NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY

JULY 26, 1997

JULY 26, 2010

In commemoration ofthe

20th anniversary ofthe ADA
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

The Making of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

Copyright © 1997, 2010 by the National Council on Disability 

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 

REISSUED 2010 

Publication date: July 26, 1997 

National Council on Disability 

1331 F Street, N.W. 

Suite 1050 

Washington, D.C. 20004-1107 

(202) 272-2004 Voice 

(202) 272-2074 TTY 

(202) 272-2022 Fax 

This work was prepared under contract with the National Rehabilitation Hospital 

Research Center, Medlantic Research Institute, and was written by Jonathan M. 

Young. 

The views contained in this report do not necessarily represent those of the 

Administration, as this document has not been subjected to the A-19 Executive 

Branch review process.
DEDICATION 

For people with disabilities throughout the nation whose 

pursuit of liberty and justice made the ADA a reality. 

For those who have since passed away. 

For those who join the cause of disability rights. 
 
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY MEMBERS

PAST AND PRESENT

Linda W. Allison 

Glenn Anderson, Ph.D., Second Vice Chairperson

Yerker Andersson, Ph.D. 

Milton Aponte, J.D. 

Gary Blumenthal 

Ellis B. Bodron 

H. Latham Breunig, Ph.D. 

Marca Bristo, Chairperson

Dave N. Brown 

Larry Brown, Jr. 

Robert V. Bush 

Victoria Ray Carlson 

Chad Colley, Vice Chairperson

Mary Ann Mobley Collins 

Edward Correia 

Justin Dart, Jr., Vice Chairperson

Robert R. Davila, Ph.D. 

Joe S. Dusenbury, Chairperson

John S. Erthein 

Chester A. Finn 

Anthony H. Flack 

Lex Frieden, Chairperson

John A. Gannon, Acting Chairperson

 Theresa L. Gardner 

Sara Gelser 

Barbara Gillcrist 

R. Budd Gould 

Margaret C. Hager 

Hunt Hamill, Vice Chairperson

Graham Hill 

Marylyn Howe 

Joel I. Kahn, Ph.D. 

Young Woo Kang, Ph.D. 

John D. Kemp 

Marian N. Koonce 

Carmine Lavieri 
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY MEMBERS

PAST AND PRESENT (CONTINUED) 

Leslie Lenkowsky, Ph.D. 

John Leopold 

Nanette Fabray MacDougall 

Michael Marge, Ed.D. 

Kathleen Martinez 

Lisa Mattheiss 

Heather McCallum 

Katherine O. McCary 

Audrey McCrimon 

Gina McDonald 

Lonnie Moore 

Robert S. Muller 

Carol Novak 

George H. Oberle, P.E.D. 

Bonnie O’Day, Ph.D. 

Dongwoo Joseph “Joe” Pak 

Patricia Pound, Vice Chairperson

Brenda Premo 

Anne M. Rader 

Mary M. Raether 

Lilliam Rangel-Diaz 

Carol Reynolds 

Debra L. Robinson 

Marco Rodriguez 

Shirley W. Ryan 

Gerald S. Segal 

Ann C. Seggerman 

Harry J. Sutcliffe, D.D. 

Joni Eareckson Tada 

Fernando Torres-Gil, Ph.D., Vice Chair 

Michael B. Unhjem 

Rae Unzicker 

John R. Vaughn, Chairperson

Roxanne S. Vierra 

Henry Viscardi, Jr. 
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY MEMBERS

PAST AND PRESENT (CONTINUED) 

Cynthia Wainscott 

Kent Waldrep, Jr., Vice Chairperson

Hughey Walker, Vice Chairperson

Helen W. Walsh 

David Wenzel 

Linda Wetters, Vice Chair

Tony Williams 

Kate P. Wolters, Vice Chairperson

Ela Yazzie-King 

Jonathan M. Young, Ph.D., J.D., Chairman

Phyllis Zlotnick 

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY STAFF

PAST AND PRESENT

Andrew I. Batavia, Executive Director 

Frederick D. Bedell, Acting Executive Director

Betty Jo Berland, Research Specialist (on detail) 

Kathleen A. Blank, Program Specialist

Brenda Bratton, Executive Assistant

Ethel D. Briggs, Executive Director 

Stacey S. Brown, Staff Assistant

Robert Burgdorf, Jr., Research Specialist

Edward P. Burke, Acting Executive Director

Christopher Button, Special Assistant (on detail)

Julie Carroll, Senior Attorney Advisor

Michael C. Collins, Executive Director 

Frances D. Curtis, Administrative Officer

Speed Davis, Acting Executive Director

John A. Doyle, Acting Executive Director

Joan M. Durocher, Executive Director 

Andrea H. Farbman, Public Affairs Specialist

Lex Frieden, Executive Director

Marilynne Gisin, Executive Assistant 

Martin Gould, Ed.D., Director of Research and Technology 

Sharon M. Lisa Grubb, Coordinator of Administration

Geraldine Drake Hawkins, Ph.D., Senior Program Analyst 

Paul G. Hearne, Executive Director

Harvey S. Hirschi, Executive Director

Allan W. Holland, Accountant

Andrew J. Imparato, General Counsel and Director of Policy

Kathleen Roy Johnson, Children’s Specialist

Naomi Karp, Children’s Services Specialist (on detail)

Lois T. Keck, Ph.D., Research Specialist

Billie Jean Keith, Program Specialist

Fred Krause, Special Assistant to the Chairperson (on detail)

Pat Laird, Staff Assistant

Ramona Lessen, Executive Assistant

Janice Mack, Administrative Officer

Jamal Mazrui, Program Specialist

Carla Nelson, Administrative Specialist
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY STAFF

PAST AND PRESENT (CONTINUED) 

Pamela O’Leary, Interpreter

Mark S. Quigley, Director of Communications

Jeffrey T. Rosen, General Counsel and Director of Policy

Katherine Seelman, Ph.D., Research Specialist

Moira Shea, Senior Legislative and Economic Advisor (on detail)

Anne C. Sommers, Legislative Affairs Specialist

Harold W. Snider, Deputy Director

Norman Subotnik, Special Assistant (on detail)

Deborah Shuck, Staff Assistant

Joyce Turner, Secretary

B. E. Villanueva, Administrative Officer

Lorraine Williams, Student Assistant
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The National Council on Disability (NCD) is indebted to the National 

Rehabilitation Hospital (NRH) Research Center for this historical account. 

Jonathan M. Young, a Ph.D. candidate in American history at the University of North 

Carolina at Chapel Hill and Project Director for the NRH Research Center, conducted 

in-depth research, interviewed many key participants in the ADA’s passage, and 

authored the manuscript. Gerben DeJong, Ph.D., Director of the NRH Research 

Center, provided overall guidance and advice in addition to reviewing the document. 

With the support of Dr. DeJong and Karen Behe, Ruth Brannon initiated this project 

for the NRH Research Center, conducted oral interviews, and collected many 

documents, which culminated in the development of an annotated outline in 1995. 

Between 1990 and 1992, prior contractors, including Alexander Vachon, began work 

on a history of the ADA, conducted selected interviews, and collected materials for 

NCD, portions of which were made available for this project. 

The Civil Rights Committee of the National Council on Disability 

coordinated the development of this project: John Kemp, Chairman; Hughey Walker, 

Vice-chairman; Lilliam Rangel Pollo; Rae Unzicker; Marca Bristo, ex officio; and 

Kate Pew Wolters, ex officio. NCD Chairperson Marca Bristo reviewed multiple 

iterations of the manuscript and contributed significantly to its development. Billie 

Jean Keith was the NCD staff person to the Civil Rights Committee and followed the 

manuscript from beginning to end. Mark Quigley, NCD Public Affairs Specialist, 

coordinated publication of the manuscript. 

Staff at the NRH Research Center assisted in the general development of the 

project. Special recognition goes to Rachel Halpern and Ben Wheatley, who helped 

edit the manuscript, as well as to Phillip Beatty, Olga Elizabeth Hayes, Barbara 

Maloney-Darbeau, Lee Ann McNnerey, Georgette LaFayette Smith, and Sabrina 

Smith. Kathy Butler and Antonio de Guzman, at the NRH Research Center Library, 

were invaluable resources for research. In addition, George Koch provided important 

access to the law library of his firm, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart. Staff at the House and 

Senate Libraries and Parliamentarian’s offices were indispensable sources of 

information. Frank Young, Leanne Young, and Bob Atwood provided essential 

editorial assistance. Personal interviews were transcribed by Ann Rand of Medical 

Dictation Services, Inc. Mary Flannery designed the cover. 

Numerous individuals provided invaluable feedback on the complete 

manuscript or parts of it: Yerker Andersson, Ruth Brannon, Maria Cuprill, Lex 

Frieden, Paul Hearne, Mark Johnson, Evan Kemp, Chris Lord, Marla Miller, Phyllis 

Rubenfeld, Liz Savage, Melissa Schulman, Robert Silverstein, Roger Slagle, Roland 

Sykes, and Pat Wright. The manuscript is stronger and more accurate because of their 

comments. 
Special thanks go to the 54 individuals who gave their time and insight in 

personal and correspondence interviews as sources for this historical account: they are 

listed in Appendix A. Many of these interviewees also provided access to their 

personal papers and made themselves available for follow-up fact-checking. Without 

them this history would have been impossible. 
CONTENTS

Foreword, July 26, 2010 .............................................................................................. xi

Foreword, July 26, 1997 ............................................................................................. xv

Executive Summary ................................................................................................... xix

1 Laying the Foundation: Disability Policy & Activism, 1968–1988 ....................... 5

2 Putting the ADA on the Legislative Agenda: The National Council on 

Disability .............................................................................................................. 39

3 Publicizing the ADA: Advocacy and the Government Response ....................... 57

4 Creating a Workable ADA: The Senate and the White House ............................. 77

5 Fashioning a Durable ADA: The House of Representatives ............................. 101

6 Enshrining the ADA: House-Senate Conference and the Signing ..................... 135

Epilogue .................................................................................................................... 149

Glossary of Acronyms .............................................................................................. 157

Appendix A: List of Interviews ................................................................................ 159

Notes ......................................................................................................................... 163

FOREWORD, JULY 26, 2010 

On behalf of the National Council on Disability (NCD), I am pleased to release this 

FOREWORD, JULY 26, 2010 

reprint of Equality of Opportunity: The Making of the Americans with Disabilities 

Act. As we convene NCD’s National Summit on Disability Policy 2010 and explore the 

current state of Living, Learning, and Earning for people with disabilities, Equality of 

Opportunity reminds us of our past and urges us to press on with renewed and united 

sense of purpose to deliver on the ADA’s legacy, hope, and promise. 

There is a personal dimension to this history of the ADA. My experience as the 

original author of the manuscript made it possible for me to write now as Chairman of 

NCD. In 1996, when I began my work on the history of the ADA, I was a doctoral 

candidate in American history specializing in 19th-century American intellectual and 

cultural history and writing a dissertation on the slavery debates. I was a person with a 

disability, having broken my neck in a high school wrestling match and living with 

partial paralysis. But I did not identify as a person with a disability and I did not view 

myself as part of a disability community. To me, disability was the enemy. I wanted to 

pass for “normal” as best I could. I had internalized social stigma about disability. 

In 1996—ten years after my original spinal cord injury—I had also spiraled 

downward into depression and gave serious thought to dropping out of my Ph.D. 

program. Writing a history of the ADA on a contract with NCD was not the lowstress opportunity I was looking for, and I decided to do the project with substantial 

doubt about my ability to complete it. However, through writing the ADA’s history, 

my life was transformed. 

I had only been vaguely aware of the ADA when it passed in 1990—probably 

much like most of the 43 million people identified in the ADA’s findings who similarly 

lacked identity as a person with a disability and thus took little note of the ADA’s 

passage. However, researching the history of the ADA, and particularly interviewing 

many of the people who made the ADA’s enactment possible, made me rethink the 

meaning of disability and my own identity. I was riveted by the story of how the ADA 

came into existence and the gravity of the change wrought through the ADA. My 

preconception that disability was a debilitating weakness, an enemy to be overcome, ran 

headlong into the life stories of disability rights advocates whose power and pride both 

individually and collectively laid the foundation for passage of the ADA. 

By the time NCD released Equality of Opportunity on July 26, 1997, I had 

begun to view myself as a person with a disability and as part of the disability 

community. I had also emerged from a deep depression and regained my selfconfidence—no doubt largely because my inability to embrace my identity as a person 

with a disability had contributed to my depression. In retrospect, the closing line of 

Equality of Opportunity—“The dawn of a new day”—was as much about the impact 

of the ADA on my life as the ADA itself. Identity as a person with a disability was 

liberating rather than stigmatizing. It gave my life new purpose and meaning. 
xii FOREWORD, JULY 26, 2010 

This personal story is part and parcel of the ADA’s significance in our 

society. The ADA is a nondiscrimination law. But, much more than that, it is a 

clarion call for transforming attitudes about disability. The ADA proclaims that all 

people, including people with disabilities, should participate fully in all aspects of our 

communities and have opportunities to take risks, to succeed, and—yes—to fail. 

Equality of opportunity means having a chance to live independently and become 

financially secure, but it is not a guarantee. 

Understanding the history of the ADA is every bit as important as when 

Equality of Opportunity was first published in 1997. Arguably, the urgency is even 

greater now. Achieving equality of opportunity for people with disabilities depends in 

large measure on individual transformative experiences like the one I had through 

writing the history of the ADA. I thus hope that this reprint of Equality of 

Opportunity enables more people to understand the ADA and the outmoded structural 

and attitudinal barriers it was meant to tear down. 

When NCD first published this history, the ADA was still relatively young. 

Hope abounded. Some of the provisions, such as rules for over-the-road buses, had 

yet to be finalized. Other provisions, such as the definition of disability and scope of 

access to public accommodations, had yet to be fully tested in the courts. Equality of 

Opportunity was published amidst what proved to be the longest period of peacetime 

economic growth in our nation’s history. To help mark a point in time, 1997 was also 

the year that the now-ubiquitous Google first got its name, though the company 

bearing its name would still not be incorporated for another year. 

Times have changed. We celebrate the 20th Anniversary of the ADA well 

after civil rights provisions have been implemented in regulations, tested in court, and 

even amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008. We 

also celebrate amidst our nation’s worst economic downturn since the Great 

Depression. Unemployment is high. People are losing their homes. Access to health 

care remains elusive. And that is before we begin talking about the individual 

experiences of millions of people with disabilities, for whom the economic downturn 

only compounds longstanding disparities in living, learning, and earning. 

Unfortunately, the challenges that we face together as a nation are 

compounded by partisan strife. Although vitriol is no stranger to the history of 

American politics, something is sorely missing today—the genuine and widespread 

willingness to set aside ideology to pursue pragmatic solutions that make critical 

differences in the lives of real people. The explosion in access to 24-hour Internetbased communications exacerbates this trend, even though information technologies 

and other technologies have provided new levels of access for people with disabilities. 

Despite the fast-paced and daunting world we inhabit, tangible marks of the 

ADA’s success surround us—not just regarding the ADA’s specific nondiscrimination 

provisions but symbolically as well. The ADA is the disability community’s standard 

bearer for the disability policy goals of equality of opportunity, full participation, 

independent living, and economic self-sufficiency. Some of the ADA’s impact has 

been increasingly felt with the march of time as requirements for new and renovated 
 FOREWORD, JULY 26, 2010 xiii 

construction create more livable communities, with physical and telecommunications 

infrastructures becoming more accessible and usable by more people with disabilities. 

In other cases we see the symbolic victory of the ADA as people with disabilities 

assume prominent positions of leadership in government, business, and our 

communities and more children grow up embracing disability as a natural part of the 

human experience. But we also know that problems abound, and the hard work of 

delivering on the ADA’s promise still lies in front of us. 

The ADA truly was “a watershed public policy,” as Marca Bristo and Gerben 

DeJong wrote in the original Foreword, and the ADA’s history still has much to teach 

us today. “Passage of the ADA is a story of political leaders on both sides of the aisle 

who put aside personal and partisan differences to do what they thought was the right 

thing to do,” states the original Foreword, and kept the ADA from falling victim to a 

venomous public debate. There is a long record of bipartisan achievements on

disability issues—the ADA chief among them. Recounting the history of the ADA is 

therefore an opportunity to remind ourselves of the potential for disability issues to 

help build bridges across partisan divides. Bipartisan collaboration will not be easy in 

the current environment, but the future of effective disability policy depends on it. 

The ADA’s history also provides a sober reminder to the disability 

community about the challenges of and need for cross-community collaboration. The 

ADA was a unique moment in disability history where diverse individuals and 

organizations rallied around a common cause. In doing so they showed the power of 

shared goals and coordinated action. Nevertheless, the years since enactment of the 

ADA have restored in large measure the longer tradition of a splintered community 

with myriad—and sometimes competing—priorities. The disability community is 

anything but homogenous. It is difficult to find a common ground of policy issues 

that are equally viewed as priorities for different types of disabilities and for discreet 

policy areas. The ADA reminds us that there is a profound strength that comes in 

unity of numbers and purpose. 

Passage of the ADA also indicates that coordination is both possible and 

necessary to remedy longstanding barriers. Passage of the ADA required separate 

review, analysis and coordination of multiple House and Senate committees, as well 

as support from the White House and executive agencies. It also required 

coordination among various stakeholders, including with various business groups—

even if such coordination was far from harmonious. Many of the barriers to 

advancing the ADA’s disability policy goals revolve around breakdowns in 

coordination—among federal agencies, across all levels of government, and among 

various stakeholders. The success of the ADA was never a foregone conclusion any 

more than solving many difficult disability policy issues is today. But enactment of 

the ADA reminds us that coordination is possible even if often overwhelming. 

I am proud to have an opportunity to join my fellow Council Members and 

NCD staff in continuing NCD’s proud legacy, particularly in light of the extraordinary 

role NCD played in my personal life through writing the ADA’s history. NCD’s 

identity is closely intertwined with the ADA’s history. NCD began as a small 
xiv FOREWORD, JULY 26, 2010 

advisory body within the Department of Education. In 1984 Congress made NCD an 

independent agency and charged it with a new mandate to review all federal policies 

and programs. Two years later, NCD delivered on that charge with its pathbreaking 

report, Toward Independence, which called for enactment of the ADA. NCD later 

helped rally the disability community around the ADA when NCD offered the first 

draft in 1988. After the ADA was signed into law, NCD’s mission was amended to 

reflect the national disability policy goals now enshrined in the ADA. 

NCD now serves a unique role among federal agencies because its mission 

reflects the breadth and diversity of the disability community itself. Achieving this 

mission requires bipartisan collaboration among diverse stakeholders. NCD will 

continue to seek common ground and help to identify priority issues for a diverse 

community that can make critical differences in the lives of millions of people with 

disabilities. In the spirit of bipartisan collaboration, with this reprint NCD is 

publishing a list not merely of NCD’s current Members and staff but a list of all 

known Members and staff past and present. NCD’s role in helping to give life to the 

ADA and to preserve and strengthen the cause of the ADA has depended on the 

contributions of all of NCD’s Members and staff. 

Of course, none of NCD’s work would be possible without the continued 

feedback and support of the disability community and other stakeholders. NCD’s 

National Summit on Disability Policy 2010 is an opportunity to build on NCD’s 

history of community engagement and to continue the difficult challenges of making 

the principles of the ADA a genuine reflection of opportunities in our communities. 

The Acknowledgments are the original acknowledgments from 1997. Since 

that original publication I had the good fortune to marry Nellie Wild and become the 

proud father of three beautiful daughters, Bella, Katie, and Julia. I am grateful for all 

of the ways my family makes me a better person, and reminds me about what matters 

most in life. I am also pleased that the ADA and my own experiences as a person 

with a disability enrich my family’s life. 

I also want to express my gratitude to Marca Bristo, then the Chairperson of 

NCD, and Gerben DeJong, then the Director of the National Rehabilitation Hospital 

Research Center, under whose contract I wrote the manuscript. They took a risk in 

entrusting me with writing the history of the ADA. In doing so they embodied the 

spirit of the ADA. I hope that President Barack Obama’s decision to entrust me with 

leadership as Chairman of NCD will enable me to provide similar opportunities to 

deliver on the ADA’s promise. 

The legacy, the hope, and the promise of the ADA endure, yet much more 

work must be done to transform law into life. Together, we can be the catalyst for our 

nation’s continued transformation. 

Jonathan M. Young

Chairman 

National Council on Disability 
FOREWORD, JULY 26, 1997 

F FOREWORD, JULY 26, 1997 

uture historians will come to view the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 

1990 as one of the most formative pieces of American social policy legislation in the 

20th century. Its enactment codified into law important principles that would henceforth 

govern the relationship between society and its citizens with disabilities. The ADA is 

universal. It champions human rights themes by declaring that people with disabilities are 

an integral part of society and, as such, should not be segregated, isolated, or subjected to 

the effects of discrimination. The ADA is also distinctively American. It embraces 

several archetypal American themes such as self-determination, self-reliance, and 

individual achievement. The ADA is about enabling 

people with disabilities to take charge of their lives 

and join the American mainstream. It seeks to do so 

by fostering employment opportunities, facilitating 

access to public transportation and public

accommodations, and ensuring the use of our

nation’s communication systems. 

Future generations will 

look back on the passage 

of the ADA as a 

watershed public policy. 

The ADA is much more. The ADA’s founding principles, explicit and 

implicit, also serve as a framework in which other public policies can be tested, 

challenged, and, if necessary, amended. It has altered our public discourse about 

disability and about the role of people with disabilities in American society. Future 

generations will look back on the passage of the ADA as a watershed public policy. 

As Major R. Owens (D-NY) wrote regarding the ADA’s final passage, the 

ADA “articulates forcefully and eloquently the purposes which must be embodied in 

our public policies and in our commitments as individuals and as a nation in order for 

America to thrive. . . . It embodies a philosophy and constitutes a declaration in 

support of human possibility and capability.” As Owens noted, ours is a nation of 

interdependence: we do and must rely on one another for success. Because the ADA 

seeks to build a society “which encourages and supports the efforts of each individual 

to live a productive life,” it promotes the success of our entire nation.1

 The ADA is 

important for what it says about our national commitments to each citizen. In a long 

tradition of promoting civil rights, the ADA upholds the principle that each individual 

has the potential, and deserves the right to participate in, and contribute to, society. 

Focus and Sponsorship 

Equality of Opportunity: The Making of the Americans with Disabilities Act

tells a story of how the ADA came about. Other works have explored in great detail 

what individual provisions of the ADA mean, how they apply to individuals and 

businesses, and what one must do to be in compliance. This account examines process 

rather than content. Its defining focus is the transition from a fragmented national 

disability policy, which often worked to the detriment of people with disabilities, to an 

affirmation of the basic civil rights of persons with disabilities, as symbolized in the 
xvi FOREWORD, JULY 26, 1997 

ADA’s passage. To help readers familiarize themselves with the content of the ADA, 

appendices include descriptions of key concepts in the ADA, a reprint of the text of the 

ADA, and information necessary for obtaining technical assistance. 

Equality of Opportunity is the first detailed history of the ADA. It was 

written for a broad audience, including the disability community, policy makers, 

academicians, and general readers. Rather than seek to be the final word on the 

ADA’s history, Equality of Opportunity hopes to succeed by leading others to explore 

the rich history of the ADA and the disability rights movement and offer additional 

information and interpretations. This work can thus serve as an important source 

document for future researchers. 

Writing the history of the ADA is not an easy task. There is not a single or 

even a handful of founding fathers and mothers around whom a narrative can be 

organized. Nor is there one straight line 

from first thoughts about implementing 

a national, comprehensive civil rights 

law for people with disabilities to the 

ADA’s enactment on July 26, 1990. 

Rather, thousands of people from all 

over the nation played roles crucial to 

the ADA’s success, and multiple 

thematic threads characterize the ADA’s 

development. Unfortunately, each 

contribution cannot be fully recognized in the limited space of this work. And 

maintaining narrative cohesion precludes full coverage of simultaneous activities 

taking place in Washington and throughout the country. Nonetheless, the spirit of 

community and cooperation among a large and diverse group of advocates and the 

complexity and intensity of the ADA’s passage are evident in the narration. 

Equality of Opportunity hopes to 

succeed by leading others to 

explore the rich history of the 

ADA and the disability rights 

movement and offer additional 

information and interpretations. 

Research and writing for this project was conducted under contract with the 

National Council on Disability at the National Rehabilitation Hospital (NRH) Research 

Center, a division of the Medlantic Research Institute, in Washington, D.C. Research was 

based on a lengthy series of personal and correspondence interviews with key participants 

in the ADA’s passage, in addition to traditional documentary sources. 

Building on Foundations 

The heart of this story begins in 1986, when the National Council on the 

Handicapped (renamed the National Council on Disability in 1988) presented a 

breakthrough report titled Toward Independence, which included a proposal for a 

comprehensive, equal opportunity law for people with disabilities—the embryo of the 

ADA. Equality of Opportunity traces the development of the ADA from this report (first 

as a draft bill, and then as a formal item of Congress in 1988), through the Senate and 

House of Representatives, and to the desk of President George Bush in 1990. 
 FOREWORD, JULY 26, 1997 xvii 

To understand the ADA one must first understand the decades that preceded 

it. Equality of Opportunity therefore pays considerable attention to the tradition of 

civil rights established in the 1960s and developments within the disability community 

during the 1970s and 1980s. Especially important for the ADA’s success was the 

emergence of a disability rights movement molded in the image of the movements that 

preceded it—the civil rights, women’s, self-help, and the deinstitutionalization and 

normalization movements. The disability rights movement deserves its own book; the 

following pages seek only to relate its relevance to the ADA’s development. 

The extraordinary efforts of people with disabilities throughout the nation 

helped build a grass roots movement that resulted in legislative and judicial successes 

and the development of crucial coalitions and networks within the civil rights 

community, Congress, and the White House. The ADA could not have succeeded 

without this foundation. Equally important was the ADA’s legislative foundation in 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and regulatory foundation resulting from the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973. By building on tested legal principles, the ADA was able 

to avert much of the debate that would have accompanied an act developed de novo. 

This is not to say there was no conflict over the ADA. On the contrary, the ADA 

went through comprehensive review by various interested parties and underwent 

painstaking revisions. The original draft, for example, was transformed to enlist 

broad, bipartisan support. But the Civil Rights Act and the Rehabilitation Act enabled 

the ADA to withstand Congressional scrutiny. 

Some Lessons 

The passage of the ADA was a consciousness-changing experience for the 

101st Congress and must remain an important analytic point of departure for the 

development of disability policy both now and in the future. This account therefore 

has as much to say about our public policy future as it does about our past. 

Students of public policy and the American legislative process would do well 

to examine how the ADA came about. In our age of cynicism about the American 

political system, where partisan clashes have led to government shut-downs and 

rampant accusations, the ADA offers a refreshing example of how the legislative 

process can work when it works well. Passage of the ADA is a story of political 

leaders on both sides of the aisle who put aside personal and partisan differences to do 

what they thought was the right thing to do. The ADA was certainly not without its 

detractors, and debate was at times prolonged and intense. Moreover, near unanimous 

support in the final voting masks deep 

divisions that characterized the 

deliberative process. But members of 

Congress and the Bush administration 

demonstrated a remarkable cooperative 

spirit that resulted in a solid, durable 

act that has been able to withstand 

subsequent scrutiny. Furthermore, they 

maintained a high level of public 

In our age of cynicism about the 

American political system, the 

ADA offers a refreshing example 

of how the legislative process can 

work when it works well. 
xviii FOREWORD, JULY 26, 1997 

debate that kept the ADA from falling victim to a venomous public debate controlled 

by spin doctors and political pundits as witnessed, for example, in the Civil Rights Act 

of 1991. In short, the passage of the ADA provides important lessons about restoring 

dignity to public debate about the leading issues of our time. 

Also important for the enactment of the ADA was the ability of the ADA 

coalition to close ranks. Historically, the disability community has been divided 

internally, in part because of conflicts over limited public funding. With the ADA, 

however, scores of organizations representing thousands of people with different 

disabilities joined forces to work for a common cause. People with blindness fought 

the battles of those who used wheelchairs; persons with epilepsy fought the battles of 

those with deafness. The disability community’s abiding commitment to act as one 

unified voice helped keep the ADA a strong act and prevented the exclusion of 

specific subgroups of disabilities. 

In Closing 

Now is the time to preserve a record 

about the creation and passage of this 

historic, landmark legislation. We view the 

present and look to the future based on our 

cumulative experiences. As we look toward 

the continued development of disability 

policy, we must have a firm grasp on how 

we have reached this point. This is 

especially important for those who were not 

direct participants in the ADA’s passage and 

for the next generation that is growing up in an America transformed by the ADA. 

Because disability is usually not passed on from generation to generation, there is not a 

natural cultural transference about disability. NCD recognizes the crucial role of the past 

and the need to build our own history as we march into the future. Therefore, we made a 

commitment to providing a thorough analysis of the ADA’s history. Other histories will 

and must be written, but this one sets the stage. 

The disability community’s 

abiding commitment to act as 

one unified voice helped keep 

the ADA a strong act and 

prevented exclusion of specific 

subgroups of disabilities. 

The National Council on Disability and the National Rehabilitation Hospital 

Research Center are pleased to make Equality of Opportunity, by Jonathan M. Young, 

available to the public. We believe it is a work in which the disability community and 

the public policy-making community can take great pride. 

Marca Bristo 

Chairperson, 

National Council on Disability

Gerben DeJong 

Director, 

NRH Research Center
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Laying the Foundation: 

Disability Policy & Activism, 1968-1988 

In retrospect, it seems as if the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) passed 

Congress easily. But most people aware of the proposal in 1987 thought success, at 

that time, was doubtful. The fact that the ADA did reach President Bush’s desk and 

was signed into law is a tribute to the groundwork that had been laid in the previous 

two decades. A string of legal precedents expanded upon the foundation of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. A nationwide disability rights 

movement emerged from within the disability community. Attorneys in the disability 

community attained a high degree of legal sophistication. Disability organizations 

successfully united with the civil rights community to promote disability policy as a 

civil rights issue. The disability community established extensive networks among its 

constituencies, Congress, and the White House. Numerous effective and talented 

leaders emerged from within the disability community to help guide the ADA through 

Congress. Without these developments, the ADA likely would have failed. 

Putting the ADA on the Legislative Agenda: 

The National Council on Disability 

Successful passage of a law depends first on getting a proposal to Congress as 

a viable policy option. For the ADA, this role as facilitator was performed by the 

National Council on the Handicapped (now National Council on Disability, [NCD]). 

In 1984, Congress issued NCD a mandate to review all federal programs relating to 

disability and offer recommendations on how Congress could best promote the 

independence of persons with disabilities and minimize dependence on governmental 

programs. NCD’s primary recommendation to Congress was a call for passage of a 

comprehensive, equal opportunity law for persons with disabilities. Subsequently, 

NCD decided to take action by drafting its own legislative proposal for congressional 

consideration. NCD successfully solicited Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-CT) and 

Congressman Tony Coelho (D-CA) to sponsor the ADA and introduce the bill to 

Congress. After incorporating recommendations offered by representatives from the 

disability community at large, Weicker and Coelho introduced the ADA to the Senate 

and House on April 28 and April 29, 1988. 

Publicizing the ADA: 

Advocacy and the Government Response 

ADA advocates introduced their proposal in 1988 not with the expectation of 

passing the bill that year, but as an opportunity to create momentum by empowering 

people throughout the nation to advocate for the bill. They planned to use the politics 

of an election year as a way to publicize the ADA and gain a foothold as a top priority 

for the next session of Congress. During this year, representatives from the disability 
xx EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

community began to form an ADA coalition to promote passage of the ADA. This 

coalition worked with members of Congress to solicit cosponsors and encouraged the 

presidential candidates to endorse the bill. It also effectively used this time to begin 

mobilizing nationwide grassroots advocacy for the ADA to demonstrate that people 

throughout the country (not just a few persons from a think tank) demanded its 

passage. Powerful testimony from persons with disabilities helped document the 

desperate need for legislation such as the ADA. As a consequence, ADA advocates 

successfully positioned the ADA for serious introduction in 1989. 

Creating a Workable ADA: 

The Senate and the White House 

George Bush, who advocated for the rights of disabled persons in his 

campaign, was elected president in 1988 and subsequently promoted passage of the 

ADA. At the same time, however, Lowell Weicker lost his bid for reelection to the 

Senate. In Weicker’s absence, Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) became the Senate ADA 

sponsor. In conjunction with Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) and with the 

participation of a variety of constituencies, Harkin rewrote the ADA in a form that 

stood a reasonable chance at passage. On May 9, 1989, Harkin and Congressman 

Coelho simultaneously introduced the ADA to both houses of Congress. Coelho, 

Kennedy and Harkin decided to begin deliberations in the Senate. After hearings held 

in May and June, 1989, the Senate entered a series of negotiations sessions with the 

Bush administration to craft a bipartisan, compromise bill. On August 2, the Senate 

Committee on Labor and Human Resources voted unanimously to report the ADA, as 

amended, to the Senate floor. The Senate passed the ADA by a vote of 76 to 8 on 

September 7, 1989. 

Fashioning a Durable ADA: 

The House of Representatives 

Under the leadership of Congressman Coelho and, later, Congressman Steny 

H. Hoyer (D-MD), the House began its deliberations by using the bill approved by the 

Senate. The House process was more complicated than the Senate’s, in part because 

the bill went to four committees and six subcommittees. In contrast to the rapid action 

in the Senate, the House took nearly nine additional months to analyze and refine the 

bill. The dynamic was also much different because business organizations, who had 

deep concerns about the cost burden and the litigation potential of the ADA, lobbied 

vigorously by applying constituent pressure on members. The disability community 

now worked to hold the ground it had achieved in the Senate. The main issue in the 

House was the effect of the ADA on businesses and governments covered by the 

ADA’s provisions; many changes were made to make the ADA more acceptable to 

entities covered by the ADA. A series of “weakening” amendments were proposed 

and defeated at the committee level and on the House floor, where the House passed 

the ADA by a vote of 403 to 20, on May 22, 1990. One controversial amendment, 

however, did succeed. The Chapman amendment said that employers could legally 
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xxi 

remove persons with contagious diseases, such as AIDS, from food handling 

positions, even where there was no evidence that the disease could be transmitted. 

Enshrining the ADA: 

House-Senate Conference and the Signing 

The overwhelming votes in favor of the ADA in both the House and the 

Senate seemingly destined the ADA for success. But the Chapman amendment 

passed in the House threatened to kill the bill: the disability community and its 

congressional sponsors decided not to support an ADA with the amendment. The 

conflict over food handling and contagious diseases had to be settled by a conference 

between the House and Senate, where conferees rejected the Chapman amendment, 

only to have members in both the House and Senate try to put it back into the ADA. 

After nearly two months of wrangling over the provision, the Senate developed a 

compromise through the leadership of Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT). The House 

and Senate then passed the ADA in final form on July 12 and 13, 1990. On July 26, 

before about 3,000 persons, President Bush signed the ADA into law as Public Law 

101-336. 

Epilogue 

The ADA is unique in the context of civil rights legislation because it requires 

that businesses and governments do more than just cease discriminatory actions. They 

must also take proactive steps to offer equal opportunity to persons with disabilities, 

commensurate with their economic resources. The ADA is distinctive in the context 

of disability legislation not for its individual provisions, most of which were already 

established in some form by various state and local governments, but in its 

comprehensive nature and application to much of the private sector. No single factor 

can explain the ADA’s success. A whole host of circumstances worked in its favor: 

effective leadership; advocates in key government positions; the rightness of the 

cause; the mobilization of the grassroots disability community; a string of legislative 

successes offering momentum; legal and lobbying expertise in the disability 

community; the willingness of persons with disabilities to unite for a common cause; 

the cautious support of the business community; and ideological justifications from 

both the right and the left. The time was right and the cause was just. 

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

“The Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities 

are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, 

independent living, and economic self-sufficiency.” 

The Americans with Disabilities Act 
VIEWS FROM CONGRESS AND THE WHITE HOUSE VIEWS FROM CONGRESS AND THE WHITE HOUSE 

Disability Discrimination 

Authorities on disability have often said, and I have quoted them on this floor 

before, that the history of society’s formal methods of dealing with people with 

disabilities can be summed up in two words: segregation and inequality. 

Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr.1

Disability Rights 

We know that there is going to have to be accommodations to give us our 

basic civil rights. We know that. We understand that. There is a cost involved. But 

isn’t there also a cost involved with us not being able to exercise our rights? 

Congressman Tony Coelho2

The Disability Community 

Within a few weeks the ADA will become the law of the land because of the 

vision of the disability community. You knew in your hearts what we now write into 

law—that discrimination based on fear, ignorance, prejudice, and indifference is 

wrong. . . . The ADA is first and foremost the outcome of the extraordinary efforts of 

the disability community. This is your bill, and you earned it. 

Senator Tom Harkin3

Changing the World 

We are sent here by our constituents to change the world for the better. And 

today we have the opportunity to do that. . . . Many have asked: “Why are we doing 

this for the disabled?” My answer is twofold. As Americans, our inherent belief is 

that there is a place for everyone in our society, and that place is as a full participant, 

not a bystander. The second answer is less lofty. It is steeped in the reality of the 

world as we know it today. If, as we all suspect, the next great world competition will 

be in the marketplace rather than the battlefield, we need the help of every American. . 

. . We cannot afford to ignore millions of Americans who want to contribute. 

Congressman Steny H. Hoyer4

Americans with Abilities 

The road to enactment of this legislation was not easy. But in the process of 

reaching this goal, we have all learned something about the evils of discrimination in 

any form, and the importance of judging individuals by their abilities—not 

patronizing misconceptions, demeaning stereotypes, and irrational fears about their 

disabilities. 

Senator Edward M. Kennedy5
 3 

The Americans with Disabilities Act 

No piece of legislation this Congress will pass articulates more forcefully and 

eloquently the purposes which must be embodied in our public policies and in our 

commitments as individuals and as a nation in order for America to thrive in the 

1990s. It embodies a philosophy and constitutes a declaration in support of human 

possibility and capability. . . . With a powerful commitment to building a society 

which encourages and supports the efforts of each individual to live a productive life, 

there is no challenge which our Nation cannot meet. 

Congressman Major Owens6

The American Dream 

The time has come for the Senate to send a loud, clear message across this 

country: Individuals with disabilities, no less than all other Americans, are entitled to 

an equal opportunity to participate in the American dream. It is time for that dream to 

become a reality. 

Senator Orrin G. Hatch7

Independence 

ADA will empower people to control their own lives. It will result in a cost 

savings to the Federal Government. As we empower people to be independent, to 

control their own lives, to gain their own employment, their own income, their own 

housing, their own transportation, taxpayers will save substantial sums from the 

alternatives. 

Congressman Steve Bartlett8

The Time Has Come 

I have supported the ADA because I believe it is a just and fair bill, which 

will bring equality to the lives of all Americans with disabilities. Our message to 

America is that inequality and prejudice will no longer be tolerated. Our message to 

people with disabilities is that your time has come. 

Senator Robert Dole9

Finding Balance 

This historic civil rights legislation seeks to end the unjustified segregation 

and exclusion of persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life. . . . 

The ADA is fair and balanced legislation that carefully blends the rights of people 

with disabilities . . . with the legitimate needs of the American business community. 

Attorney General Richard Thornburgh10

The Shameful Wall 

And now I sign legislation which takes a sledgehammer to another wall, one 

which has, for too many generations, separated Americans with disabilities from the 
4 VIEWS FROM CONGRESS AND THE WHITE HOUSE

freedom they could glimpse, but not grasp. Once again, we rejoice as this barrier 

falls, proclaiming together we will not accept, we will not excuse, we will not tolerate 

discrimination in America. . . . Let the shameful wall of exclusion finally come 

tumbling down. 

President George Bush11
1 

LAYING THE FOUNDATION: 

DISABILITY POLICY & ACTIVISM, 1968–1988

LAYING THE FOUNDATION

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 raced through Congress. 

So much momentum drove the bill forward that many members of Congress, 

caught by surprise, reacted by claiming the bill had come from nowhere, that there 

was little precedent for such sweeping legislation, and that the deliberative process 

should be extended to provide time to grasp the novelty of the bill’s provisions. 

Such claims, however, overlooked one crucial fact: the ADA had been long in 

gestation. Indeed, part of the reason the bill became law with such alacrity is 

precisely the degree to which the legislation was built on a solid foundation: of 

policy, legal principle, personal networks, coalition-forming, and an increasingly 

active disability community. Without this foundation, which was put in place 

largely over the 1970s and 1980s, the ADA’s passage would have been 

impossible. To comprehend the ADA one must first understand the context in 

which it developed. 

Contours of Disability in America CONTOURS OF DISABILITY

Disability has a history. In colonial America, persons with disabilities 

were often viewed as part of the “deserving poor.” They were consequently 

accepted by local communities, where they contributed however possible and 

shared in the community’s offerings. But with the nineteenth-century industrial 

and market revolutions and the growth of a liberal individualistic culture, the 

cohesion of physical and geographic communities began to break down.1

 One 

consequence was that persons with disabilities, increasingly deemed unable to 

compete in America’s industrial economy, were spurned by society. Growing 

side-by-side with social structures catering to individual achievement were 

custodial institutions for those who did not “fit” with the American creed: persons 

with sensory impairments, reduced cognitive capacities, physical impairments, 

mental illnesses, or other conditions. Institutions supposedly “protected” these 

persons from public harm. 2

 Institutions also allegedly protected society from 

those who were feared by many as dangerous and a threat to the gene pool. Some 

persons with physical disabilities were displayed as “freaks” of nature, to be 

marveled at like exotic animals.3

 Such literary works as Herman Melville’s Moby 

Dick reinforced stereotypes of persons with disabilities as sinister, or even crazy, 

through such characters as the peg-legged Captain Ahab.4

 
6 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

Racism, ethnic imperialism, 

and xenophobia plagued early 

twentieth-century America. 

Darwin’s theories about the origin 

of species gave rise to universal 

theories about natural selection 

within humankind and the evolution 

of society.5

 Many believed it was in 

the best interest of humanity to 

eliminate or at least curtail 

populations considered inferior, as 

witnessed in the treatment of 

African Americans and Jews. These ideas also adversely affected persons with 

disabilities, displayed most starkly in the 1927 Supreme Court case Buck v. Bell. 

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes ruled 

that it was “better for all the world, 

if, instead of waiting to execute 

degenerate offspring for crime, or to 

let them starve for their imbecility, 

society can prevent those who are 

manifestly unfit from continuing 

their kind.” 

Carrie Buck argued before the Court that state-imposed sterilization, based on 

disability, was unconstitutional. The Court disagreed. Instead, the Court sided with 

“experts” who alleged that persons with disabilities, namely those collectively 

classified as “the feeble-minded,” were “a menace” to society, threatened society’s 

“best citizens,” and tended to “sap the strength of the state.” Justice Oliver Wendell 

Holmes thought it best for society to seek to avoid “being swamped with 

incompetence.” He thus ruled that it was “better for all the world, if, instead of 

waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 

imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their 

kind.”6

 Although sterilization and segregation practices targeted those classified as 

“feeble-minded” persons—or people with mental retardation, mental illness, and 

epilepsy—it reflected a general intolerance for those who allegedly did not fit the 

model for the rugged, individualistic, capitalistic American. 

Significant developments over 

the course of the twentieth century, 

however, transformed the nature of 

disability in American life. These 

included demographic changes among 

persons and parents of persons with 

disabilities, the creation of disability 

organizations, and the growth of rehabilitation as a profession. In the early twentieth 

century, the demographics of disability changed as thousands of Americans acquired 

disabilities through industrial, work-place injuries. Moreover, World War I 

introduced thousands of veterans with disabilities, as did World War II, the Korean 

War, and the Vietnam War. In addition to the increased numbers of disabilities 

caused by injuries, Americans also began to live longer. Whereas in 1900 the average 

life span was 47 years, by 1980 life expectancy had increased to the age of 74. Since 

disability tends to increase with age, an older population meant an America with 

greater prevalence of disability.7

 By 1980 at least thirty million Americans 

experienced disability first-hand. As all Americans, these persons wanted the best life 

Increasing numbers of persons 

with disabilities made disability a 

societal challenge rather than a 

scattered, personal predicament. 
 CONTOURS OF DISABILITY 7 

possible and worked to get it. Increasing numbers of persons with disabilities made 

disability a societal challenge rather than a scattered, personal predicament. 

As demographics changed, persons with disabilities began forming 

organizations to act as advocates for their interests. Early examples include the 

Disabled Veterans of America (DVA) and the National Mental Health Association 

(NMHA), both founded in 1920, and the National Federation of the Blind (NFB), 

founded in 1940. After World War II, this growth accelerated. The Paralyzed 

Veterans of America (PVA) opened its doors in 1946, the United Cerebral Palsy 

Associations (UCPA) began in 1949, the National Association for Retarded Citizens 

(ARC) was founded in 1950, the first Home Office of the National Association of the 

Deaf (NAD, originally founded in 1880) opened in 1953, and the American Council 

of the Blind (ACB) started its operations in 1961. These organizations dedicated their 

existence to improving the lives of their constituencies and gave persons with 

disabilities a stronger voice. They raised money, identified areas of need, and lobbied 

to pass legislation that would help solve problems. They looked for ways to achieve 

employment and to gain better education. By working with Congress and the 

judiciary to achieve their goals, they also gained valuable legal experience. As a 

result of these activities, they further imprinted disability on the American landscape. 

Throughout the twentieth century a variety of professions developed to attend 

to the challenges posed by disability. By giving increased attention to persons with 

disabilities, physicians, researchers, nurses, physical and occupational therapists, and 

vocational rehabilitation 

counselors, and other professionals 

enabled many persons with 

disabilities to live healthier lives. 

New technologies, drugs, and 

devices enabled persons to live 

longer with lower incidence of 

secondary disabilities, and with 

greater control over their daily 

activities. It also helped transform disability rehabilitation into a full-fledged industry, 

which had the concomitant affect of making rehabilitation a commodity to be bought 

and sold in the marketplace.8

 Moreover, professionals tended to focus their attention 

on specific disabilities, fostering the compartmentalization and fragmentation of 

people with disabilities. 

Most Americans still understood 

disability primarily as a problem that 

resided in the individual. People were 

to be “rehabilitated” to become 

“normal.” 

As the numbers of persons with disabilities grew, and as they, their parents, 

organizations, and professionals worked to improve their lives, the attitudes manifest 

in Buck v. Bell came under attack: persons with disabilities, too, deserved to be part of 

society. National policy developments assisted in this transition. Over the course of 

the twentieth century, the scope and power of the Federal Government expanded to 

meet the growing demands of an industrializing nation. New legislative endeavors 

accordingly addressed disability issues. Reforms directed at corporate America 

provided benefits to persons injured on the job. By 1941, forty-five states ensured 

compensation for work-place injuries. The United States Public Health Service 
8 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

(USPHS), established in 1902, gave new attention to the importance of health care for 

society. The Veterans’ Rehabilitation Act of 1918 established a program for training 

veterans with disabilities. In 1920, the combined problems posed by industrial 

impairments and war veterans led to the Smith-Fess Act, which established the 

vocational rehabilitation program. By 1935, every state had a vocational program in 

operation, providing vocational training, job placement assistance, and counseling to 

those with physical disabilities. During World War II, Congress expanded the 

vocational rehabilitation program to offer “medical, surgical, and other physical 

restorative services” and to include services for the mentally ill and mentally 

retarded.9

 Legislatures passed other laws directed toward greater access for persons 

with disabilities: for example, laws permitting the public use of guide dogs and white 

canes for blind persons. 

The Social Security system also had a profound effect on persons with 

disabilities. In the 1950s, Congress amended the Social Security Act to provide income 

benefits to working-age people with disabilities who could not engage in any “substantial 

gainful activity.” In 1965, Congress established the Medicare and Medicaid programs that 

provided health care coverage to select groups of people with disabilities, as well as to 

elderly and lower income persons. Persons with disabilities could also be eligible for food 

stamps, school lunches, and housing 

subsidies if they met income tests. 

Although these programs 

demonstrated a recognition of 

disability as a matter of national 

concern, they would later prove to be 

a mixed blessing. While they 

provided much-needed income 

security, they could make paid 

employment less appealing. 

Advocates of the ADA regularly 

declared that it was the most 

sweeping civil rights legislation in a 

quarter century: that is, since the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964—one of the 

most important twentieth-century 

domestic initiatives. 

Despite many improvements, problems for persons with disabilities were 

widespread: unemployment, lack of education, low income, and isolation. Moreover, 

most Americans still understood disability primarily as a problem that resided in the 

individual. They viewed disability as a “medical” problem that required medical 

supervision. People were to be “rehabilitated” to become “normal.” The public 

policy approach to disability, however, would be revolutionized in the wake of the 

1960s. 

The Twin Pillars THE TWIN PILLARS

Advocates of the ADA regularly declared that it was the most sweeping civil 

rights legislation in a quarter century: that is, since the Civil Rights Act of 1964—one 

of the most important twentieth-century domestic initiatives. The aims of the Civil 

Rights Act were not achieved overnight. But the legislation heralded a revolutionary 

proposition: it is against the law to discriminate on the basis of race, color, national 

origin, or religion. The Civil Rights Act was born of a protest movement. In the 
 THE TWIN PILLARS 9 

 

decade following the historic 1954 Supreme Court ruling, Brown v. Board of 

Education, African Americans, students, and white supporters participated in 

nationwide sit-ins to protest segregated eating establishments; bus boycotts to protest 

segregated bus seating; freedom rides to protest segregation in bus stations; voting 

registration drives; and numerous demonstration marches supporting, among other 

things, the enrollment of African Americans in white educational institutions. This 

movement faced vehement and violent opposition from whites viscerally committed 

to centuries of white supremacy—first in slavery and then in segregation and 

disfranchisement. But television coverage of dogs and fire hoses unleashed on 

peaceful marchers thrust the injustice of rampant racism and racial subordination into 

the living rooms of Americans throughout the country. Confronted by the flagrant 

violation of American principles of liberty and equality, American public opinion 

shifted to support the aspirations of America’s blacks.10

President John F. Kennedy and, after Kennedy’s 1963 assassination, President 

Lyndon B. Johnson, sought to quell the social unrest by submitting to Congress 

comprehensive civil rights legislation that would protect the rights that millions 

earnestly pursued. But it was a battle. A protracted and vigorous debate ensued; 

compromises were made. When the legislation finally reached the House floor, one 

Representative introduced an amendment that would include women in the coverage 

of the act by adding sex as a prohibitive category for employment discrimination. His 

intent, however, was to kill the bill by suggesting what to many was a laughable 

proposition: equality for women. The amendment was approved, but it did not kill the 

bill. The resulting Civil Rights Act of 1964, signed into law by Johnson on July 2, 

1964, provided numerous protections to racial and ethnic minorities and persons of 

varied religious faiths.*

 The heart of the law was the principle that all persons, 

regardless of “race, color, religion, or national origin,” are entitled to the “full and 

equal enjoyment of the goods, services, privileges, advantages, and accommodations 

of any place of public accommodation.”11 This was in accordance with one of the 

central demands of the civil rights movement—equal access. Political realities, 

however, restricted that access to places of lodging, eating, and entertainment, and 

exempted private clubs and religious organizations. Additional provisions of the Civil 

Rights Act included the desegregation of public facilities and public education. Other 

provisions stipulated nondiscrimination in federally-assisted programs and 

employment practices. More legislation followed close behind. The Voting Rights 

Act of 1965 granted the Federal Government the power to ensure that racial minorities 

could register to vote. In 1968 the Fair Housing Act expanded the scope of the Civil 

Rights Act by adding Title VIII, which prohibited discrimination in the sale or rental 

of housing. 

All of these measures had varying degrees of success. Nondiscrimination in 

public accommodations resulted in the most change. Retail businesses welcomed this 

*

 Protections based on sex applied only to the employment title. Racial and 

ethnic minorities and persons of various religious faiths were protected by every title. 
10 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

provision because it translated into more customers and more money. In addition, it 

eliminated the cost of dual facilities. Gains in education and employment 

nondiscrimination would come more slowly. The civil rights movement, however, 

left a crucial legacy to African Americans and other disadvantaged groups, including 

persons with disabilities. They would seek the same protections and model the protest 

movement. First, the Civil rights movement legitimated and proved the success of 

civil protest to demand civil rights. Persons with disabilities, as other groups, would 

use the same sit-in and marching tactics. Second, the civil rights movement 

established a vital principle: discrimination according to characteristics irrelevant to 

job performance and the denial of access to public accommodations and public 

services was, simply, against the law. Once codified, logical implications extended 

well beyond race. Finally, the civil rights movement left a body of statutes and case 

law—models for future legislation. There would be no ADA were it not for the 

successful protests of African Americans, for their crowning achievement in the Civil 

Rights Act was also the philosophical foundation of the ADA. 

The civil rights movement did not, however, have an immediate, direct impact 

on the disability community. The Civil Rights Act made no reference to persons with 

disabilities. The only significant statute increasing access for persons with 

disabilities, and passed near that time, was the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968. 

This act was largely the result of the efforts of Hugh Gregory Gallagher. As a 

legislative assistant, Gallagher had been instrumental in making the Library of 

Congress and other buildings in Washington accessible. These efforts culminated 

with his drafting of the Architectural Barriers Act, which required that all buildings 

constructed, altered, or financed by the Federal Government had to be physically 

accessible.12 

The first attempts to merge disability with the civil rights movement were 

unsuccessful. In 1972, for example, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Jr. (D-MN) 

proposed an amendment to the Civil Rights Act that would incorporate disability as a 

protected class. But the proposal made little headway. There was no constituent base 

to support such an endeavor. Moreover, advocates of the Civil Rights Act feared that 

the addition of “disability” as a “protected class,” similar to ethnic minorities, might 

dilute the Civil Rights Act. And, once the act was on the table for discussion, 

members might introduce damaging amendments. 

The political climate of the late 1960s and early 1970s worked against the 

advancement of civil rights for persons with disabilities. In 1968, Richard M. Nixon 

campaigned for the presidency with pledges to stem the tide of civil rights advances. He 

won the election in part due to a cultural 

backlash against the civil rights movement and 

President Johnson’s War on Poverty. Nixon’s 

election reflected a breakdown of the New 

Deal consensus, the splintering of the 

Democratic party, and the dawn of a 

conservative shift in American public opinion. 

In the early 1970s, the nation also faced new 

The legal foundation of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 

alone could not adequately 

buttress as comprehensive a 

measure as the ADA.
 THE TWIN PILLARS 11 

economic pressures and financial restraint. Many thought welfare measures now 

exceeded the American budget. It was simply not a friendly time for new civil rights 

protections. 

Ironically, however, a crucial component of the infrastructure of disability law 

came precisely at this time. The legal foundation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 

alone could not adequately buttress as comprehensive a measure as the ADA. 

Although ethnic minorities and women had been afforded civil rights protections 

identical to those for African Americans for identical civil rights protections, disabled 

people as a class were different and required such unique legal provisions as 

“reasonable accommodation.” This part of the ADA’s foundation came from 

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a stealth measure in the midst of a 

backlash against civil rights. 

This occurred in spite of President Nixon because Congress continued to 

promote social legislation. When the Vocational Rehabilitation Act came up for reauthorization, Congress crafted an even broader piece of legislation called the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1972. Congress sought to expand the program beyond its 

traditional employment focus by identifying ways to improve the overall lives of 

persons with disabilities: “the final goal of all rehabilitation services was to improve 

in every possible respect the lives as well as livelihood of individuals served.”13 The 

new law would extend rehabilitation services to all persons with disabilities, give 

priority to those with severe disabilities, provide for extensive research and training 

for rehabilitation services, and coordinate federal disability programs. The act would 

be carried out by a Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) housed in the 

Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). Passage of this legislation, 

however, resulted in a vigorous battle. Nixon vetoed the bill on two occasions. He 

claimed that the bill was “fiscally irresponsible” and represented a “Congressional 

spending spree.” He urged: “We should not dilute the resources of [the Vocational 

Rehabilitation] program by turning it toward welfare or medical goals.”14 After failing 

to override the president’s veto by six votes, the Senate was forced to negotiate with 

the Nixon administration. 

The compromise legislation signed into public law on September 26, 1973, 

made for a weaker RSA tightly controlled by the Secretary of HEW. It reduced 

appropriations levels, abolished programs designed to help address certain categories 

of disability, substituted “emphasis” for “priority” in dealing with persons with severe 

disabilities, and eliminated a proposed Division of Research, Training and Evaluation. 

Nevertheless, the Rehabilitation Act fell short of original congressional intent, it was 

the first legislation designed to improve the overall lives of persons with disabilities. 

