In the Missouri Court of Appeals 

Eastern District 

DIVISION FOUR 

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED102088 

 ) 

Plaintiff/Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

) of the City of St. Louis 

v. ) 

 ) 

DRANEL CLARK, ) Honorable Thomas Frawley 

 ) 

 Defendant/Appellant. ) Filed: February 23, 2016 

Introduction 

Dranel Clark (Appellant) appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered after a 

jury trial convicting him of assault in the second degree, armed criminal action, and 

resisting arrest. We affirm. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

The State charged Appellant, as a prior offender, with assault in the first degree 

(Count I), armed criminal action (Count II), attempted robbery (Count III), armed 

criminal action (Count IV), unlawful use of a weapon (Count V), and resisting arrest 

(Count VI). The evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

verdict, is as follows. 

In October 2011, Edward White (White) worked at a bar doing odd jobs. At 

approximately 10 p.m. on October 1, 2011, White left the bar and walked to a check 

cashing place about two blocks away to get change for the bar. On his way there, White 
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saw a group of young men on the street that made him nervous. After getting about $200 

in change, White left the check cashing place and crossed the street to avoid the group of 

men he had seen earlier. 

As he crossed the street, Appellant started walking, and then running, toward him. 

White was walking through a White Castle parking lot when Appellant caught him and 

tried to push him into a car. White resisted. 

Appellant put a gun to White’s head and told him to “up it” which White believed 

meant to give Appellant the money. Appellant put the gun to White’s temple and pulled 

the trigger but White “ducked real quick” and the bullet missed him. White struggled 

with Appellant and Appellant shot again, this time grazing the back of White’s head. 

Appellant fired a third shot, but the gun jammed. Appellant then began hitting White in 

the back of the head with the gun. 

Officer Aaron Quarles (Quarles) was driving in his patrol car when he heard a 

gunshot at the White Castle approximately 100 feet away. Quarles saw two people 

fighting and a muzzle flash, then heard another gunshot. Quarles pulled into the lot and 

saw Appellant beating White. When Quarles told Appellant to stop, Appellant looked at 

him and ran away. Quarles pursued Appellant in his vehicle, with the lights and siren 

activated. Quarles saw the magazine fall out of the gun Appellant was carrying and then 

saw Appellant throw the gun. Once Appellant threw the gun, Quarles exited his vehicle 

and pursued Appellant on foot. Quarles ordered Appellant to stop but Appellant 

continued to run until Quarles drew his firearm. Appellant then stopped and put his 

hands up. When Quarles holstered his weapon, Appellant turned toward Quarles and 

assumed a “fighting stance.” Quarles took out his baton and, while attempting to strike 
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Appellant’s arm, hit Appellant in the head as Appellant bent over. Appellant then 

complied with Quarles’ orders and was placed under arrest. 

After the altercation, White returned to the bar where someone called the police. 

White received stitches for lacerations on the side of his head and over his right eye. 

 The jury found Appellant guilty of the lesser-included offense of second-degree 

assault (Count I), armed criminal action (Count II), unlawful use of a weapon (Count V), 

and resisting arrest (Count VI). The trial court sentenced Appellant to seven years for 

second-degree assault, three years for armed criminal action, and four years each for 

unlawful use of a weapon and resisting arrest. The court ordered the sentences to run 

concurrently except the three-year sentence for armed criminal action, which was ordered 

to run consecutively to the assault charge, for a total sentence of ten years. Following 

sentencing, the trial court vacated the conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by 

agreement of the parties. This appeal follows. 

Points on Appeal 

 In his first point, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 

grant a mistrial because the jury panel saw Appellant in restraints, without good cause, 

which made Appellant appear to be dangerous and destroyed the presumption of 

innocence to which he was entitled. 

 In his second point, Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

limiting Appellant’s defense by allowing the State to redact pages of White’s medical 

records admitted into evidence which contained the results of blood tests performed on 

White because the positive alcohol and cocaine blood test results were relevant and 
4

admissible evidence and corroborated Appellant’s defense that White was intoxicated and 

attacked Appellant. 

 In his third point, Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in 

submitting Jury Instruction 6 for assault in the second degree, in that Appellant was not 

assured a unanimous verdict because the submitted instruction did not specify the 

“assault” charged and did not ensure the jury would unanimously convict Appellant of 

the same conduct, in that it was a disputed fact at trial whether Appellant shot at or struck 

White. 

Discussion 

Point I − Restraints 

 Before jury selection began, the court sent the venire panel to lunch. After 

addressing several pretrial matters, the court told the deputies that if any jurors were in 

the courtroom following the lunch break, the deputies should allow Appellant to walk 

into the courtroom ahead of them so it would not appear that they were escorting him into 

the room. After the lunch recess, defense counsel advised the court the deputies may 

have escorted Appellant into the courtroom in front of the jurors: 

 [Defense Counsel]: Judge, it’s been brought to my attention they 

may have walked my client in in front of everybody. I wasn’t here so I 

don’t know. 

