD, trade is restricted by the EC as described in Section 4.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">Measures mitigating the risk of spread of SVD into Slovakia through trade in swine products are similar to those noted above that mitigate the risk from trade in live swine.  Strict EC controls on trade of swine products, including restrictions on the origin of product and swine from which the products are derived, as well as requirements for veterinary inspection and certification. Additional controls include requirements that the products undergo specified processing to inactivate the virus (Commission Decision 92/119/EC).  As indicated previously for trade in live swine, the risk of spread of SVD into Slovakia through trade in swine products is also mitigated by the limited distribution of SVD worldwide (OIE 2008b).  </p>
<p>7.5.2 Ruminants and ruminant products
</p>
<p>Slovakia is a net exporter of both cattle and small ruminants, and exports of cattle have increased since accession (GTA 2008); in 2006, Slovakia exported 184,832 head of cattle. Imports of live cattle remained relatively constant at around 400 head per year until 2006, when imports increased five-fold with cattle from countries such as Germany, Poland, Italy and Romania (see Annex 2). The Czech Republic was the largest exporter of cattle to Slovakia in 2007 (1,220 head); few live cattle were imported from Austria, Denmark, or Hungary in the last few years. Imports of small ruminants continued a gradual decline to less than 1,000 head. Small ruminants were imported almost entirely from Poland in recent years, although 6 head were imported from Russia. 
</p>
<p>Trade in beef occurs at a relatively low level, with exports approximately equivalent to imports in 2006. Slovakia imported only 50 tons of sheep and goat meat in 2006, from the Czech Republic, Italy, and the United Kingdom (see Annex 2). APHIS considers all of the countries from which Slovakia has imported live ruminants and their derived products to be free of FMD and rinderpest under 9 CFR 94.1, with or without restrictions as in 9 CFR 94.11, except for Russia, Romania, and Macedonia.
</p>
<p>7.6
Veterinary control of passenger traffic
</p>
<p>Per SVFA officials, there are no uncontrolled border crossing points into Slovakia but there are crossings for passenger traffic and local transport that do not have veterinary inspection <i>per se</i> (APHIS 2004b). Individuals attempting to cross the border with consignments of agricultural products at one of the Customs-controlled checkpoints are redirected to a BIP with veterinary inspection. All passengers from third countries must pass customs inspection, which is performed according to Commission Regulation 2454/93 and Council Regulation 2913/92. 
</p>
<p>Commission Regulation 745/2004, which is directly applicable to all Member States, dictates that posters to promote public awareness of prohibited meat, milk, and meat and milk products be prominently posted at all border crossings. Under this Regulation, personal consignments of meat, meat products, milk or milk products from the Faeroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland with a combined total weight not exceeding 5 kilograms are permitted entry, as well as personal consignments of these commodities from Andorra, Norway, and San Marino. APHIS has not evaluated the status of many of these countries for CSF, SVD, and/or FMD risk, although none have reported an outbreak of CSF, SVD, or FMD in recent years.
</p>
<p>The site visit team observed posters listing restricted items at some border ports, but not all (APHIS 2004b). The team also observed prominently placed amnesty bins, which may serve to decrease the amount of illegal animal products carried across the border unintentionally. Customs officers visually inspect 100% of passenger luggage at the BIPs on Ukraine border since the volume of traffic is low, primarily looking for drugs, arms, and cigarettes (FVO 2004b; SVFA 2006). The luggage of selected travelers is checked visually or with scanning equipment at three airports, including Bratislava. The selection process takes into account the country of origin of the traveler and the point of origin of the flight, with emphasis on flights and travelers from third countries. 
</p>
<p>No illegal consignments were found at the airports in 2005; at road and railway ports, 96 consignments consisting of 6.5 kilograms of meat and meat products, 61 eggs, and 184.9 kilograms of milk and milk products were detected in personal luggage (SFVA 2006). These commodities were confiscated and destroyed by rendering, or the passenger was denied entry into Slovakia.  Slovakian officials indicated that the busiest border crossings are Ubl’a (over 296 thousand travelers in 2005), Čierna nad Tisou (166.3 thousand travelers), and Vyšné Nemecké (approximately 5 thousand travelers in 2005). 
</p>
<p>7.7
Discussion
</p>
<p>The BIPs visited by the APHIS team were operating with sufficient personnel coverage, as well as appropriate equipment and adequate facilities. Slovakian officials transposed EC legislation concerning veterinary controls on export and trade in live animals and animal products into Slovakian legislation prior to accession. The veterinary inspectors were knowledgeable of relevant import control legislation and confident in implementing inspection procedures. Both electronic and paper records were well organized and readily accessible. Each BIP is inspected at least annually by the SVFA and periodically audited by the FVO. 
</p>
<p>Based on the information presented above, the following pathways for disease introduction are of interest to APHIS: (1) import and trade of live animals; (2) import and trade of animal products; (3) incoming vehicular traffic; and (4) agricultural commodities for personal consumption. 
</p>
<p>7.7.1
Import and trade of live animals
</p>
<p>EC legislation imposes less stringent restrictions on sourcing of imported ruminants than do APHIS requirements, which could result in a comparatively greater likelihood of FMD or rinderpest introduction into Slovakia. This is true to a lesser extent regarding live swine and CSF. EC import policies and the restricted scope of SVD infection worldwide limit the risk of introducing this disease via imported live animals. APHIS considers the risk of introducing FMD or SVD into Slovakia via intra-Community trade in live animals to be low at the present time, although the likelihood of introducing CSF is comparatively greater. 
</p>
<p>Slovakia has received substantial imports of live swine from Germany, where CSF is endemic in the wild boar population. However, Slovakian import practices otherwise appear to have been protective concerning CSF, SVD, FMD, and rinderpest in that APHIS considers most of the other source countries free of these diseases. Other measures that substantially reduce the risk of disease introduction via import or trade in live animals include a mandatory observation period and veterinary inspection prior to shipment; certification of disease status by an official veterinarian; and isolation procedures with veterinary spot-checks at the point of destination. Imported animals also undergo veterinary inspection at the port of entry into Slovakia. 
</p>
<p>EC certification requirements, which are generally comprehensive with regard to international standards, also reduce the risk of disease introduction. Country and commodity specific certificates are readily available to veterinary inspectors on the internet and the inspectors appeared familiar with the content and governing regulations. The observation periods and veterinary inspection required for certification greatly increase the likelihood of disease detection but depend in large part on the extent of clinical signs and the ability of the observers to recognize the diseases of concern. Serological testing for CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest is generally not required for import or trade.</p>
<p>7.7.2
Import and trade of animal products
</p>
<p>Current EC legislation only allows imports of fresh pork and pork products from a limited number of third countries, all of which APHIS recognizes as free of CSF, FMD, rinderpest, and SVD (see Section 7.2.1). Slovakia may also import fresh meat and meat products from domestic and wild ruminants from third countries that APHIS has not evaluated the FMD risk. In addition, EC legislation permits import of swine semen from Switzerland, which APHIS has not finished evaluating for CSF, as well as bovine semen and embryos from regions that APHIS has not evaluated the risk for FMD. 
</p>
<p>Slovakia has received substantial imports of pork from Germany. Intra-Community trade in most swine products is prohibited from regions affected by CSF or SVD, which substantially limits the risk to the common market. However, outbreaks occurring outside of established control zones pose a risk to the common and export markets during the time period that the disease remains undetected.
</p>
<p>Risk mitigation measures currently in place include mandatory approval of third country establishments for export or trade, veterinary certification requirements, and veterinary spot-checks at the point of destination. Exporting countries must be authorized by the EC and the products undergo veterinary inspection at the point of entry. Veterinary inspection would likely detect irregularities in documentation or identity, but the physical examination would not detect virus if present.   
</p>
<p>EC certification requirements for meat, meat products, and genetic material are generally comprehensive with regard to international standards and must be signed by an official veterinarian of the country of origin. The certificate used depends on the commodity for export and includes specific guarantees for products from certain countries. 
</p>
<p>7.7.3
Incoming vehicular or human traffic
</p>
<p>As discussed in Section 3, Slovakia shares a common land border with Ukraine, which APHIS has not evaluated for CSF, SVD, FMD, and rinderpest risks. Ukraine has not reported a FMD, rinderpest, or SVD outbreak in over a quarter century and the likelihood of such diseases existing in the domestic animal population is low. The risk of CSF introduction or reintroduction into Slovakia from Hungary is more likely, considering the overall regional CSF situation in wild boar. (APHIS is currently evaluating the CSF status of Hungary.)</p>
<p>Slovakian officials indicated that, if an outbreak were reported in a neighboring region, biosecurity measures would be put in place such as tire baths and disinfecting the undercarriage of all vehicles (APHIS 2004b). Such measures are not currently in place at border crossings without veterinary inspection or at crossings from other EU member States. Additional biosecurity measures also would be enacted for airline passengers from affected regions in the event of an outbreak further abroad. EC legislation requires that all live-haul trucks and rail cars be cleaned and disinfected at the point of destination. Such vehicles from third countries must be accompanied by a certificate stating that they were cleaned and disinfected prior to loading. 
</p>
<p>7.7.4
Agricultural commodities for personal consumption
</p>
<p>The majority of border crossings are controlled by the Customs Service, without veterinary control <i>per se.</i> EC legislation permits personal consignments of products that could carry live CSF, SVD, or FMD virus from countries that APHIS has not evaluated for these disease risks. Posters indicating prohibited items and prominently placed amnesty bins at the BIPs may decrease the amount of illegal products unintentionally carried across the border.  
</p>
<p>At Bratislava airport, customs checks are carried out on passengers on all flights from third countries using a risk based approach and scanning equipment. No illegally imported products of animal origin have been found in personal luggage (FVO 2004b). Targeted customs searches are performed at 4 border crossings with Ukraine, where 100% of the personal luggage is visually inspected (SVFA 2006). In 2005, 124 vehicles (1%) were diverted for veterinary inspection and in 2006, 58 vehicles (0.5%) were diverted for veterinary inspection.  Seized commodities are immediately sent back to  Ukraine or disposed of in accordance with EC requirements (SVFA 2007).</p>
<h2>8.
Livestock demographics and marketing practices in the region
</h2>
<p>8.1 
Livestock demographics
</p>
<p>8.1.1
Ruminant census
</p>
<p>In 2006 there were 524,247 cattle on 19,904 holdings; 326,322 sheep on 4,949 holdings; and 5,507 goats on 918 holdings (OIE 2008b). Slovakia has strong sheep and cattle industries in comparison to many other EU Member States. Sheep are primarily of the meat/milk production type with the majority on holdings of 200 – 500 animals (SVFA 2002a). Goats are primarily raised for milk, with a very small number dedicated to wool or hair production. Most small ruminants (75%) are farmed on an extensive rather than intensive system. 
</p>
<p>Biosecurity measures on the dairy, sheep, and goat farms included perimeter fencing, and sometimes footbaths and overalls for workers; these measures would limit but not prevent contact with wildlife or live virus on clothing or vehicles (APHIS 2004b).
</p>
<p>8.1.2
Domestic swine census
</p>
<p>In 2005, there were 1,421,122 swine on 6,811 farms in Slovakia (OIE 2008b). However, swine production in Slovakia is losing profitability as a result of low prices for swine and pork, and the swine sector is contracting (APHIS 2004b).  The number of breeding sows has decreased in recent years; by December 2006, the swine population was approximately 921,723 pigs. The number of holdings remained relatively constant at 6806 (OIE 2008b). The majority of farms have between 1 and 450 animals (APHIS 2004b).</p>
<p>Large farms remain concentrated in the eastern and southwestern part of the country; commercial swine operations typically have 7,000 – 10,000 pigs. Medium sized farms (500 – 5,000 pigs/farm) are concentrated in the far western and eastern parts of the country. Breeding farms are mainly located in southwestern Slovakia, where there is the greatest swine density (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2).
</p>
<p>The larger swine holdings are primarily confinement operations with restricted access, internal housing, and perimeter fencing. The site visit team noted biosecurity measures such as limiting or excluding vehicular traffic onto the farm, disinfecting any entering vehicles, limiting entry of nonessential personnel and visitors, requiring showers and protective clothing when entering the production areas, use of foot baths, and color coding to designate “clean” and “dirty” areas (APHIS 2004b). 
</p>
<p>Commercial swine operations are required to provide food for their employees so that they do not bring food onto the premises. Employees cannot own pigs or hunt wild boar and must sign a statement to this effect (APHIS 2004b). In fact, all keepers/owners of swine must state that none of their family members are hunters or deal in any way with wild boar. If they break this rule they will not receive indemnity and compensation in the event of an outbreak. Farm owners often provide pork meat at a discount to employees.
</p>
<p><img src="embedded:image23.png" alt="image23.png"><b>Figure 8.1: Distribution of breeding swine herds
</b></p>
<p><b>Figure 8.2: Distribution of fattening swine herds
</b></p>
<p></p>
<p>Smaller holdings exhibited less attention to biosecurity and disease exclusion (APHIS 2004b); however, holdings with very small numbers of swine are generally intended for personal consumption (FVO 2002; FVO 2004a). 
</p>
<p>8.1.3 
Wild boar census
</p>
<p>The number of wild boar in Slovakia has increased in the past decade despite greater hunting pressure (SVFA 2004c). In the spring of 1997 there were an estimated 20,507 wild boar, whereas in 2003 the estimate was 28,779 boar; spring population estimates are based in part on hunting results from the previous year. 
</p>
<p>8.2
Animal identification system
</p>
<p>Identification and registration of animals is mandatory under the Veterinary Act and the DVFAs are responsible for enforcement of the requirements (SVFA 2004b, FVO 2005). The State Breeding Institute in Žilina operates a central database (CDB) for animal identification and holding registration (SVFA 2003; FVO 2004a). Geographical coordinates of livestock holdings are included in the CDB (SVFA 2006).  The SVFA reported counts for all registered holdings in the CDB at 22,638 cattle (11,399 active with one or more animals), 5,146 sheep (2,829 active with one or more animals), and 950 goat (264 active with one or more animals) (SVFA 2007). </p>
<p>National legislation also requires that an on-farm register be kept for cattle and swine holdings registered in the CDB, which should be updated within 24 hours of any event. Animal keepers are responsible for identifying their animals and keeping the farm register. A recent FVO audit found that crosschecks of the CDB and the farm registers yielded good results  and that an overall system for holding registration, animal identification and movement controls was in place and, in general, worked effectively (FVO 2004a; FVO 2005). </p>
<p>Cattle are marked with an ear tag in each ear (SVFA 2003; FVO 2004a). Calves are initially identified at birth and then permanently marked within 72 hours. Cattle owners may apply to the CDB for a replacement ear tag if one is lost; ear tags of dead or slaughtered animals may not be used again. Cattle must have two ear tags to leave the holding. Cattle are also issued passports at birth or, for some older cattle, at the time they leave the holding. At present the DVFA offices inspect 10% of bovine holdings for compliance with animal identification, in accordance with the “Methodical instruction to perform the control of bovine identification and registration on the spot” (SVFA 2004c). Few sanctions have been imposed as a result of these inspections.
</p>
<p>Identification and registration of sheep, goats, and swine began in November 2003 (SVFA 2004b). The holdings receive a 6-digit registration number. Pigs are identified by the number of the holding of origin (group identification), whereas small ruminants are individually identified. Swine ear tags and tattoos have a 5-digit alphanumeric code which correlates to the holding number (SVFA 2004c). Swine farmers are obligated to notify the CDB monthly of changes such as births, deaths, arrivals, and departures, whereas small ruminant owners must notify the CDB within 7 days. Holdings where only 1 pig is kept for the owner’s consumption need not register.
</p>
<p>As of November 2004, holding registration was ongoing, with approximately 95% of cattle holdings registered, 90% of swine holdings, and 80% of small ruminant holdings (FVO 2004a). The State Breeding Institute estimated at the time that 95% of animals were properly identified, although the percentage was lower for swine (90%), and lower still for sheep (less than 50%). The SVFA subsequently indicated that registration and identification were ongoing and approaching completion, and that most of the non-identified animals are kept on very small holdings for own consumption. </p>
<p>A recent FVO report found that the cattle database has been enhanced by the inclusion of logical controls which detect inconsistencies in data entered, i.e. report of an animal being moved on a date before it was reported to have been born (FVO 2005).  In almost all cases examined, holding registers were found to be maintained in accordance with the requirements and evidence was provided that the vast majority of cattle notifications (birth, death and movement) were made by farmers correctly and within the prescribed time limits. However, entry of the data into the CDB was often delayed.</p>
<p>8.3
Internal movement controls
</p>
<p>Cattle, swine, sheep, and goats must be accompanied by a veterinary certificate that confirms the registration of the farm, identification of the animals, and fulfillment of criteria for freedom from diseases such as tuberculosis, brucellosis, and Aujeszky’s disease (SVFA 2004c). The certificate is issued by an official veterinarian of the DVFA in the place of origin and is valid for 10 days for breeding and production animals, and 3 months for slaughter animals. An official veterinarian examines breeding and production animals at the time the documentation is issued, whereas animals for slaughter must be examined by an approved private veterinarian within 72 hours of movement. Authorization to move is withheld if animals are incorrectly identified or otherwise in breach of identification and registration requirements (FVO 2005).</p>
<p>Individual passports are required for cattle movement (SVFA 2004c). Both the sender and receiver of animals are responsible for notifying the CDB of the movement (FVO 2002a). Livestock for breeding or production must remain on the holding of origin for at least 30 days prior to movement (SVFA 2004c). All pigs must originate from a holding which fulfills the annual CSF monitoring requirements. Cattle, pigs, sheep, and goats must be isolated for 30 days at the destination holding before introduction into the recipient herd. 