Especially significant was Title V of the act. Section 501 directed federal agencies to 

develop affirmative action programs for the hiring, placement, and advancement of 

persons with disabilities. Section 502 established the Architectural and Transportation 

Barriers Compliance Board (ATBCB), which would ensure compliance with the 

Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, pursue ways to eliminate transportation barriers, 

and seek ways to make housing accessible. Under Section 503, parties contracting 

with the United States were required to use affirmative action to employ qualified 
12 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

persons with disabilities. Finally, and most importantly, Section 504 stated: “No 

otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . . shall, solely by 

reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits 

of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 

financial assistance.”15 

This phrase was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 

Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, which prohibited discrimination 

in federally-assisted programs on account of race, color, religion, national origin, or 

sex. Unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 504 did not emerge in response to 

protest. Rather, it was created silently by a group of congressional staff members. No 

suggestion for such a provision was made at the hearings, and the provision was not in 

the original draft of the bill. Staff added the section late in the deliberative process 

without any statement of congressional intent or appropriations to finance it. Not a 

single member of Congress mentioned the section during floor debate, and President 

Nixon made no reference to it as grounds for his veto. The section apparently 

developed out of a fear that persons receiving vocational rehabilitation would later be 

blocked from employment, thus negating the rehabilitative benefits. It was a way to 

add an element of civil rights language without the danger of amending the Civil 

Rights Act.16 

Although Section 504 was not introduced at the behest of disability advocates, 

the Rehabilitation Act helped energize the disability community. Persons with 

disabilities protested each of President Nixon’s vetoes. And, though it appears that 

many in the disability community were only vaguely familiar with Section 504 as late 

as 1975, conflict over the regulations for Section 504 culminated with unprecedented 

demonstrations by the disability community in the spring of 1977.17 

Three consecutive administrations delayed action in issuing regulations for 

Section 504. Part of the problem was that Section 504 did not expressly mandate 

regulations. Accordingly, for the year culminating with President Nixon’s resignation 

on August 9, 1974, the Nixon administration failed to take any action toward 

developing Section 504 regulations. President Gerald Ford, however, supported the 

promulgation of Section 504 regulations and assigned HEW with the responsibility to 

issue them. HEW’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) was appointed to write the 

regulations. This was significant because such regulatory agencies as RSA, a 

potential alternative for writing the Section 504 regulations, focused mostly on 

community education and voluntary compliance among recipients of federal 

assistance. OCR, however, based its regulations on its history in dealing with civil 

rights and segregation, where firm legal foundations rather than mere voluntary 

compliance was necessary. 

Under the leadership of John Wodatch, OCR prepared regulations that offered 

a new definition of disability, issued mandates for educating persons with disabilities 

in public schools, and demanded accessible buildings and transportation. But shortly 

after presenting the regulations to HEW Secretary Casper Weinberger on July 23, 

1975, Weinberger was replaced by David Mathews, who was reputed to be “a 
 THE TWIN PILLARS 13 

cautious and indecisive man who tended to be more philosophical than pragmatic in 

running the department.”18 Mathews did not oppose the regulations outright. But by 

demanding further analysis of the regulations, rather than taking the usual step of 

publishing the regulations as a proposal, Mathews delayed action. He even sent the 

regulations outside of HEW for review by a private firm. On March 11, 1976, OCR 

resubmitted the regulations with revisions, but two months passed before Mathews 

presented the regulations to the public. 

The failure of HEW to issue regulations for Section 504 began to attract 

attention. By the fall of 1974, for example, Jim Cherry, a young attorney and 

disability lobbyist who had a rare, degenerative muscular disease, began writing 

letters to HEW requesting that the department issue regulations. But nothing came of 

these efforts. Ultimately, Cherry turned to the legal system and found a firm, 

Georgetown’s Institute for Public Interest Representation (INSPIRE), to support his 

cause pro bono. After a year of presenting formal petitions demanding that HEW 

issue regulations, INSPIRE finally filed a case against HEW on February 13, 1976—

Cherry v. Mathews. Later that spring, a group of people with disabilities 

demonstrated in Secretary Mathews’s office. The delay also began to catch the 

attention of Congress, which held oversight hearings on May 5 to determine why no 

action had been taken. 

Mathews finally presented the regulations to the public on May 17, 1976, but 

he issued them only as an intent to propose regulations, not an actual proposal. 

Mathews did not issue a Notice of Proposed Rule Making, the standard procedure for 

soliciting public feedback on proposed regulations, until July 16. Three days later, on 

July 19, the district court of Washington, D.C., ruled on the Cherry v. Mathews case 

and ordered Mathews to promulgate regulations. In the next six months, HEW 

solicited public comment. OCR made minor changes to the regulations and presented 

the revised regulations to Mathews on January 10, 1977. Over three years had now 

passed since the Rehabilitation Act became public law. But Mathews still stalled. On 

January 18, instead of signing the regulations, he sent them to the Senate Committee 

on Labor and Public Welfare for review—an unprecedented action in regulation 

writing. That same day, the district court ordered Secretary Mathews to cease the 

delay. But, two days later, Jimmy Carter was inaugurated as president and Mathews 

left office. 

During his campaign, Carter had promised to make people with disabilities 

“active partners in our attempts to achieve . . . full civil rights” and made a 

commitment to signing the regulations.19 As president, he nominated Joseph Califano 

to be Secretary of HEW. Califano allegedly supported the concept of Section 504, but 

he too postponed action on the regulations; he wanted to review them before attaching 

his name. Califano worried especially about the costs associated with the statute and 

resisted the inclusion of drug and alcohol abusers as a protected class. When he 

proposed implementing a more limited concept of making individual programs 

accessible rather than demanding broad, structural changes, however, his actions drew 

the ire of persons with disabilities. 
14 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

DISABILITY PROTEST 

Opposition to the delay in signing regulations developed from growing 

collaboration among people with disabilities. In the early 1970s, the primary 

gathering place for people with disabilities was the annual spring conference of the 

President’s Committee on Employment of the Handicapped (PCEH). President Harry 

S. Truman had founded PCEH in 1947 to assist physically disabled veterans in finding 

employment. In the 1960s, PCEH expanded its mission to include persons with 

mental retardation and mental illness. In addition to drawing attention to employment 

for people with disabilities, which naturally led to a broader interest in other disability 

issues, PCEH became the first central meeting ground where disability advocates, 

disability professionals, and public officials could share ideas and set agendas for the 

future.20 

At the 1973 PCEH meeting, following Nixon’s second veto of the 

Rehabilitation Act and the accompanying disability protest, a group of disability 

activists discussed the need for an organized, collective disability voice that would 

unite the disparate disability-specific organizations.21 Only then, they thought, could 

they exert effective influence on the Federal Government. The coalition would not 

disband other disability organizations: they would become its members. In 1974, Fred 

Fay, Roger Peterson, Dianne Latin, Al Pimentel, Judy Heumann, Fred Schreiber, and 

others set up a committee to write the constitution and bylaws for such an 

organization. They named it the American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities 

(ACCD): it was the first major cross-disability organization. The purpose of ACCD 

was to enhance communication among people with disabilities, promote the rights of 

disabled persons, educate people about their rights, and foster collective political 

action. 

In April, 1975, again at the annual PCEH meeting, representatives from a 

spectrum of disability organizations approved the ACCD constitution and bylaws and 

established a governing board. They elected Eunice Fiorito, a blind woman who had 

become the first director of the New York City Mayor’s Office for the Handicapped (the 

first of its kind) in 1972, to be president. Fiorito was an aggressive and effective disability 

rights advocate and crucial to ACCD’s early development. “If it wasn’t for Eunice,” said 

Rubenfeld, who was one of the successors as ACCD President, “I don’t think there’d be 

an ACCD.”22 Schreiber, Heumann, and Fay joined Fiorito as vice president, secretary, 

and treasurer. In 1976, Frank Bowe, a recent Ph.D. graduate, became the first Executive 

Director. Scores of disability organizations scurried to join ACCD. Some, such as the 

Houston Coalition for Barrier Free Living, were established in order to be a part of 

ACCD. 

The fast-growing power and 

reputation of ACCD positioned it 

take the lead in coordinating 

advocacy regarding the Section 504 

regulations. ACCD threatened to 

demonstrate at the 1976 Republican 

The fast-growing power and 

reputation of ACCD positioned it 

take the lead in coordinating 

advocacy regarding the Section 504 

regulations. 
 THE TWIN PILLARS 15 

convention with black coffins, symbols of the plight of people with disabilities, if the 

Ford administration did not act. Representatives of ACCD worked with Democrats to 

have Carter issue statements that he would ensure the signing of the regulations if 

elected. On the first day of the Carter administration in January, 1977, ACCD sent a 

telegram to HEW reminding the agency of the 504 regulations and, the next day, 

showed up at the HEW office to demand signing within 30 days. In addition, ACCD 

Executive Director Frank Bowe, who worked full time in ACCD’s Washington office, 

organized the production of “Sign 504” buttons to heighten public awareness about 

the regulatory stalemate. 

After it became evident that a signature from Secretary Califano was not 

forthcoming, ACCD began considering ways to exert additional pressure. Members 

decided to be dramatic and attract press coverage. “When you put the pressure on, 

you embarrass politicians,” said Rubenfeld.23 Accordingly, in February, ACCD 

decided to stage sit-ins at Regional Offices of HEW. On March 18, ACCD wrote a 

letter to President Carter asserting that disability advocates would resort to political 

action if the regulations were not signed by April 4. “The disabled are furious over 

what they see as a retreat by President Carter on his promises” to help people with 

disabilities, reported The Washington Post in an editorial publicizing the planned sitin.24 Still, no action came. On Monday, April 4, at 1:30 p.m., Frank Bowe, Dan 

Yohalem, Deborah Kaplan, and others met with Secretary Califano in his office. 

Califano tried to explain the delay and expressed support of public demonstrations to 

urge signing of the regulations. The disability activists, however, stated their demand 

for immediate signing of the unchanged regulations and then walked and rolled out of 

the office. Television cameras captured the events on film.25 The following morning, 

on April 5, hundreds of disability activists gathered at the Capitol building, where they 

publicly declared their demand for immediate signing of the regulations. Later in the 

afternoon, they marched several blocks from the Capitol to the HEW building. 

Simultaneously, activists staged demonstrations at regional offices in Atlanta, Boston, 

Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Philadelphia, New York, San Francisco, and Seattle. 

In Washington, the HEW demonstration had two components. Most of the 

activists who marched from the Capitol remained outside the HEW building to make 

sure the protest stayed in the eye of the media. A second group of about fifty activists, 

however, stealthily entered the building in small groups and then gathered in the 

waiting room outside Califano’s office. They tried to storm Califano’s personal 

office, but dozens of guards blocked their way. Consequently, they decided to stay in 

the waiting room until they met the secretary personally. The guards permitted them 

to stay, but they imposed tight restrictions. When the protesters tried to order food 

around 5:00 p.m., the guards ripped the phones from the wall. Security also shadowed 

activists to the restrooms to prevent use of public phones. Guards even prohibited 

Schreiber, who was the president of NAD, from contacting his wife or leaving the 

floor to get his heart medication. Eventually, however, the guards recognized the 

severity of the situation and enabled Schreiber to receive his medication. The 

protesters went without food and stayed over night—sleeping on couches, desks, and 

the floor. On Wednesday, April 6, Secretary Califano met with the protesters and 

asked them to leave. But he would not commit to signing the regulations 
16 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

immediately. The demonstrators discussed staying and being forcibly arrested, but 

voted to end the protest that afternoon instead. 

The longest demonstration was in San Francisco, where the group refused to 

leave the HEW building until the regulations were signed.26 As in Washington, HEW 

officials initially tried to squelch the protest by starving the demonstrators and cutting 

off telephone communications. Persons whose conditions required personal 

attendants, medication, and medical devices such as catheters were thus putting their 

health and lives at risk. The clamp-down, however, served to motivate and unite the 

demonstrators rather than discourage and disband them. Moreover, largely due to the 

intervention of Governor Jerry Brown, protesters were ultimately allowed to stay in 

the building and receive outside assistance. Within days, the number of people 

dwelling inside the building grew to well over 100. 

The surrounding community, which cherished its tradition of protest, aided the 

protesters. Area grocers and restaurants donated food. The local Black Panthers prepared 

and delivered an Easter dinner. And community religious leaders assisted in celebrating 

Easter and Passover. Congressman Phillip Burton helped win the installation of pay 

phones. This helped demonstrators maintain their lines of communication with the 

outside world, which they sustained as well through banners, sign language, and a set of 

walkie-talkies smuggled in by a local gay activist group, the Butterfly Brigade. On the 

inside, demonstrators were cultivating “a mini-Woodstock,” as one journalist described it. 

Rubenfeld called it “a love-fest.”27 Living in open quarters stimulated close friendships. 

People with diverse disabilities came to know and understand each other better, which 

helped cultivate a united vision for their common betterment. The persistence of the 

demonstrators was a powerful testimony to their determination to achieve their civil rights. 

And their actions left Secretary Califano little 

choice but to sign the regulations without 

change, which he finally did, on April 28.28 

Two days later, the disability activists ended 

their occupation of the HEW building. 

The battle over Section 504 

regulations gave voice to the 

disability rights movement. 

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 

Section 504, and the 504 regulations were significant for a number of reasons. First, 

Section 504 eventually helped change the way people thought about disability. As 

one disability historian explained: “The words we use to define problems, or to 

evaluate potential solutions to those problems, structure thinking by linking concrete 

situations to moral categories. Section 504 transformed federal disability policy by 

conceptualizing access for people with disabilities as a civil right rather than as a 

welfare benefit.”29 This was a decisive and important shift. Disability had long been 

viewed as a condition meriting government assistance, but this elevated disability to 

the realm of civil rights and gave persons with disabilities access to a new legal 

vehicle for asserting their place in American society. The regulations affirmed this 

point: Section 504 “represents the first federal civil rights law protecting the rights of 

handicapped persons and reflects a national commitment to end discrimination on the 

basis of handicap.”30 
 DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 17 

Second, the battle over 

Section 504 regulations gave voice to 

the disability rights movement. The 

disability community’s minor role in 

bringing about the original Section 

504 legislation is less important than 

the protests that the regulations 

spurred. Secretary Califano would 

have had to sign the regulations 

eventually. But the protests made it extremely difficult for the secretary to 

incorporate any changes that might have weakened the regulations. And they left a 

lasting image of persons with wheelchairs taking over federal buildings—a practice 

which became a model for future demonstrations. 

Legislation develops in political, 

social, intellectual, and cultural 

contexts. Successful laws are as 

much about the people that shape 

them as they are about legislative 

language. 

Third, the Section 504 regulations established legal standards for 

nondiscrimination tailored to the civil rights needs of persons with disabilities, which 

would later be replicated in the ADA. The regulations determined that ending 

discrimination for persons with disabilities meant taking proactive steps to remove 

barriers and make reasonable accommodations. Additionally, the regulations 

balanced this need against a limit of “undue hardship” for the federal agencies and 

contractors covered by the regulations. 

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 would be the 

principal legal foundation for the ADA: the twin pillars. There could be no ADA 

without them. It was not enough, however, only to have a legislative foundation. 

Passing legislation is a complicated process; it is not merely an inevitable and logical 

development of legal principle. Legislation develops in political, social, intellectual, 

and cultural contexts. Successful laws are as much about the people that shape them 

as they are about legislative language. Thus, even with the legal framework of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 well-established by 1980, 

the ADA could not have succeeded at that time. The social, political, and cultural 

contexts necessary to support such legislation were simply not yet in place. While the 

1977 protests were the crowning achievement of ACCD and a major rite of passage 

for the disability rights movement, the movement was still in its infancy. Yet, over 

the ensuing decade, the disability rights movement bloomed. The disability 

community attained a new sophistication in legal expertise, developed a political 

presence in the White House and on Capitol Hill, and established credibility with the 

broader civil rights community. 

Growth of the Disability Rights Movement DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT

As Congress and HEW in Washington were writing civil rights language into 

federal laws and regulations, important work within the disability community was taking 

place throughout the nation. A disability rights movement was being born. It was not the 

first time people had advocated for the rights of persons with disabilities, but the 

movement that formed in the 1970s was uniquely consumer-driven. Not all constituencies 
18 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

of the disability community supported the 

effort to view disability as a civil rights issue 

with the same vigor. Indeed, great obstacles 

had to be overcome to establish a meaningful 

disability rights movement. 

Although the disability rights 

movement developed in the tradition of the 

1960s social movements, a number of factors made the rise of this movement much 

more difficult. “Disability” as a class did not share the same cohesive forces manifest 

with race and gender. In the 1950s and 1960s, persons who were blind, paralyzed, or 

mentally ill did not naturally share a common identity. In fact, persons with different 

disabilities were often in conflict over limited government resources. Moreover, 

disability transcended and intersected such categories as race, gender, and class that 

often provided a basis for affinity and identity. Persons with disabilities generally did 

not inhabit the same physical communities that helped fuel the civil rights movement. 

And segregation for persons with disability meant not only separation from 

mainstream society, but also isolation from each other. 

The disability rights movement 

grew primarily out of personal 

experiences and the 

recognition that current 

quality of life was inadequate. 

The disability rights movement began to take shape during the 1970s in spite 

of these obstacles. It is difficult, however, to explain its origins neatly, for it derived 

from multiple sources. While the movement drew on various cultural currents to 

achieve its ends, it grew primarily out of personal experiences with disabilities and the 

recognition that current quality of life was inadequate. Even though most persons 

within the disability community shared similar goals—such as education, jobs, 

dignity, access, and equal participation—the wide variety of disabilities meant that 

subgroups of the disability community did not always seek the same objectives. The 

activities of one group were not only often unknown to others, at times they ran 

counter to the efforts of others. 

One key source of the disability rights movement was the independent living 

movement. Early threads of the movement can be seen as early as the 1950s, when 

people such as Mary Switzer and Gini Laurie began to realize that disability services 

could be cheaper and more effective when provided through personal attendant care at 

home rather than in institutions. In the 1960s, the independent living movement 

gained momentum predominantly through the influence of college students. In 1962, 

for example, four students with disabilities at the University of Illinois at ChampaignUrbana helped start the movement by leaving an isolated facility to reside near 

campus in a home modified for accessibility. They then began working with the 

University to improve campus accessibility and gain increased control over their own 

lives. 

A similar and more visible effort took place the same year, when Ed Roberts, 

who was paralyzed from polio, entered the University of California at Berkeley.31 The 

school housed him in the third floor of Cowell Hospital, where he was aided by 

friends and attendants with eating and dressing. Roberts thrived. He earned not only 

his undergraduate degree, but also a masters degree in political science. News of his 
 DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 19 

success spread, and by 1967 twelve students with major disabilities joined him in 

Cowell. These students, who called themselves the “Rolling Quads,” began holding 

brainstorming sessions about ways they could increase their self-sufficiency. Rather 

than be directed by, and dependent on, bureaucrats, they wanted to be able to secure 

their own funding, find their own jobs, and make their own decisions. 

To promote this they secured a grant from HEW, in 1970, to finance a 

Physically Disabled Students’ Program (PDSP). The goal of the program was 

independent living. The ramped office 

provided access to residential 

counselors, tips on where and how to 

obtain personal attendants, and a 

wheelchair repair shop. To meet the 

growing requests for service from nonstudents, PDSP leaders joined to 

incorporate the Berkeley Center for 

Independent Living in 1972. As one 

journalist observed: “It would be run by 

people with disabilities; approach their problems as social issues; work with a broad 

range of disabilities; and make integration into the community its chief goal. 

Independence was measured by an individual’s ability to make his own decisions and 

the availability of the assistance necessary—from attendants to accessible housing—to 

have such control.”32 

The potential of persons with 

disabilities could not be realized 

simply by trying to “rehabilitate” 

the individual. “Society” also 

had to be “rehabilitated.” 

Shortly after the Berkeley center began its operation, other programs opened 

their doors: in Boston, Massachusetts; Houston, Texas; Columbus, Ohio; and Lansing, 

Michigan. The movement also gained support in Congress. The original 

Rehabilitation Act of 1972 included an Independent Living Program to help promote 

independent living services around the country. Although it was eliminated as part of 

the compromise with President Nixon in 1973, the Carter administration afforded a 

new opportunity. The program was established as part of the 1978 Amendments to 

the Rehabilitation Act and became known as the Title VII program. Despite its very 

limited funding, the Title VII program breathed life into the incipient independent 

living movement. It helped establish standards for independent living programs that 

ensured a high level of consumer control and the provision of core services. In the 

ensuing decade, the number of independent living centers around the country grew 

exponentially. 

The independent living movement represented nothing less than a radical 

transformation in thinking about disability policy. One might call it a paradigm 

shift.33 Prior to the 1970s, disability was viewed primarily as a medical issue. 

Persons with disabilities were considered “sick” or “impaired” and in need of a cure. 

They were patients who required experts’ instructions about how to “get better.” The 

problem of disability was seen to reside in the individual, who must be “rehabilitated” 

and returned to gainful employment. 
20 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

Advocates of independent living saw things differently. Infused with a rights 

mentality sparked by the civil rights, women’s, and anti-war movements, these 

individuals wanted to shed the medical model that cast them as passive recipients of 

professional care. Instead they 

asserted their rightful place in society. 

They pursued mechanisms for self-help 

rather than relying predominantly on 

authorities. They advocated a 

consumer spirit that established the 

role of the consumer as the decisionmaker and people with disabilities as 

the experts. And they rejected the idea 

that persons with disabilities, even 

persons with severe disabilities, should 

be isolated in custodial institutions. 

Instead they promoted community-based living. Moreover, advocates of independent 

living hoped to improve the lives of people with disabilities by promoting crossdisability interaction. People with diverse disabilities could help each other through 

peer counseling and present a stronger voice for policy change. 

The independent living movement 

represented nothing less than a 

radical transformation in thinking 

about disability policy. Advocates 

wanted to shed the medical model 

that cast them as passive 

recipients of professional care. 

According to the philosophy of independent living, the problem of 

“disability” did not reside simply in the individual, but also in society, in the 

rehabilitation process, the physical environment, and the mechanisms of social policy. 

The full potential of persons with disabilities therefore could not be realized simply 

through trying to “rehabilitate” the individual. “Society” also had to be 

“rehabilitated,” by making the physical environment more accessible and destroying 

the attitudes that rendered persons with disabilities as helpless victims in need of 

charity. 

In this respect, the independent living movement was strikingly analogous to 

previous movements for civil rights. In the early twentieth century, people widely 

talked of the “race problem,” referring to the presence of blacks in America. The 

locus of the problem was supposedly the individual black person and his or her 

supposed inferiority. With the civil rights movement came a new social critique. The 

problem was not the black person, but pervasive racism. The American economy and 

social structures tended to exclude blacks, rather than incorporate them as valued 

citizens. What was needed, therefore, was a transformation of the nature of America’s 

institutions—through legal measures and a gradual erosion of prejudice. Feminists 

experienced similar problems, as the social and economic frameworks functioned to 

limit their opportunities. To give women their rightful place in society, fundamental 

structural change had to occur. And so it was with the nascent disability rights 

movement. Advocates argued that people with disabilities should not have to 

accommodate themselves to a society designed to exclude them. Instead they 

encouraged disabled persons to assert their right to join society and promoted reforms 

to facilitate participation. 
 DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 21 

This social critique, however, was not about subverting core American values. 

Rather, it was about partaking of the American ideology of liberty and opportunity. 

Persons with disabilities had the same aspirations as other Americans. This mentality 

also challenged disability professionals. Many disability rights advocates viewed 

these professionals as accomplices in discrimination because they treated disabled 

persons as “sick” patients. In addition, advocates thought some special interest 

organizations contributed to infantile notions of persons with disabilities by appealing 

to charity for “helpless” children. 

The rise of independent living centers was a crucial aspect of the disability 

rights movement. But other contributions were also significant: for example, those 

concerning developmental disabilities and mental illness. Organizations such as the 

ARC, which endeavored to assist persons with developmental disabilities in living 

better lives, focused especially on two issues: institutionalization and education. 

Advocates found appalling conditions and subhuman standards in many institutions 

for people with disabilities. In addition to exploring ways to develop communitybased alternatives, they promoted institutional reform. In the early 1970s, the ARC 

collaborated with a group of Washington-based organizations to pass a law to protect 

the rights and treatment of persons with developmental disabilities in institutions. By 

1975, under the leadership of Paul Marchand of the ARC, the group of organizations 

formally identified themselves as the Consortium for Citizens with Developmental 

Disabilities (CCDD). Their efforts culminated in the Developmental Disabilities 

Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, which promoted respect for the basic 

human rights of institutionalized persons. Congress built on this Act in 1980 with the 

Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, which gave the Federal Government 

authority to sue local operators of institutions that consistently violated the 

constitutional rights of persons in prisons, mental hospitals, and other institutions. 

CCDD was also interested in improving educational prospects for persons 

with developmental disabilities. In this regard they shared the interests of a variety of 

disability organizations, whose collective efforts assisted in passage of the Education 

for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (more commonly known as Public Law 94-

142). This act, supported by persons with disabilities across the spectrum, was a 

milestone. It had the crucial effect of raising a generation of persons with disabilities 

who expected to attain a rightful place in American society, not isolation and 

segregation. This generation would compel its teachers and peers to develop the same 

understanding. A decade later, it 

would help mold public opinion 

about the ADA. 

In addition to centers for 

independent living and disabilityspecific organizations, other important 

elements of the growing disability 

rights movement included legal action 

centers and organizations devoted to political protest. For example, as an outgrowth of a 

legal activist project in law school, Robert Burgdorf and several other students at the 

“DIA was made up of young 

disabled dreamers who believed that 

fighting for their rights was their 

obligation.” 

—Judy Heumann 
22 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

University of Notre Dame established the National Center for Law and the Handicapped 

(NCLH). With support from the university, the American Bar Association, the ARC, and 

HEW, NCLH pursued cases around the country to help persons with disabilities. Their 

first work was based on due process and equal protection law, but Section 504 provided a 

new and stronger legal foundation. It “seemed like manna from heaven,” said Burgdorf.34 

Other legal centers active in promoting the rights of persons with disabilities were the 

Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (PILCOP) and INSPIRE of Georgetown 

University. 

While these organizations concentrated their efforts on the legal front, others 

focused exclusively on political activism. In 1970, Judy Heumann, who used a 

wheelchair because of polio, founded Disabled in Action (DIA). It developed out of 

publicity generated by Heumann’s lawsuit against the New York City Board of 

Education, which had denied her a license to teach. Heumann and such friends as 

Denise McQuade, Frita Tankus, and Larry Weisman decided to use the case as a 

vehicle to heighten attention to disability issues in general. As people with disabilities 

and their families read and saw the coverage of Heumann’s case, many began calling 

her about their own experiences: a cry for broader, collective action. Heumann and 

others felt that existing organizations were not sufficiently politically active: DIA 

would thus be overtly and exclusively political. It “was made up of young disabled 

dreamers who believed that fighting for their rights was their obligation,” said 

Heumann. Two more DIA organizations soon formed in Philadelphia and Baltimore. 

They were all cross-disability in focus and engaged such issues as transportation, 

architectural accessibility, television telethons, sheltered workshops, and 

institutionalization. In 1972, Heumann led DIA to protest President Nixon’s veto of 

the Rehabilitation Act, culminating with two separate occupations of Nixon’s 

headquarters just days before the election.35 DIA was also instrumental in protesting 

HEW’s delay in issuing the Section 504 regulations. 

The experiences with political protest, and especially the 1977 

demonstrations, led Robert Funk, Mary Lou Breslin, Pat Wright, and Judy Heumann, 

who were in varying ways associated with the independent living center in Berkeley, 

to focus on the absence of a national legal defense fund for persons with disabilities. 

As a partial solution, Heumann helped found the Disability Law Resource Center 

(DLRC) as part of the Berkeley Center for Independent Living. The purpose of 

DLRC was to provide legal services to individuals with disabilities: studies had shown 

that persons with disabilities were not adequately served by state legal services. 

Robert Funk and Paul Silver were among its leading attorneys. 

To help manage the legal affairs of the organization, Funk and Silver hired a 

young attorney named Arlene Mayerson. Interestingly, Mayerson had no prior 

experience in disability law; she was trained in civil rights law. But Funk and Silver 

selected her over scores of applicants, including persons who recounted stories of 

working with disabled children in camps. “They wanted someone who didn’t have a 

lot of preconceived notions about what was best for people with disabilities,” 

Mayerson explained. “They wanted someone who thought in terms of civil rights and 

whom they could mold in the disability rights movement’s image.”36 At DLRC 
 DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 23 

Mayerson addressed any issue people brought to her—being kicked out by a landlord, 

getting fired, or being denied entrance to a restaurant—with whatever legal means 

were available at the time. 

DLRC was only a two-year model program. As funding approached its end, 

Funk, Breslin, and Wright decided that a more comprehensive and long-lasting 

program was needed: a national legal defense fund in the tradition of those for 

minorities and women. Consequently, in 1980, they created and opened a new 

organization called DREDF, the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund. 

Wright referred to Funk as “the architect” of the operation, the one who was 

responsible for its stable foundation. Breslin provided the “vision” and excelled at 

management. Wright described herself as the “political strategist” and the “brawn” of 

the organization. Mayerson joined these three and represented “the brains” behind the 

legal operation. This blend of talent, said Wright, was the key to DREDF’s success.37 

Through DREDF, Funk, Wright, Breslin, and Mayerson could advocate a 

national legislative and law reform agenda to provide more leverage for meeting the 

concerns of persons with disabilities. DREDF had two main goals. The first was “to 

make disability a real true partner in the civil rights community nationally.”38 Up until 

that time, although many persons were increasingly demanding their own rights, 

neither the civil rights community nor most disability interest groups viewed disability 

rights primarily as civil rights. Rather, most groups focused narrowly on their own 

missions shaped by particular diagnoses and impairments. DREDF hoped to change 

that. The second goal was to pursue law reform that would provide persons with 

disabilities legal protections equivalent to those available to other minorities and 

women. 

As a first step toward meeting these goals, DREDF leaders sponsored a 

meeting in San Francisco in the fall of 1980. They invited prominent strategists, 

organizers, and attorneys from other civil rights causes. The purpose of the meeting 

was twofold. First, DREDF wanted to educate the civil rights community about 

disability. They prepared a briefing book that laid out how the education, 

employment, and voting problems faced by persons with disabilities were similar to 

those confronting racial minorities and women. The second objective was to provide 

DREDF with an opportunity to learn from the successes of other civil rights causes 

and make contacts so that DREDF and other disability organizations could become 

full partners in the civil rights community. 

Funk, Wright, Breslin, and Mayerson learned an important lesson from the 

meeting. If DREDF were to achieve its goal of being a truly national legal defense 

fund, it had to have a presence in Washington. Thus, in 1981, they set up an office in 

the nation’s capital. There they encountered Evan Kemp, Jr., who, since 1980, ran the 

Disability Rights Center (DRC)—an organization sponsored by Ralph Nader. 

Although Kemp worked out of just two small rooms, he donated one to DREDF. 

Kemp had begun making his own imprint on the disability rights landscape. Since 

1976, first under the direction of Deborah Kaplan and then under Kemp, DRC focused 

its efforts on eliminating employment discrimination by disseminating information 
24 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

and lobbying to retain programs. It also educated the general public about the 

disability rights movement by submitting articles to newspapers and magazines, and 

appearing on television shows and radio spots. 

One of Kemp’s favorite 

campaigns was assaulting the 

image of “pity” that dominated 

public portrayals of persons with 

disabilities. He focused especially 

on the Jerry Lewis Muscular 

Dystrophy Association Telethon, 

which, Kemp argued, contributed 

to prejudice against persons with 

disabilities. “These prejudices 

create stereotypes that offend our self-respect, harm our efforts to live independent 

lives and segregate us from the mainstream of society,” Kemp wrote. Moreover, the 

telethon reinforced infantile notions of persons with disabilities by showing them as 

dependent children. It lent credibility to public images of disabled persons as 

“helpless.” It also underscored the notion of persons with disabilities as “sick” and in 

need of cure. “If it is truly to help,” said Kemp, “the telethon must show disabled 

people working, raising families and generally sharing in community life,” and 

promote independent living programs rather than servile dependence.39 Kemp also 

defended efforts to integrate persons with disabilities through barrier removal by 

arguing how it would benefit all Americans: for example, bicyclists and stroller-users 

taking advantage of curb cuts and subway elevators.40 

“These prejudices create stereotypes 

that offend our self-respect, harm our 

efforts to live independent lives and 

segregate us from the mainstream of 

society.” 

—Evan Kemp, Jr. 

After joining Kemp in Washington, Wright and Mayerson began introducing 

themselves to people and groups around Washington “to say we’re here to do one 

thing, and that’s civil rights.”41 The early 1980s, however, were not exactly an 

auspicious time to be heading to Washington to promote civil rights. President 

Ronald Reagan entered office with the intention of minimizing federal regulations and 

reducing government’s role in society, not establishing new rights and more 

regulations. This placed most persons in the disability movement in a defensive 

posture, trying to hold the territory already secured rather than launching new 

expeditions. But DREDF had other things in mind. 

One of the most important contacts DREDF made at the 1980 San Francisco 

meeting was with Ralph Neas, Director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

(LCCR). LCCR was the legislative arm of the civil rights movement and coordinated 

the legislative side of all civil rights initiatives. It worked by the consensus of all 

conference constituencies: for example, African Americans and women. DREDF 

believed that any effective campaign to advance the civil rights of persons with 

disabilities would need the support of LCCR, which carried over thirty years of 

experience in civil rights, had extensive relationships in Congress, and had firmly 

established its credibility. Neas described Wright and Mayerson as “thinking five or 

six years down the line” in their solicitation of LCCR at the conference. And it was at 
 FIRST VICTORY 25 

the 1980 meeting, he said, that the strategy for achieving comprehensive civil rights 

for persons with disabilities was first articulated.42 

DREDF was not the first disability organization to join with LCCR. PVA and 

ACB, for example, had been long-time members of LCCR. DREDF was unique, 

however, in seeking a tight alliance with the civil rights community as its central 

mission. Although Wright and Mayerson established a link with Neas and the LCCR 

as a result of the San Francisco conference, and Wright eventually represented 

DREDF on the LCCR Executive Board, they did not think they could count on 

LCCR’s support immediately. First they had to establish their own credibility and get 

involved in LCCR campaigns as much as any other group. Over the next several 

years they did precisely that. 

First Victory FIRST VICTORY 

Sometimes, as in basketball, the best way to launch an offensive assault is to 

get a good defensive stop—a steal, a forced turnover. President Reagan’s Task Force 

on Regulatory Relief provided just such an opportunity. No single president since 

Franklin Roosevelt, wrote one historian, “altered the political landscape so radically 

and in such a short period” as did Reagan.43 He entered office on January 21, 1981, 

with the support of a business coalition dedicated to rescuing a languishing, inflationridden economy. To Reagan, government was primarily an “obstacle to personal 

achievement and opportunity.” Alternatively, he promoted the idea of the “selfreliant, self-made individual.”44 For domestic policy, Reagan proposed and obtained 

the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. This act provided deep personal and 

corporate tax cuts that primarily benefitted the wealthiest Americans, on the 

assumption that wealth would trickle down to assist lower-income persons. 

By insisting on a combination of tax cuts and vast increases in military 

spending, President Reagan was able to force a reduction in federal, domestic 

expenditures. Thus, in addition to freeing up business through tax cuts, Reagan 

wanted to roll back the development of the welfare state by advocating reductions in 

social spending. He achieved this aim through the Omnibus Budget and 

Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), which cut $140 billion from the federal budget 

through Fiscal Year 1985. Reagan also hoped to aid businesses, school boards, and 

government units through a deregulation campaign: the Task Force on Regulatory 

Relief. He appointed Vice President Bush to lead these endeavors, who in turn 

designated his chief counsel, C. Boyden Gray, to take charge. Over 150 different 

pieces of enacted legislation were targeted for analysis.45 

Section 504 was now 

known by many as “the 

Civil Rights Law for the 

Handicapped.” 

As Kemp observed, President Reagan’s 

emphasis on self-reliance and rugged individualism 

resonated with some aspects of the disability rights 

movement.46 But Reagan’s initiatives did not 

generally offer hope to the disability community. 

Reagan’s civil rights record, for example, was cause 
26 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

for concern: he had won his way to the California governorship in part by standing against 

student and civil rights protests in the 1960s. And his Task Force on Regulatory Relief 

posed a direct threat to the civil rights gains of the disability community. Three of the 

early targets of the task force were the Section 504 regulations, the Education for all 

Handicapped Children Act (P.L. 94-142), and the regulations for the Architectural and 

Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (ATBCB). Although the ATBCB regulations 

were relatively technical and non-controversial, changes to Section 504 and P.L. 94-142 

regulations had potentially staggering implications. 

Section 504 was now known by many as “the Civil Rights Law for the 

Handicapped.”47 Any changes to it would be a major defeat and could have dire 

consequences for other civil rights regulations. As one civil rights attorney explained, 

persons in the disability community thought the Reagan administration started with 

disability regulations because “they thought the disability community was the least 

well organized and they could slip these regulations through and use them as 

precedents for other regulations.”48 Deregulation of P.L. 94-142 posed an additional 

threat to the educational prospects of persons with disabilities, which in turn might 

jeopardize employment opportunities. The administration also considered introducing 

legislation limiting the level of service for, and individual attention to, persons with 

disabilities in the educational process.49 

Prior to becoming chief counsel to Vice President Bush, Gray had no 

experience with disability policy. But these regulations immersed him in it, and he 

gained a new education. The Task Force started with Section 504. By January, 1982, 

Gray had received a draft of proposed changes from the Department of Justice (DOJ). 

This draft was leaked, however, and came into the hands of disability organizations, 

including DREDF. Wright and Funk convened a meeting of nine disability 

organizations to discuss the proposals, which decided to have DREDF lead the fight. 

In March, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) supplied DREDF 

with extra ammunition: a leak of OMB’s proposed changes. OMB’s proposals 

included a provision that would allow federal grant recipients, in certain cases, to 

weigh the cost of an accommodation against the “social value” of the person involved. 

“This was a cost-benefit analysis of how human you are,” said Funk. DREDF worked 

with such organizations as NCIL and ARC to help mobilize disability groups all over 

the country to protest by writing letters. For NCIL, which was founded that year, this 

was one of the first opportunities to join other organizations in national advocacy 

efforts. In Washington, Wright and Funk met extensively with Gray to discuss the 

details and ramifications of changing the regulations. They were joined by Kemp, 

who brought a trump card to the 

table: himself. For over a decade, 

Gray and Kemp had been bridge 

partners and had become close 

friends. Kemp built on this 

relationship to persuade Gray against 

permitting damaging alterations to 

Section 504 and P.L. 94-142. Gray 

Persons in the disability community 

organized a nation-wide, 

grassroots letter-writing campaign 

and flooded the White House with 

letters—over 40,000 by 1983. 
 FIRST VICTORY 27 

consequently became a mediating force between those rewriting the regulations and 

the disability lobbyists.50 

The controversy intensified later in the fall when the Task Force began 

consideration of the education provisions. Parents of persons with disabilities were 

outraged and united with other disability advocates to resist President Reagan’s 

actions. Persons in the disability community organized a nationwide, grassroots 

letter-writing campaign and flooded the White House with letters—over 40,000 by 

1983. As part of the review process, Gray held hearings throughout the country. 

Thousands of persons and parents of persons with disabilities attended to demonstrate 

their opposition. They presented testimony explaining the harm that would be caused 

by changing the regulations. One two-inch-tall Los Angeles headline declared: 

“Parents of Disabled Children Boo Reagan Proposals.”51 Congress joined these efforts 

by sending a letter signed by majorities in both chambers urging the president to 

support the full funding of P.L. 94-142. House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel 

helped arrange a meeting between Sally Hoerr, president of the Illinois Alliance for 

Exceptional Children and Adults, and Chief of Staff James A. Baker, III, to enable 

Hoerr to articulate her opposition. 

By January, 1983, Gray had a final draft of the proposed revisions in his 

hands, but Kemp and Wright pleaded with Gray not to make the changes. Two 

months later, in part because of Gray’s influence, Bradford Reynolds, Assistant 

Attorney General for Civil Rights, finally agreed to abandon the regulatory efforts.52

And on March 21, Vice President Bush wrote a letter to Kemp informing him that 

Section 504 and P.L. 94-142 would be left untouched. Bush explained that 

conversations with members of Congress and with the disability community made him 

understand the negative impact such changes would have. Especially helpful, Bush 

said, were the comments of persons with disabilities and their families. “Your 

commitment to equal opportunity for disabled citizens to achieve their full potential as 

independent, productive citizens is fully shared by this Administration,” he told 

Kemp.53

This was a huge victory, a big defensive stop. And it was important not 

simply for the content of the regulations. What had started out as a threat to roll back 

years of gains served to unite the disability community. For the first time persons and 

parents of persons with disabilities and scores of different organizations joined 

together for a common cause, to defend disability rights. “It showed the disability 

community that there was a reason to write in all those responses to alerts,” Mayerson 

said, “and it showed the Administration that there was a political element here as well 

as a legal righteousness in the cause.”54 Gray concurred: “One of the things I found is 

[that] the disability community . . . wanted to be treated as a potent political force just 

like any other force. [It] was part of the empowerment.”55 

This two-year process was also crucial for the relationships it fostered. 

Wright, Funk, and Kemp were now close allies. During the ADA deliberations, Funk 

and Kemp would be working within the administration instead of lobbying it from the 

outside—respectively as a White House negotiator and Chairman of the Equal 
28 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

Employment Opportunity Commission 

(EEOC). They would be important links 

for the disability community. Moreover, 

through the efforts of Wright, Funk, 

Kemp, Mayerson, and thousands of 

Americans, Gray and Vice President 

Bush had earned a valuable education that 

would prove indispensable during the 

deliberations over the ADA. Gray marveled at how Bush “intuitively grasped” 

disability issues.56 Gray and Bush also became genuinely interested in disability 

issues. Bush, for example, began asking Kemp to write his speeches when he spoke 

before disability groups, which enabled him to develop relationships with others in the 

disability community.57 

The activities of the disability 

community in the 1980s may 

largely be viewed as a defensive 

effort to sustain the gains of the 

1970s. 

Building a Winning Record BUILDING A WINNING RECORD

Washington likes winners. Throughout the 1980s, the disability community 

recorded an impressive string of judicial and legislative victories that helped build the 

disability movement’s credibility in Washington. In the process, crucial networks 

continued to develop. The DREDF-arranged San Francisco conference of 1980 laid 

the foundation for forming an alliance with the civil rights community. Neas reports 

meeting with Wright and Mayerson at the conference and notes one occasion in which 

Wright emphasized that it was extremely important to be victorious in the first civil 

rights battle for people with disabilities. They therefore decided to tackle something 

comparatively small: the issue of voting accessibility.58 The goal was to ensure that 

the principle of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, equal access to voting, encompassed 

persons with physical impairments. Wright and Neas and others achieved this goal 

with the passage of the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 

1984. Neas explains that this victory was absolutely crucial: “If we had not won on 

the Voting Rights extension, . . . I don’t think we would have won any civil rights bills 

after.”59 Indeed, many more difficult challenges lay ahead, and that victory was an 

important foundation for facing them. 

The activities of the disability community in the 1980s may largely be viewed 

as a defensive effort to sustain the gains of the 1970s. In addition to the deregulation 

efforts of the Reagan administration, the disability community also faced a Supreme 

Court that did not enforce the disability rights that had been attained and threatened to 

overturn established provisions. In fact, the preponderance of legal activity within the 

disability community during the 1980s related to the Supreme Court and its rulings. 

Things did not start out well. In a 1979 Supreme Court ruling in Southeastern 

Community College v. Davis, the Court questioned the viability of the regulations 

developed to implement Section 504. The case addressed a nursing school’s 

responsibility to accommodate the needs of a hearing-impaired applicant. The Court’s 

conclusion that such accommodations were not required by the school was a 

significant defeat for the disability community. 
 BUILDING A WINNING RECORD 29 

The Supreme Court did not take on 

another Section 504 case for five years, but in 

1984 the results were much more encouraging. 

In Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, 

the Court affirmed that the Section 504 

regulations did indeed apply to employment discrimination. DREDF had taken the 

lead in arguing the case for the disability community and was pleased to see its efforts 

pay off: the Court established that courts must give considerable deference to the 504 

regulations. This decision reflected the results of a Pennsylvania District Court case, 

Nelson v. Thornburgh, which ruled that the state’s Department of Public Welfare was 

obligated to absorb the costs of readers or electronic devices for visually-impaired 

employees, because the cost did not constitute an “undue hardship.” 

Discrimination cannot be 

justified by ignorance. 

The Supreme Court’s decisions, however, were not all positive for the 

disability community in the 1980s. From 1984 to 1986, the Supreme Court handed 

down six cases with, at best, mixed results. In the 1985 decision Alexander v. Choate,

the Court ruled against a group of Medicaid claimants, alleging the state violated 

Section 504 by reducing the number of days Medicaid covered for inpatient 

hospitalization. They argued the policy had a disparate impact*

 on persons with 

disabilities and that the policy should therefore be prohibited. Although the Court 

decided against the plaintiffs by affirming the policy, it made an important ruling on 

the nature of disability. The Court stressed that disability discrimination came most 

often not in the form of direct, conscious discrimination, but rather by unconscious 

neglect: curbs without ramps for wheelchairs, for example. Laws directed against 

disability discrimination therefore had to target discriminatory practices deeply 

embedded in society. 

Also in 1985, in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court 

considered whether a state zoning agency could exclude a group home for persons 

with developmental disabilities. The Court rejected an argument that persons with 

disabilities should be treated as a “quasi-suspect” class, which would warrant 

heightened judicial scrutiny for policies treating a group as a class. But it did 

establish an important principle by ruling that the exclusion was unconstitutional. The 

Court decided that the group home did not pose any “special threat” to the city’s 

“legitimate interests.” Rather, the exclusion was based on “irrational prejudice.” 

Discrimination against persons with disabilities, in other words, could not be justified 

by ignorance. 

 

*

 “Disparate impact” refers to indirect results of policy or action. In this 

case, plaintiffs alleged that the policy of reducing the number of covered days, while 

not expressly discriminating against persons with disabilities, would nonetheless have 

that effect because persons with disabilities were the most likely to require longer 

hospital stays.
30 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

The four remaining cases prompted the disability community to solicit 

Congress to pass legislation devoted to overturning the Supreme Court’s rulings. In 

1986 alone, Congress passed three acts to reverse Supreme Court decisions. The 

Handicapped Children’s Protection Act reversed the 1984 ruling Smith v. Robinson by 

ensuring that parents had the right to reasonable attorneys’ fees when successful in 

litigation. The Civil Rights and Remedies Equalization Act overturned Atascadero 

State Hospital v. Scanlon by establishing that states may not be immune from alleged 

Section 504 violations filed in federal court. And the Air Carriers Access Act 

overturned U.S. Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America by 

requiring that commercial airlines be subject to the accessibility standards of 

Section 504, regardless of whether they received federal assistance. Through these 

cases, the disability community attained a new level of legal sophistication. It also 

developed important connections. For the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act, for 

example, Wright and Mayerson worked extensively with Robert Silverstein, who later 

helped orchestrate the ADA deliberations in the Senate. 

The most significant Supreme Court decision was the 1984 ruling in Grove 

City College v. Bell. This case concerned Title IX of the Education Amendments Act, 

which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex in all programs receiving federal 

assistance. Although the Court sustained the principle of nondiscrimination, it ruled 

that the Title IX sanction of cutting off federal funds would be applied only to the 

particular program in question and not the entire institution. This decision had a 

profound impact on the entire civil rights community. Since the language prohibiting 

discrimination on the basis of sex in federally assisted programs or activities was 

identical to that for discrimination on the basis of race, age, and disability, it affected 

all groups equally. Consequently, overturning this decision and returning the civil 

rights statutes to their previous interpretation became the top priority for LCCR and 

the civil rights community. 

This gave the disability community a perfect opportunity to work side-by-side 

with other civil rights groups as equal members and partners. It took three years for 

them to see their objective met in the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which had to be 

passed over President Reagan’s veto. Mayerson, the chief attorney for the disability 

community, explained the significance of this act: “Not only could [the civil rights 

community] see that we could again do the work as well as they could and do the legal 

analysis as well as they could, but we were also actually able to open a few doors that 

weren’t traditionally open in the civil rights community.”60 Wright and Mayerson 

could build on the contacts they had made in their own disability-specific work and 

bring them to bear on the civil rights community’s endeavors. Moreover, as Neas 

explained, “those four years enabled about thirty or forty people to get to know one 

another really well, and we went to hell and back [on] a legislative roller coaster ride.” 

Those experiences, while trying, made for meaningful relationships and developed the 

trust necessary for effective collaboration.61 

Two further victories are important to understanding the ADA’s future 

success. The first is another Supreme Court case, the 1987 decision in School Board 

of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline. In this case a school board fired a teacher 
 BUILDING A WINNING RECORD 31 

exclusively because she was found to be susceptible to tuberculosis. Her attorneys 

tried to gain her protection under Section 504 as a handicapped person. The Court 

obliged them, ruling that a person with a contagious disease may be deemed a 

“handicapped person.” Such a decision, however, had to be based on an individual 

basis to determine whether an individual could do a job with or without a reasonable 

accommodation and if there were scientific evidence that the person posed a 

substantial health risk to others. This was a significant victory for the disability 

community because it made a powerful statement against “fearful, reflexive reactions” 

to people and confirmed that the discrimination faced by persons with disabilities is 

often based on fear and misapprehension, not on reality.62 

A final major victory for the disability community in the 1980s came with the 

Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, which expanded the protections afforded by 

the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and prohibited discrimination in the sale or rental of 

housing on the basis of disability. The Fair Housing Amendments Act was significant 

for several reasons. First, it added to the momentum the disability had been building 

throughout the 1980s. Its passage in September, following introduction of the ADA in 

April, gave a big boost to the ADA. Second, it afforded people with disabilities 

another opportunity to work with the civil rights community on one of its top 

priorities. But now, for the first 

time, disability was an important 

component in a major civil rights 

legislative initiative. Moreover, the 

disability community formed a close 

alliance with organizations 

advocating the rights of persons 

with the Human Immunodeficiency 

Virus (HIV) and Acquired 

Immunodeficiency Syndrome 

(AIDS), who were protected under this act as persons with disabilities. Third, the Fair 

Housing Amendments Act broke new ground with respect to civil rights for persons 

with disabilities by incorporating provisions that applied to the private business sector 

as well as to recipients of federal funding. And Fourth, the act provided an important 

foundation for the ADA by building on the Arline decision: it provided that unless an 

individual with a contagious disease posed a “direct threat” to the health and safety of 

others, discriminatory practices against such persons was unlawful. 

The history of the ADA began “in 

cities and towns throughout the 

United States when persons with 

disabilities began to challenge 

societal barriers.” 

—Arlene Mayerson 

Enactment of the Fair Housing Amendments Act on September 13, 1988, 

marked the end of a string of national, legislative victories during the 1980s. These 

accomplishments were crucial for the ADA’s success. As Mayerson explained: “The 

respect for the legal, organizational, and negotiation skills gained during these 

legislative efforts formed the basis of working relationships with members of 

Congress and officials of the administration that proved indispensable in passing the 

ADA.”63 
32 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

Grass Roots Activism GRASS ROOTS ACTIVISM

Although the legal battles won in Washington were of critical importance, 

equally important activities were taking place around the nation. As Mayerson writes, 

the history of the ADA began “in cities and towns throughout the United States when 

persons with disabilities began to challenge societal barriers that excluded them from 

their communities, and when parents of persons with disabilities began to fight against 

the exclusion and segregation of their children. It began with the establishment of 

local groups to advocate for the rights of persons with disabilities.”64 While the 1970s 

witnessed the creation of the disability rights movement, the 1980s experienced its 

blossoming, which came with a flurry of grass roots activism. 

Thousands of people around the country contributed to the disability rights 

movement. For many people with disabilities, college was a life-changing experience 

that marked the beginning of political action and underscored the importance of 

community. Roland Sykes, a student at Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio, was 

one example. He selected Wright State after his spinal cord injury because the 

university made concerted attempts to achieve campus accessibility. There Sykes 

joined with over 20 other students with disabilities who, as Ed Roberts had done at 

Berkeley, promoted a more accessible campus. This affirmed an important lesson 

Sykes had learned as a member of United Mine Workers of America: the power of 

collective bargaining. Joining with others not only provided emotional support, it 

added leverage in dealing with campus administrators. For example, students at 

Wright State helped create an adapted athletic program for persons with disabilities. 

“If it had been one person against [the] system, that never would have happened,” 

Sykes said.65 Students also succeeded in starting a pilot program for persons with 

disabilities. After all, the school was named after the famous Wright brothers who 

made history by taking to the air. People with disabilities had the same desire to fly. 

Another example was the disability community growing at Brooklyn College 

in New York, where Denise Figueroa gained a better understanding of living with 

polio by interacting with other students. At Brooklyn College she participated in her 

first demonstration: a protest against President Nixon’s veto of the Rehabilitation Act. 

She and her peers were also able to use student government funds to send students to 

the annual meeting of the President’s Committee on the Employment of the 

Handicapped. This provided an opportunity to make contacts with students from 

other college campuses who were also developing their own disability communities 

and fostering local activism. Even if students did not network directly with disabled 

students at other campuses, simply knowing that others shared the same goals was 

empowering. 

While Figueroa relished the opportunities college provided, she realized that 

she could not always rely on its architectural accessibility. “If I ever wanted to leave 

the campus and be able to participate in the community, we had to change the 

community too,” she observed.66 This understanding led many people to take their 

community-based activism beyond the college campus. In 1976, for example, 

students at Wright State University sued the city of Dayton under the Urban Mass 
 GRASS ROOTS ACTIVISM 33 

Transit Act, which said that public transportation should service all citizens, including 

people with disabilities and the elderly. Disabled activists won the case and secured a 

mandate that all transportation vehicles had to be accessible. Had it not been for the 

mobilization of the disability community, however, the transit authorities simply 

would not have taken the initiative. 

Outside of college campuses, the growing network of independent living 

centers served as crucial “community gathering places,” as Mark Johnson called 

them.67 Among other things, they fostered emotional support through peer counseling 

and thereby spread the “gospel” of disability rights and local action. Charlie Carr, for 

example, said that Fred Fay, who visited Carr at a hospital that he resided in while 

attending Massachusetts Bay Community College, “put a fire under me.” Fay 

demonstrated that a person with quadriplegia could be mobile, have one’s own 

apartment, drive a car, get married, have children, and earn a Ph.D.—”all the things 

that I would lay in bed and look up at the ceiling and think that I would never have,” 

Carr said.68 As a founding member of the Boston Center for Independent Living and 

one of the first to use its services, Carr obtained his own housing, attendant care, and 

became an ardent activist. 

Independent living 

centers drew on the learning 

experiences of other centers. In 

Denver, Colorado, the center 

known as Atlantis set an 

example of taking 

sledgehammers to sidewalks for 

fashioning curb cuts. Under the 

leadership of Wade Blank, Atlantis members also took busses hostage overnight to 

demand accessible transportation. Such demonstrations could be an effective tactic, 

as they were in Tulsa, Oklahoma, for example. After becoming Executive Director of 

the independent living center Ability Resources, in 1983, Sykes joined with Woody 

Osburn and others to organize Tulsans for Accessible Public Transportation (TAPT). 

Since they were unable to find an attorney willing to pursue litigation, they decided to 

use public opinion as an alternative and pressured local mayoral candidates and 

members of the transit board to promote accessible transportation. Between 1984 and 

1988, by using such dramatic tactics as chaining themselves to buses, members of 

TAPT helped swing elections to mayoral candidates who supported their cause. 

TAPT also targeted transit board members, who were volunteers, and had 

demonstrators follow them around town, compelling many to resign. Progress in 

achieving transportation accessibility, though slow, was real. And it illustrated the 

power of community action. 

Perhaps no single group epitomized 

grass roots activism more than people 

who considered themselves members of 

ADAPT—American Disabled for 

Accessible Public Transportation. 

Public demonstrations were fruitful in other contexts as well. Johnson, for 

example, gained his first taste of activism through the Metrolina Independent Living 

Center in Charlotte, North Carolina. It was 1980, and Metrolina activists learned that 

a local mall was developing an inaccessible theater. After seeking to work with the 

architects to no avail, Johnson and others staged a protest as a media event. Mall 
34 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

administrators responded in just a few weeks by installing a wheelchair lift. Public, 

media-oriented protests were not the only manifestation of grass roots activism. 

Subtler actions included placing warning cards on the windshields of cars illegally 

parked in spaces reserved for people with disabilities. 

Perhaps no single group epitomized grass roots activism more than people 

who considered themselves members of ADAPT—American Disabled for Accessible 

Public Transportation. The groundwork for ADAPT was laid by the Atlantis 

community in Denver in the early 1980s. Atlantis activists decided they wanted to 

develop a national effort to promote transportation accessibility through public 

protests. They approached NCIL to coordinate and sponsor the activities. Although 

NCIL publicly stated its support of accessible transportation, it was unwilling to 

advocate nationwide civil disobedience. People at Atlantis and other independent 

living centers, for example Bob Kafka and Stephanie Thomas in Houston, Texas, thus 

decided to organize their own grass roots organization. They made it radically 

decentralized. “It’s not incorporated,” Johnson explained: “no board, no president, no 

budget.”69 Rather, people from around the country identified themselves with ADAPT 

informally, based on their trust of others associated with the group. ADAPT’s 

activities were the product of volunteers and relied on networks of activists who could 

join its efforts. 

ADAPT’s most significant undertakings were its demonstrations at the annual 

meetings of the American Public Transit Association (APTA), held each fall in a 

different city. ADAPT targeted APTA because it was singularly most responsible for 

opposing accessible transportation. APTA had won a law suit against the Department 

of Transportation and thereby overruled the department’s Section 504 regulations. 

These regulations had required the purchase of accessible vehicles. But, according to 

the court decision, each local transit authority could determine the extent to which it 

made its services accessible. Members of ADAPT basically decided to shadow APTA 

until federal transportation laws changed. They began by disrupting APTA’s 

conference in Denver in 1983. ADAPT rallied the following year in Washington, 

D.C., in Los Angeles in 1985, in Detroit in 1986, and in San Francisco in 1987, 

coincidentally on the tenth anniversary of the Section 504 protests. ADAPT also 

surprised APTA by traveling all the way to Canada for one of its meetings. By the 

1989 deliberations of the ADA, APTA had largely resigned itself to equipping buses 

with lifts for public transportation. ADAPT had played a significant role in this 

change of heart. 