 The Court: I told them specifically how to do it before I left. 

 [Defense Counsel]: I wasn’t here. 

 The Court: I wasn’t specifically in the room, but I told them how to 

do it and I trust my deputies to do what I tell them to do. 

 [Defense Counsel]: Okay. I guess I don’t know how it was done, 

I’m just going by what he’s telling me, they walked in side by side with 

him. If that is the case I would request a mistrial at this point. 

 [Prosecutor]: I wasn’t here. I do know the court was very specific 

in the court’s instruction. I do know those deputies well, I would be 

shocked if it is anything other than what the court instructed them to do. 

 The Court: Your request is denied. 
5

On appeal, Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to grant his request 

for a mistrial because he was denied his rights to due process of law and a fair trial before 

an impartial jury, in that the venire panel knew Appellant was incarcerated and Appellant 

appeared in restraints without good cause, destroying the presumption of innocence to 

which he was entitled. 

Granting a mistrial is a drastic remedy employed only in the most extraordinary 

circumstances. State v. Whitt, 461 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015). The trial court 

is in the best position to determine whether a mistrial is appropriate. Id. We review the 

denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. Id. 

Here, nothing in the record supports Appellant’s position on appeal that he 

appeared before the venire panel in restraints. The trial court record indicates only the 

possibility that the deputies walked into the courtroom “side by side” with Appellant. 

Appellant’s suggestion on appeal that he was shackled, or even possibly shackled, before 

the venire panel is completely unsupported by the record. Furthermore, uniformed 

officers escorting a defendant into the courtroom does not imply restraint and the use of 

identifiable security guards in the courtroom is not inherently prejudicial. State v. 

Vaughn, 271 S.W.3d 632, 633 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008). Appellant’s Point I is denied. 

Point II – Redaction of Medical Records 

 

At trial, White testified he drank two to three beers on the night of the assault. 

White denied having five or six beers or being intoxicated. White’s boss also testified 

White did not appear to be intoxicated. During cross-examination, defense counsel 

proceeded to question White about his drug use: 
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[Defense Counsel]: ...Now we talked about alcohol. Were you 

under the influence of any drugs that night? 

A. No, man, I don’t use no drugs. 

Q. So you weren’t using any drugs around that time period? 

A. No. 

 During a sidebar, the State argued the defense’s questioning regarding drug use 

was an attempt to introduce irrelevant testimony regarding prior bad acts. A discussion 

ensued about hospital records showing White had “tested positive” for cocaine on the 

night of the assault. Defense counsel argued White’s denial of drug use “around that time 

period” was a lie. The prosecutor argued it was unclear from the medical records when 

the cocaine was ingested. Defense counsel stated he was “fine” with White’s answer. 

 Before the defense’s case-in-chief, defense counsel advised the court he was 

going to introduce White’s hospital records into evidence under a business-records 

affidavit. The prosecutor indicated she had no objection to their admission but would 

object to those portions “including prior bad conduct like we discussed, the cocaine 

amount.” At the conclusion of Appellant’s case, defense counsel moved to admit the 

records. The prosecutor did not object to admission of the records as long as certain 

portions were redacted in the event the records were sent to the jury during deliberations. 

 During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court requesting White’s hospital 

records. The prosecutor objected to the inclusion of White’s alcohol and drug testing 

results. Defense counsel argued the records should be provided to the jury without 

redaction because they dispute White’s testimony that he was not using drugs “around 

that time period.” The court redacted the records as requested by the State before 

submitting them to the jury for consideration. 
7

 On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion redacting the 

blood alcohol and drug testing results from White’s medical records because the positive 

alcohol and cocaine blood test results were relevant and admissible evidence as they 

served to impeach White’s testimony, corroborated Appellant’s testimony that White was 

intoxicated and attacked Appellant, and went to the issue of whether White accurately 

recalled the incident. 

The trial court has broad discretion when ruling on the admission or exclusion of 

evidence at trial, and this Court will not disturb the court’s ruling absent a showing of an 

abuse of that discretion. State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Mo. banc 2007). “[T]hat 

discretion is abused when a ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is 

so unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration.” Id. We will reverse on 

claims of error in the admission or exclusion of evidence only if the error was so 

prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id. “Trial court error is not 

prejudicial unless there is a reasonable probability that the trial court’s error affected the 

outcome of the trial.” Id. at 145-46. 

 With regard to White’s blood alcohol, the test revealed White had an ethanol level 

of 176.0 milligrams per deciliter at 11:10 p.m. on the night of the assault. A section titled 

“Interpretive Data” in the comment section indicates that “[i]f ethanol is the only drug 

taken, the blood level can be roughly correlated with the clinical findings:...100-200 

mg/dL Emotional instability[,] 150-200 mg/dL Confusion...” 