</p>
<p>Breeding swine over 4 months of age must test negative for CSF during the 30 days in isolation; individual breeding swine from holdings in regions where the wild boar population is infected must also test negative for CSF not more than 7 days prior to movement (SVFA 2004c). Each lot of production swine (weanlings) from a holding in a wild boar infected area must test negative for CSF within 7 days of movement with a sample size sufficient to detect 10% prevalence with 95% confidence. 
</p>
<p>Domestic swine may move from an area that is restricted due to CSF in wild boar if going to slaughter and showing no clinical signs; all of the pork stays in Slovakia (APHIS 2004b). There are two types of slaughterhouses: low-capacity plants that are approved by the DVFA and produce for national consumption, and high-capacity plants that are approved by the central SVFA for trade with other EU Member States. Slaughterhouses that slaughter swine from a restricted zone cannot be approved for trade with the EU, even if they are located outside of the restricted zone.
</p>
<p>8.4
Marketing practices 

</p>
<p>There are no approved cattle marketing centers in Slovakia (SVFA 2002a). Swine are marketed in the southwestern part of the country at markets approved by the SVFA. There are also special exporting farms that feed and grow animals to 250 kilograms and export them all at once (APHIS 2004b). The pigs must stay on these farms for a minimum of 30 days but may stay up to 6 months. These farms are approved assembly centers and are registered with the CDB. 
</p>
<p>The RVFAs are responsible for approval of assembly centers (FVO 2005). Animals arriving at an assembly center for export must be examined prior to movement and accompanied by a veterinary certificate, and must leave with a health certificate issued at the center with a destination holding specified (APHIS 2004b). Animals transferred through an assembly center may not stay at the center for more than 6 days.
</p>
<p>8.5
Discussion
</p>
<p>In recent years, cattle and swine numbers in Slovakia have largely declined while sheep and wild boar numbers have increased. As the CSF infected area has evolved in recent years, it has come to encompass areas in which a fair number of large swine breeding and fattening operations are located. Interaction of livestock on small, non-confinement holdings with wild boar is possible considering the rise in wild boar numbers and their widespread distribution in Slovakia. However, exports to the United States will likely be derived from the larger operations which have more stringent biosecurity measures in place to prevent exposure to wild boar populations.  </p>
<p>The majority of livestock holdings in Slovakia are small and biosecurity on these premises is somewhat lacking as compared to more stringent biosecurity measures in larger/commercial swine operations. Potential shortcomings in biosecurity on primarily small holdings may increase exposure risk; however, for the most part, swine on very small holdings are kept for personal consumption and unlikely to be exported to the U.S.</p>
<p>Compliance with mandatory animal identification/registration is high with the exception of very small holdings which keep livestock for personal consumption. Movement restrictions, isolation parameters, and assembly center requirements are sufficient and promote adequate internal movement and export controls. There are no approved cattle marketing centers but swine markets and livestock assembly centers must be approved by the veterinary authorities. In the event of suspicious disease and/or outbreak (FMD, rinderpest, CSF, SVD), these mechanisms should appropriately assist authorities with prompt mitigation of disease spread.
</p>
<h2>9.
Disease surveillance in the region
</h2>
<p>9.1
General information
</p>
<p>National surveillance plans are in place for CSF in domestic swine and wild boar; the surveillance requirements are set each year at the central level. CSF surveillance is funded approximately 50% by Slovakia and 50% by the EU. Slovakia does not conduct SVD surveillance in wild boar or active surveillance for FMD, rinderpest, or SVD in domestic or wild animals (APHIS 2004b). Although no SVD, rinderpest, or FMD suspicions have been reported by private veterinarians or producers in the past three years, suspect cases of CSF have been reported—one in 2004, one in 2005 and two in 2006—and, as required, were submitted for laboratory confirmation (SVFA 2007). </p>
<p>Due to heightened awareness of CSF in domestic swine and wild boar, swine farmers and local veterinarians have responded early to suspicious clinical cases.  The 2004 APHIS team visited two farms that had experienced previous outbreaks and had notified the district veterinary offices as soon as clinical suspicion was observed. This led to early detection and implementation of quarantine measures (APHIS 2006d).</p>
<p>9.2
CSF surveillance 
</p>
<p>9.2.1
Domestic swine
</p>
<p>CSF surveillance in domestic swine occurred at a high level in 1998 then decreased sharply in 1999 and 2000 during the compulsory vaccination campaign (see Annex 3) (APHIS 2004b; SVFA 2007). After cessation of vaccination in December 2000, surveillance again increased with the goal of detecting latent outbreaks (FVO 2002). Surveillance initially occurred within a restricted zone established following the identification of CSF in wild boar, then was extended to the national territory. Surveillance included testing of non-vaccinated breeding animals when moved or used as replacements and taking 5 samples twice per year from farms supplying pigs to slaughter. 
</p>
<p>The scheme changed in June 2002 to require a minimum of 5 samples every 3 months on all commercial farms, with testing of breeding stock at the discretion of the DVFA. From 2004, the SVFA has required sampling for CSF at both the slaughterhouse and farm levels (SVFA 2004c). The sampling plan stipulates 5 blood samples from culled or slaughter pigs from each holding every 3 months, as well as serological examination of at least 15% of breeding animals on commercial holdings, again every 3 months. An investigation is conducted of seropositive results which includes clinical and laboratory examination of all pigs in the source herd. The sampling pattern reflects the distribution and density of domestic swine in Slovakia. </p>
<p>Slovakian authorities indicated in November of 2008 that new measures for domestic pigs will include more intensive monitoring within wild boar infected areas and around CSF-positive cases in wild boar (SVFA 2008d).</p>
<p>9.2.2
Wild boar
</p>
<p>CSF surveillance in wild boar occurs throughout Slovakia (FVO 2002; APHIS 2004b; SVFA 2004c; SVFA 2007; SVFA 2008e; SVFA 2008f). Districts are classified into four surveillance categories: 1) outbreak districts where CSF was found in the past year; 2) threatened districts bordering outbreak districts; 3) districts bordering Hungary; and 4) the districts remaining. All wild boar hunted or found dead in districts of types 1-3 are subject to virological testing and in most cases serological testing as well. Virological testing in type 4 districts may be reduced to 20% after July 15th each year as determined by the DVFA. All wild boar found dead are tested for CSF. </p>
<p>Surveillance testing for the period 1998 to 2008 is summarized in Annex 3 (SVFA 2008f). Testing peaked in 2004-05, when approximately 13,000 samples were submitted for serological testing and 15,000 for virological testing, and again in 2007. Virological testing is considered the standard, since Slovakia is not using the marker vaccine. While sampling of wild boar decreased in many districts in 2008 compared to 2007, sampling increased in the four districts (Levice, Nové Zámky, Rimavská Sobota, and Komárno) that were added to the infected/restricted area via Commission Decision 2008/631/EC (SVFA 2008e; 2008f).
</p>
<p>The hunting associations, represented by 57 local organizations, coordinate activities in 1,500 hunting areas throughout the country (FVO 2002). In cooperation with the DVFA, the hunting associations estimate the number of wild boar per square kilometer based on hunting data and the spring census. A hunting plan is drawn up in advance of the hunting season and approved by the district office of the Department of Land, Agriculture, and Forest Economy. These entities also provide training for hunters three times each year with emphasis on sampling, sample transportation and timely delivery, and completion of the accompanying documentation (FVO 2006). 
</p>
<p>Each hunter receives a set of yellow tags from the local hunting association and the unique number of each tag is transcribed on the hunting license (APHIS 2004b). Hunters place a tag on the leg of a hunted boar; the tag cannot be removed unless broken. Anyone caught with an untagged wild boar is considered to be smuggling and may be fined. Hunting and forestry guards, police, and regional forestry office officials have the right to check for smuggling.
</p>
<p>As discussed in Section 4, the official hunting season is July 15th through January 31st but year-round hunting is allowed in order to control wild boar numbers (APHIS 2004b). In some districts, the hunting association is fined if it does not meet the quota set at the beginning of the year. Hunting is intensified to obtain more samples from a given area if CSF virus is detected. Hunters are paid for each wild boar killed in an infected area.
</p>
<p>9.3
SVD surveillance
</p>
<p>Slovakia does not conduct active surveillance for SVD in domestic swine or wild boar; however, SVD has never been reported in swine that originated in Slovakia. Diagnostic testing is performed by request, primarily for import or export purposes (APHIS 2004b). SVD test results for years 2001-2005 are summarized in Annex 3. Surveillance peaked in 2002, with 1,324 animals tested, of which 1,239 were tested for import or export. No confirmed positive samples have been reported (APHIS 2004b; SVFA 2007). </p>
<p>9.4
FMD surveillance
</p>
<p>Slovakia does not currently conduct active surveillance for FMD in domestic or wild species; the SVFA does not consider monitoring other than passive surveillance to be justified (SVFA 2003). After vaccination against FMD ceased in 1991, no surveillance was conducted in domestic species until 1994, when antibodies against FMD virus were detected in 3.6% of examined cattle and in sheep older than 5 years, but not in swine (SVFA 2002a). Each serologically positive animal was investigated and the results determined to be the due to vaccination. Antibodies continued to be detected in cattle at low percentages through 1999. 
</p>
<p>Active surveillance continued through 2000 (SVFA 2003; SVFA 2004b). Surveillance in sheep consisted of 1% of 2-year old animals, 1% of 5-years and older, and 1% of lambs from 5-year old dams (SVFA 2004b). At least 3 samples were taken from each herd of cattle, preferably 1 sample from a calf less than 6 months of age, 1 sample from a yearling heifer, and 1 sample from a cow in the first or second lactation (SVFA 2002a). Monitoring in domestic swine consisted of random sampling at slaughter of up to 100 sows. Wild and zoo animals were also randomly included in the plan, although few samples were tested from wild boar (SVFA 2004b). 
</p>
<p>From 2001, FMD testing was performed only on request for international trade; samples that were positive on serology were retested at a reference laboratory in Padova, Italy (SVFA 2004b). Results of FMD testing from 1997 to October 2004 are summarized in Annex 3; no tests were positive (SVFA 2002a; APHIS 2004b; SVFA 2007). </p>
<p>9.5
Rinderpest surveillance
</p>
<p>Slovakia does not conduct active surveillance for rinderpest.
</p>
<p>9.6
Discussion
</p>
<p>Surveillance measures for CSF in domestic swine and wild boar, conducted through targeted sampling schemes, appear sufficient to detect disease outbreaks. Most surveillance is based on serology for antibodies to the CSF virus, as is common throughout the world.  Since antibodies occur late in CSF infection, serological surveillance would likely miss an early infection (i.e. first 21 days). Training and national simulation exercises aid in passive surveillance for CSF by enhancing the ability to quickly detect clinical signs of the disease; however, detection may be delayed in cases of moderate or low virulent strains. Relationships between the veterinary authorities, local practitioners and producers are effective at maintaining heightened awareness of clinical signs for rapid reporting of CSF suspects.</p>
<p>CSF surveillance and testing in wild boar have been well organized between DVFA and hunting associations with hunter incentives, hunting parameters, identification and accountability controls in place and clearly communicated. Surveillance in wild boar, particularly in the restricted zone, has continued to result in CSF findings which enable Slovakia to protect domestic swine, as well as closely monitor and prevent CSF spread in wild boar populations. 
</p>
<p>Passive surveillance is utilized for detection of SVD and FMD. Slovakia has never reported a case of SVD in swine that originated in that country. Both SVD and FMD diagnostic testing is currently performed only by request for international trade purposes. In recent years, no confirmed positive samples were reported. Consequently, detection may be delayed in the absence of overt clinical signs. If an outbreak is suspected, the SVFA would forward samples to outside laboratories (United Kingdom/Germany) for confirmatory diagnosis (see Section 10).  All of these factors influence the timeframe for outbreak detection and the export risk to the United States, as discussed in Section 12.
</p>
<h2>10.
Diagnostic laboratory capacity
</h2>
<p>10.1
General information
</p>
<p>The diagnostic laboratory system consists of 6 SVIs distributed throughout the country (APHIS 2004b). SVI Zvolen is the National Reference Laboratory for CSF, SVD, and FMD, among other diseases. This laboratory is comprised of the following divisions: animal health laboratory, quality assurance, civil defense, general safety and fire safety, bio-safety, waste management, cleaning and sanitation, information systems, equipment systems and metrology (APHIS 2004b). The animal health laboratory has been undergoing renovation over the last two years and is equipped with updated laboratory equipment, including a bio-safety level-2 (BSL-2) facility. This laboratory has 3 departments: department of pathological morphology and histology, department of bacteriology, and department of virology.
</p>
<p>Standard operating procedures are in place for conducting CSF, FMD, and SVD testing (APHIS 2004b). Laboratory personnel receive training through seminars and courses organized in EU reference laboratories. The laboratory also participates in inter-laboratory testing and proficiency testing annually. The existing diagnostic reporting database can accommodate entry of new diagnostic accessions but the test results are entered manually. The APHIS team suggested that laboratory officials consider replacing the existing system with a laboratory information management system for permanent data storage and elimination of human error.    
</p>
<p>10.2
Classical swine fever
</p>
<p>All CSF testing is performed in a BSL-2 laboratory as approved by the EC (APHIS 2004b). The laboratory is equipped with the OIE-recommended tests for detection of CSF virus and antibody. Diagnostic samples are stored after testing for 3 months at -70C for tissue, and for 2 weeks at 4C or 1 month at -20C for serum. Positive samples for virus isolation are tested twice before test results are reported to the CVO and OIE. 
</p>
<p>The following tests are used for detection of CSF antibody: 
</p>
<p>1. Ceditest ELISA (purchased from Lelystad in the Netherlands).
</p>
<p>2. In-house antibody ELISA: This test was evaluated and validated extensively against a collection of antisera created in house and performed well when compared to the commercially available ELISAs. 
</p>
<p>3. Immunoperoxidase neutralization test: This test is used to differentiate CSF antibodies from those for bovine viral diarrhea (BVD) and border disease.
</p>
<p>Tests used for detection of CSF virus:
</p>
<p>1. Immunohistochemistry on frozen tissue sections using immunoperoxidase monoclonal or polyclonal antibody-linked conjugates to differentiate CSF from BVD and border disease (reagents purchased from Lelystad).
</p>
<p>2. Virus isolation in SK-6 cells with immunoperoxidase staining for antigen using polyclonal antibody-linked conjugates (in-house reagent). 
</p>
<p>3. Nested polymerase chain reaction (PCR).
</p>
<p>SVI Zvolen has carried out intensive epidemiological studies since 1995 to phenotype and genotype CSF strains circulating in domestic swine and wild boars populations (see Section 2). Sixteen monoclonal antibodies developed in-house or provided by Lelystad are used to phenotype CSF field isolates. This tool is useful for identifying strain mutation and introduction of new strains, and tracing back the source of introduction of a new strain. Genomic typing is conducted by sequence analysis of E2 and 5’UTR regions of the viral genomes. This work is done in conjunction with the phenotyping and in collaboration with EU reference laboratory in Hanover, Germany. 
</p>
<p>10.3
Swine vesicular disease
</p>
<p>SVI Zvolen performs serology for SVD using the Ceditest SVD virus antibody ELISA by Cedi Diagnostics (APHIS 2004b). Testing for SVD is limited to antibody detection since the laboratory is not equipped to handle live SVD virus (no BSL-3 laboratory). Slovakia has signed an agreement with the Friedrich Löffler Institute in Germany to conduct confirmatory testing (SVFA 2006).
</p>
<p>10.4
Foot and mouth disease
</p>
<p>SVI Zvolen performs FMD tests in a BSL-2 laboratory; therefore, testing is limited to serological assays. The laboratory conducts a liquid phase blocking ELISA for FMD serotypes O, A and C (APHIS 2004b). This test has a lower sensitivity and specificity than the more commonly used solid phase ELISA. SVI Zvolen also conducts a nonstructural protein ELISA (3ABC) purchased from Lelystad, which is a group-specific antibody ELISA for detection of antibody against all seven FMD serotypes. This test is approved by the EU and OIE, and recommended to be used for screening animals during recovery from an FMD outbreak due to its high sensitivity and specificity.
</p>
<p>SVI Zvolen does not perform virus isolation for FMD and does not have the capability to perform nucleic acid detection tests like reverse transcriptase PCR (APHIS 2004b). Samples would instead be sent to the Friedrich Löffler Institute (FLI Insel Riems) in Germany to conduct confirmatory testing, under agreement between SFVA and FLI Insel Riems. In emergency situations, SVI Zvolen is capable of increasing diagnostic and resource capacities while operating 7 days a week, or two shift operations (SVFA 2007).</p>
<p>10.5
Discussion
</p>
<p>SVI Zvolen has well-trained scientific and technical staff and is well equipped to perform CSF diagnosis and to improve diagnostic tests if needed. CSF diagnostic tests are conducted in accordance with OIE recommendations. The cell culture laboratory maintains adequate numbers of cell lines for a complete diagnostic work up on swine cases including CSF.  The quality control testing on stock cell lines is done periodically to ensure sterility of the cell lines. This laboratory has also been carrying out epidemiological studies to monitor the status of CSF in wild boar and to determine the time and source of introduction into wild boar and domestic pigs, when outbreaks occur. Such studies can be a strong tool in eradication of CSF. </p>
<p>SVI Zvolen also provides a partial range of diagnostic tests for the diagnosis of SVD and FMD. This laboratory would likely be able to make a presumptive diagnosis based on clinical signs and the results of serology, but samples would be sent abroad for confirmatory testing, resulting in a slight delay.  