ADAPT’s efforts at coordinated action on the national level reflected a 

significant trend toward establishing vast networks for collective action, which 

accelerated during the 1980s. ACCD had been the first organization to develop a 

broad, cross-disability network. Under the authorship of Frank Bowe, ACCD 

published books to facilitate this growth. Coalition Building: A Report on a 

Feasibility Study to Develop a National Model for Cross-Disability Communication 

and Cooperation appeared in 1978.70 The next year, Planning Effective Advocacy 

Programs became available to fledgling organizations seeking integration into the 

ACCD network.71 In the 1980s, however, ACCD began to unravel. Fiscal restraint 
 GRASS ROOTS ACTIVISM 35 

imposed by the Reagan administration reduced the levels of available grant money, on 

which ACCD depended. In the absence of private funding, ACCD could not sustain 

its operations. Member organizations also felt the budget crunch, which caused many 

to turn inward and focus more on their own survival. Furthermore, internal conflicts 

over the focus of ACCD’s mission, predominantly concerning the degree of attention 

devoted to advocacy, reduced ACCD’s effectiveness. In 1985, ACCD officially 

closed its doors.72 

Other organizations tried to fulfill some of ACCD’s functions. Shortly after 

the establishment of the Title VII Independent Living Program in 1978, RSA 

convened a meeting of all centers supported by the grant. Marca Bristo, Director of 

Access Living in Chicago, described it as a “magical” time in which people from 

around the country were able to share their experiences. There was a “sense of 

excitement,” she said, and a “thirstiness” for greater levels of interaction. This laid 

the groundwork for the founding of NCIL in 1982, by Bristo, Max Starkloff, Bob 

Williams, Jim DeJong, and others. Starkloff was the first president and Bristo the first 

vice president.73 In 1986, Bristo became president of NCIL. 

NCIL’s main purpose was to facilitate the creation and maintenance of 

independent living centers. Throughout the 1980s, NCIL, as ADAPT, had no 

centralized headquarters, but rather coordinated its efforts through networking and the 

contributions of volunteers from local centers and other organizations. NCIL 

presented itself as the only cross-disability, national grassroots organization that was 

run by and for people with disabilities. For example, at least 51 percent of all 

independent living center staff had to be people with disabilities to qualify for 

membership. NCIL offered a national voice to the philosophy of independent living 

by promoting the rights, empowerment, and self-direction of people with disabilities. 

Its first major challenged involved working with the Federal Government to 

implement standards for the creation and operation of independent living centers. 

Consumer control was the major issue, and it took years for NCIL to compel the 

Federal Government to adopt its proposals. As NCIL battled Washington, it also 

established grass roots networks throughout the country, through which NCIL could 

funnel information to members and solicit advocacy for political initiatives. 

In 1985, Sykes augmented NCIL’s networking by creating a computer 

network. The network was started as the NCIL Computer Network and received 

funds from NCIL. Its purpose was to facilitate the information-intensive mission of 

NCIL. But as the network grew, 

the name was changed to 

DIMENET—Disabled Individuals 

Movement for Equality Network. 

DIMENET helped people with 

disabilities get online at the advent 

of the information age, giving 

them easy and inexpensive access 

to computer networking. By 

dialing into a local computer, and 

“By friend and foe alike, the disability 

community was taken seriously—it 

had become a political force to be 

reckoned with in Congress, in the 

voting booth, and in the media.” 

—Arlene Mayerson 
36 LAYING THE FOUNDATION

paying only for long-distance charges, callers could open electronic mail accounts, 

join discussion groups, and post files. It gave independent living centers a central 

clearing-house for information about the experiences of other centers and enabled 

them to download files. DIMENET was also a means to linking disability advocates 

in Washington to people with disabilities around the country. 

NCIL and ADAPT were not alone in fostering grass roots networking during 

the 1980s. Other disability-specific organizations, including NFB, ARC, NAD, and 

PVA, continued to expand their own membership. Consequently, by the time the 

ADA was introduced in Congress, dozens of mailing lists were available to serve as 

links between developments in Washington and the rest of the country. Moreover, the 

face of the disability community was changing. The Education for Handicapped 

Children Act was helping to raise a generation of persons with disabilities who 

expected to attain a respected place in society. Technical assistance training contracts 

such as those with DREDF helped arm individuals with legal knowledge. And such 

organizations as NCIL, ADAPT, ARC, UCPA, NAD, and NFB helped people with 

disabilities unite as a collective voice. 

The Disability Community in 1988 DISABILITY COMMUNITY IN 1988

Although the 1980s began by putting the disability community and the 

broader civil rights community on the defensive, Wright, Kemp, Neas, Funk, 

Mayerson, and many other leaders were able to achieve significant victories. “Piece 

by piece we put together a decade of legislative success,” Neas observed.74 In fact, he 

said, while the going was tough in dealing with the policies and practices of the courts 

and the Reagan administration, in Congress the “the 1980s, in all honesty, . . . were a 

bipartisan reaffirmation of civil rights and a bipartisan rejection of right-wing 

philosophy.”75 

Many people in the disability community, as well as such organizations as 

DREDF, aimed for the implementation of comprehensive civil rights protections for 

persons with disabilities. But a record of legislative success, coalition-forming, and 

grass roots organizing had to be established first. And in the decade between the 

Section 504 demonstrations and passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act, the 

disability community laid the necessary foundation. It earned the respect of the civil 

rights community. Talented leaders such as Wright proved their negotiation and 

legislative skills. People with disabilities formed an extensive and indispensable 

network of contacts with Congress and the administration. Through such disabilityrights attorneys as Mayerson, Burgdorf, Feldblum, Weisman, Tim Cook (with the 

National Disability Action Center), Bonnie Milstein (with the Mental Health Law 

Project), and Karen Peltz-Strauss (with the National Center for Law and the Deaf), the 

disability community reached new levels of legal sophistication. And throughout the 

country, hundreds of communities organized to improve the lives of disabled 

Americans by winning local battles: pockets of the United States were crafting 

stronger protections and providing greater access for persons with disabilities. These 

developments had a profound impact. “By friend and foe alike,” observed Mayerson, 
 DISABILITY COMMUNITY IN 1988 37 

“the disability community was taken seriously—it had become a political force to be 

reckoned with in Congress, in the voting booth, and in the media.”76 

No single activity or single event accounts for this success. Rather, it was due 

to the combined effect of the disability community’s efforts. “No one particular tactic 

is more valuable than another,” Mark Johnson said of his campaigns to achieve 

transportation accessibility. “If you’re an activist and an organizer, you have a fully 

developed strategy.”77 Indeed, the genius of the disability community’s political 

mobilization was that it pushed for change in so many different ways, by so many 

different people. The diverse efforts were not necessarily coordinated, but the 

cumulative effect was the creation of fertile soil in which an ADA seed could flourish. 

As Mayerson aptly concludes: “The ADA owes its birthright not to any one person or 

any few, but to the many thousands of people who make up the disability rights 

movement—people who have worked for years organizing and attending protests, 

licking envelopes, sending out alerts, drafting legislation, speaking, testifying, 

negotiating, lobbying, filing lawsuits, and being arrested—doing whatever they could 

for a cause in which they believed.”78 

 2 

PUTTING THE ADA 

ON THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA: 

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY 

When Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-CT) and Congressman Tony Coelho (DCA) first introduced the Americans with Disabilities Act in April, 1988, many

persons in and out of the disability community did not give it a fighting chance. During 

the 1980s the disability community was primarily on the defensive—withstanding a 

number of assaults and hoping simply to maintain its legislative and financial ground. 

Taking the offensive and introducing comprehensive civil rights legislation, when existing 

laws were not even adequately enforced, seemed unrealistic. In 1985, for example, when 

disability activist Duane French encountered people who talked about the need for 

comprehensive civil rights for people with disabilities, his response was: “Not in my 

lifetime, pal!”1

 Where did the idea for the ADA come from? How did it make its way to 

Congress as a viable policy option? And why at this particular moment? 

THEADA AND THE LEGISLATIVEAGENDA 

Accounting for why some issues and not others make their way to the 

legislative agenda is a favorite pastime of political scientists. Although no legislation

follows a generic model precisely, one compelling analysis is useful in understanding 

the ADA’s development. John Kingdon describes the Federal Government as an 

“organized anarchy.” According to Kingdon, public policies are not created through a 

systematic, orderly process of establishing goals, identifying problems, analyzing 

alternatives, and making rational choices. Nor is there an incremental, inexorable 

development over time. Rather, the process is messy. Kingdon contends that at any 

given moment three independent “policy streams” are active: problems (conditions 

that demand corrective attention), policies (proposals made by various academics, 

government staff members, and lobbying groups), and politics (swings in national 

mood, elections, a new administration, and ideological distribution shifts). Problems 

emerge and recede; pet solutions are developed even where there is no concrete 

problem; and the political landscape constantly shifts. However, at particular, limited 

moments in time—”windows of opportunity”—each of these streams merge and offer 

the potential for action: “A problem is recognized, a solution is available, the political 

climate makes the time right for change, and the constraints do not prohibit action.”2

Asked to explain why the ADA succeeded, numerous participants in the 

deliberative process asserted that the “timing” was right. Indeed, the ADA appears to 

have occurred during a window of opportunity. We have seen how during the 1980s a 

disability rights movement blossomed, characterized by grass roots political activism, 

important networking, and tangible legislative success. This developed fertile soil where a 
40 THE ADA AND THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

 

civil rights seed might flourish. But that was only part of the equation. There needed to 

be a clearly defined problem (for society, not just isolated individuals), coupled with a 

concrete solution, and a political climate to legitimate it. This complicated process also 

took shape during the 1980s. Although numerous sources helped give life to the ADA, 

the vehicle that united these elements and brought the bill to Congress was a little-known 

federal agency called the National Council on the Handicapped (NCD).*

 

National Council on the Handicapped NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED

The history of NCD dates to 1972, when Congress proposed an Office for the 

Handicapped as part of the Rehabilitation Act. Its purpose would be to review the 

programs of the Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) and evaluate and 

coordinate all federal programs affecting persons with disabilities. But Congress 

eliminated the Office in the compromise with President Nixon. The idea resurfaced in 

May, 1977, when delegates from every state gathered at the White House Conference 

on Handicapped Individuals. The participants reviewed federal disability policy and 

offered legislative recommendations. Among their conclusions was that the 

incoherence and intrinsic tensions of various disability policies required an agency to 

bring it to order. The Carter administration afforded Congress to take action. 

Congress passed legislation creating the National Institute of Handicapped Research 

(NIHR, now NIDRR), the Title VII independent living program, and the “projects 

with industries” program to assist disabled persons starting their own businesses. 

Congress also used the shift in political climate to implement the White House 

Conference’s recommendation by passing legislation that created NCD. 

In addition to directing NCD to establish policies for NIHR and advise the 

RSA Commissioner about RSA policies, Congress charged NCD to “review and 

evaluate on a continuing basis all [federal] policies, programs, and activities” 

concerning persons with disabilities, and to report on its activities.3

 NCD would be 

composed of fifteen presidential appointees, each serving three-year terms and with 

five new members each year. NCD could hire up to seven technical and professional 

staff, conduct hearings, and appoint advisory committees. It was housed in the 

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). 

NCD’s activities prior to 1984 are not well documented.4

 But the skeletal 

framework for the ADA was laid in 1983. After President Ronald Reagan entered office 

in 1981, he decided to disband the existing council and appoint all new members. On 

*

 Prior to November 7, 1988, when Congress changed the title of the 

National Council on the Handicapped to the National Council on Disability (NCD) to 

reflect changes in contemporary language use, the appropriate acronym was NCH. 

But to avoid confusion, since the time period covered in this work overlaps the name 

change, the latter acronym, NCD, will be used consistently, even for the time during 

which the agency went by the name of the National Council on the Handicapped. 
 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED 41 

October 4, 1982, he selected Joe Dusenbury, previously the Commissioner of the South 

Carolina Vocational Rehabilitation Services and President of the National Rehabilitation 

Association, as NCD Chairperson. NCD apparently had a mixed record, and the 

Education Department urged Dusenbury to submit a credible annual report, on time, to 

help improve NCD’s reputation.5

 To help direct NCD activities, Dusenbury appointed 

two Vice-chairpersons: Justin Dart and Sandra Parrino. Dart was the only NCD member 

Dusenbury knew before joining NCD; they had worked together on the President’s 

Committee on the Employment of the Handicapped. NCD members turned immediately 

to the task of the report, and decided that, in meeting NCD duties, they should prepare an 

ambitious proposal for disability policy. 

They also decided that if the report were to have any legitimacy, it needed to be 

the product of a nationwide effort. Thus began Justin Dart’s famous public forums. 

Authorized by Dusenbury and using his own funds, Dart traveled to every single state to 

discuss disability policy and obtain feedback for NCD’s policy report. Dart, who had 

contracted polio in his teens, went in his wheelchair and with his trademark cowboy hat. 

On this campaign he met with over 2,000 people, including persons and parents of persons 

with disabilities, government officials, and disability professionals. Among the most 

frequently-cited problems were discrimination and the inadequacy of laws to protect the 

rights of persons with disabilities.6

 This was by no means Dart’s introduction to civil 

rights issues. On the contrary, Dart had become an impassioned advocate for the civil 

rights of African Americans as a student at the University of Houston, where he argued 

that black students should be allowed to attend the all-white university. By the 1980s, 

Dart viewed disability rights in a broader context of human rights and as a logical and 

necessary extension of the civil rights guaranteed for African Americans. 

Dart and Dusenbury took the 

feedback obtained at public forums to 

heart in designing the NCD report, in 

which the spirit and content of human 

rights, civil rights, and disability rights 

are pervasive. Persons throughout the 

nation reviewed the various iterations of the document, so the final product was truly 

national in origin. Issued in August, 1983, the National Policy on Disability built on the 

independent living philosophy: pursuit of “maximum independence, self-reliance, 

productivity, quality of life potential and equitable mainstream social participation.” While 

individuals must assume primary responsibility for their lives, the report said, the Federal 

Government had a critical role to play. This included 22 different policy areas in need of 

attention, ranging from accessibility issues, to employment, education, and research. Part 

of the government’s obligation, contended the report, was “to develop a comprehensive, 

internally unified body of disability-related law which guarantees and enforces equal 

rights and provides opportunities for individuals with disabilities,” including integrating 

persons with disabilities into all existing civil rights legislation. “In matters of 

fundamental human rights,” the report declared in vintage Dart form, “there must be no 

retreat.”7

 

“In matters of fundamental human 

rights, there must be no retreat.” 

—National Council on Disability 
42 THE ADA AND THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

 

This was not the first call for a comprehensive body of civil rights law 

protecting persons with disabilities. State and local governments throughout the 

nation were passing a multitude of laws and constitutional amendments—some 

amending civil rights legislation, others creating new disability-specific provisions.8

 

Others in the disability community had talked about it.9

 The NCD report, however, 

was a powerful declaration that also had the backing of a federal agency.*

Unfortunately for NCD, the Reagan administration did not take well to the 

document. In fact, Dusenbury had to fund the printing and distribution of the 

document with private funds because the administration would not support it. NCD 

did not circulate the document widely, distributing it primarily to state and national 

legislators, and little action was taken by legislatures. Dusenbury subsequently drew 

the ire of the Reagan administration when he refused to support its introduction of 

legislation to disband the vocational rehabilitation program. Later that year, the White 

House asked Dusenbury to step down from the Chairmanship, under the pretext of 

instituting a one-year term for the Chairperson.10 In his place, Vice-chair Parrino 

became the Chairperson. 

Yet before Dusenbury stepped down (in spite of the Department of 

Education’s insistence that he have no direct contact with Congress), he and NCD 

Executive Director Harvey Hirshi lobbied Congress to make NCD an independent 

agency, so that it would not have its hands tied by the administration, particularly the 

Department of Education. Congress granted NCD its request in the 1984 amendments 

to the Rehabilitation Act, claiming that “the Council has not been able to meet 

congressional intent for an independent body to advise on all matters in the 

Government affecting handicapped individuals.”11 

NCD’s independence, however, also reflected Congress’s dissatisfaction with 

the agency’s operation. Some members of Congress had even advocated disbanding 

NCD. But others saw the potential for a centralized evaluation of a patchwork of 

disability programs as requested by the White House Conference on Handicapped 

Individuals.12 As a result, in addition to making NCD an independent agency, 

Congress issued a mandate that NCD produce a comprehensive analysis of federal 

disability programs and policy by February 1, 1986. It was “kind of a test” of NCD’s 

mettle, an ultimatum, and the future of NCD’s authorization hung in the balance.13

Congress demanded a “priority listing” of federal disability programs according to the 

number of individuals served and the costs of such programs. Congress also 

requested that NCD evaluate the degree to which federal disability programs “provide 

incentives or disincentives to the establishment of community-based services for 

*

 NCD members at the time were: Joe S. Dusenbury, Chairperson; Sandra 

Swift Parrino, Vice-chairperson; Justin Dart, Vice-chairperson; Latham Breunig, 

Robert V. Bush, John Erthein, Budd Gould, Hunt Hamill, Marian N. Koonce, Carmine 

R. Lavieri, Nanette Fabray MacDougall, Michael Marge, Roxanne S. Vierra, Henry 

Viscardi, and Alvis Kent Waldrep.
 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED 43 

handicapped individuals, promote the full integration of such individuals in the 

community, in schools, and in the workplace, and contribute to the independence and 

dignity of such individuals.”14 Members of Congress wanted to know: was the 

Federal Government promoting dependence? 

Congressman Steve Bartlett (R-TX) appeared before NCD on April 30, 1984, 

to explain the significance of the challenge that lay ahead. “You are to advise 

Congress in a whole new approach, a whole new concept,” he said, “on how to 

decrease dependence and increase independence.” This, he suggested, represented 

what the disability community knew and that Congress was only reluctantly 

recognizing: “Sometimes Federal laws or provisions in Federal laws are the worst 

enemy of independence.”15 According to NCD’s minutes, Bartlett emphasized that 

“Congress is not looking for more programs, more maintenance grants, and larger 

appropriations.” Instead, NCD should “look for ways to convert existing maintenance 

dollars to help recipients achieve independence.”16 Disability policy was therefore not 

only about improving the lives of persons with disabilities; curtailing dependence also 

helped minimize the federal cost of disability.17 

By reviewing federal programs NCD might actually reduce government 

expenditures. Thus, while many were surprised by NCD’s subsequent actions, these 

goals for NCD substantially coincided with President Reagan’s philosophy. Although 

Republicans and the disability community might seem “strange bedfellows,” wrote 

Evan Kemp in a compelling Washington Post article, “their philosophical similarities 

are striking.” He explained: “Both have accused big government of stifling individual 

initiative. Both have advocated that only the truly needy should receive welfare and 

that others should be given the opportunity to work and to become self-reliant and 

responsible citizens.” As an example of excessive government, Kemp noted that 

Social Security benefits for people with disabilities had risen 400 percent in just seven 

years. If physically and mentally disabled persons became wholly or partially selfsufficient, opined Kemp, there would be “more taxpayers and fewer tax users—the 

ultimate Reagan objective.”18 Patricia Owens, Associate Commissioner for Disability 

in the Social Security Administration, reinforced this link at an appearance before 

NCD. “The Administration wants a program that encourages people to return to 

work,” reported NCD’s minutes.19 Motivations to improve the lives of persons with 

disabilities intertwined with attempts to reduce dependence on government and 

federal outlays. The subsequent work of NCD reflected this dual concern. 

Although NCD now carried new independence, it remained substantively 

beholden to both the administration, which held the purse strings, and Congress, 

which controlled authorization and appropriations.20 Nevertheless, the establishment 

of NCD as an independent agency heralded a decisive shift. Congress now prioritized 

recommendations concerning the entire sweep of disability policy over such specific 

responsibilities as overseeing NIHR. And NCD’s new identity as an independent 

“think tank” gave increased stature to disability as a policy. “For the first time, 

disability as an issue is institutionalized, by statute, in the structure of the Federal 

Government,” said John Doyle, who left his post on the Senate Subcommittee on the 

Handicapped for six months to help NCD in its transition.21 The actions of the 
44 THE ADA AND THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

disability community were clearly gaining attention, and the themes of independence 

and community integration were working their way into national policy directives. 

Chairperson Parrino accepted the heightened responsibilities for NCD eagerly 

and passionately.22 She was a longtime advocate for people with disabilities based on 

her experience in raising a child with a major physical disability. In Briarcliffe 

Manor, New York, Parrino had become a leading spokesperson for parents of persons 

with disabilities and helped obtain improved transportation and voting accessibility 

for disabled persons. Under her leadership, NCD met its statutory requirements by 

holding four quarterly meetings each year. These public meetings rotated around the 

country, and often met in conjunction with “consumer forums” designed to solicit the 

views of persons in the disability community. Although NCD attended to the 

requirements to monitor NIHR, RSA, and explored the ideas of its various members, 

it increasingly turned its attention to satisfying Congress’s mandate to prepare a 

report, which imposed heightened work demands. This required hiring new staff. 

Parrino and Dart recruited Lex Frieden, who initially agreed to serve for two 

years as Executive Director. Frieden had founded the Independent Living Research 

Utilization Program, an independent living technical assistance program, in 1977, and 

had earned great respect within the independent living community. In the early 1980s, 

he worked closely with Dart on the Texas Governor’s Committee for the Employment 

of the Handicapped. And in 1984, coincidentally, he testified before Congress to 

promote a blue-ribbon panel to evaluate federal programs, which culminated in 

NCD’s mandate. Meeting that 

requirement was precisely the kind of 

task-directed job Frieden relished. 

Frieden assumed NCD’s reins 

in December, 1984, and immediately 

turned to the task of finding highquality staff to support him. He hired 

Ethel Briggs, who had extensive 

experience in vocational rehabilitation, 

as Adult Services Specialist. Attorney 

Robert Burgdorf filled the Research Specialist position. Burgdorf had actually sought 

out the job when he heard of NCD’s new responsibilities. He had devoted much of 

his career to promoting disability rights, and saw this as an opportunity to continue his 

campaigns.23 Naomi Karp joined Frieden as Children’s Services Specialist (on detail 

from NIHR), and Brenda Bratton became Secretary. Having acquired independence, 

additional staff, and a $500,000 budget, NCD was now able to face its growing 

responsibilities with increased zeal. 

“The Contribution of this Council 

and its continued existence will 

rest almost entirely on the content 

of our February, 1986, Report to 

the President.” 

—Sandra Parrino 

Toward Independence and The ICD Survey of Disabled Americans TOWARD INDEPENDENCE & ICD SURVEY 

“The Contribution of this Council and its continued existence,” Chairperson 

Parrino asserted at the quarterly NCD meeting on January 23, 1985, “will rest almost 
 TOWARD INDEPENDENCE & ICD SURVEY 45 

entirely on the content of our February, 1986, Report to the President and how it is 

judged by the president and the Congress.”24 She urged NCD members to unite in 

common purpose and pledge their highest commitment. In April, as preparation for 

NCD meetings and consumer forums dominated the better part of NCD’s time, 

Frieden directed NCD to clear the table and focus almost exclusively on the report.25 

To make the report manageable, Frieden and Burgdorf presented Council 

members with a list of 41 potential topics and recommended that they focus on eight 

to ten of them. Since most of the 1983 council still served as members, the 1983 

report was fresh in their collective memory. Building on and narrowing its earlier 

report, NCD settled on eleven topics. One of them was “Unified disability laws 

including civil rights.” Some members doubted “whether the subject of civil rights is a 

topic that should be addressed in the 1986 report, in view of the breadth and 

complexity of the subject.” But others contended “there is no question about its 

central importance” and noted that it was consistently discussed at the consumer 

forums.26 To make the concept more palatable to reluctant NCD members and 

ultimately to the Reagan administration, NCD presented the issue as an “equal 

opportunity law” rather than “civil rights.” The former coincided with independence 

and self-reliance; the latter smacked of affirmative action. 

In June, NCD members held working sessions to sketch out the content of 

each proposed topic and finally settled on the following ten topics: equal opportunity 

laws, employment, disincentives to work under Social Security laws, prevention of 

disabilities, transportation, housing, community-based services for independent living, 

educating children with disabilities, personal assistant services, and coordination of 

disability policy and programs. NCD chose to take responsibility for the report rather 

than simply contracting an outside organization to do it. Because of the logistical 

problems posed by meeting only four times a year, primary responsibility for 

designing the report fell to Frieden and Burgdorf. They committed to developing 

detailed and thorough topic papers to document their findings. The project was a 

model of teamwork in which staff members and a few consultants wrote most of the 

essays and NCD members worked with them closely in the review process.27

One recurring theme in NCD’s discussion of the papers was the cost of 

disability policy to the Federal Government. NCD members generally agreed not to 

recommend any funding increases.28 Jeremiah Milbank, for example, suggested that 

any request for federal dollars required anticipation of “massive Federal cost-saving 

benefits with positive human results.”29 Indeed, NCD took care not to embarrass the 

president by presenting recommendations that would require large funding increases. 

Chairperson Parrino explained that NCD’s recommendations were “designed to 

improve the ability of persons with disabilities to live with dignity and as 

independently as possible within their communities.” By following them, she added, 

“current Federal expenditures for disability can be significantly redirected from 

dependency-related approaches to programs that enhance independence and 

productivity of people with disabilities, thereby engendering future efficiencies in 

federal spending.”30 This fiscal conservatism was crucially important for securing the 

later success of the ADA. It demonstrated that efforts to improve the lives of persons 
46 THE ADA AND THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

with disabilities could coincide with fiscal restraint, and thus win the support of 

skeptical members of Congress. 

Moreover, NCD rooted the ADA in Republican soil, preventing it from being 

discarded as a “liberal” bill. In fact, NCD members endeavored to depoliticize their 

job and focus simply on what was most important for persons with disabilities. 

Frieden, Burgdorf, and others praised NCD for this approach.31 Dart captured the 

spirit in a statement to NCD about the direction of disability policy: “Major emphasis 

should be given to the absolute necessity for all who believe in the fulfillment of the 

American dream . . . to rise above the traditional limits of politics and personality and 

to unite in support of the fundamental human rights of disabled people32

Also crucial to the ADA’s eventual success was the approach NCD took in 

developing the report. As he did in 1982, Dart personally financed another series of 

public forums, visiting every state to learn what persons with disabilities throughout the 

country thought were the most important issues. In the same vein, NCD devoted its 1985 

“consumer forums” to soliciting feedback about the various topic papers. Moreover, 

Frieden consulted with disability organizations from around the country constantly. He 

also developed a list of approximately 50 people from the grass roots that he spoke to on 

at least a monthly basis. It was, said Frieden, “ironic” that supposedly “elitist” 

Republicans were so interested in cultivating grass roots collaboration.33 Nevertheless, 

this extensive, nationwide involvement helped give the disability community a sense of 

ownership over NCD’s activities and helped form important links that would pay 

dividends later. By the end of 1986, NCD had crafted over 400 pages of policy analyses; 

the disability community had helped to refine them. 

The philosophy of the disability rights movement manifested itself in the 

report’s title. At a brainstorming session, staff reflected on the independent living 

movement and on Dart’s findings. Facilitating independence through equal 

participation, they thought, must be the ultimate goal of disability policy and evident 

in the report’s title. But the goals were yet to be reached, so they focused on policy 

direction. They thus conceived an appropriate title: Toward Independence. 

NCD prioritized the advancement of “equal opportunity laws” for people with 

disabilities as its primary recommendation. Although Congress had enacted several 

anti-discrimination laws for persons with disabilities, council members noted, 

coverage for persons with disabilities paled in comparison to those afforded racial 

minorities and women. Reminiscent of 

the 1983 report, NCD therefore 

proposed that Congress “enact a 

comprehensive law requiring equal 

opportunity for individuals with 

disabilities, with broad coverage and 

setting clear, consistent, and 

enforceable standards prohibiting 

discrimination on the basis of 

handicap.”34 This time, however, the 

NCD prioritized the advancement 

of “equal opportunity laws” for 

people with disabilities as its 

primary recommendation in 

Toward Independence. 
 TOWARD INDEPENDENCE & ICD SURVEY 47 

 

proposal came with a thorough explanation for why such an approach was necessary 

to facilitate the employment and general life satisfaction of persons with disabilities. 

It also delineated what such a law should entail. 

With the support of Frieden and newly-hired staff member Andrea Farbman 

in January, 1986, Burgdorf devoted a weekend to synthesizing the topic papers into a 

short readable report, which specified over forty different recommendations. Pressed 

for time, NCD contracted at the Federal Prison Industry to publish the document 

rather than risk the potential for delay with the Government Printing Office. About a 

week before the scheduled release, however, with 10,000 copies of Toward 

Independence prepared for distribution, Frieden received a call from Bob Sweet at the 

White House. Sweet threatened to block the report because the White House 

allegedly could not support it. “This report is so liberal, Ted Kennedy wouldn’t 

produce it,” he told Frieden in reaction to the report’s ambitious proposals.35 But 

Sweet’s superior—highly-respected physician and public health expert, Dr. William 

L. Roper—quelled the conflict after being persuaded by Frieden that the basic 

principle of Toward Independence was that all Americans should share in society. He 

simply directed Frieden not to attach the presidential seal to the report. 

NCD officially presented Toward Independence, accompanied by letters of 

transmittal, to President Reagan, President of the Senate George Bush, and Speaker of 

the House James C. Wright (D-TX), on February 1, 1986.*

 NCD also scheduled a 

press release for January 28, 1986. But media attention that day was riveted to the 

explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger, leaving few reporters and little time for 

Toward Independence. 

The NASA catastrophe also canceled another Council arrangement: a meeting 

with President Reagan to present the report in person. Consequently, Vice President 

Bush and Boyden Gray met with Parrino, Dart, Milbank, and Frieden. The White 

House meeting was noteworthy because Bush exhibited tremendous interest in NCD’s 

report. A ten-minute photo-op evolved into a substantive discussion that lasted nearly 

an hour. Bush recounted his own personal experience with disability through family 

members. Evidently, as Frieden recalled, Bush had familiarized himself with the 

report before the meeting: he talked about some of the issues in detail, namely 

education and equal opportunity laws. Bush ended the meeting without a single 

criticism of NCD’s recommendations and with a promise that he would pass the report 

*

 NCD members at the time were: Sandra S. Parrino, Chairperson; H. 

Latham Breunig, Robert V. Bush, Justin W. Dart, Joe S. Dusenbury, John S. Erthein, 

R. Budd Gould, Hunt Hamill, Marian N. Koonce, Nanette Fabray MacDougall, 

Michael Marge, Roxanne S. Vierra, Henry Viscardi, and Alvis Kent Waldrep. NCD 

staff were: Lex Frieden, Executive Director; Brenda Bratton, Ethel D. Briggs, Robert 

L. Burgdorf, Marilynne Gisin, and Naomi Karp. National Council on the 

Handicapped Fellows were: Janet Anderson and Laura Rauscher. Consultants for 

Toward Independence were: Elizabeth Defay, Margaret A. Nosek, and John Raisian.
48 THE ADA AND THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

along to Reagan. He also said he wished he could do more, but noted that there was 

only so much he could do as vice president.36 

Although NCD’s press conference and meeting with President Reagan were 

canceled, the agency’s third public relations event went through as planned: a 

reception on Capitol Hill, where many members of Congress gathered to accept the 

report. Senator Weicker, Senator Paul Simon (D-IL), and Congressman Steve Bartlett 

(R-TX), among others, offered remarks.37 

NCD ultimately distributed over 20,000 copies of Toward Independence to 

legislators, government officials, disability advocates, and disability organizations.38 

DIMENET, the computer network started under the aegis of NCIL, received 

permission from NCD to type the report and make it available on the Internet.39 The 

report “made a big splash,” as Bonnie O’Day, at the time the director of an 

independent living center in Norfolk, Virginia, put it.40 Thousands of people across 

the country read it and talked about it. The attraction was not the novelty of the 

proposals it contained: virtually every issue and recommendation presented by NCD 

had been initiated or proposed at the state and local level. Rather, the report was 

significant because it represented a proposal for a national, comprehensive approach 

to disability policy. Moreover, it carried the clout of being the product of a federal 

agency. Regardless of the content of the report, simply producing a comprehensive 

analysis of disability programs was significant in the stature it gave to disability as 

part of the national policy agenda. 

With respect to Kingdon’s analysis, Toward Independence can be seen as a 

body of policy solutions. Of special importance was NCD’s prioritization of a 

comprehensive equal opportunity law as necessary to achieve functional independence 

and social participation for persons with disabilities. But at this stage it represented 

only a potential solution. Getting the issue on the legislative agenda would require 

further documentation that the lack of such a law was a desperate problem. An 

influential national poll helped this process along. 

As NCD deliberated the topic papers comprising Toward Independence, one 

of its members, Milbank, voiced the concern that NCD’s conclusions might not 

adequately reflect what average Americans with disabilities thought. He feared that 

the forums sponsored by Dart and NCD were too selective. Unfortunately, there was 

no substantive survey data on how having a disability affected a person’s ability to 

participate in the life of the community. This led Milbank to contact his friends at the 

polling agency Louis Harris and Associates, namely its president, Humphrey Taylor, 

who agreed to conduct a study. NCD staff and members contributed to the 

development of the questions and structure of the survey. The International Center for 

the Disabled (ICD), where Milbank served as Chairman of the Board, provided most 

of the funding. Although NCD hoped the results would be available in time for 

inclusion in Toward Independence, it was finished soon after and published in March, 

1986, with the title: The ICD Survey of Disabled Americans: Bringing Disabled 

Americans into the Mainstream.

41 
 TOWARD INDEPENDENCE & ICD SURVEY 49 

“The purpose of the survey,” explained ICD Executive Director John 

Wingate, “was to obtain data on disabled people’s experiences and attitudes that 

would provide a clear information framework of NCD’s recommendations on public 

policy for disabled people.”42 The nationwide survey was based on 1,000 telephone 

interviews with a national sample of non-institutionalized disabled persons aged 

sixteen and above. In some respects it paralleled the significance of NCD’s report 

Toward Independence. While other organizations had conducted surveys, this was the 

first comprehensive survey of persons with disabilities that solicited their perceptions 

of their own quality of life. It provided solid data that could document the extent of 

problems faced by persons with disabilities and help guide fruitful directions for 

policy development. Significantly, it suggested that federal disability programs had 

improved the lives of persons with disabilities, which warranted continued policy 

development and federal funding. 

The Harris poll found that the prevalence of disability for noninstitutionalized persons aged 16 and over was 15.2% of the United States, or about 

27 to 28 million people. In an analysis of the Harris results, NCD concluded that the 

addition of institutionalized persons, 

children, and households that could not be 

reached by telephone would place the total 

number of persons with disabilities 

somewhere near the oft-quoted figure of 36 

million.43 The poll also presented a series of 

significant, quantified findings about this 

group of Americans: 

67% aged 16–64 were not 

working; 66% of those not 

working said they would like 

to be employed. 

● 72% said their lives had been at least “somewhat better” in the past decade. 

● 67% said the federal policies had helped at least “somewhat.”44 

● 40% did not finish high school, compared with 15% in the non-disabled 

population. 

● 50% reported household incomes less than $15,000, compared with 25% 

among the non-disabled population. 

● 56% reported that disability prevented desired levels of social and 

community participation. 

● 49% identified lack of transportation as a barrier to social and community 

participation. 

● 67% aged 16 to 64 were not working; 66% of those not working said they 

would like to be employed. 

● Employment correlated with levels of education, income, life satisfaction, 

self-perception as disabled, and perception of life potential. 

● 95% advocated increased public and private efforts to educate, train, and 

employ persons with disabilities. 

● 74% supported implementation of anti-discrimination laws affording 

disabled persons the same protections as other minorities. 
50 THE ADA AND THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

45

For the most part, these findings were not surprising. But they served the 

crucial role of documenting what were previously subjective assessments. And the 

survey was a ringing endorsement of initiatives to help disabled Americans find work. 

Unemployment more than anything else seemed to define disability, and the 

correlation between employment and life satisfaction cried out for attention. NCD 

had argued strongly in Toward Independence that civil rights protections would help 

improve accessibility and facilitate employment. The poll affixed numbers to a real 

and pressing problem and functioned as a nationwide endorsement of NCD’s report. 

With respect to Kingdon’s policy analysis, this linked two policy streams: problems 

and solutions. Frieden asserted: “I doubt that the recommendations in Toward 

Independence, and particularly [those regarding] civil rights, would have been taken 

as seriously by the policy makers had we not had the data.”

Drafting the ADA DRAFTING THE ADA 

As Frieden’s successor Paul Hearne observed in 1988, NCD’s preparation of 

Toward Independence and instigation of the ICD Survey helped “put the Council on 

the map.”46 NCD member Michael Marge said of the reports: “We were very well 

received by both sides of the aisle as a valuable, worthwhile group. Our entree to the 

Congress was fantastic.”47 Despite the tremendous respect NCD gained, however, 

Congress took little action—a great frustration to NCD members. Although Congress 

pointed to Toward Independence as “the Manifesto, the Declaration of Independence 

for people with disabilities,” said Frieden, “nobody bothered to do anything about 

it.”48 NCD members and staff—especially Burgdorf, Dart, Frieden, and Parrino—

were frustrated most by the lack of attention to their number-one recommendation, an 

equal opportunity law. 

After waiting for nearly a 

year, they began discussing what 

NCD could do. They concluded that 

the only way to overcome legislative 

inertia was for NCD to take the lead. 

Frieden remembers talking about 

drafting a civil rights proposal as early 

as December, 1986.49 There was 

some early dispute over whether

disability rights legislation should

come in the form of an amendment to 

the Civil Rights Act or whether it should be an independent initiative. At a strategy 

meeting, Burgdorf and Frieden solicited the input from such disability rights 

advocates as Marca Bristo, Evan Kemp, and Robert Funk. They discussed whether 

using the vehicle of a separate law might ironically reinforce discrimination by 

underscoring the separateness of people with disabilities. But they decided that an 

adequate foundation for disability rights required unique provisions and that a separate 

law could serve as an energizing force for the disability community.

“Congress pointed to Toward 

Independence as the Manifesto, the

Declaration of Independence for 

people with disabilities,” but 

“nobody bothered to do anything 

about it.” 

—Lex Frieden 

50 
 DRAFTING THE ADA 51 

The framework for such a law was already sketched out. In Toward 

Independence, Burgdorf specified that the law should prohibit discrimination by the 

Federal Government, recipients of financial assistance, federal contractors and 

subcontractors, employers, housing providers, places of public accommodation, 

persons and agencies of interstate commerce, transportation providers, insurance 

providers, and state and local governments. He also proposed that the law secure 

private right to action to remedy discrimination, give the Architectural and 

Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (ATBCB) the authority to remove barriers 

according to universal accessibility standards, and establish Protection and Advocacy 

Systems in each state to protect and advocate for the rights of persons with 

disabilities. To make nondiscrimination on the basis of handicap meaningful, he 

stressed, the law would have to be founded on the concept of providing reasonable 

accommodations and taking affirmative steps to eliminate barriers. Among the 

proposal’s most ambitious provisions was that all existing barriers to accessibility 

would have to be removed in two to five years, except where a private business or 

public entity received a special waiver. 

Yet it was not an optimal time to introduce new civil rights legislation. The 

disability community, the civil rights community, and Congress were just beginning 

their campaign for the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which was introduced on 

February 19, 1987. Another civil rights measure might adversely affect its passage. 

putting the law on paper, 

expecting it could be used 

eventually, and finished a 

preliminary draft in February.

Burgdorf nonetheless began 

51 

During the spring of 1987, he and 

others began holding 

brainstorming sessions with 

“important and knowledgeable 

persons in the disability 

community” to include them in the process and facilitate the drafting.52 At the May 

quarterly meeting, NCD decided to move forward and give official sanction to 

crafting a legislative proposal, deciding that a comprehensive law, rather than a 

piecemeal approach, was the best way to protect disabled persons’ civil rights. Staff 

members Burgdorf and Frieden worked most intensively on the law. And NCD 

members reviewed draft after draft of the proposal prepared by Burgdorf, who 

advanced his own vision for the law while helping to put NCD members’ thoughts in 

proper legal form. 

By August, 1987, Robert Burgdorf had 

a complete draft of what was now 

called, at the suggestion of NCD 

member Kent Waldrep, the Americans 

with Disabilities Act of 1987. 

By August, 1987, Burgdorf had a complete draft of what was now called, at 

the suggestion of NCD member Kent Waldrep, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 

1987.53 Principal strategic planning for the legislative proposal was carried out by 

Parrino, Frieden, and Burgdorf. They concluded that success required a body of 

individuals and organizations to support the endeavor and good timing of its 

introduction so as not to obstruct the efforts of the civil rights community. At the 

August Council meeting, members hoped that the bill would be passed in the 
52 THE ADA AND THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

100th Congress—by the end of 1988. Dart, who was in attendance at the meeting 

though no longer a Council member, was more cautious. He suggested it would take 

years to obtain passage. Nevertheless, he fully supported moving forward to initiate 

the requisite education process.54 

For congressional sponsorship, 

Parrino turned first to Senator Weicker, 

with whom NCD had a longstanding 

relationship. Weicker was one of the 

disability community’s greatest 

advocates in the Senate. This was in 

part because Weicker had personal 

experience with disability through his 

son, who had Down’s Syndrome. For Weicker, however, interest in disability issues 

stemmed from a broader philosophical and political commitment to assisting those in 

need. “He was a man of very strong principles about the role of government and the 

responsibility for caring for those who were less fortunate,” said Terry Muilenburg 

who worked on his staff. This applied to elderly persons and people of lower-income 

as well as to people with disabilities. At times Weicker acted as “the conscience of 

the Senate” to defend the constitutionality of an active Federal Government, 

Muilenburg added.55 Weicker was a fitting congressional contact because he had 

played a pivotal role in ensuring that NCD stayed alive in 1983. Early in 1987, during 

a meeting with Parrino, he had indicated a willingness to support disability rights 

legislation if NCD drafted a proposal. Now Weicker officially agreed to be the bill’s 

sponsor: he was absolutely crucial in giving the ADA its life. 

Senator Weicker officially agreed 

to be the bill’s sponsor: he was 

absolutely crucial in giving the 

ADA its life. 

For the ADA to succeed, Senator Weicker emphasized that the bill would 

have to be introduced simultaneously in both houses of Congress. He recommended 

that NCD contact Congressman Coelho, who was, coincidentally, a close friend of 

NCD member Roxanne Vierra’s husband, to sponsor the House bill. Coelho also had 

epilepsy, and was becoming a public advocate for people with disabilities. Although 

Congressman Coelho’s staff cautioned him against sponsoring the bill for fear that it 

would not win the support of the broader disability community, Coelho agreed to 

sponsor it.56 Senator Weicker later encouraged NCD to begin working closely with 

Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA). Harkin was Chairman of the Subcommittee on the 

Handicapped, which would likely have jurisdiction over the bill in the Senate. 

While NCD’s solid reputation with Congress helped in finding congressional 

sponsors, enlisting the support of the disability community proved more difficult. 

Many persons in the disability community had been working toward the goals, shared 

by NCD, of equal opportunity and full participation; some strove for civil rights 

legislation akin to NCD’s proposal. But many people in the disability community 

viewed NCD with apprehension. While NCD collaborated with persons with 

disabilities throughout the country, NCD generally did not work closely with leading 

disability organizations, especially those that had been championing recent legislative 

campaigns. Moreover, given the context of the Reagan administration’s civil rights 

record, some questioned NCD’s motives. Some NCD members, on the other hand, 
 DRAFTING THE ADA 53 

already established 

suspected that others were envious of NCD for being the first to draft civil rights 

legislation.57 For these and other reasons, the relationship between much of the 

disability community and NCD was strained. 

Prior to the November Council meeting, Burgdorf met with representatives of 

the Consortium for Citizens with Developmental Disabilities (CCD)*

 to discuss the 

bill. At a later meeting convened by Terry Muilenburg of Senator Weicker’s staff, 

CCD members stated that they opposed the bill as written. Their greatest concern was 

that they did not want the ADA to undermine the coverage of Sections 503 and 504 of 

the Rehabilitation Act. Securing the Section 504 regulations had been a protracted 

battle, and the regulations had been subsequently assaulted by President Reagan’s 

Task Force on Regulatory Relief just a few years before. CCD feared that if the 

provisions of Section 503 and 504 were included in the ADA it would mean the 

regulations were back on the bloc, and an administration unfriendly to disability rights 

could substantially rewrite and weaken them. As an alternative, CCD proposed what 

became known as the “donut-hole” approach: leave what was 

alone, and write the ADA around it to cover everything left out. 

ecticut, where insurance was a major industry, made the 

CCD also argued that the ADA should not enforce standards inconsistent with 

those afforded to other minority groups. The disability community was in the midst of 

working with the civil rights community on the Fair Housing Amendments Act. 

Passage of the ADA would require the full backing of the civil rights community, so it 

was important to advocate the same protections. For example, while many people in 

the disability community believed health insurance should be a part of the ADA 

because people with disabilities often could not find affordable health care, health 

insurance was not a protection afforded to any other group. In a more general sense, 

CCD expressed concern about incorporating new language and new terms, such as a 

revised definition of disability. They urged that NCD use language from Section 504, 

which would help secure congressional support because it was familiar. At the 

November Council meeting, members voted on the draft of the ADA and rejected 

changes proposed by CCD. Three days later, however, Senator Weicker met with a 

variety of disability groups and decided, together with Senator Harkin, that 

Sections 503 and 504 and health insurance needed to be dropped from the ADA. 

Although a variety of factors warranted the exclusion of health insurance, Weicker’s 

representation of Conn

inclusion impractical. 

 

Senator Weicker urged NCD to accede to the disability community’s changes, 

but NCD bristled because it was afraid to weaken its legislative proposal. 

*

 The Consortium for Citizens with Developmental Disabilities (CCDD) 

changed its name to the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD) in 1989. 

Since this name change took place midway through the ADA deliberations, and to 

avoid confusion, CCD will be used consistently throughout this work when identified 

in relation to the ADA.
54 THE ADA AND THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

ndation, hoping to draw 

Chairperson Parrino suggested getting a broader range of opinion from persons 

outside Washington at a meeting coinciding with the February Council meeting, on 

February 9, 1988. In the meantime, NCD was preparing its 1988 report, On the 

Threshold of Independence.†

 The report evaluated progress made since its 1986 

report, Toward Independence, on each of the ten topics. At the suggestion of Public 

Affairs Specialist Andrea Farbman, NCD decided to include the current draft of the 

ADA in its discussion of the equal opportunity law recomme

further attention to the ADA and enlist grass roots support.58 

 

On February 9, representatives from around the country gathered at NCD’s 

quarterly meeting. There they formed working groups and unanimously agreed to 

remove Sections 503 and 504 and health insurance from the purview of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act. On the following day, NCD decided to circulate the bill, with 

these changes, to Congress and the Reagan administration. Negotiations with the 

disability community continued 

after the February Council meeting, 

but Weicker, faced with a string of 

proposals from the disability 

community, decided to honor 

NCD’s work in drafting the 

legislation and forge ahead with its 

version of the ADA. 

Discrimination on the basis of 

disability is “just as intolerable as 

other types of discrimination that our 

civil rights laws forbid.” 

—Senator Lowell Weicker 

On April 28, 1988, Senator Weicker introduced the Americans with 

Disabilities Act on the floor of the United States Senate. He called the legislation 

“historic,” and said that it “will establish a broad-scoped prohibition of discrimination 

and will describe specific methods by which such discrimination is to be eliminated.” 

He compared the conditions faced by persons with disabilities to those faced by 

minorities in the 1960s. Civil rights advocates then argued forcefully and 

demonstratively that no person, because of race or national origin, should be 

discriminated against in obtaining access to public accommodations, use of transit, 

employment opportunities, services of state and local governments, and housing. 

Laws prohibited this type of discrimination by business owners, employers, and 

governments, Weicker said. “Yet, today,” he noted, “it is not unlawful for these same 

establishments to exclude, mistreat, or otherwise discriminate against people because 

of their disabilities.” He contended that discrimination on the basis of handicap was 

†

 NCD members at the time were: Sandra Swift Parrino, Chairperson; John 

S. Erthein, Theresa L. Gardner, Marian N. Koonce, Leslie Lenkowsky, Nanette 

Fabray MacDougall, Robert Muller, Brenda Premo, Harry J. Sutcliffe, Joni Eareckson 

Tada, Roxanne Vierra, A. Kent Waldrep, and Phyllis Zlotnick. NCD staff were: Lex 

Frieden, Executive Director, Brenda Bratton, Stacey Brown, Ethel Briggs, Robert 

Burgdorf, Frances Curtis, Andrea Farbman, Kathleen Roy, and Deborah Shuck. 

National Council on the Handicapped Fellows were: LaVerne Chase and D. Ray 

Fuller.
 DRAFTING THE ADA 55 

inistration. She also gave important 

“just as intolerable as other types of discrimination that our civil rights laws forbid.”59 

The following day, Congressman Coelho joined Weicker by introducing an identical 

bill to the floor of the House of Representatives. Civil rights for persons with 

disabilities had entered the national, legislative agenda. 

NCD’s role did not end with Senator Weicker’s final acceptance and 

introduction of their proposal, but in a very real sense the baton was being passed 

from NCD to congressional sponsors and the disability community. NCD was in an 

awkward position. Although NCD could present legislative proposals and justify its 

recommendations by offering “technical information,” federal law at the time 

prevented NCD members and staff, as all employees of federal agencies, from 

personally lobbying members of Congress. In lieu of formal lobbying, NCD members 

made presentations in their home towns and in their professional circles. Chairperson 

Parrino met extensively with officials in the White House and helped pave the way for 

favorable action on the ADA by the Bush adm

congressional testimony on multiple occasions. 

NCD’s presence was also carried

forward as Frieden and Burgdorf resigned to 

take positions where they could exert more 

direct influence. Frieden, for example, 

became Executive Director of the 

congressional Task Force on the Rights and 

Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, 

which played an important role in 

documenting the need for the ADA. Some members felt slighted by the transition in 

ADA leadership. But it was actually a testament to their success—NCD had 

accomplished its mission. No other single disability organization could have 

introduced a proposal to Congress with the same authority NCD possessed as an 

independent federal agency. NCD had performed the crucial function of documenting 

a problem, crafting a solution, and securing a foothold in Congress. It brought people 

to the table to develop a workable solution with substantial consensus. Now NCD 

would join the ranks of other organizations and thousands of individuals in educating

America about the ADA. 

NCD performed the crucial

function of documenting a 

problem, crafting a solution, 

and securing a foothold in 

Congress. 

3 

PUBLICIZING THE ADA:

ADVOCACY AND THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 

PUBLICIZING THE ADA 

Gallaudet University erupted on March 1, 1988, as an estimated 1,500 alumni, 

students, faculty, and community supporters rallied to demand the selection of 

the university’s first deaf president. The board of trustees had narrowed its candidate 

pool to three: Harvey J. Corson and I. King Jordan, both deaf; and Elizabeth A. 

Zinser, who neither had a hearing impairment nor understood sign language. On the 

evening of March 6, under the leadership of Chairperson Jane Bassett Spilman, the 

board selected Zinser as president. Hundreds of students, alumni, and others 

responded the next morning by shutting down the school: they organized before dawn 

and blocked every campus entrance. They even searched cars and planned to lie on 

the ground to prevent a helicopter from landing in the event that Zinser tried to step 

foot on campus (she never did). They also marched to Capitol Hill and demonstrated 

at the White House. 

Later that day, a ten-person delegation representing students, faculty, and 

alumni issued four demands to the board: appoint a deaf president; demand Spilman’s 

resignation; protect protestors from punishment; and designate a majority of the 

board’s seats for deaf persons. But the board rejected the demands. At a meeting in 

the field house that followed, where Spilman appealed to a crowd of protesters to give 

Zinser a chance, students shouted down Spilman, sounded a fire alarm to obstruct her 

presentation, and taunted her: “If you could sign, we could hear you.”1

 The following 

day, on March 8, the group hung Zinser and Spilman in effigy; later they cut them 

down and burned them. 

The volatile activity on the campus of the world’s only deaf university was 

front-page news; people from around the world lent their support. Senator Robert 

Dole (R-KS), Congressmen David E. Bonior (D-MI) and Tony Coelho (D-CA), and 

Vice President George Bush backed selection of a deaf president. Bonior threatened 

that the university might lose government funding, which accounted for 75 percent of 

its budget, unless it met demonstrators’ demands. 

To students, alumni, and faculty, the selection of a deaf president symbolized 

deaf persons’ attempt to attain full citizenship, equal participation, and self-direction. 

“The time has come for the plantation mentality, which has for so long controlled this 

institution and others serving the deaf, to end,” psychology professor Allen Sussman 

said.2

 “We want to be free from hearing oppression,” student leader Bridgette Bourne 

declared. “We don’t want to live off the hearing world, we want to live as 

independent people,” she continued. Freshman John Limmidis opined: “We believe 
58 PUBLICIZING THE ADA 

that we have to fight to prove to 

the world that a deaf person is just 

as good as a hearing person.”3

 

The presidency of Gallaudet was 

the highest position in the deaf 

community; a decision to bypass a 

deaf person for that office 

broadcasted the message that 

hearing persons were better suited for power and leadership. Consequently, it 

questioned the potential of deaf persons in other employment and social opportunities. 

Like racial minorities and women, the deaf community wanted the empowerment and 

legitimacy that comes with leadership from one’s own ranks. 

The Deaf President Now! protest 

“proved, convincingly, that deaf 

people could band together effectively 

for a common cause and succeed.” 

—Jack Gannon 

On March 10, under relentless pressure, Zinser submitted her resignation. 

The following day the board acceded to the protestors’ demands: it appointed Jordan 

president, accepted Spilman’s resignation, committed to reconstituting the board, and 

dismissed repercussions for demonstrating. It was a huge victory for the deaf 

community. As one historian said, the protest “proved, convincingly, that deaf people 

could band together effectively for a common cause and succeed.”4

 

The protest also benefitted and strengthened the disability community as a 

whole. Students’ demands for self-direction, independence, and opportunity echoed 

the disability rights movement. National coverage of the events confronted many 

Americans with a foreign image of disability: repudiation of pity and charity, 

insistence on civil rights. The protest also came at an opportune moment, just over a 

month before the Americans with Disabilities Act was introduced in Congress. It 

powerfully symbolized the potential of the disability community, a fitting beginning 

to a nationwide education about disability and the ADA. 

Mobilizing the Disability Community MOBILIZING THE DISABILITY COMMUNITY 

In 1988, the top priorities for the disability community were the Civil Rights 

Restoration Act, which became public law on March 22, 1988, and the Fair Housing 

Amendments Act, enacted on September 13, 1988. The ADA would not get the 

spotlight until 1989. However, ADA sponsors and the disability community used 

1988 as an opportunity to publicize the act, mobilize grass roots support, solicit the 

endorsement of presidential candidates, enlist congressional cosponsors, and establish 

the act as a top priority for the next Congress. 

The political sophistication attained by the disability community during the 

1980s enabled ADA advocates to pursue a multi-pronged strategy to meet its 

objectives. A Washington-based ADA coalition coordinated these activities in 

conjunction with the bill’s congressional sponsors. Although this coalition did not 

fully form until 1989, it began to take shape even before the bill’s introduction in 

April, 1988. Describing the emerging leadership is extremely difficult, however, 

because it was not highly structured. There was no body of voting members that 
 MOBILIZING THE DISABILITY COMMUNITY 59 

elected officials to formally-defined job positions. There were no department heads. 

Rather, individuals and a variety of organizations formed a loose (though united) 

ADA coalition. To facilitate communications, the ADA coalition conducted many of 

its activities “under the auspices” of the well-established Consortium for Citizens with 

Disabilities (CCD).5

 

Paul Marchand, Director of the Governmental Affairs Office for the 

Association for Retarded Citizens (ARC), had founded CCD’s predecessor, CCDD, in 

the early 1970s to unite federal advocacy efforts of the disability community. By 

1988, the consortium represented dozens of Washington-based organizations. 

Additional groups enlisted their support to CCD’s campaign to pass the ADA. CCD’s 

operations were carried out through multiple task forces, including the Civil Rights 

Task Force, which from 1988 to 1990 focused almost exclusively on the ADA. Pat 

Wright of the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF), Liz Savage of 

the Epilepsy Foundation of America (EFA), and Curt Decker of the National 

Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems (NAPAS) were the Civil Rights 

Task Force Co-chairs. The ADA coalition used the task force as its headquarters and 

CCD stationary for much of its correspondence. Although most of the ADA coalition 

leaders were from organizations who were members of CCD, it would be misleading 

to refer to CCD and the ADA coalition interchangeably, since key participants also 

came from outside CCD. This applied especially to people with disabilities 

representing the grass roots: ADAPT and NCIL, for example. And Dart, who was a 

full-fledged supporter and close ally of CCD, nonetheless did not officially represent a 

CCD member organization: he served the ADA coalition as a voice of the people. 

The ADA coalition organized its efforts according to four major functions: 

overall strategy development; education and lobbying; grass roots mobilization; and 

legal writing and analysis. And it creatively exploited all available resources to 

accomplish the job, varying the approach to meet changing circumstances. For the 

most part, participants tended to focus on one of these four areas, but there was 

overlap. At the core was a handful of leaders who were most responsible for guiding 

the overall effort. 