The drug testing records of White’s urine screen showed a “Value” of “confirmed 

positive” for “cocaine metabolite” but the “Ref. Range” was “None Detected.” The 

result also indicated a “Flag” of “A” and a “Status” of “C” but the records provided no 
8

information as to the meaning of the “Flag” or “Status.” The records subsequently stated 

the “Value” for cocaine metabolite to be “Presumptive.” Under “Interpretive Data” in the 

comments section, the records stated the “Immunoassay Screen cutoff level 150 ng/mL. 

Drug results are to be used only for medical purposes. All results, especially 

unconfirmed screening results, must not be used for non[-]medical purposes.” 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in redacting White’s medical records 

prior to submitting them to the jury. The meaning and implication of the alcohol and 

drug testing records were unclear without the assistance of expert testimony to explain 

the results. It is unknown what is meant by a positive result for cocaine metabolite 

without a detected range. There is no evidence as to when White may have consumed the 

drugs and, therefore, the test results do not impeach White’s testimony that he did not 

consume drugs on the night of the assault or “around that time period.” 

 There is no evidence that White’s ethanol level of 176.0 milligrams per deciliter 

would impeach White’s testimony that he consumed two to three beers and was not 

intoxicated on the night of the assault. Nor is there any evidence explaining the effect 

this amount of ethanol in White’s blood would have had on White. Based on the 

foregoing, Appellant’s Point II is denied. 

Point III – Second-Degree Assault Instruction 

At trial, the jury was instructed on the charged offense of first-degree assault in 

Instruction 5 and on the lesser-included offense of second-degree assault in Instruction 6. 

These instructions provided in relevant part as follows: 

Instruction 5 

As to Count I, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a 

reasonable doubt: 
9

That on or about October 1, 2011, in the City of St. Louis, State of 

Missouri, the defendant attempted to kill or cause serious physical injury 

to Edward White by shooting at him and striking him with a gun, then you 

will find the defendant guilty under Count I of assault in the first degree. 

However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a 

reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the 

defendant not guilty of that offense. 

... 

Instruction 6 

As to Count I, if you do not find the defendant guilty of assault in 

the first degree as submitted in Instruction No. 5, you must consider 

whether he is guilty of assault in the second degree. 

As to Count I, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a 

reasonable doubt: 

That on or about October 1, 2011, in the City of St. Louis, State of 

Missouri, the defendant attempted to cause physical injury to Edward 

White by means of a deadly weapon by shooting at him and striking him 

with a gun, then you will find the defendant guilty under Count I of assault 

in the second degree 

However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a 

reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the 

defendant not guilty of that offense. 

... 

Defense counsel objected to Instruction 6 at trial, contending the jury may convict 

Appellant of second-degree assault based on a finding Appellant either shot at or struck 

White. The trial court rejected Appellant’s objection, noting both instructions required 

finding Appellant both shot at and struck the victim. 

On appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in submitting 

Jury Instruction 6 for assault in the second degree, in that Appellant was not assured a 

unanimous verdict because the instruction did not specify the assault charged and did not 

ensure that the jury would unanimously convict Appellant of the same conduct. 
10

The submission of or refusal to submit a tendered jury instruction is within the 

trial court’s discretion. State v. Davis, 203 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006). On 

appeal, we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of that discretion. Id. 

Again, Appellant’s point on appeal is completely unsupported by the record. 

Appellant attempts to liken this case to State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 152 (Mo. 

banc. 2011), involving instructions as to seven separate incidents of statutory sodomy 

which failed to differentiate the various acts in a way that ensured the jury unanimously 

convicted the defendant of the same act or acts. The case sub judice is distinguishable, in 

that Appellant was charged with one count of assault that occurred in one place at one 

specific time. 

Instruction 6 clearly required the jury to find Appellant attempted to injure White 

by “means of a deadly weapon by shooting at him and striking him with a gun” in order 

to find him guilty of second-degree assault. (Emphasis added). Jurors are presumed to 

follow the instructions provided. State v. Dominguez-Rodriguez, 471 S.W.3d 337, 344 

(Mo. App. E.D. 2015). As such, this Court presumes the jury did not deviate from the 

clearly worded instruction and, instead, presumes the jury found Appellant both shot at 

and struck White with a gun in convicting him of second-degree assault. Contrary to 

Appellant’s contentions otherwise, nothing in the record indicates the jury did not come 

to a unanimous decision with regard to the criminal conduct supporting the conviction. 

Notably, Instruction 6 effectively increased the State’s burden by requiring the jury to 

find Appellant committed both acts in order to convict Appellant of second-degree 

assault. See State v. Edwards, 365 S.W.3d 240, 249 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)(submission 

of verdict director requiring the jury to find two distinct acts of sodomy where one alone 
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