</p>
<h2>11.
Emergency response capability
</h2>
<p>11.1
General information
</p>
<p class="comment_Text">Slovakia has in place contingency plans for CSF, SVD, and FMD outbreaks (SVFA 2004b). The contingency plans are supplemented by official instructions and guidelines detailing procedures for disease notification and confirmation, sampling methods, diagnostic procedures, humane killing of animals, and cleaning and disinfection of the affected premises. The plans conform closely to the provisions of EC legislation.
</p>
<p>A central element is the establishment of national and local disease control centers, which in Slovakia correspond to entities within the headquarters SVFA and the DVFA offices, respectively (SVFA 2004b; APHIS 2004b).  The national disease control center manages the outbreak response at the national level, securing and allocating the necessary resources, as well as acting as a liaison with agricultural trade associations, the media, the OIE, and the EC. The local disease control center coordinates control and eradication measures in the affected area in accordance with the findings and recommendations of an expert group established for that purpose. 
</p>
<p>The contingency plans stipulate a stamping out policy with destruction of all susceptible animals on the affected premises (SVFA 2004b; SVFA 2004c). Carcasses would be collected and transported to a processing plant, although burning or burial on the spot could be done in exceptional cases. All live animals and animal products that moved off the affected premises during the time between disease introduction and detection of the outbreak would be traced and destroyed. According to SVFA, rendering capacity is considered sufficient to cope with minor outbreaks not covering the whole country (FVO 2005a). Protection and surveillance zones of 3 km and 10 km radius from the affected premises, respectively, would be established and any animal products allowed out of these zones would be marked for national consumption. 
</p>
<p>SVFA conducts lectures, refresher courses and provides educational materials for veterinarians, as well as veterinary and agriculture students, in epidemiology, notification procedures and control measures regarding CSF, SVD, and FMD—all suspects require notification under Act No. 39/2007 Coll (SVFA 2007). Awareness campaigns for CSF target groups such as swine farmers, livestock haulers, and slaughterhouse and livestock market operators who come in regular contact with live swine. Emphasis is on disease risk, clinical signs, epidemiology, compensation availability and the requirement for immediate notification when CSF is suspected.  </p>
<p>11.2
Classical swine fever
</p>
<p>The emergency response policies and regulations formulated by SVFA reflect control measures established in Council Directive 2001/89/EC and Commission Decision 2002/106/EC (SVFA 2004c). The CSF contingency plan was approved by the EC under Commission Decision 2004/431/EC. The plan reflects control measures outlined in the Veterinary Act and the Ordinance of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 276/2003 on measures for the control of CSF (SVFA 2004c). </p>
<p>The CSF contingency plan details action to be taken in case of suspicion or confirmation of CSF on a holding, slaughterhouse, market, or in transport; notification procedures for suspicion and confirmation; chain of command; the national disease control center role; role of expert groups; epidemiological investigation procedures; actions in the protection and surveillance zones; killing of animals and disposal of carcasses; repopulation; measures in case of suspicion or confirmation of CSF in wild boar; plans for eradication of CSF from the wild boar population; emergency vaccination of wild boar and domestic swine; and training of SVFA veterinarians and other critical personnel (SVFA 2004c).
</p>
<p>Since Slovakia has experienced several CSF outbreaks in domestic swine in recent years, critical parameters with regard to emergency response can be evaluated, although data points were not provided for all outbreaks. From the data provided in Table 11.1, it appears that the median time to detection of an outbreak, or the time between the estimated date of infection and laboratory confirmation, is approximately 5 weeks (SVFA 2004c; APHIS 2004b). Movement controls were generally enacted upon suspicion of CSF, infection was confirmed by laboratory diagnosis on average 5 days after suspicion, protection zones were established immediately upon confirmation if not before, and depopulation of the infected herd commenced within 5 days. Management of the 2005 and 2008 CSF outbreaks in domestic swine was in accordance with the contingency plan and proved to be effective. Written procedures were generally followed and were supported by the required documentation (FVO 2005; EC 2008; EC 2008a; EC 2008b).</p>
<p><b>Table 11.1: Data points for response time estimates</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p>No.</p>
</td>	<td><p>Location</p>
</td>	<td><p>Date suspected</p>
</td>	<td><p>Date confirmed</p>
</td>	<td><p>Protection zone</p>
</td>	<td><p>Date depopulated</p>
</td>	<td><p>Estimated date of infection</p>
</td>	<td><p>Time to detection</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>District</p>
</td>	<td><p>Region</p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>01/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Prievidza</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>14 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>19 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>19 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>24-26 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>10 Oct</p>
</td>	<td><p>5-6 weeks</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>02/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Prievidza</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>18 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>26 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>19 Nov*</p>
</td>	<td><p>24 Nov*</p>
</td>	<td><p>10 Oct</p>
</td>	<td><p>6-7 weeks</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>03/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Prievidza</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>27 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>30 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>30 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>3 Dec</p>
</td>	<td><p>10 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>3 weeks</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>04/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Bánovce nad Bebravou</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>27 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>4 Dec</p>
</td>	<td><p>4 Dec</p>
</td>	<td><p>6 Dec</p>
</td>	<td><p>30 Oct</p>
</td>	<td><p>5 weeks</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>05/03</p>
</td>	<td><p>Prievidza</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>2 Dec</p>
</td>	<td><p>4 Dec</p>
</td>	<td><p>2 Dec</p>
</td>	<td><p>4 Dec</p>
</td>	<td><p>18 Nov</p>
</td>	<td><p>2-3 weeks</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>01/04</p>
</td>	<td><p>Prievidza</p>
</td>	<td><p>Trenčín</p>
</td>	<td><p>3 Jan</p>
</td>	<td><p>7 Jan</p>
</td>	<td><p>7 Jan</p>
</td>	<td><p>11 Jan</p>
</td>	<td><p>-----</p>
</td>	<td><p>> 6 weeks</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>03/04</p>
</td>	<td><p>Lučenec</p>
</td>	<td><p>Banská Bystrica</p>
</td>	<td><p>3 Aug</p>
</td>	<td><p>10 Aug</p>
</td>	<td><p>10 Aug</p>
</td>	<td><p>12 Aug</p>
</td>	<td><p>-----</p>
</td>	<td><p>2-3 weeks</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>*The source herd 02/03 was located in the protection zone established for outbreak 01/03; depopulation occurred prior to confirmation of CSF infection on the basis of clinical signs and epidemiological association with 01/03.</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>EC legislation and the Slovakian CSF contingency plan allow removal of CSF restrictions on domestic swine in protection zones as early as 30 days after completion of preliminary cleaning and disinfection measures on the infected holding (21 days in surveillance zones). Measures are lifted after clinical examinations and serology indicate that the pigs remaining in the zones are free of CSF.
</p>
<p>FVO reports had indicated at one point a concern regarding lack of awareness, in some areas of the country, of the risk of CSF in domestic swine (FVO 2002; FVO 2004a). Awareness was low in a slaughter plant visited by FVO inspectors, and biosecurity measures were poor in some areas (FVO 2004a). Conversely, a more recent FVO report stated that operators in establishments and holdings showed a good level of awareness with regard to risks and actions to be taken in case of suspicion; furthermore, biosecurity on visited farms was noted as generally acceptable (FVO 2005a).  
</p>
<p>CSF is a notifiable disease in Slovakia; to that end, SVFA maintains awareness and incentive measures for prompt notification of CSF suspects by farmers, private practitioners and official veterinarians. Regional veterinarians are knowledgeable regarding their areas and know the locations and types of farms in their assignments (APHIS 2004b). The SVFA stepped up public awareness campaigns and now estimate that detection would be quicker than indicated historically. Videos and other training material have been prepared by the SVFA and are available at the local level. However, the time to detection during the January 2008 outbreaks was estimated to be greater than 6 weeks. Hunters are obliged to collect and submit wild boar samples to the DVFA and receive training on the procedures they must follow (FVO 2005a).</p>
<p>Emergency vaccination was performed in the protection zone around an outbreak in the Partizánske district in 2001 (SVFA 2002a). All vaccinated pigs were ultimately slaughtered in a designated slaughterhouse and the meat was marked with a special stamp and heat treated prior to marketing within Slovakia. The CSF contingency plan contains provisions for emergency vaccination of domestic swine if approved by the EC (SVFA 2004c). See Section 5 for further details regarding CSF vaccination in Slovakia.</p>
<p>11.3
Swine vesicular disease
</p>
<p>The SVFA indicated the contingency plan for vesicular diseases details procedures and measures in the event of an outbreak. Serological tests are conducted on all SVD suspects and sent to the World Reference Laboratory in Pirbright, United Kingdom, for isolation, identification and typing (SVFA 2001). As such, Section 11.4 (below) provides details regarding the FMD contingency plan.</p>
<p>11.4
Foot and mouth disease
</p>
<p>The emergency response policies and regulations formulated by the central competent authority generally reflect control measures established in Council Directive 2003/85/EC (SVFA 2004b). The FMD contingency plan was formulated according to the criteria established in Commission Decision 91/42/EEC and approved by the EC. The plan reflects control measures outlined in the Veterinary Act and the Ordinance of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 731/2002 on measures for the control of FMD (SVFA 2004b).
</p>
<p>The FMD contingency plan details actions to be taken in case of suspicion of FMD on a holding, at slaughter, at market, or in transit; chain of command; the national disease control center role; role of expert groups; actions upon confirmation in the affected area, protection zone, and surveillance zone; killing of animals and disposal of carcasses; repopulation; actions in a slaughterhouse or market in case of suspicion or confirmation of FMD; measures in case of FMD in wild animals; emergency vaccination procedures; and training of SVFA veterinarians and other critical personnel.
</p>
<p>11.5
Indemnity and compensation
</p>
<p>In an outbreak situation, indemnity at market value would be paid in accordance with the Veterinary Act (SVFA 2004b). Upon written application, an animal owner is entitled to 100% reimbursement of the costs incurred for killing the animals; destruction of the carcasses; cleaning and disinfection of the premises and equipment; and losses caused by killing the animals and destroying related products, feeding stuffs, and equipment which cannot be disinfected. 
</p>
<p>In addition, the EC provides partial indemnity in case of an outbreak of CSF or SVD, and in the past has passed critical legislation to financially support eradication of FMD outbreaks in Member States. Commission Decision 90/424/EEC describes the conditions under which the EC would support a financial contribution for emergency control and eradication of CSF or SVD, most of which are covered in the respective Slovakian contingency plans and supporting legislation.
</p>
<p>11.6
Discussion
</p>
<p class="comment_Text">The contingency plans for CSF and vesicular diseases such as FMD and SVD are comprehensive and reflect control measures developed and promulgated by the EC.  Equally important, official veterinarians appeared to be familiar with the provisions of the contingency plans and the initial actions required of them in the event of suspicion and/or confirmation of an outbreak. 
</p>
<p>As required by EC legislation, notifiable disease awareness and training programs for veterinary authorities, private veterinarians, students and private stakeholders are in place to enhance preparedness, rapid recognition, reporting and emergency response. Training and national simulation exercises, as discussed in Section 1, aid in developing and maintaining the ability to quickly detect and contain these diseases. Additionally, heightened public awareness should enhance passive surveillance efforts to promote more rapid response times. </p>
<p>APHIS is concerned that 30 days following a CSF outbreak is insufficient time to ensure that an area where an outbreak has occurred is no longer affected by the disease. CSF has recurred in several areas of the EU shortly after EC restrictions were removed from those areas and the movement of swine commenced. For example, in December 2001 a CSF outbreak was confirmed in Osama, Spain, 22 days after release of EC movement restrictions and 83 days after depopulation on the affected holding (APHIS 2004a). Similarly, a CSF outbreak in August 2002 in Luxembourg was epidemiologically linked to an outbreak that occurred in June 2002 (APHIS 2004a). The August outbreak occurred 27 days after release of EC movement restrictions and 56 days after depopulation. 
</p>
<p>These observations suggest that 30 days may be an insufficient duration for restrictions. APHIS addressed this concern for the other Member States comprising the APHIS-defined EU CSF region in previous regulations by establishing a process which would not allow swine, swine products, or semen from an area affected with CSF in domestic swine to be exported until 6 months after the last affected premises was cleaned and disinfected (APHIS 2006b; APHIS 2007).
</p>
<h2>12.
Discussion of identified risk factors
</h2>
<p>12.1
Existing internal risk factors
</p>
<p>The preceding 11-factor assessment identified wild boar within Slovakia as a potential source of exposure of domestic swine to CSF virus (<i>see </i>Sections 2 and 9). The virus continues to be detected in wild boar in the restricted zone, albeit at decreasing levels. It appears that the epidemiological situation is slowly improving; however, CSF antibodies continued to be found in juvenile animals, indicating an ongoing source of infection. In 2005, Slovakia implemented an oral vaccination plan using live attenuated virus; consequently, serological prevalence in juvenile wild boar cannot be used to track changes in incidence from year to year. The program has been fairly successful but CSF virus is likely to remain active in wild boar in Slovakia for several more years. </p>
<p>CSF virus circulating among wild boar within Slovakia clearly poses a risk of exposure of domestic swine. However, Slovakian officials continue to be proactive in determining the extent of the infected zone and implementing movement restrictions on live swine as specified by the EC. The risk of direct or indirect exposure is substantially mitigated by commercial production and biosecurity practices on swine confinement operations such as breeding farms, semen collection centers, and large production units (<i>see </i>Section 8.1). Exposure to infected wild boar is more likely to occur on small holdings with limited biosecurity, although direct contact might be prevented on holdings that keep pigs indoors. 
</p>
<p>Both Slovakia and the EC restrict movement of live swine and swine products out of the CSF infected zone; these restrictions substantially mitigate the risk of exporting CSF virus to the United States. If the provisions of 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38 were applied to Slovakia, the veterinary authorities of Slovakia would need to certify that live swine and swine products were sourced from outside of the CSF restricted area and that commingling had not occurred, thereby providing additional risk mitigation. </p>
<p>12.2
Pathways for disease introduction
</p>
<p>The preceding 11-factor assessment also identified five main pathways by which CSF, SVD, and/or FMD or rinderpest could be introduced into Slovakia from other EU Member States or third countries, resulting in exposure of a susceptible domestic swine or ruminant population (see Figure 12.1). However, introduction of these diseases into Slovakia by the identified pathways would only affect export risk to the United States if a susceptible domestic animal population became infected and this infection was not detected prior to export. The timeframe for detection of a disease incursion depends on a number of factors, including characteristics of the disease agent, surveillance practices, diagnostic capabilities, and the disease recognition capability of animal caretakers and veterinarians. 
</p>
<p>As noted above, CSF virus circulating in among wild boar clearly poses a risk of exposure of domestic swine and Slovakian officials continue to be proactive in determining the extent of the infected zone. The majority of the large commercial swine operations are located outside of the current infected zone. Exposure to wild boar is more likely on small farms with limited biosecurity, although very small holdings generally keep swine for personal consumption. 
</p>
<p><b>Figure 12.1: Pathway assessment for virus introduction and subsequent export</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image10.emf" alt="image10.emf"></p>
<p class="comment_Text">EC legislation allows, under restrictions, limited trade in live swine from infected to non-infected areas within a Member State, as well as limited intra-Community trade between certain Member States. Furthermore, there is no limitation on intra-Community trade of fresh meat, meat preparations, or meat products from infected areas of Germany, France, Hungary, Bulgaria, or Slovakia. This type of movement holds potential for CSF virus spread and exposure to domestic swine populations. However, the pre-movement requirements required by EC legislation—veterinary inspection, serological testing, heat treatment of products at approved establishments, transport in sealed vehicles—are mitigating factors that serve to reduce such risk for the EU. 
</p>
<p class="comment_Text">9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38 further mitigate the risk to the United States by prohibiting sourcing of swine from a restricted zone established because of detection of CSF in wild boar or a CSF outbreak in domestic swine, as well as for the 6 months following depopulation, cleaning, and disinfection of the last infected premises in the zone. Applying provisions of 9 CFR 94.11 and 94.13 also mitigate risks of less restrictive trade practices through specified product treatment, handling and certification requirements. Consequently, APHIS concludes that the export risk to the United States associated with low levels of CSF virus circulating in wild boar in infected areas is minimal.
</p>
<p>As discussed under the hazard identification section, some forms of CSF, SVD, and FMD are difficult to detect in live animals or on post-mortem examination without laboratory testing. For example, carrier sows that were exposed to low virulence CSF strains are capable of shedding virus for substantial periods of time without clinical signs. Subclinical SVD infection is common, although the period of virus shedding is generally short and persistent infection is rare. Both subclinical and persistent (carrier) infections are characteristic of FMD in ruminants, particularly sheep and goats. In addition, virus shedding may occur in animals incubating FMD prior to the appearance of clinical signs. 