While many people contributed to developing the overarching strategy for 

passing the ADA, two persons in particular focused their efforts on this area: Pat 

Wright and Ralph Neas. Wright’s leadership during the ADA’s passage eventually 

earned her the nickname “The General.” She had attended medical school in the 

1960s, but, after a progressive eye disease left her legally blind, she was forced to 

leave the profession. Temporarily derailed, she found a new interest in assisting 

persons with disabilities move from institutions to community-based living and gained 

an intimate knowledge of how legal 

technicalities affected the lives of 

persons with disabilities. Wright made 

her first major inroads to the disability 

rights movement at the San Francisco 

sit-in of April, 1977, where she had 

served as a personal assistant to Judy 

The ADA coalition embraced 

four major functions: strategy 

development; education and 

lobbying; grass roots 

mobilization; and legal analysis. 
60 PUBLICIZING THE ADA 

Heumann and demonstrated her negotiation skills in working with the guards. In her 

decade of work with DREDF, Wright had refined her extraordinary and tough 

negotiating techniques. 

“She has [more] hutzpah than 

anyone I’ve ever met,” said Eastern 

Paralyzed Veterans of America 

(EPVA) attorney Jim Weisman, who 

worked with her closely during the 

ADA’s passage.6

 Wright certainly 

made her presence known. Her 

rejection of standard Washington attire 

stood out among beltway veterans; one journalist said she appeared as if she had arrived 

directly from the 1960s Berkeley campus.7

 But Wright was so widely respected in 

Congress and the White House that her apparel and colorful vocabulary were beyond 

reproach. “She really is brassy,” said Weisman, “but she got it done.”8

 Indeed, the 

ADA’s success was due in no small part to Wright’s efforts, though some perceived 

Wright as a “loner” because she took advantage of her contacts and her capabilities to 

negotiate unilaterally in high-pressured situations.9

 

The ADA’s success was due in no 

small part to Pat Wright’s efforts. 

“She has more hutzpah than anyone 

I’ve ever met.” 

—Jim Weisman 

Neas, an attorney and Director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

(LCCR), brought to the ADA coalition unparalleled experience in civil rights legislation. 

LCCR carried more than three decades of civil rights advocacy, and was “the broadest, the 

largest, and oldest coalition in the country,” with over 185 organizations and their 

60 million dues-paying members.10 It had either assisted or led the coordination of every 

civil rights bill since 1957. As Executive Director of the LCCR since 1981, Neas led 

several civil rights campaigns, including the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and 

Handicapped Act, the Civil Rights Restoration Act, and the Fair Housing Amendments 

Act. (In 1989, he would begin work on what became the Civil Rights Act of 1991.) In the 

spring of 1988, Wright approached Neas and the Executive Council to obtain an 

endorsement of the concept of the ADA. She stressed that the disability community 

would work with Congress to develop a viable bill after the 1988 election; the important 

consideration was to lend credibility to the general principles. DREDF’s efforts during 

the 1980s paid off, and LCCR joined the disability community as an indispensable ally. 

Although Neas did not join the strategy team full-time until he finished with the Civil 

Rights Restoration Act and Fair Housing Amendments Act, the ADA would become one 

of his top priorities in January, 1989. 

While Wright and Neas were the principal strategists, most strategy 

development did not take place behind closed doors. For example, Savage and 

Marchand (who focused on lobbying in Washington), Justin Dart and Marilyn Golden 

(who focused on the grass roots), and Mayerson and Feldblum (who directed legal 

strategy) all were regular participants in shaping strategy. Moreover, important 

strategic contributions came from people such as Mary Lou Breslin of DREDF; 

National Council on Disability (NCD) Chairperson Sandra Parrino; Lex Frieden of 

The Institute for Rehabilitation and Research (TIRR) and former NCD Executive 

Director; Paul Hearne of the Dole Foundation; and Jay Rochlin, Executive Director of 
 MOBILIZING THE DISABILITY COMMUNITY 61 

the President’s Committee on the Employment of People with Disabilities. These 

individuals provided additional contacts in Congress and the administration and also 

contributed specific statutory recommendations.11 Such organizations as NCIL and 

ADAPT brought the concerns of consumer-directed organizations to the table. 

Furthermore, when the CCD Civil Rights Task Force began holding weekly strategy 

meetings in 1989, out-of-town visitors were active participants. 

Crucial for implementation of strategy was the Washington-based education 

and lobbying effort. In this respect, Wright worked especially closely with Savage—

attorney, Assistant Director for Government Affairs of EFA, and Co-chair of the CCD 

Civil Rights Task Force. Wright and Savage had met in 1985, around the time Savage 

joined EFA. Together they worked on such landmark civil rights cases as the 

Handicapped Children’s Protection Act, Civil Rights Restoration Act, and Fair 

Housing Amendments Act. Wright and Savage’s strengths complemented one 

another. Whereas Wright’s expertise was in strategy and negotiating, Savage’s 

strength was lobbying. This experience and relationship with Wright naturally 

evolved into the role of coordinating lobbying activities for the ADA coalition. If 

Wright was the “General,” Savage was one of the principal “Field Commanders.” 

Marchand also played a key role in the education and lobbying effort. As 

Director of the Governmental Affairs Office of the ARC, Marchand brought to the 

ADA coalition the resources of one of the nation’s largest disability organizations: 

1,200 chapters nationwide, and an Action Alert Network that monitored congressional 

activities and mustered thousands of letters and phone calls. Advocates for persons 

with developmental disabilities were a well-established and widely-respected presence 

in Washington, which effectively positioned Marchand for ADA leadership. 

Moreover, as Chairman of CCD he had an effective platform for working with 

members of Congress and the administration. 

To aid in the crucial task of educating members of Congress about disability and 

lobbying them to be ADA cosponsors, which began even before the ADA was first 

introduced, the ADA coalition relied on a number of lobbying “captains.” These included 

Becky Ogle of the Spina Bifida Association, Bob Williams of the United Cerebral Palsy 

Associations (UCPA), Denise Rozell of the National Association of Developmental 

Disabilities Councils (NADDC), Tom Sheridan of the AIDS Action Council, Kathy 

Megivern of the Association for Education and Rehabilitation of the Blind and Visually 

Handicapped, Fred Cowell of the Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA), David Capozzi 

of the National Easter Seal Society (NESS), Caren Friedman of the Human Rights 

Campaign Fund, and Curt Decker of the National Association of Protection and Advocacy 

Systems (NAPAS). These lobbyists in turn worked with members of such organizations 

as CCD, LCCR, NCIL, the National Organization Responding to AIDS (NORA), and 

ADAPT. Together they organized lobbying teams to visit senators’ and congressmen’s 

offices, which supplemented the efforts of congressional sponsors. 

Although lobbying was important, successful passage of the ADA could not 

be achieved by efforts only within the Washington beltway. Well before the ADA 

entered Congress, the ADA coalition concluded that success was dependent on 
62 PUBLICIZING THE ADA 

convincing members of Congress, the 

executive branch, and the general public 

that the difficulties faced by persons with 

disabilities were a genuine national 

problem. The ADA could not be viewed 

as the brain-child of a coterie of think-tank 

intellects; it had to be correctly understood 

as an outgrowth of the pervasive 

experience of discrimination. Victory would be won through the efforts of thousands 

of advocates across the nation who could humanize and personalize the issues, not by 

privately wrestling with legal technicalities. NCD had begun this process through 

“consumer forums,” Justin Dart’s public forums, Toward Independence, and The ICD 

Survey.

12 After the ADA was introduced, Marilyn Golden of DREDF and Justin Dart 

led these efforts. In 1988, the primary goal of the ADA coalition was to get an army 

ready. In 1989 and 1990, with a communication system in place, Dart and Golden 

would issue a nationwide call to arms. 

Victory would be won through 

the efforts of thousands of 

advocates across the nation 

who could humanize and 

personalize the issues. 

There were three main objectives for grass roots mobilization. The first was to 

educate persons with disabilities about the ADA to prepare them for action. An important 

part of this process was uniting the fragmented disability community by centering the 

focus on a common cause. The second was to accumulate evidence of discrimination. 

This came not only through the standard form of congressional testimony, but also 

through the novel approach of soliciting “discrimination diaries.” In addition to providing 

evidence for Congress, preparing these documents would prompt people throughout the 

country to organize diary parties and foster the empowerment that comes from numbers. 

Over time, many persons with disabilities had internalized oppression, taken complete 

responsibility for their situations, and thus turned their backs to discrimination. By writing 

down their experiences, however, people could face discrimination, recognize society’s 

role, get “mad as hell,” and lose patience with the circumstances to which they had 

become acclimated.13 Third, grass roots mobilization would provide a means to apply 

pressure on members of Congress and the president. Not only did persons with 

disabilities write letters, they also joined the lobbying campaign by paying for trips to 

Washington out of their own pockets. 

Golden drew on the extensive contacts she had made through administering 

DREDF disability rights training projects. In the 1980s, DREDF had brought 

thousands of persons with disabilities to Berkeley to educate them in their rights and 

teach them how to mobilize communities for action. These persons in turn shared 

their knowledge with their local communities. Golden supplemented this network by 

establishing ties to other organizations, such as NCIL, and the ARC, and their grass 

roots links. The computer network DIMENET was another avenue for mobilizing 

people around the country. 

As a result of his public forums, Dart had become famous among people with 

disabilities around the country, indeed he had become somewhat of a cultural icon for 

much of the disability community. As he toured the country, Dart kept lists of all the 

people who attended, which produced a massive list of people he could later contact 
 MOBILIZING THE DISABILITY COMMUNITY 63 

for political action. And by spending years touring the country, people in the grass 

roots felt as if they were part of the ADA’s development rather than objects of it. 

They were thus more willing and eager to join Dart when the time came for action. 

Dart simply had “no equal” in getting people mobilized, said Maria Cuprill, a staff 

member of the House Subcommittee on Select Education.14 

Members of Congress also recognized the need to demonstrate broad-based 

support for the ADA. Congressman Major R. Owens (D-NY), in particular, devoted 

considerable energy to empowering the grass roots. Although Owens was a relative 

newcomer to disability policy, first encountering it after becoming a member of the 

House Education and Labor Committee in 1983, he brought additional assets. He had 

experienced the 1960s civil rights movement first-hand, including service as chairman 

of the Brooklyn chapter of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE)—an organization 

central to the movement’s success. He had also developed a passion for fostering 

citizen participation. In 1987, Owens became Chairman of the House Subcommittee 

on Select Education, which had jurisdiction over many disability issues. When he 

first learned about the ADA prior to its introduction, he thought of it primarily as a 

civil rights issue: carrying forward the banner for civil rights from African Americans 

to women to people with disabilities. Owens wanted to do whatever he could to help 

energize people with disabilities. 

Accordingly, on May 2, 1988, less than a week after the ADA’s introduction, 

Congressman Owens created the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of 

Americans with Disabilities. The group’s purpose was twofold: to present to Congress, 

the executive branch, and the general public evidence of disability discrimination, and to 

make recommendations. Owens appointed Dart to be the Chairperson. Dart had testified 

before Owens’s subcommittee as Commissioner of the Rehabilitation Services 

Administration (RSA), which was part of the Department of Education. Owens thereby 

discovered that Dart shared his philosophy that disability rights were primarily civil rights. 

But, following his critical testimony regarding the Department of Education and its 

paternalistic attitudes toward and policies for people with disabilities, Dart resigned as 

RSA Commissioner. Owens saw his task force as an opportunity for Dart to continue his 

mission of achieving civil rights for people with disabilities. Owens named Elizabeth 

Boggs, of the ARC, as Co-chair with 

Dart. And Lex Frieden assumed the 

reins as Coordinator. Thirty-five 

others from the disability 

community were selected as task 

force members.*

Justin Dart chaired 63 forums in all 

fifty states, with over 7,000 people in 

attendance, and collected more than 

5,000 documents supporting the ADA. 

 

*

 Task Force members were: Elmer Bartels, Wade Blank, David Bodenstein, 

Frank Bowe, Marca Bristo, Dale Brown, Philip Calkins, David Capozzi, Julie Clay, 

Susan Daniels, James DeJong, Eliot Dober, Charles Estes, Don Galloway, Keith 

Gann, James Havel, I. King Jordan, Gordon Mansfield, Paul Marchand, Connie
64 PUBLICIZING THE ADA 

 

Dart immediately began organizing another series of public forums. As 

always, Dart’s wife Yoshiko was crucial for the management and execution of Dart’s 

activities, which they paid for primarily with their own funds. Justin met Yoshiko in 

Japan, where Justin worked as president of Japan Tupperware. Yoshiko was a 

remarkably successful sales representative for the company. In addition to managing 

his company, which met with great success, Justin used his position as president to 

assist people with disabilities in attaining better livelihoods. For example, he 

sponsored sales campaigns in which the company and employees donated profits to 

buy wheelchairs for persons with disabilities. Justin also provided employment 

opportunities to boys who used wheelchairs. And Yoshiko took an active role in 

training them for work and assisting them in building greater self-confidence as 

productive citizens. Yoshiko’s success, capabilities, and interest in disability attracted 

Justin’s attention, who ultimately hired her as an executive assistant. They married in 

1968 and became partners in championing the rights of persons with disabilities. 

Between 1988 and 1990 Justin Dart chaired a total of 63 forums in all fifty 

states, Guam, and Puerto Rico, with over 7,000 people in attendance overall. 

Attending a public forum was extraordinarily empowering, said Denise Figueroa of 

New York. When someone has a disability, she said, one tends to “tolerate the 

discrimination, because it’s how you survive.” Hearing people talk about their 

experiences, however, could be a consciousness-raising experience and charge one 

with a desire to fight for human rights. It was also empowering, said Figueroa, 

because one realized “you weren’t alone.”15 

While traveling throughout the country, Dart collected upwards of 

5,000 documents and tape recordings detailing discrimination, offering proposals, and 

urging passage of the ADA.16 In addition to people with disabilities, comments came 

from parents, health care providers, and others who worked with people with 

disabilities. Virtually every type of disability was represented. Thousands of people 

filled out petitions titled “A VOTE FOR JUSTICE,” which declared support of the ADA 

and concluded with the invitation: “I HAVE PERSONALLY EXPERIENCED AND/OR 

OBSERVED THE FOLLOWING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES:.” 

For example, when Gary Janski, who had a psychiatric disability, tried to rent a 

favorite, vacant apartment, the owner said: “we won’t rent to your kind.” When 

you’re “crippled,” observed Sheila Sorenson, “you get treated like you’re a two year 

old and can’t do anything.” “It makes us feel better to [do] things on our own instead 

of having everything done for [us],” she said. Ree Steidemann described how deaf 

persons she worked with repeatedly tried to reach hospitals and other institutions 

through TTY’s, where no one answered or people answered and did not know how to 

Martinez, Celane McWhorter, Oral Miller, Gary Olsen, Mary Jane Owen, Sandra 

Parrino, Ed Roberts, Joseph Rogers, Liz Savage, William Spencer, Marilyn Price 

Spivack, Ann Vinup, Sylvia Walker, Michael Winter, Pat Wright, Tony Young. Task 

Force staff were: Douglas Burleigh, Yoshiko Dart, Tsuneko Gozu, Marcia Lee 

Nelson, Eileen Raab, Kate Reilly, Gwyneth Rochlin, Marnie Sweet, Hisako Takei.
 MOBILIZING THE DISABILITY COMMUNITY 65 

 

use their TTY devices.* “Please, please help us,” wrote Frances Murtagh, an 

exasperated mother of a child with cerebral palsy. “I’m at my wits end trying to fight 

these people alone.” In a profound poem, Carolyn Schwartz pleaded: “So before you 

condemn what you don’t understand. Let me reach out to you and come touch my 

hand.” Debbie Wimmer described how she overheard a security guard announce: “I 

have a girl in a wheelchair that needs watching.” “I was speechless. I was hurt. I was 

mad,” wrote Wimmer. Phyllis Geldzalh captured the blunt sentiments of many people 

with disabilities: “It would be a serious injustice if ADA was not passed.”17 

In addition to presenting boxes of materials to Congress, the task force issued 

11 interim reports to Congress, and prepared 37 statements to leaders in the disability 

community. Dart also sponsored 14 meetings in Washington and made presentations 

to various organizations around the country, reaching an estimated 25,000 persons. 

Moreover, task force members contributed to lobbying efforts by consulting with 

members of Congress and the executive branch. As a testimony to its dedication to, 

passion for, and personal investment in disability policy, the task force carried out all 

its efforts without government funding, through volunteered time and money. And it 

far exceeded Congressman Owens’s expectations. 

Although the disability community conducted very little legal work on the 

ADA in 1988, this was the fourth main objective in addition to strategy development, 

grass roots mobilization, and lobbying. By mid-1989, a legal team was fairly 

organized. The lead attorney for the disability community, and the one who most 

often testified before Congress on behalf of the ADA, was Arlene Mayerson of 

DREDF. She had worked extensively on the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and 

Handicapped Act, Civil Rights Restoration Act, and Fair Housing Amendments Act, 

and had submitted countless briefs to various committees and courts. Especially 

significant was her role in passing the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act. 

Although Mayerson lived in Berkeley, California, during the congressional 

deliberations on the ADA, Mayerson visited Washington frequently, for weeks at a 

time, in order to guide legal strategy. Chai Feldblum of the ACLU, who had met 

Wright while working on the Civil Rights Restoration Act (the first time HIV/AIDS 

entered a Senate bill for civil rights protections), fulfilled much of the daily 

responsibilities of legal writing while Mayerson was in California. Although 

Feldblum specialized in AIDS-related law, and championed the efforts to include 

persons with HIV and AIDS within the housing provisions, she began developing a 

firm grasp on general disability law. 

Mayerson and Feldblum were hardly alone, however. Robert Burgdorf, the 

original author of the ADA and now a professor at the District of Columbia School of 

Law, participated in all modifications to the bill and helped ensure continuity from the 

*

 TTY refers to a teletype device for transmitting text over telephone lines. 

Such a device is often referred to as a TDD—Telecommunication Device for the 

Deaf.
66 PUBLICIZING THE ADA 

original version. Tim Cook of the National Disability Action Center offered general 

guidance as well as his expertise with respect to public accommodations and 

transportation. Weisman, of EPVA, served as the resident specialist in 

Transportation. Bonnie Milstein of the Mental Health Law Project offered her 

expertise concerning mental impairments. Karen Peltz-Strauss, from the National 

Center for Law and the Deaf, focused on telecommunication provisions. Depending 

on the issues pressing at any given moment, these and other attorneys worked closely 

with Congress, disability strategists, and lobbyists to translate disability objectives 

into proper legal form. Meanwhile, attorneys Robert Funk and Evan Kemp worked on 

behalf of the disability community within the Bush administration, respectively as a 

White House negotiator and Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (EEOC). 

The massive effort of the disability community was not without its tensions. 

Many disability organizations had previously been in conflict with one another over 

limited government resources. As with any coalition, there were tensions between 

those who held Washington leadership roles and those who worked in the trenches, 

between inside-the-beltway politicos and persons throughout the rest of the country. 

Some felt that their views were not being adequately represented in the decisionmaking process. Others resented claims that persons outside of Washington did not 

understand the legislative process. There was also tension between persons with 

disabilities and those without them. It is natural to assume that African-American and 

women’s advocacy groups would be led by African Americans and women. In the 

disability community, however, one found large numbers of persons without 

disabilities at the helm. Regardless of the actual impact on policy development and 

implementation, some persons with disabilities demanded that “their own” be in 

charge. The important point, however, is not the presence of these tensions, but the 

way in which the disability community overcame them. 

There was something in the 

ADA for everyone. Virtually all 

disability sub-groups wanted to, and 

subsequently did, champion the 

goals of the ADA. With few 

exceptions, they were united in the 

commitment that there would be “no 

long term legitimation of unequal 

status for people with disabilities.” 

Full realization of the goals might 

take decades, but they wanted to 

undercut any national policies that would promote discrimination indefinitely. The 

disability community made a second important commitment. There would be no 

splintering with respect to the ADA: “No subgroup of people with any type of 

physical or mental disability, or perceived disability, no matter how politically 

impotent or how stigmatized, will be sacrificed.”18 And they would fight each other’s 

battles. Advocates for persons with mental retardation pushed for ending 

discrimination against AIDS; people with epilepsy argued for the need for accessible 

“No subgroup of people with any 

type of physical or mental disability, 

or perceived disability, . . . will be 

sacrificed.” 

— Task Force on the Rights 

and Empowerment of 

Americans with Disabilities 
 THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 67 

transportation; and individuals using wheelchairs urged that persons with mental 

disabilities equally deserved freedom from employment discrimination. Even at the 

most intense moments in congressional deliberations, the community would stick 

together. 

The Government Response THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

While persons with disabilities throughout the country were mobilizing to 

learn about and support the ADA, the general public remained largely unaware of the 

legislation. Prior to the ADA’s introduction, The Washington Post pointed to the 

ADA as a potential rallying point for the disability community. But there was 

virtually no mainstream press coverage, either of the bill’s introduction, or during the 

rest of 1988. This was due in part to the lateness of the bill’s entree to Congress. 

Since the ADA’s advocates were not pushing for immediate passage, the bill drew 

neither the press coverage nor the opposition it would when the bill became a serious 

proposal in 1989. Individuals throughout the country, however, helped raise 

consciousness about the ADA by talking with their circles of friends and family. And 

scores of disability and non-disability organizations endorsed the ADA and funneled 

information to their members. 

Disability and congressional advocates focused much more on the executive 

branch and Congress than on the general public.19 The ADA was first introduced, as 

Congressman Coelho said, “to just get reaction, to get people to respond.”20 A 

prominent executive branch voice was Evan Kemp, who approached the issue both as 

a Commissioner of EEOC and as a disability rights advocate. He made his first public 

declaration on the ADA before hundreds of people at the Employers Banquet of the 

President’s Committee on Employment of the Handicapped. The event took place in 

the International Ballroom of the Washington Hilton Hotel, just a week after the bill’s 

introduction on May 5. Kemp wanted a bill that President Bush could support and 

therefore alerted people to problematic provisions. Kemp spoke primarily about 

employment issues, of how it made good business sense to tap the market of disabled 

persons by promoting accessibility, and good government sense to reduce federal 

spending through employment. For these reasons he applauded the ADA, but he also 

questioned its current form. Kemp thought the bill needed to be more detailed to 

avoid control by bureaucratic regulators. He was especially concerned about the 

definition of “reasonable accommodation” and advocated federal economic assistance 

to employers to ease the economic burden the ADA might cause. He also thought the 

proposed limit on reasonable accommodations was “unrealistic” because an employer 

would have to demonstrate either that the business would be “fundamentally changed” 

or that it would be forced to file bankruptcy. The definition of “handicap” was also 

problematic for Kemp. He proposed a restricted definition that focused on what he 

termed the “truly disabled”: the “severely handicapped” and persons “excluded 

because of myths, fears and stereotypes.” Kemp’s emphasis on the vagueness of 

language, limits for accommodation, and definition of disability, foreshadowed 

several issues that would dominate congressional deliberations.21 
68 PUBLICIZING THE ADA 

A vigorous response came from Thomas M. Boyd, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, who presented the position of the Reagan administration. While the 

administration “is deeply committed to the goal of bringing individuals with 

handicaps into the mainstream of American life,” wrote Boyd, “we have very serious 

reservations” about the extent and standards of the ADA. Highlighting the potential 

costs associated with disability rights, and rejecting the link to provisions for 

minorities and women, Boyd emphasized the need to keep the pursuit of equal 

opportunity “within manageable bounds.” Especially problematic were the ways in 

which the ADA departed from Section 504 in two ways: first, by requiring barrier 

removal uniformly for both existing and new facilities; second, by incorporating the 

“utterly unrealistic and extreme” provision that a business could defend itself against 

charges of discrimination only if its basic existence was threatened by the cost of 

accommodations. The administration objected to the ADA’s novel definitions of 

“handicap” and “reasonable accommodation,” and questioned the application of 

reasonable accommodation beyond employment settings. Boyd also repudiated the 

proposal for requiring all new transportation vehicles to be accessible, and demurred 

to ordering implementation of universal design in new housing. Finally, the 

administration proposed a more limited standard of accessibility to public 

accommodations, and demanded that the effective date for the bill be delayed at least 

a year.22 

Although the Reagan administration, 

as illustrated in Boyd’s letter, was at best 

cautious in its support of the ADA, the 

disability community’s sights were set on the 

next president. In fact, one of the principal 

reasons for introducing the ADA in 1988 was 

to use the politics of a presidential election 

year to solicit candidate endorsement and 

induce the candidates to outbid one another. People in the disability community correctly 

believed that presidential support was crucial for the ADA’s success. They worked for 

both campaigns to encourage disabled persons to vote and make disability a campaign 

issue. They had some leverage. On June 30, 1988, the Louis Harris polling company 

determined that the disability community comprised 10 percent of the electorate, was “a 

force to be reckoned with in the politics of the future,” and could be the deciding factor in 

a close election.23 

The ADA was introduced in 

1988 to solicit the endorsement 

of presidential candidates and 

induce them to outbid one 

another. 

Vice President Bush’s personal experience with disability shaped his 

relationship with the disability community. He had a daughter who died from 

leukemia, a son with a learning disability, an uncle with quadriplegia, and a son whose 

cancer required a plastic ostomy bag. In conjunction with his leadership of President 

Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief, his support of the disability community 

had grown steadily since 1983. This was due in no small part to Kemp, who worked 

with Bush by writing many of his public statements. 

In the September issue of the disability magazine Mainstream, Kemp faced 

off with Timothy Cook of the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (PILCOP) to 
 THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 69 

argue the respective attributes of 

the two presidential candidates. 

Kemp noted how, on March 1, 

1988, Vice President Bush wrote 

to the Gallaudet Board of 

Trustees and urged the Board “to 

set an example and . . . appoint a 

president who is not only highly 

qualified, but who is also deaf.” 

A month before the ADA was introduced, on March 31, Bush also pledged to support 

legislation providing persons with disabilities “the same protection in private 

employment that is now enjoyed by women and minorities.”24 Kemp noted how Bush 

made an even stronger commitment when he participated in the swearing in ceremony 

of Paul Hearne as Executive Director of the National Council on Disability, on August 

12, 1988. Bush’s presence alone, before nearly 100 persons with disabilities and the 

organization that authored the original ADA, symbolized his support of the disability 

community. But Bush went further and, while he did not endorse the ADA introduced 

to Congress, said that he would promote a civil rights act for people with 

disabilities.25 Kemp’s efforts in courting Bush also bore fruit at the Republican 

convention in August, where Bush incorporated the rights of disabled persons into his 

acceptance speech. He did not say much, but it was the first time disability was 

included on such an occasion: “I am going to do whatever it takes to make sure the 

disabled are included in the mainstream. For too long, they have been left out, but 

they are not going to be left out anymore.”26 

“I am going to do whatever it takes to 

make sure the disabled are included in 

the mainstream. For too long, they 

have been left out, but they are not 

going to be left out anymore.” 

—Vice President George Bush 

Cook, a leading disability advocate for Dukakis, focused on Michael 

Dukakis’s strong record on disability as Governor of Massachusetts. Similar to other 

states, Massachusetts provided full access for persons with disabilities in all stateassisted programs and activities. It was also one of few states to have an executivelevel independent agency to enforce disability civil rights. Cook noted that Governor 

Dukakis strengthened enforcement mechanisms for accessibility standards, including 

barrier-free sidewalks and roadways. He also made concerted efforts to recruit 

persons with disabilities for government offices, including high-level leadership 

positions such as the Massachusetts’s Rehabilitation Commission. Moreover, 

Governor Dukakis had augmented Massachusetts’ health insurance, attendant care, 

and education programs for persons with disabilities.27 

Yet, while Dukakis promoted accessibility in campaign functions and gave a 

mild endorsement to the principles of the ADA, he did not court the disability 

community as vigorously as Vice President Bush. In addition to his personal 

experiences with disability, Bush’s leadership of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief 

and the disability community’s defensive effort helped convinced Bush of the power 

of the community as a voting block: it commanded respect and could pay high 

dividends. Bush did not let the opportunity escape him. For example, at the 

suggestion of Kemp he made a point to incorporate disability issues into his 

presidential debates. 
70 PUBLICIZING THE ADA 

Dukakis, on the other hand, was facing criticism that he and the Democratic 

party were too beholden to interest groups, which led him to downplay rather than 

accentuate direct appeals to specific constituencies such as persons with disabilities. 

He thereby alienated much of the disability community. Some of Dukakis’s tempered 

support of the disability community may in fact be attributed to the disability 

community itself. Some disability advocates had advised Dukakis not to come out too 

strong on behalf of the ADA. Their goal was to have both candidates endorse the 

principles of the ADA so that whoever was elected would be on their side. They thus 

wanted to encourage Bush to support the ADA by giving him room to outbid Dukakis, 

rather than make Bush feel as if he needed to contrast himself with Dukakis by being 

more reserved in his support of the ADA.28 

ADA advocates also sought the support of members of Congress. The 

disability community joined congressional staff and members in a cosponsorship drive 

that began before the ADA was first introduced and continued throughout the entire 

session of Congress. Cosponsorship is crucial to the success of any bill. It promises 

affirmative votes and enables advocates to gauge the level of support. Cosponsorship 

is also important because, if one can achieve a cross-section of party and ideology, it 

helps thwart reflexive, negative reaction and partisan labeling. Although ADA 

advocates anticipated a high level of cosponsorship because they presented the ADA 

as a civil rights bill, the process proved to be very difficult. Members did not take the 

issue of costs lightly and were reluctant to attach their name simply because someone 

else had done so.29 Nevertheless, by the close of the 100th Congress on October 22, 

1988, 26 senators and 117 representatives had endorsed the bill. 

Congressional Hearings CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS

The highlights of the 1988 ADA campaign were the congressional hearings 

held in September and October. On September 27, 1988, the Senate Subcommittee on 

the Handicapped and the House Subcommittee on Select Education held a joint 

hearing in the Hart Senate Office Building. On October 24, the House Subcommittee 

on Select Education held a hearing in the Lafayette Hotel of Boston, Massachusetts. 

These hearings were not intended to be substantive examinations of the ADA’s 

provisions. “This bill is not going anywhere this year,” Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) 

said flatly at the joint hearing.30 Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-CT) also conceded 

that the real battle would not begin 

until Congress reconvened in 1989. 

But Weicker emphasized the need 

to get disability discrimination on 

the table for immediate discussion: 

“If there is silence now, there will 

be silence later. If there is 

indifference to discrimination now, 

there will be indifference later.”31 

The purpose was therefore to 

establish a record of 

The message was clear: persons with 

disabilities struggled with unequal 

opportunities; they confronted not 

only the challenges of their 

impairments, but also the barriers 

society erects; federal action was 

necessary to remedy the situation. 
 CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS 71 

discrimination—to humanize the ICD Survey data with the lives of real persons—and 

make congressional inaction on the ADA intolerable. 

Of the 95 witnesses at the two hearings, there was not a single technical 

expert speaking to the details of the bill. Only seven federal and state government 

officials testified. The remaining witnesses were all from the disability community—

persons and parents of persons with disabilities, and people who worked with disabled 

persons in such settings as independent living centers—who spoke of their own 

experiences. This was, therefore, the first instance in which a congressional hearing 

regarding disability was dominated by the presence of people with disabilities. Some 

of the predicaments identified by witnesses were not even issues that the ADA 

addressed. But the message was clear: persons with disabilities struggled with 

unequal opportunities; they confronted not only the challenges of their impairments, 

but also the barriers society erects; federal action was necessary to remedy the 

situation. 

The joint hearing in the Hart Senate Office Building overflowed with eager 

spectators, many of them disabled, and many having traveled hundreds of miles to 

participate. Around 200 people with disabilities came to Washington for the event 

from New Jersey alone. Senator Weicker actually had to stop the proceedings to 

attend to space needs; he asked those present to rotate so that others watching on 

television could have a chance to be in the hearing room. The stories of those who 

testified were gripping and spoke volumes. 

Mary Linden, who had been unable to walk since early childhood as a result 

of physicians’ surgical errors, launched the first panel. She described her struggles 

with a public school that considered her unworthy of education. It was not until after 

Linden graduated from a disability-segregated high school in 1951 that she learned 

how to write, and then only because she taught herself. Subsequently she spent over 

two decades accumulating 61 hours of college credit. To her dismay, she could not 

enroll in a four-year college because of inaccessible public transportation. She 

therefore had to do all of her work through correspondence. Linden said she 

desperately wanted to finish her degree because it was necessary for attaining what 

she significantly termed “the most precious thing in the world”— “a paying job!” “I 

beg you to pass this bill,” she pleaded, so that other children will not have to face the 

same barriers.32 

Twelve-year-old Jade Calegory followed Linden’s testimony and, compared 

with Linden, presented the stark contrast of what opportunity could do. Jade praised 

the Federal Government for passing the Education for all Handicapped Children Act 

because the act enabled him, with his spina bifida and wheelchair, to join the rest of 

his community’s children in the public school. Jade starred in the movie “Mac and 

Me,” which he described as “terrific because it shows a kid with a disability giving 

help instead of just getting help, and nobody tries to cure me or take away my 

disability by the end of the movie. That gives people the idea that it is okay to be 

disabled and just be accepted for who you are.” Jade also described his passion for 

participating in wheelchair races. But he reported that he would get frustrated when 
72 PUBLICIZING THE ADA 

 

he tried to ride a bus home. “Most of the buses do not have lifts on them. Some of 

the drivers are very rude and get mad if I want to take the bus. Can you believe that? 

I work and part of my taxes pay for public buses, and then they get mad just because I 

am using a wheelchair.” Accessible buses were important, said Jade, because “it is 

hard for people to feel good about themselves if they have to crawl up the stairs of a 

bus, or if the driver passes by without stopping.”33 

Dan Piper and his mother, Sylvia Piper, illustrated the uncertainty they faced 

because of Dan’s developmental disability. Although the Pipers were told that Dan’s 

condition was “hopeless” when he was a young child, and that Dan should be 

institutionalized, they decided to keep him at home. Ultimately he joined the special 

education program of an integrated*

 public school, where he took courses with nondisabled peers, helped manage the football team, and became the lead performer in a 

traveling high school lip-sync group. The Pipers were worried, however, about what 

would happen to Dan when he finished school and wanted to fulfill his dream of 

getting a job and living in his own apartment. “Will the landlord decide, because Dan 

has mental retardation, that he is incapable of independent living? Will he be denied 

access to transportation? Will restaurants refuse service? Will hotels refuse 

accommodations?” The Pipers viewed the ADA as a much-needed extension in 

disability policy: “It is now time to expand handicapped antidiscrimination to the 

private sector so that Dan’s and our visions for his adult life and the lives of many 

others can finally become a reality.”34 

Judith Heumann’s polio resulted in paralysis. Despite her remarkably 

successful career, she was burdened by the psychological impact of discrimination. 

She described how she could not enter public school as a child because she was 

considered “a fire hazard.” When she graduated from high school, the principal tried 

to prevent her from accepting her diploma on stage because of her wheelchair. In 

college, she was denied her elementary school teaching credentials because of her 

paralysis: administrators did not think she could teach from a wheelchair. On one 

occasion, officials at an auction house attempted to remove Heumann and a friend 

because they were allegedly “disgusting to look at.” People do not emerge unscathed 

from these experiences, concluded Heumann: “this stigma scars for life.”35 

Belinda Mason knew stigma first-hand. At the age of 30, Mason had been 

diagnosed HIV-positive after a blood transfusion. Moreover, a stroke left her partially 

paralyzed. “I have learned a terrible truth about America,” she said of her subsequent 

experiences, “that it is not a good place to be different or to be ill, in spite of what we 

teach in government class.” She related that her 75-person town closed the 

community pool for a week after she entered it, ostensibly because of a cigarette butt. 

One neighbor carried around a petition demanding that she move out. Mason 

*

 In this context, “integrated” schools are those that did not isolate persons 

with disabilities in separate educational facilities, as opposed to racially integrated 

schools.
 CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS 73 

described another woman who lost her job simply because she decided to have her 

son, who had AIDS, live at home. She also told of one occasion where police locked 

a man with AIDS in his car overnight, rather than take him into jail. The next day, 

people peered through the windows at him as if looking in an aquarium. Mason 

acknowledged that one cannot simply legislate attitudes and behavior. But she 

poignantly added: “The truth is that sometimes legislation precedes and enhances 

humanity.”36 Mason was the first person with HIV ever to testify before Congress. 

And her moving testimony earned her an appointment to the President’s Committee 

on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic. 

Congressman Owens organized the field hearing in Boston at the request of 

Dart and others from the New England disability community. The purpose was to 

solicit an even more extensive demonstration of citizen participation. “It was an 

unforgettable day,” said Owens, for the range of disabilities represented, the racial and 

gender diversity, and the united spirit of those in attendance.37 Everyone wanted the 

chance to address Congress. To accommodate as many people as possible, the 

subcommittee met nonstop from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.: over 80 witnesses testified in 

rapid-fire succession, each having but a few minutes to relate his or her experiences. 

William Cavanaugh, a consumer of the Massachusetts mental health system, 

spoke about the “abusive treatment practices and human rights violations” of persons 

in mental institutions. He described one man, Vincent Veletia, who suffocated and 

died after being restrained with “a full sensory deprivation hood,” replete with ear 

phones emitting constant static, and being forced into a fetal position with his hands 

cuffed behind his knees.38 Bonnie O’Day described how a prominent disability 

advocate from Charlottesville, Franz Stielfried, died because of poor accessibility. 

Impeded by an intersection without curb cuts, Stielfried tried to cross a dangerous, 

grassy area next to a 50-foot drop. While trying to lower himself over another curb, 

however, he lost control of his wheelchair and fell over the cliff to his death. He had 

been traveling to a meeting to 

demand for greater 

accessibility.39 

Nancy Husted-Jensen 

described how fully-registered 

disabled persons were turned 

away from voting booths 

because they supposedly did not 

look sufficiently “competent” to vote.40 Eileen Healy Horndt similarly recounted how 

one man with mental retardation was barred from opening a savings account at a local 

bank because he “did not fit the image the bank wants to project.” She spoke of another 

gentlemen with quadriplegia who joined her in visiting a presidential campaign office to 

discuss accessibility, but there was no handicap parking space wide enough for the van 

lift. Horndt also described her own frustration of having to use a calling card at pay 

telephones because she could not reach the coin slot.41 

“You know, sometimes I almost wish a 

person would hate me for being 

disabled. Then at least I would know 

they knew I was alive.” 

—Anonymous 
74 PUBLICIZING THE ADA 

Only after the Disability Law Center of Boston threatened legal action did 

Barbara Waters avoid leaving college when administrators said her epileptic seizures 

represented a “liability risk.” Eleanor Blake was not so fortunate. After being 

hospitalized for manic depression, college officials denied her graduation from the 

human services program because, they said, she was not “psychologically fit.” Later, 

after switching majors, she graduated summa cum laude.42 

Patricia Deegan further illustrated the excessive discrimination persons with 

mental illness face, including “the assumption that what we say about our own 

experiences is an expression of a disordered mind and can therefore be ignored.” 

Presumed to be crazy, one’s basic civil rights were readily violated. Deegan related 

how one woman reported to mental health workers that she was pregnant, but the 

professionals dismissed her claim as delusional. Later she visited an emergency room 

only to be met with the same response. That evening, while roaming the streets in 

desperation, the woman miscarried and suffered from serious hemorrhaging.43 

These examples capture only a small fraction of the testimony presented about 

lost education and employment opportunities, physical and transportation barriers, 

social stigma, and violation of basic human rights. But the problem came not only 

from actions committed, it also 

came from simple avoidance. 

Michael Oestreicher related how 

one frustrated, member of a group 

discussing beach accessibility 

poignantly declared: “You know, 

sometimes I almost wish a person 

would hate me for being disabled. 

Then at least I would know they 

knew I was alive.”44 

“We are not asking for pity. We are 

not even asking for your sympathy. 

All we ask is that you make real the 

promises and opportunities that 

America strives to offer everyone.” 

—Denise Karuth 

In a discrimination diary presented to the committee, Cynthia Miller captured 

the exasperation evident in these sentiments and those of many other persons with 

disabilities. “I got home late this evening and did the things most Americans do like 

cooking, cleaning, feeding the cat,” Miller wrote. Then she prepared a list of things 

she thought needed to be changed to improve the lives of persons with disabilities. 

I thought of doing all these things, but the list seems to grow every 

day. Instead, I got angry and depressed. I got angry and depressed 

because after I work all day, fight the barriers to get to work, [and] 

fight the barriers to do the things all Americans do like shop, I have 

meetings and phone calls and letters and other things I have to do to 

fight for my equal rights as an American with a disability. I’m tired 

of being tired, frightened, angry and depressed every day, fighting for 

my rights. And now, I’m writing a stupid diary until 2:00 in the 

morning to prove that discrimination exists to my Congress. Why 

does Congress think so many Americans are fighting this battle if 

discrimination doesn’t exist? Does Congress think we enjoy or prefer 
 EVE OF THE 1988 ELECTION 75 

to fight for equal rights before we eat or sleep sometimes? . . . I would 

like to watch The Cosby Show, with slippers on my feet, and time on 

my hands, like other Americans. I don’t want to be Rosa Parks. I just 

want to be Cyndy Miller.45 

Denise Karuth, who used a wheelchair because of multiple sclerosis and was 

legally blind, eloquently stated what people like herself and Cyndy Miller were 

fighting for. “We are not asking for your money,” she explained. “We are not asking 

for pity. We are not even asking for your sympathy. All we ask is that you make real 

the promises and opportunities that America strives to offer everyone: the respect and 

dignity we deserve as free and responsible citizens.”46 

The hearings were captivating and televised on C-Span. Savage used a copy 

of the proceedings to edit a 30-minute version and make it available all around the 

country. She became known as the “Girl Scout Cookie-Lady” for her persistence in 

pushing the video on people. Dart also played a crucial role in spreading the edited 

hearings by taking copies with him as he traveled around the country for his public 

forums. People could use the video to explain what disability discrimination was all 

about and draw on the testimony for examples of how to describe their own 

experiences. 

The ADA on the Eve of the 1988 Election EVE OF THE 1988 ELECTION

Although no further action was 

taken on the ADA in 1988, the ADA did 

not “die,” as some people claimed, when 

Congress closed its 100th Session on 

October 22. On the contrary, the ADA of 

1988 fulfilled its mission. ADA sponsors 

never intended it to come to a vote that 

year. The goal, rather, was to complete the process begun by the National Council on 

Disability in getting the ADA on the legislative agenda, not only as a token measure, 

but as a congressional priority. The disability community reached this objective with 

a pronouncement from Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) at the joint hearing. “I 

just want to give the assurance,” he asserted, “that this will be the first order of 

business” when Congress convenes for the 101st session in 1989.47 

The ADA of 1988 fulfilled its 

mission. The goal was to get the 

ADA on the legislative agenda 

as a congressional priority. 

The disability community had begun its education process, both internally and 

with members of Congress and presidential candidates. Members were learning more 

about what it meant to be disabled. They were being exposed to scores of people with 

disabilities for the first time. Many declared their support by becoming cosponsors of 

the bill. The disability community was also becoming much more optimistic at the 

close of 1988. The 1980s had been a decade of struggle against encroachments. But the 

Civil Rights Restoration Act symbolized the new alliance formed with the civil rights 

community. And the Fair Housing Amendments Act broke new ground by extending 

disability policy to encompass the private sector. The Reagan administration was 
76 PUBLICIZING THE ADA 

winding to a close, and the tide was apparently turning. Both presidential candidates 

had vowed to support legislation akin to the ADA. By the end of 1988, the compelling 

problem of discrimination had been fused with the solution crafted by the National 

Council on Disability. The political climate was also changing in a way that would 

invite, rather than impede, future action. 
 4 

CREATING A WORKABLE ADA: 

THE SENATE AND THE WHITE HOUSE 

 

O n November 8, 1988, George Bush defeated Michael Dukakis in the election for 

President of the United States. Bush’s strong statements in support of the 

CREATING A WORKABLE ADA

disability community, and particularly civil rights legislation for people with 

disabilities, had swayed many disabled voters, including many Democrats. In fact, a 

poll of voter intentions on the eve of the election, conducted by Louis Harris and 

Associates, suggested that the wide margin of persons with disabilities supporting 

Bush was a deciding factor in the election.1

 Although many persons with disabilities 

had campaigned for Dukakis and were disappointed by the outcome, Bush’s election 

clearly offered an opportunity to the disability community. His attentiveness to 

disability issues signaled a change in the political climate and made passage of the 

ADA seem more promising. Moreover, two days before his inauguration, Bush 

avowed his intent to follow through on his pledges and push the ADA toward passage. 

“I said during the campaign that disabled people have been excluded for far too long 

from the mainstream of American life,” Bush noted. “One step that I have discussed 

will be action on the Americans with Disabilities Act in order, in simple fairness, to 

provide the disabled with the same rights afforded others, afforded other minorities.”2

In another respect, however, the election of 1988 was damaging to the ADA 

cause. Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-CT), a long-time supporter of persons with 

disabilities and the Senate sponsor of the ADA in 1988, lost his bid for reelection to 

Joseph Lieberman. As one senate staff member said, Weicker was “one of the fivehundred-pound gorillas” in Congress.3

 His leadership in the area of disability was 

consistent and strong. Now someone else had to fill the void he left. The chief 

cosponsor of the 1988 ADA was Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), who had worked 

closely with Weicker, the National Council on the Handicapped (NCD), and the 

disability community in the development of the ADA. Weicker and Harkin had even 

discussed whether Harkin’s position as Chairman of the Subcommittee on the 

Handicapped placed him in the best position to be the original sponsor in 1988. 

Harkin also had a personal understanding of the need for the ADA because of his 

brother, who was deaf. It was therefore natural for Harkin to assume Senate 

leadership. But it was not a foregone conclusion. 

Sponsorship of the ADA was a risky endeavor for the first-term senator. He was 

up for reelection in 1990, and no Democratic senator from Iowa had ever won a second 

term. As a relative newcomer to disability policy, Senator Harkin would have to begin his 

relationship with the disability community by making compromises with respect to 

provisions in the ADA—potentially alienating the people he was trying to help. 
78 CREATING A WORKABLE ADA 

Moreover, failure to pass the bill rapidly 

might lead some people to compare the 

leadership skills of Senators Harkin and 

Weicker. By sponsoring the ADA, 

Harkin would also become a target for the 

opposition, which included employers, 

transit operators, owners of public 

accommodations, railroads, 

telecommunications providers, and state 

and local governments. Finally, the prospects for successfully expanding civil rights 

protections to incorporate an additional “class” of people, while improved with the change 

in administration, remained uncertain at best. 

“I didn’t get elected to get reelected. My brother is deaf. I 

understand discrimination. . . . 

We are doing this legislation.” 

—Senator Tom Harkin 

Sponsoring the ADA and risking failure could potentially jeopardize Senator 

Harkin’s political career. Although Robert Silverstein, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

for the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, cautioned him about the pitfalls, Harkin 

accepted the challenge. “I didn’t get elected to get re-elected,” he told Silverstein. “My 

brother is deaf. I understand discrimination. I understand what it means and what this 

country can look like in thirty years. We are doing this legislation.”4

 

Master Strategy and the Retooling of the ADA RETOOLING THE ADA 

Senator Harkin took the lead in preparing the ADA for reintroduction. 

Success depended on developing a solid strategy for maneuvering the bill through the 

treacherous terrain of Congress. It also required attaining the complete backing of the 

disability community.5

 Harkin’s first step was to establish an effective relationship 

with Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) and Carolyn Osolinik and Michael 

Iskowitz from Kennedy’s committee staff. This was important because a bill 

successfully voted out of Harkin’s 

Subcommittee on the Handicapped 

would have to clear Kennedy’s 

Committee on Labor and Human 

Resources. Coordination of all 

legislative activities with Kennedy 

could improve the possibility of a 

smooth and quick transition to the 

Senate floor. The disability community 

was also courting the support of Kennedy. They hoped his stature as a “heavy hitter” 

senator with seniority could match the standing of Senator Weicker and augment the 

efforts of Harkin.6

 Kennedy brought the experience of decades of civil rights 

leadership. Osolinik, whom Pat Wright described as “one of few people who really 

saw disability as a civil rights issue,” directed civil rights issues in Kennedy’s office. 

Moreover, Kennedy had personal experiences with disability through his son who lost 

a leg to cancer and a sister with a developmental disability. Kennedy’s support, 

however, depended on making significant changes to the ADA.7

 

Senator Kennedy brought the 

experience of decades of civil 

rights leadership in addition to 

his stature as a “heavy hitter” 

senator with seniority. 
 RETOOLING THE ADA 79 

Senators Harkin and Kennedy concluded that the bill introduced in 1988 was 

too ambitious and stood little chance for passage. Therefore, they decided to rewrite 

the ADA. In accordance with the objectives of the disability community, the senators’ 

primary goal was to achieve the best possible civil rights coverage for persons with 

disabilities. Toward this end, they and their staffs, in consultation with leaders from 

the disability community, developed a four-pronged legislative strategy. 

First, Senators Kennedy and Harkin made a commitment to achieving 

bipartisanship. They believed that the ultimate goal of legislation must not simply be 

to pass a bill, but rather to make an enforceable law. For the bill to be taken seriously, 

it needed to be widely supported by the business community as well as the disability 

community, Republicans and Democrats, the Senate and the House, and the Bush 

administration. Second, Senators Harkin and Kennedy wanted to craft a bill that 

could withstand the strict scrutiny of Congress. Rather than introduce a bill with 

aggressive provisions and rely on subsequent negotiations, which ran the risk of 

permanently labeling the bill “extreme,” they hoped to hold extensive discussions and 

reach important compromises before they even introduced the bill. 

The third and fourth strategic commitments followed logically: modesty and 

parity. The original ADA applied rigorous and rigid standards of accessibility that 

would be implemented immediately. Senators Kennedy and Harkin instead promoted 

accessibility at some point in time, and varied provisions according to specific 

circumstances. While the bill’s 

complete effect would not be apparent 

immediately following its enactment, 

the American landscape would be 

transformed for subsequent generations. 

Finally, in crafting the actual language 

of the bill, Silverstein and Osolinik 

worked with the disability community to 

build the ADA securely on the 

foundation of earlier legislation—especially on the Civil Rights Act, Section 504 of 

the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Proponents could 

therefore argue that the bill was an application of tested principles, not a new creation. 

While the ADA’s complete effect 

would not be immediately 

apparent, the American 

landscape would be transformed 

for subsequent generations. 

With this strategy in place, Osolinik and Silverstein began 1989 by reviewing 

the bill line by line. Redrafting the ADA was not, however, a solitary endeavor. 

After developing their own preliminary ideas about what provisions should constitute 

a new bill, Silverstein and Osolinik turned to others to identify interests in and 

reservations about the bill, including the disability community, all “covered entities,”*

 

* “Covered entity,” as defined in § 101(2) of the final version of the ADA, 

means “an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labormanagement committee.” For the purpose of this work, however, “covered entities” is 

defined more broadly to mean any entity covered by any portion of the ADA. This
80 CREATING A WORKABLE ADA 

 

the Bush administration, and members of Congress and their staffs. The principal 

House contacts were Congressman Tony Coelho (D-CA) and Rochelle Dornatt from 

his staff. Especially helpful from the business community was Nancy Reed Fulco of 

the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Osolinik and Silverstein worked most closely, 

however, with a group of representatives from the disability community. In addition 

to the general guidance provided by Pat Wright, Ralph Neas, Liz Savage, and Paul 

Marchand, Silverstein and Osolinik received technical expertise from attorneys Arlene 

Mayerson, Chai Feldblum, Robert Burgdorf, Jim Weisman, and others according to 

specialties. By retooling the bill in close cooperation with this group, Osolinik and 

Silverstein hoped to earn the backing of the disability community. Then they could 

present a united front as the bill went through Congress. 

From January to March, 1989, Silverstein and Osolinik produced scores of 

different drafts of the ADA. By March 15 they completed a draft (S. 933), which they 

circulated privately to representatives of the disability community, the Bush 

administration, and several members of Congress. The bill duplicated the findings 

and purpose of the original bill (S. 2345) crafted by NCD. It also covered the same 

main areas, with the exception of housing (which had been addressed by the Fair 

Housing Amendments Act). S. 933 even incorporated some language of S. 2345 

verbatim. But there were marked distinctions. 

The new bill, S. 933, demonstrated the commitment to modesty and flexibility 

in standards by tailoring definitions, provisions, and enforcement to four main titles—

Employment, Public Services, Public Accommodations, and Telecommunications.†

 

The dedication to legal precedent was also clear. S. 933, for example, incorporated 

more than five times as many references to earlier statutes. There was also a 

difference in tone. Whereas the original bill, S. 2345, emphasized discriminatory 

practices that should not be tolerated—for example, providing unequal services—

S. 933 spelled out positive, proactive steps that must be taken to meet 

nondiscriminatory standards. Several major revisions are worth noting. 

One of the most contested aspects of the ADA was the definition of disability. 

People asked: Who would be protected by the ADA? It was a difficult question 

because one cannot readily identify disability with the same precision that one can 

identify, for example, race and gender. It would also be impractical to name, in a 

statute, each and every type of disability. This would be cumbersome, if not 

impossible, and require constant adjustment for future, unknown impairments. The 

challenge, therefore, was to find a definition that was at once inclusive enough to 

cover diverse disabilities, but not so universal that anyone could claim protection by 

the ADA. Under the original bill, S. 2345, a disability was defined as “a physical or 

would include, for example, employers, operators of public transit, owners of places 

of public accommodation, and communications providers. 

†

 The bill introduced on May 9 had two more titles in addition to the four 

main titles. Title I, later deleted in the course of negotiations, included general 

provisions that applied to most covered entities. Title VI (which became Title V after 

the deletion of Title I) contained miscellaneous provisions. 
 RETOOLING THE ADA 81 

mental impairment, perceived impairment, or a record of impairment.”8 This 

definition was similar to the three-pronged definition implemented under Section 504, 

except that it did not limit the first prong to impairments that “substantially limit” 

major life activities. This meant that anyone with “any physiological disorder or 

condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss” or “any mental or 

psychological disorder” was covered.9

 Osolinik and Silverstein instead used the 

Section 504 standard and restricted the first prong to “a physical or mental impairment 

that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities”—such as seeing, 

walking, self-care, and learning.10 This meant that a physical impairment such as an 

infected finger would not constitute a disability. 

The most controversial issue in the redrafting stage was the cost and burden 

imposed upon covered entities.11 Legislative endeavors of the 1980s successfully 

established that, in the area of disability civil rights, equal treatment was not enough. 

The goal had to be equal opportunity.

12 That required modifying policies, providing 

services, and breaking down barriers: “reasonable accommodations”.13 In other 

words, it was not enough simply to leave the door open, the door also had to be 

widened. And this meant that civil rights for persons with disabilities could cost 

money. But at what point does providing “equal opportunity” become an 

“unreasonable” burden? 

Under S. 2345, the only defensible limits to providing accommodations were 

actions that “would fundamentally alter the essential nature, or threaten the existence 

of, the program, activity, business, or facility in question.”14 Although Burgdorf 

wrote the provision to assure that compliance would not mean shutting down a 

business, it came to be known pejoratively as the “bankruptcy” provision: interpreted 

to mean that a business would have to go to the brink of bankruptcy before it could 

defend against charges of discrimination.15 S. 933, on the other hand, followed 

Section 504 in using “undue hardship” as the standard for determining whether 

employment accommodations were “reasonable.” Undue hardship meant “an action 

that is unduly costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that will fundamentally alter 

the nature of the program.”16 It was not a fixed concept, but rather varied on a caseby-case basis, according to such factors as the size of the business, the type of 

operation, and the nature and cost of the accommodation. 

Concern for cost shaped the new approach to barrier removal. S. 2345 

required the retrofitting of all public transportation vehicles and facilities to make 

them accessible. S. 933, on the other hand, varied its demands according to whether 

vehicles and facilities were newly constructed or already in operation. The general 

principle was that all new vehicles and transportation facilities would have to be 

“readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities”.17 For used 

vehicles, transportation operators had to make “good faith efforts” to find accessible 

vehicles. If a company remanufactured a vehicle to extend its life for at least five 

years, it had to be made readily accessible to “the maximum extent feasible.” With 

regard to existing facilities, S. 933 required only that certain “key stations” had to be 

retrofitted for accessibility. 
82 CREATING A WORKABLE ADA 

The approach in S. 933 to barrier removal in public accommodations 

paralleled the transportation provisions. The original bill, S. 2345, required that 

nearly every place of public accommodation had to remove all barriers within five 

years. This provision earned S. 2345 the nickname of the “flat earth” bill. Drafters of 

S. 933, however, dispensed with the idea of wholesale retrofitting. Instead they 

required that all new construction be accessible. Nevertheless, they did not want to 

leave existing structures untouched. Consequently, drafters created a new legal term. 

S. 933 required that businesses make changes to existing structures where 

accessibility was “readily achievable,” which was eventually defined to mean “easily 

accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.”18 The 

goal was to create a mind-set of accessibility, to encourage people to look for creative 

ways to make the world more accessible. “Readily achievable” modifications might 

include installing grab bars, ramping a few steps, lowering telephones, adding raised 

letter and braille markings on elevator controls, and adding flashing alarm lights. 

S. 933 also required that where structural changes were not readily 

achievable, covered entities had to make their services available through alternative 

methods: for example, coming to the doorway of a Laundromat to pick up laundry 

when a person could not get inside. Moreover, the bill required the provision of 

“auxiliary aids and services” to persons with disabilities: for example, reading a menu 

to persons with visual impairments so that they could fully enjoy the benefits of places 

of public accommodation. 

The version of the ADA crafted by Senators Harkin and Kennedy did not only 

limit initial provisions. In one significant area they significantly expanded the scope 

of the original bill. Under S. 2345, only those public accommodations covered under 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had to be accessible. This principally meant places of 

lodging, eating, and entertainment. Service establishments such as doctors’ offices, 

retail stores, and private clubs, were not included. S. 933, by contrast, defined within 

its scope virtually every privately-operated establishment that was used by the general 

public and affected commerce. This included places of lodging, office buildings, 

parks, recreation facilities, theaters, retail stores, medical facilities, and restaurants. 

Although this apparently broke the commitment to parity with the Civil Rights Act, 

advocates argued that it was consistent in spirit: just as the Civil Rights Act addressed 

the universe where race discrimination was an issue, the ADA covered the broader 

universe where disability discrimination was relevant. 

The new draft of the ADA also took steps to define the original ADA’s 

prohibition of discrimination in “broadcasts, communications, or telecommunications.” 

S. 933 required that communications providers implement telecommunication relay 

services. A relay service enabled an individual using a Telecommunication Device for the 

Deaf (TDD)—a machine that transmits typed data over telephone lines—to communicate 

with someone without such a device, through an operator who would translate text to 

voice, and voice to text. 
 BUILDING SUPPORT FOR S. 933 83 

 

Another significant change from S. 2345 concerned legal actions available to 

remedy discrimination. S. 2345 included both administrative and civil remedies.‡

 It 

granted administrative agencies the authority to order “all appropriate remedial 

relief”19 and gave individuals the right to sue in a district court for both injunctive 

relief and monetary damages, including punitive damages.§

 Drafters of S. 933, 

however, viewed these remedial provisions as extreme and politically impossible. 

Therefore they introduced remedies tailored to each title. Only administrative 

remedies were available for the public accommodations and telecommunications 

provisions. Private right to action was granted for employment and public services 

provisions. For employment discrimination, S. 933 also allowed for punitive 

damages. 

Building Support for S. 933 BUILDING SUPPORT FOR S. 933 

Before publicly circulating the final draft of the bill, Silverstein and Osolinik 

submitted it to a group of individuals in the disability community for their approval. 

On one occasion, the two staff members were grilled for hours by persons with 

disabilities who objected to the apparent weakening of the bill. Osolinik tried to 

explain that the bill could not be passed without the proposed changes. Silverstein 

emphasized that the new bill remained true to the original principles.20 Some in the 

disability community, however, were outraged. “Lots of people felt let down,” said 

Bonnie O’Day about the reactions at the spring, 1989, conference of the National 

Council on Independent Living (NCIL).21 Yet most agreed that it was dangerous to 

include provisions that might endanger the entire bill. Ultimately, the disability 

community lent its support, persuaded that it was the best that could be achieved 

politically. This was crucial, for a competing Republican bill might polarize the 

debate and kill the ADA; unity behind S. 933 made it difficult for an alternative 

proposal to gain a foothold. 

After the disability community backed S.933, the next task for ADA 

supporters was to enlist the cosponsorship of members of Congress and the 

endorsement of President Bush. As in 1988, Liz Savage coordinated a cosponsorship 

drive in conjunction with House and Senate sponsors. This time the drive was even 

more aggressive, and it continued throughout the entire ADA deliberations. At the 

same time, Justin Dart, Marilyn Golden, and others throughout the disability 

‡

 Administrative remedies refer to actions taken by the government to 

enforce regulations. Civil remedies refer to private claims filed in a district court, 

which can include monetary compensation. 

§

 Injunctive relief refers to putting an end to the discrimination, which could 

include reinstatement to a job or an order to remove a physical barrier. Monetary 

damages can include back pay or any other expenses incurred as a result of the 

discrimination. Punitive damages are a penalty for discrimination, that can include 

awards for “pain and suffering” that surpass any actual financial loss.
84 CREATING A WORKABLE ADA 

community continued to mobilize the national grass roots network. Persons with 

disabilities began writing letters urging their representatives to support the ADA. 

On the Senate side, ADA advocates were especially interested in enlisting the 

support of Senators Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT) and Robert Dole (R-KS). Hatch’s support 

was extremely important because he was the ranking Republican on the Labor and 

Human Resources Committee, and the rest of the committee Republicans generally 

followed his lead in disability policy. In December, 1988, Senator Harkin began 

meeting with Hatch personally, in addition to consultations between their staffs. 

Harkin had hoped that Hatch’s long and solid record of supporting persons with 

disabilities would lead to his endorsement of the bill as chief cosponsor. As with 

Senators Kennedy and Harkin, Hatch had personal experience with disability through 

his brother, who lost the use of his legs from polio. Hatch, however, had serious 

reservations about the bill. For example, he proposed more limited remedies and the 

exemption of religious groups from the public accommodations provisions. He also 

wanted to coordinate his position with the White House. As a result, he declined 

Harkin’s invitation to be the lead cosponsor. 

Instead, Senator Hatch directed his chief counsel, Mark Disler, to draft an 

alternative bill.22 Disler had worked for Bradford Reynolds in the attorney general’s 

office during the Reagan administration. During the battles over President Reagan’s 

Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Disler had formed good working relationships with 

Kemp and Wright and become much more knowledgeable about disability, which 

helped smooth working with Senator 

Hatch’s staff. The bill Disler crafted 

was similar to S. 2345 in that it was 

short and focused on general 

principles of nondiscrimination. 

Rather than propose strong, detailed 

requirements as in S. 933, it gave 

executive agencies the responsibility 

and authority to create 

nondiscrimination standards. 

Senator Dole’s support was crucial 

because, as Minority Leader, he 

could wield considerable influence 

over the progress of the ADA 

through Senate committees and on 

the Senate floor. 

Senator Hatch’s actions were, nonetheless, ultimately designed to aid in the 

ADA’s passage. A quick endorsement of the Harkin bill might have alienated other 

Republicans, whose support was necessary for effective implementation. Senator 

Dave Durenberger (R-MN), whose advocacy for people with disabilities stretched 

back to his tenure as chief of staff for the Governor of Minnesota in the 1960s, 

explained that Hatch “in effect had to stay off of the original bill in order to leverage 

Republican support for the final product.” By drafting his own bill, Hatch paved the 

way for achieving a broader base of consensus and helped prevent filibustering on the 

Senate floor.23 

Senator Dole’s support was also crucial because, as Minority Leader, he had 

the power to wield considerable influence over the progress of the ADA through 

Senate committees and on the Senate floor. For example, he could discourage his 
 BUILDING SUPPORT FOR S. 933 85 

party from requesting that the ADA be referred to multiple committees, which could 

delay or even kill the bill. He could also help prevent damaging amendments from 

being introduced on the floor. Similar to Senator Hatch, Dole had a solid record on 

disability issues. He knew disability first-hand from the paralysis he incurred in 

World War II. On each anniversary of his injury, April 14, he gave a speech about 

disability on the Senate floor. In fact, he devoted his first official speech in the 

Senate, on April 14, 1969, to the needs of the disability community. “It is a minority 

group whose existence affects every person in our society and the very fiber of our 

Nation,” said Dole. He noted that people with disabilities faced significant problems 

with employment, income, health care, education, rehabilitation, transportation, and 

access to public accommodations. Accordingly, he urged Congress to promote 

collaboration between the public and private sectors to improve opportunities for 

persons with disabilities. He asserted his commitment to make wise use of financial 

resources, but he wanted to do what was necessary to achieve for people with 

disabilities “the independence, security, and dignity” to which they are “entitled.”24 

Subsequently, in 1984, Dole established the Dole Foundation, which he dedicated to 

improving the employment prospects of persons with disabilities. 

Nevertheless, Senator Dole had reservations about the ADA. In part, he was 

ambivalent because he had talked with Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-IA), Senator 

Harkin’s fellow senator from Iowa about introducing his own bill. Dole, however, 

received a flood of phone calls from the disability community urging him to 

cosponsor Harkin’s bill and abstain from introducing a competing bill.25 Crucial in 

shaping Dole’s position on the ADA and encouraging him to support it was one of his 

staff members, Maureen West. Paul Hearne, Executive Director of NCD and a longtime associate of Dole, assisted West in educating the senator about the ADA. Dole 

refrained from introducing his own bill. But he also continued to withhold his support 

of S. 933, even though he was one of fourteen original cosponsors of S. 2345. 

In addition to Senators Hatch and Dole, ADA supporters were interested in 

enlisting the support of President Bush and his administration. President Bush had 

already spoken strongly on behalf of civil rights legislation for people with disabilities 

on multiple occasions. And Senators Harkin and Kennedy had consulted with the 

administration throughout the winter and spring of 1989 for input on the development 

of S. 933. Sometimes these conversations were held person-to-person; at other times 

they were mediated by members of the disability community, such as Pat Wright and 

Justin Dart, who had very strong White House connections. The main goal, however, 

was to encourage the Bush administration take a further step and endorse the version 

of the ADA developed by Senators Harkin and Kennedy. Faced with the demands of 

forming an administration and lacking adequate technical disability expertise, 

however, the White House did not develop a firm position on the bill. Harkin was 

actually ready to introduce S. 933 in March, but he delayed its introduction at the 

request of the administration. By April, ADA supporters decided they simply had to 

move forward with the bill, with or without President Bush. Accordingly, Senator 

Harkin scheduled the introduction of S. 933 for May 9, 1989, at which time 

Congressman Coelho would also introduce the companion bill, H.R. 2273. Although 

ADA supporters were unsuccessful in securing the cosponsorship of Hatch and Dole 
86 CREATING A WORKABLE ADA 

 

and the endorsement of Bush, the congressional cosponsorship drive was effective. 

By May 9, the bill had acquired 33 Senate cosponsors and 84 House cosponsors. 

In consultation with Congressman Coelho, Senators Kennedy and Harkin 

developed a strategy for maneuvering the ADA through Congress. They decided to 

begin the ADA deliberations in the Senate. The Senate would be more manageable 

because of its rules for legislative deliberations. Whereas in the House a bill went to 

all committees with partial jurisdiction, in the Senate a bill went only to one 

committee, whichever had the preponderance of jurisdiction (subsequent referrals to 

additional committees could be requested). Moreover, Kennedy and Harkin were 

chairmen of the committee and subcommittee with jurisdiction. Kennedy’s 

Committee on Labor and Human Resources also had a comfortable Democratic 

majority. And the ranking Republicans of both the committee and subcommittee—

Senators Orrin Hatch and Dave Durenberger—were strong supporters of disability 

policy.26 Furthermore, the Senate had a better working relationship with the 

administration. Given the importance of bringing the administration on board, it was 

wise to tailor strategy to its interests. 

Senators Harkin and Kennedy hoped to push the ADA through the Senate as 

rapidly as possible with minimal alterations. They feared that lengthy deliberations 

would increase the chance of losing control of how the ADA was characterized in 

public debate. Kennedy thus proposed going to mark-up** before the Fourth of July 

recess and to the Senate floor before the August recess. The House would then 

proceed with the version passed by the Senate, which would help limit the 

discrepancy between House and Senate versions and smooth conference 

deliberations.††

Senate sponsors scheduled three hearings for May 9, 10, and 16; they devoted 

April to preparing for them. They hoped to prevent any surprises by getting the facts 

** Mark-up is the final process of committee consideration of a bill. After 

holding hearings and working to craft an amended bill that all committee members 

can support, committees go to mark-up. At mark-up, committee members generally 

begin by voting on all agreements reached prior to the mark-up session as one single 

amendment. Then, members can discuss and vote on additional amendments 

concerning unresolved issues. The last action of the committee at mark-up is to vote 

on the bill as amended by the committee. If the committee approves the bill, it is sent 

to the Senate (or House) floor for consideration by the entire Senate (or House). If the 

committee does not approve the bill, the bill basically dies: it cannot be brought up at 

the floor unless first approved by committee(s). 

†† Both the Senate and House must independently approve a bill for it to be 

passed on to the president. Unless the two houses pass identical bills (a rarity for such 

complex bills as the ADA), the Senate and House must send representatives to a 

conference to fashion an agreement on all differences. Each house must then approve 

the bill reported out of the conference. 
 SENATE HEARINGS 87 

in order and crafting responses to anticipated opposition. Silverstein turned to those 

who knew disability the best: members of the disability community. He developed a 

list of about 100 questions and asked representatives of the disability community to 

explain, based on their experiences at the local level, how various covered entities 

would respond to ADA provisions. Osolinik and Silverstein then prepared thick 

briefing books based on the responses. They also worked with the disability 

community to select witnesses to testify on each aspect of the bill. Unlike the 

hearings of 1988, the 1989 Senate hearings would include very detailed, technical 

analyses of the ADA, with a balance of testimony from those who supported the 

legislation outright and those who promoted changes. Accordingly, the business 

community and other covered entities were gearing up for the hearings and working 

with Senate leaders to identify effective witnesses. On May 5, for example, just 

before the bill’s introduction, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce sponsored the first of 

several meetings for all business organizations to discuss their strategy for the ADA, 

which culminated in their testimony before Congress. Subsequently, a group of 

business organizations formed a coalition called the Disability Rights Working Group. 

Senate Hearings and the Quest for Bipartisanship SENATE HEARINGS

Senate Hearings on S. 933 began in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on 

Tuesday morning, May 9, 1989. Ranking minority member Senator Hatch set the 

stage for the hearings in his opening statement. “I support a comprehensive civil 

rights bill for persons with disabilities,” Hatch declared unambiguously. But he also 

stated he had “serious concerns.” Hatch challenged the extension of public 

accommodations provisions beyond those establishments covered under the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964. He promoted an exemption for small businesses. He also 

opposed provisions for remedies that included monetary and punitive damages. 

Moreover, Hatch stated that his reservations concerning S.933 might compel him to 

introduce his own bill, or support a different bill, presumably one introduced by 

Senator Dole.27

Traditionally the administration offers the lead testimony on major bills, but 

by May 9 the Bush administration had still not developed a formal position.28 In fact, 

the White House had to cancel a May 1 Rose Garden press conference with Senate 

leadership, which had been designed to promote the ADA.29 Consequently, 

Congressman Coelho was the lead witness. He was selected to open the deliberations 

not only because he was the sponsor of the identical ADA bill introduced in the 

House; he also poignantly symbolized the ADA. In his senior year of college, Coelho 

learned he had epilepsy—reputed by some to be demonic possession. As a result, he 

was barred from the Catholic priesthood and his familial relationships were severely 

strained. “I was suicidal and I was down,” Coelho said of his experience with 

discrimination.30 But Bob Hope took him into his own home and encouraged him to 

pursue his ministry through public service. 

Congressman Coelho met with considerable success after following Hope’s 

advice and beginning a government career. Elected to Congress in 1978, he became 
88 CREATING A WORKABLE ADA 

Chairman of the Democratic 

Congressional Campaign 

committee in 1981. Five years 

later, he was elected Majority 

Whip.‡‡ He also became a national 

leader in disability issues, which 

included service as Director of the 

Epilepsy Foundation of America 

(EFA). Coelho therefore spoke not 

only with the authority bestowed upon him from the Democratic leadership, but also 

as an example of the potential of persons with disabilities. “Tony was sort of the 

epitome of what a person with a disability can do,” said Dornatt of his staff, “and what 

they can achieve given a fair shake and given a chance.”31 Coelho echoed this theme 

in his remarks at the Senate hearing: “We can be productive, if you will give us that 

right, give us that opportunity. That is all we ask for, nothing more, but definitely 

nothing less.”32 

“We can be productive, if you will 

give us that right, give us that 

opportunity. That is all we ask for, 

nothing more, but definitely nothing 

less.” 

—Congressman Tony Coelho 

In addition to speaking about his personal experiences, Congressman Coelho 

addressed Senator Hatch’s remarks and stressed the need for bipartisanship: “We very 

much want you on board and very much need your support,” he entreated. “We 

would prefer that you not introduce your own bill,” he added, urging Hatch to work 

toward a common bill instead.33 Hatch replied by pledging his best efforts to develop 

consensus. “I would love nothing better” than to cosponsor this bill, Hatch said. “But 

in its present form, I cannot.”34 Only minutes into the first hearing, it was clear that 

considerable work lay ahead to achieve bipartisanship and shepherd the ADA through 

Congress. The prospect of a competing bill made cooperation much more critical. 

The hearings were an opportunity to find a solution. 

As in 1988, persons with disabilities presented powerful testimony about the 

need for the ADA by describing their personal experiences. “There is not one 

disabled American alive today who has not experienced some form of 

discrimination,” I. King Jordan said.35 The most vivid imagery came from Justin 

Dart. In addition to his carefully crafted and eloquent words, Dart brought visual aids. 

He presented the committee with a box of discrimination diaries and letters that he 

and others had gathered from around the country. Yet, Dart acknowledged, no 

document could truly demonstrate the impact of discrimination. As a supplement, 

Dart thus brought an extra wheelchair. “I submit to you this brand new empty 

wheelchair,” he said to the committee chairman forcefully. “On January 24, 1988, last 

 

‡‡ The Majority Whip is the third-ranking leader of the majority party in the 

House of Representatives, following Speaker of the House and Majority Leader, and 

is elected by his or her party. The Whip’s chief responsibility is to rally support 

behind or in opposition to legislative initiatives. Although the Majority and Minority 

Whips focus especially on persuading members of their own parties, they also work to 

get votes from the opposing party. 
 SENATE HEARINGS 89 

year, my younger brother, Peter, was faced with the necessity to use, [and] be 

identified with, this public invitation to discrimination.” But his brother claimed: “I 

would rather be dead.” Four days later, said Dart, he committed suicide.36 

Others described specific examples of discrimination. Mary DeSapid 

described being fired by her employer because of her cancer treatment.37 Amy 

Dimsdale, a wheelchair-user trained in journalism at the University of Texas at 

Arlington, described her experiences of being overlooked by potential employers. “I 

have submitted over 300 resumes and more 

than 100 applications. I have indicated my 

willingness to be flexible, work at home, 

relocate, and use my own special 

equipment—all to no avail. I need virtually 

no special accommodations to work, as long 

as I can get in the building.”38 Lisa Carl, 

whose cerebral palsy impeded her speech and 

required use of a wheelchair, spoke about a time when she went to see a movie at a 

theater around the corner from her house. But Lisa was told she could not enter. 

Later the theater explained to Lisa’s mother: “I basically don’t have to let her in here, 

and I don’t want her in here.”39 Betty Corey, who took into her home a girl born with 

AIDS, described having to contact twenty-six different funeral directors before she 

could find one who would bury the six-year-old without adding surcharges for 

handling a person with AIDS. Yet, in none of these situations had a law been broken: 

there was no protection such as that provided for minorities and women. 

Discrimination “destroys 

healthy self-concepts, and it 

slowly erodes the human 

spirit.” 

Disability advocates used numerous arguments to justify the ADA. Many 

emphasized the loss of human dignity experienced from discrimination. Dimsdale, for 

example, said she felt “useless, powerless, and demeaned” by her inability to get a 

job.40 Discrimination “destroys healthy self-concepts, and it slowly erodes the human 

spirit,” said Jordan.41 Others argued that discrimination against the disabled violated 

one of America’s central tenets: individualism. Dart explained that he addressed the 

committee as “a fiscal conservative, an active Republican, and, above all, an advocate 

for the principles of individual responsibility, individual productivity, and individual 

rights which have made America great.” Social barriers to persons with disabilities, he 

asserted, undermined an individual’s opportunity to participate in American society 

fully and equally.42 Others argued that it was more costly to keep persons with 

disabilities dependent on government assistance than it was to spend the small amount 

needed to break down barriers and enable people to support themselves. Senator 

Harkin, for example, hypothesized that the cost to institutionalize one of his 

constituents with a developmental disability would cost nearly five million dollars 

over 65 years.43 

Another argument on behalf of the ADA was simply that it was nothing new, 

nothing radical. “These standards are not new, they are not confusing, and they are 

workable,” Arlene Mayerson of the Disability rights Education and Defense Fund 

(DREDF) declared in reference to the ADA’s foundation in Section 504.44 “We tried 

very hard to avoid any kind of new language,” Senator Harkin explained.45 Although 
90 CREATING A WORKABLE ADA 

transportation was the most controversial aspect of the ADA, many defended it as the 

linchpin to the entire bill. “The freedom to go to college does not exist without the 

means to get to the college,” testified Michael McIntyre, Executive Director of 

Queens Independent Living Center. “The freedom to work does not exist without the 

ability to get to work. The freedom to organize politically does not exist without 

people being able to get together in one place. The freedom to date, to go to the 

movies, to go to the library, to go shopping, to go to a ball game, [to go] anyplace that 

makes life meaningful, is predicated on the ability to travel.”46 ADA supporters also 

emphasized the need to develop solid enforcement provisions to make the bill have a 

practical effect. “The whole trick is to make it more expensive to break the law than it 

is to keep the law,” testified Neil Hartigan, the Attorney General of Illinois. “It won’t 

work without damages.”47 

Although testimony also came from those proposing changes to the bill, 

virtually every witness pledged support of the overall ADA concept. The Chamber of 

Commerce, for example, testified that the chamber “shares the goal of the sponsors of 

this act,” and pledged to cooperate “in trying to achieve a workable piece of 

legislation that we can fully support.”48 Similarly, the National Federation of 

Independent Business (NFIB) endorsed “the right of every American to have the 

opportunity to realize his or her full potential.”49 These sentiments were manifested in 

the name of the business community’s coalition: the Disability Rights Working 

Group. 

The two dominant reservations about the ADA were cost and litigation. Cost 

was an issue because the ADA, unlike other civil rights legislation, required 

businesses and employers to spend money on accommodations and modifications. 

The second main concern was that, as Lawrence Lorber testified, the “litigation 

potential of this bill is enormous.” This fear built on the perception that phrases such 

as “reasonable accommodation,” “undue hardship,” “readily achievable,” “essential 

function,” and “less effective” were inadequately defined, compelling courts to decide 

the meaning of the ADA.50 It also stemmed from the belief that the remedies available 

under the ADA would invite frivolous law suits. Specific concerns included 

objections to the public accommodations provisions. William Ball, representing the 

Association of Christian Schools International, argued that religious organizations and 

religious schools should be exempt from the public accommodations provisions. The 

ADA, he argued, would be too costly, might force schools to hire drug/alcohol 

abusers or homosexuals, and threatened the constitutional separation of church and 

state.51 The small business community also argued for an exemption from public 

accommodations provisions, because of the associated costs and because small 

business owners were exempt from other civil rights laws. 

Careful preparations by Senators Harkin and Kennedy, their staffs, and the 

disability community paid off in the course of the hearings. Harkin, presiding over the 

deliberations, was especially deft in handling one of the most controversial issues: 

mandatory lifts for intercity buses (called “over-the-road” buses because their 

passengers ride above luggage compartments). In a dialogue with Charles Webb of the 

American Bus Association (ABA), Harkin creatively used Webb’s testimony to defend 
 SENATE HEARINGS 91 

the ADA. Webb testified that a bus lift cost $35,000, required annual maintenance of 

$2,000, and resulted in a 38 percent loss in luggage space and a loss of 11 or 12 seats. 

Harkin, however, asked Webb whether a technologically-advanced lift that cost less 

than $8,000, required little or no maintenance, and resulted in no loss of package space 

and only one seat, would be acceptable. “Absolutely,” Webb replied. “Well, now, I am 

glad to hear you say that,” said Harkin with pride, “because I have a letter here from the 

Regional Transportation District of Denver, Colorado,” which has secured a contract for 

a lift with exactly those specifications. To the applause of those assembled, Senator 

Harkin went on to explain that competition and technology would only drive the price 

further down when lifts were ordered by the thousands.52 

In addition to their compelling testimony, the Senate hearings were significant 

for the dialogue concerning bipartisanship and the Bush administration, which was 

carried out between Senators Kennedy and Harkin, on the one hand, and Senators 

Dole and Hatch, on the other. On May 10, under relentless pressure from the 

disability community, Dole made an appearance before the Senate committee to make 

a statement. On the previous Friday, May 5, he had met with President Bush’s chief 

counsel C. Boyden Gray, Chief of Staff John Sununu, head of the Domestic Policy 

Council Roger Porter, and others in the White House, to discuss how they could 

cooperate in working out a bipartisan bill. Dole had also spoken with President Bush 

on May 9. Before the committee, Dole now asserted that he and the administration 

hoped to see, before year’s end, “a bipartisan piece of legislation passed by Congress, 

signed by the president, and embraced by, hopefully, the business community and 

certainly by the disability community.” He was “somewhat cautious,” however, 

because he wanted a bill that all affected parties could defend. He feared the potential 

for litigation and promoted a gradual phase-in to protect small businesses. 

Nevertheless, he wanted to be a “positive force” rather than “an obstructionist,” and 

urged that the administration needed more time to formulate its position on the bill.53 

The disability community, however, was growing impatient. NCIL held its 

annual conference in Washington, D.C., from May 12 to May 14. At the conference, 

Bonnie O’Day, Chairperson of the NCIL Civil Rights Subcommittee, met with Pat 

Wright and Liz Savage, whereupon they talked about organizing NCIL conferees to 

hold a rally at the White House to demand swift action on the ADA. In short order, 

O’Day and others from NCIL began planning a march for Sunday, May 14—Mother’s 

Day. Committees formed to make signs and work out such details as getting a police 

permit. They planned to march from NCIL’s reception on Capitol Hill to the White 

House. Several hundred people, including local ADA supporters, joined the march. 

They left in the evening amidst pouring rain, carrying candles. People using 

wheelchairs covered themselves with garbage bags, a symbol of their second-classcitizen status. 

At the White House, Marca Bristo, President of NCIL, approached the 

security desk to place a call to President Bush. Although she intended only to 

mobilize and rally the crowd, an operator actually answered the phone and placed a 

call through to the Domestic Policy Office. Subsequently, Bristo told a White House 

representative that she and others were out in the rain, were concerned about the 
92 CREATING A WORKABLE ADA 

ADA, and wanted to see the 

president. In reply, the 

representative offered Bristo a 

meeting with White House staff 

the following morning. The next 

day, Bristo, Dart, and several 

other representatives from the 

disability community met with 

Dr. William L. Roper, of the 

Domestic Policy Counsel, Chief Counsel Boyden Gray, and EEOC Chairman Evan 

Kemp to complain about the president’s delays. Although the discussion did not 

result in a specific commitment, the disability representatives came away feeling as if 

they had gotten their message through to the administration.54 

“Boyden Gray is the most powerful 

counsel to a president we’ve had in a 

long, long time. . . . On the issues 

Boyden has chosen, he is awfully 

damned influential.” 

—A.B. Culvahouse 

Two days later, at the final scheduled hearing on May 16, the NCIL march 

appeared to have had an effect. Having consulted with the White House, Senator 

Hatch said that it was “imperative that this committee hear testimony from the 

administration on this bill.” Accordingly, he requested that the committee give the 

administration one more chance. Hatch proposed that the committee delay mark-up 

for five weeks, hold one additional hearing during the week of June 19, and invite the 

administration to come forward. If it did not, Hatch pledged that he would not stand 

in the way of the bill.55 Although the administration had already possessed a draft of 

the bill for nearly two months, Senator Kennedy agreed to grant more time, stipulating 

that if it did not come forward, the committee would move on without its input. 

White House Testimony WHITE HOUSE TESTIMONY

During the next five 

weeks, executive agencies 

reviewed the bill to make 

recommendations for an 

administration position. Unlike 

Congress, which follows a fairly 

organized if messy deliberative 

process to reconcile the views of 

two legislative bodies, party 

leaders, congressional committees, and individual members, developing an administration 

position involves an organic process of synthesizing input from senior officials and staff in 

both the Executive Office of the President and among Cabinet agencies and non-Cabinet 

agencies. A final administration position is often determined as much the force of 

personality, influence, and respect of key officials as according to specific position in a 

decision-making structure. 

President Bush wanted the ADA “done 

in a way that was good for the 

American people . . . this was not going 

to be a shell promise.” 

—Dr. William Roper 

The key to the ADA in the White House was Chief Counsel C. Boyden Gray, 

who had previously served as Bush’s counsel for eight years during the Reagan 

administration. They became close friends and shared similar family backgrounds: 
 WHITE HOUSE TESTIMONY 93 

their fathers were golf partners. Their relationship gave Gray considerable influence. 

“Boyden is the most powerful counsel to a president we’ve had in a long, long time,” 

said Gray’s immediate predecessor during the Reagan administration, A.B. 

Culvahouse. Gray was selective in the issues which he engaged. But “on the issues 

Boyden has chosen,” said Culvahouse, “he is awfully damned influential.”56 And, based 

on his friendship with Evan Kemp and following his experience with President 

Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Gray took a keen interest in the ADA.57 

White House action on the ADA was framed by President Bush’s declarations 

in support of disability rights legislation. This was a relatively unique interest for 

Bush, as he was best known and respected for his expertise on, and passion for, 

foreign policy. The question, said Dr. William Roper, who worked for Porter on the 

Domestic Policy Council, was precisely how Bush’s commitments would be 

translated into specific policy. There were discussions about the extent to which the 

administration would abide by the campaign promise. But Bush was steadfast in his 

commitment to getting a solid act passed. “He wanted it done in a way that was good 

for the American people,” said Roper: “this was not going to be a shell promise.”58 

Others inside the White House were much less enamored with the ADA, and 

had substantive reservations. Civil rights was a charged issue in the Bush 

administration. Kemp explained that the White House would not entertain any 

concept of “quotas” with regard to the ADA. Officials within the Bush administration 

emphasized that people with disabilities needed to be qualified for any given job, that 

the original ADA definition needed to be limited, and that there needed to be a 

sensible limit to the responsibility of providing reasonable accommodations. If these 

fundamental issues were settled, said Kemp, the White House could move forward 

with shaping the details.59 As White House consultant Robert Funk explained, Funk, 

Gray, and others reminded skeptics of Bush’s promise.60 In addition to Gray, 

Attorney General Richard Thornburgh was a crucial advocate of the ADA and Bush’s 

aspirations. So was Kemp, who functioned as a vital link between the disability 

community and the White House. 

The Department of Justice 

(DOJ) organized the various 

recommendations made by executive 

agencies, and Attorney General 

Thornburgh became the point person 

to represent the administration. 

Thornburgh, as many others, had 

personal experience with disability. 

His son, Peter, had acquired a learning disability from an automobile accident. As 

parents, Thornburgh and his wife Ginny had moved from caring for the special needs 

of their own son to working for others with similar conditions. In Pennsylvania, Mrs. 

Thornburgh had served as county chairperson of the ARC and was a member of 

President Reagan’s Committee on Mental Retardation. Her work influenced her 

husband, who used his authority as Governor of Pennsylvania to assist persons with 

disabilities.61 

Thornburgh’s testimony was 

crucial: it demonstrated that the 

White House was willing to work 

toward consensus on a bill that 

President Bush could endorse. 
94 CREATING A WORKABLE ADA 

 

At the Senate hearing on June 22, 1989, it was clear that those in support of 

the ADA within the White House prevailed in shaping the administration’s position, 

which was presented by Attorney General Thornburgh. “We at the Department of 

Justice,” Thornburgh said, “wholeheartedly share [the ADA’s] goals and commit 

ourselves, along with the president and the rest of his administration, to a bipartisan 

effort to enact comprehensive legislation attacking discrimination in employment, 

public services, transportation, public accommodations, and telecommunications.” He 

explained that granting civil rights to disabled persons would help the American 

economy by promoting employment instead of dependence. Moreover, Thornburgh 

declared the administration’s support of every basic principle, as well as to the overall 

principle of linking the bill to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act 

of 1973. He also identified areas of concern: drug-abusers should not be covered by 

the definition of disability; measures should be taken to ameliorate the burden on 

small businesses; the extension of public accommodations beyond the Civil Rights 

Act should be carefully analyzed; attempts should be made to minimize litigation; the 

Secretary of Transportation should be able to grant exemptions to transit systems; and 

“the most cost-effective and efficient system” of telecommunications should be 

pursued. Most significantly, however, Thornburgh pledged to begin working, both at 

the staff and principal levels,§§ to work toward bipartisan consensus on the ADA.62 

Although there were pronounced differences between ADA sponsors and the 

Bush administration, Senator Harkin responded to Attorney General Thornburgh by 

emphasizing all the areas of agreement. Accordingly, a Washington Post headline 

declared: “Thornburgh Endorses Civil Rights Protection for the Disabled.”63 This 

statement masked deep divisions, but it effectively identified the ADA’s advances and 

potential. 

Attorney General Thornburgh’s testimony was crucial because it 

demonstrated that the Bush administration was willing to work toward consensus on a 

bill that President Bush could endorse. Senators Harkin and Kennedy eagerly 

accepted the invitation to open negotiations with the Bush administration. And, as a 

result of Thornburgh’s testimony, Senators Dole and Hatch laid to rest the possibilities 

of introducing competing bills. The ADA, sweeping in its provisions, emerged from 

the hearings with virtually every witness supporting the concept of the bill. Every 

argument against the ADA met with an effective rebuttal. The ADA was sound and it 

was on the move. 

§§ “Principals” refer to persons of high-level offices, for example Senators, 

Congressmen, and top administrators. Traditionally, meetings between the House and 

Senate and between Congress and the administration require same-level discussions. 

Thus, a Senator would not open negotiations with a staff member of the 

administration. Staff members meet with staff members, principals meet with 

principals. 
 SENATE-WHITE HOUSE NEGOTIATIONS 95 

Negotiations Between the Senate and the White House SENATE-WHITE HOUSE NEGOTIATIONS

Although Senator Harkin was the Senate sponsor, Senator Kennedy—the full 

committee Chair and a senior Senator—took the lead in negotiating with the White 

House.64 Kennedy’s plan of attack was to get all parties into the same room and 

essentially stay there until all issues were resolved. These discussions would include 

the administration, the Senate, the House, and both the business and disability 

communities. House Republicans, however, declined to participate, for they did not 

want to be bound by any agreements. Moreover, the White House insisted that only 

representatives of Congress and the administration could join the negotiations. 

Kennedy and Harkin wanted disability representatives to be at the table because they 

had so much technical expertise, but they and all other outside constituencies were not 

allowed into the negotiating room. Thus, only representatives from the Senate and the 

Bush administration came to the table. 

The first meeting took place about a week after Attorney General 

Thornburgh’s testimony in the anteroom of the Senate Committee on Labor and 

Human Resources. Roper was the lead negotiator for the administration. He worked 

especially closely with Robert Funk, a co-founder of DREDF and a disability 

advocate from the Domestic Policy Council. Osolinik and Silverstein were the leaders 

for the Senate. At the outset of the meeting, in light of the absence of House 

Republicans as participants, Osolinik insisted on two main ground rules. First, she 

emphasized that they needed to come up with a complete settlement: leaving any issue 

unresolved might undercut the agreements that were made. Second, she argued that 

the administration had to stand by the negotiated agreements, even if House 

Republicans later opposed them and looked for administration support. Roper, 

however, said he could not commit to these stipulations because he had not cleared 

them with his superior, Chief of Staff Sununu. Osolinik promptly called off the 

meeting and said she was ready to continue whenever the administration was willing 

to agree to the conditions. Such actions led Wright to claim that Osolinik was “one of 

the toughest negotiators I have ever seen.”65 

Over the Fourth of July weekend, Chief of Staff Sununu telephoned Senator 

Kennedy to talk about the abruptly-ended meeting. Kennedy repeated the two ground 

rules submitted by Osolinik, and Sununu agreed to abide by them. Accordingly they 

made plans to resume negotiations on July 6, 1989, and settled on the times, 

participants, and location. Over the next two weeks, through July 18, Senate staff and 

administration staff held ten negotiation sessions. From the Senate, the principal 

participants were the staffs of Senators Kennedy, Harkin, Hatch, Durenberger, and 

Dole. Staff from the office of Senator John McCain (R-AZ) joined the discussion 

regarding telecommunications provisions and were pivotal in shaping that portion of 

the bill. For the administration, participants came primarily from the White House, 

including Roper and Funk; the Justice Department, especially the author of the 

Section 504 regulations, John Wodatch; the Department of Transportation; and OMB. 

Although non-governmental constituencies were not allowed in the Senate 

anteroom, they waited in a nearby conference room where they could be consulted 
96 CREATING A WORKABLE ADA 

during breaks. Those present in the meetings devoted several hours to each session, 

went through the bill line by line, and identified scores of disagreements for 

discussion. The staffs reached agreement on the vast majority of issues, but a few 

unresolvable disputes were left for the principals. These more difficult issues 

included the scope of remedies (namely the inclusion of compensatory and punitive 

damages), the scope of public accommodations (namely whether the ADA applied to 

more establishments than those covered by the Civil Rights Act), exemption of 

religious groups from the public accommodations provisions, the definition of 

disability, and coverage of drug and alcohol users. 

On July 28, ten days after the conclusion of negotiation sessions, Senator 

Dole sponsored a principals meeting in his conference room. They met there because 

of the ample space and because the office of the Minority Leader was friendlier terrain 

for the administration. Those present included Senators Kennedy, Harkin, Dole, 

Hatch, and Durenberger, Chief Counsel Gray, Chief of Staff Sununu, Secretary of 

Transportation Samuel K. Skinner, Attorney General Thornburgh, head of the 

Domestic Policy Counsel Roger Porter, and others representing executive agencies 

covered by the ADA. The purpose of the meeting was to hammer out agreements on 

remaining issues. But at one point Sununu lost his temper and began yelling at 

Silverstein. Kennedy slammed his hand on the table, yelled back that he would not 

stand for shouting at Senate staff, and threatened to walk out.66 The discussion 

resumed, but no official agreements were made: the meeting was cut short. 

Three days later, on July 31, Senators Kennedy and Harkin and Attorney 

General Thorn-burgh resolved the handful of remaining issues and closed the 

negotiations. The breakthrough compromise, which facilitated agreement on other 

issues, was essentially a swap concerning public accommodations and remedies. In 

the area of public accommodations, the administration had used the parity principle 

against ADA sponsors by arguing that the ADA should cover only those 

establishments covered under the Civil Rights Act. With respect to remedies, the 

administration wanted to exclude compensatory and punitive damages. As a 

compromise, Kennedy and Harkin agreed to restrict remedies to the standards of the 

Civil Rights Act in exchange for the administration’s consent to apply the ADA to the 

broad spectrum of public accommodations. 

There were several other major agreements included in what Senator Kennedy 

termed a “fragile compromise.”67 First, with respect to employment, negotiators 

incorporated a two-year delay of the effective date for operations with 25 or more 

employees, and a four-year delay for operations with 15 to 24 employees. Establishments 

with fewer than 15 employees were 

already exempted from the employment 

title. They also introduced stronger 

language to ensure that current 

employees who abused drugs and 

alcohol would not be a protected class. 

Second, concerning public 

transportation, the agreement included 

The breakthrough compromise, 

which facilitated agreement on 

other issues, was essentially a 

swap concerning public 

accommodations and remedies. 
 SENATE APPROVAL 97 

authority for the Secretary of Transportation to waive the requirement of bus lifts for 

fixed-route systems when lifts were unavailable. For private intercity bus transportation, 

the agreement delayed implementation of lift requirements for at least five years and 

mandated a study to explore how best to make intercity buses accessible. Third, regarding 

public accommodations, the negotiated agreement delayed implementation for 18 months, 

exempted religious organizations and private clubs, and specified that elevators were 

required only in buildings with at least three stories or more than 3,000 square feet per 

floor. 

Senate Approval SENATE APPROVAL

After reaching a final agreement with Attorney General Thornburgh on 

July 31, 1989, Senators Kennedy and Harkin continued to push the ADA forward, 

scheduling the Labor and Human Resources committee mark-up for August 2. This 

gave Senate staff only a couple of days to translate every agreement into appropriate 

legislative language. They did not finish writing the substitute bill until about 3:00 in 

the morning on the day of the mark-up. The committee mark-up itself was rather 

uneventful—it lasted less than an hour.68 This was mainly because the intense and 

detailed negotiations had settled most issues. Moreover, committee Democrats and 

Republicans gave deference to Senators Kennedy and Harkin, and Senators Hatch and 

Durenberger, all of whom supported the rewrite of S. 933. Accordingly, the 

committee voted unanimously, 16 to 0, to report the ADA to the Senate floor for final 

consideration. The Senate, the Bush administration, and the disability and business 

communities had truly come a long way since January to achieve unanimous, 

bipartisan support. It was “one of the most extraordinary legislative accomplishments 

I’ve ever seen,” said Neas.69 For the disability community, it was a remarkable 

victory. Moreover, the compromise empowered President Bush, who had previously 

supported the principles of the ADA, to endorse a specific version of the bill. 

The Senate closed for recess 

just two days after the mark-up, on 

August 4. But while many members 

and their staffs went on vacation, 

Senators Harkin and Kennedy 

continued to drive the ADA forward 

to keep the momentum alive. They 

wanted to make the ADA one of the 

first items of business when the 

Senate resumed on September 6. 

This meant that the committee report had to be filed by August 30 in order to give 

Senators and their staffs ample time to review the issues. For three weeks Democratic 

and Republican Senate staff worked intensively with the administration, the disability 

community, and the business community to develop a report that established an 

accurate historical record reflecting the various negotiated agreements. They 

completed a draft by August 22, and submitted the report to accompany the substitute 

version of S. 933 on August 30. 

The Labor and Human Resources 

Committee voted unanimously, 

16 to 0, to report the ADA to the 

Senate floor for final 

consideration—a remarkable victory 

for the disability community. 
98 CREATING A WORKABLE ADA 

The speed with which the Labor and Human Resources Committee moved the 

ADA shocked many senators and staff members. When the ADA came up for a vote 

on September 7, just a day after the Senate reopened for the fall, some senators 

complained that things had happened too quickly, that they did not have enough time 

to review the legislation.70 Others opposed the bill outright. Humphrey (R-NH) called 

it “one of the most radical pieces of legislation I have encountered.”71 Senator Jesse 

Helms (R-NC) cynically suggested the bill should be called the “Lawyers Relief Act 

of 1989.”72 For the most part, however, senators applauded the concepts of the ADA. 

In fact, by September 6 more than 60 senators had signed on as cosponsors. 

Debate on the Senate floor lasted late into the night, totaling over fourteen 

hours. Although the fundamentals of the bill were never threatened, several divisive 

issues emerged. The first was a proposed amendment by Senator Hatch, which would 

provide a $5,000 tax credit to businesses for making accommodations and 

modifications—an alternative to a complete exemption for small businesses from the 

public accommodations provisions. Hatch warned that the government was a 

potentially “oppressive” institution and said that it was unfair to burden small 

businesses with the costs of implementation without placing any of the responsibility 

on the government.73 Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), however, argued that the 

amendment was a “killer amendment” because all bills affecting revenue are 

constitutionally required to come from the House.74 Hatch disagreed with Bentsen, as 

did a majority of the Senate. But since the Budget Act required a two-thirds majority 

for such revenue amendments, the tax credit proposal failed.75 

Near the end of the floor debate, shortly before 10:00 p.m., Senator Grassley 

introduced an amendment that brought Congress under the purview of the ADA. 

Senator Hatch had raised the issue during the committee mark-up, but Senator 

Kennedy had cautioned Hatch that the provision might kill the bill if introduced too 

early.76 On the Senate floor, Grassley argued that it was unfair for the Senate to 

impose a burden on the American people without sharing it. Senator Wendell H. Ford 

(D-KY), however, argued that such an amendment blurred the constitutional balance 

of powers by giving the executive branch administrative control over Congress. Ford 

agreed with Senators Harkin and Kennedy that the ADA should apply to Congress. 

But he thought the issue should be considered more carefully in conference, not 

passed hastily because people were tired and wanted to go home. Despite his 

objections, the Senate approved the amendment (by counting the number of Senators 

standing in favor of and against it) with the supposition that the amendment only 

articulated intent: details would be worked out in the House or in conference. 

A much more acrimonious debate centered on the definition of disability. 

Senator William L. Armstrong (R-CO) argued that the definition of disability in the 

ADA was too broad. He was especially concerned about the inclusion of “mental 

disorders” and disorders with a “moral content.” He questioned whether senators 

thought homosexuality, bisexuality, exhibitionism, pedophilia, voyeurism, and 

kleptomania should be protected by the ADA.77 Senator Jesse Helms shared 

Armstrong’s concerns, especially with respect to homosexuality, and feared that 

employers would no longer be allowed to maintain “moral standards” in their 
 SENATE APPROVAL 99 

businesses.78 Senator Kennedy, however, argued that prohibiting discrimination 

against persons with HIV was crucial if the epidemic was to be controlled, because 

people would otherwise be less likely to reveal their illness. And Senator Pete V. 

Domenici (R-NM) cautioned against excluding persons with mental illness, noting the 

recent recognition that such legendaries as Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill 

struggled with bipolar disorder. Although Senators Kennedy and Harkin opposed 

unduly restricting the definition, it appeared that the bill would not go forward unless 

specific conditions or impairments were expressly excluded from the bill. They thus 

worked with Armstrong and Hatch for hours, in consultation with the disability 

community, to prepare a list. Senator Hatch typed the amendment himself, and the 

Senate approved it by a voice vote. 

With these and several other smaller amendments considered and resolved, 

the Senate finally voted on the ADA. In a remarkable demonstration of 

bipartisanship, the Senate voted affirmatively by a count of 76 to 8.79 This 

bipartisanship was crucial for the ADA’s success, because the bill consequently 

entered the House deliberations as a 

coalition bill with the indispensable 

support of President Bush. Without the 

negotiations that had culminated in the 

support of Senators Hatch and Dole and 

President Bush, the ADA might have been 

labeled as a partisan initiative. “If it had 

become a Democratic bill,” said 

Congressman Coelho, “we would have 

lost. . . . It had to be bipartisan.”80 The ADA had indeed achieved a broad base of 

support from both parties, but a difficult battle in the House of Representatives lay 

ahead. 

“If it had become a 

Democratic bill, we would 

have lost. . . . It had to be 

bipartisan.” 

—Congressman Tony Coelho 

 5

FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA:

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

The overwhelming affirmative vote in the Senate contributed to the ADA’s remarkable 

momentum. The intense negotiations with the White House had resulted in a bill that 

FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

earned President Bush’s endorsement, which essentially guaranteed passage of the bill in 

some form. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources had been unanimous 

in its support of the ADA. A grassroots disability community had made its presence 

known on Capitol Hill by uniting to advocate aggressively for the ADA. Meanwhile, no 

considerable opposition had organized. By the time the Senate voted on September 7, 

1989, nearly half the House had cosponsored the bill—almost enough votes to pass it.1

 

These factors led many senators and the Bush administration to anticipate and hope for 

swift passage in the House before year’s end. 

Other factors, however, pointed to a more 

challenging process. 

Whereas 185 Democrats signed on 

as cosponsors (88 percent of all House 

signatures), only 25 Republicans attached 

their names to the bill. Moreover, while 

House Democrats had worked with the 

Senate in redrafting the ADA and were kept 

informed about the negotiations with the 

administration, House Republicans had kept 

their distance. They did not contribute substantively to the redrafting process; they 

also declined from participating in the White House negotiations to avoid being bound 

by them, and because they wanted to convey “that they were trying to look out for 

[the] needs” of the business community.2

 Consequently, though the Senate crafted a 

breakthrough compromise bill, House deliberations would have to cover the same 

issues all over again. Much more work had to be done to achieve the bipartisan 

support that ADA advocates sought. Hopes for quick passage were dashed; debate in 

the House took nearly nine more months. 

Much more work had to be 

done to achieve the bipartisan 

support that ADA advocates 

sought. Hopes for quick 

passage were dashed; debate 

in the House took nearly nine 

more months. 

Early Actions in the House EARLY ACTIONS IN THE HOUSE

Compared with the Senate, where there were powerful and passionate 

advocates of disability in leadership positions on both sides of the aisle, Republican 

and Democratic leadership in the House, with the exception of Majority Whip Tony 

Coelho (D-CA), were much more cautious. House Speaker James C. Wright, Jr. 
102 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

(D-TX) and Majority Leader Thomas S. Foley (D-WA) were skeptical of the ADA’s 

wide-ranging impact and viewed the bill more as a private agenda of Congressman 

Coelho than an issue of national policy importance.3

 “I had the leadership unwilling to 

tell me no because it was me,” Coelho said. But they were not openly supportive and 

would have “killed” the ADA, “if it hadn’t been [for] my making it so personal.”4

Although in time the ADA would come to be viewed as a leadership bill, largely 

because of Coelho’s status as Majority Whip, the initially weak support of Democratic 

leadership placed Republicans in a position to shape the ADA to their interests.5

 

Congressman Coelho was the first member of the House to join the campaign 

to pass the ADA. He was the bill’s sponsor both in 1988 and in 1989. He also 

collaborated with Senators Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) to 

rewrite the ADA and craft a master strategy for passage. House Republicans did not 

demonstrate significant interest in the ADA until it entered Congress for the second 

time in the spring of 1989. The leader among Republicans was Congressman Steve 

Bartlett (R-TX). He had played an integral role in recasting disability policy in terms 

of independence and in issuing a mandate to the National Council on the Handicapped 

(NCD) to review federal programs and make recommendations. Although he 

generally supported the proposals in Toward Independence, Bartlett was cautious 

about the lead recommendation pertaining to an equal opportunity law. Throughout 

1988 he had watched the ADA from a distance. But after President-elect Bush 

promised support of an act similar to the ADA at a pre-inaugural event on January 19, 

making passage seem imminent, Bartlett decided to become involved to ensure that it 

was a reasonable bill.6

 

In April, 1989, Congressman Bartlett joined with Minority Leader Robert H. 

Michel (R-IL) and Congressman William F. Goodling (R-PA) to propose a 

partnership with Congressman Coelho. “We would like to work with you to develop a 

good bipartisan bill,” they wrote to Coelho on April 25. “By working together, we 

hope to develop language that we can agree upon, support, and introduce together.”7

But the revised draft was already completed and Bartlett, Michel, and Goodling did 

not cosponsor the ADA at the time of its introduction. Michel also wrote a letter to 

President Bush, on April 26, urging him to join in the efforts of working toward a 

bipartisan bill. Such an effort, Michel said “is appropriate, definitely warranted, and 

most importantly, deserved by individuals with disabilities and others who will be 

affected by it.”8

 Bush fulfilled this request by working with the Senate to develop a 

compromise bill. 

Shortly into the House deliberations in the spring of 1989, ADA supporters 

received a significant blow that paralleled the 1988 defeat of Senator Lowell P. 

Weicker, Jr. (R-CT). While House Speaker Wright was under scrutiny for alleged 

ethics violations, some members accused Congressman Coelho of violating House 

ethical standards by investing in certain bonds. Unlike Wright, however, who dragged 

out his own investigation before leaving Congress, Coelho promptly submitted his 

resignation, effective June 15. His commitment to the ADA influenced this decision. 

Coelho had become a national leader for disability policy. And, though he flatly 

denied the charges against him, he feared that an investigation might, by association, 
 EARLY ACTIONS IN THE HOUSE 103 

embarrass the disability community and consequently hurt its prospects for success on 

the ADA.9

 

Although Congressman Coelho’s career as a U.S. Representative drew to a 

close, his advocacy for the ADA did not. According to Ralph Neas, “he played a key 

role, if not a crucial role, on many different occasions with Democrats in the House 

and the Senate, with Republicans in the House and the Senate, and with President 

Bush, pushing the calendar on a number of occasions, really helping get us through 

some difficult times.”10 For example, he took the lead in the House cosponsorship 

drive and capitalized on his personal attachment to the bill and the trust he had 

cultivated among colleagues. Moreover, though he was a partisan Democrat, Coelho 

was well known for his desire to bring opponents to his side by working to empower 

them with shared ownership and 

finding common ground, rather than 

pitch battles.11 

Accordingly, Congressman 

Coelho joined with Democratic 

Congressman Major R. Owens (DNY), and Republican Congressmen 

Silvio O. Conte (R-MA) and 

Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R-NY), to 

facilitate cosponsorship. In a letter to the rest of their colleagues on June 1, they 

emphasized the Republican origins of the bill through NCD and the problem of paying 

persons with disabilities not to work. “Persons with disabilities want to be productive, 

self-supporting, and tax-paying participants in society,” they wrote. “This bill will 

grant them that dignity and that right.”12 Because the ADA was a civil rights bill, 

ADA supporters anticipated that members would readily support it. Yet, despite the 

bipartisan effort, the process of enlisting House cosponsors was slow: the issue of 

costs caused people to hesitate. Whereas members often cosponsor a bill when certain 

colleagues do, in this case they wanted to scrutinize the bill individually.13 

“There was always the possibility 

that having to go through four 

committees . . . could endanger some 

of the best and strongest 

provisions.” 

—Ralph Neas 

The House cosponsorship drive was less successful than that in the Senate—

33 percent of all senators and 19 percent of all representatives were cosponsors on 

May 9. But Congressman Coelho secured a crucial commitment from Congressman 

Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD). The two members had become close friends since Coelho, 

as Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, had assisted 

Hoyer in his first campaign. At Coelho’s request, Hoyer assumed the role of 

managing the ADA in the House. This meant organizing committee deliberations, 

serving as the principal negotiator, and leading floor deliberations. Out of respect for 

Coelho’s commitment to the ADA, Hoyer called himself “chief cosponsor,” and 

continued to identify Coelho as the ADA’s sponsor. Like so many other members of 

Congress, the ADA had personal significance for Hoyer: his wife had epilepsy. He 

became a zealous advocate for the ADA. 
104 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

 

A Bird’s Eye View of the House Deliberations A BIRD’S EYE VIEW 

By the time the ADA reached the House committees, the basic goals of the 

bill had been widely affirmed. Many members, however, viewed the legislative 

process as an incremental one, whereby major policies would be assembled step by 

step over many years. Passing the ADA was especially challenging because, as 

Rochelle Dornatt of Coelho’s staff observed, “we were creating a whole new set of 

rights . . . a whole new set of civil rights.” The principal focus in the House was not 

the needs of persons with disabilities, which had already been well-established by the 

Senate, but, rather, the bill’s effect on “covered entities.”*

 As Melissa Schulman of 

Congressman Hoyer’s office explained: “What the House was doing . . . was making 

the bill more acceptable to business.”14 Coelho often noted that “the trick” in the 

legislative process was “to find that magic number, that 218, to get the bill passed.”15 

With the ADA, advocates were trying to get much more than that, but it required 

extensive work at the committee level to satisfy members concerned with covered 

entities in their districts. 

House consideration of the ADA was different and more complicated than the 

Senate’s for several reasons. First, the committee structure was more complex. In the 

Senate, the bill went only to one committee and one subcommittee. There it was 

considered primarily as a civil rights bill and did not undergo the technical scrutiny of 

the commerce and transportation committees. In the House it went to four committees 

(Education and Labor, Public Works and Transportation, Energy and Commerce, and 

Judiciary), and six subcommittees (Select Education; Employment Opportunities; 

Surface Transportation; Telecommunications and Finance; Transportation, Tourism, 

and Hazardous Materials; and Civil and Constitutional Rights). In addition, the 

Committee on Small Business held a non-legislative hearing to generate information 

that could be used by other committees or during floor deliberations. These multiple 

committee referrals meant that the ADA would have to withstand the scrutiny of 

various technical experts, especially with regard to transportation. Moreover, 

164 representatives, compared with 16 senators, and many more House staff than 

Senate staff reviewed the bill in committee. This increased the chance of a committee 

altering, delaying, or even killing the bill and posed a major challenge to coordinating 

the deliberative process and keeping the bill intact. All indications suggested that a 

bill would pass. But, as Neas explained, “there was always the possibility that having 

to go through four committees . . . could endanger some of the best and strongest 

provisions.”16 According to Arlene Mayerson, it was “an overwhelming strategic 

nightmare.”17

*

 “Covered entity,” as defined in § 101(2) of the final version of the ADA, 

means “an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labormanagement committee.” For the purpose of this work, however, “covered entities” is 

defined more broadly to mean any entity covered by any portion of the ADA. This 

would include, for example, employers, operators of public transit, owners of places 

of public accommodation, and communications providers. 
 A BIRD’S EYE VIEW 105 

A second factor also complicated the House deliberations. In the Senate, the 

chief sponsors of the bill, Senators Kennedy and Harkin, were chairmen of the full 

committee and subcommittee with jurisdiction. In the House, however, Congressman 

Hoyer was not even a member of any of the committees reviewing the bill. He was 

“responsible for shepherding . . . the bill through the process,” explained Schulman, 

even though he had to do it without committee authority, relying on forming 

relationships with chairmen who often guarded their committee jurisdiction jealously. 

Keeping everything together was a challenging task indeed. But Hoyer rose to the 

challenge. As Neas said, he “put on one of the best legislative shows of all time.”18 

One cannot underestimate Hoyer’s importance. “Unless you have somebody who is 

going to take responsibility for seeing that it all gets done and there is some cohesion 

in the process,” Schulman said, “it never would have happened.”19 

Congressman Hoyer and staff member Schulman were central players, if not 

the leaders, in every aspect of the bill’s development in the House—cosponsorship, 

hearings, committee review, negotiations, committee and floor amendments, 

interactions with the White House, floor deliberations, conference proceedings, and 

crisis management. They feared that the committees might significantly weaken the 

bill, and that the disability community might walk out of the process in frustration. 

Hoyer thus committed to meeting 

with any member who wanted to 

discuss the bill. He even walked 

through a Giant Food store with 

concerned parties to explore the 

practical impact of the ADA.20 

Schulman remained confident that 

the bill would pass. But at times, 

she said, “it just looked next to 

impossible.”21 

“Unless you have somebody who is 

going to take responsibility for 

seeing that it all gets done and there 

is some cohesion in the process, it 

never would have happened.” 

—Melissa Schulman 

The legislative process in the House also differed in a third respect: the roles 

assumed by the business and disability communities and the Bush administration. The 

ADA went through the Senate like a “blitzkrieg.”22 This had compelled many 

business lobbyists essentially to throw in the towel with respect to the Senate and 

strategically focus their efforts on the House. The disability community, on the other 

hand, had been very much on the offensive throughout the Senate deliberations, 

seeking to persuade senators and the Bush administration to support its goals for an 

accessible America. Although many compromises had to be made to achieve 

presidential and Senate support, the disability community had been generally satisfied 

with an ADA that emerged from the Senate. And with respect to the Bush 

administration, it had been an active participant in hammering out a compromise bill 

that could win the endorsement of President Bush, which Bush granted on August 2, 

1989. 