</p>
<p>Passive surveillance for these diseases is enhanced by ongoing training in disease recognition as discussed in Section 1.3.2. Active serological surveillance for CSF in domestic swine and wild boar appears sufficient to detect the presence of the disease (<i>see</i> Section 9), and is well supported by the diagnostic laboratory system (<i>see </i>Section 10). However, serological surveillance for antibodies to CSF would likely miss an early infection, since antibodies occur relatively late (around 21 days). Passive surveillance could overlook early infection with a moderate or low virulence strain, thereby delaying the time to detection, but the current level of serological surveillance would likely reveal the historical presence of CSF.
</p>
<p>In contrast, Slovakia does not conduct active surveillance for FMD, rinderpest, and SVD. Serological surveillance in domestic swine occurs at a very low level, in part because these are not perceived as diseases of concern. Although such surveillance would likely reveal the historical presence of these diseases eventually, detection is primarily dependent on passive surveillance. Consequently, detection could be delayed in the absence of overt clinical signs.
</p>
<p>APHIS concludes from this discussion that the timeframe for detection of CSF, SVD, rinderpest, or FMD in domestic animal populations could be somewhat delayed under certain circumstances. There might, therefore, be a period of time between virus introduction and outbreak detection during which infected animals and products could be presented for export to the United States. Physical inspection of individual animals is sufficient to detect clinically affected animals prior to live export, slaughter, or collection of genetic material. However, such inspection is unlikely to detect subclinical or persistent infection, which may be more apparent at the herd level.
</p>
<p class="body_Text">As noted in the hazard identification section, each of the causative agents may remain viable through carcass maturation, transport, and storage, and may be present in genetic material as well. Consequently, if one or more of these diseases is introduced into a domestic animal population in Slovakia, the potential exists for it to remain undetected long enough for export of infected live animals, meat, meat products, and genetic material to the United States. Although APHIS considers the probability of this scenario occurring to be relatively low due to current mitigation efforts, it cannot be entirely disregarded. Even so, early detection of CSF, SVD, and FMD virus in domestic swine in Slovakia is enhanced because of EC and SFVA requirements for veterinary examination, animal health certification for movement of swine, and efforts to raise awareness of clinical signs among veterinary professionals, farmers and the general public. The likelihood of disease introduction via the pathways identified in the previous sections resulting in exposure of a susceptible domestic animal population is examined below. 
</p>
<p>12.3
Natural movement of wild animals into Slovakia
</p>
<p>12.3.1
Central risk issue
</p>
<p>Infected wild animals migrating from neighboring affected regions, either third countries or other Member States, could introduce CSF, SVD, FMD or rinderpest virus into Slovakia. As shown in Figure 12.2, direct or indirect contact with infected wild animals could spread the disease to a susceptible population of domestic animals, creating the potential for export of infected animals or products to the United States. The likelihood of introduction of these diseases into Slovakia and the associated export risk are discussed below.
</p>
<p><b>Figure 12.2: Pathway for disease introduction via migrating wild animals
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image11.emf" alt="image11.emf"></p>
<p>12.3.2
Risk factors and existing mitigation measures 
</p>
<p>The likelihood of introducing CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest into Slovakia via entry of infected wild animals from surrounding regions depends primarily on the disease status of wild animals in the neighboring regions and the extent to which natural barriers prevent movement of wild animals into Slovakia. Risk factors for disease introduction and associated mitigating factors identified in Sections 1-11 are summarized below.
</p>
<p><i>Risk factors for disease introduction:
</i></p>
<p>1. CSF, SVD, FMD, rinderpest – Slovakia shares a common land border with Ukraine, which APHIS has not evaluated for CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest risks (<i>see</i> Section 3). APHIS therefore cannot rule out the existence of these diseases in wild animal populations in Ukraine.
</p>
<p>2. CSF – Slovakia shares land borders with countries that have experienced CSF in wild boar populations in recent years (<i>see</i> Section 3.1).
</p>
<p>3. CSF, SVD, FMD, rinderpest – Natural barriers do not protect against movement of wild animals into Slovakia from most of the neighboring regions (<i>see</i> Section 6).
</p>
<p><i>Factors mitigating the risk of disease introduction:
</i></p>
<p>1. FMD – FMD has not been reported in domestic or wild species in a region bordering Slovakia in the past 19 years (<i>see </i>Section 3.3).
</p>
<p>2. SVD – Poland, Ukraine and Austria have not reported SVD in over 28 years and SVD has never been reported in the remaining two countries—Czech Republic and Hungary—bordering Slovakia (<i>see</i> Section 3.2).</p>
<p>3. Rinderpest –The last occurrence of rinderpest in a country bordering Slovakia was in 1923.
</p>
<p>12.3.3
Summary discussion
</p>
<p>APHIS considers the risk of introducing SVD, FMD, or rinderpest virus into Slovakia via susceptible wild animals to be very low. However, the risk of CSF introduction into Slovakia via migration of wild boar from potentially affected neighboring regions is greater and is an issue of concern for exposure of domestic animals. For example, outbreaks in Hungary have been detected in regions directly abutting Slovakia, and there are few natural barriers to prevent wild boar movement between these regions.<u> </u>However, in the event of a CSF incursion via wild boar, mitigations are in place to reduce the risk of exposure of domestic swine.</p>
<p>12.4
Import, transit, or trade of infected live animals
</p>
<p>12.4.1
Central risk issue
</p>
<p>Infected live ruminants and swine may enter Slovakia legally through import from third countries or intra-Community trade, or illegally via smuggling from neighboring countries (see Figure 12.3). Legally imported live animals may be intended for breeding, production (i.e. fattening and slaughter), or direct to slaughter. APHIS considers the likelihood of illegal entry of infected live animals into Slovakia to be low when compared to other pathways. 
</p>
<p>. 
</p>
<p><b>Figure 12.3: Pathway for disease introduction via live animals
</b></p>
<p>                           <img src="embedded:image12.emf" alt="image12.emf"></p>
<p>12.4.2
Risk factors and existing mitigation measures </p>
<p>The likelihood of disease introduction via legal import or trade of live animals depends primarily on the provisions of the harmonized EC import legislation for ruminants and swine, the efficacy of limiting intra-Community trade from affected regions, and Slovakian import and trade practices. Risk factors for disease introduction and associated mitigating factors identified in Sections 1-11 are summarized below. </p>
<p><i>Risk factors for disease introduction:
</i></p>
<p>1. FMD – Harmonized EC legislation allows Slovakia to import live ruminants from regions that APHIS has not evaluated for FMD risk (<i>see</i> Section 7.2.1), and Slovakia has imported live ruminants from such countries, including Romania and Russia. 
</p>
<p>2. CSF – Harmonized EC legislation allows Slovakia to import live swine and non-domesticated suidae from a country that APHIS has not evaluated for CSF (<i>see </i>Section 7.2.1). </p>
<p>3. CSF, SVD, FMD – Veterinary inspection of imported animals at the ports of entry is unlikely to detect incubating or subclinical infection, or infection in species that show few clinical signs (e.g. FMD in small ruminants) (<i>see</i> Sections 7.2.3 and 7.7.1).
</p>
<p>4. CSF – Outbreaks occurring outside of established control zones within affected Member States where CSF is endemic in wild boar pose a risk to the common and export markets until detected (<i>see</i> Section 4.3). </p>
<p>5. CSF – Outbreaks have recurred in several areas of the EU shortly after EC restrictions were lifted, suggesting that 30 days may be an insufficient duration for restrictions (<i>see </i>Sections 11.2 and 11.6).
</p>
<p><i>Factors mitigating the risk of disease introduction:
</i></p>
<p>1. SVD – APHIS considers the countries from which EC legislation permits Slovakia to import live swine to be free from SVD (<i>see</i> Section 7.2.1).
</p>
<p>2. CSF, SVD, FMD – EC certification requirements for import, transit, or trade in live animals are comprehensive and must be signed by an official veterinarian of the country of origin (<i>see</i> Section 7.2.2). </p>
<p>3. CSF, SVD, FMD – Veterinary inspection practices at the point of entry are likely to detect clinically diseased animals (<i>see</i> Section 7.2.3).
</p>
<p>4. CSF, SVD – EC legislation and the control measures put in place by affected Member States prohibit direct intra-Community trade of live swine from zones under restrictions for CSF or SVD (<i>see</i> Section 7.4). 
</p>
<p>5. CSF, SVD, FMD – EC requirements for isolation, observation, and veterinary inspection of live animals prior to transport increase the likelihood of detecting infected animals (<i>see </i>Sections 7.2.2 and 7.4). 
</p>
<p>12.4.3
Summary discussion
</p>
<p>EC legislation imposes less stringent restrictions on the sourcing of imported ruminants than does U.S. legislation, which could result in a comparatively greater risk of FMD introduction into Slovakia and other Member States with which Slovakia trades. The same is true to a lesser extent for CSF in imported swine, and the potential exists for trade on the internal common market to introduce CSF from undetected infected herds in unrestricted areas, or from herds in areas released from restrictions too quickly following an outbreak.
</p>
<p>However, the mitigation measures currently in place substantially reduce the risk of FMD or CSF introduction into Slovakia via import or trade of live animals. Isolation, observation, and veterinary inspection of animals at the point of destination further limit exposure of susceptible domestic animal populations. However, additional mitigation measures may be necessary to restrict sourcing of animals for the export process and to prevent commingling of live animals with those from regions APHIS regards as affected with FMD or CSF. 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">The risk of spread of SVD into Slovakia through trade in live swine is mitigated by strict EC controls which include movement restrictions, SVD testing, transport requirements, and veterinary inspection certification. The risk of spread of SVD into Slovakia through trade in live swine is also mitigated by the limited distribution of SVD worldwide, and in particular, among Slovakia’s trading partners.  
</p>
<p>12.5
Import, transit, or trade of infected animal products
</p>
<p>12.5.1
Central risk issue
</p>
<p>Infected bovine or swine products such as fresh meat, meat products, semen, embryos, or ova can enter Slovakia legally through import or trade, or illegally via smuggling. Figure 12.4 shows the main pathways for introduction of CSF, SVD, or FMD virus via infected animal products. 
</p>
<p><b>Figure 12.4: Pathways for disease introduction via infected animal products
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image13.emf" alt="image13.emf"></p>
<p>12.5.2
Risk factors and existing mitigation measures
</p>
<p>The likelihood of introducing CSF, SVD, or FMD virus via infected animal products depends primarily on the provisions of the harmonized EC import legislation for ruminants and swine, the efficacy of limiting intra-Community trade from affected regions, and Slovakian import and trade practices. </p>
<p><i>Risk factors for disease introduction:</i></p>
<p>1. CSF, SVD, FMD – Veterinary inspection of imported animal products at the port of entry is unlikely to detect infective virus (<i>see </i>Sections 7.2.3 and 7.7.2). 
</p>
<p>2. FMD – Harmonized EC legislation permits Slovakia to import fresh meat and meat products from domestic and wild ruminants from third countries that APHIS has not evaluated the risk for FMD (<i>see </i>Section 7.2.1). 
</p>
<p>3. FMD – Harmonized EC legislation allows Slovakia to import bovine semen, ova, and embryos from regions that APHIS has not evaluated the risk for FMD (<i>see </i>Section 7.2.1).
</p>
<p>4. CSF – Harmonized EC legislation allows Slovakia to import swine semen from Switzerland, which APHIS has not evaluated the risk for CSF (<i>see</i> Section 7.2.1). 
</p>
<p>5. CSF – Outbreaks occurring outside of established control zones within affected Member States where CSF is endemic in wild boar pose a risk to the common and export markets until detection (<i>see</i> Section 3.1).
</p>
<p>6. CSF – Outbreaks have recurred in several areas of the EU shortly after EC restrictions were lifted, suggesting that 30 days may be an insufficient duration for restrictions (<i>see </i>Sections 11.2 and 11.6).
</p>
<p><i>Factors mitigating the risk of disease introduction:
</i></p>
<p>1. CSF, SVD, FMD – EC certification requirements for imported commodities derived from swine and ruminants between Member States and third countries are comprehensive and must be signed by an official veterinarian of the country of origin (<i>see</i> Section 7.2.2). 
</p>
<p>2. CSF, SVD, FMD – The EC approval process for exporting establishments, including semen collection centers and slaughterhouses, is rigorous and comprehensive, and substantially limits exports from approved third countries (<i>see </i>Section 7.2.1). 
</p>
<p>3. CSF, SVD – EC legislation and the control measures put in place by affected Member States prohibit the sale of swine commodities from regions restricted for CSF or SVD outbreaks (<i>see </i>Section 7.4). 
</p>
<p>12.5.3
Summary discussion
</p>
<p>APHIS considers disease introduction via meat and meat products, rather than genetic material, to be the primary risk concern associated with this pathway. Although infected genetic material would most likely result in direct exposure of domestic swine, the strict biosecurity practices required of semen collection centers substantially reduce the risk of disease introduction. Infected meat and meat products pose little exposure risk to wild or domestic ruminants, but could be fed as waste to wild boar or domestic swine.
</p>
<p>Harmonized EC legislation imposes less stringent restrictions on sourcing of swine and ruminant products than do U.S. regulations, resulting in comparatively greater risk of introducing CSF, SVD, and/or FMD into Slovakia. However, the approval process for exporting establishments in third countries provides substantial risk mitigation and limits the number of countries actually exporting to the EU. The potential exists for trade on the internal common market to introduce CSF via commodities from undetected infected herds in unrestricted areas. APHIS is also concerned that 30 days following a CSF outbreak is insufficient time to ensure that the area where the outbreak occurred is no longer affected by the disease. </p>
<p>The likelihood of spread of SVD into Slovakia through trade in swine products is further mitigated by the limited distribution of this disease worldwide. While CSF and FMD have a much broader global distribution than SVD, the risk of CSF and FMD diseases spread through trade in swine products is mitigated by the limited incidence of these diseases in Slovakia’s trading partners (<i>see</i> Section 7.5.1). To date, the FMD outbreaks in Great Britain have been localized and eradicated. 
</p>
<p class="body_Text">As discussed in the hazard identification section, waste feeding of infected meat or meat products is perhaps the most common cause of outbreaks in domestic swine and wild boar in previously free regions.  Noncompliance with the waste feeding ban is most likely on small swine holdings, as is exposure to wild boar infected via waste feeding (<i>see</i> <i> </i>Section 1.4). Adequate biosecurity practices limit the risk of exposure on large confinement holdings, which are considered the most likely source of swine commodities for export to the United States (<i>see </i>Section 8.1.2). However, additional mitigation measures may be necessary to prevent commingling of pork and pork products destined for export with those sourced from an affected country or region.  </p>
<p>12.6
Incoming vehicular or human traffic
</p>
<p>12.6.1
Central risk issue
</p>
<p>CSF, FMD, rinderpest, or SVD could be introduced into Slovakia via incoming vehicular traffic, particularly improperly disinfected live-haul trucks coming from affected Member States or third countries. Virus could also be passively introduced by human traffic from affected regions through transmission of live virus on clothing, potentially resulting in on-farm exposure of a susceptible domestic animal population (see Figure 12.5). 
</p>
<p><b>Figure 12.5: Introduction pathways via vehicular or human traffic
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image14.emf" alt="image14.emf"></p>
<p>12.6.2
Risk factors and existing risk mitigation measures
</p>
<p>The likelihood of introducing CSF, SVD, rinderpest, or FMD into Slovakia via incoming vehicular or human traffic depends primarily on the disease status of neighboring regions and disinfection practices at the point of entry. Risk factors for disease introduction and associated mitigating factors identified in Sections 1-11 are summarized below.</p>
<p><i>Risk factors for disease introduction:</i></p>
<p>1. CSF – Slovakia shares common land borders with several countries that APHIS considers low risk for CSF. Hungary is currently under APHIS evaluation for CSF; however, APHIS has not evaluated Ukraine for risk of CSF (<i>see</i> Section 3). 
</p>
<p>2. SVD, FMD, rinderpest – Slovakia shares a land border with Ukraine, which APHIS has not evaluated the risk for SVD, FMD, or rinderpest (<i>see</i> Section 3). 
</p>
<p>3. CSF, SVD, FMD, rinderpest – Considerable local traffic occurs to and from neighboring third countries and Member States (<i>see</i> Section 7.6).
</p>
<p>4. CSF, SVD, FMD, rinderpest – No standard disinfection practices are in place for human or vehicular traffic at border crossings without veterinary inspection in the absence of a reported outbreak (<i>see</i> Section 7.1.2).
</p>
<p><i>Factors mitigating the risk of disease introduction:</i></p>
<p>1. CSF, SVD, FMD, rinderpest – Most regions bordering Slovakia are considered low risk for CSF and free of SVD, FMD, and rinderpest. In addition, Ukraine has not reported an SVD outbreak in 30 years, an FMD outbreak in 19 years, and a rinderpest outbreak in over 80 years (<i>see </i>Sections 3.1 – 3.3). 
</p>
<p>2. CSF, SVD, FMD – Slovakia has standard biosecurity measures in place for disinfection of live-haul trucks from third countries at BIPs with veterinary inspection (<i>see </i>Section 7.1.2).
</p>
<p>3. CSF, SVD, FMD – EC legislation requires disinfection of all live-haul trucks after unloading, and in some cases, prior to animal loading (<i>see</i> Section 7.1.2).
</p>
<p>4. CSF, SVD, FMD – The veterinary services are prepared to implement biosecurity measures to prevent disease introduction via vehicular or human traffic if an outbreak is reported in a neighboring region (<i>see</i> Section 7.7.3). 
</p>
<p>12.6.3
Summary discussion
</p>
<p>APHIS considers the likelihood of introducing CSF, FMD, rinderpest, or SVD virus via incoming vehicular or human traffic to be low. The level of biosecurity on most ruminant and small swine holdings is likely insufficient to protect against virus exposure from this quarter. However, ruminant populations with the greatest potential for exposure to humans or vehicles are generally also those that are intensively managed, which increases the odds of rapid disease detection. As stated above, small swine operations in Slovakia are unlikely to contribute products for export. Existing husbandry and production conditions in Slovakia substantially mitigate the export risk to the United States. 
</p>
<p>12.7
Agricultural commodities for personal consumption
</p>
<p>12.7.1
Central risk issue
</p>
<p>Infected meat or meat products carried into Slovakia by human traffic for personal consumption could introduce CSF, SVD, or FMD into the country, as shown in Figure 12.6. Such products may be intentionally smuggled into the country or simply missed during Customs inspections at border crossings.</p>
<p><b>Figure 12.6: Introduction pathways via personal consignments
</b></p>
<p><img src="embedded:image15.emf" alt="image15.emf"></p>
<p>12.7.2
Risk factors and existing mitigation measures
</p>
<p>The likelihood of CSF, SVD, or FMD introduction via agricultural products for personal consumption depends primarily on EC policies regarding allowable commodities for personal consumption; the extent of passenger traffic from affected regions; and Customs and inspection, confiscation, and disposal practices at the point of entry. 
</p>
<p><i>Risk factors for disease introduction:</i></p>
<p>1. CSF, SVD, FMD – EC legislation permits personal consignments of meat, fluid milk, and meat and milk products from several countries that APHIS has not evaluated the risk for CSF, SVD, and/or FMD (<i>see </i>Section 7.6).
</p>
<p>2. CSF, SVD, FMD – Considerable local traffic occurs from neighboring third countries that is subject to Customs inspection (<i>see </i>Section 7.6).
</p>
<p><i>Factors mitigating the risk of disease introduction:</i></p>
<p>1. CSF, SVD, FMD – None of the third countries from which the EC allows personal consignments has reported an outbreak of CSF, SVD, or FMD in recent years, if ever (<i>see </i>Section 7.6).
</p>
<p>2. CSF, SVD, FMD – Signs indicating prohibited items and prominently placed amnesty bins decrease the amount of illegal products unintentionally carried across the border (<i>see </i>Section 7.6).
</p>
<p>3. CSF, SVD, FMD– The Slovakian Customs Service performs substantial random and targeted inspections of passenger luggage (<i>see</i> Section 7.6).
</p>
<p>12.7.3
Summary discussion
</p>
<p>Although EC legislation permits personal consignments of products that could carry CSF, SVD or FMD virus from potentially affected countries, APHIS considers the risk from this pathway to be low. APHIS considers the risk of introducing CSF or FMD into Slovakia to be far greater than SVD, because of the limited geographical distribution of the latter disease. 
</p>
<p>Infective virus in agricultural commodities for personal consumption could result in direct exposure of susceptible wild boar or domestic swine populations via waste feeding. Noncompliance with the waste-feeding ban and exposure of domestic swine to infected wild boar are considered most likely to occur on small swine holdings, which are unlikely to contribute products for export to the United States. Although APHIS considers agricultural commodities for personal consumption a higher risk pathway for CSF or FMD introduction, existing Slovakian production and biosecurity measures mitigate the export risk to the United States.</p>
<h2>13. 
Release assessment conclusions
</h2>
<p>Based on the preceding assessment of the 11 factors specified in 9 CFR 92.2, APHIS concludes that Slovakia has experienced limited CSF outbreaks in domestic swine and these outbreaks have been linked to CSF reservoirs in the country’s wild boar population or associated with movements between infected premises or the source was unknown or inconclusive.  Slovakia has implemented strong measures that have effectively controlled these CSF outbreaks in domestic swine and wild boar. CSF surveillance in domestic swine and wild boar is sufficient to detect an incursion of this disease within the limits of serological diagnosis. Based on current production and biosecurity practices, there is low risk of exposure of domestic swine to CSF on confinement operations.
</p>
<p>APHIS has no evidence that SVD, FMD, or rinderpest currently exist in Slovakia. Surveillance for SVD, FMD, and rinderpest depends heavily on the disease recognition capability of veterinarians and animal caretakers; in the absence of overt clinical signs, detection could be substantially delayed. Once an outbreak is detected, the official veterinary services are well trained and equipped to contain and eliminate the outbreak. 
</p>
<p>However, APHIS considers the potential for introduction of CSF, SVD, FMD or rinderpest into Slovakia greater in several regards than the current potential for introduction of these diseases into the United States. Specifically, Slovakia shares a common land border with and imports live animals/products from Ukraine, which is a region that APHIS has not evaluated the risk for these diseases.  Slovakia also engages in free trade with other Member States that import live animals or animal products from regions that APHIS has not evaluated the risk of CSF, SVD, or FMD.  
</p>
<p class="comment_Text">Regarding the ongoing risk posed by low levels of circulating CSF virus in wild boar, APHIS has recognized in previous assessments that a reservoir of CSF infections exists in wild boar in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region (APHIS 2000; APHIS 2004a; APHIS 2006a; APHIS 2006c). This reservoir is likely to produce continuing CSF outbreaks in domestic swine in the EU.  However, APHIS concluded from these assessments that EC control measures were sufficient to detect and contain any outbreaks that might occur. This assessment verified that the same EC control measures apply in Slovakia as in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region. The greatest risk is from the infected/restricted zones but the controls in these areas, principally on live animal movement, have been effective; moreover, the risk outside the restricted/infected zones is no greater in Slovakia than any of the previously assessed low-risk EU Member States.</p>
<p>APHIS’ current regulations recognize an equivalent level of risk across the APHIS-defined EU CSF region due to harmonized EC legislation and trading on the internal common market. The APHIS-defined EU CSF region is considered a low-risk region for CSF for the purposes of export to the United States and is subject to the import conditions specified in 9 CFR 94.24 for breeding swine, pork, and pork products, and 9 CFR 98.38 for swine semen. APHIS also recognizes all of the individual Member States comprising the APHIS-defined EU CSF region as free of FMD and most as free of SVD, but subject to import restrictions specified in 9 CFR 94.13 and 94.11, respectively. These restrictions are based on the existence of common land borders with regions not considered free and/or import of live animals or animal products from such regions.
</p>
<p>The risk profile of Slovakia resembles that of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region; APHIS therefore considers the export risk from Slovakia to be equivalent to that of the Member States comprising the APHIS-defined EU CSF region with regard to CSF, SVD, FMD, and rinderpest. Applying provisions of 9 CFR 94.11, 94.13, 94.24, and 98.38 (see Annex 1) to Slovakia would address the risk issues discussed in Section 12 and result in a level of risk that is equivalent to that portion of the EU authorized to export breeding swine, swine semen, and fresh pork to the United States.
</p>
<p>In summary, these CFR sections mitigate the risks associated with less restrictive trade practices by (1) restricting the sourcing of swine and ruminants for live export or slaughter to regions free of the pertinent diseases; (2) prohibiting commingling of live animals, meat, or meat products for export with such commodities from regions not considered free of these diseases; (3) restricting the use of transportation equipment for live swine; and (4) requiring exporting slaughter establishments to be approved by the U.S. Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). An official veterinarian of the exporting country must certify that these conditions have been met. These CFR provisions reinforce existing mitigation measures already in place by Slovakia and the European Commission, i.e. no exports allowed from restricted zones.  Also, the very few CSF cases in domestic swine occurring outside of restricted zones and/or linked to transmission from the restricted zones further suggests that the disease control measures in place are effective.</p>
<p>The CFR provisions do not directly address the risk of exporting infected live animals or animal products during the period between virus incursion and outbreak detection. However, 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38 substantially mitigate this risk by prohibiting sourcing of swine from a restricted zone established because of detection of CSF in wild boar or a CSF outbreak in domestic swine, as well as for the 6 months following depopulation, cleaning, and disinfection of the last infected premises in the zone. In addition, swine semen centers must be approved by the national government of the exporting country, which provides substantial risk mitigation under EC legislation.
</p>
<p>Biosecurity measures and production practices on swine confinement operations most likely to export to the United States limit exposure risk as discussed in Section 12. Other potential mitigation measures include a mandatory period of observation and/or diagnostic testing prior to live export or slaughtering for export. These measures are necessary due to the reservoir of CSF in wild boar populations; however, since the results of this assessment indicated that Slovakia is currently free of SVD and FMD, these measures would not be necessary for these vesicular diseases.</p>
<h1>Exposure assessment
</h1>
<p>An exposure assessment as defined by OIE describes the biological pathway(s) necessary for exposure of animals and humans in an importing country to the hazards released from a given risk source, and estimates the probability of the exposure(s) occurring, either qualitatively or quantitatively (OIE 2008a).  APHIS' regulatory authority is limited to animal health, however, so potential risks to animals are the primary focus of this evaluation.
</p>
<p>APHIS considers that the most likely pathway of exposure of domestic livestock to CSF, SVD, and FMD viruses in meat (pork or beef) and meat products is through feeding of contaminated food waste to swine (APHIS 2001). Other exposure pathways are more direct and include contact with imported infected live animals or contact with infected genetic material. 
</p>
<h2>1.
Waste feeding to susceptible swine
</h2>
<p>The likelihood of exposure of susceptible species to virus-infected meat was evaluated in previous APHIS studies. In 1995, APHIS conducted a pathway analysis to estimate the likelihood of exposing swine to infected waste (APHIS 1995). The analysis included two pathways for exposure of swine to contaminated waste; namely, exposure associated with illegal household imports, and exposure associated with legal imports. The latter is the exposure pathway that would be applicable to importing meat or meat products from Slovakia. With 95% confidence, APHIS estimated that 0.023% or less of plate and manufacturing waste would be inadequately processed prior to feeding to swine (APHIS 1995). Based on this fraction, APHIS estimates that less than 1 part in 4,300 parts of imported beef that are feed to swine as plate or manufacturing waste is likely to be inadequately cooked.
</p>
<p>APHIS conducted a survey in 2001 of the U.S. swine waste-feeding sector to update a similar study done in 1994 (APHIS 2002). Based on this survey, APHIS estimated that the proportion of plate and manufacturing waste fed to swine diminished by about 50% between 1994 and 2001 due to a significant decrease in the number of waste-feeding premises. The study also found that:
</p>
<p>1. Several more States prohibited feeding food wastes to swine;
</p>
<p>2. The number of waste-feeding premises in the continental United States decreased by 40.5% from 1994-2001, and in Hawaii and Puerto Rico decreased by 37.5% and 52.3%, respectively; and
</p>
<p>3. Institutions and restaurants provide nearly 90% of all plate waste fed to swine.
</p>
<p>APHIS considers that prohibiting the feeding of unprocessed plate waste to swine has further contributed to the reduction of waste-feeding to swine. Waste-feeder operations must be licensed and inspected regularly by U.S. Department of Agriculture inspectors (9 CFR 166). The licensing process requires that producers adequately cook the waste fed to swine using methods designed to destroy foreign animal disease agents.
</p>
<p>Based on the 1995 estimate that a very small proportion of food waste is inadequately processed prior to feeding to swine, and the substantial reduction in waste-feeding operations in recent years, APHIS concludes the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to CSF, SVD, or FMD viruses through inadequately processed food waste is low. Based on the results of the release assessment, APHIS further regards the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to these viruses through inadequately cooked infected meat from Slovakia as low. </p>
<h2>2.
Imported live animals
</h2>
<p>The likelihood of exposure of susceptible species to infected live animals was evaluated by briefly reviewing virus persistence and shedding in live swine and ruminants, as well as standard import requirements for these species. The exposure assessment focuses on breeding animals because transportation costs are prohibitive for export of other live animals (e.g. feeder pigs or cattle) to the United States from EU Member States. APHIS considers exposure of a susceptible U.S. animal population to illegally imported infected live animals from Slovakia to be highly unlikely.
</p>
<p>The survival period of CSF virus within live swine ranges from 1 week to greater than 6 months depending on various host-pathogen factors. Similarly, up to 50% of ruminant animals may become carriers of FMD virus (Alexandersen 2003). The maximum reported duration of the carrier state is 3.5 years in cattle, 9 months in sheep, and 4 months in goats. Carrier virus is fully infectious and consequently the carrier state is associated with at least a theoretical risk of introducing FMD into a susceptible population. Although SVD virus is not known to cause persistent infection, a large percentage of infections are subclinical and therefore may remain undetected without diagnostic testing prior to export. 
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">Current U.S. regulations require certification that ruminants and swine have been kept in a region entirely free of FMD for 60 days prior to export (9 CFR 93.405 and 93.505) and also require a minimum quarantine of 30 days for most imported ruminants (9 CFR 93.411) and not less than 15 days for all imported swine (9 CFR 93.510). If any contagious disease appears among ruminants and/or swine during the quarantine period special precautions must be taken to prevent spread of the infection to other animals in the quarantine station or to those outside the grounds. The affected ruminants and/or swine will be disposed of as the Administrator may direct, depending upon the nature of the disease (9 CFR 93.411; 9 CFR 93.510). These requirements serve to partially mitigate the risk of exposure by increasing the likelihood of FMD detection in ruminants and detection of FMD, CSF and SVD in swine. 
</p>
<p>Based on the results of the release assessment, APHIS considers the likelihood of exposure of susceptible animals to CSF, SVD, or FMD viruses via live animals from Slovakia to be low. The mitigation measures for live swine described in 9 CFR 94.24, which further limit the sourcing of swine for export (see footnote on page 42), the likelihood of exposure of susceptible U.S. swine to CSF virus via infected swine from Slovakia is low.
</p>
<h2>3.
Imported genetic material
</h2>
<p>Genetic material has been implicated in the introduction of foreign animal disease into susceptible populations, as well as the spread of established disease epidemics over considerable distances. For example, two semen collection centers became infected during the course of the 1997-1998 CSF epidemic in the Netherlands (Hennecken et al 2000). Potentially contaminated semen was distributed to 1,680 swine herds over the course of 5 weeks, during which the disease remained undetected in the donor boars. Although investigators concluded that only 36 farms had been infected through artificial insemination, all suspect farms were subject to quarantine and testing, resulting in a tremendous expenditure of resources. 
</p>
<p>Survival of CSF virus in semen has been estimated in experimental studies to be 12-72 hours are 20oC but ranges from 1 month to several years at 4oC or below (Floegel et al 2000). Survival in embryos and ova is unknown (Floegel et al 2000; Glossup and Cameron 2002). Survival of SVD virus in genetic material is possible but is not considered to be a primary mode of transmission (OIE 2008). FMD virus may be present in semen up to 4 days before clinical signs become apparent (OIE 2008).</p>
<p>Based on the extended period of survival of CSF and FMD viruses in frozen semen, APHIS considers the unmitigated likelihood of exposure of susceptible animals to these viruses in infected semen to be high. However, based on the results of the release assessment, APHIS considers the likelihood of exposure of susceptible animals to CSF or FMD viruses via infected semen from Slovakia to be low. With the mitigation measures for swine semen described in 9 CFR 98.38 (see footnote page 45), the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to CSF or SVD virus via infected semen from Slovakia is also low.  
</p>
<h1>Consequence assessment
</h1>
<p>A consequence assessment describes the biologic and economic consequences of introducing the hazards under consideration into the United States. This consequence assessment addresses both direct and indirect consequences as recommended by the OIE (OIE 2008a). 
</p>
<p>The magnitude of the biologic and economic consequences following an introduction of CSF, SVD, or FMD or rinderpest virus would depend on the location of the introduction; the virus serotype introduced; the rate of virus spread and whether other environmental conditions at the introduction site that might facilitate this spread; the ability to detect the disease rapidly; livestock demographics and movement patterns; and the ease of employing eradication procedures (McCauley 1979). In addition, depending on the extent of export of livestock and their products, trade restrictions imposed by trading partners may result in severe economic consequences.
</p>
<p>Direct consequences include effects of the disease on animal health and the subsequent production losses, the total costs of control and eradication, the effect on the environment, and public health consequences. Indirect consequences include impacts on international trade and associated domestic consequences.
</p>
<h2>1.
Effects on animal health and production
</h2>
<p>1.1
Classical swine fever
</p>
<p>CSF infection may take an acute or a chronic course. The severity of the disease depends largely on the age of the animal and virulence of the viral strain, with young animals usually more severely affected than older animals. In older breeding pigs the course of infection is often mild or even subclinical, whereas mortality rates may reach 90% in young pigs (Moennig 2000). Low virulence strains may manifest primarily as poor reproductive performance and birth of piglets with neurologic defects.