The circumstances were much different in the House. While business groups 

worked extensively with the Senate and the Bush administration in developing a 

compromise bill, activity was primarily in Washington: there were only limited efforts 
106 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

to apply pressure on members from 

their constituents at home. But, 

during House deliberations, the 

business community vigorously 

lobbied the House by mobilizing 

constituent pressure. By the time 

the ADA reached the House, 

Mayerson said, the National 

Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) was distributing “millions of flyers to 

every business across the country.”23 Moreover, because of President Bush’s 

endorsement of the ADA, outright opposition was futile and apathy was dangerous. 

Barring an unexpected calamity, the bill was going to pass, at least in some form. If 

businesses wanted their voice to make a difference and meet some of their objectives, 

they had to support the overall concept of the bill. Persons with disabilities, on the 

other hand, were now more on the defensive. Their chief goal was to hold as much 

ground as possible amidst an onslaught of proposed revisions. 

Persons with disabilities were now 

more on the defensive. Their chief 

goal was to hold as much ground as 

possible, amidst an onslaught of 

proposed revisions. 

The disability community continually reminded opponents that a Republican 

president backed the ADA.24 Indeed, President Bush was a strong advocate of the 

ADA and had been in the forefront of promoting civil rights legislation for people 

with disabilities. By endorsing the negotiated version of the ADA on August 2, 1989, 

President Bush set the stage for the House deliberations, where passage consequently 

seemed imminent. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh most actively articulated 

the Bush administration’s support. For example, on September 19, Thornburgh wrote 

a powerful letter to the editor of the New York Times on behalf of the ADA. He 

underscored his and the president’s support of the ADA. In particular, he challenged 

the errors of a Times article—for example, its allegation that there had been 

“surprisingly narrow public scrutiny” of the ADA. Thornburgh described how the 

Bush administration, the Senate, and interested parties had entered “painstaking 

negotiations” that resulted in “a carefully balanced measure.”25 

On October 12, Attorney General Thornburgh testified on behalf of the 

administration, before the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights 

and gave a ringing endorsement of the ADA. He noted that many people with 

disabilities continue to live “in an intolerable state of isolation and dependence” and 

argued that the ADA could be “the vehicle that brings persons with disabilities into 

the mainstream of American life.” It was a “historic opportunity,” he said, to have the 

chance to help move the ADA through Congress.26 Thornburgh’s testimony was 

important because it demonstrated the Bush administration’s continued support of the 

ADA and reflected President Bush’s desire to see the ADA passed quickly. 

For the most part, however, compared with its intense and consistent 

interaction with the Senate, the Bush administration participated in the House 

deliberations only intermittently. Proponents of the ADA widely assumed that the 

administration stayed in the background because the administration was willing to let 

the House modify the bill and perhaps implement proposals the administration had 

been unable to negotiate with the Senate.27 House Republicans, for their part, 
 LOBBYING & GRASS ROOTS ACTIVISM 107 

preferred that the White House let them have the freedom to conduct their own 

analysis and revisions of the bill. House Democrats wanted the administration to 

speak out more authoritatively on behalf of the negotiated ADA, but they would settle 

for not having the administration advocate any weakening amendments.28 President 

Bush satisfied all parties by remaining outside the fray. 

The House deliberations were also characterized by ideological distinctions. 

ADA supporters widely hailed the bill as bipartisan legislation.29 Indeed, in the final 

analysis the ADA received overwhelming support from both parties—93 percent of 

the vote in each chamber and at least 86 percent of the vote in each party.30 There 

were also key advocates on both sides of the aisle, especially in the Senate, where 

Senators Harkin, Kennedy, Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT), Dave Durenberger (R-MN), and 

Robert Dole (R-KS) were deeply committed to the ADA. Moreover, Republicans and 

Democrats found common ground: they agreed “that it was a bad idea to pay people 

not to work, to stay home.”31 Nevertheless, an ideological fault line emerged between 

the interests of the business and disability communities. Republicans tended to vote 

in favor of easing the demands imposed on business. This became evident during the 

Senate floor deliberations. For example, Senator Hatch’s amendment to include a tax 

credit for businesses (the only vote to be recorded) split along party lines. Whereas 

71 percent of Republicans supported the amendment, 64 percent of Democrats 

opposed it.32 In the House, the division was even more clear. For example, whereas 

85 percent of Democratic committee members were cosponsors of the ADA, only 

10 percent of Republican committee members were.33 In the committees, members 

tended to split along party lines regarding amendments that most viewed as helping 

businesses.34 

It is important, however, not to lose sight of the enormous area of agreement 

on the ADA, which was established in the course of negotiations. Although 

Republicans and Democrats had their differences, it is a testament to their talents and 

commitment to a laudable objective that they were largely able to put aside 

partisanship to find common ground. 

Lobbying & Grass Roots Activities LOBBYING & GRASS ROOTS ACTIVISM

For business organizations such as NFIB, the Senate deliberations represented 

a failure. “The reason we failed in the Senate,” said Wendy Lechner, the NFIB point 

person for the ADA, “was we didn’t have time to educate” the members. The ADA 

was “pushed through as motherhood and apple pie before we had a chance to do 

anything.” In the House, therefore, the objective was to “slow it down long enough for 

education.”35 NFIB was not alone. Largely under the direction of Nancy Reed Fulco 

of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, business groups formed the Disability Rights 

Working Group to help mold the ADA. Different organizations focused on different 

provisions: NFIB and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce devoted considerable attention 

to public accommodations; the American Bus Association (ABA), the American 

Public Transit Authority (APTA), and Greyhound examined transportation issues; the 

National Restaurant Association (NRA), the Chamber of Commerce, and the National 
108 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

Association of Manufacturers dealt with 

employment. But they banded together to 

lobby members of the House about their 

common concerns. As illustrated in the 

Senate testimony, business groups were not 

completely opposed to the bill. “We really 

weren’t trying to deep-six it,” said Lechner. 

“We were really trying to get a better bill, a 

more livable bill.”36

“We really weren’t trying to 

deep-six it. We were really 

trying to get a better bill, a 

more livable bill.” 

—Wendy Lechner 

To create a more “livable” bill, representatives of covered entities developed a 

list of about 20 to 30 amendments. Throughout the House deliberations they 

continually updated this list, removing those changes that were accomplished, and 

adding others as new issues arose. And they lobbied members of Congress to argue 

the need for those amendments by issuing various position papers and visiting 

members’ offices. In addition to lobbying inside Washington, organizations such as 

NFIB sent out action alerts to their members urging people to write their 

representatives, especially those serving on committees. Some opponents of the ADA 

took their concerns about the ADA to the mainstream media. 

Business groups had a number of overriding concerns. One was the 

“vagueness of language” contained in the ADA. Business lobbyists argued that such 

phrases as “undue hardship,” “readily achievable,” and “readily accessible,” were 

inadequately defined, and would therefore invite frivolous law suits. Businesses, they 

argued, would not be able to know whether they were in compliance. A second 

concern was the potential cost of accommodations. One proposed solution was to 

have the government share some of the burden through tax credits and other 

mechanisms. Third, numerous covered entities lobbied to have a more concrete 

definition of disability, ideally one that listed every covered disability instead of 

relying on a flexible definition. Fourth, small businesses argued that they should be 

exempt from the public accommodations requirements, or at least be phased in more 

gradually, because small businesses were exempt from other civil rights legislation. 

Fifth, scores of organizations protested the enforcement mechanisms available under 

the ADA, especially private litigation and the availability of punitive damages. Sixth, 

many business groups proposed that the ADA should preempt all other disability laws, 

so that there would be no confusion between different statutes, and no possibility for 

bringing multiple law suits for one violation. 

The business community, however, faced a significant problem in educating 

and lobbying Congress: it had a much more difficult time than the disability 

community in keeping its coalition together. By the end of the fall of 1990, the 

coalition had begun to break down, as organizations focused on those provisions that 

affected them most. They were, therefore, unable to present a united front to 

Congress. Nevertheless, during the course of the House deliberations, business 

groups succeeded in obtaining many of the changes they sought. 
 LOBBYING & GRASS ROOTS ACTIVISM 109 

In response to a variety of objections posed by business groups, some House 

members took the initiative in undertaking vigorous publicity campaigns against the 

ADA. Congressman Dan Burton (R-IN), for example, sent out a flyer in which he 

enumerated “some of the more onerous provisions” of the ADA. According to 

Burton, the ADA would “federalize American private enterprise,” “wreak havoc in the 

workplace,” “crush small and medium-sized businesses,” and “confer federal approval 

on homosexual/ heterosexual ‘domestic partners.’” He also attached an editorial by 

Gene Antonio that characterized the ADA as “the last ditch attempt of the remorseless 

sodomy lobby to achieve its national agenda before the impending decimation of 

AIDS destroys its political clout. This bill simply must be stopped . . . and will 

become law unless there is a massive public outcry immediately.”37 

Similarly, Congressman Ron Marlenee (R-MN) issued a flyer to all the postal 

patrons in his district. The headline read: “Americans With Disabilities Act: 

Washington’s Latest Way to Crush Businesses, Schools, While Hurting The Disabled.” A 

subheading announced: “ADA Bill 

To Give Federal Endorsement For 

Homosexual ‘Partners’ and 

‘AIDS.’”38 Congressman Chuck 

Douglas (R-NH) distributed a letter 

that pictured a man pointing a gun at 

the reader. “Berserkers: Time 

Bombs in the Workplace,” the 

headline declared. Douglas favored 

the general idea of the ADA, but 

said the bill “needs dramatic 

rewriting.” He was especially with preventing persons with mental illness from 

endangering their coworkers and thus proposed excluding such persons from protection 

under the ADA.39 

“The beauty of the ADA was it was an 

effort where people in the grass roots 

were just as important, if not more 

important, than people in 

Washington.” 

—Liz Savage 

The disability community was more unified than the business community, but 

the heightened activity of the business community during House deliberations 

demanded a strong response from the disability community. “The beauty of the 

ADA,” said Liz Savage, “was it was an effort where people in the grass roots were 

just as important, if not more important, than people in Washington.”40 To facilitate 

disability grass roots involvement, leaders such as Marilyn Golden developed regional 

coordination networks: it was too complicated for one or even a handful of people to 

manage the calls for an entire nation. While in some cases there was a coordinator for 

an individual state, most states were organized in groups under a regional coordinator. 

The regional coordinators were selected because they were well known in their states. 

They came from a variety of organizations, often from independent living centers. 

During the House deliberations, the ADA coalition coordinated its lobbying 

efforts with each of the scheduled committee mark-ups. As the bill went through each 

committee, members of the legal team responded to virtually every business position 

paper by issuing rebuttals. They would proceed point-by-point through amendment 

lists and either show how claims were in error or why the disability community took a 
110 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

different position. ADA Lobbyists used this information in visiting members of the 

House, presenting a “Disability Rights 101” education course. Lobbyists were not 

just Washingtonians. Often at their own expense, persons with disabilities flew and 

drove in from around to be part of the Washington effort. The National Council on 

Independent Living (NCIL), for example, ensured that at least one of its 

representatives resided in Washington throughout the congressional deliberations. On 

many occasions, Liz Savage offered her apartment as a sort of boarding house for outof-town visitors. Once they arrived in Washington, grass roots advocates met with 

leaders in the ADA coalition to get weekly briefings and plot strategy. They also 

coordinated their lobbying techniques to ensure that they were presenting a unified 

message to members of Congress. 

Grass roots participation in lobbying helped humanize the ADA. Many 

members were seeing persons with disabilities for the first time and viewing them as 

assertive citizens. This helped break down the stereotype of persons with disabilities 

as dependent children. It also illustrated that disabled people could make a difference 

and offer valuable contributions to society—if only given the chance. Only a minority 

of people with disabilities, however, could make personal trips to Washington. Others 

did what they could in their local communities. Kathleen Kleinmann, for example, 

wanted to do whatever she could do from her home in rural Pennsylvania. She felt 

she simply had to be a part of the action. “We had that urgency about us,” she said. 

“It was contagious. It spread through the whole country.”41 For Kleinmann and many 

others, NCIL was the crucial link to activities taking place in Washington. Through it 

they could learn when and to whom they should write letters. Moreover, people in 

various local committees applied pressure on the local offices of their representatives. 

They also contested erroneous public statements about the ADA by calling into local 

radio shows and making local television appearances.42 

The largest single letterwriting campaign took place 

between the 100th and 101st 

Congresses, during the winter of 

1989–90. The campaign was 

directed at members of the 

House of Representatives, who 

were frustrating many in the 

disability community by taking 

so much longer than the Senate and proposing “weakening amendments.” Thousands 

of “New Year’s” postcards were mailed throughout the country with a cover letter 

from James S. Brady, soliciting individuals to mail to them to their congressman. The 

front of the card printed “ADA” in giant letters for a background. Set over it was the 

statement: “Our New Year’s Wish For Congress: Open the Doors to America. Pass 

the Americans with Disabilities Act.” On the back it said: “The President has 

endorsed it. The Senate has overwhelmingly passed it.” And in larger letters: “Now 

it’s up to you. Don’t weaken a law that will strengthen America.” Space was 

provided for people to add their own personal messages. They were encouraged to 

“The President has endorsed it. The 

Senate has overwhelmingly passed it. 

Now it’s up to you. Don’t weaken a law 

that will strengthen America.” 

—New Year’s Postcard 
 LOBBYING & GRASS ROOTS ACTIVISM 111 

send cards to their own Congressperson, committee members from their states, 

Speaker of the House Foley, and Minority Leader Michel.43 

In addition to lobbying, sending letters, and making phone calls, persons in 

the disability community, both inside and outside Washington, served the important 

function of presenting testimony at congressional hearings. As with the hearings of 

1988 and the Senate hearings of 1989, the House’s ADA hearings included powerful 

testimony about the need for civil rights protections for persons with disabilities. 

Persons from the disability community also offered their technical expertise on 

specific issues and countered the claims of those who proposed weakening 

amendments. 

A final way in which the disability community exerted pressure on Congress 

and the Bush administration was through demonstrations. One of the most significant 

protests was organized by ADAPT in September, 1989. In a long ADAPT tradition, 

the demonstration coincided with the annual meeting of APTA in Atlanta, where 

Secretary of Transportation Samuel K. Skinner was expected to present an address. 

On Sunday, September 24, about 100 people throughout the U.S. and Canada, most of 

whom were in wheelchairs, protested at the entrance of the Hilton Hotel convention 

site. Stephanie Thomas, a spokesperson for ADAPT, said they were protesting APTA 

because of its opposition to the ADA.44 

At about ten o’clock the following morning, on September 25, more than 

100 disability activists occupied the main floor of the Richard B. Russell Federal 

Building and blockaded the main entrances. Some attached chains and bicycle locks to 

their necks and locked them to door handles so that security could not simply lift them 

from their wheelchairs. ADAPT demanded that Secretary Skinner sign an executive 

order requiring the purchase of accessible vehicles for all new transit buses, which 

would take effect immediate. “We’re here until the order gets signed,” said Michael W. 

Auberger, one of the co-founders and leading organizers for ADAPT. “They’ll have to 

carry everybody out or arrest them.”45

Later that day, at around six o’clock, 

Atlanta police and security officers 

from the General Services 

Administration (GSA) did just that. 

They used bolt cutters to remove 

demonstrators from the building. 

“We’re here until the order gets 

signed. They’ll have to carry 

everybody out or arrest them.” 

—Mike Auberger 

About two hours later, only a few protesters still remained in the building. 

From inside the building, Marca Bristo contacted Evan Kemp, who told her to call 

Boyden Gray directly. As she was on the phone with Gray, a police officer insisted 

that she leave the building. Bristo left, but only after she handed the phone to the 

officer to prove she was talking to Gray from the White House. Gray subsequently 

contacted President Bush. Within minutes, police and other security officers began 

letting the disability activists back into the building. After speaking with Gray, 

President Bush had personally intervened to inform Gary C. Carson, Regional General 

Services Administration (GSA) administrator, that the protesters should be allowed to 
112 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

stay.46 Carson attributed Bush’s action to the president’s “deep commitment to the 

handicapped and their right to protest.” Apparently, Bush was also concerned about 

the alternative of having them stay overnight outside the building in a chilling rain.47

Auberger and others welcomed Bush’s intervention, but threatened to stay until 

Skinner signed the executive order they demanded. 

The sit-in ended the following afternoon subsequent to an agreement between 

the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) and leaders of ADAPT. 

UMTA agreed to help facilitate a process of identifying and interfering with transit 

operators that were rushing to buy inaccessible buses before the ADA was enacted. 

UMTA also agreed to relay to Secretary Skinner ADAPT’s desire to see more 

effective implementation of the Air Carriers Access Act of 1986, which required 

accessibility for air travel. The agreement fell short of ADAPT’s demands. Yet it 

appeared to be the best possible action, since UMTA explained that Skinner did not 

have the authority to issue such an executive order. 

ADAPT, however, was not finished with its demonstrations. The next day, 

Wednesday, September 27, protesters effectively shut-down the Atlanta Greyhound 

terminal for several hours by encircling the terminal and blocking buses. They 

chanted: “We Will ride!” “Access is our civil right!” One protester even climbed into 

the bus, sat in the driver’s seat, and chained himself to the steering column. Only four 

buses carrying about 80 passengers left the terminal during the protest, compared with 

a typical 20 buses carrying 600 passengers. The purpose of the demonstration was to 

urge Greyhound and other intercity bus services to begin purchasing lift-equipped 

buses. The protest ended, however, with the arrest of over 20 activists, who received 

$75 fines the following day. 

Five-and-a-half months later, amidst seemingly stalled House deliberations, 

ADAPT organized another demonstration—the “Wheels of Justice” campaign.48 

Disability activists from around the country gathered on Sunday night, March 11, to 

plan the week’s events. Wade Blank and Michael Auberger, co-founders of ADAPT, 

were there. Other leading ADAPT organizers included Bob Kafka, Mark Johnson, 

Stephanie Thomas, Dianne Coleman, Ben Freeman, and Bernard Baker. At noon the 

following day, hundreds of activists associated with ADAPT and other disability 

organizations assembled at the White House. From there they marched and rolled to 

the Capitol, where they gathered at the west front to listen to speeches from ADA 

supporters. On the way, they chanted: “What do we want?” “ADA!” “When do we 

want it?” “Now!” 

At the Capitol, Justin Dart, now Chairman of the President’s Committee on 

the Employment of People with Disabilities, 

addressed the crowd as “pioneer patriarchs of 

the twentieth century.” He likened the ADA 

to the Declaration of Independence and urged 

those assembled to “go forward, in the spirit 

of Ghandi and Martin Luther King, with love, 

with reasoned truth, with unyielding 

“We are American citizens 

and we will be part of the 

American dream.” 

—Justin Dart 
 LOBBYING & GRASS ROOTS ACTIVISM 113 

insistence on respect for the sacred value of each human life.” Concluding with a 

demand for immediate passage of the ADA, Dart declared: “We are American citizens 

and we will be part of the American dream.”49 Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder 

and Congressman Major Owens also spoke in support of the ADA, likening the 

disability rights movement to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Additional 

speakers included I. King Jordan, President of Gallaudet University, Evan Kemp, 

Chairman of the EEOC, and James Brady, former press secretary for President Ronald 

Reagan. 

Auberger was the final speaker. He, too, likened the efforts of those gathered 

to earlier movements for equality. He described the plight of people with disabilities 

and urged that disability activists must remain steadfast in demanding civil rights. 

Then, sitting in his wheelchair at the base of the Capitol steps, Auberger observed that 

the steps “were a symbol of discrimination against the disabled.” Yet, he said, he 

would not let them continue to be an obstruction. “We will not let any barrier prevent 

us from the equality that is rightfully ours.”50 As he concluded his speech in front of 

television cameras, many individuals left their wheelchairs behind to climb the 

Capitol steps—a symbol of their fortitude in surmounting barriers. 

On Tuesday, March 13, ADAPT continued its campaign by meeting with House 

Speaker Foley (who assumed the House leadership position after Congressman Wright’s 

resignation), Republican Leader Michel, and Congressman Hoyer in the Capitol Rotunda. 

Leaders of the protest insisted on immediate passage of the ADA. When Foley informed 

the crowd that two months was a likely time frame, more than 100 demonstrators began 

chanting: “ADA Now!” Foley and Michel subsequently departed. Hoyer stayed a little 

longer and departed with a thumbs-up signal. Then, Capitol police told the demonstrators 

to leave, as demonstrating in the Capitol is against federal law. Most demonstrators 

refused, however, and formed a tight circle; many chained their wheelchairs together. 

They chanted: “Access is a civil right!” and “The people united will never be defeated!” 

But police officers, many protected with riot gear, began using chain-cutters and torches to 

break through the links demonstrators had fashioned. For about two hours, police 

reportedly arrested 104 people whom charged them with demonstrating in the Capitol 

building.51 The next day, Wednesday, March 14, protesters assembled in Congressmen 

Shuster and Fish’s offices. Others crowded the Energy and Commerce Committee markup session. Numbers dwindled over the rest of the week, however, as many were 

appearing in court. 

The “Wheels of Justice” campaign did not bring immediate passage of the 

ADA. And the ADAPT demonstration in Atlanta did not result in an executive order 

that required the purchase only of accessible transit buses. Yet the protesters were 

more concerned with demonstrating the lengths to which persons with disabilities 

would go to secure their rights. In that sense they succeeded. The events were also an 

indication that further demonstrations could follow if the ADA got stuck in a 

quagmire. Combined with the other education and lobbying efforts of the ADA 

coalition, these activities underscored the nationwide, grass roots demand for passage 

of the ADA. 
114 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

Although such demonstrations reflected unity within the disability 

community, there was not complete unanimity among all people with disabilities. The 

National Federation of the Blind (NFB), for example, was outspoken in its 

reservations about the ADA. At its 1989 convention in Denver, Colorado, NFB 

passed a resolution declaring that if the ADA “could not be amended to cure its 

weaknesses, it should be opposed.” Early in 1990, Kenneth Jernigan of NFB wrote a 

brief, “Reflections on the Americans with Disabilities Act,” to explain NFB’s 

position. The primary concern, he said, was that the ADA might create additional 

problems for blind people as it attempted to eliminate other problems. In particular, 

NFB feared that the ADA might force people with disabilities “to accept the special 

accommodations mandated by the bill and . . . [prevent people] from using the same 

facilities and services that are available to others.” Such accommodations, Jernigan 

said, may themselves become discriminatory, and make the ADA “a source of 

unintentional discrimination against some persons with disabilities.”52 

For instance, NFB cautioned that the provision of specially-equipped rooms in 

hotels might require blind persons to use specific rooms and prevent them from 

staying near friends. To NFB, the alleged need for this accommodation (or for street 

corners with audible sounds for crossing and specially-designated seats on buses) was 

based on “the false assumption that sight is essential for successful performance of 

most tasks.” Blindness, said Jernigan, “is not generally disabling.” Consequently, 

unwanted accommodations falsely portrayed blind people “as limited in ways that 

they are not” and imposed unfair and unequal restrictions.53 

As a solution, NFB proposed an amendment stipulating that people with 

disabilities had the right not to participate in programs or activities specially designed 

for disabled persons. During the fall of 1989, NFB worked with John Wodatch of the 

Justice Department to elicit the backing of the administration. Following a meeting 

with White House staff on January 19, 1990, NFB representatives were confident that 

they would obtain their proposed amendment. But, Jernigan said, if the amendment is 

rejected, “we must oppose the bill as vigorously as we can . . . we will do anything we 

can to slow it down and block [the ADA’s] passage.” He concluded his “Reflections” 

with the cautionary statement: “Simply because a thing calls itself civil rights, that 

does not mean that it is civil rights.”54 NFB eventually attained its goal through an 

additional clause to the ADA: “an individual with a disability shall not be denied the 

opportunity to participate in . . . programs or activities that are not separate or 

different.”55 Subsequently, NFB did not oppose the ADA. 

The ADA and the House Committees: Three Phases HOUSE COMMITTEES

Part of the master strategy for passing the ADA involved organizing the 

committee deliberations in the House. Leading ADA supporters among Democrats, 

including Congressmen Coelho, Hoyer, and Owens, wanted to start the bill in a 

committee that was familiar with and favorable to civil rights. In consultation with 

each of the committee Chairs—Augustus F. Hawkins (D-CA), for Education and 

Labor; John D. Dingell (D-MI), for Energy and Commerce; Glenn M. Anderson (D-
 HOUSE COMMITTEES 115 

CA), for Public Works and Transportation; and Jack Brooks (D-TX), for Judiciary—

they decided to begin with Education and Labor. Several factors made this a logical 

choice. First, most of its Democratic members supported disability rights. Second, 

Democratic leadership included Congressman Owens, Chairman of the Subcommittee 

on Select Education, who had created the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment 

of People with Disabilities and was a strong advocate of civil rights and grass roots 

activism. Third, the ranking Republican for the Subcommittee on Select Education 

was Congressman Bartlett, who had a strong record on disability policy and was 

instrumental in shaping the mission of NCD. Bartlett, in fact, urged Republicans on 

other committees to promote letting Education and Labor go first. Fourth, Pat 

Morrisey, a leading Republican staff member, had also worked extensively with 

disability policy and, in addition, had a disability.56 Ideally, the Education and Labor 

Committee would complete its review of the ADA as a starting point for the rest of 

the committees. 

Although committees operate differently, they tend to follow a similar process 

of deliberation. The committee chair and committee members give overall guidance 

to their staff regarding what they would desire to achieve. Then, hearings are 

scheduled, designed, and held. The purpose of hearings is to solicit justification and 

document the need for the bill, as well as to hear and discuss reservations about the 

bill. As much as possible, staff try to settle issues raised by the hearings on their own, 

which is generally the vast majority of a given bill. For issues that remain unresolved, 

however, there is a ladder of conflict resolution. Usually, the first step the staff take is 

to prepare memos for their congressmen about the issues in dispute and then obtain 

the member’s feedback, which can be used in negotiations. If this proves inadequate, 

members meet directly with one another. Finally, issues that members cannot settle 

get carried to committee mark-up sessions where they can be introduced as 

amendments for member voting. Typically, mark-up sessions begin with the 

consideration of one collective amendment that incorporates all the agreed upon 

changes. Then, members proceed to discuss and vote upon individual amendments 

concerning the disputed issues.57 

Although the activities of all four committees often overlapped, there were 

three distinguishable phases in the committees’ review process. Deliberations by the 

Education and Labor Committee marked the first phase. A focus on transportation 

provisions by two committees, the Energy and Commerce Committee and the Public 

Works and Transportation Committee, constituted the second phase. Activities by the 

Judiciary committee represented the third and final phase before moving the 

deliberations to the House floor. 

PHASE I: EDUCATION AND LABOR COMMITTEE 

The Education and Labor Committee conducted the most thorough 

evaluation of the bill, at least with respect to the volume of testimony received. 

Two subcommittees had jurisdiction over the bill: Select Education, chaired by 

Congressman Owens, and Employment Opportunities, chaired by Matthew G. 
116 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

Martinez (D-CA). In the interest of facilitating rapid consideration of the ADA, 

Owens negotiated with Martinez to have Employment Opportunities yield to 

Owens’s Select Education Subcommittee. Moreover, Congressman Hawkins, 

Chairman of the full committee, essentially deferred to Owens for leading the 

committee’s consideration. In addition to the two hearings held in 1988, the 

Subcommittee on Select Education hosted four hearings between July 18 and 

October 6, 1989, two of which were joint hearings with the Employment 

Opportunities Subcommittee. 

Perhaps the most significant of the four hearings was the field hearing of the 

Subcommittee on Select Education held on August 28, in Houston, Texas. Lex 

Frieden and Justin Dart had recommended such a hearing to Congressman Owens due 

to concerns that Congressman Bartlett might not be fully supportive of the ADA 

because of his close associations with such business groups as NFIB. Owens 

approved of the idea and enjoyed 

playing the role of bringing the 

U.S. Congress to local 

communities. The purpose of the 

field hearing was to demonstrate to 

Bartlett that his own constituents 

strongly supported the ADA. 

Hundreds of persons with 

disabilities attended the hearing 

and an open forum that followed. 

At the hearing, businessmen, government officials, and transit authorities gave a 

ringing endorsement to the ADA. And dozens of people with disabilities spoke about 

their personal experiences at the forum. The proceedings appeared to have a 

significant impact on Bartlett. Later that evening, he told Frieden and others that he 

had been “kind of a skeptic” of the ADA. But the day of discussions “made me a 

believer,” and he pledged to do what he could to support the legislation.58 

Congressman Owens welcomed 

Hoyer as the leader in committee 

negotiations, because it gave Owens 

an opportunity to be a “Watch Dog” 

for the disability community. 

Contrary to the typical committee process, where staff settle most 

disagreements following the hearings, negotiations for the Committee on 

Education and Labor were led by Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett in a lengthy 

series of member-to-member meetings. This was also a unique circumstance 

because Hoyer was not even on the committee. Although Chairman Hawkins 

could have exercised his authority over the full committee, he “graciously,” as 

Ralph Neas described it, allowed Hoyer to take the lead. This gave Hoyer, the 

House manager of the ADA, an opportunity to set the tone for the rest of the 

House deliberations. Congressman Owens welcomed Hoyer as the leader of 

committee negotiations, because it gave Owens an opportunity to be a “Watch 

Dog” for the disability community: he could help ensure that negotiations did not 

result in a net loss for people with disabilities.59 

Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett represented different parties and different 

clientele—Hoyer spoke mostly on behalf of Democrats and the disability community, 

Bartlett mostly on behalf of Republicans and the business community. But they 
 HOUSE COMMITTEES 117 

shared enough in common to 

produce extraordinarily 

productive negotiations.60 

Bartlett wanted to foster business 

development. His position as 

Republican point man was to 

prepare a bill that could gain the 

support of Republicans and the 

business community. Hoyer 

shared similar goals. As 

Schulman explained: “we weren’t 

interested in creating a new right 

and doing it in such a way that it would have been impossible for the private sector, 

for employers and businesses, to meet their responsibilities.”61 Rather, in meeting the 

needs of persons with disabilities, Hoyer wanted to ensure that businesses knew what 

was expected of them, that language was clear and fair, and that the bill did not 

impose an undue burden on business.62 By working together, the two congressmen 

were able to help craft legislation that would be acceptable to both sides of the aisle 

and foster a level of bipartisanship comparable to what had developed in the Senate. 

The meetings were “the most productive and satisfying legislative negotiations that I 

had ever been involved with,” said Bartlett.63 

Congressman Hoyer spoke mostly on 

behalf of Democrats and the disability 

community, Congressman Bartlett 

mostly on behalf of Republicans and 

the business community. But they 

shared enough in common to produce 

extraordinarily productive 

negotiations. 

Throughout October, Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett met extensively and 

negotiated fourteen amendments that would later be brought up for a vote in 

committee. Although the committee had jurisdiction mainly over portions of the 

Employment and Public Accommodations titles, some of their proposed amendments 

affected the entire bill. The most significant amendment concerned the application of 

“undue hardship” and “readily achievable.” Business lobbyists wanted precise dollar 

figures to determine exactly how much businesses had to spend on accommodations 

and modifications. Rather than offer a price cap, the Senate bill specified that three 

factors should be evaluated in determining whether an accommodation was 

“reasonable” or a structural modification was “readily achievable”—the size of a 

business, the type of operation, and the cost of the accommodation. Although this 

provision fell mainly under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee, and was 

ultimately settled there, Hoyer and Bartlett began discussions about “site-specific” 

factors.64 They suggested that in determining whether an accommodation was 

“reasonable” a court should consider the financial resources of the local facility as 

well as those of the entire covered entity. Thus, a local K-Mart in financial difficulty 

would not be evaluated only according to the resources of the entire K-Mart 

corporation. Hoyer and Bartlett also clarified that an employer’s obligation to provide 

a reasonable accommodation was always limited by the standard of “undue hardship”: 

there would be no loopholes. 

Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett addressed another persistent concern of 

employers by adding tougher language for drug and alcohol abuse. They agreed that 

past drug users who had completed, or were actively engaged in, drug rehabilitation 

treatment were protected under the ADA. They also decided that covered entities 
118 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

 

should be free to administer drug 

tests and exclude individuals who 

used drugs and had not sought 

treatment. 

Congressmen Hoyer and 

Bartlett also worked to help 

minimize the potential for excessive 

litigation. They added language 

requiring that all complaints filed under the ADA or Sections 503 and 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act must be coordinated so that only one case could be brought against the 

covered entity; a claimant could not file two claims under two different statutes. They 

also developed a procedure whereby the attorney general could certify state or local 

building codes that met ADA accessibility standards, which would be a defense against 

discrimination charges. In cases where the attorney general exercised authority to pursue 

monetary damages for aggrieved persons, the two congressmen proposed to exclude 

punitive damages. They also suggested that when courts considered assessing civil 

penalties, they must consider the “good faith” efforts of the covered entity. Finally, 

Congressmen Bartlett and Hoyer incorporated into the bill requirements that executive 

agencies prepare technical assistance manuals to be disseminated to those with rights and 

responsibilities under the ADA. 

The meetings with Congressman Steny 

Hoyer were “the most productive and 

satisfying legislative negotiations that 

I had ever been involved with.” 

—Congressman Steve Bartlett 

These changes were brought before, and approved by, members of the 

Committee on Education and Labor at the mark-up sessions on November 9 and 16. 

Eight additional amendments came up for consideration.65 Among other things, these 

amendments would have: 

● linked the determination of reasonableness for accommodations and 

modifications exclusively to the resources of a local facility; 

● reduced the penalties the attorney general could assess; 

● substituted “significant risk” for “direct threat” as the standard according to 

which persons with contagious diseases could be discriminated against; 

● capped the amount a business had to spend on “readily achievable” 

modifications to 5 percent of a company’s profits; 

● delayed implementation until regulations were completed; and, 

● limited nondiscrimination protection for association with someone who had 

AIDS to one’s family members.†

 

†

 According to the ADA, an individual is protected not only from 

discrimination because of having a disability but also from discrimination based on 

being associated with a person with a disability. Thus, one could not be fired because 

one’s spouse had a disability such as AIDS. This amendment would have restricted 

the types of associations that were protected by the ADA to biological and legal
 HOUSE COMMITTEES 119 

 

Except for the package of amendments introduced by Congressmen Hoyer 

and Bartlett, all amendments introduced at the committee mark-up were voted down, 

predominantly along party lines. The Democratic position was a “no” vote on all 

amendments besides the Hoyer-Bartlett package.66 In the final vote, the committee 

voted unanimously, 35 to 0, to report H.R. 2273 to the House, as amended by the 

committee. Despite the contested amendments, this was another strong endorsement 

of the ADA, and gave the bill a boost similar to that given by the Senate vote. Tough 

battles lay ahead. But the Hoyer-Bartlett compromises positioned the ADA for future 

success, and Hoyer and Bartlett would continue to play central roles in the 

negotiations of other committees. 

PHASE II: ENERGY AND COMMERCE & PUBLIC WORKS

AND TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEES 

Although the Committee on Education and Labor reached a significant 

compromise that drew the support of many members, it accomplished little with 

respect to transportation and telecommunications provisions. These responsibilities 

fell to two committees: Energy and Commerce, and Public Works and Transportation. 

Their deliberations constituted the second phase of the House process of committee 

review. 

From the beginning of the ADA campaign, advocates worried most about the 

transportation provisions. Transit authorities had historically posed vigorous 

challenges to accessibility for persons with disabilities. When the Department of 

Transportation issued its original Section 504 regulations, APTA responded with a 

lawsuit—and won. The court ruled that requiring lifts on every bus went beyond the 

purview of Section 504 and left it up to transit authorities to decide whether to have 

accessible buses, provide paratransit service, or use a mixture. As a result of this socalled “local option,” transportation operators throughout the country provided widely 

varying levels of accessible transportation. Cities such as New York and Seattle had 

achieved nearly 100 percent accessible buses, while Chicago had virtually none. 

Railroad systems had other problems. Accessibility standards for Amtrak, for 

example, had been in effect for nearly two decades; the regulations simply were not 

being enforced. By proposing fully accessible public transportation vehicles, the 

ADA would thus face resistance from such powerful lobbying groups as the ABA, 

Greyhound, Amtrak, and APTA. 

Working the transportation provisions of the ADA through the committee was 

also challenging because the scope was so broad. The ADA covered all public 

transportation by both public and private entities, with the exception of air travel, 

which had been addressed in the Air Carriers Access Act. This included: fixed route 

relationships. As a result, one would not have been protected by the ADA if 

discriminated against because a friend had AIDS.
120 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

 

systems‡ (including buses, light and rapid rail§), paratransit service** (which applied 

only to public entities), demand responsive systems,†† intercity rail,‡‡ commuter rail,§§

over-the-road buses*** (which applied only to private entities), and transportation 

facilities. To avoid presenting executive agencies with any ambiguity, the 

transportation committees prepared extraordinarily detailed provisions. Given the 

memory of the regulatory nightmare of Section 504, where lack of detail in the statute 

resulted in intense conflict over the regulations, many people in the disability 

community welcomed the specificity promoted by the transportation committees. 

Although the two transportation committees upheld the basic principles of the Senate 

bill, they made the most changes—nearly tripling the amount of space dedicated to 

transportation provisions. 

The two committees operated simultaneously, but the Energy and Commerce 

Committee was the first to complete its review. It held its hearings on September 27 

and 28, 1989 and met for mark-up six months later on March 13, 1990, at which time 

it reported the ADA, as amended, to the House. The ADA’s fate in the transportation 

committees was largely a function of personalities. Working with the Energy and 

Commerce Committee was difficult for the disability community. Chairman Dingell 

was notorious for jealously guarding his committee’s jurisdiction, and he was one of 

Amtrak’s greatest advocates. Over the course of the 1980s, funding for Amtrak had 

plummeted, and Dingell was reluctant to impose any new demands on the struggling 

public service. This made for a much different dynamic than the other three House 

committees, where Democrats generally sided with disability advocates to prevent any 

‡

 A fixed route system is one where public transportation is provided by 

vehicles that follow prescribed routes according to a fixed time schedule. 

§

 Light and rapid (or heavy) rail are categorized according to the volume of 

passengers carried, and have nothing to do with weight. An example of a light rail 

vehicle is a street car like those in San Francisco. An example of a rapid (or heavy) 

rail vehicle is one used for the Washington Metro subway system. ** Paratransit service is door-to-door service provided to qualified persons 

according to the inability to use standard public transportation. Use must be 

scheduled in advance, sometimes as much as a week, and can be restricted only to 

certain destinations, like doctors’ offices. 

†† Demand responsive transportation means any system of providing 

transportation to the general public that does not operate according to a fixed 

schedule: for example, a hotel or rental car company running an airport shuttle. 

‡‡ Intercity rail, as defined in the ADA, refers exclusively to transportation 

provided by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). 

§§ Commuter rail refers to any rail service, provided by public or private 

entities, used by the general public primarily for commuter purposes, as opposed to 

rail systems with dining and sleeping cars. Some routes may be “intercity” in nature: 

for example, commuting from Baltimore to Washington. *** Over-the-road buses are those where passengers are elevated above a 

luggage compartment: for example, Greyhound buses. 
 HOUSE COMMITTEES 121 

“weakening” amendments. In this case, Democrats tended to side with the public rail 

company and were thus more skeptical of the ADA’s objectives. The principal staff 

person for the Energy and Commerce Committee was Alan Roth. By the end of the 

process he became a hero of sorts for the disability community, but in the beginning 

Roth posed a great challenge. He thought things had happened too quickly in the 

Senate, where there was little expert review of transportation provisions, and he 

wanted to conduct a thorough review of the bill’s provisions within his committee’s 

jurisdiction. This had the effect of extending the deliberative process. 

Unlike the Education and Labor Committee, and its open negotiations, the 

Energy and Commerce Committee began its consideration privately, without 

consulting the disability community. The relationship between disability advocates 

and the committee was not improved when Pat Wright and Ralph Neas worked with 

Michigan constituents to apply pressure on the Chairman. It was not until the 

committee circulated a draft of its own version of the bill, which invited a 30-page 

rebuttal from the outraged disability community, that Congressman Hoyer could 

persuade the committee to work with him in developing a bill that the disability 

community could support.67 

Although the Energy and Commerce Committee could introduce amendments 

that affected the entire bill, its jurisdiction over the ADA centered on two main 

components: telecommunications and railroads. Telecommunications provisions were 

the least controversial of the ADA’s four main titles. Karen Peltz-Strauss and Sy 

Dubow were the principal attorneys from the deaf community who worked with 

congressional staff. The National Association of the Deaf (NAD), 

Telecommunications for the Deaf, Inc., and Self-Help for the Hard of Hearing 

(SHHH) were active in demonstrating broad support for changes in the nation’s 

telecommunications system. Peltz-Strauss described Congressman Edward J. Markey 

(D-MA), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, as the 

deaf community’s “chief advocate” in the House. He was “very interested in 

expanding telecommunications access for people with disabilities.”68 This made for 

“smooth and harmonious” deliberations, as Congressman Bob Whittaker (R-KS) later 

described them.69 “There was striking cooperation among industry, commerce, and 

Congress,” said Peltz-Strauss, which produced provisions “that met the needs of 

people who were deaf and hard of hearing.”70 

Historically, three of the main telecommunications issues for the deaf and 

hard of hearing were hearing-aid compatibility, teletype devices, and television 

decoding. During the 1980s, the deaf community succeeded in passing legislation that 

required employers to provide hearing-aid compatible telephones, which were 

equipped to transmit electromagnetic signals to certain hearing aids. In 1988, the 

Hearing Aid Compatibility (HAC) Act expanded this requirement such that nearly all 

telephones manufactured or imported into the country had to be compatible. The 

issue the ADA addressed most directly were teletype (TTY) devices, often called a 

Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD). Under the original bill introduced to 

the House and Senate, the ADA required states to establish telecommunications relay 

services that would allow people to communicate, through an operator, with people 
122 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

who did not have TTY devices. During House deliberations, the basic requirement 

was affirmed, though the implementation date was extended from two to three years. 

The most significant change was the removal of the “undue burden” limit on the 

mandate to provide relay service. The committee also addressed the issue of closed 

captioning for televisions. Earlier legislation required public television to broadcast 

with closed captioning. During the House deliberations, Congressman Markey’s 

subcommittee stipulated that all public service announcements partly- or fully-funded 

by the Federal Government must be produced with closed captioned text. 

The Subcommittee on 

Telecommunications and 

Finance was the first of all 

House subcommittees to 

complete its action, on October 

12, 1989. Subsequently, the 

Energy and Commerce 

Committee devoted several 

months to deliberating 

transportation provisions. The committee held the preponderance of jurisdiction over 

railroads and had absolute jurisdiction over Amtrak. It began its deliberations with 

the Senate bill, which required that all new rail cars had to be accessible, and 

mandated that at least one car per train had to be accessible within five years. Since 

Amtrak was standardized throughout the nation, the committee could be 

extraordinarily detailed about what accessibility meant for Amtrak. For example, the 

committee delineated distinctions between single- and bi-level cars. It also designed 

separate provisions for sleeping, dining, and passenger cars. For Amtrak, the Energy 

and Commerce Committee even developed a formula to determine precisely how 

many spaces had to be available for persons using wheelchairs, including space to 

store wheelchairs. Perhaps the most important decision coming out of this committee, 

however, was that it sustained the Senate’s one-car-per-train rule and the stipulation 

that all new cars had to be accessible. This was significant because the Public Works 

and Transportation Committee shared partial jurisdiction over railroads, and wrestled 

with whether all cars had to be accessible. 

“The perpetuation of prejudice and 

discrimination against persons with 

mental disorders in a vehicle designed 

to end discrimination is sadly ironic.” 

—American Psychological Association 

Although negotiating over transportation provisions was difficult, the most 

controversial and intense negotiations in the Energy and Commerce Committee had 

nothing to do with structural 

transportation accessibility. Members 

of the Energy and Commerce 

Committee were concerned that the 

ADA’s protection of persons who 

were mentally ill could result in 

uncontrollable train disturbances, 

where train operators would be 

unable to ask meddlesome riders to 

leave. Consequently, their initial 

draft of the ADA excluded persons 

“We in the House felt an obligation 

to . . . fine tune” the ADA “in a way 

the transit authorities could 

embrace” the act “and make it 

work.” 

—Roger Slagle 
 HOUSE COMMITTEES 123 

who were mentally ill from the definition of disability. This caused an uproar in the 

disability community. “Persons with mental disabilities, among all the disabled, have 

suffered the greatest stigmatization and resulting discrimination,” said the American 

Psychological Association. “The perpetuation of prejudice and discrimination against 

persons with mental disorders in a vehicle designed to end discrimination is sadly 

ironic.”71 

The committee ultimately removed the exclusion, but the issue came back up 

at mark-up. Congressman William E. Dannemeyer (R-CA) proposed an amendment 

that would have supplemented the established exclusion of compulsive gambling, 

kleptomania, and pyromania by prohibiting all “behavior disorders.” Based upon his 

belief that the ADA was “a homosexual rights bill in disguise,” his amendment also 

proposed the exclusion of anyone with a contagious or sexually transmitted disease.72 

These proposals posed a major threat to the ADA, for they applied not just to 

transportation, but to the entire bill. Although the committee rejected the Dannemeyer 

amendment, these issues were only temporarily put to rest. 

The Public Works and Transportation Committee held its hearings on the 

ADA before Energy and Commerce, on September 20 and 26, 1989. But it held its 

mark-up several weeks after the Energy and Commerce Committee, on April 3, 1990. 

For disability advocates, the Public Works and Transportation Committee was much 

easier to work with than the Energy and Commerce Committee, but it ultimately 

posed a significant threat to their objectives. Chairman Anderson was a strong 

supporter of the ADA and charged staff member Roger Slagle, whom he appointed to 

take the lead on the ADA, with a clear mission: “Get the people on the bus.”73 Slagle 

was not a detached mediator; he strove for optimal accessibility. From the disability 

community, he worked especially with attorney Chai Feldblum, whom he described as 

“one of the brightest people I’ve ever worked with in my life.”74 But Slagle had one 

major reservation: unwarranted litigation against transit authorities. Slagle said 

people on the House side referred to the Senate bill as the “we’re-going-to-sue-yourass” bill. They feared that under the Senate bill a person with a disability might be 

able to sue a transit authority simply because a lift-equipped bus was late. “We in the 

House felt an obligation to . . . fine tune” the ADA, said Slagle, “in a way the transit 

authorities could embrace [the act] and make it work.”75 

The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation was 

Congressman Norman Y. Mineta (D-CA). Congressman Coelho, who was a close 

friend of Mineta’s, vigorously lobbied Mineta to be more than a passive supporter of 

the ADA; Coelho wanted him to be an active advocate. The fact that Mineta was 

indebted to Coelho for crucial help on one of his own legislative endeavors helped 

persuade him. And Congressman Mineta came through: he was “absolutely 

wonderful,” said Coelho.76 

Although there were strong advocates for the ADA on the Public Works and 

Transportation Committee, there was also a powerful counter-voice in Congressman 

Bud Shuster (R-PA). Shuster repeatedly referred to his mother, who was “a double 

amputee in a wheelchair,” and how he “skinned my knuckles more times than I can 
124 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

count trying to jiggle her wheelchair through a door that should have been wider . . . 

or trying to lug a wheelchair up a set of stairs where there should have been a ramp.”77 

There was no reason, he thought, that she would ever want or need to get on a bus, 

and he outright opposed equipping all buses with lifts. Many persons in the disability 

community, however, thought Shuster was out of touch with their sentiments. Persons 

in wheelchairs did not want to be pushed around and transported; rather, they wanted 

to control their own mobility and travel as independently as possible—which required 

accessible vehicles. 

The Public Works and Transportation Committee had jurisdiction over transit: 

that is, transportation used primarily for commuter purposes. One of the biggest 

issues the committee faced was whether to include a lift on every transit bus. Eastern 

Paralyzed Veterans of America (EPVA) attorney Jim Weisman, who served as a 

transportation expert for the disability community, was amazed that some members 

were opposed to putting lifts on buses. It seemed “ridiculous to me,” he said, 

“because it was academic. . . . Transit authorities had just about given this up. 

[Everybody] who was anybody knew transit authorities knew that the handwriting was 

on the wall.”78 

The alternative to equipping buses with lifts was providing paratransit service. 

Congressman Shuster emphasized that persons with disabilities in his district 

preferred paratransit over fixed-route buses. So might most people, given a chance to 

have door-to-door transportation. The problem with paratransit service was that its 

expenses were unlimited, whereas for fixed route systems the primary cost was a onetime lift installation. Fixed-route buses collected money with every ride; each ride on 

paratransit cost the operator substantial money. Consequently, paratransit service was 

unable to meet the demand of its clientele. Transit authorities such as APTA, as 

Weisman observed, were becoming convinced that it was more cost-effective for them 

to purchase lift-equipped buses and were thus very moderate in their reservations 

about the ADA. Members of Congress were the most vigorous opponents. 

Ultimately, however, the committee sided with its constituents who pushed for liftequipped, fixed-route bus systems and a supplemental paratransit service for those 

unable to use standard service. 

Debate about what to do with intercity bus services such as Greyhound was 

much more contentious. Senators had responded by removing the original lift 

mandate and requiring that a three-year study assess the most effective and costefficient accessibility. Greyhound and the ABA argued that people who could not 

manage the steps into an intercity bus should simply be carried onto the bus. The 

difference with intercity (“over-the-road”) buses was that a lift potentially took away 

seats and luggage space. Companies such as Greyhound were in many cases the only 

transportation serving rural areas. They argued that the loss of revenue from liftinstallation would necessitate reduced service areas, and that many people would thus 

be deprived of their only form of transportation. The disability community used the 

same evidence to make the opposite point: since buses were in some cases the only 

available form of transportation, it was imperative that persons with disabilities be 

able to use them. They also argued that it was unfair for Greyhound, which was 
 HOUSE COMMITTEES 125 

struggling financially, to point to accessibility as the cause or potential cause of its 

problems. Ultimately, the committee agreed with the Senate’s provision requiring a 

study and thereby delayed the final decision. 

The Public Works and Transportation Committee’s primary responsibility 

with respect to the ADA was bus transit, subways, paratransit, and intercity buses, but 

it had jurisdiction over rail systems operated by transit authorities. Thus, certain 

commuter rail routes—for example, from Baltimore to Washington—fell under its 

jurisdiction. This meant that two different committees had the opportunity to craft rail 

requirements. The bill the Public Works and Transportation Committee brought 

before the mark-up, like that of the Energy and Commerce Committee, endorsed the 

Senate requirements for one car per train, and accessibility for all new vehicles. But 

an amendment was introduced at the Public Works and Transportation Committee 

mark-up that removed the accessibility requirement for all new vehicles. Proponents 

of the amendment contended that trains should be approached like airplanes, where 

only designated seats, not the entire plane, had to be accessible. The amendment 

attracted a small number of Democrats whose districts had made little headway in rail 

accessibility. Combined with the votes of Republicans, who almost unanimously 

supported the amendment, these Democrats’ votes helped give the amendment a 

majority. It was a significant defeat for the disability community, since the provision 

violated one of the community’s main principles: accessibility for all new vehicles. 

The matter was not, however, settled. The amendment created a jurisdictional 

conflict that had to be settled by House leadership, the House Parliamentarian, and the 

Rules Committee. Chairman Dingell characteristically and vigorously argued that his 

committee’s jurisdiction should prevail. Democratic leadership on the Public Works 

and Transportation Committee, on the other hand, especially Congressman Mineta, 

subtly revealed to Congressman Hoyer and the House leadership that they supported 

the Energy and Commerce version of the ADA. To the relief of the disability 

community, the House Parliamentarian and the Rules Committee ruled in favor of 

Energy and Commerce. 

PHASE III: JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 

After surviving review by the first three committees—Education and Labor, 

Energy and Commerce, and Public Works and Transportation—the ADA’s final 

committee hurdle was the Judiciary Committee. This final phase of the House 

committee process was also a symbolic one: the last chance for opponents of the bill 

to offer unrestricted amendments. Once the bill went to the House floor, the Rules 

Committee would allow only certain amendments for consideration. Similar to the 

Education and Labor Committee, where Subcommittee Chairman Major Owens 

effectively led the committee’s deliberations, Don Edwards (D-CA), Chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, essentially took the lead in the 

Judiciary Committee’s consideration of the ADA. Moreover, as with the Education 

and Labor Committee, Congressman Hoyer played a central role in shaping the 
126 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

Judiciary Committee’s negotiations and Congressman Bartlett continued to represent 

the Republican party. 

The Judiciary Committee held three hearings, on August 3, October 11, and 

October 12, 1989. The Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights met for 

mark-up on April 25, 1990. The full committee held mark-up sessions on May 1 and 

2, at which time it reported the ADA favorably to the House, as amended. 

One of the hottest issues for the Judiciary Committee, which had jurisdiction 

over portions of the employment and public accommodations titles, was remedies. 

Prior to the Judiciary Committee’s consideration of the ADA, the Senate and the 

White House had reached a breakthrough compromise on the issue of remedies: the 

Senate agreed to restrict available employment and public accommodations remedies 

to those in the Civil Rights Act, which omitted punitive damages. As a result of this 

agreement, the Education and Labor Committee never even considered changing the 

available remedies. A crucial development during the Judiciary Committee’s 

deliberations, however, made them a live issue once again. 

On February 7, 1990, Senator Kennedy and Congressman Hawkins 

introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1990. This bill amended the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 by allowing courts to award compensatory and punitive damages at jury trials, to 

persons who successfully proved they were victims of discrimination. Because the 

ADA merely incorporated the remedies of the Civil Rights Act by reference, this 

proposed change to the Civil Rights Act would also apply to the ADA. 

Representatives from the disability community contended that this was consistent with 

earlier agreements with the White House, that the principle all along had been parity 

with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, regardless of whether those provisions were 

strengthened or weakened over time. 

The Bush administration, however, felt betrayed and argued that their 

negotiated agreement expressly excluded punitive damages from the bill. On 

March 12, The Washington Post reported rumors that President Bush might withdraw 

his endorsement of the bill if the ADA did not expressly limit its remedial provisions 

to injunctive relief, reinstatement, and back pay. That same night, Attorney General 

Richard Thornburgh wrote a letter to Congressman Steny Hoyer. He said the 

administration opposed the link to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and proposed that the 

conflict be resolved by specifying the current standards of the Act.79 

When the committee 

introduced an amended version of 

the ADA to the Subcommittee on 

Civil and Constitutional Rights on 

April 25, it sided with the disability 

community and retained the crossreference to the Civil Rights Act of 

1964. Congressman F. James 

Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-WI), however, 

The most significant contribution of 

the Judiciary Committee concerned 

“site-specific” factors for the 

determination of “reasonable 

accommodation” and “readily 

achievable.” 
 HOUSE COMMITTEES 127 

introduced an amendment to eliminate the reference. Some people with disabilities 

suggested giving up on the remedies issue in order to save the rest of the bill, but the 

disability community generally lobbied vigorously to oppose this and all other 

“weakening amendments.” To the relief of disability activists, the Sensenbrenner 

amendment failed. Sensenbrenner tried to pass the amendment a second time when the 

full committee met on May 1 and 2, but it was voted down again. In its report on the bill, 

the Judiciary Committee argued that the Sensenbrenner amendment was “antithetical” to 

the very nature of the ADA. It also referred directly to the Civil rights Act of 1990 and 

stated that any changes there would be applied to the ADA.80 Sensenbrenner joined five 

colleagues in authoring “Additional Views” for the report, where they continued to insist 

on the need for the Sensenbrenner amendment. They also cryptically threatened that a 

failure to pass it might jeopardize the entire ADA.81 

The most significant contribution of the Judiciary Committee concerned “sitespecific” factors for the determination of “reasonable accommodation” and “readily 

achievable”. Discussions on the topic had begun in earnest between Congressmen 

Hoyer and Bartlett during the Education and Labor Committee’s deliberations and 

continued throughout the House deliberations. For the most part, the Judiciary 

Committee introduced the same changes proposed by the Education and Labor 

Committee. But the Judiciary Committee rearranged the factors for clarity and for 

different emphasis. It was primarily concerned with avoiding a determination that 

sided either with the local facility or the covered entity. Rather, the committee 

stressed that, on a case-by-case and flexible basis, both entities should be evaluated. 

Moreover, it emphasized that the relationship between the parent company and the 

local facility should be taken into consideration. 

The committee made many other changes, most of which were technicalities 

compared with earlier, more sweeping compromises. In addition to clarifying the 

cross-referencing on remedies and site-specific factors, the Judiciary Committee 

added a new section to the bill that encouraged alternative dispute resolution through 

reconciliation before moving to litigation. And it made technical changes to the 

interim standards of accessibility. The final amendment accepted by the Judiciary 

Committee was a package of six amendments introduced by Congressman Fish, based 

on negotiations that included the disability community, the White House, and 

Congressmen Hoyer and Bartlett. Essentially, three of the amendments came from the 

disability community, and three from the administration. For the administration, the 

committee added language clarifying: the meaning of “direct threat,” the standards by 

which “anticipatory discrimination” were valid, and that an employer’s view of what 

constituted “essential functions” would be considered by courts. For the disability 

community, the package included clarification about which entities were covered in 

the public accommodations title and what was meant by “commercial facilities.” It 

also provided that places where exams were administered had to be accessible.82 

Additional amendments were introduced, but they failed. Two of these failed 

amendments—a proposal to cap an employer’s obligation to provide accommodations 

at 10 percent of an employee’s salary, and a proposal to enable employers to remove 

persons with contagious diseases, such as AIDS, from food handling positions—
128 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

 

would reemerge on the House floor. On May 2, the Judiciary Committee concluded 

its deliberations by favorably reporting its version of the ADA to the full House. 