</p>
<p>1.2
Swine vesicular disease
</p>
<p>SVD is typically a transient vesicular disease of pigs. The virus causes essentially no mortality, and infected pigs generally recover within one week (up to three weeks). Some strains produce only mild clinical symptoms or are asymptomatic (OIE 2008). Morbidity rates may be low throughout a whole herd but high in certain pens. </p>
<p>1.3
Foot and mouth disease
</p>
<p>FMD causes significant distress and suffering to animals regardless of the size and sophistication of their livestock unit. Very high mortality rates in young animals can occur, particularly among pigs and sheep (Alexandersen 2003; Dunn and Donaldson 1997; Geering 1995).  Mortality in older animals occurs less frequently but may be significant with certain virus strains.
</p>
<p>FMD also causes significant losses in the production capacity of affected animals. Productivity losses of 10-20% are reported in FMD-infected livestock if the disease is allowed to run its course (McCauley 1979). In addition, FMD can cause a reduction in the growth rate of animals raised for meat (Doel 2003). The comparatively greater severity of FMD in pigs would imply at least similar losses to those described for cattle.
</p>
<p>1.4 Rinderpest
</p>
<p>Rinderpest is characterized by fever, oral erosions, diarrhea, lymphoid necrosis, and, in populations with low immunity, high mortality.  </p>
<h2>2.
Control and eradication costs
</h2>
<p>The overall cost of control and eradication depends on the mitigation or policy option chosen to control and eradicate the disease. Potential costs include disease control measures such as imposing quarantine measures and movement controls, direct costs related to stamping out of affected and other herds, indemnity payments, vaccination costs, surveillance and laboratory testing, etc. For disease-free countries like the United States that have a substantial export market for livestock and livestock products, the preferred option for control and eradication has traditionally been to stamp-out infected herds without the use of vaccine.
</p>
<p>The U.S. policy for most significant foreign animal disease emergencies is to follow strict quarantine measures and stamping-out of infected and contact herds with ongoing assessment for the need for and implementation of strategic vaccination. Available data do not allow quantification of the number of herds/farms that would be infected if one of these diseases were introduced. Nevertheless, the cost of control, eradication and compensation is likely to be significant. 
</p>
<p>1.1 Classical swine fever
</p>
<p>Since there have been no CSF outbreaks in the United States from which economic estimates can be derived, estimates of economic effects in other countries are provided as illustrations.  Saatkamp et al (2000) reviewed the economic aspects of control of small and large CSF outbreaks in the EU from 1990-1997. For the largest outbreak, involving 429 herds over 14 months, the cost of removal of affected swine was 426.9 million Euros, slaughter for welfare purposes cost 1.2 billion Euros, and program operational costs were 134.3 million Euros. Overall, the outbreak cost pig producers 712.4 million Euros, the national government 230.5 million Euros, and the EU 807.8 million Euros. The total cost of smaller outbreaks ranged from 10.9 million Euros (8 affected herds over 2 months) to 208.7 million Euros (113 affected herds over 10 months) (Saatkamp et al 2000). Approximately 10 million pigs were destroyed during the course of the outbreak, primarily for welfare reasons (overcrowding or overweight) (Stegeman et al 2000). 
</p>
<p>Garner et al (2001) estimated the potential economic impact of CSF on the pig industry of Australia using a stochastic modeling process. The model estimated a loss in gross income of 28-37% for the pig industry in the affected region, and a 9-11% loss in gross income for the national pig industry.  
</p>
<p>1.2 Swine vesicular disease
</p>
<p>Little information exists on the cost of control and eradication of SVD in a previously free region. SVD virus generally does not spread as quickly as CSF virus; even on infected premises, spread from one pen to another may not occur in the absence of a common open drainage system or of frequent movement of pigs between pens (Lin and Kitching 2000). However, a SVD outbreak may not be detected for weeks or even months due to the frequently mild nature of the disease, allowing ample time for spread to other swine establishments.  In addition, the virus is extraordinarily stable in the environment, which could lead to disease recurrence on previously infected farms.   
</p>
<p>In the absence of specific data on the cost of control and eradication, APHIS assumes a baseline cost similar to that of a small- to medium-sized CSF outbreak (see above).
</p>
<p>1.3 Foot and mouth disease
</p>
<p>A few studies have estimated the potential consequences of an FMD outbreak in the United States. Bates et al (2003) used results from a FMD simulation model to estimate the direct costs associated with indemnity, slaughter, cleaning and disinfecting livestock premises for various vaccination and eradication strategies to control transmission of FMDV in a cattle population of 2,238 herds and 5 sale yards located in 3 counties of California. The study found that mean herd indemnity payments were USD 2.6 million and USD 110,359 for dairy and non-dairy herds, respectively. Cleaning and disinfection costs ranged from USD 18,062 – 60,205 per herd. The mean vaccination cost was USD 2,960 per herd and the total eradication cost ranged from USD 61 million – 551 million depending on eradication strategy.
</p>
<p>At the national level, McCauley et al (1979) conducted a comprehensive study to assess the potential economic impact of FMD in the whole of the United States. The study estimated the direct costs (control and eradication program costs) and increased costs borne by consumers of FMD introduction over a 15-year period (1976-1990). Using the Consumer Price Index to update to 2001, the estimated total cost of a strict quarantine and slaughter policy was USD 34.4 million. 
</p>
<h2>3.
Effect on the environment
</h2>
<p>Environmental effects have been considered under all applicable environmental review laws in force in the United States. These are considered in a separate, but related, environmental assessment conducted for certain regions of the EU (APHIS 2003). The environmental assessment complies with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and implementing regulations (NEPA 1969).
</p>
<h2>4.
Effect on public health
</h2>
<p>Although public health consequences are not issues under APHIS’ regulatory authority, the issue is briefly addressed in this assessment. Direct public health consequences are insubstantial the number of cases reported is so small when compared with the number of persons exposed to these viruses that the World Health Organization generally does not consider CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest to be a threat to humans.
</p>
<p>Perhaps more importantly, a substantial foreign animal disease outbreak can result in severe psychosocial effects on farmers and farming communities. Farmers and their families can suffer from grief over losing animals, in some cases blood lines kept over many generations, as well as loss of control over their lives due to movement restrictions, disruptions in community life, and short- and long-term stress over their financial future. For example, a study of the social consequences of the 2001 FMD outbreak in the Cumbria community of the United Kingdom revealed high rates of depression, alcohol consumption, and mortality among farmers during the crisis (Anonymous 2004).
</p>
<h2>5.
Indirect consequences
</h2>
<p>In addition to the direct costs of CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest introduction, impacts on international trade and related domestic consequences need to be considered. Export losses due to restrictions imposed by trade partners on animals and products susceptible to these diseases could run into billions of U.S. dollars. The value of U.S. exports of pork and pork products was an estimated USD 1.3 billion in 2003 (FAS 2003). Similarly, the value of U.S. exports of beef products alone, which would also be lost in an FMD or rinderpest outbreak, was over USD 3 billion in 2001. Since the United States exports only small amounts of lamb and mutton, economic losses associated with these commodities are not likely to be significant compared to cattle and swine.</p>
<p>The impact of an outbreak of a foreign animal disease on the rural and regional economic viability, including businesses reliant on livestock revenue, could also be substantial. For example, Paarlberg et al. (2002) conducted a study to estimate the potential revenue impact of an FMD outbreak in the United States similar to the one that occurred in the United Kingdom in 2001. This study estimated the gross revenue losses for the animal sector as follows: live cattle (17%), beef (20%), milk (16%), live swine (34%), pork (24%), live sheep and lambs (14%), and sheep and lamb meat (10%). 
</p>
<p>Indirect economic losses to U.S. firms that support export markets for live animals and animal products could also be substantial. For example, such firms would stand to lose at least USD 2.5 billion annually if ruminant export markets were lost (Green and Grannis 2003). More than 33 thousand full-time U.S. jobs, accounting for almost $1 billion in wages annually, could be jeopardized by loss of these three markets. In the longer term, if trade restrictions persisted and alternative export markets did not develop, the U.S. ruminant production sector could contract, allowing other supplying countries to establish trade relationships in the absence of U.S. supply. Losses due to restrictions on live swine, pork, and pork products are likely to be significant as well. 
</p>
<h1>Risk Estimation
</h1>
<p>Risk estimation consists of integrating the results from the release assessment, exposure assessment, and consequence assessment to produce overall measures of risk associated with the hazards identified at the outset.  Thus, risk estimation takes into account the whole risk pathway from hazard identified to the unwanted event.
</p>
<p>APHIS concludes from the release assessment that there is no evidence that SVD, FMD, or rinderpest exist in Slovakia, nor evidence that CSF currently exists in domestic swine in that country.  APHIS considers the risk potential for introduction of these hazards from Slovakia into the United States via export of swine commodities to be low.  In keeping with previous analyses, APHIS also concludes that, with the mitigation measures currently in place for CSF, there is an equivalent low level of risk across all of the EU Member States that APHIS has evaluated.  Further risk reduction would be gained if mitigation measures for Slovakia are implemented that are equivalent to those specified in 9 CFR 94.11, 94.13, 94.24, and 98.38.
</p>
<p>APHIS concludes from the exposure assessment that the likelihood of exposure of susceptible U.S. livestock to CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest viruses via meat or meat products, live animals, or genetic material from Slovakia is low.  Applying risk mitigation measures similar to those described in 9 CFR 94.24 for live swine, pork, and pork products, and 9 CFR 98.38 for swine semen would reduce that low risk even further.
</p>
<p>Conversely, APHIS concludes that the animal health and economic consequences of a CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest outbreak in the United States would be very high.  Although control and eradication measures would be costly, the major economic impact would likely result from export trade losses.
</p>
<p>In summary, although a CSF, SVD, FMD, or rinderpest outbreak in the United States would likely have severe animal health and economic consequences, APHIS considers the risk of infected live swine and/or swine commodities entering the United States from Slovakia and exposing U.S. livestock to be low.  The risk is further mitigated if Slovakia is subject to the same mitigation measures as are specified in 9 CFR 94.11, 94.13, 94.24, and 98.38.</p>
<h1>Annexes
</h1>
<h1>Annex 1: Text of Title 9 Code of Federal Regulations 94.11, 94.13, 94.24, and 98.38.
</h1>
<pre>§ <b>94.11:</b>  Restrictions on importation of meat and other animal products from specified regions.
</pre>
<pre>    (a) Austria, The Bahamas, Belgium, Channel Islands, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (except for Surrey County, England), which are declared in Sec. 94.1(a)(2) to be free of rinderpest and foot-and-mouth disease, supplement their national meat supply by the importation of fresh (chilled or frozen) meat of ruminants or swine from regions that are designated in Sec. 94.1(a) to be infected with rinderpest or foot-and-mouth disease; or have a common land border with regions designated as infected with rinderpest or foot-and-mouth disease; or import ruminants or swine from regions designated as infected with rinderpest or foot-and-mouth disease under conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into the United States. Thus, even though this Department has declared such regions to be free of rinderpest and foot-and-mouth disease, the meat and other animal products produced in such free regions may be commingled with the fresh (chilled or frozen) meat of animals from an infected region, resulting in an undue risk of introducing rinderpest or foot-and-mouth disease into the United States. Therefore, meat of ruminants or swine, and other animal products, and ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing such meat or animal products originating in the free regions listed in this section shall not be imported into the United States unless the following requirements in addition to other applicable requirements of chapter III of this title are met. However, meat and meat products which meet the requirements of Sec. 94.4 do not have to comply with the requirements of this section. As used in this section the term “other animal product” means all parts of the carcass of any ruminant or swine, other than meat and articles regulated under part 95 or 96 of this chapter.
</pre>
<pre>    (b) All meat or other animal product from such regions, whether in personal-use amounts or commercial lots (except that which has been fully cooked by a commercial method in a container hermetically sealed promptly after filling but before such cooking and sealing produced a fully sterilized product which is shelf-stable without refrigeration) shall have been prepared only in an inspected establishment that is eligible to have its products imported into the United States under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and the regulations in Sec. 327.2, chapter III of this title, issued thereunder, and shall be accompanied by a Department-approved meat inspection certificate prescribed in Sec. 327.4 in chapter III of this title, or similar certificate approved by the Administrator, as adequate to effectuate the purposes of this section, regardless of the purpose or amount of product in the shipment.
</pre>
<pre>    (c) Additional certification. Meat of ruminants or swine or other animal products from regions designated in paragraph (a) of this section must be accompanied by additional certification by a full-time salaried veterinary official of the agency in the national government that is responsible for the health of the product in the United States, the certification must be presented to an authorized inspector at the port of arrival. The certification must give the name and official establishment number of the establishment where the animals were slaughtered, and shall state that:
</pre>
<pre>    (1) The slaughtering establishment is not permitted to receive animals that originated in, or have ever been in, or that have been aboard a means of conveyance at the time such means of conveyance called at or landed at a port in, a region listed in Sec. 94.1(a) as a region infected with rinderpest or foot-and-mouth disease;
</pre>
<pre>    (2) The slaughtering establishment is not permitted to receive meat or other animal products derived from ruminants or swine which originated in such a rinderpest or foot-and-mouth disease infected region, or meat or other animal products from a rinderpest and foot-and-mouth disease free region transported through a rinderpest or foot-and-mouth disease infected region except in containers sealed with serially numbered seals of the National Government of the noninfected region of origin;
</pre>
<pre>    (3) The meat or other animal product covered by the certificate was derived from animals born and raised in a region listed in Sec. 94.1(a)(2) as free of rinderpest and foot-and-mouth disease and the meat or other animal product has never been in any region in which rinderpest or foot-and-mouth disease existed;
</pre>
<pre>    (4) The meat or other animal product has been processed, stored, and transported to the means of conveyance that will bring the article to the United States in a manner to preclude its being commingled or otherwise in contact with meat or other animal products that do not comply with the conditions contained in this certificate.
</pre>
<pre>§ <b>94.13:</b>  Restrictions on importation of pork or pork products from specified regions.</pre>
<pre>    Austria, the Bahamas, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man, and Northern Ireland), Yugoslavia, and the Regions in Italy of Friuli, Liguria, Marche, and Valle d'Aosta are declared free of swine vesicular disease in Sec. 94.12(a) of this part. 
</pre>
<pre>    These regions either supplement their national pork supply by the importation of fresh (chilled or frozen) meat of animals from regions where swine vesicular disease is considered to exist, have a common border with such regions, or have trade practices that are less restrictive than are acceptable to the United States. Thus, the pork or pork products produced in such regions may be commingled with fresh (chilled or frozen) meat of animals from a region where swine vesicular disease is considered to exist, resulting in an undue risk of swine vesicular disease introduction into the United States. Therefore, pork or pork products and ship's stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing such pork, other than those articles regulated under part 95 or part 96 of this chapter, produced in such regions shall not be brought into the United States unless the following requirements are met in addition to other applicable requirements of part 327 of this title:
</pre>
<pre>    (a) All such pork or pork products, except those treated in accordance with Sec. 94.12(b)(1)(i) of this part, shall have been prepared only in inspected establishments that are eligible to have their products imported into the United States under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) and under Sec. 327.2 of this title and shall be accompanied by the foreign meat inspection certificate required by Sec. 327.4 of this title. Upon arrival of the pork or pork products in the United States, the foreign meat inspection certificate must be presented to an authorized inspector at the port of arrival.
</pre>
<pre>    (b) Unless such pork or pork products are treated according to one of the procedures described in Sec. 94.12(b) of this part, the pork or pork products must be accompanied by an additional certificate issued by a full-time salaried veterinary official of the agency in the national government responsible for the health of the animals within that region. Upon arrival of the pork or pork products in the United States, the certificate must be presented to an authorized inspector at the port of arrival. The certificate shall state the name and official establishment number of the establishment where the swine involved were slaughtered and the pork was processed. The certificate shall also state that:
</pre>
<pre>    (1) The slaughtering establishment is not permitted to receive animals that originated in, or have ever been in a region listed in Sec. 94.12(a) as a region in which swine vesicular disease is considered to exist;
</pre>
<pre>    (2) The slaughtering establishment is not permitted to receive pork derived from swine which originated in such a region or pork from swine from a swine vesicular disease free region which has been transported through a region where swine vesicular disease is considered to exist except pork which was transported in containers sealed with serially numbered seals of the National Government of a region of origin listed in Sec. 94.12 as a region considered free of the disease.
</pre>
<pre>    (3) The pork has been processed, stored, and transported to the means of conveyance that will bring the article to the United States in a manner that precludes its being commingled or otherwise coming in contact with pork or pork products that have not been handled in accordance with the requirements of this section.
</pre>
<p>§ <b>94.24: </b>Restrictions on the importation of pork, pork products, and swine from the APHIS-defined EU CSF region.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (a) <i>Pork and pork products. </i>In addition to meeting all other applicable provisions of this part, fresh pork and pork products imported from the APHIS-defined EU CSF region must meet the following conditions:
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (1) The pork or pork products must not have been derived from swine that were in any of the following regions or zones, unless the swine were slaughtered after the periods described:
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (i) Any region when the region was classified in §§94.9(a) and 94.10(a) as one in which classical swine fever is known to exist, except for the APHIS-defined EU CSF region;
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (ii) A restricted zone in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region established because of detection of classical swine fever in domestic swine, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State or until 6 months following depopulation of the swine on affected premises in the restricted zone and the cleaning and disinfection of the last affected premises in the zone, whichever is later; or
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (iii) A restricted zone in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of classical swine fever in wild boar, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (2) The pork and pork products must not have been commingled with pork or pork products derived from other swine that were in any of the regions or zones described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(iii) of this section, unless the other swine were slaughtered after the periods described. Additionally, the pork and pork products must not have been derived from swine that were commingled with other swine that were in any of the regions or zones described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(iii) of this section, unless the swine from which the pork or pork products were derived were slaughtered after the periods described.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (3) The swine from which the pork or pork products were derived must not have transited any region or zone described in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(iii) of this section, unless the swine were moved directly through the region or zone in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal determined to be intact upon arrival at the point of destination, or unless the swine were slaughtered after the periods described.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (4) No equipment or materials used in transporting the swine from which the pork or pork products were derived from the farm of origin to the slaughtering establishment may have been used previously for transporting swine that do not meet the requirements of this section, unless the equipment and materials have first been cleaned and disinfected.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (5) The pork and pork products must be accompanied by a certificate issued by an official of the competent veterinary authority of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region Member State who is authorized to issue the foreign meat inspection certificate required by §327.4 of this title, stating that the applicable provisions of paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this section have been met.20 
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (b) <i>Live swine. </i>In addition to meeting all other applicable provisions of this title, live swine imported from the APHIS-defined EU CSF region must meet the following conditions:
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (1) The swine must be breeding swine.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (2) The swine must not have been in any of the following regions or zones, unless the swine are exported to the United States after the periods described:
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (i) Any region when the region was classified in §§94.9(a) and 94.10(a) as one in which classical swine fever is known to exist, except for the APHIS-defined EU CSF region;
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (ii) A restricted zone in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of classical swine fever in domestic swine, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State or until 6 months following depopulation of the swine on affected premises in the restricted zone and the cleaning and disinfection of the last affected premises in the zone, whichever is later; or
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (iii) A restricted zone in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of classical swine fever in wild boar, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (3) The swine must not have been commingled with other swine that have at any time been in any of the regions or zones described in paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through (b)(2)(iii) of this section, unless the swine are exported after the periods described.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (4) The swine must not have transited any region or zone described in paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through (b)(2)(iii) of this section, unless the swine were moved directly through the region or zone in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal determined to be intact upon arrival at the point of destination, or unless the swine are exported after the periods described;
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (5) No equipment or materials used in transporting the swine may have been used previously for transporting swine that do not meet the requirements of this section, unless the equipment and materials have first been cleaned and disinfected.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (6) The swine must be accompanied by a certificate issued by a salaried veterinary officer of the competent veterinary authority of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region Member State, stating that the conditions of paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(5) of this section have been met.21 
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (c) The certificates required by paragraphs (a)(5) and (b)(6) of this section must be presented by the importer to an authorized inspector at the port of arrival, upon arrival of the swine, pork, or pork products at the port.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">20 The certification required may be placed on the foreign meat inspection certificate required by §327.4 of this title or may be contained in a separate document.</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">21 The certification required may be placed on the certificate required by §93.505(a) of this chapter or may be contained in a separate document
</p>
<p>§ <b>98.38:</b> Restrictions on the importation of swine semen from the APHIS-defined EU CSF region.</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    In addition to meeting all other applicable provisions of this part, swine semen imported from the APHIS-defined EU CSF region must meet the following conditions, except as noted in paragraph (h) of this section with regard to swine semen imported from Denmark, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, or the United Kingdom:
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (a) The semen must come from a semen collection center approved for export by the competent veterinary authority of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region Member State.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (b) The semen must not have been collected from a donor boar that was in any of the following regions or zones, unless the semen was collected after the periods described:
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (1) Any region when the region was classified in §§94.9(a) and 94.10(a) of this chapter as one in which classical swine fever is known to exist, except for the APHIS-defined EU CSF region;
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (2) A restricted zone in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of classical swine fever in domestic swine, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State or until 6 months following depopulation of the swine on affected premises in the restricted zone and the cleaning and disinfection of the last affected premises in the zone, whichever is later; or
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (3) A restricted zone in the APHIS-defined EU CSF region established because of the detection of classical swine fever in wild boar, from the time of detection until the designation of the zone as a restricted zone is removed by the competent veterinary authority of the Member State.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (c) The semen must not have been collected from a donor boar that was commingled with swine that at any time were in any of the regions or zones described in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section, unless the semen was collected after the periods described.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (d) The semen must not have been collected from a donor boar that transited any region or zone described in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section during the periods described, unless the donor boar was moved directly through the region or zone in a sealed means of conveyance with the seal determined to be intact upon arrival at the point of destination, or unless the semen was collected after the periods described;
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (e) The donor boar must be held in isolation for at least 30 days prior to entering the semen collection center.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (f) No more than 30 days prior to being held in isolation as required by paragraph (e) of this section, the donor boar must be tested with negative results with a classical swine fever test approved by the World Organization for Animal Health.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (g) No equipment or materials used in transporting the donor boar from the farm of origin to the semen collection center may have been used previously for transporting swine that do not meet the requirements of this section, unless such equipment or materials have first been cleaned and disinfected.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (h) Except for semen collected from swine in Denmark, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, or the United Kingdom, before the semen is exported to the United States, the donor boar must be held at the semen collection center and observed by the center veterinarian for at least 40 days following collection of the semen, and, along with all other swine at the semen collection center, exhibit no clinical signs of classical swine fever.
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">    (i) The semen must be accompanied by a certificate issued by a salaried veterinary officer of the competent veterinary authority of the APHIS-defined EU CSF region Member State, stating that the provisions of paragraphs (a) through (h) of this section have been met.3 
</p>
<p class="normal_(Web)">3 The certification required may be placed on the certificate required under §98.35(c) or may be contained in a separate document.
</p>
<h1>Annex 2: Slovakia import data 2002 – 2007 (GTA 2008)</h1>
<p><b>Table 2A: Live swine imports 2002 – 2007 (Number)</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>Country</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2002</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2003</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2004</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Country</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2005</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2006</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2007</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>36337</p>
</td>	<td><p>20362</p>
</td>	<td><p>323619</p>
</td>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>135532</p>
</td>	<td><p>337621</p>
</td>	<td><p>80543</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>30236</p>
</td>	<td><p>18067</p>
</td>	<td><p>298779</p>
</td>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>73006</p>
</td>	<td><p>55429</p>
</td>	<td><p>44336</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Netherlands</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>16802</p>
</td>	<td><p>Netherlands</p>
</td>	<td><p>47455</p>
</td>	<td><p>53575</p>
</td>	<td><p>24252</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Denmark</p>
</td>	<td><p>5896</p>
</td>	<td><p>2230</p>
</td>	<td><p>366</p>
</td>	<td><p>Poland</p>
</td>	<td><p>515</p>
</td>	<td><p>148178</p>
</td>	<td><p>7632</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Hungary</p>
</td>	<td><p>179</p>
</td>	<td><p>53</p>
</td>	<td><p>102</p>
</td>	<td><p>Spain</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>9</p>
</td>	<td><p>7570</p>
</td>	<td><p>Hungary</p>
</td>	<td><p>12842</p>
</td>	<td><p>6513</p>
</td>	<td><p>429</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>1330</p>
</td>	<td><p>3837</p>
</td>	<td><p>3737</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>France</p>
</td>	<td><p>23</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>Denmark</p>
</td>	<td><p>384</p>
</td>	<td><p>7104</p>
</td>	<td><p>157</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><b>Table 2B: Live cattle imports 2002 – 2007 (Number)
</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>Country</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2002</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2003</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2004</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Country</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2005</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2006</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2007</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>770</p>
</td>	<td><p>356</p>
</td>	<td><p>332</p>
</td>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>445</p>
</td>	<td><p>2244</p>
</td>	<td><p>2586</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Switzerland</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>32</p>
</td>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>40</p>
</td>	<td><p>1220</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Macedonia</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>67</p>
</td>	<td><p>Denmark</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>88</p>
</td>	<td><p>13</p>
</td>	<td><p>46</p>
</td>	<td><p>Italy</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>516</p>
</td>	<td><p>470</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Netherlands</p>
</td>	<td><p>328</p>
</td>	<td><p>235</p>
</td>	<td><p>182</p>
</td>	<td><p>Romania</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>403</p>
</td>	<td><p>725</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td>	<td><p>79</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>Netherlands</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Italy</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>Poland</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>506</p>
</td>	<td><p>140</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Poland</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>416</p>
</td>	<td><p>700</p>
</td>	<td><p>27</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>France</p>
</td>	<td><p>234</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>Sweden</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>15</p>
</td>	<td><p>23</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>Hungary</p>
</td>	<td><p>27</p>
</td>	<td><p>22</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Not Determined</p>
</td>	<td><p>82</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>55</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><b>Table 2C: Live sheep and goat imports 2002 – 2007 (Number)</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>Country</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2002</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2003</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2004</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2005</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2006</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2007</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>1485</p>
</td>	<td><p>794</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>44</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Poland</p>
</td>	<td><p>1689</p>
</td>	<td><p>1450</p>
</td>	<td><p>748</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>34</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>110</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>12</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>42</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Russia</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>France</p>
</td>	<td><p>185</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Hungary</p>
</td>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><b>Table 2D: Pork Meat Imports 2002 – 2007 (Tons)</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>Country</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2002</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2003</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2004</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Country</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2005</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2006</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2007</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>14872</p>
</td>	<td><p>11467</p>
</td>	<td><p>27605</p>
</td>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>51545</p>
</td>	<td><p>57241</p>
</td>	<td><p>55766</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>10220</p>
</td>	<td><p>6506</p>
</td>	<td><p>6560</p>
</td>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>12166</p>
</td>	<td><p>11187</p>
</td>	<td><p>11855</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>France</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>1062</p>
</td>	<td><p>2397</p>
</td>	<td><p>5682</p>
</td>	<td><p>Poland</p>
</td>	<td><p>8843</p>
</td>	<td><p>14910</p>
</td>	<td><p>12910</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>1875</p>
</td>	<td><p>568</p>
</td>	<td><p>4040</p>
</td>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>7929</p>
</td>	<td><p>10297</p>
</td>	<td><p>9844</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Denmark</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>291</p>
</td>	<td><p>568</p>
</td>	<td><p>2915</p>
</td>	<td><p>Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>1099</p>
</td>	<td><p>2752</p>
</td>	<td><p>5004</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Poland</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>80</p>
</td>	<td><p>2378</p>
</td>	<td><p>France</p>
</td>	<td><p>7106</p>
</td>	<td><p>5657</p>
</td>	<td><p>5318</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Hungary</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>756</p>
</td>	<td><p>627</p>
</td>	<td><p>1634</p>
</td>	<td><p>Hungary</p>
</td>	<td><p>5031</p>
</td>	<td><p>2674</p>
</td>	<td><p>2579</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Spain</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>105</p>
</td>	<td><p>193</p>
</td>	<td><p>888</p>
</td>	<td><p>Netherlands</p>
</td>	<td><p>1779</p>
</td>	<td><p>3166</p>
</td>	<td><p>2882</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Italy</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>21</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>1008</p>
</td>	<td><p>Italy</p>
</td>	<td><p>1572</p>
</td>	<td><p>3072</p>
</td>	<td><p>2374</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>114</p>
</td>	<td><p>76</p>
</td>	<td><p>862</p>
</td>	<td><p>Denmark</p>
</td>	<td><p>3795</p>
</td>	<td><p>1348</p>
</td>	<td><p>1441</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Belgium</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>183</p>
</td>	<td><p>409</p>
</td>	<td><p>773</p>
</td>	<td><p>Spain</p>
</td>	<td><p>1021</p>
</td>	<td><p>1560</p>
</td>	<td><p>1364</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Netherlands</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>245</p>
</td>	<td><p>44</p>
</td>	<td><p>666</p>
</td>	<td><p>Belgium</p>
</td>	<td><p>1067</p>
</td>	<td><p>407</p>
</td>	<td><p>65</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Sweden</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>137</p>
</td>	<td><p>Cyprus</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>175</p>
</td>	<td><p>130</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Finland</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>21</p>
</td>	<td><p>Greece</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>16</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Greece</p>
</td>	<td><p>T</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>42</p>
</td>	<td><p>Sweden</p>
</td>	<td><p>138</p>
</td>	<td><p>21</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><b>Table 2E: Beef Meat Imports 2002 – 2007 (Tons)</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>Country</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2002</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2003</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2004</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Country</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2005</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2006</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2007</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>846</p>
</td>	<td><p>1544</p>
</td>	<td><p>15043</p>
</td>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>1333</p>
</td>	<td><p>1588</p>
</td>	<td><p>916</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>496</p>
</td>	<td><p>1014</p>
</td>	<td><p>14509</p>
</td>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>711</p>
</td>	<td><p>259</p>
</td>	<td><p>278</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Italy</p>
</td>	<td><p>86</p>
</td>	<td><p>291</p>
</td>	<td><p>336</p>
</td>	<td><p>Poland</p>
</td>	<td><p>97</p>
</td>	<td><p>238</p>
</td>	<td><p>151</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Poland</p>
</td>	<td><p>202</p>
</td>	<td><p>63</p>
</td>	<td><p>75</p>
</td>	<td><p>Spain</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>71</p>
</td>	<td><p>175</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>52</p>
</td>	<td><p>140</p>
</td>	<td><p>39</p>
</td>	<td><p>Denmark</p>
</td>	<td><p>51</p>
</td>	<td><p>26</p>
</td>	<td><p>113</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Denmark</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>63</p>
</td>	<td><p>Italy</p>
</td>	<td><p>109</p>
</td>	<td><p>319</p>
</td>	<td><p>65</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Hungary</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td>	<td><p>Hungary</p>
</td>	<td><p>15</p>
</td>	<td><p>25</p>
</td>	<td><p>27</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td>	<td><p>17</p>
</td>	<td><p>France</p>
</td>	<td><p>42</p>
</td>	<td><p>133</p>
</td>	<td><p>43</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>France</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>Netherlands</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>263</p>
</td>	<td><p>57</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Bangladesh</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>United Kingdom</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Not Determined</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>142</p>
</td>	<td><p>56</p>
</td>	<td><p>4</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Spain</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>13</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>Austria</p>
</td>	<td><p>165</p>
</td>	<td><p>195</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><b>Table 2F: Sheep and Goat Meat Imports 2002 – 2007 (Tons)</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2002</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2002</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2004</b></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2005</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2006</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2007</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>15</p>
</td>	<td><p>World</p>
</td>	<td><p>40</p>
</td>	<td><p>50</p>
</td>	<td><p>32</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>15</p>
</td>	<td><p>Czech Republic</p>
</td>	<td><p>40</p>
</td>	<td><p>26</p>
</td>	<td><p>18</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>United Kingdom</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>Germany</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>Poland</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>5</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>Italy</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>22</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p></p>
</td>	<td><p>Netherlands</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<h1>Annex 3: CSF Surveillance
</h1>
<p><b>Table 3A: CSF surveillance in domestic swine 1998 – 2005
</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>Year</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Virological</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Serological</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Tested</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Positive</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Tested</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Positive</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1998</p>
</td>	<td><p>7,671</p>
</td>	<td><p>117</p>
</td>	<td><p>63,400</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>4,092</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1999</p>
</td>	<td><p>136</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,351</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>1,841</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2000</p>
</td>	<td><p>296</p>
</td>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,049</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>698</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2001</p>
</td>	<td><p>271</p>
</td>	<td><p>3</p>
</td>	<td><p>20,572</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>679</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2002</p>
</td>	<td><p>410</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>26,195</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>253</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2003</p>
</td>	<td><p>876</p>
</td>	<td><p>55</p>
</td>	<td><p>25,836</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>265</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,544</p>
</td>	<td><p>83</p>
</td>	<td><p>42,818</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>256</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>2005</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>486</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>6</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>41,778</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>114</b></p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><b>Table 3B: CSF surveillance in wild boar 1998 – 2008</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>Year</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Virological</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Serological</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Tested</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Positive</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Tested</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Positive</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1998</p>
</td>	<td><p>5,833</p>
</td>	<td><p>128</p>
</td>	<td><p>3,005</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>593</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1999</p>
</td>	<td><p>5,576</p>
</td>	<td><p>17</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,984</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>228</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2000</p>
</td>	<td><p>7,734</p>
</td>	<td><p>20</p>
</td>	<td><p>4,323</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>564</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2001</p>
</td>	<td><p>12,601</p>
</td>	<td><p>43</p>
</td>	<td><p>8,899</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>485</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2002</p>
</td>	<td><p>14,140</p>
</td>	<td><p>69</p>
</td>	<td><p>10,339</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>509</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2003</p>
</td>	<td><p>11,726</p>
</td>	<td><p>37</p>
</td>	<td><p>9,073</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>509</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>15,337</p>
</td>	<td><p>11</p>
</td>	<td><p>12,965</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>616</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2005</p>
</td>	<td><p>14,601</p>
</td>	<td><p>6</p>
</td>	<td><p>13,463</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>1,366</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2006</p>
</td>	<td><p>11,636</p>
</td>	<td><p>13</p>
</td>	<td><p>11,043</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>1547</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2007</p>
</td>	<td><p>15,503</p>
</td>	<td><p>10</p>
</td>	<td><p>14,962</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>1619</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>2008*</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>11,618</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>4</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>11,335</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>910</b></p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>

* January through September 2008</p>
<p><b>Table 3C: SVD testing in domestic swine
</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>Year</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Total Samples
</b></p>
<p><b>Tested</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Testing for</b></p>
<p><b>Import/Export</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2000</p>
</td>	<td><p>925</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Not provided</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2001</p>
</td>	<td><p>852</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Not provided</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2002</p>
</td>	<td><p>1324</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>1239</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2003</p>
</td>	<td><p>171</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>156</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>94</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>0</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>2005</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>30</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>0</b></p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<p><b>Table 3D: FMD testing in cattle, swine, and zoo animals 1997 – 2005</b></p>
<table><tbody><tr>	<td><p><b>Year</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Cattle</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Swine</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Sheep</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Goats</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Wild/Zoo animals</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Tested</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>Positive</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b></b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1997</p>
</td>	<td><p>8,508</p>
</td>	<td><p>1,225</p>
</td>	<td><p>735</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>2</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1998</p>
</td>	<td><p>7,565</p>
</td>	<td><p>44</p>
</td>	<td><p>4</p>
</td>	<td><p>2</p>
</td>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>0</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>1999</p>
</td>	<td><p>2,942</p>
</td>	<td><p>18</p>
</td>	<td><p>15</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>13</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2000</p>
</td>	<td><p>463</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>54</p>
</td>	<td><p>NP</p>
</td>	<td><p>NP</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>0</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2001</p>
</td>	<td><p>287</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>1</p>
</td>	<td><p>NP</p>
</td>	<td><p>NP</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>0</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2002</p>
</td>	<td><p>56</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>23</p>
</td>	<td><p>NP</p>
</td>	<td><p>NP</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>1</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2003</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>13</p>
</td>	<td><p>NP</p>
</td>	<td><p>NP</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>0</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p>2004</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>0</p>
</td>	<td><p>24</p>
</td>	<td><p>NP</p>
</td>	<td><p>NP</p>
</td>	<td><p><b>0</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>	<td><p><b>2005</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>0</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>0</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>4</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>NP</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>NP</b></p>
</td>	<td><p><b>0</b></p>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<h1>References</h1>
<p class="plain_Text">Alexandersen, S., Z. Zhang, et al. (2003). "The pathogenesis and diagnosis of foot-and-mouth disease." J Comp Pathol 129(1): 1-36.