Moving to the House Floor HOUSE FLOOR

The ADA proceeded rapidly to the House floor after the Judiciary Committee 

completed its work. On May 14 and 15, 1990, the four committees submitted their 

reports, which included four different drafts of the ADA. It was then the task of the 

Rules Committee to produce a bill that synthesized the four versions. A bipartisan 

staff working group collaborated to sort out the different texts. The only conflict was 

between the transportation committees over whether new rail vehicles had to be 

accessible. Otherwise, it was a matter, albeit a challenging one, of piecing everything 

together. The staff working group crafted a new bill, H.R. 4807, which they 

substituted for the text of H.R. 2273. On May 16, the Rules Committee submitted its 

own report that included the new version of H.R. 2273 and a resolution, H. Res. 394. 

This resolution provided that, at any subsequent time, the Speaker of the House could 

take up H.R. 2273, the Americans with Disabilities Act, for consideration on the 

House floor. 

Floor deliberations are somewhat of a free-for-all in the Senate: a senator may 

introduce virtually any amendment, even one that is not germane to the bill, and also 

filibuster—dominating the floor for unlimited time. The House, by contrast, conducts 

its floor proceedings according to rules established by the Rules Committee. In the 

case of the ADA, H. Res. 394 submitted a modified closed rule, meaning that general 

debate would be restricted and that only specific amendments would be allowed for 

consideration. The resolution provided that at any time after adoption of the 

resolution the Speaker of the House could resolve the House into the Committee of 

the Whole House on the State of the Union for consideration of the ADA and the 

proposed amendments.††† There would be two hours of general debate: 30 minutes 

for each committee, split equally between majority and minority members. Eight 

amendments were approved for consideration. 

††† For most minor legislative initiatives that make it to the floor of the House, 

as in the Senate, there is only brief consideration, there are no amendments, and 

members approve the bill unanimously or by a voice vote. For major legislation such 

as the ADA, however, members generally want to debate the bill and offer 

amendments. In the House, such extensive consideration usually takes place by the 

House resolving into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 

where fewer members are required to be present to conduct business and all 

amendments unrelated to the legislation in question are prohibited. Final passage 

must take place after reporting the bill, as amended, back to the House, where the 

amendments approved in the Committee of the Whole must be approved either en 

bloc or individually. Before the final vote, members have the option of requesting 

that the bill be recommitted back to committee for further consideration. 
 HOUSE FLOOR 129 

On May 17, only one day after the Rules Committee presented its resolution, 

the House met to consider passage of the ADA. The first order of business was to 

accept the closed rule. Minority congressmen protested. Congressman Robert S. 

Walker (R-PA) called it a “totalitarian rule” and said the committee used “a process 

which is both undemocratic and . . . sad.”83 Congressman Bill McCollum (R-FL) said 

the rule was “an abomination” and “ridiculous” and suggested that the lack of House 

activity that session provided plenty of time for free debate.84 Congressman Lynn 

Martin (R-IL) complained that only 8 of the 45 amendments proposed to the Rules 

Committee were accepted, and noted that a proposal to have an open rule was 

defeated on a strict party line vote.85 Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-GA) said the 

ADA was an “extraordinarily important bill” and that consideration of every 

amendment submitted to the Rules Committee was therefore appropriate.86

Congressmen in the majority, however, generally supported the rule and argued that 

allowing open debate would undermine all the agreements made in the committees 

and defeat the basic purpose of committee deliberations. As is customary, the House 

passed the rule on virtually a straight, party-line vote.87 

Immediately following the vote, the House resolved itself into the Committee 

of the Whole. Congressman Hoyer took the lead for ADA supporters throughout the 

deliberations and frequently entered debate to clarify various aspects of the ADA. 

The general debate provided members an opportunity to make basic statements about 

the virtues and problems of the bill, review the history of committee deliberations, and 

note key accomplishments. Hoyer drew special attention to how the ADA was “truly 

the product of thousands and thousands and thousands of people.”88 Similarly, 

Congressman Owens thanked “all of 

the members of the community of 

people with disabilities, who 43 

million strong raised their voices 

across the Nation, and it was their 

push, their sense of empowerment, 

that has brought us to where we 

are.”89 Hoyer also emphasized how 

much business interests were taken 

into consideration: “We have worked closely with them, and adopted numerous 

amendments, to ensure that American business can work with the ADA.”90 

“We have worked closely with” 

businesses, “and adopted numerous 

amendments, to ensure that 

American business can work with the 

ADA.” 

Others, however, thought more work needed to be done. Congressman 

Bartlett was Congressman Hoyer’s counterpart in coordinating the efforts to amend 

the ADA. Congressman McCollum said the issue was not whether to bestow civil 

rights, but how to “minimize costs to the employers while still doing that.”91 Back 

and forth across the aisle, Democrats emphasized the bill’s balance and the need to 

reject “weakening” amendments, and Republicans stressed the potential pitfalls of the 

bill and the need to fine tune it with further amendments. 

The House considered four of the seven amendments on May 17. Two were 

non-controversial. Congressman John J. LaFalce (D-NY), based on the Small 

Business Committee hearing he chaired, proposed postponing the time at which civil 
130 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

actions could be brought against a covered entity. Republicans and Democrats united 

in unanimous support.92 The House also approved, by voice vote, Congressman 

James V. Hansen’s (R-UT) amendment to allow wheelchair use in wilderness areas. 

Congressman Jim Olin’s (D-VA) amendment, to impose a 10 percent salary 

cap on the amount of accommodations an employer had to provide an employee, was 

more contentious. The NFIB strongly endorsed the amendment, and Congressman 

McCollum called it “the small business amendment in this legislation.” He suggested 

that a vote against it would be a vote against small business—a position no member 

was eager to take.93 The bill would have put a finite dollar cap on accommodations. 

But, according to ADA supporters, there were two main problems. First, as 

Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) said: “It is great for Donald Trump. It is 

lousy for the person who is cleaning up after Donald Trump.”94 The amendment 

would mean that persons with similar disabilities would not be given individualized 

treatment—a central premise of the ADA. Rather, they would be grouped according 

to income level. 

Second, as Congressman Bartlett stated forcefully, the amendment “would in 

fact be harmful both to those who are disabled and to the employers themselves.” By 

setting a dollar cap, persons with disabilities might insist on 10 percent of their 

income as a mandatory level of accommodation, when much less might be needed. 

“The Olin amendment attempts to set a ceiling,” said Bartlett, “but in fact it sets a 

floor.”95 Members on both sides argued that they had the White House’s support. 

Congressman Fish, on one hand, said the Bush administration had tried to negotiate a 

similar amendment at the committee level but concluded that the principle was 

unacceptable. Congressman Olin, on the other hand, said he had called the White 

House during the course of deliberations and was told the administration “very much 

favors” the amendment.96 Bartlett put an end to the discussion by declaring that the 

White House had no position. The final vote was close. The 32 members who did not 

vote could have passed the amendment, which failed 187 to 213. As with each of the 

contested amendments, votes split along party lines. Whereas 71 percent of 

Democrats voted no, 74 percent of Republicans voted yes.97 

The most controversial amendment to reach the floor was the Chapman 

amendment, which would enable employers to remove persons with contagious 

diseases, such as AIDS, from food handling positions. The issue of AIDS was not 

new. It had always been covered by the ADA. From the beginning, many 

organizations supported the bill precisely because it offered protection to persons with 

HIV and AIDS. Moreover, the provisions in the ADA that protected persons with 

AIDS essentially replicated what had already been settled in the Fair Housing 

Amendments Act. Nevertheless, the Chapman amendment posed a significant 

challenge to members, most of whom would have preferred the issue did not exist. By 

this time, in May, 1990, it appeared the ADA would pass; few wanted to stand in its 

way. But members also feared that being forced to vote on an “AIDS” amendment 

during an election year could be damaging: a perfect ten-second sound bite. 

Moreover, the Chapman amendment was precisely the kind of issue that could kill the 
 HOUSE FLOOR 131 

ADA. It seemed to represent more than just concerns about contagious diseases: it 

looked like a way to stop the ADA in its tracks.98 

Congressman Jim Chapman (D-TX) led the debate in favor of his amendment. 

By having a Democrat such as Chapman lead the charge, supporters of the 

amendment might counter the perception that it was a Republican amendment and 

enlist the support of more Democrats. For similar reasons, the lead floor opponent of 

the amendment was Republican Congressman Fish. Arguments in support of the 

amendment rested on the claim that customers who knew that food handlers at a given 

establishment had AIDS would discontinue taking their business there. “The reality is 

that many Americans would refuse to patronize any food establishment if an 

employee were known to have a communicable disease,” said Chapman. He also 

argued that the “hospitality” industry was the best employer of persons with 

disabilities and that it would be foolish to harm that source of employment.99

Congressman Douglas, who introduced the same amendment in the Judiciary 

Committee, supported it “because perception is reality.”100 Significantly, Chapman, 

Douglas and others admitted that there was no known evidence that AIDS could be 

transmitted through food handling. The amendment was needed not to stop the spread 

of AIDS, they said, but to protect businesses from fears and prejudice. 

For ADA supporters, as Congressman Ted Weiss (D-NY) said, “The 

Chapman amendment flies in the face of the very purpose of the ADA” by 

institutionalizing irrational discrimination.101 Congressman Jim McDermott (D-WA), 

who was also a physician, said he would support the amendment if it protected public 

health. “But the amendment is 

not about the reality of 

contagious disease,” he 

explained. “It is about the fear of 

contagious disease.” The 

amendment established public 

policy in contradistinction to 

known facts “in deliberate 

deference to the fears and 

prejudice of others.” This, he 

said, was “bad medicine, bad 

science, bad public policy.”102

Congressmen Don Edwards (D-CA) and Steny Hoyer likened the amendment to 

arguments used against the Civil Rights Act: that “white customers would not eat in 

restaurants where black Americans were served,” as Edwards put it.103 Hoyer simply 

called it “the Jim Crow amendment of 1990.”104

“We should not make exceptions to the 

principle in ADA that employment 

decisions should not be based on myth 

or stereotype. Mr Chairman, the 

Congress must not enshrine 

 ignorance and prejudice in the law.” 

—Congressman Hamilton Fish 

Largely due to the efforts of Congressman Hoyer, the Bush administration 

entered the Chapman debate by issuing formal statements on the medical facts of 

AIDS and food handling. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human 

Services (HHS), and Dr. William L. Roper, Director of the Centers for Disease 

Control (CDC), wrote letters on the issue. They flatly repudiated the notion that 
132 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

persons diagnosed with HIV or AIDS posed a health risk in the context of food 

handling. 

Congressman Fish brought the floor debate to a close by pleading: “We 

should not make exceptions to the principle in ADA that employment decisions 

should not be based on myth or stereotype. Mr. Chairman, the Congress must not 

enshrine ignorance and prejudice in the law.”105 Congressman Chapman, however, 

prevailed. In a strikingly close vote—199 to 187—the House supported the exclusion 

of persons with contagious and communicable diseases from food handling. The 

46 members who abstained from voting easily could have swayed the tally. Although 

it was not as pronounced as in some of the other amendments, this issue also tended to 

split on party lines. Whereas 80 percent of Republicans supported the measure, 

67 percent Democrats opposed it.106 

The Chapman amendment was the last of the day. The disability community, 

which made a commitment to staying united no matter what the cost, had encountered 

a significant defeat. Persons with HIV and AIDS, they believed, were equally entitled 

to civil rights protections. They also feared that allowing one group to fall prey to 

prejudice might establish a trend. Would persons with mental illness, for whom 

exclusions had also been proposed, be next? Where would it stop? More than 

anything else, it seemed inconceivable to embrace a nondiscrimination law that 

patently enshrined discrimination based on irrational fear. 

Although the Chapman amendment was the first major defeat for the 

disability community in congressional floor deliberations, three more threatening 

amendments were left for consideration on May 22, 1990. Two concerned 

transportation. The Lipinski amendment was a repeat of the amendment passed by the 

Public Works and Transportation Committee and overruled by the Rules Committee: 

it rejected the requirement that all new rail vehicles had to be accessible. William O. 

Lipinski (D-IL) argued that his amendment provided better accessibility and did not

weaken the ADA: it would guarantee space according to demand. But most members 

and spectators viewed it as undermining one of the basic premises of the ADA: that all 

new buildings and vehicles will be accessible, that society will not consciously build 

obstacles to persons with disabilities. Moreover, they pointed out that the Lipinski 

amendment would mean that spaces accessible for wheelchairs would be confined to 

one car, providing a sort of “cattle car” effect. The White House chose not to take a 

stand on the issue. The amendment failed decisively, with 75 percent of members 

voting against it.107 

The second transportation amendment came from Congressman Shuster. 

With the Rules Committee having supported the principle of all new transit buses 

being lift-equipped, Shuster proposed an alternative. He suggested that the Secretary 

of Transportation should be allowed to waive the requirements of accessible vehicles 

for urban areas of less than 200,000, or in non-urban areas, provided that the 

community designed an alternative based on input from persons with disabilities. 

Shuster was concerned that the lift mandate would be implemented at the expense of 

paratransit. But Congressman Mineta’s argument, that “local option simply does not 
 HOUSE FLOOR 133 

work as a national policy,” prevailed.108 Democrats tended to side with Mineta, and 

Republicans with Shuster. But, overall, the disability community won with a 

favorable margin: 64 percent of the House opposed the amendment.109 

The final amendment taken up by the House was a revisit of the 

Sensenbrenner amendment: restricting remedies to those currently stated in the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964. The basic argument on behalf of the amendment was that the 

potential to add punitive damages through the Civil Rights Act of 1990 represented a 

violation of the negotiated agreement with the White House. Congressman Bartlett, 

speaking in favor of the amendment, said it “simply codifies” what the Education and 

Labor Committee reported in principle.110 Although representatives of the disability 

community felt all along that the principle was parity, representatives of the 

administration and many Republicans felt that the compromise was a fixed reference 

to the Civil Rights Act, and that they therefore had been double-crossed. 

Congressman Sensenbrenner also expressed the widespread fear that the ADA would 

lead to excessive litigation and that the availability of punitive damages would do 

nothing but encourage adversarial law suits. The Bush administration expressly 

supported this amendment. 

Opponents, however, thought 

that this amendment, like the 

Chapman amendment, struck at the 

very essence of the ADA. The 

philosophical basis of the ADA was 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964—that 

persons with disabilities should share the same civil rights protections as those 

possessed by other disadvantaged groups. To provide persons with disabilities with a 

different standard of remedies was discriminatory, they said. Congressman Dan 

Glickman (D-KS) conceded that there might be legitimate reasons for excluding 

punitive damages from civil rights laws, but said it was “unfair to lock the disabled 

into a lesser set of remedies.”111 As Congresswoman Schroeder said: “you have lesser 

rights if you have lesser remedies.”112 Congressman Bruce A. Morrison (D-CT) 

argued that it was an “abomination” to “plant the seeds of . . . discriminatory 

treatment before the courts, discriminatory treatment before the law,” in a bill 

expressly designed to prohibit discrimination.113 

“You have lesser rights if you have 

lesser remedies.” 

—Congresswoman Pat Schroeder 

The voting results for this amendment were the most strictly partisan of all the 

amendments. Overall, the House rejected the amendment by a narrow margin of 

54 percent. Democrats, however, opposed the amendment with an 81 percent 

majority, while Republicans supported the amendment with an 86 percent majority.114

After the vote on the Sensenbrenner amendment, the House Committee on the Whole 

reported the bill back to the full House for a final vote. Although no member 

requested a second vote on any of the amendments, Congressman Tom DeLay (R-TX) 

exercised his right to offer a motion to recommit the bill back to the Rules Committee 

for consideration. He proposed the committee consider two further amendments: one 

giving employers more latitude in evaluating drug and alcohol history in employment 

decisions, and another applying the entirety of the ADA to the executive and judicial 
134 FASHIONING A DURABLE ADA 

branches. But the House rejected the motion with a 66 percent majority. As with the 

other votes, this decision split largely on party lines: 96 percent of Democrats opposed 

the amendment; 78 percent of Republicans supported it.115 After the DeLay motion 

was defeated, the House turned immediately to a recorded vote on the ADA. Both 

parties passed the bill overwhelmingly. Of the 423 members voting, 403 (95 percent) 

supported the ADA.116 The ADA was now destined for passage, but still more 

challenges lay ahead. 

 6

ENSHRINING THE ADA: 

HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCE AND THE SIGNING 

ENSHRINING THE ADA 

On May 22, 1990, it seemed as if the battle to pass the Americans with Disabilities 

Act was won. Both the Senate and the House approved the bill with upwards of 

90 percent majorities. Moreover, rumors that President George Bush might veto the 

bill because of the remedies

conflict proved false. Although

Bush hoped to prevent the

incorporation of punitive damages 

by amending the Civil Rights Act 

of 1990, he continued to endorse 

the ADA and pledged to sign it. 

However, the House and Senate 

had passed two different bills, and 

the Chapman amendment posed a major negotiation challenge. Throughout the 

deliberations of the 1989 ADA, most disability advocates had remained at least 

somewhat optimistic that the bill would pass, albeit only after surmounting significant 

obstacles. But the circumstances of the conference proceedings caused some 

advocates to feel, for the first time, that the ADA might unravel altogether.

The Chapman amendment posed a 

major negotiation challenge, causing 

some advocates to feel, for the first 

time, that the ADA might unravel 

altogether. 

1

 

Conference Proceedings and Final Passage CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 

On May 24, 1990, just two days after the House passed the ADA, the House 

requested a conference with the Senate to resolve all points of disagreement. The 

Speaker appointed 22 conferees representing each of the committees and key 

participants in the ADA’s passage.2

 Two weeks later, on June 6, the Senate met to 

consider the House’s substitute amendment for the Senate bill, S. 933. Senator Tom 

Harkin (D-IA) asked for unanimous consent that the Senate object to the House 

version of the ADA, rather than approve it, and request a conference to settle 

differences. 

Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), however, introduced a motion to instruct the 

Senate conferees to support the Chapman amendment passed in the House. 

Reminiscent of the House floor debate, Senator Helms argued that the reason the 

Chapman amendment was necessary was that it represented “a matter of staying in 

business.” Although Helms acknowledged that there was currently no known 

evidence that AIDS could be transmitted through food or drink or casual contact, he 
 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 137 

said the livelihood of restaurants was 

dependent largely on “public 

perception.” If, said Helms, “the 

public is led to perceive that there 

will be a health risk to those coming 

into the restaurant and eating the 

food, rightly or wrongly, that 

business could be destroyed.” Helms 

cited examples of restaurants that 

closed because people found out their 

employees had AIDS. He also listed many organizations that supported the 

amendment, chief among them the National Restaurant Association (NRA). The 

National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), in order to apply pressure on 

representatives, staked the claim that the amendment was “a key small business vote.” 

Moreover, Helms argued that the Chapman amendment struck “a sensitive balance” 

by requiring that employers transfer persons with AIDS to comparable jobs of equal 

pay.3

 

“Persons with disabilities ought to 

be judged on the basis of their 

abilities; they should not be judged 

nor discriminated against based on 

unfounded fear, prejudice, 

ignorance, or mythologies.” 

—Senator Tom Harkin 

Senator Harkin disagreed. The amendment “strikes right to the heart and soul 

of the Americans with Disabilities Act,” he said. It violated the act’s central thesis: 

“that persons with disabilities ought to be judged on the basis of their abilities; they 

should not be judged nor discriminated against based on unfounded fear, prejudice, 

ignorance, or mythologies.” The Chapman amendment, said Harkin, was asking 

Congress “to codify fear.” Harkin noted that Secretary of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) Louis Sullivan wrote a letter to House Speaker Thomas S. Foley (D-WA) 

saying that policy based on misconceptions about, and fear of, HIV would “only 

complicate and confuse disease control efforts without adding any protection to the 

public health.” William Roper, who had left the White House to become Director of 

the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), wrote that there was no reason for a person 

with HIV or AIDS to be prohibited from handling food, unless he or she had another 

infection for which any worker would be restricted from food service.4

 Harkin 

requested that these and two dozen other letters opposing the amendment be printed in 

the Congressional Record. Many senators joined Harkin in opposing the Chapman 

amendment as well. 

Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-ME) attempted to counter Senator 

Helms by introducing a motion to table, and thereby suspend, Helms’s motion. 

Mitchell’s motion came to an immediate vote, but only 40 senators supported it. 

Democrats counted for 33 of the affirmative votes, but more than a third of the 

Democrats joined Republicans to oppose the motion.5

 Since the vote on Mitchell’s 

motion illustrated Senate opinion on the Chapman amendment, the Senate then agreed 

to Helms’s motion by a voice vote and appointed conferees.6

 

House and Senate conferees and their staffs reviewed 81 points of dispute. 

Throughout the House deliberations, Robert Silverstein and others from the Senate 

side had worked closely with House members and staff to ensure that the Senate 

agreed with the changes the House made. Consequently, House and Senate staff were 
138 ENSHRINING THE ADA 

able to develop prompt agreements on 79 of the 81 disputed issues. In each case (and 

with amendments in a few cases), the 

Senate conferees conceded the House 

position. 

Although staff swiftly 

resolved most differences, Silverstein 

described the time between House 

passage and final approval of the 

ADA as “the month from hell.”7

 

This was because staff and members 

were at a complete impasse on two issues: the Chapman amendment and 

congressional coverage by the ADA. Although House and Senate sponsors hoped to 

get the ADA to the president’s desk before July 4, the conflicts could not be resolved 

that quickly.8

Although staff swiftly resolved most 

differences, Robert Silverstein 

described the time between House 

passage and final approval of the 

ADA as “the month from hell.” 

House and Senate conferees met on June 25, 1990, with Senator Edward M. 

Kennedy (D-MA) presiding. Congressman Hoyer was the leading conferee and key 

negotiator for the House; Senator Harkin joined Senator Kennedy as the leading 

conferees for the Senate. Congressional coverage was the easier of the two disputed 

areas, for which there were two separate issues. The first concerned who had the 

power to enforce the application of the ADA to Congress. The original Senate 

provision had been introduced late in the floor debate on September 7, 1989, as a 

single sentence of intent, rather than a detailed proposal. Largely at the insistence of 

Congressman Hoyer, the House had endorsed the Senate’s proposal.9

 The House had 

also clarified the section by specifying that administrative authority would be 

exercised by the House of Representatives. At the Conference, however, Senate 

conferees bristled at the thought of “the other” chamber having executive power over 

the Senate. Conferees thus agreed to have the Senate be responsible for exercising 

administrative authority over itself. The second point of discussion was whether 

individuals alleging discrimination by either the House or Senate would have a private 

right to action—the ability to sue a senator or representative in district court. 

Conferees decided that persons with disabilities should have the same remedial 

options available with respect to Congress as they did with other entities covered by 

the ADA. The conference thus upheld private right to action. 

Debate over the Chapman amendment was much more contentious, and 

conferees devoted hours to discussing it. The arguments for and against the 

amendment, by this time, were clear. The difficulty for the conferees was that, on one 

hand, a majority of members in the House voted for the amendment. And in the 

Senate, a majority of senators indirectly voiced their support for the amendment. 

Going against the majority opinion of both Houses might endanger the bill. On the 

other hand, inclusion of the Chapman amendment threatened to kill the bill. The 

disability community took a firm and united stand that they would withdraw their 

support from the bill if the amendment stayed in. There simply could not be a viable 

ADA if the disability community, which the law was designed to assist, opposed it. 
 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 139 

Moreover, the disability community’s chief congressional supporters stood with the 

disability community. 

Senate and House conferees, independently, had to approve decisions for each 

area of dispute. As it became increasingly clear that the Chapman amendment not 

only contradicted basic premises of the ADA but also might mean the end of the 

ADA, some conferees opted to save the bill by rejecting the Chapman amendment, in 

spite of their sympathy to it. For House conferees, it was a close vote. Among the 22 

House conferees, opponents of the amendment won by only two votes, 12 to 10. 

Senate conferees also voted to reject the Chapman amendment. 

On the following day, June 26, the conferees prepared and presented a 

conference report that listed each point of disagreement and how it had been resolved. 

It might seem that the ADA was finally secure now that delegations from the House 

and the Senate agreed, in entirety, about a version of the ADA. But conferees had 

taken the bold action of ruling against their colleagues and the conference report still 

had to be passed by both chambers. 

Although the general public 

remained largely unaware of the 

conflict that was brewing, since there 

was virtually no press coverage in the 

six weeks between House approval and 

final passage, the disability community 

and the business community were 

lobbying aggressively. Some members 

of the disability community thought it 

was best to accept the Chapman 

amendment in order to save the rest of the ADA. The vast majority of advocates, 

however, insisted that the disability community stick together. Consequently, they 

worked closely with AIDS organizations to oppose the Chapman amendment. On one 

occasion, around the Fourth of July weekend, the Human Rights Campaign Fund, a 

lobbying group for the gay and lesbian community, organized a public relations coup. 

As the disability community had done throughout congressional deliberations, they 

prepared position papers to present to members. To distribute their information this 

time, however, they used brown lunch-bags marked: “The National Restaurant 

Association is Out to Lunch on the Chapman Amendment.” And at a press conference 

announcing the “Out-to-Lunch” campaign, Wright said the disability community 

would pull out its support of the ADA if the Chapman amendment was part of the bill. 

As it became increasingly clear 

that the Chapman amendment not 

only contradicted basic premises 

of the ADA but also might mean 

the end of the ADA, some 

conferees opted to save the bill by 

rejecting the amendment. 

A powerful demonstration of the disability community’s unity occurred later 

that day in a meeting at the White House. At either end of a table in the Roosevelt 

Room sat Pat Wright and Boyden Gray. Around the table were other members of 

White House staff and leaders of the disability community, including representatives 

from NCIL and UCPA. Gray emphasized that the disability community had secured 

much if not most of its aims for the ADA and that compromise was a normal part of 

the legislative process. Wright, however, knowing that President Bush badly wanted 
140 ENSHRINING THE ADA 

to see the legislation passed, reaffirmed the message that the ADA coalition would 

withdraw its support of the ADA if the Chapman amendment was part of the bill. 

Around the table, other disability advocates weighed in, one-by-one, describing the 

Chapman amendment as a horrendous violation of the principles of the ADA. 

Accordingly, they urged the White House to intervene on their behalf and pass the 

ADA without the Chapman amendment.10 

The session reached a climax when Bob Williams, who sat next to Gray, 

offered his words. Williams was sitting in a wheelchair that he used because of 

cerebral palsy. To speak more clearly he used 

a lap board covered with letters and symbols, 

which enabled him to point and spell out 

sentences one letter at a time. Someone 

standing by spoke each letter or word. 

Williams echoed the sentiments of the others in 

the room. But he personalized the issue with 

his own experiences. Williams said the 

Chapman amendment struck a personal chord because it concerned restaurants. 

Among Williams’s earliest childhood memories were experiences of being turned 

away from restaurants because of his cerebral palsy. Restaurant operators always 

insisted that they would be happy to serve him and his parents and understood that he 

posed no threat. But they said Williams’s presence bothered other people and thus 

interfered with business. Williams concluded his remarks with an eloquent and 

powerful statement of the disability community’s understanding of the Chapman 

amendment: “I-t a-i-n’-t c-i-v-i-l. A-n-d i-t a-i-n’-t r-i-g-h-t.” About midway through 

this declaration, the rest of the disability advocates anticipated the subsequent letters 

and thus began saying each letter in unison.11 

The Chapman amendment: 

“I-t a-i-n’-t c-i-v-i-l. 

A-n-d i-t a-i-n’-t r-i-g-h-t.” 

—Bob Williams 

The unity of the disability community on behalf of persons HIV/AIDS moved 

Tim McFeely to tears. It was “incredibly moving,” he said. McFeely was the 

Executive Director of the Human Rights Campaign Fund and the only person in 

attendance representing the AIDS community. ADA advocates had made a 

commitment more than a year before that they would stand together: one for all and 

all for one. And while they agreed that they could be flexible with time lines, they 

committed to being steadfast on principles. The words spoken that day demonstrated 

to McFeely that the commitments made by people with disabilities were deep and 

abiding.12 

In addition, the disability community illustrated its opposition to the Chapman 

amendment by developing technical analyses of the food handling issue. For 

example, Robert Burgdorf, the original author of the ADA, wrote a House staff 

member on the constitutionality of the Chapman amendment. The thrust of the 

amendment, Burgdorf explained, was directed primarily at individuals who did not

pose a threat to society. Excepting a group of persons as a class, however, according 

to the Constitution, had to be based on “legitimate” government interests. Burgdorf 

concluded: “It is blatantly irrational for Congress to rely upon . . . prejudicial attitudes, 

ignorance, myths, fears, misapprehensions, and reflex reactions about contagiousness, 
 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 141 

. . . as the basis for an exception from the ADA’s nondiscrimination mandate.” 

Singling out persons who did not pose a threat to society, he said, “has no rational 

relation to any legitimate governmental objective” and violated “ the underlying 

principles, premises, and requirements of the very piece of legislation it is attached 

to.”13 

The business community was similarly active in demonstrating its support of 

the Chapman amendment. To counter the efforts of disability organizations, dozens 

of business organizations sent letters to members of Congress urging support of the 

Chapman amendment. Chief among them was the NRA. Its Senior Director of 

Government Affairs, Mark Gorman, had wrote repeated letters urging members of 

Congress to hold the line on the Chapman amendment and not allow it to get stripped 

in conference or on the floor of either house.14 

The Senate was the first to take up the conference report, amidst lobbying 

from the disability and business communities, on July 11, 1990. Before the Senate 

floor deliberations began, two conflicting amendments to the conference report were 

circulating. One was authored by Senator Helms. He had originally planned to 

introduce an amendment that would send the report back to conference and insist that 

the conferees put the language of the Chapman amendment into the report. That very 

day, however, Senator Hatch developed a rival amendment that caused Helms to 

redraft his own amendment. 

Senator Hatch’s amendment represented an important shift in his position on 

the food handling issue. In the conference meeting, Hatch had argued forcefully that 

the Chapman amendment should be retained in the bill. He disagreed with those who 

thought the issue should be dropped, suggesting that they did not realize “how 

electric” the issue was. He also doubted whether the House of Representatives or the 

White House would accept the ADA without some attention to the issue Congressman 

Chapman had raised.15 However, after the conference meeting Silverstein pursued 

Hatch to discuss the amendment. Silverstein and Hatch had worked together on 

disability policy for many years, and both agreed that the disability policy should not, 

generally, encourage business decisions to be made on unfounded fears. Silverstein, 

however, emphasized to Hatch that it was dangerous to use a different standard for a 

single constituency of the disability community—persons with contagious or 

communicable diseases. Supporting the Chapman amendment, said Silverstein, 

would potentially undo years of Hatch and Silverstein’s work in trying to unite the 

disability community and develop holistic policy. By allowing prejudice to prevail in 

one area, it would create an internal chasm within the disability community. This 

meeting had a crucial impact on Hatch: he called it “the key to my own evolution on 

the Chapman amendment.”16 

This discussion also prepared the senator for an encounter with disability 

advocates the morning of the July 11 floor deliberations. That morning Wright went 

looking for Senator Hatch. She figured the best place to find him was in the hallway 

between the Senate chamber and the Majority Leader’s office. But that area was 

restricted to members of Congress, their staff, and their guests. Accordingly, Wright 
142 ENSHRINING THE ADA 

brought Michael Iskowitz, who was Senator Kennedy’s chief staff member regarding 

AIDS, to gain access to the area. Also with her was Chai Feldblum, who was 

prepared to translate an agreement into proper legal form. After waiting for some 

time, the advocates found Senator Hatch. They urged the senator not to allow fear and 

prejudice to prevail. Rather, they argued, let available medical evidence be the 

deciding factor. They also made an impassioned plea that the bill was on its way to 

dying unless Senator Hatch helped resolve the conflict—only he had the stature to 

shoulder a compromise.17 

Senator Hatch’s views had been changing since the conference meeting; now 

he agreed with the disability advocates that the Chapman amendment, as written, 

should not be part of the ADA. Yet he still thought the issue needed to be taken 

seriously and resolved in a way that could win broad support. Accordingly, he 

searched for, and found, a compromise. Science would be the linchpin. On an annual 

basis, proposed Hatch, the Secretary of HHS would prepare a list of those 

communicable and contagious diseases that were knowingly able to be transmitted 

through food handling. Then, restaurant operators would be able to insist that anyone 

with a disease on that list could be removed from food handling positions. The ADA, 

moreover, would not preempt any local laws concerning food handling. 

Senator Hatch called on Nancy Taylor from his staff, who was nine-months 

pregnant, to craft the language. Hatch, Taylor, Wright, Feldblum, and Iskowitz then 

worked together to scrawl the agreement on a piece of paper, and prepared to 

introduce it to the Senate as an alternative to the Helms amendment. It was a major 

breakthrough. “That could have been the end of the ADA,” said Wright.18 Helms, 

predictably, was irate. Feldblum recalled passing Helms in the hall later that morning: 

he was walking briskly with an unidentified sheet of paper, red with anger.19 

Later that day in the Senate 

chamber, after several senators 

tried unsuccessfully for two hours 

to reach a consensus on food 

handling and the Hatch-Helms 

proposals, Majority Leader 

Mitchell concluded that the conflict 

could only be settled in open floor 

debate. Senator Hatch worked with 

Senator Harkin to manage the 

deliberations. They expected the 

Senate to approve the vast majority 

of the conference report. Besides 

the Chapman amendment, only the 

issue of congressional coverage was contested, concerning which Senator Wendell H. 

Ford (D-KY) intended to recommit the ADA to conference. According to Harkin and 

Hatch’s strategy, Hatch would introduce his “perfecting amendment” after Ford 

submitted his motion regarding congressional coverage. Following debate on the 

Hatch amendment, the Senate would lay the amendment aside and allow Senator 

“I think if we would rely more on 

science and a little less on fears and 

misperception we would be better off 

as a society, as a nation, and there 

would be less prejudice.” 

 —Senator Orrin Hatch

Senator Hatch had come up with 

“another miracle.” 

—Senator Dave Durenberger 
 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 143 

Helms to introduce his own “perfecting amendment.” After consideration of the 

Helms amendment, the Senate would proceed to vote in order: first on the Helms 

amendment, then on the Hatch amendment, and finally on the Ford motion. No other 

motions or amendments would be allowed. 

As an early application of the ADA, Majority Leader Mitchell asked 

unanimous consent to have the Senate floor debate translated into sign language, 

which had never been done before. As planned, the issue of congressional coverage 

came up first. The night before, on July 10, the Senate had passed legislation 

concerning application of all civil rights laws to the Senate, and rejected private right 

to action: only administrative remedies, through internal review, were allowed. 

Senators were thus concerned about the ADA being inconsistent with other civil rights 

laws. Accordingly, Senator Ford introduced his motion to send the ADA back to 

conference and instruct the conferees to exclude private right to action for the Senate. 

Although Senators Charles E. Grassley (R-IA) and Tom Harkin objected that people 

should have a private right to action to remedy Senate violations of the ADA, they 

agreed to let the motion stand. 

Senator Hatch then introduced his amendment to Senator Ford’s motion, and 

senators rehashed the arguments for and against the Chapman amendment yet another 

time. Hatch emphasized that his amendment “places a premium on science” as the 

basis for decision-making. “I think if we would rely more on science and a little less 

on fears and misperception we would be better off as a society, as a nation,” explained 

Hatch, “and there would be less prejudice.”20 Senator Dave Durenberger (R-MN) said 

Hatch had come up with “another miracle”; he hailed the ability of Hatch to fulfill the 

role of intermediary.21 Senator Helms, however, said the Hatch proposal would gut 

the Chapman amendment and “render it totally nugatory.”22 Because public health 

experts such as HHS Secretary Sullivan and CDC Director Roper affirmed that AIDS 

could not be transmitted through food handling, restaurant operators would not be 

allowed to discriminate against them. 

To counter Senator Hatch’s amendment, Senator Helms modified his original 

amendment and introduced one with language virtually identical to the Hatch 

amendment. The main difference was that instead of the HHS Secretary posting a list 

of diseases that are transmitted through food handling, as the Hatch amendment 

specified, the Secretary would post a list of diseases that may be transmitted through 

food handling. Thus, anyone who had a disease that might possibly be transmitted 

through food handling, even if there was no evidence to prove it, could be barred from 

food handling positions. 

When the time came to vote, the Senate decisively rejected the Helms 

amendment, 61 to 39, with 78 percent of Democrats opposing the amendment and 

60 percent of Republicans supporting it.23 The Senate then immediately voted on the 

Hatch amendment and approved it 99 to 1: Senator Helms stood alone in opposition. 

Subsequently, after a clarifying colloquy between Senators Hatch and Dole, the 

Senate approved the Ford motion, as amended, by a voice vote. 
144 ENSHRINING THE ADA 

The following day, on July 

12, conferees met to review the 

Senate proposals. They accepted 

the Senate instructions concerning 

both food handling and 

congressional coverage and 

submitted their report that same 

day. Later that afternoon, the House of Representatives met to consider the second 

version of the conference report. Once again, they first had to accept a rule 

structuring debate. But this time there was little dispute: 86 percent of members voted 

in favor of the closed rule.24 Afterward, Congressman Hoyer congratulated the House 

for its bipartisan collaboration. The deliberative process, he said, had “perfected” the 

ADA and made it “an excellent piece of legislation.” All House members, he said, 

should be “proud to say” that they had played a part in the Congress that “extended 

to” Americans with disabilities “the welcome sign . . . to come into our society, . . . to 

have the ability to work and support themselves and their families, . . . to ride on our 

transportation systems, . . . to come into our stores, and our banks, and our doctors’ 

offices, and fully avail themselves of the opportunities of American society.”25 

The deliberative process “perfected” 

the ADA and made it “an excellent 

piece of legislation.” 

—Congressman Steny Hoyer 

The only real issue left for House consideration was the Chapman 

amendment. Many members argued that the Hatch amendment did not adequately 

fulfill the purpose of the Chapman amendment: persons with AIDS would still be able 

to hold food handling positions. Accordingly, Congressman William E. Dannemeyer 

(R-CA) submitted a motion to recommit the conference report back to conference yet 

again, with instructions that House conferees insist that the Chapman amendment be 

accepted. This time, however, there were not enough votes in the House. The vote 

split along party lines, with 77 percent of Democrats opposing the amendment and 

75 percent of Republicans supporting it. But, overall, 55 percent of the House voted 

to reject adding the language of the Chapman amendment.26 The House immediately 

voted on the entire bill that evening, and members passed the ADA, for the final time, 

with near unanimity. More than 90 percent of the members voted in favor of the 

ADA.27 

Although many in the disability community hoped that the Senate could take 

its final vote that night, the Senate waited until the following day, July 13. It was an 

emotional occasion. Similar to Congressman Hoyer, Senator Harkin praised his 

fellow senators for the spirit of bipartisan collaboration that produced a bill with a 

broad base of support. And he was especially complimentary of the disability 

community. “It may be raining outside,” he said, “but this is truly a day of sunshine 

for all Americans with disabilities.”28 Harkin wanted to communicate directly with 

his brother, who taught Harkin, “at a very early age, that people with disabilities could 

do anything that they set their minds to do and that people should be judged on the 

basis of their abilities . . . not on the basis of their disabilities.” Accordingly, Harkin 

signed to his brother that this was the proudest day of his sixteen-year career in 

Congress—the ADA opened doors to all Americans with disabilities and promoted an 

end to fear, ignorance, and prejudice.29 
 SIGNING CEREMONY 145 

The floor deliberations brought Senator Hatch to tears. He remarked how 

“senseless discrimination, intended or not,” had “subjected persons with disabilities to 

isolation and robbed America of the minds, the spirit, and the dedication we need to 

remain a competitive force in a worldwide economy.”30 Hatch also extended his 

appreciation to scores of people who contributed to the ADA’s passage. Many more 

senators followed in proclaiming the virtues of the ADA and crediting various 

contributors. 

When the Senate finally voted on the conference report, it passed the ADA 

with margins almost identical to those in the House: 93 percent of the senators voted 

in the affirmative. The ADA had made it through Congress. The final step in making 

the ADA public law was a signature from the President of the United States, George 

Bush. 

The White House Signing Ceremony SIGNING CEREMONY

As early as May 1, 1990, President Bush told persons with disabilities that 

there would be “a proud bill-signing ceremony” for the Americans with Disabilities 

Act.31 Many in the disability community hoped this meant a grand celebration of 

thousands of people uniting to celebrate the American dream. Virginia Thornburgh, 

for example, whose husband was the attorney general, suggested that the White House 

sign the bill at the Lincoln Memorial, where she proposed as many as 100,000 people 

could attend. She hoped the ADA would be viewed as an initiative that was good for 

all Americans and thus wanted persons with and without disabilities to be welcome. 

She advised White House staff that a celebratory platform should include members of 

Congress from both parties, Cabinet members, and representatives from major sectors 

of society. Such an event could attract the attention of international media and 

promote the improvement of the lives of persons with disabilities around the world.32 

Shortly after the Senate passed the ADA on July 13, however, rumors spread 

that the Act would be signed in the White House’s East Room, which could seat no 

more than 220 people.33 Apparently, White House staff feared that the summer heat 

might cause medical problems for persons with disabilities if the ceremony was held 

outdoors. But people from the disability community protested when they heard the 

news. Congressional sponsors joined in advocating a “people’s signing ceremony” 

comparable to the democratic principles of the ADA, where thousands could attend. 

Finally, due to the efforts of such people as Virginia Thornburgh, Boyden Gray, Justin 

Dart, and Evan J. Kemp, Jr., the White House announced, on July 16, that it would 

hold a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House. The proposed time was 

10:00 a.m. on July 26, 1990, rain or shine. 

That left Bonnie Kilberg, Deputy Assistant to the President from the Office of 

Public Liaison, just ten days to plan the event and prepare an invitation list. To 

determine who should attend the gala event, Kilberg worked predominantly with 

colleague Shiree Sanchez; Phil Calkins, an executive with the EEOC; Sharon Mistler; 

Evan Kemp; and disability advocates Justin and Yoshiko Dart, who supplied 
146 ENSHRINING THE ADA 

thousands of names. In addition to Washington-area supporters of the ADA, Kilberg 

included hundreds of people with disabilities from around the country on the list. By 

July 18, Kilberg had drafted an invitation. People were to arrive at the White House 

gate at 9:00 a.m. for admittance, with photo identification in hand.34 Seven airlines 

and seven area hotels agreed to give visitors significant discounts. 

Roughly 3,000 persons with and without disabilities gathered on the White 

House South Lawn on the morning of July 26. It was the largest signing ceremony 

ever held by the White House. After the U.S. Marine Band played the “Battle Hymn 

of the Republic” and “The Stars and Stripes Forever,” President and Mrs. George 

Bush and Vice President Dan Quayle walked to the stage to the tune of “Hail to the 

Chief.” There they joined EEOC Chairman Evan Kemp, National Council on 

Disability Chairwoman Sandra Parrino, disability rights advocate Justin Dart, 

Reverend Harold H. Wilke, and two sign language interpreters. Conspicuously absent 

from the platform were any of the 

ADA leaders from Congress: among 

them Senators Harkin, Kennedy, 

Weicker, Hatch, Durenberger, and 

Robert Dole (R-KS); and 

Congressmen Tony Coelho (D-CA), 

Steny Hoyer, Norman Y. Mineta (DCA), Major R. Owens (D-NY), Steve 

Bartlett (R-TX), and Hamilton Fish, 

Jr. (R-NY). 

“From ancient times to today we 

celebrate the breaking of the chains 

holding your people in bondage.” 

The ADA provides “new access to 

the Promised Land of work, play 

and service.” 

—Reverend Harold Wilke 

As suggested by Virginia Thornburgh, Reverend Wilke opened with an 

invocation—reputedly the first ever offered at a bill signing ceremony.35 “From 

ancient times to today we celebrate the breaking of the chains holding your people in 

bondage,” Wilke prayed. The passage and signing of the Americans with Disabilities 

Act was a new occasion for celebration, he said, which provided “new access to the 

Promised Land of work, play and service.”36 

After Reverend Wilke’s interfaith prayer, Kemp introduced the president. He 

praised the efforts of persons in Congress, the Bush administration, and the disability 

community, who “worked tirelessly to develop this civil rights bill.” Then he pointed 

to President Bush, without whose “steadfast support . . . this bill would not have 

become law.” He likened President Bush to Abraham Lincoln for his foresight and 

introduced him as “the foremost member of the disability community.”37 

“Welcome to every one of you, out there in this splendid scene of hope,” 

began President Bush, as the crowd interrupted him with applause for the first of 

20 times. “This is, indeed, an incredible day,” he said, especially for those who 

worked to pass the ADA. In consideration of the vast numbers of participants, Bush 

identified those who had personally helped him. He mentioned Justin Dart, Boyden 

Gray, Evan Kemp, William Roper, Sandra Parrino, and Robert Dole. Bush also 

praised the contributions of disability organizations and the collective efforts of 43 

million Americans with disabilities, who “have made this happen.” 
 SIGNING CEREMONY 147 

President Bush likened the 

signing of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act to Independence 

Day, which had been celebrated 

just three weeks earlier. The ADA 

was the world’s first “declaration of 

equality” for persons with 

disabilities, he said. Because of it, 

“every man, woman and child with 

a disability can now pass through 

once-closed doors into a bright new 

era of equality, independence and 

freedom.” It offered persons with disabilities the basic guarantees of “independence, 

freedom of choice, control of their lives, the opportunity to blend fully and equally 

into the right mosaic of the American mainstream.” This was important, said Bush, 

because if America was to be “a truly prosperous nation,” everyone within it had to 

prosper. To those who expressed reservations about the ADA, Bush emphasized that 

the Act was carefully crafted to contain costs. He added that the ADA could help 

answer businesses’ request for additions to the working force. As an alternative to 

spending $200 billion a year to keep persons with disabilities dependent on the 

government, Bush urged that people give them the opportunity to “move proudly into 

the economic mainstream of American life.” 

The ADA is the world’s first 

“declaration of equality” for persons 

with disabilities. “Every man, 

woman and child with a disability 

can now pass through once-closed 

doors into a bright new era of 

equality, independence and 

freedom.” 

—President George Bush 

President Bush concluded his remarks with an additional analogy to an event 

not yet a year old: the fall of the Berlin Wall. Signing the ADA represented taking “a 

sledgehammer to another wall,” said Bush, “one which has, for too many generations, 

separated Americans from the freedom they could glimpse, but not grasp.” He 

rejoiced in the fall of this barrier, affirming that “we will not tolerate discrimination in 

America.” Finally, as he lifted his pen to sign the ADA to the applause of those 

surrounding him, at 10:26 a.m., Bush proclaimed: “Let the shameful wall of exclusion 

finally come tumbling down.”38 With his signature, the long-fought battle to make 

the ADA public law reached its climax. 

President Bush signed four copies of the ADA, each with a different pen. He 

gave three of the pens to Dart, Kemp, and Parrino, saving the fourth for Attorney General 

Thornburgh. He then took a fifth pen from his pocket to present to Reverend Wilke, who, 

because he had no arms, promptly and deftly accepted the pen with his foot. 

As members of Congress, the Bush administration, the disability community, 

and others in the audience shouted, cheered, smiled, cried, and embraced, President 

Bush, the First Lady, and Vice President Quayle worked through the crowd to regain 

entrance to the White House. About a half an hour later, people moved across the 

street to Ellipse Park for a colossal picnic of fried chicken and soda. Music played in 

the background. For dessert, people found cakes adorned with the faces of President 

Bush, Senator Harkin, and Congressman Hoyer. Dozens of advocates in and out of 

government presented remarks from a makeshift platform. Media swarmed the 

grounds for interviews and photographs. Later in the afternoon, as the temperature 
148 ENSHRINING THE ADA 

reached 92 degrees, the crowd dispersed. At 5:00 p.m., however, hundreds gathered 

for an additional celebration in the Hart Senate Office Building sponsored by Justin 

and Yoshiko Dart, where wine and a seafood buffet were served. There were more 

hugs, more kisses, and more speeches. They had much to be proud of. The battle, 

finally, was won. 

EPILOGUE 

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as so many people have said, was 

truly landmark legislation. It promoted an America in which all persons have the 

right to participate as valuable citizens. In the areas of employment, public services, 

public accommodations, and telecommunications, the ADA took steps to break down 

barriers that stood in the way of persons with disabilities and prevented them from 

reaping the benefits of our society and offering their own contributions. 

It should be clear that the ADA is 

not the starting point of United States 

disability policy. The ADA stands on the 

legal foundation of the “twin pillars”: the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The former 

provided the philosophical foundation, the 

general principle of nondiscrimination. The latter offered a framework for applying 

nondiscrimination to persons with disabilities. These two legislative initiatives represent 

two streams of policy: civil rights and disability rights. With respect to each, elements of 

the ADA represent a portion of a continuum as well as a unique departure. 

The ADA stands on the legal 

foundation of the “twin pillars”: 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 

The ADA is similar to other civil rights laws in that it provides the same basic 

protections. Making employment decisions according to circumstances that do not 

have a bearing on actual performance is simply wrong. All individuals must have an 

equal opportunity to partake of such social services as public transportation. No one 

should be denied access to places of public accommodation. All must be able to share 

in our nation’s communication system. 

Applying these principles to persons with disabilities, however, required unique 

attention. By the end of the 1980s, state and federal laws had established a central 

principle of the ADA: that in granting civil rights to persons with disabilities, equal 

treatment alone is inadequate. Truly equal opportunity for people with disabilities 

required that governments and businesses take proactive steps to provide opportunity. 

This might mean adding a lift to a bus, providing an employee with an amplified 

telephone headset, ramping a few steps, installing braille signs, or allowing an individual 

to modify his or her work schedule. Unlike providing civil rights to minorities or to 

women, however, bestowing civil rights upon persons with disabilities could therefore 

require governments and businesses to spend money. Unique among civil rights laws, this 

meant that disability rights had to be balanced against the fiscal responsibility of society. 

In the context of disability rights legislation, the various provisions of the ADA 

are not unique. In fact, virtually every one had been implemented somewhere in the 

nation by a state or local government in the form of new laws and constitutional 

amendments. The ADA built on these provisions as well as on federal statutes and court 

cases. The ADA was nonetheless unique amidst this growing nationwide recognition of 

disability rights in its comprehensive application to the entire nation and the private sector. 
 EPILOGUE 151 

Pat Wright likens disability policy 

before the ADA to Swiss cheese 

covering a map of the United 

States: there were many holes 

where there were little to no civil 

rights protections for persons with 

disabilities. Disability policy under 

the ADA, by contrast, is more like 

a piece of American cheese: it 

covers the entire nation thoroughly 

and uniformly.1

 Every new building must follow accessibility guidelines. Every new 

transit bus must be accessible. No place of public accommodation can willfully exclude 

persons with disabilities. Every state must provide a telecommunication relay service. No 

employer can overlook an applicant because he or she required a reasonable 

accommodation. 

There could have been no successful 

and meaningful ADA without a ground 

swell of people who demonstrated what 

happened in the absence of significant 

legal protections and told positive 

stories of how legislative initiatives 

helped improve their lives. 

These two unique aspects of the ADA—civil rights that had financial 

implications and comprehensive application to the public and private sectors—are 

what made the ADA’s passage so difficult. The overwhelming margins in both the 

House and the Senate with which the ADA was finally approved mask how 

challenging it was to work the bill through Congress and acquire a signature from the 

president. By the fall of 1989, it was evident that an ADA would pass in some form, 

but the provisions it would contain were still very much contested. Only through 

intense efforts were disability rights advocates able to achieve their goals. 

No single factor alone can account for the ADA’s success. Rather, a whole 

host of factors worked in its favor. First and foremost, the ADA is a tribute to the 

growth and organization of the disability rights movement. Through such pivotal 

developments as the protests to issue the Section 504 regulations and the nationwide 

outcry against President Ronald Reagan’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief, the 

disability community asserted itself and became a political force to be reckoned with. 

On the state and local levels, persons and parents of persons with disabilities fought 

aggressively to obtain for themselves and their children decent education and 

employment opportunities. Students on college campuses organized to demand 

greater accessibility. Centers for independent living built systems of community 

support and helped people with disabilities understand and exercise their rights. 

Disability-specific and cross-disability organizations advocated for state and federal 

laws that became building blocks for the ADA. And people with disabilities 

demonstrated a willingness to take to the streets and risk arrest to bring public 

attention to the problems they faced. There could have been no successful and 

meaningful ADA without a ground swell of people who demonstrated what happened 

in the absence of significant legal protections and told positive stories of how 

legislative initiatives helped improve their lives. 

In addition to providing sheer numbers to demand passage of the ADA, the 

disability rights movement produced extraordinarily effective leaders. Disability rights 

advocates such as Pat Wright, Ralph Neas, Justin and Yoshiko Dart, Liz Savage, Paul 
152 EPILOGUE

Marchand, Marilyn Golden, and 

Lex Frieden were simply 

remarkable. The legal expertise of 

people such as Arlene Mayerson, 

Chai Feldblum, Robert Burgdorf, 

Jim Weisman, David Capozzi, 

Timothy Cook, Karen PeltzStrauss, and Bonnie Milstein was 

indispensable. Scores of organizations and their members contributed countless hours to 

the ADA campaign. Over the course of the 1980s, the disability community proved that it 

could stand its own ground in the court room and in the halls of Congress. Moreover, the 

disability community effectively formed crucial relationships with members of Congress 

and the White House. By the time the ADA emerged on the national scene, people were 

in place to move it. 

A crucial factor that helps explain the 

ADA’s positive reception in Congress 

was the extent to which the ADA drew 

on ideological justifications from both 

the left and the right. 

The success of the ADA is due in no small part to the American civil rights 

heritage. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided not only a legal principle that could be 

extended to other constituencies, but also a model for civil protest to achieve political 

goals. Although during the 1970s and 1980s there were attempts to roll back some of the 

achievements of the civil rights movement, the basic notion that no individual should be 

denied basic civil rights endured. Because the disability community successfully 

presented the ADA as a civil rights initiative, few could afford to take the position of 

opposing the ADA outright. Indeed, a crucial development in the ADA’s success was that 

even those organizations that worked to tighten and refine the ADA in Congress called 

themselves the Disability Rights Working Group. The disability community forced 

opponents to fight the battle on its own 

terms: opponents had to explain why 

disability advocates’ proposals should not

be implemented. Forming a tight bond 

with Neas and the Leadership Conference 

on Civil Rights (LCCR) was essential for 

that achievement. 

The ADA would have made little 

headway were it not for the early 

and consistent support from the 

nation’s highest office. 

More than any other single player, the role of President Bush cannot be 

overestimated. The ADA would have made little headway were it not for the early 

and consistent support from the nation’s highest office. Of course, the president did 

not do the detail work: there were plenty of others to assume that role. But, by 

speaking out on behalf of the ADA, Bush made passage more certain. In Congress, 

Democrats were primarily responsible for pushing the ADA aggressively forward. 

The president’s support brought people to the table to work out a bipartisan 

compromise bill that could attain the support of the business community as well as 

that of the disability community. 

The ADA’s progress in Congress and the administration was dependent 

largely on the roles of key individuals who were extraordinarily dedicated to the 

objectives of the ADA. Part of this was due to personal experience, either from 

having a disability or through a relative’s disability. Senator Tom Harkin’s (D-IA) 
 EPILOGUE 153 

brother was deaf. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) had a son who lost a leg to 

cancer and a sister with mental retardation. Senator Orrin G. Hatch’s (R-UT) brotherin-law was paralyzed from polio. Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) acquired partial 

paralysis from a war injury. Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-CT) had a son with 

Down’s Syndrome. Congressman Tony Coelho (D-CA) had epilepsy. Congressman 

Steny H. Hoyer’s (D-MD) wife had epilepsy. These and other personal encounters 

with disability made the ADA vitally real to many members of Congress. 

The same was true for the 

Bush administration. President 

George Bush had a daughter who 

died from leukemia, a son with a 

learning disability, an uncle with 

quadriplegia, and a son whose 

cancer required a plastic ostomy 

bag. Attorney General Richard 

Thornburgh’s son had a traumatic head injury. EEOC Chairman Evan J. Kemp used a 

wheelchair because of a form of muscular dystrophy. White House negotiator Robert 

Funk had part of one leg amputated due to a disease similar to leprosy and tuberculosis. 

These and other members of Congress and White House officials approached the ADA 

with a passionate desire to see not only their own and their children’s lives improved, but 

those of the entire population of Americans with disabilities. 

The ADA’s progress in Congress and 

the administration was dependent 

largely on the roles of key individuals 

who were extraordinarily dedicated to 

the objectives of the ADA. 

One of the key factors of the ADA’s success was, as President Bush said, the 

desire of members of Congress and representatives of the Bush administration, “on both 

sides of the political aisle,” to “put politics aside” and “do something decent, something 

right.”2

 This is seen most clearly in the negotiations between the Senate and the White 

House during the summer of 1989 and the member-to-member negotiations of 

Congressmen Steny Hoyer and Steve Bartlett (D-TX). Although working out the details 

was frequently intense, most Washington political leaders supported the basic goals of the 

ADA and wanted to see people with disabilities enter the mainstream of American life. 