</p>
<p>Anonymous (2004). Unpublished report. Lancaster University, United Kingdom.
</p>
<p>APHIS (1994). Foot-and-mouth disease: Sources of outbreaks and hazard categorization of modes of virus transmission. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health.
</p>
<p>APHIS (1995). Risk Assessment of the Practice of Feeding Recycled Commodities to Domesticated Swine in the U.S. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">APHIS (2000). Risk analysis for importation of classical swine fever virus in swine and swine products from the European Union. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services.
</p>
<p>APHIS (2001). Pathway assessment of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) risk to the United States: an evaluation in response to international FMD outbreaks in 2001. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">APHIS (2002). 2001 waste-feeder survey, Unpublished data. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">APHIS (2003). Proposed rule for importation of live swine, swine semen, and pork and pork products from certain regions within the European Union – Environmental assessment. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Policy and Program Development, Environmental Services.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">APHIS (2004a). APHIS risk considerations on importation of classical swine fever (CSF) virus in breeding swine, swine semen, and fresh pork from a European Union region of fifteen Member States. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export. September 2004.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">APHIS (2004b). APHIS site visit to Slovakia: Classical swine fever, swine vesicular disease, and foot and mouth disease evaluations. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Site visit conducted in November 2004.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">APHIS (2005). Notice of availability of a document concerning the identification of EU administrative units [Docket No. 04-081-2]. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Published July 29, 2005: 70 FR 43838-43839.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">APHIS (2006a). APHIS evaluation of the Czech Republic regarding classical swine fever and swine vesicular disease. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Dated January 2006.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">APHIS (2006b). Final rule: Importation of swine and swine products from the European Union [Docket 02-046-2]. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Published May 19, 2006: 71 FR 29061-29072.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">APHIS (2006c). APHIS evaluation of Poland regarding classical swine fever and swine vesicular disease.  U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Dated January 2006.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">APHIS  (2006d). Personal e-mail communications dated 22 December 2006.
</p>
<pre>APHIS 2007. Final rule: Importation of swine and swine products from the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland [Docket APHIS 2006-106]. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Published November 28, 2007: 72 FR 67227-27233. May 19, 2006: 71 FR 29061-29072. 
</pre>
<p>APHIS (2008). APHIS Risk Analysis on Importation of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Virus from Surrey County, England, in the United Kingdom. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export, Regionalization Evaluation Services. Dated March 2008. 
</p>
<p>APHIS (2008a). Change in Disease Status of Surrey County, England, Because of Foot-and-Mouth Disease [Docket No. APHIS-2007-0124]. Federal Register May 23, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 101).
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Artois, M., K. R. Depner, et al. (2002). "Classical swine fever (hog cholera) in wild boar in Europe." Rev Sci Tech OIE 21(2): 287-303.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Bachrach, H. L., S. S. Breese et al. (1957) “Inactivation of foot-and-mouth disease virus by pH and temperature changes and by formaldehyde.” Proc Soc Exper Bio Med 95: 147-52.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Barnett, P. V. and S. J. Cox (1999). "The role of small ruminants in the epidemiology and transmission of foot-and-mouth disease." Vet J 158(1): 6-13.
</p>
<p>Bates, T.W., T.E. Carpenter et al. (2003). “Benefit-cost analysis of vaccination and preemptive slaughter as a means of eradicating foot-and-mouth disease.” Am J Vet Res 64(7): 805-12.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Belsham, G. J. (1993). "Distinctive features of foot-and-mouth disease virus, a member of the picornavirus family; aspects of virus protein synthesis, protein processing and structure." Prog Biophys Mol Biol 60(3): 241-60.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Biagetti, M., I. Greiser-Wilke, et al. (2001). "Molecular epidemiology of classical swine fever in Italy." Vet Microbiol 83(3): 205-15.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Brocchio, E., S. Grazioli et al. (2002). Swine vesicular disease in Italy during 2002: epidemiological and diagnostic aspects. 2002 Session of the Research Group of the Standing Technical Committee of EUFMD. Izmir, Turkey. Appendix 7. 
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Burrows, R., J. A. Mann, et al. (1981). "The pathogenesis of natural and simulated natural foot-and-mouth disease infection in cattle." J Comp Pathol 91(4): 599-609.
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Coetzer J.A.W., G.R. Thomsen et al. (1994). Foot-and-mouth disease. <i>In </i>Infectious Disease of Livestock with Special Reference to Southern Africa. Coetzer, J.A.W., G.R. Thomsen et al. (Eds). Cape Town, Oxford University Press: 825-852.</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Commission Decision 1994/63/EC of 31 January 1994 drawing up a provisional list of third countries from which Member States authorize imports of semen, ova and embryos of the ovine, caprine and equine species, ova and embryos of the porcine species (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Directive 1997/78/EC of 18 December 1997 laying down the principles governing the organization of veterinary checks on products entering the Community from third countries (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 1997/365/EC of 26 March 1997 drawing up provisional lists of third country establishments from which the Member States authorize imports of products prepared from meat of bovine animals, swine, equidae and sheep and goats (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 1998/139/EC of 4 February 1998 laying down certain detailed rules concerning on-the-spot checks carried out in the veterinary field by Commission experts in the Member States.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 1999/608/EC of 10 September 1999 amending Annexes of Council Directive 90/429/EEC laying down the animal health requirements applicable to intra-Community trade in and imports of semen of domestic animals of the porcine species.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2000/208/EC of 24 February 2000 establishing detailed rules for the application of Council Directive 97/78/EC concerning the transit of products of animal origin from one third country to another third country by road only across the European Community.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2000/428/EC of 4 July 2000 establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for the evaluation of the results of laboratory tests for the confirmation and differential diagnosis of swine vesicular disease. 
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2000/678/EC of 23 October 2000 laying down detailed rules for registration of holding in national databases for porcine animals as foreseen by Council Directive 64/432/EEC.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2001/812/EC of 21 November 2001 laying down the requirements for the approval of border inspection posts responsible for veterinary checks on products introduced into the community from third countries (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2001/881/EC of 7 December 2001 drawing up a list of border inspection posts agreed for veterinary checks on animals and animal products from third countries and updating the detailed rules concerning the checks to be carried out by the experts of the Commission (as amended).</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2002/106/EC of 1 February 2002 approving a Diagnostic Manual establishing diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for evaluation of the laboratory tests for the confirmation of classical swine fever (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2002/349/EC of 26 April 2002 laying down the list of products to be examined at border inspection posts under Council Directive 97/78/EC (as amended).</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2002/613/EC of 19 July 2002 laying down the importation conditions of semen of domestic animals of the porcine species (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2003/526/EC of 18 July 2003 concerning protection measures relating to classical swine fever in Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2004/212/EC of 6 January 2004 on Community health conditions on imports of animals and fresh meat including minced meat from third countries and amending Decisions 79/542/EEC, 2000/572/EC and 2000/585/EC.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2004/375/EC of 20 April 2004 amending Decision 2003/526/EC as regards the inclusion of Slovakia amongst the Member States to which certain disease control measures apply with regard to classical swine fever.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2004/431/EC of 29 April 2004 approving certain contingency plans for the control of classical swine fever (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2004/625/EC of 26 August 2004 amending Decision 2003/526/EC as regards the termination of the classical swine fever control measures applied in Saarland, Germany, and the enlargement of the area of Slovakia where the classical swine fever control measures apply.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2004/639/EC of 6 September 2004 laying down the importation conditions of semen of domestic animals of the bovine species (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2004/831/EC of 3 December 2004 amending Decision 2003/526/EC as regards classical swine fever control measures in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany, and Slovakia.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2005/59/EC of 26 January 2005 approving the plans for the eradication of classical swine fever in feral pigs and the emergency vaccination of such pigs in Slovakia (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2005/225/EC of 14 march 2005 amending Decision 2003/526/EC as regards classical swine fever control measures in Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Slovakia.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2005/226/EC of 14 March 2005 amending Decision 2005/59/EC as regards areas where the plans for the eradication of classical swine fever in feral pigs and the emergency vaccination of feral pigs against classical swine fever are to be implemented in Slovakia. 
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2005/779/EC of 8 November 2005 concerning animal health protection measures against swine vesicular disease in Italy (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2005/946/EC of 23 December 2005 amending Decision 2003/526/EC as regards classical swine fever control measures in Germany and Slovakia.</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2006/20/EC of 23 December 2005 amending Decision 2005/59/EC as regards areas where the plan for the eradication of classical swine fever in feral pigs is to be implemented in Slovakia .
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2006/117/EC of 3 February 2006 amending Decisions 2001/881/EC and 2002/459/EC as regards the list of border inspection posts.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2006/168/EC of 4 January 2006 establishing the animal health and veterinary certification requirements for imports into the Community of bovine embryos and repealing Decision 2005/217/EC.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2006/779/EC of 14 November 2006 concerning transitional animal health control measures relating to classical swine fever in Romania.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2006/805/EC of 24 November 2006 concerning animal health control measures relating to classical swine fever in certain member states (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2007/275/EC of 17 April 2007 concerning lists of animals and products to be subject to controls at border inspection posts under Council Directives 91/496/EEC and 97/78/EC.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2007/554/EC of 9 August 2007 concerning certain protection measures against foot-and-mouth disease in the United Kingdom and repealing Decision 2007/552/EC (as amended). 
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2007/862/EC of 13 December 2007 amending Decision 2006/805/EC as regards animal health control measures relating to classical swine fever in Hungary and Slovakia.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2008/88/EC of 28 January 2008 amending Decision 2005/59/EC as regards areas where the plans for the eradication of classical swine fever in feral pigs and the emergency vaccination of feral pigs against classical swine fever are to be implemented in Slovakia.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2008/303/EC of 14 April 2008 concerning interim protection measures relating to classical swine fever in Slovakia (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2008/377/EC of 8 May 2008 concerning certain protection measures relating to classical swine fever in Slovakia. 
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2008/419/EC of 30 May 2008 amending Decision 2008/377/EC concerning certain protection measures related to classical swine fever in Slovakia. 
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2008/553/EC of 30 June 2008 repealing Decision 2008/377/EC concerning certain protection measures relating to classical swine fever in Slovakia.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2008/631/EC of 29 July 2008 amending Decision 2006/805/EC as regards certain Member State regions set out in the Annex and the extension of application of that Decision.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2008/636/EC of  22 July 2008 establishing the list of third countries from which member states authorise imports of  ova and embryos of the porcine species.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2008/686/EC of 20 August 2008 amending Decision 2005/59/EC as regards areas where the plans for the eradication of classical swine fever in feral pigs and the emergency vaccination of feral pigs against classical swine fever are to be implemented in Slovakia.
</p>
<p>Commission Decision 2008/725/EC of 27 June 2008 amending Annexes I and II to Council Decision 79/542/EC as regards certification requirements for imports into the Community of certain live ungulate animals and their fresh meat.
</p>
<p>Commission Directive 1991/496/EC of 15 July 1991 laying down the principles governing the organization of veterinary checks on animals entering the Community from third countries and amending Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC.
</p>
<p>Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2454/1993<b> </b>of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (as amended).
</p>
<p>Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1774/2002 of 3 October 2002 laying down health rules concerning animal by-products not intended for human consumption.</p>
<p>Commission Regulation (EC) No. 745/2004 of 16 April 2004 laying down measures with regard to imports of products of animals origin for personal consumption.
</p>
<p>Cottral, G. E. (1969). “Persistence of foot-and-mouth disease virus in animals, their products and the environment.” Bulletin OIE 70: 549-68.
</p>
<p>Council Decision 1979/542/EEC of 21 December 1976 drawing up a list of third countries or part of third countries, and laying down animal and public health and veterinary certification condition, for importation into the community of certain animals and their fresh meat (as amended).
</p>
<p>Council Decision 1990/424/EEC of 26 June 1990 on expenditures in the veterinary field (as amended).
</p>
<p>Council Directive 1964/432/EEC of 26 June 1964 on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine (as amended).Council Directive 92/119/EEC of 17 December 1992 introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease (as amended).
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Council Directive 1988/407/EEC of 14 June 1988 laying down the animal health requirements applicable to intra-Community trade in and imports of semen of domestic animals of the bovine species (as amended).
</p>
<p>Council Directive 1990/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market (as amended).
</p>
<p>Council Directive 1990/429/EEC laying down the animal health requirements applicable to intra-Community trade in and imports of semen of domestic animals of the porcine species (as amended).
</p>
<p>Council Directive 1991/496/EEC laying down the principles governing the organization of veterinary checks on animals entering<b> </b>the Community from third countries and amending Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC (as amended).
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Council Directive 1992/119/EC introducing general Community measures for the control of certain animal diseases and specific measures relating to swine vesicular disease (as amended).
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Council Directive 1997/78/EC of 18 December 1997 laying down the principles governing the organization of veterinary checks on products entering the Community from third countries (as amended).
</p>
<p class="plain_Text">Council Directive 2001/89/EC of23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever (as amended).
</p>
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<p>� Regions listed under 9 CFR 94.13 are in a special category because, even though APHIS has determined that the region is free of SVD, one or more of the following conditions occur: (1) the region supplements its national pork supply with fresh, chilled, or frozen pork from regions that are not designated in 94.12 as free of SVD; (2) it shares a common land border with regions that are not considered to be free of SVD; or (3) it has trade practices that are less restrictive than are acceptable to the United States. The text of 9 CFR 94.13 is provided in Annex 1.
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<p>� Regions listed under 9 CFR 94.25 are in a special category, because even though APHIS has determined  that the region is free of CSF, one or more of the following conditions occur: (1) the region supplements their national pork supply with fresh, chilled, or frozen pork from regions that are not designated in 9 CFR 94.9 and 9 CFR 94.10  as free of CSF; (2) the region supplements their national pork supplies with pork from CSF affected regions that is not processed in accordance with 9CFR Part 94.17; (3) they share a common land border with CSF-affected regions; or (4) they import live swine from CSF-affected regions under conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into the United States. The text of 9 CFR 94.25 is provided in Annex 1.
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<p>�Regions listed under 9 CFR 94.11 are in a special category for FMD because, even though APHIS has determined that the region is free of FMD, one or more of the following conditions occur: (1) the region supplements their national meat supply through the importation of meat from ruminants or swine from regions that are not designated in 9 CFR 94.1 as free of FMD; (2) they share a common land border with regions that are not designated as free of FMD; or (3) they import ruminants or swine from regions that are not designated as free of FMD under conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for importation into the United States. The text of 9 CFR 94.11 is provided in Annex 1.
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<p>� 9 CFR 94.24 restricts the sourcing of pork, pork products, and breeding swine to regions where CSF has not been known to exist, and prohibits commingling with such commodities from CSF-affected regions. The text of this regulation is provided in Annex 1.
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<p>� 9 CFR 98.38 restricts the source of imported swine semen to boars in approved collection centers that have not lived in CSF-affected regions or commingled with other swine from such regions, and stipulates certain isolation, observation, and transportation requirements. The text of this regulation is provided in Annex 1.
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