This cooperation was critical. Voting on the ADA “would have come out as deep partisan 

splits,” said Chai Feldblum, “if people had not committed to engage in a negotiation 

process and if the negotiation process did not have effective people in them.”3

 

Another crucial factor that helps explain the ADA’s positive reception in 

Congress was the extent to which the ADA drew on ideological justifications from 

both the left and the right. Historically, the disability community has had a powerful 

Democratic contingency because of its insistence on governmental support and its 

identity as a disadvantaged class. But the ADA entered Congress at the behest of a 

Republican federal agency: the National Council on the Handicapped (NCD). NCD’s 

work in reviewing federal disability programs, identifying problems, and making 

legislative proposals, among them passage of equal opportunity laws, rooted the ADA 

in principles of independence, personal choice, and fiscal responsibility. By 

presenting the ADA as a way to reduce dependence on government, the NCD helped 

win over people who might otherwise be reluctant to extend civil rights protections. 
154 EPILOGUE

There was a certain 

inherent righteousness to the 

ADA. How could one argue with 

the desire of people who wanted 

simply to become part of the 

American mainstream and to share 

in the fruits of society that others 

took for granted? “What’s wrong 

with a person trying to work 

instead of securing welfare?” 

asked Wright.4

 People involved in 

the ADA’s passage recognized 

that the cause was just. “I’m 

convinced that maybe more than 

anything else I ever worked on,” 

said Ralph Neas, “people were motivated primarily by what they perceived as the 

right thing to do.” There was comparatively little negative fallout for advocating the 

ADA: “you could do the right thing without really getting anybody that upset.”5

 

Some people question whether pity played a role in the ADA’s passage. 

Congressman Coelho appropriately said the issue is irrelevant. “If what you want to 

do is really right,” he said, “get the votes and worry about those other things later.”6

 

Voting on the ADA “would have come 

out as deep partisan splits if people 

had not committed to engage in a 

negotiation process.” 

 —Chai Feldblum 

“I’m convinced that maybe more than 

anything else I ever worked on, people 

were motivated primarily by what they 

perceived as the right thing to do.” 

 —Ralph Neas 

One factor that helped secure the necessary votes was that the deliberations 

over the ADA were, for the most part, kept out of the “gutter.” Although ADA 

advocates wanted to educate the public about the ADA, especially administration 

officials and members of Congress, they worked to control the level of press coverage. 

People such as Congressman Coelho and Pat Wright feared that the press might distort 

the ADA. As Rochelle Dornatt of Coelho’s staff explained: “it would be too easy to 

lose control over the spin of what this bill was supposed to be, which was a bill to help 

people realize their potential and incorporate them and assimilate them into . . . 

American society, as opposed to boiling it down to its dollar figures.”7

 Coelho 

repeatedly told those around him, “I don’t want fanfare, I don’t want a lot of 

publicity.” Rather, the goal was to work toward agreement with members of Congress 

and the Bush administration quietly and efficiently.8

 Wright described it as “a press 

blackout.”9

 While this helped the ADA make it through Congress, Denise Figueroa 

noted that it had the side effect of 

limiting the general public’s knowledge 

of the ADA, which complicates the 

implementation process. Nevertheless, 

“in retrospect, I would do it again,” says 

Wright, “because the final bill simply 

would not have looked the same if we 

had carried the debate into the press.”10

“The final bill simply would not 

have looked the same if we had 

carried the debate into the press.” 

—Pat Wright 

Although this historical account closes with the signing of the ADA into 

public law, the history of the ADA does not end on July 26, 1990. It continues 

through the important process of regulation-writing and implementation. In stark 
 EPILOGUE 155 

contrast to the regulatory delay regarding Section 504, the Department of Justice and 

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission moved with striking speed to issue 

their regulations within a year of the ADA’s signing. On July 26, 1991, Attorney 

General Thornburgh signed the regulations at a ceremony reminiscent of President 

Bush’s signing a year before. 

In the years since the ADA’s passage, the act has proved remarkably durable. 

This is a tribute to the deliberative process that refined the ADA. Many critics have 

claimed that the ADA was passed as motherhood and apple pie and without serious 

consideration. But the Senate and House records indicate that such assertions are 

false. Members, staff, disability advocates, officials from the Bush administration, 

and representatives of covered entities scrutinized every title, section, paragraph, line, 

and word of the ADA—countless times. The intense and detailed deliberations, 

especially those in the House, served an important function. Although businesses and 

other covered entities were not entirely satisfied with the outcome, the ability of the 

business and disability constituencies to work together toward scores of compromises 

helped make a bill that can achieve broad support, promote voluntary compliance, and 

avoid subsequent amendments. 

Truly, the process by which the ADA became public law stands as a model 

for the legislative process and for cooperation between Congress and the White 

House. Neas observed that it is an example others would do well to follow “in terms 

of bipartisanship, in terms of 

broad coalitions, in terms of 

strategies, and media efforts, 

and grassroots efforts, as well as 

the legislation lobbying 

effort.”11 The ADA did not 

solve every predicament facing 

people with disabilities. But it 

took giant steps forward, 

shattering the barriers of today 

and tomorrow, so that the future may be shared by all. “It is the world’s first 

declaration of equality for people with disabilities,” said Justin Dart. “It will proclaim 

to America and to the world that people with disabilities are fully human; that 

paternalistic, discriminatory, segregationist attitudes are no longer acceptable; and that 

henceforth people with disabilities must be accorded the same personal respect and 

the same social and economic opportunities as other people.”12

The ADA “will proclaim to America and 

to the world that people with disabilities 

are fully human; that paternalistic, 

discriminatory, segregationist attitudes 

are no longer acceptable.” 

—Justin Dart 

The dawn of a new day. 
BEYOND THE ADA: 

THE PAST IS PROLOGUE 

The Future for Americans with Disabilities 

ADA represents a significant accomplishment in the evolution of society’s views and 

treatment of people with disabilities. . . . Nonetheless, ADA is but one node in a 

continuum of progress, and it pales in relation to the extant overwhelming service and 

survival needs of people with disabilities. Ultimately, the full impact of ADA will be 

realized only after the majority of people with disabilities gain access to certain basic 

services like attendant care, readers, interpreters, transportation, housing assistance, 

affordable health care, and medical and vocational rehabilitation. Formless as liquid 

in a vacuum, the concept of equality has little meaning for people who struggle to 

survive without the resources necessary to meet fundamental human needs. 

Lex Frieden1

Looking to the Twenty-First Century 

The United States has long been a champion of civil rights. It is only natural that we 

are now in the forefront of efforts to ensure equal opportunity for persons with 

disabilities, as exemplified in the Americans with Disabilities Act. We have begun 

shifting disability policy in America from exclusion to inclusion; from dependence to 

independence; from paternalism to empowerment. 

But our work is far from finished. As we work to build an accessible bridge to the 

twenty-first century, we cannot be satisfied until all citizens with disabilities receive 

equal treatment under the law—whether in the workplace, in schools, in places of 

public accommodation, in government, or in the courts. Every American deserves a 

chance to participate in society. And our nation needs every individual’s contribution. 

For America will succeed in the next century only by pooling all our resources and 

capabilities. By working together we can ensure that every individual and our nation 

have the opportunity to succeed. 

President William Jefferson Clinton

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 

ABA American Bus Association 

ACB American Council of the Blind 

ACCD American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities 

ACLU American Civil Liberties Union 

ADA Americans with Disabilities Act 

ADAPT American Disabled for Accessible Public Transit (prior to 1990) 

American Disabled for Attendant Programs Today (since 1990) 

AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 

APTA American Public Transit Authority 

ARC Association for Retarded Citizens 

ATBCB Architectural Barriers and Compliance Board 

CCD (CCDD) Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (formerly the 

Consortium for Citizens with Developmental Disabilities) 

CDC Centers for Disease Control 

CORE Congress on Racial Equality 

DIA Disabled in Action 

DIMENET Disabled Individuals Movement for Equality Network 

DLRC Disability Law Resource Center 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DRC Disability Rights Center 

DREDF Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund 

DVA Disabled Veterans of America 

EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

EFA Epilepsy Foundation of America 

EPVA Eastern Paralyzed Veterans of America 

GSA General Services Administration 

HAC Hearing Aid Compatibility Act 

HEW Department of Health, Education and Welfare 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services 

HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 

ICD International Center for the Disabled 

INSPIRE Institute for Public Interest Representation 

LCCR Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 

NAD National Association of the Deaf 
 GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 159 

NADDC National Association of Developmental Disabilities Councils 

NAPAS National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems 

NCD (NCH) National Council on Disability (formerly National Council on the 

Handicapped) 

NCIL National Council on Independent Living 

NCLH National Center for Law and the Handicapped 

NESS National Easter Seal Society 

NFB National Federation of the Blind 

NFIB National Federation of Independent Business 

NIHR (NIDRR) National Institute of Handicapped Research (now National 

Institute for Disability and Rehabilitation Research) 

NMHA National Mental Health Association 

NORA National Organization Responding to AIDS 

NPRM Notice of Proposed Rule Making 

NRA National Restaurant Association 

OBRA Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act 

OCR Office of Civil Rights 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PCEH (PCEPD) President’s Committee on Employment of the Handicapped (now 

President’s Committee on Employment of People with 

Disabilities) 

PDSP Physically Disabled Student’s Program 

PILCOP Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia 

PVA Paralyzed Veterans of America 

RSA Rehabilitation Services Administration 

SHHH Self-Help for Hard of Hearing 

TAPT Tulsans for Accessible Public Transportation 

TDD Telecommunication Device for the Deaf 

TIRR The Institute for Rehabilitation Research 

UCPA United Cerebral Palsy Association 

UMTA Urban Mass Transportation Administration 

USPHS United States Public Health Service 
APPENDIX A 

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Only those interviews for which proper authorization was obtained have been listed 

here and used in writing this manuscript, though many others were held. Some 

individuals important in the history of the ADA were unavailable to participate in 

interviews. 

I. Personal Interviews: 

Bartlett, Steve March 10, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Batavia, Andrew November 7, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Bristo, Marca January 6, 1994, by Gerben DeJong and Ruth Brannon; 

February 20, 1997, by Jonathan Young; May 29, 1997, by 

Jonathan Young. 

Burgdorf, Robert February 19, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Carr, Charlie March 14, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Cherry, Jim November 13, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Coelho, Tony November 22, 1996 and December 2, 1996, by Jonathan 

Young. 

Cuprill, Maria April 28, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Dart, Justin August 18, 1993, by Gerben DeJong; January 31, 1997, by 

Jonathan Young. 

Decker, Curtis October 12, 1993, by Gerben DeJong and Karin Behe. 

Disler, Mark November 13, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Dornatt, Rochelle August 6, 1993, by Gerben DeJong; December 4, 1996, by 

Jonathan Young. 

Durenberger, Dave November 26, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Dusenbury, Joe February 25, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Feldblum, Chai January 13, 1997 and March 14, 1997, by Jonathan 

Young. 

Figueroa, Denise March 12, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Fiorito, Eunice May 30, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Frieden, Lex December 27, 1996 and December 28, 1996, by Jonathan 

Young. 

Fulco, Nancy Reed August 3, 1993, by Ruth Brannon and Karin Behe. 
 LIST OF INTERVIEWS 161 

Funk, Robert February 3, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Golden, Marilyn February 24, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Gray, C. Boyden October 23, 1996, by Jonathan Young and Gerben 

DeJong. 

Hearne, Paul July 23, 1993, by Ruth Brannon and Karin Behe. 

Johnson, Mark March 7, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Kailes, June March 14, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Kemp, Evan December 16, 1996 and February 3, 1997, by Jonathan 

Young. 

Lechner, Wendy November 4, 1993, by Gerben DeJong. 

Marchand, Paul October 26, 1993, by Gerben DeJong, Ruth Brannon, and 

Karin Behe. 

Marge, Michael December 27, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Mayerson, Arlene October 13, 1993, by Gerben DeJong and Karin Behe; 

October 28, 1993, by Gerben DeJong, Ruth Brannon, and 

Karin Behe. 

Milbank, Jeremiah November 1, 1993, by Ruth Brannon and Karin Behe. 

Muilenburg, Terry December 11, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Neas, Ralph December 10, 1993, by Gerben DeJong; January 21, 1994, 

by Gerben DeJong, Ruth Brannon, and Karin Behe. 

Osolinik, Carolyn June 1, 1994, by Gerben DeJong, Ruth Brannon, and 

Karin Behe; November 25, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

O’Day, Bonnie February 20, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Owens, Major April 29, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Reich, Alan February 18, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Roper, William December 2, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Rubenfeld, Phyllis May 23, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Savage, Liz July 30, 1993, by Ruth Brannon and Karin Behe; February 

26, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Schulman, Melissa July 9, 1993, by Gerben DeJong, Ruth Brannon, and Karin 

Behe; December 6, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Silverstein, Robert August 30, 1993, by Gerben DeJong and Karin Behe; 

October 31, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Slagle, Roger December 2, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Sykes, Roland March 5, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 
162 APPENDIX A 

Thornburgh, Richard October 22, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Thornburgh, Virginia February 18, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Treanor, Richard November 27, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Vierra, Roxanne 1993, by Ruth Brannon. 

Weisman, Jim November 16, 1993, by Gerben DeJong, Ruth Brannon, 

and Karin Behe. 

West, Maureen November 11, 1996, by Jonathan Young. 

Wright, Pat November 19, 1993, by Gerben DeJong, Ruth Brannon, 

and Karin Behe; February 7, 1997, by Jonathan Young. 

Yale, Ken September 20, 1993, by Gerben DeJong and Karin Behe. 

II. Correspondence Interviews: 

Bush, George Jonathan M. Young to President George Bush, February 3, 

1997; George Bush to Jonathan M. Young, February 26, 

1997. 

Hatch, Orrin G. Jonathan M. Young to The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch, 

February 19, 1997; Orrin G. Hatch to Jonathan M. Young, 

February 24, 1997. 

NOTES: 

Foreword, July 26, 1997 

1. Congressman Major Owens, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (July 12, 1990),

p. H4622. Views from Congress and the Bush Administration

Views From Congress and the White House 

1. Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., statement, Cong. Rec., v.134 (April 28, 

1988), p. S5107.

2. Congressman Tony Coelho, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 9, 1989), p. 7. 

3. Tom Harkin, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (July 13, 1990), p. S9689. 

4. Congressman Steny H. Hoyer, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (May 17, 

1990), pp. 2427 (first sentence), 2426 (second sentence). 

5. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, quoted in “ADA: A Special Issue,” Worklife 

3:3 (Fall, 1990), p. 19. 

6. Congressman Major Owens, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (July 12, 1990),

p. H4622. 

7. Senator Orrin G. Hatch, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 135 (September 7, 

1989), S10714 

8. Steve Bartlett, quoted in “ADA: A Special Issue,” p. 15. 

9. Senator Robert Dole, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (July 13, 1990), S9695 

10. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, quoted in “ADA: A Special 

Issue,” p. 24. 

11. President George Bush, quoted in ibid., p. 11.

1. Laying the Foundation: 

Disability Policy & Activism, 1968–1988 

1. Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877–1920 (New York: Hill and 

Wang, 1967). 

2. David J. Rothman, Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in 

the New Republic (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). 

3. Rosemarie Garland Thomson, ed., Freakery: Cultural Spectacles of the 

Extraordinary Body (New York: New York University Press, 1996.) 

4. Joseph Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil 

Rights Movement (New York: Times Books, 1993), pp. 30–31 

5. Carl N. Degler, In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of 

Darwinism in American Social Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 

6. Quoted in Timothy M. Cook, “The Americans with Disabilities Act: The 

Move to Integration,” Temple Law Review 64:2 (Summer 1991), p. 399. 

7. Gerben DeJong and Raymond Lifchez, “Physical Disability and Public 

Policy,” Scientific American 248:6 (June 1983), p. 43.
 NOTES 165 

8. Gary L. Albrecht, The Disability Business: Rehabilitation in America

(Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1992). 

9. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Rehabilitation Act of 

1973: Report, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., July 16, 1973, Report No. 93-391, reprinted in 

1973 USCCAN, pp. 2082–83. 

10. Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954–1992 (New York: 

Hill and Wang, 1993); Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black 

Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995). 

11. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Public Law 88-352, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 

H.R. 7152, July 2, 1964, § 201(a). 

12. Skip Kaltenheuser, “Hugh Gallagher: ADA’s Hidden Architect,” New 

Mobility (July-August 1995), p. 41.

13. Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Report, pp. 2077–78. 

14. Richard Nixon to the Senate of the United States, March 27, 1973, 

printed in ibid., pp. 2088–90. 

15. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Public Law 93-112, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 

September 26, 1973, § 504.

16. Richard K. Scotch, From Goodwill to Civil Rights: Transforming Federal 

Disability Policy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984), pp. 49–57. 

17. Ibid., p. 84. 

18. Ibid., p. 87. 

19. Quoted in Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, “Handicapped Plan 10-City 

Sit-In,” The Washington Post, March 26, 1977, p. E37. 

20. Nora Groce, The U.S. Role in International Disability Activities: A 

History and a Look Towards the Future (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 

Education, 1992), pp. 32–33. 

21. The following account of ACCD is based on: Eunice Fiorito, interview, 

May 30, 1997; Phyllis Rubenfeld, interview, May 23, 1997; and Frieden, telephone 

conversation with author, May 18, 1997. 

22. Rubenfeld, interview. 

23. Ibid. 

24. Anderson and Whitten, “Handicapped Plan 10-City Sit-In,” p. E37. 

25. Scotch, From Goodwill to Civil Rights, p. 111. 

26. The following account of the San Francisco protest relies heavily on 

Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights 

Movement (New York: Times Books, 1993), pp. 66–69. 

27. Rubenfeld, interview. 

28. Scotch, From Goodwill to Civil Rights, pp. 87–115. 

29. Ibid., p. 156. 

30. Federal Register 42:86 (May 4, 1977), p. 22676. 

31. Shapiro, No Pity, pp. 41–58. 

32. Ibid., pp. 53–54. 

33. The idea of a paradigm shift is developed more fully in Gerben DeJong, 

“Independent Living,” pp. 442–44. 

34. Robert Burgdorf, interview, February 19, 1997. 

35. Shapiro, No Pity, pp. 55–58.
166 NOTES

36. Arlene Mayerson, interview, October 13, 1993. 

37. Wright, interview, November 19, 1993; Wright, telephone conversation 

with author, April 30, 1997. 

38. Mayerson, interview, October 13, 1993. 

39. Evan Kemp, Jr., “Aiding the Disabled: No Pity, Please,” The New York 

Times, September 3, 1981. See also Robert Allen Bernstein, “Do-Good Pitythons,” 

The New York Times, September 6, 1983. 

40. Evan J. Kemp, Jr., “Welcome Side Effects of Helping the Disabled,” The 

New York Times, January 29, 1982. 

41. Mayerson, interview, October 13, 1993. 

42. Ralph Neas, interview, January 21, 1994. 

43. William C. Berman, America’s Right Turn: From Nixon to Bush

(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 118. 

44. Ibid., p. 88. 

45. Boyden Gray, interview, October 23, 1996. 

46. Evan J. Kemp Jr., “Stop ‘Caring for’ the Disabled,” The Washington 

Post, June 7, 1981. 

47. DeJong and Lifchez, “Physical Disability and Public Policy,” p. 40.

48. Rochelle L. Stanfield, “Reagan Courting Women, Minorities, But It May 

Be Too Late to Win Them,” National Journal, May 28, 1983, p. 1121. 

49. Charles R. Babcock, “Handicapped Policy Undergoing a Rewrite,” The 

Washington Post, March 4, 1982, p. A27.

50. Felicity Barringer, “How Handicapped Won Access Rule Fight,” The 

Washington Post, April 12, 1983, p. A8. 

51. Mayerson, interview, October 13, 1993. 

52. Barringer, “How Handicapped Won Access Rule Fight,” p. A8. 

53. Vice President George Bush to Mr. Evan Kemp, Jr., March 21, 1983, in 

possession of Evan Kemp. 

54. Mayerson, interview, October 13, 1993. 

55. Gray, interview, October 23, 1996. 

56. Ibid. 

57. Evan Kemp, interview, December 16, 1996. 

58. Neas, interview, January 21, 1994. 

59. Neas, interview, December 10, 1983. 

60. Mayerson, interview, October 13, 1993. 

61. Neas, interview, December, 10, 1993. 

62. School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Gene H. Arline, 107 S.Ct. 

1124 (1987). 

63. Arlene Mayerson, “The History of the ADA: A Movement Perspective,” 

in Implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act: Rights and Responsibilities of 

All Americans, ed., Lawrence O. Gostin and Henry A. Beyer (Baltimore: Paul H. 

Brookes Publishing Co., 1993), p. 21. 

64. Mayerson, “The History of the ADA,” p. 17. 

65. Roland Sykes, interview, March 5, 1997. 

66. Denise Figueroa, interview, March 12, 1997. 

67. Mark Johnson, interview, March 7, 1997.
 NOTES 167 

68. Charlie Carr, interview, March 14, 1997. 

69. Johnson, interview. 

70. Bowe, Coalition Building: A Report on a Feasibility Study to Develop a 

National Model for Cross-Disability Communication and Cooperation (Washington, 

D.C.: American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, 1978). 

71. Frank Bowe, Planning Effective Advocacy Programs (Washington, D.C.: 

American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, 1979). 

72. Rubenfeld, interview; Fiorito, interview. 

73. Marca Bristo, interview, May 29, 1997. 

74. Neas, interview, January 21, 1994. 

75. Neas, interview, December 10, 1993. 

76. Mayerson, “The History of the ADA,” p. 21. 

77. Johnson, interview, March 7, 1997. 

78. Mayerson, “The History of the ADA,” p. 17. 

2. Putting the ADA on the Legislative Agenda: 

The National Council on Disability 

1. Duane French, conversation with author, June 5, 1997, Renaissance Hotel, 

Washington, D.C. 

2. John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: 

Little, Brown, 1984), p. 93. 

3. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities 

Amendments of 1978, Public Law, 95-602, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., § 401(4). 

4. Minutes of the National Council on the Handicapped date from 1984 

onward. The only report available prior to 1984 is the 1983 report, National Policy 

for Persons with Disabilities. 

5. Joe Dusenbury, interview, March 3, 1997. 

6. Michael Marge, interview. December 27, 1997. 

7. National Council on the Handicapped, National Policy for Persons with 

Disabilities (August 1983). 

8. See, for example, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Civil Rights Issues of 

Handicapped Americans: Public Policy Implications (Washington, D.C.: [1980]), 

especially the state statutes printed as exhibits. 

9. Robert Burgdorf, interview, February 19, 1997. 

10. Dusenbury, interview. 

11. U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Senate Report 

No. 98-168, to accompany S. 1340, May 23, 1983, reprinted in 1984 USCCAN, p. 32. 

12. Lex Frieden, interview, December 28, 1997. 

13. Frieden, interview, December 27, 1997. 

14. Rehabilitation Amendments of 1984, Public Law 98-221, 98th Cong., 2nd 

sess., § 142(b). 

15. NCD Minutes, April 30–May 2, 1984, p. 6. 

16. Ibid.
168 NOTES

17. Frank Bowe made this argument in Rehabilitating America: Toward 

Independence for Disabled and Elderly People (New York: Harper & Row, 

Publishers, 1980). 

18. Evan J. Kemp, Jr., “Stop ‘Caring for’ the Disabled,” The Washington 

Post, June 7, 1981.

19. NCD Minutes, August 12–14, 1985, pp. 2–4.

20. Frieden, interview, December 27, 1997. 

21. NCD Minutes, April 30–May 2, 1984, p. 3. 

22. Sandra Parrino was not available to participate in an interview for this 

project. 

23. Burgdorf, for example, joined with Christopher G. Bell to author the 

comprehensive analysis of “reasonable accommodation” in disability rights policy for 

the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual 

Abilities. 

24. NCD Minutes, January 23–25, 1985, p. 6–7. 

25. NCD Minutes, April 29–May 1, 1985, p. 6. 

26. Ibid., p. 15. 

27. Primary responsibility for topic papers fell to the following authors: 

Research Specialist Robert Burgdorf and NCH Fellow Janet Anderson on Housing; 

Adult Services Specialist Ethel Briggs and Children’s Services Specialist Naomi Karp 

on Employment; Consultant Betty Defay on Disincentives to Work; Consultant 

Margaret Nosek on Attendant Services and on Independent Living; Executive 

Director Lex Frieden on Coordination; Research Specialist Robert Burgdorf on Equal 

Opportunity Laws; NCH Fellow Laura Rauscher on Transportation; NCD Member 

Michael Marge on Prevention; and Michael Marge and Naomi Karp on Children’s 

Education. 

28. NCD Minutes, August 12–14, 1985, p. 12. 

29. Ibid., pp. 19–20. 

30. National Council on the Handicapped, Toward Independence: An 

Assessment of Federal Laws and Programs Affecting Persons With Disabilities—With 

Legislative Recommendations (February 1, 1986), pp. ii–iii. 

31. Frieden, interview, December 28, 1997; Robert Burgdorf, interview, 

February 19, 1997. 

32. NCD Minutes, January 29–30, 1986, p. 2.

33. Frieden, telephone conversation with author, May 18, 1997. 

34. Toward Independence, p. 18. 

35. Quotation attributed to Sweet by Frieden. Frieden, interview, December 

28, 1997. 

36. Frieden, telephone conversation with author, May 18, 1997. 

37. Frieden, telephone conversation with author, March 26, 1997.

38. Frieden, interview, December 28, 1996. 

39. Rowland Sykes, interview, March 5, 1997. 

40. Bonnie O’Day, interview, February 20, 1997. 

41. International Center for the Disabled, The ICD Survey of Disabled 

Americans: Bringing Disabled Americans into the Mainstream (New York: Louis 

Harris and Associates, Inc., 1986).
 NOTES 169 

42. NCD Minutes, January 29–30, 1986, p. 3. 

43. National Council on the Handicapped, On the Threshold of 

Independence: Progress on Legislative Recommendations from Toward Independence 

(January 1988), p. 13. 

44. The Harris poll considered this support for government programs unique: 

“The strength of this endorsement for a federal program is unsurpassed since the 

Harris firm began measuring public support for federal programs and laws.” ICD 

Survey, p. 20. 

45. Frieden, interview, December 28, 1996. 

46. Quoted in NCD Minutes, July 30–August 1, 1988, p. 3. 

47. Marge, interview. 

48. Frieden, interview, December 27, 1996. 

49. Frieden, interview, December 28, 1996. 

50. Marca Bristo, telephone conversation with author, May 28, 1997. 

51. Burgdorf, interview. 

52. NCD Minutes, May 18–20, 1987, p. 21. 

53. Burgdorf, interview. 

54. NCD Minutes, August 3–5, 1988, p. 12. 

55. Terry Muilenburg, interview, December 11, 1996. 

56. Tony Coelho, interview, November 22, 1997. 

57. Burgdorf, interview. 

58. Ibid. 

59. Senator Lowell Weicker, statement, Cong. Rec., vol. 134 (April 28, 

1988), p. S5107, S5109–10. 

3. Publicizing the ADA: 

Advocacy and the Government Response 

1. Molly Sinclair, “Students Close Gallaudet U.; Protesters Demand a Deaf 

President,” The Washington Post, March 8, 1988, p. A1. 

2. Molly Sinclair and Eric Pianin, “Protest May Imperil Gallaudet Funding; 

Some Members of Congress Back Movement for Deaf President,” The Washington 

Post, March 9, 1988, p. A1. 

3. Carlos Sanchez, “Gallaudet Students: ‘We Want Ours’; College Protesters 

Peaceful, Passionate,” The Washington Post, March 8, 1988, p. A12. 

4. Jack R. Gannon, The Week the World Heard Gallaudet (Washington, D.C.: 

Gallaudet University Press, 1989), p. 15. 

5. Liz Savage, interview, July 30, 1993. 

6. Jim Weisman, interview, November 16, 1993. 

7. Joseph Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil 

Rights Movement (New York: Times Books, 1993), p. 114. 

8. Weisman, interview. 

9. Curtis Decker, interview, October 12, 1993. 

10. Ralph Neas, interview, December 10, 1993. 

11. Paul Hearne to Billie Jean Keith, May 9, 1997, in possession of author; 

Hearne, telephone conversation with author, May 14, 1997.
170 NOTES

12. National Council on the Handicapped, Toward Independence: An 

Assessment of Federal Laws and Programs Affecting Persons With Disabilities—With 

Legislative Recommendations (February 1986); National Council on the Handicapped, 

The ICD Survey of Disabled Americans: Bringing Disabled Americans Into the 

Mainstream (New York: Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., 1986). 

13. Pat Wright, interview, November 19, 1993. 

14. Maria Cuprill, interview, April 28, 1997. 

15. Denise Figueroa, conversation with author, June 5, 1997, Renaissance 

Hotel, Washington, D.C. 

16. Discrimination diaries are currently stored at the President’s Committee 

on Employment of People with Disabilities. 

17. The discrimination diaries are currently stored at the President’s 

Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities. These quotations are taken 

from selections printed in Appendix E. 

18. From ADA to Empowerment: The Report of the Task Force on the Rights 

and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities (October 12, 1990), p. 14.

19. Denise Figueroa, interview, March 12, 1997. 

20. Tony Coelho, interview, November 22, 1996. 

21. Evan J. Kemp, Jr., “Before the Employers’ Banquet of The President’s 

Committee on Employment of the Handicapped,” May 5, 1988, in possession of Evan 

Kemp. 

22. Thomas M. Boyd to Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, [1988], in 

possession of Chai Feldblum. 

23. Louis Harris, “Disabled, 10 percent in Electorate, Could be Pivotal in 

November,” Press Release, June 30, 1988, National Rehabilitation Hospital Research 

Center Library. 

24. Quoted in Evan J. Kemp, Jr., “Where Was George?” Mainstream 13:5 

(September 1988), pp. 13–14. 

25. Paul Hearne to Billie Jean Keith, May 9, 1997, in possession of author; 

Hearne, telephone conversation with author, May 14, 1997. 

26. Quoted in Mark Johnson, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 16, 1989), 

pp. 145–46. 

27. Timothy Cook, “Why Disabled People Should Vote for Mike Dukakis,” 

Mainstream 13:5 (September 1988), pp. 17–19. 

28. Wright, interview, November 19, 1993. 

29. Rochelle Dornatt, interview, December 4, 1996. 

30. Senator Tom Harkin, statement, Senate Committee on Labor and Human 

Resources and House Committee on Education and Labor, Joint Hearing Before the 

Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 

United States Senate, and the Subcommittee on Select Education of the Committee on 

Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., September 

27, 1988, S. Hrg. 100-296, Serial No. 104, reprinted in Leg. Hist., vol. 2, p. 1019. 

31. Senator Lowell Weicker, statement, ibid., p. 930. 

32. Mary Linden, statement, ibid., pp. 986–87.

33. Jade Calegory, statement, ibid., pp. 992–93. 

34. Sylvia Piper, statement, ibid., pp. 995–97.
 NOTES 171 

35. Judith Heumann, statement, ibid., pp. 1002–03. 

36. Belinda Mason, statement, ibid., pp. 1004–06.

37. Major Owens, interview, April 29, 1997. 

38. William Cavanaugh, statement, House Committee on Education and 

Labor, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the Committee on 

Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., October 24, 

1988, Serial No. 100-109, reprinted in Leg. Hist., vol. 2, p. 1067. 

39. Bonnie O’Day, statement, ibid., p. 1076. 

40. Nancy Husted-Jensen, statement, ibid., p. 1220. 

41. Eileen Healy Horndt, statement, ibid., p. 1117–18. 

42. Barbara Waters, statement, ibid., p. 1162. 

43. Patricia Deegan, statement, ibid., p. 1251. 

44. Michael Oestreicher, statement, ibid., p. 1129. 

45. Cynthia L. Miller, statement, ibid., pp. 1200–02 

46. Denise Karuth, statement, ibid., pp. 1225–26. 

47. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, statement, Joint Hearing (September 27, 

1988), p. 945. 

4. Creating a Workable ADA: 

The Senate and the White House 

1. Louis Genevie, Voting Intentions During the 1988 Election: A Comparison 

of Disabled and Non-disabled Voters (New York: Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., 

[no date]). 

2. Quoted by Senator Tom Harkin, statement, Senate Hrgs. (June 22, 1989), 

p. 193. 

3. Carolyn Osolinik, interview, November 25, 1996. 

4. Quotation attributed to Senator Harkin by Robert Silverstein. Robert 

Silverstein, interview, August 30, 1993. 

5. The following discussion on Congressional strategy development is based 

on Robert Silverstein, interviews, August 30, 1993 and October 31, 1996; Carolyn 

Osolinik, interview, November 25, 1996; and Chai Feldblum, interview, January 13, 

1997. 

6. Osolinik, interview, November 25, 1996. 

7. Pat Wright, telephone conversation with author, April 30, 1997.

8. ADA of 1988, § 3(1). 

9. Ibid., § 3(2). 

10. ADA of 1989, § 3(2). 

11. Silverstein, interview, October 31, 1996. 

12. Arlene Mayerson, interview, October 13, 1993. 

13. ADA of 1989, § 202(b)(1).

14. ADA of 1988, § 7(a)(1). 

15. Robert Burgdorf, interview, February 19, 1997. 

16. ADA of 1989, § 202(b)(1).

17. Ibid., § 303(b)(1), § 303(e). 

18. ADA of 1989 (October 16, 1989), § 301(5)(A).
172 NOTES

19. ADA of 1988, § 9(a)(2). 

20. Osolinik, interview, November 25, 1996. 

21. Bonnie O’Day, telephone conversation with author, May 2, 1997. 

22. “S. [no number], To Establish a Clear and Comprehensive Prohibition of 

Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap,” in possession of Mark Disler. 

23. Dave Durenberger, interview, October 26, 1996. 

24. Senator Robert Dole, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 135 (April 14, 1969), 

p. 8816–17. 

25. Maureen West, interview, November 11, 1996. 

26. Committee Democrats were Brock Adams, Tom Harkin, Christopher J. 

Dodd, Spark Matsunaga, Howard M. Metzenbaum, Barbara A. Mikulski, Claiborne 

Pell, and Paul Simon. Committee Republicans were Dan Coats, Thad Cochran, Dave 

Durenberger, Orrin G. Hatch, James Jeffords, Nancy Landon Kassebaum, and Strom 

Thurmond. 

27. Senator Orrin Hatch, statement, Senate Hearings (May 9, 1989), p. 2.

28. Osolinik, interview, November 25, 1996. 

29. Ruth Marcus, “Thornburgh Endorses Civil Rights Protection for the 

Disabled,” The Washington Post,” June 23, 1989, p. A8. 

30. Congressman Tony Coelho, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 9, 1989), p. 6. 

31. Rochelle Dornatt, interview, December 4, 1996. 

32. Congressman Tony Coelho, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 9, 1989), 

pp. 6–7. 

33. Congressman Tony Coelho, statement, ibid., p. 6. 

34. Senator Orrin Hatch, statement, ibid., p. 8. 

35. I. King Jordan, statement, ibid., p. 13. 

36. Justin Dart, statement, ibid., p. 20. 

37. Mary DeSapid, statement, ibid., p. 25. 

38. Amy Dimsdale, statement, ibid., p. 29.

39. Lisa Carl, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 10, 1989), p. 65. 

40. Amy Dimsdale, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 9, 1989), p. 29. 

41. I. King Jordan, statement, ibid., p. 13. 

42. Justin Dart, statement, ibid., p. 18. 

43. Senator Tom Harkin, statement, Senate Hrgs. (June 22, 1989), p. 232–33 

44. Arlene Mayerson, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 9, 1989), p. 40. 

45. Senator Tom Harkin, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 10, 1989), p. 93. 

46. Michael McIntyre, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 16, 1989), p. 138–39. 

47. Neil Hartigan, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 10, 1989), p. 79, 81 

48. Zachary Fasman, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 9, 1989), p. 34–35. 

49. Sally Douglas, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 10, 1989), p. 94. 

50. Lawrence Lorber, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 9, 1989), p. 35, 37. 

51. William Ball, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 10, 1989), p. 73–74. 

52. Charles Webb, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 16, 1989), pp. 172–73; 

Senator Tom Harkin, Senate Hrgs. (May 16, 1989), pp. 172–73. 

53. Senator Robert Dole, statement, May 10, 1989, Senate Hearings, p. 87, 

89.
 NOTES 173 

54. Bonnie O’Day, interview, February 20, 1997; Marca Bristo, interview, 

January 6, 1994. 

55. Senator Orrin Hatch, statement, Senate Hrgs. (May 16, 1989), p. 132–33. 

56. Quoted in Owen Ullmann, “Soul Brothers,” The Washingtonian, May 

1992, p. 78.

57. Boyden Gray, interview, October 24, 1996. 

58. William Roper, interview, December 2, 1996. 

59. Evan Kemp, telephone conversation with author, May 21, 1997. 

60. Robert Funk, interview, February 3, 1997. 

61. Richard Thornburgh, interview, October 22, 1996. 

62. Richard Thornburgh, statement, Senate Hrgs. (June 22, 1989), p. 195,

201. 

63. Marcus, “Thornburgh Endorses Civil Rights Protection for the Disabled,” 

p. A8. 

64. The following discussion of negotiations between the White House and 

Senate is based on: Osolinik, interviews; William Roper interview, December 2, 1996; 

Silverstein, interviews; Thornburgh, interview; and West, interview. 

65. Wright, telephone conversation with the author, April 30, 1997.

66. Mary McGrory, “For the Disabled, A Capital Day,” The Washington 

Post, May 27, 1990, p. B1. 

67. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, statement, Cong. Rec., vol. 135 (September 

7, 1989), p. S10714. 

68. Silverstein, telephone conversation with author, May 15, 1997. 

69. Neas, telephone conversation with author, June 3, 1997. 

70. For example, Senator Rudy Boschwitz, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 135 

(September 7, 1989), p. S10751. 

71. Senator Gordon Humphrey, statement, ibid., p. S10782.

72. Senator Jesse Helms, statement, ibid., p. S10774. 

73. Senator Orrin Hatch, statement, ibid., p. S10740. 

74. Senator Lloyd Bentsen, statement, ibid., p. S10738. 

75. Senate: 48 of 92 (52.2%) voted yes. Democrats: 32 of 50 (64.0%) voted 

no. Republicans: 30 of 42 (71.4%) voted yes. 8 Senators did not vote. 

76. Chris Lord, telephone conversation with author, April 25, 1997. 

77. Senator William L. Armstrong, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 135 (September 

7, 1989), p. S10753. 

78. Senator Jesse Helms, statement, ibid., p. S10772. 

79. Senate: 76 of 84 (90.5%) voted yes. Democrats: 44 of 44 (100%) voted 

yes. Republicans: 32 of 40 (80%) voted yes. 16 Senators did not vote. 

80. Tony Coelho, interview, November 22, 1996. 

5. Fashioning a Durable ADA: 

The House of Representatives 

1. 210 voting members of the House were cosponsors. Seven non-voting 

members also cosponsored the bill. 

2. Rochelle Dornatt, interview, December 4, 1996.
174 NOTES

3. Dornatt, interview, December 4, 1996. 

4. Tony Coelho, interview, December 2, 1996. 

5. Coelho, interview, December 2, 1996.

6. Steve Bartlett, interview, March 10, 1997. 

7. Robert H. Michel, William F. Goodling, and Steve Bartlett to Honorable 

Tony Coelho, April 25, 1989, in possession of Chai Feldblum. 

8. Robert Michel to George Bush, April 26, 1989, in possession of Feldblum. 

9. Coelho, interview, December 2, 1996.

10. Ralph Neas, interview, December 10, 1993. 

11. Dornatt, interview, December 4, 1996. 

12. Tony Coelho, Major Owens, Silvio Conte, and Hamilton Fish to 

Members of the House of Representatives, June 1, 1989, in possession of Feldblum. 

13. Dornatt, interview, December 4, 1996. 

14. Melissa Schulman, interview, December 6, 1996. 

15. Dornatt, interview, December 4, 1996. 

16. Neas, interview, January 21, 1994. 

17. Arlene Mayerson, interview, October 13, 1993. 

18. Neas, interview, December 10, 1993. 

19. Schulman, interview, December 6, 1996. 

20. Schulman, interview, July 9, 1993. 

21. Ibid. 

22. Mayerson, interview, October 13, 1993. 

23. Mayerson, interview, October 28, 1993. 

24. Paul Marchand, interview, October 26, 1993. 

25. Dick Thornburgh to the Editor of The New York Times, September 19, 

1989, in possession of Virginia Thornburgh. See also Thornburgh, “Toward 

Independence for the Disabled,” Wall Street Journal, October 3, 1989, p. A13, in 

which Thornburgh similarly criticizes the Journal for misrepresenting the ADA. 

26. Richard Thornburgh, statement, Hearings Before the Committee on the 

Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee 

on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., (October 12, 

1989), Serial No. 58, in Leg. Hist., pp. 2014, 2020. 

27. Schulman, interview, July 9, 1993. 

28. Neas, interview, January 21, 1994. 

29. For example, Elizabeth Boggs, Co-chair of the Task Force on the Rights 

and Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, stated: “In a remarkable 

demonstration of bipartisan support for the bill, dozens of potentially weakening 

amendments were rejected in committee or on the floor by Congressmen who became 

folk heroes in the disability rights movement.” From ADA to Empowerment: The 

Report of the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities

(October 12, 1990), p. 13. 

30. Senate: 91 of 97 (93.8%) voted yes. Senate Democrats: 54 of 54 (100%) 

voted yes. Senate Republicans: 37 of 43 (86.0%) voted yes. 3 Senators did not vote. 

House: 377 of 405 (93.1%) voted yes. House Democrats: 233 of 238 (97.9%) voted 

yes. House Republicans: 144 of 167 (86.2%) voted yes. 27 Congressmen did not vote. 

31. Jim Weisman, interview, November 16, 1993.
 NOTES 175 

32. Senate: 48 of 92 (52.2%) voted yes. Republicans: 30 of 42 (71.4%) voted 

yes. Democrats: 32 of 50 (64.0%) voted no. Eight Senators did not vote. 

33. Democrats: 93 of 110 (84.5%) were cosponsors. Republicans: 7 of 67 

(10.4%) were cosponsors. This includes members on the Rules Committee. These 

results are tabulated according to total number of seats on the committees, not 

according to the actual number of members. Representatives sitting on more than one 

of these committees are thus counted twice. 

34. Schulman, interview, July 9, 1993. 

35. Wendy Lechner, interview, November 4, 1993. 

36. Ibid. 

37. Dan Burton to “Colleague,” October 4, 1989, in possession of Feldblum. 

38. Ron Marlenee, “Americans with Disabilities Act: Washington’s Latest 

Way to Crush Businesses, Schools, While Hurting the Disabled,” to Postal Patron, 

2nd Congressional District, Montana, in possession of Feldblum. 

39. Chuck Douglas, “Berserkers: Time Bombs in the Workplace: How Can 

We Protect Ourselves From an Apparently Growing Menace?” to Colleague, March 

16, 1990, in possession of Feldblum. 

40. Liz Savage, interview, February 26, 1997. 

41. Kathleen Kleinmann, conversation with author, June 5, 1997, 

Renaissance Hotel, Washington, D.C. 

42. Marca Bristo, interview, February 20, 1997. 

43. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, “A Message From Jim Brady - 

Calling on America,” [no date], in possession of Feldblum. 

44. Alma E. Hill and Sandra McIntosh, “Handicapped Demonstrators Block 

Building: Dozens of Disabled Protest Poor Transportation Access,” Atlanta JournalConstitution, September 25, 1989, p. A8. 

45. Pat Burson and Alma E. Hill, “Bush Order Lets Disabled Resume 

Courthouse Sit-In: Protesters Demanding Access to U.S.-Funded Transit Systems,” 

Atlanta Journal-Constitution, September 26, 1989, p. A1. 

46. Marca Bristo, conversation with author, June 5, 1997, Renaissance Hotel, 

Washington, D.C.; Evan Kemp, interview, December 16, 1996. 

47. Burson and Hill, “Bush Order,” p. A1. 

48. Richard Bryant Treanor, We Overcame: The Story of Civil Rights for 

Disabled People (Falls Church, Virginia: Regal Direct Publishing, 1993), p. 117. 

Much of the following description of the week’s events are based on Treanor, 

pp. 117–22. 

49. Quoted in Treanor, We Overcame, pp. 118–19. 

50. Quoted in ibid., p. 119. 

51. Steven A. Holmes, “Disabled Protest and are Arrested,” The New York 

Times, March 14, 1990, p. B7. 

52. Kenneth Jernigan, “Reflections on the Americans with Disabilities Act,” 

[date: “early 1990”], in possession of author. 

53. Ibid. 

54. Ibid. 

55. ADA of 1990, § 302(b)(1)(C). 

56. Neas, interview, January 21, 1994.
176 NOTES

57. Roger Slagle, interview, December 2, 1996. 

58. Quotation attributed to Steve Bartlett by Lex Frieden. Lex Frieden, 

interview, December 28, 1996. 

59. Major Owens, interview, April 29, 1997. 

60. Feldblum, interview, March 14, 1997. 

61. Schulman, interview, December 6, 1997. 

62. Schulman, interview, December 6, 1997. 

63. Bartlett, interview. 

64. Maria Cuprill, telephone conversation with author, May 15, 1997. 

65. Two more amendments were proposed but withdrawn. 

66. Five amendments received roll call votes. Two fell strictly along party 

lines. On one amendment, one member from each party switched sides. In the 

remaining two votes Republicans accounted for all but one “aye” vote, and some 

Republicans voted no. 

67. Neas, interview, January 21, 1994. 

68. Karen Peltz-Strauss, telephone conversation with author, June 5, 1997. 

69. Congressman Bob Whittaker, 136 Cong. Rec. (May 17, 1990), p. H2433. 

70. Karen Peltz-Strauss, telephone conversation with author, June 5, 1997. 

71. American Psychological Association, “Comments on Energy and 

Commerce Committee ADA Staff Discussion Draft,” [no date], in possession of 

Feldblum. 

72. Bill Dannemeyer, Joe Barton, Don Ritter, “Dissenting Views on the 

Americans with Disabilities Act,” in Committee on Energy and Commerce of the U.S. 

House of Representatives, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Report Together 

with Dissenting Views, reprinted in Legislative History of Public Law 101-336, 

p. 615–17. 

73. Quotation attributed to Glenn Anderson by Roger Slagle. Slagle, 

interview. 

74. Ibid. 

75. Ibid. 

76. Coelho, interview, November 22, 1996. 

77. Congressman Bud Shuster, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (May 17, 1990), 

p. H2436. As transcribed for the Cong. Rec., Shuster’s statement reads that he 

“skimmed” his knuckles. This appears to be a transcription error, and has been 

corrected silently in the text to read “skinned.” This is consistent with another 

reference to this experience where Shuster says he “banged up my knuckles.” 

Congressman Bud Shuster, statement, Committee on Public Works and 

Transportation, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the 

Committee on Public Works and Transportation, House of Representatives, 101st 

Cong., 1st sess., Serial No. 101-32, (September 20, 1989), reprinted in Leg. Hist., 

p. 2561. 

78. Weisman, interview. 

79. Richard Thornburgh to Hamilton Fish, March 12, 1990, printed in Cong. 

Rec., vol. 136 (May 22, 1990), p. H2613.
 NOTES 177 

80. House Committee on the Judiciary, Americans with Disabilities Act of 

1990: Report together with Additional and Dissenting Views, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 

Rept. 101-485, Pt. 3, May 15, 1990, reprinted in Leg. Hist., p. 488. 

81. “Additional Views of Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Hon. Bill 

McCollum, Hon. George W. Gekas, Hon. William E. Dannemeyer, Hon. Lamar S. 

Smith, and Hon. Craig T. James,” in ibid., pp. 528–31. 

82. Feldblum, interview, March 14, 1997. 

83. Congressman Robert S. Walker, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (May 17, 

1990), p. H2412. 

84. Congressman Bill McCollum, statement, ibid., p. H2414. 

85. Congresswoman Lynn Martin, statement, ibid., p. H2411. 

86. Congressman Newt Gingrich, statement, ibid., p. H2422. 

87. Motion to vote on resolution. House: 251 of 413 (60.8%) voted yes. 

Democrats: 245 of 248 (98.8%) voted yes. Republicans: 159 of 165 (96.4%) voted 

no. 19 members did not vote. Resolution to adopt rule. House: 236 of 409 (57.7%) 

voted yes. Democrats: 222 of 242 (91.7%) voted yes. Republicans: 153 of 167 

(91.6%) voted no. 23 members did not vote. 

88. Congressman Steny Hoyer, statement, Cong. Rec., v.136 (May 17, 1990), 

p. H2426. 

89. Congressman Major Owens, statement, ibid., p. H2431. 

90. Congressman Steny Hoyer, statement, ibid., p. H2426. 

91. Congressman Bill McCollum, statement, ibid., p. H2442. 

92. House: 401 (100%) voted yes. Democrats: 249 (100%) voted yes. 

Republicans: 152 (100%) voted yes. 31 members did not vote. 

93. Congressman Bill McCollum, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (May 17, 

1990), p. 2475. 

94. Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder, statement, ibid., p. H2473. 

95. Congressman Steve Bartlett, statement, ibid., p. H2472. 

96. Congressman Jim Olin, statement, ibid., p. H2473. 

97. House: 213 of 400 (53.3%) voted no. Democrats: 71 of 243 (70.8%) 

voted no. Republicans: 116 of 157 (73.9%) voted yes. 32 members did not vote. 

98. Curtis Decker, interview, October 12, 1993. 

99. Congressman Jim Chapman, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (May 17,

1990), p. H2478. 

100. Congressman Chuck Douglas, statement, ibid., p. H2481. 

101. Congressman Ted Weiss, statement, ibid., p. H2482. 

102. Congressman Jim McDermott, statement, ibid., p. H2480. 

103. Congressman Don Edwards, statement, ibid., p. H2480. 

104. Congressman Steny Hoyer, statement, ibid., p. H2482. 

105. Congressman Hamilton Fish, statement, ibid., p. H2483. 

106. House: 199 of 386 (51.6%) voted yes. Democrats: 157 of 236 (66.5%) 

voted no. Republicans: 120 of 150 (80.0%) voted yes. 46 members did not vote. 

107. House: 290 of 400 (72.5%) voted no. Democrats: 213 of 237 (89.9%) 

voted no. Republicans: 86 of 163 (52.8%) voted yes. 32 members did not vote. 

108. Congressman Norman Mineta, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (May 22, 

1990), p. H2609.
178 NOTES

109. House: 266 of 414 (64.3%) voted no. Democrats: 212 of 246 (86.2%) 

voted no. Republicans: 114 of 168 (67.9%) voted yes. 18 members did not vote. 

110. Congressman Steve Bartlett, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (May 22, 

1990), p. H2616. 

111. Congressman Dan Glickman, statement, ibid., p. H2616. 

112. Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder, statement, ibid., p. H2615. 

113. Congressman Bruce A. Morrison, statement, ibid., p. H2618. 

114. House: 227 of 419 (54.2%) voted no. Democrats: 203 of 251 (80.9%) 

voted no. Republicans: 144 of 168 (85.7%) voted yes. 13 members did not vote. 

115. House: 280 of 423 (66.2%) voted no. Democrats: 243 of 253 (96.0%) 

voted no. Republicans: 133 of 179 (78.2%) voted yes. 9 members did not vote. 

116. House: 403 of 423 (95.3%) voted yes. Democrats: 250 of 253 (98.8%) 

voted yes. Republicans: 153 of 170 (90.0%) voted yes. 17 of 20 (85%) “no” votes 

were Republicans. 9 members did not vote. 

6. Enshrining the ADA: 

House-Senate Conference and the Signing 

1. Paul Marchand, interview, October 26, 1993. 

2. From the Committee on Education and Labor: Augustus F. Hawkins, 

Major R. Owens, Matthew G. Martinez, Steve Bartlett, and Harris W. Fawell. From 

the Committee on Energy and Commerce: John D. Dingell, Edward J. Markey, 

Thomas A. Luken, Norman F. Lent, and Bob Whittaker (for telecommunications 

issues, Matthew J. Rinaldo replaced Whittaker). For the Committee on Public Works 

and Transportation: Glenn M. Anderson, Robert A. Roe, Norman Y. Mineta, John 

Paul Hammerschmidt, Bud Shuster. From the Committee on the Judiciary: Jack 

Brooks, Don Edwards, Robert W. Kastenmeir, Hamilton Fish, Jr., F. James 

Sensenbrenner, Jr. Additional conferees: Steny H. Hoyer, and Jim Chapman (for 

discussion relating to his amendment). 

3. Senator Jesse Helms, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (June 6, 1990), 

p. S7436–37. 

4. Senator Tom Harkin, statement, ibid., p. S7437–39. 

5. Senate: 53 of 93 (57.0%) voted no. Democrats: 33 of 40 (64.7%) voted 

yes. Republicans: 35 of 42 (83.3%) voted no. 

6. Senate conferees: Edward M. Kennedy, Tom Harkin, Howard M. 

Metzenbaum, Paul Simon, Orrin G. Hatch, Dave Durenberger, James M. Jeffords. 

The following served as additional conferees for issues under the jurisdiction of the 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: Ernest F. Hollings, Daniel K. 

Inouye, and John C. Danforth. 

7. Robert Silverstein, interview, August 30, 1993. 

8. On May 24, amidst a discussion of planning a signing ceremony, Virginia 

Thornburgh reported to White House staff that sponsors hoped to have the act to the 

President before the Fourth of July. Ginny Thornburgh to The Honorable Sig Rogich, 

May 24, 1990, in possession of Virginia Thornburgh. 

9. Melissa Schulman to Jonathan M. Young, May 13, 1997, in possession of 

author.
 NOTES 179 

10. Wright, telephone conversation with author, April 30, 1997; Tim 

McFeely, telephone conversation with author, May 2, 1997. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Robert Burgdorf to Bob Tate, June 20, 1989, in possession of Chai 

Feldblum. 

14. See, for example, Mark Gorman to the Senate, May 23, 1990, printed in 

136 Cong. Rec. (June 6, 1990), p. S7437; Gorman to the Senate, June 26, 1990, ibid., 

p. S9537; and Gorman to the Senate, July 11, 1990, ibid., p. S9536. 

15. Orrin G. Hatch to Jonathan M. Young, February 24, 1997, in possession 

of author. 

16. Orrin G. Hatch to Robert Silverstein, July 20, 1990, in possession of 

Robert Silverstein. 

17. Wright, telephone conversation with author, April 30, 1997 

18. Ibid. 

19. Chai Feldblum, interview, March 14, 1997. 

20. Senator Orrin Hatch, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (July 11, 1990), 

p. S9533. 

21. Senator Dave Durenberger, statement, ibid., p. S9534. 

22. Senator Jesse Helms, statement, ibid., p. S9535. 

23. Senate: 61 of 100 (61%) voted no. Democrats: 43 of 55 (78.2%) voted no. 

Republicans: 27 of 45 (60.0%) voted yes. 

24. House: 355 of 413 (86.0%) voted yes. Democrats: 243 of 245 (99.2%) 

voted yes. Republicans: 112 of 168 (66.7%) voted yes. 19 members did not vote. 

25. Congressman Steny Hoyer, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (July 12, 1990), 

p. H4615. 

26. House: 224 of 404 (55.4%) voted no. Democrats: 183 of 239 (76.6%) 

voted no. Republicans: 124 of 165 (75.2%) voted yes. 28 members did not vote. 

27. House: 377 of 405 (93.1%) voted yes. Democrats: 233 of 238 (97.9%) 

voted yes. Republicans: 144 of 167 (86.2%) voted yes. 27 members did not vote. 

28. Senator Tom Harkin, statement, Cong. Rec., v. 136 (July 13, 1990), 

p. S9684. 

29. Senator Tom Harkin, statement, ibid., p. S9689. 

30. Senator Orrin Hatch, statement, ibid., p. S9685. 

31. Ginny Thornburgh to The Honorable David F. Demarest, Jr., June 28, 

1990, in possession of Thornburgh. 

32. Ginny Thornburgh to The Honorable Sig Rogich, April 11, 1990, in 

possession of Thornburgh. By April 19, Thornburgh lowered her estimate to a 

proposal for 5,000 attendees. Ginny Thornburgh to The Honorable Sig Rogich, April 

19, 1990, in possession of Thornburgh. 

33. Much of the following narrative about the ADA signing ceremony is 

based on the account in “ADA: A Special Issue,” Worklife: A Publication on 

Employment and People with Disabilities3:3 (Fall 1990). 

34. Bobbie Kilberg to Ms. Thornburgh, July 18, 1990, in possession of 

Thornburgh.

35. Ginny Thornburgh, interview.
180 NOTES

36. Harold H. Wilke, “A Blessing: For the Presidential Signing of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act,” in possession of Thornburgh. 

37. President Bush quoted in “ADA: A Special Issue,” p. 8. 

38. President Bush quoted in ibid., pp. 9–11.

Epilogue 

1. Pat Wright, interview, February 7, 1997. 

2. George Bush to Jonathan M. Young, February 26, 1997, in possession of 

author.

3. Feldblum, interview, March 14, 1997. 

4. Wright, telephone conversation with author, April 30, 1997. 

5. Ralph Neas, interview, January 21, 1994. 

6. Tony Coelho, interview, December 2, 1996.

7. Rochelle Dornatt, interview, December 4, 1996. 

8. Coelho, interview, December 2, 1996. 

9. Wright, telephone conversation with author, April 30, 1997. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Neas, interview, January 21, 1994. 

12. Justin Dart, “ADA: Landmark Declaration of Equality,” Worklife 3:3 

(Fall 1990), p. 1.

Beyond the ADA: 

The Past Is Prologue 

1. Lex Frieden, quoted in “ADA: A Special Issue,” Worklife 3:3 (Fall 1990), 

p. 15.